1 Wednesday, 2 March 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

8 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

10 WITNESS: MIRKO BABIK

11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. You may begin. Let us have the

13 name of the witness.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. The

15 witness is Mirko Babik.

16 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Babik, good morning to you.

18 A. Mr. President, good morning.

19 Q. I shall be going through a few of the first questions fairly

20 rapidly to save time. From your CV I see that after secondary school, you

21 were enrolled at the faculty of medicine in Skopje. Is that true?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. And you -- for some private reasons, you interrupted your studies

24 in your last year, so you didn't actually graduate although you got to the

25 last stage. Is that right?

1 A. Yes, it is.

2 Q. From 1973, or more precisely, from January 1973, you have been

3 working in the emergency service in Skopje as a medical technician; is

4 that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. That means for over 30 years. Have you been working continuously

7 during those 30 years?

8 A. Yes, continuously in that service for 30 years.

9 Q. In your capacity there, did you work there during the NATO bombing

10 of Yugoslavia?

11 A. Yes, I did work there in that capacity during the NATO bombing of

12 Yugoslavia.

13 Q. From the beginning of the bombing, were you -- did you do a

14 medical duty work in the border belt towards the Federal Republic of

15 Yugoslavia?

16 A. Yes. I was at the border belt from the very beginning. We did

17 shifts at Donje Blace and later on Stenkovac 1 and 2.

18 Q. When you say "from the very beginning," was this regular duty work

19 immediately after the 24th of March?

20 A. Yes. Our shifts and duty work was after that. Not at the

21 beginning, not for the first few days, but from the 1st of April, we had

22 round the clock, 24 hour stints or shifts, permanent shifts there.

23 Q. And you would take regular shifts very frequently?

24 A. Yes. We had a rapid succession of shifts, and we would go to do

25 our stints very frequently.

1 Q. What does that mean? Can you explain that to us? How do you mean

2 "frequently"?

3 A. Well, we had shifts in town in our basic workplace, and we had to

4 go out in the field. We had three teams on duty, which meant that the

5 three teams replaced one another fairly frequently, on a fairly regular

6 basis.

7 Q. As you say, you were at the approach to Donje Blace, which is

8 across from the Djeneral Jankovic crossing; is that right? Border

9 crossing.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And when did you start doing duty work in the holding camps?

12 A. I started working in the holding camps sometime around the 6th of

13 April.

14 Q. Let's just establish the exact time, because the previous two

15 witnesses spoke about this same situation. Tell us when those holding

16 camps were established first, from the border crossing. When were the

17 refugees accommodated in the camps? According to my information, that

18 would be between the 5th and 6th of April. Is that correct or did that

19 happen earlier?

20 A. Stenkovac was established sometime around the 5th and 6th of

21 April. That is when they were transferred to Stenkovac 1, and then later

22 on to Stenkovac 2. That means the 5th or 6th of April.

23 Q. All right. Thank you. Let's get right to the point now in medias

24 res. Throughout that time did you happen to notice or, rather, you took

25 in patients. You saw patients; is that right?

1 A. Yes, we did.

2 Q. Throughout that time, did you come across a single Albanian coming

3 in from Kosovo who had perhaps been beaten or had suffered from any side,

4 let's say the police, the army, or anybody else? Did you notice anybody

5 like that who had come in beaten up?

6 A. No, I didn't notice any Albanian who had been beaten up or beaten

7 by the police or the army.

8 Q. Did you happen to notice that anybody had been beaten by anybody

9 else? I mean, did you see any injuries consistent with that?

10 A. No, I did not.

11 Q. Did you take in patients regularly, see patients regularly in your

12 capacity as medical technician whose job it is to see patients?

13 A. Yes, I did, I saw them regularly, and I was the first person to

14 come into contact with a patient, actually. I received them.

15 Q. And throughout that time, did you come across any Albanian who was

16 wounded, either by firearms or by a knife or anything like that?

17 A. No. I didn't see any entrance/exit wounds or anything like that.

18 Q. And did anybody come to contact you and complain that he had been

19 beaten by the Serbian forces?

20 A. On one occasion one Albanian did come to me. He was standing in

21 front of our makeshift clinic and said he had been beaten up and that he

22 was all black and blue. He said he was black and blue, like liver.

23 Q. When you say "dzigarica," that word means "liver" in Serbian; is

24 that right?

25 A. Yes. He was black and blue, but looking at his hands and face and

1 the areas that I could see and the way he moved around and walked, I

2 wasn't able to establish anything like that. And then I said, "Well, you

3 can come into our field examination room and we'll examine you." He

4 changed the subject straight away and asked me how far it was to Skopje.

5 I said it was about 23 kilometres away. And in the meantime, another man

6 and woman came into the examination room. I told them to take a seat, and

7 the man got lost. He just disappeared.

8 Q. So you offered to examine him, and he just disappeared, left the

9 infirmary.

10 A. Yes. I said that we would help him and take a look at him,

11 examine him, but he just disappeared.

12 Q. Did you ask him to show you the bruises that he talked about?

13 A. Yes. I asked him to come into the infirmary to -- for me to take

14 a look, to examine him, but he just got lost and disappeared very soon

15 after that.

16 I can also say that there was another Albanian who came to see me,

17 a man of about 70 years of age, and he said that he lived in a village and

18 that he had some livestock and several milking cows, and he said that some

19 people had come and told him to leave his house. He didn't want to. He

20 said he was an old man and didn't want to go up into the fields and hills

21 and live with his cattle.

22 One of the men had a firearm, and with that firearm he shot a

23 round of bullets in the direction of the roof of the house and said that

24 if they find him there next time they come round, they'd kill him, and

25 they would blow the house up. And they went off in a direction that was

1 known to him. There was a group of people. And he said, "This is where I

2 turned up -- ended up." I asked him, which people were they? What

3 language were they speaking? He looked to his left and to his right, and

4 in an angry way he energetically pointed to the direction of the tent and

5 the camp and pointed to his own people, in fact. And I remember --

6 Q. Let's just get one thing straight here. Was that an example that

7 the KLA was forcing civilians to join the refugees and go to Macedonia?

8 A. Yes. He told me that they were -- or, rather, let me see that

9 they -- he meant that they were his men and that that's what they wanted

10 him to do, to move towards Macedonia.

11 Q. And another example --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me hear from Mr. Babik. What exactly did

13 your work as a medical technician involve?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, my duty was to administer

15 therapy together with the doctor and to administer first aid. That's it.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Continue.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. That means giving injections, bandaging wounds. I assume that if

19 somebody needs a wound bandaged, you'd do that and not the doctor.

20 A. Yes. First aid, that's what we were trained to do, and also

21 therapy, drips, anything of that nature.

22 Q. Have you got any other example?

23 A. Well, I also remember the story of a Roma, a man who came when the

24 morning shift was on duty. He came in very much afraid and said he hadn't

25 been able to have water or food for two days and the children were crying.

1 And when we asked why they weren't being given food and water, a group of

2 young men came in and beat them up. He managed to jump over the fence, he

3 said, and same to see me, and ten metres away from us there was the police

4 and the Red Cross. I went over there, and the man repeated the same

5 story, and a policeman and a lady from the Red Cross went to see what all

6 this was about, see what was going on in the tent. When they returned, I

7 asked them what had happened. They said it was true, and then I saw them

8 take the food to the people ten minutes later.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly slow down for the

10 benefit of the interpreters and the Court.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Babik, the interpreter is

12 asking you to slow down.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Pause between question and answer.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Babik, you were saying that the Albanians, in actual fact, as

17 far as I was able to understand, mistreated the Roma in the refugee camp.

18 They didn't allow them to get food, get to the food and the water and that

19 the Macedonian policemen had to separate them from them. Is that right?

20 A. Yes. The police had intervene, and afterwards they were

21 transferred to another place, but that didn't help much either. And then

22 they were transferred to some other camps; Cicino Selo, Selo Saraj near

23 Skopje, and Momo Advodno [phoen].

24 Q. As you received the patients, I assume that you wrote down the

25 entries -- wrote down the names of the people that came to see you and

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1 took their data. Did you do that or did somebody else do that?

2 A. I did that, and so did the nurse. We kept our records regularly.

3 And in the registers, if you look at them, there might be some

4 misunderstanding, because very often --

5 Q. I wanted to ask you whether you kept the register and you wrote in

6 the entries. Is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, tell me this, please: In some of the columns we can see that

9 there -- you have the name and surname recorded and some basic data, and

10 then we would see an empty column, no diagnosis and no therapy. Can you

11 explain what that means?

12 A. Yes, I do have an explanation. That would happen because the

13 people would come in to be examined, there would be a crowd, and when we

14 asked them to come in for an examination, they would just disappear. So

15 that is why we would have the name and surname recorded when they first

16 came to us, and then they would disappear.

17 Q. Yes. And then they would disappear and you didn't have anything

18 to fill in.

19 A. Yes, that's right, and then there would be an empty space in those

20 two columns for the diagnosis and the therapy.

21 Q. First, let us establish how often you were on duty working with

22 the refugees, be it at the border crossing where you received them or in

23 the camps. How often did you do those stints?

24 A. Very often. Once in two or three days perhaps. And the same goes

25 for my colleagues.

1 Q. Very well. In that period, you had opportunity to meet a large

2 number of patients, didn't you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Their complaints, their conditions, how would you characterise

5 them? How would you categorise them?

6 A. Since it was cold, they suffered from colds, laryngitis,

7 respiratory problems. Also digestion problems because the food was dry

8 mostly. There were some skin conditions because of lack of hygiene.

9 There were many pregnant women.

10 Q. Very well. At border crossings and in camps, did you notice the

11 presence of a large number of TV crews and reporters?

12 A. Yes. They turned out in force. I will give you an example. On a

13 morning shift, once we were sitting in our vehicle when a group of about

14 10 young men came behind our vehicle and almost stole our stretcher. I

15 ran out of the car and said, "What's the matter? Do you need the

16 stretcher? Shall I help you?" They said, "No, no. We'll bring the

17 patient ourselves." And then they ran into the depth of the camp about 20

18 or 30 metres, and then I saw them put a young man on the stretcher.

19 They put a young man on the stretcher. The young man was all

20 crumpled, convulsive, like in great pain, while some cameramen were

21 filming them. And when this scene was over, the young man got up from the

22 stretcher, they cheerfully waved good-bye to each other, et cetera.

23 Q. That was a staged scene, it's quite clear, isn't it? Did you see

24 anything else that would be similar to that?

25 A. Yes. On another occasion, I must say there was an elevation near

1 our infirmary, they gathered a group of women, very old men, disabled

2 people, and I saw them with my own eyes taking children, children of about

3 2 to 5 years of age, away from their mothers, and they gave the children

4 to the old people as if those were their grandchildren, and then they

5 would film them.

6 When the first shots, the first recordings were over, they would

7 change the order. The people from the back would be put in the front and

8 vice versa, and then they filmed some more. And I saw this myself. I

9 have no doubt about it. The people who were around, including myself, we

10 reacted and we said, "Look what -- look at what they're doing." We

11 summoned the police and the police chased them away.

12 The most active in this staging game, in this rigging game, were

13 the camera crews of the CNN and BBC.

14 Q. I suppose that when you take such small children away from their

15 mothers and give them to some elderly men, the children naturally cry.

16 A. The children weren't crying; they were wailing, screaming. The

17 cameramen instructed the old men to take their tissues out of their

18 pockets and wipe their eyes and pretend to be crying themselves.

19 Q. You witnessed this scene. What do you think was the purpose of

20 this whole exercise?

21 A. You don't have to be very clever to understand that the whole

22 purpose of this was to -- to mediatise the suffering of the people, to

23 make it seem even worse than it actually was.

24 Q. When you spoke to Albanians from Kosovo, did they ever tell you

25 why they left Kosovo?

1 A. At the beginning, they were saying that they were fleeing bombs.

2 I think it was a natural reaction. Later on, they started saying that the

3 army and the police were chasing and beating them and that's why they were

4 fleeing.

5 Q. And when did they change the story?

6 A. As soon as they were moved to the Stenkovac 1 and 2 refugee camps.

7 Q. So they changed their account when they were transferred to the

8 camps. When they came to the border, they still said they were running

9 from the bombing?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. But you never saw anyone who was obviously beaten or injured?

12 A. No, in all the time I worked there.

13 Q. Did you see a woman who was a rape victim in that period?

14 A. Close to us there was an Israeli hospital. They were the best

15 equipped. We often came to see that hospital. They had a lot of

16 gynaecologists, internists, et cetera, but they left not long after. And

17 the morning -- one morning I came and found that the Israeli hospital had

18 disappeared, and I asked the policeman, "What's this?" And he told me

19 that they left because there was a rape attempt against an Israeli woman

20 doctor.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Nice, assist me in this

22 matter. Where does the indictment allege that the refugees were

23 maltreated? Is it in Kosovo or in Macedonia? Because this evidence that

24 is being led, as I understand it, relates to the camps in Macedonia.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The allegation is -- what you say is

1 right, Mr. Robinson, but this so-called indictment alleges that those same

2 refugees ran to Macedonia after being shot at.

3 MR. NICE: "So-called indictment." The accused has got to

4 remember the decorum with which he has to approach this Court.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Quite so, Mr. Milosevic. We've been through that

6 before. Totally inappropriate language.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it is a mild word for

8 the lies contained in what Mr. Nice calls the indictment. Mr. Robinson,

9 it is alleged that hundreds of thousands of people were chased away from

10 Kosovo by being shot at, by being beaten, and you read that in the report

11 of the so-called humanitarian organisations, by gunfire, by beatings. And

12 later on in Macedonia, among a crowd of refugees, there is not a single

13 gunshot wound, there's not a single person bearing any marks of beatings.

14 And it is clear that this is a media story launched first by Madeleine

15 Albright to the effect that Serbs were expelling Kosovo Albanians from

16 Kosovo. That story was launched first by the CNN and repeated here by

17 Mr. Nice.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I'm just trying to clarify the allegations

19 in the indictment. Your case would then be, Mr. Milosevic, that if the

20 indictment does allege - and I'll ask Mr. Nice to clarify this - that

21 these incidents of maltreatment took place in Kosovo, the mere fact that

22 this evidence relates to Macedonia, to camps in Macedonia, would not make

23 the evidence irrelevant, because if you have evidence in the camp in

24 Macedonia that they arrived there without any signs of having been beaten

25 and so on, then the inference is that they were not beaten in Kosovo.

1 But let me just -- Mr. Nice.

2 MR. NICE: The reference is, as I think volunteered yesterday, can

3 be found at paragraph 59.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: 59. I have that, yes.

5 MR. NICE: And that, of course, says nothing about maltreatment of

6 refugees after they've left Kosovo. It says: "Some of these internally

7 displaced persons remained inside of the province of Kosovo throughout the

8 time period relevant to this indictment and many --"

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is a reference to inadequate medical --

10 MR. NICE: "-- many persons died as a consequence of the harsh

11 weather conditions, insufficient food, inadequate medical attention and

12 exhaustion. Others eventually crossed over the Kosovo border into

13 Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro or crossed the provincial boundary

14 between Kosovo and Serbia."

15 There is no allegation here about the treatment of these refugees

16 in Macedonia, nor could there be. The accused, whatever his original

17 purpose of leading this evidence, has focused yesterday and today on the

18 significance for his case generally of the condition of these refugees as

19 they were found in Macedonia, and it's on that basis that I'm going to

20 approach the evidence and cross-examine on it to the very limited extent

21 that I will.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Babik --

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Bonomy is speaking.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Babik, can I ask you one question for

1 clarification. After the 5th of April, did you continue to work at the

2 border crossing or was your work confined to the camps at Stenkovac?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the 5th and the 6th of April I

4 worked in Stenkovac 1 and Stenkovac 2 refugee camps.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in paragraph 55, it

7 says: "Forces of the FRY and Serbia, in a deliberate and widespread or

8 systematic manner, forcibly expelled -- forcibly expelled thousands of --

9 hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians ... the forces of the FRY and

10 Serbia intentionally created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through

11 the use of force, threats of force," et cetera. Acts of brutality and

12 violence.

13 So if acts of brutality and violence have to be visible once these

14 refugees crossed the border the next day, they must be evident to the

15 medical staff who deals with them if they were so brutally treated.

16 I can go on reading this indictment in many other sections, but

17 the same thesis permeates the whole text, that the police and army troops

18 beat people with rifle butts, with truncheons, et cetera. None of that

19 happened, and that story doesn't hold water.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Paragraph 57, Mr. Nice, the middle, it says:

21 "Kosovo Albanians were frequently intimidated --" this is the next line.

22 "Many Kosovo Albanians --" let me just see. Judge Kwon was just showing

23 me a paragraph that's relevant.

24 Yes, it says: "Kosovo Albanians were frequently intimidated,

25 assaulted or killed in public view to enforce the departure of their

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1 families and neighbours."

2 Well, it depends on the form that the force took, but I'm not

3 saying the evidence is not relevant. I was trying to determine to what

4 paragraph it relates.

5 Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions for

7 Mr. Babik. I think that suffices.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Nice.

9 MR. NICE: As I observed yesterday --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

11 MR. NICE: As I observed yesterday, the 65 ter summaries said

12 nothing about the staging of events by television companies. I haven't

13 yet been able to elicit a response from CNN. I will be playing a short

14 clip in a second to the witness made by CNN.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm curious to know, Mr. Nice, if the witness can

16 indicate a reason for this taking place, because it's very difficult to

17 work out why this would be done.

18 MR. NICE: Would Your Honour like to ask him or shall I?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: No, please. I'd be grateful if you would.

20 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

21 Q. Two things, Mr. Babik. Is it Babic or Babik, your name? Babic or

22 Babik?

23 A. Babik.

24 Q. I only ask because of the way it's turning up on the transcript.

25 Now, you mentioned the BBC as being one of the two riggers of scenes. Can

1 you name any BBC reporter who you can remember engaged in rigging of

2 scenes?

3 A. I don't know any names, but I claim with full responsibility that

4 this indeed happened. It happened ten metres away from our tent, the tent

5 in which we were located, but I don't know any names.

6 Q. The question identified by His Honour Judge Bonomy is this: Can

7 -- what reason was there, as far as you could judge it, for their rigging

8 the evidence or rigging the content of their reports?

9 A. I think they wanted to sensationalise the media picture about the

10 suffering of Albanians.

11 Q. Very well. Let's look at a short clip which is one from CNN in

12 light of something that your colleague mentioned yesterday, but we'll just

13 look at it and see if you can help us with it. It's a CNN clip.

14 [Videotape played]

15 "Forced from their homes, some of them say at gunpoint, suddenly

16 the weather became their worst enemy. Standing shoulder to shoulder in a

17 chilly rain, sickness set up. The oldest and the youngest, the most

18 vulnerable targets. Throughout the day about every five minutes another

19 extremely ill Kosovar refugee was hauled uphill from this mountain valley

20 camp along the Yugoslav-Macedonian frontier. Doctors say 11 had died

21 Friday night, and Saturday they feared the toll would rise even higher.

22 "What's going to happen within a couple of days, if it's still

23 raining like it is now and the people are still there? You can think of

24 the diseases that are going to spread all over the place. No good.

25 "The mountain climate along the frontier has been both a blessing

1 and a curse. Refugees are suffering from exposure and upper respiratory

2 problems but the cold climate has stopped the spread of infectious

3 diseases like cholera.

4 "Despair was another enemy. Kosovar Albanians who just a day or

5 two ago had a roof over their heads now have only plastic. The healthy

6 barely noticed as the sick passed them by. Life had been reduced to a

7 struggle to stay warm, dry, and fed

8 "They're living in mud. They're wet, they're dirty, they're

9 tired, they're angry. They want to move on. They want to move to

10 families, they want to go back home.

11 "During the refugee rebellion, Macedonia brought in more soldiers

12 and police to keep order. But a bureaucratic bottleneck worsened the

13 situation. Thousands still waited in line to be registered, and despite

14 an instant and growing refugee city of about 65.000, fewer have been

15 evacuated by bus than the day before. The problem was so bad that

16 Macedonia once again closed its border with Yugoslavia.

17 "We are sitting here, women and children in the rain, said one

18 very ill refugee. We are going to die. Escape from Kosovo for her, her

19 husband, and thousands of other Kosovar Albanians have led nowhere but

20 here.

21 "Mike Betcher, CNN, on the Yugoslav-Macedonian border."

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. Mr. Babik --

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

25 JUDGE KWON: Was it translated to the witness?

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are not to speak when a Judge

2 is speaking. That's just very basic protocol.

3 JUDGE KWON: I just asked whether it was translated to the

4 witness.

5 MR. NICE: I hope so.

6 JUDGE KWON: I'm afraid --

7 MR. NICE: I'll check with the witness, shall I?

8 Q. Mr. Babik, as well as seeing what we were looking at, could you

9 hear in your language a translation of what was being said by the

10 newscaster?

11 A. I'm afraid not. It wasn't interpreted.

12 MR. NICE: I'm sorry that's the position, Your Honour, and I

13 don't, I'm afraid, have time to -- well, if necessary I'll of course take

14 some time to go back, but I know how limited my time is if I'm to stick

15 within two-thirds.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, Mr. Milosevic wanted to say something.

17 I don't know whether it's the same point.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was just about to draw your

19 attention to the fact that the videotape wasn't interpreted, one; and

20 second, certain things are said here that are contrary to what the

21 witnesses were saying. One of them is that eight persons had died

22 overnight in that camp. The witness should know about it because he

23 worked there.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: If the tape was not translated, Mr. Nice, we will

25 not be able to rely on it unless we do it again.

1 MR. NICE: I can rely on it simply for the visual images because

2 those are all I want to ask about.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

4 MR. NICE:

5 Q. Mr. Babik, it's this: We saw, according to the script on the

6 screen, that part of that was Blace camp. Is that correct? And does that

7 accord with your recollection of what Blace camp looked like?

8 A. I only recognised a part of the area around Blace, around by the

9 river Lepenac. The other infirmary, the Red Cross infirmary, I don't

10 remember anything like that having been there. The other parts I can't

11 recognise.

12 Q. The general picture of the condition of the camp and of the

13 refugees as shown in that footage accurate? Was it accurate?

14 A. In those first few days when they started coming in, there was a

15 little space and a lot of people, and they had lost their nearest and

16 dearest along the way somewhere, so there were crowds.

17 Q. There were hundreds of thousands of people in these camps

18 eventually, weren't there?

19 A. In Stenkovac 1 and 2, yes, there were a lot of people. I don't

20 know the exact number, but there were lots of people.

21 Q. We also saw in the footage the presence of police and/or

22 Macedonian army personnel. Is it right that such people were present in

23 the camp at all times?

24 A. The police was present, and as far as I remember, throughout the

25 whole time, from the beginning.

1 Q. You spoke of the difference in accounts given by individuals from

2 the time when they were in the border camp until the time when they were

3 moved to Stenkovac 1 and 2. At the border camp, in the first few days

4 there were police and military present, weren't there?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Although we haven't focused on this, and it's not an issue that

7 need necessarily trouble the Trial Chamber, the truth is that in the same

8 way as there is tension between Albanians and Serbs, there is tension

9 between Albanians and Macedonians; correct?

10 A. Well, I don't know. Macedonia is the country that accepted the

11 Albanian people, gave them assistance, and later on gave more than it was

12 economically capable of extending. And even today it is helping the Romas

13 who have stayed on in Macedonia.

14 Q. In order to be brief if Mr. Prendergast would help me with page

15 113 of the "Under Orders" book, which is Exhibit 145.

16 This summary is given by those who prepared this book. It says

17 this of the exit to Macedonia: "There can be little doubt that the

18 arrival of some 260.000 refugees from Kosovo placed an enormous strain on

19 relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.

20 The government's go-slow policy in admitting refugees during the spring of

21 1999, the occasional police violence against the refugees, and the

22 government's periodic refusal to admit --" just down a bit. "-- to admit

23 additional refugees created enormous --" and then over the page, please,

24 to finish this paragraph, five lines "-- created enormous resentment and

25 anger among Macedonia's Albanians. Equally, the common cause shown by

1 Macedonian Albanians for their Albanian neighbours from Kosovo fuelled

2 fears about succession among ethnic Macedonians. The restraint shown by

3 the leadership of the Albanian party in the ruling coalition, the Albanian

4 Democratic Party, as well as the NATO presence, certainly helped prevent

5 open conflict in Macedonia ..."

6 Now, I only read that for completeness. My question to you is

7 this: At the border crossing itself, is the truth that there was tension

8 between Macedonians and Albanians because Albanians were anxious that they

9 weren't going to be allowed in?

10 A. Well, there shouldn't have been any fear because the Macedonians

11 accepted those people and offered them selfless help and assistance.

12 Q. The border camp, which is a sort of holding camp against a

13 background of a go-slow by the government and a stop-start of letting

14 people in, there would be anxiety that people would be allowed to stay.

15 Did you experience that?

16 A. We did our job. As to the rest, I'm not really informed enough

17 about it to be able to say.

18 Q. You see, you've given us various accounts of people talking to

19 you about this and that. I take it that none of the people you spoke to

20 is somebody you could identify so that I can go and speak to that person;

21 correct? You can't identify any of the people you spoke to?

22 A. Well, that was in passing. I don't know what happened to those

23 people later on.

24 Q. You see --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, could I just interrupt for a moment.

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1 Mr. Babik, you told us that people gave different reasons for

2 being there; either because they were escaping from bombing or because

3 they were claiming to have been attacked by Serb police or forces. Where

4 did these people want to go to?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the beginning, they said they

6 just wanted to be safe and take refuge from the bombs, but later on they

7 asked to go to third countries, to Europe, just transit through Macedonia

8 on to other places. But many also asked to come to Macedonia to stay with

9 their relatives and friends they had there.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, Mr. Nice.

11 MR. NICE:

12 Q. You see, if you're right, you and your two colleagues about the

13 first account being accounts of people wanting to avoid the bombs and they

14 subsequently giving an account of being forced out, I'm just going to

15 suggest this to you: The first account may have been conditioned by the

16 fact that they were facing Macedonian soldiers and police in the first

17 interim camp at a time when they had no certainty they were going to be

18 accepted. What do you say to that?

19 A. The Albanians knew that they would be taken in, accepted. We took

20 them in, and the police and the army and all the services, the Red Cross,

21 they saw that we were trying to help them.

22 MR. NICE: I'm not going to take it any further than that, Your

23 Honours.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think you can.

25 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, the want of time, perhaps I can just

1 say this: The -- I'm not going to ask the witness about it. The details

2 of the numbers moved are contained in various reports. We can find the

3 numbers moved into Macedonia and when. Neill Wright, from UNHCR. It's in

4 "As Seen, As Told." The figures are all there. Perhaps I should deal

5 with this once with one witness so that at least I've put it.

6 If you'd like, please, to look at "As Seen, As Told," page 99.

7 Just one piece of evidence that we have which suggests that the flow of

8 refugees to Macedonia started - and these are cumulative figures - was

9 16.000 as at about the 23rd of March; 20.500 as at about the 30th; 28.000

10 as about the 31st; and then sharply rising on the 1st of April through the

11 3rd of April. So those are just figures by an organisation.

12 Q. Do you have any reason to doubt the accuracy of those figures,

13 Mr. Babik?

14 A. I don't know the figures. I can't confirm or otherwise refute.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just take a look at the column here

18 where it says the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. If you add up

19 those figures, you would get almost 1.5 million. So these are

20 unbelievable figures. Just look at the days. 116.000 every day from the

21 3rd of April to the 14th of April. Every day, there are over 100.000.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, that's plainly a running total.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice and Mr. Milosevic, I'm keen to discover

24 the reason for the change in attitude of the refugees, but I'd like to

25 ascertain it on the basis of evidence, not speculation. So I certainly

1 don't want Mr. Milosevic to comment on it, but of course he may address us

2 on it in his final address. But if we could get evidence that would

3 explain the difference, why this change in explanation from fleeing bombs

4 to fleeing Serb persecution and violence.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, my position is as follows, and it may help

6 the accused despite -- especially in light of some of the observations he

7 makes, to understand that this is the way is these courts operate. I can

8 raise responsibilities where they seem reasonable, and I then raise them

9 as possibilities. I can make assertions or direct propositions where I

10 have good reason to make those assertions. So if one takes the previous

11 witness -- not the previous witness, the witness who took rather longer,

12 three witnesses ago, who produced a great deal of material that identified

13 people, when we'd spoken to those people, one in particular, we found that

14 there was a very clear reason for saying something that didn't accord with

15 that person's experience; namely, he was frightened of the presence of

16 figures of authority standing behind the interpreter. He had a reason to

17 give the account. I was then in a position to advance that as the

18 explanation for what was coming, apparently, from that video tape.

19 Now, with these last three witnesses, no detail of any kind has

20 been provided that will enable me --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to make.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On the videotape, you couldn't see

24 any armed people standing around.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Nice is on his feet. When

1 Mr. Nice is finished, then you can raise your objection.

2 MR. NICE: And I'll have to be sure that I can pick up the train

3 of my thought otherwise, as it was once said, I'll have to go right back

4 to the beginning, but I've got a transcript to help me.

5 With these witnesses, no detail of any kind has been provided that

6 will enable me to send someone to speak to them to find out first whether

7 the witnesses are telling the truth; and second, if they are, what was the

8 explanation for the reason given. And it looks as though I'm never going

9 to be provided with the identification or identity of any such person to

10 whom I can go and speak, and it's --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think we have heard that. You must

12 deal with it -- you have to deal with the case as you get it.

13 MR. NICE: But Your Honour asked me the question.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I know, I just made the observation. I just made

15 the observation.

16 MR. NICE: So that --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: And I said I don't want a comment from

18 Mr. Milosevic, and I don't want a comment from you either.

19 MR. NICE: I'm not sure I am commenting because I'm trying to

20 explain the position so that the accused can understand it.

21 In those circumstances, I'm exploring a possibility with this

22 witness, which is the explanation I've raised with him, and at the moment

23 I can go no further than that.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thanks.

25 Mr. Milosevic, what's the objection that you had?

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice explained how on the

2 videotape you could see the existence of armed people there, which is

3 incorrect. You can't see that on the tape. And I should like to remind

4 you of this: Even that chef de cabinet, Rugovin Rugovci [phoen], when I

5 showed him his own interview here on one occasion couldn't answer and came

6 back two months later and told the same story. So they really have no

7 imagination. He said that Kalashnikovs were pointed to his chest but you

8 couldn't see them because they were behind the cameras. And then I asked

9 him why he hadn't said that before --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have something to ask the witness.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I want to say something to Mr. Nice.

15 Mr. Nice, this question of CNN and the BBC stage managing these

16 events is a serious allegation. Mr. Milosevic has explained how he sees

17 the evidence as being relevant to the indictment. Regardless of whether

18 you accept that or not, I think it is a matter that should be taken up in

19 rebuttal so that these agencies have an opportunity to respond to these

20 grave allegations.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if that's the Court's view, then of course

22 I'll reflect it, but I'd make this observation at this stage:

23 Sensationalising news is irrelevant so far as this indictment is

24 concerned. I have no cause, joint or otherwise, with CNN and BBC,

25 although as a matter of courtesy to them I will pass on the allegations

1 that are made. It would be my primary submission, and it may be something

2 the Chamber will want to reflect on, that what is relevant is not what was

3 made out of any particular incident by the BBC or CNN but what were the

4 true reasons given by the refugees who were spoken to and who came and

5 gave evidence here for their leaving Kosovo, and that's the real issue.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's a matter for you, Mr. Nice.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But if a news agency is encouraging a certain form

8 of behaviour, then it goes to undermine the point that you're trying to

9 make.

10 MR. NICE: Only if it can be shown, I suppose, they've undermined

11 the witnesses themselves. But I don't think -- well, that's a matter --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: You should certainly pass it on to them.

13 MR. NICE: Yes. But the connection between sensationalising news,

14 if that happened, and undermining the evidence of the witnesses who have

15 been called here or who have been spoken to by other agencies is, in my

16 submission, either non-existent or tenuous in the extreme. But I'll pass

17 the thing on to the BBC and CNN, and I'll of course respond to any

18 specific invitation by the Court, perhaps later, to call evidence to deal

19 with the problems.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, re-examination, and please

21 remember re-examination is to deal with matters that arise in

22 cross-examination. It's not an examination-in-chief all over again. And

23 no leading questions.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just have one question, but before

25 asking it I want to say for the record that you personally, Mr. Robinson,

1 you personally here established playing the tape back several times that

2 Mr. Nice showed that the BBC falsified even what I said in the translation

3 they provided. So those are the same motives that Mr. Nice cannot seem to

4 uncover. If they go so far as being -- as taking it upon themselves to

5 translate incorrectly --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have dealt with the matter in the way that I

7 think it should be dealt with. Proceed with your re-examination.

8 Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Babik, Mr. Nice read something out to you

10 from a book. It doesn't matter what the title of the book is. I think it

11 is "Under Orders," that was the title of the book, I believe. And said

12 that the Macedonian government --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: "As Seen, As Told" was the book.

14 MR. NICE: The passage I read out was indeed from "Under Orders."

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, okay.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Whereby the Macedonian government, from time to time waged a

18 policy of force towards the Albanian refugees. You as a citizen of

19 Macedonia, as an inhabitant of Macedonia, and as an employee of the health

20 service working in the border belt, did you have any awareness at all of

21 the fact that your country was waging a policy of violence towards the

22 Albanian refugees?

23 A. That's not true at all. Neither the Macedonian police nor the

24 people there, the humanitarian workers, the people in the Red Cross, all

25 of us there, there was just no violence there. That's not true.

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1 Q. Now, in the portion that wasn't translated to you we heard that

2 the reporter said that that night eight people had died in the camp.

3 Could that have happened without your knowing about it, because you were

4 there on the spot.

5 A. That could not have happened. Only one patient, to my knowledge,

6 died. And to be more exact, on the 25th of May, that is one day prior to

7 leaving, he died. However, he was seriously ill anyway. So I only know

8 about that one patient. The others couldn't have happened without us

9 knowing about it.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

13 Mr. Babik, that concludes your testimony. Thank you for giving

14 it, and you may now leave.

15 [The witness withdrew]

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My next witness is Dietmar Hartwig.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honours, while the witness is coming in, and to

19 make use of every available second of time, it's perhaps worth having in

20 mind that the issues that the accused is raising through those witnesses -

21 I don't make a complaint about this but I observe - weren't raised with

22 Prosecution witnesses who passed through Macedonian camps, I don't

23 believe. One source of material that I can turn to to try and amplify the

24 position of what happened in those camps and what may have been said by

25 people in those camps is those very witnesses, and it's possible that if I

1 can find out information from them I'll serve it 92 bis or serve it in

2 some format for your consideration. I will try to deal with it as quickly

3 as I can but these things always take time.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Nice.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're waiting for the witness,

8 I should like to ask you to bear in mind the fact that this is already the

9 second German witness who, through force of circumstance, has been forced

10 to testify in English, although the witness has asked for a German

11 interpreter. That was the case with one of the previous witnesses too.

12 The explanation was that there was no booth for German interpretation, and

13 this witness speaks English but you should bear in mind that it would be

14 easier for him to testify in German. This will not make this testimony

15 not take place or happen slower, but I just would like to draw your

16 attention to that fact.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpretation will be provided.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Interpretation is here.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I've just been told

20 that they will have German interpreters, because yesterday the situation

21 and the explanation given to me was that they couldn't ensure a German

22 interpreter to be present, but today I hear that they have been able to

23 get one. Otherwise, I wouldn't have raised the whole matter.

24 [The witness entered court]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

2 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

4 WITNESS: DIETMAR HARTWIG

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may begin.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

8 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Hartwig. Could you please tell

10 me when and where you were born.

11 A. [In English] I was born 28 March 1939 in a town which is Poland

12 today. On 7th May, 1947, we were expelled and we had to move to different

13 places in -- I finished my school --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hartwig, you may give your testimony in

15 German, if you wish.

16 THE WITNESS: I accept in German.

17 [Interpretation] I was born on the 28th of March, 1939, in a town

18 that is now part of Poland. At the beginning of 1947, we were expelled

19 from our homeland --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think we are interested in that. Just

21 bring him to the areas of his CV that would be relevant, Mr. Milosevic, so

22 that we can move on.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. All right, Mr. Hartwig. You are a national of which country now?

25 A. I am a German national.

1 Q. That is, you were born in Germany and you are a German national.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. What is your occupation?

4 A. I served 33 years in the German army. I was an upper lieutenant.

5 Q. Apart from having spent 33 years in the German army, in the rank

6 you mentioned, what positions -- in what positions did you serve?

7 A. There were national uses in the integrated area.

8 Q. I did not understand this answer.

9 A. In national uses, I had officer staff functions and also command

10 functions in which I worked, among other things. Also for nearly 10 years

11 in different integrated positions in NATO.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. It wasn't interpreted in full. Only a

13 portion of your sentence had been interpreted earlier, so I couldn't

14 really understand.

15 Could you please tell me, in which period did you visit the former

16 Yugoslavia? Which period or periods?

17 A. My first stay in former Yugoslavia was from about October 1995

18 through to March 1996. Within the framework of the international

19 conference of former Yugoslavia I had an observer mission. My second task

20 was as part of the United Nations, as part of the return of east Slovenia

21 to Croatia from May 1996 through to January 1998. And from July 1998

22 through to the end of October, beginning of November, I was as part of a

23 European Observer Mission in Bosnia; and from there I went to the Kosovo

24 where I was until the 19th of March, 1999, when we were evacuated to

25 Skopje.

1 Q. Mr. Hartwig, if I understood you correctly, from November 1998

2 until the day of evacuation into Skopje on the 19th of March, you were in

3 Kosovo and Metohija; is that correct?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. Mr. Hartwig, according to this information, you headed the

6 regional office of the monitoring mission of the European Union for Kosovo

7 and Metohija. Is that correct?

8 A. That is correct. I was manager of the regional office of the

9 observer mission of the European Community in Pristina.

10 Q. This regional office that you had, the regional office of the

11 monitoring mission, had in its purview the entire territory of Kosovo and

12 Metohija; correct?

13 A. That is correct. And also I had teams in Mitrovica, Kosovska

14 Mitrovica, in Prizren, in Orahovac, and in Pec.

15 Q. Thank you for this additional explanation, Mr. Hartwig, but I

16 wanted first of all to establish one thing: You were head of the monitors

17 of the European Union for Kosovo and Metohija; is that correct?

18 A. Within the scope of this mission, I was certainly its manager of

19 the office, the person responsible for the Kosovo region.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. In which period exactly did you head the

21 mission, the monitoring mission of the European Union for Kosovo?

22 A. I was head of this office officially from the 1st of January,

23 1999, through to the day of evacuation. Before that I -- for initial

24 training, I spent about five weeks in Pristina beforehand.

25 Q. Mr. Hartwig, to make it quite clear to everyone, you in fact

1 became head of the monitors on the 1st of January, that is the day when

2 your country, Germany, took up the Presidency of the European Union. So

3 your country became president of the European Union on the 1st of January,

4 1999, and you become the president -- or, rather, the head of the monitors

5 for the European Union.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. A moment ago you mentioned that several weeks earlier you had

8 arrived in Kosovo and Metohija for preparation, in order to get ready

9 before you took up the regional office. Tell me, how long did this

10 preparatory period last, and what did the preparations involve?

11 A. The pure preparatory period, as I said, was about five weeks, and

12 mainly I was concerned with finding a link to the mission up to this point

13 of time and to learn about developments and to get information in order to

14 quite simply obtain the necessary background.

15 Q. From what you have said, your headquarters were in Pristina, and

16 you had several regional centres that reported to you. That is, to put it

17 most simply, the organisation within which you worked.

18 A. The teams were virtually the external offices or the external

19 offices of the main office, and every team, if possible, had to submit a

20 report daily to the regional office, and this report, the main information

21 was extracted from this report and this contributed to the picture.

22 Q. Just to clarify, because you said "were to report." I think they

23 had the obligation to report to you daily on their observations as

24 monitors. Did they in fact do that? Did you receive reports from your

25 regional teams on a daily basis?

1 A. I received reports regularly, but I neglected this if perhaps

2 there was nothing to report on any particular day. But I did receive

3 reports regularly, and if there was nothing to report, then I simply

4 submitted "nothing to report" and that was also a report.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. Could you tell me, please, in addition to

6 the daily reports you received from the monitoring teams on the ground,

7 did you yourself travel occasionally across Kosovo and Metohija in order

8 to gain a personal insight into the situation on the ground?

9 A. Well, I was travelling nearly every day, and on both sides, on the

10 Albanian side and on the Yugoslav-Serbian side, I met all the people who

11 in one form or another were involved in forming political decisions and

12 who could make decisions, and I tried to get a balanced point of view from

13 all this information.

14 Q. Did you also in the preparatory period, because you told me right

15 now what you did as of the 1st of January, but did you in the preparatory

16 period, starting with November, have insight into the daily and other

17 reports received from the field and the work of the monitoring teams?

18 A. In the period before taking over, I also had a look at reports and

19 also I had discussions on visits.

20 Q. But you also toured the area?

21 A. I was travelling in the whole region. I spent more time outside

22 of the office than -- I think I would say I spent more time outside of the

23 office than in the office.

24 Q. Would you tell us, please, what was the mandate of the monitors of

25 the entire mission you headed?

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1 A. Well, the mission was to look at the political, the economic, and

2 religious aspects in Kosovo and to follow all this and, where possible, to

3 find out where the focus was and to report this.

4 Q. Your mandate was known under the acronym EUMM, European Union

5 Monitoring Mission. It was known under that acronym; is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. That mandate of unbiased monitors, did it imply contacts with all

8 the parties involved?

9 A. As far as I can judge this, I did this with all the people, in

10 particular with the main parties.

11 Q. Who were the people you contacted on the main sides involved?

12 When I say "you," I mean also your monitors.

13 A. I personally talked to the Albanian side, to -- to Rugova. I

14 talked to the designated vice-president of an independent Kosovo.

15 Unfortunately, I cannot remember his name. I also talked to the leader of

16 the Albanian university, Professor Kelmendi. I also talked to Dr. Jakobi

17 about the legal implications of independence. I also talked with the

18 chief editor and publisher of Kosovo Sot [phoen]. I also talked to

19 somebody from Koha Ditore. I also talked to commanders of the KLA whose

20 names I cannot remember. They were commanders, for example, at brigade

21 level. And on several occasions I tried to meet a commander called Drini.

22 Also travelled on my own with my interpreter to -- outside, but there

23 was never a meeting on the Serbian side. I had a contact who was the

24 leader of the Kosovo Verification Mission, General Loncar. Then also the

25 head of the Kosovo security forces, General Lovric [as interpreted]. I

1 also talked to the head of the Tribunal in Pristina --

2 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Hartwig. I suppose you said not Lovric but Lukic.

3 A. Yes, General Lukic.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, with that correction, we will take

5 the adjournment for 20 minutes. We'll break for 20 minutes.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Hartwig, we left off after you described who your contact

11 persons were on all the sides. Do you have anything to add as to the

12 people you contacted on various sides?

13 A. I think I've mentioned the Albanian side completely. On the

14 Serbian side I talked with Bishop Atimir [phoen], with the president of

15 the kidnapped Serbs, and then the head of the Tribunal in Pristina, and

16 some other persons whose functions and names I cannot recall.

17 Q. When you say "Tribunal in Pristina," do you mean the district

18 court in Pristina?

19 A. I assume it must be the district court.

20 Q. Thank you for that. Mr. Hartwig, was it the task of the

21 monitoring teams on the ground to find out as much as they can and to

22 reflect in their reports what they heard and saw in the field?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Could you please tell me, how often did you in your regional

25 office in Pristina make reports that you sent to the headquarters of the

1 monitoring missions in Sarajevo.

2 A. Every day the teams would forward a report, and the regional

3 office also sent a daily report to Sarajevo, which was set up with the

4 various team reports and also with my information and observation. In

5 addition, a weekly report was also put to Sarajevo, and moreover, on

6 particular occasions we could also file special reports.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us hear about the reports now, Mr. Milosevic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't quite understand what you

9 said, Mr. Robinson.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was saying I think you have laid a sufficient

11 foundation. Let us now hear what was reported to him, why he has come

12 here to give evidence.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Let us just clarify a couple of other points. Did you yourself

16 write any reports?

17 A. Yes. At any rate, I drew up the weekly reports myself. As far as

18 the procedure is concerned, I wrote them normally on my private laptop,

19 and then I sent a final version which I then wrote on the -- on the office

20 computer, which was then sent to the -- to the main office.

21 Q. Did you perhaps keep any of those reports or draft reports that

22 you drafted on your laptop?

23 A. I kept some of the drafts.

24 Q. Did you keep all of them or only some of them?

25 A. I suppose I have kept most of the drafts, but due to time

1 pressure, I put them directly onto the office computer, but the majority,

2 I assume I kept them on my laptop.

3 Q. Could you tell us, please, Mr. Hartwig, what was the general

4 impression and the generally accepted picture of the situation in Kosovo

5 and Metohija?

6 A. At some stage I noticed that there was a contradiction between the

7 image portrayed and reality. I also got this impression confirmed in

8 conversations and with my personal observations.

9 In our reports and in my report, we concentrated on facts,

10 information -- information and data that were received from teams and that

11 I -- I've learnt myself to use all of that.

12 Q. You say there was a difference between what you saw and the image

13 that was being created. Could you tell us in more detail what the

14 difference was.

15 A. So, for example, in telephone conversations and in personal

16 letters, I was made aware of situations and thinking, You must live in a

17 terrible world; the Serbs are killing everybody. And I could only say it

18 didn't happen in the region where I was based. I didn't see anything like

19 that.

20 Q. This actual state of affairs that your own teams reported and that

21 you could see with your own eyes, did they coincide with the generally

22 accepted picture in the West or was there a difference?

23 A. So for my part, the most striking difference was after the return,

24 after the evacuation to Germany where in the media I read about a picture

25 of Kosovo, and I didn't think it had anything to do with reality.

1 Q. What was the image you encountered in the media after returning to

2 Germany and that you say had nothing to do with reality?

3 A. Mainly it was the -- about the issue that events were taken out

4 from their original context and that reporting was always very one-sided.

5 There was only one perpetrator and always one victim.

6 Q. Who was the victim and who was the perpetrator?

7 A. As the victims were normally Albanians and the perpetrators were

8 normally deemed to be Serbians, Serbs.

9 Q. Was that the reality that you saw in Kosovo and Metohija?

10 A. I didn't see it like that, and it wasn't my experience either, and

11 I didn't see it in reports either.

12 Q. Well, do you have any explanation? How did this inaccurate

13 picture come about? How was it created?

14 A. I don't have an explanation for that. I could only speculate, and

15 I do not want to speculate.

16 Q. Well, did this manipulation take place only in the West or was it

17 helped also by Albanian media that launched it?

18 MR. NICE: Leading, and the witness has already declined to answer

19 the general topic.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: You'll have to ask the question differently,

21 Mr. Milosevic.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Hartwig, do I understand you correctly that you are saying

24 there was a manipulation of public opinion? Just a simple yes or no would

25 suffice.

1 A. There was a stark contrast between the picture and reality.

2 Q. Which daily in the Albanian language, because we already talked

3 about the Western press, was used by your mission to collect information

4 and to compare with what you could see for yourselves?

5 A. There was Koha Ditore for one thing. For some time it was also

6 the Albanian edition of a newspaper called Times. Furthermore, we also

7 received every morning from the Serbian and Albanian side, via fax, pieces

8 of information. I cannot remember which news agency it was, but on the

9 Albanian side it was mainly Koha Ditore and Times and the fax information.

10 Also from the Serb side we got information from the information office and

11 also via fax.

12 Q. And what was -- what kind of reporting did Koha Ditore provide?

13 A. Koha Ditore was certainly, as far as its reporting was concerned,

14 was Albanian oriented, and it certainly cannot be assumed that it can be

15 -- that it should be unbiased. It clearly was in favour of the Albanian

16 side and against the Serbian administration.

17 Q. Were you able to purchase the daily Koha Ditore on a regular basis

18 while you were in Pristina?

19 A. I took over from my predecessor. I think he asked our driver to

20 buy the newspaper, who then brought it to the office every day. That's

21 why we received it every day on the day that it was published.

22 Q. Were you able to buy all the newspapers without any hindrance on

23 the newsstands of Kosovo, particularly Pristina?

24 A. I don't know whether all newspapers would have been available. If

25 I wanted, let's say, Newsweek, then I asked somebody to buy it in -- to

1 buy it in the town, and then I usually also received it.

2 Q. Mr. Hartwig, are you aware of the existence and activity of

3 various NGOs or similar organisations that transmitted an unrealistic,

4 inaccurate picture of what was going on?

5 MR. NICE: Leading or otherwise.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't agree, because he has already given

7 evidence that in his view the general picture given was inaccurate and

8 unrealistic.

9 Yes. Answer the question. Answer the question.

10 THE WITNESS: I think everybody who is little bit familiar with

11 non-governmental organisation knows that they are also playing a part of

12 politics, and this is not a criticism at all because it's their

13 existence. Otherwise, they can't do any job. I think most of them, they,

14 in a very plain and fair way, they tried to help others. Of course, they

15 tried to take advantage of the situation.

16 And I remember one case which might not be typical, but it was 8th

17 of March in this time frame when in the radio I heard that Serbs had

18 attacked three villages close to the Macedonian border, and that 4.000

19 refugees were waiting in front of the border crossing point Djeneral

20 Jankovic, and by chance one of my teams was in that area and I radio --

21 excuse me. I -- [Interpretation] And then I asked them to go there and

22 then to check things. And then they told me up to 3 or 400 people were

23 there, whereas the NGO was talking about 4.000. Maybe it was just a

24 mistake, but again you can notice that numbers are increased in order to

25 achieve more flexibility in people's reactions.

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1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Hartwig, you also mentioned that allegedly three villages had

3 been attacked and, if I understood well, they were destroyed and burnt

4 down. Did your monitor check that as well?

5 A. As far as I can remember, it was the village Ivajakajlo [phoen]

6 and Kotlina. And I heard it on the radio, and then went straight away to

7 my car and drove there. I was also in one place called Ivaja. On the

8 radio they said the villages are burning. And only about two hours later

9 I was in Ivaja, and I saw a small fire there. Apart from that, the

10 village was deserted, no people there. But it didn't look as if it had

11 been destroyed. It was during the lunch break.

12 Then I asked the team and tasked them to go back to the place a

13 few days later, and I remember in the few days -- the few days later the

14 report said roughly the villages have not been destroyed, but houses had

15 been broken into, plundered partially, and there could be some fire --

16 some fire was detected in Ivaja. Ivaja was really the only village that

17 was really destroyed. The other two villages had not been destroyed up

18 until that point but only the houses had been plundered. And let's say

19 fences, et cetera, were destroyed and parts of furniture, but that's what

20 the report said.

21 Q. Do you happen to remember a situation which confirmed your doubts

22 or led you to doubt the truthfulness of what was happening and what was

23 being said about the events in Kosovo and Metohija with respect to the

24 generally accepted picture that was being painted, such as the -- and I

25 mean the event, for example, that took place in Rogovo, the Rogovo case.

1 Do you remember that?

2 I'm asking you, Mr. Hartwig, just to make it quite clear, I'm

3 asking you this because in certain documents I saw that the European

4 monitors were there on the spot. Just if you remember. If you don't

5 remember, you can say, "I don't remember," and we'll move on.

6 A. Well, I know about the Rogovo only a few details, and I'm not sure

7 if my team was the first to be there. I only know that I received a

8 report that 25 dead had been found and that some of them -- that some of

9 them had the camouflage uniforms from the UCK, or the KLA.

10 I know that afterwards I think there was an investigation, but as

11 far as I know, nothing particular emerged from this, so I don't know what

12 the outcome of this was, what the results were.

13 Q. All right. Now, then, did you personally have a chance to attend

14 the media sessions that were being made about the establishment of some

15 kind of concentration camp for Albanians at the stadium in Pristina, for

16 example?

17 A. I did not really get much note of the general reaction from the

18 media, but at the beginning of March certainly I spent about a week -- an

19 evening every week in this region, and our office was broken into this

20 period, and among other things my camera and my films were stolen. But

21 from a journalist I heard that such stolen goods occasionally were sold in

22 the small shops near the stadium. And every evening I spend about half an

23 hour or a quarter there and I took a look at this, and I also wanted to

24 see if I could find my camera, but I didn't find anything. On the inside

25 part of the stadium, I didn't see that anything unusual or illegal had in

1 fact taken place.

2 Q. Did you know about the news that was being put out that there was

3 some kind of concentration camp over there for Albanians?

4 A. I certainly heard this, and I was very concerned about it. I'm

5 not sure if I saw it on television or whether I heard it on radio or

6 whether I had read about it, but I know that, yes, that there was mention

7 of this.

8 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mr. Milosevic. If I can go back to Rogovo

9 incident.

10 Mr. Hartwig, you mentioned that the 25 dead men, some of them had

11 the camouflage uniforms from the UCK. I'm interested in the camouflage

12 uniforms of KLA. How did they look like, and how do you know that they

13 were camouflage uniforms of the KLA?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in my journeys through Kosovo

15 repeatedly I was stopped at KLA posts, and I spoke to commanders of the

16 UCK, or KLA. Where I was there were two different type of uniform. First

17 of all, there was a camouflage uniform in -- well, at the moment I

18 couldn't describe precisely what this looked like because the uniforms --

19 such uniforms look very similar throughout the world. And other --

20 another part of UCK had a black uniform without any particular pattern or

21 without any particular pattern to it.

22 So I know that there are camouflage uniforms all over the world,

23 that these were not necessarily UCK people but certainly they were

24 camouflage uniforms which were similar to those that were worn by the UCK,

25 or KLA.

1 JUDGE KWON: But they were certainly uniforms, at any rate, not

2 common clothing.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please go on.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Mr. Hartwig, did you contact anyone, and if so whom, to ask for an

7 explanation as to the major differences that occurred between what you

8 could see on the ground in the field and what was being written by the

9 media and the official versions that appeared in the West?

10 A. I think this question was put and not just once, but I never got

11 an answer to this question.

12 Q. So you -- I do apologise. I'm not quite clear on the

13 interpretation I was given. Did you raise the question? Because the

14 question was raised neutrally, as -- it said, "I think this question was

15 put." So that's neutral. Did you ask?

16 A. Yes. Also I asked my superior in Sarajevo where this came from.

17 Q. So your superior was the main -- the headquarters in Sarajevo; is

18 that right?

19 A. Yes. Sarajevo.

20 Q. What was your question to the headquarters? What question did you

21 ask them, did you ask the headquarters in Sarajevo?

22 A. Well, I can't remember the exact wording of the question, but I

23 certainly asked or I requested for an explanation whereupon we had this

24 contradiction between reality and the way things were described. I asked

25 for an explanation as to the difference.

1 Q. And you didn't receive an answer, as far as I was able to gather

2 from what you just said.

3 A. That is correct. I received no answer.

4 Q. Mr. Hartwig, in the exhibits here, we have several texts which I'd

5 like you to identify first, and then we can go on to deal with their

6 contents. Would you take a look at tab 1 first, please.

7 Have you found that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is it your text?

10 A. It is my text.

11 Q. Now, could you tell us, please, when you wrote this text.

12 A. I probably wrote this immediately after my return from Germany.

13 The essence of this was that the developments in Kosovo and the war that

14 ensued, that I had been working on this within my mind, and it was

15 necessary for me to put things down on paper, to also give my immediate

16 assessment, my impressions and information. In other words, it was a type

17 of -- for me, it was a paper in which I wrote down things to remind me

18 about things that I had seen at the time.

19 Q. And so this aide-memoire, if I understand it, you wrote before the

20 end of June 1999; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Before that date at the latest. Is that right, Mr. Hartwig?

23 A. Before which day?

24 Q. Well, before the end of June 1999.

25 A. In this period, yes.

1 Q. I should now like to ask you to look at the document. And they

2 are your personal observations set down in writing. And look at point 1.

3 In point 1, you talk about the following: "What happened between the

4 beginning of January and the 19th of March, 1999?" Or, rather, as far as

5 I can see from this, you talk about what happened throughout the period of

6 time that you headed the observer mission of the European Union in Kosovo

7 and Metohija; is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And now it says: "From the beginning of the year, an increasing

10 number of attacks [In English] out of ambushes against Yugoslav security

11 forces, rifle/grenade launcher and mortar fire against police stations and

12 police officers, and later also against VJ could be recognised; in many

13 cases Yugoslav police officers were killed, more frequently heavily

14 wounded or sometimes kidnapped."

15 [Interpretation] Did that come from the reports you received and

16 from what you yourself saw when you were on the spot, in the field, that

17 you were able to write your observations based on that; is that right?

18 A. My entire statements were not based on assumptions or things

19 whispered to me but essentially I relied on information from the teams,

20 and certainly in discussions I obtained background information, but what

21 in total is described in the foreground, this was derived from official

22 documentation, or semi-official documentation, and this can also be

23 verified. There is evidence of this.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hartwig, I'm not clear as to exactly when you

25 wrote this report. In response to Mr. Milosevic, you said sometime before

1 June 1999. Are you able to be more precise?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I cannot state the

3 date with greater accuracy. It must be around the period immediately

4 after the time when I started with this report. And I'm very sorry that I

5 cannot give a definite statement on this.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: It would have been based on information that you

7 received.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: And when would you have received that

10 information?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Information, for example, on attacks

12 on police stations or also attacks on individual persons, this information

13 I had within 24 hours on my desk.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: So when you wrote the report, you consulted that

15 information.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly, because this was

17 fresh in my mind, and I used this for my weekly reports. And with a great

18 deal of luck, I was able to keep my diaries at the time in which I had

19 noted daily events.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hartwig, you wrote this article with your

22 computer, using word processor, and you kept the file in your laptop? Can

23 you tell us when this document specific -- this one specifically was

24 printed out?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot say. It may be that it was

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1 printed out at a much later time. It is possible that I printed it out at

2 a time later than the time when I was asked to come to The Hague.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

4 MR. NICE: Your Honours, before we move on, I observe that the

5 witness said that the -- that this report's derived from official

6 documentation or semi-official documentation. This can also be verified.

7 Now, the documentation of his mission is material that I would

8 have expected him to have brought with him. If he has and if I have a

9 chance to look at it, I will be able to deal with it more fully and more

10 satisfactorily in cross-examination. If he hasn't brought it with him, I

11 have to tell the Court that the material is not available to be me in a

12 form that I can use. We have some material from his mission and, subject

13 to restriction, we have brought them but only for the purposes of ensuring

14 that the accused has the material to which he is entitled under Rule 68.

15 So if the witness who says he was the senior official in this mission

16 hasn't brought the supporting material, I'm going to be in that

17 difficulty.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. We hear the submissions.

19 Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Just something with respect to that, another explanation,

22 Mr. Hartwig, please. How did it come about that part of your documents

23 were destroyed in Pristina?

24 A. I had a small collection of personal notes that I had made, and in

25 mid-March I was away for some time, and in this period some of my teams

1 from the team locations were evacuated to Skopje and also part of my

2 office, and in this context, some of my personal notes were destroyed.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. Now, let's go back for a moment to tab 1.

4 You go on to say the following: "Additionally, there was an increasing

5 number of actions [In English] against installations in cities known as

6 social meeting points of Serbs (hand grenades in cafes or bars, rifle fire

7 at guests - e.g. Pristina, Pec, Djakovica, et cetera); so far, similar

8 actions only happened outside villages and towns."

9 [Interpretation] You go on to say, "The 'normal' -" the normal is

10 under inverted commas - "The 'normal' killing of Serb civilians [In

11 English] or of Albanians suspected to cooperate with Serbs or to work for

12 Serbs or Serbian companies, Yugoslav administration continued..."

13 [Interpretation] And then you say, the "(11 February the OSCE reported

14 that 10 Albanians were kidnapped by UCK due to suspected relations with

15 Serbs) [In English] or even increased."

16 [Interpretation] Were all these events which you were able to

17 follow on a daily basis in your capacity as head of the European monitors

18 in Kosovo?

19 A. As I've already said, I always heard about these incidents at the

20 latest 24 hours after the event, and hence I was always updated. Then you

21 talked about the -- what was said in inverted commas, the "normal"

22 killing, that reflects my personal impression, because the whole

23 atmosphere was so tense that the death of a person as such was considered

24 to be something normal.

25 Q. You then go on to speak in this text of yours about the following:

1 "[In English] On 24th of January, UCK tried to create pressure on the

2 international community --" [Interpretation] and then in brackets "IC" --

3 "UCK is ready to resort to a more active campaign should IC not respond to

4 Racak into tangible and early benefits of the Albanian case."

5 THE INTERPRETER: On January 24th, the sentence begins.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Could you explain that to us more closely, please.

8 A. I know that in a statement, I think I read it, that the KLA

9 announced that they would be harsher if the international community would

10 draw clearer consequences from what happened in Racak.

11 Q. Mr. Hartwig, since we haven't got time to go through the entire

12 text, I should just like to draw your attention to a couple of other

13 things.

14 At the bottom of page 1 you say the following: "[In English] I

15 would like to stress the point that - always only until 19 March 1999 -

16 Yugoslav security forces and VJ reacted very disciplined and controlled on

17 attacks and provocations by UCK. On the other hand, as soon as Yugoslav

18 Security Forces or VJ reacted on UCK attacks or provocations, UCK loudly

19 and skilfully blamed the Serbs/Yugoslav publicly for arbitrary actions.

20 "Tactics and operations in a conflict against an underground army

21 unfortunately do not allow for a lot of consideration of human lifes or

22 the opinion of nations not directly concerned."

23 [Interpretation] Therefore, you were talking about, and I'd like

24 to extract that point, about the fact that the Yugoslav forces, that is to

25 say the security forces and the army, you say, reacted very disciplined

1 and controlled on attacks and provocations by the UCK. Could you explain

2 that to us more fully, please. What do you mean by it?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm still not clear about what is

4 called here a report, tab 1.

5 Was this a report, Mr. Hartwig, that you prepared for onward

6 transmission to a body or was it for your own personal purposes, private

7 purposes?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was basically for my own personal

9 purposes.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. And what we have here is a translation,

11 then. It would have been in German. In English?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I certainly must have written it in

13 English.

14 Just to explain, I did write in English straight away in order to

15 practice my English.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you've done quite well.

17 Continue, Mr. Milosevic. Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I have in mind the

19 fact that Mr. Hartwig was the head of the monitoring mission of the

20 European Union and that he is talking about what he saw personally and

21 also what he learnt on the basis of the reports from his team, and it is

22 he himself who is testifying, and we have established --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: My question was prompted by the description of

24 tab 1 as a draft report, which suggests that it was prepared for

25 transmission to some authority. In fact, it was -- as it has turned out,

1 it is Mr. Hartwig's own assessment of the situation in Kosovo for his own

2 private purposes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I -- that doesn't diminish the

4 importance.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I haven't said that at all. I just need

6 to be clear as to what it is that we're looking at.

7 Mr. Hartwig, yes.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Originally I considered it to be my

9 personal document. After the war, I also asked for a talk back home in

10 order to give the background of my report, and if I had had -- took such a

11 meeting with somebody, I certainly would have used this report, but it

12 didn't happen.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. As we were saying, Mr. Hartwig, from what you observed here, it

17 would emerge that the army or, rather, the security forces, always

18 responded to provocations, and you say provocations by UCK. Then whenever

19 there was a response to the provocations, the army and the police were

20 accused of arbitrary violence. Would that be an accurate description of

21 what you were able to see on the ground?

22 A. Basically it's precisely the kind of guerrilla tactics that were

23 used, that from an ambush fighting started, and then the fighters would

24 withdraw as quickly as possible and then watch or behave normally, so that

25 if further investigations were carried out, no links could be established.

1 Apart from that, it was my clear -- it was my clear -- I had a clear

2 impression that a provocation had taken place, and if the security forces

3 reacted to such provocations, they were accused of acting arbitrarily.

4 If I can just give you a little personal history. Sometimes my

5 little sister annoyed me very much. And when I wanted to react to it, she

6 immediately started crying, and I was the bad one.

7 Q. Mr. Hartwig, I'll try to move on as fast as I can but not at the

8 cost of skipping over important facts.

9 Look at page 2. You say that after you arrived in Pristina, in

10 relation to this paragraph A(1), you say after your arrival in Pristina,

11 you talked one after another to all the members of the Western mission,

12 and you say: "[In English] I was told by all of them, I was told by all

13 of them that there was a clear contradiction between their reports into

14 their capitals (governments) and the Kosovo situation published by their

15 governments."

16 [Interpretation] Was that the rule, the phenomenon you could

17 observe throughout your stay in Kosovo?

18 A. That is first experienced from meetings I had with the members of

19 the various nations that certainly has made me very sensitive and alerted

20 me to something that -- something that you had to be aware of that. It

21 wasn't on a daily basis, but whenever I had the opportunity, I could note

22 that they -- these differences that we talked about at the beginning, that

23 is the contrast between what really happened and how it was then reported,

24 that this -- there was this difference. This contrast did exist.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the next sentence reads: "So far,

1 I fully agree to your link between the late NATO engagement in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the early/unjustified NATO commitment in Kosovo."

3 Mr. Hartwig, "your link" suggests that you were referring to a

4 link made by somebody else. Who is that person?

5 THE WITNESS: There was no -- no clear particular person

6 whatsoever. I just tried to develop, to describe my feelings, my

7 considerations, somehow my -- my idea, and it was something I just used.

8 Somebody would -- does not physically exist. It was like a dispute with a

9 shadow.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: You could have said easily "to a link."

11 THE WITNESS: If I had known that it will be the subject of a case

12 in front of a court, I would have probably used very careful words. It

13 was at this time something that I never thought would be used. No, it was

14 really nothing which was assigned to be sent to somebody. It was a

15 collection of thoughts to describe my feelings, my concerns as well of the

16 situation. And as mentioned, it was never originally -- it was not signed

17 to be published or something like this.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hartwig, that is the second numbered paragraph

19 in a section which starts or is headed "To a." and then over the page we

20 have "To b." Were these questions which were posed that you were

21 answering?

22 THE WITNESS: I don't know. Maybe I had something, a scheme on a

23 draft paper that I used, manually written, a type of guideline, what would

24 you like to think about, the sequence of paragraphs that I referred to

25 that manual draft paper.

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1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And just beneath 2 perhaps is the

3 explanation. It says: "Before this main point, more easier questions

4 need to be answered: A. What did really happen? B. What was reported by

5 the media..." I suggest that those are questions he had set himself.

6 Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. I had

8 initially skipped over this point "2. 'Cui bono' the old Romans asked..."

9 What did really happen and what was reported by the media.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. In paragraph 2, under A, you say, "As indicated earlier already,

12 [In English] until 19 March 1999 there were no reasons at all to anybody

13 to interfere with the Yugoslav Administration in the Kosovo.

14 "All leading politicians and on request of OSCE the Head of the

15 Yugoslav Kosovo Verification Mission successfully tried to retain control

16 of the security forces and the VJ which were very much upset and excited

17 of the permanent attacks, provocations, pin-pricks by UCK and numerous

18 killings of colleagues without any opportunity of a legal retaliation."

19 [Interpretation] And then in brackets we read "underground army."

20 And then in point 3 you say: "Within the Yugoslav security

21 forces, there were not only Serbs, but also Albanians who were

22 specifically targets of UCK due to their clear cooperation with the

23 Serbs."

24 Mr. Hartwig, could you give us a comment on this? Establish a

25 link with what you personally found to be the case as head of the

1 monitoring mission in Kosovo.

2 A. I do not understand the question. I'm sorry.

3 Q. I just quoted point 2, where you said, "As indicated earlier

4 already, until 19 March 1999 --" that is practically until the end of your

5 mission, until your withdrawal -- "there was no reason at all for anybody

6 to interfere with the Yugoslav administration in Kosovo."

7 So your entire experience as head of European monitors indicates

8 that there was no reason for such interference. Is that your basic

9 conclusion?

10 A. So on the basis on that what I've seen, what I've experienced,

11 what I got in terms of information, that is true.

12 Q. Let us cover very briefly. At the end of this point A, you say:

13 "One aspect hasn't been mentioned at all so far: [In English] The rivalry

14 between the old and traditional Albanian clans living in Kosovo. They did

15 not cooperate, there was no 'time out' for their traditional revenge ...

16 and they most probably used the critical situation to strengthen their

17 positions. There was a saying that one mass grave in the vicinity of

18 Srbica (approximately 40 dead bodies) was the result of clan 'competition'

19 - albeit the Serbs were blamed for."

20 [Interpretation] How did you manage to establish this and how did

21 you arrive at these conclusions?

22 A. I think we're talking about the mass grave. I went there, and I

23 heard that this mass grave was filled with people killed by the Serbs, and

24 I'm not sure who actually killed them, but I spoke to people not

25 specifically with respect to Donje Crnje [phoen] but in discussions I'm

1 not quite sure with whom, suddenly someone told me that the dead people of

2 Donje Brnje [phoen] were not victims of a Serbian attack but that this was

3 an armed dispute between two clans.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, is there an allegation in the

5 indictment about Srbica, the mass grave there?

6 MR. NICE: I'll check it. I'll check.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm asking, I'm trying to find out

8 whether there's an allegation, because you must bear in mind,

9 Mr. Milosevic, you will strengthen your case if this witness, who was with

10 the ECMM, can give specific information on the basis of reports made to

11 him such as this, which would contradict anything in the indictment. That

12 would be much more helpful than merely getting his general observations

13 about the situation.

14 MR. KAY: 66(G) Srbica.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this is not only about

16 Srbica. The point here that everything that happened was ascribed to the

17 Serbian side, all the killings, although there were many conflicts, and

18 here the witness, I'm quoting paragraph 3. According to the data we had,

19 Albanian terrorists killed more Albanians than Serbs did. The paragraph 3

20 was in item A, "Within the Yugoslav security forces, there were not only

21 Serbs, but also Albanians - which were specifically targets of KLA due to

22 their clear cooperation with the Serbs."

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is an allegation in 66(G) that relates to

24 Srbica. Or is it Ivica?

25 JUDGE KWON: In the municipality of Skenderaj.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is in 63(C) a reference to Srbica.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, continue.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Would you please look now at what you wrote until -- under subitem

6 B. You explain: "For quite some time nobody paid any attention as to

7 what was going on in Kosovo. Perhaps it was the tiredness of the

8 Europeans after their energy consuming decision to task NATO to intervene

9 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But suddenly Kosovo became a subject; reports

10 were increasingly published talking of the suppression of Albanians by the

11 Yugoslav/Serb administration, attacks against Albanians, arsons against

12 Albanian houses, discrimination against Albanians in companies, schools,

13 et cetera.

14 "After the experience with 'the Serbs' in Croatia and

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were no doubts at all that those reports were

16 true. But there was no European reaction - until the media brought the

17 story of ethnical cleansing and atrocities against Albanians."

18 Thus, Mr. Hartwig, what we have here is an easily marketable story

19 that Serbs were committing crimes, and the story was launched without any

20 real grounds. Was that what you were able to establish and testify to?

21 A. Well, I repeat that on the basis of my observations, the statement

22 is correct that many crimes or that a lot was ascribed to the Serbs.

23 Q. That was easy to believe for everyone thanks, among other things,

24 to the propaganda.

25 A. Well, I agree that the fact of presenting someone immediately and

1 on the spot, of finding a culprit immediately, this makes life easier for

2 many people.

3 Q. Now, look further below. "[In english] It is to be assumed that

4 at this time already a political plan existed to look for an opportunity

5 to attack Kosovo; since no political goal for a commitment of military

6 power could be offered to the public, big-scale atrocities were required.

7 "Everything reported by Albanians was gratefully accepted."

8 Gratefully. "Balanced reporting became a foreign word. I do not want to

9 be misunderstood: I am very much in favour of clear reporting in the case

10 of crimes or atrocities - if they are reality; I am strongly against any

11 manipulation of situations, statements or reports."

12 [Interpretation] Then you say: "When I did my courtesy calls to

13 Serbian political and clerical leaders (I did the very same to the

14 Albanians, too), I was always 'the first European.' [In English] It is,

15 therefore, no miracle that the interviews and reports were rather

16 one-sided and by no means impartial - but, obviously, they were not

17 intended to be objective."

18 [Interpretation] Then you say: "The main point in most of the

19 interviews prior to the NATO air attacks seemed to obtain a picture as bad

20 as possible [In English] and to show YU as ugly as feasible. The media

21 reported everything and to the very last detail - the worse, the better.

22 "Ordinary people couldn't differ between propaganda and reality -

23 though politicians declared stories honest and true.

24 "It was imperative to report of or to show atrocities - the worse

25 the easier it was to the media to justify any own/NATO military

1 commitment."

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have taken up almost a whole

3 page of the transcript just reading. It's time for a question.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me finish with this sentence:

5 "The prescription worked - and today it is believed that it was the media

6 that failed. They were not a control element of politics but compliant

7 servants."

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. So, Mr. Hartwig, according to what you were able to see, was there

10 a parallel media war that was leading to and enabling a real military

11 intervention?

12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm -- I wonder really whether that sort

13 of question is the right side of the line. I've noticed a number of

14 leading questions which I haven't objected to, and the witness is quite

15 cautious about the way he answers, but I wonder if characterising his

16 state of mind in that way is really helpful.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Reformulate the question, Mr. Milosevic.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Hartwig, at the time -- at the time when you were formulating

20 these observations of yours, how were you able to assess the relationship

21 between the media campaign and the military campaign?

22 A. I think quite simply, because today it is not easily possible to

23 start a war. Today wars must be prepared on the basis of previous

24 experience in some way, and to prepare a war, in my opinion, it is

25 necessary to find some facts that support this, and therefore I believe

1 that it is a possibility and certainly it is a historically proven or

2 tried possibility if the things really have occurred or if they are

3 developed to a fantasy, if these things are presented in such a clear or

4 overclear way that a simple man on the street can see a reason for taking

5 military action.

6 Q. And then you say at the end of this paragraph 1: "Until the

7 commencement of NATO air attacks on Kosovo, the Serbs did not expel people

8 out of Kosovo."

9 Since you've just commented upon the portion quoted previously,

10 the prescription worked and it is considered today that the media failed.

11 And on the next page you say: "The campaign only makes sense if the above

12 question can be answered. Is it really realistic to assume that human

13 rights were defended or restored? Were there clear facts to prove that

14 the Serbs (basically the Yugoslav army - VJ - and MUP units) really

15 committed crimes against other ethnical groups prior to the commencement

16 of NATO air attacks? Or were the media only compliant servants of

17 politics and reported what the politicians wanted them to report? [In

18 English] If this should be the case, it would be of interest to know who

19 there was interested in providing a manipulated or even wrong picture of

20 the situation on the Kosovo to the public."

21 [Interpretation] Does this need additional comment, Mr. Hartwig,

22 or is it a clear attitude, clear belief of yours that you recorded in this

23 text?

24 A. Well, it was or it is a very clear, or even to the limit of the

25 permissible description of what I have seen and experienced.

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1 Q. And then you conclude by saying, "This indicates [In English] that

2 the contention to 'defend human rights' et cetera and to avoid a human

3 catastrophe in front of the European Community are neither true nor

4 honest."

5 [Interpretation] Let us note once again, Mr. Hartwig, you wrote

6 this in 1999, at the time when you headed the European Monitoring Mission.

7 Is that correct?

8 A. I don't think in the -- I don't think I wrote this at the time,

9 the active time when I was head of the mission, but later. I produced

10 this collection at a later time.

11 Q. Yes, but in 1999.

12 A. Yes.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You told us earlier this was prior to June 1999.

14 THE WITNESS: A major part for sure. I -- as mentioned, it was

15 not -- [No interpretation] [Interpretation] ... a draft paper and Serbs

16 would put them down on paper and followed them. And I do not -- cannot

17 exclude then on occasions I changed the wording of some sentences, but the

18 paper as such was worded at that time.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: What did you do with the paper? Did you make any

20 use of it after you wrote this? It's obviously strongly held views.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't use that document, but on

22 occasions in discussions, in personal discussions but not in public but in

23 personal conversations that I had I did explain the experience that I've

24 had.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for the break. We will adjourn for 20

1 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I don't think I'll be

7 returning to tab 1. I'd like to tender it into evidence.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Hartwig, we're going to go on to tab 2 now, please. I hope

11 we'll be able to get through that quicker. Would you have a look at that

12 exhibit now, please.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let the court deputy give the number for

14 the exhibit.

15 THE REGISTRAR: The whole binder will be D283.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you have tab 2 in front of

17 you, Mr. Robinson.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Hartwig, is this your presentation, the one you gave, the one

21 you delivered to the European Union?

22 A. This is the text of a presentation that I held at a conference in

23 Sarajevo in front of staff of the mission headquarters.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tell us about this conference. Who organised it,

25 under whose auspices?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the beginning of the year 1999,

2 the Federal Republic of Germany had the Presidency of the European Union.

3 At that moment in time, a German head of mission was also set in -- set

4 up. And at the time, within these six months, he set up this conference

5 where particular matters were debated. And as I came from Kosovo, I was

6 tasked to portray the situation in Kosovo.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the general purpose of the conference?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was an exchange of information,

9 update -- general update to inform people about the state of affairs which

10 emphasis was supposed to be put over the next six months. It was for

11 people who had been dealing with the history of the Balkans.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Let's just explain the first page. It says German Presidency of

15 the ECMM, 1st January 1999 to 30th June 1999. That is the period of time

16 when Germany presided; is that right? It's just an indication of the

17 period of time that the German Presidency was in force for.

18 A. Yes. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. "AOR" means "area of responsibility"; right? Is that correct?

20 A. [In English] Responsibility.

21 Q. And then the internal memorandum, you submitted that on the 16th

22 of March, 1999; right?

23 A. [Interpretation] I think I must have put it forward about a week

24 in advance. The conference was on the 16th of March.

25 Q. Well, we've clarified all that now. The conference was held on

1 the 16th of March, and this internal memorandum you sent in to them one

2 week prior to that.

3 Now, using this internal memorandum, did you present an oral

4 presentation at the conference on the situation on Kosovo and Metohija.

5 Is that right?

6 A. Yes, I did that presentation. I made that presentation, based

7 myself on this particular document.

8 Q. We'll just skim through it briefly, I hope.

9 In the first sentence, this is what you say. The title is

10 "Situation on the ground in Kosovo." "[In English] Generally, the

11 situation is different to the picture provided by media - and in reality

12 it also differs between ethnic and social groups.

13 "The media demonstrate their philosophy to promote news according

14 to their own political position - and do not always pay attention to a

15 complete and true and honest picture."

16 [Interpretation] So that position taken by you which we were able

17 to see through the previous document we looked at, you are now presenting

18 at a public conference; is that right?

19 A. It wasn't a public conference, but it was a conference in front of

20 the staff of the observers mission.

21 Q. Very well. Yes, I understand that correction. You mean that the

22 journalists weren't present, but it was an official conference with the

23 participation of all those involved in the observer missions, if I

24 understood you correctly.

25 A. Observers as well as administrative staff.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the format of the presentation? Were

2 questions asked after the presentation?

3 THE WITNESS: No. No.

4 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether we heard. The "AOR" is

5 abbreviation of what?

6 THE WITNESS: "Area of responsibility."

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. How many participants were there at the conference?

10 A. [In English] Between 40 and 60.

11 Q. Very well. When I say that you publicly presented your views and

12 positions, I mean publicly before those 40 or 60 people who attended; is

13 that right?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, that's your own definition of public,

15 Mr. Milosevic, yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Let me say official,

17 then, because it was a conference and the conference was officially held.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. You state here the following: "Kosovo Albanians, to a big degree,

21 are not politically interested [In English] or just political trimmers

22 without an own political opinion - following every LDK or KLA statement

23 promising a better life.

24 "Only a small part of the Kosovo Albanians is - more or less -

25 politically engaged, deals with political ideas which not yet have clearly

1 been identified. Even worse, Kosovo Albanians could not agree upon one

2 political representation or representative who was entitled to speak on

3 behalf of most of the Albanians."

4 [Interpretation] Then you go on to explain what the radical part

5 does of the Kosovo Albanians, mainly represented by the KLA. And you go

6 on to list the political objective, as you say, and the first point you

7 set down is to get rid of the Serbian ruled administration. And then you

8 go on to say, to get completely rid of all Serbs within Kosovo. And then

9 you go on to explain who it is who expresses this, as indicated by: "[In

10 English] To establish an Albanian Kosovo - with a hidden view on the

11 Albanians in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro -"

12 [Interpretation] that's the next objective - "[In English] and a

13 unification with the these parts."

14 [Interpretation] In your explanations, did you use the term or did

15 you know of the term "Greater Albania"?

16 A. I have used the term "Greater Albania," as far as I recall, on one

17 occasion, when I drew a comparison where on the one -- where I said on the

18 one hand the idea of a Greater Serbia or -- is going -- is considered as a

19 reality, and nobody says anything about what I've heard in conversations

20 with Albanians, that is the restoration of an Albanian Empire within

21 medieval restraints, frontiers.

22 Q. Is fully what you say -- not fully but partially when you say,

23 "Establish an Albanian Kosovo - with a hidden view on the Albanians in [In

24 English] the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro -

25 unification with these parts." [Interpretation] Is that a partial

1 description of what you implied by the concept or notion of Greater

2 Albania?

3 A. When I talk about the Greater Albania and its historic concepts,

4 that did include today's state of Albania. At the time in Kosovo when I

5 had meetings with Albanians and talked to them, they referred to the

6 Macedonian part of Albania and Montenegro. So I had the impression that

7 the citizens of the state of Albania are considered to be the poor cousin

8 of the Albanians.

9 Q. Then you go on to speak of the following, the Serbs -- next title.

10 And you go on to describe the situation with the Serbs, that the Serbs

11 speak about political mistakes made in '89, "... the political mistake of

12 1989 when the autonomy was withdrawn from Kosovo by Milosevic; [In

13 English] and almost all of the politicians in office met would be willing

14 to participate in discussions with the moderate Albanians on the

15 organisation of the future..." on the organisation of the future.

16 [Interpretation] So that, then, was the general mood that

17 prevailed and which you noted in your contacts with the Serb officials you

18 met in Kosovo. Is that right, Mr. Hartwig?

19 A. So what I wrote with regard to the withdrawal of autonomy, that

20 was my understanding on two or three occasions. But what I generally

21 noted in my conversations was this very strong need in order to create a

22 situation which for the Serbs and also for the other ethnic groups in

23 Kosovo there would be a basis for co-existence.

24 Q. That was the position of the Serbs that you talked to, was it?

25 A. Yes. Yes.

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1 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, you go on to say the following:

2 "[In English] The increasing expansion of UCK and their 'terrorist

3 attacks' in guerrilla tactics against police, civilians and VJ hardened

4 the positions of even moderate Serbs and decreased the willingness to

5 negotiate. Western media and politicians, in the view of Serbs - not only

6 Kosovo Serbs - supported that development by an inappropriate public and

7 political acknowledgement of and attention paid to KLA, their leaders, and

8 permanently blaming only one side - the Serbs. It is not for our fun or

9 voluntariness - we are obliged by law to protect people and to guarantee

10 law and order; we do it in our way. What would happen in your country if

11 police patrols were ambushed, policemen assassinated or bombs thrown into

12 cafes or restaurants? Would your police just observe? - These were the

13 questions of the head of the Kosovo police force to me."

14 [Interpretation] Therefore, Mr. Hartwig, at the time, and this is

15 happening on the 16th of March, you prepared this one week before that or

16 somewhat more in advance because you sent it in a week before, but anyway,

17 this is the situation in which we see confirmation -- or, rather, let me

18 ask you: Is this an assertion which confirms that what we were dealing

19 with was an escalation of terrorist attacks of the KLA against the

20 objectives in Kosovo and Metohija, targets in Kosovo and Metohija; the

21 police, the army, civilians and other targets; restaurants, cafes, and all

22 the other things mentioned here?

23 MR. NICE: Is the Chamber happy with that sort of question? It

24 would seem to me again it's pretty well giving the entire answer to the

25 witness.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Answer the question.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my statement, there's certainly

3 the facts from reports and from other sources of information which were

4 gained from an intensified number of attacks of the executive power and

5 against the Serb authorities. It was quite interesting that when

6 negotiations started, the number of incidents per day increased. And you

7 can -- that was also -- and that was also reflected in my report even if

8 it doesn't say so explicitly here.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hartwig, could I ask you what you mean by the

10 comment or the question, "What would happen in your country if police

11 patrols were ambushed, policemen assassinated or bombs thrown into cafes

12 or restaurants? What would your --" sorry -- "Would your police just

13 observe?" What was the point of these comments?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wrote that basically in order to

15 portray the situation of the Serb executive. These questions come from a

16 conversation with General Lukic, and he asked these questions. And he

17 said, "How would people react in your country to a situation like this?"

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Did that observation sound to you like an attempt

19 at justification for retaliation?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't have that impression at

21 all. And during my time in Kosovo, I didn't have the impression that the

22 police or the military -- I did have the impression that to stick to the

23 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. And I had another conversation with

24 General Lukic, and on that occasion he said we could use -- we were under

25 different circumstances. We could cope with the KLA, but we do not want

1 to be a party -- a contractual party who could be deemed to be not

2 reliable.

3 So there was the aspiration by complying with the agreement

4 between Milosevic and Holbrooke to really comply with it as fully as

5 possible in order not to create any problems.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Hartwig, Mr. Bonomy mentioned the word "retaliation" a moment

8 ago. Did you anywhere during your stay in Kosovo have the impression that

9 the police or the army entered into any type of retaliation, that it was

10 -- that it engaged in an action that could be defined as retaliation?

11 Did you gain that impression ever?

12 A. I didn't receive any single report in which there was even an

13 indication of anything like this having been said. My own personal

14 impression was -- was similar. I personally had -- I personally did not

15 hear of revenge, and it was not said in many discussions with Albanians.

16 Actually, there was never any indication that the police in general, or

17 that certain policemen or military personnel had done anything that was

18 illegal. But on questioning them, they spoke rather more generally.

19 People were arrested by the Serbian police, and they were put into prison,

20 and we do not know where they are. But there was no clear reference, nor

21 was there any indication in the report that somewhere revenge had taken

22 place.

23 And I personally would like to add this does not exclude the

24 possibility that in individual cases perhaps something did happen, as is

25 always possible where so many people are involved. Perhaps a single

1 incident did occur. But the way it is described there, that something had

2 been commanded from a high level, that revenge actions had taken place, I

3 know nothing about anything of this sort.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. You then go on to speak here -- or,

5 rather, you inform about the KLA military: "[In English] The UCK attack

6 against a police patrol in the village of Likosani on 28 February 1998

7 ..." [Interpretation] That was the beginning, when two policemen were

8 killed, two wounded, and so on and so forth. And then you go on and say,

9 "Since then, KLA guerrilla tactics have developed [In English] and

10 operations improved - together with the material status of light infantry

11 weapons. Military training - unitwise already, status of skills and force

12 organisation improved and fighting and supporting personnel numbers

13 increased."

14 [Interpretation] Then you go on to say: "[In English] The rector

15 of the Albanian university Pristina announced that he is happy of every

16 student who joins or who will join the KLA."

17 [Interpretation] How did you come to learn of that?

18 A. Because I had a talk with him.

19 Q. Fine. Thank you. So that means from direct contact; right?

20 Thank you.

21 "[In English] Police/MUP stations and patrols remained main

22 targets during the last year - while VJ remained untouched till the end of

23 1998; this changed in 1999 when repeatedly VJ convoys were attacked by KLA

24 which more and more tries to dictate courses of actions."

25 [Interpretation] How did you then deduce and draw the conclusions

1 as to what the goal was of the KLA, and did you have any knowledge at all

2 about any conflict that was initiated by the army or the police?

3 A. The second question first. I know of no conflict that was

4 initiated, and I did not receive any reports, and I myself had seen

5 nothing or heard anything.

6 As regards the question of the goals of the KLA, my impression was

7 that the UCK, the KLA, because of their action, to some extent

8 deliberately accepted that damage or that harm would occur to their own

9 people, the Kosovo conflict, and they tried to keep the conflict in Kosovo

10 alive in the eyes of the public.

11 Q. You then go on to give two examples. One example, in the second

12 paragraph, where you say the following: "[In English] One example is when

13 a Serb investigation team from Pristina was shot at by KLA and five MUP

14 were wounded --" MUP means policemen -- "were wounded while trying to

15 gather evidence of a murder of one Serb and the wounding of another two

16 Serbs on 22nd and 23rd of February respectively at Bukos; the media

17 excessively reported of the MUP reaction of that incident."

18 [Interpretation] Is that one example of this complete distortion

19 in reporting?

20 A. I assumed that this was less due to the report although you could

21 see it in that way, but I recorded it because of the expansion of the KLA

22 and the -- and this also made clear the growth in their forces.

23 Meanwhile, it had become clear that not just the state executive, whether

24 one was satisfied with them or not, that the executive maintained the law,

25 but that an illegal troop was responsible for upholding the law. And in

1 March 1999, I had to make great efforts to get a police team to us in the

2 office in Pristina because -- Pristina, because the police also did not

3 feel very sure.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hartwig, what do you mean by "The media

5 excessively reported the MUP reaction to that incident"? What was the

6 reaction of the MUP that they were reporting excessively?

7 THE WITNESS: The reason behind that statement -- [Interpretation]

8 The background to this is the following: In the initial period, many

9 journalists came -- that were visiting Kosovo, came to us in the office to

10 get information on the situation, and during this time journalists in

11 general came or went mainly to the Albanians and obtained information on

12 the situation, and this necessarily meant that the one side where they got

13 more information was reported on in more detail, and in talks with people

14 on the Serbian side that were involved in public relations, I found that

15 here hardly anyone was interested in the other side of a version or of an

16 event.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. You go on to give a fairly extensive explanation about the

19 functioning or, rather, the evolvement of the operations themselves in the

20 last paragraph on the page I'm quoting from. So in your report you say

21 the following: "[In English] Village by village is infiltrated, villagers

22 are voluntarily or forcibly convinced to join - or to at support at

23 least." [Interpretation] And you're referring to the KLA. "[In English]

24 As soon as the advance of KLA is known to the police, the village becomes

25 a potential target. Should there be any incidents in the close proximity

1 to that village, police will automatically assume the perpetrators are

2 from there - and take action. Actions against guerrilla fighters are the

3 most difficult military operations and, therefore, something like an area

4 covering action seems to be the only means. There is a method behind:

5 The international community, of course, sympathises with Albanians and KLA

6 when TV pictures can be presented showing civilians killed or villages

7 destroyed - regardless of whether it was an action or reaction conducted

8 by security forces.

9 "Finally, the liberation of KLA and the potential search or

10 retaliation by Serb security forces turn out to become a vicious circle to

11 the villagers; their alternative might be to either be killed by KLA - or

12 by Serb security forces."

13 [Interpretation] Faced with a situation like that, did you happen

14 to note a phenomenon by which when the KLA comes into a village and

15 occupies it, takes control of it and starts launching its provocations and

16 ambushes of the police and others, that the civilians leave that village?

17 They tend to take refuge, leave the village and take refuge somewhere

18 else?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the reference to "starts launching

20 its provocations and ambushes of the police," the question is leading and

21 you will have to reformulate it. It is my view that you do not exercise

22 sufficient discipline in your examination-in-chief, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. All right.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. You go on to say, and I'm going to read another passage -- not to

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1 ask leading questions, I'm going to quote your own text: "[In English]

2 Should there be any incidents in close proximity to that village --"

3 [Interpretation] When you say incidents in the close proximity to a

4 village, do you mean an incident which is caused by the police or do you

5 have in mind incidents caused by the KLA?

6 A. Well, certainly there were no incidents that had been provoked by

7 the police. These were incidents where -- which resulted in the police

8 reaction.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, where are you reading from? What

10 page?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I re-read something that I've read

12 before. It's in the middle of the page I earlier read from, and then I

13 came back to it. "Should there be incidents in the close proximity of

14 that village." It's in the middle of the last paragraph on that page,

15 paragraph starting with "KLA ..." and I asked Mr. Hartwig whether it would

16 be an incident caused by the KLA or by the police, and Mr. Hartwig

17 answered that it was an incident caused by the KLA. And now I hope I can

18 ask a question which is not provocative or, rather, isn't leading.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Whenever an incident would occur, such as an ambush, killing of a

21 policeman or a serviceman, followed by a clash, did you notice perhaps

22 whether the civilians from the villages, tend to take cover, to leave the

23 village or the area in which --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have to ask him what did the civilians from

25 the villages do.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson. Let me ask

2 the witness.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. What did the civilians do?

5 A. As a rule, in accordance with our observation, it was not such

6 that a policeman was shot, and that will certainly -- if a shooting had

7 taken place, that of course people shot back, but this inclusion of the

8 villages resulted frequently much later when -- if the police tried to get

9 hold of the culprit. Then the situation was that the villagers, the

10 inhabitants of the village then found themselves in the crossfire because

11 those that attacked the police and then they were caught in the reaction,

12 shooting from the security forces, and frequently this was the reason why,

13 if there was any indication of something like this, that the civilian

14 people left the village.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. That is the only thing I wanted to hear

16 from you.

17 In your contacts with the police administration in Kosovo, did you

18 have opportunity to hear anything about the concern and efforts and orders

19 issued by the police to -- aimed at avoiding civilian casualties?

20 A. Now, I did not experience any such commands being issued, but at

21 least in discussions I obtained the clear impression that one really did

22 try to ensure that every kind of attention, or one wanted to avoid

23 attention in the world which would lead to further worsening of the

24 Serbian reputation.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hartwig. You speak here specifically about the

1 police. "MUP, the federal police under command of the Ministry of the

2 Interior, supports normal Traffic Police. Independently, there are

3 stationary MUP-controlled points along predetermined roads. [In English]

4 Apart of general observation and traffic control activities, MUP is the

5 means to conduct semi-military operations within and around villages; the

6 training status is high, discipline is told to be high, and equipment

7 consists of armoured vehicle, automatic guns and light infantry weapons."

8 [Interpretation] Then you go on to say: "... MUP sub-units or

9 units are committed against KLA elements to prevent or to follow actions

10 and in patrolling throughout dangerous areas."

11 So reference is made here to the KLA and the problems experienced

12 by the police with the KLA as well as the origin of incidents.

13 Do you know of any incident from your personal experience or from

14 reports wherein the police attacked civilians?

15 A. I've already said so. I didn't -- I don't know any -- I don't

16 know anything of such incidents. If I interpret that the police would

17 carry out an attack against the civilian population without a specific

18 reason, then I do not know of any such incident.

19 Q. Then you explain here further below, speaking of the humanitarian

20 situation, after the sub-heading "Humanitarian situation," in the second

21 paragraph: "Refugee numbers vary extremely; in the first week of March,

22 UNHCR reported some 3.000 refugees and more in the area of Djeneral

23 Jankovic border crossing along the road Pristina-Skopje. [In English] We

24 had a team there twice - and the members never counted more than 300 to

25 400 people. After MUP actions, UNHCR publishes refugee numbers which

1 exceeded the number of inhabitants of the village sometimes by two or

2 three times. This is partially caused by the sheltering of refugees by

3 local inhabitants."

4 [Interpretation] Could you please tell us, on the basis of your

5 knowledge, why would the UNHCR increase the number of refugees almost

6 tenfold? For instance, we have reference to 3.000 as reported by UNHCR as

7 opposed to 300 or 400 that you actually found on the ground.

8 A. As I've already said, I do not know the real reason, but I've only

9 got one or two possible explanations for that. For one thing, it could be

10 that UNHCR relied on statements made by people who were on site. It might

11 be villagers who might have said so. On the other hand, as far as

12 humanitarian aid is concerned, there's always the question of numbers, as

13 far as aid is concerned.

14 So there are only two explanations to this, in my opinion: Either

15 in the heat of the moment somebody just gave a figure, but you cannot

16 exclude the intention then, when giving a larger number, you might get a

17 -- more room for manoeuvre. But this is only speculation, and I would

18 like to take it as such.

19 Q. All right. Then I will not press you on this. Tell me,

20 Mr. Hartwig, was there any relationship or cooperation between your

21 monitoring mission and the Verification Mission of the OSCE?

22 A. Let me say it differently. Our mission already existed in Kosovo

23 when the OSCE was set up. So our mission already existed before the OSCE

24 was set up in Kosovo. In the preliminary phase, we helped with setting it

25 up and also sent along reports. So our working level cooperation was the

1 usual in international posts. Sometimes there were particular problems

2 relating to the profession. Each military commander has got its area of

3 responsibility, and whoever comes in from the outside is a subordinate.

4 And we were in Kosovo in the OSCE area, and we were not subordinates,

5 which meant that General Dizat [phoen], he would have liked us to be under

6 his command but that wasn't the case.

7 Q. So your mission was independent of the OSCE Verification Mission?

8 A. Yes. We were completely independent.

9 Q. I should now like to move on to another subject. If you could

10 tell us very briefly about what you know from your experience and your

11 contacts with the representatives of the administration, the Serb

12 administration in Kosovo and in Serbia, and the representatives of Kosovo

13 Albanians. What were the authorities of Serbia seeking to achieve, and

14 what were the goals of the Kosovo Albanian leadership as you heard from

15 KLA leadership that you met? You were in contact with both sides.

16 A. So the authorities within Kosovo were already -- already existed.

17 I talked to ministers, to other representatives. And as I've already

18 stated, there was a clear aspiration that was noticeable in order to find

19 a peaceful and a solution which would be acceptable to all sides. That

20 was different on the Albanian side, because there, right from the

21 beginning, the independence of Kosovo existed as the objective, and I -- I

22 didn't get a description of this kind of independence of Kosovo in

23 conjunction of Serb presence. It was mainly pointed out by the designated

24 vice-president of independent Kosovo, not with the Serbs and not under the

25 Serbs, because the Serbs would not give any rights to minorities; hence,

1 the objective stated was independence.

2 Q. Thank you for this very clear answer. Just one more thing. Was

3 the purpose of eliminating Serbs - and you used the expression "getting

4 rid of the Serbs" - only to become an independent part, independent of

5 Serbia and Yugoslavia, or was it also desirable to eliminate Serbs from

6 Kosovo?

7 A. So after the conversations I had, the objective was clearly to

8 have a Kosovo with exclusive -- with an exclusive Albanian administration.

9 There was no deviation or there were no differences in ideas. Kosovo

10 without Yugoslavia independent. I talked to Dr. Jakobi and asked him what

11 independence should mean in that context because in such a small country

12 as Kosovo with 11.000 square kilometres, economic independence would be

13 difficult to imagine, and I occasionally had the impression that this term

14 "independence" can be interpreted quite differently.

15 Q. In what way differently?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, how much longer do you plan to be?

17 You had estimated, I see here, two hours. At the rate at which we are

18 going, you will probably need two or three times that. Progress has been

19 very slow.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope I can finish within

21 another hour, at least the examination-in-chief.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have another ten minutes, so use it very

23 well.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I've got a few matters that I'd like to

25 raise, probably about five minutes in all, two of them concerning this

1 witness, two not. No more than five minutes.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Another five minutes, because we have to stop at

3 1.45 today.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. A very straightforward question: Did this interpretation of the

6 independent Kosovo imply, on the basis of the conversations you had and

7 the knowledge you had, did it imply elimination of Serbs from Kosovo?

8 A. So the statement made by the vice-president not with -- not under

9 the Serbs -- not with the Serbs implies to me quite clearly that no

10 peaceful co-existence was envisaged with the Serbs. "Not with the Serbs"

11 meant out of Kosovo.

12 Q. Mr. Hartwig, you spent almost six months in Pristina. Let me not

13 engage in guesswork. You were there from November until the 15th of March

14 without interruption. What was the situation in town during the time you

15 were in Pristina, including the preparatory period and during your term of

16 office as leader of European monitors? What was the situation in

17 Pristina?

18 A. So regardless of the fact that I couldn't cope with the language,

19 I moved around Pristina as I would move around other towns as well. I

20 didn't feel threatened, nor did I feel in -- under any risk. You could

21 also go out and have a meal somewhere in the evenings without any

22 restrictions. So from that point of view, it was quite a normal

23 situation. I might just draw the following comparison: About a week ago

24 I returned from Kabul. Kabul and such, it wasn't possible to move around

25 there like that.

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1 Q. In the course of that period, did you witness any active

2 discrimination against Albanians by any representative of Serbian

3 authorities in Kosovo?

4 A. To be quite precise, I do not know anything of that, but I know an

5 example. We lived in the house of a couple. The husband, I think, worked

6 in the Serbian Ministry of Health, and his wife was professor at the

7 university, and a daughter was a medical doctor, and today daughter was

8 going through medical training. And he stated that they were -- they were

9 fired due to the fact that they were Albanians. And then I asked the

10 daughter on one occasions later on, and she said that the father went into

11 retirement because of the age limit, and then -- so he gave up his -- and

12 then the wife gave up her post because she wanted to join her husband.

13 And the son said I had to treat a Serb patient in the hospital, and then I

14 was made to leave. And I just gave this as one example. I'm not saying

15 this was the principle in the whole of Kosovo. I always heard -- I don't

16 know, I think there are 180 Albanians were fired, so they were unemployed.

17 But nobody gave me an example in point which we could use.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please stop here for today.

19 Mr. Nice had some matters to raise.

20 MR. NICE: Only very quickly. They are only very short.

21 As to this witness and before he withdraws, in light of our

22 interest and also the question asked by His Honour Judge Kwon about tab 1,

23 it would always be open for the witness, since he has to come back, either

24 to check his computer, or if indeed tab 1 was typed on a laptop, to bring

25 his laptop with him so that we can see its generation date.

1 Separately, I would ask that the witness search his records and/or

2 his computer so that he can bring with us, if he chooses, the letter he

3 sent to General Sreten Lukic on the 24th of March, I think it was of 2000.

4 But in any event, he'll know the letter concerned. I have adequate

5 secondary evidence of it, but it will save time if we simply have the

6 typed copy of the letter that he sent to General Lukic.

7 I regret that I do not have a file of materials to make available

8 to the witness for him to pre-read for cross-examination, because I wasn't

9 aware until he's given evidence, of materials that I might have wanted to

10 research and free from restriction. So if things change, if, for example,

11 I do find materials between now and the weekend, may I have leave of the

12 Court, if the witness is willing, to present materials to him? But I

13 don't think it's likely. But I suppose it would save time.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hartwig, you heard what the Prosecutor said.

15 Those two pieces of material, if you have them, then bring them.

16 Secondly, he may have material that you can pre-read, and which,

17 if he does have, he would transmit to you over the weekend. Would you be

18 in agreement with pre-reading that material?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm prepared to read through the

20 material, and I'm also prepared to look through my computer. It's a

21 laptop which is 12 years old, and I know that in questioning General Lukic

22 about a year or two years after my stay in Kosovo that I sent this to him,

23 but I know that I did not store everything.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for your cooperation.

25 MR. NICE: The other two matters don't concern the witness but he

1 doesn't need to withdraw. The first one, before we forget it, is that the

2 video clip of Blace was adopted in part by the previous witness. I didn't

3 ask for it be exhibited by oversight. May it be exhibited?

4 MS. HIGGINS: Your Honour, there are technical objections which,

5 subject to anything Mr. Milosevic may want to raise himself I can raise

6 them quickly --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's deal with that at another time.

8 MR. NICE: The last point is this: Can I deal with this in

9 private session for just one minute?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: With the witness present?

11 MR. NICE: It doesn't matter. I don't want to take time.

12 [Private session]

13 (redacted)

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12 [Open session]

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender tab 2 into

14 evidence. That is the presentation given at the conference in Sarajevo.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. That will be exhibited.

16 We are adjourned until 9.00 a.m. next Tuesday.

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of

19 March, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.

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