1 Tuesday, 29 January 2013
2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone in and around this
7 courtroom. Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
9 number IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and
10 Franko Simatovic.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. I'd like as a
12 preliminary matter, I'd like to put a few informal communications on the
13 record before we start with the final arguments -- closing arguments.
14 First, on the 17th of December of last year, the Prosecution
15 requested an extension until the 8th of February, 2013, to file the
16 consolidated list of protective measures which was ordered on the
17 7th of November, 2012. That extension was granted on the 18th of
18 December. On the 25th of January of this year, the Chamber notified the
19 parties through another informal communication that this deadline, as
20 well as the deadline to file public redacted versions of confidential
21 exhibits was further moved to the 8th of March.
22 Second, on the 7th of December of last year, the Chamber's staff
23 informed the parties that all references to document 1D1572.1 in its
24 5th of November, 2012, decision on miscellaneous rebuttal documents
25 should be understood as a reference to 1D1572.
1 Third, on the 11th of January, 2013, the Prosecution filed a
2 request for guidance in relation to redacting the time trial briefs. On
3 the 17th of January of this year, the Chamber declined to give guidance
4 expressing its confidence that the parties are able to continue
5 implementing the Chamber's protective measures orders without further
7 Then we are here today to hear the closing arguments, at least
8 the beginning of it. Times allotted was four hours for the Prosecution,
9 two and a half hours for each Defence team, and in the second round one
10 hour for the Prosecution and one hour for the Defence teams together.
11 Mr. Groome, are you ready?
12 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Then you may proceed.
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, as a preliminary matter in the interest
15 of remaining in public session as much as possible, earlier today the
16 Prosecution filed a confidential filing with references to evidence, and
17 I believe courtesy copies have been handed out to everyone here in the
19 Secondly, Your Honour. We will be using a series of slides, and
20 it is also possible that the Chamber wants to adjust its monitors. It
21 will be able to view those slides for a longer period of time. They will
22 be visible on the public projection of these proceedings.
23 With that, Your Honours, I'll begin.
24 Your Honours, when the Prosecution opened its case on the
25 9th of June, 2009, I told you that this case in its simplest terms is an
1 examination of the conduct of two of the people with primary
2 responsibility for organising, training, funding, equipping, and
3 directing members of the Special Units of the Serbian DB to perpetrator
4 grievous crimes in the name of protecting Serbs and securing for them a
5 land free from Croats and Muslims.
6 To establish that proposition beyond reasonable doubt, the
7 Prosecution relied on the evidence of 97 witnesses; many the victims of
8 terrible crimes, many former members of the special units of the
9 Serbian DB, others were Serbs who lived where crimes occurred and came
10 forward to provide evidence about the destruction of their mixed ethnic
11 communities. The Prosecution tendered videos and intercepted
12 communications by both accused and thousands of pages of documents that
13 give insight into the daily workings of the State Security Service. A
14 large corpus of evidence which when examined brings to the light of day
15 the covert criminal operations by the Serbian State Security Service in
16 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 Your Honours, the evidence establishing the crimes alleged in the
18 indictment is set out in detail in the Prosecution final trial brief.
19 For those members of the public interested in learning more about this
20 evidence, a public version of that brief will be filed in the coming
22 It is not our intention today to focus on the detail of the
23 crimes. The fact that they occurred or even how they transpired is
24 beyond any reasonable dispute, and in fact, in several instances the
25 accused acknowledge some of the crimes in their briefs. Rather, we will
1 focus our remarks today on how we have established the accused's
2 participation in and contribution to these crimes and how that
3 demonstrates their responsibility for them.
4 We will depart from the structure we employed in the brief and
5 try to assist the Chamber now by organising our remarks according to a
6 different structure, to discuss the case from the perspective of each of
7 the special units of the Serbian State Security Service and the crimes
8 they participated in. Our remarks are not meant to be as comprehensive
9 as the brief, but to usefully amplify certain aspects of it.
10 Later this afternoon Mr. Adam Weber will provide an overview of
11 the special units of the Serbian State Security Service and address the
12 crimes in which the Red Berets or "the unit," participated. Crimes in
13 the Krajina in places like Glina, when on the 26th of July, 1991, 50 of
14 the unit's first members attacked that town and neighbouring Struga,
15 targeting the homes, schools, and churches of its non-Serb civilian
16 population, driving them from their homes and farms. On the 5th
17 of August, 1991, Mr. Simatovic himself would participate in the attack on
18 Lovinac, attacking with mortars from one side and an armoured train from
19 the other.
20 Later that month on the 26th, Martic delivered an ultimatum to
21 Kijevo telling non-Serbs that co-existence was no longer possible.
22 Martic's Police ravaged the town, ransacking and burning the homes of
24 In October 1991, Martic's police and others rounded up 53 unarmed
25 elderly and infirm people in a local firehouse. Their names had already
1 been placed on a list there. The following day they were slaughtered in
2 Krecane. The project of cleansing the Krajina of non-Serbs would
3 continue in Vukovici, Saborsko, Skabrnja, and Nadin with murders and
4 forced removals in November of 1991.
5 After Mr. Weber describes the unit's role in these events, he
6 will trace their movements, the movement of the unit, into
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina where in Bosanski Samac and Doboj they used their
8 newly honed skills on non-Serbs there with even greater efficiency.
9 Mr. Simatovic himself would order the Red Berets into
10 Bosanski Samac. One unit member proudly asserted that the operation to
11 take control of the town took little more than half an hour. After that,
12 the more time consuming task of identifying and removing the non-Serb
13 population took place.
14 The Red Berets under the command of Raja Bozovic worked with
15 local forces to conduct a vicious campaign of ethnic cleansing in Doboj.
16 Non-Serb prisoners were kept in deplorable conditions like in Spreca and
17 Percin's Disco, places where they were detained and tortured, all the
18 while just outside their window the Red Berets drilled and trained. For
19 some their torture would only end on the 12th of July when they met their
20 death on a minefield at the edge of town.
21 However, these were not the first crimes in
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina the accused are responsible for. Their first move
23 into Bosnia was in Bijeljina and Zvornik along the border with Serbia.
24 These crimes perpetrated by Arkan and his Serbian Volunteer Guard or SDG,
25 more popularly known from his television ads as Arkan's Tigers will be
1 the focus of Rachel Friedman's submissions today. In 1996, while running
2 for public office, Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan make the statement that we
3 can now see on slide 5. In both Bijeljina and Zvornik, he gave
4 ultimatums: He would destroy the towns if they were not surrendered to
5 him, Arkan.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, sorry to interrupt you, but what I see
7 on my screen, always the left part is missing. So I can't read the
8 beginning of -- but that may be my problem rather than anyone else's
10 You have the same problem? Then we'll try to work on it, but
11 apparently some are missing the left margin, some are not. Please
12 proceed meanwhile and we'll see if we can find a solution for if.
13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, we will be filing with the Registrar a
14 copy of these slides, and I apologise for any inconvenience at the
15 moment. Hopefully it will be sorted soon.
16 Your Honours, here on slide 5 we can see the iconic image that
17 first introduced the world to Arkan's Tigers. Over the course of this
18 trial, one Defence witness would put a name to the man kicking the woman
19 who has just been murdered, Srdjan Golubovic, also known as Max.
20 The first place Stanisic deployed Arkan's men was to
21 Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem where they were among the
22 most brutal perpetrators of crimes. After Bijeljina, Arkan would move
23 south to Zvornik in co-ordination with Simatovic and the Bosnian Serb
24 leadership. When he arrived, it was clear to the non-Serb population
25 that their lives were under serious threat.
1 Arkan's Tigers would be responsible for many of the killings in
2 Zvornik. Others were committed by paramilitary groups who were given
3 impunity to destroy the non-Serb population of the municipality.
4 Seselj's men were among these paramilitaries, and as Seselj has
5 publicly stated, it was a well-organised operation, organised with the
6 direct involvement of Mr. Simatovic.
7 We will then ask you to turn your attention to the crimes of the
8 Skorpions and conclude with Arkan's crimes in Sanski Most in 1995.
9 Ms. Grace Harbour will address you on these points.
10 The Chamber is by now very familiar with the killing of six men
11 and boys in Trnovo, taken captive during the fall of Srebrenica and
12 brought to Trnovo to be murdered. We will amplify our written
13 submissions on this as well as respond to some of the arguments presented
14 in the Defence briefs.
15 The last crimes charged in the indictment concern Arkan's crimes
16 in Sanski Most in 1995. On the 20th of September, 1995, the SDG forced
17 approximately 13 detainees into a truck, drove them to the village of
18 Trnova, unloaded them in pairs, and shot them as they stumbled into an
19 abandoned garage. The next day the SDG crowded more than 65 Bosniaks
20 into small buses, drove them to a place called Sasina, and murdered them
21 in cold blood, slitting the throats of some and shooting others.
22 Your Honours, before we lead you through the evidence setting out
23 the contribution of each accused to these crimes, it will be helpful to
24 spend some measure of time setting out the joint criminal enterprise
25 underlying these crimes, and for this I would now turn the podium over to
1 Mr. Travis Farr.
2 MR. FARR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. As Mr. Groome has
3 indicated, I will be addressing the Chamber on matters related to the
4 joint criminal enterprise, and I have six points to address.
5 First, I'll discuss the close relationship between the accused.
6 Second, I'll discuss the evidence that Stanisic was an astoundingly
7 well-informed and engaged leader. Next, I'll discuss a DB document
8 signed by Mr. Simatovic that corroborates the Prosecution evidence
9 regarding events in the Krajina. From there, I'll move on to the
10 accused's involvement in the common criminal plan in early 1991,
11 including the attack on Lovinac. Then I'll briefly discuss the
12 co-operative relationship between public security and state security, and
13 finally, I will discuss the irrelevance of the tensions among Milosevic,
14 Karadzic, and Krajisnik to the accused's liability for the 1995 crimes.
15 Moving now to my first point about the relationship between the
16 two accused. Each of the accused has sought to distance himself from the
17 other in his final brief, but Your Honours should not be taken in by
18 these arguments. The relationship between the accused was a close
19 relationship of co-operation and trust throughout the indictment period.
20 It is the most important relationship among JCE members in this case.
21 Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic stood side by side at key moments
22 throughout the indictment period. In P390, which we see here on slide
23 number 10, we see them together with Karadzic and Krajisnik. And
24 General Milovanovic testified that this photo appears to have been taken
25 in Serbia sometime during the war.
1 We also see a still image from P1592, in which
2 Stanisic and Simatovic are together in Bajina Basta in the critical
3 period following the ABiH attack on Skelani.
4 On slide number 11, in a still from P61, we see Stanisic and
5 Simatovic celebrating the success of their unit together with Milosevic.
6 We also see a still from P3043, in which the accused are together
7 at the hostage release press conference in Bosnia.
8 I'll also mention P391, which we'll see during Mr. Weber's
9 presentation. In that photo, we'll see Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic
10 together again, this time with Karadzic, Krajisnik, Martic, and
11 Stojan Zupljanin.
12 Your Honours, I've started with these photos and video stills
13 because they are incontestable evidence that Your Honours can see with
14 your own eyes. But there is a tremendous amount of witness evidence on
15 the relationship between Stanisic and Simatovic. I don't have time to
16 summarise all of it but I'd like to make one point.
17 At least four witnesses describe Simatovic as Stanisic's second
18 in command. Babic calls Simatovic Stanisic's assistant, and Sliskovic
19 puts Mr. Simatovic directly below Mr. Stanisic in the JATD chain of
20 command. Two other witnesses give similar evidence that is set out at
21 rows A1 to A4 of the confidential evidence chart.
22 The evidence of these four independent witnesses is consistent
23 not just with each other but also with the photos and video stills I've
24 just shown you. The only reasonable inference available to Your Honours
25 is that the relationship between the accused was characterised by a high
1 degree of closeness and trust.
2 Before I move to my next point I'd also just point out to the
3 Chamber that in the pictures we just looked at, Simatovic was almost
4 always wearing a camouflage uniform, and he was always in the company of
5 other JCE members. This obviously contradicts his arguments that he only
6 did operative work and was a lowly functionary.
7 My next point concerns Mr. Stanisic's leadership and management
8 style. Stanisic Defence witness Corbic testified --
9 [B/C/S on English channel]
10 I'm getting B/C/S on the English channel.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I was on the live channel so I couldn't ... do you
12 have English now again on channel 4?
13 MR. FARR: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then we can continue.
15 MR. FARR: Stanisic Defence witness Corbic testified that Mr.
16 Stanisic was a well informed, active, and involved leader who carefully
17 reviewed information provided to him by subordinates and who informed
18 himself of the work of individuals several levels below him in the
19 hierarchy. He was not content to rely solely on reporting, but he also
20 travelled to the field to gather information for himself. That's at
21 transcript pages 14423 to 14426, but in fact it follows from the entirety
22 of Mr. Corbic's testimony.
23 Mr. Corbic limited his comments to the context in which he worked
24 with Mr. Stanisic but General Milovanovic's evidence demonstrates that
25 these were general leadership and management traits that Stanisic applied
1 to all of his work, something that we can see here in slide number 14.
2 In video Exhibit P376, Milovanovic said the following:
3 "I was astounded by Stanisic's knowledge about our situation in
4 Podrinje. Some things he knew even better than I did. He knew who was
5 fighting in which village, who was in command. I really was a bit
7 In court before Your Honours, General Milovanovic confirmed that
8 he was "quite amazed with the extent of Stanisic's knowledge and
9 information about particular areas in Bosnia." That's at transcript
10 page 4385. The picture that these two witnesses, Corbic and Milovanovic,
11 paint as Stanisic's active, involved leadership and detailed knowledge of
12 events in the field corroborates Prosecution witnesses heard throughout
13 the case.
14 One particular point I would like to emphasise, given that
15 Stanisic was better informed about some aspects of VRS operations in
16 Eastern Bosnia than General Milovanovic a senior VRS officer was. Your
17 Honours can have no doubt that Stanisic was intimately familiar with all
18 aspects of the operation of his own organisation.
19 In that context, I would like to turn to P3251, a document that
20 was obtained and uploaded by the Stanisic Defence. The Prosecution was
21 not aware of this document until it was disclosed on e-court. This
22 document provides powerful corroboration for the Prosecution witnesses
23 who testified about events in the Krajina.
24 The document which you see on slide 16 before you is an official
25 note regarding contact with Daniel Snedden who, as Your Honours are
1 aware, was also known as Captain Dragan. It is dated 13 April 1991, and
2 it is signed by operative Franko Simatovic, and I note in passing that
3 the signature on this document appears consistent with the signatures on
4 P3039, several of which were identified by Krsmanovic as the signatures
5 of Simatovic.
6 The first sentence of this document is the most important, and it
7 reads as follows:
8 "On 13 April 1991, a meeting was held with Daniel Snedden in
9 order to discuss the possibilities of his further engagement pursuant to
10 the plan which was presented to him during the last meeting."
11 This document thus speaks of at least two meetings between
12 Daniel Snedden and the DB, at least one of which was with Simatovic. It
13 also explicitly states that the DB is considering further, and I
14 emphasise "further," engaging Captain Dragan.
15 The Simatovic Defence devote 19 pages, more than 60 paragraphs,
16 of their brief to analysing the DB monitoring of Captain Dragan, but they
17 fail to mention this document even once. At paragraph 295, they come to
18 the conclusion that:
19 "The foregoing evidence shows clearly and beyond doubt that
20 Daniel Snedden, aka Captain Dragan, had no contacts or connections with
21 the Serbian DB."
22 Your Honours, this single document undermines that conclusion and
23 the analysis it relies on.
24 It does more than that, though. It also strongly corroborates
25 the account Captain Dragan gives in Exhibit P2976 of his contacts with
1 Simatovic before his deployment to Knin. More generally it corroborates
2 Captain Dragan's entire account of his co-operation with the DB. Let's
3 listen to what Captain Dragan says about the meeting Simatovic described
4 in P3251.
5 [Video-clip played]
6 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] [No interpretation]"
7 MR. FARR: Your Honours, there was no translation during the
8 playing of that clip. I believe that the transcript was provided to the
9 booth on a copy of slide 17, which is what we are looking at now.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Now, is the language which is seen under the
11 photograph on the video, is that the language of what was said by
12 Captain Dragan?
13 MR. FARR: It is, Your Honour, and it is a complete transcript of
14 what was said.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Under those circumstances, does any of the
16 parties insist to have it replayed or can we continue? We can continue.
17 Mr. Farr, you may proceed.
18 MR. FARR: P3251 provides strong corroboration for
19 Captain Dragan's account, but it does more than that. It also
20 corroborates all the other testimonial and documentary evidence that
21 Your Honours have seen and heard through this case clearly establishing
22 the relationship between the DB and Captain Dragan.
23 To use just one simple example, the warm embraces between the
24 accused and Captain Dragan at the end of the Kula video make no sense
25 whatsoever in the context of the Defence narrative, but they are the most
1 natural thing in the world in light of the Prosecution evidence regarding
2 the close relationship between the accused and Captain Dragan.
3 The Defence have aggressively challenged the credibility of
4 Prosecution witnesses who say that Captain Dragan was engaged by the
5 accused and that he was close to them. These witnesses are, of course,
6 well corroborated by each other and by a large body of other evidence,
7 but this one document signed by Simatovic and this one video, P61, show
8 on their own that the Prosecution witnesses spoke the truth.
9 In short, Your Honours, in light of the strong corroboration
10 among all of the evidence, the Chamber can have no reasonable doubt that
11 the accused sent Captain Dragan to the Krajina and that they co-operated
12 with him while he was there.
13 P3251, Simatovic's note about his meeting with Dragan, also
14 refutes another argument that the Defence have made with respect to
15 several key individuals in this case; namely that the DB could not
16 possibly be co-operating with anyone that it was also monitoring. They
17 have attempted this argument -- excuse me. They have attempted this
18 argument with at least three individuals, Captain Dragan, Arkan, and
19 Slobodan Miljkovic, aka Lugar. This argument is unpersuasive even in
20 theory since there is nothing that would prevent the DB from working with
21 someone they were monitoring and nothing that would prevent them from
22 monitoring someone they were working with. But the example of
23 Captain Dragan takes this argument from weak to entirely untenable.
24 Given the clear evidence that the DB was indeed co-operating with
25 Captain Dragan even as it monitored him the Chamber can draw no
1 inferences from the evidence that the DB monitored Arkan and Lugar as
3 I would now like to move to my next point regarding the existence
4 of the common criminal plan.
5 The Simatovic Defence argues that we have failed to prove the
6 existence after common criminal plan design or purpose at all, while the
7 Stanisic Defence asserts that we have failed to establish the existence
8 of a common criminal plan prior to September 1991.
9 With respect to the Simatovic claim that the JCE never existed at
10 all I refer Your Honours to our submissions at the 98 bis stage which
11 were made in response to an identical challenge by the Simatovic defence
12 at that point in time.
13 Regarding the Stanisic Defence claim that no criminal plan
14 existed before September 1991, I will turn once again to Captain Dragan.
15 The document on slide 20 before you is a Defence exhibit, a report from
16 the 2nd administration of the Belgrade DB centre. It is dated
17 3 April 1991, just ten days before Simatovic's report recording his
18 meeting with Captain Dragan. This report shows that the DB knew that
19 Captain Dragan was potentially dangerous. It states that Snedden is
20 inclined to terrorism, that he wished to procure a large quantity of
21 weapons, and most importantly, that he had undertaken actions to create
22 and arm paramilitary formations in the Knin Krajina as you see on the
23 slide before you. In other words, the accused knew at the time they
24 brought him to the Krajina that Captain Dragan was an aggressive and
25 dangerous individual. This shows that the Golubic camp was not a
1 defensive project as the Stanisic Defence has claimed. It also shows
2 that even in April 1991, the accused intended to further the common
3 criminal plan.
4 The attack on the Croat village of Lovinac provides further
5 evidence that the accused intended to further the common criminal plan in
6 the summer of 1991. A witness described the purpose of the attack on
7 Lovinac this way:
8 "The target was to cleanse the village and to get the entire
9 population out and to establish a purely Serb territory."
10 And Your Honours have that citation on slide 21 before you now.
11 This is precisely a statement of the common criminal plan to
12 forcibly and permanently remove non-Serbs. Babic also confirmed that the
13 civilian population was a target of this attack. He said that the attack
14 was directed against the village itself as well as against the police
15 station and that Simatovic bragged that the whole village had been
16 destroyed. That's P1877 at page 44.
17 At rows A5 to A9 of the confidential evidence table, Your Honours
18 will find more evidence that this was an attack aimed at forcible
20 Your Honours, as discussed at paragraphs 402 to 405 of our final
21 brief, Mr. Simatovic personally participated in the attack on Lovinac
22 together with Milan Martic. As you see on the slide before you, Babic
24 "Frenki, or Franjo Simatovic ... and Milan Martic with mortars,
25 with a mortar unit, they were the first to open fire on the village of
1 Lovinac and thus expel the Croats from the Gracac area."
2 Another witness also corroborates Simatovic's participation in
3 the attack as set out at rows A10 and A11 of the confidential evidence
4 table. And both of those witnesses are corroborated by a key document
5 that we will now look at.
6 A distinctive feature of the attack on Lovinac was its use of an
7 armoured train, as set out in the confidential evidence table at rows A12
8 to A16. On slide number 22, we see a document that links Mr. Simatovic
9 to this train and both Simatovic and the train to the attack on Lovinac.
10 This document, which is signed by Mr. Simatovic, concerns the
11 creation of an armoured train that would "have the capability to target
12 and attack Lovinac." And the document is dated 21 June 1991. And I
13 would draw the Chamber's attention to the initials at the bottom of the
14 slide before we move on.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, the reference to confidential evidence
16 chart row, do we have to -- is there a row number, no? Apparently you
17 want to ...
18 MR. FARR: Sorry, I was drawing Your Honours' attention to the
19 initials at the bottom of the slide, slide number 22.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I followed that, and then I put this question, the
21 blue language, see confidential evidence chart row, dot, dot, dot.
22 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour. You're correct. It's A5.
24 JUDGE ORIE: A5. Thank you.
25 MR. FARR: If we move on now to slide number 23. On this slide
1 Your Honours see the initials we have just looked at from slide P2673,
2 the armoured train document, as well as initials from Exhibits D1117,
3 P2420, and P352. The initials on those three exhibits were identified as
4 the initials of Mr. Simatovic by Defence witness Radivoje Micic, and the
5 initials on all four documents appear to be consistent.
6 Your Honours, this document, together with the consistent witness
7 evidence regarding this attack, shows beyond reasonable doubt that the
8 attack happened, that Simatovic participated in it, and that its purpose
9 was to drive out the Croat civilian population. In other words, that its
10 purpose was to further the common criminal plan.
11 The attack also shows that the purpose of the Golubic training
12 camp was not defensive as the Stanisic Defence have claimed. Row A15 of
13 the confidential evidence table establishes that the crew of the armoured
14 train was trained at Golubic. Their use in this attack shows that the
15 purpose of training at Golubic was fundamentally linked to the common
16 criminal plan.
17 The attack on Ljubovo also shows that Golubic was not a defensive
18 project. Like the attack on Lovinac, JF-039 said that the purpose of the
19 attack on Ljubovo was to "cleanse the village and to get the entire
20 population out and to establish a purely Serb territory."
21 As established in rows A17 to A19 of the confidential evidence
22 table, the Ljubovo attack was carried out by men trained at Golubic. And
23 this wasn't some kind of a rogue action on their part. It was a kind of
24 graduation exercise from their Golubic training. In other words, this
25 attack which furthered the common plan was an inherent part of the
1 training at Golubic. The Golubic camp was intended to further the common
2 criminal plan and so was the training conducted there.
3 Your Honours, we've seen that Stanisic and Simatovic had a close
4 relationship and that Stanisic was an astoundingly, to use
5 General Milovanovic's word, well-informed leader. Based on that,
6 Your Honours can be satisfied that Stanisic knew that Simatovic and
7 Martic were in the process of implementing the common criminal plan in
8 the Krajina and that he supported it.
9 Your Honours can also rely on Stanisic's own actions to find that
10 he shared the common criminal plan from the time he made his
11 contributions in the Krajina and the SBWS.
12 A key event in this regard is Stanisic's travel to Dalj in
13 mid-September 1991 to personally intervene in the conduct of the
14 operations to take Vukovar. Your Honours can find further details of
15 this event at rows A20 to A21 of the confidential evidence table.
16 The attack on Dalj, including the expulsion of the Croat
17 population, occurred on 1 August 1991, and had been planned by Hadzic and
18 others for at least several days prior to that. And I refer Your Honours
19 to row A22 of the confidential evidence chart in that regard. This alone
20 proves that the common criminal plan existed prior to September 1991.
21 The intensity of Stanisic's determination in mid-September 1991
22 that the common goal be achieved as soon as possible supports an
23 inference that he must have shared the goal for some time. So does the
24 fact that he was able to demand on very short notice a meeting with
25 high-level leaders regarding military operations. He certainly wouldn't
1 have been able to do that unless he had been involved in planning for
2 some time.
3 Your Honours can also properly consider evidence of later events
4 to determine what Stanisic's intent was at the time he provided his
5 contributions in the SAO Krajina and SBWS in 1991.
6 P690 records Stanisic talking with Karadzic about exterminating
7 Croats in January 1992. P61 shows that in 1997, Stanisic gave
8 Goran Opacic an award and praised him in front of the rest of the DB
9 special unit. P12 and P990 show that Stanisic celebrated
10 Krajina Security Services Day with Martic, Babic, and Hadzic. And P2667
11 shows that he congratulated the Krajina security forces on their work
12 going back to 1991.
13 When viewed in light of the extensive evidence of Stanisic's
14 presence in the Krajina, his meetings with Martic, and his assistance in
15 setting up the Krajina security forces, all of this shows that Martic and
16 the other members of the Krajina security services used Stanisic's
17 assistance in precisely the way he intended that it be used.
18 I would now like to deal quickly with the relationship between
19 public security and state security within the Serbian MUP. The Defence
20 make much of this distinction, primarily as an attempt to avoid
21 responsibility for things done by Radovan Stojicic, aka Badza. But the
22 evidence of Stanisic's own witnesses shows that this is nonsense.
23 When asked whether Badza had a productive and co-operative
24 relationship with Stanisic and the Serbian DB, Defence witness
25 Vlado Dragicevic said:
1 "Both sections of the Ministry of the Interior, i.e., the public
2 security and the State Security Services, had a very correct
4 And that's at transcript page 14872.
5 Defence witness Nebojsa Bogunovic also gave an example of
6 co-operation between Jovica Stanisic and a public security special unit.
7 That evidence is addressed at rows A23 and A24 of the confidential
8 evidence table.
9 And Your Honours will, of course, recall General Milovanovic's
10 evidence about this relationship. He testified that when he asked Badza
11 who Stanisic was, Badza's answer was "I arrived here with the boss."
12 That's at transcript page 4385.
13 At the very least, the evidence shows that Badza and the accused
14 co-operated, as did public security and state security more generally.
15 And there is nothing surprising about this. There is nothing surprising
16 about two parts of a single ministry co-operating with each other. It is
17 to be expected that they would in the normal course of things. This has
18 arisen as an issue in this case only because the accused seek to distance
19 themselves from their public security colleagues by drawing artificial
20 institutional boundaries that in reality constituted no barrier
21 whatsoever to co-operation.
22 Your Honours, my next point concerns the Defence arguments
23 regarding the tensions among the political leadership of Serbia and the
24 RS set out at pages 300 to 314 of the Stanisic brief. The Defence use
25 this to attempt to defeat liability for the 1995 crimes.
1 In essence, the Defence have provided Your Honours with evidence
2 of tension in the relationship among just three men: Milosevic,
3 Karadzic, and Krajisnik. They then ask Your Honours to conclude based on
4 this evidence that there must have also been a rift in the relationship
5 between the accused and the entirety of the Bosnian Serb leadership as
7 This piggybacking argument is an obvious non sequitur, and it is
8 also contrary to the Defence's own evidence.
9 Sir Ivor Roberts, the primary witness that the Defence depend
10 upon to make this argument, made it clear that the tension was among the
11 political leaders and did not include state security. He said:
12 "That was the impression one had for the reasons I was saying
13 earlier, that while the political leaderships were very much out of
14 sympathy with each other, at other levels conversations and
15 understandings continued between state security people and the armies."
16 That's at transcript page 18579.
17 In light of Roberts' testimony, the most that the Defence's
18 evidence might show is that Milosevic, Karadzic, and Krajisnik were no
19 longer effectively co-operating. It tells Your Honours nothing about the
21 In fact, however, the Defence's evidence does not even support a
22 conclusion that Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Milosevic no longer shared a
23 common criminal goal. A closer look at the dispute among these men shows
24 that their disagreement was only about the degree to which the common
25 criminal plan could be achieved and not about the common criminal plan
2 The Defence say that when Milosevic went to Pale to support the
3 Vance-Owen Plan and was subsequently humiliated when it was rejected by
4 the Bosnian Serb parliament, these events led to "a distinct cooling
5 between the governments." But Exhibit P2532 shows that in December 1993,
6 six months after this supposed cooling, Milosevic, Karadzic, and
7 Krajisnik were still able to sit down together to discuss progress
8 towards the achievement of the common criminal plan and to plan military
9 operations. It bears mentioning, of course, that this meeting was hosted
10 by Jovica Stanisic at the DB headquarters. This meeting makes it crystal
11 clear that the disagreement over the peace plan did not represent a
12 rejection of the common criminal plan by any of the members of the JCE.
13 Milosevic's own comments at Pale show the same thing. In his
14 remarks there, he emphasised that the goal was to consolidate what had
15 already been achieved. He praised the Vance-Owen Plan in explicitly
16 nationalistic terms. He encouraged support for it because it offered the
17 Serbs 50 per cent more territory than the Muslims even though their
18 population was 50 per cent less. I refer Your Honours to P3116 at
19 pages 2 and 3. Exhibit P3047 and page 36 of Exhibit P2358 also show that
20 Milosevic's support for the Contact Group Plan and the Dayton plan later
21 was also based on nationalistic considerations. In fact, he sometimes
22 phrased his support for the peace plans in terms of the six strategic
23 goals of the Bosnian Serbs.
24 The basic questions Your Honours have to assess in determining
25 liability for the 1995 crimes is whether the common criminal plan still
1 existed. The Defence urge you to conclude that the project of ethnic
2 cleansing had finished by 1993 and that the common criminal plan had
3 therefore ceased. But the events at Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 are
4 tragic and incontestable proof that ethnic cleansing had not ended in
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina by the middle of 1993. The murders in Trnovo were
6 an inherent part of that ethnic cleansing. I refer Your Honours to row
7 A25 of the confidential evidence table in connection with Srebrenica and
9 Similarly, the charged crimes in Sanski Most show that the
10 process of forcibly and permanently removing non-Serbs, sometimes by
11 killing them, continued there as well. In short, the common criminal
12 plan continued until the last days of the war. The accused's role in the
13 1995 crimes, which will be discussed by my colleagues, demonstrates
14 beyond reasonable doubt that the accused continued to share this plan.
15 With the Chamber's leave, Mr. Weber will now continue the
16 Prosecution's submissions.
17 MR. WEBER: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
18 As Mr. Groome indicated, I will provide an overview of the
19 special units of the Serbian DB and address the Chamber on matters
20 related to the activities of one of these units, the Red Berets. As part
21 of this discussion, I will address the existence and continuity of the
22 unit between 1991 and 1996 in addition to particular activities of the
23 unit in the Krajina, Bosanski Samac, and Doboj.
24 The special units of the Serbian DB were paramilitary formations
25 deployed by the accused throughout Croatia and Bosnia. Whether it was
1 the Red Berets applying the Doboj experience, the Tigers enforcing
2 Arkan's policy of taking no prisoners in Dalj, or the members of the
3 Skorpions executing six Muslim men and boys at Trnovo, the use of these
4 units furthered a common purpose and resulted in mass devastation to the
5 non-Serb population of the former Yugoslavia.
6 These units acted with impunity, with the blessing and support of
7 the State Security Service of Serbia. The evidence in this case has
8 shown that the Red Berets, Tigers, and Skorpions shared many things in
9 common. The special units shared a common symbol of an upward pointed
10 sword. Their actions were directed by the accused and their
12 They operated from nearby bases in Croatia along the border with
13 Serbia in Ilok, Erdut, and Djeletovci, and they participated together in
14 joint operations in both Croatia and Bosnia.
15 Despite their efforts to act in secrecy, despite the attempts of
16 the accused to recycle these efforts to conceal their liability, the
17 evidence consistently demonstrates that Jovica Stanisic and
18 Franko Simatovic contributed these special units in furtherance of the
19 JCE's common criminal purpose.
20 The special units of the Serbian DB often operated in
21 co-ordination with other Serb forces, including the armies, police, and
22 local Territorial Defence units of Republika Srpska and the
23 Republic of the Serbian Krajina. During these operations, the Serbian DB
24 units were included in joint formations, often referred to as tactical or
25 operational groups. These groups were formed for specific purpose in a
1 limited period of time.
2 The important thing to remember about this is that any
3 resubordinations were temporary and for a particular purpose. This
4 didn't change the fundamental character of the units as DB units loyal to
5 the accused. The fact that the accused willingly and repeatedly gave
6 their men to other JCE members just shows that they were co-operating
7 with those other JCE members and contributing to the overall JCE.
8 Examples of this include the participation of the Red Berets in
9 TG-17 during the take-over of Bosanski Samac, and their participation in
10 TG-Ozren during the take-over of Doboj. Another example is the
11 participation of the Red Berets, Tigers, and Skorpions in Tactical
12 Groups 2 and 3 during Operation Pauk or Spider.
13 In their final trial briefs, the accused seek to mitigate their
14 responsibility for contributing DB special units to joint operations with
15 other Serb forces. An example, the Defence submissions on the
16 participation of Vaso Mijovic and the Red Berets during the 1993 Drina
17 valley operations. As seen on the slide before the Chamber, the
18 Simatovic Defence asserts that Mijovic was within the composition of the
19 VRS. The Stanisic Defence acknowledges Mijovic had some association with
20 Simatovic and claims he had allegiances to many entities.
21 These submissions attempt to obfuscate the fact that the
22 Red Berets trained locals from Bratunac and then participated in combat
23 formations with VRS units at the time. The Prosecution would refer the
24 Chamber to paragraphs 263 through 269 of its brief concerning the
25 involvement of the Red Berets in Bratunac.
1 As the evidence has shown, these co-ordinated joint operations
2 with other military or MUP structures are important because they reflect
3 the accused's intended participation in contribution of special units to
4 other JCE members. It does not make the special units of the Serbian DB
5 formally part of these other structures or diminish their allegiance to
6 the DB as argued by the Defence.
7 Regardless of the level of temporary resubordination with other
8 Serb forces, the accused are responsible for the crimes of their units
9 and those of the other Serb forces because of their contributions to the
11 Turning to the Red Berets. The accused contributed to the JCE's
12 common purpose by establishing and directing a special DB unit initially
13 referred to by others as Frenki's men and the Knindzas, then often
14 referred to as the Red Berets. The "unit," as it was affectionately
15 called by its members, existed in one form or another from its formation
16 in May 1991 when it was known as a Special Purpose Unit or JPN through
17 its formalisation as the JATD in August 1993, and on to its reincarnation
18 as the JSO in 1996.
19 As Captain Dragan stated twice in Exhibit P2976, the unit existed
20 at all times. Through the testimony of multiple members of the special
21 units of the DB, through DB payment records and personnel files, and
22 through many other witnesses and documentary materials, the Prosecution
23 proved the unit existed at all times and grew over time.
24 In paragraphs 196 to 296 of its final trial brief, the
25 Prosecution discusses the activities of the unit from its inception in
1 1991 through the Kula award ceremony in 1997, which in the words of
2 Franko Simatovic recorded on video in Exhibit P61 was a "ceremony marking
3 the anniversary of the formation of the Special Operations Unit of the
4 State Security Service." The next words out of the accused's mouth were,
5 "It was constituted on 4 May 1991."
6 The training camps and operations discussed in our brief show a
7 repeated pattern of the accused setting up camps to train unit members
8 and other Serb forces before they were deployed on joint operations where
9 they committed the crimes charged in the indictment.
10 At this stage of the proceedings, it is useful to look at what
11 remains contested and some of the concessions made by the accused in
12 their final trial briefs concerning the Red Berets.
13 Both accused acknowledge in their briefs that the JATD existed
14 after August of 1993. Although they still contest their respective roles
15 in some of the JATD's activities, these challenges are not credible in
16 light of the evidence presented at trial. The Prosecution will not spend
17 much time at this point discussing the unit's activities between 1993 and
18 1996, but would note a few specific points.
19 In section II of Stanisic's brief entitled "Debunking the
20 mythology that the DB was a war machine," Stanisic portrays himself as a
21 simple civil servant who possessed limited operative resources. These
22 submission ignore the fact that the Serbian DB was devoting funds and
23 resources to their special units through various forms of payment. As
24 examples of cash expenditures on the JATD, the Prosecution would refer
25 the Trial Chamber to row B1 of the confidential evidence chart.
1 The JATD also had priority in terms of staffing. As an example
2 of the preferential treatment in the staffing of the JATD by the accused
3 Stanisic, the Prosecution would refer the Chamber to row B2 of the
4 confidential evidence chart. And also at this time for Your Honours, the
5 Prosecution would additionally refer the Chamber to page 2 of
6 Slobodan Milosevic's 2001 appeal concerning the Serbian government's
7 expenditures on weapons, ammunition, and equipment for the VRS, RSK, and
8 special anti-terrorist forces. The appeal is Exhibit P3023.
9 The Prosecution requests that the next slide not be broadcast to
10 the public.
11 The personnel files of unit members further illustrate that the
12 Red Berets were built and used for combat. All parties in this case
13 tendered personnel files. Here, on slide 40 are some references from the
14 personnel files tendered by the Defence. Even these files show the
15 commander of the unit was Franko Simatovic, and the functions of unit
16 members described repeatedly as soldiers including commanding platoons
17 and combat groups. The files tendered by the Defence also demonstrate
18 that the unit provided combat training, engaged in combat operations, and
19 sent unit members to the front line.
20 DB payment records, personnel files of unit members, and even the
21 DB's own reports all show the priority of Stanisic was to support a
22 combat unit commanded by Simatovic.
23 Your Honours, I don't know if you're anticipating taking a break
24 at this time or if you'd like me to continue.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I think we take a -- yes. First of all, before even
1 considering to take a break, we should allow the interpreters to finish
2 their interpretation.
3 I think we would take a break after -- yes, approximately this
4 time. That's 75 minutes. Would this be a suitable moment?
5 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then we will take the break now, and we will resume
7 at three minutes past 4.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.33 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.05 p.m.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, when you are ready, you may proceed.
11 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 As the commander of the unit, Simatovic was a powerful and
13 well-connected man. If Simatovic was some low functionary as he claims
14 throughout his brief, unit members like Dejan Sliskovic would not have
15 considered him their commander. We would also not see him sharing a
16 couch with Martic, Karadzic, Krajisnik, Zupljanin, and Stanisic as we see
17 in Exhibit P391. Nor would he have attended planning meetings for
18 military operations like the February 1993 meeting with senior leadership
19 of the VRS and VJ regarding Operation Udar as P392 shows he did. The
20 Prosecution would additionally refer the Chamber to rows B3 to B7 of the
21 confidential evidence chart.
22 Thought the Defence cases and their final trial briefs, both
23 accused challenged the continuity of the unit between 1991 up until its
24 formalisation as the JATD in 1993. Before discussing evidence related to
25 the unit's early existence, the Prosecution would like to note some
1 additional statements by the accused Stanisic in his find brief.
2 In paragraphs 497 and 514, Stanisic makes a number of concessions
3 with respect to the unit's existence prior to 1993. Some of these
4 statements are now on the slide before the Chamber.
5 In paragraph 497, Stanisic acknowledges that he had control over
6 a unit known as the Red Berets between August-September 1991 until the
7 end of February 1992 as "part of his aim to create an anti-terrorist
8 unit, ATU." And "Stanisic intended to use the 28 selected to create an
10 By making these concessions, Stanisic is not challenging the
11 Prosecution's case that he had the authority to create and control the DB
12 special unit known as the Red Berets at some point prior to his official
13 appointment as chief of the service in 1992. He is also not challenging
14 the Prosecution's case that a DB unit known as the Red Berets existed
15 prior to its reformation as the JATD, albeit in a limited form for a
16 six- to seven -month period.
17 The evidence in this case does not support these limited
18 conclusions, and it shows the unit existed at all times from May 1991
20 As a general observation, Stanisic tries to redesignate his
21 Red Berets between 1991 and 1992 as the ATU throughout his brief.
22 However, this is not what the unit was commonly referred to in documents
23 prior to 1993. As seen in a significant quantity of materials admitted
24 in this case, it was often referred to as the Special Purpose Unit of the
25 MUP Serbia, a unit, the evidence shows, existed between 1991 and 1993
1 until being renamed the JATD. The Prosecution provides references to
2 examples of these documents in row B8 of the confidential evidence chart.
3 In paragraphs 37 to 63 of his brief, Stanisic acknowledges some
4 of the individuals who were present in Fruska Gora for portions of either
5 1991 or 1992, including unit members Laka, Pilipovic, Borjan Vuckovic,
6 and the Bozic brothers. These were all individuals who joined the unit
7 in Golubic prior to August 1991. The Prosecution would refer the Chamber
8 to Annex A of its brief for further description of evidence related to
9 these unit members.
10 With Your Honours' leave, the Prosecution requests to turn into
11 private session.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We turn into private session.
13 [Private session]
11 [Open session]
12 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
14 MR. WEBER: The evidence in this case also shows that not all
15 members of the unit were in Fruska Gora and Pajzos after July 1991.
16 Milan Babic, JF-031 and JF-039 all provided evidence that unit members
17 continued their operations in the Krajina after Golubic. Milan Babic
18 testified that Frenki's base, a base of the Serbian DB, was in Korenica
19 after August 1991. This can be found on page 335 of P1878. The
20 Prosecution would additionally refer the Chamber to rows B19 to B24 of
21 the confidential evidence chart.
22 Simatovic himself admits to the continuing involvement of the DB
23 in the Krajina during the Kula awards ceremony when he stated that:
24 "The unit provided important support in the liberation of the
25 Republic of Serbian Krajina."
1 He then stated:
2 "Around 5.000 soldiers were engaged in these battles, and their
3 actions were co-ordinated by the unit command and intelligence team from
4 the 2nd Administration."
5 In other words, the accused used people from the
6 2nd Administration along with unit members to co-ordinate the actions of
7 other Serb forces who were controlled by Milan Martic.
8 Before continuing with further submissions on the continuity of
9 the unit, the Prosecution would briefly make a few points about two
10 witnesses relied upon in the Defence briefs and related to the events in
11 the Krajina.
12 The first, Aco Draca. He greatly minimised evidence related to
13 the conduct of the accused and Milan Martic. During cross-examination,
14 the witness displayed his bias, and the Chamber had to caution the
15 witness on repeated occasions to provide complete answers and tell the
16 whole truth about interactions between the Krajina and Serbian DBs.
17 For example, he testified that there were rumours of Rade Kostic
18 working for the Serbian DB, but he couldn't remember who said that to
19 him. He later acknowledged that he knew that Milan Martic himself had
20 claimed that. On this occasion, he was cautioned by the Chamber to tell
21 the whole truth. On another occasion, he absolutely asserted that there
22 was never a plan or proposal to join the RSK DB to the Serbian DB. He
23 later acknowledged that Milan Martic frequently proposed the very same
24 idea to him.
25 Specific examples of his unreliable testimony can also be found
1 in his evidence related to the charged crimes in the indictment. Draca
2 portrayed the crimes committed in Bruska as a private feud between a few
3 citizens on direct examination. He stated at page 16765 that the
4 villagers from Bruska were interviewed by the Krajina police and "no
5 statements were taken from them." Admitted in evidence as P43 is an
6 official record of an interview completed by the Benkovac SJB, the very
7 station that Draca worked for. This record includes the account of
8 Jasna Denona just four days after the murders charged in the indictment
9 and shows that the Benkovac SJB possessed information that the Krajina
10 police were the perpetrators of the murders in Bruska.
11 This witness's evidence related to the perpetrators of the
12 Skabrnja massacre is also inaccurate when compared to other exhibits,
13 such as D675, which does not reference the 63rd Parachute Brigade as
14 being one of the JNA units engaged in these operations. Draca's evidence
15 regarding Skabrnja is also contradicted by Prosecution Exhibits 2802,
16 1212, and 1209.
17 The second witness, Goran Opacic, was convicted for the crimes
18 committed in Skabrnja according to Exhibit P3106 and P3107. In his
19 brief, Simatovic does not rely upon Opacic's evidence related to the
20 massacre in Skabrnja but instead relies upon his denials that the accused
21 were involved with the training and activities of Serb forces in the
22 Krajina. This witness is wholly uncredible.
23 For example, he claimed to never have any interactions with
24 Stanisic before the Kula award ceremony in 1997. However, as you can see
25 on slide number 47 before you, Stanisic greeted Opacic unlike many of the
1 other members of the unit at Kula with a kiss, and then during his
2 unscripted remarks at the ceremony Opacic was the first person mentioned
3 by Stanisic out of all the members of the unit present that day.
4 When confronted with his prominent role during the presentation
5 of awards at page 18313, the witness provided an unconvincing answer
6 about his exchange with Stanisic. His answer is provided on slide number
8 Even this witness's own brother and fellow unit member admitted
9 in Exhibit P2984 that he was "co-operating with the RDB from the very
10 beginning via the Golubic camp."
11 Returning to the continuity of the unit between 1991 and 1993, as
12 already seen, Stanisic acknowledges that the Red Berets existed during
13 the fall of 1991 and spring of 1992. There were individuals who joined
14 the unit during this time that are centrally relevant to this case. Two
15 of these individuals, both relevant to the crimes committed in
16 Bosanski Samac where Dragan Djordjevic, aka Crni, and Aleksandar Vukovic.
17 Crni joined the unit in October 1991 as part of the unit's active
18 service. His personnel file shows that by February 1992, Crni was based
19 in Lezimir as the commander of the 1st Rifle Squad. In P2984, another
20 report by Zivojin Ivanovic from December 1991 indicates that Crni had
21 been stationed in Ilok.
22 According to Stevan Todorovic in P1576, Aleksandar Vukovic was
23 one of the instructors with the DB special unit in Ilok before being
24 deployed to Bosanski Samac. A document from Vukovic's personnel records
25 admitted as P3154 further confirms he was a member of the unit in
1 February 1992 and joined an assistant machine-gunner.
2 Both Crni and Vukovic are mentioned in a December 1992 entry from
3 the Mladic notebooks. This entry reflects a meeting between Mladic and
4 members of the Samac municipality, including Stevan Todorovic.
5 On slide 50, are Mladic's notes of what Todorovic said at the
6 meeting. Todorovic stated that there were men sent to Ilok for training
7 and on 18 April 1992, they were transferred together on helicopters with
8 30 volunteers from Kragujevac and among them were two members of the
9 Serbian MUP, Dragan Djordjevic, aka Crni, and Aleksandar Vukovic.
10 This exhibit represents significant corroboration of the
11 92 quater testimony of Todorovic and shows that locals from Samac were
12 sent to Ilok for training by the Serbian MUP and then returned to Bosnia
13 with former SRS volunteers and members of the Serbian MUP. In
14 conjunction with other evidence related to Crni, Vukovic, and Ilok, it is
15 clear that the DB were the ones who provided this training and oversaw
16 the perpetrators of crimes upon their deployment to Bosanski Samac in
17 April 1992.
18 During their deployment to Bosanski Samac, the individuals who
19 were trained in Ilok considered themselves to be part of a unit called
20 the Grey Wolves and Red Berets. Stanisic attacks the credibility of
21 JF-047 and attempts to distinguish the Grey Wolves from the Red Berets as
22 being associated to two different units in paragraphs 588 to 592 of his
23 brief. They were not two different units. As seen on the slide before
24 the Chamber, the Grey Wolf patch worn by the unit is admitted as P141.
25 The same emblem was also placed on the unit's own forms as seen in
1 Exhibit P2786.
2 Also depicted on the slide the Wolf insignia was used by the
3 Red Berets on the wall of the Kula centre to show the location of --
4 locations of their operations. In P2976, the same Wolf symbol was worn
5 by Simatovic on his own red beret. The Prosecution would additionally
6 refer the Chamber to row B25 of the confidential evidence chart.
7 In paragraph 278 of its brief, the Prosecution discusses the unit
8 members who were killed during operations prior to 1993. Serbian DB
9 extended posthumous awards or payments to many of these individuals.
10 These recognitions further illustrate that the unit continually existed
11 between 1991 and 1993.
12 The Prosecution requests that the next slide not be broadcast to
13 the public.
14 One of these individuals was Milan Dimic, a unit member who was
15 killed in Doboj on 13 July 1992, one day after approximately 27 non-Serb
16 civilians were removed from Percin's Disco and killed while forming part
17 of a human shield for the Red Berets and other Serb forces. For his
18 efforts, the Serbian DB extended 62 payments to Dimic's relatives between
19 1993 and 1995 and recognised him with an award in 1996, which is noted on
20 the slide before the Chamber.
21 Between April and July 1992, other members of the unit were also
22 involved in the training in Ozren and operations in Doboj. Three
23 witnesses in this case all name Raja Bozovic and Davor Subotic, aka Riki,
24 as possessing a commanding role in these operations. The Prosecution
25 would refer the Chamber to rows B26 to B29 of the confidential evidence
2 And, Your Honours, again with your leave if we could please turn
3 to private session.
4 JUDGE ORIE: We turn into private session.
5 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
13 MR. WEBER: Both accused argue that they only did things that
14 they were permitted or required to do by the Serbian law and certain
15 regulations. For example, at paragraph 100 of his brief, Stanisic claims
16 that he was a "stickler for rules." The next 25 pages of his brief
17 analyses those rules and requests an inference that Stanisic did only the
18 things permitted by the regulations. This argument is contradicted by
19 the accused's own concession that an anti-terrorist unit was formed
20 between 1991 and 1992 and did exist after the fall of 1993.
21 There is no provision in any of the relevant laws or regulations
22 permitting the DB to form an armed unit. Nevertheless, the evidence has
23 shown that they did.
24 Lastly. Stanisic Defence weaves arguments about notice
25 throughout its final trial brief. With respect to the Stanisic Defence
1 claim that the only unit sufficiently pled is the "28 elite trainers,"
2 the Prosecution asserts that the special units of the Serbian DB which
3 were the focus of this case were clearly set out in the indictment,
4 particularly paragraphs 4 and 6, and that is consistent with the evidence
5 presented by the Prosecution.
6 With respect to the Defence contention that the names of certain
7 individuals contained in the evidence tendered by the Prosecution are
8 material fact which should have been pled in the indictment, the Defence
9 confuses evidence with material facts. The third amended indictment pled
10 the material facts which underpin the charges in a manner sufficient to
11 inform the accused of the charges and allow him to prepare his defence.
12 The names individuals, whether physical perpetrators or tools or simply
13 otherwise relevant individuals are a matter of evidence.
14 At this time, Ms. Friedman will continue the Prosecution's
15 submissions with your leave.
16 MS. FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honours. The Prosecution has
17 proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused are liable for the
18 deployment and operations of Arkan's SDG in numerous locations, including
19 in SBWS, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Sanski Most, where they committed the
20 charged crimes which were the object of the JCE.
21 I will begin by speaking about the credibility of
22 Prosecution Witness JF-057 and Defence Witnesses Dmitrovic and Pelevic in
23 relation to Arkan's connection to and reliance on the Serbian DB. Those
24 are the first two items listed on slide 56 before you.
25 I will next discuss issues related to SBWS. First, Simatovic's
1 liability for crimes, item 3, and then three points in relation to
2 Stanisic's liability, items 4 through 6.
3 My final three points relate to the Bijeljina and Zvornik crime
5 I will now move into private session for approximately five
7 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
8 [Private session]
11 Page 20216 redacted. Private session.
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
15 Could you please adjust your speed of speech.
16 MS. FRIEDMAN: Yes, Your Honour.
17 Dimitrijevic testified that Srdjan Golubic, the SDG member
18 depicted in P605 kicking civilians lying on the street in Bijeljina, was
19 punished for his conduct by removal from the SDG. He emphasised that
20 this kind of conduct was unacceptable in the SDG. Only when confronted
21 on cross-examination by the fact that Golubic appeared on a DB payment
22 list from 1995, did Dimitrijevic acknowledge that it was practice that
23 people were forgiven some time.
24 Witness Pelevic cannot be considered a witness of truth in light
25 of his more than evident admiration towards Arkan whom he still considers
1 to be a hero of the Serbian people.
2 This admiration led to biased and dishonest evidence as
3 demonstrated by his statement that he never heard of crimes being
4 committed by Arkan or members of the SDG and SBWS and affirmed that he
5 had still not heard of such things even at the time that he testified.
6 Pelevic offered evidence that was demonstrably false. When asked
7 whether the SDG ever participated in combat with the Skorpions, Pelevic
8 answered "no, never." The Prosecution has tendered video footage of
9 joint operations seen on P483 as well as additional documentary and
10 witness evidence. It is highly unlikely that Pelevic did not know about
11 joint operations between these units. And even if it were the case that
12 he did not have actual knowledge and chose to remain wilfully blind as he
13 claims to have done in respect of Arkan's criminal record, that, too,
14 should preclude any reliance being placed on testimony he offered.
15 In another instance, Pelevic asserted that he was sure that
16 nobody from the Serbian MUP or DB came to the Erdut training centre while
17 also stating that Badza often came to the Erdut training centre. Your
18 Honours will find this at T-16337 to 16338. Giving Pelevic the benefit
19 of the doubt of what he knew at the time of the events, he must have
20 later learned that even when Badza first arrived to the region and
21 commanded the TO, he was also a high profile employee of the Serbian MUP,
22 yet he unabashedly provided evidence that no one from the Serbian MUP
23 came to the Erdut training centre because he was determined to provide
24 evidence which distanced the SDG from the Serbian DB.
25 Simatovic argues that there is no evidence linking him to Arkan
1 and cites Gagic's evidence that he never saw him in Slavonia. There is
2 certainly -- there is certainly more evidence of Simatovic's personal
3 presence in Krajina than of his presence in SBWS. It is important to
4 bear in mind that the charged crimes in these two regions were occurring
6 Simatovic is responsible for the crimes in SBWS because they were
7 part of the common criminal plan and he was a member of the JCE. His
8 main contribution at that point in time was in the Krajina, and that was
9 a significant contribution to the JCE. Simatovic made contributions in
10 the SBWS as well by setting up bases there and participating in the
11 attack on Vukovar; yet, even if he had not made a significant
12 contribution in SBWS, his liability for the crimes rests firmly on his
13 participation in the JCE.
14 Both Defence teams have accepted the evidence that Badza and
15 Arkan co-operated closely in the SBWS.
16 The Defence attempt to dispute the link between Arkan and the DB
17 in two ways. First, by breaking the link between the public security and
18 state security, or Stanisic and Badza, and secondly, by discounting the
19 evidence that DB operatives were acting on Stanisic's behalf. Stanisic
20 emphasises Badza's presence and claims that his own absence is
21 significant. However, the fact that Badza was actually deployed to SBWS
22 in the fall of 1991 does not diminish Stanisic's responsibility.
23 First, Stanisic was present in the region at key moments and was
24 very well informed about what was occurring there. Second, Stanisic
25 co-operated closely with Badza and the other JCE members, including
1 Hadzic, Milosevic, Bogdanovic, and Arkan. Third, Stanisic ensured that
2 the men he was in charge of, including Kostic and Kojic, provided vital
3 assistance to JCE members Hadzic, Badza, and Arkan who were on the ground
4 in SBWS.
5 The Stanisic brief at page -- paragraph 417 claims that there is
6 "not a single piece of reliable evidence to support the assertion that
7 Badza took orders or even advice from Stanisic." Stanisic would
8 apparently dismiss the evidence of General Milovanovic referred to
9 earlier by Mr. Farr and which appears now on slide 65.
10 The only reasonable inference based on General Milovanovic's
11 evidence is that when Badza said, "I arrived here with the boss," he was
12 referring to Stanisic.
13 In cross-examination, the Defence challenge this evidence on the
14 basis that according to their de jure positions, Stanisic should not have
15 been Badza's boss. This is an example of where the evidence of what
16 actually transpired portrays a situation that is different than what the
17 laws dictated.
18 Milovanovic's evidence about this meeting in which he found
19 Stanisic's knowledge to be astounding attests to Stanisic's role in
20 planning and co-ordinating actions in furtherance of the JCE on behalf of
21 the Serbian government and explains why he may have functioned as Badza's
22 boss even though, legally speaking, Badza was not subordinated to him.
23 The Prosecution requests that the next slide not be broadcast.
24 Even putting aside the evidence that Stanisic had de facto
25 authority over Badza, this is but one instance where Stanisic attempts to
1 elevate the Prosecution's evidentiary burden by suggesting that the
2 Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt certain facts which are
3 not necessary in order to prove the accused's responsibility. The fact
4 is that Stanisic and Badza as heads of state security and public security
5 of the Serbian MUP worked closely with Milosevic and co-operated with
6 each other during the indictment period providing significant Serbian MUP
7 resources to the other JCE members. Slides 66 and 67 contain examples of
8 the evidence Your Honours have heard about the co-operation between the
9 state security and public security, both between the heads of the
10 services and members operating in the field.
11 Sliskovic provides evidence about co-operation between members of
12 the SAJ unit under Badza and the JATD under Stanisic and Simatovic, which
13 is corroborated further by the interview with Obrad Stevanovic, contained
14 in P973, and other operations -- and other evidence of joint operations
15 that Ms. Harbour will discuss.
16 It is also important to bear in mind that references to the
17 Serbian MUP do not refer only to public security. The Serbian MUP
18 contains two divisions, the public security and state security, and a
19 reference to the Serbian MUP can refer to either of them.
20 The Prosecution requests that the next slide not be broadcast.
21 Slide number 68 contains two documents which refer to DB members
22 as employees of the Serbian MUP without further specification.
23 Furthermore, it is apparent in the evidence that individuals who were not
24 closely affiliated with the DB may not have known whether a particular
25 person worked for public security or state security due to their
1 intertwined activities. I refer the Chamber, for example, to the
2 evidence of Borivoje Savic at T-1876.
3 Perhaps the best example of the intertwined nature of the
4 services is Kojic's statement, P1698, seen on slide 69, wherein he
5 asserts that even while he was officially employed by the Serbian MUP
6 public security, he was actually answering to Stanisic.
7 I will now move to a discussion of Stanisic's responsibility for
8 the acts of his subordinates as they relate to his liability for crimes
9 in SBWS and in Bijeljina and Zvornik.
10 Stanisic argues at paragraph 734 that the Prosecution has not
11 shown evidence that Stanisic provided instructions or orders to Kostic or
12 that Kostic's actions were in furtherance of a DB policy and suggests
13 that the Prosecution is inappropriately resting liability on an
14 employment relationship.
15 The Prosecution has demonstrated that Kostic actions were carried
16 out in accordance with how Stanisic intended to use the Serbian DB to
17 further the JCE. The Prosecution does not need to produce evidence of an
18 order directly from Stanisic to Kostic in order to meet its burden of
20 Stanisic was the man in charge, and as such he could be expected
21 to be well informed. But he was even better informed than expected.
22 Mr. Farr has discussed this issue recounting evidence from
23 Witnesses Milovanovic and Corbic. I will provide you with two more
24 examples of this evidence.
25 In January 1992, Stanisic affirmed to Karadzic that he had the
1 ability to appoint people in SBWS. Excerpts from this conversation
2 appear on slide 71.
3 Stanisic discussed having been present in the field in order to
4 talk to commanders and states that he would be responsible for creating
5 "some kind of concept."
6 Defence Witness Knezevic testified at T-13542 that Stanisic had a
7 conversation with him about the situation in SBWS when Stanisic was
8 passing through the area. He asked Knezevic to confirm certain
9 information that he had received from DB operative Lazar Sarac. This
10 shows that Stanisic had personal knowledge of information reported by DB
11 operatives who were several levels beneath him in the DB hierarchy and
12 that he actively sought additional information.
13 The only reasonable inference based on Stanisic's level of
14 knowledge and personal involvement is that the actions of his employees
15 were pursuant to the direction in which he led the Serbian DB. It is
16 clear that he established a policy of helping the Serb forces perpetrate
17 JCE crimes.
18 I would like to move into private session for approximately eight
20 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
21 [Private session]
11 Page 20224 redacted. Private session.
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
3 MS. FRIEDMAN: The words and actions of Milan Martic offer
4 further evidence of Kostic's association with Stanisic. I refer
5 Your Honours to the intercepted conversation P1605 on slide 73. In this
6 call, Martic irately implores Milosevic to have Stanisic removed Kostic
7 and the rest of what he refers to as Stanisic's gang from Erdut and
8 Pajzos. Milosevic denies that these men are Stanisic's men, but in fact
9 Kostic's personnel file leaves no doubt that he was working for Stanisic
10 at that time.
11 Simatovic referred to Kostic at the Kula camp celebration as a
12 "distinguished member of this unit."
13 I will now discuss several issues in relation to the accused's
14 liability for the Zvornik crime base. The Defence again argued that the
15 crimes were planned and carried out by other JCE members without their
17 The Prosecution requests that the next slide not be broadcast.
18 In trying to dismiss the evidence that Marko Pavlovic, commander
19 of the Zvornik TO, was a member of the Serbian DB, Stanisic attempts to
20 challenge the evidence of three witnesses at paragraph 739 of his brief,
21 claiming that the evidence of each is uncorroborated when in fact they
22 are three independent sources of evidence that corroborate each other as
23 summarised in slide number 75.
24 First, the Stanisic's brief misstates JF-061's evidence.
25 Stanisic states that according to JF-061, Pavlovic claimed to have a DB
1 ID, which is a clear indication of the falsity of his claims. Your
2 Honours can see what JF-061 actually said in the confidential evidence
3 table at row C1; thus the evidence is not that Pavlovic claimed to have a
4 card issued by the DB.
5 B-161 provides evidence of Pavlovic's close relationship with
6 Tepavcevic which Your Honours will find at rows C2 and C3 of the
7 confidential evidence table. Stanisic urges the Chamber to dismiss this
8 evidence which he claims is uncorroborated. This applies an overly
9 stringent approach. It is not necessary for another witness to offer the
10 exact same facts. Evidence of a connection with Tepavcevic is evidence
11 of a connection with the DB.
12 Stanisic then asks the Chamber to disregard JF-026's evidence by
13 asserting that JF-026 retracted his evidence that Tepavcevic was
14 Pavlovic's boss. First this assertion is erroneous since JF-026's
15 evidence was about Kostic, not Pavlovic. Further, JF-026 did not retract
16 this evidence altogether. JF-026's testimony was that Kostic worked for
17 the Serbian MUP but he could no longer remember the name of his superior
18 at the time. JF-026 also testified that Pavlovic referred to Kostic as
19 his boss, which is another point of corroboration and his connection to
20 the DB.
21 JF-026 also offered evidence which indirectly bolsters B-161's
22 credibility and attests to the independence of these two witnesses.
23 Your Honours will find that evidence and brief confidential arguments at
24 rows C4 to C6 of the confidential evidence table.
25 As he did with Kostic, Stanisic argues that actions committed by
1 Tepavcevic cannot be impugned to Stanisic. The Prosecution submits that
2 the fact that Tepavcevic was Stanisic's deputy leads to a strong
3 inference that he was acting pursuant to Stanisic's directions. I will
4 discuss just one piece of evidence that makes this the only reasonable
6 In December 1993, a meeting that was attended by the key leaders
7 from Serbia and Republika Srpska was hosted at the DB headquarters in
8 Belgrade. This meeting was discussed in detail during the Prosecution's
9 98 bis submissions and earlier by Mr. Farr. It is Exhibit P2532 and is
10 on slide 77. At this time, I would simply draw Your Honours' attention
11 to the Serbian MUP attendees of this meeting who were Sokolovic,
12 Stanisic, Badza, and Tepavcevic. Stanisic presided over the meeting, and
13 Sokolovic and Badza both spoke during different points in time; whereas
14 Tepavcevic outranked by all these men did not. The meeting demonstrates
15 Stanisic's intent to use the resources available to him to contribute to
16 the JCE on the territory of the Republika Srpska, as well as the fact
17 that Tepavcevic was well aware of this.
18 With respect to Stanisic's liability for the crimes in Zvornik
19 the Stanisic Defence brief at paragraphs 771 to 772 asks the question:
20 Why would Stanisic be involved in the take-over of Zvornik and arrange
21 supplies for paramilitaries only to later arrest the Vuckovic brothers
22 for crimes.
23 The possible answer to the question, if the evidence that the
24 arrest occurred at Stanisic's behest is believed, is that he felt
25 compelled to do so for political reasons. The arrests occurred more than
1 a year and a half later, at a time when reports about the crimes in
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina were being published. The arrest of only two
3 individuals is insignificant in light of the evidence of the DB's
4 involvement in those crimes.
5 The more telling question is why these were the only arrests that
6 were made at that time. Both of the Vuckovic brothers in their
7 statements to the DB provided information about heinous crimes
8 perpetrated by Marko Pejic, one of Arkan's men. I refer Your Honours to
9 an excerpt of Vojin Vuckovic's statement, P2987, which appears at row C7
10 of the confidential evidence table.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Friedman, I'm looking at the clock. Time for a
13 MS. FRIEDMAN: Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If this is a suitable moment.
15 MS. FRIEDMAN: Yes, this is a suitable moment.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We have another 75 minutes after the break,
17 which would bring us to approximately -- let me just -- which would mean
18 that you would need tomorrow, I take it, not necessarily you, but perhaps
19 I should address you, Mr. Groome. Another 25 minutes, is that --
20 MR. GROOME: I think at the pace we're going, Your Honour, we may
21 finish today.
22 JUDGE ORIE: That would be appreciated. Then we can hear the --
23 it makes it easier perhaps for the Defence.
24 Then we take a break and we resume at a quarter to 6.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 5.16 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 5.47 p.m.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Friedman, when you are ready, you may proceed.
3 MS. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Your Honours, before the break I referred you to Vojin Vuckovic's
5 statement which implicates Marko Pejic, one of Arkan's SDGs -- SDG
6 members in crimes in Zvornik.
7 Not only did the Serbian DB fail arrest Pejic on the basis of
8 this information, they issued per diem payments to him as a member of the
9 SDG. Pejic's name appears at page 30 of Exhibit P541 and page 8 of P543.
10 These are JATD payment lists for the period leading up to the Sanski Most
11 operations from mid-August to mid-September 1995.
12 Finally, Your Honours, the report compiled by Milorad Davidovic
13 in August 1992 about the situation in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Brcko
14 provides additional evidence of the Serbian DB's involvement in sending
15 men to Eastern Bosnia. Excerpts from this important piece of evidence
16 appear on slide 79.
17 The Davidovic report demonstrates that members of the unit
18 operated alongside member of the SDG in "liberating these areas" and
19 discusses the involvement of the Serbian MUP in sending these and other
20 forces. Another passage at page 10 conveys Ivanovic's statement that his
21 group was sent by Simatovic and Tepavcevic.
22 Your Honours, it is significant that Serbian DB employees and
23 associates who operated under Stanisic's direction appeared wherever
24 Arkan appeared. Whether it be Kostic and Kojic in SBWS, Kostic and
25 Pavlovic in Zvornik, or Dragan Filipovic in Sanski Most as Ms. Harbour
1 will discuss.
2 The Prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
3 Stanisic and Simatovic used the resources and personnel at their disposal
4 to make a significant contribution to the crimes charged in SBWS,
5 Bijeljina, and Zvornik.
6 Ms. Harbour will now continue the Prosecution's submissions.
7 MS. HARBOUR: Your Honours, I am going to introduce the third
8 special unit of the Serbian DB, the Skorpions. I will then discuss the
9 joint operations that the unit, SDG, and Skorpions participated in
10 together from 1994 until the end of the indictment period. The evidence
11 of these operations reveals how Stanisic and Simatovic used these units
12 to further the common purpose. I will conclude with a discussion of
13 Sanski Most, particularly the SDG's operations and crimes there. All of
14 these operations depended upon the co-ordination of different JCE members
15 and the organs they controlled, demonstrating that JCE members continued
16 to pursue the common criminal purpose throughout the indictment period.
17 The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that are both accused are
18 criminally responsible for the charged crimes in Trnovo and Sanski Most.
19 My first point and an overarching theme of my submissions is that
20 the accused were responsible for the Skorpions. Stanisic and Simatovic
21 controlled the Skorpions during the indictment period, using them for
22 special operations in Croatia and Bosnia. Slobodan Medic, the Skorpion's
23 commander, referred to Stanisic as his boss and took orders from both
24 accused from at least 1994.
25 Slide 82 sets out some of the evidence showing that the Skorpions
1 were a special unit of the Serbian DB and controlled by both accused.
2 This corroborates the evidence of JF-024 and Stoparic which both Defence
3 teams have challenged in their final trial briefs.
4 In addition to, the evidence of the Skorpions' joint operations
5 with the SDG and JATD in 1994 and 1995 unequivocally demonstrates that
6 Stanisic and Simatovic were controlling the Skorpions' movements during
7 this entire period: Before, during, and after the Trnovo murders. The
8 evidence of these operations also reveals how the accused contributed to
9 the JCE through the Skorpions, SDG, and JATD. I will address the three
10 successive operations in turn, beginning with Operation Pauk.
11 As stated in the Prosecution's final trial brief, Operation Pauk
12 was significant for two main reasons. One, it exemplifies the close
13 co-ordination between JCE members pursuing the common purpose during this
14 period; and two, it is the first in a series of actions where the accused
15 deployed members of all three of the DB special units into combat
17 The accused do not dispute that Stanisic was involved in meetings
18 with high-level leaders before and during Operation Pauk.
19 The Mladic notebooks reflect several meetings where the attendees
20 discuss Stanisic's contribution of manpower to Pauk as reflected on
21 slide 84. At a meeting on 7 October 1994, Stanisic promised to send
23 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. --
24 MS. HARBOUR: On 8 November, both accused attended a meeting
25 where Stanisic said he had "provided forces strong enough to ensure the
1 liberation of Velika Kladusa and Fikret Abdic's return there."
2 Indeed, around this time the Skorpions, SDG, and JATD deployed to
3 Pauk. I refer Your Honours to slide 85. Zoran Rajic escorted the
4 Skorpions across the border from Serbia into Bosnia and oversaw their
5 activities in Pauk. Witnesses Sliskovic and JF-024 discussed this in
6 their evidence.
7 The Stanisic Defence argues that Operation Pauk was a legitimate,
8 lawfully conducted operation. Curiously, they then argue at
9 paragraph 1032 of their brief that Mladic attempted to implicate Stanisic
10 by the notebook entries showing that Stanisic was personally involved in
11 sending Arkan's men and the Skorpions into this operation. The
12 Stanisic Defence fails to explain how implicating Stanisic in what they
13 consider to be an entirely legitimate and lawfully conducted operation
14 would benefit Mladic.
15 The Simatovic Defence does not dispute that Simatovic was present
16 in Petrova Gora during the Pauk operations on multiple occasions, but
17 they argue that Simatovic's role in Pauk was limiting to -- limited to
18 setting up radio surveillance. Similarly, the Stanisic Defence argues
19 that Stanisic's only role in the Pauk command involved "members of the
20 JATD involved in security."
21 Viewed in its totality, the evidence tells a different story.
22 Slide 86 sets out evidence that Stanisic and Simatovic spent a
23 significant amount of time in Petrova Gora, that the Pauk commander
24 Novakovic reported to Stanisic on the operation's progress, and that both
25 accused gave orders to and met with Bozovic and Legija, the commanders of
1 TG-2 and TG-3. Bozovic and Legija in turn commanded the JATD, the SDG,
2 and the Skorpions in combat. The Stanisic Defence agrees that Bozovic
3 was a reserve JATD member during Pauk, while the Simatovic Defence relies
4 on Witness Plahuta's claim that Bozovic never belonged to the JATD.
5 An official JATD note, P3024, describes JATD members' involvement
6 in ambush, sniping, combat training, and identification of "targets for
7 our operations." The document sets out the combat equipment used, the
8 combat equipment issued to both Bozovic and Legija, evidence of these two
9 individuals' relationship to the Serbian DB. Stanisic argues that this
10 was probably the only time the JATD engaged in such activities. In light
11 of the totality of the evidence, this argument does not hold water.
12 The Prosecution requests that the next slide not be broadcast.
13 The Serbian DB's payment lists for the Pauk period reveal the
14 level of their financial investment in the Pauk operation and their
15 logistical involvement in transferring funds that Abdic provided for the
16 units involved. The Simatovic Defence has pointed out that the Serbian
17 DB's payment lists included commanders, pilots, and other members of the
18 Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina who were involved in the operation.
19 In addition, groups of JATD members were paid on the same list as
20 Bozovic, and groups of Tigers were paid on the same list as Legija during
21 this period, as indicated on slide 87. Rajic was also paid during this
22 period that he was overseeing the Skorpions in Pauk. Simatovic
23 personally signed some of these payment lists.
24 The fact that the Skorpions do not appear on any Serbian DB
25 payment lists for this or any other period indicates that they may not
1 have been paid by the DB through this vehicle. Their absence from the
2 payment lists does not negate the incontrovertible evidence of their
3 involvement in the Pauk under Legija's TG-2 and the totality of the
4 evidence that they were there at the behest of the accused.
5 Let us now turn to the Trnovo-Treskavica operation, shortly after
6 Pauk, where JATD member Mijovic commanded the SDG and Skorpions. During
7 this operation, the Skorpions shot six Muslim men and boys in cold blood
8 while one of them videotaped the entire event.
9 Both Defence final trial briefs discuss a meeting that took place
10 before the operation at Badza's office at the Serbian MUP attended by
11 Kojic, Badza, Medic, Arkan, Mrgud, and Ljubo Milojavic, the Plavi Brigade
12 commander. At this meeting, Badza said the Skorpions, SDG, and Plavi
13 Brigade should be sent to Trnovo to assist the VRS in combat. Simatovic
14 then contacted Arkan in Erdut and arranged for the SDG's participation.
15 I refer Your Honours to P1666 and the confidential evidence table, items
16 D9 to D11.
17 Kojic ultimately led these three units into Trnovo as indicated
18 in items D12 and D13 on the confidential evidence table. As shown on
19 slide 89 and discussed by Ms. Friedman, Kojic was an official DB employee
20 who by his own account was reporting directly to Stanisic. Through his
21 involvement at the pre-deployment meeting and in leading these units,
22 Kojic was responsible to the accused.
23 During the operations, prominent JATD member Mijovic commanded
24 the three units. Mijovic was a long-time member of the unit and directly
25 subordinate to the accused as indicated by the evidence on slide 90. His
1 leadership role in the Trnovo-Treskavica operation is evidence that
2 Stanisic and Simatovic were behind this operation.
3 Throughout their involvement in the Trnovo-Treskavica operations,
4 Skorpions, Plavi, and SDG were consistently referred to as Serbian MUP
5 units in official military and police reports as indicated on slides 91
6 and 92.
7 The Defence offers several arguments to distance the Serbian DB
8 from these units. The Simatovic Defence argues that the documents
9 referring to Serbian MUP units are mistaken and that Karadzic had
10 requested the assistance. The Stanisic Defence argues that these were
11 called Serbian MUP units because they were subject to Badza and the
12 public security and had nothing to do with the accused and the DB.
13 Stanisic's final trial brief is very misleading, asserting that
14 both JF-029 and JF-024 testified that the Skorpions were reserve forces
15 of the SAJ of public security. Both witnesses were testifying about the
16 1998 to 1999 period.
17 Aside from this misleading assertion, the Defence's
18 characterisation of Karadzic and Badza's involvement arises from the
19 evidence and is a crucial part of the Prosecution's case, demonstrating
20 the JCE members' deep involvement in furthering the common purpose
21 through the Skorpions' crimes in Trnovo.
22 Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence and the prominent role
23 the accused's subordinates Kojic and Mijovic played in the Trnovo
24 operations precludes any interpretation that would exclude the Serbian
25 DB's authority over the Skorpions.
1 Both accused challenge the evidence that Mijovic commanded these
2 units in the Trnovo-Treskavica operations. In light of all the evidence,
3 the Defence challenges should be dismissed.
4 And I would like to ask if we can go into private session for
5 approximately two minutes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
7 [Private session]
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
16 MS. HARBOUR: The next two pieces of evidence are on slide 94 and
17 must be considered together. P1454 is an order from Mladic on
18 1 July 1995 in response to a 30 June dispatch from the "MUP of Serbia's
19 ATD unit." Mladic orders "inform us through proper channels if anyone is
20 seriously wounded in the Trnovo sector." This order was sent to the
21 organs whose subsequent reports refer to the Skorpions, SDG, and Plavi in
22 the Trnovo operations as Serbian MUP units as I previously discussed.
23 The next document, P1084, is a document on Serbian MUP ATD unit
24 letterhead signed by Mijovic as commander and delivered to the RS MUP in
25 Pale on 19 July 1995. It states that "the ATD unit of the MUP of the
1 Republic of Serbia was ordered to pull back from the zone of combat
2 operations in the Trnova sector by 1200 hours on 20 July 1995."
3 Together, it is clear from these two documents that (a) the Serbian MUP
4 ATD unit was active in Trnovo; and (b), Mijovic was its commander. The
5 evidence reveals that the Skorpions pulled out of Trnovo five days after
6 Mijovic's dispatch. These documents independently corroborate the two
7 witnesses I've discussed regarding Mijovic's role in Trnovo, commanding
8 Serbian MUP units in July 1995.
9 Another corroborating piece of evidence is P2966, page 7, the
10 testimony of Tomislav Kovac in the Skorpions trial in Belgrade. He
11 testified that Vaso Mijovic was the Skorpions' commander in Trnovo. The
12 Prosecution relies on this evidence only to the extent that it
13 corroborates the other evidence I have just discussed, taking the Defence
14 point that Kovac was not cross-examined before this Chamber.
15 I will now discuss the SBWS operations after Operation Storm when
16 the accused pulled the Skorpions, SDG, and JATD together once again.
17 In September 1995 and thereafter, the accused held meetings in
18 the SBWS with high-level military officials. I refer Your Honours to
19 slide 96. By early September, following an approach similar to that
20 taken in Pauk, three operational groups were formed of the DB special
21 units and SVK units. Mijovic co-operated with the OG-1 Baranja command
22 and provided soldiers trained by the JATD. Legija led OG-2, leading
23 around 250 SDG in Eastern Slavonia, and Zvezdan Jovanovic was deputy
24 commander of OG-3 which included the Skorpions and covered Western Srem.
25 I refer Your Honours to P1080.
1 The pattern of the Skorpions deployments in 1994 and 1995
2 demonstrates that they were a unit under the accused's control. For a
3 year they were deployed into consecutive operations with the SDG and
4 JATD. For each operation, the Skorpions were subordinated to a member of
5 a DB special unit, first Legija in Pauk, then Mijovic in Trnovo, and
6 finally Jovanovic in the SBWS. For Pauk and Trnovo, DB members Rajic and
7 Kojic escorted them across borders into the combat zone.
8 Both Defence teams cling heavily onto evidence that the Skorpions
9 were a unit of the SVK under General Loncar. As shown and slide 97,
10 P3096 shows that whatever their relationship with the SVK, the accused
11 ultimately controlled the Skorpions' assignments. On 28 August 1995,
12 Bozovic and other members of the unit took over command of the SVK
13 security organs and provided the Skorpions, called the Boco Squad, to
14 escort the SVK officials out of town.
15 On 30 October 1995, the SVK reported "The Serbia State Security
16 is in charge now, 'Frenki,' Jovica. Loncar is nothing but a pawn now."
17 In light of the totality of the evidence, there can be no
18 reasonable doubt that the Skorpions were acting as tools of the accused
19 when they persecuted and then murdered six Bosniaks near Trnovo.
20 As the Skorpions, SDG, and JATD units were forming operational
21 groups to prepare for combat in SBWS, Arkan led a SDG unit into
22 operations around Sanski Most and Banja Luka. Arkan and the SDG rounded
23 up non-Serb civilians at the Sanus Hotel and then murdered them in groups
24 in the areas of Sasina and Trnova on 20 and 21 September 1995. I will
25 now discuss the accused's liability for these murders, first through the
1 lens of the Mladic notebooks and then through the lens of the DB payment
3 Both Defence teams seek to distance the accused from Arkan and
4 the SDG's activities in Sanski Most. They argue that Arkan was in
5 Sanski Most at the behest of Karadzic and the SDS leadership and working
6 with the RS MUP. Stanisic also points out that the RS government
7 requested Badza to supply men for the operations, resulting in some 400
8 PJPs being sent from Serbia where they were also resubordinated to the
9 RS MUP. The evidence on which the Defence relies is important and
10 relevant to reveal the deep involvement that JCE members Karadzic,
11 Mico Stanisic, Badza, Mladic, and others had in perpetuating the common
12 criminal purpose along with Arkan in these operations.
13 The evidence is clear that Stanisic and Simatovic were also
14 intimately involved in these operations, and I particularly draw the
15 Chamber's attention to a series of Mladic notebook entries in September
16 and October 1995.
17 On slide 100, P2543, reflects that at a meeting among high-level
18 VRS leaders on 22 September 1995, Milovanovic reported that a team from
19 the Serbian DB, including Filipovic and Bozovic, had arrived and three
20 brigades from the Serbian DB were promised. Milovanovic's testimony at
21 transcript page 15524 is clear that Bozovic and Filipovic were already in
22 the area prior to the SDG's murders.
23 Bozovic and Filipovic were JATD members who were direct
24 subordinates to both accused and paid by the JATD in September and
25 October 1995 as indicated on slide 101.
1 On slide 102 is P2544, which reflects that on 29 September 1995,
2 in a meeting with Mladic, Karadzic stated:
3 "Jovica Stanisic is angry about something. He gave 300 of his
4 men, and the US is begrudging us for having advertised Arkan."
5 This reveals that (a) Stanisic was responsible for sending
6 personnel into the Sanski Most area; (b) Stanisic was abreast of Arkan's
7 role; and (c) he communicated with Karadzic about these issues. This
8 meeting between Karadzic and Mladic took place only six days after Mladic
9 sent Karadzic a dispatch stating that Arkan had identified himself as a
10 member of the MUP of Serbia and RS. And that's P289.
11 Slide 103 shows that the next day Mladic met with Stanisic and
12 Perisic. Stanisic's report reveals that he was well informed about the
13 situation on the ground in Sanski Most and well informed about Arkan's
14 activities. Stanisic stated "We sent 400 people." Stanisic interprets
15 that comment as referring to public security PJP units, citing to
16 Witness Grekulovic's testimony at transcript page 15308 that the chief of
17 the DB could be involved in deploying public security units. Although
18 there is no evidence that Stanisic was referring to public security units
19 in this entry, if the Defence is correct, this would be another element
20 of Stanisic's involvement in the operation on top of supplying and
21 funding JATD and SDG units.
22 On 3 October 1995 Mladic's notebook reflects a meeting with
23 Filipovic and Bozovic as indicated on slide 104. Filipovic reported on
24 Arkan's activities, revealing that as a subordinate of the accused, he
25 was well informed about Arkan. Bozovic reported that, "It was agreed
1 that we would replace the RS police." This again reveals the
2 co-operation among JCE organs in the Sanski Most operations and alludes
3 to units supplied by the accused.
4 In addition to the evidence in the Mladic notebooks, Stanisic and
5 Simatovic demonstrated their authority over the SDG in Sanski Most by
6 paying them. The JATD payment list reveal that as during Operation Pauk,
7 the Serbian DB made payments to the SDG through the end of 1995.
8 Seeking to undercut this powerful evidence against him, Stanisic
9 has presented a number of unsupported theories regarding the per diems.
10 He asserts the possibility that public funds were embezzled, then later
11 asserts that someone in the DB was doing the SDG a favour. The reality
12 is that SDG members known to be in the Sanski Most operations received
13 payments in September and October 1995 as indicated on slide 106.
14 The Prosecution requests that that slide not be broadcast to the
16 The per diems are supported by the evidence that the largest
17 amount the DB ever paid to the SDG was received after the Sanski Most
18 operations in September 1995 as indicated on the confidential evidence
19 table, items D31 and 32.
20 Attempting to distance himself from the payment lists, Stanisic
22 "Logic and the DB's financial processing dictates that Stanisic
23 would not have known who were being paid per diems. This is true even if
24 Simatovic paid the per diems himself as the Prosecution suggests."
25 Simatovic, on the other happened, asserts regarding Pauk that he
1 "played no role and had no influence on the disbursement of wages" and
2 "the financial arrangement had been made by Jovica Stanisic."
3 It should be fairly obvious that the Prosecution's case is not
4 that Stanisic would have known by name every individual on the payment
5 lists. Rather, that as chief of the DB, he was the one who set the
6 policy and made the decision about who should be paid, particularly among
7 reserve units and people who were not officially employed by the service.
8 Vujovic, a DB employee and Defence witness, testified that there were
9 some individuals who on their own initiative engaged in amateur
10 surveillance work in Ilok and that at some point the 8th Administration
11 regularised and began to pay them. When asked whether this decision
12 would have to have been approved by the chief of the DB, Vujovic
13 responded, "Of course. Of course, yes."
14 Further, Stanisic's personal exchanges with many unit members at
15 the Kula ceremony including Bozovic reveals that he was personally
16 acquainted with individuals who appeared on per diems. The video of the
17 Kula ceremony also captures the fact that Stanisic began speaking
18 extemporaneously after giving out awards, thus displaying his personal
19 knowledge about the unit.
20 I will play a portion of this speech now, and the translation is
21 on slide 107, so Stanisic's words do not need to be translated.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] There, Frenki's correcting our
24 protocol. We have now actually given out the greatest, the highest
25 awards that can be earned in work of this kind and these are the awards
1 for valor. Each of you that receive this award, be it Opacic in the Knin
2 area or Djurica in the Banija area, and even the story of us as men who
3 tried to help their people. Each one of them is the same, particularly
4 the way it came about, but in essence it speaks of the heroism of our
5 people and what we have put into our unit /inaudible passage/ and who
6 will carry on the tradition of this unit."
7 Stanisic gave this speech after Milosevic left the ceremony.
8 This fact alone rebuts the accused's arguments that they were merely
9 putting on a show for Milosevic and that their discussion of the unit was
11 In light of the totality of the evidence, there is no escaping
12 that the accused funded and remained well informed about the SDG's
13 operations in Sanski Most and supplied JATD units to assist in the same
14 operations. With this pattern of involvement, there can be no reasonable
15 doubt of the accused's liability for the SDG's crimes in Sanski Most
16 where they were acting as tools of Arkan and of both accused to further
17 the common criminal purpose.
18 This concludes my submissions, and I will turn the floor over to
19 Mr. Groome.
20 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, we have now set forth our case. These
21 remarks in conjunction with our written submissions establish a
22 comprehensive and compelling case establishing the crimes charged in the
23 indictment and the accused's responsibility for them. I want to spend a
24 few of these last remaining moments on the issue of a possible sentence.
25 Both of the accused put forward their role in the hostage crisis
1 as meriting mitigation. The Prosecution accepts and recognises that
2 their role in this event may be appropriately considered by the Chamber
3 should it find them guilty of crimes. It is important to recognise when
4 doing so that their involvement in the crimes charged in this indictment
5 continued throughout and after this period. Their participation in the
6 crimes in Sanski Most through Arkan and in Trnovo through the Skorpions
7 both took place around the time of the hostage crisis. Their efforts to
8 free the UN personnel held hostage by the VRS was not a watershed
9 withdrawal from the JCE but an effort to mitigate a situation which the
10 JCE perceived had the potential to ultimately damage their goals.
11 Having said this, the Prosecution does recognise that both
12 Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic personally entered Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 during a very dangerous period. The likelihood of additional air-strikes
14 by NATO was real. The likelihood that some members of the VRS would
15 physically resist handing over the hostages was real. The Prosecution
16 recognises that both men willingly assumed dangers to their personal
17 safety and brought over 300 UN personnel to safety.
18 The Prosecution notes that the fact that the accused were able to
19 enter Bosnia during such a volatile period and secure the release of the
20 hostages corroborates the other evidence in this case and demonstrates
21 once again the positions of significant influence they yielded.
22 The Stanisic Defence puts forward Mr. Stanisic's health and
23 advanced age. The Prosecution recognises that he did for the most part
24 co-operate with respect to health issues as they impacted the trial,
25 something which allowed the trial to make regular progress, but this
1 trial did not cause or aggravate his illnesses. They are chronic
2 conditions that he would deal with irrespective of the trial.
3 The Prosecution does accept that Mr. Stanisic played a positive
4 role in the Dayton Peace Accords. He helped unify a fractious delegation
5 and facilitated the ultimate acceptance of the plan by the Bosnian Serbs.
6 One of the most significant factors for a Chamber to consider in
7 assessing an appropriate sentence is the gravity of the offences an
8 accused is convicted of. This is a two-part consideration by a
9 Trial Chamber of both the seriousness of the underlying crimes and the
10 form and degree of an accused's participation.
11 Should the Chamber find the two accused guilty of all of the
12 crimes on the indictment, it would be difficult to imagine crimes of
13 greater severity. The crimes charged in the indictment involve thousands
14 of victims directly impacted by the crimes, crimes which have lasting
15 consequences to this day, crimes that will continue to impact lives long
16 after this Chamber enters its judgement.
17 The last witness in the Prosecution's case in chief was the son
18 of one of the men whose murder by the Skorpions was recorded on video.
19 He recounted for you the day when the television news played as he sat in
20 a cafe in a country far from the former Yugoslavia. As he watched the
21 tape, he had a sense that the man in the video was his father, the man
22 begging his captors for water, a sense that was confirmed shortly
23 afterward. He watched his very own father being murdered by the
25 Since that day, every time he sees something as common place as a
1 glass of water, he is reminded of his father's suffering, his mother's
2 loneliness, his own suffering growing up without his father.
3 Your Honours, this is but one example of the suffering of many
4 who struggle through their lives deeply and daily impacted by the crimes
5 of Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic.
6 Should this Chamber come to the conclusion that the evidence
7 established beyond a reasonable doubt the accused's criminal
8 responsibility, then they must accept responsibility for the gravity of
9 those crimes. They must be held to account for the great suffering they
10 occasioned. It is for that reason that despite the existence of
11 mitigating factors that I now ask, on behalf of the Prosecutor,
12 Mr. Brammertz that the Chamber impose a sentence of life incarceration
13 should the Chamber find them guilty of these crimes.
14 Before I conclude the Prosecution recognises the many witnesses
15 who appeared to give their evidence during this trial. For the victims
16 it was often a difficult experience to recount what happened to them. A
17 large number of the witnesses were of Serb ethnicity who were either
18 present in the areas where the crimes were committed or were members of
19 the special units of the Serbian DB. They have appeared before this
20 Tribunal because of the strength of their conviction in the importance of
21 the truth.
22 The Prosecution also recognises the co-operation of the
23 government of Serbia. It provided some of the most relevant
24 documentation when requested to do so and allowed former government
25 officials to give evidence. Judges in its courts facilitated our work
1 and the Ministry of Interior assisted when the security of witnesses was
2 a concern. Serbia has made an important contribution to the truth. It
3 is my hope that the Chamber's judgement be it conviction or acquittal,
4 gives the people of Serbia a deeper understanding of the events that had
5 such a deep impact on that country.
6 Your Honours, that concludes our submissions here today. Thank
7 you for receiving them.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome. I think it would not be a
9 good idea to start the closing arguments by the Defence but, rather, give
10 you time and do it tomorrow, Mr. Jordash.
11 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: What will be the sequence? Will it be
13 Stanisic Defence first?
14 MR. JORDASH: Yes, it will.
15 JUDGE ORIE: And I think we've reserved two and a half hours for
16 each Defence team. Then we adjourn for the day and we will resume
17 tomorrow, Wednesday, the 30th of January, at 2.15 p.m. in this same
18 Courtroom III.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.48 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day
21 of January, 2013, at 2.15 p.m.