1 Tuesday, 29 April 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused Simatovic entered court]
4 [The accused Stanisic is not present]
5 --- Upon commencing at 1.16 p.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome, you are to continue with your
8 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 When court day ended yesterday, I was beginning my remarks
10 regarding the joint criminal enterprise and explaining why in our summary
11 diagram, we had placed Mr. Stanisic in both a box for the Serbian MUP and
12 also in a box for Serbian politicians. As an illustration of how
13 Mr. Stanisic was involved in realisation of the common plan through
14 political activity, I played an intercept on slide 16 between Stanisic
15 and Karadzic in which they expressed their view that Babic is not adept
16 in political matters.
17 Stanisic informs Karadzic that he has had a serious discussion
18 with Babic about how to act politically.
19 Similarly, as you can see on the left-hand side of the diagram,
20 Milan Martic can be found not only in the Republika Srpska Krajina or the
21 RSK Ministry of Internal Affairs but also in the box for RSK political
22 figures. This represents the dual role that he played.
23 My colleagues and I will come back to this diagram on several
24 occasions during the course of the opening.
25 The Prosecution will over the course of this trial establish the
1 shared intent of these core members with a primary focus on these accused
2 present, their intent and their acts of contribution to the overall
3 criminal plan.
4 It is difficult to trace the roots of a covert criminal plan,
5 particularly in a case such as this in which secrecy and surprise was
6 viewed as an essential component of the plan's success. As best we can
7 determine, we see the germination of this criminal plan in the words of
8 its primary architect, Slobodan Milosevic.
9 Slide number 18 shows the words Milosevic spoke on the 16th of
10 March, 1991, to a closed group of deputies after a period of steadily
11 increasing tensions.
12 In this context, and at a meeting with the presidents of Serb
13 municipalities, Milosevic said, "The government has been tasked with
14 creating suitable units which will make us safe at all times, that is,
15 capable of defending the interests of our Republic, but also the
16 interests of Serbs outside Serbia
17 It is the Prosecution's case that approximately six weeks after
18 Milosevic gave this order for the creation of special units tasked with
19 protecting Serb interests outside of Serbia, Jovica Stanisic established
20 these units in the State Security Department of the Serbian Ministry of
21 Internal Affairs.
22 Let me once again direct your attention to the awards ceremony in
23 Kula in May of 1997 where Franko Simatovic gave a retrospective of the
24 special unit's history. A candid history of it in a private setting to
25 the select group of people who supported the unit and its objectives.
1 [Videotape played]
2 MR. GROOME: Here on slide number 20, you can see the two
3 statements side by side and considering that there is no other unit that
4 we know of that Milosevic created, it becomes clear that we are talking
5 about one and the same unit.
6 Mr. Simatovic would go on to say in his speech, "The contribution
7 of the Special Operation Unit is enormous. 47 soldiers were killed and
8 250 wounded in combat operations at 50 different locations."
9 With his own words, Simatovic tells us that the special units of
10 the Serbian DB operated in 50 different locations in Croatia and
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He would also say, "26 training camps for special
12 police units of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina
13 also formed in that period."
14 26 training camps mostly in Bosnia and Croatia
15 The genesis of the special units was the day that Milosevic
16 charged Stanisic with the task of establishing a covert fighting force
17 not bound by law but only by the dictates of Mr. Milosevic.
18 On this day which we are able to identify with no greater
19 precision than it was during the spring of 1991, Stanisic would join
20 Milosevic's plan to ensure that in the break-up of Yugoslavia, a break-up
21 which appeared inevitable, in this break-up, they would ensure that Serbs
22 came out on top regardless of in which republic those Serbs were and
23 regardless of the cost or harm to the other ethnic populations in
25 Stanisic would, in turn, give the day-to-day administration of
1 the special unit to his most entrusted subordinate, Franko Simatovic.
2 From the outset, secrecy was an important principle for the unit.
3 Former members of the special unit will describe how they only
4 learned they were working for the Serbian DB some time after they joined
5 the Special Units. Often these men only knew their comrades by aliases
6 and nicknames, forbidden to reveal or to ask another's name. Such
7 secrecy helped create confusion over who was behind the unit. Public
8 knowledge that the Serbian DB had created and maintained such an
9 extra-legal unit would have had negative consequences for Milosevic.
10 Such secrecy was also essential because Milosevic, Stanisic,
11 Simatovic, and other members of the core group knew that their work in
13 serious crimes against the non-Serb populations there. They realised at
14 the outset what the world would come to understand as the tragedy
15 unfolded. You cannot forcibly remove large civilian populations from
16 their homes without committing grave crimes against them.
17 I would like to play an intercept for you to illustrate
18 Mr. Stanisic's ever-present concern for secrecy.
19 [Intercept played]
20 MR. GROOME: On slide number 21, Stanisic reminds Karadzic that
21 they must be careful what they say on the telephone.
22 In another intercept, Stanisic says to Karadzic, "Could you maybe
23 do it in a way so that I am not shown as part of the initiative?"
24 In other intercepts, the Prosecution will introduce into
25 evidence, you will hear Franko Simatovic talk in guarded cryptic
1 sentences to another core member of the criminal enterprise.
2 The map that Stanisic shows Milosevic in the earlier clip is
3 affixed to the wall at the Kostic Training Centre in Kula. It is a map
4 of Yugoslavia
5 and Bosnia
6 lists those locations in his speech.
7 Here on the bottom left corner of slide 22 is a photo still of
8 that map. On the right are those same locations marked on a standard map
9 of Yugoslavia
11 located in Serbia
12 Over the course of their establishment and evolution, the units
13 of the Serbian DB would refer to themselves by several names.
14 Slide number 23 contains a list of these names as well as some of
15 the badges that members of the special units displayed on their uniforms.
16 Some of these names such as JATD and JSO would be official names
17 used within the State Security Service. Some of the units were named
18 after the individuals who led that particular unit, Arkan's Men,
19 Arkan's Tigers, Martic's men, Captain Dragan's Knindzas.
20 One of the names they were commonly referred to describe the head
21 gear they often wore on operations, the red berets.
22 Your Honours, the units of the Serbian DB was a large
23 organisation with many members. We will throughout this opening
24 introduce you to a few of the most prominent members, those particular
25 members you will hear referred to numerous times during this trial.
1 Slide 24 is of Milorad Ulemek, or more popularly known as Legija
2 because of the time he spent in the French foreign legion. His uncle
3 Mihajlo Ulemek was a member of Arkan's Serbian volunteer guard and
4 Legija, after joining his uncle in the guards, became one of its most
5 respected and feared members.
6 Because of his leadership ability, Legija quickly rose to become
7 one of the main instructors and ultimately one of the main commanders of
8 Arkan's Serbian volunteer's guard. He is the special unit member who
9 features most prominently in the Kula video because he is always at
10 Stanisic's side as they show Milosevic their new centre.
11 Slide 25 concerns Zika Crnogorac, or Zika the Montenegrin. He
12 was another prominent member of the Red Berets. You will hear of his
13 involvement in Mount Fruska Gora at the training centre in Ilok.
14 I will show you a clip from Kula video in a few moments in which
15 he greets Milosevic and introduces him to the senior members of the
16 Special Units of the Serbian DB.
17 In light of the Chamber's limitation on the Prosecution's
18 opening, I will skip slide 26 concerning Mr. Bozovic and move directly to
19 slide 27.
20 Over the course of the celebration in Kula in May 1997,
21 Mr. Stanisic would give Mr. Milosevic a tour of the equipment the
22 Special Unit of the Serbian DB had. In this video slip on slide 27,
23 Milosevic is shown a mobile operating room, armoured personnel carriers,
24 and trucks with rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns mounted on the
1 Keeping in mind that the legal mandate entrusted to Mr. Stanisic
2 and Mr. Simatovic's department was the collection of data and
3 information, these images make clear that the unit had equipped itself
4 for a very different task.
5 While the idea of creating a Special Unit was conceived in
7 While the idea of creating a Special Unit was conceived in Belgrade, its
8 birth would be in the Krajina during the spring of 1991. The Krajina is
9 the part of Croatia
10 Krajina had a large majority of Serbs who felt increasingly vulnerable as
11 they listened to nationalistic Croatian rhetoric being spoken in Zagreb
12 In the context of this fear and mistrust, several ordinary Croatian Serbs
13 would rise to prominence and become pivotal players in the unfolding
14 events. I would like to introduce you to two of them now.
15 Milan Babic was the first prime minister and president of the
16 government of the Serbian Autonomous Regina of the Krajina. The
17 self-declared region was more commonly referred to as the SAO Krajina.
18 He testified in several trials before this Tribunal and pled
19 guilty to the crime of persecution. He was sentenced to a term of
20 incarceration of 13 years. A little over two years ago, he committed
21 suicide in the UN Detention Unit. His testimony before this Tribunal
22 sets out the events of the Krajina from an insider's perspective.
23 Admission of that testimony is a matter that is pending before this
24 Chamber and I will therefore refrain from discussing his testimony in
25 this opening.
1 Another Croatian Serb who rose to prominent was a local police
2 official by the name of Milan Martic. In time, he would come to hold
3 several leadership positions in the SAO Krajina and the subsequently
4 so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina.
5 On the 12th of June last year, a Trial Chamber convicted him of
6 murder, persecutions, deportation, and other crimes and sentenced him to
7 35 years imprisonment. His appeal against this judgement is currently
9 Here on slide number 29, you can see an excerpt from his driver
10 describing how Milan Martic and Jovica Stanisic met regularly.
11 This close relationship becomes apparent in September 1991 after
12 Milan Martic was arrested in the Bosnian town of Bosanska Krupa. His
13 release was arranged after a series of telephone calls, one of which I
14 will play as an example. The call is transcribed on slide 30 and is a
15 call from the 9th September, 1991.
16 [Audio tape played]
17 MR. GROOME: In this intercepted phone conversation, we not only
18 see Milosevic and Karadzic discussing how to free Martic after he was
19 arrested, but how Jovica Stanisic serves as the person who is carrying
20 Milosevic's directives to another core member of the joint criminal
22 The Special Units of the Serbian DB would take their initial form
23 by supporting, training, and facilitating the crimes committed against
24 the non-Serb population of the Krajina. Franko Simatovic personally
25 oversaw this effort.
1 When he first went to the Krajina, he would take with him a
2 person by the name of Dragan Vasiljkovic who would develop the training
4 Dragan Vasiljkovic, also known as Captain Dragan, born in Serbia
5 Dragan Vasiljkovic moved with his parents to Australia and returned to
7 advantage of his experience and sent him to the Krajina in order to act
8 as an instructor for the newly-established Krajina police forces.
9 As the report from the Yugoslav army on slide 31 demonstrates, it
10 was clear that Captain Dragan was working with and for the Serbian
11 Ministry of Internal Affairs under the supervision of Jovica Stanisic.
12 I would like to show you on slides 32 and 33 a letter drafted by
13 Captain Dragan on the 8th of November, 1991. You can see his signature
14 at the bottom of slide 32.
15 At this time, Vasiljkovic did not fully appreciate Stanisic's
16 demand for secrecy and candidly revealed his connections with the DB in
17 this request we see on slide number 33 where he stated that he had "the
18 obligation toward the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia
19 and his activities had to be "fully in accordance with the mentioned
21 In this excerpt from the Kula dedication or the Kula awards tape
22 on slide number 34, we can see Jovica Stanisic embrace Captain Dragan
23 when he gives him an award.
24 [Videotape played]
25 MR. GROOME: In early April, as Milan Martic began to cobble
1 together a police force of mostly unarmed and untrained men, Simatovic
2 and Captain Dragan arrived bearing the support of Jovica Stanisic and
3 Slobodan Milosevic.
4 Martic took the State Security delegation of Simatovic and
5 Captain Dragan to a place called Golubic, approximately 9 kilometres
6 north of Knin, where within a few days, they established a Serbian DB
7 training centre to prepare Serbs for the takeover of Serb lands in
9 The training that would take place created a formidable
10 well-equipped fighting force that not only prevented the Croatian
11 government from imposing its will in the Krajina but would also be used
12 to ethnically cleanse the Krajina of non-Serbs. Six years later in Kula,
13 Mr. Simatovic would refer to Golubic as one of the accomplishments of his
15 In all, over 3.000 men received training in Golubic. Some who
16 received this training would go on to set up the next 25 training camps
17 Stanisic and Simatovic would establish. These first members of the
18 Special Units would be dubbed with the name Knindzas because of the
19 proximity of the Golubic camp to Knin.
20 One of the early battles that the Knindzas would fight was in
21 Glina. After the battle, Captain Dragan would distribute some red
22 berets; this would become one of the emblems of the unit and be the basis
23 of their most commonly used name, the Red Berets. Here on slide 35 are
24 some pictures of its prominent members as well as a display case in the
25 Kostic training centre in Kula in which the red beret is in the centre of
1 the display surrounded by weapons.
2 And while the unit was referred to by several names over the
3 course of its history, its use of the red beret remained a constant. And
4 although some military units not directly affiliated with the DB donned
5 berets of this colour, the red beret soon became emblematic of the units
6 of the DB.
7 Much of what we know about the birth of the Special Units is
8 corroborated by documents the Office of the Prosecutor has been able to
9 obtain. I will take this opportunity to show the Chamber some of the
10 most significant of these documents.
11 I will skip over the document on slide 36 to shorten the opening
12 but will go to slide 37.
13 As we can see from this document on slide number 37, on the 14th
14 of June, just a few weeks after Captain Dragan made his proposal,
15 Captain Dragan and Frenki held a planning meeting attended by several
16 officers of the Yugoslav army. This document confirms that the Yugoslav
17 army was not a neutral presence in the Krajina.
18 Two days later, Mr. Simatovic himself would issue a written
19 order. Slide 38 is a photo of the original document. It is an order
20 signed by Franko Simatovic ordering the removal of all weapons and
21 armaments from the Knin fortress to the Golubic camp.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Groome kindly slow down now. Thank
24 MR. GROOME: Yes.
25 This order gives an insight into how Simatovic viewed his
1 authority in the Krajina. It is he and not the Yugoslav Army, not
2 Milan Babic, not Milan Martic who gives the order on such an important
3 matter as the removal of weapons. And Your Honours by this time will
4 have noted the letterhead, "Republic of Serbia
6 He would sign the order not with his full name but with his
7 nickname, Frenki, the name most would come to know him by.
8 The Prosecution will also tender documents such as the one on
9 your screens which makes reference to orders given by Frenki. According
10 to the author of this report shown on slide 40, the Serbian Ministry of
11 Internal Affairs previously provided four vehicles. Two months after
12 receiving the equipment, the author reports that he received an order
13 from "Frenk" who he explains is the chief representative of the
14 Serbian MUP to remove radio equipment from two of the vehicles.
15 Around this time, Captain Dragan drafted a report. Based on the
16 initial success of Captain Dragan, he now proposed a way for
17 Special Units of the Serbian DB to grow. He believes their objective
18 must be more than simply training individuals. He has a vision for
19 training men who can go to other areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 and establish new training facilities and new branches of the
21 Special Units.
22 As slide number 41 shows, he suggests that the three men directly
23 responsible for this initial success tour the field to boost morale.
24 Those people being Milan Martic, Frenki, and Captain Dragan himself.
25 He suggests that these three as well as prominent specials, a
1 reference to members of the Special Units, visit these newly-formed local
2 formations to boost morale and to "give advice on further formation of
3 units in the field."
4 The Prosecution will produce other reports that demonstrate that
5 Frenki, or Mr. Simatovic, along with the local Serb leaders were provided
6 detailed information about what was transpiring in the Krajina.
7 On slide 42, you can see a report of 19 July. It bears pointing
8 out with this document the use of the term "special units", perhaps the
9 first use of this term to describe these units created by the Serbian DB.
10 The significance of the training they received is evident in the
11 last sentence, "Our forces are deployed according to the training plan."
12 Slide 43 shows a report from the 6th of August, 1991, announcing
13 a cease-fire we can once again see Mr. Simatovic's alias or nickname
15 On your screen, you will see two excerpts of reports from
16 July 1991. Later that summer on the 19th of July, Captain Dragan made a
17 detailed report to his superiors, to Frenki, to Milan Martic, and to
18 Major Fica who according to the JNA intelligence service was an inspector
19 in the MUP of Serbia
20 From the outset, it is clear the people they have trained and
21 equipped are perpetrating war crimes. To Captain Dragan's credit, his
22 initial view of this behaviour was that it was something that needed to
23 be corrected. As the Chamber will see over the course of the trial,
24 these crimes were not incidental to the plan but an integral part of it.
25 In the second report on slide 44, an excerpt from a 23rd of July
1 report, we can see from the earliest days of the unit, less than three
2 months after its establishment, an organised system of reporting has been
4 We can see from this document that one of Captain Dragan's
5 foundational tasks in the Krajina was to organise a system of command and
6 reporting that included the Republic of Serbia
7 Did Stanisic and Simatovic receive reports about the activities
8 of the units they created? Did Milosevic know what the unit was doing?
9 I draw your attention to slide 45 and once again to the Kula
10 video. In this segment, Stanisic takes Milosevic over to a dress
11 formation of the unit's senior commanders and they introduce themselves.
12 After being saluted by Crnogorac, Milosevic shakes his hand and then
13 walks over to Colonel Rajo Bozovic. I will make an observation about
14 their exchange after you view the video.
15 [Videotape played]
16 MR. GROOME: It is the Prosecution's case that Milosevic, through
17 Simatovic and Stanisic were regularly informed of where their unit was
18 and what it was doing. In this exchange, Milosevic is meeting Bozovic in
19 person for what appears to be the very first time. Milosevic, upon
20 hearing the name, recognises it immediately from reading his reports,
21 reports the Prosecution asserts must have passed through Simatovic and
22 Stanisic. Reports that were provided with sufficient frequency that
23 Milosevic quickly recognised the name.
24 I now invite Ms. Brehmeier-Metz to address the role Mr. Stanisic
25 and Mr. Simatovic played in the crimes committed in Croatia.
1 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: May it please the Court, Mr. President,
2 Your Honour.
3 As the seams of Yugoslavia
4 Serb minorities living in Croatia
5 autonomous region, a region that while it lay within the geographic
6 boundaries of Croatia
8 These self-declared regions were called Serb Autonomous Regions
9 or SAOs, the acronym in the -- from the B/C/S language.
10 In August 1991, Milan Martic decided to take control of the
11 Croatian village of Kijevo
12 ultimatum to the Kijevo police station threatening to attack the civilian
13 population of the village. At this moment, the Yugoslav Army openly
14 entered the conflict on the Serb side. After the ultimatum had expired,
15 a combined force of Martic's men, the Yugoslav Army and the local Serb
16 reservists or TO members attacked and took control of Kijevo and removed
17 the entire Croat population.
18 From this time onwards, the Yugoslav Army and the local
19 Serb Krajina armed forces, that is the police forces, the TO units, and
20 some Serb volunteer units, many of them trained, equipped, financed, and
21 supported by the Serbian DB under Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic
22 started attacking Croat villages in the SAO Krajina.
23 The TO, that is, the Territorial Defence in the former Yugoslavia
24 were comprised of former members of the Yugoslav People's Army that
25 retained their uniforms and a weapon and remained as reservists under the
1 command of the Republic in times of peace and were incorporated into the
2 Yugoslav Army in times of war.
3 In August 1991, Slobodan Milosevic would settle a dispute between
4 Babic and Martic over the control of the TO forces by forcing Babic to
5 appoint Milan Martic as Deputy Commander of the TOs.
6 This appointment, together with the fact that many of the TOs in
7 SAO Krajina were loyal only to Martic ultimately led to Martic's control
8 over the TOs. On 1st August 1991
9 that the police special purpose units and the TOs would jointly form the
10 armed forces of the SAO Krajina.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpretation, thank
13 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: Slide number 46 that is now shown
14 illustrates the locations in Croatia
15 particular, the municipalities and villages that are of relevance for the
16 indictment against Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic. The villages in
17 SAO Krajina that I will deal with now have been marked with red circles.
18 And in the circle that is at the bottom of the map, you can also see the
19 town of Knin
20 Dubica, Bacin and Cerovljani are villages situated on the border
21 between Croatia
22 half of the inhabitants living in Dubica were of Croat ethnicity with a
23 small Muslim minority whereas the villages of Bacin and Cerovljani were
24 predominantly Croat.
25 Until 1991, the relations between the ethnic groups had been
1 friendly and harmonious. In summer 1991, however, these relations
3 Armed clashes occurred between the Croatian and Serb armed
4 forces, and in September 1991, the Croatian army withdrew, Serb forces
5 and in particular Martic's police and his TO took control of the
6 villages. Serb forces came repeatedly, burning the houses of Croat
7 inhabitants, using them as human shields and killing people.
8 They did, for example, not refrain from firing a rocket launcher
9 at the bell tower of the Catholic church of Dubica
10 decided to leave their village, only a few elderly and sick remaining.
11 On the 20th of October, 1991, members of Martic's police and of
12 Milicija Krajina went around Dubica with a truck picking up a total
13 number of 53 of the remaining civilians and taking them to a fire station
14 in Bacin. They pretended that a meeting would be held there. In fact,
15 at the fire station, the people were detained. One of those detained
16 there witnessed that some 10 civilians were later released apparently
17 because of connections they had with Serbs. He himself was let go by one
18 of the guards who happened to be a former student of his. The witness
19 later compiled a list of the people that were detained together with him
20 in the fire station.
21 Looking at the ages of the civilians on the list that is now
22 shown on slide 47, you will notice that the vast majority of them were
23 older than 60. The following day, the remaining civilians in the fire
24 station were executed by Serb forces together with a number of elderly
25 civilians from Bacin and Cerovljani. One of those killed was a
1 90-year-old woman.
2 The village of Saborsko
3 Plitvice. In August 1991, its population was almost entirely Croat as
4 was that of the neighbouring villages of Poljanak, Lipovaca and Vukovici.
5 These villages were surrounded by villages with mostly Serb
6 population. In August 1991, Serb forces started shelling Saborsko aiming
7 at linking the Serb territories that were separated by it. In the
8 following months, members of Martic's police and other Serb forces
9 started a campaign of harassment, arbitrarily arresting detaining and in
10 many cases severely beating Croat civilians. Most of the Croats left the
11 villages as a result of this.
12 In late October and early November 1991, Poljanak, Lipovaca,
13 Vukovici, and finally Saborsko were again subject to attacks by Serb
14 forces. In the course of these attacks, Croat civilians were
15 deliberately and intentionally murdered. In Vukovici for example, Serb
16 forces removed eight Croat civilians from a house, among them both
17 elderly and women. They lined them up against a wall and simply shot
18 them. Another man who was too sick to leave the house was shot by Serb
19 forces while still in bed.
20 On 12 November 1991
21 on Saborsko. The village was first attacked by JNA planes dropping bombs
22 and then by heavy artillery. Afterwards, ground units moved into
24 Slide number 48 refers to this attack. It is a letter of a
25 representative of the village of Plaski
1 against evil people.
2 A Catholic church in Saborsko was shelled and damaged.
3 Subsequently, the artillery withdrew leaving Serb soldiers and policemen
4 in the village. Those Serb forces then started looting the hamlet,
5 driving away private cars, stealing household goods and cattle, and
6 burning houses. Civilians were pulled from basements, men were separated
7 from women, and some 20 men were executed. Most of the inhabitants of
8 Saborsko fled or were taken by bus and released in Croatian territory.
9 During the course of this trial, we will present witnesses that
10 will speak about the attack on Saborsko. On slide number 49, you see
11 quotes of the testimony of one of them during the trial against
13 who took part in the attack on Saborsko, the witness answers that these
14 had been men trained in Golubic, the Red Berets.
15 As a final example, Skabrnja. Skabrnja and the surrounding
16 villages are situated near Zadar in south-western Croatia. In 1991, the
17 village was almost entirely Croat. Following the pattern that I have
18 described, this area was shelled and bombed by Serb forces from September
19 1991 onwards. The final attack took place on 18th November, 1991.
20 There were three Catholic churches in and around Skabrnja. One
21 of them was the Church of the Assumption of the Virgin. The following
22 photos on slide 50 show this church before the attack and afterwards. It
23 was shot at and damaged by a JNA tank. Serb forces took the civilians
24 out of the village and transported them against their will to territory
25 controlled by the Croatian government. Serb forces moved from house to
1 house, searching for those who remained and looting and burning the
3 In all, some 38 civilians were killed in Skabrnja. On 21st
4 December 1991, Martic's police in joint operations with other Serb
5 forces, forced themselves into houses in the tiny village of Bruska
6 is situated between Skabrnja and Benkovac. They took the men outside,
7 lined them up and shot them. They also fired at fleeing women. In all,
8 nine people were killed.
9 All this shows the repeated and eventually predictable pattern of
10 attacks on Croat villages in the Krajina in the fall and winter of 1991.
11 Villages with Croat population were first put under JNA siege, blockaded,
12 and then often shelled. After that, Serb forces, including Martic's
13 police entered the villages.
14 Non-Serb buildings were destroyed. Non-Serb property was looted.
15 Very often, individual Croats were arrested and detained, others were
16 driven out. Those that remained, mostly the elderly population, were
17 murdered thus ethnically cleansing the villages.
18 Again, I would like to refer you to what a witness who is going
19 to be called by the Prosecution said in the trial against Milan Martic.
20 An excerpt of his testimony is shown on slide 52. This witness was
21 personally present when Franko Simatovic, acting on behalf of
22 Jovica Stanisic brought weapons and money to Milan Martic in Knin.
23 For reasons that are unclear, the relationship with
24 Captain Dragan temporarily cooled after the summer of 1991 and he was
25 recalled to Belgrade
1 Krajina. As Captain Dragan's Knindzas broke up, Franko Simatovic
2 hand-picked the best of them to create a select group that would be
3 cultivated into a more organised and professional covert fighting force.
4 This would take place in Mount Fruska Gora in Serbia proper.
5 Your Honours, if I might refer you back to slide 22 of this
6 presentation or to map 6 of the map book that has been handed over to you
7 yesterday. We will show it again later in the opening, but you will see
8 Fruska Gora on the right-hand side of the map just outside
9 Eastern Slavonia
10 which states Lezimir, Mount Fruska Gora.
11 Here, on Mount Fruska Gora, the elite force was within striking
12 distance of Eastern Slavonia where there was a tentative peace or in
14 would be brought back to help train these men on Mount Fruska Gora.
15 Zika, also known as Crnogorac, was appointed the head of the unit. He
16 like the others would be issued a red beret, a state security
17 identification number and a nickname.
18 Stanisic would keep this evolving unit from the public eye by
19 keeping them as part of the State Security Service and not part of the
20 ordinary police or military units of Serbia or the SFRY.
21 The Prosecution's case is summarized on slide number 53. It is
22 the Prosecution's case that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic's role
23 in the organisation, training and outfitting of the direct perpetrators
24 of these crimes as one of the contributions they made to a joint criminal
25 enterprise to forcibly remove Croats and other non-Serbs from targeted
1 lands through the crimes of persecution and murder makes them
2 individually criminally liable for these crimes.
3 The second region in Croatia
4 Eastern Slavonia
5 in Slavonia
7 or SNC of Slavonia Baranja and Western Srem, which will be from now on
8 referred to by its abbreviation SBWS, was established. The SNC
9 proclaimed the Serbs in Croatia
10 autonomy in February 1991. The area is depicted on slide 54.
11 At a meeting held in Backa Palanka just across the Danube river
12 in Serbia
13 the so-called Great National Assembly of SBWS. On 25 June 1991, the very
14 day that Croatia
15 this Great National Assembly declared secession from Croatia and
16 established the Serb Autonomous Region or SAO SBWS.
17 Goran Hadzic who had been the president of the Serb National
18 Council was elected prime minister designate.
19 The SAO Western Slavonia
20 entity, however, will not play a prominent role in the proceedings before
21 this Court. Suffice it to say that in February 1992, the SAO
22 Western Slavonia, along with the SAO SBWS joined the SAO Krajina and
23 created the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
24 Goran Hadzic who is depicted in slide number 55 turned out to be
25 the most prominent political figure in the self-proclaimed SAO SBWS. He
1 had been a founding member and president of the Serbian National Council
2 and was elected the first prime minister designate and on 25th
3 September --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down for the record.
5 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: I'm sorry. He had been a founding member
6 and president of the Serbian National Council and was elected first prime
7 minister designate and on 25th September 1991, prime minister of
8 SAO SBWS.
9 When the three SAOs in Croatia
10 1992, he became president of this newly built entity and remained in that
11 position until December 1993 when Milan Martic took over.
12 Like the political figures in the Krajina, the leadership of the
13 newly created SAO SBWS would also refrain from doing anything without
14 first consulting with Belgrade
15 meet with both Slobodan Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic. He would receive
16 instructions on how to proceed. When he came back to Dalj, he would
17 convene the police and TO commanders and frequently mention things he was
18 told by Milosevic.
19 During an intercepted telephone conversation with Karadzic on
20 14th December, 1991, Stanisic would say, amongst others, "I barely
21 convinced Hadzic not to go," thereby again indicating his close
22 connections with the political leadership of SAO SBWS.
23 Like the Krajina, the SAO SBWS also lacked money and resources
24 and the government of Serbia
25 needed to support them. During his regular meetings with
1 Jovica Stanisic, Hadzic would continuously address the question of
2 equipment for his police force and Stanisic would see that it would be
4 Jovica Stanisic, however, not only exerted his influence during
5 meetings with Hadzic in Belgrade
6 personally came to Eastern Slavonia. Around 19th or 20th September,
7 1991, he arrived in Dalj. We will present evidence that Stanisic
8 screamed at people and berated them because Vukovar, the town that then
9 lay under siege by the JNA had not surrendered yet.
10 The witness will recall that Stanisic pointed out that they had
11 all the equipment necessary to take the city. Stanisic ordered Hadzic to
12 be brought to a meeting in Dalj -- Stanisic ordered Hadzic to be brought
13 to a meeting in Dalj together with all the TO commanders. Indeed, that
14 meeting took place with Stanisic, Hadzic, and others being present. And
15 in October 1991, as can be seen from slide 56, Stanisic came to see
16 General Arandjelovic accompanied by two members of the Red Berets,
17 Bozovic, and Ivanovic, Crnogorac.
18 The person to organise this was Radovan Stojicic, also known as
19 Badza, a member of the Serbian MUP who later became the deputy minister
20 of interior of the Republic of Serbia
21 about him. Stojicic had been the head of the anti-terrorist unit, or
22 SAJ, in the MUP Serbia since the late 1980s.
23 He came to the SAO SBWS by the end of September 1991, after
24 Jovica Stanisic had come to Dalj and complained about Vukovar. We will
25 invite Your Honours to draw the inference that although according to the
1 organisation structure of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs,
2 Stojicic was not Stanisic's subordinate; he was sent by Stanisic in order
3 to ensure that the local police forces would function according to the
4 wishes of the leadership and in order to assist the furtherance of the
5 JCE's common plan which included the fall of Vukovar.
6 Consequently, Stojicic, a member of the Ministry of Internal
7 Affairs of Serbia
8 SAO SBWS TO in early autumn 1991.
9 Here, on slide 58 we have some photos taken at Stojicic's
10 funeral. We can see Milosevic and Arkan standing close to each other
11 paying their respects. And the right frame of the slide shows
12 Jovica Stanisic also present during the same occasion.
13 Another member of the Serbian MUP who came to be of importance in
14 the SAO SBWS was Radoslav Kostic also known as Kola or Ante. Kostic had
15 been an agent for the DB from early 1991 onwards.
16 On slide 59, you see another excerpt from the video taken at Kula
17 in 1997 at the training centre that was named after Radoslav Kostic.
18 Jovica Stanisic pays tribute to his comrade by laying down a wreath at
19 Kostic's memorial.
20 The Serbian DB had been involved in transporting weapons from the
21 JNA barracks at Bubanj Potok south of Belgrade to Borovo Selo as early as
22 April 1991.
23 Kostic would oversee the transport of weapons. We will present
24 evidence that huge quantities were arriving from Serbia in the region in
25 June 1991. The weapons belonged to the JNA and the deliveries were
1 organized by the Novi Sad DB with Kostic in charge.
2 Kostic was also involved in forming the SAO SBWS Milicija and
3 oversaw their equipment with weapons through the Novi Sad DB. In
4 September 1991, he accompanied Jovica Stanisic to Dalj.
5 Slide 60 shows the amount of financial support that came from
7 did not have any legal foundations but that one planned to continue to
8 provide assistance nevertheless.
9 Another intermediary between the political leadership in SAO SBWS
10 and Belgrade
11 whole war: Zeljko Raznjatovic, also known as Arkan.
12 He had begun his "career" in the 1980s committing several serious
13 crimes throughout Europe
15 of violent hooligans around him. In 1990, using members of this group,
16 he set up a paramilitary unit called Serbian Volunteer Guard or more
17 notoriously, Arkan's men with its elite sub-unit, Arkan's Tigers. It was
18 this group that would come to terrorise the non-Serb civilians in
19 SAO SBWS and later in Bosnia
20 war crimes to the men he trained.
21 His second in command was another person who was already
22 introduced, Milorad Ulemek or Legija.
23 They would serve as a shock force, the strike force for the JNA
24 that preferred that some of the more blatantly illegal crimes perpetrated
25 against the population be committed by people like Arkan.
1 Arkan had a very close working relationship with the Serbian MUP.
2 His unit was supplied by the MUP, and he would claim that he would do
3 nothing without Jovica Stanisic's knowledge and orders. A few days after
4 the takeover of Dalj, Arkan came to Borovo Selo with some of his men. He
5 introduced them as being from the Serbian DB and showed his ID card which
6 was a Serbian DB ID card.
7 Slide number 63 has at the bottom of it an excerpt from a report
8 detailing the type of training that was being conducted in the training
9 centres of the Special Units of the Serbian DB. I would also like to
10 play a short clip in which Arkan, speaking in English, describes his
11 unit's policy towards captured soldiers.
12 [Videotape played]
13 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: There are other military reports such as the
14 one in slide 64 that the Prosecution will tender that show the notoriety
15 of Arkan for brutality and criminal conduct that was not only known by
16 the non-Serbs who fled in terror at the sound of his name, but the JNA,
17 Serb politicians, and most importantly for the purpose of this case by
18 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
19 In all, the SAO SBWS was never an independent entity. You will
20 hear evidence that Slobodan Milosevic controlled Hadzic through Arkan and
21 Stojicic and Jovica Stanisic was the link between them and Belgrade.
22 Since late 1990, many former members of the Milicija, that is the
23 police forces, had left their office and had established their own
24 Milicija groups which operated independently and without any legal basis.
25 In July 1991, Goran Hadzic along with Radoslav Kostic tried to organise
1 them. Kostic would remain the contact person for the Milicija and supply
2 them with what was needed.
3 In the course of time, however, it became evident that Arkan had
4 become so powerful in Erdut and Dalj and that those men in the Milicija
5 who did not take side with him would endanger their lives. There were
6 many who rather joined Arkan in the crimes that were later committed in
7 the area.
8 Around the summer of 1991, Hadzic set up a special unit that was
9 initially meant to ensure his security. Eventually, this unit was
10 renamed into the Serbian National Security or SNB and became a special
11 unit with specific powers. It was meant to be the equivalent of the
12 Special Units of the Serbian DB. Goran Hadzic was in overall command.
13 Amongst those that were of importance within the SNB was
14 Mihajlo Ulemek, Legija's uncle. He, as a member of Arkan's Tigers, was
15 the head of the security within the SNB. The SNB, however, did not only
16 serve as security guards for the government. In the course of this trial
17 we will present evidence that will show how the SNB together with the
18 local TOs, the Milicija, and first and foremost, Arkan's men were
19 involved in the grave crimes and atrocities that were committed in the
20 region during late 1990 and early 1992.
21 In August 1991, Arkan set up a training centre in Erdut that was
22 used not only to train members of his paramilitary group but also
23 volunteers and TO members. The training centre was well-equipped. A
24 report of late October 1991 mentions and I quote, "large quantities of
25 different infantry weapons, grenade launchers, hand grenades, zolja
1 hand-held launchers, et cetera, that Arkan is using to whomever he --
2 issuing to whomever he wants."
3 Your Honours, slides 65 to 68 are documents demonstrating how
4 Arkan would submit bills for payment and on the mechanisms that would be
5 used to financially support his men and to compensate him.
6 I will skip them in slight of the Chamber's limitations on the
7 length of this opening. Arkan's, however, was not the only training
8 centre in the region. In December 1991, the DB set up its own training
9 centre near Ilok just across the border from Backa Palanka.
10 This training centre, which sometimes will also be referred to as
11 Pajzos, served as one of the training camps of the DB for both Red Berets
12 and volunteers and it was specifically mentioned in Franko Simatovic's
13 speech in Kula in 1997.
14 Crnogorac was in charge of the camp with Franko Simatovic paying
15 regular visits to it.
16 Your Honours, the Prosecution alleges Jovica Stanisic and
17 Franko Simatovic to be ultimately responsible for several incidents in
18 Erdut and Dalj between September 1991 and July 1992. As a result of
19 these incidents, non-Serb civilians were forcibly removed from their
20 lawful homes and a total of 107 persons were killed, merely because they
21 were not of Serb ethnicity.
22 Arkan's men and the local police set up makeshift detention
23 centres where they would then hold non-Serb civilians under inhumane
24 circumstances for the only reason of being non-Serb. They would
25 constantly beat the detainees and threaten to kill them while they
1 interrogated them.
2 In the course of this opening, the Prosecution will not describe
3 all seven of these incidents, two of them may serve as examples as to how
4 the events in SAO SBWS took place.
5 The first incident that the accused are charged with occurred in
6 mid-September 1991. Goran Hadzic himself brought a number of Croat
7 civilians to the police headquarter in Dalj.
8 For the detainees, life turned to be hell. Every night and also
9 during the days, some of them were taken out of the cells and beaten
10 severely. You will hear the evidence of one of the detainees who will
11 describe to you that at one point, a man kicked the door of the cell,
12 broke the lock and entered. He told the detainees, "I want you to know I
13 am Arkan." And looked on while the three men accompanying him started
14 beating the prisoners with iron chairs.
15 Around the 23rd of September, 1991, Hadzic and Arkan came back to
16 the detention centre in Dalj. Arkan was accompanied by some 20 of his
17 Serbian Volunteer Guard. They selected two of the detained civilians and
18 let them go. The remaining 11 detainees were then taken out of detention
19 and killed by Arkan and his men. Immediately afterwards, the commander
20 of Dalj police station, a Serb, reported the incident to the Ministry.
21 His report is shown on slide number 70. He was removed from his post on
22 1st October 1991
23 On 9th November 1991, members of the local TO, SAO SBWS MUP
24 forces and members of Arkan's men arrested at least nine non-Serb
25 civilians in and around Erdut and took them to the TO training centre in
1 Erdut where they shot them dead the following day. Several days later,
2 the widow of one of the men started to make inquiries about her husband.
3 Mihajlo Ulemek intervened and ordered the execution of the rest of the
4 family whereupon members of the SNB and of Arkan's men arrested and
5 killed the widow, her son, and his wife.
6 Another widow of those men that were killed on 10 November asked
7 for their whereabouts. On 3rd June 1992
8 the SNB. They took her to Erdut, killed her and threw the body in an
9 abandoned well in Dalj Planina.
10 It is the Prosecution's case as summarized on slide number 71
11 that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic participated in the joint
12 criminal enterprise to forcibly remove Croats and other non-Serbs from
13 targeted lands in the SAO SBWS through organising, training, and
14 financing the direct perpetrators of the crimes in Eastern Slavonia.
15 They also contributed to this common plan by exerting a huge influence on
16 and directing the SAO SBWS government and in particular Goran Hadzic who
17 would then order and direct the crimes that were committed.
18 Your Honours, as we have seen, the storm that was intended to
19 sweep away anything non-Serb began in the south of Croatia in the
20 Krajina. From there, it moved to Eastern Slavonia where it reached its
21 climax in late 1991. It seems apparent that Serb forces would now turn
22 their attention to the areas in Eastern Bosnia that lie on the border to
24 be Bijeljina and Zvornik.
25 I would like the give the floor to my colleague, Mr. Docherty,
1 who will introduce you to the Prosecution's case for Bosnia and
3 convenient moment for the break.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll accept your recommendation. We'll take
6 the adjournment now, 20 minutes.
7 --- Recess taken at 2.36 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 3.01 p.m.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, you're closing the innings.
10 MR. DOCHERTY: There may be a clean-up inning after mine,
11 Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I should have said at the outset of the hearing
13 that today, in the absence of Judge Picard, Judge David and I sit
14 pursuant to the provisions of Rule 15 bis.
15 Yes, thank you. Please proceed.
16 MR. DOCHERTY: May it please the Court, Mr. President,
17 Your Honour, counsel.
18 In order to understand how the joint criminal enterprise applied
19 its programme in Bosnia
20 unique among the six former Republics of Yugoslavia, why it presented
21 fundamentally different challenges to implementation --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down. Thank you.
23 MR. DOCHERTY: Why it presented fundamentally different
24 challenges to implementation of the joint criminal enterprise's
25 objectives and why Bosnia
1 committed during the war.
2 In the simplest terms, the characteristic which made Bosnia
3 unique and which must be understood is that unlike other former republics
4 that had large minority populations that were relatively contiguous,
6 out across the country in a polka-dot pattern, some communities
7 resembling ethnic islands in a sea dominated by some other ethnic group.
8 What historians and other observers rightly extolled as evidence
9 of the peaceful integration of different ethnicities and cultures would
10 prove to present a special problem for members of the joint criminal
12 What plan did they decide upon to break up this large patchwork
13 of ethnicities and carve out and area that would be dominated by Serbs?
14 The clearest articulation of their plan can be found in a document.
15 But before describing that document and what happened in Bosnia
16 I would like to take a few minutes to speak about some of the central
17 people involved in the crimes that occurred in Bosnia.
18 Radovan Karadzic was the first president of the Bosnian Serb
19 government which would eventually be called the Republika Srpska. As
20 such, he had formal authority over the Bosnian Serb Army and the
21 Bosnian Serb Police.
22 He has been indicted by this Tribunal and is currently a
23 fugitive. He made his intentions clear in a speech given on 15 October
24 1991, which is before you in slide number 73.
25 [Videotape played]
1 MR. DOCHERTY: The Prosecution will establish with intercept
2 evidence, documents, and testimony the interaction between
3 Jovica Stanisic and Dr. Karadzic who played a paramount role as a core
4 member of the joint criminal enterprise. The Prosecution will introduce
5 a number of intercepts between Mr. Stanisic and Dr. Karadzic, most of
6 them from the critical period of August 1991 until February 1992. In
7 these conversations, you will hear them discuss both political and
8 practical issues related to the implementation of the joint criminal
9 enterprise's plans and will understand that the two men realised that
10 what they were discussing was covert and had to remain hidden because you
11 will hear them talk on these intercepts in guarded language, at times
12 even reminding each other of the importance of not saying too much on the
14 In an intercept of 14 December 1991
15 Radovan Karadzic that he will send his men over into Bosnia to deal with
16 a specific problem. Stanisic also refers to "his boys" whom he says he
17 has sent in previously. And finally, Stanisic tells Karadzic that he
18 will order Goran Hadzic, a Croatian Serb leader from Eastern Slavonia, to
19 do something.
20 Momcilo Krajisnik shown here with Biljana Plavsic on slide number
21 74 was a member of the Bosnian Serb leadership during the war. He held a
22 number of senior political positions including being a member of the
23 National Security Council, the expanded Presidency of the
24 Serbian Republic
25 the Bosnian Serb Assembly. He was convicted of persecutions as a crime
1 against humanity and is currently appealing his trial judgement and
3 Biljana Plavsic was a leading Bosnian Serb politician from before
4 the conflict until the war's end. She was notorious for the extremity of
5 her Serb nationalist ideology. She was a member of the collective
6 Presidency of Bosnia
7 Serbian Republic
8 Bosnian Serb army. After pleading guilty to the crime of persecution as
9 a crime against humanity, she was sentenced to imprisonment for 11 years.
10 Ratko Mladic was a career JNA officer who became chief of the
11 Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska. He has been indicted by this
12 Tribunal and is currently a fugitive.
13 He said, and it is printed on slide number 75, "People and
14 peoples are not pawns, nor are they keys in one's pocket that can be
15 shifted from here to there. We cannot cleanse, nor can we have a sieve
16 to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that Serbs would fall through
17 and the rest leave ... I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic
18 would explain this to the world. People, this would be genocide."
19 The document that clearly articulates the objectives of the joint
20 criminal enterprise, the document I referred to a few moments before, was
21 officially introduced at the 16th Session of the Assembly of the
22 Serb Republic
23 strategic objectives for the Bosnian Serb people. In Mr. Simatovic's
24 speech in Kula, he tied the activities of the Special Units of the
25 Serbian DB to those six objectives.
1 The first objective, shown here on slide number 76, is the
2 separation of the Serbian people from the other two national communities.
3 Two, establishment of a corridor between Semberija and the
5 Mr. Simatovic's remark at Kula that his units were involved in
6 the "corridor at Brcko" is a reference to the second strategic objective
7 to connect lands the Serbs targeted in the western and the eastern parts
8 of Bosnia
9 Three, shown here on slide number 78, establishment of a corridor
10 in the Drina
12 This "corridor" was really a large chunk of territory comprising
13 most of the eastern half of Bosnia
14 presence in "the Drina
15 Slide number 79 shows the fourth strategic goal, establishing a
16 border on the Una and Neretva rivers.
17 Five, the division of Sarajevo
18 When Mr. Simatovic refers to operations in Sarajevo, he is
19 referring to this objective.
20 And six, the sixth strategic objective was providing the Serbs
21 with access to the sea.
22 As I describe the crimes committed in the six Bosnian
23 municipalities in which the present indictment charges crimes, I ask the
24 Chamber to keep in mind how the locations targeted by the accused and the
25 crimes they perpetrated there advanced the objectives expressed in these
1 goals. With respect to the joint criminal enterprise as it was applied
2 to the unique geography and demography of Bosnia, these goals are clear
3 articulations of the shared intent of the members of the joint criminal
5 In December 1991, a document with the title, "Instructions for
6 the organisation and activity of the organs of the Serbian people in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances," was promulgated
8 among high-level representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party, its
9 initials SDS, of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10 The document became more popularly known as the Variant A and B
11 document because of its contents. When it prescribed the actions to be
12 taken by SDS functionaries, it distinguished between municipalities in
13 which the Serbs were the majority - this was variant A. And those
14 municipalities in which the Serbs were in the minority - this was variant
16 In essence, the document contained precise instructions regarding
17 how local Serbs were to convene and declare a local assembly of Serbian
18 people in the municipality which would then take upon itself the
19 authority to take over the functions of the existing government including
20 the function of the existing police and security structures.
21 Municipal takeovers proceeded in four steps. The first step was
22 the construction of a system of governance that paralleled the official
23 government, but was for Serbs only. Second, the arming of the Serb
24 population. Third, the violent armed takeover of non-Serb
25 municipalities. And fourth, the ethnic cleansing, whether through murder
1 or expulsion of the non-Serb population.
2 Here in slide number 82 is a map of the Special Units training
3 facilities. The 13 labelled in yellow are camps that the accused
4 established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As you can see, these camps are in
5 areas marked for Serbs by the second, third, and fourth strategic
6 objectives. Eastern Bosnia, along the Drina, northern Bosnia
7 bridge between Semberija and the Krajina, and southern Bosnia, along the
8 Una and Neretva Rivers
9 In this trial, the Prosecution will confine its evidence to just
10 six of the many municipalities that were taken over. These
11 municipalities are: Bijeljina in northwestern Bosnia. Our evidence will
12 be confined to the forcible transfer of people from that municipality.
13 Zvornik, the label for Zvornik is in the right-hand column, it's
14 number 6 from both the bottom and the top.
15 Bosanski Samac, the label for Bosanski Samac is in the top row,
16 far right.
17 Sanski Most, in north central Bosnia. Later, Mr. Groome will
18 talk about the events in Sanski Most in 1995.
19 Doboj, the label for Doboj is in the top row, second from the
21 Trnovo near Sarajevo
22 takeover of this area but in June and July of 1995, in the aftermath of
23 Srebrenica, one of these paramilitary units, the Skorpions participated
24 in the executions that followed the fall of Srebrenica by summarily
25 executing six Muslim males.
1 The special units of the Serbian DB directly participated in the
2 takeover of each of the other five municipal areas. After the violent
3 takeover of these towns, non-Serbs, predominantly Muslims, were forcibly
4 removed from their homes and their land through the commission of the
5 crimes of murder and persecution perpetrated with the intent to secure
6 the area for Serbs. Many who were not killed were forced at gun point to
7 sign over the property rights to their lands and then placed on a bus to
8 take them out of the area. Others were subjected to unrelenting
9 harassment and persecutory acts which took the form of arbitrary arrests,
10 illegal detention in appalling conditions, beatings, curfews, and
11 frequent aggressively conducted searches of the homes of non-Serbs.
12 Creating an ethnically pure Serb municipality in a peaceful
13 multi-ethnic community is hard to imagine in any case. It really
14 stretches our capacity to imagine what such an enterprise would entail
15 when we consider a place like the municipality of Zvornik
16 the war in 1991, had a population that was 54.8 per cent Muslim. After
17 the war, in 1997-1998, only 0.6 per cent of the population of Zvornik was
18 Muslim. I will discuss these five towns in chronological order of the
19 date on which the crimes in them occurred.
20 On 24 March 1992
21 Radovan Karadzic stated, as shown in slide number 83, that soon the
22 Serbian municipalities will begin the takeover process.
23 The takeover of Bijeljina and Zvornik was a well-planned and
24 well-executed campaign that occurred with precision and lightning speed
25 over the course of a few days. The Special Units of the Serbian DB, in
1 this case Arkan's men, established a camp just -- in Serbia just over the
2 border from Bijeljina poised to attack when given the signal in the early
3 morning hours of the night of March 31 into the morning of April 1, 1992
4 Both Bijeljina and Zvornik fell within the first and most
5 important goal, the separation of the ethnic communities. They also fell
6 within the second and third strategic goals, the establishment of a
7 corridor to areas targeted by Serbs that lie in central and western
10 In an effort to shorten the length of this trial, the Prosecution
11 will no longer seek to prove the killings and persecutions that occurred
12 in Bijeljina. And while we will only prove the crimes against humanity
13 of deportation and forcible transfer with respect to Bijeljina, a basic
14 understanding of what happened in Bijeljina is essential in order for the
15 Chamber to understand who Arkan was and what Mr. Stanisic and
16 Mr. Simatovic knew about him.
17 The brutality of Arkan in Bijeljina was even reported
18 contemporaneously by senior officers in the Yugoslav Army, one of whom
19 saw the awesome potential for unimaginable interethnic crimes as recorded
20 here on slide number 85. In this contemporaneous report, a Major General
21 in the Yugoslav Army complains that movements of his armoured units were
22 restricted by Arkan and his men.
23 Arkan and his 50 men could hold up a JNA armoured column because
24 Arkan was a core member of the group of people who were behind these
25 crimes. Shortly after the takeover of Bijeljina, we see Arkan and
1 Plavsic greeting each other with a kiss in this slide.
2 It would be Bijeljina where Arkan would cement his reputation for
3 unbridled brutality.
4 Slide 87 shows two photographs shot by Ron Haviv, a war
5 photographer. The world was introduced to the brutality of Arkan's men.
6 Shortly after these pictures shocked the world, Arkan himself identified
7 the men in the pictures as his to a correspondent of the BBC.
8 As a result of the efforts of the joint criminal enterprise and
9 relevant to the indictment now before the Chamber, many of the non-Serbs
10 of Bijeljina were forced out or fled in terror.
11 Zvornik. If there was a colourable claim that the two accused
12 were unaware of Arkan's penchant for extreme violence before Bijeljina,
13 there can be no escaping this knowledge after Bijeljina, as Arkan made
14 his way to his next target, Zvornik.
15 Zvornik is one of the towns that lies on the eastern border of
17 town connected it to Mali Zvornik, its sister town in Serbia. You will
18 hear witnesses describe how in the weeks before the takeover of the town,
19 JNA artillery positions were established in Mali Zvornik, their guns
20 pointing towards Bosnia
21 The takeovers of Bijeljina and Zvornik were the product of one
22 well-planned operation. We will introduce the transcript of an
23 intercepted telephone conversation in which Plavsic speaks with Arkan's
24 deputy and asks about how things went in Zvornik and asks him to pass on
25 her request for Arkan to come to another municipality.
1 A group of responsible local Serb and Muslim leaders from Zvornik
2 tried tenaciously to keep the peace in Zvornik. During a meeting in
3 which they had reached agreements that would hopefully prevent violence,
4 Arkan burst into the room and slapped the Serb representatives, accusing
5 them of giving away Serb lands. This is referred to on slide number 91,
6 "two representatives were beaten before that."
7 Arkan turned to the Muslim negotiator and gave him an ultimatum.
8 It is in red at the bottom of the slide. Izet Mehinagic would recount
9 these events in a desperate telegram to the Yugoslav People's Army which
10 is the text above the ultimatum on this slide.
11 On the evening of the 8th of April, the takeover was underway.
12 The adult men were separated and at least 20 civilians murdered.
13 Following the takeover, the surviving Muslims of Zvornik were subjected
14 to a reign of terror.
15 Reports like this one on slide number 92 and others we have seen
16 show Arkan's effectiveness at achieving the goals of the joint criminal
17 enterprise. They also show notice to the core members of the joint
18 criminal enterprise of Arkan's ability to whip up Serbian nationalistic
20 Kozluk was a small town on the outskirts of Zvornik. After the
21 initial takeover, the predominantly Muslim population sought to reach a
22 peaceful settlement with the Serbs now in power. But on 26 June 1992,
23 the Muslims of Kozluk were told to leave by the Serb mayor. Here is a
24 list of those who left on slide number 93.
25 The mayor told the Muslims that if they did not leave, "an all
1 out attack" would be launched, which would kill all the Muslims. The
2 Muslims left, but not before the Serb authorities had made them sign
3 papers giving their homes, land, and personal property to the new Serb
4 government in Zvornik.
5 The deportees were taken along the route shown by the blue line
6 on this slide toward Hungary
7 entry because they did not have passports, the deportees were issued
8 Serbian passports, that is, Bosnian nationals were issued with Serbian
9 passports. You will remember that one of the functions of the
10 Ministry of Internal Affairs was the control of passports.
11 Vojislav Seselj was a core member of the joint criminal
12 enterprise, President of the Serb Radical Party who formed the
13 Serbian Chetnik movement and sent his volunteers to conflict areas of
15 In a videotaped interview with the BBC, Vojislav Seselj described
16 the involvement of Simatovic in the planning of the takeover of Zvornik
17 and I will now ask that the video on slide number 96 be played.
18 [Videotape played]
19 MR. DOCHERTY: One of the reasons that Zvornik was one of the
20 municipalities selected by the Prosecution is that it clearly
21 demonstrates the intent that the members of the core group of
22 perpetrators shared. The excesses perpetrated against the Muslim
23 population of Zvornik had spiralled into a level of chaos in which no
24 one, not even Serbs were safe from the criminals turned loose with
25 impunity on the municipality as we can see in this report on slide number
2 In a report drafted by Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, about events all
3 over Bosnia
4 about the men who had perpetrated such grievous crimes in Zvornik.
5 Here in slide number 98, he identifies by name Arkan's men,
6 Captain Dragan's men, and Seselj's men.
7 He describes these three groups as being composed of many
8 criminals, even pathological criminals.
9 He states that these formations "display hatred of non-Serbian
10 peoples and one can conclude without reservations that they are the
11 genocidal element among the Serbian people."
12 He continues, "War profiteering and looting are the motive for a
13 great majority of paramilitaries."
14 Here, he enumerates the 30 to 40 million German marks worth of
15 booty stolen from the area of Srebrenica and Skelani.
16 In the end of July 1992, there was a crackdown against
17 paramilitary forces in Zvornik. In fact, the Serbian DB would itself be
18 involved in the investigation of these paramilitary units. Two
19 paramilitary leaders, the Vukovic brothers, leaders of the Yellow Wasps
20 would ultimately be investigated and arrested by the Serbian MUP.
21 The two accused contributed to the goals of the JCE in the ways
22 outlined in the box on the right-hand side of this slide and by so doing
23 made themselves individually criminally liable for the crimes committed
24 in Zvornik.
25 All elements of the JCE except only those from the Republic of
1 Serb Krajina on the far left of the diagram, had some involvement in the
2 takeover and ethnic cleansing of Bijeljina and Zvornik.
3 Bosanski Samac. Bosanski Samac, shown here on slide 101, located
4 along the Sava River
5 in the lands targeted to create the land bridge between land targeted by
6 Serbs in the east of Bosnia
7 region. A successful conquest and cleansing of Bosanski Samac would
8 achieve the first and second goals, namely separation of the ethnic
9 communities and establishment of a corridor, a Posavina Corridor as it
10 came to be known.
11 In early 1992, the Serb Crisis Staff of the Bosanski Samac
12 municipality sent 20 local men to be trained in the Red Beret training
13 camp in Ilok. These men were just completing their training at the
14 Red Beret camp in Ilok when the takeovers of Bijeljina and Zvornik were
15 underway. They were airlifted back to Bosanski Samac on JNA helicopters
16 with 30 of Seselj's men. Before leaving, they were briefed by
17 Mr. Simatovic.
18 The day after Arkan announced he had finished his task in
19 Zvornik, they commenced their attack on Bosanski Samac.
20 Among these 50, there were others who were trained by the Serbian
21 DB who would work with them in the takeover of the town.
22 Slobodan Miljkovic also known as Lugar was present, as were
23 Dragan Djordjevic also known as Crni, and Srecko Radovanovic also known
24 as Debeli, and a group of men from Serbia.
25 As this report on slide 102 indicates, Crni one of the leaders of
1 the crimes perpetrated in Samac was in fact arrested and what happened
2 after his arrest demonstrates the role that both Simatovic and Stanisic
3 played in the takeover of Samac.
4 Another report shown here on slide 103 summarizes the time of
5 crimes that Crni and his men were believed to have perpetrated. They
6 include specific allegations including murder, and the looting of
7 expensive cars.
8 A local Serb leader recognising the loss of Crni to their efforts
9 to ethnically cleanse Samac went to the Serbian MUP building in Belgrade
10 in search of Franko Simatovic. He intended to ask Mr. Simatovic if there
11 was anything he could do to secure Crni's release from the military
12 police. He was unable to find Mr. Simatovic but as he walked in the
13 parking lot, by chance he saw Jovica Stanisic who he approached and
14 explained the problem. Mr. Stanisic told him that he would see to the
15 matter by sending a telex to the military. Shortly thereafter, Crni was
16 released to continue his crimes.
17 The answer to how Crni, a man whose excesses resulted in his
18 arrest by the Bosnian Serb army that he was fighting alongside of could
19 promptly be released is perhaps best captured in a report issued by the
20 local military authorities.
21 In this document on slide 104, the author makes the observation
22 that the crimes now being committed in the name of Serbs are comparable
23 to the crimes committed against the Serbs in the Second World War.
24 The basic facts of Crni's release were set out in this Bosnian
25 police report on slide number 105.
1 The Prosecution charges that the two accused contributed to the
2 achievement of the JCE's goals in the ways listed in the box on the right
3 of slide 106. By doing so, they made themselves individually criminally
4 liable for the crimes committed in Bosanski Samac.
5 As in Bijeljina and Zvornik, all elements of the JCE except those
6 in the Republic of Serb Krajina were involved.
7 Before the war, the population of Bosanski Samac had been 29.8
8 per cent Croat and 8.7 per cent Muslim. After the war, those figures
9 were 1.9 per cent Croat and 1.3 per cent Muslim.
10 Doboj. Like Samac and Brcko, these municipalities not only had
11 large non-Serb populations that needed to be removed but they also lay in
12 the corridor or land bridge that was to be created between the targeted
13 lands in the west of Bosnia
14 Over 15.000 Muslims fled Doboj during the takeover. When the war
15 began, Doboj municipality was 30 per cent Muslim, 11.5 per cent Croat,
16 and 50 per cent Serb. At war's end, it was 0.6 per cent Muslim, 1.5 per
17 cent Croat, and 92.5 per cent Serb.
18 Before the takeover of Doboj, men from a long list of DB
19 paramilitaries began converging on Doboj including Martic's men from the
21 While Arkan commanded his own men and Seselj's men had their own
22 commanders, the remaining men were referred to as Red Berets and were
23 commanded by Rajo Bozovic, a Colonel in the special units of the
24 Serbian DB.
25 The takeover of Doboj ended on the 3rd of May, 1992. This
1 overwhelming force, many trained and outfitted by Mr. Stanisic and
2 Mr. Simatovic, were able to quickly and decisively seize control of a
3 municipality with a population of 102.549 covering 684 square kilometres.
4 When the town was firmly in Serb control, the campaign of
5 persecutions against Doboj's municipalities began, mirroring what by this
6 time had become the well-known signature of these units. Beatings,
7 arbitrary arrests, interrogations, and murder. Non-Serb homes were
8 aggressively searched and damaged, making it clear that non-Serb families
9 who had lived in Doboj for generations had now better leave.
10 Non-Serb civilians from Doboj were taken into custody and housed
11 in various make-shift detention facilities in and around Doboj. For
12 example, nearly 200 people were imprisoned in a discotheque. In these
13 facilities, the detainees were beaten and some prisoners were taken out
14 and summarily executed. Muslim prisoners were forced to eat pork in
15 violation of their religion. And in acts of almost unspeakable
16 vulgarity, prisoners were compelled to perform sexual acts upon each
18 On 12 July 1992
19 discotheque and used as human shields. These detainees were placed in
20 front of the Serbian front lines and made to walk toward the front lines
21 of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the detainees hesitated, a
22 Serb shot one detainee in the head to encourage the others. When the
23 Bosnian soldiers began beckoning the detainees calling them to run
24 towards the Bosnian front lines, the detainees broke into a run. The
25 Serbs then opened fire, killing 27 of the human shields.
1 So decisive and absolute was the Red Berets campaign in Doboj
2 that those in the neighbouring municipality of Teslic
3 an example, as indicated in this report shown on slide number 108.
4 These are but four of the many municipal areas that were taken
5 over by Bosnian Serbs in the spring and summer of 1992. Takeovers that
6 were marked by the precision of their execution and the brutality of
7 their success.
8 The Prosecution charges that the two accused contributed to the
9 achievement of the JCE's goals in the ways set out in the box on the
10 right of slide number 109 and by doing so, incurred personal criminal
11 liability for the crimes committed in Doboj.
12 Here, one difference from the previous municipalities is that it
13 is also the Prosecution's case that the direct involvement of Martic's
14 men also implicates the individual criminal responsibility of the
16 Thank you, Your Honours. I now turn the floor back to my
17 colleague, Mr. Groome.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Groome.
19 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, the overall criminal plan was a
20 success and many municipalities were placed under Serb control in the
21 spring of 1992. To place the crimes committed in these four
22 municipalities in context of the overall plan of the joint criminal
23 enterprise, it is helpful to look at a series of maps on slides 110 to
24 117 that show in chronological order the takeover of territory as well as
25 the role the two accused took in this process. The rapid comprehensive
1 and organised assertion of Serb control over territory in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina is evidence of the existence of and effectiveness of a
3 joint criminal enterprise.
4 The takeover process begins when Arkan enters Bijeljina on the
5 night between the 31st of March and the 1st of April. In that first
6 week, over a dozen municipalities would be taken over and placed under
7 Serb control. While some of those municipalities such as Tito Drvar were
8 predominantly Serb and asserting control was primarily done by switching
9 allegiance from Sarajevo
10 Bijeljina, these municipalities were taken by armed force and the
11 commission of grievous crimes against the civilian population.
12 During the second week, the focus of the takeovers would remain
13 on the Drina
14 places like Visegrad, Foca, and Sekovici. As you have already heard,
15 Mr. Stanisic and Simatovic played a direct role in the takeover of
16 Zvornik and the expulsion of its large Muslim population.
17 In Central Bosnia
18 second week of April.
19 Here in slide 113, we see that in the third week of the takeover,
20 after Arkan would advise that his work was completed in Zvornik, the
21 Special Units of the Serbian DB would turn their attention to the
22 municipality of Bosanski Samac.
23 The takeovers continue along the Drina River
24 in Foca's neighbour to the west, Kalinovik. Vogosca, part of the greater
1 Up in the northwestern part of Bosnia in the Bosnian Krajina,
2 Serb control would be forcibly imposed in Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most.
3 Serb gains would continue in the Bosnian Krajina into the last
4 days of April when Prijedor, where some of the most grievous crimes of
5 the takeovers were committed. Serb control was asserted over
6 Mrkonjic Grad and large parts of Bosanska Krupa bringing the border of
7 the Serb-controlled lands to the banks of the Una river. The campaign in
8 the Drina
9 Your Honours, by the end of April in this 30-day period, 35
10 municipalities would be taken over, an average of over one municipality
11 per day.
12 While the pace of the takeovers would slow a bit during the
13 following months, the pace of the crimes only accelerated. The accused
14 would send Colonel Bozovic along with other members of the Special Units
15 to spearhead the takeover of Doboj. The encirclement around Sarajevo
16 would be complete with the taking of Hadzici, Trnovo and Ilidza in May.
17 And with the fall of Rogatica and Rudo, the takeover of the
18 municipalities along the eastern border of Bosnia would be complete with
19 the exception of Srebrenica.
20 The Bosnian Krajina would be completely secured by the end of
21 June with the takeover of Prnjavor and Kotor Varos.
22 During June, the primary focus of takeovers shifted to the
23 southern areas of Bosnia
24 Trebinje would be taken over. By the end of the summer with the takeover
25 of Derventa and Odzak, over 50 municipalities would be placed under Serb
1 control to secure the functioning of the Posavina corridor.
2 The two maps you see on the screen in slide 118 are demographic
3 maps, one from 1991 before the ethnic cleansing campaign of 1992 and one
4 from 1997.
5 You may observe the success of the joint criminal enterprise as
6 measured statistically in the dramatic demographic changes it occasioned.
7 You will look along the Posavina corridor that is the horizontal
8 oval at the top of the map, the target of the second strategic goal, you
9 will see a dramatic shift in the population as marked by the change of
10 the colour to red.
11 The vertical oval on the right-hand side of the map is the
12 Drina Valley
13 represents the restructuring of the demographic landscape from mixed or
14 Muslim majority municipalities into red or Serb municipalities.
15 These takeovers and subsequent crimes resulted in population
16 shift of hundreds of thousands of people. Nearly 400.000 people forcibly
17 removed from their homes.
18 The map on slide 119 shows what happened after the summer of
19 1992. Some takeovers would continue. The light blue municipalities on
20 this map show where the Prosecution will lead evidence of involvement by
21 the Special Units of the Serbian DB. The dark blue municipalities
22 indicate those municipalities in which the two accused are charged with
23 the commission of crimes.
24 The next charges in the indictment concern the serious crimes
25 committed toward the end of the conflict in 1995. It would be incorrect
1 for the Chamber to conclude that Mr. Stanisic's and Mr. Simatovic's
2 involvement in Bosnia
3 were very much involved in joint operations designed to hold on to
4 targeted lands they seized in 1992.
5 You will hear summary evidence of the accused's involvement in
7 they established in Bajina Basta in Serbia just across the border with
9 I would now like to turn the attention of the Chamber to the
10 crimes charged in the indictment related to Trnovo. The facts of what
11 occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995 have been the subject of several
12 trials in these courtrooms. I will not repeat them. They are well
14 The two accused here today are charged with the death of three
15 boys and three men whose murder was captured on videotape. In order for
16 you to understand the Prosecution's case as to why Mr. Stanisic and
17 Mr. Simatovic are responsible for the deaths of the six, we must take a
18 look at what is occurring in another part of the country prior to
20 I want to focus your attention on the north-west corner of Bosnia
21 shown here on slide 121, a place referred to as the Bihac Pocket which in
22 1993 had a population of approximately 300.000 people, mostly Muslim.
23 Its local leader, a Muslim man by the name of Fikret Abdic sought
24 to extricate himself from the war in Bosnia by disassociating himself
25 with the Bosnian government and entering into an uneasy alliance with
1 Milosevic in Belgrade
2 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the record, please.
3 MR. GROOME: So in October 1993, Abdic traded his war with
5 shortly thereafter, the Bosnian army was engaging Abdic's poorly trained
6 and equipped men.
7 Abdic turned to Milosevic for help and within a short time,
8 Milosevic responded by sending Stanisic and Simatovic to the Bihac Pocket
9 to command an operation called Pauk or the spider.
10 Milosevic sent the two men whom he could rely on for this task.
11 Stanisic would in turn bring with him the men who he had come to rely on
12 in his covert operations in Bosnia
13 again by Colonel Bozovic, Legija, Captain Dragan, and Arkan. They
14 established their headquarters in Mount Petrova Gora in the Krajina.
15 The diary depicted here on slide 122 is of one of the commanders
16 in the Pauk operation and if you look at it you will see it shows a
17 number of references to Mr. Simatovic and one of several references to
18 Mr. Stanisic.
19 The Special Units of the Serbian DB were to join forces with the
20 Serbian Krajina Army as well as Abdic's men. Two of the three tactical
21 groups formed with these joined forces would be under the direct command
22 of the Special Units of the Serbian DB. The second tactical group would
23 be placed under Legija's command and the third tactical group would be
24 placed under the command of Colonel Bozovic. The Scorpions, the
25 perpetrators of the crimes at Trnovo, were part of Legija's tactical
2 The Scorpions were first formed after the fall of Vukovar
3 following a request by the Djeletovci oil company to Milan Milanovic, a
4 minister to the SAO SBWS. It's commander Slobodan Medic, aka Boca, the
5 unit's task was to protect the oil fields in Djeletovci; a task that at
6 times was shared with Arkan's men. The unit grew quickly to include
7 several hundred men. The Serbian DB provided the Scorpions with
8 significant equipment and paid the salaries of its members in cash.
9 Approximately 30 per cent of its members had been trained in one of the
10 Serbian DB's camps in Kula, Mount Tara
11 after the war, some members of the unit would remain in the service of
12 the Serbian DB and join the JSO.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. GROOME: The two men you see in the video on slide 123 are
15 Legija, you've already heard much about him, and Slobodan Medic, the man
16 who gave the direct order to kill the captives in Trnovo.
17 This video is long and I will not ask the Chamber to look at all
18 of the relevant parts today, but in one segment you will hear Legija take
19 a decision regarding what to do with captured Muslims. His decision as
20 you might expect is consistent with his treatment of non-Serbs in other
21 areas of the conflict.
22 Mr. Simatovic would mention this involvement in Pauk in his May
23 1997 speech in Kula when he said, "In western Bosnia, the unit was the
24 backbone of Fikret Abdic's army." The Pauk operation would last until
25 August 1995.
1 Let me now take you back to eastern Bosnia, July 1995. The
2 Bosnian Serbs decided to overtake the UN protected area of Srebrenica.
3 By the end of July, nearly 8.000 Muslim boys and men would be summarily
4 executed. Not all of the murders were committed in the immediate
5 vicinity of Srebrenica.
6 In addition to their presence in the Bihac pocket, Special Units
7 of the Serbian DB were also present in Central Bosnia. In late June, the
8 Serbian MUP was active in rounding up Serb men who were believed to be
9 avoiding their military service. Slide 124 is a document recording this.
10 Morale of the Serb soldiers at this stage was very low and there was a
11 high incidence of desertion. Many of these men crossed into Serbia
12 stay with family or hide among the crowds in Serbia's cities.
13 In this document, Tomislav Kovac, the deputy minister reports
14 that on June 23rd, he has handed over to the VRS in excess of 1500 men
15 taken into custody in Serbia
16 Even with this operation to compel able-bodied men to go to the
17 front lines in Bosnia
18 additional troops. In late June 1995, weeks before Srebrenica, in a
19 meeting attended by Arkan and Slobodan Medic, the decision was taken that
20 members of the units of the Serbian DB under the command of Vaso Mijovic,
21 a senior commander in the unit, would go to Bosnia and help fight with
22 the Bosnian army.
23 I would draw your attention to slide 125 and would like to return
24 to a portion of the Scorpion videotape that shows their arrival in Pale
25 on the 26th of June. After the religious ceremony I showed you at the
1 start of this opening, a ceremony which took place in Deletovci, this
2 group travelled to Pale in the Serb-controlled area just outside of
4 [Videotape played]
5 MR. GROOME: As you can see in the excerpt of a report at the
6 bottom of slide 125, an RS MUP report records their arrival and their
7 planned deployment to the Trnovo battlefield the next day.
8 The map on slide 126 shows the relationship between Pale, Trnovo,
10 a command post. During the course of the trial, you will get a sense of
11 the size of this operation by seeing video from Jahorina and the many
12 paramilitaries and troops gathered there.
13 One of the ways that we can track the presence of the units of
14 the Serbian DB is that they sustained significant and regular casualties
15 in the Trnovo area. Slide 127 shows a chart of eight of the documents
16 that the Prosecution will introduce establishing that throughout this
17 period, units of the Serbian DB were present in the Trnovo region.
18 Another senior member of the Special Units of the Serbian DB I
19 would like to introduce you to is Vaso Mijovic. It was him that
20 commanded the Special Units of the DB while they were operating in
22 When Srebrenica fell on the 11th of July, a column of 10.000 to
23 15.000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys fled. The column was hit by
24 Bosnian Serb artillery on the 12th, and those that survived the artillery
25 barrage, several thousand, were captured. These prisoners were
1 systematically executed at a variety of places between the 13th and 17th
2 of July. Some of the captured were distributed for execution outside the
3 Srebrenica area. Approximately 15 captives were given to the Scorpions
4 as their complement of detainees for killing. Some of these prisoners
5 were delivered to the Scorpions at their base in Trnovo.
6 Slide 129 shows a report of Mijovic on the letterhead of the
7 Special Units of the Serbian DB. At this stage, officially called the
8 Unit for Anti-terrorist Operations or JATD. On the 19th of July, Mijovic
9 notifies his counterparts in the Republic of Srpska Ministry of
10 Internal Affairs that he was ordered to pull back from the zone of combat
11 to "undertake other assignments." What those assignments were, the
12 report does not say. We do know that this is around the period in which
13 the six captives were killed.
14 Slobodan Medic and a group of Scorpions put six of the captives
15 in a truck and drove them to an isolated area near Trnovo to kill them.
16 Medic ordered that what they were about to do would be
17 videotaped. Slide 130 contains a short excerpt of that video. It does
18 not include the executions.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MR. GROOME: The Scorpions shouted abuse at the prisoners, kicked
21 them, taunted the youngest boy that he would die a virgin. The six
22 almost certainly knew they were about to die. They were made to wait
23 while the truck driver went into town to get a newly-charged battery for
24 the video recorder.
25 Once the camcorder was ready, four of the prisoners were made to
1 stand in a line while the other two were forced to lay in the grass. The
2 four standing up were then shot one by one. After the first was shot in
3 the back, the others were made to walk to the spot where the previous
4 victim had just fallen, to stand and wait.
5 As some of the victims twitched in the grass, additional shots
6 were fired into their heads to ensure they would not survive.
7 The two who had been forced to lie in the grass were made to
8 carry the bodies to a nearby house. The Scorpions then shot and killed
9 the two remaining men.
10 In this report of the 24th of July, 1995, shown on slide 131, we
11 can tell by this rotation report that the Scorpions are still in the
12 Trnovo area and have returned to their regular duties.
13 It is the Prosecution's case as summarized on slide 132 is that
14 the Scorpions were one of the units of the Serbian DB and that the
15 accused are criminally responsible for the killing of the three men and
16 three boys in Trnovo. In this case, these members of the units of the DB
17 under the command of a senior DB officer, Vaso Mijovic were made
18 available to Karadzic, Mladic and other core members of the joint
19 criminal enterprise to perpetrate crimes in furtherance of their common
20 criminal plan.
21 Around the same time period, Arkan himself was in the
22 municipality of Sanski Most. He was there primarily to frighten
23 deserters from the Bosnian Serb Army into holding the front lines against
24 Croatian forces who were by now retaking some of the territory lost to
25 Serbs in 1992. We can see from this report in slide 134 that
1 Mr. Stanisic is in direct contact with Arkan on these matters.
2 While in the municipality of Sanski Most, a place that after 1992
3 had few Muslims left, he engaged once again in his characteristically
4 brutal crimes. His presence there was part of a larger Serbian DB
5 operation that encompassed not only Sanski Most but Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc,
6 and Prijedor. This coordinated mission involved the Special Units of the
7 Serbian DB commanded once again by Colonel Bozovic. Arkan's Tigers were
8 under his command.
9 In mid-1995, advances by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 threatened to retake Sanski Most from the Serbs. To prevent this,
11 Arkan's Tigers were sent to Sanski Most.
12 On the 19th of September, Arkan's Tigers arrived in large numbers
13 and rounded up any remaining Muslims they could find. They were
14 imprisoned in the Hotel Sanus in appalling conditions. 30 of them were
15 kept in the hotel's small boiler room; two detainees died from the
16 brutality that they suffered there.
17 On September 20th, 1995, Arkan's Tigers took at least 12 men from
18 the Hotel Sanus to a house in the nearby village. There, the men were
19 shot two at a time in the back of the head. The last two victims had
20 their throats slashed when Arkan's men ran out of bullets.
21 On the 21st of September, Arkan's Tigers took another group of
22 approximately 65 Muslims where they were executed in a similar manner.
23 Several days later, several hundred Muslim detainees were placed on a bus
24 and expelled from Sanski Most.
25 One month later on the 23rd of October, 1995, following the
1 events in Sanski Most, Radovan Karadzic would publicly give an award to
2 Arkan as he was now leaving Bosnia
3 perhaps not by chance that his presence in Bosnia would end in front of
4 the very town hall in Bijeljina where he was greeted three years earlier
5 with a kiss. I return your attention to slide 135 while I play this
7 [Videotape played]
8 MR. GROOME: It is the Prosecution's case that the accused are
9 criminally responsible for the crimes committed in Sanski Most because
10 Arkan was a co-member in the joint criminal enterprise and a member of
11 the units of the Serbian DB. The accused provided Arkan with some of the
12 support and military supplies he needed to perpetrate these crimes.
13 It is also the Prosecution's theory that they are responsible
14 having made members of the units of the Serbian DB available to other
15 core members of the joint criminal enterprise, in this case, Radovan
16 Karadzic, who directed them to perpetrate the crimes in furtherance of
17 the common criminal plan.
18 After NATO finally struck some Bosnian Serb positions, Mladic's
19 troops took UN peacekeepers hostage in June 1995 and placed them as human
20 shields on potential targets. Milosevic immediately recognising the
21 jeopardy this placed Serbia
22 Stanisic to intervene, to go with Simatovic and with the full authority
23 of Milosevic to return with the hostages unharmed.
24 The Prosecution does not deny Mr. Stanisic or Mr. Simatovic any
25 of the honour or respect they have earned and deserve in this display of
1 courage, freeing the hostage and perhaps even saving their lives. Should
2 the Court find them guilty of crimes after this trial, the Prosecution
3 will join the Defence in submitting that their deeds during the hostage
4 crisis merits consideration by the Chamber in assessing an appropriate
6 It is the Prosecution's case, however, and there can be no
7 mistake regarding this, the authority Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic
8 commanded that day, the day they decided to use their authority and their
9 ability to save lives is tragically the very same authority and the very
10 same ability that they had used more often over the prior four years to
11 take lives, to persecute innocents, to drive people from their homes.
12 The reason Mr. Milosevic sent them there during the hostage
13 crisis, one of the most tense and volatile events during the war, when
14 all the eyes of the world were fixed on what might happen to these UN
15 peacekeepers, the reason he sent them was because they, like no one else,
16 had the capacity to walk in among this madness and come out with the
17 hostages unharmed.
18 I would like now to turn to the indictment itself and offer a
19 brief explanation of the charges and the Prosecution's theory of the
21 The indictment charges both accused with crimes against humanity
22 in violation of Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute and violations of the
23 laws and customs of war in violation of Article 3 of the Statute.
24 Slide 137 is a summary of the indictment against Mr. Stanisic and
25 Mr. Simatovic.
1 The crimes against humanity are enumerated in counts 1, 2, 4, and
2 5 of the indictment and they are respectively, count 1, the crime of
3 persecution in violation of Article 5(h). Count 2, murder in violation
4 of Article 5(a). Count 4, deportation in violation of 5(d). And
5 finally, forcible transfer, one of the inhumane acts prohibited under
6 Article 5(i) of the Statute.
7 The crime of murder is also charged as a violation of the laws
8 and customs of war and is charged in count 3 which charges murder as
9 recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
10 and punishable under Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute.
11 It is the Prosecution's case that the accused are individually
12 criminally responsible for these crimes pursuant to Article 7(1) of the
13 Tribunal's Statute in that they participated in these crimes with the
14 requisite intent in the following ways:
15 1. They committed the crimes as members of and participated in a
16 joint criminal enterprise whose goal and purpose was to perpetrate these
18 2. They participated in the planning of these crimes.
19 3. They ordered some of the crimes charged in this indictment.
20 4. They aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and
21 execution of the crimes charged in this indictment.
22 It is the Prosecution's case that both of the accused were part
23 of and helped form a joint criminal enterprise, a criminal enterprise
24 conceived at the highest levels of the government of the Republic of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, an enterprise that conceived of and implemented a
2 criminal plan designed to secure exclusively for Serbs land lying in
4 To acquire these targeted territories, this criminal enterprise
5 would envisage the large and rapid removal of the non-Serb population by
6 the perpetration of the crimes of murder and persecution.
7 It is the Prosecution's position that at all times relevant to
8 this case, these core members shared the intent to remove non-Serbs from
9 designated parts of Croatia
10 acts. The glue that bound them together, that harmonized their
11 individual contributions, that ensured that they worked in unison toward
12 a common goal was the shared criminal intent.
13 The jurisprudence of joint criminal enterprise has evolved to
14 recognise that such criminal enterprises may come to take several forms
15 as shown on slide 140. These different forms reflect the nuances between
16 the different ways in which the --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down. Thank you.
18 MR. GROOME: I apologise.
19 These different forms reflect the nuances between the different
20 ways in which co-perpetrators can join, conceive of and implement their
21 criminal plans.
22 While the actus reus
23 identical, they are distinguished based upon their mental element or mens
25 The evidence you will hear in this case is consistent with two
1 forms of joint criminal enterprise.
2 JCE I, which is sometimes referred to as the basic form,
3 conceives of criminal responsibility for members of a criminal enterprise
4 engaged in a common criminal agreement to commit a specific crime. While
5 each member may carry out a different role in the commission of the
6 crime, they nonetheless each intend for that specific crime to be
7 committed and contribute to it.
8 This is to be contrasted with JCE III, sometimes referred to as
9 the extended form, in which the crime charged, while not part of the
10 originally-intended crime is nonetheless a natural and foreseeable
11 consequence of the implementation of that criminal purpose.
12 With respect to this case --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome, you should be bringing your closing
14 remarks now to an end. I believe your time would be up at half past
16 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, my calculation would bring it that we
17 would have 15 minutes after the break which I believe is in keeping with
18 what I have about left. I believe this is a rather important part of the
19 opening statement, setting out our legal theory.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're going to take the break at half past.
21 MR. GROOME: With respect to this case, firstly, and most
22 importantly, and the principal legal theory of the Prosecution is that
23 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic were members of the core group of
24 co-perpetrators that conceived of the crimes contained in the indictment.
25 At all times relevant to these charges, they had the shared intent to
1 forcibly remove non-Serbs from designated areas in an effort to effect
2 fundamental demographic changes in the population.
3 The intent that they shared was not only to forcibly remove these
4 targeted groups of non-Serbs but they shared the intent to kill them and
5 to persecute them as a means to realise their goals.
6 How do we know they shared this intent? There will be much
7 evidence from which the Chamber may conclude that the two accused shared
8 the criminal intent of other core members such as Martic, Karadzic,
9 Hadzic, Mladic. I will confine myself to a single example.
10 In Zvornik, fighters belonging to Seselj, Arkan, and a group
11 called the Yellow Wasps were all engaged in the commission of serious
12 crimes there. You will hear evidence that the Yellow Wasps were
13 investigated by Mr. Stanisic, by Serbian State Security Service and
14 subsequently arrested by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. They
15 were ultimately prosecuted in a Serbian court for crimes they committed
16 in Bosnia
17 investigate and arrest the Vukovic brothers, the question that is raised
18 is why wasn't similar action taken against Seselj's men or Arkan's men?
19 Not only was action not taken, but you will be presented with evidence
20 that the crimes they committed after Bijeljina and Zvornik were
21 facilitated and supported by the two accused.
22 It is the Prosecution's case that the only reasonable conclusion
23 that can be drawn from this is that Arkan and Seselj were among the core
24 members of the JCE and that Stanisic and Simatovic shared their intent to
25 perpetrate the crimes perpetrated in Zvornik.
1 Your Honour, would that be a convenient place to take the break?
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it will be. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.
3 --- Recess taken at 4.27 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 4.58 p.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Knoops.
6 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, before we proceed, may we just seek the
7 guidance of the Prosecution as to question whether they rely their
8 opening statement on the second revised indictment of May 2006 or whether
9 they already anticipate the theory and the changes which are included in
10 the proposed third amendment of the indictment. I think it's rather
11 essential for the Defence to know.
12 As Your Honour knows, there is a motion pending from the Defence
13 against the proposed third amendment of the indictment. Now that the
14 Prosecution arrives at the legal theory apart from the fact that, in my
15 view, an opening statement should not be meant to argue the law but apart
16 from that, I think if the Prosecution continues with the legal theory,
17 that maybe the Prosecution could indicate whether they rely their opening
18 statement on the second revised indictment and its underlying theory or
19 whether they anticipate this amended -- the third amended indictment
21 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I haven't anticipated the Court's
22 decision. Everything I've said is based upon the current indictment
23 that's in effect in this case. And its the Prosecution's view that one
24 of the essential tasks that I'm charged with is to explain the legal
25 theory of culpability in after effort to help the Defence meet the case
1 that the Prosecution will present against them.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, please proceed.
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the evidence in this case is also
4 consistent with what is commonly referred to as Joint Criminal Enterprise
5 III. The two accused as well as the other core members of the joint
6 criminal enterprise shared the intent to forcibly remove non-Serbs from
7 designated areas.
8 Under this theory, even absent a finding that the accused shared
9 the intent to murder and persecute Muslims and Croats, they would remain
10 liable if they shared the intent to forcibly remove these non-Serbs from
11 targeted areas and they willingly accepted the proximate and foreseeable
12 risk that this forcible removal of people would result in the commission
13 of murder and persecutions.
14 In the context of this case, the accused having joined with
15 others possessing the shared intent of forcibly transferring people from
16 their homes bear individual criminal responsibility for the crimes of
17 persecution and murder which are reasonably foreseeable.
18 As I have previously said, the actus reus for a JCE I and JCE III
19 are the same except for slight nuances.
20 First, that there be a plurality of persons. Given the large
21 collective nature of these crimes, we can in practical terms only
22 identify for you and present evidence regarding those members we believe
23 to be the core members of the joint criminal enterprise. These are the
24 people indicated on the chart we have used several times during the
25 course of this opening statement.
1 The second actus reus
2 purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime under this
3 Statute. It is the Prosecution's case that each of the crimes charged in
4 this indictment was a purpose of the joint criminal enterprise.
5 The third actus reus
6 furtherance of the common criminal design in a manner that assists in its
7 achievement, contributes to it, materially helps in its execution.
8 I will now in very summary fashion using slide 143 to identify
9 the acts of participation which the Prosecution allege incur criminal
10 liability for Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic.
11 With respect to the Krajina, it's the Prosecution's case that
12 their joint efforts to organise, finance, train, and equip Martic's men
13 and army thereby enabling them to perpetrate the serious crimes they did
14 against the non-Serb population of the Krajina was an act of
15 participation in the overall criminal enterprise.
16 Similarly with respect to the SAO SBWS, it is the Prosecution's
17 case that the accused's acts of participation in the joint criminal
18 enterprise were in part: Financing and equipping Arkan and his men who
19 directly perpetrated the crimes.
20 With respect to both the Krajina and the SAO SBWS, Mr. Stanisic
21 and Mr. Simatovic gave direction to the local political leaders including
22 Martic, Babic, and Hadzic, to ensure that their political activities also
23 advanced the goals of the common criminal purpose.
24 Finally, even if after the conclusion of this case, the Chamber
25 has a doubt about whether Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic directly funded
1 and equipped Arkan, they would still be responsible for his crimes, the
2 crimes of another co-member in a joint criminal enterprise if the Chamber
3 were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that they were in fact part of the
4 same joint criminal enterprise.
5 With respect to the Bosnian municipalities, Mr. Stanisic and
6 Mr. Simatovic had a role in their takeover in 1992. It is the
7 Prosecution's contention that their culpable acts of participation in the
8 joint criminal enterprise included: Planning the attacks; providing
9 training, arms, equipment and funding. In some instances, they also
10 arranged military transport for the direct perpetrator of crimes.
11 In the event the Chamber finds that the evidence does not permit
12 an inference that they directed the immediate perpetrators of these
13 crimes and in fact that it was Bosnian Serb leaders alone who directed
14 them to commit the crimes, the Prosecution's case would be that placing
15 these men and this equipment at the disposal of another member of a joint
16 criminal enterprise to use to advance the criminal purpose of the joint
17 criminal enterprise also incurs liability.
18 Finally, in such a large collective crime, the jurisprudence of
19 this Tribunal, in the Brdjanin Appeals Judgement recognises that those
20 most responsible for these serious crimes are often also those most
21 removed from them. It considers that those high-level members of the
22 enterprise can and do use others to directly perpetrate the crimes they
23 intend and as such bear individual criminal responsibility.
24 Under this theory, the core members of the joint criminal
25 enterprise, sharing a common intent to remove non-Serbs, used others to
1 directly advance this criminal goal.
2 Those they used may or may not have also shared their intent, but
3 this theory holds that even absent proof of a shared intent with these
4 perpetrators, the accused are criminally responsible because they
5 employed these people as instrumentalities of their criminal plan.
6 To give you an example from this case, I remind you about what we
7 have already said about Bosanski Samac. When it became necessary,
8 Jovica Stanisic would personally intercede to have one of the primary
9 perpetrators released, a man named Crni released so that he could return
10 to Samac to continue his crimes.
11 Did Crni and Stanisic share the same intent? Probably. But even
12 absent the finding that they did share the same intent, Mr. Stanisic and
13 Mr. Simatovic bear responsibility for the crimes of Crni if the Court
14 finds that Crni was used as an instrumentality of the joint criminal
15 enterprise to perpetrate its objectives.
16 It is the Prosecution's case that Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic
17 are responsible for and participated in the crimes charged in several
18 ways as set out in the indictment and the pre-trial brief. It is not our
19 case that each crime relied on only one mode of participation, given the
20 size of the DB units and the breadth of Stanisic's and Simatovic's
21 activities, it is most often the case that in any one criminal event,
22 their involvement in these crimes can be discerned in more than one way.
23 The indictment also alleges that the two accused planned the
24 crimes charged. Planning a crime considers that one or several persons
25 contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the preparatory
1 and execution phases.
2 It is the Prosecution's position that Stanisic's and Simatovic's
3 establishment of 26 training camps, the provision of instructors, supply
4 and military weapons and logistical equipment to the direct perpetrators
5 of the crimes is evidence upon which the Chamber could conclude they
6 engaged in acts of planning as defined by the jurisprudence of this
8 The Chamber will recall slide number 42 in the Krajina, someone
9 by the name of Miljovic refers to things going according to "the training
11 You will also recall the statement of Vojislav Seselj in which he
12 identifies Mr. Simatovic as the mastermind behind the plan for the
13 takeover of Zvornik.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down. Thank you.
16 MR. GROOME: Ordering. According to the jurisprudence of this
17 Tribunal, concerns a person in a position of authority using that
18 position to persuade another to commit an offence under the Statute. The
19 order can be explicit or implicit and can be proved with circumstantial
21 It is the Prosecution's case that the evidence will support a
22 conclusion by the Chamber that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic sent
23 Arkan to the several municipalities in the indictment where he committed
24 crimes. And even if they did not explicitly tell him to commit the
25 crimes of murder and persecution, in the context of their knowledge that
1 everywhere he went, he committed these crimes, the only conclusion that
2 can be drawn is that they are directing him to a particular location with
3 a non-Serb population was an implied order to perpetrate the crimes of
4 murder and persecution there.
5 I will not spend any time discussing aiding and abetting at this
6 stage. All of the acts the Prosecution attributes to Stanisic and
7 Simatovic could be the basis of participation as an aider and abettor.
8 It is the Prosecution's case at the conclusion of the evidence in this
9 trial, it will be clear that they were the principals in the crimes
10 charged in this indictment. We are charging aiding and abetting purely
11 as an alternative theory.
12 Your Honours, in the indictment, the Prosecution alleges that the
13 accused committed these crimes by their acts and omissions. I would like
14 to take a few minutes to expound on what is meant by that phrase.
15 The word omission actually has two distinct meanings according to
16 the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. One use of omission is as a form of
17 criminal liability. The other use is a description of a factual
18 situation from which inferences can be drawn. Omission as a legal form
19 of criminal liability imagines a situation in which an accused has a
20 legal duty toward the victim. For example, a legal duty to protect.
21 It is not the Prosecution's case that Stanisic or Simatovic had
22 an affirmative legal duty to ensure the welfare of the victims of crimes
23 in Croatia
24 Omission as it applies to a factual determination from which
25 inferences can be drawn is how the Prosecution uses the word omission in
1 this case. For example, if over the course of this case, the Chamber
2 takes the view of the evidence that despite receiving information about
3 the crimes which were being committed as a result of their contribution
4 to the joint criminal enterprise, and that in the face of that knowledge,
5 they failed to take any corrective measures such as instructing the
6 members of DB units to refrain from criminal conduct, then the Court can
7 draw the reasonable inference that such omission constituted
8 encouragement, material support to the direct perpetrators of the crime
9 because they were emboldened by the failure of Stanisic and Simatovic to
10 take any corrective action.
11 You have seen a video of Arkan on the veranda of his shop in the
12 middle of Belgrade
13 other evidence that he and his men were a regular sight in Belgrade
14 moved openly, dressed in uniform, carrying military weapons often in cars
15 with tigers painted on the hood.
16 His ability to travel freely around Belgrade under the very nose
17 of Stanisic, whose legal responsibility if you recall from slide 7
18 included the control of extremist groups, Arkan's confidence in his own
19 impunity, a result of Mr. Stanisic's failure to ever take action against
20 him materially advanced the crimes Arkan committed in addition to the
21 accused's positive acts of directing and supporting him.
22 Your Honour, this brings to a conclusion the Prosecution's
23 summary of its evidence and overview of why it alleges that
24 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic are criminally responsible for the
25 crimes charged in the indictment.
1 I thank you for your time and attention. As we commence the
2 calling of evidence, I give the Chamber as well as Mr. Stanisic and
3 Mr. Simatovic my assurance and the assurance of Mr. Brammertz that the
4 Prosecution will conduct its case according to the highest standards of
5 fairness and justice enabling this Chamber to reach a fair and just
6 adjudication of the charges against the accused.
7 Your Honours, with that, the Prosecution stands ready to call our
8 first witness.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Groome. And the Chamber will of
10 course hold you to that promise. We are now going to move into the
11 hearing of testimony. The first witness ...
12 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, before we call that first witness,
13 there are a couple of administrative things I would like to raise with
14 the Chamber.
15 One is, over the course of the opening we've been referring to
16 slides which looking at the cold record no one would ever be able to
17 figure out what was in the slide. We did not read everything on the
18 slide in the interests of time. I would ask that the copy, a copy of
19 those slides be marked for identification, in the event it ever becomes
20 an issue at an appeal stage, what was said during the opening and what
21 was the content of the opening. I'm not asking that they be introduced
22 as evidence but simply that they be marked for identification.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see no objection to that.
24 MR. GROOME: Secondly, Your Honour, I believe it is important
25 that we state on the record the fact that Mr. Stanisic --
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I see that Mr. Stanisic has not been
3 here and I don't believe he has been in the video conference room and
4 ordinarily the Court makes a record of that as well as the absence from
5 the UNDU unit. I wonder whether it would be prudent to investigate
6 whether we do have such a unit saying he is too ill or at least identify
7 for the record that he has not been present during the opening.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Knoops.
9 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, now that the position of the Defence
10 team for Mr. Stanisic factually diminished to guardians of his legal
11 position, I also point to the right of Mr. Stanisic, according to Rule 84
12 bis and in light of the medical evidence and the notification today from
13 the detention centre, I believe that without verifying that information,
14 it would be contrary to the fair rights of this accused to proceed with
15 the first witness without endeavoring the invocation of Rule 84 bis and
16 actually --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: But you are his lawyer. What do you say? Does
18 he wish to make a statement?
19 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, we don't have instructions whether he
20 will --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why don't you have instructions? Don't waste my
23 MR. KNOOPS: I cannot --
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you think I'm going to put up with nonsense,
25 you are mistaken. Why are you describing yourself as a guardian of the
1 interests of the accused?
2 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, if Your Honour reads the motions we
3 have filed to the Appeals Chamber, Your Honour can read that our present
4 function is diminished to the guardian of the legal rights because we
5 don't have instructions. And I believe it's fair to say --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: As far as I'm concerned, you remain counsel
7 until the matter that you have raised is settled. And unless you can
8 advise me that the accused wishes to make a statement, I will proceed on
9 the basis that he does not wish to make a statement because that is
10 something which you should have gathered from him before coming here.
11 If you have no other submissions, we'll proceed.
12 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, my submission is that the accused is
13 not able to assess whether he can give a statement. That is my point.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We've been through that already and I'm not
15 going through it again.
16 Yes, Mr. Groome.
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, with respect to B-299, the Prosecution
18 has made two applications, one was 92 ter. In light that we have not had
19 a decision, we've actually prepared this witness to testify --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to give the decision. Before I do
21 that, let me inquire from the court deputy what the position is with
22 regard to the accused, whether the accused is watching the proceedings by
23 videolink from the detention unit.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the accused is not present in the
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
2 This is the Chamber's decision on the application of the
3 Prosecution in relation to Witness B-299.
4 On the 18th of June, the Chamber received a motion for the
5 admission pursuant to Rule 92 ter of the transcript of evidence given by
6 Witness B-299 in the Martic case and the exhibits that were admitted
7 during his testimony. B-299 worked with the DB. The Chamber has
8 carefully reviewed the evidence given by and tendered through
9 Witness B-299 in the Martic case and considers that it is sufficiently
10 probative and relevant to the present case. The evidence is cumulative
11 of other viva voce or Rule 92 ter testimony the Prosecution has indicated
12 it will present at trial.
13 After reviewing the arguments advanced by the parties, the
14 Chamber allows the Prosecution motion. The Chamber is also seized of a
15 Prosecution motion for the continuation of protective measures granted in
16 prior proceedings for Witness B-299. The Prosecution in this motion
17 requests the continuation of protective measures granted in the prior
18 proceedings to this witness.
19 The Defence has not responded to this motion.
20 Rule 75(f)(i) provides that protective measures granted in
21 previous proceedings before the Tribunal shall continue to have effect
22 mutatis mutandis in any other proceedings before the Tribunal unless and
23 until they are rescinded, varied or amended in accordance with the
24 procedures set out in this rule.
25 No application has been made to rescind, vary or amend the
1 protective measures and those measures will therefore continue. The
2 measures are a pseudonym, and voice and facial distortion.
3 Yes, Mr. Jovanovic.
4 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. At this
5 time, I do not wish to take an issue with the -- or discuss the decision
6 you've rendered but if the decision of Their Honours is based on the
7 belief (redacted)
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty is on his feet.
14 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, excuse me, I'm going to be taking
15 this witness and this is a protected witness and if we are going to go on
16 about details of this witness's work, I ask to move into closed session.
17 I don't wish to stop Mr. Jovanovic from making his submission, it's
18 simply the context in which he is making it. And I'm also going to ask
19 for a redaction of lines 19 through 25 on page 78 of the transcript
20 that's on the screen.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that redaction will be done.
22 Mr. Jovanovic.
23 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. It was
24 was not my intention to reveal the identity of the upcoming witness in
25 any way. I merely believed that I ought to point out that if this was
1 the basis upon which the witness's testimony was to be admitted under
2 Rule 92 ter, that it was misconceived.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We have heard your submissions.
4 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just one final matter with respect to
5 B-299, yesterday the Court issued an order restricting examination of 92
6 ter witnesses to 30 minutes. Not having the benefit of the Chamber's
7 decision on 92 ter, Mr. Docherty has prepared the witness for his
8 evidence as if we did not have a 92 ter decision. I would ask that we be
9 allowed to continue with this witness for the two hours of direct
10 examination that we had anticipated before the Court's ruling. We will
11 try to or I will try to catch up or reduce the time that other witnesses
12 who may spend testifying on similar matters try to identify that and
13 reduce the amount of time that we spend so that we can make up this time.
14 But I appreciate if we could move forward with this witness with the
15 originally-allotted time that we were -- the understanding of yesterday
16 which is the two hours of examination.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I really want to say that two hours for a
19 92 ter witness is really much too long, much too long. But I take
20 account of the point that you have made that you were not aware of the
21 decision that we were going to give that every effort should be made to
22 keep examination-in-chief of those witnesses, those kind of witnesses to
23 half an hour.
24 In the circumstances, I'll allow you to go beyond the half an
25 hour and perhaps to the end of the day's proceedings.
1 I'm to inquire whether we can sit from the court deputy without a
2 break. I know that there are certain guidelines in this matter. We are
3 now in the third session for an hour and a half.
4 THE REGISTRAR: We will need to have 15 minutes break minimum for
5 technical reasons.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Now?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We need to have a 15-minute break to allow the
9 technical staff to set up the apparatus. So we'll take that break now.
10 --- Recess taken at 5.25 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly swear that I will speak
15 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
16 WITNESS: WITNESS B-299
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit. And you may commence,
19 Mr. Docherty.
20 Examination by Mr. Docherty:
21 Q. Good afternoon, Witness.
22 A. Good afternoon.
23 MR. DOCHERTY: May I ask the court usher to take the pseudonym
24 sheet to the witness, please.
25 Q. Witness, the court usher has just handed to you what is known as
1 a pseudonym sheet. Are your name, date, and place of birth correctly
2 stated on that pseudonym sheet?
3 A. Yes.
4 MR. DOCHERTY: Could the court usher please show the pseudonym
5 sheet to counsel for the parties and to the Chamber, and after that could
6 the pseudonym sheet please be admitted into evidence under seal.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.
8 THE REGISTRAR: The document will be Exhibit P2 under seal.
9 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, could we move into closed session for
10 a couple of minutes while I take the witness through the witness's
11 personal background?
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
13 [Private session]
11 Page 1078 redacted. Private session.
2 [Open session]
3 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session.
4 MR. DOCHERTY:
5 Q. Witness, did you, in April of 1991, get sent to the Krajina by
6 your service?
7 A. That was in May 1991 and that's true. But it happened in May
9 Q. And I'm going to ask the court usher to display on the screen a
10 map from the Prosecution map book number 10. Maps are large files, they
11 take a while to load, so while we are waiting for the map, could you
12 please explain to us what your mission was in the Krajina, what you were
13 doing there?
14 A. Since general unrest occurred in Croatia between the Serb and
15 Croat peoples residing there, the government of the SFRY and the
16 government of Croatia
17 life in that area. Thereupon, it was decide that had someone ought be
18 charged with controlling the truce and maintaining the cease-fire out in
19 the field. Probably the government and the Presidency of the SFRY
20 decided that we from the Federal Ministry of the Interior were best
21 placed to enforce peace in the field and to oversee peace out in the
23 Q. How many people were on your team?
24 A. Pursuant to the decision of the government, three teams were sent
25 out to crisis areas in the Republic of Croatia
1 deployed to Sibenik, the second one to Gospic and the third to Plitvice.
2 These three areas were considered crisis areas where the concentration of
3 the Serb people was highest. These were Serbs living in the area and on
4 the other side, there were Croats whose state this was.
5 The first group posted to Sibenik included 7 to 8 persons
6 including auxiliary staff and specialists who were at our disposal to
7 ensure our security and safety.
8 Do you want me to name them? With your permission, I can give
9 you their names and their respective functions that they held out in the
10 field whilst controlling the cease-fire.
11 Q. No, the names will not be necessary. Thank you. But I take it
12 from that answer that you were on the team that went to Sibenik; is that
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. The map is now on the screen beside you. Do you see it there?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And with the assistance of someone from the court, I'm going to
18 ask you to make a few marks on that map. The first thing I want you to
19 do is to put your witness number B-299 and today's date in the lower
21 A. Right here you mean?
22 Q. That's fine, thank you. And could you date the map, please.
23 A. What's the date?
24 Q. Today is the 29th of April.
25 Do you see on this map the area of Croatia that you have been
1 referring to as Krajina?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Could you please draw a circle around the Krajina and label it
4 with K for Krajina.
5 A. Yes, I can. That would roughly be the area. I can't be asked
6 really to draw proper maps here, but that would be the extent of the area
8 Q. And could you label that circle with the letter K so that in
9 future, we'll know what we are looking at, please.
10 A. I can.
11 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, could the map as marked be admitted
12 into evidence.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that would be Exhibit P3.
15 MR. DOCHERTY: I'm going to ask for another map, this is
16 Prosecution map book number 2, and again that will take a while to load.
17 Q. While we are waiting for the map to load, did you travel from
18 Sibenik to Knin and, if so, how did you get from Sibenik to Knin?
19 A. I travelled from Sibenik to Knin because we were accommodated at
20 the Hotel Solaris in Sibenik. We occasionally travelled to Knin by the
21 car that we had at our disposal and we went along the Sibenik-Drnis-Knin
23 Q. Let me draw your attention -- well, we have the map so let's use
24 the map and then come back to this, please. Do you see the map in front
25 of you?
1 A. I do, but I can't make out any of the text. It's quite small in
3 Q. Could the usher please magnify the area of the map, the Adriatic
4 coast of Croatia
5 Can you see that better, Witness?
6 A. I have to get closer. I can see it now, yes. I see it.
7 Q. As with the preceding map, would you please put your witness
8 number B-299 and today's date in the lower right.
9 A. Do you want the date as well?
10 Q. Yes, please.
11 A. I beg your pardon, this should be a 4. And 08.
12 Q. Now, you've mentioned two towns, Sibenik and Knin. Do they
13 appear on this map?
14 A. Yes, they do.
15 Q. Could you circle Sibenik and circle Knin, please?
16 A. [Marks]
17 Q. Could you please write an S beside the Sibenik circle and a K
18 beside the Knin circle.
19 A. [Marks]
20 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, could this map as marked please be
21 introduced into evidence.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that would be Exhibit P4.
24 MR. DOCHERTY:
25 Q. Before the map came up on the screen, we had been talking about
1 travel between Sibenik and Knin. Did there come an occasion when you
2 travelled from Sibenik to Knin in a military helicopter? Do you know the
3 incident I'm referring to?
4 A. Yes, I do know the incident. And that was my first visit, the
5 first time I went from Sibenik to Knin.
6 Q. Was there a naval officer in the helicopter with you, and if so,
7 who was it?
8 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, I believe this is leading the witness.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it is. Reformulate, Mr. Docherty.
11 MR. DOCHERTY:
12 Q. Who was in the helicopter with you, if anyone?
13 A. It was a military helicopter and at the insistence of
14 Admiral Zec, who introduced himself as an officer for naval security, he
15 proposed that we take the helicopter for security reasons because
16 allegedly in the field, there were quite a lot of snipers and so he
17 recommended that for security reasons, he, together with the
18 helicopter -- that we should go in the helicopter to Knin together with
20 Q. And when you got to Knin, was anything pointed out to you?
21 A. Near Knin itself, and this is something that I saw later on,
22 there was a fortress, there was a fortress above Knin. And probably
23 pursuant to an order from the Admiral, the helicopter circled the
24 fortress twice and then the Admiral drew our attention to the fact that
25 there were units in Knin called the Knindzas which were being prepared
1 and trained by Captain Dragan, that he was conducting training for these
3 We weren't able to talk anymore although we were very interested
4 in learning more. The helicopter was rather old, you see, and there was
5 noise from the air. There was a lot of noise. So we weren't able to
6 conduct a conversation very well because we couldn't hear each other.
7 Q. Do you know when the word "Captain Dragan" was used to identify
8 this person, do you know who was being talked about? Can you identify
9 that person?
10 A. Not at that point, no, but later on, we learned more about him
11 when we met various individuals in the field and also privately later on
12 through my life when I returned from the field. But at the time, he said
13 that he was an expert in combat, that he had completed some sort of
14 military courses, terrorist, anti-terrorist somewhere in the west, and
15 that for the time being, he was conducting training of the Knindzas or
16 rather the Serb forces in the area.
17 Q. And what was your reaction upon hearing that there were Serb
18 forces in the area since this was Croatia?
19 A. Well, when we were sent from Belgrade, we were told that in the
20 field, down there, there were some paramilitary units of some kind over
21 there and that's what General Gracanin, the minister also told us. He
22 informed us about the fact that there were problems with Martic's police
23 and that they were outside the control of the Croatian forces, that they
24 did not respect or recognise Croatian laws but that they were functioning
25 according to some sort of law which was not -- well, which could be said
1 was inappropriate and did not comply with the laws of the Croatian state
2 and where all the other laws were in force.
3 MR. DOCHERTY: Could we please see on the screen 65 ter number
5 Q. Witness, could you please read the title of this document?
6 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, at this point, we object because first
7 of all, there is no proper foundation to introduce the document.
8 Secondly, we don't know whether the witness is the author of the
9 document, whether it's beyond or within his personal knowledge, and
10 whether the document itself has any relevance to the case.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Docherty, lay some foundation.
12 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, the document just came up on the
13 screen. I'm just about to ask my first foundation question.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Go ahead.
15 MR. DOCHERTY:
16 Q. Witness, what type of document does this appear to you to be?
17 What category of document?
18 MR. KNOOPS: Does this call for speculation from the witness?
19 Did the Prosecution ...
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us hear what the witness says and we'll know
21 whether he's speculating. Yes.
22 Can you answer the question, Witness?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, from the document, we can see
24 as the title says, it is a proposal to set up a new training centre and
25 transfer the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence to the Knin fortress.
1 MR. DOCHERTY: Could we please scroll down in both languages to
2 the bottom -- excuse me -- yes --
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I were to compare what I saw in
4 the field when the helicopter circled the fortress and this document,
5 there is some congruity. It corresponds to the fact that training
6 courses did in fact take place at the Knin fortress.
7 A policeman, volunteers and those from the reserve force of the
8 police were taken and selected for training.
9 MR. DOCHERTY: Could we please go to the signature block which I
10 believe is on the second page.
11 Q. Do you see a signature block on this document?
12 A. I can't see a signature here. I can see the name and surname of
13 Captain Dragan.
14 Q. No, I'm not asking you for the signature. I'm asking you for the
15 name on the signature block.
16 A. Yes, I can see that, it says Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic. Now
17 we're going back to the time when we were there, our group was interested
18 in knowing the true surname of ...
19 Q. I think you might have anticipated my next question. Is there
20 any correspondence between this Captain Dragan and the man that you had
21 described to you in the helicopter over the Knin fortress that day?
22 A. Well, that's precisely what I was going to connect. We were just
23 told Captain Dragan. Although we insisted on learning more, our group
24 insisted on learning more both from Admiral Zec and later on in the
25 field, we were not able to learn his real surname and we learned that
1 nobody could actually know his real surname.
2 At one point, we arrived at some information that this
3 Captain Dragan, as he was referred to, was a sort of nickname and later
4 on I learned that his actual surname was Vasiljkovic, but at the time
5 when we were in Knin, we never learned his real surname.
6 Q. But you know it now and you know it's Vasiljkovic; is that
8 A. Yes, that's right.
9 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, I move the admission of 65 ter 1269
10 and then I'll have some questions about the content of the document.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it will be admitted.
12 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, we object against admission. We object
13 against admission of this document.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have already admitted it but let us hear the
16 MR. KNOOPS: First of all, we have no form of authentication
17 whether this document is indeed from the person with the name
18 Captain Dragan. Secondly, it's legally not viable that a document not
19 authored by this witness can be introduced through this witness.
20 The witness merely and only referred to the document as seeing
21 some congruity from what he saw from the helicopter and in this document.
22 But there is no -- this document is not within the personal knowledge of
23 the witness as such.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let's hear Mr. Jovanovic.
25 Are you finished?
1 MR. KNOOPS: Yes, thank you.
2 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. The same
3 objection. The document isn't signed, that's the first point. It wasn't
4 signed by Captain Dragan for it to be maintained that he was the author
5 of the document.
6 On the left-hand version, we can see -- well, you don't have to
7 be an expert in handwriting to establish this, that the surname which
8 stands there and which was written there, that the letters are quite
9 different which leads us to believe that the document isn't authentic.
10 And the witness is referring to Captain Dragan's surname and we see that
11 this, the letters typed out in the surname Vasiljkovic are quite
12 different to the letters that are typed out in Captain Dragan and I'm
13 referring to the B/C/S version. You can see that with the naked eye.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me hear that point again. Please repeat
15 that last point.
16 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The witness
17 said that the document was not signed and that at the bottom of the
18 document, we see the name of Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic. Now, this
19 witness was referring to Captain Dragan's surname which he said he
20 learned subsequently. It is quite obvious in the B/C/S version if you
21 take a look at it that that surname "Vasiljkovic" is typed out in
22 different letters from the "Captain Dragan" name. As you can see, the
23 "Captain Dragan" is in bold letters whereas the surname "Vasiljkovic" is
24 in different letters, typed out differently. And it seems as if the
25 Vasiljkovic surname has been added to this Captain Dragan because the
1 letters are quite different in the surname Vasiljkovic to the typed
2 script of all the other words in the text.
3 Since we don't have a signature, then I don't think we can take
4 this document to be authentic and whether this has subsequently been
5 added to the document, this surname.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Docherty.
7 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, I think that the objection that the
8 witness did not himself sign the document does not matter. What matters
9 is that the witness can identify and lay foundation for the document.
10 In this case, the witness has testified about knowing the person
11 whose name appears on the signature block of the document and has noted
12 that the name that is on the bottom of this document is the same as the
13 name that he eventually learned was the surname of Captain Dragan.
14 In addition, and I can perhaps -- need to get this from the
15 witness, but I believe that it is common for military orders not to be
16 signed in ink but, rather, simply have the issuing person's name appear
17 down at the bottom of it.
18 I believe that any of these objections would go to the weight of
19 the document and would not go to its admissibility.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: What do you say to the point, Mr. Docherty, that
21 the name that we see there, Vasiljkovic, is obviously differently written
22 from Captain Dragan and that that poses an issue of authenticity?
23 MR. DOCHERTY: I respectfully disagree. The document appears to
24 have been typewritten rather than prepared on a word processor which is
25 what we have all gotten used to and of course typewriters do vary quite a
1 bit, particularly if the ribbon needs to be changed.
2 The type face and the size of the type are identical. There is
3 no change in the type face. There is no change in the type size. And
4 again, I put it that this is simply the sort of thing that is common when
5 documents are prepared on typewriters rather than on computerised word
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were we to admit this document, Mr. Docherty,
8 what use would we be able to make of it?
9 MR. DOCHERTY: The relevance of this document, Your Honour, is
10 that it shows that the Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic that the witness has
11 said he was informed was in the Krajina area, indeed in the Knin
12 fortress, in fact, has authored a proposal to establish, in fact, a
13 military training centre in the Knin fortress and that it is dated the
14 27th of May, 1991. So it corroborates what the witness was told by
15 Admiral Zec while flying in the helicopter from Sibenik to Knin at the
16 beginning of his truce mission in May of 1991.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Knoops, what do you say to that?
18 MR. KNOOPS: Your Honour, the fact remains that when it concerns
19 the overall contents of the document, it's not from the personal
20 knowledge of the witness. The witness just said that he observed
21 something from a helicopter but he cannot testify about the accuracy of
22 the content, the full content of the document simply because he didn't
23 write the document itself.
24 I believe it's evidence from the Prosecution himself to say that
25 this is common within the military. We don't know whether this is a
1 military document after all. So I believe that on the basis of what the
2 witness has testified, there is ample -- there is no foundation, little
3 foundation to admit the document simply because, apart from the
4 authenticity, the witness information to the Court is too little to
5 accept this document as being within his full personal knowledge.
6 If the Prosecution wants to establish that what the witness said
7 that there are military training camps at that time in Knin, it cannot be
8 the case that the document which is totally out of the personal knowledge
9 and out of the authorship of this witness is introduced merely on the
10 simple saying of this witness that he saw a military training camp or
11 military units being trained.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: In the Tribunal, we have admitted, on many
13 occasions, documents through witnesses who have not been the signataries
14 of the documents. Isn't that so?
15 MR. KNOOPS: That is correct, Your Honour, although the witness
16 is not a military witness yet the Prosecution alleges that this is a
17 document drafted by a military person, namely -- a person with the name
18 Captain Dragan. So this contradicts already admissibility.
19 I would agree with Your Honours if we are dealing with the
20 military expert or somebody who works within the military.
21 This is a person working for a civil service.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Jovanovic.
24 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Just a
25 short objection. The Prosecutor said that as far as the documents, that
1 documents which contain a military order are not customarily signed.
2 This document here is just a proposal. So it's not a document of any
3 military order.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll not admit it at this stage. We'll mark it
5 for identification and if you have another witness later on who can speak
6 more directly to its contents then at that stage we'll consider its
7 admission again.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P5 marked for
10 MR. DOCHERTY: Your Honour, can we please move back into private
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session, please.
13 [Private session]
11 Pages 1093-1100 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: I want to deal with some matters relating to the
8 accused Stanisic. We have been told that he has not been following the
9 proceedings by videolink.
10 Is that so, Madam Court Deputy?
11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have also received the form which is headed
13 "Absence from court due to illness," and that form which is the form for
14 today has not been signed by the accused. And on the second page under
15 the section, "UNDU medical service," the deputy medical officer has
16 ticked the box 2A
17 which indicate that he may feel too unwell to attend court.
18 In light of the decision that has been made by the Chamber, it
19 appears to me that some consideration should be given to amending that
20 part of the officer's declaration because now the question is whether he
21 feels too unwell to follow and participate in the proceedings via
22 videolink because we have already made the decision that the trial will
23 proceed by way of videolink.
24 I just wanted to hear any comments that the parties might have on
1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I would agree with that and I would
2 also ask that there be an additional amendment to it. As the Court heard
3 yesterday during the testimony of Dr. Falke, we had a similar form that
4 also had the box ticked that there were observable signs that
5 Mr. Stanisic was too unwell to come to court. Yet when I asked Dr. Falke
6 what were the observable signs, the medical doctor who saw him the very
7 day, hours before he was in court, he said that he saw no observable
9 So I would suggest that the form also be amended to ask the
10 medical staff to actually list what are the observable signs that they
11 have seen that indicates to them that Mr. Stanisic is too unwell to go to
12 use the video conference centre or come to court.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not certain that I want to go that far
14 because, after all, these are matters of -- may be matters of
15 interpretation and one officer is saying that he has seen observable
16 symptoms and another one is saying that he has not.
17 What I think I'll certainly do is ask the court deputy to bring
18 to the attention of the registrar who will bring that to the attention of
19 the UNDU that the question now is whether the accused is well or unwell
20 to follow and participate in the proceedings via the video conference
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me hear Mr. Knoops. Do you have anything on
24 this matter to say?
25 MR. KNOOPS: Thank you, Your Honour. No comments.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber has considered your submissions,
3 Mr. Groome. We believe there is merit in it, so I'll also ask the court
4 deputy to transmit to the registrar who will in turn pass on to the UNDU
5 the Chamber's instructions that where there is a confirmation of
6 observable symptoms, then those symptoms should be indicated, those
7 symptoms should be identified.
8 In the box 4A
9 not certain, is that a two, a number, or a question sign? Can anyone
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, based on all of the forms when I
12 reviewed them from my examination for Dr. Falke, I believe it's a
13 question mark and it's been used consistently since, I believe, the
14 second week of April.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: It appears to be a question mark, yes. Yes,
16 they all have that question mark, yes.
17 The Chamber has today issued an order as to the monitoring of the
18 accused while he is watching the proceedings by video conference link and
19 you would have seen that order or if you have not yet received it, you
20 will have it shortly.
21 Before we adjourn, I want to say that on Tuesday, the 6th of May,
22 we will sit in the morning, that's at 9.00 a.m., and also in the morning
23 on Wednesday the 7th, and Thursday the 8th.
24 We'll therefore adjourn until Tuesday, the 6th -- just a minute.
25 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just -- sorry. Just one quick
1 question. Your Honour, the statements that you've asked us to provide,
2 do you wish them in hard copy or in electronic format? The statements of
3 the witnesses the week prior, would you prefer them ...
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. The prior statements.
5 MR. GROOME: Yes.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see.
7 MR. GROOME: We can provide them in either hard copy or
8 electronic form.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Hard copy, please.
10 So we'll adjourn then until Tuesday the 6th, 9.00 a.m.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.
12 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th
13 of May, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.