Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 41400

1 Wednesday, 29 June 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber has been considering

7 the best way to deal with the presentation of this evidence, which relates

8 to 1998, you know, and which you say is important to your case. The

9 Chamber, as you know, has a duty under Rule 90(F) to exercise control over

10 the presentation of evidence so as to avoid needless consumption of time.

11 There are various possibilities: As the evidence relates to 1998

12 and seems to be directed to the issue of clashes between the KLA and the

13 VJ forces, one matter which we would wish to discuss -- one approach that

14 we'd wish to discuss and on which I'd wish to hear from Mr. Kay and

15 Mr. Nice is to admit the -- the rest of the evidence which is of the same

16 kind. It's -- it's repetitive, you know. Subject, of course, to the

17 right of the Prosecutor to cross-examine on that evidence.

18 May I hear from Mr. Kay first on that -- that approach.

19 MR. KAY: On the basis that the evidence is cumulative, it's been

20 cumulative of prior testimony in the Defence case, I would see no

21 difficulty with that myself. And as a -- an advocate, it would be the

22 kind of course I would ask the Tribunal to -- to take so that I could get

23 more material in from the Defence witness of a more contemporaneous nature

24 to the indictment. And that would be a -- a step that I personally would

25 take. Whether the accused would or not, I can't speak for him, but that

Page 41401

1 would be my position.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: The -- I am reminded that in relation to the

3 Prosecution case, we did admit evidence along the same lines. I think the

4 OSCE material, and there may have been other instances.

5 MR. KAY: Yes. The -- the ground was set for the OSCE material

6 through General DZ, General Drewienkiewicz. And in the course of his

7 testimony, if one looks at it, passages that were cumulative were merely

8 skated over by Mr. Nice. And then when subsequent witnesses came to

9 testify, that procedure was followed again, and it was on the basis that

10 we've heard about that already, the issues are before the Trial Chamber,

11 and we can move on to other issues. It was very much a -- a strategy that

12 the Prosecution were inclined to take to try and maximise the amount of

13 time available to them.

14 It's not a novel strategy in relation to the testimony of -- of

15 this witness. And indeed, when we progressed further into other aspects

16 of the trial in Croatia and in Bosnia, the same process was -- was applied

17 again. We'd hear about it, and Judge May frequently ruled, "Well, we've

18 got that material before us, let's move on." And indeed, Mr. Nice would

19 often say that "You've heard about this, we're using this as a vehicle to

20 set something up, it's before you already."

21 Mr. Harland produced all the UN Security Council resolutions. As

22 Mr. Nice said at the time, he had very little to do with it, but it was

23 just a convenient vehicle by which material --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: And he did so without dealing with them

25 individually.

Page 41402

1 MR. KAY: Absolutely. In fact, I -- on the version of the

2 electronic exhibits I've got at the moment -- they haven't been scanned

3 into the system, I think there were so many of them. So it -- it was just

4 a convenient package of -- of dealing with it, without Defence objection.

5 Mr. Milosevic didn't -- didn't object because it -- it was rational and

6 made sense, because --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: The issue is critical to the proper use of time,

8 because we are now at tab 25, and 1998 goes up to tab 250. Now, if we

9 continue with the same course, we'll spend all of today on -- on this

10 particular kind of evidence. And I don't consider that to be a proper use

11 of the -- of the Court's time, you know.

12 MR. KAY: For my part, I'm concerned the accused has the maximum

13 impact for his Defence --


15 MR. KAY: -- which goes to the indictment that this witness can

16 deal with, with aspects of that evidence that has been called in the

17 Prosecution case. I think I mentioned two witnesses last week. Another

18 one I came across yesterday was John Crosland, who had mentioned Colonel

19 Delic, as well as his brigade, which was an extra one. So it shows that

20 there is a great degree of relevance to be had from this witness. And for

21 my part, I -- I wouldn't be objecting if -- if the accused's cumulative

22 testimony was to be treated in that way, and it would not be departing

23 from previous procedures in this trial if the purpose was to -- to get to

24 the point of the evidence.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the 25 tabs that we have already looked at

Page 41403

1 are illustrative of the kind of evidence -- of the rest of the evidence up

2 to tab 250.

3 MR. KAY: Yes, there would be no admission here of acts and

4 conduct of the accused. It would be cumulative testimony about which the

5 Trial Chamber has frequently said it's -- it is aware of these issues.

6 It is evidence that is actually reflected in the Prosecution case

7 as well, so in many respects, although the Prosecution might not be

8 inclined to admit any material from the Defence, as we -- we do have two

9 poles apart here, it can be said that it reflects a dimension of their

10 case concerning the KLA anyway through their own witnesses that we've

11 heard about through the evidence of John Crosland, through the evidence of

12 DZ and others in 1998.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay.

14 Mr. Nice.

15 MR. NICE: Probably not exactly the same as the Harland evidence,

16 but I don't think that matters for these purposes. Had the material been

17 introduced in writing, then a witness statement would have identified all

18 the purposes to which these exhibits would have been put, or were to be

19 put, and there might have been some tabulated identification of the value

20 exhibit by exhibit was to be offered in evidence, and that would have been

21 the ideal way of dealing with it.

22 Having made that observation, I have no objection on this

23 occasion to compendious production of the material, provided that we are

24 notified -- to be sure we're on notice as to the purposes for -- for which

25 the exhibits are to be produced. That may already have been covered by

Page 41404

1 the accused's general observations when he introduced this witness or it

2 may be that the Chamber will want to be quite sure that we know all the

3 topics said to have been covered by these 250 tabs.

4 My only other two observations are these: It may well be,

5 judging from the detailed way the accused is examining this witness, that

6 the equivalent of a witness statement in some form or another does exist

7 which would show the accused's reliance document by document on these 250

8 tabs. If he'd only make that available, and he will be quite sure that

9 his points through these tabs would be available to us in detail.

10 The second outstanding point: Having material adduced in bulk

11 may have consequences on the amount of time and the proportions of time

12 required for cross-examination, but I would hope not.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you've heard the -- the idea

16 which the Chamber proposed for dealing with the rest of this evidence.

17 You have heard submissions from Mr. Kay. You have heard the very

18 carefully formulated submissions from the Prosecutor. The Chamber would

19 deal with the matter in that way, unless you can persuade us otherwise.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, now the microphone is on.

23 Mr. Robinson, I also looked at all of this once again, everything

24 that you have before you, and I have a sort of middle-of-the-road solution

25 to save time as much as possible and at the same time not to omit the most

Page 41405

1 important things that this witness is testifying about. This is the first

2 commander of the Army of Yugoslavia whose area of responsibility was a

3 very big area, covering a long portion of the state border. In this area,

4 many of the events that were referred to took place. It is very important

5 to see how the army behaved all the time. Everything can be followed as

6 far as the conduct of the army is concerned because everything is

7 contained in orders and analyses as things develop. There are working

8 maps, there are orders, there are analyses of all the actions taken every

9 time anything takes place.

10 So all of this fully contradicts the pattern launched here by Mr.

11 Nice; namely, that forces of Yugoslavia and Serbia went out there and shot

12 at the Albanians, at the innocent civilians, as they put it. This is

13 testimony from the actual sites. These are not documents of the United

14 Nations or whatever, this is the direct testimony of a commander who had

15 14.000 troops under his command during the war. When speaking of these

16 troops, we can see how the Army of Yugoslavia functioned. Precisely what

17 is contained here speaks of the fact that it did function as a serious,

18 organised, disciplined, and very efficient army. So these entire dynamics

19 are in contrast to everything that was presented previously.

20 That is why I suggest that we deal with this in groups. We've

21 dealt with tab 29. Never mind you said 25, but it doesn't really matter

22 whether it's 25 or 29.

23 In order not to omit some of the very important things involved -

24 for example, in May there are a few very important decisions that were

25 taken; perhaps we should go through that month within a few minutes only -

Page 41406

1 then as far as June is concerned, then we are going to dwell on some of

2 these things a bit longer. As far as June is concerned, Paddy Ashdown,

3 Mr. Nice's witness, testified about June. For the same period, we have

4 the documents that this witness have. We cannot say, "Well, we're just

5 going to submit these documents in writing and then you can have a look at

6 this." We want this witness to look at this, we want this witness to deal

7 with what Paddy Ashdown said here. It was those units that were

8 concerned, his units. So I really want to deal with that here.

9 Fully respecting your intention of speeding things up, which

10 suits me fine, of course, I think that we should deal with groups of

11 exhibits that we have here. We should make it possible for the witness to

12 deal with them and point out the most important things in this regard.

13 For example, among the documents, you have an order issued by the

14 Chief of Staff of the corps as far back as the 26th of June, 1998.

15 Objectively speaking, there were no war operations then but there were

16 clashes with terrorists at the time and they also call for the

17 implementation of the rules of international humanitarian law. This is a

18 very important develop as far back as June 1998.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm listening very carefully to

20 what you say. You said you had a midway approach. It is to deal with the

21 evidence in groups, as I understand it. And when would you finish the

22 1998 evidence on that basis? Because the whole idea is that we should not

23 spend the Court's time on evidence which can be dealt with in some other

24 way and in a shorter manner, you know. When -- when would you conclude

25 the evidence of 1998 following the pattern that you have in mind?

Page 41407












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Page 41408

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think I could conclude by

2 the middle of the second session. I didn't really calculate the time - I

3 don't have the possibility of doing that - but I think that would be about

4 right.

5 There are different types of evidence involved.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber respects your right

8 to present your case, you know, subject, of course, to our duty to control

9 the proceedings. And for that reason, we'll allow you to present the

10 evidence in the manner that you suggested, but you should endeavour to

11 conclude by the end of the first session the evidence relating to 1998.

12 Proceed.


14 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General. We looked at the order

16 of General Pavkovic on the last day, and you explained that.

17 Now, as far as May is concerned, we have a series of events that

18 are included in documents that are contained in tab 30 through 36. Could

19 you please just deal with this group of documents very quickly, those that

20 are contained in tabs 30 through 36. Could you just indicate the most

21 important things taking place then.

22 A. I shall try to do so in the briefest possible time.

23 Q. May I remind you that you have documents there that have to do

24 with clashes in the area of Gorozup, then documents about the arrest of

25 five armed persons in uniform, then also the incident on the

Page 41409

1 Djakovica-Prizren road, and so on and so forth. You have several

2 incidents there. Try to explain what this was all about.

3 A. As far as tab 30 is concerned, that is a decision of the corps

4 command -- or rather, the Chief of Staff of the corps about deblocking

5 Ponosevac, Morina, Junik and Ponosevac, Morina, Potok in order to give

6 access to the border posts.

7 Tab 31 says that there is a continuation of this deblockade on

8 the basis of the decision taken on the 27th of May. Also what is

9 requested is to provide maximum security to the state border and that the

10 military does not enter built-up areas.

11 Then tab 32 deals with Gorozup, various persons trying to bring

12 in weapons. And in connection with that, there is a large quantity of

13 grenades and ammunition that was seized then after the illegal immigrants

14 fled back to Albania.

15 34 deals with the Popovac, Babaj Boks, where five armed members

16 of the KLA were arrested. They were identified. This is a review of the

17 weapons they had with them.

18 Tab 35 speaks of the attack on two officers from the Djakovica

19 garrison on the road between Djakovica and Pristina near the village of

20 Lapusnik. One of the officers was wounded there. They were moving along

21 the road in their civilian vehicle, the terrorists tried to stop them.

22 When they did not stop, they opened fire on the vehicle and one officer

23 was seriously wounded.

24 As far as tab 36 is concerned, it refers to the area of Djakovica

25 as well. It states that near Ponosevac and Popovac synchronised mortar

Page 41410

1 fire was opened at MUP members and two were wounded.

2 Q. General, throughout this month of May - you explained this just

3 now - you were supposed to deblock the road and you had more or less

4 regular activities. As far as clashes are concerned, everything boiled

5 down to the defence of the units involved. There was no active position,

6 if I can put it that way, in relation to the terrorist groups in that

7 period.

8 A. No. The very deployment of the units speaks in itself. This

9 deblockade has to do with a road which is of local importance, and it's

10 only important for those villages and for the border organs. This had to

11 be carried out because the border organs were cut off from their logistics

12 and their command.

13 Q. Thank you, General. Let's move on to June now. The documents

14 referring to June are in tabs 37 to 63.

15 A. In tab 31 -- 37, it says here that the terrorists, apart from

16 mobilising men, gathered funds to buy weapons. It also shows that

17 according to operative information, the terrorists were preparing to cut

18 off the Djakovica-Prizren communication or the Djakovica-Pec

19 communication.

20 In tab 38, this is an order issued by me based on the order

21 coming from the Pristina Corps banning the use of motor vehicles, guns,

22 and other large-calibre weapons without sufficient reason. When a unit is

23 attacked by terrorists, fire must be opened only on the target until it is

24 destroyed. And when the unit is not under threat, no fire is to be opened

25 on the target.

Page 41411

1 Q. General, let us dwell briefly on the documents in tab 40. This

2 is a reminder for the work of members of the Army of Yugoslavia, which is

3 attached. It is a reminder for Yugoslav Army members on the territory of

4 areas affected by terrorism.

5 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. This is a reminder we received from our

6 superior command, and pursuant to orders. This is provided in a very

7 brief form so that a soldier may carry it in his pocket. However, for

8 officers, there is this extended version. It describes what army members

9 are to do if they are deprived of their freedom -- or, rather, kidnapped

10 by the terrorists. Then it outlines how they are to treat members of

11 terrorist groups if they are deprived of their freedom, what officers in

12 charge of the unit have the right to do, what security organs have the

13 right to do, and what is prohibited. Also how they should treat material

14 goods and citizens.

15 Q. Very well.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have the reminder there? Do you have the

17 reminder in front of you?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do in this form, here, but I

19 do have it, yes.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not with our papers. That was why I ask you.

21 We simply have the covering note, we don't have the reminder for some

22 reason. We have the bit that doesn't matter. Well, at least, I don't

23 have it.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's probably not been translated,

25 but it is in tab 40 in its entirety.

Page 41412

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as you can see, these

3 are very important documents. They are not cumulative at all. And this

4 reminder, according to what we can see here in the cover letter, was dated

5 the 22nd of June, 1998. I will take it out of my documents. It can be

6 placed on the ELMO. We'll just put the front page with the title and the

7 way members of terrorist sabotage groups are to be treated.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Bonomy's point is that the reminder is not

9 -- is not enclosed. It says: "Please find enclosed the reminder for the

10 work of VJ members." So Judge Bonomy was inquiring about the reminder.

11 Do you have any information on that, General?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the next document.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: The next one.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The reminder is in the same

15 document. It's the next one.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we -- it's not number 41. We don't have

17 this reminder.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's in tab 40. Tab 40 contains

19 both the cover letter and the reminder.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not in our binders. Okay? That's the only

21 point I'm making. Give us a copy, please. We can read it -- we can all

22 read -- we can read it for ourselves if you just give us the copies. All

23 this trolling through the documents, reading what we can read for

24 ourselves as if we were children of five who couldn't read is just a total

25 waste of time.

Page 41413

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: We don't have the reminder, Mr. Milosevic. You

2 must endeavour to find it and produce it. In the meantime, continue.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will ask the witness to put the

4 reminder on the ELMO. I gave my copy to the liaison officer to copy, and

5 I was convinced not only that it was in your binders, because it's in my

6 binders, but that it was -- it had been translated. Perhaps someone took

7 it out in order to translate it, I don't know, but it's among the

8 documents.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... is it on

10 the ELMO?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is page 2: "How to treat

12 members of sabotage terrorist units when depriving them of their freedom."

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, you don't have to read it all, but just read the main

15 points. I don't have this here because I gave it to be photocopied.

16 A. "As long as members of sabotage terrorist units are using weapons

17 or offering resistance, treat them in accordance with the rules of combat.

18 After they lay down their arms and stop offering resistance, treat them in

19 the following way: Gather them into a group, disarm them, and confiscate

20 from them anything they might use as weapons; separate them off according

21 to gender, age, rank; identify them and establish the role of each one.

22 Every member of a terrorist unit and their aiders and abettors are to be

23 deprived of their freedom. The circumstances are to be established and

24 their participation in the terrorist sabotage unit. They can be deprived

25 of their freedom because they are caught in the act of perpetrating an act

Page 41414

1 of terrorism. They are to be searched in detail. All written materials

2 and objects are to be confiscated. A file is to be opened for each person

3 deprived of his liberty. Commanders may question them about military

4 matters. Security organs may detain them for up to three days."

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's enough, General. Yes. That's fine.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. On page 3, it says that "A person deprived of his liberty can be

8 --" or rather, "must be examined by a medical doctor in order to

9 establish their state of health. They are to be treated humanely in

10 accordance with the rules of the military police. Their families are to

11 be informed that they have been deprived of their liberty." What does it

12 say here that must not be done? What is prohibited?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't believe the Prosecution is -- is arguing

14 that VJ army did not have proper rules of combat. I don't think that's

15 the Prosecution's case at all. So let us -- let us move on.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am trying to show here not only

17 that they had rules, but through these documents and this testimony I want

18 to show that the army abided by those rules.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, I think that this is in tab 42. Does it contain your

21 order on the return of the population to the abandoned villages?

22 A. Yes. Pursuant to an order issued by me, my command, pursuant to

23 an order from the Pristina command, in relation to the territory where

24 fighting had taken place, approval is granted for the return of the

25 population to their homes. The unit commanders are to take measures and

Page 41415












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Page 41416

1 contact the heads of the villages in order to get information about their

2 families, their property, where their land is, that they are to be treated

3 correctly and properly, that no damage is to be done to their property,

4 that their property is not to be stolen, and that --

5 Q. Very well. General, you have an order here from General

6 Lazarevic in connection with steps to be taken in compliance with the

7 rules.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So, Mr. Robinson, it is not just a

9 book of rules but also an order from the competent commander as to how

10 members of sabotage terrorist units are to be treated. It's in tab 43, a

11 document signed by the Chief of Staff, Lazarevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. It says in the beginning: "Order of the command of the Pristina

14 Corps on the -- compliance with international law." It goes on to order

15 that they should comply with it.

16 A. Yes, that's what the order says. And it also mentions the

17 reminder and that every individual in every unit is to be familiarised

18 with it.

19 Tab 44 --

20 Q. Let's look here, because it mentions the month of June. General,

21 I wanted you to comment, as we are now dealing with the month of June,

22 what Paddy Ashdown, Mr. Nice's witness, said here.

23 On page 2366 of the transcript, in a question put to Paddy

24 Ashdown, it says - and I am saying this in order to show what time he's

25 referring to - "... between the 20th and the 25th of June, 1998, did you

Page 41417

1 meet the Macedonian Prime Minister?" This was a visit that took place

2 between the 20th and the 25th of June. This is simply to pinpoint to the

3 witness the time period I am asking him about.

4 And in connection with this visit in June, he was asked whether

5 he remembered the precise date, and he couldn't. That's irrelevant now.

6 And this was what the other side asked him.

7 The time frame is quite clear. It's quite clearly defined. He

8 said that during that visit to Macedonia he also visited Northern Albania.

9 I won't read the entire transcript now, but the question is on page 2343:

10 "[In English] Now, while in Albania on this visit, and in indeed this

11 part of your visit, were you able to keep up observation, through

12 binoculars, on the area of Junik, which we can see? Perhaps you can just

13 point it out for us."

14 [Interpretation] And then Ashdown goes on to say: "[In English]

15 [Previous translation continues] ... I was informed --"

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the question now, Mr. Milosevic? What's

17 the question now?

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. My question to the general is as follows: General, in June 1998,

20 were your units in the area that Ashdown mentioned?

21 A. My units were in Batusa and Molic. These are neighbouring

22 villages to Junik. And we contacted the units that were in Junik.

23 Q. Very well. But this is the area. It's not just one village. He

24 says: "... a village which I was informed was called Gegaj..." Gegaj.

25 Is there a village called Gegaj there?

Page 41418

1 A. You can't see it on this map, that part, but there is, yes. This

2 is Junik here and that's on the other side.

3 Q. What other side? What do you mean by "the other side"?

4 A. The other side of the border. He could only have been in

5 Albania.

6 Q. Very well. And from there he says he had a very good view of the

7 entire area to the south of Junik. He says "... a very good view of the

8 whole area around south of Junik. There are some small villages down

9 here." He's referring to a view of the whole area south of Junik -- [In

10 English] "And indeed I could see deep into Kosovo."

11 [Interpretation] Can you comment on this, General?

12 A. I was a teacher of topography once. Absolutely. From the

13 territory of Albania, this entire area, as far as our barracks in Morina,

14 you can see neither Junik, which is in a depression here, nor Batusa,

15 Molic or Ponosevac.

16 Q. Ashdown says that from this village of Gegaj he could see deep

17 into Kosovo. He could see Junik, villages to the south of Junik, and the

18 whole area.

19 A. From where he was standing, he could see nothing as far as the

20 Decani-Djakovica communication. He could see only some 20 kilometres

21 away. That is, from the border point, the Albanian border point of

22 Kamenica, he could see only the Albanian village of Morina, which is on

23 our side, near the Morina border point. But he could see nothing that has

24 to do with Junik or to the south from Junik to Ponosevac. This can't be

25 seen because it's at an angle that he couldn't view.

Page 41419

1 Q. Because of the high mountains?

2 A. Yes, because of the mountains and because of the impossibility of

3 seeing, because the border runs along the edge and this is right next to

4 the mountain, and Junik is in a valley, so you cannot see it from any

5 other side except when approaching it from our territory from the east.

6 Q. Very well.

7 MR. NICE: Your Honours, before we move on from that, I'm quite

8 happy to deal with maps in the way they're being dealt with, but for

9 something of this particularity, if it's possible for the general to

10 prepare a hard copy marking the positions of visibility or invisibility,

11 it would be greatly of assistance to us before the cross-examination,

12 otherwise I will have to deal with it on the hoof then and it may not be

13 so easy. So if he can mark up a map with the points he says Ashdown was

14 in and from which he couldn't see into Kosovo, I'd be very grateful.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you able to do that, General? Your

17 topographic skills are --

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be absolutely no problem

19 for me if there are maps here showing that territory, because on my map

20 you can see our territory, but you cannot see in every place the depth of

21 Albanian territory. So if I'm unable to use these maps here, I couldn't

22 do it right now, but generally speaking it wouldn't be a problem at all.

23 I will have a look at all the maps that I have with me.

24 MR. NICE: If I can locate a suitable map that appears to cover

25 the relevant Albanian and Kosovo territory and provide it to the witness,

Page 41420

1 perhaps he'd mark it with the effect of his testimony and I'd be very

2 grateful.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. If you can do that then, Mr. Nice, that

4 he can do that possibly in the break.

5 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I will repeat for you, General, in view of this assignment that

8 you accepted to mark the map, I will repeat for you what Ashdown said:

9 "...Albanian Kosovo border, approximately where my marker is now --" and

10 we cannot know where it was -- "above a village which I was informed was

11 called Gegaj [In English]... and this gave me a very good view of the

12 whole area south of Junik. There are some small villages down here. And

13 indeed, I could see deep into Kosovo, because this is an area of plains

14 here --" [Interpretation] In Serbian language, that means a plain, not a

15 valley. "-- almost as far as Pristina." So he was able to see up to

16 Pristina.

17 And then the next question, asked by the opposite side was:

18 "What did you observe in this four-hour period?" So -- I am on page 2344

19 now. Please listen to this carefully, General. He says: "In this area,

20 I saw a number of VJ, Army of Yugoslavia, tanks, [In English] a number of

21 VJ positions, Vojska Jugoslavija, in particular, a mortar position laid

22 out in a classic military Warsaw Pact style, and that throughout this area

23 there were small units, probably platoons --" [Interpretation] "platoons"

24 should be "vod" in our language -- "[In English] moving about in armoured

25 personnel carriers, and that they were bombarding, subjecting to tank

Page 41421

1 fire, subjecting to mortar fire - I would estimate perhaps 82-millimetre

2 mortars - the houses and villages around here."

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Ask a question now. With the help

4 of Judge Kwon, I'm actually following the -- the transcript that you are

5 quoting from. What is the question you're now putting to the general?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page of the transcript is 2344.

7 I've already said that.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, I have that. I'm asking the -- what is the

9 question that you wish to put to the general about that evidence of

10 Mr. Ashdown?

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. So you heard what Paddy Ashdown said about what he had seen in

13 the month of June on those dates when he was visiting, what he saw from

14 Albania. I just read it out to you. Did that happen?

15 A. I don't know what kind of military training Mr. Ashdown has.

16 Q. He does have a military training. He's famous for this bloody

17 week in Northern Ireland.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Bloody Sunday, correction.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, looking from the territory of

20 Albania, the first thing mentioned is mortars. It's impossible to see the

21 positions of mortars because they are located on the opposite side, on the

22 other side, and their positions must always be, according to our rules,

23 shelters, so that they cannot be seen even from a distance of 200, 300

24 metres, let alone several kilometres.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 41422

1 Q. He said he was at a distance of 2 kilometres. That's what's

2 written here.

3 A. I've already answered that. There is only a narrow belt near

4 Morina watchtower that is visible, but that is only one Albanian village.

5 Nothing between Junik and the south of Junik, Batusa, Morina, and

6 Ponosevac, nothing else is visible. And at the end of the day, my unit

7 was there too. So as for combat equipment, my unit located there had only

8 three tanks.

9 Q. My question is: What were the units doing at the time?

10 Mr. Ashdown says that they were shooting at Albanian houses, that there

11 was no return fire, and that you were practically going around firing at

12 Albanian houses.

13 A. There are many tabs here that we will not have time to go

14 through, but in them you can see exactly what the army was doing, from

15 which houses the army was fired upon, and how the army responded. I've

16 already said Kosare watchtower can be reached only by going through Junik.

17 When the road was deblocked the inhabitants of Junik village, once the

18 terrorists left the village, accepted the army. We talked to them. That

19 was filmed by the Television and Radio of Serbia. I don't have this

20 footage but they are well known to the general public. And after that,

21 the road from the Junik village until Kosare watchtower was deblocked.

22 There are constant ambushes along the road but that has nothing to do with

23 the villages or civilians.

24 This other, second road, leads from Morina watchtower to

25 Ponosevac and it goes through Morina village. While it was being

Page 41423












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Page 41424

1 deblocked, there were clashes with terrorists. Fire was opened only at

2 those who endangered the units. After Morina village, there were no

3 particular problems.

4 Q. Well, he says that the army was moving in armoured personnel

5 carriers and that it was firing at houses. Please, I'm asking you in very

6 precise terms, since you are using -- or rather, you are referring to some

7 tabs we will not be using, please feel free to find that document that

8 shows us what happened there.

9 A. I am trying to find the official note. Here, I found one. It

10 says: "During the deblocking of the road, in order to provide supplies to

11 Kosare watchtower, while entering Brovina village, which is on the left of

12 the said road, from the houses along the road simultaneous fire was opened

13 from various weapons, at the army. On the same road, fire was returned to

14 neutralise the sources of fire. Near the -- the houses at the very

15 entrance to the village --"

16 Q. What are you reading from?

17 A. Tab 49. "From the first houses, looking from the direction of

18 Djakovica, fire was opened from infantry weapons from the upper floor of

19 the house and the area in the front of the house. Two gun projectiles

20 were used in response."

21 JUDGE BONOMY: That also doesn't help us because we're talking

22 about a very precise period in time. The point Mr. Milosevic is making is

23 between the 25th and the 28th of June he's asking you.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already said this tab I

25 referred to shows what the army did, and this tab contains the on-site

Page 41425

1 investigation of the military police concerning the damages -- the damage

2 on the -- of the houses that occurred during army activity.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: What period was it, General? What period does

4 it cover?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document speaks of one day,

6 the 28th of May.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Please be so kind, General, as to tell us whether at the time

10 referred to by Mr. Ashdown there were any attacks by the Army of

11 Yugoslavia on Albanian villages -- or rather, Albanian population of that

12 area.

13 A. I assert with full responsibility that the Albanian population in

14 various villages was never targeted by the army. Throughout these

15 tabulators - and there are many of them - you can see that during those

16 days there were daily incursions across the state border from the

17 tripartite border Montenegro-Albania-Yugoslavia up to the end of the

18 border with Albania, up to the Dedaj watchtower. We have Official Notes

19 here and on-site investigation records by military police and

20 investigating judges that record attempts of illegal border crossings and

21 illegal import of weapons. So there was fighting. That this fighting was

22 restricted to a very narrow space, that is, axes and tracks used for

23 transporting weapons.

24 Q. Did fire -- did the army open fire exclusively at points from

25 which it was fired at, or did it fire randomly at houses?

Page 41426

1 A. There are certain orders here - and I already read one from the

2 month of May - that say that fire may not be opened unless the target is

3 precisely defined. And this rule applied to all members of the army.

4 Q. Could it happen that fire was opened at houses from which nobody

5 was firing at the army? Because Ashdown says there was no return fire.

6 A. First of all, there is one order that says that wasteful use of

7 ammunition is forbidden and that large-calibre weapons may not be used.

8 Only the corps commander is allowed to approve the use of large-calibre

9 weapons. And there were other orders, both by corps command and my own

10 order affecting my units, that fire may be opened only on targets

11 previously defined.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The issue is not what is written down in the

13 orders. The issue is what happened on the field.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Well, that's what I'm asking you, General: What happened on the

16 ground? Is the statement of Mr. Ashdown correct?

17 A. I am asserting with full responsibility that my troops never

18 fired on a building from which there was no fire at us. We always opened

19 fire only at sources of fire. That can be seen in tab 48.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you are saying -- General, you are saying

21 additionally that Mr. Ashdown's evidence is not to be relied upon because

22 from where he was, he could not have seen mortars because your mortars are

23 sheltered? Is that -- is that correct?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know where mortars were located,

25 and I know where Mr. Ashdown was. It's absolutely impossible. If I'm

Page 41427

1 given a map, I can mark exactly the territory that can be seen from his

2 position and I can show you also the territory that is sheltered by the

3 mountainous terrain.

4 JUDGE KWON: I remember tab -- Exhibit 74 was used by Lord

5 Ashdown. If the Prosecution can offer that map.

6 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Ashdown made other statements as well. Do you know the

9 situation in Suva Reka? Was it in your zone of responsibility?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. He says, for instance, here on page 2358: "[In English]

12 Yesterday we heard from you about your observations from the hills above

13 Suva Reka and how you spent an hour looking at villages being destroyed.

14 You gave us the account of the weaponry you believe to have been

15 deployed."

16 [Interpretation] As far as I can see, on the basis of this, he

17 was indicating in the area of Suva Reka some fires. What do you know

18 about this? What do you know about this time and what do you know about

19 what happened in Suva Reka -- or rather, this valley of Suva Reka that

20 Ashdown is talking about?

21 A. If he was on the hill of Birac, that's up here on the road, where

22 there was an army unit. Anyway, he could see from the hill of Birac Suva

23 Reka and the surrounding area.

24 Q. I'm not asking you what he could see. So he was looking at Suva

25 Reka and the surrounding area. What was going on in the area of Suva Reka

Page 41428

1 at the time? What was on fire? Who had set that on fire? Do you know

2 what was going on there?

3 A. It's the month of September 1998.

4 Q. I assume that that's it. That's when he was in Kosovo. I cannot

5 find it exactly in the transcript now, but I assume that they did

6 establish that.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: But that's very important, Mr. Milosevic, if the

8 witness is to provide useful evidence.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He knows everything that was going

10 on in that area, I assume.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're seeking to contradict the Prosecution

12 evidence, so you -- you have to be fairly precise. You have to be very

13 precise, as a matter of fact.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am very precise. I am

15 talking about -- or rather, I quoted what Ashdown said himself.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: But what period of time does it relate to?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find the exact reference to

18 a date here in his transcript.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, would you remember what period of time

20 this particular piece of evidence related to?

21 MR. NICE: I'll do my best to find out.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It can only be the end of

23 September.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: And why would that be?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because although there had been

Page 41429

1 some minor action taken by terrorist groups there against this road and

2 other areas of Suva Reka, that was the antiterrorist drive at the end of

3 the September. It was carried out in this area: From the Suva

4 Reka-Stimlje road and in this part of Mount Sara [phoen], including these

5 areas to the east of Suva Reka, Vranic, Musutiste, Dvorane [phoen],

6 Budakovo, Maticevo [phoen], and so on.

7 After the terrorist groups were broken in all the territory of

8 Kosovo and Metohija, this was the last big group of terrorists left. As

9 far as I can remember, this is the fifth stage of the antiterrorist

10 operation in accordance with the plan that was drafted in the command of

11 the Pristina Corps and it was approved by the army General Staff.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Can you explain now what happened there in Suva Reka?

14 A. Specifically in Suva Reka? Nothing was going on, because it was

15 under control of the regular police forces. However, these villages that

16 are to the east of Suva Reka, these are villages that run in a series,

17 from Musutiste, Popovjane [phoen], Vranic, Dvorane [phoen], and then there

18 are very well-known villages. Budakovo is particularly well known. Later

19 on throughout the war, it was the headquarters of a command, the command

20 of a brigade, Maticevo and Budakovo. It is in that area that there was a

21 concentration of strong terrorist forces. The fighting with these forces

22 went on for three days until they were broken. The population of these

23 villages fled to this area here, near the village of Vranic. When the

24 fighting was over, this population returned to their villages. There were

25 several thousand of them. I was there myself in Maticevo.

Page 41430

1 Q. All right, General. Let's move on, then. Let's move on. June.

2 We said that June ended with tab 63. Take a look at the other documents

3 that have to do with that period of time.

4 A. What is characteristic here is that in the Official Notes - and

5 there are many of them in the month of June - that speak of daily attacks

6 on the state border, there are many Albanian citizens who were arrested,

7 and in a few cases there were some Albanian citizens who got killed

8 because they were bringing weapons for sale in the Republic of Macedonia

9 in some cases and in the other cases they were bringing arms to sell in

10 the territory of Kosovo. There are also quite a few notes that have to do

11 with soldiers who were wounded either at the border or in ambushes in

12 other parts of the territory.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Let's move on now, Mr. Milosevic. We are

14 trying to finish 1998 by 10.30.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's very difficult,

16 Mr. Robinson.

17 MR. NICE: Incidentally, we have, I think, just had brought down

18 the map that His Honour Judge Kwon referred to. And so far as Lord

19 Ashdown's evidence of a visit is concerned, as far as I can remember and

20 indeed confirm, if it's his visits that we are concerned with, we are only

21 concerned with the end of September 1998. But we'll find the map, if

22 that's going to assist.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what the witness said too.

24 September.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All of it was over by the 28th of

Page 41431












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13 English transcripts.













Page 41432

1 September.

2 MR. NICE: This is the map that His Honour Judge Kwon, I think,

3 referred to. At least, it's our version of it. And I don't know if it's

4 going to assist with this witness or provide any further detail beyond

5 that's which is available to Your Honours --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General, are you aware of the list of soldiers and officers who

9 were killed or wounded? You have that in tab 57.

10 A. Yes. This is a list that was compiled by my company of the

11 military police.

12 MR. NICE: There's no translation of this one, I think.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tab 57. These are my soldiers who

14 got killed.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. All right. Have you got anything else that is particularly

17 characteristic of these documents that have to do with June and that end

18 with tab 63?

19 A. I've already said that there were constant everyday attacks

20 against the state border and that that is what is characteristic of this

21 period.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, would you want to

23 admit this into evidence by these groups, as we already mentioned?

24 [Trial Chamber confers]


Page 41433

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: We admit -- we admit them, with the exception

3 that those that are not translated are marked for identification pending

4 translation, in the usual way.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, I'm going to ask you now to move on to the month of

8 July. All the documents that have to do with July are in tabs 63 through

9 92. Have you got these documents before you?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Are you aware of what happened in the beginning of July in the

12 area of Karaula-Kosare when a group of Albanians started bringing weapons

13 in? An extraordinary report was sent.

14 A. Yes, the border post of Kosare. 13 horses were used to bring in

15 these weapons, and what is characteristic is that there were a large

16 number of anti-tank mines that were brought in and that were later placed

17 along roads; mortars, ammunition for mortars as well, and so on.

18 Q. Could you please just indicate the most important things now in

19 these documents. There is your order here dated the 7th of July. Then

20 there is your order dated the 8th of July. Then there are many reports

21 about illegal border crossings. Then there is the report of the 9th of

22 July that has to do with Cafa Prusa, that area. So in July there are

23 quite a few things that happened. So could you please go through this,

24 the most important developments only.

25 A. On the basis of the order on banning any action without approval

Page 41434

1 of the command, this has to do with my units, that I ban any kind of

2 action without previous knowledge from the command. Every action has to

3 be previously planned, with clearly defined objectives and duration. All

4 actions taken out by army units shall be authorised by the VJ and those by

5 the MUP by the MUP, and appropriate documents have to exist for all these

6 actions; that is to say, a map, an order or command, and an operational

7 plan. Under exceptional circumstances, when a unit is attacked, that

8 is --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have heard enough of that kind of

10 evidence.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, please, just go through these documents that have to do

14 with the month of July.

15 A. Tab 68, that's from the command of the Pristina Corps.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is it relating to?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says that there is information

18 in view of the observers who are coming in, the KLA units are -- intend to

19 present themselves as a military force, and then it is said what should be

20 done. I would just like to read two points. Paragraph 2: "Whenever

21 terrorists attack a VJ unit or facility, fire back from all available

22 weapons."

23 Then 5: "If attacked by Siptar terrorists, before returning fire

24 units must warn the attackers to stop firing at the VJ units and move away

25 from the facility, and the civilian population must be told to leave the

Page 41435

1 zone."

2 Then there is mention of the incidents at Cafa Prusa, and the

3 participants in this incident are citizens of Albania who brought weapons

4 to our territory.

5 Then tab 70 is also a special report about that incident.

6 Then tab 71 is an order written again on the basis of the order

7 of the superior command when opening fire is strictly prohibited from

8 122-millimetre artillery pieces and tanks without authorisation of the

9 command, and only the commander of the brigade can authorise this kind of

10 fire in order to prevent the -- any loss of lives, and so on.

11 "Open fire on Siptar terrorist forces only if --"

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That's not taking us any further, you

13 know.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The next order also pertains to --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you -- you must lead your

16 witness more carefully just to points that are important. We don't wish

17 to hear anything more about the orders.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Robinson, everything the

19 army does it does on orders, and these are orders of this witness. That's

20 what he's talking about. And this indicates what the activity of the army

21 was. And after any kind of action taken, there is an analysis of how the

22 order was carried out. That's the way the army operates.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, in tab 73, your order pertains to the presence of

25 diplomats and monitoring missions. Not to go back to all of this now,

Page 41436

1 what was the attitude of the military towards these foreign

2 representatives of diplomatic missions? The verification mission was not

3 there yet, but there are different diplomats and diplomatic missions

4 coming in to familiarise themselves with the situation on the ground.

5 What is your experience, your personal experience in this regard?

6 A. These delegations of diplomatic representatives and humanitarian

7 organisations stayed in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The

8 humanitarian organisations brought in aid. They had no restrictions, as

9 far as the military was concerned.

10 As for diplomatic missions, they could come to each and every

11 unit, each and every position, except the border area, where they could

12 not come unannounced and unescorted.

13 Q. Everywhere else they could come unannounced?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. As for the border area, they had to announce their visit and to

16 have someone escorting them.

17 A. Yes, some kind of liaison officer, if I can put it that way.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: General Delic, you've been -- your attention has

19 been drawn to tab 73, which makes special orders in the case of -- of

20 monitors from the international community being in the area. Why was

21 that?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says so in the preamble. The

23 estimates are that Siptar terrorists are going to use the presence of

24 international monitors in order to open fire and cause an incident and

25 demonstrate to the world that they were endangered by the Army of

Page 41437

1 Yugoslavia.

2 In order to prevent this kind of manipulation and this kind of

3 opening of fire, commanders are ordered to open fire only when they deem

4 it necessary. For example, if international monitors are where the Siptar

5 terrorists are, they should not open fire on any account. The basic thing

6 was to protect the lives of the international observers present; and

7 secondly, these were obvious provocations -- these would be obvious

8 provocations.

9 In paragraph 2, it says: "If the situation dictates that fire

10 must be returned in order to protect members of our unit, take measures to

11 return fire using the same type of weapon..." that the terrorist used.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: So are these different orders from the normal

13 combat instructions of the army?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, combat rules do not

15 envisage the presence of international observers on the other side, the

16 enemy side. That is what is special about this. There are different

17 diplomatic representatives present there, and the army as a state

18 institution is responsible for their safety and security. Therefore, even

19 if terrorists are firing, if we have information that international

20 observers are there, the army is ordered here not to open fire. And

21 that's what is specifically said here. That they should monitor the

22 movement of diplomatic representatives and that they should report on it.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. In July, captain first class -- a captain first class was killed,

25 Mikicevic.

Page 41438

1 A. Yes, Captain Mikicevic was killed in July. He was my assistant

2 for security.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, at this rate, when will you

4 finish 1998?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am going as fast as I can,

6 Mr. Robinson, as you can see.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: It is not sufficiently expeditious, you know.

8 You have to go to 250?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, August ends with number 127,

10 and that's what comes next. I think that with reference to the reports on

11 the verification mission, we can proceed even faster.

12 MR. NICE: As to maps, I'm not sure whether the maps we've been

13 able to find so far would cover the relevant area. I haven't had a chance

14 to look at them against the text of the transcript. However, if the

15 witness would be good enough to cast an eye over these at the break and if

16 he says that one of them enables him to mark the positions where he says

17 Lord Ashdown was and the lines of invisibility or visibility, I'd be very

18 grateful. That could possibly then become an exhibit and that would

19 enable me to deal with the matter in one way or another during

20 cross-examination. If these maps are not sufficient, we'll make further

21 efforts over the break and in the course of the next session to find maps

22 that are.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: The maps may be passed to the witness.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there -- we are going to take the

Page 41439












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Page 41440

1 break. When we return, you must begin the evidence relating to 1999.

2 This is without prejudice to returning to 1998, if necessary.

3 We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

4 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please continue.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood that I should no

8 longer deal with 1998, Mr. Robinson.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct. That was the Chamber's

10 ruling. Yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. But I will ask you to

12 make one exception, referring to one event which Mr. Nice's witness

13 referred to, but I'll come to that.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Before that, before we start dealing with 1999, General, please

16 clarify the working map, your working map, which refers to the period --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And Mr. Robinson, this is not dated

18 the 1st of January 1998 but the 1st of December 1999 -- rather, the 1st of

19 December, 1998, until the 9th of April, 1999. This working map covers one

20 month of 1998 and more than three months of 1999, so I assume it falls

21 within the material you said can be dealt with, and this is in tab 204.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Could you please briefly clarify it, Witness. We also had a

24 working map referring to October and November 1998, but that's not

25 something you want to see now, therefore I will not deal with it now.

Page 41441

1 Tab 204, General, the working map.

2 A. This is also the commander's working map, the fourth in sequence.

3 Q. General, excuse me for interrupting you. When you say "the

4 commander's working map," you are the commander in question.

5 A. Yes. This is my working map. It's signed by me. And this was

6 also something that my security officer kept updated. This shows the

7 incidents from the 1st of December, 1998 until the 9th of April, 1999.

8 This is the key explaining the symbols. And these are activities of the

9 army, of the MUP, and activities against civilians. And in this map, you

10 can see the most significant incidents. You can see where they occurred,

11 on what date. The most significant ones can also be seen here because the

12 consequences are shown. And you can conclude how many incidents occurred

13 against members of the army, against members of the MUP, and against

14 civilians.

15 There is a number of incidents which were not entered in the map

16 because there were no consequences. What is characteristic here is that

17 on the territory to the south, toward Macedonia, there were no incidents,

18 and an especially large number of incidents occurred on the territory of

19 Suva Reka municipality and here in this area toward the border.

20 Q. When you say, General, there were no incidents on the territory

21 inhabited by the Goranci, can you please explain what this refers to.

22 A. Goranci is a term we use to refer -- or Gorani. It's the Muslim

23 population which adopted Islam two centuries ago. They speak the

24 Serbo-Croatian language. And what is characteristic of them is that they

25 always supported Serbia -- or rather, they felt that Serbia was their own

Page 41442

1 state and they always supported all the measures taken by the state organs

2 and the government and they always had an exceptionally correct attitude

3 toward members of the army.

4 Q. Very well, General. You indicated the incidents on the map. The

5 army had special organs to cooperate with the verification mission.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Although we have a large number of exhibits here dealing with the

8 relations with the verification mission, could you explain briefly what

9 the essence of these relations was, as can be seen in the documents

10 presented here.

11 A. We omitted a part where I wanted to speak about what happened

12 after the arrival of the verification mission. If we start in January

13 1999, what characterised these relations was, first of all, that the

14 verification mission was never present in the numbers provided for in the

15 agreement.

16 Secondly, individual sub-centres never became active when the

17 mission came to carry out its role, as envisioned.

18 Secondly, the Army of Yugoslavia was supposed to report every

19 movement from company level upwards, and all motor vehicle movements, and

20 this was done regularly. There were no problems.

21 Next, the agreement provided for the army leaving all the

22 locations it had held until the 13th of October, 1999 and to remain -- or

23 rather, only seven company-size units were to remain in the border area.

24 And you can see these four locations that my unit was in and also the

25 locations towards Decani and Pec. Only one unit was to remain in the

Page 41443

1 Djula area, which is on the Prizren-Stimlje-Pristina road and one unit in

2 the area of Lapusnik on the Orahovac-Malisevo-Pristina road, and one in

3 the Voljak [phoen] area which is on the Djakovica-Klina-Pristina road.

4 In addition to this, there were to be 25 observation posts of the

5 MUP. All other positions which, in short, control over the territory

6 after the break-up of the terrorist forces were abandoned. According to

7 the agreement, the opposing side, the terrorists, although at that time,

8 as we have seen -- as we saw on Friday, there were about 5.000 of them,

9 they were to remain at their positions.

10 What is characteristic was that as the army and police left their

11 positions, the terrorists took them over.

12 Q. Did the verification mission establish this?

13 A. Yes, the verification mission also established this. At our

14 request that this problem be solved, the answer was always that there were

15 two opposing factions among the terrorists, one of which was in favour of

16 complying with the agreement and the other against. And the answer was

17 always that it was this other faction that was doing this.

18 The terrorists again cut off the communications. They cut off

19 the roads. This group at Dulje, a mixed company, ensured the road was

20 passable, but on more than one occasion columns were attacked. The road

21 leading from Orahovac to Suva Reka, although according to the agreement it

22 was supposed to be controlled by the MUP, was never possible for the MUP.

23 There always had to be a verification mission vehicle at the front and

24 rear of the column, which means that practically MUP had no control over

25 this territory. And the same applies to the road from Orahovac to

Page 41444

1 Dragobilje. According to the agreement, Dragobilje was to be exempt from

2 the control of the MUP, Malisevo and Dragobilje, because allegedly there

3 was a large concentration of the civilian population. However, I state

4 with full liability that this is not correct. Dragobilje at that time was

5 the main headquarters of the terrorist KLA, and that is why this point was

6 exempt and this part was not under control.

7 From Orahovac towards Malisevo, the police could move as far as

8 the Troja and Ostrozub pass but only if accompanied and escorted by the

9 vehicles of the verification mission.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: In your initial answer, you said that part of the

11 agreement was for the army to withdraw from the positions they had held up

12 until a certain date. Could you clarify that date, please.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The agreement was signed on the

14 13th of October in Belgrade. I know --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: It was 1998 then, and not 1999, as you said?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. But we skipped over

17 that part. We didn't talk about it.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: No. But in your answer, you gave the date 1999.

19 I just want to be clear that it was 1998 you meant to say. Thank you.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes.

21 What characterised every month was that all army activities were

22 reported, all incidents on the territory were reported, the verification

23 mission went out, sometimes on the same day, sometimes two or three days

24 later, to verify the incident, and also what I have just said, the

25 retaking of the territory. And what is characteristic in this period is a

Page 41445

1 large number of murders of civilians, primarily murders of civilians of

2 Albanian ethnicity, by the terrorists, both in the towns and in villages,

3 especially those villages that handed back their weapons in September and

4 October 1998.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Very well, General. On the working map, we were able to see

7 where all this took place. I will now put a question to you in connection

8 with the testimony of General Drewienkiewicz about a specific incident.

9 MR. NICE: Before we move to that, and on the topic of maps, two

10 small points: First, as to this map - but I suspect as to the earlier

11 maps - the witness speaks of the map showing what occurred, consequences.

12 Now, the legend on the map is in Cyrillic and I think is untranslated, and

13 the expectation may be that it's never going to be translated, because

14 normally maps and things like that we don't necessarily translate

15 individual entries on them. If the map is to serve the purpose that the

16 accused wants, including that you should understand what these

17 handwritten, and indeed very neatly written, entries mean, some

18 arrangement has got to be made to have the individual terms translated,

19 either on the map or in the form of a legend.

20 The second point on maps is that the witness found the maps we

21 provided at the last break too detailed. We have another map to show him

22 which is less detailed but shows relief more readily, and I'd ask that he

23 looks at that at the next break.

24 And if Ms. Dicklich is prepared to do this - I haven't asked her

25 - and if the Court is happy, it's possible that he could discuss the

Page 41446

1 matter with her, perhaps in the presence of the accused, in order to

2 identify the sort of map that will enable him to do the exercise we want

3 of him.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That may be done in the next break.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: As for the map, Mr. Milosevic, the legend is not

7 translated, and if it is to be of any use, there will have to be a

8 translation.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood, Mr. Robinson, that

10 the witness read out the legend. It refers to the entire map according to

11 the time from December 1998 to April 1999, to incidents against the army,

12 against the police, and against citizens. And these few words only

13 explain the symbols; what refers to incidents against the army, what

14 refers to incidents against the MUP, and what refers to incidents against

15 civilians.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Perhaps, General, you can tell us what colours were used to

18 refer.

19 A. Above the triangle, the red, the colour red, means that it's an

20 incident against the army; green means against the MUP; and brown means

21 against civilians. And the symbols are exactly the same.

22 Q. So only the colours differ between the army, the MUP, and the

23 civilians and the incidents are precisely located on the map for this

24 period of time.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it sufficiently clear now,

Page 41447












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Page 41448

1 Mr. Robinson?

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: That should be helpful.

3 JUDGE KWON: We can't read the consequences noted down in the

4 map.

5 MR. NICE: Can I suggest, to save time, that the accused consults

6 with Mr. Kay on the provision of code or translation of the legend and a

7 colour-coded identification or a symbol-coded identification so that we

8 can make use of these maps. Doing it in Court will take a great deal of

9 time. Not doing it at all will render the map useless.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm not clear. In addition to the

12 explanation that the general gave as to the meaning of the different

13 colours, you'd like something else done?

14 MR. NICE: If that makes sense to the Court, then the Court is

15 just moving rather more rapidly in its comprehension than I am. We

16 certainly need a -- a translation of this block, of the legend here on the

17 left. We can make out -- well, Ms. Dicklich can make all of it out and I

18 can make some of it out. There's a reference to triangles, but I imagine

19 that means these round symbols -- well, there are both round symbols and

20 triangular symbols. We certainly need those translated -- or interpreted.

21 If all the other references are simply to place names, then they clearly

22 don't need to be translated. But we would need that material conveniently

23 available for all the maps that he's using so that anyone looking at it

24 now or hereafter can understand what they mean.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 41449

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I think that's -- that's reasonable.

2 So, Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to ask you to have -- perhaps you

3 can work through the liaison officer and provide a translation -- a full

4 -- a fuller translation of the -- the legend and the other matters

5 referred to by Mr. Nice.

6 Let us proceed.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to draw your

8 attention, Mr. Robinson, to the fact that the same symbols are used on all

9 working maps and the witness has already explained them when using the

10 first map. Only the colours differ as regards the army, the police, and

11 civilians, and those colours are the same on all maps.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Is that correct, General?

14 A. Yes, these colours are used in the same way. Everything related

15 to the MUP is always green; everything related to the army is always red.

16 Q. And what about civilians?

17 A. Yes, we decided on this colour for civilians.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, on the 11th of April, 1992 [as interpreted], we heard a

21 witness from the other side, General Drewienkiewicz, who testified to an

22 incident on the 14th of December, 1998. He stated on that occasion that

23 he had seen ten killed on the KLA side, including one woman, but no

24 casualties on the other side. It's page 2851 of the transcript.

25 "[In English] The KLA were fired at, and then they withdrew and

Page 41450

1 eventually 34 KLA members were killed in -- over the period of the

2 ambush. And it was reported that nine Albanians, nine Kosovo Liberation

3 Army members, had been taken prisoner, including one female. The patrols

4 photographed the bodies which were in three broad locations but were given

5 no sight of the prisoners."

6 [Interpretation] So this is the evidence of General

7 Drewienkiewicz. Regarding precisely this incident, you brought video

8 footage which recorded this incident on Pastrik Mountain on the 14th of

9 December. Then you also filmed the weapons seized. Could we please see

10 this footage; that is, the incident of the 14th December 1998. It is --

11 it has been made available to the AV booth.

12 [Videotape played]

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the arrival of two KVM

14 teams. This place is several kilometres away from the site. They are

15 being given indications on the map where the incident happened. This is

16 the morning of the 15th of December.

17 At this moment, the vehicles are abandoned because they cannot be

18 used any more, and these are the slopes of Mount Pastrik. Fighting

19 occurred with the terrorist group. You can see that it's very foggy and

20 the crushed parts of the terrorist group ran into the front of the column

21 where the members of the verification mission were.

22 In this spot, three terrorists were killed and one woman

23 terrorist. That is about 2 kilometres away from the site of the incident

24 of the morning of the 14th of December.

25 This is the six-power sniper rifle, a state-of-the-art weapon.

Page 41451

1 These are the nine prisoners who were given assistance and who

2 are warming next to the fire.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. You can see one woman here.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Who lit the fire for them?

7 A. The army.

8 Q. So these are the prisoners about whom Drewienkiewicz said that he

9 hadn't seen them.

10 A. They talked with them quite normally. This is the money found on

11 one of the founders of the KLA, Muji Kapici Krasniqi, who was killed in

12 this operation. He had 255.000 Deutschemark in his little bag. This is

13 the Barrett rifle, 12.7 millimetres. It is only available to the US army.

14 Four terrorists were killed here, and there were nine prisoners.

15 Q. And you can see KVM members.

16 A. These are special ignition devices for remote activation of

17 explosives. Remote detonation.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, do you know what 255.000 Deutschemarks

19 would be in -- in euros or ...?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] About a half of the amount.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a large amount of money.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: I may have missed this on the film, but did we see

23 contact between the prisoners and the KVM force?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You could see that in the beginning

25 of the tape. What do you mean prisoners and KLA? They were members of

Page 41452

1 the KLA.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But was -- were they -- were the KVM given

3 access to the KLA prisoners, which is the issue.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They talked to them quite normally

5 while the latter were sitting around that fire.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Did we see that on the film?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last sequence on the footage,

8 they were filmed next to the prisoners, 2 or 3 metres away, and you can

9 see them standing next to the prisoners. There were two teams of the KVM

10 mission from the regional centre 1, Prizren.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

12 Is it -- is it possible to see that again?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be shown again.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: That last part of it that you say --

15 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, the -- the accused identified this

16 as page 2851. It may be my mistake, but I don't seem to be able to find

17 it on that page. I don't know if anybody else --

18 JUDGE KWON: In the electronic version it's 2849.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honour's very kind. Thank you very much.

20 JUDGE KWON: Dated the 11th of April.

21 MR. NICE: Yes.

22 JUDGE KWON: The footage which shows the KLA prisoners, the last

23 part of the film, I remember.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]

Page 41453

1 JUDGE KWON: Let's start from here.

2 [Videotape played]

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can see that medical assistance

4 was given to one of the terrorists who was wounded. They are now telling

5 which places, which municipalities they are from.

6 The verifiers are now acting on their own accord. There were

7 several of them. And they are filming whatever they think interesting.

8 This was found on a number of terrorists, Zolja hand-held rocket

9 launchers.

10 They even inspected individual weapons. These are these special

11 detonators.

12 Here -- here it is. The wounded terrorists are in the left of

13 the screen, 2 or 3 metres away, and I am there on the spot too.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: I can't see them. Are you telling me they were on

15 the screen?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm saying how far they were

17 from this group, 2 or 3 metres away, because this conversation took place

18 right next to the group of terrorists. This conversation took place just

19 before leaving. Several hours were necessary to get back from this spot.

20 Two teams had to retrace their steps. I stayed behind with these soldiers

21 and they were asking what to do with the -- those who were killed and with

22 the prisoners.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: The question, though, was whether the KVM people,

24 if that is what these people are, were able to interview the KLA

25 terrorists.

Page 41454

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Throughout the time they were able

2 to talk to them. They were enabled to do so. This incident happened in a

3 spot on a 400-metre stretch, and these people who are standing are just 2

4 or 3 metres away from the terrorists who are gathered around a fire. And

5 the people who are standing are discussing how to go back using the same

6 track and what to do with the bodies and the prisoners who were to be

7 taken to the vehicles and in another direction, where the vehicles were

8 waiting. This is just before dark fell, and we completed this task at

9 1.00 a.m. the next morning. That was when we reached the vehicles.

10 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I don't think we've got the tab number

11 for this document, this video, yet. The evidence seems to suppose its

12 origin to be one source, and the cameraman to have come from one source,

13 but it would help if we could see how it's listed on the index.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what is the tab number for this

15 video?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It should be 216, Mr. Robinson.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And all of it -- all of it was shot -- excuse me.

18 All of it was shot on the 15th of December; is that right?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. On the 15th of December a

20 team -- a crew from Prizren Television - I know both the editor and the

21 person who's speaking on the -- on this film - and it was broadcast on

22 national television. A much longer tape was actually broadcast. The

23 editor was Boris Ugrinovic and the cameraman was Sanjevic.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if this a shorter version, by editing, of

25 the longer version shown on television, then the longer version may well

Page 41455












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Page 41456

1 deal with and satisfy the query of His Honour Judge Bonomy. On the other

2 hand, if the longer version, which must be available to this witness or

3 the accused's associates and which we could probably find time to view,

4 does not deal with the point, the point remains.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there a longer version, General?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Television Belgrade, there is

7 one, I suppose. Most probably. But I was there all the time. I had

8 arrived in a column of ten soldiers 20 minutes earlier than this other

9 column that you saw on the footage. I was there the whole time.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You mentioned it was a production of a Prizren

11 Television and then you mentioned Television Belgrade. Are the two

12 related to each other?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is all the Radio and Television

14 of Serbia, the studio in Prizren.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, everything we saw now on this footage, was it all filmed

17 at the same time, the same place, on that particular day where the

18 prisoners around the fire can be seen and the verifiers? Was all that

19 filmed on one single location?

20 A. Yes, all of it. You saw the column arriving and you saw the

21 direct fighting. This is about 2 kilometres away from this spot. And the

22 verifiers were directly present. Two kilometres away is the spot that was

23 filmed afterwards, in continuation, and it was all filmed on the same day,

24 the 15th of December.

25 Q. So that's the place where the verifiers were?

Page 41457

1 A. That's the place where the verifiers were.

2 Q. And that's where the terrorist prisoners were too?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: General, to be absolutely clear, I take it the

5 prisoners were actually captured on the 14th, when -- when there were 34

6 deaths. Is that correct?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 36 were dead and 9 were taken

8 prisoner. I've already said --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: On the 14th? I just want the timing correct.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This activity? Well, that requires

11 time if you want me to tell you exactly the timing, how everything

12 evolved.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: We saw -- we saw a clash on this film which

14 occurred on the 15th involving, what, the death of three terrorists? But

15 the main incident in which the prisoners were taken occurred on the 14th,

16 or have I misunderstood that?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, perhaps it's my fault. Perhaps

18 I misspoke. The incident occurred on the morning of the 14th and this

19 footage was also taken on the 14th but in the afternoon. The day is the

20 same, though. The first incident -- or rather, there were three

21 incidents: One was on the 14th at 2.30; the second one was around 4.00;

22 and the last one was here on this spot at 5.30. Between 8.00 and 9.00 on

23 that day, the 14th, we informed the mission about this. We waited for

24 them and we set out around 11.00. We needed time, perhaps about two

25 hours, to get to the actual site. Then these activities took place, our

Page 41458

1 activities -- or rather, the activities of the verification mission,

2 within about one hour and 30 minutes. Perhaps an hour before night fell

3 on that day, the 14th, everything was over. I am the one who made a

4 mistake here; all of it happened on the same day.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: But when did you and the film crew get there?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that we set out

7 at 11.00 and we were there -- well, I cannot be very precise in terms of

8 minutes, but we were there between 1.00 and 2.00 p.m.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: So you were there before the main event resulting

10 in the death of 36 people.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The main event was at 5.30 in the

12 morning on that day. So I came a few hours after that.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: What -- what has been written in the transcript

14 is: "There were three incidents: One was on the 14th at 2.30; the second

15 was around 4.00; and the last one was on the spot at 5.30." So these are

16 all in the early hours of the morning?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, all of it is in the early

20 morning.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: And at what time -- at what time were the nine

22 prisoners taken?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At 5.30 in the morning.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: And all the bodies, the bodies that we saw in the

25 film, they were all dead by 5.30 in the morning?

Page 41459

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At 5.30. Approximately that time,

2 5.30. Because the fighting was going on. That's when the incident

3 started, and the fighting went on for a while.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... now clear.

5 It was very unclear before.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, could you just describe in a few sentences the details

8 of the incident as you described them now and we saw on the footage,

9 everything that was filmed immediately after the incident on the same day.

10 Tell us where this place actually is, where this group came from, what

11 they came across, and how the clash occurred.

12 A. The group came from Albania. Pastrik, Mount Pastrik. They were

13 near Liken and they crossed the state border there. They entered our

14 territory about 3 kilometres. At 2.30 -- or between 2.00 and 2.30, when

15 they had their first encounter with the army. The army did not know then

16 what kind of group this was because they saw only four men and these were

17 their main scouts. When they were asked to stop, they opened fire and

18 then the army fired back, and the duty operations officer was informed

19 immediately and I was informed immediately. However, at that time we

20 still didn't know what kind of forces these were.

21 The terrorist group started going back to Albania. They come

22 across another security organ on the border. They were also there, but

23 they do not meet directly. They're about 150 metres away, if you look at

24 the footpath there.

25 Since that group was on the alert too -- you must be aware of the

Page 41460

1 fact that this was a mountain and it was foggy -- they asked who this was,

2 because they were thinking that perhaps it was our forces. Fire was

3 opened. They responded with their own gunfire, these border security

4 organs, and some mines were activated that are there to protect these

5 border organs; however, no losses were sustained by the terrorists yet.

6 Only during the first encounter.

7 Later we saw that the terrorists discarded 145 rucksacks with

8 equipment and ammunition and different types of special equipment. After

9 that, nothing happened until 5.30. The terrorists returned to the border.

10 The snow was about 40 centimetres deep. And they move along a valley and

11 they come across our first border organ. They were on the alert as of the

12 early morning and at their own positions, and when they were told to halt

13 and when they were asked who was coming, the terrorists opened fire. The

14 army, who were at their positions, fired and activated mines. Fighting

15 went on for about half an hour to 40 minutes. My orders were that the

16 military units that were about 2 kilometres away should come and help.

17 The terrorists we saw here, that were killed here and those who

18 were wounded, were lying in an area that was about 200 or 300 metres long,

19 and they remained there. Part of the terrorists returned to Albania.

20 Another group of the terrorists were firing and withdrawing towards the

21 villages, especially the village of Kusni; whereas, yet another part of

22 the terrorists - because later on there was fighting here - but some

23 groups came to the village of Planeja, where the command one of one of

24 mixed companies was and there was fighting there where two men got killed,

25 two terrorists.

Page 41461

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. How big was this group that came from Albania? On the basis of

3 what you learned from the prisoners and on the basis of your own insight

4 or -- or rather, the insight of your organs, how big was that group?

5 A. We could see that by their rucksacks, and that's what the

6 prisoners stated too, that the group consisted of about 145 persons.

7 Q. How many of our soldiers were there protecting the border at that

8 time?

9 A. Where the main incident occurred, here, at 5.30, there were six

10 soldiers and one non-commissioned officer, so a total of seven men. Also,

11 at the other localities, there were six soldiers respectively and one

12 non-commissioned officer or commissioned officer.

13 Q. So these were the security organs -- the border security organs

14 that are about as big as a squad, or perhaps even less than that.

15 A. Less than a squad.

16 Q. Let me say --

17 A. Let me say that in this column there was a special unit and there

18 were about 40 officers that were returning from Albania from training

19 there. They had a lot of special equipment.

20 Q. Thank you, General. Now we are going to move on to what happened

21 in 1999. But just a preliminary question: There is a considerable number

22 of working maps here, and you show them to -- and there are a large number

23 of documents showing what the army did from day to day, and there's also a

24 large number of documents and maps showing where the army moved during

25 their activities. Is that right or is that not right?

Page 41462

1 A. Yes. Like in 1998, the army had their own tasks only.

2 Q. General, all these activities of the army are documented in terms

3 of the dynamics involved, in terms of the localities involved, and the

4 purpose of the movement of the military. When you bear in mind everything

5 that happened throughout 1998 until the beginning of 1999, all these

6 movements of the army, can this be briefly defined, why the army was on

7 the move, what their objectives were, and why the army was moved from one

8 place to another and why they engaged in particular activities?

9 A. After the agreement and after the mission came, the army was

10 returned to the barracks, except for seven locations along the border

11 where they were providing in-depth security for the state border. And at

12 the border itself, there were the border units and also there were the

13 three localities that I mentioned. All other activities of the army were

14 regular activities. They were reflected in the following: Providing

15 security for the state border and preventing any bringing-in of weapons in

16 this area, and also protecting their own facilities, and also carrying out

17 training.

18 Q. Thank you, General. So those were the tasks of the military.

19 That is what the army actually did.

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. Thank you, General. Now we're going to move on to these specific

22 events of 1999. You adopted an order on the 3rd of January, 1999 that you

23 sent to your mixed companies. That is tab 251.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the

25 speaker.

Page 41463












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Page 41464

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I have found this tab.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You wrote this order to all mixed companies.

4 A. Yes.

5 Could this map please be taken down now so that I could show what

6 we're discussing now?

7 Q. You need the map that is underneath?

8 A. Yes.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the microphone of

10 the accused please be adjusted. We cannot hear him properly.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, please speak to the microphone so

12 that the interpreters can follow you.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General, do we still need this working map that has to do with

16 the period up until April?

17 A. Well, during the break, I will find this larger-scale map, so

18 I'll put it here, where the first map was. I need this one, though, to

19 show these four out of the total of seven mixed companies that were

20 permitted, according to the agreement reached. I wanted to show where

21 they were stationed, and also the order contained in tab 251 was sent to

22 them.

23 Q. At any rate, it says here: "To reinforce -- to step up

24 surveillance of the most probably axis of appearance and attack of Siptar

25 terrorist forces." That is in relation to what you explained, as to how

Page 41465

1 border control was exercised.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: General, can you explain what a mixed company is?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, according to the agreement, a

6 mixed company is not a unit according to establishment. It had part

7 infantry, part scouts, and it was part artillery -- or rather, artillery

8 support at the rank of battalion, mostly mortars. That's why it's called

9 a mixed company, because it has several different units. But its total

10 strength is a company, ranging from 120 to 150 men, depending on the

11 situation involved.

12 Here on the map you can see the exact composition. Of those

13 companies, that is.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General, among the documents that you presented here, there is

16 also an excerpt from the monthly intelligence report on electronic

17 surveillance and anti-electronic activities from mid-December until

18 mid-January 1999. Specific incidents are referred to by day. So, for

19 example, on the 12th of January at 1250 hours, approximately, on the

20 frequency authorised for the International Red Cross, communications were

21 noticed by participants in the Siptar language exchanging information on

22 the position of a convoy of trucks, probably a humanitarian convoy.

23 Please take a look at this, and what is it that you can conclude

24 on the basis of what you see here as regards the beginning of 1999? You

25 see here this excerpt of the monthly intelligence report on electronic

Page 41466

1 surveillance.

2 MR. NICE: Can I have the tab? What is the tab number?

3 JUDGE BONOMY: It's the next one, 252.

4 MR. NICE: 252. Thank you. I'm grateful.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 12th of January. It says here

6 that "On the frequency authorised for the International Red Cross,

7 information was exchanged in the Albanian language." What we know is that

8 terrorists were also following these humanitarian convoys and that they

9 took part of this humanitarian aid for themselves. Practically some

10 humanitarian convoys directly went to the terrorists.

11 It also says here that "The KLA -- the illegal KLA radio reported

12 on its last session the KLA staff adopted a conclusion stating that

13 soldiers who failed to withdraw from Kosovo by the 1st of March of this

14 year will lose the right to be freed." This refers to soldiers of the

15 Yugoslav Army.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. On this same page, it says that "On the 11th of January, there

18 were clashes with the Yugoslav Army," and it refers to enemy losses.

19 These enemies are our soldiers, and they say here how successful they

20 were.

21 A. They stated that "Over the past two months they inflicted losses

22 on the enemy," that is, our forces, "28 wounded and 9 killed," and that

23 they had only one killed and several wounded. Dragobilje, I said that's

24 where the main headquarters of the terrorist KLA was at the time. I

25 cannot say with certainty whether or not we had losses. Here they are

Page 41467

1 counting members of the army and members of the MUP together. It's

2 possible, however, that we did have losses because there were many

3 ambushes, so we could have had that number of killed.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: When did that clash commence, the one on the

5 11th of January?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It doesn't say here. What it says

7 here is that on the 11th of January they were monitoring the arrival of

8 the army and MUP in the area, and it also said that over the past two

9 months in clashes losses were inflicted on the army and that there were 28

10 wounded and 9 killed, not on that day.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue, Mr. Robinson?

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but it would have been helpful to hear how

13 the clash started, who started it, matters of that kind. But move on.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Very well. General, clashes such as the one reported on here,

16 who initiated them?

17 A. What was characteristic for this entire period of time was that

18 these clashes most often took part on the roads. There were ambushes.

19 Columns, whether of army or of police, were ambushed. And mines were

20 laid. Also there were attacks on individual points.

21 Q. Well, they boast here that they inflicted large losses on our

22 forces and that their losses were very small.

23 A. Yes, they say they had only one man killed and several wounded.

24 Q. Let's now deal with this part of the report on the next page

25 which talks about how many Albanians were in a dilemma as to whether they

Page 41468

1 should join the KLA, as they were sending them to the most risky spots,

2 probably to raise manpower levels of their army, and that many families

3 were concealing their sons because they felt it was better that their sons

4 stay alive than that they worry about what the neighbours would say, and

5 they hoped that with the assistance of NATO they would be able to create

6 an ethnically pure Kosovo in that year. So that's what was broadcast on

7 the Albanian media.

8 A. Yes, and it says that they would never cease their armed attacks

9 until Kosovo was liberated and completely Siptar.

10 Q. But they mention NATO support.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. On the next page, it says that "On the 6th of January,

13 information was received that Siptars were preparing to welcome the

14 director of the verification mission," and it says that "Siptars from the

15 Podujevo region claimed that the verifiers are closely watching every

16 movement by the VJ and MUP forces and that in most cases they prevent them

17 from attacking, and there is no direct information for representatives of

18 the KLA on the movement of our forces."

19 Was that your experience at the time of the events of which you

20 were an immediate participant?

21 A. Yes. Every movement by my units, even individual vehicles

22 leaving the barracks, were escorted by the verifiers. There were two

23 exits and entrances from the barracks. There were vehicles belonging to

24 the verifiers opposite these exits and entrances. And whenever a vehicle

25 or a column of vehicles set out to get supplies, a vehicle would escort

Page 41469

1 the column wherever it was going.

2 Q. When you were explaining the deployment of our units, you said

3 that the main headquarters was in the area of Dragobilje. On the last

4 page of this document, on tab 252, on the top of the page, it says that

5 "They learned that the main headquarters was in the area of Dragobilje,

6 south-west of Malisevo. The same participants talked about large training

7 centres in Albania where many soldiers were trained and had various

8 weapons." Is this information indicating their preparations -- and then

9 it goes on to say: "The 13th of January they personally saw that there

10 were weapons stored in Albania for the KLA. The crates are marked 'NATO

11 military', there are also instructors training people to use weapons. The

12 weapons are being brought in by air, unlike last summer when they came in

13 by land via Milan and then on to Albania by sea." And it also says that

14 "The war does not depend on Siptars or Serbs but on America." It goes on

15 to say that "The KLA was created by Robert Gelbard and he keeps convincing

16 Siptars that the final victory is theirs."

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. What did you know? We received these reports. What we are

20 quoting from now is what you as a brigade commander received.

21 A. We knew that the main headquarters was in Dragobilje because,

22 according to the agreement, the army couldn't go there and it was also a

23 prohibited area for the MUP forces. As for the training centres in

24 Albania, we had previously identified all these centres so that this was

25 nothing new for us. We also knew that the Albanian army had given their

Page 41470

1 heavy weapons to the terrorists for training.

2 Q. At the bottom of this page, the date is smudged here but we can

3 see that it's January. We cannot see the precise date. It says that

4 "They learned that the director of Maljoku, the director of the Kosovo

5 information centre, had been killed by the terrorists because he had been

6 a Rugova supporter and associate, and people disappearing in the same way

7 in Malisevo last summer. There are rumours that the main executioner is a

8 Siptar named Azem Uka." Did you know anything about this, General?

9 A. We knew that people who belonged to Ibrahim Rugova's party in the

10 course of 1998, and especially in the course of 1999, were also, in

11 addition to Albanian civilians and all those who thought that a solution

12 for Kosovo should be found through negotiations, that all of these people

13 were potentially targets for the KLA and that there were liquidation

14 groups and lists of people and that a certain number of Rugova's adherents

15 were also listed on these execution lists.

16 Q. Thank you, General. In the daily report of the 8th of January,

17 there is mention of terrorist provocations being registered against MUP

18 members in Rznic and Saptej in Decani municipality but that there had been

19 no consequences for the MUP. What else does this report contain?

20 A. Which report?

21 Q. That's from the command of your own brigade.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

23 Mr. Milosevic. 253?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's 253.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says here that in January, on

Page 41471












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Page 41472

1 the Prizren axis, the arrival of a large terrorist formation is expected

2 from Albania, several hundred terrorists near the Vrbnica border crossing.

3 If necessary, a combined armed attack will be mounted on members of the

4 army and police. Both -- it's this axis here, Vrbnica. If necessary,

5 both an attack from Albanian territory and from the territory of our

6 country in order to enable this large group to enter.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. What does "large group" mean in this context? Is it 150 or what?

9 A. It says "several hundred."

10 Q. So even larger.

11 A. Groups returning from training.

12 Q. The next document refers to the security organ drawing attention

13 to the activities of the Siptar forces, and it's addressed to your brigade

14 command.

15 A. Yes, my chief of security, the new one after Captain Mikicevic

16 was killed, he drew attention to the nearest unit - that's the unit of

17 Planeja, the mountain of Pastrik, that in the area of the village of Krajk

18 [phoen], this is here next to Drin, a group in uniform had been observed.

19 They were KLA men wearing Yugoslav army uniforms, and attention was being

20 drawn to this so that our men would not be surprised.

21 Q. You wrote a report on the 15th of January, 1999 on the activities

22 of the other side, and you say that "Pursuant to orders of the Suva Reka

23 staff, a large group had been formed." That's tab 255. What does this

24 report of yours contain?

25 A. It's addressed to the commander of the combat group 131 in the

Page 41473

1 Planeja area, and it says that as of the 15th of January the same group is

2 expected to move through the village of Samodraze, Velika Krusa, Rogovo in

3 the direction of the state border and that they would cross the state

4 border between the watchtowers of Gorozup and Liken, and that they would

5 be moving in this direction.

6 Q. And did this prove to be correct? Was this information correct?

7 Who did you get it from?

8 A. It says here: "Starting on the 15th." This happened a few days

9 later.

10 Q. Thank you, General. There is a document here in tab 256 issued

11 by your Chief of Staff, Vladimir Stojiljkovic.

12 A. Yes. This document says that a group of terrorists below the

13 Gorozup watchtower right next to the lake, because the water had receded,

14 that they had tried to cross over to our territory and come across mines,

15 and that one terrorist was probably wounded because mines were activated,

16 and they withdrew to their own territory.

17 Q. General, you compiled an analysis of these events concerning the

18 in-depth securing of the state border, and this analysis was written on

19 the 17th of January, 1999 and forwarded to the corps command. It's here

20 among your documents in tab 258. What does it refer to?

21 A. Yes, this has to do with the warning in tab 255. The corps here

22 is being informed that between the 15th and the 16th and between the 16th

23 and the 17th it is expected that strong terrorist forces will be

24 infiltrated into our territory, and for this reason reinforcements were

25 sent to the forces carrying out the in-depth securing of the state border

Page 41474

1 and that the number of in-depth security organs had increased from five to

2 eight. On the -- between the 15th and the 16th, there were no attempts to

3 infiltrate our territory, but between the 16th and the 17th, at about 2100

4 hours, one terrorist group, which is estimated to have comprised around 15

5 men, tried to enter our territory.

6 Q. You then inform the brigade command in tab 259, which speaks of a

7 group of 100 terrorists -- you inform them about the modern weapons they

8 have at their disposal. Who did you get this information from and could

9 it be considered reliable?

10 A. Before sending information, we checked it. When a brigade sent

11 information to a lower-level unit, it certainly meant that the commander

12 receiving the information had to act on it because it had already been

13 verified at brigade level. We have already seen the electronic

14 surveillance reports and the exchange of information with the MUP.

15 Q. Again, you provide an analysis several days later, and from this

16 we can conclude that you analysed the situation weekly. What was the time

17 period between the analyses you drew up, General?

18 A. An analysis was made after every movement of the unit from the

19 barracks in order to provide assistance to the organs for in-depth

20 securing of the border.

21 Q. So always, for every event.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Very well. The analysis in tab 260, which refers to activities

24 on the in-depth security of the state border, which you sent to the

25 command of the Pristina Corps, very briefly, what does it contain? It's

Page 41475

1 quite long. It has two densely typed pages.

2 A. What it refers to is that a group of Siptar terrorists, about 50

3 members of them, entered the territory of our country, passed through the

4 line security of the state border, and clashed with the in-depth security

5 of the state border; that three terrorists were killed; that large amounts

6 of equipment were left behind by them; and that from the traces that could

7 be found, they had wounded men whom they were dragging along behind them.

8 What is characteristic here is that the unit that set out from the

9 barracks to provide assistance at the village of Dedaj encountered two

10 vehicles. One was a van, a Volkswagen without a license plate; and the

11 other one was a Zastava truck with wooden benches, prepared to transport

12 men. These were vehicles which were waiting in the area of Ljubizda

13 village. In the area of Ljubizda village, they were waiting there for the

14 terrorists in order to transport them further on.

15 Q. As this document is very extensive, right after it you have an

16 order in tab 261 on the urgent taking of additional security measures. Is

17 this because the situation was becoming more complex?

18 A. I'd like to say something about the previous document. An

19 incident was mentioned of the 29th in Rogovo. This incident of the 27th

20 is connected with this incident because the injured persons and the

21 terrorists who had fled from this ambush were then transported to Rogovo.

22 And in an antiterrorist action by the MUP forces, I think 24 terrorists

23 were killed and later on it transpired that among them were also those who

24 had been wounded in this action on the 27th. What is characteristic in

25 this ambush of the 27th, the commander of the 134th KLA Brigade, Drago

Page 41476

1 Rama, was killed, and that was in the Dukagjin operative zone. In fact,

2 he was wounded and he died in Rogovo.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the break. We'll

4 adjourn for 20 minutes.

5 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, these questions now have to do with 1999. We are

11 dealing with 1999 in detail, of course, but I would like to save time here

12 too. I'll be putting a group of questions to you that have to do with

13 documents pertaining to the verification mission and in cooperation with

14 the verification mission. In actual fact, in tabs 262 onwards, all the

15 way up to 291, that is, you have documents that have to do with the work

16 of the verification mission -- or rather, the work of the army with the

17 verification mission. If possible, I would like us to go rather quickly

18 through these documents, from 262 to 291. And you should indicate only

19 some of the very important matters involved.

20 Already in tab 262, we see that this is a dispatch sent to the

21 General Staff and the liaison team for the OSCE and NATO missions.

22 A. Yes. These reports were sent from October onwards.

23 If I were to say what is characteristic of January now, I could

24 say the following: Movements of the army regularly reported to the

25 mission. We can see this in this first report too, that on such-and-such

Page 41477

1 a day a convey made up of such-and-such vehicles was moving in

2 such-and-such a direction. This was for the purpose of the mission

3 following these convoys. So this was a regular thing, reporting all the

4 activities of the military to the mission.

5 What is characteristic to all these tabs pertaining to January is

6 that the terrorists stepped up their activity. Already from the 31st --

7 between the 31st and the 1st we have such an incident.

8 There was a larger total number of such incidents too during the

9 month, so on the 3rd, the 7th, 11th, 15th twice, the 17th, the 25th, the

10 26th, and the 28th two incidents. These incidents were reported to the

11 mission. Depending on the conditions involved, the representatives of the

12 mission would come to verify what happened. If the conditions were not

13 right for them to do it the same day, sometimes they would do it a few

14 days after the actual event took place.

15 On the 28th of January - that's what it says here, and we already

16 mentioned that - at Liken - that's mentioned in tab -- in the tab that has

17 to do with that date. I think it is tab -- tab 290 speaks of that too;

18 that is to say, Goden, when one terrorist was killed, and Liken, when

19 three were killed. So the intensity of such grave incidents was stepped

20 up.

21 Another characteristic thing was that there were no incidents

22 between the army and the mission. Another characteristic is that every

23 day some teams, unannounced, tried to enter the border area. That was on

24 the 31st twice, and then three times on the 3rd, and then on the 6th and

25 three times on the 7th and on the 9th, and on the 10th of January twice,

Page 41478

1 then on the 16th, and on the 18th twice again.

2 In all the talks with the leadership of the mission, the

3 following was stated: When the border area is concerned, they should be

4 announced previously and they should go with liaison teams. That's for

5 the sake of their own safety too because incidents were possible there at

6 any point in time. And also because, on the basis of the agreement, that

7 was not envisaged, that the border area could be entered any way one

8 wished.

9 Q. General, at any rate, in all these documents from 262 until 291

10 that have to do with cooperation with the verification mission, is there

11 any incident in any one of these documents between the representatives of

12 the army and the representatives of the verification mission which could

13 indicate an absence of cooperation that was envisaged and regulated by the

14 agreement?

15 A. No incidents whatsoever. In one of the tabs, it says that there

16 were a few attempts made near the border positions to come unannounced, so

17 there would be a barricade there and there would be a guard and they would

18 call the -- the guard would call his superior officers and say that they

19 came and they wanted to see the border post. And then they tried to

20 remove the barrier themselves, the roadblock. They would -- the guard,

21 the soldier involved, would react the way they were taught to; that is to

22 say, they would cock their rifles and say that they are not allowed to

23 pass. That would be the gravest incident I could refer to as committed by

24 the military.

25 But in 1998, when the KDOM American team said that the army had

Page 41479












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Page 41480

1 fired at him and then after the event was reconstructed that was not --

2 proven not to be correct.

3 Q. What it was that happened, was the event reconstructed together

4 with the representatives of the verification commission or separately from

5 them?

6 A. This is an event from 1998, from November. Together with the

7 team, together with the mission team. What was shown was that actually

8 the combat vehicle that encountered the mission vehicle, this was a

9 Soviet-made vehicle, a BRDM, it was moving downhill and the engine -- the

10 sound of the engine was reminiscent of a burst of gunfire. So when this

11 incident was reported, we investigated the matter, so the following day

12 everything was repeated but in the presence of the team that verified that

13 there was no gunfire, that this was a completely different matter.

14 Q. Oh, so what they reported was that they heard a burst of gunfire

15 but it proved to be the engine of a motor vehicle moving downhill that

16 sounded that way.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And that was verified later by the mission itself.

19 Was any member of the mission injured in any way ever?

20 A. Not by the military, no. There was no such incident ever, as far

21 as the military and the police are concerned, as far as I know. And I was

22 there all the time.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... evidence as

24 to the non-cooperation of the army with the verification mission?

25 MR. NICE: I'm not in a position to put my finger on that at the

Page 41481

1 moment. If the accused can direct us as to what this evidence is related,

2 I'll turn to it, but at the moment I'm not alert to what he's focussing

3 on, no.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am just wondering why you're

5 leading this evidence.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because an entire series of

7 documents -- or rather, you didn't want us to deal with 1998, but in 1998,

8 when the mission was established, for every month there is a set of

9 documents that pertains to contacts with the representatives of the

10 mission, contacts between the military teams that were working with the

11 representatives of the mission. Now we have covered part of 1999 as well,

12 so I am leading this evidence to show that the army had a very proper

13 cooperation with the military mission all the time and they acted in each

14 and every situation in accordance with the agreement. All the members of

15 the mission were protected. There was not a single incident with them in

16 which anybody was injured. They were allowed to go everywhere they wanted

17 to go -- or rather, the army fully complied with the obligations taken

18 upon itself by our state as regards the verification mission, and that is

19 attested to by these documents.

20 MR. NICE: There is, of course, one discrete issue that may

21 arise, and that relates to Racak, which on the Prosecution's case and on

22 the material you've looked at recently was a joint military-police

23 operation and for which there is a claim of advance notification to the

24 mission which is not, I think, necessarily accepted by the witness, as

25 we've heard. But that's a quite discrete area.

Page 41482

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice and Mr. Milosevic. I just

2 wonder whether you're not indulging in an overkill in relation to this

3 matter of the proper conduct of the army. I thought you were moving on to

4 issues raised by the indictment in 1999.

5 MR. KAY: It did feature in the Prosecution case through

6 witnesses Vollebaek and Walker in relation to the KVM.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well, Mr. Milosevic, move on.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You just mentioned Racak. Racak is

9 not within the area of responsibility of General Delic. But I can put

10 this question to him -- or rather, does he have any information that the

11 army took part in what happened in Racak at all.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Do you have any such information about that?

14 A. The first information about what happened in Racak is what I

15 learned from my colleague from the MUP; that is to say, the head of the

16 secretariat in Prizren, who told me that the MUP carried out an action in

17 Racak. On the 17th of January, a meeting was requested with me by the

18 team of the verification mission, and they asked that I explain what

19 happened in Racak. I told them that Racak was not in my area of

20 responsibility, and as far as the army is concerned, I told them to speak

21 to the command of that unit; that is to say, the 243rd Brigade.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General. It's not within his area of

23 responsibility and he ...

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Microphone not activated] Move on,

Page 41483

1 Mr. Milosevic.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Or rather, Mr. Robinson, I assume

5 that this group of documents can also be admitted, the group that we dealt

6 with a short while ago, and that we can do this rather quickly. They have

7 to do with the work with the verification mission.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, General Vladimir Lazarevic wrote a paper on the

12 activities of the commands and units in January 1999. It was written on

13 the 4th of February, 1999. Inter alia, it says that "During the month of

14 January, there were several serious extraordinary events that took place,

15 like eight persons abducted, ammunition seized, manslaughter as far as a

16 soldier is concerned, fire," et cetera. What is -- what does all of this

17 have to do with, this information contained in tab 292?

18 A. This is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps.

19 Q. 292 is command of the 549th Motorised Brigade, report on the

20 activities of commands and units in January 1999.

21 A. Oh, yes. So practically this is a copy of the order of the corps

22 commander. Basically, it was copied out and then I gave six tasks to all

23 the units at brigade level. So through these first paragraphs, all the

24 incidents are referred to, the ones that occurred in January, on the 2nd,

25 3rd, 9th, 11th, 14th, all the way up to the 28th. The consequences of

Page 41484

1 these incidents are referred to as well, and it says that on average every

2 day there was a combat activity in protecting the state and the border

3 units.

4 The next, it says that "The units with their high degree of

5 combat readiness resolved these problems in the best possible way, in

6 spite of the difficult conditions, but still there were special things

7 that happened. The members of the 125th Brigade that were abducted, eight

8 men. And then the fire and then the manslaughter. And there was -- there

9 was control at all levels, and based on the order issued that -- in order

10 to deal with the previously mentioned unusual events and willful

11 abandonment of units as well as the order to ensure," et cetera --

12 Q. All right, General. Let's not go into all of that now, but

13 basically it is proper work and lawfulness that are stressed.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you move on, let me just

15 clarify. The last set of documents will be admitted except for those that

16 are untranslated, which are marked for identification pending translation.

17 Please continue.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, you adopted measures to prevent any surprises and

21 maintain the level of combat readiness and this order was reached on the

22 4th of February, 1999.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. This document is tab 293. What did these measures pertain to?

25 A. This is an order of lasting nature. It's a standing order. In

Page 41485

1 order to preserve the morale of the units, I order that all units with "A"

2 classification go "to suitable sectors on special orders and undertake all

3 measures to protect troops and materiel and technical equipment from air

4 operations."

5 And then the suitable sectors are referred to: Who provides

6 security for barracks once they are abandoned, where different units will

7 take up positions, and in the areas of deployment there should be at least

8 the second level of protection from an engineering point of view.

9 Q. General, I have to ask you to speak slower because I see that

10 some parts of your sentences are being omitted. Probably they cannot keep

11 up with you.

12 A. The most important points from this order are to continue the

13 second level of protection; then to continue with additional obstacles

14 towards the Republic of Albania, especially along the state border; and

15 then also to provide in-depth security in those areas where there are

16 incursions from Albania to Kosovo and Metohija according to the plan that

17 relates to such incursions; and also forces for intervention - and I had

18 two facilities - should be on the ready and that a plan of masking should

19 be made for all units at the level of the brigade; Vrbnica-Prizren,

20 Dragas-Prizren are the roads that should be observed. All units are given

21 assignments.

22 Logistics should also be ready to move on from peacetime

23 deployment to war levels, and also to prepare for quick call-up, to

24 mobilise the brigade and to inform them all about the political situation

25 - I am referring to paragraph 12 - the Siptar terrorists, and to prevent

Page 41486

1 possible effects of enemy psychological propaganda. Focus morale and

2 psychological work on motivating and mobilising all brigade members in

3 order to execute the tasks set in a disciplined, professional, and precise

4 manner.

5 And the last thing referred to here: That everyone should be made

6 aware of the provisions of the Geneva Convention and of conduct towards

7 captured and wounded members of the enemy forces. Who was responsible for

8 this? Commanders of subordinate units. And also to ensure maximum

9 command secrecy and information protection by technical protection,

10 equipment, et cetera. That would be the content of this order in the

11 briefest possible terms.

12 Q. All right. When a NATO attack is anticipated, you say here:

13 "NATO forces and Siptar terrorists." You speak of them as a single enemy.

14 A. This is the month of February. So in February there was a real

15 danger of bombing. The political security situation in the country was

16 very complex. And this order actually steps up preparations in order to

17 prevent any surprise from air attacks and attacks by NATO forces and

18 terrorist forces.

19 Q. All right. Almost at the same time, already on the 15th of

20 February, you wrote a document titled "Political security situation in the

21 area of responsibility." What is implied is the area of responsibility of

22 your brigade. It stipulates similar measures. What is the most important

23 part of this document?

24 A. With this document, I am reporting to the command - although the

25 command already has this information - that practically all roads leading

Page 41487












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Page 41488

1 to my brigade are blocked, cut off. Orahovac-Malisevo-Pristina cannot be

2 used because it is under the control of Siptar terrorist forces. Then the

3 road Prizren-Dulje-Stimlje is possible but only for specially organised

4 convoys and has to be protected from ambushes.

5 Prizren-Brezovica-Urosevac-Pristina has been saved but ambushes are

6 possible because it is not under the full control of the MUP.

7 Q. You've already told us this, General. What do you say about the

8 second page, about findings from the ground? You say: "There's a lot of

9 shooting among the Siptars. Many of those who are loyal to the Republic

10 of Serbia were liquidated, so that they are either forced to respond to

11 training and mobilisation call-ups or have to donate large sums of money."

12 Were you familiar with these occurrences?

13 A. We knew about it in 1998; however, from the beginning of 1999 the

14 terrorists became even more brutal in their approach to the civilian

15 population, so that the number of those who were liquidated was recorded,

16 but our information is probably not correct because the number of those

17 who were liquidated is probably much higher. But the fact is that those

18 who were spared were either those who complied with their demands or

19 donated large sums of money.

20 Q. I will quote: "All Serbs who live -- who lived in villages where

21 they were a minority have moved to Prizren, Djakovica, Orahovac, and Suva

22 Reka. Serbs remained only in the villages Velika Hoca, Zociste, Mala

23 Krusa, Novake, Smac, Zojic, Rastane and Musutiste, as well as in villages

24 in the Sredacka Zupa locality." Why did they move out?

25 A. All Serbs moved out of villages where they were in the minority

Page 41489

1 because they were subjected to terrorist attacks. These villages where

2 Serbs remained, such as Velika Hoca, were purely Serb villages. Novake

3 also. Musutiste was 50/50. In other villages, Zociste, Mala Krusa, Smac,

4 Zojic, Rastane had a smaller percentage of Serbs but in those places they

5 remained nevertheless. They moved out of everywhere else.

6 Q. You also mention here that during January and especially in

7 February most officers, most commanding officers of the Army of

8 Yugoslavia, sent their families to Serbia and Montenegro. You say that

9 three officers sent their families to Macedonia to stay with family, and

10 three to Republika Srpska. You continue to say that this had a positive

11 effect on the officers' work since they are constantly in their units and

12 devote themselves more to their duties.

13 A. That's correct. Commanding officers sent their families away

14 upon approval, because they couldn't have done so without prior approval.

15 However, this had a negative effect on the Serb population, so that in

16 addition to the positive impact -- namely that the officers were free to

17 devote themselves to their work -- there were negative impacts on the

18 Serbian population when they saw -- when people saw that officers sent

19 their families away.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have, again, to -- to raise the issue of

21 evidence of this kind. Does the general have any evidence to give that

22 relates to the incidents mentioned in the indictment? We can't sit here

23 just listening to evidence about the -- the proper conduct of the VJ

24 forces, that they acted according to orders, that they were sensitive to

25 prisoners, and so on. We're dealing with an indictment, and the

Page 41490

1 indictment sets out specific charges. Does the general have evidence that

2 relates to any of these charges? Because if he doesn't, I'll -- I'll have

3 to consult my colleagues as to the relevance of the evidence.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly he has specific evidence

5 relating to specific charges of what you call the indictment, but all the

6 evidence that is being given by the general is directly related to charges

7 of so-called illegal action by the army in 1999. What we see from here is

8 the actual conduct of the army. We can also see the observations of the

9 general and the information that became available to him concerning in

10 particular direct cooperation between the KLA and the KVM and between the

11 KLA and NATO. You were able to see in the video footage how much

12 state-of-the-art equipment was seized -- or, rather, left behind when some

13 prisoners were taken.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the illegal conduct that the

15 indictment alleges relates to the specific incidents. It's only

16 marginally relevant to show that the army had a culture of proper conduct.

17 Only marginally relevant. You have to deal with the incidents in the

18 indictment and stop skirting around them.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not skirting around them. I

20 am following the chronological sequence of events to show the conduct of

21 the army. When we reach those incidents in the proper time line, we will

22 deal with them. We are now dealing with 1999, which you yourself

23 qualified as entirely relevant. And if we observe the conduct of the army

24 across a large part of the territory that constituted the area of

25 responsibility and activity of the unit of General Delic, that is of

Page 41491

1 course relevant. This relates to 1999; in other words, what you call "my

2 conduct."

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... by your

4 observation that we will reach those incidents in the proper time line.

5 When will that be?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am saying we are going

7 chronologically. I'm not saying that we will reach it eventually. Those

8 incidents mentioned in the charges of Mr. Nice come later. None of the

9 incidents mentioned by Mr. Nice and located in the area of responsibility

10 of General Delic will not be omitted [as interpreted]. I'm not saying

11 that we will deal with it in due course, I'm saying that we are going

12 chronologically.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Delic, in that exchange, Mr. Milosevic

14 mentioned a concern about apparent cooperation between the KLA and the

15 KVM. Was that a matter that concerned you?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. I was very concerned

17 that the mission was not playing its part.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: The answer only needs -- the question only requires

19 a yes or no answer. What -- what steps were taken to explain to the KVM

20 this concern?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we look at the tabs related to

22 team reports submitted to the General Staff, we will see that at various

23 meetings - and meetings took place at every level on a daily basis - the

24 mission was made aware of the problems in the territory. The mission was

25 not there only to note the number of dead among the MUP, the army, or the

Page 41492

1 civilians. The MUP was supposed not only to follow the activities of the

2 army, they were also supposed to follow the activities of the terrorists.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: So will we see a document that you are responsible

4 for or familiar with addressed to and sent to or delivered to the KVM

5 explaining the concern, or are you saying that all we will see is internal

6 documentation recording that concern?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This documentation was at the

8 highest level. That is to say, after meetings with the leadership of the

9 mission, be it Mr. Walker or General Drewienkiewicz, those reports were

10 sent to the team of the General Staff, after those meetings. In these

11 reports, we can find the questions raised.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by "the team of the General

13 Staff"?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a team of the General

15 Staff that was in charge of contacts with the verification mission.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: What I'm asking you about is whether there are

17 documents sent to - sent to - the verification mission from the VJ

18 explaining concern about apparent collaboration or cooperation between the

19 KVM and the KLA. It's all very well to look at internal documentation

20 that we're looking at at the moment, but where was something put in

21 writing and sent to them to tell them what you were concerned about?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In our talks, these issues were

23 raised not in so many words. It was not put that way, that the mission

24 was cooperating with the terrorists, but it was said that the mission was

25 not fulfilling its mission with regard to terrorists.

Page 41493

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Why wasn't it put in so many words if that was

2 what you were concerned about?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One cannot say with regard to the

4 entire mission, all the individuals, that they were cooperating with

5 terrorists, but such cooperation certainly existed. And I can give you a

6 specific example to show that.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, with regard to the question asked by Mr. Bonomy a moment

11 ago, we were discussing 294, tab 294 from which you quoted. And in point

12 4 of this document, which I will remind you after this interruption deals

13 with the situation in your zone of responsibility, this paragraph reads:

14 "The OSCE Mission continues to monitor all our movements and activities

15 around the clock. OSCE teams monitor every supply convoy and the

16 movements of individual pieces of hardware."

17 And you say that civilians - I suppose you mean - make constant

18 requests for visits to be made "to villages located in areas of our combat

19 disposition or in the border area. Whenever there were clashes with the

20 KLA, OSCE teams immediately went there or were already in the area.

21 Sometimes one has the impression that they closely cooperate with the KLA,

22 informing them of the movements of our forces. They exerted no influence

23 on the KLA, nor did they prevent them from taking up new positions.

24 According to our information, the Siptars are waging a kind of

25 psychological and propaganda warfare through the OSCE Mission. Every day

Page 41494

1 they report to the Mission a large number of incidents, human rights

2 violations and such like by the MUP and the VJ; in most of the cases, it

3 can be established that the reports were false or that the operations were

4 completely legitimate. On the other hand, our approach to them is not

5 good either: it is not aggressive enough, we do not confront them with the

6 problems we have, nor do we insist that they totally fulfil their Mission

7 obligations."

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was just asking a question.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Was this what you knew about the conduct of the mission in your

12 area of responsibility?

13 A. Yes. What is written here in this report reflects faithfully

14 their conduct.

15 I would like to add something. Just let me find the appropriate

16 tab. It concerns a meeting of the 27th of January between team leader

17 Colonel Kotur and Luigi Orsini [phoen] and Colonel Guy Senza [phoen], a

18 representative of the mission. This meeting took place in Pristina. A

19 request was made to the mission to react and open the Orahovac-Suva Reka

20 road because the terrorists had placed roadblocks. Colonel Orsini replied

21 that Mr. Walker talked in Dragobilje with the terrorist commander known as

22 Soko and that the latter ordered the roadblocks to be removed and that

23 terrorists move away from the road. It says further on: "Mr. Walker

24 believed there are two factions among the terrorists: One that does not

25 wish the Rambouillet agreement to be signed and wishes to provoke a clash

Page 41495












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Page 41496

1 of wider proportions opposed to another faction who is in favour of the

2 agreement."

3 It also says that: "An agreement exists and the army will never

4 open fire first."

5 That much is true, but the terrorists have mobile telephones.

6 These are not ordinary cell phones. These are actually radio devices with

7 a base in a house, for instance, and they receive with a range of 20 to 40

8 kilometres. So it says here: "They have mobile telephones and the

9 Siptars are always the first to call mission members and to say the police

10 and the army are slaughtering us. Since the mission knows nothing about

11 it firsthand, they believe the party who called them first." Those are

12 the words of Colonel Orsini from the mission.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: All of -- yeah. All right.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I don't know if we are moving from this

15 topic to another, but two very short administrative points, one not

16 connected to the witness at all, and that is that today was the day when

17 you had announced an intention to discuss, however briefly, the Jasovic

18 exhibits. You've had our filing. I think I have five sentences that I

19 would wish to add to that, which will not take very long.

20 The second administrative matter goes back to your earlier

21 questioning of the accused about how long he was going to spend with this

22 witness. The witness was listed to be 12 hours. By the end of today, he

23 will have used 10. I nevertheless assume from the way things are

24 developing that I'm not going to be cross-examining the witness tomorrow,

25 but it might be helpful for all of us to know how long the accused is

Page 41497

1 intending, in terms of hours or days, to go on so that we can prepare for

2 it.

3 The third point is that the witness was unable to deal with the

4 question of maps for the Ashdown questioning or evidence at the last

5 break, but I gather he is prepared to discuss them at the end of the

6 session this morning with Ms. Dicklich.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, when will you conclude your

8 examination of this witness, bearing in mind that you had scheduled him

9 for - what is it - 12 hours, 10 of which have already gone by the end of

10 today?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand this, Mr. Robinson,

12 but I will need more time than that for this witness. Please bear in mind

13 that I am being constantly interrupted and that there are constant

14 discussions of procedural matters here. Today we didn't even start right

15 away but discussed procedural matters before I could begin. Then we

16 discussed the maps, what the witness was to do in order to assist. My

17 time is constantly being cut short. I am trying to be as expeditious as

18 possible but I cannot plan the length of my -- of my examination-in-chief

19 with precision. I estimated the time as best I could; however, obviously

20 it will not be sufficient.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: But it was an estimate nonetheless. It was an

22 estimate nonetheless, because we need to make arrangements. And I should

23 remind you: When a Judge intervenes, that is not to be characterised as

24 an interruption, and I hope that was a mistranslation earlier. A Judge

25 may make an observation. A Judge does not interrupt the proceedings.

Page 41498

1 What is your estimate for the rest of the witness's evidence?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least two days more.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: At least two days? That would be Friday.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please don't take me at my word. I

5 will try to be as expeditious as I possibly can, but I really cannot give

6 you a precise answer. If I could, I would. I cannot tell you with

7 precision how long a witness will dwell on a certain response.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: For Jasovic we'll reserve the last ten minutes

10 of the day's proceedings.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we did say that we would hear the

13 parties on the question of the admission of exhibits relating to

14 Mr. Jasovic. And I think it is appropriate to do that now, spend the last

15 12, 13 minutes doing that, and we'll return to your examination tomorrow.

16 And we'll take account of the fact that we are spending the last 12

17 minutes on this particular matter.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand that, Mr. Robinson,

19 and it's quite in order that these documents finally be considered;

20 however, I understood that the issue of all the exhibits tendered with

21 General Stevanovic would also be considered.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's being considered, but we are not going to

23 hear any arguments on that. That's being considered by the Chamber quite

24 actively, yes. Now we'll just hear very brief submissions on exhibits

25 relating to Jasovic's evidence, not Stevanovic.

Page 41499

1 Mr. Kay.

2 MR. KAY: Your Honour, it falls into two categories. Now, I'll

3 deal with them separately.

4 First of all, the --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, if you have decided

6 to discuss the documents in connection with Jasovic, I feel it would be

7 proper to let this witness go as today's session will end in 15 minutes

8 and there's no point in the witness sitting here listening to the

9 arguments about Jasovic.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, quite so. Yes.

11 You may leave, General, and return tomorrow morning at 9.00. I

12 remind you you are not to discuss your evidence with anybody.

13 MR. NICE: But Ms. Dicklich will accompany him for the purpose of

14 offering him some maps.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's approved.

16 JUDGE KWON: Let her try page 9 of [inaudible] -- Page 9.

17 [The witness stands down]


19 MR. KAY: Documents fall into two distinct areas: The Defence

20 materials, Prosecution materials. I'll deal with the Defence materials

21 first. They were all documents arising at the time of 1988 to 1999,

22 contemporaneous, so-called official records, being statements,

23 intelligence reports, and other forms of memoranda derived from the police

24 station at Urosevac, relevant to the Defence case to establish the

25 strength of the KLA in the Stimlje area with particular regard to the

Page 41500

1 strength of the KLA in Racak as well as information that would have been

2 received over a period of time by the local police force concerning the

3 strength of the KLA in that area.

4 The approach that the Trial Chamber has consistently taken

5 throughout the trial is that documents arising not prepared for this

6 particular litigation but arising at the time as part of an official

7 record or compilation is admissible because it was not prepared for these

8 proceedings and could be considered to have a degree of independence from

9 these proceedings in relation to the content of the material.

10 The Prosecution had a ruling to that effect in relation to a

11 witness that they called in relation to investigative material. That was

12 a man called Dragan Karleusa, who gave evidence on the 22nd of July, 2002,

13 transcript page 8363. He produced the investigation documents relating to

14 the bodies in the truck in the river. That's all I need say about it. It

15 was objected to by the Defence, but it was ruled by the Trial Chamber as

16 being admissible because it was material deriving from an official

17 investigation, not prepared for these proceedings. It is exactly similar

18 to the kind of material that this accused has brought before the Court

19 through the witness Jasovic.

20 If we move on to the Prosecution materials, our submission is

21 that, consistent with previous rulings by the Trial Chamber on this issue

22 relating to some of the witnesses that have -- that have been sought to be

23 presented through the form of exhibit material, that is ammunition

24 material for cross-examination. What they have done is attempted to

25 produce statements from witnesses undermining the credibility of the

Page 41501

1 witness, alleging instances of torture, human rights abuse. We had

2 exactly the same kind of issue in the Defence -- in the Prosecution case

3 when Dr. Bosanac of Vukovar Hospital was called. That was on the 5th of

4 February, 2003, transcript page 15663. The accused wanted to use two

5 statements, one by a soldier called Sasa Jovic, the other by a doctor who

6 had worked with Dr. Bosanac, called Dr. Djuranec. Both those statements

7 alleged torture, alleged human rights abuses by the doctor against

8 patients at the hospital as well as themselves. The evidence from

9 Dr. Djuranec was in the form of a transcript that had been produced for

10 proceedings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

11 Again, whilst it was used as cross-examination ammunition and

12 material, the Trial Chamber ruled that the accused could not exhibit those

13 statements in support of the allegations that he was making. He had to

14 call his own evidence to deal with those issues. That's exactly the same

15 position that the Prosecution are faced with now, and indeed, Mr. Nice

16 gave a very clear explanation for the basis of Rule, which can be found in

17 the transcript in relation to his submissions to the Trial Chamber at the

18 time and the reason for it.

19 So in our submission, the consistent approach adopted by the

20 Trial Chamber to date in relation to the admission of materials in

21 cross-examination should be followed to do justice between the parties and

22 to enable both to have been treated the same.

23 A few specific matters relating to the Prosecution's schedule:

24 I've been able to observe that although we have a detailed schedule, there

25 appear to be some tabs missing, for whatever reason, during the

Page 41502

1 preparation of materials. We skip from tab 135 to tab 138; tab 138 to tab

2 140; tab 145 to 149. And this can be seen throughout the materials, with

3 no apparent explanation.

4 We can also see that in relation to the witness statements that

5 challenge the basis upon which they were taken by the police officer

6 Jasovic, the statements relied upon by the Prosecution don't appear to

7 deal with the kernel of the issue in relation to three -- three

8 statements: Afrim Mustafa, who was interviewed on the 16th of January,

9 his Prosecution statement sought to be adduced the 3rd of April of this

10 year gives an account of how that statement was taken, but his statement

11 was signed on the 17th of January, and his statement given to the

12 Prosecution is silent on that matter. He wasn't held for just one day at

13 the police station. He apparently went there two days, and he

14 authenticated his statement on the 17th and he doesn't actually deal with

15 that process of authentication.

16 The same point can be made for Saban Rama, tab 1.44. Again,

17 statement dated the 16th of January but no explanation as to why he signed

18 it on the 17th of January and what was prevailing at that time.

19 Exactly the same observation can be made for Saban Rexhaj, tab

20 2.3. Interviewed on the 2nd of August, statement signed on the 3rd of

21 August. No explanation as to why he signed it on the 3rd.

22 These appear to be statements following a particular course of

23 making allegations against Defence witnesses, but in fact have flaws

24 within them in relation to key areas: As to why a statement was signed on

25 a different day, no allegation of torture on the other day. So in our

Page 41503












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Page 41504

1 submission, that's a classic reason why material should not be admitted

2 into evidence in -- in this form in these proceedings.

3 I've dealt with this very briefly, and I --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay.

5 Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Just looking at the two points that Mr. Kay has

7 referred to, but having not had advance notice of them and they not having

8 been dealt with in re-examination, I find myself at something of an

9 unfortunate and, in the circumstances, I think unfair, disadvantage. But

10 I'll see what I can do to deal with those two points.

11 So far -- I'm just looking at 1.43 now. He makes it quite clear

12 that he didn't sign the statement and that the signature is not his. This

13 is on the statement that was produced. And he deals with the

14 circumstances of the inaccuracy. He also deals with the circumstances in

15 which he was taken into the prison in which he was beaten and forced to

16 behave in the way he did. I'm not sure that that's in any sense

17 incomplete in the material way, and if it was, it should have been raised

18 earlier.

19 I think probably a similar consideration arises in relation to

20 1.44, which was an interview note, similar in format to some of the

21 alleged notes of the witness Jasovic himself, and he again says that the

22 contents is inaccurate. He doesn't recall speaking about certain names.

23 There it is.

24 Incidentally, one point that -- so I don't think there's any

25 point in that.

Page 41505

1 As to missing numbers, I think Mr. Kay has probably misunderstood

2 the purpose of the file. The file that was produced here was not an

3 exhaustive file of all the Defence exhibits; it was those that were

4 relevant. The schedule, on the one hand, if I've understood Mr. Kay's

5 point, the schedule does indeed cover all the statements, including those

6 for which there was a nil return, but the Prosecution file with the

7 additional statements details only those that were relevant.

8 As to our filing on the point, as I said, there were five

9 sentences to add, and only five, but I'll deal with them in just two

10 minutes after I deal with Mr. Kay's other points.

11 The materials are not relied upon solely for the strength of the

12 KLA, but they're relied upon for the function of those who died, the

13 function and role of those who died at the time, a different and more

14 specific issue.

15 He says that it's a matter of practice that official documents

16 are admitted. It's a matter of practice that such documents have been

17 admitted, but a general practice of permissive admission in no way

18 overrules the general discretion about admission or exclusion of material

19 which has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. And unfortunately, I

20 can't get into the precise page reference that Mr. Kay referred to for

21 Bosanac because the electronic version doesn't turn it up for me in that

22 format, but nevertheless here was a case-by-case consideration by the

23 Court as then constituted on an arguably similar but indeed distinct

24 question arising with two only different witnesses. An entirely different

25 position from that where this Court has been supplied with a very

Page 41506

1 substantial body of material going to show that this witness is wholly

2 unreliable for reasons that are both independent in that they come from a

3 number of different sources but themselves consistent.

4 When you look at the filing we've made, I have my five points, I

5 think, to make. The first, which isn't spelled out at paragraph 8, is

6 that the standard of proof for admissibility is balance of probabilities

7 but the burden -- we have not discussed this -- must be on the party

8 seeking to produce the document.

9 We identify several reasons, quite independent of the material

10 we've produced, that would show that none of this material can be

11 admitted. And I only desire to emphasise two points: First, a

12 superficially small point, like the use of the phrase "so-called KLA" is

13 actually in itself sufficient to exclude all this material. The witness

14 was --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, are you saying that --

16 MR. NICE: -- quite --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- that by itself is sufficient to exclude all

18 the material?

19 MR. NICE: Absolutely. If the Court concludes that of course

20 that phrase was not used by each and every -- or indeed probably any of

21 the alleged opponents, it's a nonsensical answer. But if the Court

22 attends carefully to the way I gave the witness the opportunity to give a

23 different explanation -- you'll remember on several occasions I said,

24 "Don't be tempted to give the answer. Think about it." It's perfectly

25 obvious that he was not writing down at that part the words of the

Page 41507

1 individuals before him. It would be ridiculous to suggest that he was.

2 And therefore in respect of each and every statement, part of what he has

3 told you is inaccurate and untrue, and it makes, therefore, the whole body

4 of his work for that simple and superficially small reason alone enough.

5 Similarly, his answers in relation to 2.23 varied over time as

6 between the anonymous informant and the identified but otherwise unnamed

7 person who we were able to track down by the coordinates given. That

8 shows you, on this potentially important source of information, completely

9 unreliable and that then infects the rest of the body of his work.

10 On the same paragraph as we deal with that, which is paragraph

11 23, an error of drafting crept through, where it was said that the witness

12 was less than honest on occasions. Our position is quite clear: It's not

13 that he was less than honest; it's that he was dishonest but that on the

14 particular instances of 2.23 he showed his dishonesty without even the

15 pressure of cross-examination because it slipped out by his own

16 inconsistencies, or to be precise, changes of account.

17 And finally, we make the point at paragraph 28 that we weren't

18 able to meet all the makers of statements. I should remind the Chamber

19 that when Jasovic first finished his examination-in-chief, he was on some

20 terms to cooperate with the Prosecution via the Registry. The Chamber may

21 recall - and if not, I can inform the Chamber of this - that efforts were

22 made to get further information from him to enable us to contact those who

23 we could not identify, but we were met with the response that that wasn't

24 possible, in the same way as, of course, we were met at the end of the

25 period of time between his giving evidence and returning for

Page 41508

1 cross-examination not with the material that we had sought, not with the

2 material that the Chamber had by very careful questioning of Your Honour

3 -- His Honour Judge Robinson identified but with other material. And of

4 course the absence of that material is one of the many matters we rely on

5 intrinsic to his evidence and without regard to the material we offer

6 going to show that he is an entirely unreliable witness.

7 As to the question of the materials that we have laid before you,

8 this is very different circumstance from other cases. And there is in the

9 jurisprudence of the Tribunal in another case a mechanism why -- whereby

10 this material can be admitted for purposes of credibility on this case, as

11 a one-by-one or one-off incident if so decided. And with such a body of

12 material before the Chamber, in our respectful submission, it would be

13 wholly wrong to allow hearsay of this kind first coming in as third-hand

14 hearsay through Marinkovic, then as secondhand hearsay, if it were to be

15 allowed in through Stevanovic, and then now as firsthand hearsay through

16 this witness. With this body of material available, either by -- well, by

17 one mechanism or another, the material must be excluded and it mustn't be

18 left that this trial has to deal with this issue by other means, which

19 will be very consuming of time at a later stage, when it is quite clear

20 that this material doesn't qualify for the reliability test that has to be

21 passed before it can be admitted.

22 Unless I can help further.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

24 Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated].

Page 41509

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All this that was said --

3 Mr. Robinson, I believe that all that was said by Mr. Nice is completely

4 devoid of any grounds. Namely, all the documents introduced through

5 Witness Jasovic are public records, public documents of the Ministry of

6 the Interior and its bodies and they were all created contemporaneously.

7 None of them was created for the purposes of this trial.

8 And the witness in question had worked in the Ministry of the

9 Interior for several decades and has been a crime investigations inspector

10 for several decades.

11 We established through examination that there had never been any

12 criticism or objections to his work.

13 The documents are doubtlessly public. Some of them were

14 introduced through investigating Judge Danica Marinkovic, whom Mr. Nice

15 called a criminal, and then he found a difference between her set of

16 documents and another set of documents. Further documents were introduced

17 through General Stevanovic and through Witness Jasovic, who in fact came

18 to testify at the initiative of Mr. Nice. I didn't even know about him at

19 the time when Mr. Nice suggested that he could testify because he was here

20 anyway to testify in the Limaj case.

21 Therefore, all of these documents are official and all of them

22 are contemporaneous.

23 All the documents of Mr. Nice were created recently, and witness

24 Jasovic made it crystal clear why the Albanians are saying something quite

25 different now. And you, if you know anything at all about Kosovo, will

Page 41510

1 understand that they are saying something different because their lives

2 are in danger.

3 The witness said this very clearly. Mr. Nice can collect

4 hundreds of statements to say anything at all against anyone who testifies

5 against the Albanian side. You, Mr. Robinson, and you, Mr. Kwon, could

6 see that in the testimony of one of Rugova's assistants when I showed him

7 a recording of his own interview. He was unable to respond. He, being a

8 politician, responded only two years later, saying that he couldn't reply

9 because Kalashnikovs were trained at him from the other side of the

10 camera. He mentioned it only two years after the event. They are in

11 mortal danger if anyone finds out that they gave any information to the

12 organs of the interior of the Republic of Serbia.

13 Graphological expertise established that it is impossible to say

14 one way or another that this was not the signature of the person in

15 question. None of the documents provided to refute these official records

16 stands up to scrutiny. We had the opportunity to hear a witness who took

17 these statements. These records of his contain countless facts, countless

18 names, descriptions of events, and it's simply unbelievable for anyone who

19 is a Homo sapiens to imagine that this was all a product of imagination.

20 This statement was given by certain persons about others who were members

21 of the KLA, and Mr. Jasovic explained that it was his job to collect

22 information about KLA members, about their strength, equipment, weaponry,

23 et cetera, and he collected this data for police purposes, not in order to

24 deceive his own superiors but, on the contrary, to supply them with valid

25 information.

Page 41511

1 Every superficial observer who reads these documents will know

2 that they are authentic. None of those documents can be refuted by the

3 explanations given by Mr. Nice. You saw that Mr. Nice made a schedule.

4 He informed all of us here that they found three persons who were placed

5 in Racak schedule. And in this book authored by KLA members, I quoted 20

6 names from Racak. That is one piece of evidence showing what Mr. Nice's

7 schedule is worth. It is a reversal of evidence and falsifying of

8 evidence. It is deliberate distortion of the truth, of what actually

9 happened. There is no comparison between a witness statement made in the

10 month of June who was asked: Weren't you tortured by the Serbs to give

11 this statement against us? This witness will know that his head is at

12 stake. There is nothing in Mr. Nice's evidence to refute the official

13 records and the official statements collected by Mr. Jasovic as an

14 official authorised officer that need to be exhibited, and the evidence

15 collected by Mr. Nice to shake the credibility of this witness should, in

16 my opinion, be rejected because it doesn't meet a single criterion of

17 authenticity.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I, with your leave -- nothing do with

19 what Mr. Milosevic has said, but the points that I was not given advance

20 notice of in relation to 1.44 and 1.45, may I adjust two sentences.

21 As to 1.44, bearing in mind the difficulty that the witness had

22 with explaining how people were detained overnight without a record of

23 their detention being made - and this was in answer to questions from the

24 Bench - the Court will remember the passage because these were people

25 apparently staying there voluntarily, if at all. It is for him to have

Page 41512

1 explained why for 1.44 there's an apparent interview on the 16th with an

2 apparent signature on the 17th, something he didn't explain.

3 With 1.45, if you look at the totality of the material, including

4 that provided by the Prosecution, although the person concerned

5 acknowledges that the signature is his, he doesn't acknowledge that the

6 date of the signature is accurate. And again, that's simply a matter of

7 what's to be found on Jasovic's material, so that the points raised by

8 Mr. Kay don't in any sense counter the material coming from the

9 Prosecution.

10 Thank you for allowing me to make those two points.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll adjourn now until tomorrow

12 morning, 9.00 a.m.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I, too, raise a technical issue

16 and ask you to issue an order in that regard? Very often I find a serious

17 discrepancy between what was actually said and what was interpreted and

18 what is in the transcript. I'm not going in depth of this issue. But

19 through the liaison officer more than a year ago I raised this, and I kept

20 repeating it every month, requiring what is my right; namely, videotapes

21 of this entire procedure. And I keep receiving the same answer through

22 the liaison officer: You will get it but we need time.

23 This issue is taking too long. I have been asking for it for a

24 long time and I have not been getting it for a long time. So I am asking

25 you to issue an order to make available to me the video recordings of this

Page 41513

1 entire trial from the beginning.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, neither Judge Kwon nor I remember

4 hearing this point before, but we'll attend to it. We'll consider it and

5 do whatever is proper in the circumstances.

6 We are adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00 a.m.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just say one thing: You are

8 right. I have never mentioned this to you before. I asked through the

9 liaison officer that the relevant service make this available to me. And

10 I am saying it to you now because I seem to be unable to exercise this

11 right otherwise, so that you can issue an order.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for the clarification. We'll attend

13 to the matter.

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.01 p.m.,

15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 30th day of

16 June, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.