1 Wednesday, 24 November 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I believe you said you had one

7 more matter to raise with the witness, or are you finished?

8 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I didn't get any interpretation of that.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I wanted to put another

11 question to this witness, and that will be my final question.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Are you getting interpretation now?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Please go ahead.

14 WITNESS: LEONID IVASOV [Resumed]

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

17 Q. [Interpretation] General Ivasov, yesterday we started discussing

18 the meeting which you attended together with Chernomyrdin, Atasari, and

19 the entire Russian delegation; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you remember that at the time, we were guaranteed a

22 sovereignty, territorial integrity, and then the issue discussed was the

23 arrival of the UN security forces which was to guarantee the security of

24 all citizens living in Kosovo?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you remember that, in view of the fact that our country was not

2 defeated in that war, we raised an issue with your entire delegation,

3 headed by Chernomyrdin, to the effect that we could not agree to these

4 forces being introduced pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which

5 specifies that the forces used?

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: It's all leading questioning.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And I don't think it's relevant. Move on

9 -- if that's the only question, then your examination-in-chief is at an

10 end.

11 Mr. Nice.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wish to put my question. I

13 need to put my question.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you must put it in a way which is not

15 leading and which makes it relevant.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is very relevant, very relevant

17 indeed.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Is it true, General Ivasov, is it true that Chernomyrdin, in his

20 capacity of envoy of President Yeltsin and as representative of Russia

21 guaranteed to us on behalf of Russia and President Yeltsin that their

22 resolution would not be passed pursuant to Chapter VII and that should

23 there be any attempts to pass it based on Chapter VII, Russia would veto

24 it?

25 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, that's an entirely leading question.

1 The time must arise --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is so.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Quite apart from its leading nature, I rule it to

4 be irrelevant. So that concludes the examination-in-chief, Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have ruled on it.

7 Mr. Nice, begin your cross-examination.

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

9 Q. General --

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Mr. Milosevic, you are not being heard.

12 Your examination-in-chief is at an end. Mr. Nice will begin his

13 cross-examination.

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. General Ivasov, you made a number of general, broad assertions

16 yesterday which may be interpreted as allegations against the United

17 States of America, NATO, I think even the United Kingdom. I want you to

18 understand that I have absolutely no interest in defending the United

19 States or NATO or the United Kingdom, and that if these allegations of

20 yours are relevant to this trial, and if they may be shown to be true,

21 it's far better that they emerge in this trial. Do you understand?

22 A. Yes, I understand.

23 Q. I want you to understand that it's no part of my function to

24 attack your evidence as unreliable or as untrue. It's my duty simply to

25 test it, and that is what I will do. Do you understand?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And so that there can be no mistake about this in light of many of

3 the questions asked of you by the accused, you, General Ivasov, coming, of

4 course, from what was for a long time a communist country, will understand

5 that the standards to be applied in testing your evidence will be the same

6 as the standards that will be applied in testing the evidence of an

7 ordinary Kosovo Albanian villager, and you would expect no different,

8 would you? You would expect no different, would you, General?

9 A. I protest against my country being accused of having lived in the

10 socialist period and your reproach or hint that I will fail to be

11 objective because of that. It's not acceptable.

12 Q. You observed yesterday --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment. I certainly didn't understand

14 that as a reproach. I understood that to be emphasising the principle of

15 communism that everyone was treated equally.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that the dispute between

17 capitalism and communism is not subject for discussion in this audience.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. You told us yesterday, General, that - at page 12 of the

20 transcript the way I have it paginated - that you relied on -- no. Let me

21 go right back to the beginning in case there are any people who didn't --

22 who currently is viewing the proceedings who didn't see it yesterday.

23 Your clear thesis is that the United States of America had and

24 pursued a preconceived plan to destroy the former Yugoslavia. Is this

25 correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, you told us yesterday, page 12, that you relied

3 on various types of information and analyses. Did you receive analyses in

4 completed form from subordinates and act on that, or did you conduct the

5 analysis of raw material yourself?

6 A. I conducted this analysis both myself, by obtaining vast

7 information, information which testified to the fact that starting from

8 1998, January of 1998 --

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... detail will come later. You

10 conducted the analysis yourself --

11 A. I conducted the analysis myself, and the analysis was also

12 conducted by rather strong departments of the Ministry of Defence, the

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Staff, and the special services,

14 and this conclusion was a common conclusion of those centres.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... General, not substance. Now,

16 from what you've told us, then, you should be in a position to explain

17 exactly what raw material there was to work upon. Correct or not?

18 A. I'm ready to explain.

19 Q. The question was a simple one. Are you able to tell us what was

20 the raw material relied upon for this conclusion about the plan of the

21 United States of America? Yes or no.

22 A. I can say yes.

23 Q. Thank you. I understand your answer that there was, as it were,

24 an intervening intermediate level of reporting by those who conducted

25 analyses on your behalf. Let's just have an answer to this straight away:

1 Are those written analyses available for this Court to read; and will they

2 be provided by you or by Russia?

3 A. Yes, they can be provided by Russia.

4 Q. Why haven't you brought them with you?

5 A. I brought with me all the -- those things which today are not

6 classified. Yesterday I showed to you a declassified analysis of the

7 General Staff of the Russian Federation. Here it is. I'm holding it in

8 front of you.

9 Q. Let's pursue that. From your answer, there was clearly some

10 reporting or analysis that is classified. Are you going to be able to

11 produce that to us or not?

12 A. I can present only those things which are declassified today and

13 published, and I will present such things if need be. Those things which

14 today are still a secret, I have no authority to discuss this. And

15 moreover, the United States or NATO never presented such documents

16 themselves. Today I can present only expert --

17 Q. We are not concerned at the moment with what America does. And

18 this Chamber is aware, because it has to deal with the processes for

19 compelling production of documents by states, of the privileges that some

20 countries hold, but you have chosen to come here and make extraordinarily

21 broad allegations and you're now telling us, are you, that some of this is

22 on the basis of secret information that you won't tell us about. Is that

23 right?

24 A. I'm ready to present part of those documents and of those analyses

25 of the General Staff which have been declassified, and I'm convinced that

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 those documents would be sufficient for tendering in court. Those

2 documents which are a secret are beyond my authority to -- for me to

3 tender them here and present them.

4 Q. General, you will understand that it's not your judgement on what

5 is sufficient in this court that counts. The three gentlemen whose

6 judgement matters are sitting in front of me. You have chosen, without it

7 being absolutely plain, to give opinions based on material that you're now

8 -- or material that you're going to keep secret. Let's explore that

9 material, shall we?

10 A. Mr. Nice, I'm saying that this is my opinion, and this is what I

11 think. However, I'm not the one to judge whether that material will be

12 sufficient or not.

13 Q. Let's just take an example, General, before we return to the

14 substance of your evidence. If you were to, in your capacity as a

15 military leader, to advise your political masters that they should attack

16 some other country, and if your political masters wanted to see the raw

17 material justifying your decision, would you say that it would be

18 appropriate for them to see that material, or would you say that you would

19 be entitled to keep it from them?

20 A. To my authorities, I report that information which I receive from

21 different sources, as well as the minutes of my meetings with Mr. Hun

22 [phoen], with Mr. Robinson, with Mr. Slocum, Warner, Naumann, Solana, and

23 others. And on the basis of those negotiations and different documents,

24 on the basis of the participation in various conferences, my subordinates

25 and myself, we analyse that material and report to our authorities. And

1 when the authorities receive from various sources - not only my sources

2 but other sources as well - various materials, conclusions and data, the

3 authorities have the capability to draw its own conclusions and form and

4 shape its own position, and this is a classical scheme of work of any

5 military institution.

6 If you would like to ask me for any specifics, I can quote here

7 specific examples or quotes from my meetings with the Secretary-General of

8 NATO and also ministers of defence of NATO Member States and also deputy

9 ministers of the United States, et cetera.

10 Q. General, that is a long answer, not responsive to a simple

11 question. If you were advising your political masters to take some grave

12 action and they asked to see the raw material, would you show it to them?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 A. I showed to my superiors such materials, but my materials were not

16 the only sources for drawing conclusions and decision-making.

17 Q. Now, let's examine the material that you declined to make

18 available to this Court. In forming your opinion, did you have intercept

19 of telephone conversations of, let us say, Presidents Bush and Clinton to

20 work on? Yes or no.

21 A. Mr. Nice, in the first observation, I'm not refusing to tender any

22 documents in court. I'm only stating that I'm able to tender only such

23 materials which have been published and which are declassified.

24 Secondly, I believe that this is not subject to debate whether we

25 ever listened to intercepts or --

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... sorry?

2 A. -- speeches or conversations from Clinton and Yeltsin, et cetera.

3 This is a different level of confidentiality. I refuse to answer your

4 question.

5 Q. I hadn't asked you, but it's helpful to know that you should

6 assume I was inquiring into the army's -- please listen to me. That you

7 should assume I was inquiring into the army's intercepting its own

8 president for it was not a question that I asked in those terms at all.

9 We will draw our own inferences from that.

10 It is not for you to decide what is relevant. It is for the

11 Judges. The question is, please: In forming your extraordinarily strong

12 conclusion, General Ivasov, did you have intercepts of telephone

13 conversations of Western leaders? Yes or no.

14 A. I can affirm only one thing, that the telephones of Hashim Thaci

15 were bugged by the Serbian services, and the Russian side participated.

16 But those were the telephone conversations between -- with the head of a

17 terrorist organisation. That was quite legal. And I can confirm that

18 Ms. Albright also participated in there.

19 Q. In what?

20 A. That in the fact that she -- I can actually give you -- quote two

21 examples: September 1998, when Ms. Albright advised Hashim Thaci to agree

22 to the introduction of NATO troops to Kosovo, and in response she would

23 guarantee the conduct of a referendum for Kosovo's independence.

24 On the 25th of April, 1999, on the second day after the

25 commencement of the bombardment of Yugoslavia, Ms. Albright demanded that

1 the KLA would raise an insurgency, and in response in Rambouillet,

2 Mr. Hashim Thaci made a statement, and I can quote.

3 Q. Go on. Document with you --

4 A. I would like to outline the efforts of the American Secretary of

5 State Madeleine Albright. In the press communique which was made by

6 Hashim Thaci, he outlines: "I would like to especially outline the

7 tireless efforts of the American Secretary of State Albright," and further

8 on, "Kosovo invites the NATO forces and expects their soon deployment."

9 So here I'm talking about the connections between the terrorists

10 and the officials of --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: General. General, what document did you just

12 read from?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This -- these documents are the

14 documents of the Yugoslav army's services. These are not documents, these

15 are radio and telephone intercepts of Hashim Thaci, the head of

16 terrorists.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. Could you make them available to the Court, please.

19 A. I believe that this is the internal matter of the current

20 government of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro. I cannot do this on

21 their behalf.

22 Q. General, if you start reading from documents in court, prima facie

23 the Court is entitled to see it and probably take possession of it. Can

24 you make it available to the Court, please.

25 A. I'm responding to your question, Mr. Nice.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think he was saying he wouldn't make it

2 available. Pass it over to the usher. Yes, the document that you just

3 read from.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to say that I have no

5 authority to provide this document because I have no power to do so. I

6 did not receive any mandate to do so, either from my government or the

7 government of Serbia and Montenegro.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will realise, then, Mr. Milosevic, that the

10 evidence is almost valueless. If the document that he read come cannot be

11 passed over to the Court for the reasons that he just outlined, the

12 evidence is valueless, because it is not, then, going to be able to be

13 tested.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to protest very emphatically.

15 Mr. Nice is badgering this witness, a very renowned witness --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you. There is no badgering of the

17 witness. He's perfectly entitled to put every single question that he has

18 to the witness, and you should have organised your examination of this

19 witness in such a way that the witness would be able to substantiate what

20 he said in court with documents which are available. The evidence is

21 totally meaningless if it cannot be tested, if he's not in a position to

22 pass over to the Court the document that he just read from.

23 I'll consult.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you might want to ascertain during

1 the break whether the general can receive the authority that he says is

2 necessary to hand over the document. Until that is done, speaking for

3 myself, I would not attach much weight to the evidence that he has given

4 because the Court is not in a position to see the document. We don't even

5 know whether what he has read is actually in the document or what else is

6 in the document.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have already asked you,

8 Mr. Robinson, whether you doubt that General Ivasov, who enjoys great

9 repute both in the East and the West is speaking the truth or not. He is

10 at the top of the military pyramid.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you. It's not for you to ask

12 me any questions. We will determine what weight to attach to the

13 evidence, and I've told you that this evidence, as far as I'm concerned,

14 is practically worthless if the Prosecutor and the Court is not able to

15 see the document from which he just read. If you want us to attach -- if

16 you want me to attach any weight to it, you must get the authority from

17 Russia which is needed for him to hand it over to the Court so that we can

18 look at it. From Serbia, rather, from Serbia.

19 JUDGE KWON: General -- go ahead. Is the document what you read a

20 minute ago an intercept or original report or a summary made by yourself?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The statement of Hashim Thaci that I

22 just read out was published in open press. The two excerpts that I read

23 earlier were indeed intercepts, intercepts made by secret services.

24 After this hearing, I can leave in this court these documents of

25 the General Staff, and I underline that these are documents and a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 monograph of the General Staff written based on many, many documents,

2 declassified documents related to the Kosovo crisis.

3 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I would not allow the witness to

4 read out a document which cannot be passed on to the Trial Chamber.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will take this into

6 account. But there is certain information that I received in the course

7 of my discussions with the high officials of various countries. How are

8 we to treat that information? For instance, my discussions with Deputy

9 Defence Ministers Slocum and Warner, who were the first to show me that,

10 from the beginning of 1998, a course was taken to force Yugoslavia to

11 accept --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The issues that you just raised go fundamentally

13 to how the accused manages his case. He's mismanaging the case, because

14 you are seeking to introduce evidence here to make allegations which

15 require for their substantiation certain documents, and you do not have

16 the documents. In those circumstances, the Chamber, in my view, will not

17 be in a position to attach much weight to the evidence.

18 Judge Bonomy.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic --

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, I would like to deal with what I

22 think is a basic misunderstanding on your part of our position. I

23 certainly would never reach a final judgement on the credibility or

24 reliability of any witness at all in this case until I'd heard all the

25 evidence in the case, and therefore it's important, when you lead evidence

1 from any witness, to do all that you possibly can to reinforce the

2 credibility and reliability of that witness. That's number one.

3 The second point is a point of clarification. I wish to ask the

4 general a question, which may be a problem of translation or

5 interpretation.

6 You indicated that the Serbian authorities did bug Thaci with

7 assistance from Russia, and you then said that Albright also participated.

8 Did you mean to say that, as a result of doing so, you were intercepting

9 her conversation, or did you mean to say that the United States were

10 involved in that exercise?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am just saying, for the record,

12 that Madam Albright speak to Mr. Thaci, Hashim Thaci.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me clarify what I said earlier.

14 Mr. Milosevic, as an accused, there is absolutely no burden on you

15 to prove anything. You can sit there and remain totally silent,

16 absolutely silent. The legal burden is on the Prosecutor to prove the

17 allegations in the indictment. But to the extent that you adduce

18 evidence, and you wish - don't speak when I'm speaking - and you wish the

19 Court to take account of that evidence, then you must do so in a manner

20 which makes the evidence as credible as possible, otherwise the Chamber

21 will not be in a position to attach much weight to it, and this is the

22 position we find ourselves in at this stage.

23 Mr. Nice, continue.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, just let us make one

25 thing clear. I would like us to understand each other. Far be it from me

1 to think that you are disputing the credibility of General Ivasov. That's

2 one.

3 And second, on the basis of what do you assume that the entire

4 book of documents which have been declassified and then published does not

5 contain anything of any use to you? General Ivasov told you the documents

6 that have been declassified, from which the stamp "Official Secret" has

7 been removed, were included in the book. Look in these documents and you

8 will see. And generally speaking, the minutes and his evidence on his

9 discussions with the officials of the NATO alliance concerning the attack

10 on Yugoslavia is a major issue. I don't see how anyone can dispute that

11 these discussions took place and that in the course of these

12 discussions --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are now discussing the particular document

14 from which the witness just read and which he's not in a position to hand

15 over to the Court. A novel position for me.

16 Mr. Nice, please continue.

17 MR. NICE: Yes. Before I ask my next question, can I, just for

18 convenience, summarise the position. The document that the accused just

19 referred to, which is, I think, the red-coloured book that the witness has

20 held up, was not served in advance, has not been translated, was not

21 relied on in any substantive way if at all in evidence-in-chief, and it is

22 simply not realistic or acceptable to ask us post the evidence of the

23 witness to conduct our own analysis in a way that may be favourable to the

24 accused.

25 Procedurally, the accused has to understand, and I'm sure the

1 Court -- well, the Court's been making this point to him, that if he wants

2 to rely on a document, it has to be prepared in advance, served in advance

3 if it's a substantial document for me to deal with. I am anxious not to

4 waste the Court's time with having this witness's evidence adjourned, but

5 if the accused actually wants us to consider that book, then out of his

6 budget of time, he would have to ask now for arrangements to be made for

7 the book to be translated, to reopen his examination-in-chief, and to take

8 the witness through the relevant parts of it. I don't ask for that to

9 happen, and I hope it won't, but that is what he should be doing.

10 Second, the general has so for declined and refused to answer

11 questions about intercepts generally. He's made one selection that he

12 obviously came prepared with, and he's refused to hand the piece of paper

13 over. I will carry on asking him questions, but depending on his

14 response, the time may come when I shall ask that his evidence be

15 disregarded altogether.

16 The solemn declaration that witnesses take is to tell the truth,

17 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. That obliges them not to be

18 selective. And if they become selective, the question of their attitude

19 toward the Court is at large, in our submission.

20 Q. General --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope it is clear to you that the

24 testimony of General Ivasov about the fact that the Clinton administration

25 had planned the aggression on Yugoslavia is not based on one single detail

1 that he mentioned in passing, this intercept of a conversation between

2 Hashim Thaci and Mrs. Albright. There are many other facts in which this

3 is grounded, and among those facts are his own personal conversations with

4 NATO officials. So even if you choose to completely discount this

5 intercept, you can take his evidence that it was so and these issues were

6 raised at the highest level within the framework of the cooperation

7 between Russia and NATO. That fact is indisputable.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

9 Mr. Nice, continue.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. General, you told us you're not going to answer the question about

12 intercepts as between Western leaders, remembering that you also answered

13 about intercepting your own political leaders. You then selected one

14 intercept that you have noted about Mrs. Albright. Let's go back to the

15 original question. Are you going to change your answer about --

16 A. Let me say one thing. We were listening, eavesdropping on Hashim

17 Thaci, a terrorist. We were not listening to the conversations of

18 Mrs. Albright. This is essential.

19 Q. My question is are you now prepared to tell us - yes or no -

20 because we're at the stage of methodology --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice insinuated to General

24 Ivasov that we were listening to their own military -- sorry, political

25 leaders, whereas General Ivasov never said anything of the kind.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think General Ivasov just clarified what he was

2 listening to.

3 Continue, Mr. Nice.

4 MR. NICE:

5 Q. Are you now prepared to tell us - yes or no - whether your raw

6 material included intercepts of conversations between Western leaders?

7 Yes or no, General.

8 A. The information about intercepts of conversations between Western

9 leaders are not available to me, and I have no comment. This was not

10 within my competence.

11 Q. For my money, that is not responsive to the question, but I'll

12 move on, I think.

13 You've spoken of other discussions you had with politicians as

14 grounding your final opinion. Do we have available notes or records of

15 these conversations that you had, please?

16 A. There are working notes of official nature. There are my reports

17 to the defence minister about the outcome of my meetings, but all that is

18 at the Defence Ministry, and it is within their purview. But I am naming

19 specific names and I'm quoting dates and I'm telling you what the

20 discussions were about.

21 Q. You see, what we want to know, or what the Judges may want to know

22 is how it is you formed this view of a pre-planned -- of a plan to destroy

23 the former Yugoslavia. Take us to your best bit of evidence. Tell us

24 what it is.

25 A. First, in 1993, a strategic concept of the US and the national

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 military doctrine that I mentioned yesterday were endorsed. That is

2 practically a military statute, military constitution of a state. I'm not

3 quoting now, but it says that the entire territory of the planet is an

4 area of vital interest of the USA, and furthermore, the US will protect

5 those interests using military force.

6 Then in 1997, the Balkans were proclaimed to be an area of vital

7 interest to the US. Furthermore, starting with January 1998, the tone of

8 conversation in all negotiations has changed. I met with Mr. Slocum,

9 Mr. Warner -- I can name other names. And if we look at the Kosovo

10 situation which was a matter of general conversation in 1997, in 1998 two

11 main thrusts became crystal clear. One option: Either Milosevic will

12 accept the ultimatum and then we proceed one way; or second option, he

13 doesn't and then the military operation is inevitable.

14 On a different level, we observed a build-up of military activity,

15 an increase in the combat readiness of armed forces, and the observation

16 of the entire military complex indicated to us that preparations were

17 underway to unleash a war. In addition to that. We received information

18 from various sources that corroborated this conclusion.

19 Furthermore, this plan, this doctrine envisaged methods of

20 conducting psychological operations, including military warfare, and all

21 this is clear from those military documents that were endorsed by the US

22 and NATO.

23 In addition to that, there were many, many international

24 conferences discussing a wide variety of aspects. And I am not ruling out

25 the huge role played by operative information. I can draw your attention

1 to the 35th Munich conference in January --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think perhaps that is enough. Mr. Nice.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. General, from -- I asked you for your best evidence. I take it

5 this is. Now, this, the 1993 strategic concept of the US and the national

6 military document, no doubt you can provide these documents for us if we

7 want them, can we, or tell us where we can get them off a website?

8 A. Of course it's on the Internet. I don't know the exact website,

9 but these are open-source documents. The whole world has seen them.

10 Q. And are we to take it that if we read this document with an

11 ordinary intelligent, if we are, intelligent mind, we're going to read in

12 it a plan to take over the former -- to destroy the former Yugoslavia? Is

13 this what we're going to find? I just want to know.

14 A. If you take those documents as a manual for action and you look at

15 the way things developed around Kosovo, you will conclude, I think, that

16 everything developed exactly in the way described in those documents.

17 Q. So because we're not -- I should have asked you this as well.

18 I've asked you about intercepts, but I meant to ask you, does your opinion

19 relay -- rely in any way on written communications passing between Western

20 leaders of which you've had sight? Just yes or no. If so, tell us what

21 they are.

22 A. Would you please specify. What leaders do you mean? The

23 correspondence and communication between whom and whom?

24 Q. Well, it's your theory, and you've managed to weave in NATO and

25 all the Western world along with America, but let's focus on America.

1 Have you got any -- have you seen any correspondence coming from or going

2 to American leaders going to show this early plan to destroy the former

3 Yugoslavia?

4 A. No. No, I haven't. But even if I had seen such a thing, I would

5 not be able to tell you that here. It is a state secret.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... again. I see. So you

7 wouldn't trust the Judges with it.

8 A. I simply don't have the right to. If I did, I would be subject to

9 criminal prosecution either in my own country or in the US.

10 Q. Sometimes it's a bit difficult to ask this question because even

11 saying something in a negative is a bit wicked, but can you actually tell

12 the Judges that there was no such material and then we can move on? There

13 was no such material, no written material of the kind to support your

14 theory; correct?

15 A. Mr. Nice, I will quote to you from a published document. It is a

16 report of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking of the

17 military doctrine from 1993.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was asking is this a document which you can

19 hand over to the Court, the one that you're --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not today. I can't do it today,

21 quite simply. But this is a published, open-source document. Somebody's

22 trying to catch me out in an untruth here, and -- will you allow me to

23 quote from this?

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: But, General, you said it's public. If it's

1 public, why can't it be handed over?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I physically don't have it. But

3 it's on the Internet. I can refer to a sentence pronounced by

4 Mr. Kissinger, published in the Newsweek magazine. I just don't have that

5 issue of the magazine with me.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are you reading from, then? What would you

7 be reading from? I thought you had some document in front of you from

8 which you were going to read.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While preparing for this hearing, I

10 simply noted down some excerpts and brought them with me, because this is

11 my first participation in a hearing. I thought that a quotation, a

12 reference, would suffice. I have numbers of orders and dates referring to

13 Yugoslavia and orders issued to the Pristina Corps. I have excerpts from

14 them, but I don't have the orders themselves. I can give you references

15 to them, but I don't have the documents as such. They were secret.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in preparing this witness, either

17 you or your associates should have made it clear to him that those

18 documents might have been needed by the Court. Therefore, they should

19 have been made available. This goes to the management of the case.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I have no need to

21 prepare the cross-examination by Mr. Nice.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I wasn't speaking about the -- I'm not speaking

23 about the cross-examination. I'm speaking about the preparation of your

24 own case. It's your preparation of your case that's being called into

25 question now, and that is leading to a waste of the Court's time.

1 Mr. Nice.

2 MR. NICE: The -- as far as I'm concerned, if he's reading a

3 narration --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

5 MR. NICE: Thank you. If he wishes to read from what he's written

6 down from an open-source document, then providing that he or the accused,

7 and it's on the accused's shoulders to do this, produces a document in due

8 course, I don't mind him telling us what it is now.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Go ahead, General. Let us hear what you

10 noted.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I just spoke about a moment

12 ago, about the military doctrine. "The US bear global responsibility for

13 everything going on in the world." The question arises in my head: Why

14 the US? Why not the UN? Why not some international organisation? "The

15 US bears global responsibility in all areas of the world that need

16 protecting by military force," and so on.

17 So the US sets objectives, in 1997, proclaiming the Balkans an

18 area of vital interest to the US and go on to take specific decisions. I

19 can read out from a document concerning Rambouillet. Henry Kissinger,

20 Newsweek magazine, May 1999. He says: "New world disorder. The first

21 decision was to send 30.000 troops to Yugoslavia, a country that was not

22 in war with NATO. Second decision envisaged the use of the Serbian

23 refusal of the ultimatum, which was predictable, as a pretext for bombing.

24 Furthermore, despite common belief in Rambouillet, there were no

25 negotiations, there was an ultimatum." That was said by Henry Kissinger,

1 published in Newsweek magazine in May 1999.

2 And furthermore, he says that "The US administration consciously

3 violated its commitment to the UN Charter and international procedures."

4 Was that sufficient? I can continue quoting. I can quote from

5 orders.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. I'm asking you for your best evidence, and it's very helpful.

8 You've set -- you've told us about something in 1997, and your general

9 concern that the United States bears global responsibility for everything

10 in the world. And then we go back to your 1993 strategic concept, and the

11 national military doctrine. And I just wanted to ask you one question

12 about that.

13 You told us yesterday that the relevant psychological campaign

14 document was FM33-5, didn't you?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Perhaps you would like to tell us what year that was published in.

17 A. This document was published somewhat earlier. I will try to find

18 this information now.

19 Q. Would 1962 be about right?

20 A. However, this is an official document of the US army --

21 Q. General Ivasov --

22 A. -- and this document is updated on a yearly basis.

23 Q. Yes, but nevertheless, the version you were referring to was the

24 1962 version. And this may all show that the United States has been

25 planning the destruction of the former Yugoslavia for three or four

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 decades, but I want to know.

2 The 1962 doctrine, the 1993 strategic concept, the 1997

3 proclamation that you tell us about, and the Newsweek interview with

4 Mr. Kissinger, now, this is your best evidence. Is there anything else

5 you would like to rely on for proof of the plan to destroy the former

6 Yugoslavia?

7 A. Mr. Nice --

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just want to tell you,

11 Mr. Robinson, that this distortion of somebody's evidence is below any

12 human dignity. What Mr. Nice is doing is entirely impermissible with

13 respect to any witness.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have stopped you. What he's doing is entirely

15 proper. He's testing evidence given in examination-in-chief, and it is

16 open to him to do that. That is an ordinary process in this Tribunal.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. General, I'd like your assistance with some matters that relate

20 specifically to this trial. Do you have any evidence going to show the

21 Americans in league with Mr. Kucan? Kucan. See, the accused has really

22 accused Mr. Kucan as leading to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and

23 I'm wondering if you have any information that he did this at the

24 Americans' behest?

25 A. Mr. Nice, first of all let me answer your previous question

1 concerning FM33-5 document. All documents of the army tend to have

2 long-term nature. However, on a yearly basis, they are amended, meaning

3 that the basis remains unchanged, and every year or every other year

4 certain amendments are made. This is a tradition in every army.

5 As for your other question, I know nothing about it.

6 Q. And help us, please, because there's a sort of progression in the

7 break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Did you have any evidence going to

8 show that the United States of America was in league with the president of

9 Croatia, leading to him taking his country away from the former

10 Yugoslavia?

11 A. Mr. Nice, I'm giving evidence on issues concerning which I have

12 knowledge. Yesterday, I said that I would be testifying about the Kosovo

13 tragedy. If you have any questions concerning Kosovo, then I will give

14 you an answer.

15 The head of the terrorist organisation, for example, Thaci and

16 Ceku not only were not arrested but were invited to all international

17 conferences where they were a negotiating side. It is a rule that

18 terrorists are not allowed to negotiate.

19 Q. General, you were asked quite specifically by this accused

20 questions about the role of the United States and the plan to destroy the

21 former Yugoslavia, and I'm testing that evidence. It may be you want to

22 withdraw your evidence. If you do, we will move on. Or do you still

23 maintain that the United States had a plan going back to the mid or early

24 1990s to destroy the former Yugoslavia? Do you still maintain that?

25 A. I did not state in the courtroom that the United States had in the

1 mid-1990s a plan to destroy the entire Yugoslavia. What I said was that

2 there was a plan on the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

3 which remained after the major break-up, and my evidence pertained to

4 Kosovo. I can confirm that. I have convictions, and I have evidence to

5 prove that. I just quoted the words of a prominent US statesman, Henry

6 Kissinger.

7 Q. Incidentally, on one matter of detail, I notice the accused

8 yesterday said in the course of an exchange with the Trial Chamber that it

9 was because you knew such information that you weren't allowed to leave

10 Russia for a long time. It's on page 18. Was the accused right in saying

11 that, that you were not allowed to leave Russia because you held such

12 secure information?

13 A. Yes, Mr. Nice. In accordance with the Russian law, a person in

14 possession of highly confidential information is not allowed to travel

15 abroad for up to five years. I left my office in June of 2001, and it

16 wasn't until August, and in relation to my involvement with this trial,

17 was I issued a passport to travel abroad. So since June of 2001, I never

18 travelled abroad. I have never travelled abroad.

19 Q. And all of the sensitive information that kept you at home or kept

20 you in Russia specifically related to the subject matter of this trial or

21 was it sensitive information generally?

22 A. I dealt not only with Kosovo. I visited 57 countries of the world

23 where I took part in negotiations and met with presidents, ministers of

24 defence, ministers of foreign affairs, and I was in possession of a huge

25 amount of information. In addition to that, I had access to highly

1 confidential information gathered by our intelligence services.

2 In addition to that, I participated in meetings, consultations

3 with the president, with high government officials within the Ministry of

4 Defence, and as a rule, such information is considered classified. This

5 is a rule that applies to all countries. And there are very strict rules

6 as to who is allowed to make such information public. This rule applies

7 in all democratic countries.

8 Q. Very well. Let's move on, now. Your -- it wasn't quite clear

9 yesterday; your detailed dealings with the former Yugoslavia start at what

10 date?

11 A. I became involved in October of 1996. However, as many things

12 were quite new to me, I did not strictly focus on Bosnian conflict and the

13 Dayton Agreement. I can even tell you that my subordinates were

14 representatives in NATO, Colonel General Zavarski [phoen], for example,

15 and even our generals served as deputies of the Supreme Commander of NATO

16 forces in Europe; General Clark. My subordinate was Mr. Clark's deputy

17 dealing with the Dayton agreement. And from there, we received

18 information that back in January 1998, there were arrows on the maps on

19 General Clark's table, pointing towards Kosovo. This is an information as

20 well.

21 Q. Just try and deal with things, broadly speaking, chronologically.

22 You obviously then know no detail. You weren't involved in the detail of

23 what happened in 1993 -- 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995, were you?

24 A. Yes. I did not take direct participation in those events, but in

25 my capacity, my official capacity and based on various investigative work,

1 I became aware of such information. However, I cannot give evidence

2 concerning that. I can only rely on public information. I did not take

3 part in those events.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... but I'm just going to seek

5 your guidance on this: You will know, of course -- it's back to this --

6 it's back to this issue, General, if how governments and military try and

7 eavesdrop on each other all the time.

8 The Russian and the Serbian intelligence services formed very

9 close liaison in about 1993, didn't they?

10 A. I was referring to the period starting in October 1996, but even

11 better, let us start from January 1997.

12 Q. I know that's your period of knowledge, but -- of detailed

13 knowledge, to which I'm going to come, but I'm just checking through you,

14 because I'm sure you know this. As a matter of fact, the Russian and

15 Serbian intelligence and counter-intelligence services, very closely

16 connected as at about 1993 with the man Stanisic playing a role, for

17 example.

18 A. I object to this type of qualification. I cannot confirm that.

19 What I spoke about was the cooperation between Russian and Yugoslav

20 special services only pertaining to combat with terrorist organisations,

21 which is something that the whole world is dealing with nowadays,

22 including us. The United States, NATO, and we cooperate concerning that

23 issue, a fight against terrorism. I can confirm that, that we had very

24 close cooperation, very fruitful cooperation on that issue.

25 Q. The way governments all listen in on each other, just help us with

1 this because we're very concerned about Srebrenica. Did you carry out

2 intercepts of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, and of this accused, you Russians?

3 Did you?

4 A. Mr. Nice, I knew much. However, in every country, not all highly

5 placed officials have access to all of the information. Not even

6 President knows everything. Therefore, to claim that I was involved in

7 this is something that I refuse to do. I don't think that this is the key

8 point for this evidence, whether I as witness took part in intercepting

9 conversations. I don't think that any state would disclose such

10 information.

11 Q. I'm sorry, I --

12 JUDGE KWON: Can I clarify this: General, before you came to The

13 Hague, I understand that you had got permission from your government, in

14 one way or another, to give evidence in relation to the Kosovo indictment.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.

16 JUDGE KWON: And not in relation to Bosnian and Croatian

17 indictment.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was not defined or ordered by

19 the government. I myself clarified that I would testify only about the

20 period and events that I am well familiar with. This was not prescribed

21 by my government. However, I couldn't have envisaged the questions put by

22 Mr. Nice. This kind of information is held by secret services. Nobody

23 gave me permission to disclose that, but I didn't even ask for such

24 permission, because I did not expect such questions.

25 JUDGE KWON: So what you are suggesting that you are not in a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 position to answer any question in relation to Bosnian and Croatian

2 indictment?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know, Your Honour, I can only

4 speak in general terms. I can speak of the implementation of the Dayton

5 agreement because there was a Russian brigade deployed there. And also in

6 Mons, in Shape [phoen], in NATO we had our representative. So this is

7 something that I can discuss. However, I did not take part in Dayton

8 negotiations and I have little information concerning that.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had meetings with the leaders of

11 the Republic of Serbia. I visited that region. However, the questions

12 put to me by Mr. Nice is not something that I can tell you about, about

13 what was going on in Srebrenica region. I can't answer that.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Not Republic of

15 Serbia but Republika Srpska.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. Indeed, General, I certainly wasn't going to ask you for any

19 detail but as you will appreciate from my very first observation to you

20 today the Prosecution in this case is the servant and supporter of no

21 one. We are trying to find out the truth, and since you hold the office

22 you do, I just wanted to know if, in Russia, there is likely to be

23 material in the form of intercepted conversations of Belgrade and this

24 accused that may help us. I suspect you could answer. Do they hold such

25 material?

1 A. Mr. Nice, I hope that your goal is to seek objective truth.

2 However, to this day, we have still not broken codes from the Second World

3 War. And for some reason, you focus your efforts on attempts to disclose

4 the secrets of Russian secret service and their technical services. This

5 is the topmost secret in every country. Great Britain has not yet

6 disclosed methods and mechanisms used to break German codes during World

7 War II despite the fact that the Nuremberg trials have been concluded.

8 And I'm really surprised that you're focusing on this issue, the issue of

9 intercepts. I have a lot of information from other sources. This is not

10 the main issue here.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, General, the problem may be that you've

12 chosen to rely on some material from intercepts in relation to Kosovo and

13 that therefore the issue of intercepts has opened up as an issue in the

14 trial.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Let me

16 clarify once again that wiretapping of terrorists is a legal activity in

17 any state, and what was intercepted while wiretapping the conversations of

18 terrorists is something that I can tell you about, the bit that is known

19 to me.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. Now, General, I'm going to move on from that, because --

22 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. I don't know if I've interrupted Your

23 Honour.

24 Q. I'm going to move on now to the period of your particular

25 knowledge and seek your assistance.

1 Listening to your evidence yesterday provided a clear picture, but

2 correct me if I've got it wrong, of KLA terrorists being resisted by a

3 totally lawful and well-behaved Serbian government. Would that be about

4 right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I wonder if you'd help us, please, with some comments on workings

7 of the Contact Group. Now, you know about the Contact Group, don't you?

8 A. Yes, I do know.

9 Q. Because, just to remind the Court, the Contact Group had a Russian

10 representative on it; correct?

11 A. Yes. However, the Contact Group was not authorised by the UN

12 Security Council or any other international legal body. This was

13 something like a voluntary international conference, and Russia takes part

14 in numerous international conferences.

15 Q. May we take it that the sort of information available to you,

16 General, would have been equally available to your representative on the

17 Contact Group?

18 A. I'm not sure of that. I did not take part in the meetings of the

19 Contact Group. This is something that the services within the Ministry of

20 Foreign Affairs of Russia were involved in. I simply analysed documents

21 that were adopted within the Contact Group and adopted only as

22 recommendations.

23 MR. NICE: Would Your Honours just give me one minute.

24 [Prosecution counsel confer]

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While you are looking for that, I

1 can tell you, Mr. Nice, that on the 9th of March, 1998, in London, the

2 Contact Group, I'm quoting: "Acknowledged the presence of terrorist

3 structures in Kosovo, condemned terrorism and separatism, condemned upon

4 the proposal of Russia the forces funding training and arming terrorist

5 groups." This statement was issued on the 9th of March, 1998.

6 Q. Well, General --

7 A. I quoted from the document.

8 Q. -- I'm so grateful because you've obviously written that down in

9 advance of coming here in order that you could read it out, and of course

10 we're going to find that, because from time to time Russia made separate

11 decisions within the Contact Group.

12 Now, you came with that particular quotation. I'll ask --

13 A. I don't know about independent decisions or separate decisions

14 taken by Russia within the Contact Group. I would ask you to refrain from

15 such claims pertaining to Russia.

16 MR. NICE: Would the Chamber be good enough to take a collection

17 of documents, which will be a new exhibit, available for distribution with

18 an index on the front. We probably can display them on the overhead

19 projector. I'm going to read some, but I hope a limited number of these,

20 and the Chamber will, I imagine, be pleased to know that I'm sure I can

21 conclude my examination of this witness today and it won't be necessary

22 for him to come back and I shan't be asking for him to bring any documents

23 in light of the answers he's already given.

24 Q. If we -- now, General, I'm sorry that this isn't translated into

25 Russian, but I wasn't to know what you were going to be going to say in

1 evidence when you came. And if the usher would be good enough, we'll go

2 through the materials and I'll describe them to you. And if the usher

3 would press the appropriate screen on the television. It's already done.

4 You can either look at the document, which will be in English on

5 your left, or you can view it on the screen which will be in front of you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it is impermissible to give

9 to the witness documents in a language he doesn't understand. He should

10 be able to read the document, and this is not how a witness should be

11 treated.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's going to be placed on the ELMO and will be

13 translated.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So what if it's on the ELMO? The

15 document cannot be translated in its entirety. There are 50 pages here.

16 And bearing in mind the manipulations of Mr. Nice and taking out words out

17 of context --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not a permissible comment, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it is not appropriate

20 to give to the witness documents in a language he doesn't understand.

21 That should be completely clear to you. This is impermissible.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, how much of this document are you going

23 to --

24 MR. NICE: There are several passages that I wish to read, but

25 I'll read them generously. It is simply impossible, if we have speakers

1 of languages other than the languages of the institution to forecast in

2 advance and find the resources to prepare documents like this not knowing

3 what the accused will say.

4 I should respectfully remind the accused through the Court that

5 all the documents he produced through the previous witness were provided

6 in the Russian language, without any translated version for us. Not that

7 I rely on that as -- in itself as a justification for what I'm doing.

8 What I'm doing is clearly the best and appropriate policy under the

9 Statute and regulations which requires documents to be in the language of

10 the institution.

11 I'm glad to have made the accused laugh.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Naturally. Naturally. The Russian

13 language is an official language of the United Nations, and you have no

14 interpreters for Russian.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And even in the NATO.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice and the witness, we are going to take an

17 adjournment now, 20 minutes.

18 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

19 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we have noted the objection that

21 you have made to this document being put to the witness without it being

22 translated in his language. However, as indicated by Mr. Nice, he only

23 intends to put particular passages from the document to the witness.

24 Those will be translated by the interpreter. If the witness finds that

25 he's at a disadvantage, then it is a matter for him to bring that to the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 attention of the Chamber.

2 Mr. Nice.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. General, incidentally, I'm told by the interpreters that because

5 of the particular circumstances of interpretation, I'm going to have to

6 speak more loudly or closer to the microphone. So if I appear to be

7 shouting, it's not a reflection of any attitude, it's merely an

8 administrative necessity. So I hope you won't be offended.

9 Your previous -- thank you. Your previous observation about the

10 role of the Contact Group, I must respectfully suggest, is incorrect. For

11 example, in his report to the Security Council of the 30th of April of

12 1998, a document which, if is isn't an exhibit I will have copied and

13 provided, the Secretary-General said: "I have had to rely on information

14 and assessments provided by the Contact Group, OSCE and the European

15 Union, as foreseen in paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1160."

16 So, General, the Contact Group served an important and formal

17 function for the Secretary-General and the United Nations. Do you accept

18 that?

19 A. I agree insofar as the Contact Group sometimes made good

20 conclusions for the benefit of the General-Secretary and provided

21 recommendations.

22 Q. And it was on the basis of that report, again a document if not

23 already an exhibit I'll produce it, on the basis of that report that

24 United Nations Resolution 1199 was made, which led to the October

25 agreements, and do you accept, General, that within that Resolution the

1 United Nations acknowledged gratefully statements of the foreign ministers

2 made by France, Germany, Italy, and the Russian Federation as well as the

3 United Kingdom, USA, and other countries?

4 A. I would be grateful if you could specify, what statements do you

5 have in mind, and what is the agreement you are referring to?

6 Q. This is Resolution 1199, which led to the October agreements with

7 which the KVM was concerned to verify. I do not have the Russian

8 statement, but this Resolution included within it gratitude for a

9 statement from the Russian Federation.

10 A. Yes. I acknowledge the Contact Group with respect. However, the

11 Security Council took into account -- took into account its

12 recommendations and opinion but not only, not only the opinion of the

13 Contact Group. If you speak about the October agreement, do you mean the

14 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of October 10?

15 Q. Can we now move to the collection of documents from the Contact

16 Group.

17 MR. NICE: And if the usher would display them, although I shall

18 ask him, so that people can see what we have, to display them in sequence

19 rapidly, we will stop at only a limited number.

20 Q. General Ivasov, the documents we have, so you can know what is

21 going to the Judges, is a statement on Kosovo of the Contact Group foreign

22 ministers dated the 24th of September, 1997.

23 Next page is blank. The following page is a statement on Kosovo

24 of the 25th of February, 1998, and that's available. The following page

25 is blank.

1 THE INTERPRETER: No microphone.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice, I would be grateful if you

3 would bear in mind that I do not know the English language. I speak

4 German, by the way, so I cannot comment on these documents.

5 MR. NICE:

6 Q. I seek no comment on the ones I've mentioned. It's just simply

7 for completeness, revealing what we have.

8 There is then a Security Council note or letter of the 12th of

9 March, 1998. Just display that. And immediately following that, we have

10 the letter, I think, or the annex to which you referred. So the next page

11 is headed "Annex," and it refers to a meeting in London on the 9th of

12 March of 1998, and I'm going to read several paragraphs from it at a

13 speed, General, that I hope will be acceptable to the interpreters and to

14 you.

15 Three lines down on paragraph number 2 reads as follows -- and any

16 interpreter who finds I'm going too fast, please wave at me or something.

17 "We are dismayed that in the period since September, rather than

18 taking steps to reduce tension or to enter without pre-conditions into

19 dialogue towards a political solution, the Belgrade authorities have

20 applied repressive measures in Kosovo. We note with particular concern

21 the recent violence in Kosovo, resulting in at least 80 fatalities, and

22 condemn the use of excessive force by Serbian police against civilians,

23 and against peaceful demonstrators in Pristina on the 2nd of March.

24 "Our condemnation of the actions of the Serbian police should not

25 in any way be mistaken for an endorsement of terrorism. Our position on

1 this is clear: We wholly condemn terrorist actions by the Kosovo

2 Liberation Army or any other group or individual. Those in the Kosovo

3 Albanian community who speak for the different political constituencies

4 should make it clear that they, too, abhor terrorism. We insist,

5 likewise, that those outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who are

6 supplying finance, arms, or training for terrorist activity in Kosovo

7 should immediately cease doing so.

8 "We condemn the large-scale police actions of the last 10 days

9 that further inflamed an already volatile situation. The violent

10 repression of non-violent expression of political views is completely

11 indefensible. We call upon the authorities in Belgrade to invite

12 independent forensic experts to investigate the very serious allegations

13 of extrajudicial killings. If these accusations are borne out, we expect

14 the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to prosecute and

15 punish those responsible."

16 I omit paragraph 5. Paragraph 6: "In the light of the deplorable

17 violence in Kosovo, we feel compelled to take steps to demonstrate to the

18 authorities in Belgrade that they cannot defy international standards

19 without facing severe consequences."

20 Over the page, please. At the top: "Against that background, the

21 Contact Group requests a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High

22 Commissioner for Human Rights, urges the Office of the Prosecutor of the

23 International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to begin gathering

24 information related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall within its

25 jurisdiction."

1 And then halfway down the page: "Will continue vigorously to

2 support the efforts of Sant 'Egidio to secure implementation of the

3 Education agreement ..."

4 Over the page, please, to page 4. And I said I would draw these

5 passages to your attention, or at least some of them. Towards the bottom

6 of the page: "The Contact Group notes that the Russian Federation cannot

7 support measures (c) and (d) above," which we can see set out, "but if

8 there is no progress towards the steps taken -- the steps called for by

9 the Contact Group, the Russian Federation will then be willing to discuss

10 all the above measures.

11 "We call upon President Milosevic to take rapid and effective

12 steps to stop the violence and engage in a commitment to find a political

13 solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue. Specifically, he should

14 within 10 days:

15 "Withdraw the Special Police Units and cease action by security

16 forces affecting the civilian population;

17 "Allow access to Kosovo for the Red Cross and other humanitarian

18 organisations as well as by representatives of the Contact Group and other

19 embassies;

20 "Commit himself publicly to begin a process of dialogue, along

21 the lines of paragraph 10, with the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian

22 community;

23 "Cooperate in a constructive manner with the Contact Group in the

24 implementation of the actions specified in paragraph 6 above which require

25 urgent action by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

1 Over the page and, Your Honours, this is the only one that I'm

2 going to read at this length.

3 "If President Milosevic --" Top of the page, please. "If

4 President Milosevic takes these steps, we will immediately reconsider the

5 measures we have now adopted. If he fails to take these steps, and

6 repression continues in Kosovo, the Contact Group will move to further

7 international measures and specifically to pursue a freeze on the funds

8 held abroad by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian

9 governments."

10 Paragraph 8: "Belgrade's own actions have seriously set back the

11 process of normalisation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's relations

12 with the international community. Unless the Federal Republic of

13 Yugoslavia takes steps to resolve the serious political and human rights

14 issues in Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement in its

15 international standing. On the other hand, the concrete proposals to

16 resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo will

17 improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

18 and prospects for normalisation of its international relationships and

19 full rehabilitation in international institutions."

20 Paragraph 10, finally: "The way to defeat terrorism in Kosovo is

21 for Belgrade to offer the Kosovo Albanian community a genuine political

22 process. The authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo

23 Albanian community must assume their responsibility to enter without

24 pre-conditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues. The

25 Contact Group stands ready to facilitate such a dialogue."

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Now, General, you, I think, came to court with a passage from this

2 noted that dealt simply with the use of the term "terrorism." Having

3 heard the majority of the text read to you, and bearing in mind that you

4 acknowledged that Russia's member of the Contact Group had access to the

5 same material that you had, would you like to accept that this document by

6 the Contact Group is a fair representation of what was happening on the

7 ground?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My objection is this: The question

11 was not put in an appropriate manner, because it was precisely in sub-item

12 (c) that says -- (c) and (d), rather, that repressive actions of security

13 forces of Yugoslavia in Kosovo are mentioned. And it says further below

14 that the Contact Group notes that the Russian Federation cannot support

15 measures (c) and (d).

16 Therefore, the Russian Federation did not actually support this

17 qualification about repressive measures, because if you remember,

18 gentlemen, speaking of those 80 fatalities, it was the clash in Prekaze,

19 where a terrorist group headed by Adem Jashari was liquidated after

20 several days of shooting with the police --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'll ask Mr. Nice to reply, but

22 (c) and (d) deals with denial of visas and a moratorium and the question

23 that he asked was whether the witness was prepared to accept that the

24 document was a fair representation of what was happening on the ground.

25 That is, the activities on the ground. So I don't see any relationship

1 between that and the fact that Russia did not accept sub-item (c) and (d).

2 The witness should answer if he can.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that this

4 document was to a great extent a result of compromise amongst various

5 parties, and the fact that Russia did not agree to two subparagraphs

6 involving accusations or conclusions does not mean that it was not a valid

7 document. But it is a fact that the Russian Federation, the Ministry of

8 Defence, and myself welcomed any attempt by any political structure to

9 find a peaceful settlement. And specifically, a peaceful settlement of

10 the Kosovo problem.

11 I do support this document.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, I'm interrupting you.

13 Mr. Nice, rephrase your question and clarify precisely what you

14 mean by "activities on the ground."

15 MR. NICE: Certainly. But I'm grateful to the witness for his

16 last answer in any event.

17 Q. But, General Ivasov, as I say, you brought to us an extract that

18 referred simply to terrorist activity, which I think we can see in

19 paragraph 3 of this annex. I've read out a general account of tensions,

20 of condemnation of terrorism, of condemnation of large-scale police

21 actions over the last ten days, of deplorable violence in Kosovo, and so

22 on, and I'm going to suggest to you that the Contact Group, on all the

23 best available information, had set out in an evenhanded way the situation

24 on the ground. Do you disagree with that or do you accept that that is

25 what they had done?

1 A. Well, first of all, the Contact Group was not an officially

2 established body, and its conclusions were sometimes subjective.

3 Second, you read out the paragraphs that were agreed upon.

4 However, the proposals of the Russian delegate, one of which was not to

5 give visas to KLA leaders, to arrest terrorists upon arrival to Western

6 capitals, as well as a number of other proposals, were not accepted and

7 are not reflected, therefore, in this document.

8 Then, Mr. Nice, you speak very confidently about certain matters

9 such as repression, et cetera. And I'm telling you once again that Russia

10 welcomed and proposed the complex of measures for political settlement,

11 and it did, therefore, take part in Contact Group -- in the Contact Group

12 and other bodies. But on a parallel track to this political process --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think you have answered the question.

14 Just pay attention to the question. The question was whether you agree

15 that the Contact Group had set out in an evenhanded way the situation on

16 the ground relating to the activities that took place on the ground, and

17 you're asked to say whether you disagreed with that or whether you accept

18 it.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not accept it completely,

20 because the Contact Group was not in a position to give an objective

21 evaluation. It issued agreed-upon recommendations. There were points on

22 which there was no agreement and Russian proposals that were not included.

23 So to agree with this document in entirety is something that I cannot do.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have the answer now, Mr. Nice.

25 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

1 JUDGE KWON: General, it is not true that Russian delegate agreed

2 upon the items on (a) and (b); i.e., a comprehensive arms embargo and

3 refusal to supply equipment to Yugoslavia?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The Russian delegate did agree

5 to these paragraphs. My personal opinion was somewhat different, but it

6 was not taken into account.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

8 MR. NICE: I'll move on. If the usher could help, please.

9 Q. The next document, which we won't linger on, is the letter of the

10 27th of March.

11 The following page, just for display, is the annex. Perhaps I can

12 just look at this very briefly, or couple of passages on this.

13 We see under paragraph 2, General Ivasov, that under this annex of

14 the meeting of the 25th of March of 1998, it's recorded that: "In London,

15 the group called upon President Milosevic to take rapid and effective

16 steps to end the violence in Kosovo and commit himself to a political

17 solution through unconditional dialogue." And that the group adopted a

18 plan to advance these goals.

19 And at paragraph 5 it recorded that: "Since our meeting in London

20 there has been progress in some areas of concern, notably some movement in

21 Belgrade's position on dialogue on a range of issues, including the

22 autonomy of Kosovo and the conclusions of the long-overdue agreement on

23 implementation of the education accord."

24 If you would be good enough, Usher, to take us to the next page.

25 Just taking, I hope, appropriate selections from a long document.

1 Paragraph 9 sets out how: "Unless the Federal Republic of

2 Yugoslavia takes steps to resolve the serious political and human rights

3 issues in Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement in its

4 international standing."

5 Going down to paragraph 10. The group reaffirmed its "Strong

6 opposition to all terrorist" -- my emphasis -- "to terrorist actions.

7 Violence does not contribute to the search for a solution in Kosovo. This

8 applies equally to Serbian police and Kosovar Albanian extremists."

9 Paragraph 10 welcomes Dr. Rugova's clear commitment to

10 non-violence and urges others to follow that leadership. It goes on to

11 say: "Belgrade authorities cannot, however, justify their repression and

12 violence in Kosovo in the name of anti-terrorist activities. We repeat

13 that the way to combat terrorism is for Belgrade to offer the Kosovar

14 Albanian community a genuine political process."

15 And at paragraph 13 the group explains its fundamental position as

16 remaining the same. "We support neither independence nor the maintenance

17 of the status quo as the end result of negotiations between Belgrade

18 authorities and the Kosovo Albanian leadership on the status of Kosovo."

19 So I realise to save time I've only read some extracts, but do you

20 have any challenge to the passages I've read out of that particular

21 document?

22 A. I support, and I did participate in the drafting of several

23 paragraphs of this document, but I wish to emphasise once again, the

24 Russian representative, just as all the others, were unofficial

25 participants. However, I do not support the conclusions referring to

1 repression and violence as applied to terrorists. I have a different

2 position, and I have stated it many times, including to the readership of

3 Yugoslavia. It was the position of the defence ministry. I said it was

4 necessary to be more active in making arrests and neutralising the leaders

5 of terrorist organisations in order to minimise casualties among the

6 civilian population.

7 In other words, I agree with some of the conclusions and don't

8 agree with the others. But you have to bear in mind that the Russian

9 representative was not an official representative, just as the Contact

10 Group was not an official body itself.

11 Q. I think you've made that point several times.

12 A. It was very useful, though, in reaching a peaceful settlement.

13 Q. And I --

14 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mr. Nice. For the benefit of the

15 transcript, I would like to check whether the witness had really said that

16 he supported and he did participate in the drafting of several paragraphs

17 of this document. Did you say so? You did participate in the drafting of

18 several paragraphs of this document or you said you did not?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did participate as an expert, as

20 an expert. And I made suggestions only on the issue of building up

21 measures of political solution. That was my position and the position

22 held by the Russian defence ministry.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. Thank you. So that your colleague and all those on the Contact

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Group had the real benefit of your input, General, didn't they?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. Next page, please, is the letter of the 30th of April.

4 And one passage from -- if you could just display that. It's the letter

5 sending -- and then we see the following page, the annex. There's only

6 one paragraph for comment. Paragraph 3:

7 "The Contact Group condemns the increase in violence in recent

8 days in Kosovo. In particular, the excessive use of force by the Yugoslav

9 army and the proliferation of arms in the territory. The Contact Group

10 absolutely rejects terrorism as a means of bringing about political

11 change, as well as all other violence to suppress political dissent. The

12 Contact Group calls upon political leaders in the Federal Republic of

13 Yugoslavia and in the countries of the region to exercise maximum

14 restraint, full respect for human rights, and to prevent the introduction

15 of arms and of armed groups from outside, and to condemn terrorism."

16 General Ivasov, an entirely fair position for the Contact Group to

17 have taken?

18 A. I cannot comment on the entire document because I don't have it in

19 front of me, but as for condemning terrorism and putting an end to the

20 arms supply and the increasing of terrorist activity, yes, those segments

21 I do support. But as for the use of excessive force, this is phrased in

22 general terms.

23 I said yesterday, and I can confirm today that Russia and its

24 military delegations discussed in detail with their Yugoslav counterparts

25 the use of military force in fight with terrorists. I can tell you that I

1 saw a number of orders limiting the activity of military troops, and I can

2 give you the numbers of those orders.

3 Within the military, there is military prosecutor's office and

4 military court. So those who violate military law and disobey orders can

5 be prosecuted. Such courts existed, and there were trials against

6 violators, and I can tell you that I'm sure that law was applied in cases

7 where excessive force was used.

8 Q. You're repeating what you told us yesterday, and of course if

9 there is going to be evidence of these prosecutions we'll see it in due

10 course, but perhaps you'd just help us with this: Within this period,

11 1998, were you yourself in Kosovo at all at any time?

12 A. During what period of time?

13 Q. 1998.

14 A. In 1998, no, I was not in Kosovo. My officers were there, the

15 officers who reported back to me.

16 Q. Next letter, please, Usher, is the 24th of June of 1998. And then

17 the annex which follows it. If we could display that.

18 The annex at 3 is what I will read, and possibly paragraph 6.

19 From the 12th of June meeting reads as follows: "Security forces have

20 again intervened indiscriminately, causing many civilian casualties and

21 forcing tens of thousands of inhabitants to flee their homes. Ministers

22 condemned Belgrade's massive and disproportionate use of force, which has

23 resulted in widespread destruction and the deliberate displacement of

24 large numbers of people. They also condemned the failure by Belgrade to

25 take concrete steps to reduce tensions. Ministers therefore decided to

1 put the authorities in Belgrade a set of essential points on which they

2 required immediate action to prevent any further deterioration in the

3 situation. These cover concrete measures:" and then set out:

4 "To cease all actions by the security forces affecting the

5 civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for

6 civilian repression;

7 "To enable effective and continuous international monitoring in

8 Kosovo and allow unimpeded access for monitors;

9 "To facilitate an agreement with the office of the United Nations

10 High Commissioner for Refugees and the Red Cross the full return to their

11 homes of refugees and displaced persons and to allow free and unimpeded

12 access for humanitarian organisations and supplies to Kosovo;

13 "To make rapid progress in the dialogue with Kosovo Albanian

14 leadership."

15 And if the usher would be good enough to take us to the following

16 page. That's paragraph 6 and 7. "Ministers expect that Belgrade will

17 take the steps set out in paragraph 3 above immediately. They welcomed

18 the invitation by President Yeltsin to President Milosevic to a meeting on

19 16th of June. They stressed the importance to President Milosevic taking

20 advantage of that meeting to announce progress on the above steps and to

21 commit Belgrade to their -- to their implementation in full. If the steps

22 set out in paragraph 3 are not taken without delay, there will be moves to

23 adopt further measures to halt the violence and protect the civilian

24 population, including those that may require the authorisation of a

25 Security Council resolution."

1 Paragraph 7: "In the meantime, ministers also urged the

2 International Criminal Tribunal to undertake investigation, agreed to give

3 active support to UNHCR, and undertook efforts to assist neighbouring

4 countries to improve their security."

5 General, this meeting of the Contact Group is acting on the basis

6 of information including that which came from you and your offices. Is

7 there any reason to doubt the depiction it gives of the position in

8 Kosovo?

9 A. Our representatives within the Contact Group received this

10 information and, to a certain extent, passed it on. However, we closely

11 followed how the Yugoslav side was implementing the recommendation, and I

12 will read you two brief lines: "The order of the commander of the

13 Pristina Corps, number 45520. Ensure a high level of responsibility of

14 all servicemen of the Yugoslav army with respect to issued orders. All

15 violators to face action and prosecution." A directive of the General

16 Staff was issued signed by General Ojdanic about the measures of

17 servicemen in the territory where there was terrorist activity. Where it

18 is stated that "killing the persons who were imprisoned, wounding them,

19 was prohibited without previous court order."

20 This also refers to civilian population --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you. I'm stopping you, General.

22 There seems to be a pattern in your answers which is to provide

23 information which does not relate to the question that was asked. It's

24 perhaps a lawyer-like practice, and I don't say so in a disparaging

25 manner, being a lawyer myself, but please attend to the specific question

1 asked.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm grateful for that. Normally I apply

3 my new rule, which is not try, try and try again, but try, try, and give

4 up. I think this time I'll move on after my first attempt because we've

5 got quite a lot of material to cover.

6 If the usher would take us to the next letter, which is the letter

7 of the 6th of July. And --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes. Yes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the question was not

10 put properly with regard to the quotation. Mr. Nice quoted item 3 of this

11 annex and failed to quote item 4, which basically balances out item 3, and

12 it says there that ministers expect Kosovo Albanian leadership to --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is a classic example of how you can

14 re-examine. You can re-examine on that and put it to the witness,

15 Mr. Milosevic. That's a classical function of re-examination.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm telling this to

17 you, because everything that was done by the Contact Group - and we have

18 evidence of that in these papers - was to balance out the action of legal

19 forces and the action of terrorists. Nowadays, nobody in this world would

20 do something like that. Would you imagine a statement nowadays where it

21 would be stated that --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've -- I've stopped you because you're going

23 beyond the permissible limit of a comment.

24 It is open to you to re-examine on this matter, to say to the

25 witness in re-examination, "You have been asked about paragraph 3. Now

1 I'm putting to you the substance of what is in paragraph 4," and that's

2 it, and you would have dealt with the point.

3 Mr. Nice.

4 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

5 Q. Incidentally, General, before I move to the next -- and I'm nearly

6 at the end of this exercise -- the next letter, you've been quoting from

7 Pristina Corps documents. Where did you obtain them from, because we've

8 had some difficulty.

9 A. Yes. I can give you the dates and the numbers of orders --

10 Q. Where did you get them?

11 A. -- and both those issued by the Ministry of Defence, the General

12 Staff, and the Pristina Corps. All of these orders were classified. I

13 made excerpts for myself, and these excerpts were brought in to us by

14 Russian representatives in the Verification Mission.

15 Why did they do that? They did that because any analysis must

16 include the analysis of legal documents, orders, legal provisions, and so

17 on, and then follow on to analyse how they were implemented. This is

18 exactly the procedure that Russian representatives followed. I can give

19 you the numbers.

20 Q. Maybe later if time allows.

21 MR. NICE: Next page, please, Usher.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I would like to hear

25 from you, based on what Mr. Nice has just said, whether Mr. Nice claims

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 that they do not have any documents of the Yugoslav army from the time

2 period of NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, meaning orders of Pristina

3 Corps, General Staff, Supreme Command, and so on. Is Mr. Nice claiming

4 that they do not have such documents in their possession?

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not an appropriate question for me to put

6 to Mr. Nice. Mr. Nice knows how to manage his case.

7 MR. NICE: Next document, please, Usher, which is, I think, the

8 letter of the 16th of July. Can you put the next document on, please,

9 which is the letter of the 16th of July. Yes, and then the annex. Thank

10 you very much, you're ahead of me as ever.

11 Q. I only want to read from the meeting on the 8th of July,

12 paragraph 3, the first bullet point, so it's a bit further down the page.

13 "Contact Group noted that:

14 "The withdrawal of security forces for civilian repression has

15 not yet been carried out, although the security forces have shown some

16 measure of restraint recently;

17 "Rapid progress in the dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian

18 leadership has not been achieved.

19 "The Contact Group acknowledged the significance of the

20 undertakings given by President Milosevic in his meeting with President

21 Yeltsin on the 16th of June and emphasised the need for them to be fully

22 implemented.

23 "It noted President Milosevic's commitment to allow international

24 observers free and unrestricted access to Kosovo ..."

25 I'm not going to read any more, but I'm trying to read a balanced

1 part of all these documents.

2 Are you happy with that part of the document?

3 A. Mr. Nice, I gave -- I was against and I still am against an equal

4 treatment of legal authorities and terrorists. There was no analysis of

5 any laws, regulations, and orders. None of that was done. Therefore, for

6 me to evaluate and give you a yes or no answer is very difficult,

7 especially since I do not see the document in its entirety. Each item,

8 each paragraph of the documents of the Contact Group is a compromise of

9 either the preceding paragraph or the subsequent one.

10 Q. They're all available to be considered in full, and we'll come

11 just to the conclusion of this bundle of documents. Just so that the

12 usher puts them on the page sequentially, we come eventually to the

13 conclusions of the 22nd of January, 1999. And this a meeting on that

14 date. Chairman's conclusions. In the middle that page:

15 "The Contact Group looks to the FRY to stop all offensive actions

16 or repressions in Kosovo;

17 "To promote the safe return home of those persons displaced in the

18 past few days from the Racak area and to take all steps to avoid a

19 humanitarian catastrophe;

20 "Permit the KVM and its chief of mission to carry out their

21 responsibilities unimpeded;

22 "To cooperate fully with the ICTY, in particular ... access to

23 investigators;

24 "To work with the Tribunal to ensure that those responsible for

25 Racak are brought to justice;

1 "To suspend those VJ or MUP officers operating in Racak on the

2 15th of January pending the results of the investigation ...;

3 "And to comply fully with OSCE/FRY and NATO/FRY agreements ..."

4 And if we then go over, please, Usher, to the next document I'll

5 ask a compendious question, which I think is a letter of the 29th of

6 January followed by an annex in two pages. And if you'd go to the second

7 page of the annex, we see a list of demands by the Contact Group that the

8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stop offensive action, comply with

9 agreements and resolutions, promote the safe return of those forced to

10 flee, cooperate with the OSCE and the KVM, cooperate with this Tribunal,

11 investigate Racak, suspend certain officers and police. And there we are.

12 Now, that's records of the Contact Group at the end of the period

13 where it made those demands on Yugoslavia. Those simply reflected, did

14 they not, General, a combination of events with repression and excesses

15 revealed by the forces of Yugoslavia as well as terrorist activity or

16 however so described by the KLA?

17 A. Your Honour, it is difficult for me to answer Mr. Nice's

18 questions. First of all, I don't know what the position was of the

19 Russian side and its proposals. I was not a direct participant in these

20 events. And the third is that these are not official documents.

21 Therefore, it is very difficult for me now to give an assessment of this

22 large set of documents. I can answer specific questions, but I cannot

23 answer questions of these nature that require a very extensive analysis.

24 Q. In which case my last question on this topic is as follows: You

25 explained in answer to His Honour Judge Kwon and to me that you had been

1 really fully engaged in drafting one of these reports and that your -- and

2 your office's information had been available to the Contact Group at that

3 time. Did that continue throughout the period of the Contact Group so

4 that your input was -- and your office's input was available at all times

5 to the Contact Group through the Russian representative?

6 A. Mr. Nice, I did not say that I was a full participant. Either

7 there was a mistake in -- in interpretation or there was some other

8 misunderstanding there. I said that I took part in drafting some of the

9 documents as an expert.

10 As for your second question, the officers of the Verification

11 Mission supplied information to the Contact Group, and I can tell you

12 right away that they did not do that. They reported back to their

13 superiors, and then that information was compiled together, and as such it

14 could have been sent either to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or

15 elsewhere and thus reach the representative. I don't know exactly what

16 was the extent of the information that he received. No officers of the

17 Russian army ever supplied any information to the Contact Group.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honours, before we move to give exhibit numbers to

19 the Contact Group material, I can provide for you, if it would be helpful,

20 and have marked as exhibits the report I relied on of the

21 Secretary-General of the 30th of April, where he refers to the role of the

22 Contact Group. That hasn't yet been produced in evidence.

23 I can also produce Resolution 1199, which leads up to the October

24 agreement, and that hasn't been produced in evidence. They are now

25 available.

1 So that if they were all to be produced, the sensible course might

2 be to put them in their logical order, which, with your leave, would be

3 first the report, and that's now available for distribution.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before we do that, let us hear Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These documents of the Contact Group

6 have nothing to do with the evidence given by General Ivasov. General

7 Ivasov was not involved with Contact Group. He did not work there. He

8 doesn't even share the assessments of the Contact Group. He did not refer

9 to the documents of the Contact Group, and no documents of the Contact

10 Group can be admitted through this witness.

11 If Mr. Nice wants to tender them, then he should do it through a

12 witness that was involved with the work of the Contact Group, not through

13 General Ivasov. If we applied this procedure, then we could probably

14 tender into evidence the Dutch papers stating or reporting that General

15 Ivasov is in town today.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I am not in agreement with you, Mr. Milosevic.

17 The witness was able to comment on several passages put to him by

18 Mr. Nice, and it's quite proper for this document to be exhibited.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm grateful. May the Security Council

20 report of the 30th of April, 1998, I quoted -- thank you very much. 789.

21 THE REGISTRAR: 789.

22 MR. NICE: May Resolution 1199 --

23 THE REGISTRAR: 790, and then 791 for the whole bunch of documents

24 with tab 1 to tab 11.

25 MR. NICE: Thank you very much for that.

1 Q. General, the October agreements were that which KVM monitored, and

2 just to remind everyone, before KVM, as you will probably know, there were

3 various independent KDOM missions, including from Russia, America,

4 England, I think France and some others. Some of those KDOM missions

5 merging into KVM, all of them except for part of the American KDOM mission

6 which remained separate. This is just to remind everybody of evidence

7 we've heard.

8 But because of the position that you take, I just want to check

9 that you will check your observations on some evidence of General Klaus

10 Naumann, the most senior military member of NATO present at the time, and

11 he said that to the best of his knowledge, he thought that the Yugoslav

12 authorities honoured the October agreement because they withdrew their

13 forces to barracks, and this was not an easy thing to do, to bring 6.000

14 police officers back, and that he explained - this is Klaus Naumann - that

15 they were optimistic at the end of October that they had achieved a

16 breakthrough.

17 Now, let me not mislead you, General Ivasov. You have made some

18 very serious allegations about NATO and about its objectivity and about

19 its complicity and I don't know what. This is what Klaus Naumann said:

20 He says, "Initially the Yugoslav authorities honoured the agreement and

21 were optimistic." Do you think that Klaus Naumann got it right?

22 A. I think Klaus Naumann was right to the extent that Yugoslav

23 authorities did honour their obligations, the demands that were made to

24 them at a diplomatic level but were backed with threats of military force.

25 As early as summer of 1998, Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Solana, stated

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 that all options have been taken into account, and NATO was prepared to

2 mount airstrikes and ground operation. After that, concerning the

3 agreement of the 16th October, he stated --

4 Q. General --

5 A. -- that NATO forces were prepared to start strikes within 96

6 hours. Strikes against Yugoslavia. This was the military pressure

7 applied.

8 I agree with Naumann about the fact that Yugoslav army and

9 Yugoslav leadership even agreed to violate their own sovereignty by

10 allowing NATO planes to conduct reconnaissance in their airspace and on

11 their territory. This is the violation of one country's sovereignty.

12 However, Mr. Milosevic did it in order to avoid military intervention. He

13 agreed to that.

14 And I would like to point to the attention of Their Honours that

15 Yugoslav forces, legal forces, from the summer until fall of 1998

16 inflicted significant losses to the terrorist organisations. After

17 Yugoslav army and police pulled back to their barracks, the number of

18 terrorist acts in the area increased by four times, and this despite the

19 presence of Verification Mission and air reconnaissance.

20 Q. General, you know, you can, if you like - I'm sure the Judges will

21 prefer this - answer questions previously where they are susceptible to

22 brevity.

23 I was going to come to the matter you've now raised, you see,

24 because Klaus Naumann, representative of this organisation NATO that you

25 characterised in the way you did yesterday, told the Court this, and it's

1 transcript page 6995. He told the Court: "In all fairness, to the best

2 information I got from the reports on the ground from KDOM and later on

3 from the KVM, many of the incidents were triggered by the UCK" -- KLA --

4 "who obviously tried to exploit the vacuum created by the withdrawn Serb

5 security forces and who then sneaked in to take control of regions or

6 areas. They also, I think, launched provocations, and they were not free

7 of violence in doing so."

8 This is the most senior representative of NATO speaking to this

9 Court. You have not a word of objection to what he said, do you? You'd

10 agree with it.

11 A. Will you please specify one thing. I must confess I wasn't quite

12 paying attention, Mr. Nice. I apologise. Just tell me who sneaked into

13 what zones and provoked violence. Did you mean state authorities or the

14 KLA?

15 Q. The KLA into the areas vacated by the forces that were withdrawn.

16 A. Yes. We had an abundant amount of information to the effect that

17 indeed the terrorist organisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army -- Your

18 Honour, I'll read again from an order. "Albanian terrorist forces have

19 been reorganised, equipped with modern arms --"

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've stopped you. I've stopped you for the

21 reasons that I've already explained.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. You see, Klaus Naumann went on, General Klaus Naumann went on to

24 say this, he said: "The problem is that in many cases, as far as I have

25 seen later on, particularly in the course of November and December, the

1 Serb side reacted again in a disproportionate way. It was, if I may say

2 so, the old attitude to react to an incident where perhaps an individual

3 had tried to kill or had killed a police officer."

4 He went on -- so bear that in mind, please, because I want to

5 finish this passage. He went on to say the following things, speaking of

6 NATO, that NATO lacked an instrument, how to get the KLA under control and

7 how to influence them, because he said in his NATO capacity, he was never

8 allowed to talk to the UCK man, the KLA man, or representative because

9 NATO had initially called these people terrorists, and the iron rule was

10 that NATO will never negotiate with terrorists.

11 That's something which is not unimportant if you look at the

12 composition of NATO, he said, since in some NATO countries we have

13 terrorist movements.

14 And then finally, he said that after December they saw increased

15 violence by both sides.

16 Now, this is the man who headed NATO, and I've, of course,

17 summarised the passage of his evidence, but I hope fairly. Is there

18 anything in what I've summarised to you that is not fair and accurate? He

19 was on the ground.

20 A. I have only respect for General Naumann. I had many discussions

21 with him over the Kosovo problem. He's right in saying that NATO could

22 not do any policing, and that is why we suggested, instead of military

23 pressure, to deploy international police forces, and that is something

24 that Mr. Naumann agreed with.

25 However, there is one important point here. When Mr. Naumann is

1 saying that if one policeman is killed it is not all right to use

2 excessive force in reaction. It was recognised, both within NATO and

3 within the Contact Group, that a terrorist network had been established, a

4 very broad organisation numbering many thousands of armed men. And every

5 terrorist act, such as the murder of a policeman or a peaceful citizen,

6 could not be dealt with by just two policemen. Of course there had to be

7 a reaction. But most of the terrorist acts were wide-scale, massive,

8 well-planned actions. In order to detect terrorists, arrest them, or

9 liquidate them, it was necessary to use major forces, primarily of the

10 security forces but also the army.

11 And I wish to point out one more thing. This is the leadership of

12 the General Staff and official orders which forbid the use of heavy

13 weaponry. Certain particular actions were forbidden under the regulations

14 and the legislation. And based on these orders, we concluded that all the

15 necessary measures were taken to avoid the use of heavy weaponry and to

16 avoid collateral damage to civilian population. But we do not deny that

17 certain excesses could have happened involving individual troops.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I said thank you, General.

19 Mr. Nice.

20 MR. NICE: We now move to the next topic upon which -- I move to

21 the next topic on which you ventured an opinion, namely the accuracy of

22 reporting of the KVM mission which was in the theatre between the late

23 autumn of 1998 and the 20th of March of 1999.

24 Were you yourself there? You weren't there in 1998. Were you

25 there at all yourself before the 20th of March of 1999?

1 A. Mr. Nice, I occupied a rather high position, and I did not

2 organise any military actions. However, I led military observers. I gave

3 them tasks, and I visited Belgrade very often.

4 I did not have any need to go out directly into the field or visit

5 the areas of combat action or even the area where the mission was working.

6 Q. To remind yourself -- to remind you, rather, and to just remind

7 the Chamber if it needs reminding, the KVM reporting system was from field

8 officer or field office up to a coordination centre, to a regional centre,

9 and then to Pristina, for example, and then to Ambassador Walker. We have

10 heard in court, as a Defence witness, somebody who for, I think, two or

11 three weeks ran a field office, a man called Keith. We have some material

12 in the form of regular reporting in documents, and we've heard from people

13 at the regional level, Maisonneuve and Ciaglinski, as well as General

14 Drewienkiewicz, one of Walker's deputies.

15 Tell us, please, again, why it is you say that the reports of

16 which we have heard in evidence are unreliable.

17 A. Mr. Nice, the references I made to several orders and laws were an

18 integral part of the work and the reports of Russian observers.

19 Second, Russian observers always started their work by studying

20 the laws and decisions of the state authorities of whatever region they

21 were sent to. However -- and let me add, they sent their reports to their

22 superior officers. However, in Mr. Walker's reports, you will see no

23 mention, no reference to any analysis of legislation or regulations.

24 Furthermore, Mr. Walker and many other NATO representatives did

25 not analyse the orders issued to the police and the army. How could they

1 make any conclusions about the legal or illegal character of their

2 actions?

3 There is probably a number of other arguments I could make to

4 explain that they did not do their work conscientiously. And the reports

5 they sent to the OSCE did not reflect the objective, the real picture.

6 Q. Now, this is a -- I think something different. No complaint,

7 General, but maybe a little different than how you expressed it yesterday.

8 Your concern is that the reports didn't focus on the legislative or

9 regulatory framework of the military or the police. Is that what you're

10 saying?

11 A. Well, Prosecution is focusing precisely on officials who held

12 official positions, who issued orders, who made the rules. And when you

13 collect your evidence only by interviewing refugees going to Macedonia or

14 interviewing terrorists, members of the KLA, and accidental passersby,

15 that is also necessary, perhaps. But I, for instance, instructed our

16 observers that they should start their work by interviewing officials, by

17 studying the rules, the regulations, and the legislation of the state

18 authorities and hearing the evidence of the -- of the other party.

19 Obviously Mr. Walker's mission had a different approach.

20 Q. Again just to remind you, if you weren't aware of this, and to

21 refresh our memories, the mission started off with a large number of

22 military personnel because they were said to be typically more readily

23 available, the intention being, in due course, to transfer to one that

24 would be more built on those with election experience and similar. And

25 the reporting was factual, it was simply to report on what was happening

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 on the ground, there being specific lines of communication established

2 with both the Serb forces and with the KLA, thus to get over, for example,

3 the problem that NATO had about dealing with people described as

4 terrorists.

5 And what I want from you, and I don't think you've helped me yet,

6 is I want to know why, and I'm going to hold them up, exhibits of this

7 kind, which are the reports that are in evidence and that I may ask you to

8 look at, why they are not factually reliable. So I don't understand it,

9 what you're saying. Why aren't they factually reliable?

10 A. If you want to talk in broad terms, Mr. Walker's mission was, on

11 the one hand, an attempt to find a peaceful solution, to restore peace to

12 Kosovo. And on the other hand, it was a detail, a cog in the wheel of

13 that large operation that I talked about yesterday.

14 For instance, on what basis did NATO constantly arrogate the right

15 to concentrate its military forces, to assume functions that normally

16 belonged to the United Nations, and to circumvent the legal bodies? And

17 in this process of Kosovo and --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, again. Mr. Nice, it's open to you to

19 stop the witness.

20 MR. NICE: I will if you want. It's just -- well, Your Honour,

21 I'm always reluctant to interfere because interference has its negative

22 side, but I will be more pro-active if the Chamber would like. It also

23 sometimes gives the false impression that I'm troubled by the answer.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: There's no jury here.

25 MR. NICE: I'm grateful for that -- I'm not grateful for that, I

1 simply observe it.

2 Q. General, if you can't explain to me -- no. It's not for me.

3 You raised yesterday that these reports are unreliable. I want to

4 explore on what ground you're saying they're unreliable, because if you

5 don't give a ground for their unreliability, I'm simply going to move on

6 to another topic.

7 Can you explain why, in factual terms, these reports are

8 unreliable?

9 A. Mr. Nice, those international commissions who were not under

10 NATO's control provided different reports. Please note down I'm not going

11 to comment. A Report of the OSCE, Kosovo, As Seen As Told. That was the

12 name of the report. October 1998 - October 1999. That is also a report

13 of the OSCE but outside of NATO control. And the conclusions you find

14 there are completely different. There are some conclusions that coincide,

15 there are others that don't.

16 I also base my claim on the fact that the reports were made --

17 Q. We have the document. It's an exhibit in the case. It's being

18 considered. Which conclusions are different?

19 A. The conclusions, in principle, are really different. I quote:

20 "Prior to the NATO operation, Serb forces" -- and I underline "prior to

21 the NATO operation," and you will not find this in Walker's report --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You said, "I quote." What are you quoting from?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I'm quoting. It is the

24 OSCE report just shown by Mr. Nice. It is an exhibit here, I understand.

25 It is a report by independent experts.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... paragraph or

2 chapter or page?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I cannot give you the

4 page because I just noted down certain excerpts from it in longhand.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll allow you to --

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For instance, there is a chapter

7 about violence in Kosovo.

8 May I quote, then?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

10 MR. NICE: Yes, we'll find it later.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll try to find it. Go ahead.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Prior to the NATO operation, the

13 Serb army and organs of law enforcement acted harshly only in areas of

14 concentration of the KLA. Punitive actions were targeted only against

15 terrorists and separatist organisations openly supporting combat

16 operations until they achieved freedom of their territory."

17 If you compare this passage to its equivalent in Walker's report,

18 you will see that the conclusions are very different.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very good. We have the OSCE. In the break,

20 Mr. Nice will try to find the passage.

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. Yes. General, can you tell us, was it from the first couple of

23 pages of the book or did you read all of it or consider all of the book?

24 A. It was a chapter that speaks of the escalation of violence. That

25 could be the title, I think.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. We're going to take a break now for

2 20 minutes.

3 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

4 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to caution you that I used up

8 215 minutes in my examination-in-chief. Mr. Nice is entitled to 60 per

9 cent of my time, and he has already used 150 minutes, and you did not

10 caution him in time. He has overstepped his time limit by a great deal.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: On many occasions, Mr. Milosevic, you were

12 allowed additional time in cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses. In

13 the Chamber's view, the overtime is entirely appropriate and warranted on

14 this occasion, but I take note of the point that you have made.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, let me just --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: In event, it will be adjusted.

17 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, I took the general encouragement to

18 take the time allowed to be a global rather than a particular witness one,

19 and a witness like this coming with the range of material without any

20 warning was one who was going to take some time, but of course I'm

21 absolutely anxious to be as short as I can.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: As I said, Mr. Milosevic, in any event, an

23 adjustment will be made so there will be no loss of time to you.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm afraid we can't find the reference in

25 "As Seen, As Told." I would ask the usher just to lay on the overhead

1 projector this passage highlighted in yellow.

2 Q. Because, General, you came to Court with one extract from "As

3 Seen, As Told," the report There are two reports, by the way. I don't

4 know if you knew that. This is the one we think you had in mind. You

5 should know that this same report upon which you rely to show the

6 unreliability of KVM reporting includes this in its executive summary or

7 its opening paragraph: "The scale on which human rights violations recur

8 is staggering. It has been estimated that over 90 per cent of the Kosovo

9 Albanian population - over 1.45 million people - were displaced by the

10 conflict by the 9 June 1999. The death toll as yet can only be guessed

11 at, but the prevalence of confirmed reports and witness statements about

12 individual and group killings in this report is indicative. The violence

13 meted out to people as recounted vividly, particularly in the statements

14 of refugees, was extreme and appalling."

15 I don't want to read further. General, this is a report that you

16 rely on to show the unreliability of the raw material before this Trial

17 Chamber, but just help me, is this conclusion of the "As Seen, As Told"

18 report something that you accept or not? Because it's part of the

19 evidence in this case.

20 A. What in particular?

21 Q. Well, where it's said that the scale of human rights violations is

22 staggering and where it says that 1.45 million people were displaced, for

23 example. Do you accept that?

24 A. I accept that insofar as the report deals with violations of human

25 rights, primarily by terrorist organisations. As for the number of

1 displaced persons, I cannot confirm it, but that the massive exodus of

2 refugees began with the start of the NATO bombing is something that I

3 support and confirm.

4 Q. I'll come back to that. Staying with the KVM, General

5 Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Walker were not asked, no complaints to you about

6 this, General, were not asked all the questions that were raised by your

7 evidence yesterday. Please confirm that there was a Russian deputy, part

8 of the KVM, who would have been present at every one of Ambassador

9 Walker's morning briefings.

10 A. How do you translate "Russian deputy"? Do you mean deputy to the

11 parliament or a Russian representative?

12 Q. No, no. Representative.

13 A. A Russian representative, yes, he was present.

14 Q. So that any bias by Ambassador Walker or those reporting to him

15 could have been detected by the Russian representative, documented, and

16 then reflected in your evidence here?

17 A. Let me note that in October 19 -- excuse me, December 1998, our

18 representative submitted a report to our Defence Minister Marshal Sergeyev

19 and submitted another long report to me in which the representative noted

20 precisely such facts; namely, that the reports by the Russian

21 representative are received but not taken into account.

22 Q. Well, have you --

23 A. The representative in question was Mr. Ivanovski.

24 Q. Have you brought that report with you?

25 A. I didn't know that the question would arise. If I had known, I

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 could have brought it, and I would probably have needed a whole plane to

2 fill with documents.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. That specific report, you can get?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a verbal report, and I

5 remember maps were laid out when he reported to the defence minister and

6 briefed me. And that happened in Belgrade in December.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. You said he submitted a report, which would

8 lead one to believe that there was a written report.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It was a verbal report on the

10 situation that had developed in the mission. The situation was that the

11 input of the Russian and some other representatives of non-NATO countries

12 were not being taken into account. That is what he reported.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... when that

14 report was submitted, that oral report?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was the marshal of Russia and

16 simultaneously Defence Minister Sergeyev, there was myself and two of my

17 officers.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: General, what was done about it in the light of

19 this report?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Marshal Sergeyev set the task of

21 firmly promoting our interests and forwarding our reports to the

22 headquarters so that they be taken into account. And upon return from

23 Belgrade, he spoke about it at one of his meetings with NATO, and he also

24 informed the foreign ministry.

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. You see, General, if there is any substance in the complaint, you

2 could have, or your marshal could have, complained to Vienna, could have

3 complained to Ambassador Walker, could have required further detailed

4 reporting to your representative who was at every one of Walker's daily

5 meetings.

6 Now, I cannot know one way or another what was said in an oral

7 report, but what I suggest to you is that there's no real substance in the

8 complaint that you're making; and indeed, just to complete it, had this

9 been raised, the position of the Prosecution through witnesses would

10 almost certainly have been that the Russians were very well used in the

11 mission, were very well distributed, as were the Ukrainians, not least, of

12 course, because the Ukrainians were able to communicate linquistically

13 directly with the people on the ground. They were well used and well

14 relied on.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you putting that as a question?

16 MR. NICE: I'm putting that as a proposition.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What could I do? Upon return to

18 Russia, I could seek written confirmation from the observers who worked on

19 the mission and forward these reports to this Tribunal.

20 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, I'm going to move on from the

21 reliability of the reports, because I don't think the witness can help us

22 further. I would respectfully remind the Court of the exercise we went

23 through with the blue book, and we've only had one ground-level witness,

24 and that was the witness Keith. I'll just deal with that with this

25 witness, actually.

1 Q. General Ivasov, I should ask for your comment on this. I don't

2 know if you've seen the evidence or had it reported to you, but the only I

3 think ground-level reporting officer, the man Keith, who was called by

4 this accused as one of the accused's witnesses, produced a couple of his

5 daily reports and found that everything in it, effectively, was faithfully

6 reported in the compendious reporting document known as the blue book.

7 Now, do you have any reason to doubt that the blue book is indeed an

8 accurate - this is a compendious account - an accurate report of the

9 events on the ground?

10 A. I don't know Mr. Keith, therefore, I cannot comment on the blue

11 book. I based my opinion on the official documents that I received.

12 Q. And the verbal report.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Which official documents?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, the same report by

15 Mr. Walker, the OSCE documents, as well as the official reports sent in by

16 the representatives of Russia within the mission who worked on the ground.

17 MR. NICE: I don't know if there's any of this material that's

18 going to be produced to us, but in the absence of it I'm just going to

19 move on.

20 May I help the Chamber in relation to one of the things or two of

21 the things that the witness said yesterday. This calls for no answer by

22 the witness, although he may wish to make a comment.

23 It is accepted that there were present in the KVM at least some

24 people who had been trained by or had experience with the American

25 organisation MPRI, and I do not challenge that members of the KLA may have

1 been trained by such people.

2 The Rule 68 regime under which I now work has been recently

3 changed by a change in the Rule, and the Chamber will understand the

4 difficulties I sometimes face with producing in written form the material

5 that I might wish to do, but I've made, I hope, adequate concessions to

6 ensure that there is no unfairness.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please clarify what you

8 have in mind. I never stated that members of the Verification Mission had

9 been recruited or used by that organisation. What I said was that in the

10 territory of Albania, there were training camps where persons recruited by

11 these organisations were observed. I never made that claim with respect

12 to any members of the mission. Please take this into account.

13 MR. NICE: Certainly. Your Honours, in light of the general

14 complaints of or criticisms about Ambassador Walker, a short collection of

15 documents, which I think I can deal with quite swiftly. They exist in

16 both English translation and B/C/S, so that there can be a B/C/S version

17 for the witness, although he may prefer to hear it through the English

18 translation. They are reports from the federal ministry -- the federal

19 foreign ministry office in Kosovo. And if they can be displayed on the

20 overhead projector in the English version so that we can follow them very,

21 very quickly.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour? Your Honour?

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to inform you that I

25 have my flight at 1600 hours today, leaving from Amsterdam.

1 MR. NICE: No problem.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So I would like you to have that in

3 mind.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is 4.00. If you leave here at a quarter to

5 two, you should get there before three. I think you're still on time.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. The first document, dated the 26th of November, 1998, described as

8 a Drewienkiewicz conversation - that's General DZ, who was a witness here

9 - and it just deals with the terminological problem of terrorism and the

10 other party, and explains: "Drewienkiewicz agreed that the two parties

11 could not be equated because one was a sovereign state and while the other

12 party certainly was not, did they consider it -- nor did they consider it

13 as such."

14 This is a small point, but the terminology of terrorism or

15 otherwise we've seen in the reports that we were looking at before, that

16 Walker and others were prepared to describe the KLA as terrorists from

17 time to time, and you would accept that, General, wouldn't you?

18 A. Yes. Precisely periodically. From time to time, they would call

19 them terrorists. But the conduct of Mr. Walker was quite surprising,

20 because he used to meet with the leaders of a terrorist organisation, and

21 moreover, some representatives of the United States and other NATO Member

22 States would meet with them in various European capitals. And there was

23 no attempt to arrest them or interview them.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. Pause. As I've explained to you through the evidence, NATO was

2 not allowed to meet terrorists, and the whole purpose of the KVM was that

3 it should be able to meet -- one of the purposes of the KVM was that it

4 should be able to negotiate with all sides, and that's what they did.

5 Now, I thought you'd accepted that, but if you don't, I rather we

6 can move on because of limited time.

7 A. I'm saying that the representatives of NATO countries would meet

8 publicly and openly with leaders of a terrorist organisation. Moreover,

9 they invited them to conferences and welcomed them warmly there. And they

10 did not display such generosity with respect to the representatives of the

11 official authorities.

12 Q. Next document, please, has got an uncertain date but is probably

13 the 16th of December. Its subject is Walker and Loncar, and at the bottom

14 of the first page: "The subjects discussed included the latest incidents

15 provoked by Albanian terrorists on the Yugoslav/Albanian border and an

16 attack on a cafe in Pec where six Serbs were killed. What was

17 characteristic for this conversation was that, for the first time, Walker

18 described such incidents as terrorist acts, adding that a similar

19 definition had been used by Ambassador Holbrooke."

20 I think this confirms your account, I think, and we can move on,

21 agreed?

22 A. I agree with the fact that this incident did take place. On that

23 particular day I was in Belgrade, and yes, I agree with the fact that

24 Mr. Walker did not ascribe clear legal responsibility for this incident to

25 the terrorist organisation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Q. The next document is the 28th of December, mistyped as '88 in the

2 translation but it's 1998. So don't take any notice of the English

3 translation. And the subject is a conversation between Drewienkiewicz and

4 Loncar. Four lines down in the body of the report: "He said that he

5 first wished to present the current assessments of the KVM on the

6 political and security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, and the latest

7 incidents which caused the negotiated cease-fire between the MUP and the

8 so-called KLA to break down. In the way he presented the assessments and

9 conclusions of the KVM, the focus of his assessment was that MUP and the

10 Yugoslav army had acted in a legitimate way lately, but their use of force

11 was disproportionate."

12 We can go over the page, please, Usher.

13 Two lines down on the next page: "He also underlined that, in his

14 view, the KVM was doing its work well, even going beyond its tasks, since

15 it not only endeavours to verify the situation but also to contact the KLA

16 in order to exert pressure on the other side and convince them not to act

17 foolishly, attempting to convince them to withdraw to the positions held

18 in October of this year and that their provocations and 'strutting around'

19 were inappropriate in the given situation."

20 And then over the page, please, Usher, to the last page of --

21 effectively the last page of this report, seven lines down.

22 "Wishing to emphasise the good intentions, refuted by our side,,

23 of the KVM, he said that mission head Walker had given a positive

24 statement with regard to the incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian border.

25 On that occasion, he clearly verified the entire event as the legitimate

1 right of the Yugoslav side."

2 So, now, this, you see, General, is a report by the Serb side on

3 various things said by General Drewienkiewicz, and it is quite clear, is

4 it not, from the material available that they were being evenhanded in

5 what they were doing by way of reporting?

6 A. Yes, absolutely. In certain cases, especially when it had to do

7 with attempted incursions across the border and also in some other

8 instances, Mr. Walker did provide objective information. However, as for

9 the claim that disproportionate force was used, there is no legal

10 interpretation of that term. However, let me reiterate once again that

11 all legislation and all orders dealing with the Supreme Command and

12 commanding of armed forces limited the use of force and reiterated that

13 those who violate regulations will be held accountable.

14 Q. This is the sixth, seventh time you've told us that, and I'm going

15 to move on to the last document of this bundle. The 12th of January,

16 1999, again, a Serb-side report. Conversation with Aleksandar Nikolaev,

17 chief, reconstruction, KVM.

18 Can you help us, is Nikalaev a Russian?

19 A. I cannot confirm that. If you tell me more about the person,

20 perhaps -- half of people in Russia has the name of Nikalaev.

21 Q. Very well. But just look at what it says in paragraph, or listen,

22 in your case, what it says in paragraph 2:

23 "Nikalaev presented some details with regard to events in the KVM

24 after the murder of the policemen and the abduction of Yugoslav army

25 soldiers. Immediately upon receiving the news about the given incidents,

1 General Drewienkiewicz informed Walker in Washington. Ambassador Walker

2 asked General D. to hold off sending the report to Washington, 'warning'

3 him that perhaps it was a matter of misinformation and so forth.

4 "Nevertheless, General D. organised a meeting with Walker's other

5 deputies. On the basis of a majority vote, it was decided to forward the

6 report to Washington, as a result of which Walker was 'furious.'

7 "In continuation, Nikalaev informed us about the assessment of

8 the situation in Kosovo and Metohija drawn up by the KVM Department for

9 Analytical Assessments on the 9th of January."

10 Now, I'm not going to take any more time with that document, but

11 it's clear, isn't it, that the workings of the KVM were transparent to a

12 body like Russia in various ways. You had a representative at their

13 morning meetings, full reports of any little disagreements were available,

14 like this, which went to Yugoslavia, and it was a body doing a serious job

15 in a responsible and transparent way; correct?

16 A. I cannot comment upon this particular case. However, I know that

17 when Igor Ivanov, minister of foreign affairs of Russia, met with

18 Mrs. Albright and other colleagues, he did put forward this issue, namely

19 the issue on the objectivity of reporting on the events in Kosovo coming

20 from all members of the mission.

21 As for Mr. Holbrooke, that he was upset, this is an internal US

22 affair, especially since Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Walker, as well as many

23 other officials who served in European Commissions --

24 Q. Very well.

25 A. -- were representatives of the United States.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer do you have?

2 MR. NICE: I can go on but I forecast the Chamber is interested in

3 how much re-examination time the accused wants. If he wants any, then I

4 can finish in perhaps 15 or 20 minutes.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, will you be re-examining; and if

6 you will be, how long would you need?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very briefly.

8 MR. NICE: I'll finish by 25 to, or 20 to, then. That would be

9 brief.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: 25 to? I'd say half past.

11 MR. NICE: Do my best.

12 Q. There is one important matter you raised yesterday, or potentially

13 important matter, General, that the Chamber may want assistance with. You

14 suggested that the KVM was actively pursuing the general plan to dismember

15 Yugoslavia by identifying targets for bombing. That's what you said,

16 effectively. What's your evidence for that, or do you in fact have none?

17 A. There is evidence supporting that. However, so far, this evidence

18 is classified, and it was contained in the report of those monitors, the

19 report which I hope to provide to the Court upon my return to Russia.

20 Q. General, I think you should reflect on what's happened so far. If

21 you're going to refer to classified material, so far as I'm concerned, do

22 so, but you must then -- we will then seek through the Court that you

23 produce it. If you're not going to be able to produce it, I don't ask you

24 to give any answers based on it.

25 Now, are you going to be able to produce this classified material?

1 Yes or no.

2 A. I will refer to indirect information in areas where certain

3 members of the mission worked. After the 24th of March, very direct and

4 precise strikes were made, and the air reconnaissance in the area probably

5 collected information. We have reasons to believe that they collected

6 military intelligence information. There could not have been other reason

7 for their presence. How many cases would be sufficient to substantiate my

8 claim, Mr. Nice?

9 Q. Armies such as NATO would have, by all sorts of contingency

10 planning, advance knowledge of all fixed-location targets, would they not?

11 They wouldn't be dependent on an ad hoc group of available staff produced

12 for the KVM mission. They would have information way before that. As a

13 military man, you must know that.

14 A. I am a military man, and I know that military men follow orders

15 and legislation. Who authorised NATO to create armed groups and prepare

16 air strikes? What organ, what body authorised this action? Was it

17 Mr. Solana?

18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... answer the question. NATO

19 would have had advance knowledge of target sites, and it would not require

20 information from an ad hoc group like the KVM to do such work for it. Yes

21 or no.

22 A. Mr. Nice, when the Russian side supplied documents to Mr. Clark,

23 documents on training camps for terrorists, routes used for them to supply

24 weapons and other supplies, Mr. Clark claimed that NATO did not possess

25 any such information and that its intelligence services was doing a poor

1 job. So this is the only comment I can give you.

2 Q. Very well. Next point. Next point.

3 A. Verification Mission probably complemented the work of NATO

4 intelligence.

5 Q. Next point. The reports that we've heard, including "As Seen, As

6 Told," the human rights report, and so on, and the evidence of somebody

7 called Ball, an expert, all go to show or to suggest that expulsion

8 following the start of the bombing campaign was as a result of action by

9 Serb forces. I only want to know methodologically what is it that you

10 rely on to suggest it? First of all, A, did you speak to the refugees

11 yourself? That's a yes or no question.

12 A. Yes, I personally spoke through a Greek-Russian interpreter.

13 Q. To how many?

14 A. I spoke to the two of them who represented two families of

15 Albanian Catholics.

16 Q. What other evidence do you rely on to show that the bulk of the

17 evidence coming to this court about the expulsions following Serb actions

18 is wrong? What do you rely on?

19 A. I also relied on the statements of the UN Commissioner for

20 Refugees. I also relied on the UN documents indicating that there was an

21 increase, dramatic increase in the number of refugees from the beginning

22 of bombing. And yesterday I explained how this came about. People were

23 looking for shelter.

24 Q. Did you from your intelligence have any explanation for how the

25 Judges are in due course satisfied of this: Mass graves in Serbia

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 contained bodies of people killed in Kosovo, in particular at Batajnica,

2 the special anti-terrorist unit based near Belgrade? Do you, from your

3 intelligence, have any explanation for how that happened?

4 A. We received regular information from our embassy, from the

5 administration of military attache, and from other structures. We also

6 received information from the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia.

7 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... explain, can you please help

8 us, as a friendly nation with access to intelligence and information, how

9 or why bodies of people killed in Kosovo were buried in an air force base

10 -- near an air force base in Belgrade? Just yes or no, can you help us?

11 A. I had nothing to do with the burial of this -- these bodies, so I

12 cannot comment on this.

13 Q. You weren't present at Rambouillet yourself?

14 A. I was not present in Rambouillet. Russia was represented there by

15 Boris Mayorsky, who, in the second round of negotiations, was not able to

16 familiarise himself with the document presented by Mrs. Albright. And

17 this is his own account of the event. And this document was immediately

18 accepted by the Kosovo Albanians.

19 Q. The reality, General Ivasov, is that you are extremely loyal to

20 the Slav and Yugoslav cause as you perceive it; correct?

21 A. Mr. Nice, you know what? I have a lot of friends in NATO. They

22 continue to be my friends. And these are highly placed individuals.

23 Mr. Solana decorated me with a medal for cooperation with NATO. But I

24 have to say that I did not accept the medal.

25 Mr. Robertson, General-Secretary of NATO, in May of 2001, awarded

1 me with a special medal for my contribution to the cooperation with NATO.

2 Yes, I am a patriot, I love my country, but let me reiterate, I was born

3 in the Islamic republic within the Soviet Union, and I treat all

4 ethnicities with respect.

5 Q. And you, for example, when it came to the agreement that ended the

6 NATO bombing, were against the conciliatory approach taken by

7 Chernomyrdin, your superior, and indeed you obstinately refused to approve

8 of his agreement, requiring your own minister's approval of it before it

9 could be effected; correct?

10 A. I categorically declined, opposed the ultimatum issued to

11 Yugoslavia. I categorically abided by the directive of the President

12 Yeltsin, which was mandatory for all members of the delegation and which

13 was violated by Mr. Chernomyrdin. I also opposed any secret dealings that

14 took place between Mr. Talbot and Mr. Chernomyrdin.

15 And let me give you an example. When Mr. Chernomyrdin and Mr.

16 Atasari arrived in Belgrade --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... example.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. If I can just ask you this, because I want you to look at a couple

20 of clips and then I'm done, from a film. You were in fact the officer who

21 took the Russian forces to Pristina airport, precipitating near conflict

22 with NATO, and you had to withdraw them. Whether you did that on

23 Yeltsin's instructions or on your own initiative not being clear, but you

24 were the officer who made that decision?

25 A. Mr. Nice, first of all, let us clarify something. What provision

1 of the UN Charter or what paragraph of the UN Security Council

2 Resolution --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you answer the question? Can you answer the

4 question whether you were the officer who took the Russian forces to

5 Pristina airport?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was the officer who executed the

7 order of President Yeltsin. The decision of President Yeltsin and the

8 order of the minister of defence. I tried to comply with it to the best

9 of my abilities.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. I'd like you to look at some very short extracts from The Fall of

12 Milosevic programme.

13 [Videotape played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: "First of all, when there were rallies,

15 primarily outside the American embassy, I went there to see. I was

16 dressed in mufti and I was really enthusiastic about our young people who

17 evaluated this aggression as what it was, aggression."

18 [Videotape played]

19 "Mr. Chernomyrdin had in his delegation a Russian general by the

20 name of Ivasov. He said no to everything. Every conceivable proposition.

21 NATO at the core, no; total withdrawals, no. You name it, the answer

22 was no."

23 [Videotape played]

24 "Moscow was clearly up to something. Clinton's Russian advisor

25 was sent there to confront the Russian foreign minister."

1 [No interpretation]

2 "Ivanov said that he regretted to inform us that there had indeed

3 been an accidental deployment of Russian forces into Kosovo but that it

4 was an accident and they would be out in a matter of hours."

5 [No interpretation]

6 "So contrite was the Russian foreign minister that he agreed to

7 phone a statement to CNN."

8 [No interpretation]

9 "As early as he dared, the foreign minister woke his colleagues.

10 "The foreign minister now learned that his president had been

11 behind the whole operation.

12 "They decided to raise the stakes and send reinforcements to

13 Pristina airport."

14 [No interpretation]

15 "We were getting information reports that the --"

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you're now running into the

17 re-examination time.

18 MR. NICE: Yes.

19 Q. All I was going to ask you is this, and it's my final question:

20 Your reaction, we can't necessarily resolve if it was your initiative or

21 President Yeltsin's order, but your reaction generally at the time of this

22 agreement that brought to the end the bombing, and we'll hear more of this

23 from other witnesses, shows sadly, General, that you are extremely

24 committed, if not overcommitted, to what you see as the Yugoslav interest.

25 Isn't that the reality?

1 A. First of all --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... short answer

3 to that, General.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, thank you for letting

5 me see this footage. I was younger then.

6 Second, I had in my hands the president's order, and I followed

7 it. And I had no negative feelings towards the American delegation and

8 even less towards the Finnish delegation. The three-star General Stugasin

9 [phoen] and General Casey and I had a very friendly mutual relationship.

10 There was no hostility. Yes, I did defend the interests of Yugoslavia as

11 an independent sovereign country. I demanded and tried to achieve that

12 the UN Charter and the international norms be observed. I did not pursue

13 any other objectives.

14 MR. NICE: Thank you.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I am as dedicated to peace as

16 any NATO General. The peace of Kosovo, I mean.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I'm going to exhibit this.

19 MR. NICE: Yes. Please exhibit that.

20 JUDGE KWON: 792. Tab 4.

21 MR. NICE: There are four other exhibits, but maybe we can deal

22 with those after the re-examination so as not to cut into witness time.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

24 Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] Just one brief topic, General Ivasov, in this

1 cross-examination. Mr. Nice asked you questions related to the

2 Verification Mission, although you spoke about it in detail yesterday. I

3 will ask you, in my turn, a very, very brief question, and it is as

4 follows: Did the Verification Mission headed by Walker -- was the

5 Verification Mission used to achieve peace or to prepare an aggression

6 against Yugoslavia?

7 A. I have to observe that many of the mission's members, especially

8 those from Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, Russia, and others, and even some

9 NATO member countries such as Greece, really did seek peace. However,

10 there was a group of representatives who were solely involved in military

11 issues, military tasks, namely the tasks of preparing the airstrikes, and

12 some of them were representatives of the intelligence services of Western

13 countries, and their primary job was an intelligence-gathering job. That

14 intelligence job was done under the cover of the Verification Mission,

15 preparing airstrikes and the ground operation that were to follow.

16 Q. Thank you. Did NATO cooperate with the KLA?

17 A. Yes, Mr. President. That cooperation was on the political level.

18 I quoted examples when leaders of terrorist organisations met with

19 officials of NATO. The cooperation was also on the military level,

20 because, particularly in autumn 1998, the terrorists' arsenal began to

21 include state-of-the-art weapons manufactured in NATO member countries.

22 Even Mr. Walker I can quote. On the 28th of September, immediately after

23 meeting with you -- sorry, not Walker, Holbrooke. Holbrooke immediately

24 went on to meet the leaders of the terrorist organisation, and so on and

25 so forth. That can easily be considered as open cooperation with the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 terrorist organisation. Furthermore, there was no attempt whatsoever to

2 arrest any of these murderers and terrorists.

3 Q. General Ivasov, in the interview you gave to the Nin magazine on

4 the 5th of May, 1999, I will quote only one sentence from it. You said:

5 "Even if President Milosevic and the Yugoslav government were to propose

6 the most constructive and the most humane option for resolving the Kosovo

7 crisis, which I repeat had been caused from outside, the NATO leadership

8 headed by the US would, nevertheless, start with their operation."

9 Is that your position?

10 MR. NICE: I don't know where this is going. I know we are

11 pressed for time, but --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

13 MR. NICE: I have an objection to this and if the accused wants to

14 run his case himself he's going to have to get used to the technical

15 rules, and apart from the general limitation on relying on prior

16 consistent statements, which we needn't debate now, simply to put a

17 sentence that hasn't been explored in evidence to a witness in these

18 circumstances doesn't to me to be likely to help the Chamber very much.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

21 I take note of the point you make, Mr. Nice.

22 Proceed. Are you finished?

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Yes. I asked General Ivasov was that his position. Does he still

25 believe so today?

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: And he did answer yes.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I am certain about this. That

3 certainty was shared by the Russian political and military leadership.

4 If Mr. Nice is still not satisfied, I can quote a sentence from

5 the Washington Post and Houston Chronicle, and even Mr. Kissinger, who

6 said in unison, "Did anyone ever imagine that Serbs could possibly accept

7 this ultimatum --"

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We've had your answer. I said, General, we've

9 had your answer.

10 Mr. Milosevic, yes.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Just one more question. Evidence and proof of your claims to the

13 effect that NATO had been preparing activities and aggression against

14 Yugoslavia has been sought here. I want to ask, is it true that this

15 claim of yours is also based on a great number of your face-to-face

16 conversations with high officials of the NATO alliance? If you wish, you

17 can enumerate by name the people from NATO with whom you discussed this

18 issue, warning them that they should not go forward with this operation.

19 A. I spoke practically with all NATO leaders, with Mr. Solana, for

20 instance, but I underline that Mr. Solana didn't take any decisions. Any

21 American general took more decisions than him. With Mr. Robertson, with

22 Colonel Naumann, and practically all defence ministers of NATO.

23 Both the Russian official position and my personal position were

24 the same; to avoid war. However, the machine was already in operation,

25 and I can quote specific materials. 6th of May, 1998 --

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, General.

2 Mr. Milosevic.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the dates when

4 NATO gave official statements and announcements about the increasing

5 readiness of their military forces and the upcoming operation.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Did I ask you already, do you have evidence that was sought here

8 that NATO had been preparing the attack on Yugoslavia as early as

9 mid-1998?

10 A. Yes. Already in June, or even May, NATO had made official

11 announcements, and our participation, our discussions in NATO-Russia

12 discussions at defence minister level showed that NATO saw only two

13 options, either the capitulation of Belgrade or the military operation.

14 And when I was discussing within the NATO-Russia partnership, I tried to

15 present arguments to Mr. Solana and others. I asked them, "Why are you

16 delivering missiles?" And they said, "For the peacekeeping operation."

17 And some of them said, "Whenever I see Mr. Ivasov raise his hand, I lose

18 one hair off my head." So we did discuss these matters constantly.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ivasov. Safe trip home.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, that -- General, that concludes your

21 testimony. Thanks for coming to give it. You may now leave.

22 And we are adjourned -- Mr. Nice.

23 MR. NICE: Exhibits. We needn't detain the general from his

24 flight.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, you may leave. You may leave now.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

2 [The witness withdrew]

3 MR. NICE: The four documents of the Serbian ministry and foreign

4 affairs I think need an exhibit number.

5 THE REGISTRAR: 792. I think Judge Kwon already mentioned.

6 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. And the clips of extracts from

7 The Fall of Milosevic film.

8 THE REGISTRAR: 793.

9 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Your Honours, I understand that,

10 as to next week, the witness listed for Tuesday is only available on

11 Tuesday. I've explained to Ms. Anoya that, as I see it, he is undoubtedly

12 a witness who will last more than one day and we're having a number of

13 these witnesses at the beginning of the Defence case. This is

14 Mr. Primakov, and if his evidence is going to cover broadly similar types

15 of topics as that which were covered in this witness's testimony, it's

16 highly unlikely that it will be concluded in one day. Indeed, we'd always

17 forecast him as a more substantial witness than this one.

18 I don't know if there's any possibility of his being extended from

19 the Tuesday to the Wednesday. Obviously we will take whatever is

20 available, but we would be assisted by knowing what the plans are. And if

21 not, who comes on the Wednesday?

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have given an estimate here of

23 2.5 hours for Mr. Primakov's -- who are we talking about?

24 MR. NICE: It's Mr. Primakov on the 30th, yes.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. 2.5 hours. Isn't that an underestimate?

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I abide by what I said. We had an

2 agreement that he would take up only one day, and I will take up only as

3 much time as I can, leaving Mr. Nice enough time for his cross.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is the situation that there is some very pressing

5 business that would require him to return on Tuesday? I am thinking of

6 the possibility that he may run over to the next day.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is not possible to extend his

8 stay. And my examination-in-chief will not go beyond the time limit that

9 leaves Mr. Nice adequate time for cross-examination.

10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the accused seems to have missed the

11 point, I think. It is not for him to identify the amount of time I will

12 require for cross-examination. These are obviously potentially very

13 interesting witnesses and, depending on whether their evidence is

14 relevant, the Chamber may be assisted by more rather than less questions.

15 There may be time for adjusting downwards the amount of time I take of

16 later witnesses. It simply isn't open to the accused -- he doesn't run

17 the timetabling of the Court, and contingency plans ought to be made.

18 Mr. Primakov, I think, I'll just check, I think he now holds the

19 office of Chamber of Commerce, is it, or have I got it wrong? He was a

20 Prime Minister, but he's now something rather different. And before the

21 witness turns up to say in strict terms that he's only available for one

22 day and no more has to be a pretty good reason for it. It's for the

23 Chamber to decide --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I quite agree. Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to

25 suggest your approach to this is a little too mechanical. We have to see

1 what kind of evidence he's going to give, the kind of cross-examination

2 that will be required. There's a qualitative element that you can't

3 entirely predict, and I'd like you to have in mind that this witness may

4 run over to the following day. That will be --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What Mr. Nice said is quite true.

6 Evgeni Primakov was Prime Minister. Before that he was foreign minister.

7 I'll not enumerate all his offices. It's not true that he works in the

8 ministry of commerce now. He is president of Russia's Chamber of Commerce

9 at this moment, the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation.

10 But bearing in mind the time that I need, I didn't have a long

11 examination in mind, I thought I could manage within the time that I

12 planned, and I thought that leaves Mr. Nice enough time. I don't think it

13 was my duty to ask the witness to be able to stay for two days. I need

14 only half of one day, and that's why he was planned for only one day, the

15 day when he was scheduled. And I will try to use even less time than I

16 originally planned, to leave Mr. Nice even more than 60 per cent of my

17 time, but I don't think he's entitled to ask for more than 60 per cent.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, as I said, we can't approach it in such a

19 mechanical manner. What I say to you is that we'll hear Mr. Primakov on

20 Tuesday, and you should be alert to the possibility, and he should be

21 alert to the possibility that his evidence may run over to the following

22 day.

23 We are adjourned until Tuesday at 9.00 a.m.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.54 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 30th day of

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 November, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25