Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 46257

1 Wednesday, 9 November 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- On commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are -- [French on English

7 channel].

8 Let's try again. Mr. Milosevic, you are to conclude your

9 re-examination.


11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

13 Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Nice dwelt a very long time on this question of cleaning or

17 cleansing; "ciscenje." Bearing in mind what your deputy recorded in the

18 war diary on that day when the anti-terrorist action was on, please take a

19 look at your tab 5, where there is an analysis of what was done in this

20 anti-terrorist action.

21 A. Number 5, Mr. Milosevic? Oh, yes. I found this document.

22 Q. Yes, document number 5. On page 2 -- on page 2 in this analysis

23 there is brief reference to the first day of the war or, rather, the first

24 day of these activities during the first day and everything that was

25 carried out, everything that it says here. Then the next paragraph --

Page 46258

1 JUDGE KWON: Can we have it? Put it on the ELMO, please.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2.

3 JUDGE KWON: It's not a logbook -- or one of the already exhibited

4 ones. Delic binder, tab 359.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, but number 5 in the list

6 of admitted exhibits that you have along with this witness.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Have we found it?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it on the ELMO now? I assume it

9 is. Oh, this is in English.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have the document in front of me,

11 my own document.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. All right. If you have the document in front of you, please take

14 a look at the first day of the war and then the task is explained and what

15 happened, and the next paragraph is the second day. During the second

16 day --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down and give us a

18 reference, thank you, interpreter's note.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreter is asking you to

20 slow down and provide the correct reference.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is on page 2, the fourth

22 paragraph from the bottom in the Serbian text. I am reading the fifth

23 paragraph, actually. It refers to the second day of the war.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. During the second day of the war -- or, rather, during the second

Page 46259

1 day of combat activities, what was carried out was the destroying of STS

2 blocked in Velika Krusa, and so on and so forth. Have you found that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, please, the next paragraph. During the third day of combat

5 action, what does it say?

6 A. "During the third day of combat activities, the cleaning up of the

7 remaining area was carried out around Donje Retimlje," et cetera.


9 MR. NICE: Page 3 on the English version.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Page 3, English, yes. Yes, proceed now.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. So in this document from that time, the contemporaneous document

13 that we're looking at, day one, day two, day three of the combat

14 activities, is "ciscenje" referred to, cleaning up?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In what sense was the word used?

17 A. Only in the -- in one single sense, and that is that kind of

18 mopping up of the terrain from the enemy. In this sense and in this case,

19 these are the armed terrorists. That is the only thing that I explained

20 over these past days, that this term only refers to fighting against

21 terrorists in this case, because we carried out combat activities against

22 them.

23 Q. Colonel, what I'm going to put before you now is a document that I

24 received this morning, Mr. Robinson, through Professor Rakic. This is a

25 document called "Battalion Rules."

Page 46260

1 You talked tactics from what I heard in your explanation before

2 the other day.

3 A. Tactics and tactical training. And there's no need for you to put

4 that document on the ELMO in front of me because I basically know it by

5 heart. You can ask me anything from that rule. That was my job for 17

6 years.

7 Q. All right. But for the transcript I'm going to ask that this be

8 placed on the ELMO. There are a few references to "ciscenje" here, but

9 let us have a look.

10 So this is the rule --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Vukovic, how is it you know what document

12 Mr. Milosevic has in his hand?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He said "Battalion Rules," sir, and

14 I was commander of --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. I'm going to ask you to place on the ELMO this document -- or,

18 rather, just a small excerpt, and then we're going to see what the front

19 page looks like. We have, two pages on, the regulation of the rule,

20 passed by the Chief of Staff of the JNA as far back as 1977. So it's

21 combat rules.

22 Please take a look. Please place this on the ELMO. It is page

23 101. I've marked with a highlighter.

24 All right. What does it say, the document? It's a printed

25 document, "Combat Rules." This is the battalion rule.

Page 46261

1 A. This is obviously a copy of the battalion rule. You just have to

2 tell me which paragraph you want.

3 Q. Just what I've highlighted. What does it say there?

4 A. "A building that is taken is examined in detail (especially

5 cellars and attics), cleansed from remaining enemy groups and ..."

6 Q. Thank you. So it's cleansed of enemy groups. Please, let's look

7 at the front page now.

8 A. I can see that straight away. It is the "Battalion Rule." It's

9 just photocopied. Battalion Rule, and in parentheses it says, "Infantry,

10 motorised, mountain, partisan and marine battalions."

11 Q. Can we have a look at this.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there anything in this document that shows the

13 year when this rule was made? Mr. Milosevic says it goes as far back as

14 1977. I see, it's published 1988.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document is from 1988 because

16 that is when the existing Battalion Rule was amended.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Just open the other page. Just open it. Just open the next page.

19 What does it say there? Let's have a look. Let's place it on the ELMO.

20 A. It says "Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the General

21 Staff of the JNA, the infantry department," number such-and-such, the 16th

22 of March, 1977. And then it entered into force, the Battalion Rule did.

23 And the amended version is the one from, obviously, 1988.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Milosevic please not speak prior to

25 the witness.

Page 46262

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Who signed the document?

3 A. The chief of General Staff of the JNA, Colonel General Stane

4 Potocar.

5 Q. Is this part of the combat rules that you taught at the tactics

6 department?

7 A. That's right. That is the basic rule that is studied. In

8 addition to the company and platoon rules, this is studied by first and

9 second-year students at the military academy. Of course, there's also the

10 brigade rule, but that is less voluminous.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Mr. Robinson, I received

12 this only this morning, so could it please be admitted into evidence or,

13 rather, marked for identification and, once it's translated, could you

14 please admit it? This is an original document or, rather, it's a

15 photocopy of the original document. It is a general document.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's marked for identification pending

17 translation.

18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D324.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, would 1977 be the first time, as you're

20 aware, that the concept of cleansing the territory of enemy be used in

21 your combat instructions?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, Mr. Robinson, and

23 I am very well aware of this, this term "cleansing" or "mopping up" has

24 been used for as long as standing armies have been in existence. And this

25 Battalion Rule that was adopted in 1977 replaced the Battalion Rule that

Page 46263

1 was, as far as I can remember, adopted in 1965. And it's not terms that

2 are changed. What is changed are tactical principles of using a unit in

3 accordance, first and foremost, with the development of war technical

4 equipment, techniques, experience from modern warfare, et cetera.

5 However, most things were taken over from the old rule. The old rule,

6 which I think was adopted in 1965, it was a successor of the previous

7 rules, to a certain extent, and after all, this is dealt with in the

8 professional literature of all countries of the world. It is only

9 tactical principles that are improved, as I say, on the basis of the

10 development of modern equipment and experience.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're saying, then, that other armies also use

12 the same terminology, mopping up the enemy?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, what I'm saying is that I

14 assume they're using that. I haven't read, to be honest, the combat rules

15 of the English army, for example, or the American army, but I assume they

16 would be along the same lines. The principles are always identical once

17 we attack an inhabited area, for example, or when we're fighting

18 terrorists, and for the most part all the armies use other people's

19 experience, among other things.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. In any event, it has been in use in

21 Yugoslavia for many, many years?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Colonel, Mr. Nice asked you a question. He asked you why you had

Page 46264












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Page 46265

1 started the campaign, what the reasons for that were to launch a campaign

2 at precisely that moment on the 24th in fact. Why did the anti-terrorist

3 operation start then? And you didn't agree that it was a campaign, but

4 anyway, anti-terrorist operation on the 24th. Would you now please take a

5 look at tab 2. You were asked for the reasons, what the reasons were for

6 the anti-terrorist action.

7 A. Do you mean tab 2 or number 2?

8 Q. I mean number 2. They're admitted exhibits.

9 A. Well, I answered that question in part and said that it was our

10 assessment --

11 Q. Let me ask you -- let me tell what you it says here first. First

12 of all, is the date the 24th or is it an earlier date?

13 A. The date is the 23rd when that order was compiled.

14 Q. I see. The order was on the 23rd. And what does it say under 1,

15 "The enemy"? The question was what were the reasons for the

16 anti-terrorist action, and tell us what it says at the beginning of that

17 document, starting with sentence number 1, "The enemy."

18 A. "The Enemy: In the past 15 to 20 days, the STS Siptar terrorist

19 forces increased their combat activities and attacks on VJ units, Yugoslav

20 army units, and members of the Ministry of the Interior, MUP members,

21 together with intensified sabotage and terrorist actions in urban areas.

22 The most indomitable strongholds of the Siptar terrorist forces are in the

23 following sectors: Retimlje village, Mount Milanovac, Studencane village,

24 Samodreza village, Dobrodeljane village, and Pagarusa village.

25 "The Siptar terrorist forces have established a Podrimlje-Pastrik

Page 46266

1 operation zone with two brigades (of around 1.500 terrorists).

2 "The 122nd Brigade --"

3 Q. All right. Fine, thank you, we needn't read on.

4 A. Do you want me to answer the question now?

5 Q. Yes, please.

6 A. So according to the assessments and the evaluation made of the 2nd

7 command and my command and my superior command and the area around me,

8 indicated that strong terrorists forces had appeared to our rear, and the

9 regions, the sectors, are stipulated here.

10 Now, may we have a map put up? But I can't see that the easel is

11 here today. I'd like to show it on the map and that would make things

12 clearer. But what we can see is that the communication lines were cut

13 off. We can see that there was more intensive combat in urban areas, that

14 is to say in towns as well. And on the other hand, on the basis of

15 monitoring the movements and groupings --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think that we've seen the

18 map and we don't need to dwell on the map again and go back to it. I

19 think the explanation will suffice.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. But just one more detail: You quoted from the document a moment

22 ago, and in the sentence it says, "The sector of the village of Retimlje";

23 is that right?

24 A. Precisely. The command was in the village of Retimlje.

25 Q. You needn't go into an explanation, but all this terrorist action

Page 46267

1 referred to the broader area of Retimlje?

2 A. Yes, Retimlje, Studencane, Dobrodeljane, Pagarusa; they're all in

3 the same sector.

4 Q. That's what it says here: Retimlje, Studencane, Dobrodeljane,

5 Pagarusa. Everything is listed there.

6 A. Yes. And also forces on Mount Milanovac.

7 Q. So according to your assessment, there were the 122nd and 124th

8 KLA Brigade; is that right?

9 A. Yes. The 124th KLA Brigade was in the broader area around Suva

10 Reka, Orahovac, and Velika Krusa. That was where it was deployed, which

11 was proved by the maps and documents that were seized, et cetera.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, you were also shown a picture of a man who

13 obviously was wounded and had severe burns. Do you remember that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. Did you have an opportunity of seeing charred bodies, the pictures

16 of charred bodies, people who had been burnt during all those activities

17 of yours in Kosovo and Metohija?

18 A. Unfortunately, I did have an opportunity of seeing things like

19 that. My own soldiers, who suffered from the results of the NATO bombings

20 and bombs and prohibited weapons, weapons that were prohibited pursuant to

21 international conventions. I saw a large number of charred civilian

22 bodies as well. I showed you some of them. I can show you some of them

23 again if need be.

24 Q. No, there's no need for us to see those pictures again. But was

25 there any doubt, perhaps, that some of the -- that -- or suspicions that

Page 46268

1 our forces had poured petrol on those individuals and set fire to them, or

2 do you know what had happened?

3 A. No. I knew what happened specifically speaking, and in cases

4 where they were my soldiers and when they were civilian casualties, they

5 were exclusively the result of the NATO Air Force bombings, NATO

6 airstrikes, and I explained that. I explained that both to you and to

7 Mr. Nice.

8 Q. Just one more question: Since Mr. Nice said that it was a

9 large-scale offensive and campaign, you mentioned here a piece of

10 information that taking part from your unit were 186 members or, rather,

11 you said 185, I believe, and you were the 186th. Is that what you said?

12 A. Yes, that's exactly what I said. And on the second day another

13 platoon was engaged from a reserve force but along a completely different

14 axis because the terrorists were pulling out. So the commander asked that

15 we prevent the terrorists from pulling out.

16 Q. All right. Fine. Now, in one of those reports of yours that we

17 saw on the overhead projector, not to have to put it back on the ELMO

18 again, when you tell us the number of men in your unit, did you see a

19 figure or mention a figure 1.600?

20 A. That was for the first stages of the war when mobilisation hadn't

21 been fully completed. There were about 1.600 soldiers and officers in the

22 battalion, and later on that figure rose to 2.500. But from that we can

23 see that a very small portion was engaged.

24 Q. All right. Fine. Now, from this can we deduce -- or, rather,

25 what was the percentage, if there were about 2.000, your unit, 186 was

Page 46269

1 engaged -- men were engaged from your unit, what was that percentage?

2 A. Well, barely 10 per cent, not even 10 per cent, because we

3 couldn't have had more people set aside because of the organisation of

4 defence at the border itself. And our assessments were such that -- or,

5 rather, by the brigade commander that that was the number of men that I

6 could have, be assigned to me.

7 Q. All right. So as Mr. Nice said, in that large-scale campaign you

8 had less than 10 per cent of your unit engaged, less than 10 per cent of

9 your men.

10 A. Yes, that's quite correct.

11 Q. In that anti-terrorist operation. Now, just a few more questions.

12 Or just one brief explanation with respect to the crossings at Cafa

13 Prusit. You mentioned that your command post was -- where did you say it

14 was?

15 A. My command post was at that time in the village of Zub, which is

16 the command post that had been raised to a third level of preparedness,

17 and that was the situation or had been the situation for 20 years. To

18 cross from Djakovica across the border crossing Cafa Prusit, you have to

19 take the road and pass through my command post.

20 Q. All right. Fine. Now, all the civilians who were there, did --

21 and crossed the border, do you have any information and knowledge about

22 whether there was civilians, for example, during the first, second, and

23 third months of the NATO aggression near your command post? I mean

24 Albanians, Albanian civilians.

25 A. Well, I've already answered that. Later on my command post was

Page 46270

1 moved to the Brekovac village area, and of course civilians lived there,

2 Serbs and Gypsies and Siptars; a diverse population. And I quoted the

3 example of the Maka Lifaj [phoen] family, his household. I remember him

4 for some other reason. We had very good cooperation with him. And I also

5 remember the Cehu family. And what was characteristic for that man was

6 that his cousin Aqir Cehu was, for instance, the commander of the local

7 terrorists in Djakovica. And that didn't matter. That was no obstacle

8 for them living there. But there were also other examples.

9 For example, after that first wave of moving out, of the

10 population moving out, a lot of Siptar civilian refugees would take refuge

11 in their friends' homes. And I mentioned the village of Ferza [phoen],

12 and they were -- there was the village of Moglica and Raca. But in

13 Brekovac, near Srbinje, Scekic Vukasin had taken about 20 Siptar refugees

14 from the Pec and Orahovac areas, which means he took them in, into his

15 home. He informed us that they were being accommodated in his own house,

16 and there was no problem there. They stayed there throughout the war.

17 Q. Colonel, all I want you to do is to tell us precisely, and you've

18 said that now, you said that Albanians lived near your command post

19 throughout the war.

20 A. Yes, exactly. The command post, of course, Mr. Milosevic, is not

21 just one building. The battalion is distributed over a surface area of

22 half a square kilometre. So at the command post and around the command

23 post is where the civilians lived.

24 Q. Did it ever happen that anybody harmed any of those civilians,

25 killed any of those civilians or expulsed them from their homes or forced

Page 46271

1 them to go to Albania?

2 A. Of those civilians from Brekovac, no one was killed. There was

3 just one incident involving the civilian population, the civilian Siptar

4 population. I can tell you about that incident if you want to hear it.

5 Q. There's no need.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, we don't want to hear it.

7 Mr. Milosevic, the earlier exercise in which you introduced the

8 document showing that the term had been used, "ciscenje," from 1970

9 something was a very good use of re-examination. This is not. Just bring

10 your re-examination to an end very quickly. You are not to regurgitate

11 matters that have been raised in examination-in-chief.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I do not wish to bring up those

13 questions again.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Just tell me briefly, since you were asked by Mr. Bonomy something

16 about your relationship towards Muslims and you didn't have the time to

17 explain your position towards Muslims, Albanians, Gypsies and other ethnic

18 groups, tell us briefly.

19 A. My attitude towards the Siptars, towards Gypsies, towards Muslims

20 is the same as is my attitude towards any other ethnic group or member of

21 an ethnic group. I don't know how else to explain that, except to say

22 that I was born and grew up in a multinational environment, which was

23 Vojvodina, where people were never divided on the basis of their ethnic

24 affiliation or on the basis of their religious affiliation. So that my

25 attitude and relationship towards citizens of the Federal Republic of

Page 46272












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13 English transcripts.













Page 46273

1 Yugoslavia as a whole was the same to one and all regardless of their

2 nationality or religious affiliation.

3 Now, as far as the Muslims are concerned, I have so many Muslim

4 friends, excellent friends, family friends, that I don't think I need go

5 into that at all. And I find it insulting if somebody in this courtroom

6 thinks otherwise, differently from what I have said. And I can give you

7 the names and surnames of my family friends and even some of my relations,

8 if it comes to that.

9 Q. All right. Fine. Now, Mr. Nice asked you the following question:

10 Why did the citizens not go to Mother Serbia? Now, let's leave aside his

11 sarcasm in asking that question. Did the citizens, and here I mean the

12 Albanians, Colonel, were there instances when Albanian citizens would flee

13 to the inner regions of Serbia?

14 A. Yes, there were many such examples. I can quote a couple where we

15 even organised their departure to the Red Cross in Nis because they were

16 afraid for their lives. Specifically, there was a woman with five

17 children, and she didn't dare go to Albania because they threatened to

18 kill her. And they threatened to kill her because she had helped, among

19 other things, our forces. She told us who the terrorists were and who

20 weren't the locals from her village. And I have the name and surname of

21 that woman and --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... next

23 question. Next question.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. There's no need for that. My question was just to ask you whether

Page 46274

1 the Albanians fled to the inner regions of Serbia. You answered in the

2 affirmative. I have got my answer, so we needn't dwell on that.

3 And I have no further questions. Thank you, Colonel.

4 A. Thank you too.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, that concludes your testimony. Thank

6 you for coming to give it. You may now leave.

7 [The witness withdrew]

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what is your position on the admission

10 of the leaflets and the book "Traces of Humanity"?

11 MR. NICE: I still haven't been able to find further material on

12 the accuracy or otherwise of the transcript, although I'm still pursuing

13 the matter, and I would prefer that matter to be put off, if it can be,

14 until I've got further information. I think it's unlikely that the

15 transcript is as recorded in that book, but I need to get some more

16 information on that.

17 As to the leaflet allegedly dropped by NATO, I'm unable to express

18 a view one way or the other. I think it's probably the case that such --

19 that leaflets were dropped in the course of this campaign. This one, I

20 think, bears no indicia of being written by a non-native, but that

21 doesn't, in a sense, help us one way or the other. If it was dropped by

22 NATO, they might have access to perfect language speakers. If it was left

23 around by others in order to make it look as if it came from NATO, they

24 would also have perfect language speakers. So I simply am in no position

25 to deal with that one way or another. But I don't object to its

Page 46275

1 production. We have had other such documents in before.

2 But the transcript is another problem. I would rather have time

3 to look into that.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were there two leaflets, Mr. Kay, or was it one?

6 MR. KAY: I think it was a front side and a back side that was

7 referred to. We would say original material dropped down, and he says

8 that it came from NATO, should be admissible.

9 On the transcript, if I could address you on that, just simply

10 this, to say that he heard a broadcast and says that reproduction in that

11 book was the same as the broadcast that he heard. In our submission, he

12 would be entitled to rely on that as the best evidence he can produce as

13 to what was said in the broadcast of that conversation.

14 MR. NICE: Ms. Dragulev reminds me that I think the witness said

15 something about his ability to produce the transcripts but I don't know

16 whether he has any intention of doing that. Our prospects of getting to

17 the transcript may not be particularly good, but we are still pursuing it.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. The leaflet we'll admit, and the book

20 "Traces of Humanity" we'll mark for identification pending further order.

21 And we encourage Mr. Milosevic and the Prosecutor to continue their

22 efforts to find further verifying material in relation to contents of the

23 book.

24 THE REGISTRAR: D325 for the leaflet. D326 for the book.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 46276

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It must be some mistake. The book

4 is called not "Traces of Humanity." It's called "Trails of Inhumanity."

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Very well. Thanks for the correction.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before I call my next witness,

7 Mr. Robinson, I wish to ask you to treat him just as you treated the

8 previous witness, because he is a very serious cardiac patient. If

9 possible, we should make breaks after each hour. I think you lose only

10 five minutes that way.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll do that, but there's another matter.

12 In the 65 ter list, there's a note to the effect that, in view of his

13 health, he has to return by the 10th, which is tomorrow, and you have him

14 scheduled for four hours. It means, therefore, that you must finish

15 examination-in-chief today.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will try.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, if you respect his health, you will do more

18 than try.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Certainly. Apart from

20 that, that is precisely why I asked that he testify earlier, namely today,

21 because he was planned to testify before another three witnesses.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness be called.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Incidentally, there is a small

24 mistake. He can testify today and tomorrow. He should leave the day

25 after tomorrow. So we should complete the examination-in-chief and

Page 46277

1 cross-examination in the course of these two days.

2 [The witness entered court]

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

5 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit. Mr. Milosevic, you may begin.


8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Farkas.

11 A. Good morning.

12 Q. General, please introduce yourself briefly and describe briefly

13 your training and career.

14 A. I was born on the 1st of October, 1942, in Beqaj. That is in the

15 municipality in the autonomous province of Vojvodina. That's where I

16 finished primary school, secondary school as well, after which I continued

17 my education in the military academy of ground forces, and in 1964 I

18 became an officer of the Yugoslav People's Army.

19 For the most part, I served in the territory of Serbia, and I also

20 took part in the Peace Corps of the United Nations in Sinai, Mount Sinai.

21 Among the important positions I occupied in the army I could mention that

22 I was head of the counter-intelligence group the 1st Army, chief of

23 security of the 3rd Army, which is now 2nd Army, chief of security of the

24 1st Army District, provincial secretary for national defence of Vojvodina,

25 Chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence of Vojvodina, assistant federal

Page 46278

1 defence minister for civilian defence, and at that time I was also head of

2 the security department of the army of Yugoslavia. I graduated from all

3 high military schools, including the School of National Defence as it was

4 called then.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in order to accommodate the

6 witness, we'll -- we'll break at 10.00 and then thereafter at one-hour

7 intervals, taking 15-minute breaks.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. What was your position during the NATO aggression in Kosovo?

11 A. During the NATO aggression in Kosovo, I was chief of the security

12 department of the army of Yugoslavia.

13 Q. Were you the highest-ranking officer or, rather, VJ general in

14 charge of security?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Ex officio were you also a part of the Supreme Command?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What was your main task? Describe briefly your methodology of

19 work or, rather, how your service functioned.

20 A. The security department is in charge of three areas. One: It

21 detects and prevents the operation of foreign intelligence services. It

22 combats enemy activity within the units of army of Yugoslavia against the

23 army of Yugoslavia, and provides counter-intelligence security of military

24 institutions. It is from these tasks that the competencies of the chief

25 follow.

Page 46279

1 Q. Who is your immediate superior?

2 A. My immediate superior is, in wartime, Chief of Staff of National

3 Defence, General Ojdanic.

4 Q. I forgot to ask about your rank.

5 A. I am a retired colonel general.

6 Q. Thank you. Tell me, were you aware of the situation in Kosovo and

7 Metohija even before 1998?

8 A. Yes. As a young officer, I served in Kosovo -- in Pristina,

9 rather, and that is where I had my first unpleasant experiences, because

10 that is when the first destructive demonstrations took place. They were

11 especially impressive because the demonstrators pushed children in front

12 of them. They had stones in their rucksacks which they used to throw at

13 the police. That is the first time in my career that I witnessed abuse of

14 children for the purpose of attaining certain objectives.

15 Q. When was that?

16 A. In 1968.

17 Q. You saw that for yourself?

18 A. Yes. My family was there at the time as well, but I had to remove

19 my family from Kosovo due to that situation.

20 Q. Later on --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, plunge in medias res. Get to the

22 point. The witness has a health problem.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. In view of your experience and the job you performed, what,

25 according to your knowledge, were the objectives of Albanian terrorists in

Page 46280












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13 English transcripts.













Page 46281

1 Kosovo and Metohija?

2 A. They had long-term objectives, and those long-term objectives

3 remained the same to this day.

4 MR. NICE: We may or may not be assisted by answers of this kind,

5 but the general question, "In light of your experience and the job you

6 performed..." don't we need to know a little bit more about the sources

7 he's going to rely on before he gives this kind of expert opinion?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, at this stage in the presentation

9 of your case, do you need to get information from this witness about the

10 objectives of Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija? Haven't you led

11 enough evidence in relation to that already? What more can this witness

12 add?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think this witness is very

14 well placed to tell us about his experience of all of this because he is

15 -- or, rather, has had the highest ranking -- the highest rank in the army

16 of Yugoslavia, and he was in charge of security. It is these facts that

17 add additional weight to his evidence.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Very well. But then you would have

19 to bear in mind what Mr. Nice said.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I am with Mr. Nice on this point, because the

21 witness has told us what areas he was in charge of, which was -- or were

22 protecting -- preventing and protecting the operation of foreign

23 intelligence services, combatting enemy activity within the units of the

24 army of Yugoslavia, against the army of Yugoslavia, and

25 counter-intelligence security of military institutions. Now, these don't,

Page 46282

1 on the face of it, give him competence to express the view he's been asked

2 to express any more than any other officer from whom -- and we've heard

3 from a number about the activities and ambitions of the KLA.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: So, Mr. Milosevic, unless you can provide another

5 foundation for the witness's testimony in this area, ask another question.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, could you please tell us, what were the sources and what

8 are the grounds, the base of your knowledge?

9 A. They follow immediately from the functions I discharged. In the

10 positions I occupied, I gained that knowledge firsthand. Apart from the

11 things I saw with my own eyes in Kosovo, I was later chief of security of

12 the 2nd Army, which had competencies in terms of security over Kosovo and

13 Metohija as well. So in that way I gained knowledge by controlling these

14 services.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I wish to draw your

16 attention to the fact that apart from what Mr. Bonomy just quoted,

17 Mr. Farkas was also chief of security of the 2nd Army for a while, and

18 that 2nd Army covered Kosovo as well. So he's familiar with all the

19 security problems there.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Farkas, when was that?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1968 I was in Kosovo serving a

22 stint as a young officer. And later in 1985 until 1990. That's when I

23 occupied the position of chief of security of the 2nd Army.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, the point's been made repeatedly here that

25 there was an upsurge in activity of the KLA in 1998 and 1999. That's what

Page 46283

1 all the evidence concentrates on, and plainly it's historical knowledge

2 that this witness would be talking of from his direct experience in

3 Kosovo.

4 I urge you, Mr. Milosevic, to get to the point, as Judge Robinson

5 has already invited you to do, and get to the year of 1999 that really

6 concerns us.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. I asked you a question which was as follows: Based on your

10 knowledge and your experience, what were the objectives of Albanian

11 extremists in Kosovo and Metohija?

12 A. Their objectives were to achieve an ethnically pure Kosovo, first

13 and foremost. Kosovo as a republic, and later, reunification of all areas

14 and territories inhabited by Albanians into one great Albanian state.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop for a minute.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the Chamber rules that you must

18 move on to another question. We have had evidence on this issue before.

19 Move on to another area.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will no longer dwell on that

21 topic, Mr. Robinson, but I think it's very important, because this witness

22 could have confirmed to you that an ethnically pure Kosovo was the main

23 objective of Albanian extremists.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... move on. No

25 further comments, just move on.

Page 46284

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, do you know anything about the setting up of illegal

4 terrorist groups within the JNA itself? The creation of illegal terrorist

5 groups within the JNA by Albanian extremists.

6 A. Yes. From the 1980s, the extremists' activities were very

7 intensive, and we had a lot of incidents of creation of illegal terrorist

8 Albanian groups within the very units of the Yugoslav People's Army. From

9 that period, we have over 200 adjudicated cases involving crimes committed

10 by illegal Albanian groups, including the most serious terrorist action

11 from Paracin barracks that took place in 1987 where one member of a

12 terrorist organisation killed four and seriously wounded five --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're wasting time. We don't want to hear about

14 1987. Move on to 1998, 1999.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. General, do you know who General Aleksandar Vasiljevic is?

18 A. Yes, I do know who General Aleksandar Vasiljevic is. I know that

19 he was my deputy during the aggression in 1999, but I've known him from

20 earlier on, from the security services.

21 Q. All right. General Vasiljevic, in his statement here when he

22 testified here on the 17th of February, 2003, said that as far back as in

23 1997 in Kosovo and Metohija, according to intelligence sources, there was

24 a great deal of activity by Albanian paramilitary units. Is that correct?

25 A. Yes. I can confirm that that statement by General Vasiljevic is

Page 46285

1 correct.

2 Q. He said that many former members of the JNA became members of

3 these paramilitary units.

4 A. That's right, yes.

5 Q. All right. What was characteristic, then -- or, rather, just now

6 Mr. Robinson and others said that we should concentrate on 1998 and 1999.

7 What about Albanian extremists? What did they do in 1998 and how did they

8 do it, to the best of your knowledge?

9 A. To the best of my knowledge, that was an escalation of terrorism

10 and violence. Terrorism vis-a-vis the members of the army of Yugoslavia,

11 and violence was displayed against the civilian population. That was a

12 period of very lively activity on the part of the terrorists. In that

13 area there was a blockade of roads. Almost 50 per cent of the territory

14 was blocked by them. So it was very difficult to bring in supplies for

15 the army, especially at the border posts. And it was also difficult to

16 maintain communications among garrisons. So from the middle of that year

17 onwards there was very intensive activity on the part of the terrorists.

18 There were organised attacks. They took certain buildings, certain

19 economic enterprises. So all of life in Kosovo was practically blocked.

20 Q. Can you tell us who you received information about these

21 activities from?

22 A. At that time, I was assistant federal minister for civil defence.

23 I received information from the provincial organ, and I also received

24 information at senior staff meetings of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us take the first break now. We'll break for

Page 46286

1 15 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.06 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 10.26 a.m.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention

7 to the following: It says in the transcript here the assistant federal

8 minister for civilian defence. There is no such thing. General Farkas

9 was assistant federal minister of national defence in charge of civil

10 defence.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have that clarification.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, a few moments ago you explained the security situation in

14 Kosovo and Metohija in 1998, and you said something about the escalation

15 of terrorism. My question is: What was the reaction of the state to the

16 situation there?

17 A. Well, of course the state reacted as any normal state would.

18 There was terrorism and escalation of terrorism in part of the territory.

19 There are legal authorities in that part of the state. In part the

20 federal organs were present there, too, by way of the federal army. And

21 in that area Serbia also had its authority. So the state reacted by

22 delegating its own authorities -- its own organs there into Kosovo and

23 Metohija in order to monitor the situation directly.

24 The situation in the army was such that the level of combat

25 readiness of the units had to be raised and the army in the barracks,

Page 46287

1 especially at the border posts, had to be on the ready.

2 Q. Thank you, General. Now we're going to move on to a subject that

3 is often mentioned here, and that is the problem of volunteers, and in the

4 broader sense of the word, the participation of different civilians in the

5 war.

6 General, from 1995 onwards you were assistant federal minister for

7 national defence in charge of civil defence; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. On the basis of which regulations was the civil defence organised

10 completely?

11 A. Its organisation is based on the law of defence and all other

12 bylaws that stem from that law, all the way up to certain orders,

13 instructions that are adopted by the Federal Minister of Defence in

14 accordance with the powers vested in him.

15 Q. Please look at tab 1 in your exhibits, General.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, there is a translation

17 too.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. What is in tab 1 of your exhibits?

20 A. In tab 1 there is a rule book on the organisation, development,

21 and establishment of Civilian Protection Units of the Federal Ministry of

22 Defence.

23 In -- according to this rule book, there is an organisational

24 structure of the civil defence units that are categorised into 12

25 categories, depending on the territory and the extent to which it is

Page 46288












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13 English transcripts.













Page 46289

1 jeopardised and the population that is in the said territory. So you can

2 see that there is the -- there are categories from 1 through 12, and the

3 size of the units is referred as to well.

4 In addition to the general units, there are the federal civilian

5 defence units for emergencies, in case of natural disasters, accidents, or

6 during a state of war.

7 Q. General, could you please just read the second part of Article 1,

8 which says: "For the purpose of protecting ..." what. So rule book on

9 organisation, development and establishment of civilian protection units

10 of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

11 A. "... for the purpose of protecting the civilian population and

12 material and other resources from the ravages of war, natural and other

13 disasters, and dangers in peace and in war."

14 Q. So is that the essence in the terms of the purpose of their

15 existence and is that why they were established?

16 A. Yes, that is the essence. That is why they were established, and

17 this in accordance with international conventions, the Geneva Conventions

18 that also envisages such an organisation of civil defence.

19 Q. When was this rule book adopted?

20 A. This rule book was adopted -- I can't see now. There is no date

21 here. Oh, here it is. On the 8th of September, 1995.

22 Q. Thank you, General.

23 A. You're welcome.

24 Q. Could you explain and describe the organisation of this total

25 sector for civil defence of the Federal Ministry of National Defence. I

Page 46290

1 would like to draw your attention to tab 5.

2 A. Yes. In tab 5, the Federal Ministry of Defence is described,

3 headed by the federal minister of national defence. He has a secretariat.

4 He also has an office of his own and also his deputy. And directly linked

5 to him are seven links. The first one is the sector for civilian defence,

6 the sector for military economic activity, the sector for urban planning

7 and construction, then the legal administration, the finance and budget

8 administration, the administration for status and service-related matters,

9 and the security department.

10 Q. All right. This sector for civil defence, which is presented here

11 in greater detail, is the one that you headed; right?

12 A. Yes. I headed that sector.

13 Q. Could you now explain the sector for civilian defence, please.

14 A. The sector for civil defence has eight entities. That is, the

15 department for organisational and mobilisation preparation of federal

16 state organs. That's the first one.

17 The second one is the department for the preparation of large

18 economic systems.

19 The third one is the department for civil protection and defence.

20 The fourth one is the department for communications and

21 cryptographic protection.

22 The fifth one is the federal centre for monitoring and reporting.

23 The sixth one is the commission for the exchange of prisoners of

24 war and tracing missing persons.

25 The seventh one is the department for legal affairs and personnel.

Page 46291

1 And the department for information technology support.

2 That's the ministry.

3 As for this sector, there are two regional organs that are related

4 to it as well. That is the regional organ in the Republic of Serbia and

5 the regional organ in the Republic of Montenegro.

6 Q. Thank you, General. Can you tell us what the order on the

7 establishment of civil defence staffs contained, the one dated the 22nd of

8 February, 1999? It is in tab 2.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, there is a translation

10 into English.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Have you found it, General?

13 A. Yes, I've found that tab. This order was adopted on the 22nd of

14 February, 1999, and this order of the federal minister for defence

15 regulates the formation of civilian protection staffs. These staffs are

16 established at different levels, from the municipality through the

17 districts in the province all the way up to federal institutions. What is

18 regulated here in detail is what kind of staffs are established at which

19 level, and in paragraph 4 on page 2, it says what organs establish these

20 staffs.

21 Q. All right. Tell me, in accordance with which laws and regulations

22 was this order written? What does it say in the beginning?

23 A. "The law on defence." First of all, it's the law on defence.

24 It's based on the law on defence of Yugoslavia. And there are also

25 certain decrees of the federal government that make it possible to

Page 46292

1 establish this kind of system of civilian defence staffs. All of that is

2 in accordance with the defence plan.

3 Q. All right. Now, we're going to leave aside all other elements of

4 these staffs that you explained in the territory of the entire Republic of

5 Serbia and Montenegro, that is to say the territory of the FRY. My

6 question will pertain only to the territory of the centre for defence of

7 Pristina. I hope that you can find tab 4, where the organisation of

8 civilian defence in the territory of the Pristina centre for defence is

9 shown.

10 Tell us, please, what is the total number of units that there were

11 at the centre and how many members did these units have? I'm referring to

12 the centre for defence of Pristina.

13 A. The civilian defence units in that area in different versions

14 contained four -- membership of 4.120, and the total number of units was

15 29.

16 Q. Thank you, General. General, we've just seen this diagram and the

17 centre, the number of units, the number of soldiers, and so on and so

18 forth. You as the assistant minister of defence, were you the person who

19 in the municipalities and districts appoints commanders of civil defence

20 staff?

21 A. Yes. Pursuant to authorisation by the federal minister, I was in

22 charge of appointing the commanders of the staffs of civil defence

23 throughout the territory of Yugoslavia.

24 Q. Can we now, in order to save time and having to do with what you

25 said a moment ago, take a look briefly at tabs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

Page 46293

1 Take a look at those tabs now, please. Let's start with tab 6. And all

2 the other tabs are very similar. We see your signature on these

3 documents. The question to you was whether you appointed commanders of

4 the staffs. And this is the first decision, the assistant minister,

5 Lieutenant General Geza Farkas, appoints for the territory, et cetera, et

6 cetera, to the position of, et cetera, et cetera. Is that a good example

7 of this kind of decision made by you?

8 A. Yes. That is an example, and those were the kinds of decisions

9 that were made for the whole of the territory of Yugoslavia.

10 Q. All right. So we have tabs 6 to 11 inclusively, and they are all

11 the same type of decision. They follow the same pattern almost to the

12 letter.

13 A. Yes. These are for districts, decisions for districts. But of

14 course the appointments went from the level of municipal staffs upwards.

15 Q. Yes, I understand, but we've taken these as an example. The

16 district is, of course, a higher level than a municipality, and you

17 appointed these people.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, may I tender these

19 tabs as exhibits? That's one question.

20 And the second question is do I have to go through all these 6, 7,

21 8, 9, 10, 11 numbers, tab numbers, which relate to decisions concerning

22 the appointment of the commanders of the staffs of Territorial Defence --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Civil defence.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, civil defence is what I meant

25 to say. In order for them to be admitted into evidence.

Page 46294

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Give a number for the binder and we'll admit all

3 of them.

4 THE REGISTRAR: The binder number will be D327.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: 1 to 11.

6 JUDGE KWON: Can I ask for a minor clarification. General, could

7 you take at look at tab 5 again. Tab 5, the organisational chart of the

8 Federal Ministry of Defence.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE KWON: You said you would be assistant minister for civil

11 defence sector, but at the outset of your testimony you said that you were

12 also the head of security of army of Yugoslavia. Does it mean that you

13 headed the security department of federal minister of defence, which we

14 can see from this chart?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I was -- well, if I understood

16 your question correctly, what I said was this: From 1985 until 1990, I

17 was the chief of security of the 2nd Army, and as of another date, rather,

18 1985, I became -- I was appointed the assistant federal minister.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, you misspoke, I believe. You said 1985, that you were

21 assistant federal minister. What you meant to say was 1995, wasn't it?

22 A. Yes, 1995.

23 JUDGE KWON: So you had nothing to do with the security from 1995?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. From 1995 to the beginning of

25 the war I did not. At the beginning of the war I was appointed chief of

Page 46295

1 the administration for security of the army of Yugoslavia. On the 24th of

2 March, 1999, in actual fact.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That clarifies everything.

4 Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, may we now move on to the problem of volunteers in the

8 units of the army of Yugoslavia. In tab 12 --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: If you're leaving this subject of the civilian

10 defence, it's not clear to me what these people were doing. We've gone

11 through the rules and the order and the structure, but were these people -

12 I think you numbered them at 4.000 plus in Pristina - were they in

13 uniform, doing a particular job?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right. They did wear

15 uniforms. They had specific assignments pursuant to the provisions of the

16 Geneva Conventions related to civilian defence. Blue uniforms with a

17 triangle on a yellow background. That was the uniform worn by the

18 civilian defence units.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Speaking for myself, I find it pretty useless to be

20 told about the organisational structure and the theory. What I really

21 want to know is what actually happened on the ground and what they did,

22 and I really am none the wiser.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, give us an example of some of their

24 functions.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Their functions were the following:

Page 46296












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 46297

1 The general purpose unit, for example, was there to clear up and deal with

2 the rubble, remains of the rubble in elementary -- elemental disasters, to

3 provide first aid to the population, and then to deal with sanitisation of

4 the terrain, to deal with debris, corpses of animals, and a complete

5 "asanacijacion" or cleaning up of the terrain, of the battlefield during

6 a war.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to draw attention to the

9 following with respect to the question asked by Mr. Bonomy: The centre

10 for the defence of Pristina was used here, that term, but what it was was

11 units which, if you look at the organigramme or, rather, tab 4, this

12 relates to all the municipalities, practically speaking, all the

13 municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija. Each municipality is comprised by

14 this centre in Pristina, security centre in Pristina, and there are 28 of

15 them. You will see the general said 29. That is because, with number 18,

16 in the Gora municipality, you have an extra small unit for rescue work.

17 It is the alpine and speleological rescue team or department, and that's

18 what it says in the Serbian text. All it says in English is "Rescue

19 department" but that's what it was. That's that additional unit. It's a

20 very small unit, alpine and speleological rescue work.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Can I ask you, General, was February

22 1999 the first time such units were actually established?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. These units -- you can see the

24 decision to establish those units, and that was made much earlier. The

25 formation of the units and all the documents related to their

Page 46298

1 establishment are part of the war plans or, rather, defence plans, the

2 defence plan of the Federal Defence Ministry.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, no doubt it's me, but the order, which is tab

4 2, which was made on the 22nd of February, 1999, says: "The following

5 civilian protection staffs shall be formed ..." Now, are you telling me

6 there's an earlier order for the formation of similar staffs?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Firstly, in the previous tab we saw

8 the units of civilian defence, which have their organisational structure

9 and purpose, and these staffs are the staffs that are established in

10 situations of crises. The staffs exist, and they did exist over the whole

11 territory previously. However, because of frequent changes in the

12 structure, the commanders of the staffs of civilian defence, here we have

13 summarised the entire territory. Because if you look pursuant to the

14 decision by the federal minister for the commanders of the staffs of

15 civilian defence, people are appointed from the structures -- or, rather,

16 civilian structures of society, which means the executive organs in the

17 assemblies of the municipalities right up to the president of the

18 Executive Council in the provinces and republics. And that for the

19 following reason: So that those people who hold that post are operative

20 people. They have set competencies and authorisation to use certain

21 resources to be found on the territory, which means civil construction

22 services, communal services, the utilities and so on that are needed to

23 carry out assignments of this kind. Then the commander of the civil

24 defence staff appoints its assistants. They are professionals. If we are

25 dealing with large scale water accumulation systems or a chemical industry

Page 46299

1 close by, then he appoints for his assistance experts from those

2 particular fields.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, again speaking for myself, I'm now in a state

4 of utter confusion. I don't even understand the relevance of this to what

5 we're dealing with. Each one of the orders we were directed to, that's

6 number 6 to 11, are for a period either of the 22nd of February or

7 thereafter, and it's not at all clear to me what change occurred on the

8 22nd of February.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here on the 22nd of February and

10 during that period of time, the defence plan was organised and its

11 documents were put in order, and there was an overall revision of all the

12 organs and the plan was updated, in fact. So this can be considered as

13 updating the plan, because it didn't refer to Kosovo alone, but it applied

14 to the whole of the territory of the FRY.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean, General, that prior to that it was

16 all pretty disorganised?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it doesn't mean that, but it

18 hadn't been updated because of the changes that took place constantly on

19 the territory; frequent elections, changes in the manpower structure,

20 changes in the power and authorities that be. It needed updating. It was

21 out-of-date. And so then when it was updated, a cross-section was looked

22 at and introduced into the defence plan.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, just briefly let's go back to tab 2 for a moment, please,

Page 46300

1 because that is the decision dated the 22nd of February, 1999.

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. What does it say in the preamble?

4 A. "Pursuant to Article 43, item 1, and Article 59 of the Law on

5 Defence --" and then it says Official Gazette -- "and Article 9 of the

6 Decree on the Organising and Training of Civilian Protection Units and

7 Measures for the Protection and Rescue of the Civilian Population and

8 Property (Official Gazette dating back to 1994), and in keeping with the

9 Plan for organising preparations for the defence of the country, the

10 Federal Defence Minister has issued the following order."

11 Q. All right. So that says that it is pursuant to a plan for

12 organising preparations for the country's defence, and on the basis of

13 rules and regulations stipulated by law.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And then we're updating it; right? Very well, General.

16 Now, we have looked at the various examples of your decision to

17 appoint certain individuals, that is to say commanders to the staffs or of

18 the staffs. Explain, please, how this functioned. For example, did I in

19 any way, or anybody in my name, influence you when you made your decisions

20 to appoint people to the different staffs?

21 A. No. There was no influence of that kind because in fact this

22 followed a certain automatic rota in updating the plans for the executive

23 organs in the municipalities, and in the republic as well, or the

24 provinces, for that matter. So they were laid down in the law and made

25 legal pursuant to those decisions.

Page 46301

1 So the person who was occupying that post, he was appointed in

2 post, he was appointed in order to update the defence plan.

3 Q. Yes. You've already explained that to us. We needn't dwell on

4 that. Let's now move on to the problem of volunteers in the units of the

5 army of Yugoslavia. And take a look at tab 12 for that purpose now,

6 please. We're going to stay with tab 12 for a while. I think that we're

7 making good time, so we can spend a little more time on tab 12.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it has been translated

9 into English. You have it before you.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Have you found it, General?

12 A. Yes, I have.

13 Q. Here it says that this is an order by the Supreme Command Staff

14 arranging the induction, accommodation, and distribution of volunteers in

15 an organised manner at the following reception centres of the 1st, 2nd,

16 and 3rd Army commands. Does that relate to the whole territory of the

17 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

18 A. Yes, it does. This is a document of the Supreme Command Staff and

19 it issues instructions and in fact is an order for the procedure and

20 manner in which the volunteers are to be incorporated into the Yugoslav

21 army structure. And this is a document which on the whole solves this

22 problem.

23 Q. Does this relate to the entire territory?

24 A. Yes. It relates to the whole territory of Yugoslavia.

25 Q. All right. Fine. Pursuant to this order, can you help us out?

Page 46302

1 Can we see which individuals were not -- were prohibited from entering the

2 army?

3 A. Well, the problem of volunteers is a complex one, because various

4 people applied as patriots mostly, although there were certain sick people

5 who also applied, adventurers. So we did have problems, and also the

6 infiltration of people belonging to foreign intelligence services who

7 would try to have their members become army members in order to achieve

8 their own goals.

9 Q. Let's limit ourselves to what it says here. Point 2.1, the second

10 half. I asked you which persons were prohibited from joining. So at the

11 beginning of page 2 of the Serbian text, what does it say there exactly?

12 A. "I prohibit admission of members of paramilitary units, groups and

13 individuals already present in the zones of responsibility to VJ

14 commands ..." et cetera "... without prior completion of procedures

15 regulated by this order."

16 Q. From this order can we see that the volunteers, when they were

17 admitted and registered and recorded with the army of Yugoslavia were

18 duty-bound to sign a statement of any kind; and, if so, what was the

19 contents of that statement?

20 A. Yes. This order deals with that.

21 Q. Is that in point 2.2, the last line? Would you read that, please.

22 A. Yes. Point 2, last line states as follow: "In following

23 admission and registration, the volunteers shall sign a declaration

24 pledging that, having been admitted and while wearing the uniform, he, as

25 a member of the VJ with an assigned VES -" which is the military

Page 46303

1 speciality register - "shall be subject --" or, rather, "... private,

2 non-commissioned officer or officer shall be subject to the provisions of

3 the law on the Yugoslav army, VJ service regulations, and other

4 regulations governing conduct and work in the VJ."

5 Q. Can you tell us, what were those rules that volunteers had to

6 accept when joining the army?

7 A. The totality of rules that apply to the entire military personnel;

8 all the rules of the army of Yugoslavia. It means they could not leave

9 whenever they wished, and they were under military command. Any AWOL was

10 considered as desertion, which is what the rule says. There would be a

11 file for every person, but in the case of volunteers, this file would also

12 indicate, among other things, that he had volunteered.

13 Q. I understand that. Since a person volunteered and signed this

14 declaration, such a soldier who had come as a volunteer, was he any

15 different in terms of his duties and obligations from any other soldier?

16 A. Absolutely not. He joined the ranks, and he would execute orders

17 and assignments just as all the other soldiers.

18 I have to emphasise that special attention was paid to avoid any

19 grouping of such volunteers. Depending on what these volunteers used to

20 do before, they would be assigned to the signals corps, to various other

21 units, avoiding any grouping of them in one single unit.

22 Q. Is anything said about their training and the application of rules

23 in general? In the beginning of page 3 in the Serbian version, which is

24 paragraph 3 towards the end --

25 A. Yes. Paragraph 3 says that they have to go through a certain

Page 46304












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13 English transcripts.













Page 46305

1 training, and it especially emphasised that --

2 Q. Could you read exactly what it says in this sentence that begins

3 "During ..." That's on page 3, fourth line from the top.

4 A. I found it. "During the training of volunteers, specifically warn

5 them that unlawful and other negative behaviour shall not be tolerated

6 (theft, looting, torching, rape, smuggling, etc.) and that legal measures

7 applicable in wartime shall be taken against perpetrators of such acts."

8 Q. Thank you, General. So we have an exact order defining the

9 treatment of volunteers, what happens with them upon induction, and it

10 looks perfectly in order on paper. But I'm asking you now about real

11 life. Were there any problems?

12 A. Of course there were problems and deviations because it was a time

13 of combat activities and aggression that affected the entire country, the

14 entire territory. So that in all units, especially in such a large

15 organisation that was based on mobilisation, there were excesses and

16 violations of rules and orders.

17 Q. Does the document in tab 13 deal with that? Let us see first who

18 wrote this document and what its contents are.

19 A. This is another document of the Supreme Command Staff, signed --

20 the document originates from the Supreme Command Staff. Since information

21 was received from the territory of the 3rd Army that certain problems had

22 been experienced with volunteers, this document gives an example of what

23 happened.

24 From a training centre in Grodska -- from a centre in Grodska some

25 people were inducted without proper procedure, and this resulted in

Page 46306

1 incidents upon which 75 members were later arrested. Attention is drawn

2 to the work, the operation of those centres that prepare volunteers.

3 Q. When we see that 25 volunteers were turned back and seven

4 arrested, several crimes are mentioned, there are even some killings - one

5 female volunteer was killed and another volunteer as well - do we see the

6 proportions of what is happening as indicated by the Supreme Command? Is

7 it a widespread phenomenon which is brought to the attention of the entire

8 personnel as an example, or was it brought to their attention even if it

9 was not wide scale?

10 A. Well, relative to the total number of volunteers, the number

11 involved in these incidents was minimal, but in response to these

12 violations of orders, the Supreme Command Staff reacted energetically.

13 They point out what can happen when proper procedures are not followed.

14 Q. Very well. Do you know the reasons behind such incidents? Can

15 you explain them?

16 A. Well, they have been explained. Volunteers come from various

17 layers of society. Most of them volunteer for patriotic reasons, but

18 there are also criminals and adventurers who apply, and they try to pursue

19 their own interests during their stay in a unit. There were also foreign

20 intelligence services anxious to infiltrate their people in the form of

21 volunteers. So it is very important to have proper psychological

22 assessment and vetting of all volunteers.

23 Q. We have one document that speaks about the sending of volunteers

24 to the 3rd Army.

25 A. Yes.

Page 46307

1 Q. Twenty-five were turned back, several were arrested. And this

2 incident inspired a reaction from the Supreme Command Staff.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Let us now look at tab 14, General. What kind of document is

5 this? Is it also a document of the Supreme Command Staff?

6 A. Yes. It is a document of the Supreme Command Staff, but it was

7 the sector for logistics. The following problems are involved: The March

8 and September classes of regular recruits whose military service expired

9 at the time of the aggression had their military service duration extended

10 by a decision of the federal government, and certain problems occurred as

11 a result of that. This document is a response, suggesting various

12 measures to deal with those problems.

13 This also explains that when men are demobed from the army of

14 Yugoslavia, the relevant districts are provided with information about the

15 physical and mental condition of these people that are to be forwarded to

16 the MUP, that is the Ministry of the Interior on the ground, so that they

17 should not issue weapons to such persons.

18 Q. This telegram was signed by the chief of the Supreme Command

19 Staff, Colonel General Dragoljub Ojdanic.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Could you read part of the second sentence. It says: "There have

22 been cases of conscripts in the reserves ..."

23 A. "There have been cases of conscripts in the reserves who are unfit

24 for military service because of mental illness but who have reported as

25 volunteers, concealing their state of health."

Page 46308

1 Q. So they were trying to hide their state of health, and you

2 couldn't tell anything by their physical appearance.

3 A. We see that the Supreme Command Staff was taking these things very

4 seriously.

5 Q. Item 3 says: "Immediately after recommendations from the relevant

6 medical boards, unit commanders shall adopt appropriate decisions on the

7 cessation of military service ..."

8 A. This is the field of competence of the sector for logistics, and

9 this is the proper channel for dealing with this.

10 Q. Could you explain in detail this item 1: "Military districts and

11 departments must excuse all conscripts ..." et cetera.

12 A. "Military districts and departments must report to the MUP all

13 conscripts who have been excused from military service on the grounds of

14 mental disorders and behavioural problems in order to avoid abuses in

15 issuing permits to carry and possess weapons."

16 So after each soldier leaves the army of Yugoslavia, his file is

17 forwarded to the relevant competent military department in his locality.

18 So this is an instruction to help avoid similar incidents from happening

19 after somebody's military service has been terminated.

20 Q. So if somebody was suffering from a mental disorder or a

21 behavioural problem, the army is required to inform the civilian

22 authorities to avoid any accidents.

23 The next tab is 15. Whose document is this?

24 A. That's a document by the Supreme Command Staff, signed by the

25 Chief of Staff, General Ojdanic. This order applies or, rather, relates

Page 46309

1 to the existence of paramilitary formations. This order provides

2 instruction as to what needs to be done so that paramilitary units could

3 not be established in various areas of command. Commanders are made

4 responsible for conducting a complete search and inspection of the terrain

5 lest a paramilitary unit find its way there.

6 Q. What does it say in the beginning?

7 A. "Verify the existence, presence --"

8 Q. No. No, I mean before that. Before the words, "I hereby

9 order ..."

10 A. "With the start of the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija caused by the

11 actions of sabotage and terrorist forces, and later following the

12 declaration of the state of war, the Supreme Command Staff dispatched many

13 orders and warnings on the ban of and activities of any paramilitary

14 organisations in your zones of responsibility ..."

15 Q. Excuse me, General. You just skipped one "and." He sent -- that

16 is, "The command staff dispatched many orders and warnings on the ban of

17 and activities of any paramilitary organisations ..." And then it goes on

18 to say "treatment of volunteers." What does it say after that?

19 A. Let me just find this passage. "... treatment of volunteers, the

20 application of the Laws of War and the Rules of Conduct and observation of

21 the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Bearing in mind the importance

22 of all these issues, in the aim of consistency in observing the above, I

23 hereby order ..."

24 And then it goes on to say: "1. Verify the existence, presence

25 and operations of paramilitary formations in your zones of responsibility.

Page 46310

1 If there are any paramilitary formations, disarm them immediately and take

2 legal steps."

3 Item 2 says: "Command and security organs shall take operative

4 measures to gather information of any violation of orders of the Supreme

5 Command Staff in the conduct of the members of the army and MUP in combat.

6 "Should violation be determined of the Laws of War and the

7 provisions of the Geneva Conventions be established and proven, detect the

8 perpetrators, apprehend them, initiate criminal procedure, and report it

9 to superior levels of command."

10 "3. Implement and observe the provisions of the Geneva

11 Conventions, the Basis of the Laws of War -- or the fundamental laws of

12 war, officer's handbook, and the Rules of Conduct for combatants and other

13 documents consistently and strictly. I hereby make the immediate

14 resubordinated commanders responsible for this."

15 Q. Just briefly, General, what is this summary for commanding

16 officers that the Supreme Command Staff refers to in this document in tab

17 15?

18 A. Just before the aggression against Yugoslavia, the General Staff,

19 and later the Supreme Command Staff through its own documents, regulated

20 the training and familiarisation of the entire commanding personnel with

21 the provisions of the international laws of war and international

22 humanitarian law. Every level of command received relevant documents

23 accompanied by the order that these should be observed.

24 Every soldier, however, received an excerpt from these documents

25 in a laminated pocket version so that everyone from the top, from the

Page 46311

1 Supreme Command down to the last soldier, was familiar with this.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: 4, is that "the report on any presence ..." or

3 "to report on any presence and measures taken against paramilitary

4 formations"?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In paragraph 1 it says that this

6 should be checked, that the entire territory should be looked at, and so

7 on and so forth. So when the first paragraph is carried through, then a

8 report should be submitted as to the existence or non-existence of these

9 units.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were any such reports submitted?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the next break for

13 15 minutes. We will adjourn for 15 minutes.

14 --- Recess taken at 11.22 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 11.39 a.m.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, in this document of the Supreme Command Staff that is

19 contained in tab 15, the one that you quoted a few moments ago, where it

20 is indicated that several warnings were sent in relation with the activity

21 of some paramilitary formations that should have been banned, what do you

22 know about the existence of paramilitary units in the territory of Kosovo

23 and Metohija?

24 A. Well, the first and strongest paramilitary formation in the

25 territory of Kosovo and Metohija is the KLA. According to all theories,

Page 46312












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13 English transcripts.













Page 46313

1 in a legal state they established these paramilitary units that they

2 armed, and they were carrying out different actions, and there was a reign

3 of terror in the territory. These, I believe, are paramilitary units

4 according to international law as well.

5 Secondly, it is possible that the Supreme Command Staff gave these

6 warnings so that a group of criminals, group of citizens, obtained

7 uniforms and established units that committed crimes in a particular

8 territory.

9 And secondly -- or, rather, thirdly, we had information that

10 people were coming in from the territory of Albania, people who knew the

11 Serbian language, that they came dressed in uniforms of the army of

12 Yugoslavia and committed various crimes and misdeeds in that territory.

13 Q. These are various possibilities, various assumptions, what you

14 referred to. Do you know about the existence of any paramilitary

15 formation?

16 A. The existence of the KLA is not an assumption. That is an actual

17 state of affairs. So we received reports that in areas of responsibility

18 of brigades and other units there were not any paramilitary groups of this

19 nature except for these that were brought into the country, and special

20 forces had to deal with them. There was information that such groups were

21 being brought in from Albania.

22 Q. While commenting this order, especially paragraph 3 where you

23 explained what all officers had and what every soldier had in terms of the

24 rules of conduct for soldiers and other documents pertaining to the law of

25 war, the Geneva Conventions, et cetera, do you have any information, in

Page 46314

1 view of your position at the time at the very top of military security, do

2 you have any information as to whether members of the army of Yugoslavia

3 observed these rules of conduct in war?

4 A. For the most part. However, there were individual cases of abuse

5 and a lack of respect for these orders and provisions in spite of all the

6 measures that had been taken, the ones I explained a few moments ago.

7 There were individual killings, rapes, lootings, yes.

8 Q. All right. Let us be quite precise. The smallest tactical unit

9 is a platoon, if I'm not mistaken.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Do you have any information about any unit, even the smallest

12 tactical unit - so a platoon - carried out a crime as a unit?

13 A. There is no such information. The Supreme Command Staff or the

14 security service had no such information that even from the lowest level

15 of command there was not a single unit that committed a crime. It was all

16 individuals who committed such crimes or groups of two or three soldiers

17 who committed crimes.

18 Q. When you say "groups," how big was the largest such group that you

19 knew of?

20 A. I think it was three or four persons in a group that committed a

21 crime. They committed several crimes, rather, but three was the largest

22 group that had committed a crime or crimes.

23 Q. And what kind of reports came in to you from the military and the

24 MUP?

25 A. They went along the chain of command. The Supreme Defence Staff

Page 46315

1 received those reports, and when such things happened they were part of

2 these reports, crimes and measures taken against the perpetrators. So

3 these reports came through the chain of command and through the security

4 channels. So as soon as we heard of such things, measures were taken in

5 order to punish the perpetrators.

6 Q. Were there any situations when crimes were learned of and measures

7 were not taken against the perpetrators?

8 A. There were no such cases. There were cases when the investigation

9 could not have been completed fully because of combat actions and KLA

10 attacks on military forces that were trying to conduct a full

11 investigation, but commands at all levels would invariably take measures

12 against the perpetrators of any crimes they had heard of.

13 Q. Thank you, General. Now, let us look at this document that is in

14 tab 16. This is the Supreme Command Staff. Who signed this document?

15 A. General Ojdanic.

16 Q. Chief of the Supreme Command Staff.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. All right. When was this order sent out?

19 A. It was sent out on the 3rd of April, 1999, and it was sent to all

20 commands and strategic groups in the territory of Yugoslavia.

21 Q. Was does it say in paragraph 1? It says, "I hereby order ..." and

22 then?

23 A. "I hereby order: 1. All perpetrators of crimes shall be brought

24 before a competent investigating judge of a military court immediately

25 upon the submission of a criminal report."

Page 46316

1 Q. In this order is there any mention of volunteers? Please look at

2 paragraph 2.

3 A. "The measures from item 1 of this order shall also be taken

4 against conscripts and volunteers, because by joining wartime units of the

5 Yugoslav army, they acquire the status of a serviceman, to whom all the

6 regulations governing life and work in the VJ apply, as well as the

7 regulations on criminal responsibility."

8 So, again, volunteers are referred to.

9 Q. All right. And what does paragraph 3 say, then, because here it

10 says that: "Perpetrators of all crimes shall be brought before a

11 competent investigating judge of a military court immediately on the

12 submission of a criminal report," and then there's item 2, and what does 3

13 say?

14 A. "Promptly inform the entire membership of the wartime unit of

15 which the perpetrator of crimes is a member of all the measures taken

16 against the perpetrator, as well as the execution of criminal sanctions."

17 Q. Who is responsible for carrying out this order?

18 A. Commanders of strategic groupings are responsible to me for the

19 execution of this order. So these are the commanders of armies.

20 Q. What does item 5 say?

21 A. "Inform all members of the army of Yugoslavia of this order."

22 Q. "Inform all VJ members of this order."

23 A. Yes. That is from the first to the last soldier.

24 Q. Please let us now move on to the document that is contained in tab

25 17. Let us see what it pertains to. First, let's see what the date is.

Page 46317

1 A. The 16th of April, 1999, the Supreme Command Staff, signed by

2 Dragoljub Ojdanic.

3 Q. All right. What does paragraph 1 say?

4 A. It says: "According to some information, there have been certain

5 cases of conduct in combat operations to date where the provisions of the

6 instructions on conduct in combat and provisions of the international Laws

7 of War have not been applied as a whole -- in whole."

8 Q. What does it say further on?

9 A. "A certain number of Siptar terrorist groups continue to operate

10 in Kosovo and Metohija, infiltrating from the territory of the Republic of

11 Albania, which may endanger the security of certain commands, units,

12 smaller and combined forces, in position and moving.

13 "Certain commands --" oh, all right. Well, that's it.

14 Q. So what is emphasised here? Certain commands what?

15 A. "Certain commands and units are not devoting the necessary

16 attention to the fight against individual cases of looting and crime."

17 Q. And finally: "In order to adhere completely to the provisions of

18 the international Laws of War ..."

19 A. "... increase security of VJ commands and units, prevent Siptar

20 terrorist group sabotage operations, and eradicate looting and crime in

21 the unit zones of responsibility and the complete displacement of RMR."

22 Q. And then: "I hereby issue the following reminder ..."

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What does paragraph 3 say in terms of these warnings?

25 A. "Commands and specialist organs shall undertake effective measures

Page 46318

1 to prevent all forms of crime (looting, theft of private property and

2 others) ..." And then they refer to a document that was written earlier

3 on.

4 Q. Of the Supreme Command Staff.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then it says: "Inform all VJ members ..."

7 A. "... of the detriment and consequences caused by all forms of

8 criminal activity to the reputation and morale of the army."

9 So the detrimental effect this has on the morale of the army.

10 Q. Thank you, General. Let us now look at tab 18 or, rather, the

11 document contained in tab 18. Is this also a document of the Supreme

12 Command Staff?

13 A. Yes, of the 10th of May, signed by Dragoljub Ojdanic.

14 Q. We're not going to spend much time on this. It also pertains to

15 full observance of international law and the laws of war, the preamble

16 says. And what does paragraph 1 say?

17 A. "All commanders, unit commanders and other superior officers must

18 undertake all (necessary) measures in their units to ensure that every

19 individual unit member adheres to the principles, rules and regulations of

20 the international Laws of War when conducting combat operations and

21 beyond ..."

22 Q. Thank you, General. We're not going to dwell on this any longer.

23 And then there was in attachment accompanying this document, an annex?

24 A. Yes, this annex had been sent earlier on, and it also says that

25 those who violate these rules and regulations will be held accountable.

Page 46319

1 Q. Since every soldier had these rules and everything else that you

2 referred to a few moments ago, was there any member of the armed forces

3 that had not been familiarised with this?

4 A. There were practically none. Even those who were subsequently

5 mobilised had their attention drawn to this. The commands were supposed

6 to pay particular attention to them and give them these documents. That

7 is to say that every soldier received these documents. These crimes could

8 only be committed by criminals and those who were meant to do so.

9 Q. And if an officer knew that a crime had been committed and did not

10 take measures against the perpetrators, would that have been punishable?

11 A. Yes, that's what's written here.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you admitted the

13 exhibits up to tab 11. What I ask for now is to admit the rest, from tab

14 11 to tab 18, the documents we've been through just now.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit them.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. General, now we're going to move on to another subject. Let us

18 briefly deal with our meetings during the course of the war. Can you

19 recall how many times you and I met during the course of the war, and

20 where?

21 A. I cannot recall the exact number of meetings we had, but on

22 several occasions we did meet, at the command post at that, because when I

23 was in Belgrade, in that territory, then practically every night I came to

24 the Supreme Command Staff, and that is where we met a great many times

25 when various reports were being made, analyses, and orders issued.

Page 46320












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 46321

1 Q. What were the subjects that you and I discussed?

2 A. Well, the subjects were always related to security, but you always

3 emphasised and you invariably asked me to report about possible misdeeds

4 that were committed in the units. You always sought information about

5 that, and you emphasised that. Not only when we were one-on-one but also

6 at meetings of the Supreme Command Staff. This was an item that was

7 invariably dealt with.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, tab 18, Judge Kwon, who is on top

9 of these matters, informs me is already Prosecution Exhibit 323.5. So

10 there is no need for the admission of that one. Please proceed.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. On all these occasions, what did you inform me about in relation

13 to your own work?

14 A. On these occasions I always exhaustively informed you about all

15 the information that the service had acquired, and that included

16 information about crimes and these crimes that happened in units. I

17 informed you about all of that.

18 Q. All right. What were my positions, my reactions, and what were my

19 instructions to you?

20 A. Your instructions and orders were explicit, and in many cases you

21 criticised the fact that this kind of thing happened in the units of the

22 army of Yugoslavia in the first place. You asked that this be prevented

23 first and foremost, and that if such things did happen, that they be

24 punished immediately and as soon as possible.

25 Q. General, in point 16 of the indictment related to Kosovo, it says

Page 46322

1 that I, in concert with, and then it mentions the other people, planned,

2 incited, ordered, aided -- or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,

3 preparation or execution of these crimes, taking part in a joint criminal

4 enterprise, the aim of which was to expel -- the expulsion of a

5 substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory

6 of the province of Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control

7 over the province.

8 Therefore, as the top military official in charge of military

9 security, do you have any knowledge of this and may we have your comments

10 on this?

11 A. I have no knowledge of this, no awareness of this, no plans, as

12 stipulated in this point of the indictment, that it was organised, that

13 any plan existed for the expulsion of the Albanian population from the

14 territory of Kosovo and Metohija. I am not aware of any kind of plan.

15 And it was under my competency, the counter-intelligence protection of all

16 plans and documents, and I would have had to have known about that had it

17 existed, or some of my subordinates would have known. So there was no

18 plan, no documents relating to a plan, nor was anything like that ever

19 mentioned in our communications.

20 Q. All right. If there was no plan or documents about a plan, in our

21 conversations or discussions or your conversations and discussions with

22 anyone did the idea ever crop up like that, that somebody was supposed to

23 expulse the Albanians from Kosovo?

24 A. I don't know about anything like that. Quite simply, in my

25 communications there was never anything like that nor was anything like

Page 46323

1 that ever mentioned in the course of my work and in solving many other

2 problems. Quite the contrary. There were situations where the Albanian

3 terrorists were exerting pressure on the population, for instance.

4 Q. Now, would it be at all possible -- let's allow for us to look

5 into a theoretical possibility that there was any kind of similar idea at

6 any level. If something like that had existed would that have been

7 possible, since you were at the head of the military security, for you not

8 to know anything about it?

9 A. That would be absolutely impossible. If there was a plan, there

10 would have to be documents, there would have to be people to carry the

11 plan out. You would have to have the chain of command. You would have to

12 organise it all down the chain of command down to the execution level.

13 And in that chain of command you would have to have included a large

14 number of people who would have known that something like that was being

15 ordered and executed, et cetera.

16 Q. Thank you, General. Now, in paragraph 17 of the indictment it is

17 stated that this joint criminal enterprise came into existence no later

18 than October 1998 and continued throughout the time period when the crimes

19 alleged took place, that is to say until June -- the 20th of June, 1999.

20 Can you comment on what is being claimed here?

21 A. I didn't hear the period that you mentioned.

22 Q. From October 1998 to the 20th of June, 1999, is the material

23 period.

24 A. I don't know. I have no comment to make, no comment. Quite

25 simply, that is impossible. I never knew of anything like that.

Page 46324

1 Q. And did you ever, during your term in office as head of the

2 security service and as a member of the Supreme Command, did you ever hear

3 of a term such as deportation, expulsion, or some similar word which would

4 relate to any portion of the population?

5 A. No, not at any meeting, either the staffs of the Supreme Command,

6 that word was never used and that concept was never used. Quite simply,

7 nothing that could be linked to anything like that was mentioned at those

8 meetings of ours, nor was it discussed, nor was anything linked to

9 anything like that ever ordered.

10 Q. All right. Fine. Now, at some level lower down were there any

11 pressures, for example, or something that could be called a campaign by

12 the forces of the FRY and Serbia against the inhabitants, the Albanian

13 inhabitants?

14 A. As far as the army is concerned, I know -- don't know of anything

15 like that organised as a campaign. No, it wasn't. I told you about

16 individual cases which are minor if you compare them to a plan of this

17 kind that is alleged and that requires a massive organisation and massive

18 pressure to be exerted. So that kind of thing just doesn't hold water.

19 And it wasn't implemented either at lower levels, to the best of my

20 knowledge.

21 Q. In view of what you've just said, to the best your knowledge and

22 according to your information, the security organs that report to you up

23 and down the chain of command, do they exist at every level?

24 A. Yes, from independent battalions right up to the General Staff and

25 the security administration department. They are included in the work of

Page 46325

1 the command and are subordinate to the commanders, and during that --

2 wartime, that line of reporting went through the command chain, that is to

3 say from the operative centre of the Supreme Command downwards, but there

4 were other lines like -- lines of communication like personal contacts for

5 security and so on. We had this kind of chain and we received proper

6 realistic information from the terrain.

7 Q. So up to the level of battalion, did you have security organs

8 which communicated down the vertical chain of command?

9 A. Yes, we did. In all individual battalions, brigades, corps, and

10 so on and so forth.

11 Q. Did any information appear at that kind of level about any

12 possible pressure exerted on the Albanian population to have them leave

13 Kosovo and Metohija?

14 A. Information appeared at the times of the fiercest bombing, that

15 there was population movement. We received information about population

16 movement, about mass population movements from the areas that were bombed

17 heavily on a daily basis, several times.

18 Q. All right. Now, to the best of your knowledge and as far as you

19 know, what was the cause of this mass exodus from Kosovo and Metohija?

20 A. The cause of the mass moving out of the population is very clear.

21 First of all, the ceaseless bombing of civilian targets and whole

22 territories along the axes of possible movement by ground forces that were

23 envisaged and grouped along our strategic points which were to -- supposed

24 to come from Albania and Macedonia. And it was the bombing that was the

25 priority reason, the number one reason that the population fled, and that

Page 46326

1 was combined with strong propaganda on the part of the Siptar terrorists

2 whose goal it was and in whose interests it was to have that space and

3 territory vacated.

4 Q. Do you know anything about that propaganda?

5 A. Yes, I do. The propaganda was launched -- you have to know the

6 mentality of those people, what -- they were intimidated. Fear was

7 instilled to them during previous events and actions in Kosovo. And even

8 those who could have been loyal towards the legal authorities, out of

9 fear, through propaganda and violence through propaganda, coercion,

10 anybody who did not adhere to their instructions were mistreated, and

11 there were even many killings. And during the NATO strikes, the NATO

12 bombing, we had widespread action on the part of the KLA who destroyed

13 their own people and exerted terror over them. There were 300 people

14 killed as a result of actions of that kind.

15 Q. All right. Was it only the Albanians who fled Kosovo and

16 Metohija, according to your data and information, or did members of other

17 ethnic groups flee as well, such as Serbs, Montenegrins and the other

18 ethnic groups that lived in Kosovo and Metohija?

19 A. Yes, that is absolutely true, they did flee, but the most massive

20 exodus was on the part of the Albanian population, and the Albanians fled

21 towards Albania whereas the other ethnic groups, Serbs, Montenegrins, and

22 Roma, they fled towards the central part of Serbia. And throughout

23 Yugoslavia there was a lot of population movement and displacement. I

24 myself am from Vojvodina. The Hungarians and everybody else there, women,

25 children, pregnant women, they would be displaced, too, because there was

Page 46327

1 merciless bombing of Novi Sad and a series of towns for no reason at all.

2 So people fled from there too.

3 Q. Aleksandar Vasiljevic, who was your deputy at that critical time,

4 confirmed that he had never heard at any level anything about any acts

5 linked to any kind of deportation. Now, since you were at a higher level,

6 up above him, he was your subordinate, were you in a position or situation

7 to hear about anything like that yourself?

8 A. I've already said I've never heard of any act, document, oral or

9 otherwise, declaration or order or anything else about any pressure for

10 that kind of thing to be done. Aco Vasiljevic could not have heard

11 anything like that because there were no such documents or nothing like

12 that was said. And if somebody would be well placed to know about that,

13 then I would be and he would be because he was my deputy.

14 Q. Do you have any knowledge or awareness about whether the members

15 of the MUP and army endeavoured to see that the people who left Kosovo for

16 the reasons you have mentioned have to turn them back from the border

17 crossings and to prevail upon them not to flee Kosovo and Metohija? Did

18 you have any information about that?

19 A. Yes, there was information of that kind, that some units of the

20 army and those unfortunate people who passed by the deployment of these

21 units, they tried to persuade them not to leave the territory. However,

22 there were bombs falling behind these people's backs. So to prevail upon

23 them in that way did not meet with success.

24 Q. Now, in the groups of civilians leaving Kosovo, to the best of

25 your knowledge were there any KLA members amongst them?

Page 46328












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Page 46329

1 A. One of the goals or, rather, the reasons for which the population

2 fled were made use of because a large number of military-able Albanians

3 would join those columns and cross into the territory of Albania. The

4 others stayed on the ground to await for a land aggression and provide

5 support and reinforcement from the rear to the toughest of these. And,

6 yes, these people did join up the centres preparing to attack Yugoslavia.

7 Q. Thank you, General. Now, in paragraph 53, it says that I and the

8 others mentioned here, on or about the 1st of January, 1999, and

9 continuing until the 20th of June, 1999, planned, instigated, ordered,

10 committed or otherwise aided and abetted in a deliberate and widespread or

11 systematic campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian

12 civilians living in Kosovo, and this campaign was launched with the help

13 of the forces from the FRY and Serbia who undertook action against the

14 Kosovo Albanians with the aim of expulsing most of the Albanian population

15 from the territory and establish Serb control.

16 Now, do you have anything that would confirm or deny any

17 operations against Kosovo Albanians implementing any operation against the

18 Kosovo Albanian population of this kind?

19 A. Well, I don't know who you could order this -- issue this order to

20 in the army. Perhaps the Chief of the General Staff or some military

21 senior officers, that something like that be done, but I explained a

22 moment ago that in the army that's not how it works. You can't just order

23 something, you yourself, and then it be executed. An order can be oral or

24 written, but it has to pass set procedure. From an order issued by you or

25 the chief of the general command there are a series of institutions and

Page 46330

1 levels in the army that would have to know this until you reach the final

2 level of implementation when something is done.

3 So that each soldier carries in his pocket his instructions, what

4 he was not allowed to do, not permitted to do. So if anyone were to order

5 anything like that, this would be sanctioned. So the existence of a plan

6 of that kind and orders issued that a plan like that be implemented, no, I

7 really don't know that that could have happened at all.

8 Q. Very well. Now, General, you spoke about our meetings during the

9 war. Do you happen to remember a meeting you had with me before your

10 appointment to the post of head of the security administration of the

11 General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia?

12 A. Yes. That was barely a month before the aggression started. You

13 called me and told me of your intention to appoint me as head of the

14 security administration.

15 Q. Can you remember what I told you on that occasion? Which main

16 tasks did I pinpoint?

17 A. Well, you spoke about the security situation, the comprehensive

18 security situation for the whole of the territory of Yugoslavia, and you

19 said that we were entering a serious stage where the army would have a

20 very difficult task, a responsible task to perform, and within the army

21 the security service was to do its utmost, to use its competence and

22 authority not to deface the army and soldiers, not -- and you said that

23 the army must use its line of command and its presence in all those units

24 to prevent any possible crimes from being committed, and that a soldier's

25 face must be saved. And you said that the part of the army that had not

Page 46331

1 been mobilised yet should be mobilised properly and that mobilisation

2 should be protected from any infiltration of undesirables and not create

3 an increased security problem within the units themselves.

4 Q. Now, the Chief of Staff or chief of the General Staff and

5 afterwards Chief of Staff General Ojdanic, did he also speak about this to

6 you when you were about to take up your appointment? Tell us what he told

7 you.

8 A. Well, I reported to the Chief of the General Staff straight away.

9 He was later the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. I told him of our

10 meeting, and I gained the impression that he had already been informed

11 about it. And we sat down and had a detailed discussion about what the

12 service entailed and possible actions on the part of the service and the

13 documents required to regulate the functioning of the service and of the

14 army itself to prevent anything untoward from happening, to prevent any

15 deviations from the rules and codes of conduct. And he particularly

16 insisted upon the fact that that was something that you had emphasised

17 when you spoke to him. So at these meetings until I was appointed this

18 was a very topical subject.

19 Q. Thank you, General. Now, tell me, please, can you remember -- can

20 you remember when the first signals reached you about possible abuses and

21 criminal acts on the part of individual members of the army of Yugoslavia?

22 A. They would reach me sporadically at the beginning of the combat

23 operations. However, they came in more intensively, these signals were

24 more intensive towards the end of April 1999.

25 Q. How did you react to that, to those first indications you

Page 46332

1 received?

2 A. Naturally, I reported these problems to General Ojdanic

3 immediately.

4 Q. And how did he react?

5 A. He ordered me to go to Kosovo myself and to investigate all

6 possibilities, to see if there are any such possibilities down there, and

7 to propose specific measures.

8 Q. So did you go?

9 A. Yes, I did. I went, I think, just after the 1st of May.

10 Q. Did you go alone or were you accompanied by a team?

11 A. No. There was just one colonel with me. The two of us went down

12 there.

13 Q. Upon your return, did you report your observations to General

14 Ojdanic?

15 A. While I was in Kosovo, I first informed General Pavkovic, army

16 commander, of the reasons for my visit and then I had a meeting with the

17 entire command personnel of the security service in the Pristina Corps and

18 in the 3rd Army as a whole where I received reports about a number of

19 crimes that had happened down there and that they had prosecuted already

20 by that time. So I verified that, but I had occasion to establish that

21 appropriate reports did not reach the appropriate destination. There was

22 a bottleneck in the channel, in the conduit of information that was later

23 removed, but at that time the reports were not moving smoothly upwards.

24 And later on when the -- it turned out that they had simply not thought it

25 necessary to give us more detailed reports.

Page 46333

1 Q. You reported all this to General Ojdanic.

2 A. Yes. I reported to him immediately upon my return.

3 Q. Did you consider all those issues at your senior staff meeting

4 including the commanding officers of the security service?

5 A. Yes. That was the first thing I did. At my own senior staff

6 meeting I reviewed the whole situation and the data that I had gathered as

7 well as the information that had been pooled through various channels to

8 make a cumulative report and inform General Ojdanic to see what can be

9 done.

10 Q. What did General Ojdanic do after your report?

11 A. Having heard me, General Ojdanic said that he would report that to

12 you immediately.

13 Q. Very well. And what did he do?

14 A. At that time, he was already busy with his own staff, developing

15 certain orders to be forwarded to all units, but on that occasion he told

16 me that he had informed you and that you had convened an urgent meeting

17 with us, people from the military security, to be attended also by

18 representatives of the MUP.

19 Q. All right. You informed him, he informed me, and I convened an

20 urgent meeting. Did any activity in the top military echelons precede

21 this activity?

22 A. Yes, it did, because the situation was as follows: When you are

23 going to see the Supreme Commander, you have to be fully prepared. So

24 General Ojdanic invited the commander of the 2nd Army, General Pavkovic,

25 to a meeting. If I remember correctly, it was on the 16th that they had

Page 46334

1 this meeting where General Pavkovic reported on the overall situation,

2 combat activities, and the status of the 3rd Army.

3 Q. When was that meeting held in my office?

4 A. On the next day, the 17th of May.

5 Q. So on the 16th May you had a meeting with General Ojdanic to which

6 the commander of the 3rd Army, General Pavkovic, was also invited and

7 which was also attended by other competent high-ranking officers of the

8 army.

9 A. Yes; my deputy Aleksandar Vasiljevic and General Gajic.

10 Q. And on the next day you had a meeting in my office?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, General, if you can, to the best of your recollection

13 describe the discussion that took place at the meeting in my office, as

14 briefly as you can.

15 A. On the 16th we had agreed that reports would first be submitted by

16 General Pavkovic, followed by General Aleksandar Vasiljevic who was to

17 report on the security situation, because at that precise time we were

18 involved in a specific action as a result of the arrest of foreign

19 intelligence agents who had been arrested and removed from Kosovo. And

20 the day before, General Vasiljevic had talked to security organs and was

21 in possession of fresh information about that. That's why it was decided

22 that he should be the one to report to you about the security situation

23 and all the developments that were related to the security of the army.

24 Q. Do you remember who attended that meeting in my office? Just name

25 the people of whose attendance you're sure.

Page 46335

1 A. Mr. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, and there was Rade Markovic as

2 well. And on the side of our service, there was me, Aco Vasiljevic, and

3 General -- I can't remember. There was one more person from the army.

4 Q. Since you are naming names now, there was chief of the Supreme

5 Command Staff -- Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, rather. There was

6 you, chief of the military security, and General Gajic. And representing

7 civilian authorities, vice-president of the government or, rather, deputy

8 Prime Minister, and chief of the security service, Rade Markovic.

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. What about the interior minister, Stojiljkovic?

11 A. At the meeting you told us he had urgent business elsewhere and

12 would be unable to attend.

13 Q. How was he informed about the discussion that took place at that

14 meeting?

15 A. During the meeting itself, after all the reports were made and

16 after the discussion, you gave an order to Rade Markovic to have an urgent

17 meeting with the interior minister and to convey to him your decisions and

18 your orders.

19 Q. Very well. What was discussed at that meeting? Was any data

20 presented about the crimes committed by army members and MUP members in

21 Kosovo and Metohija?

22 A. Yes. Reports were made including data that we had at that moment

23 and including the cases reported by Aleksandar Vasiljevic and General

24 Pavkovic, which had been already prosecuted by that time. And chief of

25 the security service, Rade Markovic, also reported some problems that were

Page 46336












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Page 46337

1 being encountered down there and the crimes committed by MUP members.

2 Q. Tell us, were there any problems that were specially emphasised at

3 that meeting?

4 A. There were. One problem was presented by General Pavkovic. He

5 complained about insufficient cooperation with the MUP on the ground.

6 Q. Did I have any reaction to that?

7 A. You reacted very emphatically, and you said that non-cooperation

8 between services and between the army and the MUP was tantamount to

9 sabotage, that this should never be allowed again to happen in the future.

10 You said again to Rade Markovic that he should urgently meet with the

11 interior minister, convey your orders, that appropriate measures be

12 agreed, and that this problem with the army should be resolved.

13 Q. Did I say anything about that problem, that particular problem

14 about which you reported, namely the crimes committed by individual

15 members of the army and the police?

16 A. Yes, you did. You were very strict in your terms. It was so

17 strict that it sounded even unpleasant to our ears. You said that such

18 things had to be dealt with immediately and should never happen again,

19 that all preventive work should be done, that measures should be taken

20 immediately, as soon as something is detected of that kind, and that

21 prosecutions are indispensable.

22 Q. Was it possible that some things remained undetected, some things

23 within the purview of our organs?

24 A. Well, that was precisely your order, that we should detect

25 everything, but everybody in the world knows about the grey areas, namely

Page 46338

1 some crimes will never be detected, not even in peacetime functioning of a

2 state let alone in wartime. We had no idea how many rapes happened last

3 night in Belgrade, and it's a big question whether we will ever find out

4 the true number. You ordered that all this should be investigated and

5 that all measures should be taken against perpetrators.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will take the 15-minute break now.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson, but before I

11 continue, I have one thing to raise. I was informed by the Registry that

12 the witness finds this 15-minute break too short, and I would like that to

13 be taken into account. Maybe not for today, because it's no longer

14 topical, but for tomorrow maybe.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll take that into account for tomorrow.

16 But all the more reason, Mr. Milosevic, to proceed as quickly with this

17 witness as possible, since he's clearly not in good health.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will certainly do that,

19 Mr. Robinson.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. General, at that meeting was there any mention of paramilitary

22 units, that meeting in my office on the 17th of May?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. How was it mentioned, in what sense, and who mentioned it?

25 A. It was said that certain problems existed. Earlier on I spoke

Page 46339

1 about problems between the MUP and the army of Yugoslavia. It was said

2 that there was a number of crimes committed by members of the army and a

3 number of crimes committed by MUP members. So at the same time another

4 problem was mentioned. A deputy of mine said that within MUP units there

5 are some people who were criminals, such as Boca, a person named Boca in

6 the area of Podujevo, and in the area of Kosovo Polje it was said there

7 was a unit that formerly belonged to Arkan.

8 Q. What was my position with regard to paramilitary units?

9 A. First of all, you asked for an explanation. You asked Rade

10 Markovic to provide more details. Rade Markovic explained that down there

11 in Kosovo Polje there were about 30 such persons. Some of them had

12 already perpetrated crimes and were under investigation, and equally, near

13 Podujevo, there was a unit of this Medic who was expelled by that time

14 from the area of Podujevo and that measures would be taken, were pending.

15 You said that everybody had to be held to account, that this

16 needed to be conveyed to the interior minister who should immediately deal

17 with such groups on the ground and do away with them. And you told us in

18 no uncertain terms that such things must not happen any longer in Kosovo.

19 Q. Was there a clear joint position on our part about paramilitary

20 units?

21 A. It was a unified position of all of us. You personally said that

22 such things could only harm us, and you ordered at that meeting that the

23 border facing the Drina River should even be closed, if necessary, to

24 prevent the so-called greater Serbs to spread their Serbdom in their own

25 way and that appropriate measures should be taken by the army and the

Page 46340

1 police.

2 Q. Were any instructions given to check once again if there were any

3 paramilitary units remaining in Kosovo?

4 A. Yes. There had already been an order from the Chief of Staff of

5 the General Staff who invoked earlier orders and said that the entire

6 territory must be inspected again and anything remotely resembling

7 paramilitary units must be removed.

8 Q. What was said in the report of General Pavkovic or the chief of

9 state security about perpetrators of crimes? What was said as to who had

10 perpetrated those crimes?

11 A. It was clear from our reports that those crimes had been committed

12 by individuals, individuals in the army, as far as we were concerned. And

13 something similar was said by Rade Markovic for his field of competence.

14 He said that those individuals had already been arrested and measures were

15 taken. So it was only individual perpetrators.

16 Q. What was my position regarding detection of perpetrators addressed

17 to both military organs of command and control and civilian organs; you,

18 Ojdanic, and Markovic?

19 A. Your unambiguous position was that everything should be

20 investigated immediately, and in those cases where crimes and perpetrators

21 were already known, that they should be prosecuted without delay.

22 Q. Do you know whether Rade Markovic really conveyed all that to the

23 interior minister?

24 A. In my subsequent contacts with the interior minister I was

25 satisfied that Markovic had indeed informed him, because he talked to me

Page 46341

1 about certain things from that meeting.

2 Q. After that meeting, do you have anything to add? Did I say

3 anything else at the end of the meeting when you finished all your

4 reports, the question and answer session?

5 A. The main topic was these crimes, and you gave very specific orders

6 and in no uncertain terms. You talked about the border to Albania --

7 towards Albania and Macedonia as well. You said that not a single foot of

8 our land should be lost, that it has to be defended with all resources.

9 And you said something to the effect that where the other side would place

10 a flag, that is where our border would be and that should not be allowed.

11 Q. All right. After that meeting, did General Ojdanic give you some

12 orders in relation to the discussion at that meeting and the reporting to

13 me at that meeting?

14 A. Yes. As we were walking out of your office, he started issuing me

15 orders and giving me assignments in terms of what should be done.

16 Q. So what did you do in that regard?

17 A. First of all, with my own senior staff I looked at the situation,

18 and I discussed with them the meeting that was held with you and also what

19 General Ojdanic defined. I set up a rather strong team of eminent

20 security organs headed by Aco Vasiljevic, and I sent them down to Kosovo

21 and Metohija so that they would go to each and every brigade and clarify

22 with the security organs what the situation was with the units in Kosovo

23 and Metohija.

24 Q. What were the results of the work of this team headed by General

25 Vasiljevic?

Page 46342

1 A. Well, the results of their work, upon their return -- I think he

2 was back on the 7th of June from Kosovo, and he reported that up to that

3 time, up to his return from Kosovo and Metohija, all cases had been

4 prosecuted, that all investigations were intensified. He said that there

5 were some problems there, that some perpetrators had deserted. And as for

6 them, I can say that later on they were captured in Vojvodina. So they

7 also ended up before the judiciary. And that security organs and commands

8 took the situation very seriously and also the warnings and orders that

9 preventive work should be done as well, because the bombing was well

10 advanced. People were frustrated. We had more and more people down

11 there. So the chances of having crimes committed were, objectively

12 speaking, on the rise.

13 Q. General, in paragraph 55 of the Kosovo indictment, it says that

14 the forces of the FRY and Serbia in a deliberate way systematically and in

15 a widespread manner, by force, expelled and internally displaced hundreds

16 of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes across the entire

17 province of Kosovo.

18 Please say whether that is correct, that they did this through

19 oppression, the use of force, threats of force and acts of violence, and

20 so on. Is that what the army did vis-a-vis the Albanians in Kosovo and

21 Metohija?

22 A. That's not something that I know of. This is an organised thing

23 that cannot be done without the command of the army and without proper

24 organisation. The army was not engaged in such things. If the civilian

25 population was moved from one place to another by the military, it was for

Page 46343

1 the sake of the civilian population, to get them out of zones of combat

2 operations. Such actions are allowed, in terms of our rules, at brigade

3 level command. So if there were combat zones, then the military had the

4 right to move the civilian population to protect them, but simply, this

5 kind of thing never happened.

6 Q. All right, General. In 56, it says: Throughout Kosovo forces of

7 the FRY and Serbia engaged in a deliberate and widespread or systematic

8 campaign of destruction of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians.

9 This was accomplished by the widespread shelling of towns and villages,

10 the burning and destruction of property, including homes, farms,

11 businesses, cultural monuments and religious sites and the destruction of

12 personal property. What can you say about that? You are the most

13 competent person who can answer that.

14 A. We have no such knowledge that this was done en masse, that the

15 army lined up and marched to villages to destroy them, surround them,

16 target them. An ordinary soldier from these units, an honest man would

17 have to say that something like that happened had it happened. Quite

18 simply, such things did not happen.

19 There were torchings, though. I did say earlier on that we had

20 groups that had infiltrated and that had our uniforms, as a matter of

21 fact. They even spoke the Serbian language. And they did things like

22 that or similar things in our territory.

23 In that territory there were also clashes between the citizens

24 themselves in a way. There were blood feuds there any way, so the

25 situation was favourable for settling such scores.

Page 46344












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Page 46345

1 It is possible that there were such torchings, but anyway, it is

2 not right to say that the military did it in an organised fashion.

3 Q. All right. In your opinion, did the military do everything within

4 its powers to prevent this --

5 MR. NICE: There must be some limit to how far he could go with

6 generalised answers.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. That's leading.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. All right. Now, let's move on to non-leading questions.

11 Paragraph 57. Regrettably, I am reading these paragraphs to you because

12 they contain similar accusations, but you can see that this is what they

13 say. They say here that brutality and violence was committed against

14 Albanian civilians.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, don't read all of that paragraph.

16 Just summarise it.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. So do you know that our forces committed acts of brutality and

20 went from village to village issuing threats, expelling people, et cetera,

21 that people were intimidated, assaulted or killed in public view to

22 enforce the departure of their families and neighbours?

23 A. Quite simply, the military did no such thing. There were

24 individual cases. Every crime, every murder is tragic enough in its own

25 right and can be intimidating, but that the army went out and did such

Page 46346

1 things in an organised fashion, that was quite simply impossible, and it

2 was impossible for us not to learn of such things.

3 Q. All right, General. Paragraph 58 is dedicated to convoys of

4 refugees leaving Kosovo. It speaks of Albanians in these convoys

5 subjected to further beatings, extortion, robbery, harassment, assaults,

6 killings, illegal arrests. Do you know anything about this?

7 A. I know that there were columns, convoys of refugees. It was not

8 only in Kosovo but everywhere. People were fleeing from bombs. But it's

9 quite impossible, like in the previous paragraph that you read out to me,

10 that the military lined up and beat these people who were passing by.

11 This is a general lack of knowledge of how a military system and

12 organisation functions. There could have been individual cases when

13 somebody was taken out of such a column, but that the army did that kind

14 of thing on orders, stood there with some kind of sticks and beat these

15 people, setting up checkpoints, whatever, that's impossible.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me tell you that getting a general refutation

17 from this witness of paragraphs like 55, 56, and 57, in my view, is not

18 helping your case because there are specific allegations in the indictment

19 that support these general paragraphs in the introductory part of the

20 indictment. So if you took the witness to the specific allegations, say,

21 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and he refuted those specific allegations, then it would

22 be helpful to round it off by referring him to, say, paragraph 55 and 56.

23 Then you would have a foundation for the general refutation which he's

24 giving. But now there is no foundation at all for it.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I bear in mind the

Page 46347

1 fact that General Geza Farkas was at the top of the military security

2 pyramid. So when I put this question to him, it goes without saying that

3 any case, any example that he could know of is an answer to this question.

4 So it's not a question of whether he established something himself at a

5 concrete place, but he was at the top of the military security pyramid.

6 All information came to him, so he would have had to know had such things

7 happened. So it only seems that these questions are general, but they

8 have to be viewed in the context of the fact that he is at the top of the

9 military security pyramid.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. I have given you my

11 own appreciation of the matter.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, tell us, is it correct that the forces of the FRY and

15 Serbia accompanied the Kosovo Albanians to the border?

16 A. Yes, there were such cases, when they passed through these zones,

17 that units or members of the units accompanied them in an organised

18 fashion, but as far as I know, only when there were minefields there. So

19 they were trying to prevent any problems, any casualties of these people

20 who were moving en masse.

21 The only situations are those that I have heard of, of soldiers

22 helping the people who were moving out. So that's the only thing I know

23 of. The army helped people move along so that these unfortunate people

24 could do so.

25 Q. Can you say something about paragraph 60, things that have to do

Page 46348

1 with the looting of property, the taking away of money and valuables, of

2 deported Albanians, as it is put here?

3 A. There were cases of looting and pillage, and they were all

4 prosecuted. Unfortunately, there were such cases even among officers who

5 robbed and -- people of their valuables, but they didn't do that on

6 orders. These were crimes that were committed by individuals.

7 Q. Are there any cases that you know of where the perpetrators were

8 not arrested and handed over to the courts?

9 A. If we found out about any case, the procedure required was

10 applied. I also mentioned that some people deserted. I mentioned a

11 particular case of one person who was later captured in Vojvodina, a

12 perpetrator of such an act. So measures were taken against all

13 perpetrators. There was not a single case that we knew of -- well, it is

14 possible that we had not brought some cases to an absolute end, because in

15 mid-June we left the area, so we no longer had any access to the territory

16 in order to carry out our investigations. And when the state of war

17 ceased, the war courts no longer functioned and the reservists were moved

18 to the authority of civilian courts.

19 Q. General, do you know about the allegations contained in 61, that

20 is to say the seizure and destruction of personal identity documents and

21 licenses of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian civilians? My question

22 is very concrete: Did the army take any documents from civilians?

23 A. No. The service is not aware of any such cases of documents being

24 taken away. Perhaps this happened sporadically, but it was certainly not

25 done in an organised fashion. I heard of a few individual cases in the

Page 46349

1 police, but not in the military, no.

2 Q. All right, General. Just a few concrete questions. You remember

3 that during the NATO aggression the residence of the president of the

4 republic was bombed. At that time, that was my residence; right?

5 A. Yes, I remember that.

6 Q. I personally saw General Clark on television explaining that this

7 was a legitimate target because under the residence of the president of

8 the republic there is a command centre. My question is: Underneath the

9 residence of the president of the republic, was there any command centre?

10 A. No. Underneath your residence there was no command centre. There

11 wasn't even a shelter, I think. There was just some basement.

12 Q. Thank you, General. During the course of the war, in different

13 communications about different activities, combat activities and in that

14 context, you undoubtedly heard the expression "ciscenje," cleaning up or

15 cleansing.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What does this pertain to, this term?

18 A. Well, when soldiers use the term, that means searching the

19 terrain. This word is used in our rules, and our rules exactly explain

20 the term "ciscenje." Say the clearing of a minefield, that is one form of

21 "ciscenje." Then "ciscenje" in the sense of terrorists is mopping up.

22 So this is a term that is used for military actions, for the military

23 carrying out combat tasks.

24 Q. Did this term ever denote any kind of violent action against

25 civilians?

Page 46350

1 A. Against civilians, no. When looking at these rules, you can see

2 by their very content that that has nothing to do with civilians.

3 Q. All right, General. When we met here in preparation of this, I

4 gave you a copy of this indictment for you to read. Did you manage to

5 read it?

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 Q. Now, please, since you were at the top of military security, have

8 you read the Kosovo indictment?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In its entirety?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What is correct out of all -- among all these allegations, I mean

13 all these accusations contained, all the charges contained? What is

14 correct?

15 A. I know that not a single contact with you, not a single meeting of

16 the Supreme Command Staff, not a single document that the Supreme Command

17 Staff issued - and I took part in the writing of these documents, or my

18 organs did -- actually, all of this speaks to the contrary. It is in

19 total contrast to what is stated here in this indictment.

20 Q. Thank you, General. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as you can see, the

22 General will be able to leave tomorrow after working hours. He will be

23 able to leave The Hague.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

25 Mr. Nice.

Page 46351

1 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

2 Q. Perhaps you'd help us with a bit more detail before we move on.

3 What were you actually doing in, say, January of 1999? Were you in an

4 office in Belgrade? Well, what were you doing?

5 A. In January 1999, I was -- I was still the assistant federal

6 defence minister.

7 Q. So you weren't in Kosovo. You were in Belgrade; correct?

8 A. Yes, I was in Belgrade.

9 Q. What range of material did you receive?

10 A. I received written material, telegrams, personal information from

11 the federal minister of defence meeting teams. But I don't know in what

12 regard, based on what material. What material are you referring to?

13 Material and documents came in to me from different directions.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues]... was available to you, and the

15 next question is going to be if this material is available to us. You

16 see? So stay with January 1999. The material that you received, reports

17 of one kind and another, written material, is that material available to

18 us?

19 A. During that period of time, we worked intensively on updating the

20 plan for the country's defence. I don't know what would interest you from

21 the country's defence plan. Probably certain portions relating to our

22 organs of power and authority. If they -- the ban on keeping secrets were

23 lifted, then I'm sure you would be able to get this information.

24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... let's be --

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 46352












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Page 46353

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.


3 Q. Let's be concrete about one particular and very famous incident:

4 Racak. Now, you're in Belgrade. Did you receive any written information

5 on Racak?

6 A. No, I did not.

7 Q. Is that because the military provided no report on Racak, or is it

8 because, although a report may have been provided, it never found its way

9 through to you? Which?

10 A. Mr. Nice, at the time I was assistant to the federal defence

11 minister for civilian defence, so I had no rapport in that way with the

12 General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia in command terms. If reports of

13 that kind did indeed come in, they would have come in through the chain of

14 command of the General Staff and they would be solved at that level and

15 dealt with at that level, because the General Staff was separate from the

16 Ministry of Defence. So it was not function to inform myself about things

17 like that through the army chain of command.

18 Q. So does this position obtain for January and February and right

19 into March, that you received no raw information or intelligence about

20 military matters on the ground in Kosovo?

21 A. Intelligence? I didn't receive intelligence material, but I

22 received information through the line of Defence Ministry about the

23 problems that occurred in Kosovo at that time. Not from the army.

24 Q. Very well. What about from the MUP? Did you receive any raw

25 material from the MUP throughout January, February, and March? Did you?

Page 46354

1 A. No, no. I was a federal organ and the MUP was organised at a

2 republican level. So that kind of information, that kind of raw material

3 would not have been sent to the Ministry of Defence. Possibly at meetings

4 if the minister of defence had been apprised of that, then at the meeting

5 of the staff members - and I was a member of that - we would be informed

6 of problems like that if he received it through the MUP lines, from the

7 republican MUP, because there were two republican MUPs; Montenegro and

8 Serbia.

9 Q. So that we can, as it were, clear the decks: From your experience

10 at the time, you can provide this Court with no information from raw

11 material or from direct experience of anything that happened between

12 January and the end of March of 1999 because you weren't involved. Hmm?

13 A. I did not personally take part in those events. However, the

14 organisational structure of the Ministry of Defence goes right down to the

15 municipalities, in-depth, right down where the municipal organs have MUP

16 organs. So certain information did reach them as to what was going on in

17 the field.

18 Q. I'm not concerned with what reached other people. We're only

19 concerned with what's known to you, and I think you've now answered my

20 question, but I must qualify it in this way: You subsequently had a major

21 role to play in the VJ's body described as the Commission for Cooperation

22 with the ICTY, didn't you?

23 A. I was retired, pensioned off in 2001, and as a pensioner, as a

24 retired person, I was a member of that commission which was set up by the

25 federal government.

Page 46355

1 Q. [Previous translation continues]... weren't you, a very senior

2 member of the commission.

3 A. Not a senior member. I was a member.

4 Q. Very well.

5 A. There was the leader there --

6 Q. Well, before I move from January, February, and March, in the

7 course of your workings at the commission, did you come across, did you

8 look at any reports either from the MUP - not likely - or from the VJ -

9 likely - about events in Racak?

10 A. The object of that commission was not, to begin with, to deal with

11 documents like that, reports like that, but to deal with organisational

12 problems, to establish a legal and legitimate cooperation with The Hague

13 Tribunal, because up until then --

14 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

15 A. -- we didn't have --

16 Q. [Previous translation continues]... time is limited. Very simple

17 question: In your work -- in fact, you were vice-chairman of the

18 commission, weren't you?

19 A. No, no.

20 Q. But in the course of your work did you - yes or no - see any

21 report from the VJ on Racak?

22 A. No, I did not.

23 Q. Did anybody try to find one?

24 A. No, we didn't. I tried to explain this to you. The function of

25 the commission was not to find documents or to conduct investigations or

Page 46356

1 anything of that kind. That's not what the commission did.

2 Q. Well, we were told by a witness last week that one of the

3 functions of the committee of experts of the commission was to reconcile

4 contradictory accounts or where there were differences of interpretation.

5 Just in a sentence or so, because you were on the commission, can you

6 explain to us, please, what it was that the commission did by way of

7 reconciling different versions of events?

8 A. That was not the task of the commission, what you've just talked

9 about. That was done by an expert team which was later set up pursuant to

10 an order from the Chief of the General Staff from amongst the composition

11 of officers, retired or otherwise, who were there to study the combat

12 operations that had taken place, and that commission had nothing to do

13 with the expert team except that at both we had the chief or, rather, the

14 general who was in charge of them.

15 Q. Well, just pursue this very shortly. The expert team to study

16 combat operations, and although the answer in translation isn't very

17 clear, it appears that this team was dealing with reconciling different

18 versions of events. Can you give us an example of how this team

19 reconciled different versions of events and what the outcome of its

20 reconciliation was?

21 A. First of all, that expert team did not have the task of

22 dovetailing or reconciling or falsifying events in any way but to perfect

23 a complete analysis of the events that had taken place during the overall

24 combat action and the NATO aggression itself.

25 Q. Well, I hadn't yet alleged falsification. Have you been following

Page 46357

1 the evidence of other witnesses here?

2 A. Sporadically.

3 Q. The complete analysis of events, has that been made available to

4 the ICTY? This expert committee apparently provided a complete analysis

5 of events, of the overall combat operation. Have we seen that complete

6 analysis?

7 A. You couldn't have seen it because that expert team ceased to work.

8 It stopped working through certain interventions, I think your own. At

9 the time you equated the commission with the expert team, I believe, we

10 ceased to work, both us and the expert team. So that task wasn't

11 completed, was never completed, brought to term.

12 Q. Minister Tadic abolished the commission on taking office as

13 minister of defence, and it was clear that the suggestions alive from

14 within Serbia were that the commission was a dishonest or possibly

15 dishonest body. Do you remember that?

16 A. What I remember is that the commission issued an order to abolish

17 it. Now, what you mean by from within Serbia or what you meant there, who

18 was dishonest, who understood what within Serbia, I didn't understand

19 that. What do you mean by saying within Serbia, from within Serbia?

20 Q. When it was abolished by Minister Tadic, were there reports in the

21 newspapers that this was a body not to be trusted and arguably a body that

22 was breaking the law? Were there such reports to explain its abolition?

23 A. I don't know. I don't know what the newspapers wrote about. I

24 really don't know.

25 Q. Two last general questions, I think, on the commission before we

Page 46358

1 move on. I may come back to it tomorrow. The commission had ready and

2 easy access to things like logbooks or, sorry, war diaries,

3 contemporaneous records, and contemporaneous working maps, didn't it?

4 A. No, that's not correct. It did not have access to those kinds of

5 things, and I said it didn't deal with problems of that kind. It was the

6 expert team that did that.

7 Q. Did the expert team, if you persist in this distinction, did the

8 expert team have access to war diaries, working maps and other

9 contemporaneous logs of events? Yes or no.

10 A. The expert team conducted investigation along those lines to

11 arrive at those source -- that source information. However, the archives

12 had been partially bombed, partially displaced, and so it was an enormous

13 amount of effort, since there were no archives or well-ordered archives.

14 They made every effort to arrive at those documents, maps, documents, and

15 so on, and that is why they would call upon certain individuals who had

16 taken part in certain events to testify, and if they have in their

17 possession documents of that kind to give them over so that they could

18 have a look at them and clarify the situation.

19 Q. You see, we've been provided very late in the day here with

20 logbooks that we've been trying to get for years and then became very

21 easily available. Can you think of any reason why this VJ Commission for

22 Cooperation should filter out logbooks and make it impossible for the OTP

23 of the ICTY to have had access to them? Can you think of any good reason

24 for that?

25 A. First of all, the expert team was not a part of the commission.

Page 46359

1 The expert team, as I've already said, was formed pursuant to an order by

2 the chief of the General Staff. The commission was established pursuant

3 to a decision made by the federal minister of defence, and in conformity

4 with agreement from the General Staff and the federal government. And

5 what you're asking me now about those documents, as time elapsed, probably

6 the expert team were set on the traces of those documents and they managed

7 to come by some of them.

8 Q. And can you think of any reason why Aleksandar Vasiljevic should

9 have been leaned on, persuaded by those in the commission not to volunteer

10 to cooperate with the OTP and to come and give evidence here? Can you

11 think of any good reason why that could have happened?

12 A. That observation is not correct, persuaded by those in the

13 commission. But when you started working with Aleksandar Vasiljevic, we

14 still did not have the law governing cooperation with The Hague Tribunal,

15 nor did we have any way in which we could waive senior officers and

16 generals of their -- the requirement to not disclose secrets.

17 At the time, talking to Vasiljevic, that we said he shouldn't do

18 that because he could be held criminally responsible. So there was no ill

19 intent or telling him not to do that.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... accept he was told not to talk

21 to the OTP under pressure of some kind of criminal sanctions and

22 notwithstanding the duty of all parties to cooperate with this Tribunal?

23 You accept that he was given that pressure and advice?

24 A. No, he wasn't under pressure. He was just made aware of the

25 situation, that is to say if there had not -- if there was not a waiver of

Page 46360












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Page 46361

1 keeping state secrets, then they could come under the effects of that same

2 state which was there to protect its citizens so that they could -- so

3 that they could cooperate in the proper way with The Hague Tribunal. So

4 that was the object of the commission, that is to say that the commission

5 insisted on the law on cooperation, the institution of waiving, keeping

6 state secrets, and so that the documents that you wanted to access could

7 be accessed by you in a legal way and legitimate manner.

8 Q. [Previous translation continues]... when the Court typically

9 breaks. In 1991, what was your function?

10 A. In 1991, until the middle of the year I was Chief of Staff of the

11 Territorial Defence of Vojvodina. And later on that year, somewhere

12 towards autumn, I was the assistant commander of the 1st Army for military

13 territorial organs.

14 Q. Until what time?

15 A. Until 1995, when I was appointed by decree as assistant federal

16 defence minister.

17 Q. Holding that position until when?

18 A. Until the 24th of April, or, until the very start of the

19 aggression against my country.

20 Q. The second topic is this: You --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A correction should be made here.

22 It's actually the 24th of March.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the 24th of March.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. You've spoken of a number of meetings. I'll give you a list of

Page 46362

1 some of them. One was a meeting you had with this accused a month before

2 your appointment as head of VJ security. Do you have any notes or minutes

3 of that meeting?

4 A. Notes, no.

5 Q. So in order to give the evidence that you've given, how was your

6 memory revived or refreshed?

7 A. Well, quite simply, Mr. Nice: You tend to remember such things

8 when you're in the army. Until then I was assistant minister, and it was

9 then that I was suggested as a future chief of security. Such

10 appointments are remembered.

11 Q. The order that -- from Ojdanic that you should go to Kosovo to

12 investigate perpetration and prosecution of VJ crimes, do we have a copy

13 of that order? Do we have a copy of the report that you produced

14 following the performance of that order, please?

15 A. I received a verbal order, and I went to Kosovo almost

16 immediately.

17 Q. And your report --

18 A. So I never got a written order.

19 Q. I see. Your report, that must have been in writing on a matter of

20 this importance. Do we have a copy of that report, please?

21 A. That report existed in writing, and it was based on that report

22 that my deputy Aco Vasiljevic --

23 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

24 A. No.

25 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

Page 46363

1 A. Unless you have it; I don't.

2 Q. [Previous translation continues]... prudent to bring it with you?

3 A. I didn't think about that. I didn't know where it was or how to

4 get hold of that document.

5 Q. Then -- but again you're acting on memory for everything you've

6 said in it; is that right?

7 A. I'm not speaking from memory. When I found out that I would be a

8 witness here, I was proofed and I refreshed my memory through these

9 contacts, but I don't have the documents you refer to.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues]... contacts?

11 A. With the legal assistants of Mr. Milosevic.

12 Q. So they told you things or spoke to you about things, but you

13 didn't have any documents to look at to refresh your memory as to the

14 content of your report?

15 A. Mr. Nice, I did not understand your question because you made some

16 statements within that question before you actually asked me something.

17 Q. Lastly, because I'm not sure what the time limit for today is, you

18 gave detailed accounts of two meetings on the 16th and 17th of May with

19 Pavkovic and others. Have you got any written record of those meetings

20 with you?

21 A. No. No, I don't.

22 Q. Do they exist?

23 A. I believe they do.

24 Q. You've made no efforts to bring them with you?

25 A. I made enough effort by coming at all.

Page 46364

1 Q. I see.

2 MR. NICE: May I ask one more question?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, one more question.


5 Q. I take it from your evidence, Mr. Farkas, that from March onwards,

6 either in your position in Belgrade or from your visit to the territory,

7 you would hold yourself out as somebody who would know pretty well

8 everything that was going on in Kosovo during what you describe as the

9 NATO aggression. Would that be fair?

10 A. It's not that I describe it as a NATO aggression. It was a NATO

11 aggression. We were bombed for 88 days.

12 Q. Do you hold yourself out as knowing pretty well everything that

13 was going on? This will help me know what I want to ask you tomorrow, you

14 see.

15 A. All right. I cannot assert that I know everything. I don't think

16 anybody can do that. It's just that we did our best, based on all the

17 orders, to find out as many details as we could.

18 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

19 A. It's -- I'm not saying that I knew everything.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... part with your answer to this

21 question: How did it come that hundreds of bodies of Kosovo Albanians

22 were dug up and transported to the north of Serbia for reburial? Would

23 you like to explain that to the Court, please, in a sentence?

24 A. As to their being exhumed and transported to the territory of

25 central Serbia, I learned about that, I believe, only when the war was

Page 46365

1 over. While the war lasted, I had no knowledge about that, in view of my

2 position and whereabouts. All this information that later transpired

3 after the exhumations is something that I didn't know at the time.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: We must stop here today. We'll adjourn until

5 tomorrow morning, 9.00 a.m.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day

8 of November, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.