1 Thursday, 13 October, 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. First of all, apologies
6 for the delayed start. Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 I don't think there are any procedural issues to be raised. One
11 question, could the parties inform me about the time estimates for the
12 present witness, also if you have the scheduling for the next witness.
13 MR. JORDASH: I would hope to be done within the hour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps 10 minutes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr.
17 MR. FARR: Your Honours, my initial estimate is two and a half
18 hours, but I do realise that there are scheduling issues, and I'll try to
19 get through as quickly as possible to facilitate that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: That's appreciated.
21 Then can the witness be escorted into the courtroom, yes.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Corbic.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to remind you that you are still bound by
1 the solemn declaration you've given yesterday that you'll speak the
2 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
3 Mr. Jordash will now continue his cross-examination.
4 You may proceed, Mr. Jordash.
5 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 WITNESS: VLADIMIR CORBIC [Resumed]
7 [Witness answered through interpreter]
8 Examination by Mr. Jordash: [Continued]
9 Q. Good morning, Mr. Corbic.
10 A. Good morning.
11 Q. As we finished off yesterday, your statement, and the map, the
12 chart are now before the Court, so I just want to seek a little
13 clarification of some issues.
14 MR. JORDASH: First of all, could we have the map back on the
16 Q. I want to speak to you first of all -- or ask you about the kind
17 of resources that you had within the Novi Pazar department, and the kind
18 of resources you had overall within the Kraljevo DB centre.
19 MR. JORDASH: I'm sorry, I don't think I said the exhibit number,
21 Q. First of all, are you able to comment or the level of man- or
22 womanpower in the region that you've indicated was covered by the
23 Kraljevo DB centre?
24 A. The centre of DB in Kraljevo consisted of four sections. Section
25 Novi Pazar, section Cacak, section Krusevac, and section Kraljevo. The
1 section of Novi Pazar in the early days, and when I say early days, I
2 mean when the situation was beginning to get more complicated, had seven
3 people working there until the end of 1993. Out of them, five operatives
4 and two administrative employees.
5 At the level of Kraljevo, the Kraljevo centre, I don't know the
6 exact number of staff but roughly -- do you want me to give you a rough
7 figure? Around 40.
8 Q. And of them how many were operatives?
9 A. In the entire centre?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. Well, roughly speaking, but I'm not sure, around 30.
12 Q. And in the years from 1991 to 1993 -- let me extend that. From
13 1991 to 1995, what kind of co-operation did you have with the public
15 A. The co-operation was very good in terms of sharing information
16 and reports about situations we were not able to deal with independently,
17 mostly crime, smuggling of arms, et cetera.
18 Q. What kind of resources did they have within the Kraljevo DB
19 centre territorial area?
20 A. They had a lot more because they had uniformed policemen and they
21 had CID inspectors and just in sheer numbers they were stronger an our
23 Q. Let me take you to your statement to seek some clarification.
24 MR. JORDASH: Please could we have D451. I think it's
25 provisionally under seal until we've checked it, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: You are supposed to have checked it by today, isn't
2 it? We hear from you later.
3 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to paragraph 4, please.
4 Q. In paragraph 4 you refer to the Novi Pazar department and it's
5 work aimed at protecting the security and constitutional order, and then
6 you make a comment that:
7 "Especially during 1992 and 1993, the primary aim, prevention of
8 the civil war in Sandzak, was determined based on an ordered of the RDB
9 chief and leadership."
10 What distinction do you make -- looking at the period of 1991 to
11 1995, what distinctions do you make in terms of the type of work that was
12 being conducted by the Novi Pazar department? Let me simplify that.
13 What was different about 1992 and 1993?
14 A. After Serbia developed a multi-party system -- I'm sorry, because
15 I'm mentioning, at least I'm going to mention some people who occupy
16 important positions now. Could we go into private session.
17 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
18 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are in private session.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, if you are talking about important
21 positions, important positions in what? In state security organs?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't hear interpretation. I
23 didn't understand what you said.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, madam usher, could you assist the witness. Do
25 you now hear me? My question was -- yes. When you are talking about
1 important positions, I asked you important positions in what, would that
2 be in state security or in other positions?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] State offices in the Republic of
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm looking at the parties. The mere fact
6 that people are holding positions now, if it's not in the state security
7 positions, I think falls beyond the scope of the protective measures
8 we've ordered.
9 MR. FARR: We would agree with that, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
11 MR. JORDASH: Yes, I think I can provide the Chamber with a bit
12 more information. I think the witness is referring to Sulejman Ugljanin
13 and Rasim Ljajic who are both members of the Serbian government, and I
14 think the witness will, as he has in his statement, testify to their
15 activities which might be characterised as terrorist activities during
16 the conflict, and I think that's the witness's concern.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm again addressing the parties, under those
18 circumstance, would it be wiser to hear this testimony in private
20 MR. FARR: I think if the Chamber is minded to do that, that's
21 fine. I don't know that the witness has a -- either a private security
22 interest or what the public interest would be in the public not knowing
23 this witness's views about those people or not having the knowledge that
24 he purports to have about those people. But if the Chamber wishes to
25 proceed cautiously, then we wouldn't object to that.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I'll consult with my colleagues.
2 MR. JORDASH: Sorry, could I perhaps add.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. JORDASH: I think perhaps a liberal reading of Your Honours'
5 ruling may incorporate those in the sense that they were state security
6 targets and arguably their associates were sources.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Out of an abundance of caution, we'll hear this part
9 of the testimony in private session.
10 Yes, we are in private session so perhaps, Mr. Jordash, you
11 repeat your question and ...
12 MR. JORDASH:
13 Q. What was different about 1992 and 1993 in terms of your work
14 within the Novi Pazar department?
15 A. I had just begun to say, when the Party of Democratic Action was
16 established, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin became its leader and Rasim Ljajic was
17 his deputy. In 1991 after Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from the former
18 Yugoslavia, on the orders of the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that
19 is to say Alija Izetbegovic, Sulejman Ugljanin, with his party, declared
20 an illegal referendum for Sandzak to secede from Serbia. At the same
21 time we were receiving reports that Ugljanin, along with some extremists
22 among his associates, that is to say not all of them, began illegally to
23 arm more extreme-minded people from his party. He sent them for sabotage
24 and terrorist training to Turkey, and all that created an atmosphere of
25 high nationalist tension and incidents. And in order to prevent all
1 that, we worked primarily to prevent a civil war in Serbia, that was our
2 priority, and to protect people and property in Sandzak, which is a part
3 of Serbia.
4 Q. Let me pause you there and let me just return you, after you've
5 given the background, to the issue of 1992 and 1993. Did something
6 happen in 1993 to make 1994 and 1995 different to 1992 and 1993?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do we need to stay in private session?
9 A. Yes. On the orders of the leadership of the service,
10 Jovica Stanisic, that is to say, our priority task was to prevent civil
11 war in Serbia and to provide absolute protection to all the citizens of
12 Sandzak. We are now using terms Bosniak and Muslim to denote one in the
13 same ethnic community, but at that time we called them Muslims.
14 So our priority was to protect Bosniaks and all the citizens of
15 Sandzak and to gather information about the way arming was conducted, how
16 sabotage terrorist groups were being created, and identify the people who
17 had been to training in Turkey. That terrorist training was organised
18 with the help of the Turkish government for the party of
19 Sulejman Ugljanin.
20 When the Operation in May 1993 began, we arrested only their
21 commanders, the commanders of their paramilitary and para-police units.
22 After that operation, towards the end of 1993 and in 1994, when a
23 criminal complaint was filed by the Prosecutor's Office against
24 Sulejman Ugljanin, the security situation improved considerably. The
25 tensions were defused, many terrorists simply fled, left the area, and
1 the situation began to calm down.
2 Q. And what happened to Ugljanin?
3 A. Ugljanin, when he heard that he was charged, fled to Turkey. He
4 returned in 1997 or 1998, I can't remember, to Serbia and continued to be
5 involved in politics.
6 Q. Okay. I think we might be able to go back into an open session
7 now. I want to continue the discussion but, if you can do it without
8 reference to these two then, unless you need to, then we can return to
9 private session.
10 JUDGE ORIE: We then move into open session. So from now on your
11 testimony will be public again.
12 Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
13 One second. I said please proceed, but I should have waited for
14 Madam Registrar.
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. For the record we are in open
17 session now.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
19 MR. JORDASH: Could we have please, 1D05100.
20 Q. Now, you've seen this. It's in Your Honours chart at item 18.
21 It's the proposal for the launching of Operation May 1993; is that right?
22 A. Right.
23 Q. How long did the operation last?
24 A. May 1993?
25 Q. Sorry, how long did it last, the operation? As we can see from
1 the document, second page, was carried out under the name "May 93," if we
2 look at the last paragraph.
3 A. It lasted until the moment I was pensioned off. As far as I
4 know, it's still on-going, but I am not sure.
5 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to page 2 in the English, bottom of page 1
6 for the B/C/S.
7 Q. I just want to understand some terms. Can you see the paragraph
8 where it says:
9 "On orders of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, the Main
10 Staff of Sandzak Defence was formed with the task of co-ordinating all
11 activities aimed at forming illegal paramilitary formations ..."
12 JUDGE ORIE: You are reading.
13 MR. JORDASH: Sorry, Your Honour.
14 Q. "... training them, arming them, et cetera. Also important in
15 this context is the role of the SDA security department and its leaders,
16 especially in terms of sending members of paramilitary formations to
17 Turkey to undergo training there for conducting sabotage operations in
18 the area of the Raska district."
19 What was the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, what did it
20 consist of, what was its objectives?
21 A. The Muslim National Council of Sandzak was a group of Muslim
22 parties, several Muslim parties that united. They joined forces.
23 Although some of those parties had no more than two or three members.
24 And this was done in order to give them importance. Sulejman Ugljanin,
25 the SDA, and several other Muslim parties that are were active in the
1 territory of Raska set up the Muslim National Council as a united Muslim
2 council that would make decisions on behalf of all the Muslim parties
3 that were there. And that was stipulated in their memorandum as part of
4 the conditions for the special status of Sandzak. The National Council
5 was tasked with co-ordinating all the activities regarding illegal
6 arming, creating paramilitary sabotage groups, sending Muslim youth for
7 training in Turkey, and so on and so forth.
8 Q. What percentage -- are you able to say what percentage of the
9 Muslim population of Sandzak did the Muslim National Council represent or
10 purport to represent?
11 A. They purported to represent all the Muslims of Sandzak, which was
12 absolutely incorrect. They represented only the extreme segment of the
13 Muslim population because not all Muslims were extremists and not all of
14 them were in favour of the setting up of the Muslim National Council, the
15 militant policies, and the secession of Sandzak from Serbia. In
16 percentage terms, I could say -- or rather, it's very difficult to say.
17 I would say that perhaps 40 per cent of the Muslims were in favour of the
18 Muslim National Council, not more than that.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, you are asking these questions. Of
20 course, the factual basis for the answers is totally unclear. Again,
21 it's common knowledge that political movements often claim to represent a
22 larger group than they may in fact represent. At the same time, what
23 they do represent often if there's no -- if no studies are done is
24 totally unclear. So I do see that you are asking for impressions at this
1 MR. JORDASH: I was -- I hope the next question might allow the
2 Chamber to see something more concrete.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's what we are looking forward to.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. JORDASH:
6 Q. At paragraph 14 of your statement - we probably don't need to
7 turn to it unless you want to be reminded of it - you note that on the
8 25th to the 27th of October, 1991, a secret referendum was organised in
9 Sandzak with the question, "Are you for secession of Sandzak from Serbia
10 and the joinder to another republic of the former Yugoslavia," and you
11 note that the results of the referendum were announced through a press
12 conference. Can you recall what the results were?
13 A. I don't remember, but approximately 73 or 70 per cent were in
14 favour and the others were against. But I'm not sure about these
15 figures. I'm absolutely not sure.
16 Q. On the one hand you had the impression that 40 per cent of the
17 Muslims were in favour of the Muslim National Council, on the other hand
18 you think, although you are not sure, that 70 or 73 per cent of the
19 Muslims within Sandzak answered "yes" to a question suggesting secession
20 from Serbia. Are you able to clarify those two figures?
21 A. Yes. The referendum on the secession of Sandzak from Serbia was
22 illegal. Actually, it never took part -- it never took place. It was
23 referendum that was not public according to the extremists themselves.
24 They went door to door to ask people to vote. According to what we he
25 know that referendum never took place, however, the results were made
1 public two or three days later.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, whether it sheds additional light or
3 whether it further confuses is a -- first of all, a political aim to be
4 achieved is not exactly the same as a certain movement representing part
5 of the population. You cannot agree with a party or a movement, but
6 nevertheless support certain aims. So it's all rather confusing. I just
7 want you to know that that's my first impression of this part of the
9 MR. JORDASH: Well, I'm not sure that I can bring much more
10 clarity or whether the witness can, but I'll try.
11 Q. Was the -- did the political agenda of the Muslim National
12 Council involve secession through politics or secession through violence?
13 What was its intended modus operandi?
14 A. The intended modus operandi absolutely followed the events in
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina. If you compare -- or rather, I have to go back
16 in order to look at the entire picture. The secession of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina happened some 20 or perhaps 15 days before this
18 referendum. After that there was this legal referendum and their modus
19 operandi for secession was double-pronged: One was political agenda, and
20 the other was a joint operation by paramilitary and para-police; that's
21 why they armed themselves, that's why they organised training and sent
22 their youth to organised training, and that's why they organised
23 paramilitary forces.
24 According to their political agenda, they had their own security
25 sector in addition to other sectors such as economic, health, and other
1 sectors. They had their own government of sorts and that was all
2 envisaged by the memorandum on the special status of Sandzak.
3 Q. And were there other political parties within Sandzak who
4 disagreed with the aims, objectives, and means of achieving those aims
5 and objectives of the Muslim National Council?
6 A. Yes, there was the Socialist Party of Serbia comprised of both
7 Serbs and Muslims. They didn't really agree amongst themselves but they
8 supported the state more than anything else. And if you mean Muslim
9 parties, is that what you are asking me about, Muslim parties?
10 Q. I was including that in my question.
11 A. Muslim parties simply were too scared to separate themselves from
12 the SDA because there was a lot of pressure put on them. They would be
13 boycotted, threatened, and so on and so forth.
14 Q. Returning for a moment to Operation May 1993, an operation, as we
15 can see from the document, formed in order to deal in part with the
16 formation of paramilitary formations. Are you able to provide some
17 evidence concerning how serious the problem was? We know from your
18 statement that 10.000 people in Sandzak were armed.
19 MR. JORDASH: That's at, Your Honours, paragraph 22.
20 Q. In terms of day-to-day state security business or public security
21 business, how problematic was this in 1991 to 1993 and thereafter?
22 A. When the operation started, the security situation in Sandzak was
23 quite volatile. War had started in Bosnia. A lot of Muslims from
24 Sandzak resided in Bosnia. Many Muslims from Sandzak went to Bosnia to
25 fight on the side of the SDA. On the other hand, there were a lot of
1 illegal weapons according to our information. Organised supply of
2 weapons that arrived from Bosnia, or rather, from one part of Bosnia and
3 that were intended for Sandzak did arrive in Sandzak and we received a
4 lot of intelligence about the presence of weapons. Muslims had a habit
5 whenever they had a celebration or a party, they would fire from those
6 weapons, so that fire that was opened disturbed the population to a large
8 In early 1993 we learned about people being sent for sabotage
9 training in Turkey. We also learned about sabotage groups being set up
10 in towns, in Tuti, in Sjenica, and Novi Pazar. We were compelled to
11 undertake very strong measures in order to prevent incidents and
12 ultimately a civil war, and to protect the population.
13 Q. What do you mean when you talk about sabotage groups? What were
14 these sabotage groups? What did they consist of?
15 A. Sabotage groups had three to five members who were all young men
16 who had served in the JNA who had been trained and were prepared to lay
17 mines, to plant explosives and so on and so forth. Their training
18 followed the -- this pattern: First they were trained in rooms where
19 they were shown films. Somebody would explain to them how to make
20 explosives. Their goal was to blow up tunnels, bridges, facilities where
21 people gathered in large numbers. And they were supposed to be armed
22 with an automatic rifle, a hand-grenade, and three knives, I believe.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, the Chamber wonders to what extent the
24 details of this training is of importance for the determinations.
25 Whether it's groups of three or ten, or whether they had three knives or
1 seven knives. I mean, the testimony is clear to the extent that this
2 witness tells us that it was a problem that they were trained, they were
3 sent to Turkey, prepared for sabotage. Now, it could be that there's any
4 specific reason why we have to know where they were trained, for how
5 long, et cetera, but the Chamber at this moment has not yet, speaking on
6 behalf of all three of us, has not gained the impression that without
7 this knowledge we would be lost.
8 MR. JORDASH: I hope very soon that Your Honours will -- I will
9 be able to bring Your Honours to where I'm heading.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then please go there as quickly as possible. Please
12 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
13 Q. What relationship with these sabotage units have with those who
14 were being sent to train in Turkey? Did you follow my question?
15 A. Those are two different things. Sabotage terrorist groups were
16 set up as part of the SDA and the sabotage and terrorist training of
17 Muslim youth was first followed by the command cadre for their units.
18 The first group consisted of some 50 men, and then the other groups
19 followed. And those were only for the SDA of Novi Pazar, Tuti, and
20 Sjenica, and the group that was trained in Sandzak came from entire
21 Sandzak including Uzice, Novi Pazar, other parts of Sandzak and
22 Montenegro. Those people went to Turkey to be trained there.
23 Q. And who was, as far as you were aware, training them in Turkey
24 and what kind of training were they receiving before returning to
1 A. They were partly trained by Turkish officers. And the other
2 parts of the training was conducted by deserters from the JNA, from the
3 former officers of the JNA who were Muslims. The training was aimed at
4 teaching them what the JNA had at its disposal, how to conduct street
5 fighting, how to set up guerilla war, where the JNA's weakest points
6 were, how to fight in the streets in urban areas. And then they also had
7 practical training in shooting, throwing hand-grenades, and so on and so
9 Q. Thank you. Two follow-on questions then we'll return to your
10 statement. First of all, did you in the state security in Novi Pazar or
11 in the Kraljevo DB centre regard it as part of your professional
12 obligations to prevent these extremists travelling to Turkey for
14 A. Our part of the job was also that. But they travelled as
15 civilians, as free citizens with passports. We didn't have any legal
16 right to stop them to prevent their travelling.
17 Q. And a similar question in relation to the Muslims who were
18 travelling into Bosnia to fight against the Bosnian Serbs?
19 A. The situation was the same; however, the intelligence we had was
20 not sufficient for anybody to be prevented from travelling to Bosnia or
21 elsewhere. We didn't have any formal rights to prevent them from doing
23 Q. Let's go to your statement, and I'm interested in -- just give me
24 a moment. In paragraph 35. Let's go to 36. And I'm interested in a
25 meeting that you refer to where you note that you took part in about two
1 to three, four at the most, meetings with the state security leadership,
2 including Vilotic. We can see a number of people there mentioned. And
3 the meeting also included -- or the meetings included Jovica Stanisic.
4 I want to take you to the meeting where you first saw Jovica
5 Stanisic in his office in Belgrade prior to the submitting of the
6 proposal for operation Operative Action May 1993. Who was at the
8 A. The meeting was attended by Chief Stanisic whom I saw for the
9 first time, as well as the late Vilotic. I believe that one of the
10 attendees was also Ristic, and assistant. And I believe that Deputy
11 Tepavcevic was also there. The objective of the meeting that was
12 attended by myself and the chief of centre was to inform the chief of the
13 service about the situation in Sandzak and the problems connected with
14 that situation. We conveyed to him everything we knew about Sandzak and
15 potential threats that could be felt there. Chief Stanisic listened to
16 us carefully, although my impression was that he had already --
17 Q. Let me just stop you there. Let me take you step by step. Why
18 had the meeting been arranged?
19 A. The meeting was called up in order to convey information about
20 the threats and dangers threatening Sandzak and also to discuss measures
21 that had to be put in place in order to diffuse the dangerous situation.
22 Q. Why were you present?
23 A. Because I was very familiar with the situation in Sandzak, and
24 that's why the chief of Kraljevo asked me to come with him.
25 Q. How long did the meeting last?
1 A. An hour, an hour and a half, perhaps two.
2 Q. And what precisely was discussed --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, could you please come to your point. I
4 checked on the transcript, the last five minutes there was nothing of
5 substance which added to what we have already in the statement. Who were
6 present, what was done during these meetings, et cetera. Now, of course,
7 we have additional information that we know that it lasted for one hour
8 or one hour and a half. If it would have been two and a half hours, it
9 would not have been really different for this Chamber. Could you please
10 come to relevant important matters in addition to what is already in the
11 statement. Please proceed.
12 MR. JORDASH:
13 Q. In your statement, Mr. Witness, you mention that there was -- and
14 I quote:
15 "There was talk about the potential need, i.e., possibility to
16 establish a unit within the MUP RDB Serbia which would be trained for
17 prevention of activities of terroristic groups."
18 Are you able to elaborate on that conversation, please?
19 A. That conversation took place at the following meeting in the
20 office of the chief of the service. In view of the difficulties we
21 encountered and the problems involving arms and sabotage units as well as
22 the disarming of people, that was not a request. That was a conversation
23 about a unit that would be set up in order to prevent the actions of
24 terrorist and sabotage groups. That would also undertake large scale
25 disarming. There were a lot of weapons and we were not in a position, we
1 did not have enough capabilities to counter all that. That was just the
2 conversation, nothing came out of that. We just discussed potential
3 solutions. Nothing else.
4 Q. And as far as you can tell, when was that meeting, please? What
5 month and what year?
6 A. It was in 1993, the second half of 1993. I can't remember now
7 exactly. I believe it was the second half of 1993.
8 Q. And from your professional perspective, how useful would an
9 anti-terrorist unit have been in Sandzak in 1991 and 1992?
10 A. Well, from my professional perspective, if that unit had been in
11 place in 1992, 1993, and 1994, it would have facilitated our work a great
12 deal. It would have been easier for us to deal with the situation and
13 calm it down, which eventually only happened in 1995, but that unit would
14 have been really very useful to Sandzak because we had all sorts of
15 situations to deal with that were very dangerous.
16 Q. Did you ever have an anti-terrorist unit come into Sandzak
17 between 1991 and 1995 to assist in any way, an anti-terrorist unit
18 belonging to the DB?
19 A. We never had that. Nobody ever came apart from the police. The
20 public security department had some units of its own, some detachments,
21 but we never had such a unit. Never existed.
22 Q. Thank you. In relation to Operation May 1993, what kinds of
23 weapons and what kind of numbers were seized during that operation
24 between 1993 and 1995?
25 A. Those were mostly infantry weapons, rifles, semi-automatic and
1 automatic rifles, machine-guns and submachine-guns, grenades, pistols,
2 one anti-aircraft machine-gun was seized, Zolja hand-held
3 rocket-launchers, mines and explosives, communication devices, and we
4 even seized some chemicals that we later sent for analysis and it turned
5 out they were poisons.
6 Q. Were there any international observers or representatives of the
7 international community who had any oversight of this operation at any
9 A. There was a OSCE mission at the time in Novi Pazar because the
10 Muslim National Council, that is to say the SDA, kept talking all the
11 time about how Muslim were threatened, how they can't exercise their
12 rights, et cetera, et cetera. This operation in 1993 when we disarmed
13 the security department of Sulejman Ugljanin, seizing a large amount of
14 weapons, including, I remember this very well, three automatic weapons,
15 MGV, produced in Slovenia that were banned by international conventions.
16 In agreement with our chief and the chief of state security, we invited
17 this mission, showed them the weapons, and their comment was that it was
18 classic terrorism. I'm telling you this because I was there. They left
19 Novi Pazar a few days later and never came back.
20 Q. Now, between 1991 and 1995, did anyone make any complaints to any
21 Serbian authority concerning your behaviour in relation to Muslim
23 A. I am sorry, the interpretation I got was Muslim detainees. We
24 never had that.
25 Q. Let me be more specific. There may be some suggestions that you
1 were -- acted in a brutal fashion towards certain Muslims who were
2 detained for police interview?
3 MR. FARR: Objection, Your Honour. The witness has just answered
4 that question. He said that this they never had any Muslim detainees.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think Mr. Jordash described it in a bit of a
6 different way. He is entitled to seek verification of the previous
8 Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
9 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Do you follow my question. I think the -- there's going to be
11 some suggestions that you were responsible for mistreating Muslims during
12 the course of your professional work. Could you give a response to that?
13 I won't delve into the specifics, I'll leave that to the Prosecution, but
14 if you would like to just respond to that before we finish -- before I
16 A. As far as I know, nobody in any state agency complained about
17 their treatment by the state security section of Novi Pazar. Not that I
18 know of at least, nor were there any proceedings.
19 Q. Have you subsequently been charged with any alleged offences
20 during the course -- committed allegedly during 1991 to 1995?
21 A. To the best of my knowledge, no.
22 MR. JORDASH: I've got no further questions, thank you,
23 Mr. Corbic, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Jordash.
25 Perhaps one question in relation to the last two questions,
1 Mr. Corbic. You said that there were no Muslim detainees, at the same
2 time when the question was put to you again, you said there were no
3 complaints in relation to what was again described by Mr. Jordash as
4 Muslim detainees. Could you clarify.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is a distinction in my mind.
6 A detainee is somebody who is arrested, kept in prison, et cetera;
7 whereas, people who are brought in, remanded in custody, or just brought
8 in for an interview is something different, at least in my book, than a
9 detainee. Detainee to me means that somebody is sitting in prison, in
10 detention. That's perhaps the explanation.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And both categories are deprived of their
12 liberty, the one perhaps during a short period of time taken into a
13 police station, the other one to end up in a more permanent detention
14 situation; is that how I have to understand your testimony?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We never detained anyone for long.
16 People would be brought in for an interview. Sometimes through a
17 summons, sometimes without a summons because we would, for instance, get
18 a report that somebody was in illegal possession of a weapon and then we
19 would bring that person in. That's the distinction.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. One other additional question before I give an
21 opportunities to Mr. Bakrac to cross-examine you. You were asked by
22 Mr. Jordash about the arms that were seized -- well, we already find in
23 your statement, paragraph 40, that these were infantry weapons,
24 explosives, bombs, anti-aircraft machine-guns, Zolja and pistols. So you
25 repeated that testimony. But you added two categories. One was
1 chemicals, and you said it was poison; second, what you refer to as MGV.
2 Could you tell us what the poison was? What poison was it?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those were two small bottles that
4 we sent for analysis because we were not sure --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Let me stop you. I didn't ask you whether the
6 poison was in bottles or in boxes or in anything else. What kind of
7 poison was it?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We did not get feedback.
9 JUDGE ORIE: So you say it was poison but without any detail as
10 what kind of poison, whether it would be good for rats or for human
11 beings or we don't know? From your body language, I understand that you
12 have no knowledge.
13 Then you referred in addition to what we find already in your
14 statement to an illegal weapon, MGV. Could you tell us -- I've got no
15 idea what MGV stands for, could you explain.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] MGV is a Slovene weapon
17 manufactured in Slovenia. An automatic rifle that has a drum at the top,
18 uses small calibre ammunition, 22 millimetres which is small calibre
19 ammunition, prohibited by the Vienna Convention, and that's what we found
20 in the security section of the SDA party.
21 JUDGE ORIE: What -- you described it as an automatic rifle with
22 a drum, the calibre of the ammunition, and you then say it's prohibited
23 by the Vienna Convention. What distinguishes this weapon from other
24 automatic rifles so that it is prohibited by the Vienna Convention?
25 What's so special about it?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The ammunition that it uses makes
2 it prohibited. It's a small round that is considered to be inhumane, if,
3 of course, any round can be considered humane.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So it's rather the ammunition than the weapon
5 that is illegal; is that how I have to understand your testimony?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That weapon can use only that
7 ammunition, and it's made for that ammunition.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I must say I'm unfamiliar with the matter, but
9 thank you for that answer.
10 Mr. Bakrac, any -- yes, Mr. Jordash.
11 MR. JORDASH: Before -- sorry, Mr. Bakrac. I've been reliably
12 informed by the B/C/S speakers in the Defence that there is a distinction
13 between prisoners and detainees, and there's a distinction -- there's a
14 distinction in the Croatian word and the Serbian word, and I think that
15 may well have been at the base of the confusion.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think the witness explained himself on why
17 he said at one moment that there were no Muslim detainees and at another
18 moment he explained it sufficiently and --
19 MR. JORDASH: I'll leave it at that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- I clearly accept -- I gladly accept that it may
21 have been caused by language issues.
22 Mr. Bakrac, we are about to have a break, but I would first like
23 to inquire with you how much time you would need, whether you have any
24 questions for the witness?
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do have questions
1 for this witness, two or three questions, and one video that lasts two or
2 three minutes. I hope it won't take more than ten minutes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we had -- we started ten minutes late, of
4 course I am aware that the accused were waiting already in the courtroom.
5 Mr. Jordash, I'm addressing you, knowing the reliability of the estimates
6 of Mr. Bakrac, would we -- would you prefer to hear this testimony before
7 the break in the next ten minutes or would you prefer to have a break
9 MR. JORDASH: I think both Mr. Bakrac and Mr. Stanisic would like
10 a break.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Then we have a break. No problem. We take a break
12 and resume at quarter to 11.00.
13 [Witness stands down]
14 --- Recess taken at 10.17 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
16 [The witness takes the stand]
17 JUDGE ORIE: I again have to apologise. Sometimes, as you may
18 have experienced as well, sometimes the breaks require even more of your
19 attention than the full attention already given when being in court.
20 Mr. Bakrac, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?
21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I am, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Corbic, you'll now be cross-examined by
23 Mr. Bakrac. Mr. Bakrac is counsel for Mr. Simatovic.
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Good morning to everyone in and
25 around the courtroom.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Bakrac:
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Corbic. I've already been introduced to you
3 and I have a few questions. If I understood well your written statement
4 and your evidence, you were responsible for the territory of Sandzak with
5 an 80 per cent Muslim and 20 per cent Serb population; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. The territory of Sandzak is on the territory of Serbia; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If I understood you correctly, you had lot operational
10 information that --
11 A. Excuse me, but I have to specify the term "Sandzak." Sandzak
12 includes Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin, but also Priboj, Prijepolje,
13 Novo Varos. Even in part of Montenegro the term "Sandzak" applies.
14 Q. I'm sorry, perhaps I was not precise enough but I was trying to
15 save time. My mistake. What I mean, the territory under your
16 responsibility falls under the territory of Serbia; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If I understood correctly, you had a lot of operational
19 information that a large number of Muslims, or in other words, Bosniaks,
20 who were nationals of Serbia were going to Bosnia and fighting on the
21 side of the Green Berets, that is to say, the Muslim Army?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Do you recall whether in the town of Novi Pazar, in its hotels
24 and restaurants, there were seeing-off ceremonies and celebrations for
25 these people who were going to fight in Bosnia?
1 A. No, I don't recall those send-offs.
2 Q. If I understood your evidence correctly, you didn't take any
3 steps against these people because they were going as volunteers. As
4 nationals of Serbia, they crossed the border and they went as volunteers?
5 A. Yes, we had no legal requirements met to apply any measures.
6 Q. In the same way, did Serbs go as volunteers to Bosnia and
8 A. From the area of Sandzak, not that I know of.
9 Q. Do you know whether Serbs went from any other area of Serbia?
10 A. From what I read in the press, yes, I do know about that, but not
12 Q. In your opinion, if these Serbs were also going as volunteers,
13 would you be able to arrest them or take them into custody?
14 A. Absolutely not. There would be no legal grounds.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Corbic. You said in your evidence that in various
16 operations, especially Operation May 1993, you seized a large quantity of
17 weapon. Can you give us an approximation of the amount?
18 A. It was a huge quantity, 2, perhaps 2 and a half thousand rifles,
19 plus I don't know how many grenades.
20 Q. Did this operation target only Muslims or did it apply to the
21 entire population?
22 A. No. That operation covered all persons in illegal possession of
23 weapons. There were cases when we prosecuted certain Serbs after we
24 seized weapons from them. People who were involved in arms smuggling.
25 Q. Do you remember if all the people, and I'm now especially
1 interested in Muslims, were prosecuted?
2 A. No, no. The only ones prosecuted were those about whom we had
3 firm evidence that they had procured weapons for the purpose of getting
4 involved in a violent secession of that territory. In all other cases,
5 we would seize weapons, file reports, and release them, and that was done
6 in agreement with the president of the supreme court.
7 Q. Would I be right in saying that the intention was to calm down
8 the situation in that area, to pacify it, to prevent the security risks
9 intentions from getting worse, or was there another intention?
10 A. You are absolutely right. Our purpose was to prevent war, to
11 protect all people and property, and to calm the situation in Sandzak
12 down to enable people to live and work normally. And I think that was
14 Q. Do you remember if there was perhaps a legal action by the courts
15 and the police wherein citizens were invited to hand-over weapons in
16 their illegal possession voluntarily without any consequences for them?
17 A. There were two such drives, and I believe the turn-out of
18 citizens was the highest in that area of the Raska district. Such
19 weapons would then be legalised and no sanctions were applied against
20 those who turned over their weapons in this way.
21 Q. That's exactly what I was asking. Those weapons that could be
22 legalised were legalised, the weapons that could not be legalised were --
23 A. Turned over to the competent authorities with no consequences for
24 the person whatsoever.
25 Q. I have only one question remaining, witness, concerning a
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] And while we are waiting, it's 2D879
3 in e-court. There is a transcript. The video footage was recorded by a
4 foreign TV crew, and the booths have received the transcript. 2D879.
5 Q. Sir, Mr. Corbic, could you please watch this video and then we'll
6 discuss it very briefly. I just want to know if you are familiar with
7 some of its details.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 "Reporter: The Yugoslav wars have introduced a new and
10 fearful phrase to the world's lexicon: 'Ethnic cleansing.' And the
11 terror that is ethnic cleansing has created masses of refugees in every
12 state and every region of what once was Yugoslavia.
13 "Some days the more you get to know about the former Yugoslavia,
14 the more confused you get."
15 JUDGE ORIE: Let's stop for a second. Have you provided a
16 transcript to the transcriber as well so that we -- apparently you have
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Our Case Manager provided copies to
19 the usher. I don't know how many copies.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because the text may be relevant, I see that
21 the transcriber has received a copy by now. Unfortunately, transcription
22 is not made by a team of two but just by one transcriber, so the solution
23 which helps out the interpreters will not help out our transcriber.
24 Let's see to what extent we can perhaps with this text have the
25 transcript be completed after we've seen the video.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that the transcript is also in
3 e-court which diminishes the importance of having it transcribed now and
4 that is of -- an accurate transcript is of utmost important for the
5 proceedings, but here we have a -- we have a remedy in the transcript
6 being filed. Let's proceed. Could we restart, looking at the video.
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we will.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 "Anchor: The Yugoslav wars have introduced a new and fearful
10 phrase to the world's lexicon: 'Ethnic cleansing.' And the terror that
11 is ethnic cleansing has created masses of refugees in every state and
12 every region of what once was Yugoslavia.
13 "Some days the more you get to know about the former Yugoslavia,
14 the more confused you get. This will be one of those days. Four hundred
15 and fifty kilometres from Sarajevo inside Serbia, sort of in the middle
16 of nowhere, in a place called Rtanj. We had heard some international
17 observers refer to Rtanj as a place where Serbs warehoused Muslim
18 refugees. Some even called it a prison camp. What we found was
19 something pretty different
20 "If Rtanj is a prison camp, it's not like any prison camp you've
21 read about in the history books. Here children fashion makeshift skis
22 and play carefree. These children are Muslims from Bosnia. They've come
23 here with their mothers to escape the violence of their homeland, and
24 these Muslims say they have found refuge in orthodox Serbia.
25 Silvana Sekic is from Sarajevo. She has been in Serbia with her two
1 children for nearly a year.
2 "Silvana Sekic: The most important thing to realise is that we
3 fight each other in Bosnia but here we all live together so peacefully
4 and so calmly. We eat together, we sleep together, we play together. We
5 have absolutely no problems with each other. We feel like a family here.
6 "Anchor: Nina Brajovic has lived here with her two children for
7 seven months.
8 "Nina Brajovic: We have no problems here at all. Our children
9 play together, our children are given gifts by the Serbs here, and we
10 have absolutely no -- no problem. We've never been harassed, our
11 children felt very welcome.
12 "Anchor: Serbs insist the world's image of them as rapists and
13 ethnic cleansers is especially hurtful given their record in places like
14 Rtanj. After all, the Serbs say, while Muslim women and children are
15 being cared for here, their husbands, fathers, and brothers may very well
16 be fighting and killing Serbs on the battle-fields of Bosnia."
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Corbic, let me ask you first, if this video that we've shown
19 you reflects the situation as you saw it in Sandzak?
20 A. Absolutely.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac, I asked you to stop for a second because
22 the French translation was -- had not yet been finished. It has now, so
23 please proceed.
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. Mr. Corbic, you've given me your answer too quickly, perhaps. I
1 was going to ask, the families of all the Muslims, Bosniaks, who stayed
2 in Sandzak, although their fathers and husbands and brothers went to
3 fight elsewhere, they were safe, nobody touched them and the police
4 protected them?
5 A. Nobody touched them. The police protected everyone and they
6 suffered no consequences.
7 Q. And my last question, because we've heard evidence here
8 concerning Muslim refugees from Bosnia, that referred to inhumane
9 treatment. Apart from this place Rtanj that we've seen in the video, do
10 you know if there were more refugee camps in Serbia where Muslims were
11 admitted, accommodated with protection of their safety, provision of
12 food, et cetera?
13 A. Not in my territory. I heard about the territory of Serbia, that
14 there were such camps, but I don't know any details.
15 Q. So there were no such camps on your territory, but you cared for
16 the safety of all those Muslim families whose brothers, husbands, fathers
17 went elsewhere to fight?
18 A. That's correct.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Corbic.
20 Your Honours, those were all my questions. I hope I did not go
21 beyond my time assessment, although I did a bit.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac, this video you've just shown dates from
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did not tender the
25 video-clip into evidence because it will be just one part of the entire
1 material that will be subject of our request to be added to our 65 ter
2 list together with some other witnesses including the author of all those
3 materials that we will eventually tender as a whole. I believe that that
4 will take place very soon. We will very soon request -- file a request
5 for our 65 ter list of evidence and witnesses to be supplemented.
6 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, Mr. Bakrac, video was played in
7 court, so therefore for anyone wanting to follow the proceedings or any
8 Appeals Chamber which would eventually have to look at these proceedings,
9 I think it should be at least MFI'd.
10 Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that is what I was going to suggest,
12 and the Prosecution would not object to an oral application to add it to
13 the 65 ter list this morning.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although Mr. Bakrac is cross-examining, so the
15 material he is using doesn't need to be added to the 65 ter list, isn't
17 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the request for adding it to the -- the
19 request which was not made orally, there's no need to make such a
20 request; and second, I think it would be good to have it at least MFI'd.
21 We have now the full text at my -- my half. Transcriber who --
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- who managed to get the whole of the spoken text
24 in the transcript, so people do not have to find it elsewhere.
25 Mr. Bakrac, what about having it MFI'd?
1 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my understanding was
2 along the lines of your explanation, and that was the -- there was no
3 need for an oral application. I wanted the document to be MFI'd, and
4 then when we have all the materials in place, that MFI number could be
5 removed. At the moment, I would like to tender the video-clip under an
6 MFI number.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number under which this video
8 and related transcript is marked for identification would be?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be D454.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And has the status of marked for identification.
11 Mr. Bakrac, you apparently were referring several times to the
12 video when you said that the husbands, fathers, and brothers were sent
13 for fighting and killing, maybe killing Serbs on the battle-fields. Just
14 in order to be very accurate, the video doesn't say that they were, but
15 it reads literally:
16 "After all, Serbs say while Muslim women and children are being
17 cared for, their husbands," et cetera.
18 So that is a quote from what Serbs say, and it's not presented as
19 a fact but rather as a quote from what Serbs are saying. I just wanted
20 to have that accurate on the record. Unless you disagree with me.
21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours, I completely
22 agree with you. I apologise if I have created confusion. My intention
23 was to use this witness in order to check whether the situation was
24 similar in the territory of Sandzak.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, are you ready to cross-examine the
2 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Corbic, you'll now be cross-examined by
4 Mr. Farr. Mr. Farr is counsel for the Prosecution.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Farr:
6 Q. Good morning, sir. I'd like to start by asking you a little bit
7 about the relationship between public security and state security.
8 During your evidence in chief, you've already said that the co-operation
9 between public security and state security was good. I just want to go
10 into a bit more detail. In paragraph 36 of your statement you describe a
11 meeting you had with Jovica Stanisic related to Operation May 93. You
12 say that Stanisic instructed you to "intensify co-operation with other
13 departments and the DB centres including the RJB."
14 First of all, the reference to the RJB is public security;
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Do you recall precisely what Jovica Stanisic said to you when
18 telling you to intensify your co-operation with public security?
19 A. Yes, I remember that conversation. The public security sector is
20 independent from the state security sector. The public security sector
21 has its tasks which is the protection of the constitutional order,
22 whether the public security sector is concerned with policing, public
23 order, traffic and so on and so forth. Which means that our duties and
24 tasks do not overlap. As for the intensification of our co-operation,
25 this should have related to the protection of public law and order,
1 reducing the rate of crime, and so on and so forth. From the beginning
2 of our Operation May 1993, according to the statistical data, we can see
3 that the rate of crime was reduced, the number of incidents was reduced.
4 Q. My question was what precisely Jovica Stanisic said to you when
5 he told you to intensify your co-operation with public security at that
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please switch off his mike.
8 Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that I've answered. We
10 were supposed to talk to those people more often and to prevent
11 inter-ethnic conflicts, to prevent crimes, to exchange information, to
12 exchange intelligence, that we should provide them with everything that
13 we were able to provide them. We couldn't give them everything because
14 we were state security and they were public security. All that was aimed
15 at increasing the safety of citizens and their property.
16 MR. FARR:
17 Q. So it sounds to me that essentially there was a shared task:
18 State security did what it was best at and public security did what it
19 was best at; is that fair?
20 A. You are right.
21 Q. Now, at the time of that meeting the head of public security of
22 Serbia was Radovan Stojicic, Badza, correct?
23 A. I believe so.
24 Q. So your instruction from Jovica Stanisic was essentially an
25 instruction or an order that the people who worked for him should
1 intensify their co-operation with the people who worked for Badza; is
2 that correct?
3 A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand your question. Could you please
4 repeat, perhaps rephrase. I apologise.
5 Q. Certainly. Stanisic's instruction was that essentially the state
6 security, that is people working for Jovica Stanisic, should co-operate
7 more intensely with public security, that is people working for Radovan
8 Stojicic; is that fair?
9 A. I don't exactly understand what you mean when you say "his men."
10 Those were not Stojicic's men, they were employees of the public security
11 sector and Stanisic's men were he employees of the state security sector.
12 I don't know what Stojicic told them, but I know what my chief told us.
13 Q. Okay. And you agree that the people in public security
14 ultimately reported to Radovan Stojicic, Badza? I think that was my
16 A. Yes, I agree with that.
17 Q. Mr. Stanisic's instruction to you to intensify your co-operation
18 with public security was then reinforced when you received his written
19 decision dated 13 September 1993, regarding Operation May 1993; correct?
20 A. You are referring to the situation after the start of May 1993
21 operation; right.
22 Q. We should probably look at the document for this.
23 MR. FARR: If we could have 1D5100. The middle of page 4 in the
24 English and the bottom of page 4 in B/C/S, please.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
1 MR. FARR:
2 Q. So the point I wanted to direct your attention to was the portion
3 that says:
4 "The need for the RDB or state security department of the MUP and
5 the RJB or public security department of the MUP to take energetic
6 measures and actions."
7 My question is, these words in Stanisic's decision reinforced his
8 oral instruction to you to co-operate with public security; is that
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Okay. I'd now like to ask a few more questions about the
12 meetings that you had with Jovica Stanisic outlined in paragraph 36 of
13 your statement. In that paragraph you first talk about a meeting you had
14 with Mr. Stanisic and others in Belgrade in 1993. You said that you went
15 to brief Jovica Stanisic and then you go on to say:
16 "Chief Stanisic listens to me carefully but from his speech I
17 realised that he had already had some findings regarding the events in
18 the field."
19 It's fair to say in your experience Jovica Stanisic was a well
20 informed leader; correct?
21 A. Based on my experience, I am afraid I don't have much experience
22 with the top leaders, but as far as the area that I covered, I can say
23 from experience that he was indeed well informed. I don't know whether
24 he was as well informed about the rest of the situation. I don't know.
25 I apologise, he was informed, he was well informed because he relied on
1 the information that we had provided him with before the meeting. I
2 would say that he was well prepared for meeting.
3 Q. Right. So he had carefully reviewed the information that you had
4 provided to him as far as you could tell?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You also describe how he took a personal interest in events in
7 your area and told you that you could count on assistance from RDB
8 headquarters. Specifically you said:
9 "He particularly of emphasised that if it deems to be necessary,
10 we could count on assistance of the RDB headquarters including assistance
11 in manpower and equipment."
12 It's fair to say that in your experience, Mr. Stanisic was an
13 active and involved leader of state security; correct?
14 A. I can only talk about Sandzak. As far as Sandzak is concerned, I
15 would absolutely agree with you. The assistance he provided came in the
16 form of instructions as well as equipment including cars and other things
17 that were necessary, so, yes, I would agree with that. I would say yes.
18 Q. Okay. And just to clarify, I'll always only be asking you about
19 things you know about. I'm never going to ask you based on someone
20 else's experience. We are only interested in what you can say from your
21 own experience.
22 At that meeting Mr. Stanisic also gave you an instruction to
23 intensify your co-operation with public security, as we've already
24 discussed. It's fair to say that in your experience Jovica Stanisic was
25 a leader who could work with people outside of state security to get a
1 job done; is that correct?
2 A. I don't know. That I don't know.
3 Q. All right. In paragraph 36 after you discuss the meeting in
4 Belgrade you go on to talk about Mr. Stanisic's visit to Novi Pazar. You
5 said he came:
6 "To obtain direct knowledge about the results of previous work of
7 OA May 1993."
8 In your experience, Jovica Stanisic was a leader who took steps
9 to keep himself personally informed about the activities and results of
10 the people who worked for him; is that correct?
11 A. I have to say that Chief Stanisic, together with the leadership
12 and operatives of Kraljevo and Novi Pazar, prevented the break-out of war
13 in Sandzak. In view of the security situation that prevailed in Sandzak,
14 after the departure of particular leaders of some extremist parties, the
15 situation greatly improved. The arrival of Jovica Stanisic was aimed at
16 finding out whether the situation had indeed improved.
17 Q. So he was not content to rely just on the reporting. He wanted
18 to verify for himself in the field what had happened; is that correct?
19 A. You have just said that you will only ask me about the things
20 that I know firsthand, and I will only speak about Sandzak and I will say
22 Q. Thank you. Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but in fact you were
23 three levels down from Mr. Stanisic in the DB hierarchy but he still met
24 with you, listens to you, knew what you were working on, and knew how it
25 was going; is that fair?
1 A. Yes, but that was because of the security situation in the
2 territory of Sandzak, yes.
3 Q. In paragraph 26 of your statement you say that your "activities
4 were applied pursuant to RDB orders from Belgrade and the head of the RDB
5 Jovica Stanisic." It's fair to say that Jovica Stanisic was aware of
6 your tasks, your methods, and your results when it came to fighting
7 Muslim extremism; correct?
8 A. I cannot say that he knew everything but he was well informed.
9 Q. So he was at least generally familiar with your tasks, your
10 methods, and your results?
11 A. Yes. We briefed him; he read our notes and reports.
12 Q. In paragraph 36 of your statement, as far as I can tell you
13 describe two to four meetings at which Jovica Stanisic was personally
14 present and at which you briefed him about Operation May 1993; is that
15 correct? Just yes or no if you can.
16 A. Yes. I don't know exactly whether there were three or four, hard
17 to tell.
18 Q. What kind of information did you provide to Jovica Stanisic
19 during these meetings?
20 A. Information about the current situation, about what was going on
21 in the territory of Sandzak. The security problems, our main training
22 and so on and so forth. Basically we told him about the grave situation
23 in Sandzak, about people's fear of a possible war.
24 Q. What kind of questions did he ask you?
25 A. His questions were about the veracity of our information, whether
1 the information that we provided him with had been verified, and so on
2 and so forth. They were the usual professional questions.
3 Q. Did he offer any suggestions or recommendations as to how you do
4 your work?
5 A. Yes. His recommendations and suggestions were not to create a
6 situation, not to compound a situation even further, to try and pacify
7 the situation, to try and prevent incidents, possible war conflicts.
8 That we should resort to repression only if we had to. That we shouldn't
9 be the ones to add fuel to the fire in Sandzak. All he wanted was peace
10 and security and we shared those thoughts with him. He wanted what all
11 of us wanted.
12 Q. Okay. Before we move on to discussing your work against Muslim
13 extremism, I have a couple of questions about DB administrative
14 procedures that I think you might be able to help with.
15 MR. FARR: And if we could have on the screen 65 ter 6280. I
16 don't think this should be broadcast. This is a document that purports
17 to be a list of per diems paid to five people, including one named Vlado
18 Corbic. Vladimir Corbic, excuse me.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 MR. FARR:
21 Q. So, sir, is it correct that you were sometimes paid per diems in
22 connection with your work for the DB?
23 A. Yes. I worked around the clock, 24-hours a day.
24 Q. So under what conditions would you be -- or what situations would
25 you be paid a per diem?
1 A. When we worked extended ours and when our engagement was bigger,
2 more extensive, longer. When our engagement went beyond the roles of
4 Q. Did it relate only to working time or did it also relate to the
5 place where you were working. In other words, would you receive a per
6 diem when you worked outside your normal duty post?
7 A. Yes, you are right. Not actually outside the working post, but
8 outside our place of residence and also when we worked extended hours.
9 So that applied to both those situations.
10 Q. Okay.
11 MR. FARR: If we could zoom in on the stamp and signature,
13 Q. Sir, is it correct this that this document is signed by Milan
14 Prodanic, the chief of the 8th Administration?
15 A. I'm not familiar with his signature, but if the name on the
16 signature is Milan Prodanic, then I suppose it's okay. I'm not familiar
17 with his signature.
18 Q. Are you able to tell us anything about the small Roman numeral II
19 that appears inside the seal or stamp?
20 A. No, I don't know anything about that. I'm sorry.
21 MR. FARR: Your Honours, I tender this as a Prosecution exhibit
22 under seal, please.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could we have a closer look at the stamp so that we
24 know exactly what you are asking about. Oh, under the --
25 MR. FARR: Underneath the design of the centre of the seal
1 there's a small Roman numeral.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, just above where the word "Beograd" gives an R.
3 MR. FARR: Exactly.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
5 Mr. Jordash.
6 MR. JORDASH: Just an objection in terms of relevance. I'm not
7 sure what the relevance is and what the witness's answers have added to
8 the evidence. Or to clarification of this document.
9 MR. FARR: Well, it corroborates his evidence that he received
10 per diem payments under the circumstances that he described.
11 MR. JORDASH: Well, I don't think there's any dispute about that,
12 so I'm not sure we need corroboration of it. I think there's a different
13 purpose to this and it relates to what my learned friend asked about the
14 number 2, and I've no idea what that is about. I don't think the Court
15 would know what that's about.
16 JUDGE ORIE: No.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Bakrac.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I would like to add to
20 that that you should allow the witness to look at the stamp more closely
21 because it says the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia,
22 nothing else. So this, as Mr. Jordash has suggested, could be Roman II.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, Mr. Jordash says that there's no dispute
24 about the witness receiving per diems. Despite this, you want to tender
25 it. Do you want to have in evidence the Roman II?
1 MR. FARR: Your Honour, I'm happy to tell the Court what we think
2 that that may be. We think -- I don't know.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Let's -- first of all, let's ask the witness, do you
4 understand and speak English, Mr. Corbic?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Do you please take your earphones off.
7 Mr. Farr.
8 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the Prosecution believes that that may
9 relate to the 2nd Administration of the DB. If the witness was receiving
10 a payment from the 2nd Administration of the DB, that could go to bias.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
12 MR. JORDASH: Well, I think that should be put directly to the
13 witness so he can deal with it, then we might have clarification of the
15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the witness says he doesn't know what the
16 Roman II stands for. I do understand that Mr. Farr wants to reserve his
17 position as to perhaps seek further evidence, whether what he says is the
18 meaning of this and for that reason to have this in evidence so as that
19 it's there. But I think it would be fair, Mr. Farr, that you also put to
20 the witness apart from whether he knows anything about stamps, whether he
21 knows anything about the origin of the payment.
22 MR. JORDASH: My objection is then withdrawn.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, the number of this document
24 would be.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be P3030.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence. No need to have it
2 on this -- it was not shown to the public. We do not know, of course,
3 about the others.
4 MR. FARR: Given that the witness is a former member of the DB,
5 it seems at least possible that the others are as well, and if that is
6 indeed Milan Prodanic's [Overlapping speakers] --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Or perhaps still are. So it -- its admitted under
8 seal. Then, Mr. Farr, you'll put your next question to the witness, who
9 is invited to have his earphones on again.
10 MR. FARR:
11 Q. Sir, as far as you know, did you ever receive a per diem payment
12 from the 2nd Administration of the DB?
13 A. No.
14 MR. FARR: Could we please now have 65 ter 6279 on the screen.
15 And again not to be broadcast.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, are you going to further pursue the matter
17 you asked the witness about?
18 MR. FARR: Not at this time, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: No, then I would like to put an additional question.
20 Who did pay the per diems to you, Mr. Corbic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The treasurer from Kraljevo centre.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And did he tell you from what budget these per
23 diems were paid?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Do I then understand that that what budget was
1 burdened with the per diems, you do not know exactly?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I suppose it's from the
3 budget of the service. I don't remember.
4 JUDGE ORIE: But you don't have any details about which section
5 of the service would pay for the per diems?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know it was the
7 8th Administration.
8 JUDGE ORIE: How do you know?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because whenever we write requests
10 and travel orders and when we fill in forms to get our expenses
11 compensated for field missions, for instance, we write to the 8th
12 Administration, the section in Kraljevo.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Whether they would then -- whether it would
14 then be the 8th Administration which would have the burden of paying you
15 or whether it was any other section, do you have any precise information
16 about that?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was only the 8th Administration.
18 I don't know about any others. I'm sure it's only the
19 8th Administration.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Farr.
21 MR. FARR:
22 Q. Sir, this document is entitled "List of Payroll Documents to Be
23 Entered." And it is dated 4 December 1993.
24 MR. FARR: And if we could please zoom in on the name at number
1 Q. Do you recognise the name at number 14 as your name, sir?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. FARR: And if we could scroll to the right for the amount.
4 Q. Do you know why you received a per diem of 75 million dinars on
5 4 December 1993?
6 A. Could I see the top, please? I don't know what this is. I don't
8 Q. Do you -- I know there was a lot of inflation at that time. Do
9 you know for how many days a per diem of 75 million dinars would have
10 been in December of 1993?
11 A. One or two days.
12 Q. One or two days, yes. This was a period when you were heavily
13 involved in anti-terrorist activities, I think you told us, and also the
14 period in which you would have liked to have had the help of a special
15 anti-terrorist unit; is that correct?
16 A. It would have been nice if it had.
17 Q. And especially at this time in December of 1993; correct?
18 A. Yes. December, January 1993, also 1994 when the tensions were
20 Q. Now, during your testimony today you said of the unit that we
21 never had that, that it never existed. Can we agree that all you can say
22 is that you never learned of the existence of such a unit and that such a
23 unit never came to Sandzak; is that fair?
24 A. You can say that, although if such a unit had been there because
25 of the tensions and because of the weapons involved, et cetera, we would
1 have probably asked for their assistance.
2 MR. FARR: Can we please have -- sorry, can we please zoom in on
3 lines number 25 and 26 on this document at the bottom. Both across the
4 whole page, yeah, like that.
5 Q. Sir, lines 25 and 26 of this document say daily allowances for
6 ATD units. Line 25 is for approximately 12 billion dinars and line 26 is
7 for approximately 121 billion dinars.
8 MR. FARR: If we could scroll up.
9 Q. We could see at line 3 that the Belgrade CRDB received only about
10 4.4 billion dinars at the same time. Are you aware of any reason that
11 something that is designated as an anti-terrorist unit would be receiving
12 more than 130 billion dinars, while the Belgrade CRDB received less than
13 5 billion?
14 A. I don't know. I see this document for the first time now.
15 Q. And you maintain your evidence that you are not aware of the
16 existence of an anti-terrorist unit within the Serbian DB?
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 MR. FARR: Your Honours, at this time I tender this document as a
19 Prosecution exhibit under seal.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objections. Madam Registrar, the
21 number would be?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be P3031 under seal.
23 JUDGE ORIE: P3031 is admitted under seal. Mr. Farr, your
24 questions have triggered my attention to numbers above the word
25 "Beograd." Witness, could you tell us on the stamp on the document we
1 last saw, we see CCCX approximately at the same place where you earlier
2 were asked about a Roman II. Do you know what it stands for?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, if it is Roman as well, then it should be
5 310. I'm just wondering what it means.
6 MR. FARR: Presumably not the 310th Administration, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Presumably not, I would agree with that. Which
8 leaves the question open what it does mean. Please proceed.
9 MR. FARR:
10 Q. Sir, if we can now turn to the purpose of your work fighting
11 Muslim extremism in the Novi Pazar DB department. In paragraph 27 of
12 your statement you say:
13 "The primary goal of our work was not to obtain information on
14 war conflict and crimes."
15 I think this is relatively clear from your evidence already, but
16 I want to make sure that I understand you. The two primary goals of your
17 work were preserving the territorial integrity and constitutional order
18 of Serbia, and the second was to prevent illegal arming; is that correct?
19 A. Yes, yes.
20 Q. Any information you gathered about war crimes was just something
21 you happened to learn in the course of pursuing these other goals; is
22 that correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. In your statement you say that the purpose of your work was to
25 prevent the illegal secession of Sandzak from Serbia. You also mentioned
1 the principle of territorial integrity set out in the SFRY constitution.
2 It is correct that in your view the possible secession of Sandzak was
3 illegal precisely because it violated that principle of territorial
5 A. Yes, and it's also so under the constitution. That is considered
6 to be anti-constitutional activity.
7 Q. And this view was shared by your DB colleagues, including
8 Jovica Stanisic, as far as you know?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And it was precisely because this potential secession was illegal
11 that the DB had a duty to prevent it; is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters cannot hear the witness well when
14 the microphone of the counsel is on.
15 MR. FARR:
16 Q. Based on that same principle of territorial integrity, did you
17 consider the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia from the
18 SFRY to be illegal as well?
19 A. The secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina was mono-ethnic.
20 Q. And in your view illegal?
21 A. Well, it was not approved by all the peoples who lived there.
22 Q. Was it illegal?
23 A. In my view it was.
24 Q. Was that view shared by your DB colleagues?
25 A. I don't know.
1 Q. Does the same apply to Croatia, you also thought that the
2 secession of Croatia was illegal?
3 A. No. No, we were not thinking about that. What was done was
4 done. That was outside our powers.
5 Q. At one point in your statement you referred to
6 Alija Izetbegovic's extremism. Why do you consider Alija Izetbegovic an
8 A. Because in agreement with the party leader in Sandzak, he was
9 negotiating the arming of people, the distribution of arms. It was
10 through him that training was organised in Turkey, and it was thanks to
11 him and with the help of one person in Vienna that the distribution of
12 arms was financed. All aimed at causing -- starting a war in the
13 territory of Serbia.
14 Q. Do you consider Radovan Karadzic to be an extremist?
15 A. I don't understand the question.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Well, a similar question was put in relation to
17 Izetbegovic and then you had no difficulty in understanding the question.
18 The question is exactly the same but now in relation to Mr. Karadzic. So
19 therefore understanding the question -- if you say --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He had extremist views of his own
21 which I did not approve.
22 MR. FARR:
23 Q. What about Slobodan Milosevic?
24 A. He was the president of my republic, the Republic of Serbia.
25 Q. Did you consider him an extremist?
1 A. I considered him as the president of the Republic of Serbia.
2 Q. And, therefore, you didn't consider whether he was right or wrong
3 by the same standards that you applied to other people; is that correct?
4 A. The same standards applied to everyone, but I don't understand
5 why you're asking me about the man who was the president of my country,
6 whether he was an extremist or not. I'm not able to say that.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, to the extent you wanted to draw our
8 attention that possibly this witness may have been selective in who he
9 called an extremist or what kind of activity he called extremist
10 activity, you have done that. If there is any other purpose for your
11 questions, then please make clear to the Chamber what you are actually
12 seeking as evidence. Please proceed.
13 MR. FARR: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Sir, I'd now like to turn to your methods of work in inviting
15 Muslim extremism. In paragraph 32 of your statement, you say that your
16 work was complicated by the fact that:
17 "A substantial number of Muslims boycotted the state organs
18 including organs of the MUP and DB Serbia."
19 You say that this created difficulties in your data gathering.
20 Is it correct that some Muslims would have viewed talking to the DB as a
21 betrayal of their own people?
22 A. That's how it was at the beginning.
23 Q. And in addition to that, they would have been reluctant to tell
24 you anything that could have led to criminal liability for themselves,
25 their friends, or their family; correct?
1 A. Well, not always. When they realised how honestly the service
2 was working and what we want, that was already the end of 1993 and 1994,
3 our work became much more efficient and we didn't have to put in so much
5 Q. You've already said that as a practical matter, you couldn't
6 investigate war crimes committed by Muslims because the Muslims simply
7 wouldn't tell you about them. I assume that they were no more eager to
8 tell you about their secret - and as you say - illegal arming, training,
9 and plans for secession?
10 A. Two different types of sources are involved. A Muslim from
11 Sandzak could not speak about war crimes in Bosnia. We could only get
12 that information from a Muslim coming from Bosnia to Sandzak. We invited
13 them for interviews but they were reluctant to talk. Still, if we had
14 some initial information we would write up a report to Kraljevo and
15 Kraljevo would send it on to other centres that could check what was
16 going on, if it was going on; whereas, getting information from Muslims
17 in Sandzak it was a problem really until 1993. But later on, later on as
18 far as the hand-over of weapons is concerned, that improved greatly after
19 1993 because they realised how well we were working to preserve peace and
21 Q. Is it your evidence that it never required some degree of force
22 to convince reluctant Muslims to share information with the DB?
23 A. Not really.
24 Q. What do you mean by "not really"?
25 A. Generally speaking not. We did not use force, but I cannot
1 really say because I wasn't at the office all the time that force was
2 never used. It certainly wasn't used with my knowledge.
3 Q. But you acknowledge the possibility that it could have been used
4 without your knowledge?
5 A. I accept that.
6 Q. On what basis are you able to accept that?
7 A. With all the propaganda by Natasa Kandic and all the human rights
8 organisations that wrote all kinds of things in huge amounts, things both
9 true and untrue, I accept that.
10 Q. In line 21 of the document chart which has now been marked D452,
11 you talk about Muslims going to Turkey for training and then returning to
12 Sandzak. You said:
13 "Some of the trained people returned to Sandzak and we conducted
14 interviews with them to let them know that we knew about them and to
15 gather information about the training and their further intents."
16 Is it really your evidence that these people were happy to share
17 information about their training and further intentions with you with no
18 force being applied?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In his decision ordering Operation May 1993, Jovica Stanisic in
21 two separate places states the need for "energetic measures and actions."
22 In paragraph 34 of your statement, you actually say that:
23 "More energetic measures and actions were required."
24 The reluctance of Muslims in Sandzak to talk to you was one of
25 the reasons that such energetic measures and actions were required;
2 A. You should not misunderstand energetic measures and actions
3 because I see what you are driving at. We intensified operative work,
4 that means contacts with all people who could be of assistance to us, but
5 in conspiracy. Work that involved the entire operative and technical
6 staff. I see what you are driving at, but you shouldn't be doing that.
7 Energetic measures and actions means intensifying operative work for the
8 purpose of gathering information.
9 Q. And what does intensifying operative work mean?
10 A. Intensifying operative work means that there are no longer any
11 working hours, that we work day and night, national holidays, all
12 holidays with the limited resources that we have using our own cars,
13 allocating all the resources that we had to make a work-plan that would
14 be much more intensive in operative terms than before.
15 Q. And informational interviews or conversations were obviously a
16 part of that work; correct?
17 A. Yes. If we found out that somebody had a rifle, we would invite
18 that person for an informational interview, we would have a discussion
19 with them, and they would more often than not surrender the weapon. We
20 never took anyone in for an interview without reason.
21 Q. In paragraph 5 of your statement, you say that at the time you
22 were head of the Novi Pazar DB department, you were also carrying out
23 operative activities at the same time. Did those operative activities
24 include you personally conducting informational interviews or
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And would those sometimes take place at the Novi Pazar SUP
4 A. Sometimes, yes, but mostly not.
5 Q. What about at the Novi Pazar police station?
6 A. Well, that's the same thing. We worked at the police station of
7 Novi Pazar, that's the same building where we were.
8 Q. In paragraph 8 of your statement you indicate that the Novi Pazar
9 DB department had seven employees of which five were operative workers.
12 MR. FARR: Your Honour, private session, please. I apologise.
13 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
14 [Private session]
11 Pages 14443-14462 redacted. Private session.
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
21 MR. FARR: And can we please have 62 [sic] number 6276 on the
22 screen. This is a report of the Humanitarian Law Fund dated 23 March
23 1994. It's title is: "Police Repression in Sandzak (October 1993 to
24 March 1994)." Unfortunately we don't have a B/C/S translation available
25 yet. Can we please have the top of page 6 in English.
1 Q. Sir, we don't have a version of this document in Serbian at the
2 moment. I'm going to read a quote and then ask you for a comment. Under
3 the heading 2, the Pester Case, the document says:
4 "According to the Fund's records, more than 300 Muslims were
5 mistreated in police stations in Sjenica, Tutin, and Novi Pazar during
6 November and December 1993. About 20 people from the village of Rasno
7 alone were beaten because they denied possessing weapons. People to whom
8 the Fund spoke alleged that the drives to confiscate weapons, or to force
9 people to obtain and then surrender automatic and semi-automatic weapons,
10 were launched or continued during February and March 1994..."
11 The document then goes on to list the villages where this took
12 place. The document continues saying:
13 "The cases researched revealed the main feature of the police
14 action in the Pester plain: The widespread use of force in police
15 stations, especially against people who insisted that they did not own
17 Sir, were you aware of these allegations?
18 A. I'm not aware of these allegations, but I suppose they are
19 against the public security wing. I know nothing about them. Absolutely
21 MR. FARR: If we could scroll down to the bottom of this page.
22 Q. We'll see the beginning of a statement of a man named NK. And if
23 we could then go to the top -- and his allegations in short are that he
24 was beaten particularly on the soles of his feet. If we could then go to
25 the top of the next page. Just the first paragraph. He says that after
1 being beaten he went home, he reported back to the police station after
2 the holiday as he had been required to do, and he says:
3 "I reported in after the holiday, but didn't take them anything.
4 I found Vlado Corbic, Nikola, and Dzemko there. They offered me coffee
5 and apologised for making a mistake. They said they would treat the
6 rifle I had bought as voluntary disarming."
7 Sir, what is your response to that account?
8 A. It's incredible.
9 MR. FARR: Your Honours, I tender this document as a Prosecution
10 exhibit for impeachment only.
11 MR. JORDASH: Same position that we have no objection to the
12 section that's just been put, but the whole document --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr.
14 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the whole document is relevant to
15 impeachment or at least larger portions than what has been put. I mean
16 section 2, certainly the entirety of section 2, is relevant to
17 impeachment; section 3 deals with Prijepolje, which is also an area that
18 witness has given evidence about. I agree that the entire thing wouldn't
19 be relevant to impeachment, but we would ask to be permitted to select
20 more than just a portion read to the witness.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Mr. Jordash, only for impeachment, I think the
22 witness testified that never any complaint was brought against him and
23 that he denies whatever involvement in whatever violent treatment of
24 persons which were or were not detained or in a police station, so
25 there's a general denial of any of these events happening as described.
1 Under those circumstances, if it's just a description of these kind of
2 allegations, wouldn't it be, even if not read to the witness in view of
3 the testimony as given until now, would it not be relevant?
4 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, I withdraw the objection. Can I just
5 put on the record that I'll -- perhaps my learned friend would just
6 indicate whether this is the same organisation that is run by
7 Natasa Kandic.
8 MR. FARR: To my knowledge it is, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Then we have matters clear, I would say. The
10 document, there's in translation yet, so therefore it should be marked
11 for identification. I do not hear from the Simatovic Defence any further
12 objections. Madam Registrar, the number would be.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be P3033 marked for
15 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked as such. One second, please.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, the Chamber considers that it is not
18 possible to conclude the testimony of the witness, not today. I take it
19 that Mr. Jordash would have some questions and there are some further
20 perhaps research to be done both by you, perhaps, and by the Defence.
21 Unfortunately where we always try to avoid the witness has to stay over
22 the weekend, I'm afraid that it's unavoidable.
23 MR. FARR: Your Honour, for the Chamber's information, I was just
24 on the point of saying that I'm done. I understand that doesn't solve
25 the problem. Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That doesn't solve the problem at this moment.
2 Therefore I suggest that we just continue on Tuesday.
3 MR. JORDASH: I literally have three questions, I think.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac, any questions as far as you are
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you anticipated my
7 questions about the stamp, so I have no further questions.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I have commitments elsewhere, but six
10 minutes is time for three questions. Please proceed.
11 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
12 Re-Examination by Mr. Jordash:
13 Q. Was the army ever employed to deal with the Sandzak problem,
14 problem of Muslim extremism?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Do you have a view on what the consequences would have been if
17 they had been?
18 A. There probably would have been problems.
19 Q. Of which kind?
20 A. Muslims hated the military. The military was deployed, but then
21 they had to withdraw because it was perceived as being there because of
22 the Muslims and that could have been the problem.
23 MR. JORDASH: Could we go into private session for the last
24 issue, please.
25 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
1 [Private session]
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
6 The Chamber has no questions for you which means that this
7 concludes your evidence. At the same time, I hereby inform the parties
8 that there are apparently some issues still pending. You've reserved
9 your position, Mr. Farr. Of course, the Chamber now has heard the
10 testimony and has heard a lot of other stories which, to say the least,
11 are rather contradicting about what may have happened in police stations
12 in Novi Pazar. So, therefore, the Chamber will also consider whether we
13 would need further information about what happened there.
14 This, therefore, means Mr. Corbic that this concludes your
15 testimony for the time being, but I could not exclude under all
16 circumstances that we would need further information. I thank you very
17 much for coming to The Hague and for having answered the questions that
18 were put to you by the parties and by the Bench. And I wish you a safe
19 return home again. I'm addressing the parties --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: -- whether under the present circumstances an
22 instruction to the witness would be appropriate or not.
23 MR. FARR: Your Honour, we still have outstanding RFAs to Serbia.
24 We would ask for the instruction.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Any objection against the instruction?
1 Mr. Corbic, in view of the fact that there is a chance that we
2 would need to hear further evidence from you, you are instructed unless
3 you receive a message that this instruction is lifted, you are instructed
4 not to speak with anyone, how difficult that may be, not to speak with
5 anyone about the testimony you've given up to the moment where you
6 receive notice that you are free again to communicate and speak,
7 et cetera, until that moment, no communication. Thank you very much.
8 You may follow the usher.
9 [The witness withdrew]
10 JUDGE ORIE: I have to raise one procedural issue with the
12 DST-040, what is at this moment the estimate of time needed with
13 that witness?
14 MR. JORDASH: Two and a half hours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Two and a half hours. Could I hear from
16 Mr. Simatovic?
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we will also need two
18 and a half hours, perhaps even three.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's been a long time since I reviewed
21 my notes on that, if I could send an e-mail later today I'd appreciate
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'll not receive that, but if you would send
24 it to Chamber staff, copied to the representative of the Registry here in
25 court so that this information which is needed not only for scheduling
1 purposes but also for logistical matters that it will be passed on to
2 those who were asking for this information.
3 Any other matter? If not, this Chamber appreciates the efforts
4 the parties have made to could be conclude the testimony of this witness
5 today. We adjourn we resume on Tuesday 18th of October at quarter past
6 2.00 in this same Courtroom II.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.53 p.m.
8 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 18th of
9 October, 2011 at 2.15 p.m.