International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9079

1 Monday, 18 November 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 11.20 a.m.

5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Having heard all the caveats this morning, may I

6 ask the Defence now to introduce its case. Please, Mr. Lukic.

7 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours. I have written my opening

8 statement in B/C/S. So I hope you don't mind. I'm too tired to translate

9 it now simultaneously, so I would prefer to have my opening statement in

10 B/C/S, with your permission, Your Honours. Thanks.

11 [Interpretation] To begin with, I should like to thank you on

12 behalf of the accused, Dr. Stakic, for allowing us to address you in our

13 brief before we start our case. Dr. Stakic's Defence is confident that it

14 will prove during its case that eight counts of the fourth amended

15 indictment need to be rejected. At the end of the case, Dr. Stakic will

16 be acquitted.

17 The Defence will refute and prove that the charges brought against

18 Dr. Stakic are not true and that they are far from the standard which the

19 Prosecution needs to meet; that is, to prove the guilt of the accused

20 beyond any reasonable doubt. The Defence expects to prove that the

21 evidence produced by the Prosecution is inconsistent, inaccurate, taken

22 out of the context, and inadmissible. When the Prosecution's evidence is

23 compared with the Defence's evidence, and expected testimonies of our

24 witnesses, it will become obvious that this evidence offers -- I mean the

25 evidence of the Prosecution is not reliable, and it all has to do with

Page 9080

1 the onus probandi, with the burden of proof. And it will also be obvious

2 that the Prosecution's evidence cannot show any involvement of Dr. Stakic

3 in the activities described in the fourth amended indictment.

4 In the course of its case, the Defence will prove that what is

5 claimed by the Prosecution is not only inaccurate, but that it is above

6 all impossible. The Defence case has been presented in our brief, and in

7 it can be found the basis underpinning our Defence. I will now merely

8 briefly go through certain things which are not covered by the brief.

9 When we consider the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when

10 we think about it, we must be aware that this conflict broke out on the

11 basis of two concepts. One was for the secession of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, and the other concept was for the continued

13 stay of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia. The former concept, that

14 is, the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was by and large the option

15 of two peoples, the Croat and the Muslim peoples. The Muslim people later

16 on was renamed as the Bosniak people. And the continuing stay of Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia was by and large the option of the Serb

18 people.

19 The reason for the secession was not the inadequacy of rights

20 enjoyed by the peoples who were for the secession because all the peoples

21 both formerly and de facto in the Former Yugoslavia enjoyed the same

22 rights. Why, then, did the Muslims want to secede? They wanted it

23 because shortly after the secession, in view of their high birthrate, they

24 would have become an absolute majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if

25 the principle of one man, one vote were applied, they would then in no

Page 9081

1 time at all become the only rulers, the only governors, of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why did the Croats want the secession of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina? The Croats wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to secede so that it

4 could -- that they could easier detach the Croat parts of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina from Bosnia-Herzegovina and annex them to Croatia.

6 Although in the beginning, both the Croat and the Muslim people wanted the

7 secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the different concepts. The

8 war between them in Bosnia-Herzegovina also broke out shortly afterwards.

9 The Muslims were represented on rump bodies of the former

10 Socialist Republic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the army of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And in these rump authorities of the Socialist

12 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina there were no representatives of the Serb

13 and the Croat peoples elected by voters. In these authorities, in these

14 agencies, there were some representatives of the Serb and the Croat

15 peoples who the Muslim authorities have brought into these institutions to

16 serve as ornaments. So even when we see a Croat or a Serb represented on

17 a Muslim agency or a body, we can still be certain that in no way either

18 in terms of their number or in terms of the -- of their weight could they

19 participate or have a say or influence the -- any decisions taken by those

20 agencies. The Croats were embodied and represented through the Croat

21 Defence council, the HVO, which is the military force of the Croats in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and through political, that is,

23 legislative, and executive bodies of Herceg Bosna, and the judicial

24 bodies of Herceg Bosna. So when we speak about the bodies of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Bosniak side never tires of insisting and the

Page 9082

1 OTP as well, there were no such bodies. That is, it was not only the

2 Serbs who set up political bodies separated from the rump bodies of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina; the same was done by the Croats. We have three

4 peoples with three separate political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina at

5 the time under our consideration.

6 Who starts the conflict? The Office of the Prosecutor alleges

7 that the conflict is started by the one who wants the status quo. The

8 Serbs want the status quo. The Serbs want Yugoslavia to survive. Who

9 wants changes? Croats and Muslims want changes. They aspire to

10 secession. It is theirs to set the action into motion. In our case, we

11 shall show that both factually and from the point of politics and from a

12 point of law, the Serbs are merely reacting to the actions of the other

13 side.

14 In Prijedor, the situation may not be viewed in isolation from all

15 the other developments in the Balkan peninsula as of 1990. We must

16 realise that there was a war in Croatia; we must realise that before the

17 war in Croatia, there was a war in Slovenia. We must realise that as

18 early as 1990, the constitution of Croatia turned the Serb people into a

19 national minority. And it was this already which caused numerous refugees

20 from Croatia who headed towards Bosnia and Serbia. And especially and in

21 particular, the beginning of the war set in motion huge numbers of people

22 from Croatia heading for Bosnia and Serbia. All this must be borne in

23 mind if one is to understand how the political life in the municipality of

24 Prijedor unfolded. On the 30th of April, 1992, the Serbs take over the

25 power. We see that there are no reprisals after that date. However even

Page 9083

1 before the takeover of power, and especially after it, the Bosniak/Croat

2 armed forces across Bosnia and Herzegovina launch armed operations against

3 the JNA and against the armed forces of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina and its civilian population. There are also orders of the

5 presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina going in on which the Serb people is

6 not represented go in the same direction. There is also the order of the

7 Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina going in the same

8 direction. His name is Alija Delimustafic, and he also orders attacks

9 on columns, military facilities, because under a pretext that allegedly

10 the property of Bosnia and Herzegovina is being misappropriated. Some of

11 these attacks -- these attacks include the attacks on Hambarine on the

12 22nd of May, 1992; the attack on the army column in Jakupovici in the area

13 of Kozarac on the 24th of May, 1992; attack on the town of Prijedor on the

14 30th of May, 1992. In response to these attacks, the armed forces of the

15 Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, subsequently Republika Srpska,

16 use force. We shall prove during our case that not only as the

17 Prosecution claims the Crisis Staff was not -- did not make part of the

18 chain of command in the military units, but moreover, that it had no, and

19 we emphasise absolutely no, say or any knowledge about the activities,

20 about the actions, of the army unless the army was ready and willing to

21 inform them about.

22 The Crisis Staff could not even request to be informed, not

23 only -- they could not order, they could not even ask the military what

24 they were doing. And the same, absolutely the same, holds true of the

25 police which is also an armed force of the republic -- of Republika

Page 9084

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 9085

1 Srpska. The attacks on military facilities and columns in the spring of

2 1992 came from the central offices of the Party for Democratic Action

3 headed by Alija Izetbegovic. At that time, the presidency, the rump

4 presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dissolved the assembly of Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina from which the representatives of the Serb people were already

6 absent, and unlawfully and unconstitutionally takes over the functions of

7 the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, they won't even bother

8 to request that the representatives of the Croat and Bosniak peoples vote

9 for something that they need; they simply take everything into their own

10 hands. And even that was not enough. Alija Izetbegovic unlawfully and

11 unconstitutionally proclaims himself the president of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, although such an office is not envisaged either by the

13 constitution or by the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And finally, the

14 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after all the political struggles and

15 attempts to avoid violent secession begins a few days after the unlawful

16 referendum. The referendum is unlawful not only because the

17 representatives of the Serb people did not participate in its

18 organisation, but also because its result which is below 66.6 per cent,

19 the first findings say that 57 per cent turned out at the referendum.

20 Later on, however, these results were changed to reach 64 per cent. And

21 even that was not enough. Even if one takes that everybody went out, that

22 it was 100 per cent turnout, and that they all voted for, even that is not

23 enough for any changes of the constitution or any secession.

24 A few days after the referendum, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina

25 started. And the witnesses who have come to testify this week will

Page 9086

1 testify about that. So these are not witnesses who are to testify on the

2 basis of tu quoque.

3 [In English] I'm sorry, Your Honour. Can we make a short break.

4 Dr. Stakic has to go out for a few moments.

5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The trial stays adjourned until 5 minutes to

6 12.00.

7 --- Break taken at 11.43 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 11.58 a.m.

9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please continue.

10 MR. LUKIC: We apologise for this interruption, Your Honours, and

11 thank you. May I continue?

12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Therefore, the incursion of the

14 regular Croatian forces into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

15 occurred on the 3rd of May, 1992. After that, on the 26th of March, there

16 was the massacre of Serb civilians in the village of Sijekovac in Bosanski

17 Brod Municipality which was also covered in all the media, and members of

18 the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina went to the scene. Only several

19 days later, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised by the European

20 Community, even though at that time there were still calls for caution

21 that such recognition might lead to dreadful consequences and to an

22 all-out war across Bosnia and Herzegovina. This may be pleasant or less

23 pleasant for someone to hear, but it is a fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina

24 was shattered and pushed into war as well as the whole of the Former

25 Yugoslavia by the so-called international community. When I say

Page 9087

1 "international community," it is clear that I am speaking about all the

2 leading countries of the western hemisphere.

3 The people who resisted this attempt to shatter their state was

4 marked off as the guilty party and the party to blame for everything which

5 later occurred in the framework of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia.

6 The other two peoples who took part in this breakup, who cooperated in the

7 breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, were spared such attacks and spared the

8 sanctions later imposed by the same international community. Who did the

9 western countries, above all, the NATO countries, side with? They clearly

10 displayed their allegiances when in the middle of peace negotiations, they

11 blamed the Serb side in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina equally. Of

12 course, this eventually led to the bombing, the bombing attacks, against

13 the federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 by the NATO forces. In order

14 to divert attention from this plan to shatter Yugoslavia, a joint criminal

15 enterprise allegedly perpetrated by the Serbs is invented. What sort of a

16 plan should the Serbs have had to remain in a state in which they already

17 were? All Serbs lived within a single state. This theory cannot be

18 confirmed by any means. If we know that the Serbs had no need to do

19 anything, take any action whatsoever in order to achieve what they wanted,

20 they wanted Yugoslavia. They wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of

21 that state. They have the Yugoslavia they want. They have Bosnia within

22 Yugoslavia. Why would they need to do anything at all?

23 The next theory used against the Serbian people is the alleged

24 theory of the attempt to create Greater Serbia. This was a theory

25 employed a long time ago by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy when it annexed

Page 9088

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina within its own borders. This theory was revived in

2 World War I. And then again in the 1990s. Such a plan was never part of

3 Serbian or Yugoslav policy. There is no trace that there ever was such a

4 plan as part of a Serbian policy. We shall put forward this theory using

5 a book written by a Muslim general, this theory that Yugoslavia was

6 shattered by the leading western forces. This is the plan which caused

7 Yugoslavia to break up. The entire situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

8 led to a state of insecurity and fear. No one knew to what extent

9 conflicts would escalate, how long they would last, or which areas would

10 be encompassed by the war. As we've said before, it began in Slovenia,

11 continued in Croatia, and then spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

12 whole territory of the Former Yugoslavia was being abandoned by a great

13 number of people, and the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, was

14 being abandoned by people en masse, prior to the 30th of April, 1992.

15 Same goes for Prijedor municipality, many people were leaving prior to the

16 30th of April, 1992. And all Prosecution witnesses who claimed that they

17 had no knowledge of people leaving before the takeover, they all lied. It

18 was not possible not to know, not to notice, large groups of people

19 appearing daily at the Prijedor bus terminal waiting for buses to leave

20 Prijedor through Croatia for third countries in western Europe or to stay

21 in either Croatia or Slovenia and find refuge there. We shall show

22 written proof of this, and we expect our witnesses to tell you exactly how

23 many people had left before the takeover, how many people had left

24 Prijedor Municipality.

25 It is our submission, and we expect to be able to prove this, that

Page 9089

1 prior to the 30th of April, 1992, more than 20.000 Muslims and Croats left

2 Prijedor Municipality.

3 Some Serbs left, too. However, their departure was not as

4 conspicuous, because there were many refugees coming in, Serb refugees

5 from Croatia. 200.000 refugees from Croatia passed through Prijedor

6 during the conflict. Even as we speak, there are still 37.000 of those

7 refugees living in Prijedor. In 1990, political parties who took power at

8 the elections in November 1990, SDA, SDS, and HDZ, all had the

9 preservation of Yugoslavia as an important feature of their programmes.

10 In 1991, there were international conferences. The first one was in

11 The Hague. And several of the later ones were held in The Hague also.

12 There was the Lisbon conference, the London conference, negotiations in

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina. All the conclusions from those conferences point

14 to the fact that Yugoslavia should remain as it was, so the claims made by

15 the Prosecution in the fourth amended indictment can by no means be

16 confirmed; namely, that it was obvious that Croatia would secede, that it

17 was obvious that SDS would not be able to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina

18 from seceding. The SDS did not need to do anything to prevent secession

19 because the only secession there could have been would have been an

20 unconstitutional and unlawful one. And this political action saw the SDS

21 and the SDA join forces just after their election victory with the SDS and

22 after they joined a coalition in 1992.

23 Correction, the HDZ and the SDA took this political action. And

24 in 1992, they formed a coalition with the SDS in order to take power. In

25 the course of our case, we shall prove that only several months after the

Page 9090

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 9091

1 election victory of November 1990, the HDZ and the SDA began to prepare

2 the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. This is not only

3 being done politically, but also by creating each their own armed forces.

4 Throughout this time, the SDS did not work towards creating their own

5 armed forces. The SDS believed that the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army,

6 was the only legal armed force in the territory of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina.

8 When you look at the territory of the Autonomous Region of

9 Krajina, at that time, it was fully isolated in terms of its territory

10 from all other Serb territories and encircled by the armed forces of the

11 Republic of Croatia, the HDZ, and the SDA in Bosnia. In addition to this

12 threat of an armed attack, this isolation caused all goods to be in short

13 supply. I'm talking about such goods as basic food stuffs, medicines,

14 fuel, electricity, which in turn caused shortage of water, drinking water,

15 created a situation where it was not possible to administer surgical

16 treatment and so on and so forth. This all very much affected not only

17 the lives of people in the town of Prijedor, but also of those who were

18 captured and held detained in investigation centres. Again, we would like

19 to point out that in our case, we shall prove that Dr. Milomir Stakic was

20 never present in any of these collection or investigative centres and was

21 in no way associated with these investigation centres.

22 At the time the conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

23 mainly the laws of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia

24 were still valid, as well as the laws of the Socialist Federative Republic

25 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So these laws applied also to the territory of

Page 9092

1 Vitez municipality as well as Konjic municipality. Presidents of the

2 Vitez and Konjic municipalities were never convicted by this Tribunal, and

3 there were camps in their territory, too. And Ivica Santic indeed was

4 tried before this Tribunal, but the Prosecution gave it up. The president

5 of the Municipal Assembly of Konjic and the Konjic war presidency

6 testified before this Tribunal, but he was never indicted. So much for de

7 jure responsibility of Dr. Stakic. In our case, we shall prove that the

8 social federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federative

9 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were both part of a legal system in

10 which even the smallest thing, even the smallest legal area, even the

11 smallest area of everyday life was strictly regulated through laws and

12 bylaws. In the Former Yugoslavia, there were over 7 million different

13 kinds of laws. That was a consequence of socialist self-management.

14 Everything was prescribed by laws and bylaws. Nothing could be done

15 unless it had first been prescribed by a law. It would not have been

16 possible for the president of the Municipal Assembly to give orders to the

17 army, to command the army or to command the police. It would have been

18 inconceivable for the president of the Municipal Assembly to even command

19 the firemen in Prijedor Municipality. The president of the Municipal

20 Assembly and the position of the Municipal Assembly was later taken over

21 by the Crisis Staff of Prijedor Municipality, the president could only do

22 exactly what they read out to us from the statute of the Municipal

23 Assembly by the witnesses of the Prosecution. He could only preside over

24 the meetings of the Municipal Assembly, and in cooperation with the

25 president of the Executive Board, he could set the agenda for the

Page 9093

1 Assembly's work. And then even that agenda had to be approved by and

2 passed by the Municipal Assembly.

3 I know that this may be confusing for people who come from the

4 west who have mayors in their own legal systems. These two positions have

5 nothing at all in common. Nothing at all. Nowadays in the legal system

6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, you have the head or the mayor of the Municipal

7 Assembly. And you have the president of the Municipal Assembly. The

8 president of the Municipal Assembly had no power to do anything that was

9 not regulated by positive laws and bylaws or prescribed as part of his

10 duty and area of competence. The same applies to the president of the

11 Crisis Staff. The Prosecution knows this full well. That's why they gave

12 up prosecuting Ivica Santic. As far as the factual power and role of

13 the 29-year-old completely anonymous in the town of Prijedor Dr. Milomir

14 Stakic is concerned, we should try to show in the course of our case what

15 influence exactly he held, that is how powerless he was. As concerns

16 Dr. Stakic, as the president of the council for National Defence of the

17 Prijedor Municipal Assembly, we shall prove that the last time this

18 council met was on the 15th of May, 1992. Even that body had no power to

19 order anything. That body could not even request information from the

20 army or the police, for that matter. After the 15th of May, 1992, that

21 body only met again in September, in late September, I think, of 1992.

22 We shall prove that the army and the police have their own chains

23 of command and that as such, they are absolutely and fully independent,

24 independent from any municipal organ. In our case, we shall prove what

25 the main reason was that the Bosniak/Muslim people started leaving the

Page 9094

1 territory of Prijedor Municipality. We shall prove that all military-aged

2 men were liable for military service. Even Serbs who failed to respond to

3 the callups were persecuted, tried, and convicted. And we shall present

4 the Court with documents in writing testifying to this effect. That was

5 the main idea of male Bosniaks and Croats, driving them to leave the

6 territory of Republika Srpska. They did not wish to serve in the

7 Republika Srpska army.

8 As for Dr. Stakic's responsibility, the Defence will mainly be

9 divided up into a number of levels. First we shall call witnesses of

10 different nationalities. We hope that Muslim, Serb, Croat, and Ukrainian

11 witnesses will appear before this Court because all these different ethnic

12 groups are represented in Prijedor Municipality. I think we even have a

13 Polish witness. The Defence will try to call witnesses who were captured

14 in Prijedor and outside Prijedor, and those witnesses will testify as to

15 who was in command and what exactly Dr. Stakic's role was in 1992. We

16 shall show by using independent documents and witnesses that Dr. Stakic

17 had no genocidal intent or the mens rea necessary for the commission of

18 any crime as charged in the fourth amended indictment. We shall use

19 documents and witness testimonies to prove that Dr. Stakic had no

20 knowledge of criminal activities taking place during that period in

21 Prijedor Municipality. Yes indeed, at a later stage, he was in a position

22 to learn about some of them, just like most inhabitants of Prijedor did

23 learn about these things, but only after a period of time had elapsed.

24 Expert and factual witnesses will be called to deny the theories presented

25 by the Prosecution against Dr. Stakic and connected to the relationship

Page 9095

1 between Dr. Stakic and the army and Dr. Stakic and the police. The

2 relationship between the local politicians, the politicians, and

3 Dr. Stakic. We also wish to deny the Prosecution claims concerning the

4 demographic makeup of the population throughout the war and after the

5 war. Our intention was also to call a forensic witness, a forensic

6 expert, especially in the light of testimonies by witnesses that we spoke

7 about just this morning where a witness claims that after a brief while,

8 Dr. Stakic did not even attend the meetings of the Crisis Staff any more.

9 Would that expert witness give a different testimony if he had known about

10 this?

11 At this moment, do we really need to have this testimony, this

12 expert testimony, where the witness will be able to tell us that

13 Dr. Stakic did not even attend the meetings of the Crisis Staff at that

14 moment? And it is our submission that he didn't even sign those documents

15 because those documents contain as many as six different signatures. And

16 this was established also through the testimony of the expert witness of a

17 graphologist during the Prosecution's case. We also wanted to call a

18 media analyst who would analyse the disgraceful, the shameful testimony of

19 the journalist Vulliamy. And we do not know whether the prosecutors'

20 Office is ready to --

21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I ask Defence counsel to calm down and to

22 use the appropriate words in this courtroom.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] The Office of the Prosecutor realises

24 that this witness in at least two different cases testified in two

25 completely different ways with regard to the same facts. And we shall

Page 9096

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 9097

1 request that the OTP bring charges against that witness, and that is why

2 we want to bring in a media analyst to testify in our case.

3 Likewise, an historian is coming to refute the Prosecution's

4 allegations regarding the historical backdrop of the conflict. A

5 constitutional law expert has been envisaged to come and show how laws in

6 the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the municipality of Prijedor worked

7 which were the real terms of reference of Dr. Stakic's. We think it is

8 better to prove that through expert witnesses than through car mechanics,

9 truck drivers, and electrical engineers. If we want to know how law

10 functioned we are not ready before this Chamber to prove legal aspects

11 through car mechanics. Why didn't the OTP call any expert on

12 constitutional law or local self-government? Because such an expert

13 cannot say what they need to hear.

14 Next -- after them, we should have witnesses who are friends,

15 neighbours, and relatives of Dr. Stakic. And they are to tell the Court

16 what was Dr. Stakic like before the conflict, during the conflict, and

17 after the conflict and all that happened in 1992. They will be coming

18 here to testify about their relations with Dr. Stakic before April 1992,

19 in April 1992, his attitude to propaganda, broadcasts on television or

20 radio, and press statements. They are also to show what was the

21 relationship of Dr. Stakic with other nongovernmental organisations, his

22 attitude towards Muslims and Croats. The standing of Dr. Stakic in the

23 neighbourhood community he lived in. These witnesses will prove that

24 Dr. Stakic never visited Omarska, never saw Keraterm, never went to

25 Trnopolje. The only thing that the Office of the Prosecutor has succeeded

Page 9098

1 in bringing before this Chamber is a witness with very poor eyesight, and

2 the Defence has come by evidence to show that that witness was suffering

3 from mental traumas; that is, that that person suffered from mental

4 disorders before the war. We also saw what poor eyesight that man

5 suffered from, and he admitted before this Chamber that he did not have

6 the eyeglasses in Omarska and yet he claimed to have recognised Dr. Stakic

7 from a distance of 70 metres.

8 And finally, the Defence believes that the documentation that was

9 disclosed to it under Rule 68, that is, the part that was disclosed to us,

10 that was given us, even though it is evident that the large part of this

11 documentation has never been turned over to the Defence and the witness

12 statements will suffice to refute the Prosecution's allegations as stated

13 in the fourth amended indictment. And in themselves, they constitute more

14 than a sufficient reason to acquit Dr. Stakic. It is the Defence's belief

15 that on behalf of Dr. Stakic, that the evidence that we expect to produce

16 will show and confirm the only logical truthful and fair conclusion, that

17 Dr. Stakic is innocent under all counts of the fourth amended indictment

18 filed against him.

19 And finally, the Defence believes that this Honourable Court will

20 find that the witnesses called by the Prosecution contradicting one

21 another, inconsistent, and untrustworthy, and that its judgement will be

22 in favour of Dr. Stakic. Thank you.

23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

24 Dr. Stakic, you are aware as it has been said in the beginning of

25 this case that whenever it's appropriate, this Trial Chamber will allow on

Page 9099

1 your request to give a statement. At this point in time, Rule 84 bis

2 provides especially that after the opening statement of a party, you have

3 the right, if you so wish, to give a statement under this rule. Do you

4 want to give such a statement now?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not ready at this moment,

6 Your Honours.

7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.

8 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, can I just clarify that by a statement,

9 Your Honour at this stage is talking about evidence on oath as opposed to

10 the type of statement that Your Honour had in mind.

11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: At this moment, I make as hopefully one can see

12 from the transcript, Rule 84 bis statement of the accused after the

13 opening statement.

14 MS. KORNER: Yes.

15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It's necessary to have the break now. And then

16 immediately after the break, we will start with the first Defence

17 witness. Please let us limit ourselves to, if possible, 5 minutes to

18 1.00.

19 MS. KORNER: Just before Your Honour rises, Mr. Lukic talked about

20 protective measures. We don't know why again there's a request for

21 protective measure.

22 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Yes, I can explain.

23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.

24 MR. LUKIC: If we can go to private session, please.

25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Private session

Page 9100

1 [Private session]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 [redacted]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 --- Recess taken at 12.38 p.m.

15 [Open session]

16 --- On resuming at 12.55 p.m.

17 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, before the witness is called, may I just

18 mention very quickly either now or the end of the session today, because I

19 can't be here tomorrow, would Your Honour allow me to raise two or three

20 matters, short matters of administration.

21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes, please do so.

22 MS. KORNER: Can I do it now.

23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.

24 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, the first is this: Would Your Honour

25 make an order that the transcripts of the summoned interviews which we are

Page 9101

1 about to disclose in full should not be disseminated beyond the Defence

2 team in this case. In other words, Your Honour, they should not be handed

3 over to people not directly connected with the Stakic case.

4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: [Microphone not activated] We issue in -- issued

5 in the beginning a general --

6 MS. KORNER: I think that applied to statements --

7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: [Microphone not activated] -- that transcripts

8 should be in an area of the Defence.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the President, please.

10 MS. KORNER: That's witnesses the Prosecution were intending to

11 call. That's what the order deals with. These were not witnesses the

12 Prosecution intends to call. So if Your Honour would be kind enough --

13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Any objections by the Defence?

14 MR. LUKIC: Absolutely no objections, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then this is ordered as requested.

16 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much. The second matter is this:

17 Would Your Honour also be ordered that today we be supplied with proper

18 summaries of the witnesses the Defence intend to call in the next -- in

19 this week, plus the order of witnesses, plus proper details of the

20 witnesses. Your Honour, and may I on that note just deal with this: That

21 I understand why Your Honour has allowed this witness who is here to be

22 called. But Your Honour one of the ways of dealing with this is that if

23 witnesses have not yet been brought to this Tribunal and the evidence is

24 as we anticipate it will be, all about the events in Bosanski Brod, which

25 we're not going to dispute, that the other witnesses need not be called.

Page 9102

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 9103

1 It is considerably expensive to the Tribunal to bring witnesses and the

2 time taken up who are not actually strictly necessary to the issues in the

3 case. But Your Honour I just mention that at this stage, but my concern

4 is we get proper summaries as required under the rules and proper details

5 and the order of the witness.

6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: No doubt, it's deplorable that we didn't receive

7 this until today. But my assumption is that we will -- we have to stay

8 realistic that we receive by the end of the day the order of the witnesses

9 to be called tomorrow and the necessary summary. And as regards the other

10 witnesses to appear during this week, no later by the end of tomorrow.

11 But in general, we have to come back to these issues when

12 discussing the 65 ter (g) motion as such. I think now we shouldn't

13 hesitate any longer. And I would ask the usher to bring in the witness.

14 MR. LUKIC: Also, before the witness comes, Your Honour, I got one

15 hour for the direct examination of this witness. Is it possible if we

16 continue until 2.00? Because there is no other trial today in this

17 courtroom.

18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We try our very best.

19 MR. LUKIC: I apologise to the translation unit.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good afternoon. Good afternoon. Can you hear

22 me in a language which you understand?

23 THE WITNESS: [No Interpretation]

24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please, my apologies that we address you only as

25 Witness DA, which is a pseudonym. It's on the request of one of the

Page 9104

1 parties for your protection. It's nothing with impoliteness, only for

2 your own protection.

3 So may we please hear your solemn declaration.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

5 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. Please be seated.

7 WITNESS: WITNESS DA

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Examined by Mr. Lukic:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. DA. We speak the same

11 language, and in view of the interpretation, will you please wait a little

12 before you answer my question so that the interpreters' service could

13 interpret.

14 For the record, will you tell us when were you born and where?

15 A. I was born on the 15th of April, 1935 in Bosanski Brod, Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina.

17 Q. Are you married?

18 A. I am married, but I do not know whether I'm still married. I am

19 married, but I don't know if something has happened to that marriage.

20 Q. And what is the ethnicity of your wife?

21 A. She is a Croat.

22 Q. Why do you say that you do not know whether you are still married?

23 A. Well, I haven't for the past ten years -- divorced.

24 Q. Is it because your wife is afraid of the consequences if she came

25 to live with you?

Page 9105

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was the reason something that you did?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And if she came to live with you, would there be a risk of her

5 losing her pension?

6 A. She could lose both her pension and her relatives might also

7 renounce her, disown her.

8 Q. And there is also the risk that her son who works in Croatia might

9 lose his job, isn't it?

10 A. Yes. And that is why the two of us are suffering.

11 Q. How many children do you have?

12 A. Three. Because I had two sons when I married her, and she had one

13 daughter when she married me. And our children were quite small when we

14 were married, and we have been married for over 20 years.

15 Q. And one daughter is married, isn't she?

16 A. Yes. One daughter got married before the war, and she

17 married -- she lives in Croatia and she is married to a Croat.

18 Q. Will you tell us briefly what happened on the 3rd of March, 1992?

19 What happened to you that day?

20 A. That day, before that day, let me tell you just one sentence.

21 There was war psychosis which one could feel in Croatia so that that

22 day --

23 THE INTERPRETER: We are sorry. We cannot hear the witness at

24 all. We cannot hear the witness. We are sorry.

25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Something is wrong with the microphone.

Page 9106

1 THE INTERPRETER: We do not hear anything. We are sorry,

2 Your Honours.

3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May we ask the booth, can you hear the witness?

4 THE INTERPRETER: The witness needs to say something.

5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I shall repeat.

7 THE INTERPRETER: We can barely hear him now. Could you repeat

8 the previous question we think the witness said. But we can barely hear

9 him, so this is not working really, Your Honours.

10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So let's try in the meantime let the technicians

11 work on this problem, that you not only can barely hear the witness but

12 entirely. But could you please rephrase your last question, Mr. Lukic.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Can you tell us what happened to you on the 3rd of March, 1992?

15 THE INTERPRETER: Now we do not hear the witness at all.

16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Our apologies. We have to wait for the

17 technician.

18 May I take the liberty in the meantime, and my apologies to the

19 witness, in order to proceed with the second question raised by the Office

20 of the Prosecution, that we discuss these issues in office in the

21 framework of a 65 ter (i) conference this afternoon, say, at 4.00. Would

22 this be appropriate for you?

23 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm very sorry, I can't be here. I have

24 to leave today at half past 2.00, but Mr. Koumjian will be here and he can

25 deal with it.

Page 9107

1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The Defence.

2 MR. LUKIC: [In English] We can be here, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So 4.00 in my office, please, for a 65 ter (i)

4 conference.

5 MS. KORNER: And Your Honour, I should say with Your Honour's

6 permission, Ms. Karper as usual will be present.

7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: That goes without saying.

8 Apparently, the problems are related to voice distortion.

9 Therefore, in order to continue, if there is no objection, we go into

10 closed session. This is feasible. I can't see any objections. So

11 therefore, we proceed in closed session.

12 [Closed session]

13 [redacted]

14 [redacted]

15 [redacted]

16 [redacted]

17 [redacted]

18 [redacted]

19 [redacted]

20 [redacted]

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted]

23 [redacted]

24 [redacted]

25 [redacted]

Page 9108

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 Pages 9108-9118 redacted closed session

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 9119

1 [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 [redacted]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

15 at 1.44 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,

16 the 19th day of November, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25