1 Wednesday, 17 July 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated. Good afternoon, everybody.
6 May we, as usual, hear the case number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon. This is Case Number IT-97-24-T,
8 the Prosecutor versus Milomir Stakic.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. And the appearances, please.
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, Joanna Korner, and may I today for the
11 first time, Your Honours, introduce Katharina Margetts, a lawyer who has
12 just joined our team and who is specifically designed to fill us in on
13 German law and procedure.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: [No microphone]
15 MS. KORNER: And as assisted by Ruth Karper.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. For the Defence.
17 MR. LUKIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Branko Lukic for the
18 Defence. And we are not that powerful to have a German expert on our team,
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You are expert enough in this law system.
21 Any problem with Mr. Ostojic, may I ask?
22 MR. LUKIC: He promised to be here tomorrow.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Anything before we start?
24 MS. KORNER: Just very briefly Your Honour, and it's because Your
25 Honour raised the question of the motions under -- for dismissal under
1 Rule 98 yesterday. Your Honours, the rules at the moment specify 10 pages
2 as the maximum amount that one can write for such motions. I'm merely
3 raising it at this stage to ask Your Honours to consider that that would
4 be insufficient, I think, both for the Defence and for us on the facts of
5 this case.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Accepted. I personally --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry, I apologise. From my point of view it
9 doesn't make sense at all. It facilitates the work of the parties when,
10 for example, they have to concentrate for the purposes of ten pages only
11 on the framework, and leaving them the search for the authorities and so
12 on to others. I think there shouldn't be any limitation. But let's take
13 this occasion to address the following. We discussed just before entering
14 the courtroom this question: We should be aware, and we have this before
15 our eyes, the schedule for the second part of the year. You are all aware
16 that the Bench invited the parties to try to come to an agreement of the
17 best possible solution and as soon as possible. I can't see any movement
18 right now, but nevertheless, what we discussed is wouldn't it be
19 appropriate to try to overcome this four weeks' motion, response,
20 rebuttal, decision of the Tribunal, in the way of coming to an agreement
21 between the parties on what basis, if any, we have to proceed for the
22 Defence case, instead of wasting enormous amount of time and manpower for
23 the purposes of these formal decisions. I wonder if it wouldn't be
24 possible to come to an agreement here and to avoid this motion by doing
25 so. It's only, once again, an invitation, and we just discussed it before
1 coming in, and I took the opportunity to address it immediately. But when
2 it should be necessary, no doubt, the page limitation should be no
3 obstacle to writing whatever you feel necessary.
4 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, obviously we're aware from the preamble
5 to the schedule that Your Honour produced, I may say that we haven't had
6 an opportunity really effectively since then to get together to discuss
7 matters. Mr. Ostojic hasn't been here. And it is our intention,
8 certainly before the Court break, to discuss matters with Defence counsel
9 to see if there's any possibility of reaching an agreement. Obviously, we
10 will do our best in compliance with Your Honours' wishes.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. I appreciate this very much. And
12 whenever you need assistance by the Bench or a judge, let us know. We do
13 everything necessary to come as soon as possible to a solution in this
14 case because we all have to be aware that more and more in public opinion,
15 the length of our proceedings are no longer accepted, opposed to the
16 length of hearings in crimes with a nearly as difficult issue and
17 difficult charges as we have them here in this case. And we have to take
18 care that we don't lose all the confidence the international society is
19 vesting into our work by deleting and deleting the cases even where it's
20 not absolutely mandatory.
21 But I appreciate your words and take them as a good signal that
22 there might be a kind of agreement. There are several possibilities. We
23 indicated today only one possibility at least to facilitate and expedite
24 the proceedings. Is there anything else to be addressed by the parties
25 before we come to today's witness?
1 MS. KORNER: No, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We are in open session, and no protective
3 measures necessary.
4 MS. KORNER: That's correct.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then may I ask the usher to bring in the witness
6 of today.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good afternoon.
9 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May you -- once again, good afternoon.
11 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You can hear me also with the headset no
14 THE WITNESS: It's okay. I can hear you.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May we please hear your solemn declaration.
16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
17 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated. And may we start the
19 examination-in-chief immediately.
20 WITNESS: JAMES MAYHEW
21 Examined by Ms. Korner:
22 Q. Mr. Mayhew, is your full name James Barnabas Burke Mayhew?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. As we'll see from reports that you're going to look at, are you
25 commonly known and do you sign yourself as Barney?
1 A. I sign myself as Barney Mayhew. I'm known as Barney Mayhew.
2 Q. Mr. Mayhew, I think as I've explained to you already, what you say
3 will be translated so there may be a delay between some of the questions
4 and your answers while the translation continues. I want to ask you a
5 little bit about your background, please. Did you go to Oxford
6 University, reading classics?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And upon leaving Oxford, did you enroll in the army, and were you
9 in the army between September 1987 until December of 1991?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And just for the record, were you, in fact, an officer in a
12 regiment which I don't think exists any longer, but the 47th Royal Dragoon
14 A. That's right, it's a tank regiment.
15 Q. Whilst in the army, did you serve with a United Nations
16 peacekeeping force in Cyprus?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Then on a NATO deployment in Germany?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Then, I think you trained the post-independent Namibia Defence
22 A. That's right, the Namibia Defence force.
23 Q. And then finally did you complete a tour in Northern Ireland?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. After you left the army in --
1 A. December 1991.
2 Q. Yes, I'm sorry. I'm just waiting. There's some catching up being
4 Did you, in fact, through the foreign and commonwealth office join
5 the then quite new organisation, the European Community Monitor Mission?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And can you just tell us your reason for joining them?
8 A. I had left the army in 1991, slightly later than I expected. I
9 expected to do three years or so. I extended because I found it very
10 worthwhile and enjoyable. And my aim in joining the army was similar to
11 my aim in continuing work with the EC Monitor Mission. I was interested
12 in contributing what I could in the army to stopping wars from beginning.
13 And I had always been interested in reconciliation since university days.
14 And so as soon as I had left the army, about a month later, I saw the
15 advertisement for the EC Monitor Mission, and it was quite clear to me
16 from that day that that was what I wanted to do. So I applied that day
17 and was sent out about two weeks later.
18 Q. Now, originally, did you go to Zagreb, arriving in early March of
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And can you just tell us a little bit about how the structure of
22 ECMM worked? What would happen in respect of reports?
23 A. ECMM had a large number of teams at one point, I think, nearly 50
24 teams deployed on the ground. They reported typically every day, and at
25 the headquarters, a small staff had to collate these reports into a single
1 daily ECMM mission report. That was fed to the head of mission ultimately
2 who would sign it, and out it would go to the 12 capitals of the European
3 community at that time, plus the four other capitals whose nations -- who
4 were contributing staff to the mission.
5 Q. Now, as we'll see, when you went into the field as it were, you
6 yourself wrote reports. What, in your view, was important about the type
7 of reports that you sent back?
8 A. It was made very clear to us, and my training was consistent with
9 this, that there should be a very clear distinction between verified
10 confirmed facts that we had been able to verify ourselves and any other
11 comments or opinions, and any comment had to be highlighted as such. So
12 the reports were typically of a fairly military, terse brief style leaving
13 out a great deal that perhaps people might have wished to say, but which
14 wouldn't conform to the rule of reporting factually. Our role as a
15 monitor mission was exactly that, to verify things, not primarily to pass
16 on what others are saying.
17 Q. So you began in Zagreb, and was your task there to collate the
18 field reports into the single report that would be sent out to each of the
20 A. Yes, that's right. I don't recall whether I began by going to the
21 field organ with a short spell at that job in Zagreb. But, at all events,
22 my job at various points was between field missions to be collating these
23 reports partly because of being a native speaker of English.
24 Q. You say you went into the field. At that stage, in March of 1992,
25 were you part of a team monitoring the cease-fire line in the area of
1 Pakrac and Lipik in Croatia?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Were you operating the Croatian side of the line?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. In late March of 1992, did you request a transfer to the Banja
6 Luka office?
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. And was that granted?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Before going to Banja Luka, did you go to Sarajevo?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And was that in early April of 1992?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Were you actually in Sarajevo still when the first shots were
16 A. Yes, that's right. I had to go through Sarajevo because flights
17 took us there, and it wasn't possible to cross the front line directly.
18 So we had to go around it through Sarajevo. The idea was then to move
19 directly north to Banja Luka, but because the first shots were fired in
20 Sarajevo, I stayed there a few days while we did what we could about that
21 situation. And it delayed my move north.
22 Q. So sometime after it were the opening salvo in Sarajevo, did you
23 go to Banja Luka?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Where was the ECMM team based in Banja Luka?
1 A. In the Hotel Bosna, in the centre of the town.
2 Q. How many people were in that team roughly?
3 A. Approximately seven monitors plus, I think, about four drivers.
4 We used local interpreters as well.
5 Q. And your job in Banja Luka at that stage was to do what?
6 A. We were given quite a broad definition, but it essentially fell
7 into two main parts: The first part was to monitor the Croatian
8 cease-fire line from the south, from the Serb-held side. And my aim in
9 coming to the other side was to make sure that I had as balanced a view as
10 I could have from both sides of that front line. The other part of the
11 job was to monitor the situation in Bosnia, which was widely thought to be
12 deteriorating, and to do what we could by finding out what was going on
13 and by persuasion to calm the situation down and to prevent a slide
14 towards war.
15 Q. And so as far as that second --
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Could you please a little bit slow down.
17 THE WITNESS: Am I speaking too quickly?
18 MS. KORNER: I think it's my fault, Mr. Mayhew, asking the
19 question too quickly after the answer.
20 Q. All right. Yes, now as far as the second or other part of your
21 job, monitoring the situation in Bosnia is concerned, what did that
22 involve you doing?
23 A. First we had to establish an open relationship, a contact, with
24 leaders within the main population centres, so Banja Luka, Derventa,
25 Prijedor were the three main ones, but elsewhere as well. We had to try
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 to get an understanding of what was the situation. It was complicated,
2 and so we had to speak to those people who we thought could give us a
3 rounded view and no single person could do that. So we tried to speak to
4 representatives of each community, secular and religious, and also to
5 doublecheck what they were saying with reference to ordinary people who we
6 might visit with no notice, at random, on the ground in a small village in
8 So that was our first task, to try to understand a complex and
9 changing situation. And our second task was to really left to our
10 discretion, to do what we could to calm things down. And if that meant
11 verifying that a particular rumour about an atrocity was true or false,
12 and very often it was false, then we could report that back having seen
13 with our own eyes that it hadn't happened, and try to get an accurate
14 picture understood by all sides and to persuade military commanders in
15 some cases and to -- not to fire and to help their own people to calm
16 down. And our, of course, through all of this, essential was the task of
17 reporting. And so we were constantly required to deliver a report, try to
18 build that picture in the ECMM mission headquarters in Zagreb which would
19 allow higher level diplomatic activity to be better focussed.
20 Q. All right. Now let's deal with some of the matters you've
21 mentioned. Rumours, you say: "verifying a picture rumour about an
22 atrocity was true or false." How prevalent were these types of rumours of
24 A. This was a very major and important feature of the situation.
25 Rumour alone was a cause of fighting and of violence. And we found really
1 a pattern growing up in most areas that in one village or town they would
2 hear of an atrocity carried out. In another area, the rumour would sweep
3 around town let's say that two people had been killed by Croats, two Serbs
4 had been killed, as an example. And so the Serb community would be
5 furious and frightened. The rumour would go around. And quite often,
6 they would then organise some sort of retaliation in their own town
7 against the Croat community. And then it would later be discovered that
8 the original rumour was false, but you now have a real atrocity that's
9 being committed or a murder or rapes or robbery. And in the other town,
10 they hear of that, but then they hear of it in an exaggerated form so it
11 wasn't two or three people, but ten or 20 or a hundred. I give this as a
12 sort of example. I can cite specific instances that remain in my memory,
13 if that would be helpful.
14 But you got this sort of multiplier effect, largely caused by
15 rumour. So we saw it as a very important part of our job to go directly
16 to the source of the rumour and find out what the truth was. And quite
17 often something wrong had been done. But usually it was of a smaller
18 scale, and we could report that back.
19 Q. Mr. Mayhew, in fact, I think actually see by the interpreters
20 having a bit of trouble. You can slow down slightly because you are
21 speaking quite fast.
22 You've said you could -- you said that you could give us an
23 example. You can give us one example of what happened.
24 A. In Derventa, I remember that we crossed the informal front line
25 from the centre, out to the west of Derventa. So the centre was held by
1 Muslims at the time. "Held" is too strong a word, an informal front line
2 had grown up and people had polarised towards their own areas. The Serb
3 military commander was now west of Derventa, and we went out to find him.
4 And he said: "We have reliable information that there are a large
5 number," I think it was 400 people, "held in the basement of a certain
6 building in Derventa town. And they are being forced to give blood, so
7 that there are blood supplies for the Muslim and Croat forces. And
8 some -- they are at risk of dying." I can't remember if he said some had
9 died. "And if this doesn't stop immediately, we will use all means at our
10 disposal to attack and prevent this atrocity." And so we travelled back
11 across the front line, and my colleagues verified, went down into the
12 basement of that building with two minutes' warning and found that there
13 were eight people, prisoners held there, Serb prisoners, but no sign of
14 any more having been held and no sign that anyone had given blood in that
15 basement. And so we were able then to go back to the Serb commander and
16 say we have been there, with our own eyes we've checked, and this is what
17 the story is. And that would deal with that rumour, and he would usually
18 accept our word. But immediately there would be another one, yes, that's
19 fine, but I now have very reliable information that. And I remember he
20 cited another example of an enclave, a Serb residential area,
21 predominantly Serb area within Derventa that was now surrounded and about
22 to be attacked, and everyone would be killed. "And if something is not
23 done about this, I will use every means at my disposal." This is a kind
24 of language that we might hear on any side. I give this just as an
25 example. So we would go and verify that people were in that place but
1 they weren't being attacked and then we'd come back and then there'd be
2 another rumour, so we fought a sort of losing battle. We couldn't keep up
3 with the pace of rumours. And of course, we were only two or three
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot keep up with the pace of
6 the speaker.
7 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry for my speed. I will really try now to be
9 MS. KORNER: I think just to be clear, unlike your colleague
10 Mr. McLeod, this is the first time you have given evidence. So it's not
11 quite the same thing.
12 Q. Presumably, you were working through interpreters.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Who provided the interpreters for you?
15 A. In almost all cases, it was the local authorities under the mayor
16 of Banja Luka.
17 Q. Right. You've spoken about the rumours and whatever. Through
18 interpreters, were you able to get an idea of what was appearing in the
19 media, newspapers, and television?
20 A. Yes, we didn't pay close attention to local media because we heard
21 from people's own mouths what they were hearing, and we were mostly
22 interested in what real people thought. And if they had been influenced
23 by the media, we would pick that up from our interviews with people. But
24 it was of interest to us how the media was used, in a secondary sense.
25 Our overall impression was that the media were used by the authorities
1 there, and really in all parts of Croatia and Bosnia, to -- for
2 propaganda, and that part of the aim of many of the media announcements
3 was to frighten their own people into believing the worst stories about
4 the other side or the other two sides, and to cause a polarisation and to
5 believe, in a sense, that unless you separated from and possibly took up
6 arms against the other side, they would come and kill you first. And it
7 seemed to us that the great majority of people, ordinary people, were
8 quite happy to live alongside each other, and had done so for many years.
9 But within each of the main communities, there was a relatively small
10 group of people who were determined to poison people's minds against the
11 other side or the other two sides and to cause -- to cause this
12 polarisation so that the small core groups's political aims could be
14 Q. Now, you've told us about the ordinary people that you were
15 meeting. Did you also have meetings, and I want to turn now to Prijedor,
16 with leaders of the parties in Prijedor?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is there anyone in particular that sticks out in your mind?
19 A. Well, in that -- at that point, in April, May, we met with the
20 council of the district, and in particular, the three leaders of the three
21 main ethnic groups within the council, including the mayor.
22 Q. And are you able to recall now which the three political or the
23 ethnic -- not the ethnic groups, but the political parties were?
24 A. The SDS, the SDA, the Serb and Muslim. I actually don't recall
25 the Croat party, but it was the main Croat party. HDZ, it must be.
1 Q. The leadership of those parties, what were they saying to you,
2 individually or together?
3 A. Yes, in our -- I think at that time we had just the one sort of
4 full meeting in Prijedor with the council. And it fell into two parts.
5 We requested that we could meet alone with each of the three main leaders,
6 and we had a full meeting with the whole council also. We then gave a
7 small press statement afterwards. Each ethnic group leader gave us their
8 version of events, and the three versions were, of course, somewhat
9 different. A key aim of each of the three sides was to show that their
10 own side had behaved well, up until now, that their own side wished to
11 continue in a peaceful and constructive democratic way, and that their own
12 side had the right to remain.
13 Q. Now, do you recall what the leader of the SDS said in particular?
14 A. Yes. I recall it particularly because he had an unusual view of
15 democracy, it seemed to me. Using maps, he showed us that the Bosnian
16 Serb part of the population in that area owned the great majority of the
17 land, and I think it was about 75 per cent or something like that. And
18 this was what gave them their right within the democratic structures, this
19 gave them -- the implication was this gave them a greater right because of
20 greater landownership, all the while admitting that the proportion of
21 population was not the same as the proportion of land that they owned.
22 This was an argument we had never heard before and was not familiar to us,
23 and so it stuck particularly in my mind.
24 Q. When you say that the proportion of the population was not the
25 same as the proportion of land as they owned, in other words, they weren't
1 the majority of the population?
2 A. I don't recall in fact the percentages within that district. We
3 had maps which were very much widely used of the different proportions.
4 Yes, but it was much less than the percentage of landownership, and I
5 don't recall the percentage that it was.
6 Q. Now, by and large, what level of leadership was ECMM dealing with?
7 A. In northern Bosnia, we were dealing with mayors and below,
8 typically. There was one occasion later where I met General Mladic who
9 was just on a visit, and we met him. Just rather unusually, he agreed to
10 see us. But normally, we were dealing at mayor or below, and at sort of
11 colonel brigadier on the military side, that sort of level and below.
12 Q. And what role did you understand the mayor played in the area? I
13 mean, why were they the people that you were seeing?
14 A. At this stage, the problem was primarily a political problem. It
15 was becoming a military problem, or became later a military problem. And
16 so it was natural that we should go to political leaders first.
17 Q. Now, you were based in Banja Luka. Did you get to know the mayor
18 of Banja Luka, Mr. Pedrag Radic?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Roughly before, as we'll hear, ECMM was pulled out in May, how
21 often would you see Mr. Radic?
22 A. We would be in frequent touch with him, probably on average every
23 two or three days. And it was his office that was facilitating our other
24 needs such as security, interpreters. So we might be in touch with his
25 office more or less daily on some administrative matter or other. And his
1 office was a very short distance from our hotel.
2 Q. I want you to look, please, at a report that you prepared on a
3 particular meeting with Mr. Radic dated the 13th of April, 1992.
4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that was attachment 2 to the statement.
5 Your Honour, if Your Honours haven't got it for some reason, we
6 have more copies.
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The problem is we have numerous attachments to
8 different documents. Just to find the correct one. It's no problem.
9 MS. KORNER: Your Honours have found it.
10 Q. Mr. Mayhew, is this a report signed by you and I think another
11 gentleman, or this is a typed copy? But Mr. Botonakis.
12 A. That's right.
13 Q. First of all, is this a classic type of report that you would be
14 sending back or was it something out of the ordinary?
15 A. This was an extra report, in addition to our regular daily
16 reports, because a particular meeting had produced information that was
17 particularly interesting.
18 Q. And if we just go through that report, we see that it was written
19 or, rather, the date on the fax is the American style. It goes 92/4/19.
20 But does that mean it was faxed through or however it was, on the 19th of
21 April, 1992?
22 A. No, it would have been faxed through -- it would have been sent by
23 a machine called CapSat, which is an early form of email, probably on the
24 same day, the 13th of April, at the latest, the 14th of April.
25 Q. So what does "UTC time 92-04-19" mean?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. That is, almost certainly, a later faxing of this document.
2 Q. I see. Thank you.
3 A. Once already received by headquarters.
4 Q. Then it's addressed to RC Sarajevo. That was what?
5 A. That's called regional centre Sarajevo, which was the Sarajevo
6 regional sort of subheadquarters of the ECMM.
7 Q. "From Banja Luka 1." What does that mean?
8 A. That means team number 1 of the three, I think it was three Banja
9 Luka teams. So it's the name of the team, which is Botonakis and myself.
10 Q. And it's dated the 13th of April, 1992. And we see it had headed
11 "Serbian Republic within Bosnia and Herzegovina."
12 Paragraph 1: "At a meeting today, the mayor of Banja Luka,
13 Mr. Pedrag Radic, outlined his view of the Serbian Republic within Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina." Now, before we go on to look at what he said, how did
15 this conversation come about exactly?
16 A. We would meet with him frequently, as I mentioned, and it just
17 happened that in a particular meeting, he came out with this vision of the
18 future political shape of a Bosnian Serb part of Bosnia. I suspect that
19 we had probably asked one of our normal questions: "How do you see the
20 future evolving?" This would be a question we would often ask to
21 political leaders of all sides.
22 Q. All right let's look what he said. "His opinion seemed carefully
23 thought out. He expects to be appointed as the vice-president of this
24 republic soon, so his comments are worth noting, and are probably an
25 accurate indication of SDS intentions.
1 "2: The Serbian Republic within Bosnia and Herzegovina would
2 consist of six parts: Semberija, and then it names the municipalities.
3 North Bosnia. Romania. Birac, and then Bosanska Krajina, which includes
4 -- what we see, well, various different municipalities including
5 Prijedor, and then the next typed line is: "Parts of the Krajina region
6 not specified." Is that what he said, that he mentioned other parts? He
7 said there would be other parts not specified or that you missed what he
8 was saying?
9 A. No, no it wasn't in this case that we missed what he was saying.
10 This is part of the Krajina just outside the Bosnian border. And what he
11 must have said is: "There would be some parts of that, but we have yet to
12 decide which they would be." It was to make the point that it would not
13 be limited only by the Bosnian border but would take some parts of those
14 other Krajina sections.
15 Q. That's over the border into Croatia?
16 A. Yes, as far as the borders show. Of course, that was a matter of
17 dispute in Mr. Radic's mind since that was a predominantly Serb area, I
18 think he wouldn't have called it Croatia.
19 Q. And then F, eastern Herzegovina, and again, the various areas,
20 municipalities are listed.
21 "3: The capital would be Banja Luka. The six parts would be a
22 confederation within BiH, and the Serbian Republic would be very largely
23 autonomous. It would retain close links with Serbia, including the use of
24 the Serbian Dinar as its currency.
25 "4: Once the Muslim and Croat constituent units of BiH are
1 established, Radic foresees a small central government with responsibility
2 for certain aspects of fiscal policy and foreign policy. Three foreign
3 ministers would rotate taking turns to head the foreign ministry for six
4 months at a time. Central government would have no responsibility for
6 "5: Radic was evasive when asked whether it was the plebiscite of
7 the 9th, 10th November, 1991, which gave the authority for the Serbian
8 Republic. He said vaguely that the Republic was a result of the wishes of
9 Serbian people."
10 Can I ask, Mr. Mayhew, how familiar were you with the events
11 leading up to and after the plebiscite?
12 A. Because it was in November 1991, I had been briefed about it, but
13 in a limited way. So I was aware of essentially what it had said. But
14 not very much more. My memory is now quite dim of that plebiscite.
15 Q. Paragraph 6: "He was asked for his opinion of the statement of
16 principle, Brussels, 9 of March, 1992, Sarajevo 18th of March, 1992, he
17 said it did not give enough autonomy to the constituent units. (See
18 Section D of the statement of principles.)
19 Again, Mr. Mayhew, if you can't remember, what was the statement
20 of principles that you were referring to?
21 A. I don't remember the details. This was part of the diplomatic
22 initiatives which I would have read at the time and we referred to in the
23 conversation. But I don't recall the detail.
24 Q. Seven: "Finally, he mentioned that the Serbian dominated areas
25 in -- he mentioned that the Serbian dominated areas in the southeast of
1 BiH, eastern Herzegovina would eventually join Montenegro."
2 "8: A frequent theme of the mayor's remarks was that the EC
3 strongly favoured Croatia and Slovenia. He seemed to believe this
4 genuinely. He also suggested less strongly that there is an EC campaign
5 against the orthodox church. This complaint has been heard often before."
6 Now, which complaint, Mr. Mayhew, that the EC strongly favoured
7 Croatia and Slovenia, or about the campaign against the orthodox church?
8 A. It's not clear from my text, and I don't recall which. My guess
9 is that it probably refers to both complaints because I do remember both
10 complaints being made frequently.
11 Q. "9: Despite his complaints, the mayor's manner was definitely
12 friendly, and he seemed convinced of the potential usefulness of the
13 ECMM." And then: "The Livno/Duvno situation, Mr. Radic warned that we
14 should not be surprised if he took Croatian civilian hostages in order to
15 exchange for Serbian civilian hostages held in Rascani, near Duvno. We
16 warned him that the EC would view this with great concern, and that he
17 would lose any moral advantage that he now has. We promised that ECMM
18 teams would do what they could to help any Serb hostages, and urged him to
19 be patient. The Belgrade press is taking a close interest in this case,
20 as well as the local press here."
21 Now, first, can you just very briefly tell us what was the
22 reference to "Serb civilian hostages in Rascani?"
23 A. Yes, that the Bosnian Serb authorities had detained a number of
24 Serb civilians in Rascani.
25 Q. He was warning that you should not be surprised if he took
1 Croatian civilian hostages. How did you react to this particular remark.
2 We can see that you reported the warning, but did you take it seriously?
3 A. Yes, we took it seriously. It was entirely within his power to do
4 that. It was not unknown elsewhere in Bosnia, and later on, subsequent
5 events showed that that was the sort of thing that could be done. So we
6 thought it was a realistic feasible threat.
7 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Mayhew. That's that report.
8 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may that be made an Exhibit.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: S214.
10 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objections?
12 MR. LUKIC: No objections, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence as S214.
14 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
15 Q. Now, when you went -- did you go to Prijedor during this period of
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And that you had already told us, because you said you had the
19 meeting with the leaders of the parties there. Were you aware at any
20 stage before you left in May of a takeover that had occurred in Prijedor
21 by the SDS?
22 A. I don't remember that.
23 Q. Whilst you were in Banja Luka itself, did you ever become aware of
24 an incursion into Banja Luka by members of a paramilitary group styling
25 themselves the SOS?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Now, I'd like you to explain how ECMM came to pull out of Bosnia,
3 in brief.
4 A. My colleague, Bertrand Borrey, who was a Belgian monitor was
5 killed, shot in no man's land near Mostar, in May. I think you will have
6 the date. And shortly afterwards, the head of mission decided that in
7 view of that event, and the deteriorating security for all monitors in
8 Bosnia, to withdraw us for consultation to Zagreb, which was a soft way of
9 saying to evacuate.
10 Q. And in fact, did ECMM pull out of Bosnia completely until August
11 of 1992?
12 A. They pulled out completely. They didn't know how long it would be
13 that they would be absent. We all hoped that it would be for a matter of
14 a few weeks perhaps.
15 Q. Now, just before we come on to the second visit you made to this
16 area, during your time there, were you aware -- you've told us about
17 rumours -- of any incidents, actual incidents, of intimidation?
18 A. This is referring to which period?
19 Q. In the period between the beginning of April and May of 1992.
20 A. There was a general atmosphere of intimidation, and whenever we
21 spoke to people, we found them afraid. We found all three groups afraid,
22 but the Muslim and Croat communities in that area the most afraid. So
23 there could be no doubt in our mind that intimidation was happening in a
24 widespread sense. As for specific incidents, we didn't investigate
25 specific threats against an individual family, for example. We were
1 tending to have to deal with much larger groups because we were concerned
2 with the overall stability rather than pursuing individual cases. I have
3 mentioned one or two examples in Derventa where --
4 Q. Can I stop you for a moment. What I'm interested in is the sort
5 of Banja Luka, Prijedor area.
6 A. No, we didn't. As far as I recall, we didn't investigate any
7 individual incidents. We heard of many stories and allegations of
8 intimidation of families. But we didn't get to the detail of individual
10 Q. Before you left, were any restrictions placed on your freedom of
11 movement throughout the area?
12 A. Yes. Mr. Radic announced just a few days, very short time before
13 we left, that he would now have to start restricting our freedom of
14 movement, and the reason that he gave was for our own safety. This was a
15 phrase that was often used by all three sides, and it was usually used
16 when they wished to hide something. Of course, there were exceptions when
17 they were genuinely concerned for our own safety. And our impression was
18 that there might be some genuine reason in this, but there would probably
19 also be some desire to stop us seeing some things that were going on.
20 Q. All right. So you pulled out, and did you then go to Zagreb?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And did you remain there until August of -- well, I think you
23 remained there after that. But were you there until you went back in
24 August 1992?
25 A. Yes. I may have made one or two very brief missions out, of one
1 or two days, but essentially I was there.
2 Q. Can we now move, then to, that visit. Had it been decided that
3 the CSCE, that is, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
4 would send a mission to inspect what was described as places of detention
5 in Bosnia?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And was that largely as a result of the London Conference that had
8 been held in August?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And was that mission to inspect to be headed by a -- an English
11 diplomat called Sir John Thomson?
12 A. Yes, I think he was a retired diplomat by that stage.
13 Q. Was ECMM requested to facilitate the mission's visit to the Banja
14 Luka area?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And because you had been there before, were you asked effectively
17 to try and set this up and coordinate things?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And so, as a result, did you obtain permission to visit Banja Luka
20 in advance of the mission's arrival?
21 A. Yes, though I think I remember that those advance missions were in
22 order to prepare for our own return, and it so happened that then the CSCE
23 mission intervened at very short notice.
24 Q. And as we've heard, and as we can see on this, as it were,
25 planning stage, were you joined by Charles McLeod?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And was that the first time that the two of you had worked
3 together, or had you worked together before?
4 A. I think it was our first field mission together, probably. We had
5 worked together in the headquarters sometime before that.
6 Q. Now, did you keep your own notes of conversations that you had
7 with, first of all, Mr. Radic, and then other people, or would you be
8 relying for the detail on the reports made by Mr. McLeod?
9 A. I haven't kept my own notes. And so for the detail of the
10 conversation, I would rely on Mr. McLeod's reports.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm not going to go through all the
12 detail again. I've already dealt with that with Mr. McLeod. But I am
13 just going to go through the various visits that were paid. Could you be
14 handed, please, the report of a visit on the 23rd of August, 1992, to
15 Mr. Radic, which has already been produced as S...
16 Your Honour, Ms. Karper tells me it wasn't exhibited when
17 Mr. McLeod gave evidence. I rather thought it was.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: From the top of my head, I remember that we
19 decided to take the entire notes as one exhibit. Is it included in this?
20 MS. KORNER: It may be the registry can help. The number on the
21 first document is 00950317. We have a copy available for Mr. Mayhew.
22 THE REGISTRAR: It's Exhibit S171.
23 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
24 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry, for clarification, is this the
25 handwritten notes?
1 MS. KORNER: No, it's the typed. But we've got a spare copy.
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
3 MS. KORNER: I think, Your Honour, Ms. Karper is quite right.
4 When I went through it with Mr. McLeod, I only made an exhibit, I think,
5 of the meeting with Stakic. I think the rest we went through.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: That's right. And then additionally, we took
7 into evidence the entire notes in handwriting.
8 MS. KORNER: The handwritten ones, that's right. Your Honour, Ms.
9 Karper was quite right. And effectively, in any event, I'm only going to
10 just go through the basic meetings with this witness. But if he could
11 have a copy of it anyhow. Has he got a -- you have, yes.
12 Q. This was a meeting with Mr. Radic; Mr. Zupljanin, the Banja Luka
13 chief of police; and a representative of the army, Colonel Vukelic. Mr.
14 Radic obviously you knew. What about the Banja Luka chief of police,
15 Mr. Zupljanin, had you met him before?
16 A. I don't think so.
17 Q. And Colonel Vukelic?
18 A. I don't think so.
19 Q. All really I want to ask you about this, Mr. Mayhew, is what was
20 the attitude of Mr. Radic to your return?
21 A. His attitude was generally positive, but a great deal had happened
22 since we had last met. And I think his attitude was therefore somewhat
23 under strain. The situation was confused. The future was doubtful. He
24 wasn't sure in his mind yet whether our return would be advantageous to
25 him and to his community. He wanted to encourage us, but he stopped short
1 of a firm and definite permission to return. He wanted some of his points
2 of view to be well understood. We had been out of contact for some time,
3 so that was natural. I think he was probably somewhat fearful for the
4 future. Would his communities aims be realised? Would there be lasting
5 peace soon? And I think all communities at that stage were confused and
6 frightened, and I think he showed some of that, which is fully
8 Is that enough of an answer for you?
9 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. All right. And then I think we'll
10 deal without showing you the document, did you pay a second visit to
11 Mr. Radic on the following day, again, with Mr. McLeod?
12 A. Yes, if the document confirms that, I rely on the document for the
14 Q. All right. Can we move, then, please to the actual arrival of
15 Sir John Thomson's mission. Did you and Mr. McLeod escort
16 Sir John Thomson, first of all -- I think you came through
17 Bosanski Gradiska, then Banja Luka, and the visit to Manjaca, and then did
18 you go to Prijedor on the 31st of August?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Without showing you the report, because I think -- unless you'd
21 like it, Mr. Mayhew -- what do you remember just about Gradiska, if
23 A. Yes, this was our first -- our first visit of such a high level.
24 And it was clear that the authorities wished to impress and to receive a
25 high-level visitor in a formal and correct manner. There were soldiers
1 standing to attention, lining the route for the last little part of the
2 route, to the mayor's office, and we were very courteously received by the
4 Q. Then moving, because for the purposes of this case, the visit to
5 Banja Luka and Manjaca is not germane. But moving to the visit to
6 Prijedor, I'd ask please that you be given what was exhibited,
7 Mr. McLeod's report on the meeting with Dr. Stakic, which is S166.
8 A. Thank you.
9 Q. Now, can I just ask you this, Mr. Mayhew, first of all: How much
10 of a recollection, an independent recollection, do you have of that
12 A. Of the meeting in Prijedor?
13 Q. In Prijedor.
14 A. I remember the occasion. My primary role was as a facilitator of
15 the high-level mission. And so I was not negotiating directly. But I
16 remember the main content and tone, certainly the main tone, and the main
17 events, but not the detail within the meeting.
18 Q. Had you ever met Dr. Stakic on your earlier visits to Prijedor?
19 A. I don't know. I had certainly met the leader of the Serb
20 community or Serb party in, as I mentioned earlier. But I don't remember
21 his name.
22 Q. All right. And if asked, after a gap of ten years or so, do you
23 think you would be able to recognise Dr. Stakic again?
24 A. I couldn't be certain. I could not be certain of it.
25 Q. All right. Can we just - really, because we have been through the
1 detail with Mr. McLeod - go to the conclusions of this report.
2 A. Page 5.
3 Q. Page 5, thank you. We can see that it must have been actually
4 written after the visit to Trnopolje, because it refers to it, although
5 the meeting came before, I think. But I'm going to deal with the visit to
6 Trnopolje in a moment. Because it states: "The version of events that
7 led to the opening of Trnopolje that we were given by the mayor was in
8 stark contrast to that given by the people we spoke to in the camp."
9 A. I'm not on the right page I'm afraid.
10 Q. I'm sorry, it's paragraph 41.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Then 42, conclusion: "The authorities insist that they are acting
13 in the best interests of all the people in their area and that they have
14 no desire to get rid of the Muslim population. However, this just does
15 not match what they are actually doing. Against this background, it is
16 very hard to draw conclusions based on what is said.
17 "43: The conclusion to be drawn from what we have seen is that
18 the Muslim population is not wanted and is being systematically kicked out
19 by whatever method is available."
20 Now, what is important -- opinion? Is that a fair conclusion,
21 Mr. Mayhew?
22 A. In general, yes. I think I would have worded it slightly
23 differently, particularly that last phrase. I fully agree with the phrase
24 "the Muslim population is not wanted and is being systematically kicked
25 out." We had seen plenty of evidence for that. If I was going to be very
1 strict with my language, I would want to be just a little bit cautious
2 about that phrase "by whatever method is available." The fact is that at
3 that visit, many Muslim people were still living in their homes. And if
4 the authorities had truly wanted whatever method, they could already have
5 transported them to the border or taken other measures. So I would
6 probably have replaced that phrase with something like "by whatever method
7 they could get away with" or -- and possibly have allowed some room for a
8 difference of opinion among the Bosnian Serb leadership. After all, not
9 everyone was certain that 100 per cent of the Muslim population had to go.
10 There was, I'm sure, a variety of opinion, hardliners, and less hardline.
11 But there was a predominant aim, it seemed, to drive out at least enough
12 of the Muslim population to be certain that the number remaining could be
13 of no threat at all and would be fully subdued. That, I am confident of.
14 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Mayhew. The report can be taken back. Thank
16 Now, can I ask you about the visit to Trnopolje. You prepared a
17 report, I think yourself, on both your visit to Trnopolje and Manjaca.
18 MS. KORNER: And I wonder if you could now be handed that, please,
19 which was attachment --
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: One.
21 MS. KORNER: One, I think it was. Yes, attachment one to the
22 statement. Thank you.
23 Q. I think the first document, it was a covering letter addressed to
24 a Mr. Gray in the foreign and commonwealth office saying -- from Mr.
25 Melhuish. Who was he?
1 A. Head of mission of the ECMM.
2 Q. Saying: "Dear Charles, conditions inside Bosnian detention camps.
3 As you know, we helped out Sir John's Thomson's CSCE mission to Banja Luka
4 on the 30th and 31st of August by assigning two ECMM monitors to act as
5 escorts and fixers. I subsequently asked one of them, Barney Mayhew, a
6 British monitor, to record his impressions. I now attach the paper he has
7 written for whatever purpose you may think fit. As was the case with an
8 earlier report by Patrick Russell in my undated letter to Jeremy
9 Greenstock, sent late July, we do not often have the chance of obtaining
10 first-hand impressions of conditions in northern Bosnia. Whenever we do,
11 we think the department should know, and you may wish to give this a wider
13 And then if we go to the actual document that you produced,
14 introduction -- I'm sorry, it's headed "Manjaca and Trnopolje."
15 "Introduction: Between the 30th of August and the 2nd of
16 September, 1992, an ECMM team visited Manjaca camp and Trnopolje Open
17 Reception Centre at northern Bosnia twice each. We were escorting first
18 the CSCE rapporteur mission, and then a representative of the EC
19 presidency following the London Conference. The Bosnian Serb authorities
20 were welcoming and determined that both places should be fully open to
22 There is then a section on Manjaca. And if we go, then, to the
23 next page where you deal with Trnopolje: "The Trnopolje, southeast of
24 Prijedor," I imagine it should read centre or whatever, camp, "is
25 described as an open reception centre. Wire fencing has been removed.
1 Approximately 1600 male refugees, again, almost all Muslim, are held there
2 for their own safety, according to the Bosnian Serb authorities, although
3 some officials claim the refugees are free to leave.
4 "However, small sandbag military guard posts on the edges of the
5 centre face inwards. The centre is run by the local Red Cross, and has no
6 visible internal discipline. Eyes are not downcast. The centre is
7 located around some school buildings with some refugees sleeping inside
8 the buildings, and the remainder living in improvised tents outside.
9 Again, no provision has been made for winter."
10 Just pausing for a moment, I'm going to come back to the whole
11 visit, but when you say again, you're referring back to your part about
12 Manjaca, I think.
13 A. Yes, in Manjaca, the commandant had stated that no provision had
14 been made for winter.
15 Q. "Food seems still be in short supply, although the ICRC is now
16 supplying food. Water also seems to be insufficient, and diarrhea is
17 again the biggest medical problem according to the centre's doctor. The
18 trees seem not to be maintained. Excrement lies on the ground in several
19 parts of the camp. When interviewed without witness, the refugees give
20 the same story as those at Manjaca. A group from the nearby town of
21 Kozarac told me that on the 24th of May, the Bosnian Serb army had shelled
22 Kozarac with artillery for 30 hours before moving in to remove men, then
23 women and children, then possessions from the houses. The houses were
24 then burned. (The team visited part of Kozarac and found nearly all the
25 houses burned. These houses were last seen by the ECMM in April, intact
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 and inhabited.)
2 "Several refugees at Trnopolje had claimed that some of their
3 numbers had been shot and others had disappeared without explanation.
4 Again, there is unison when asked what they want to do; to leave to
5 anywhere other than Bosanska Krajina, Serb-held northern Bosnia."
6 I'll deal with the next paragraph after I've asked you about
7 Trnopolje. Now, Mr. Mayhew, if you can, let's put some flesh on to this
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I remind you, we would have only five
10 minutes, and I think it's appropriate, because it will be a longer issue,
11 that we have a break now.
12 The trial stands adjourned until 10 minutes past 4.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 3.39 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated.
16 Let me take the opportunity to immediately inform you on what
17 happened this morning as regards the documents. Trial Chamber has
18 received an internal memorandum from Judge Per Lindholm dated 17th of July
19 2002, subject documents in Stakic case. It reads: "Please be informed on
20 the 17th July, 2002, at 11.00 in my office, a review of documents send
21 from the United Nations Detention Unit to me was conducted pursuant to the
22 order to the registry of the Tribunal to provide documents dated 5 July,
24 "One, the persons present during the review included Judge Per
25 Lindholm, Mr. Branko Lukic, Defence counsel for Milomir Stakic, Miss
1 Katherine Gallagher, and Miss Sanja Matesic, who assisted with
2 translation. The envelope was opened in the presence of myself and the
3 Defence counsel for Milomir Stakic as instructed. Three, the envelope
4 contained 22 documents, 20 documents contained Dr. Stakic's signature.
5 Two documents included additional writings by Milomir Stakic. Also, 20
6 documents containing Dr. Stakic's signature, one document was a colour
7 copy, and the remaining 19 documents were originals. 4, both myself and
8 Branko Lukic examined every document. 5, both myself and Branko Lukic
9 agreed that there were no confidential materials in the envelope, and all
10 the documents could be sent to the Office of the Prosecutor. It was
11 decided to include two documents that did not contain Dr. Stakic's
12 signature (his driver's license and identity card) for completeness.
13 "6, all documents were placed in an envelope addressed to the
14 Office of the Prosecutor, attention Joanna Korner. I sealed the envelope
15 in the presence of all, Branko Lukic included, and gave it to Katherine
16 Gallagher for delivery to Ms. Joanna Korner."
17 This document will be admitted into evidence as J8. And I hope,
18 then, without further notice the handwriting expert can start the work.
19 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, there is one matter that arises from
20 that. I actually didn't get the documents. Ms. Gallagher left a message
21 for me because I was in another court. I think Mr. Koumjian collected or
22 Ms. Karper did. There is one matter that Mr. Koumjian wants to raise. I
23 think I will finish this witness in chief before the end of today, so if
24 Mr. Koumjian could raise it at that stage.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. So let's now proceed with the
1 examination-in-chief of the witness before us.
2 Thank you for your understanding. And proceed immediately.
3 MS. KORNER:
4 Q. Mr. Mayhew, remembering again, if you can, not to speak too
5 quickly, and I'll try not to pick up straight at the end of an answer of
7 We read your report that you provided to your head of mission.
8 Can you try and flesh out a little what you said about Trnopolje. You've
9 described it as containing approximately 1600 male refugees. What most
10 struck you about the camp?
11 A. A number of things. The first is it was quite a relaxed
12 atmosphere at that stage. We couldn't tell whether this was a recent
13 innovation or whether this had always been the case. Some wire fencing
14 had recently been removed, we noticed that. And that, combined with
15 common sense, told us that the conditions as we saw them were likely to be
16 somewhat improved from the recent past. It would be in the interests of
17 the camp authorities to show a good face and to make sure that nothing too
18 damaging was visible. Now, that is me using common sense to guess. It's
19 not a fact that I can confirm.
20 But the atmosphere was relaxed. Conditions of hygiene were poor.
21 That was one of the strong impressions, excrement on the ground, no action
22 being taken to clean that. People living in makeshift shelters covered
23 with bits of cloth or plastic. This certainly can't be called adequate
24 accommodation and no authority would consider that as adequate
25 accommodation, except, of course, in an emergency for a night or two.
1 This camp had been around longer. People were frightened, not truly --
2 not free to leave. Guns were pointing inwards from these guard posts as I
3 referred to. And there seemed to be some freedom of movement, but within
4 limits that we couldn't quite determine. So it was a mixed picture, but
5 one of control but not of harsh control at that stage. Yes.
6 Q. You've said the atmosphere was relaxed. How would you compare
7 what you'd seen in Manjaca?
8 A. The relaxed thing is the key difference with Manjaca, that people
9 were free to mill around and walk about. They would be playing draughts
10 or something or some sort of activity to keep themselves entertained or
11 occupied. And they could walk around freely within the centre. And they
12 would engage your eyes with eye contact. I was able to just to slip to
13 one side into the corner of a building and have a quick conversation for
14 several minutes with a group of people and get an impression of their
15 stories. I couldn't have done that for long, but it was longer than
17 Now, in Manjaca, just about everyone's eyes were held deliberately
18 down like this. Some people, you know, would look up, but sort of
19 briefly and quickly look down. A most unnatural way for anyone to behave.
20 Similarly, when walking around the camp, heads all bowed, all uniformly
21 hands behind back. And our impression was the regime would have had to
22 have been particularly strict, at the very least, and probably very harsh
23 to achieve that kind of human reaction.
24 Q. You said, because I think we saw somewhere that it had been
25 described as an open reception --
1 A. Centre.
2 Q. -- At the beginning of your report, an open reception centre. And
3 you described that there was a machine-gun, I think, post or whatever
4 facing inwards. Sorry, small sandbag military guard posts on the edge of
5 the centre face inwards. What did that suggest to you?
6 A. Well, it was quite clear to someone who had any military
7 experience that the primary purpose of that post was to prevent people
8 from leaving and to make the point unequivocally to the inhabitants that
9 they were required to stay. This was at variance with the theme of the
10 authorities locally, which was "they are there for their own protection
11 and their own safety." So you would have simply reversed the orientation
12 of these guard posts which had no view -- the one I'm particularly
13 thinking of had no view external to the camp. It could only look inwards.
14 So it was quite clearly not for the purposes of protection of the camp.
15 Q. Now, I want you to have a look at some photographs that were taken
16 during the course of this visit by the mission. I think not by you; you
17 didn't carry a camera with you.
18 A. No, I felt it could be compromising to my work.
19 Q. I think we'll leave out the Manjaca ones because they are not
20 relevant, if we could go to the ones that were taken at Trnopolje.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Did I understand correctly that this document we
22 just had before us was tendered?
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, no, Your Honour is quite right. I
24 don't think I have tendered. I haven't finished with the document yet.
25 There is one more paragraph Your Honours will see. I just want to deal
1 with the photographs.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
3 MS. KORNER:
4 Q. If we could look at first of all the one bearing the number
5 00456962, and yes, if we could put that on the ELMO. If you turn to your
6 right, you can probably see it on the screen as well. You will see the
7 first photograph coming up.
8 Do you remember this building?
9 A. Yes, I think so. I can't be certain it's the right building, but
10 I see an ECMM colleague dressed in white in the front there. It looks
11 very like the building which was at the front of Trnopolje.
12 Q. And then could we go to the next one with the number 63. Now, is
13 that -- you talked about this makeshift accommodation. Is that what you
14 were meaning?
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 Q. These sort of tents and that. Can you remember seeing any women
17 at all there?
18 A. I actually do not remember whether it was a mixed population or
19 only male. I talked mainly or exclusively to men. I'm afraid I can't
21 Q. All right. Yes. If we then could go to the next, number 64. A
22 close-up apparently of one of these tents.
23 A. That looks just like the accommodation I remember.
24 Q. Number 65.
25 A. Just a point of clarification, some accommodation was inside the
1 building, and some was outside in these makeshift tents.
2 Q. Now, this group here, the man in the middle of the group, in
3 comparison to the rest, seems to be somewhat thinner. Can you recall,
4 were there a number of men who were that sort of type of figure?
5 A. Yes. I remember that there were a significant number of people
6 there who were particularly thin, of this -- roughly of this degree of
7 thinness. I can't remember the proportion in any way. In any case, we
8 didn't survey the whole population. It was not just two or three. It was
9 not sort of completely exceptional, but it was a significant proportion,
10 and perhaps it was 5 or 10 per cent as a rough guess.
11 Q. Can I just ask you this: Before you went on this visit, had you
12 seen the film, the news film, that had been made by the ITN news crew or
13 any other television news crew earlier that month?
14 A. No, I don't think so.
15 Q. And then the next one is the number 66 at the end. The cooking
16 facilities, were there a number of people cooking in this fashion?
17 A. Yes. I don't remember there being a kitchen area. Now it's quite
18 possible that there was a kitchen area, but I don't recall it. And I do
19 recall a number of people cooking like this outside, which would suggest
20 that they were not being fed from the kitchen area or not being adequately
21 fed. I remember from my report that the ICRC was bringing food. This is
22 a very significant fact in my opinion, given the duty on any detaining
23 power to provide sufficient food. And in my private conversations with
24 the ICRC, they were quite clear in their opinion that the level of food
25 supplied, both here and in Manjaca, was woefully insufficient, well below
1 what was needed. And as a last resort and under protest, they had agreed
2 to supply food.
3 Q. And then the last photograph, please, number 67. Can you tell us
4 what we're looking at here. Yes, this is a water tanker, water being
5 brought to the camp in an orderly and correct fashion. I recall that
6 water supplies were said to be on the low side, and I don't have accurate
7 recollection of precisely how much water was supplied. But this is a, in
8 my opinion, a perfectly reasonable way to supply water to a temporary
10 Q. Yes. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Mayhew.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may the photographs be admitted, again,
12 as a separate exhibit from Ms. Sutherland's bundle.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes let's please call it 216. This leaves open
14 215 for the report provided by the witness.
15 MS. KORNER: Yes.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: And then the photos, then they are tendered,
17 216-1 to -6.
19 MR. LUKIC: No, Your Honour, no objections. Only I'm not sure
20 whether we have the same set of photographs.
21 MS. KORNER: Everyone should have the same set, although there's
22 the extra Manjaca ones attached to it which I haven't put in.
23 MR. LUKIC: I'll check it with your case manager. Thank you.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. Then admitted into evidence, S216-1
25 to -6.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MS. KORNER:
2 Q. Now, you refer in your report to the Kozarac area, and also to
3 coming across a convoy. Before I ask you on each aspect of that, did you
4 see the convoy on your way to Trnopolje or on the way back, or Manjaca?
5 A. I'm not certain, but I remember the convoy was travelling east on
6 that main road which runs from -- which runs east towards Banja Luka, or
8 Q. In that case, let's deal with that final part of your report that
9 you made, which was headed: "Population movement."
10 "While in the area, the team came across a convoy carrying an
11 estimated 300 to 400 people moving from Sanski Most (an area with a large
12 Muslim population) to Travnik (a Muslim-held area) presumably to be sent
13 across the front line, either unilaterally or in exchange for Serb
14 prisoners. Muslim and Croat refugees" -- it has been chopped off I'm
16 A. I think that word is "also."
17 Q. Also continued to cross from northern Bosnia into Croatia. Does
18 it read caveat?
19 A. Yes. I can explain that.
20 Q. If you can explain that now, yes.
21 A. There has been a part of this report removed, I think one further
22 paragraph whose heading was: "Caveat". I don't recall precisely what
23 that said, but I'm reasonably confident that I said something like, treat
24 this information with caution. We had a problem at one stage in the ECMM
25 where our reports were not being acted on as we wished back in the
1 European capitals. And there was one incident where the European
2 presidency condemned the shelling of civilians outside Jajce in Bosnia. I
3 was very surprised to see this because I knew the press had reported this
4 shelling of civilians. And we checked very very carefully all our sources
5 and we had no reliable report that civilians had been, in fact, shelled.
6 And we had emphasised this in our reports, and still a public condemnation
7 had been made of this unconfirmed report from some few people. And this
8 made me angry because it reduced our credibility in the eyes of the
9 Bosnian Serb leadership. It seemed to them sometimes as if they would be
10 dammed if they did something bad, and they would be damned if they didn't.
11 Now, I say this because I think it's relevant to my evidence.
12 As a result of this, I put a caveat in to warn against -- I can't
13 remember how I would have put it. But to make sure that this information
14 was used correctly.
15 MS. KORNER: Right. Your Honour, just before everybody thinks
16 that the Prosecution has been removing things, this is how we acquired the
17 document from ECMM. I hasten to add this is not an excision made by us.
18 THE WITNESS: And I can explain that, if you'd like me to.
19 MS. KORNER: I think yes.
20 THE WITNESS: I remember that the caveat was removed, I think, by
21 the head of mission before he sent it out with his covering letter. So
22 this is the version that he sent to the foreign office in London.
23 MS. KORNER:
24 Q. I see. Thank you very much.
25 Was this the only time during those two or three days that you
1 were with Sir John that you saw one of these convoys of refugees?
2 A. Yes. In fact, I think Sir John may not have been in the vehicle
3 with me when I saw this.
4 Q. Then, you refer to the team visiting part of Kozarac, which the
5 Court knows would have been on your way back from Trnopolje through to
6 Prijedor, that area. But what was the area like when you saw it?
7 A. Can you just refer me to the paragraph.
8 Q. In your report on Trnopolje --
9 A. There we go, I see it.
10 Q. You refer to the team visiting part of Kozarac and found nearly
11 all the houses burnt.
12 A. Yes. Now I can't recall whether I personally was in the team or
13 part of a team that visited that part of Kozarac. I certainly saw houses
14 near there myself. I was reporting here on behalf of the team, and it
15 makes no difference, in my view, whether it was me personally or not. But
16 the team, whether it included me or not, did go and visit those houses in
17 Kozarac and described them in the same way that we had seen the houses
18 lining the route and the houses that I had personally seen.
19 And the striking thing was to any military person that there were
20 no bullet marks in the walls and no shell splash marks visible, but the
21 houses were burnt out. And when I asked what had happened, the reply was:
22 "Well, there was a battle that's happened here." But no battle would
23 cause that kind of visible evidence. I didn't pursue the matter at the
24 time in discussion, but it was quite clear to us that while there may have
25 been a few shells to frighten people, there had been no kind of military
1 engagement, as I would understand it, other than perhaps some
2 intimidation. So, it was a clear piece of evidence that we were not being
3 told the truth about what had happened in Kozarac. And by implications
4 other similar places in the area.
5 Q. Yes, that's all I want to ask you about that report.
6 MS. KORNER: So Your Honour, may that now be admitted as S --
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: 215. Objections?
8 MR. LUKIC: It's clearly the document composed by the witness, so
9 we don't have any objections, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence, S215A and B
12 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
13 Q. Mr. Mayhew, before I come to the report of the whole of Sir John's
14 mission, may I ask you this: With Sir John, did you actually visit a
15 particular enclave of Muslim houses?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you remember where that was?
18 A. It was in a suburb of Prijedor or a village very close to
19 Prijedor, but I think probably a suburb of Prijedor town.
20 Q. And did you talk to the residents there?
21 A. Yes. In quite a relaxed manner, for quite some time. Let's say
22 an hour or more.
23 Q. Did you notice anything in particular about their houses?
24 A. Yes, there were white flags hanging, jutting out from the front of
25 all the houses or nearly all.
1 Q. I should have asked you this: In respect of the burnt-out houses
2 that you noticed on the route, were there also houses still standing?
3 A. Yes. Normally, where there had been a large number of burnt-out
4 houses, there would be some individual houses with their roofs and
5 everything intact. And I think all of those houses, though there may have
6 been some exceptions, had the Serbian mark on it of the cross with the
7 four Cs, to show that that house belonged to a Serb family and should not
8 be torched.
9 Q. All right. Now I want you to look, please, at the full report
10 that was prepared as a result of Sir John Thomson's mission, which I
11 hope --
12 MS. KORNER: Have Your Honours got a copy of? It does have a 65
13 ter number. I can't think what it is. 354.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15 MS. KORNER:
16 Q. Mr. Mayhew, just to make this clear, I think it's right, you had
17 no hand in the actual writing of this report.
18 A. No.
19 Q. But did you read the report at or about the time that it was
21 A. I can't remember, but it would have been extremely likely that I
22 read the report immediately after publication. We would have received a
23 copy, and I was directly involved.
24 Q. And having gone through it, I think you're able to make various
25 observations based on your part in this whole mission. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Yes. It's headed --
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, again, because it's a very lengthy
4 report, I'm going to read in full certain passages, but summarise others.
5 Q. It's headed: "Report of the CSCE mission to inspect places of
6 detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 29th of August, to the 4th of September
8 And the first page, if we turn to that, is a summary of its
9 recommendations, the first being that: "The CSCE to pronounce against the
10 policy of ethnic cleansing and insist that it not provide a basis for
11 future settlement of the dispute.
12 2: To insist on accountability of all authorities, parties, and
13 individuals participating in the conflict.
14 "3: CSCE to declare forcible disposal of property null and void.
15 "4: CSCE to insist that all other prisoners be released
16 immediately and in a safe and controlled manner.
17 "5: CSCE to recommend the immediate evacuation of Trnopolje 'open
19 And then I'm going to leave out the rest because they were
20 effectively political recommendations, I think. Well, Item 9
21 urges -- encourage the ICRC urgently to devote resources to the process of
22 identifying and monitoring detainees.
23 So then if we go to the introduction, the first part explains how
24 the terms of reference were developed, and then in paragraph 2: "This
25 humanitarian mission was headed by Sir John Thomson of the United Kingdom
1 who was assisted by ambassador Kenneth Blackwell of the United States and
2 a distinguished group of international legal, medical, and political
3 experts and a full list of the mission is attached at Appendix G." And
4 then it says: "The main task of the mission was to survey the human
5 rights situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina through direct observation of the
6 detention camps and centres throughout the country insofar as it could in
7 the one-week duration of the mission. The team saw places of detention
8 where thousands are held, often under conditions of severe hardship and
9 sometimes of terror.
10 "The mission was also tasked to offer concrete proposals and to
11 take appropriate steps during its operation which support fulfillment of
12 the vital humanitarian tasks of the ICRC and UNHCR and other international
13 and local bodies."
14 And then it talks about how the leader, Sir John, attended the
15 London Conference and talked with leaders of several of the factions so
16 that the mission was thus able to set out with some assurance of local
17 support. Nonetheless, it was apparent that the supposed support owed more
18 to political than to humanitarian considerations.
19 Then the method of work, and we can summarise this, I think. Is
20 this right, Mr. Mayhew, effectively the mission was split into two?
21 A. Yes. One team went south to, roughly speaking, the Muslim and
22 Croat-held areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other team covered the
23 north areas of Bosnia.
24 Q. And effectively we see the itinerary, and then the
25 acknowledgments, one of which was to your organisation, the ECMM, and then
1 the plan of the report.
2 The next part deals with the background, and I think it's worth
3 just reading a little bit of what was said.
4 "The tragic story of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state and
5 the outbreak of war and violence is well-known to the world community and
6 needs no reiteration in this report. Yet, it would be wrong not to record
7 that seasoned international observers who have witnessed many a conflict
8 were impressed by the degree of bitterness involved. They heard that
9 people who had lived comfortably together as neighbours for years suddenly
10 denounced each other and enviously expropriated the property of the weaker
11 group. There was much anecdotal evidence that mixed marriages were
12 disrupted, and that in such cases, divorce was a common occurrence.
13 The barbarism that occurred on a large scale, especially given the
14 small size of the population of BH, some 4.4 million, was frequently
15 inflicted by people who knew their victims. This is not an impersonal
16 war. It is a civil war between communities for territorial expansion and
17 ethnic supremacy. The first casualty has been good neighbourliness and
18 compassion. The second, truth."
19 Mr. Mayhew, did that, as it were, overall conclusion accord with
20 your view of what had happened?
21 A. Yes, I think it's very well put.
22 Q. There is then -- there's a further part which deals with how it
23 should be approached, and then talks about the consequences of what has
25 "The virulent nationalistic wave that is now sweeping across the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 former Yugoslavia has produced death and destruction on a huge scale.
2 Thousands of homes have been destroyed. An estimated 1.9 million people
3 have become refugees or displaced persons."
4 And then it talks about the economy and the history of the
5 Balkans. Then if we go to Part I on page 5, effectively this is, again, a
6 sort of summary of the aims and the limitations, I suppose, of this
7 mission. "There is no doubt that massive violations of basic human rights
8 have occurred in the former Yugoslavia. The evidence of refugee reports,
9 press and television stories, and the credible statements of hundreds of
10 eyewitnesses testify to anguish and tragedy to a degree that is almost
11 unbearable for those who have seen it. The Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, once an impressive oasis of ethnic cooperation and
13 cohabitation has been caught up in the Yugoslav madness and is now torn by
14 savagery. The passions engaged in this once-peaceful republic have
15 produced a situation in which the facts and the truth have become enmeshed
16 in partisan distortion. And this is possibly an unduly gentle way of
17 expressing the reality."
18 That last part, Mr. Mayhew, again, how does that accord with your
19 experience of what had happened in Yugoslavia?
20 A. Again, I think it's very well-put. I might have said something
21 very similar myself.
22 Q. And then, as I say, the next paragraph really deals with the
23 limitations of the investigations that could be conducted, and indeed, at
24 the end of that -- before we get to the detention and notification part,
25 they say that this report -- "the problems preclude any claim that this
1 report is the last word on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should
2 be viewed as the first in a series."
3 And then it talks about the detention and notification and pays
4 tribute to Mr. Mazowiecki and the ICRC and UNHCR.
5 Over to page 6, please. There it lists how many places ICRC had
6 visited and talks about the difficulty in notification of places of
7 detention. In the middle of the paragraph it says: "In the reports which
8 were available to us, it is clear that Serb forces in BH hold a
9 disproportionate share of the prisoners. We can make no claim to know
10 with indisputable accuracy the number of prisoners and hostages held by
11 all sides."
12 And it then goes on to talk about reports of private prisoners,
13 areas where villages were effectively turned into a detention camp. And
14 then explains how it came to visit the various places that it did.
15 If we go over to page 7: "Mr. Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader,
16 explained to the mission that Pale, the seat of his authority, had no
17 camps or centres of detention. However, at approximately the same time,
18 his officials were notifying the ICRC of 50 prisoners in Pale. This is at
19 least a fault in the preferable direction. In our opinion, it is more
20 common for places of detention to be denied. The authorities tend to
21 deceive themselves into supposing that the truth is whatever they say it
23 And then it goes on to talk about the international community
24 insisting on notification.
25 Then: "Lack of respect for civilian population. The mission
1 determined that a complete range of individuals, both male and females,
2 young and old, are now being held throughout BH in various places of
3 detention. We met with prisoners as young as 17, or even less, and as old
4 as 83. The crucial point is that thousands are being held against their
5 will or under conditions which make their departure from the places of
6 their confinement virtually impossible."
7 From your own observations, Mr. Mayhew, it says "as young as 17 or
8 less and as old as 83," were you able to establish those sort of ages from
9 the people you were able to talk to?
10 A. I didn't ask people their exact ages. It is credible to me
11 that -- there were certainly some elderly around, and it's credible to me
12 that that very old age is possible. It's also credible to me,
13 particularly credible, that people of 17 or younger, providing they looked
14 as if they were males of fighting age would be held. The aim was not to
15 draw a line at an age limit; the aim was to reduce the threat to the
16 detainer, the detainer's community, and anyone aged 15, 16, who looked as
17 if they would fight, once sent to the other side, would be eligible for
18 detention. That was my impression.
19 Q. From whom did you get the impression that they were detaining
20 anybody who looked as though they could be of fighting age?
21 A. In looking in Trnopolje and Manjaca, the majority were of fighting
23 Q. And then they go on in the report to deal with the types, the
24 categories of prisoners. First, prisoners of war. "These prisoners have
25 taken an active part in hostilities and can legally be detained." "The
1 mission saw very few of these. It was our impression that much of the
2 fighting was to the death."
3 Leaving aside the second part of that, would you agree that you
4 saw very few people who actually appeared to have taken part -- in an
5 active part in the fighting?
6 A. Yes, that was our impression. Of course, everyone was in civilian
7 clothes and so would not necessarily look any different. So my impression
8 is partly from general knowledge of the situation and partly from the
9 stories taken, at random with no notice in snatches, from the men who were
10 there. And they gave me every indication of having -- of telling the
11 truth and of having really no idea why they were there. And they all said
12 about everyone that they were civilians. We learned increasingly to
13 distinguish between -- to try to distinguish between people who were lying
14 to us and people who were telling the truth. There is a great deal of
15 falsehood in what is said. In our meetings, particularly with leaders, it
16 has entered part of I'm afraid to say managing a crisis, perhaps more
17 widely than that, but I've only know this area during wartime or crisis.
18 So we had to develop a sense of feel as to when we were being led astray
19 and when we were being spoken to truthfully.
20 Now, I do not claim that I knew infallibly when I was being lied
21 to, but I simply rested on my experience of a few months in the region and
22 a general feel for what is military and what isn't, based on my previous
23 professional experience.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry, just to interrupt, at the record we can
25 read that the paragraph you just read out on prisoners of war, it was
1 there cited as a quotation, but when it is a quotation, it has to be added
2 that it reads "they can legally be detained as combatants under the 3rd
3 Geneva Convention of 1949."
4 MS. KORNER: Yes, I left out the words. I said legally detained,
5 but left out the -- Your Honour is quite right.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
7 MS. KORNER:
8 Q. While we're on that topic, Mr. Mayhew, just to the Court
9 understands, after your experience in Bosnia, did you in fact go and work
10 in Rwanda?
11 A. Yes, and thereafter, I think it was the Congo?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So now, at this stage, you've had quite a lot of experience in
14 dealing with...
15 A. Yes, I spent a year in Rwanda immediately following the genocide
16 and war and two years in the Congo during the two wars there, as a UN
17 manager and as an NGO humanitarian manager, respectively.
18 Q. All right. Can we look at the second category B. "People who had
19 allegedly been hiding weapons in their homes and/or possessed information
20 of potential military significance. Their civilian (noncombatant) status
21 should have protected them from military detention although they could
22 arguably be subject to judicial proceedings. There were probably a
23 significant number of those."
24 And then category C: "People who were taken prisoner because they
25 lived or worked in the zone of combat. These people were not taking part
1 in hostilities, but were seen as enemies due to their ethnic origin.
2 Their civilian (noncombatant) status should have protected them from
3 detention. This category was easily the largest.
4 "Our experience suggests that a comparatively small percentage of
5 prisoners are genuine POWs. The remainder should never have been
6 imprisoned. We are not impressed by claims that they were incarcerated
7 for their own safety or simply because they happened to be resident in a
8 combat zone. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that most
9 prisoners are innocent people who have been seized as hostages to promote
10 "ethnic cleansing." They are pawns in vicious games played by
11 nationalist politicians. These innocent people should be released
13 Again, Mr. Mayhew, does that paragraph -- first of all, paragraph
14 C, the third category was the largest, would you agree from your
15 observations that seemed to be right?
16 A. Yes. And I think I mentioned in the Manjaca report that the
17 definition of "prisoner of war" seemed often to be someone who was
18 arrested within a combat zone; simply that. And this seemed to be the
19 definition that we received when we posed the question to camp
20 authorities, and we were very surprised that the definition should be
21 simply that, without any attempt to add something on to that.
22 Q. And the conclusion or the observation that "most prisoners are
23 innocent people, seized as hostages to promote ethnic cleansing" would you
24 agree with that?
25 A. Yes, I would guess that a proportion of them, a minority, would
1 have felt quite ready to pick up a weapon, if available, and either defend
2 themselves or take part in offensive operations. After all, they would
3 feel a loyalty to their own community. But my impression was that the
4 great majority had had no opportunity to do that, and therefore would not
5 have done that. And therefore, were not correctly arrested.
6 Q. And then the next paragraph deals with a phenomenon I don't think
7 you saw, where a whole village had been turned into a camp effectively.
8 A. No, I didn't see that.
9 Q. Then the paragraph after that: "The frequent and deliberate
10 destruction of dwellings of the local population (of one or the other
11 ethnic group) can never be justified as an action against military
12 targets, a claim that was made to the mission. The ethnically selective
13 torching of houses constitutes, in all circumstances, a grave violation of
14 international humanitarian law, and military commanders or political
15 authorities who were in a position to prevent such acts should be held
16 legally responsible for them."
17 Then the report goes on to discuss the dilemma of the assessment
18 of these prisoners, and the groups who are participating in the conflict.
19 And perhaps I should read the second part of this paragraph. "There are
20 all sorts of uniformed and nonuniformed armed groups and units
21 participating in the conflict. Some are the creation of what can only be
22 understood as local warlords; others represent some kind of community
23 defence force; and still others are the armed part of a right-wing
24 political party. Moreover, individuals have been mobilised directly from
25 their homes and fight in civilian clothes.
1 "All authorities told us that the prisoners they held were
2 legitimate prisoners of war."
3 Pausing there, Mr. Mayhew, that goes back to what you just told
4 us, that that was their definition of prisoners of war.
5 "Serb authorities also insisted that they had the right to hold
6 "individuals taken in the area of the conflict."
7 And again, pausing, Mr. Mayhew, is that what you were referring
9 A. Yes, that's right. Of course, it occurs to me now that if our
10 impressions about Kozarac, for example, are accurate, the term doesn't
11 even apply because it was not an area of conflict that they had taken, if
12 there was no battle in somewhere like Kozarac.
13 Q. And then it talks about international legal experts, and then goes
14 on to say: "Moreover, in our discussions with hundreds of detainees in
15 Serb, Muslim, and Croat places of detention, we found an appalling number
16 of individuals who we believe are, in fact, civilians with little, if any,
17 direct connection with the conflict. We are also very disturbed by the
18 assertions from the parties that many of the people they hold under these
19 severe conditions are being held for their own "protection." Serb
20 authorities in Prijedor, for example, insisted that they were protecting
21 the Muslims from Muslim "extremists" who were fighting a guerilla campaign
22 from the former partisan stronghold of Korazde mountain.
23 "We urge that a renewed effort be made to identify clearly those
24 innocent civilians now being held and steps be taken forthwith to secure
25 their immediate release and adequate protection after their release."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Then it talks about what you've mentioned, the approach of winter.
2 And then the responsibility of leaders.
3 "Despite the existence of 'warlords' the bulk of the evidence
4 points to the responsibility of acknowledged leaders. The mission
5 believes that in general, leaders exchange effective control over their
6 military and civilian structures. Contrary to what is usually accepted,
7 the so-called "uncontrolled elements" are marginal. They exist, but their
8 importance has been exaggerated by various leaders who find them a
9 convenient explanation for numerous barbarities. The mission have seen
10 camps well-organised with military personnel or policemen doing what they
11 were told to do."
12 Now, again, Mr. Mayhew, that paragraph, how does that accord with
13 your knowledge or impressions of what had been happening?
14 A. Very well. So far, from -- in northern Bosnia, the leaders hardly
15 ever, if ever, said that some areas were out of their control in areas
16 which they claimed to be the authorities of. And this is understandable,
17 because one of their main political aims at the time was to convince us
18 and the outside world that they were about to become a nation or something
19 close to a nation, sovereign, and needed to be convincing that they had
20 proper power and authority. And we never came across any evidence that
21 local warlords were operating in northern Bosnia with an effective
22 autonomous area. There may have been more cause for claiming that in
23 southwestern Bosnia where forces were much more irregular and newly
24 created. But in northern Bosnia, I don't recall any example of this.
25 Q. And the sentence that "camps well organised...," you would agree
1 that you saw as well?
2 A. Yes, there was firm, clear organisation and chains of command
3 evident -- particularly at Manjaca, and also at Trnopolje. It was clear
4 that the uniformed personnel were under clear command.
5 Q. Then it -- the rest of the paragraph, I don't propose to read,
6 because it deals with the agreements that had been signed. Over the page,
7 it continues: "However, the mission is very conscious that on all sides,
8 there have been numerous breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and that to a
9 significant extent, some of these continue. The most widespread breach by
10 all parties is the long continued detention, in some cases of more than
11 three months, of civilians who cannot possibly be classified as prisoners
12 of war. The largest number of these appear to be in Serb places of
13 detention; and therefore, while the international community should bear
14 down heavily on all parties, it should do so particularly firmly on the
16 Then: "The lack of transparency. The mission is very concerned
17 about the lack of transparency in relation to prisoners. The leaders and
18 the people we met work very much along the lines of the old communist
19 system of suspicion and opacity. This opacity perpetuates bitterness and
20 leads to a situation in which virtually all stories about atrocities are
21 believed. Naturally, it has its effect inside the camps as well as
22 outside them. Thus nothing is readily verifiable except the terror to be
23 observed in the eyes of the prisoners."
24 So again, Mr. Mayhew, the report is echoing what you told us about
25 your earlier experience when you were in the Banja Luka area in April.
1 A. Yes, it's well and fairly written.
2 Q. Then it deals with there are going to be suggestions made. And
3 then it goes on: "The ethnic cleansing operations which are taking place
4 with official connivance or direct support have left people virtually
5 defenceless even in their own homes. Murders, rapes, robberies, assaults,
6 and beatings are continuing. Those who carry out these activities are
7 often personally known by their victims and by others in the community.
8 Few have reportedly been brought to justice."
9 That information, Mr. Mayhew, in this report would have come from
11 A. I think it would have come from -- partly from prisoners, and
12 partly from people like myself who were interlocutors with the mission,
13 and partly from other people who they met during their mission. And they
14 may have spoken to people en route.
15 Q. Right. And then the next paragraph: "Local authorities who
16 profess to be powerless to prevent such abuses and who claim lack of
17 knowledge cannot be allowed to continue" --
18 THE REGISTRAR: We don't hear the French interpretation.
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Nothing can be heard in French, indeed.
20 Yes, I think we can proceed.
21 THE WITNESS: May I just add something to my previous response.
22 MS. KORNER:
23 Q. Certainly, Mr. Mayhew, yes.
24 A. I think that the ICRC was obviously another important source of
25 information on the question you posed just before.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I stopped. I'll just read again the
2 part of that next paragraph.
3 Q. "Local authorities who profess to be powerless to prevent such
4 abuses and who claim lack of knowledge should not be allowed to continue
5 such charades."
6 Again, Mr. Mayhew, how do you view that statement?
7 A. It is perfectly possibly that there were a number of isolated
8 incidents which realistically the authorities could do little or nothing
9 about. However, the general situation was one of effective control
10 throughout their areas of governance. And I agree with the sentence here
11 for that reason.
12 Q. And then the remainder of the paragraph deals with the dangers of
13 effectively closing the camps and pushing them out. And then they record
14 their view of Trnopolje.
15 "We would like to call the chairman's attention to the Trnopolje
16 so-called open centre in the Serb-conquered area around Prijedor. This
17 dismissal location no longer has barbed wire surrounding it, and Serb
18 officials insisted that the inmates were free to come and go as they
19 pleased. Our interviews with the persons within that facility produced a
20 vastly different perspective. Most of the 2.000 or so Muslims were
21 civilians driven from their homes in the region by Serb forces. Their
22 residences have been burnt, bombed, or occupied by immigrant Serb
23 families, leaving them no local place to go to should they wish to do so.
24 Numbers of detainees who have left the camp have never returned; and when
25 night falls, the level of personal security reportedly drops
1 precipitously. We discussed this situation with controlling political
2 authorities; and as a result, have developed a plan of action which is set
3 out in Part II."
4 Now, two matters, Mr. Mayhew: The reference to "detainees who
5 have left the camp not returning," was that something that you heard
6 about, or other members of the mission?
7 A. Other members of the mission.
8 Q. What about the level of personal security dropping at night?
9 A. That specific detail I didn't hear; however, it accords with my
10 overall impression that they were frightened, not feeling secure at that
11 moment in that camp. And so that daily experience was clearly one of
12 insecurity and fear, and it was the kind of fear consistent with the fear
13 of being shot or beaten when people are not looking. But no one said to
14 me, as far as I recall, except where I may have recorded that in a report,
15 that people had been -- that people had been shot. I think I may have
16 said that in a Trnopolje report in which case, that will be accurate.
17 Q. And then were you a party to any discussion with the political
18 authorities about this after the visit?
19 A. I attended the meetings that the mission had, and I don't recall
20 whether there was a meeting with the authorities after the -- outside the
21 camp after the visit to Trnopolje. But if there was, I would have been
22 present. They may be referring -- no, they obviously are not referring to
23 camp authorities present on the ground, unless they were accompanied by
24 political authorities at that camp visit in which case that may be the
25 discussion that they are referring to.
1 Q. Then the next paragraph: "Treatment of prisoners by authorities.
2 With very few exceptions, camp authorities have little sympathy for
3 detainees. We witnessed the results of beatings, wounds, fractures, and
4 other injuries in camps controlled by Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian
5 authorities, and have reason to believe that innocent prisoners on all
6 sides have been executed. The prisoners interviewed are reluctant in most
7 cases to provide specific detail concerning atrocities, but many provided
8 hints. We conclude that some camp authorities have treated the detainees
9 with relative fairness, given the current circumstances, whilst others
10 have been clearly abusive or at least have tolerated mistreatment of
12 Now, did you see any signs in Trnopolje yourself of beatings or
13 other injuries?
14 A. No, I don't think so.
15 Q. Had you seen anything of that nature in Manjaca?
16 A. Again, I don't think so, though there were people in the medical
17 centre with a variety of complaints including injuries.
18 Q. Then it goes on to talk about the conditions and describes the
19 type of accommodation that there was. Then it effectively talks about
20 overcrowding, about water and food and then sanitation and hygiene.
21 And then "health of prisoners. While many civilians in BH are
22 said to be short of nutritious food, there can be no doubt that a majority
23 of prisoners are more seriously deprived." And then effectively the
24 concentration is on Manjaca.
25 Mr. Mayhew, would you agree that from what you saw, that was the
2 A. That Manjaca was the worst?
3 Q. Of the malnutrition that was seen.
4 A. In terms of malnutrition, yes, and we were always conscious that
5 here was a camp on display, on show, this is the stage that it had reached
6 after being prepared to be shown to the outside world with notice given
7 and so on. So anyone -- what we were seeing was the best, and that anyone
8 in a worse state, and it is reasonable to estimate that there would have
9 been some, would have not been shown to us, would have been spirited away.
10 And this was after some months as well. So we were I think quite
11 reasonably deducing, by implication, that previous conditions had been
12 significantly worse than what we were seeing, but of course we didn't
13 report that because we hadn't seen it. But I think it's a reasonable
15 Q. Then the report talks about interviews with prisoners, and again
16 talks about the fear that they experienced and the behaviour that you've
17 already described, of how they walked and the like in Manjaca. And then
18 again, medical services, physical work outside the centre, and then the
19 visits by the ICRC and family visits. And then finally, it talks about
20 violations of international humanitarian law and really deals with the
21 legal consequences according to the report's writers.
22 While we're on that subject, having read this report again,
23 reminding yourself, who would have been responsible for this report,
25 A. Sir John Thomson. Well his whole team would have had
1 responsibility individually for the report because they all agreed it. It
2 strikes me that this is written by him directly, or at least with
3 significant editing by him.
4 Q. And then we come to the recommendations, and again, I'm going to
5 summarise this. What seems to have been concerning the mission most was
6 the approaching winter. Would you agree, Mr. Mayhew, that was a problem?
7 A. Yes. One of the major problems. I recall -- and I'd like to add
8 one thing about the conditions on water supply. You showed me the
9 photograph. Thinking about that a little more, it was clear from the
10 hygiene conditions and the medical condition of prisoners found in the
11 medical centre, and the number of complaints of diarrhea and so on, that
12 the water supply was well below what was needed. And it is difficult to
13 argue that water was in such short supply that the authorities couldn't
14 afford to give more water. There is plenty of water. It requires fuel to
15 get it there, but it's not really the same argument that one could use for
16 food. And in that culture, high levels of water supply for basic washing
17 and for health and hygiene are really required. So I wanted to make sure
18 that that was noted.
19 Q. Yes.
20 I'm not sure that we need go through really the recommendations
21 because I think effectively we dealt with the summary of them in the
22 beginning of the report. If we then skip the map, there is then a list of
23 the alleged places of detention, based on lists supplied. We see the
24 first part deals with alleged concentration camps for Serbs in Bosnia.
25 Then the next, page 21, prisons in Sarajevo with Serbs in them. A lot of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 those. And then if we go to page 23, we see the following list was
2 received from the mayor of Banja Luka. And again, that's alleged places
3 of detention holding Serbs. And then if we go to page 25, there's a
4 special memorandum there on Trnopolje, yes, which talks about special
5 arrangements that should relate to it, the reason being given: "The
6 number of inmates at the centre, of whom the great majority, if not all,
7 are of the Muslim faith, is currently thought to be in the neighbourhood
8 of 2.000. These people are living in terror, and the CSCE mission believe
9 they have substantial reasons for their fears." And it then makes
10 recommendations about teams to go in and register and deal with food
11 deficiencies and the like.
12 And in fact, effectively try and close the camp down. Then
13 there's the agreement that takes place in Geneva in May. And then if we
14 go to page 32, we see the places of detention, actual and alleged, which
15 were inspected during the mission. The first two, Bihac -- you didn't
16 visit either Bihac or Ripac, did you?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Then we see number 3, what I take should be the "Manjaca" as
19 opposed to "Menjaca centre." And 3.000-odd detainees, Serbian, Muslim,
20 1.800, and then the list of other places visited.
21 And then there is a further description of each of the places that
22 were visited during the course of the mission. And I rather think that,
23 yes, there's yet another description of Trnopolje at page 47.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Due to the fact that I believe it could be
25 necessary to read this out in toto, we should have a break now, bringing
1 us to 5 minutes past 6.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 6.09 p.m.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated. For the record, we can see
5 Mr. Koumjian appearing for the OTP.
6 MR. KOUMJIAN: Yes, Your Honour. There is one matter I wanted to
7 address the Court regarding -- It regards the witness who Your Honours
8 indicated yesterday you prefer to hear live. I believe it's number 47,
9 27. 27, excuse me. 27. We contacted that witness today, and just within
10 the last half hour, the witness was able to confirm that the witness could
11 come Sunday and testify on Monday, and the witness we were going to have
12 on Monday would then testify on Tuesday. However, we were told by the VWU
13 that there is a rule that they have that they must have five days' notice
14 to arrange the trip of the witness. I don't want to be in the habit of
15 asking the Court to make orders to the registry that has been so helpful
16 to us so often. But in this particular case, especially at this time when
17 no one is there to speak to, I would ask the Court if the Court could make
18 an order or a request to the registry or the VWU on this particular
19 occasion to help us bring the witness on Sunday. The witness is willing
20 to come. There was a big potential next week that we wouldn't have enough
21 witnesses to fill the time. I think it would be very, very convenient
22 coming to the end of the trial. And in the end we're going to have a lot
23 of witnesses trying to fit into a short space. So the fact that next week
24 is an opportunity to hear a witness whose testimony will be very
25 pertinent, we just have to arrange to bring him on Sunday.
1 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: For the reasons given by the OTP, the Trial
3 Chamber requests the registry kindly to provide for the necessary,
4 enabling the OTP to, and the Chamber and the parties, to hear Witness 27
5 already by Monday next week as time is of the essence. Thank you. I
6 think this would be enough.
7 If necessary, the Registrar himself in person should be contacted
8 immediately. Let me know. I know he is still in the premises, and it's
9 possible to contact him in person. If there is any obstacle I will help
10 out --
11 MR. KOUMJIAN: I will go down right now to the VWU and try and
12 work it out.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Let us know. Just to be on the safe side, I
14 think, as I have seen no objections by the Defence to this procedure, and
15 the necessary documents were provided already earlier to the Defence, this
16 shouldn't be any obstacle for proceeding this way.
17 MR. LUKIC: No objections, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
19 Please continue with the examination-in-chief.
20 MS. KORNER: Yes.
21 Q. Mr. Mayhew, I'm sorry about that small administrative
23 Can we now look at the part of the report that describes the camps
24 in rather more detail for Trnopolje, at page 47. Gives the location, then
25 the facility: "This place of detention is in and around a two-storey
1 structure formerly used as a school." Pausing there, can I take it that
2 was the photograph we saw of that building?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. It goes on: "The fencing was recently removed, and the periphery
5 is irregularly patrolled by a uniformed authority armed with automatic
6 rifles. A number of detainees are housed in the school, but a large
7 number are sheltered in makeshift tents produced from scraps of wood and
8 wire fencing covered with pieces of cloth or other material with little
9 waterproofing in evidence. A number have made an empty truck their home
10 in detention."
11 Then: "Number of detainees and description: We have estimated
12 1600 to 2.000 Muslim males are quartered in this centre. They range in
13 age from teenagers to 60 years or older, and virtually all are believed to
14 be victims of ethnic cleansing, arrested in their homes in nearby towns
15 and villages. Some have been relocated to the centre more recently after
16 having experienced the horrors of the Omarska Detention Centre which was
17 very recently closed. With a few exceptions, their families have been
18 removed from the area, and their homes destroyed or occupied by Serbs."
19 "Period of detention: A majority has been held in this centre for
20 two to three months, whereas a smaller number has been moved here more
21 recently from other places of detention in the area.
22 "General conditions in Trnopolje: We have been led to believe
23 that the authority is relatively relaxed during the mornings and until
24 3.00 p.m. each afternoon, when the major in charge completes his onsite
25 duties. Until that time, the detainees are permitted to leave the centre
1 to purchase (a minority) or scrounge for food without fear of reprisal.
2 However, after dusk, the unsupervised guards often harass and mistreat the
3 detainees with no apparent provocation. Beatings are apparently common,
4 and there is good reason to believe that some detainees are removed and
5 executed, or at least never to be seen nor heard from again. This centre
6 appears to have no real organisation and it undoubtedly `a disaster ready
7 to happen'.
8 "Health-related conditions: Water for consumption and washing of
9 self and clothing is brought to the centre in a tanker truck most days and
10 remains while the detainees fill whatever containers they have available,
11 plastic bottles, pots, and pans, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain
12 personal hygiene under such circumstances. The two-person pit latrine is
13 not maintained and is completely contrary to basic accepted norms. The
14 grounds are relatively free of litter, but the single waste container was
15 overflowing on to the surrounding mud courtyard. There was an extensive
16 waste disposal area in one corner of the camp which was also used as a
18 "Even though no meals are provided by the authority, there is less
19 evidence of malnourished detainees in this centre than in most other
20 places of detention. They have been permitted to leave the centre to
21 search for food, and relatives or friends have brought in what food they
22 could spare. During the past week or so, the ICRC has delivered prepared
23 meals, one for each detainee. Several detainees are seriously
24 malnourished. They were usually persons who have arrived recently from
25 Omarska or other more inhumane places of detention.
1 "We were unable to assess accurately the general physical health
2 of detainees, but the fact that they live out of doors in a gypsy-like
3 existence has probably been to their advantage and will continue to be so
4 until the colder and damper weather arrives several weeks hence. At that
5 time, these individuals will be placed at particularly great risk.
6 "There is obvious evidence to suggest that detainees in the
7 centre, as in other locations, have been subjected to terrible psychic
8 stress prior to and during incarceration. However, they have maintained
9 some contact with the outside world, which appears to have provided a
10 protective effect. There can be no doubt that they share most of the
11 fears and uncertainties of detainees in Manjaca and other centres, but
12 they walk about the centre relatively freely, play chess and engage in
13 more lively conversations with their fellows.
14 "A medical clinic has been set up in one of the school rooms,
15 staffed by two medical students who appear to be relatively sensitive to
16 clients' concerns. They have very little to offer in treatment since the
17 supply of drugs and other materials is very limited. Seriously ill or
18 injured have been transferred to a local hospital, but very infrequently,
19 as it appears.
20 "To your knowledge, detainees here are not frequently permitted to
21 work except to keep the grounds neat and tidy, but there is currently
22 unlimited opportunity to remain out of doors in the sunshine.
23 "ICRC and other assistance: The ICRC has been able to visit
24 Trnopolje during the past two or three weeks and has documented detainee
25 details in addition to arranging for the delivery of preprepared meals.
1 Relatives and friends are permitted to visit freely, at least during
2 daytime hours. We were told that bread is delivered to the camp
3 periodically by the local Red Cross, who sometimes charge detainees who
4 may be able to pay."
5 And then it deals with the notes. The visit was on the 31st of
6 August. Next part of the report dealt with Manjaca, and then the other
7 places of detention visited.
8 And finally, we see at the back the list of the people who were
9 members of the mission. Finally on this report, Mr. Mayhew, you told us
10 the mission had split. Sir John Thomson went on your part of the mission.
11 Do you know who else on this list went?
12 A. I recall that someone who was acting as a local advisor -- or
13 advisor on the local area and who spoke the local language was on the
14 team, and I imagine that that was Mr. Davico who is at the bottom of that
15 list. As for the others, I'm not certain which of them was on my section
16 of the team.
17 Q. I think it's right. You knew Mr. Telle, the --
18 A. Yes, I know Mr. Telle, I met him in several crises and I can't be
19 certain that I actually met him on this one.
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may I ask that this report be admitted
21 as S --
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: 217.
23 MS. KORNER: 217.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objections?
25 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, is it possible for us to reserve our
1 right after cross-examining this witness?
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. Then this document has provisionally the
3 number 217, and we wait until the end of the cross-examination.
4 MS. KORNER:
5 Q. Now, after the mission was completed, Mr. Mayhew, I think you told
6 us you went back again, escorting somebody else to Manjaca.
7 A. Yes, that's right. It was a man called Dr. Gilbert Greenhalgh
8 [phoen] who was sent by the British government, I think possibly under the
9 umbrella also of the European Community presidency.
10 Q. And thereafter, did you return to Zagreb?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And then, and I can deal with this quite shortly because again,
13 it's more in connection with Manjaca, did you assist in the evacuation of
14 some 69 sick Muslims from the camp in Manjaca, the main organisers being
15 the Red Cross?
16 A. Yes. Were they all from Manjaca, the report will remind me. It
17 occurs to me they might also have come from local hospitals, but I'm not
19 Q. Yes, you're absolutely -- in fact it doesn't make it clear. There
20 was an airlift, I think, from Banja Luka. I'm just going to see. Yes,
21 well perhaps -- I'm going to ask for it to be exhibited, Your Honour. But
22 it may help for Mr. Mayhew to refresh his memory. Could we show him from
23 the 15th of September, attachment 4.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
25 MS. KORNER:
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. If we look -- this is what your normal daily summary report, is
2 it, Mr. Mayhew, as you described, different from the --
3 A. Yes. Now, this is slightly different from what I described. This
4 is from the regional centre, Sarajevo, as you see on the top right.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. And that at this point was a cell within the headquarters in
7 Zagreb. It's misleading, because we had no permanent people in Bosnia
8 anymore. But the regional centre Sarajevo existed outside with the hope
9 of going back in. But it retained that name, and it was the daily summary
10 produced by me as the person responsible for that cell out of Zagreb.
11 Q. Right. And if we just look at the paragraph number 5:
12 "Humanitarian issues. The delayed ICRC-sponsored airlift of 69 sick
13 Muslims was successfully completed today. Three ECMM teams monitored the
14 operation, although they took no direct part, the ICRC made it clear they
15 were very grateful. Convoys brought the evacuees from Manjaca military
16 prison camp, Trnopolje Open Reception Centre, and Banja Luka hospital to
17 Banja Luka airport, and a chartered Aeroflot aircraft flew them out at
18 1540. It is hoped that this will kick start a much greater tide of
19 evacuation of people who have lost their homes and are under threat as
20 much from the winter as from the security situation.
21 "Other matters: While delayed in Banja Luka for three days, an
22 ECMM team met the three main religious leaders. All three were keen that
23 the ECMM should redeploy permanently to the area and do anything possible
24 to improve the situation which had worsened after the ECMM left the area
25 in April. The team also met General Mladic, who reiterated many familiar
1 views and demands, but was noticeably positive about the proposed return
2 of the ECMM. The date of the ECMM next visit is not known. I depends on
3 a higher level political agreement."
4 So Mr. Mayhew, you're quite right, it was a mixture of people from
5 various areas that were air-lifted out. And here we see the reference to
6 General Mladic that you were talking about.
7 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, in fact, it's my fault, I think it
8 should be made an exhibit, because it does refer to Trnopolje as well.
9 And I've read it out now. So if there's no objection, could it be made
11 MR. LUKIC: No objections, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted, S218.
13 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
14 Q. And then, can I ask that you look at your report for the 26th of
15 September, which was attachment 3. And before we deal with that, can I
16 just note on that in passing, Mr. Mayhew, were you provided with a letter
17 of thanks from the ICRC which had gone via the head of mission?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. For your help in the airlift.
20 Again, report from your daily summary: "General situation, one,
21 political situation, NTR." Nothing to report.
22 "B, military and operational situation: Dr. Karadzic last night
23 refused permission by telephone for the ECMM to redeploy to Banja Luka or
24 other Serb-held areas of BH. His reason was that local Muslims are
25 waiting for the ECMM to return so that they can cause chaos and an
1 uprising. ECMM redeployment would, therefore, worsen things."
2 And I don't think the next is relevant.
3 Did you ever get back to the area of northern Bosnia before you
5 A. I don't actually remember. Our main -- my job for the remainder
6 of my time until March 1993 was the Bosnia desk officer, otherwise known
7 as the person running the Sarajevo cell. And our big aim was to get teams
8 back into all three areas of Bosnia, and we succeeded in the Muslim and
9 Croat-held areas. But by the time I left, we had no permanent presence in
10 the Bosnian Serb-held areas which was a matter of great regret to me. And
11 of course it caused an unfortunate imbalance in our reporting, and we
12 tried many times to be allowed back in without success. I don't remember
13 a specific visit that I made. So it is possible that I didn't visit
14 again, but I would be corrected by the reports. There will be reports if
15 I visited.
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may this be made Exhibit S219..
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I can see no objections. S219 --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
19 MS. KORNER: And Your Honour, that's all I ask of Mr. Mayhew.
20 Mr. Mayhew, thank you very much.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. What about the cross-examination?
22 The Defence is prepared to start, at least to start today?
23 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, if possible, we would like to start
24 tomorrow because Mr. Ostojic should be here and to conduct that cross.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it's fair enough.
1 MS. KORNER: I was going to say, Your Honour, "he hopes." Your
2 Honour, certainly there's no objection. Mr. Mayhew is perfectly all right
3 for tomorrow. It would be difficult if it went into Friday for him. But
4 for tomorrow, he's available, yes.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. Then I have to thank you for today. And
6 you understood from that what has been said, it will be necessary to have
7 some additional questions by the Defence, and probably also by the Judges
8 tomorrow. But I'm convinced - convinced - that we can finalise your
9 testimony by tomorrow. And if there is nothing additional to be said --
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, there is a matter I want to raise about
11 the handwriting, but I think I'll raise it tomorrow because I'm still not
12 all together clear from Mr. Koumjian what it is we're supposed to be
13 raising. I better check that with him.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. I think all parties agree that it is time
15 for finalising our today's hearing.
16 The trial stands adjourned until tomorrow, 2.15. Thank you.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
19 6.37 p.m., to be reconvened on
20 Thursday, the 18th day of July, 2002,
21 at 2.15 p.m.