Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3969

 1                          Friday, 26 March 2004

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 6            JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  May I remind you, Admiral, of the

 7    affirmation you took at the commencement, which still applies.

 8            Ms. Somers.

 9            MS. SOMERS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

10                          WITNESS:  MIODRAG JOKIC [Resumed]

11                          [Witness answered through interpreter]

12                          Examined by Ms. Somers: [Continued]

13       Q.   Good morning, Admiral Jokic.  I would ask you, please, to turn

14    your attention to tab 22.  Admiral, you have in front of you a document

15    dated 24 October, 1991.  Do you recognise this document?

16       A.   Yes.  This is a document produced by my command, and it bears my

17    signature.

18       Q.   Admiral, I want to ask you to comment on some provisions of the

19    document.  First of all, to whom is the document addressed?

20       A.   This document is addressed to all the subordinate units of my

21    command.  It was produced based on the report of the superior command, the

22    2nd Operational Group, indicating that during the operations conducted by

23    the Trebinje Brigade, five soldiers have been killed and eight wounded.

24    And that due to that, certain measures were to be taken to avoid this

25    situation arising again.  This is a report and it is a request to take

Page 3970

 1    certain measures with respect to improvements to control and command with

 2    respect to reconnaissance, other operations, discipline, firing, and so

 3    on.

 4       Q.   Was your view that the number of casualties was excessive under

 5    circumstances?

 6       A.   Yes.

 7       Q.   Was your view that lack of discipline or willfulness may have been

 8    involved in the combat activities that you are addressing?

 9       A.   Yes.

10       Q.   And was there a concern on your part about use --

11       A.   Yes, yes.  Certainly.

12       Q.   I'm sorry.  Let me finish my question to you, Admiral, and then

13    you can respond.  Were you concerned about the overall skill or lack

14    thereof with which the operation had been carried out?

15       A.   In this particular case, there were errors that were made by

16    lower-ranking commands subordinate to the command; these were battalion

17    and company commanders that made these errors.  These were professional

18    issues.  It was about applying certain rules of combat when in combat,

19    especially as concerned those officers that were supposed to apply those

20    rules.  The superior command noticed these shortcomings and these

21    unacceptable losses, and then an order was issued to those

22    commands to eliminate them.  I was concerned by the fact that this

23    brigade was supposed to be resubordinated to me several days from then,

24    and I was very anxious to avoid a repetition of these occurrences so I had

25    all the more cause to be concerned.

Page 3971

 1       Q.   Thank you.

 2            MS. SOMERS:  I would like to tender this document into evidence,

 3    please.

 4            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 5            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P122.

 6            MS. SOMERS:

 7       Q.   I would like to ask you to turn your attention to tab 31, please.

 8    You have before you, Admiral, a document which is dated 26th of October,

 9    1991, and bears --

10            MS. SOMERS:  And, Your Honours, this document has been tendered

11    already in evidence.

12       Q.   Bears the signature or the endorsement of -- it says:  "Commander

13    of the Naval Sector," but Lieutenant General Pavle Strugar.  Perhaps that

14    is an error in the original title.  You can assist us, if you wish, on

15    whether or not the title of Strugar is correct there.

16            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours -- Your Honours, this

18    document has not been tendered so far.  We have not seen a document like

19    this before.  It doesn't bear a number, and it has not been tendered into

20    evidence so far.  I'm sure of that.  Thank you.

21            MS. SOMERS:  This perhaps is my error.  I thought it came in with

22    an early ECMM witness.  If that is the case, my apologies, but I thought

23    it came in under an ECMM.

24            It is my error.  I'm terribly sorry.  I have the wrong notation.

25            JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Rodic.

Page 3972

 1            MS. SOMERS:  Thank you, Counsel, also, for bringing that to my

 2    attention.

 3       Q.   I would like to ask you if you are familiar with the content of

 4    this particular document.

 5       A.   Yes, I am.

 6       Q.   And what was your understanding of what the purpose of the

 7    document was and how it was dealt with in the course of the campaign?

 8       A.   The purpose of this document was to finally resolve, in a peaceful

 9    manner, the problem of the Dubrovnik crisis.  There were supposed to be a

10    normalisation of life within the town.  There was a proposal that was sent

11    to the Dubrovnik Crisis Staff comprising 11 points or items that had been

12    formulated by the command of the 2nd Operational Group and approved,

13    probably, by the superior command.

14            There is an error in this document, the title itself.  You can see

15    that the Municipal Assembly of Dubrovnik I believe sent this document by

16    telex, sent it back.  I think the addressee is erroneous and also the

17    signature says General Pavle Strugar, but the essence of this document is

18    familiar to everyone.  These are proposals that as of the 26th of October

19    were very much in the focus of interest -- in the negotiations between the

20    Dubrovnik Crisis Staff and the 2nd Operational Group.  The main request

21    put forward by this proposal was to hand over the weapons that had been

22    amassed in the town of Dubrovnik itself and also for the volunteers and

23    for the surplus men who had entered Dubrovnik after the 1st of October to

24    leave town.  This was actually the problem of demilitarisation of

25    Dubrovnik; that was behind the request.

Page 3973

 1       Q.   I'd like to ask you about some of the points in there, and I want

 2    to turn in particular your attention to point 7, where it says:  "The JNA

 3    should guarantee that its members will respect the complete cease-fire and

 4    the safety of citizens and the city of Dubrovnik with its cultural and

 5    historical assets."

 6            Is this, in your view, a matter which is subject to condition or

 7    acceptance?  In other words, should this be a point of bargaining, in your

 8    view, to protect citizens and cultural assets, or is it a mandate of law?

 9       A.   Well, yes, I believe this matter was worded inaccurately and

10    erroneously, in part at least.  There must be a guarantee of a complete

11    cease-fire.  I think that is a legitimate request and proposal.  But

12    certainly on the part of the citizens, the protection of cultural

13    monuments is regulated by international conventions and this is something

14    that cannot be negotiated in this way.  I don't think that should have

15    been included as part of this.

16       Q.   Would you agree that the safety of civilian citizens, of citizens,

17    is also guaranteed by -- regulated by international law and -- yes.

18       A.   Yes.

19       Q.   Is this proposal a document that you have heard referred to as an

20    ultimatum?  Have you heard that term used, "ultimatum"?

21       A.   Yes.  The Dubrovnik side called this document an ultimatum to

22    surrender the town.

23       Q.   Did the 2nd Operational Group genuinely expect the Croatian

24    defenders to surrender their arms?  Was there a general expectation that

25    there would be compliance with the terms of this document?

Page 3974

 1       A.   Yes, I think so.

 2       Q.   When you take into account, Admiral, the events occurring

 3    elsewhere in Croatia, was it not expected that the Croatians would reject

 4    this document and the conditions therein?

 5       A.   Well, the situation surrounding Dubrovnik was different from that

 6    faced by the other garrisons in Croatia.  We had blocked the town from

 7    both sea and land.  The town had not been demilitarised and it

 8    was armed but not nearly sufficiently armed to pose any

 9    real danger to the forces carrying out the blockade.  We believed it was a

10    well-founded belief, I believe, that the crisis could be resolved in a

11    peaceful way.  There had been certain indications that the proposal would

12    be accepted.

13       Q.   I want to make sure you understand that my question surrounds the

14    Croatians' willingness to disarm themselves in light of all that was

15    happening in Croatia.

16       A.   Yes, I agree with you that in all the other garrisons and at the

17    decision-making level of the Croatian state, no such proposal was ever

18    accepted.  I agree with that.

19       Q.   Thank you.

20            MS. SOMERS:  I would ask to tender this into evidence.

21            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

22            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P123.

23            MS. SOMERS:

24       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.

25            Admiral, we are now going to ask to turn your attention to a map,

Page 3975

 1    Exhibit 20 -- I'm sorry, tab 22(A), and because time is very much a

 2    factor, we will try to move very swiftly through the next line of

 3    questioning.

 4            MS. SOMERS:  Everyone has his or her map in front of them.

 5       Q.   Admiral, I would ask if you can assist us in what does this map --

 6    what date is this map covering and what does it depict?

 7       A.   This map covers the 14th of November, and it depicts the

 8    disposition of the forces of the 2nd Operational Group on that day in the

 9    Dubrovnik operation.

10       Q.   And at the top -- the centre and the top -- I'm sorry.  In the

11    centre and the top, what does it say?  It says something "2OG."  Above the

12    date, just above the date.

13       A.   Disposition group for -- the disposition of the forces for the 2nd

14    Operational Group.

15       Q.   And does this map accurately depict the positions of the 2nd

16    Operational Group on that date?

17       A.   Yes, it does.

18       Q.   And is this map a working map, a map that the --

19       A.   Yes.  This is a working map of the staff, the headquarters of the

20    2nd Operational Group.

21       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.  I'm going to try -- and yes, I'm sorry.  The

22    map was also -- indicates positions, and they were indicated

23    contemporaneously with the making of the map?  It is a

24    contemporaneously-made -- a contemporaneous map?

25       A.   Absolutely.

Page 3976

 1       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.

 2            We're going to emphasise the area which is - let's see if I can

 3    help you try to focus on the map - which is around Dubrovnik itself and

 4    which is close to the Old Town of Dubrovnik.  If you can indicate which

 5    units are in the area closest to the lines around Dubrovnik, which units

 6    of the 2nd Operational Group.

 7       A.   The closest point to Dubrovnik that the units reached was that

 8    reached by the 472nd Brigade, more specifically its 3rd Battalion.

 9       Q.   And are companies of the battalion indicated on this map, Admiral?

10       A.   Yes.

11            May I have the microphone closer, please.

12       Q.   Admiral, are you able to give us a scale on this map?  I know it's

13    not -- it doesn't appear to be written, but are you able to indicate a

14    scale, if you can?

15       A.   This scale is 1 against 100.000, I believe.  The usual map that

16    would be used by JNA units would be 1:100.000.  That's what the scale

17    would be, what I would expect it to be.

18       Q.   Would that also have included the map you looked at yesterday for

19    October?

20       A.   Yes.

21       Q.   Would this map also -- well, were the positions from the 8th

22    through the 13th of November different to the positions that are indicated

23    on this map that represents the 14th of November, 1991?

24       A.   Yes, they are.  They are different.

25       Q.   And how so?

Page 3977

 1       A.   The difference is that until the -- before the 14th of November

 2    there had been an operation carried out in the area of Dubrava, above

 3    Dubrovnik, and in the area of Komolac, just across Rijeka Dubrovacka, in

 4    the area where the 472nd Brigade was operating.  The units of the 4th

 5    Battalion that were in the Zarkovica-Dubac area had been pulled out.  I

 6    pulled that unit out, I detached it from the combat disposition, and in

 7    order to replace it, I set up a mixed TO detachment that operated for five

 8    days.  The 3rd Battalion, too, had been introduced that had taken these

 9    fortifications above Dubrovnik, the fortifications of Bosanka, Gradci and

10    Strincijera.  You can see a disposition of the forces of the 3rd Battalion

11    here.

12       Q.   When was the 3rd Battalion introduced into this particular

13    operation, combat operation you're referring to?

14       A.   It was introduced on the 10th of November.

15       Q.   For the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd, can you please name the

16    positions that are shown on the map as -- where it has 1, 2, 3 of the

17    companies.

18       A.   Yes.  The first company comprises the Bosanka area.  The third

19    company, the Strincijera Fort, and the fourth company, the Zarkovica

20    area.  The mortar battery occupies the Uskoplje area.

21       Q.   Admiral, who was the commander for the period shown on this map

22    and also from the 8th through the -- the 8th to the 13th, who was the

23    commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade -- sorry -- yeah.

24       A.   From the 25th of October, when the commander of the 3rd Battalion

25    was seriously wounded, the Captain Kovacevic, Vladimir Kovacevic was the

Page 3978

 1    one who took over from the 25th of October, including this date the 14th

 2    of November, he was in command of that battalion.

 3       Q.   And particularly on the 10th of November when the 3rd Battalion

 4    was introduced into this combat operation, are you indicating that

 5    Vladimir Kovacevic was the commander of the battalion?

 6       A.   Yes.

 7       MS. SOMERS: I think the area is small enough that we're looking at,

 8    Mr. Usher, that we could try to put it on the ELMO.  It might be easier.

 9            THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter cannot hear the speaker.

10            MS. SOMERS:

11       Q.   Admiral Jokic, if you can take your pointer and place it on the

12    position indicating the location of the 1st Company of the 3rd Battalion

13    of the 472nd Brigade --

14            MS. SOMERS:  Mr. Usher, could you move the map up a little bit,

15    please.  This lower portion is what we're looking at, if you could move it

16    up.  There.  That's better.  Thank you.  And the focus is a little bit --

17    if it's possible to sharpen.

18       Q.   Admiral, again, if you could please indicate the location with

19    your pointer of the 1st Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd.  And

20    where is it located?

21       A.   The Zarkovica - Dubac area.

22            THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter cannot hear the speaker.

23            MS. SOMERS:

24       Q.   Could you speak --

25       A.   Zarkovica-Dubac.

Page 3979

 1       Q.   And what weapons were in that location, Admiral, that could be in

 2    the range of the Old Town of Dubrovnik?

 3       A.   That company, like any other, has mortars of 82 millimetres in

 4    addition to infantry arms.  This kind of deployment is not identical to

 5    the deployment that took place later.  There were some changes that were

 6    made in the combat deployment of the battalion later.

 7       Q.   The 2nd -- let me take a quick look and make sure I've covered --

 8            The 2nd company, could you point it out, please, its location, and

 9    identify its location.

10       A.   The second company was in the area of Bosanka, the fortification

11    of Bosanka.  This is right across Srdj.

12       Q.   And what type of weapons were within range of the Old Town that

13    that company had at its disposal?

14       A.   Again, these mortars of 82 millimetres.

15       Q.   Were there any other weapons beside mortars that would have

16    applied or belonged to either the company you just identified, the 2nd or

17    the 1st --

18       A.   No.  There weren't any within those companies then.

19       Q.   How about the entire battalion?  Were there direct-fire weapons?

20       A.   Yes, yes.  The battalion had other weapons with which it supported

21    these companies during attack, that is to say it had its artillery, plus

22    the reinforcements it had got.

23       Q.   The 3rd company, could you please point it out and give its

24    location.

25       A.   The 3rd company was on the Strincijera fortress which, during

Page 3980

 1    the 10th -- the period between the 10th and the 12th, was taken.

 2       Q.   The other positions that are shown with weaponry, the 3rd company

 3    -- and what -- I'm sorry, Admiral, what is the marking where it says --

 4    there is a triangle that says "3."  Perhaps you can indicate what the

 5    marking around that is, it's a round circle with dots, black dots.  It

 6    says "1" and "3."  If you can bring your pointer down a little bit.  A

 7    little lower.  A bit lower yet.  There you go.

 8       A.   These are positions of the anti-armour company of the battalion,

 9    however the number is not there.  This is the 4th company.

10       Q.   And what type of weapons are you referring to when you say

11    "anti-armour"?

12       A.   This company had 82-millimetre mortars, it had recoilless guns, it

13    had launchers for rockets, Maljutkas, and it also had anti-aircraft guns,

14    20-millimetre ones.

15       Q.   Were the weapons you have just described of the 3rd Battalion

16    within reach or range of the Old Town of Dubrovnik?

17       A.   In this position, this anti--armour company, on this particular

18    position was not within reach -- or rather, the Old Town was not within

19    reach or range yet.  All its firearms were deployed in order to be able to

20    target the Old Town.  It's not depicted on this map, but it was only later

21    that it took these positions on Zarkovica from which targets in the Old

22    Town could be engaged.

23            However, as regards artillery -- or rather, mortars,

24    120-millimetre mortars that were here within this circle, that was the

25    artillery of the 3rd Battalion in the area of Uskoplje.  From there, the

Page 3981

 1    Old Town could be targeted, including the city harbour and part of the new

 2    town of Dubrovnik outside the old walls.

 3       Q.   Admiral, can you indicate where the units of the 3rd Battalion

 4    were between the 10th of November and the 13th of November.

 5       A.   Between the 10th and the 13th, they were in attack.  This

 6    battalion was introduced on the 10th for combat operations.  The task was

 7    to take over the fort of Gradci, Dubrava, and Fort Strincijera.  And

 8    before that, before the 10th of November it was resting in the

 9    Ivanica/Trebinje area because it was taken out after the losses it had

10    sustained on the 23rd and 24th of October.  An order was given to withdraw

11    them and to give them a period of rest of about ten days.  I mean, it was

12    not within my troops, but I know what they did when they were taken out.

13       Q.   The units of the 3rd Battalion were within firing range of the Old

14    Town of Dubrovnik during that period of time?

15       A.   Yes.

16       Q.   Who had ordered the 3rd Battalion to take these positions?

17       A.   The command of the 2nd Operational Group gave orders regarding the

18    main part of the task of this operation.  The details were given by the

19    command of the sector, the details regarding the 3rd Battalion and how

20    these forts should be taken.

21       Q.   Was there a degree of risk in having this type of weaponry so

22    close to the city?

23       A.   Well, yes, yes.  Such potential danger did exist.

24       Q.   Can we take a look, Admiral, at some of the other positions very

25    quickly that are on this map.  I want to ask you about the 3rd Battalion

Page 3982

 1    of the 5th Brigade.  Was it at that point under the command of the 9th

 2    Naval Sector?

 3       A.   The 9th Naval Military Sector, yes.  This battalion was on leave

 4    in Podgorica until the 5th of November.  On the 5th of November, they came

 5    to their area; it can be seen here, opposite Rijeka Dubrovacka. Its

 6    deployment can be seen above Mokosica above the settlement of Mokosica,

 7    Podbrijezje, Petrovo Selo, et cetera; that's the area.  It was supposed to

 8    take over -- or rather, to enter the combat deployment of the 2nd

 9    Battalion of the Trebinje Brigade.  It did take over from them, as was

10    ordered previously; namely, that on the 6th of November the entire brigade

11    withdraw from that area and go north-west.  This battalion came in good

12    time, carried out the necessary preparations, and took over the duties

13    involved in that combat deployment, as can be seen on this map.

14       Q.   Admiral Jokic, were -- what -- were the weapons of the 3rd

15    Battalion of the 5th Brigade within range of the Old Town of Dubrovnik?

16       A.   No.

17       Q. On that date.

18       Admiral, can I ask, please, when was Bosanka taken? What date?

19 A. Bosanka was taken on the 10th, between the 8th and 10th of November,in that

20 period of time. I'm sorry. I beg your pardon. You asked about the 5th -- or

21 rather, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade? Was that the previous question?

22    Q.  Yes, I did.

23    A.  Whether it was within range?

24    Q.  It was, Admiral.

25    A.  Yes, then it’s all right.

Page 3983

 1       Q.   Yes.  What was your -- and your answer was for that date?

 2       A.   Yes.  Its artillery pieces were not within reach or range of the

 3   Old Town.  They were on the other side of Rijeka Dubrovacka.

 4       Q.   Thank you.

 5  If we can take a look at some of the surrounding units very quickly, if you

 6  can identify what they were, starting at the -- it says "the 5th of the 3rd

 7  lpbr," just what the unit was, its location, and what weapons it had. Do you

 8  see it on the left?  It says "the 5th of the 3rd" -- yes. Describe the unit,

 9  its location, and the weaponry it had.  Or at least the location.

10      A.   This is the area of Zaton.  This is where the companies of the 3rd

11    Light Brigade were deployed.  This was a unit, a newly established unit,

12    poorly armed, and for the most part it was used for auxiliary routes, for

13    controlling territory, and for giving assistance to others.  It was poorly

14    armed and insufficiently trained.  These are its companies.

15     Q. And then moving along very quickly, the one -- it says "1, 3 at pmtb."

16     A little bit over to your left -- left, more, more, please. There you go.

17       A.   Yes, yes.

18       Q.   Okay.  What is that unit and where is it located?

19       A.   That is the 1st Battalion -- or rather, the 1st Company of --

20    there seems to be a mistake here.  This is a company of the battalion.

21    This is a mistake.  There is no such unit here.

22    Q. Then the 3rd of the -- it says:  "3 of the 5th pmtbr" -- I'm sorry, I

23    beg your pardon.  You're having to repeat yourself unintentionally.  It

24    It says:  "3 pmtb," below, if you move down a little bit.  It says 3 --

25       A.   Yes, yes, I see that.

Page 3984

 1       Q.   And what is the unit?  Where is it located, please?

 2       A.   Well, I cannot say.  I know all the designations and I think I

 3    know everything from the combat rules, but now is this a mistake or

 4    perhaps it's a territorial battalion.  But I don't know this particular

 5    designation, "pmt."

 6       Q.   Admiral, from what you're describing in terms of range of

 7    weaponry, what was the -- which units that -- during this time period on

 8    that day, or let's say between the 8th and the 13th of November, were

 9    within range -- had weapons that were within range of the Old Town?

10       A.   Well, in that period, between the 8th and the 13th of November,

11    the units that can be seen here across Rijeka Dubrovacka, that is to say

12    the 1st Battalion of the 472nd Brigade, and the 2nd Battalion of the 472nd

13    Brigade, which are the main units in this combat deployment, due to the

14    configuration of the terrain and the tasks that they got, and as it can be

15    seen from the combat deployment, their companies could not have targeted

16    the Old Town, because its mortars were behind in terms of the combat

17    deployment, that is to say outside effective reach of the Old Town in

18    terms of distance.

19       Q.   Then which units had reach of the Old Town, firing reach of the

20    Old Town?  I'm sorry, range.

21       A.   The 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade, which was brought into

22    action on the 10th of November, and on the 14th of November, after having

23    taken these forts which we can see here, it came into this kind of combat

24    deployment in terms of its companies and artillery support.  From these

25    positions, it could have targeted -- well, not exactly within effective

Page 3985

 1    range if its objective was to engage targets in the Old Town, but it could

 2    have targeted the Old Town, yes.

 3       Q.   Admiral, there are some units on the outer edges of this area of

 4    the map - you may have to move your map over a little bit to see it - and

 5    I just want to quickly ask you about those.  To the right, somewhat below

 6    Trebinje, there's a circle, a black circle, that says -- can you move it a

 7    bit more.  Thanks.  This is good.  Right.

 8            I can't read the abbreviation very clearly, but if you could tell

 9    us what it is and what the "130 mm" designation signifies.

10       A.   This is actually a division, a mobile division, coastal artillery

11    division, 130 millimetres.  These are cannons for supporting the units of

12    the 472nd Brigade.  Their effective range is about 15 to 16 kilometres.

13    That is why its positions are in this area of Volujac, near Trebinje.

14    That's why they're so far away.

15       Q.   Do they have firing range of the Old Town?

16       A.   Yes.  Their range covered the entire area of Dubrovnik as a town

17    in view of the fact that they had quite a long-range.

18       Q.   And above it says -- there's a 472nd designation with a black

19    circle.  Yes, please, could you describe that position and the weaponry.

20       A.   This was a Howitzer division, 105 millimetres, Howitzers of 105

21    millimetres, and their range was about 10 kilometres.  They were intended

22    to be support to the battalions to the right of DubrovnikDubrovnik and

23    the Old Town were at the end of effective range, so I believe they could

24    not have been used except in great necessity.  They could have targeted

25    Rijeka Dubrovacka, though, in this area here.  The 472nd Brigade, this is

Page 3986

 1    the command post of the brigade in this area of Cerovac.

 2       Q.   Admiral, the units that you have identified that were within

 3    firing range -- that had weapons that were within firing range of the Old

 4    Town in the period 8th through 13th of November, to what formations did

 5    those units belong?

 6       A.   They belonged to the 9th Sector, or rather, the 2nd Operational

 7    Group at a higher level.  That is to say that at that time the brigade,

 8    since it had not been taken out as was ordered in the previous orders of

 9    the 6th of November, it still remained within combat deployment and it

10    remained subordinated to me.

11       Q.   And as part -- did you indicate as part of the 2nd Operational

12    Group as the overall formation?

13       A.   Yes, of course.

14       Q.   If you can take a quick look at the coastal waters.  Can you

15    indicate, please --

16            MS. SOMERS:  I think you'll have to move your map up a little bit,

17    Mr. Usher.  Thank you.

18       Q.   What are -- where are vessels of the -- of your sector indicated.

19    We have blue and red markings.  Can you say which are the red?

20       A.   The blue are my ships, the patrol boats.  And here in front of

21    Dubrovnik there is the number 2.  There are two ships PC and one in the

22    Mljet canal and one in the Zupa channel.  This symbolically shows their

23    tasks, providing security in the channels, for the bays, within the

24    blockade of Dubrovnik and the harbours, the ports, near Dubrovnik.

25            The colour blue denotes communications and the routes that

Page 3987

 1    speedboats and other fast boats took from Ston, Metkovic, Opuzen, used to

 2    supply the town with weapons.  So this route of theirs across the islands

 3    was supposed to be intercepted, hence the patrolling of these speedboats.

 4       Q.   Admiral, what do the red markings signify on the waters?  There

 5    are five red markings.  Do you see them?  What do they signify?

 6       A.   Well, those are patrol boats in their positions -- or rather,

 7    within a blockade line, or rather, patrol line.

 8       Q.   Perhaps it's been a little less than clear.  Those patrol boats

 9    belong to which forces?

10       A.   These are patrol boats of the 16th Border Naval Unit, and they are

11    subordinated to the 9th Naval Sector.

12       Q.   And just to clarify, the blue -- well, figures, or however we want

13    to call them, the blue elliptical or triangular figures that you have

14    running along the coast, would you again please clarify what those

15    represent.  Those blue figures; do you see them?  Yeah.

16       A.   They represent speedboats or other fast boats of the Dubrovnik

17    defence that took these routes and used these islands for smuggling, for

18    bringing in contraband weapons and personnel for the defence of the town

19    of Dubrovnik from this area Metkovic, Ston, Opuzen.  They usually did this

20    during the night.

21       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.

22            MS. SOMERS:  I would ask at this time to move this exhibit into

23    evidence.

24            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

25            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P124.

Page 3988

 1            MS. SOMERS:

 2       Q.   Admiral, between 8 and 14 November, were there any changes in the

 3    subordination relationships of the 2nd -- of the 3rd Battalion of the

 4    472nd Brigade?  Was there any change in the subordination relationships of

 5    the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd?

 6       A.   Well, on the 10th of November, the 3rd Battalion was introduced

 7    that had been on leave.  It was brought into the battle to take the forts

 8    that we spoke about.

 9       Q.   Can you indicate from the 10th of November whether or not the 3rd

10    Battalion of the 472nd became directly subordinated to the 9th Naval

11    Sector.

12       A.   Yes.

13       Q.   Can you explain the difference between direct and indirect fire.

14       A.   Direct fire is fire used to hit the target directly, the target

15    that can be seen from the firing positions where the weapons are

16    positioned, the weapons used for firing.  Indirect firing is when you

17    can't see the target from the firing positions, but rather from an

18    observation post.  The hits are being reported, and there's a correction

19    of firing.  There's an observation post, and then the observation post

20    reports back to whoever's firing on the success of firing, whether the

21    target has been hit or not.  And then this is reported to the commander

22    who is next to the weapon.  There is the crew, the firing crew, which is

23    located at the firing position.

24       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.  I want to take one second; I want to just

25    check a note.  Thank you.

Page 3989

 1            Which positions would have allowed the best use of direct-fire

 2    weapons during the period of combat operations you have just discussed, in

 3    November?

 4       A.   You mean in relation to targeting the town of Dubrovnik or

 5    generally speaking?

 6       Q.   You're right.  Excuse me.  I'll rephrase the question.

 7            Which positions would have provided the -- would have allowed the

 8    best use of direct-fire weapons toward the Old Town of Dubrovnik during

 9    that period of time?

10       A.   Well, if you look at the map, it is clear that in the Zarkovica

11    area there's an elevation about 350 metres high.  And from there, a clear

12    unobstructed view opens on to the Old Town.  As for the other positions,

13    Bosanka and Strincijera, there's a rock just in front, the rock of Srdj,

14    which obstructs the view.  As for the use of artillery, the mortars,

15    120-millimetre mortars and far-range cannon, you would need observation

16    posts placed at certain elevations; Zarkovica, if possible.  They would

17    observe the hits and then report back to the firing commander.  At

18    Zarkovica, there should be an observation post, and the short-range

19    weapons firing positions, too, which can be used to target certain points

20    inside the town.

21       Q.   When you say "the town," are you referring to the Old Town,

22    Admiral?

23       A.   I'm referring to the Old Town, but I'm referring to the town of

24    Dubrovnik as a whole, because most of the artillery had been positioned

25    outside the Old Town.  And in order to neutralise those, these weapons

Page 3990

 1    were being used, at least pursuant to all the orders that we had issued.

 2       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.

 3            If I can ask you, please, to turn your attention to tab 23.

 4    Admiral, this is an order dated the 5th of November, 1991, addressed to

 5    the 2nd Operational Group command, the 472nd Motorised Brigade, and the

 6    9th VPS for the units marked.  Can you please indicate, whose order is

 7    this?

 8       A.   This order was produced by my command; it bears my signature.  And

 9    the time, or rather, the date given is the 5th of November.

10       Q.   And what -- can you give us a brief indication of the significance

11    of this order for the operations upcoming.

12       A.   The crux of this order, pursuant to the tasks given to the sector

13    by the 2nd Operational Group, I was supposed to set up a mixed detachment

14    that would replace the 4th Battalion of the Trebinje Brigade.  Previously

15    -- I must add, previously I was supposed to draft a statement and send it

16    to Admiral Brovet because of firing, acts of provocation that were

17    directed at some hotels in town but outside the Old Town.  It was not

18    proven exactly who was to blame, but probably the blame was on both sides,

19    the Croatian side and our side equally.  In order to reduce the

20    possibility of using artillery fire against the town, I removed the 4th

21    Battalion of the Trebinje Brigade and replaced it with the Territorial

22    Defence mixed detachment, who did not have the same strong artillery.

23    They did not have 120-millimetre mortars, but rather, short-range mortars.

24    As for the guns, 40 and 60 millimetre that were supposed to be used for

25    anti-aircraft defence, those were not used from the area to target the

Page 3991

 1    town.  Therefore, I believe that the problem of these acts of provocation

 2    and firing on the town was thereby eliminated or dealt with.

 3       Q.   Turning your attention to the section under -- it says "point 2"

 4    of this order, there's a reference to the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd

 5    Brigade.  Would you please indicate what is discussed about that brigade

 6    there.

 7       A.   Yes.  Here it says that the battalion is assembled in the area of

 8    deployment and that it should remain until further notice in the Talez

 9    area.  It had been pulled out from combat, therefore it is outside the

10    zone of combat operations.

11       Q.   So by going into Talez, is it making it available for use in

12    operations?

13       A.   No, no.  It was on leave, resting, on the 5th, when this was --

14       Q.   When did it leave its position from Talez and become available for

15    combat operations?

16       A.   This battalion was brought before it was introduced.  I think it

17    was between the 8th and the 10th of November, but I can't specify the

18    date.  I don't have that document now, but it must have been between the

19    8th and the 10th because it was introduced on the 10th, so give or take a

20    day or two.

21       Q.   Thank you very much, Admiral.

22            MS. SOMERS:  I would ask to move this document into evidence.

23            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P125.

25            MS. SOMERS:

Page 3992

 1       Q.   Admiral, were -- what was the number of combat casualties in the

 2    course of this attack, and which units sustained them?

 3       A.   During these operations, there were heavy losses, especially when

 4    Bosanka was taken.  This mixed TO detachment, which did not have any

 5    powerful artillery, there was a limited operation with no use of

 6    artillery, especially not against the town itself.  I think they had four

 7    dead and many wounded.  When those dead and wounded were being evacuated,

 8    there were new losses that were sustained because the area was clear, the

 9    whole rock was exposed, and the Croatian artillery from the town itself

10    opened fire, which made it impossible for them to evacuate their dead and

11    wounded, not even at night.  This lasted for about two or three days, the

12    evacuation itself took about two or three days.

13       Q.   Was that the total number of casualties for that operation?  What

14    about from the 10th?

15       A.   On the 10th, when the 3rd Battalion was brought in, and during the

16    fighting -- the fighting around the forts, the three forts, they did have

17    several men who were killed or wounded.

18       Q.   And were those men casualties of the 3rd Battalion?

19       A.   Yes.

20       Q.   Who issued the orders for this operation?

21       A.   The command of the 2nd Operational Group.

22       Q.   And I'd ask you, please, to turn to tab 24.

23            Admiral, do you recognise this document which bears the date of 10

24    November, 1991?

25       A.   Yes.  This is a combat order that was produced by my command on

Page 3993

 1    the 10th of November, and it bears my signature.

 2       Q.   Okay.  And was this order issued following or pursuant to any

 3    other orders of a superior command?  What was the purpose of the order?

 4       A.   Yes.  This is an order that was written on the 10th, and it

 5    pertains to an operation that was supposed to be carried out on the 11th

 6    of November.  It sets out the tasks for my subordinate units, and it was

 7    written pursuant to a decision on operations by the command of the 2nd

 8    Operational Group, which ran the entire operation in the area.

 9       Q.   The reference on the first page in the first paragraph to the

10    general access of Bosanka, which units were to have participated in the

11    extension of the attack?

12       A.   The 472nd Brigade, the 3rd Light Brigade, and the 3rd Battalion of

13    the 472nd Brigade.  In order to better understand the situation, we must

14    point out the following:  The 3rd Battalion was operating along a special

15    route.  It would only take the rock just above Dubrovnik, and that's why

16    special emphasis is given to their tasks.  The remaining forces were

17    active in Rijeka Dubrovacka, the 3rd Light Brigade, and the 1st and 2nd

18    Battalion of the 472nd Brigade, and that's why these tasks were separate

19    tasks.

20       Q.   When you say "the rock just above Dubrovnik," what are you

21    referring to?

22       A.   I meant the Bosanka, Strincijera, and Gradci forts.  These were

23    the forts that were taken in this attack.

24       Q.   Thank you, Admiral.

25            MS. SOMERS:  I would ask to move this document into evidence,

Page 3994

 1    please.

 2            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 3            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P126.

 4            MS. SOMERS:

 5       Q.   Would you please turn your attention to tab 25.  Admiral, before

 6    you is a document dated 10 November, 1991, and it bears the signature of

 7    an individual named Radovan Klikovac.  Who is that, please?

 8       A.   This is an officer who was in charge of the organisation and

 9    mobilisation at the command of the 9th Sector.

10       Q.   And it is addressed to whom?

11       A.   This is addressed to the command of the 2nd Operational Group.

12    And it was probably produced pursuant to a request to forward information

13    on officers and soldiers who had been killed.

14       Q.   Thank you very much.

15            MS. SOMERS:  I'd ask to move this document into evidence, please.

16            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

17            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P127.

18            MS. SOMERS:

19       Q.   Tab 26, please.  I want to ask you very quickly about this

20    document, Admiral.  It is a combat order.  Do you recognise it?

21       A.   Yes, I do.  This is a combat order produced by my command dated

22    the 12th of November.  It bears my signature.

23       Q.   And does this order confirm that the 9th VPS is, in fact, issuing

24    orders to the 472nd Brigade?

25       A.   Yes, precisely.

Page 3995

 1       Q.   Thank you.

 2            MS. SOMERS:  I'd ask to move this document into evidence, please.

 3            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 4            MS. SOMERS:  The next -- sorry.

 5            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P128.

 6            MS. SOMERS:

 7       Q.   If you can please turn your attention to tab 27.  Just briefly

 8    taking a look at a document dated 13 November, 1991, Admiral, do you

 9    recognise this order?

10       A.   Yes.  This document was produced by my command on the 13th of

11    November, and it bears my signature.

12       Q.   And in this document, does it indicate that you are -- that your

13    command is now issuing orders to the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade?

14       A.   Yes.  This document comprises three units, the 3rd Battalion and

15    the 16th Border Naval Detachment, the 3rd Battalion.

16       Q.   Both this order and the order we just looked at from -- excuse me,

17    from the 11th -- I'm sorry, from the 12th and the 13th of November, are

18    issued in the midst of combat operations, are they not?

19       A.   Yes.

20       Q.   Thank you.

21            MS. SOMERS:  I would ask to move this last document into evidence.

22            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

23            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P129.

24            MS. SOMERS:

25       Q.   Admiral Jokic, was the Old Town of Dubrovnik shelled in the course

Page 3996

 1    of the combat operations we have just discussed?

 2       A.   I must point out briefly that during the operation itself between

 3    the 10th and the 12th, personally I was not aware of any shelling of the

 4    Old Town.  When the operations began, I was with the 3rd Light Brigade.

 5    My chief of staff was back at the command post, and Captain -- Colonel

 6    Kovacevic was with the 3rd Battalion.  Finally, on the 10th or on the

 7    11th, I believe, at the command post awaiting further action, based on

 8    information that I had received about the Old Town being shelled from the

 9    chief of staff of the brigade who had gone to Kupari for reporting, I

10    asked whether and why they had shelled the Old Town.  He told me that they

11    didn't shell the Old Town.  I called the chief of staff to confirm whether

12    he had seen him in command of the guns and what was being targeted.  He

13    said that the 76-millimetre guns were being trained on Srdj, but that they

14    were not targeting the town.  I told him this was only an excuse, and that

15    even if they weren't targeting the town, every shell that missed its

16    target, every single volley that missed its target, would fly past Srdj

17    and land on the Old Town.  Whether he was doing it in order to take

18    revenge on his former commander, brigade commander, who had fled to

19    Dubrovnik and organised the town's defence, or whether he was doing this

20    deliberately pursuant to someone else's orders, why --

21       Q.   Admiral, sorry to cut you off.  Was the Old Town of Dubrovnik --

22    did you come to learn that the Old Town of Dubrovnik was shelled during

23    the combat operations in this period?  Yes or no.

24       A.   Yes.

25       Q.   Thank you.  Did you make an inquiry into the shelling of the Old

Page 3997

 1    Town during this period of time, an inquiry or an investigation?

 2       A.   Following this operation, I conducted an investigation.  I

 3    questioned the commanders and officers who may have been responsible for

 4    these operations, the chief of staff of the 472nd Brigade, Major Komar,

 5    his commander, Colonel Obrad Vicic.  I also called the battalion commander

 6    following the completion of this operation from the command post when he

 7    arrived in Kupari.  I talked to him.  I discussed with him who had done

 8    this, whether it was his units, the artillery of the 472nd Brigade, or a

 9    different battalion.  He insisted that it had not been him.  I asked to

10    have the chief of staff removed as well as the brigade commander, to have

11    them both resign.  And that's what I did about this investigation, but no

12    further inquiries were made.

13       Q.   Did you inquire whether or not there was any outgoing fire from

14    the Old Town, or was it told to you?  Did you inquire?

15       A.   During those interviews, the commander of the 3rd Battalion

16    insisted that he had been under permanent fire from the ramparts and from

17    the turrets of the Old Town and that there must have been mortars, either

18    in the Old Town itself or just next to the ramparts.

19       Q.   Was there any outgoing fire from the Old Town, Admiral?  What is

20    your assessment?  Was there any outgoing fire from the Old Town?

21       A.   In my assessment, even if there had been any such fire, it could

22    only have been an act of provocation by 120-millimetre gun or something

23    like that.  But certainly there could have been no fire coming from the

24    Old Town that would have posed a real threat to our units.

25       Q.   Which units of the units under your command shelled the Old Town

Page 3998

 1    between the 10th and 13th, and with what weapons?

 2       A.   Only the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade was in a position from

 3    which this could have been done.  Possibly the artillery of the 472nd

 4    Brigade also took part, its 130-millimetre guns, but I have no evidence

 5    that those were ever used.

 6       Q.   Who was the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade at

 7    this time?

 8       A.   Captain Vladimir Kovacevic.

 9       Q.   Did he control the situation at all times during these operations?

10       A.   Yes.

11       Q.   Did you order the shelling of the Old Town during the November

12    operations, Admiral Jokic?

13       A.   Me, never.

14       Q.   Did you personally observe the attack on the Old Town, Admiral

15    Jokic?

16       A.   No.  I didn't personally witness this.  I was in no position to

17    see that from the position in which I was at the time.  However, based on

18    the reports that I received after the operation, this was possible -- it

19    was possible to ascertain that.  I did, in fact, ascertain that.

20       Q.   If you did not order this operation, how could the shelling of the

21    Old Town, in light of the previous orders prohibiting the shelling of the

22    Old Town, have occurred in the course of a well-planned combat operation?

23       A.   My assessment at the time was - and it has only been reinforced by

24    further questioning - that this was a willful attack by the battalion

25    commander receiving support and in coordination, in combat coordination,

Page 3999

 1    with the chief of staff of the brigade, Major Komar.

 2       Q.   Did you become aware of civilian casualties and damage to civilian

 3    objects that resulted from this shelling or these shellings?

 4       A.   No.  During the entire operation, we were not aware of any

 5    civilian casualties or of the extent of destruction, except on the 6th of

 6    December when we expected that, but not this time around.

 7       Q.   Was the shelling of the Old Town that you've just discussed during

 8    the time period of 10 - 13 November, was it ever investigated within the

 9    2nd Operational Group or by the command of the 2nd Operational Group?

10       A.   Not as far as I know.

11       Q.   Was Strugar -- General Strugar, excuse me, informed of the

12    investigation that you had begun?

13       A.   After questioning Major Komar about his role in terms of support

14    to the 3rd Battalion and the targeting of the Old Town, on the 10th or

15    possibly on the 11th, I informed the chief of staff.  I'm not sure if it

16    was General Damjanovic, but I think it was him, or possibly Stankovic.  I

17    requested the resignation of the chief of staff and the brigade commander

18    because of those activities.  The commander of the brigade group was not

19    at his -- of the operational group was not at his command post.  I'm not

20    sure where he was at the time.  We discussed the extent of damage, and he

21    told me that he would inform the commander about this, because he did not

22    have the authority to deal with this issue.  The next day, I asked to

23    speak to General Kandic and General Strugar yet again to have these

24    officers replaced by other officers, and I failed.

25       Q.   You failed in having them replaced or you failed in speaking to

Page 4000

 1    them?

 2       A.   I did speak to them, but the command of the 2nd Operational Group,

 3    or rather, General Strugar did not have any competent officers to offer as

 4    replacements.  The general told me that he would send an officer who was

 5    the commander of an armoured unit, but that he would only send this

 6    officer later.  Therefore, the situation remained unresolved.

 7            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the transcript I

 8    believe contains an error.  On page 31, line 19, it says "General Kandic"

 9    whereas it should read "Admiral Kandic."  And the next thing is, this last

10    answer at line 25, it reads: "The general told me," and what the admiral

11    actually said is that the admiral would send another competent officer and

12    the way I heard it was a reference to Admiral Kandic.  Therefore, I would

13    like to have this clarified.

14            JUDGE PARKER:  Could you seek to clarify the position, please,

15    Ms. Somers.

16            Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.

17            MS. SOMERS:

18       Q.   When you said, Admiral Jokic, in the transcript -- let's see --

19    that someone of the two persons, Kandic or Strugar, would send an officer

20    who was a commander of an armoured unit, to whom were you referring?  Who

21    would send it?

22       A.   Admiral Kandic was the one who said that.

23       Q.   Were the two officers you referred to, Captain Kovacevic and

24    Komar, chief of staff, ever replaced?  Excuse me.  I beg your pardon.  The

25    brigade -- I beg your pardon --

Page 4001

 1            JUDGE PARKER:  I thought it was the brigade commander.

 2            MS. SOMERS:  Yes, I have a wrong note.

 3       Q.   Were the brigade commander and chief of staff Komar ever removed

 4    or replaced in connection with these combat operations?

 5       A.   No, they weren't.

 6       Q.   And was Captain Kovacevic removed or replaced in connection with

 7    these combat operations?

 8       A.   No.

 9            MS. SOMERS:  Your Honour, would this be a convenient time for a

10    break?

11            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

12            MS. SOMERS:  Thank you.

13            JUDGE PARKER:  We will have the morning -- first morning break

14    now.

15                          --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

16                          --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

17            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Ms. Somers.

18            MS. SOMERS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19       Q.   Admiral Jokic, based on your findings and your recommendation to

20    replace the chief of staff Komar and the brigade commander Vicic, what

21    measures did you propose to take against Captain Kovacevic, whose conduct

22    - that is the shelling of the Old Town - you deemed to have been

23    willfully done?

24       A.   At that time, I did not ask for his removal or replacement.  I was

25    not convinced that it was his fault, in view of the fact that an

Page 4002

 1    investigation had not been carried out and that around Dubrovnik there

 2    were other units belonging to the brigade as well as the brigade

 3    artillery.

 4       Q.   Your finding of his willfully shelling did not lead you to take

 5    any action against him?

 6       A.   At that time, I thought that it was the responsibility of the

 7    brigade command, and he was part of that brigade.  I did not learn

 8    anything then, but only later that he was the main perpetrator and that

 9    the others just supported his actions.

10       Q.   Was there any other reason you did not further pursue an

11    investigation into Captain Kovacevic?

12       A.   Right now I do not remember that very clearly, but I think that he

13    was given certain support and that perhaps that was the reason then why I

14    did not raise the issue of his replacement.

15       Q.   Support by whom?

16       A.   I mean the support of individuals from the command of the 2nd

17    Operational Group.

18       Q.   Which individuals?

19       A.   I mean the chief of staff and the commander of the 2nd Operational

20    Group.

21       Q.   Did you believe he had the support of -- by "the commander of the

22    2nd Operational Group," to whom are you referring?

23       A.   I was referring to General Pavle Strugar.

24       Q.   Did you discuss your findings about Captain Kovacevic's actions

25    with General Strugar?

Page 4003

 1       A.   I think that at that time I did not succeed in talking to him,

 2    because he was not at the command post.  Due to his obligations, he was

 3    often absent, either in other corps or in Podgorica or reporting in

 4    Belgrade.

 5       Q.   Did you shortly thereafter discuss your findings, if not

 6    immediately?

 7       A.   I think we talked about that once when he was in Kupari, but the

 8    conversation boiled down to the following, that we did not know whether

 9    certain damage was greater, and that's where it all remained.

10            Actually, can I just say something very briefly?  We thought -- or

11    rather, in the commands, we thought that the other side was exaggerating

12    the damage, that they were not presenting the entire truth.  Their

13    newspapers wrote that all of Dubrovnik was ablaze, that they had a lot of

14    ruins and casualties.  So we, as units were in between, so to speak, we

15    did not know what the actual state of affairs was at the time.

16       Q.   And did you do anything to determine what the actual state of

17    affairs was at the time?

18       A.   Not then.

19       Q.   Would you agree that irrespective of the degree of damage to the

20    Old Town, the fact of shelling of the Old Town was prohibited and that was

21    known to all persons in the 2nd Operational Group?

22       A.   Yes, I agree.

23       Q.   And that the shelling, irrespective of damage, the shelling of a

24    protected place that is a subject of orders prohibiting that shelling is a

25    serious violation?

Page 4004

 1       A.   Yes, I agree.

 2       Q.   You indicated earlier that you had proposed the removal of the

 3    chief of staff of the brigade and the brigade commander.  What was General

 4    Strugar's response to that, if any?

 5       A.   I said that at that time I did not find him; he was absent.  But I

 6    think I talked to the chief of staff.  He told me - and I heard later as

 7    well - they did not have such officers, that their officers ranked from

 8    lieutenant colonel upwards, and that he could not supply me with

 9    appropriate officers.

10       Q.   Who had the authority to remove or replace officers of the 2nd

11    Operational Group?

12       A.   Well, the commander of the 2nd Operational Group had that

13    authority.  I had authority over the units that were subordinated to me,

14    like the 3rd Battalion and the brigade.  However, since these were units

15    that were temporarily subordinated, I had to seek approval from my

16    superior commander.

17       Q.   If you had recommended the removal and replacement of these

18    officers for what you perceived to have been wrongdoing or indiscipline,

19    what would you have expected General Strugar to have done, as the most

20    senior officer in the area?

21       A.   Well, to call them and to replace them -- or rather, to find

22    appropriate officers who could replace them.

23       Q.   If you could please turn to your tabs -- to tab 28.

24            Admiral, are you -- were there protests by international community

25    representatives or the Croatians concerning the shelling of the Old Town

Page 4005

 1    and of the city as well?

 2       A.   Yes.  This document refers to the protest of the international

 3    monitoring mission on the 10th of November.  Of the chief of mission, Mr.

 4    Van Houten, and his protest addressed to General Kadijevic.

 5       Q.   And also delivered to whom?  Whose names are indicated above the

 6    phrase "international monitoring mission"?  To whom was this letter

 7    delivered?

 8       A.   The letter was delivered to General Raseta, who was negotiating

 9    with the Croatian government in Zagreb, and General Strugar, commander of

10    the 2nd Operational Group.

11       Q.   When you say General Raseta negotiating for the government, was he

12    a negotiator for the JNA?

13       A.   Yes.  He was the JNA negotiator in Zagreb.

14       Q.   I would ask you about the text of this document.  "To General

15    Kadijevic, Minister of Defence, breach of cease-fire in Dubrovnik.  I have

16    been informed by the monitoring mission team of the European community in

17    Dubrovnik that the shelling of the city is not only continuing but that it

18    is intensive.  The monitors have noticed actions in the area of the Old

19    City walls.  General Raseta, the deputy commander of the 5th military

20    district, was informed about this breach of cease-fire, as was General

21    Strugar, the commander of the federal forces of the region of Dubrovnik,

22    and as such without any reply.  I am now forwarding this information to

23    you in the interests of security for the monitors of the European

24    community in Dubrovnik.  Their lives are at stake due to the actions of

25    the Yugoslav People's Army.  I plead that you order a cease-fire

Page 4006

 1    immediately so that the monitoring teams in the Dubrovnik port can go

 2    through a safe evacuation."

 3            Then it indicates that it has been delivered, et cetera, et

 4    cetera, signed, "Chief of Mission, D. J. Van Houten."  Was there any

 5    response by General Strugar to this letter?

 6       A.   I don't know of any.  I don't have any knowledge about this.

 7       Q.   Did General Strugar call together the officers of his subordinate

 8    units and indicate that this letter had come to his attention and pass it

 9    on to these officers to be passed down to subordinate units?

10            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, objection.

11            JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Rodic.

12            THE INTERPRETER:  Would Mr. Rodic please be asked to speak into

13    the microphone.  Thank you.

14            JUDGE PARKER:  Your microphone, Mr. Rodic.

15            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.  It would be

16    logical to ask before this question whether the witness knows of General

17    Strugar having received this letter at all.  And then once this question

18    had been put, it is only then on the basis of the answer given that

19    further questions can be put as to whether he did anything about it, et

20    cetera.  Thank you.

21            JUDGE PARKER:  I do notice the content of the letter suggests that

22    the matter was directly put to General Strugar before this written letter.

23    But I think you're alerted to the issue, Ms. Somers.  You could resolve

24    it.

25            MS. SOMERS:

Page 4007

 1       Q.   Perhaps I can just ask whether or not you or any of the other

 2    officers, to your knowledge, heard of the contents of this letter in any

 3    means or manner while in the 2nd Operational Group.

 4       A.   I must have heard of the contents, or rather, elements of the

 5    contents.  But I don't think I had this letter.  General Strugar had to

 6    ask me whether these were my units or what the problem was, or rather, how

 7    he resolved the response to this letter.  I know that things could have

 8    gone beyond me, because we did have a negotiating team that talked to

 9    Dubrovnik and the mission then.  So perhaps it went along those channels,

10    that is to say not including me.  I believe I was asked, though.

11            MS. SOMERS:  I would like to tender this document in evidence,

12    please.

13            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

14            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P130.

15            MS. SOMERS:

16       Q.   Would you please turn your attention to tab 29.  In front of you,

17    Admiral, is a document indicating a delivery date of 11 November, signed

18    by or bearing the endorsement of chief of staff Colonel Dr. Vuk Obradovic

19    to Ambassador Van Houten, the chief of the international monitoring

20    mission in Zagreb.  It reads -- please indicate, if you know, who a

21    Colonel Dr. Vuk Obradovic is.

22       A.   Colonel Obradovic was chef de cabinet to the federal secretary,

23    General Kadijevic.

24       Q.    "Your Excellency, Regarding your letter dated 10 November, 1991,

25    and by the order of army General Veljko Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary

Page 4008

 1    for National Defence, I would like to inform you there was truly an

 2    intensified shelling of the Dubrovnik region with focus on the region of

 3    Bosanka and Srdja, and this is due to the fact that there were

 4    strengthened provocations and attacks from the Croatian Armed forces upon

 5    the JNA.

 6            "At the same time, I would like to once again bring to your

 7    attention upon the fact -- I'm sorry -- to bring your attention upon the

 8    fact that the Croatian Armed Forces have been opened fire from the

 9    direction of Stari Grad (Old City), and even with that the JNA units did

10    not act against the old city centre of Dubrovnik, as can also be seen from

11    your letter.

12            "Even though the JNA does nothing to endanger the lives of your

13    monitors, we are ready to enable a safe evacuation for them, if you so

14    regulate.  For the cease-fire to take effect, it should also be acted upon

15    the Croatian Armed forces to cease with the attacks upon the JNA, given

16    that our side is at cease-fire, and that the JNA forces only answer to the

17    open fire once the lives of their members are at stake.  I ask you to

18    arrange the particulars of the agreement with General Major Andreja

19    Raseta."

20            Signed.  Is there a denial in this letter of shelling of the Old

21    Town?

22       A.   Yes.

23       Q.   Considering your previous testimony about the events of the

24    November shelling of the Old Town, would you conclude that the

25    representations or the contents about the Old Town contained in this

Page 4009

 1    letter are false, are not true?

 2       A.   I just have to be very specific.  I claimed that the Old Town had

 3    been shelled and that I learned about this after the action had been

 4    completed, but that was between the 10th and 12th November, when the 3rd

 5    Battalion of the brigade had been introduced.  That is to say between the

 6    10th and 12th.  Up to the 10th of November, in the period when Bosanka was

 7    being taken, the fort of Bosanka, there were operations around the Old

 8    Town, or rather, Srdj and other old forts were targeted.  However, it was

 9    not established then by way of fact that the Old Town was targeted at that

10    time.  That is what I wish to say in order to be as precise as possible.

11       Q.   Do you agree, Admiral, however, that what is said, that is that

12    "the JNA units did not act against the old city centre of Dubrovnik," is

13    it incorrect?  Is it incorrect?

14       A.   Yes, for this period, yes.

15            MS. SOMERS:  I ask to move this document into evidence, please.

16            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

17            THE REGISTRAR:  It will be Prosecution Exhibit P131.

18            MS. SOMERS:

19       Q.   How do you view, Admiral, the reaction of a command of the 2nd

20    Operational Group to the November shelling of the Old Town?

21       A.   Well, I think that at the level of my sector and particularly at

22    the level of the command of the 2nd Operational Group, it was necessary to

23    carry out an investigation and establish exactly what had been going on in

24    terms of what the units were doing around Dubrovnik, especially the 472nd

25    Brigade and its 3rd Battalion.

Page 4010

 1       Q.   And what is your assessment, what are your views, about the lack

 2    of measures taken to undertake such investigation and to establish exactly

 3    what happened?  Again, I address it to the lack of action by the command

 4    of the 2nd Operational Group, your views on that.

 5       A.   I said that an investigation was supposed to have been carried out

 6    at the level of my command or at the level of the 2nd Operational Group,

 7    because the brigade was under its command all the time.  It was only

 8    temporarily assigned to me for being used over a certain period of time.

 9    That is to say that I was supposed to have been ordered to carry out an

10    investigation or the investigation should have been carried out by the

11    organs of the 2nd Operational Group, within their own organisation.

12       Q.   Do you, under the circumstances, view -- feel that the command of

13    the 2nd Operational Group fell short of its responsibility to investigate

14    and deal with this incident?

15       A.   If I can be the judge of my superior command now, then it can be

16    put that way.  However --

17       Q.   Thank you --

18            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be allowed

19    to finish his answer.  I do apologise.

20            JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues]... accidental, Mr.

21    Petrovic.  The two commenced to speak at the same time.

22            MS. SOMERS:  I apologise.  It was my fault.

23            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Admiral.  You were saying, Admiral.

24            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  This is what I

25    wished to say:  I think differently now, and of course at that time my

Page 4011

 1    thinking was incomplete and different in relation to what I think now.

 2    This is what I'm trying to say.  I don't know what the command of the 2nd

 3    Operational Group bore in mind, what guided them, and why such a decision

 4    was made not to carry out an investigation.  Because the command had other

 5    information, too, as to what was going on beyond our lines.  It had a

 6    negotiating team which was in daily negotiations with the Crisis Staff of

 7    Dubrovnik, and they also had other intelligence, too.

 8            MS. SOMERS:

 9       Q.   Thank you very much, Admiral.

10            Moving on.  I'd like to ask you to look to tab 30, which is a map.

11    Admiral Jokic, do you recognise this particular map?

12       A.   Yes.  This is a map of the deployment of the units of the 2nd

13    Operational Group for the 2nd of December, 1991.

14       Q.   What is the scale of this map, please?

15       A.   The scale is 1:50.000.  It's a larger scale than the one used in

16    the previous map.

17       Q.   Admiral, would this map also reflect the deployment of units on

18    the 6th of December, 1991?

19       A.   Yes.  This is the deployment that applied on the 6th of December

20    also.  Practically, it didn't change, this disposition, this deployment,

21    since the 14th of November, the 2nd of December, and the 6th of December.

22    The deployment remained the same.  The units in the immediate vicinity of

23    Dubrovnik were not moved.

24       Q.   In the upper left-hand corner, Admiral, the upper left-hand corner

25    of your map, what type of map does this indicate this is and what

Page 4012

 1    situation does it cover?

 2       A.   This is the deployment of the forces of the 2nd Operational Group,

 3    a grouping of units in the blockade of Dubrovnik.

 4       Q.   I understand.  And in the upper left-hand corner, what type of map

 5    is it called?  In the left, can you see, Admiral, yes --

 6       A.   This is a working map, yes.

 7       Q.   Thank you.  Was this map a contemporaneous map, in other words one

 8    that was used at the time?

 9       A.   Yes.  This completely reflects the situation on the 2nd of

10    December.  You can see on this map the 3rd Battalion stayed in the same

11    positions, bearing in mind the fact that on the 13th of November there had

12    been a cease-fire, a truce, therefore the positions of these units did not

13    change.  But the 472nd Brigade had been pulled out, and you can see the

14    position of that brigade here on the map.  It was in the area of the 2nd

15    Corps.  But its 3rd Battalion remained in its previous position.

16       Q.   Admiral, let's -- if it's -- if you can do it comfortably, can you

17    indicate, by the 6th of December, what territory was controlled by the 2nd

18    Operational Group.

19            MS. SOMERS:  This may be convenient, Mr. Usher, to put on the

20    ELMO.  I think the area would lend itself to being discussed that way.

21    Let me just take a look at the size -- in just a few minutes.  I think

22    we'll start big and we'll work our way down.  I think it's a bit tough.

23       Q.   Admiral, what territory was held by the 2nd Operational Group as

24    of the 6th of December?

25       A.   On the 6th of December, you can see the deployment from Ston, the

Page 4013

 1    front units of the 2nd Corps, and then on towards Neretva and Mostar.

 2    Those were the front-end units of the 2nd Operational Group.

 3       Q.   Moving down perhaps toward the Dubrovnik area, can you indicate

 4    what territory in the Dubrovnik area was held by the 2nd Operational Group

 5    as of the 6th of December?

 6       A.   In the immediate blockade of Dubrovnik, you can see units of the

 7    3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade, you can see units of the Territorial

 8    Defence from the Trebinje Battalion, and the Trebinje TO detachment.  You

 9    can also see the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade immediately

10    surrounding the town.  These were the basic units that we used -- or

11    rather, positioned around Dubrovnik.

12            MS. SOMERS:  I think at this point, Mr. Usher, we can go ahead and

13    put it on the ELMO.  The emphasis will be on the Dubrovnik area and the

14    3rd Battalion of the 472nd, if you can see it.

15       Q.   Admiral, can I just ask you whether or not the naval situation, so

16    we can discuss the waters first, had changed as of the 6th of December

17    from your previous indications on the earlier map.

18       A.   The situation on the sea remained the same.  You can see a

19    symbolic presence of boats along the patrol lines blocking the town in the

20    Mljet channel, just off the coast of Dubrovnik itself and in front of

21    Cavtat.

22       Q.   Excuse me.

23            MS. SOMERS:  Could you perhaps adjust the map so that more of the

24    area of the 3rd of the 472nd is centred and covered.  Yeah.  Even a bit

25    more to the left, please.  Thank you very much.  Okay.  Good.  And

Page 4014

 1    focusing.  Thank you.

 2       Q.   Can you discuss, please, the positions of the companies of the 3rd

 3    Battalion of the 472nd Brigade that are in position -- that are visible on

 4    the map.  And if you could take your pointer and just show the territory

 5    that the 3rd Battalion had occupied as of that date, as of the 2nd -- I'm

 6    sorry, actually as of the 5th, the 5th of December.

 7       A.   You can see the combat deployment of the units of the 3rd

 8    Battalion if you go from the right flank.  You can see in the area of the

 9    Strincijera fort, the 3rd Company of that battalion.  In the central area

10    of this combat deployment, you can see the 2nd Company in the Bosanka

11    area.  Along the left flank in the Zarkovica area, you can see the 1st

12    Company of the 3rd Battalion.  You can see the battalion's command post at

13    Brgat, and an observation post at Zarkovica.

14       Q.   Can you just assist us before going on about the distance between

15    these areas you've just talked about and the Old Town of Dubrovnik.

16       A.   From the Strincijera fort to the Old Town, the distance is about 3

17    kilometres.  Between Bosanka and the Old Town, less than 2 kilometres.

18    And finally, between Zarkovica and the Old Town, about 2 and a half

19    kilometres.  As the crow flies, all of these distances.

20       Q.   Looking at these three positions you've just discussed, can you

21    describe -- I'm sorry, four positions, can you describe the weapons that

22    were situated at each position, and if you could indicate the name of the

23    position and then the weaponry.

24       A.   At the Strincijera fort, there were infantry elements with simple

25    weapons.  I think they had four 82-millimetre mortars.  The range is about

Page 4015

 1    2 kilometres.

 2       Q.   Sorry.  What unit is that that you're referring to at Strincijera?

 3    What unit?

 4       A.   That is the 3rd Company of the battalion.

 5       Q.   Thank you.  You just indicated that the range was about 2

 6    kilometres.  Okay.

 7       A.   Yes.

 8       Q.   Does that range bring those weapons within firing distance of the

 9    Old Town?

10       A.   Yes.  Some sections of the Old Town, maybe half the Old Town.

11    Yes, it would have been in effective firing range.

12       Q.   Would you continue, please.

13       A.   The 2nd Company, in the Bosanka area, had the same kind of

14    weapons, but they also had several 20-millimetre guns and there were two

15    tanks in the area for support in the operations that the company was

16    carrying out.

17       Q.   Were the 80 -- I'm sorry, were the weapons within firing range of

18    the Old Town in the 2nd Company?

19       A.   Yes.  Yes, they were.

20       Q.   [Previous translation continues]...

21       A.   In the Zarkovica area there was an anti-armour company, which had

22    weapons for direct fire.

23       Q.   Would you please point out Zarkovica, if you don't mind.

24       A.   [Witness complies]

25       Q.   And which weapons for direct fire did that company have?  What

Page 4016

 1    type of direct fire weapons?

 2       A.   It had four recoilless guns, 82 millimetre was the calibre.  Four

 3    82-millimetre mortars.  It had two 20-millimetre guns, too.  And it also

 4    had three launchers, the Maljutkas; anti-armour missiles, wire-guided.

 5       Q.   Can you explain the Maljutka as a weapon.  Can you explain a

 6    little bit about its operation.  If you say "wire-guided," it is a direct

 7    fire; is that correct?

 8       A.   Yes.  It's an anti-armour missile used for the destruction of

 9    armoured targets, usually tanks, forts, ramparts, strongly fortified

10    targets.  It is wire guided.  The crew handling the weapon must have the

11    target in sight.

12       Q.   Could you again, please, with your pointer point out Zarkovica so

13    that we make sure we're pointing to the same ...

14       A.   [Witness complies]

15       Q.   There.  Thank you very much.  I think you just showed Bosanka.

16    Could you please identify Zarkovica.

17       A.   [Witness complies]

18       Q.   Thank you.

19            Is that the place with symbol for the anti-armour weaponry?

20       A.   Yes, and the observation post of the battalion commander was also

21    here, the observation post from which he observed the areas in which his

22    companies were deployed as well as the axis of their attack.  My

23    apologies, I pointed out Bosanka, yes, you're quite right, where the black

24    ellipse is.

25       Q.   And the particular battalion commander you're referring to is?

Page 4017

 1       A.   Captain Kovacevic.

 2       Q.   And this is the same map, the positions are the same as they would

 3    have been on the 6th of December with these particular weapons?

 4       A.   Yes.  Yes.

 5       Q.   Thank you.  Can we go back for a minute to the 1st Company.  I

 6    believe it's -- the focus is not terribly good, so I don't know if there's

 7    a way to -- it looks like it's at Bosanka.  Can you discuss, please --

 8    thanks, that's much better.

 9            Please discuss what weapons were available at that position and

10    whether they were in range of the Old Town.

11       A.   You mean Bosanka?

12       Q.   I do, yes.

13       A.   At Bosanka there was the 1st Company.  A while ago I made a slight

14    mistake.  It had the same composition as the 2nd and 3rd Companies,

15    however the anti-armour company in the black ellipse is not marked by a

16    number, so that's why I made the mistake.  This anti-armour company that

17    had the missiles and other weapons.  All these companies had the same

18    composition in terms of the weapons they had.  They had 82-millimetre

19    launchers, but the central one at Bosanka also had two tanks in addition

20    as support.

21       Q.   Is the position at Zarkovica - just going back for a moment - in

22    the direct line of fire to the Old Town?

23       A.   Yes.

24       Q.   I'm corrected to say line of observation.  Is it the direct line

25    of observation to the Old Town?

Page 4018

 1       A.   Yes.

 2       Q.   Admiral, are you able to indicate if all four units of the 3rd

 3    Battalion were within firing range of the Old Town?

 4       A.   Yes, they were.

 5       Q.   Can we take a look now at the other positions that are in the

 6    Dubrovnik area that are indicated on this map.  If you could slide the map

 7    a little bit perhaps to your left, maybe up and to the left.  To the left.

 8    Thank you.  And up a bit, please.  We want to show the term "9th VPS" and

 9    the position there, if it's easily visible.  You were fine.  That's good.

10    Fine.  Thank you.  Okay.

11            Can you identify, please, the positions that are shown here,

12    including whatever is marked as 9 VPS, what it represents, and just tell

13    us as quickly as you can about the positions, location, identification.

14    What does the flag 9 VPS in that red circle indicate?

15       A.   The 9th VPS marks the command that is in charge of all these units

16    marked on the map.  The small flag --

17       Q.   Yes, that's what I want to know.  Tell me, please, what the flag

18    which is at a location in a circle, what does that indicate?

19       A.   Oh, my apologies.  In Kupari, there was the forward observation

20    post of the 9th VPS.  The command post is located at Kupari, within this

21    circle.

22       Q.   Okay.  Moving perhaps up a little bit -- let's see if we can get

23    the usher to assist us there.  Okay.  Thank you.  Can you indicate, there

24    are some abbreviations, "OdTO-Tr."  It's slightly larger than the other

25    print.  "OdTO-Tr."  No, it's a bit -- centre it a bit.  If you come down a

Page 4019

 1    bit, please.  "OdTO-Tr.," what does that stand for, please?

 2       A.   This writing stands for the abbreviation Territorial Defence

 3    Detachment Trebinje.  This is a battalion-level unit; it's a bit weaker

 4    than a battalion would normally be, subordinated to the 9th Sector when

 5    the brigade was pulled out of the area.

 6       Q.   And there are some indications -- symbols there.  One is a black

 7    circle with a red symbol inside, if you can see it.  If you move down a

 8    little bit.  Come back, down, please.  Down again.  In that area, the

 9    black circle with the red indication -- yeah, that one.  Yes, what does

10    that stand for, please?

11       A.   This is the mortar platoon.  They had 82-millimetre mortars.  It's

12    a mortar unit belonging to that battalion.  The battalion was not very

13    strong in terms of artillery.  This mortar unit was all they had.  The

14    position of that platoon is given here as well as the command post of the

15    Territorial Defence unit where the flag is.  You can see a red circle just

16    next to it.

17       Q.   Now, was that position, the one in the circle -- no, the next --

18    with the black circle and the red marking, was that -- keep going -- yeah,

19    yes.  Was that in firing range of the Old Town?

20       A.   No.  No.  This unit was not trained on the Old Town.  Its axis of

21    operation was down towards Rijeka Dubrovacka.  The front ends of that unit

22    are here, of that detachment.  This platoon acts as support for that unit

23    along the axis of attack, but it's not within firing range of the town,

24    nor is it along the same axis of that detachment of the TO.

25       Q.   Where you have your pointer right now, if you could move up to the

Page 4020

 1    area where it says "BVG/3mtb."  Could you discuss those positions and what

 2    the symbols mean, please.

 3       A.   This is a firing group belonging to the battalion.  That is only

 4    its short name.

 5       Q.   Of what battalion?

 6       A.   Of the 3rd Battalion.  This is a battalion firing group of the 3rd

 7    Battalion providing support for other units of the 3rd Battalion.  It's a

 8    120-millimetre mortar battery containing six mortars.

 9       Q.   And is that the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade?

10       A.   Yes.

11       Q.   Was -- were the weapons that you've just discussed in range of the

12    Old Town?

13       A.   Yes.  From that position, it was possible to target the Old Town.

14    The range is 6 kilometres, and the distance is between 5 and 6 kilometres.

15    That's at the edge of the firing range, so to speak.

16       Q.   And what is the name of the area where those weapons were found,

17    where those positions were?

18       A.   Uskoplje, the railway station of Uskoplje.

19       Q.   If you could indicate what the "mpoad" stands for.  It's just to

20    the left of your pointer right now.  "Mpoad," what does that stand for,

21    please?

22       A.   This stands for Mixed Anti-armour Artillery Division.

23       Q.   And where is that as well?  Where is its location?

24       A.   That division -- well, in fact, it wasn't the entire division that

25    was there.  There were anti-armour guns ZIS, 76-millimetre, but this

Page 4021

 1    marking is wrong.  Not the entire division was there, only those four guns

 2    were actually there.  I do happen to know this for sure.

 3       Q.   Is that attached to which battalion?

 4       A.   The 3rd Battalion.

 5       Q.   Of which brigade?

 6       A.   The 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade.  They got this from their

 7    brigade as support, as a kind of reinforcement.

 8       Q.   Have you -- can you discuss the weapons that were part of that,

 9    that were available.

10       A.   They had the anti-armour guns, ZIS 76-millimetres.  The range was

11    about 4 kilometres.  This is only a symbol, but the positions of those

12    guns were in a different place.  All in all, this was given only because

13    the firing group was within that unit.  But these positions given here are

14    not their exact positions.

15       Q.   You have "bTO-Tr." where your pointer is now.  What does that

16    signify?

17       A.   Trebinje Territorial Defence Battalion.  That's what it means.

18    This is their command post, and the units are to the right.  You can see

19    their combat disposition here.  These are the units that are part of that

20    combat disposition, and this here means that the command of that battalion

21    was located right here.

22       Q.   What weapons were available to those units?

23       A.   This TO unit was poorly armed, and the battalion was usually

24    deployed along the auxiliary axis, where there weren't many operations

25    underway.  They only had the 82-millimetre launchers, same as the

Page 4022

 1    Territorial Defence detachment.

 2       Q.   Were those weapons within range of the Old Town?

 3       A.   No.

 4       Q.   If you can move perhaps the map a little bit to cover the bigger

 5    encircled area -- yeah.  That's it.  That's good.

 6            Can you start at the top and indicate what -- we're in a circle

 7    now where the unit that we're talking about says "3/5 pmtbr."  What does

 8    that mean?  It says "3/5 pmtbr."  What does that mean?

 9       A.   This is the 3rd Battalion of the 5th pmtbr.  Well, it's the

10    Proletarian Motorised Brigade.  That was the official name of that unit.

11    The last map, there was something that I couldn't figure out, those units

12    and those abbreviations.  I think those referred to this unit, "pmtbr,"

13    Proletarian Motorised Brigade, I think that's what the abbreviation

14    actually stands for.

15       Q.   On the 6th of December, to whom was that unit subordinated?

16       A.   The 9th Sector.

17       Q.   You're saying the 9th Naval Sector, your sector?

18       A.   Yes, yes.

19       Q.   And was that part of the 2nd Operational Group on the 6th of

20    December?

21       A.   Yes, yes.

22       Q.   Can we look now at the markings.  Starting at the centre, there's

23    a flag.

24       A.   Yes, that is the command post of the battalion.

25       Q.   What is the location of the command post?

Page 4023

 1       A.   The village of Podbrijezje.  That's where it should be.

 2       Q.   Looking above, where it says "BVG-3," what is that position and

 3    what is its location?

 4       A.   This is the battalion firing group equivalent to the kind of

 5    weapons that the 3rd Battalion had, 120-millimetre mortars, and it is the

 6    area above Mocinska Spilja.  There is a graveyard there and the firing

 7    position was there.

 8       Q.   Were they within range of the Old Town?

 9       A.   No, no.

10       Q.   Looking up above - above - there's a red circle, a bigger red

11    circle.  Do you see it?  Yeah.  What is that?

12       A.   This is a rear unit, "poz."

13       Q.   Of what formation?

14       A.   That's the logistics unit of the battalion.  Each battalion has a

15    logistics unit for supplies, ammunition, and all the other supplies.  It's

16    actually a platoon that's used for the purpose -- a bit less than a

17    platoon, actually.

18       Q.   Sorry.  So that belongs to the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade?

19       A.   Yes.

20       Q.   We would like to take a look now, if you could raise the map a

21    little bit, please.  Sorry, no.  If you can bring it so we have a closer

22    look at the various subunits.  That's it.  Okay.  Looking over to the

23    section of the 3rd of the 5th, look at 1/3.  What does that represent?

24    Mm-hmm.  That's it.  What is that, please?

25       A.   That's the 1st Company of that battalion.  The combat disposition

Page 4024

 1    is along the coast.

 2       Q.   And where is that?  Can you give us a location indication, please,

 3    for that company.

 4       A.   Well, it's at Zaton.

 5       Q.   And what weaponry was there on the 6th of December?

 6       A.   Small arms with small mortars, 82 millimetres.

 7       Q.   Okay.  And what range -- were they within range of the Old Town?

 8       A.   No.

 9       Q.   Moving on to the centre -- yeah.  2 -- 2nd Company of the 3rd

10    Battalion.

11       A.   Yes.

12       Q.   Where is that located?

13       A.   Well, the area can be seen left of Mokosica, Podbrijezje.  The

14    broader area of the village of Podbrijezje.  They have the same weapons

15    like the previous, 1st Company.

16       Q.   And what is the range of those weapons?  Is it -- are those

17    weapons within range of the Old Town?

18       A.   No, no, they were not.

19       Q.   Looking at the 3rd Company.

20       A.   The 3rd Company was somewhat removed towards the back, and they

21    had the same weapons like the previous two ones did.

22       Q.   Okay.  And were they also -- were they in range of the Old Town?

23       A.   No.

24       Q.   Now, there's a symbol of a -- with a flag, and it -- the symbol is

25    to the right of the word "Mokosica," if you see it.  Can you tell us what

Page 4025

 1    that represents, please.  Yeah.

 2      A. This is the command of the settlement of Mokosica.  It's a rather big

 3  settlement and all the surrounding settlements belong to it.  The command of

 4  this settlement is responsible for law and order and the proper functioning

 5  of these settlements.

 6  Q. There are some broken lines within this circle, broken red lines. Do you

 7  see them? Yeah. Within the circle and generally around.

 8  What do those signify, please?

 9  A.   The front end positions of this battalion of the Territorial

10  Defence of Trebinje.  These are its companies.

11  Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Can we ask you to move the map so that Cilipi

12  is shown.  Are you able to point out, please - yeah - the area of Cilipi.

13  A.   The airport of Cilipi.

14  Q.   Were there -- first of all, under -- to whom were units there

15  subordinated and what units were there?

16  A.   The battery, the mobile battery, of 130-millimetre cannons was

17  there.  Its position can be seen at the end of the airport runway.

18  Q. And to whom -- well, what unit was actually there? Name the unit, please.

19       A.   The mobile battery of 130-millimetre cannons, and it was

20    subordinated to the command of the 9th Military Naval Sector.

21       Q.   So those were sector weapons?

22       A.   Yes.

23       Q.   Were those weapons within firing range of the Old Town?

24       A.   Yes, yes.  Almost as far as they could be, but they could be

25    targeted.  The distance was about 12 or 13 kilometres.

Page 4026

 1       Q.   And what is the range of a 130-millimetre cannon?

 2       A.   16 kilometres.  That is the effective range, and its ultimate

 3    range is over 20 kilometres; 24 kilometres.

 4       Q.   Looking at a flag that's -- that appears on the map, can you see

 5    it?  It -- a red symbol with a flag on it near -- it says near Cavtat.

 6    What is that, please?  The flag, yes.

 7       A.   This is the command post of Cavtat, in the town itself.

 8       Q.   And the command post for what formation?

 9       A.   Well, this is a newly established command post.  It doesn't have a

10    formation.  This is a small unit for providing security so that life

11    itself could function.  How can I explain this?  So the traffic would

12    evolve, so that looting would be prevented, everything that is needed in

13    that kind of situation.  All such things were to be resolved by this

14    command, a few officers and a few men.  It was not intended for combat

15    use.

16       Q.   Were there any heavy weapons in that location?

17       A.   No.

18       Q.   Can I ask you where the command post of the 2nd Operational Group

19    is on this map.  I think you may have to move it to show us, but if you

20    could do that.  Yeah.  In this small red circle in the town of Trebinje,

21    it says on the flag, the 2nd Operational Group.

22       Q.   And the area is called?

23       A.   The town of Trebinje.

24            MS. SOMERS:  Mr. Usher, if you could move the map back for a

25    moment to show the area of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade.

Page 4027

 1       Q.   Admiral, can you indicate, in addition to the heavy weaponry that

 2    you discussed earlier, were there also rifles or sniper rifles available

 3    to all units in this area?  "Sniping equipment" perhaps is a more

 4    technical term.

 5       A.   Yes.

 6       Q.   Yes, there were?

 7       A.   Yes.

 8       Q.   And the 3rd Battalion then had sniping equipment, as a follow-on

 9    to this?  The 3rd of the 472nd had sniping equipment?

10       A.   Yes, yes.

11       Q.   And this equipment was usable within range of the Old Town -- do

12    you know -- was it subject to being used generally during the course of

13    the Dubrovnik operations period?  Were they weapons used?

14       A.   As regards to the 3rd Battalion, I don't think so.  I think the

15    answer is no.  Because at that time, it did not have sniper weapons of

16    that range and they didn't need it either.  They had enough machine-guns,

17    submachine-guns, and other automatic weapons, so they didn't really need

18    this sniping equipment.  I think that, according to establishment, they

19    only had one or two sniper shooters, but with ordinary sniper rifles, with

20    a short range, a kilometre or something.  They didn't have special snipers

21    with a longer range.

22       Q.   Can you repeat again the distance between Zarkovica and Srdj, just

23    remind us.

24       A.   Between Zarkovica and Srdj, there is approximately 1 kilometre --

25    perhaps a kilometre and 200 metres, perhaps a kilometre and a half.

Page 4028

 1       Q.   Looking at the positions you have taken us to and shown, would you

 2    conclude that it is only the units of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd

 3    Brigade that had firing range of the Old Town?

 4       A.   Yes, yes.

 5            MS. SOMERS:  Excuse me just a second.

 6                          [Prosecution counsel confer]

 7            MS. SOMERS:

 8       Q.   Can you just give us an idea of if there was any change in the

 9    coastal situation, the waters -- the water patrols on the 6th of December.

10       A.   On the 6th of December, these ships were not firing.  What is

11    drawn on this map are symbolically depicted areas of patrolling, but that

12    does not mean that the boats were in those positions actually on the 6th

13    of December.  Perhaps one boat was here, perhaps way up here on the 6th of

14    December.  So these are not the positions of the ships at that time.  This

15    is only a symbolical depiction as to what the boats are doing, if there

16    are three of them, and where their positions usually where.  On the 6th of

17    December, they were not operating from there because they did not receive

18    such orders and no operations on their part were planned for the 6th of

19    December.  Also, there were no plans for the 3rd Battalion either, because

20    there was a cease-fire in force.

21       Q.   That was my next series of questions, Admiral.

22            MS. SOMERS:  If we could remove the map and move it into evidence,

23    please.

24            JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

25            THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Prosecution Exhibit P132.

Page 4029

 1            MS. SOMERS:  Admiral, you have indicated that this map, which is

 2    dated the 2nd of December but is equally valid as for positions as of the

 3    6th of December, on this map there are considerable heavy weapons

 4    remaining in the area of Dubrovnik.  Was there an operation, a combat

 5    operation, planned for the time frame of up to this -- between the 2nd and

 6    the 6th of December in the Dubrovnik area?

 7       A.   No.  No operations were planned between the 2nd and the 6th of

 8    December.

 9       Q.   Was there a military necessity on the 6th of December to have

10    these positions so close to the Old Town within firing range of the heavy

11    weaponry of the 2nd Operational Group?

12       A.   There was no such military necessity.

13       Q.   Are you aware of comprehensive cease-fire negotiations that were

14    undertaken in connection with a resolution to the situation in Dubrovnik

15    between the JNA and members of the -- of a Dubrovnik negotiating team

16    about the 5th of December?

17       A.   Yes.  I was given the task of leading these negotiations on the

18    5th of December in Cavtat, in the morning, together with the negotiating

19    team of the Croatian side.  On the Croatian side there were three

20    ministers; Rudolf Davorin, Cifric, and Kriste.

21       Q.   And what other persons were on your negotiating team?

22       A.   The intelligence officer of my command was with me, Captain

23    Jeremic, Sofronije Jeremic.

24       Q.   What was the intention behind the negotiations?  What was to be

25    achieved?  What were some of the terms that were on the table?

Page 4030

 1       A.   These were the final negotiations regarding a settlement to the

 2    problem of Dubrovnik, or this crisis around Dubrovnik, aimed at

 3    normalising life in Dubrovnik.  Those 11 points were given up on, or part

 4    of them, rather, the ones that had been discussed earlier.  Practically on

 5    the 3rd of December, General Strugar conveyed to me, after he was in

 6    Belgrade, that I was supposed to lead these negotiations on the 5th of

 7    December, together with the ministers that I referred to already.  It was

 8    said that various requests should be given up on, namely to surrender

 9    arms, and to hand over volunteers, or rather, to revert to the previous

10    situation regarding MUP personnel levels in Dubrovnik.  So these requests

11    that were within those 11 points were given up on.

12       Q.   When you say "MUP personnel," could you please identify what "MUP"

13    means.  I know it's an abbreviation, but if you could tell us what's

14    referred to.

15       A.   The Ministry of the Interior of Croatia, which grew through

16    mobilisation in Dubrovnik.  So the intention was to reduce the number of

17    their members.

18       Q.   Was there any meeting or briefing involving JNA commanding

19    officers on the 3rd of December that you might be able to discuss?

20       A.   Yes.  I mentioned that on that day there was a meeting at the

21    General Staff, at the Supreme Command, and the commander of the 2nd

22    Operational Group, General Strugar, took part in this as did Admiral

23    Kandic, commander of the navy, as well as other army commanders.

24       Q.   Did you take part as well?  Were you there?

25       A.   No, no, that was not my level.  I was not at that level.

Page 4031

 1       Q.   And who actually led these negotiations?  Who spoke?  Who was the

 2    -- I'm sorry.  I beg your pardon.  Who chaired this meeting?

 3       A.   I think the meeting was chaired by General Blagoje Adzic.

 4       Q.   [Previous translation continues]... where?

 5       A.   The general staff, Belgrade.

 6       Q.   What, if any, orders did General Adzic convey to those commanders

 7    present?  Do you know?  Did you find out what the items in the meeting

 8    covered?

 9       A.   I don't know.  I'm not aware of the agenda.  I don't know what the

10    substance of that meeting was, but I know what the orders were, what

11    General Adzic ordered General Strugar to convey.  And General Strugar

12    asked Admiral Kandic to convey this to me in Kumbor in relation to these

13    negotiations.  I think it was decided at that meeting that final

14    negotiations should be held with Croatia regarding the withdrawal of the

15    JNA from Croatia and the acceptance of the Vance plan.  I don't know the

16    details.  I just know what I was told in terms of what I was supposed to

17    do about Dubrovnik.

18       Q.   Can you explain or do you know why Admiral Kandic was asked to

19    relay these points to you, since you were under the 2nd Operational

20    Group?  You were subordinated to the 2nd Operational Group, so why would

21    Admiral Kandic have been the messenger?

22       A.   I don't know the reasons.  I cannot state any; I can only make

23    assumptions.  Admiral Kandic came to Kumbor from Podgorica by helicopter

24    en route to the island of Vis.  Since he was going that direction and he

25    reached my area of command, then General Strugar asked him to convey to

Page 4032

 1    this to me.  I think that General Strugar stayed back in Podgorica or he

 2    went to Trebinje, to his command post.  I don't know that.  He was

 3    certainly prevented by some reasons.

 4       Q.   Thank you.

 5            JUDGE PARKER:  Is that a convenient time, Ms. Somers?

 6            MS. SOMERS:  Thank you, it is, Your Honour.  Your Honour, may I,

 7    just before we break, indicate to the Chamber, I would ask for a bit more

 8    time on Monday to complete the examination-in-chief of Admiral Jokic.

 9    There is a bit of material that I think merits the detail that I want to

10    go into and will be helpful to the Chamber.

11            JUDGE PARKER:  What does "a bit more time" mean?

12            MS. SOMERS:  I have the other witness lined up, so perhaps -- no

13    more than three hours, perhaps two and a half.

14            JUDGE PARKER:  Well, thank you for that indication.

15            We will take the second break now.

16                          --- Recess taken at 12.26 p.m.

17                          --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.

18            JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Somers.

19            MS. SOMERS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

20       Q.   Admiral, returning to the point you were making about the meeting

21    on the 3rd of December, where General Adzic gave certain directions, what

22    did you learn about what was ordered by General Adzic as to placing units

23    within the 2nd Operational Group under control, under total control?  What

24    was addressed, if anything, about levels of control?

25       A.   Yes.  What I was told was that full control was to be established

Page 4033

 1    over the subordinated units to not respond to any acts of provocation, not

 2    to exacerbate tensions with Dubrovnik, and to continue negotiations in a

 3    flexible way.  That's what I was told.

 4       Q.   You mentioned also that this cease-fire that was on the table was

 5    connected with more global issues beyond Dubrovnik.  I believe you said

 6    about the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia.  Does that indicate that

 7    every area where there was JNA presence had some local level of

 8    negotiation?  By "local," I mean that cease-fire negotiations had to be

 9    conducted in every area of conflict in Croatia?

10       A.   Yes.  I believe this was only a part of a more comprehensive plan,

11    an all-encompassing plan.

12       Q.   And was it your understanding that it was very important to have

13    this particular Dubrovnik component of the plan work, be effective, be

14    brought into action?

15       A.   Yes, I believe so.

16       Q.   Now, the level of negotiator for the Croatian side, I believe you

17    indicated Davorin Rudolf, Mr. Cifric, and Mr. Kriste.  Were these local

18    persons from Dubrovnik or what level were they representing in the

19    Croatian structure?

20       A.   They were ministers in the Croatian government.  And on their way

21    from Zagreb heading south, they had other problems to deal with south of

22    Split, I believe, on the island of Vis.  And their final destination was

23    Dubrovnik.  That was the highest negotiation level possible for us at the

24    time.

25       Q.   The prior negotiations had been handled on a different level, any

Page 4034

 1    other meetings concerning cease-fires in Dubrovnik.  I say cease-fires; on

 2    what level had those generally been handled?

 3       A.   Earlier talks were between our negotiating team, led by Colonel

 4    Svicevic and his deputy, Captain Jeremic, on behalf of the 2nd Operational

 5    Group.  The opposite side was represented by representatives of the

 6    Dubrovnik Crisis Staff and the monitors of the European Community.

 7       Q.   Do you know what General Strugar's attitude was toward the

 8    upcoming comprehensive cease-fire?

 9       A.   He was the one who conveyed the words of General Adzic to Admiral

10    Kandic and then told Admiral Kandic to tell me, the way I just told you.

11    I think that reflected his position.

12       Q.   The -- were you designated by whom -- or by whom were you

13    designated to conduct the negotiations?

14       A.   I told you what I was told, how I was informed about that, and my

15    understanding was that I was designated on the basis of what General

16    Strugar had told Admiral Kandic.  But I did not have any firsthand account

17    of this.  This was told to me by Admiral Kandic.

18       Q.   Thank you.  What was the situation with the units in the areas

19    around Dubrovnik?  What was the general attitude or morale of those units

20    at that time?  When I say "units," I mean the units of the 2nd Operational

21    Group around Dubrovnik.  What was the morale like?

22       A.   At that time, it was understood that the crisis was nearing a

23    settlement.  It was peaceful.  There were no combat operations and

24    everyone was waiting for this final solution.

25       Q.   Was there any perceptible sense of frustration about the operation

Page 4035

 1    in Dubrovnik from a military perspective of the units?

 2       A.   Yes.  There was a sense of frustration, especially so with the

 3    more extremist elements or individuals who were dissatisfied with the

 4    outcome.  There was discontent with regard to why the war had been waged

 5    in the first place and why people died, but they failed to hand over their

 6    weapons and the reservists had not been demilitarised.  Certainly some of

 7    the senior officers, too.

 8       Q.   And how long had some of those units --

 9            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we have a problem with

10    the interpretation.  Page 66, line 7:  [In English] "... and the

11    reservists had not been demilitarised."  [Interpretation] I believe the

12    admiral was talking about the discontent by the reservists, not about them

13    being militarised or demilitarised.

14            JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.

15            MS. SOMERS:  Would you like me to clarify that point?

16            JUDGE PARKER: Yes, thank you.

17            MS. SOMERS:

18       Q.   Admiral, there may have been an issue of interpretation.  I wonder

19    if you could go back.  My question was: "Was there any perceptible sense

20    of frustration about the operation in Dubrovnik from a military

21    perspective of the units."  Your answer was not quite clear.  I wonder if

22    you could revisit it, please.

23       A.   What I said, roughly -- I mean, my opinion is as follows:  The

24    fighters were dissatisfied, especially some of the more extremist

25    individuals were dissatisfied about the outcome of the operation, because

Page 4036

 1    Dubrovnik had not been disarmed and the expectations of the units had not

 2    been met.  Dubrovnik did not accept any of the terms in terms of the

 3    surrender of the volunteers, them leaving town, or the handing over of

 4    weapons.  Certain individuals questioned the reason for war, why people

 5    were killed, and so on and so forth.

 6       Q.   These negotiations which were considered so important were

 7    represented or had the Croatian minister level on that side, what was your

 8    understanding of why the operational group commander would not have -- was

 9    not conducting these negotiations?  Why were you designated to do so?

10       A.   It is difficult for me to answer that question.  Actually, I don't

11    know why I was designated, but I was.  It's a fact.  I'm not sure what

12    guided them in making that decision.  I find it very hard to speculate

13    what the commander of the 2nd Operational Group had in mind when assigning

14    me, or the chief of the General Staff.  That's what I was told and that's

15    what I did.  I carried out those tasks.  I'm afraid I might make a mistake

16    if I were to speculate on the reasons.

17       Q.   Excuse me.  I checked my transcript and my signal went down.

18            Was it known --

19            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --

20            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for counsel, please.

21            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] My apologies for interrupting, Your

22    Honour.  What the Admiral said is that he didn't know what guided the

23    commander of the Operational Group or the chief of the General Staff to

24    designate him, which does not exactly follow from page 67, lines 11 and

25    12.

Page 4037

 1            MS. SOMERS:  I'm not sure, Your Honour, that I see a lack of

 2    clarity in that.  Perhaps --

 3            JUDGE PARKER:  Well, it's just the structure of the sentence, I

 4    think.  I think it comes through clear enough that both commander of the

 5    2nd Operational Group and the chief of the General Staff had determined to

 6    designate Admiral Jokic to this task, which is the point being made by

 7    Mr. Petrovic.

 8            MS. SOMERS:

 9       Q.   Then, Admiral, your point is you don't know.  You don't know.

10    You don't know the reasons.

11       A.   Yes, precisely.

12       Q.   Are you able to indicate generally what General Strugar's attitude

13    towards cease-fire agreements and peace negotiations was?

14       A.   I can't say.  I can't speculate.  I can't second-guess what his

15    attitude may have been.  As a soldier at the highest possible level, he

16    carried out his orders, the orders that he received.  Now, what his

17    personal opinion was, I simply don't know.

18       Q.   When were cease-fire negotiations set to take place in the

19    Dubrovnik area between the designee of the 2nd Operational Group and the

20    Croatian ministers?

21       A.   They were set to begin on the 5th of December, I believe, at about

22    11.00, in Cavtat.  The negotiators had arrived by ship.  We secured safe

23    passage for them, and the negotiations were held and were over by 1400

24    hours, I believe.

25       Q.   Were the negotiations finalised, in other words signed and sealed,

Page 4038

 1    or was there at least some understanding that there would be an agreement

 2    reached?

 3       A.   Yes.  An agreement was reached quite soon.  My understanding of

 4    the overall tone of the negotiations and the objective was to accept the

 5    requests made by Dubrovnik and to give up our own requests in terms of

 6    volunteers handing over their weapons.  I think effectively the

 7    negotiations and dealing with the requests of the Dubrovnik side only took

 8    a very short time, and all their requests were accepted fully, with the

 9    exception of one point, and that was control of the ships.

10       Q.   Now, can you discuss, please, what that control of the ships point

11    entailed.  What was the actual issue?

12       A.   This was only about the way and place where control of the

13    incoming and outgoing ships would take place.  Based on the agreement, we

14    agreed for Dubrovnik to be open to incoming ships and traffic from the

15    mainland.  The question was:  Where will the checks be conducted to keep

16    weapons from being smuggled into Dubrovnik, as well as other combat needs.

17    The ministers wanted these checks to be performed within the town itself.

18    Based on my experience, however, and knowing what the procedure used to be

19    earlier when plenty of ships were entering Dubrovnik, were inspected, and

20    there were a number of incidents related to that, I proposed that the

21    checks be performed on the sea.  Bearing in mind the safety of my men in

22    the town itself, which was a hostile environment, this could have given

23    rise to further incidents.  So this was the only point of disagreement we

24    had.  We agreed for me to check again with my superiors and to sign the

25    agreement the next day.  As for all the other points of the agreement,

Page 4039

 1    everything else was accepted.

 2       Q.   And was it your perception that both sides, both yourself, both

 3    the 2nd Operational Group representatives, and the Croatian side, left the

 4    meeting with the same understanding?

 5       A.   Absolutely.

 6       Q.   What time of day was the meeting to resume the next day for

 7    finalisation of the cease-fire agreement?

 8       A.   We agreed that I would get back to them about the time, but I

 9    believe we agreed on the same time as the day before, 10.00 or 11.00,

10    roughly speaking.  That was when the agreement in Cavtat was supposed to

11    be signed.

12       Q.   After these negotiations on the 5th of December, did you report to

13    General Strugar about the meeting, about the terms of the negotiations,

14    about the cease-fire in general, any outstanding issue?

15       A.   Yes.  Once the negotiations were completed, I went to Trebinje and

16    I informed General Strugar at his command post with all the terms and all

17    the modalities of the agreement.  I also pointed out that the agreement

18    had not been signed, but that was a merely formal matter.  Essentially

19    there were no differences, no discrepancies.  The only disagreement was

20    about checking the ships.  He did not wish to go about it this way.  He

21    believed it was a naval problem in its nature, that it was related to the

22    navy, and he thought that it should have been up to me to decide whether

23    these checks would have been carried out on the sea or in the town itself.

24    He did not wish to go any further into that.  As for all the other terms,

25    those were never challenged.

Page 4040

 1       Q.   You indicated, Admiral, that you had agreed to return around 10.00

 2    or 11.00 the next day.  Now, when was the cease-fire, after your return at

 3    10.00 or 11.00, actually, in its entirety, to go into effect?  What time?

 4       A.   Bearing in mind the fact that the agreement was to be signed at

 5    about that time, we decided that the cease-fire should take effect at 1200

 6    hours on the 6th of December, in order to comply with its final formal

 7    matter in terms of when the cease-fire would begin.  Essentially, however,

 8    we ordered our units to start the cease-fire in the morning, on the 6th of

 9    December.

10       Q.   How did you communicate to your units the fact that a cease-fire

11    and that a significant cease-fire was about to be going into effect?  By

12    what means did you issue orders?

13       A.   Having reported to General Strugar in Trebinje, I returned to my

14    command post in Kupari, where I explained to my staff what the agreement

15    was about as well as the terms of the agreement.  And I ordered them to

16    convey to all the units this message about the complete cease-fire that

17    was to begin on the morning of the 6th.  Even as early as the 5th, that

18    day, there were no operations, no firing, but formally it was decided that

19    the cease-fire would take place the following morning and all operations

20    would cease, all operations against Dubrovnik.

21       Q.   Did you receive an order from General Strugar to cease fire --

22    excuse me, to put into effect -- to make sure that the cease-fire would be

23    put into effect?

24       A.   Yes.  In the Decision on Further Operations, as the combat

25    document is entitled, the 6th of December, at the very end of the document

Page 4041

 1    it reads:  "The cease-fire shall take effect at 1200 hours on the 6th of

 2    December."  That's part of his order, and it was even underlined.

 3       Q.   Do you know whether or not the order was complied with?

 4       A.   Yes, as concerns the other units, with the exception of the 3rd

 5    Battalion of the 472nd Brigade.

 6       Q.   Explain, please, what happened with the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd

 7    Brigade; what and when.

 8       A.   The next day, having carried out that task, I returned, and having

 9    in mind the fact that there was to be a cease-fire, I was facing

10    difficulty evacuating units and commands.  From the 5th Military Naval

11    Sector of Pula, I went back to Kumbor to my original command post, where I

12    spent the night.  The next day, the next morning, I received word from my

13    operations centre.  I received a phone call from the duty operations

14    officer, Captain Slobodan Kozaric.  At about 4.45 in the morning, just

15    before 5.00 a.m., he reported to me that Captain Kovacevic had got in

16    touch from his command post at Gornji Brgat to say that he was under fire

17    from the Dubrovnik side, especially from the front end of Srdj and that

18    one of his men had been killed and two wounded by that time.  He said,

19    "I'm now leaving for my observation post at Zarkovica to see what's going

20    on."  Kozaric warned him that I had issued an order, an explicit order, to

21    not go anywhere or attack.

22       Q.   When you say "the morning of," what date are you referring to?

23            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Admiral said that

24    Kozaric conveyed to him that Kovacevic had told Kozaric that one of his

25    men had already been killed.  This, unfortunately, did not enter the

Page 4042

 1    transcript, Your Honour.

 2            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, I see the omission there.  It certainly was

 3    reported in the English translation as the evidence was given.  It was

 4    reported by the -- to the Admiral that Captain Kovacevic had indicated

 5    that one of his men had been killed.  That might be checked in the

 6    transcript in due course.

 7            MS. SOMERS:

 8       Q.   Admiral, you had just begun to answer my question when counsel

 9    needed to have a clarification.  When you said "that day," what day were

10    you referring to?

11       A.   I was referring to the 6th of December.

12       Q.   Of 1991?

13       A.   Yes.

14       Q.   The same day that the cease-fire we have been discussing was to go

15    into effect?

16       A.   Yes.

17       Q.   What did you do upon hearing this information?

18       A.   I ordered Kozaric to stop the attack -- or rather, I ordered him

19    first of all to warn Kovacevic that he should not attack and to inform

20    Zec, who was chief of staff, and Colonel Kovacevic, who was supposed to be

21    at Kupari.

22       Q.   Do you know from where Kozaric telephoned you?  Where was he when

23    he telephoned you?

24       A.   He phoned me from the operations centre at the forward command

25    post at Kupari, the operations centre.

Page 4043

 1       Q.   And where were you, Admiral?  Where did he phone you to?

 2       A.   I was at Kumbor, at my original command post.  The distance is

 3    between 45 and 50 kilometres.

 4       Q.   What did Kozaric tell Captain Kovacevic?  I know you've mentioned

 5    a Colonel Kovacevic, now I'm talking about Captain Kovacevic.  What did

 6    Kozaric tell Captain Kovacevic?

 7       A.   He cautioned him that there had been an explicit order issued by

 8    myself that there were to be no operations, that a cease-fire had taken

 9    effect.  His answer was:  I am now going to the observation post to see

10    what is going on, because I'm not exactly clear about the situation.  That

11    was the answer by Captain Kovacevic, and he left the Brgat command post.

12       Q.   Further to your instructions to Kozaric, who communicated with

13    Captain Kovacevic, what happened afterward?

14       A.   At 6.00, Kozaric called me again, saying that Captain Kovacevic

15    had told him to start the attack on Srdj, because they could no longer

16    cope with this lethal fire.  Then again he was warned about the cease-fire

17    and that he shouldn't do it.  He said:  "I still have time before 12.00,

18    and I may need artillery" -- or he said, "I will need artillery,"

19    something along those lines.

20       Q.   Excuse me, when you say:  "Captain Kovacevic told him to start the

21    attack on Srdj," who is "him"?  Who did Captain Kovacevic tell?

22       A.   Kozaric.

23       Q.   Now, the Croatian side, you indicated, was equally in agreement

24    about the cease-fire negotiations.  Did your command post contact the

25    Croatian side to find out what was going on, to inquire about the

Page 4044

 1    allegations by Captain Kovacevic about activities up -- from the Srdj

 2    area?

 3       A.   No.  As far as I was concerned and my reaction at the time, I did

 4    not bear that in mind.  For me, the highest priority was to stop the

 5    attack, knowing what an attack on Srdj would have meant.  It was perfectly

 6    clear to me that attacking Srdj was the same as attacking Dubrovnik, or

 7    rather, that firing on the city would follow.  That's why I wanted to stop

 8    that attack at all costs.

 9       Q.   To clarify a point, when Captain Kovacevic spoke to your

10    operations officer Kozaric, who did -- who was going to start the attack?

11    Who was actually -- who did Kovacevic mean was going to start an attack?

12       A.   He meant the Srdj feature.

13       Q.   Yeah.  I mean, was it Kovacevic who was going to start the attack?

14    Perhaps I wasn't clear.

15       A.   Yes.

16       Q.   Thank you.

17            After hearing that Captain Kovacevic was going to start the

18    attack, what happened from your own officers?  What did you hear next from

19    them?  This would be after the phone call from chief of staff Zec.

20       A.   In the meantime, I had asked to speak to Captain Kovacevic [as

21    interpreted], and I ordered Kozaric to pass me the commander of the 3rd

22    Battalion so that I could speak to him.  He said, however, that Captain

23    Kovacevic had hung up and that he left to go back to his own unit, or that

24    perhaps a shell had interrupted communications and that's why the line

25    broke down.  Therefore, I was not able to speak to the commander of the

Page 4045

 1    3rd Battalion.  Then I ordered him to let me speak to the chief of staff,

 2    Zec.

 3            After that, Captain Kozaric informed me that the chief of staff

 4    was not at the command post and nor was Captain Kovacevic, who was another

 5    person that I asked to speak to.  I conveyed to him --

 6            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Colonel Kovacevic, 76,

 7    line 1.  Not Captain Kovacevic, Colonel Kovacevic.

 8            MS. SOMERS:

 9       Q.   And after that, what occurred?  What happened next?

10            JUDGE PARKER:  Can we get that clear.  We have two Kovacevics.

11            MS. SOMERS:  Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour.  Okay.

12       Q.   If we go back, I'm going to ask you:  You asked to speak to

13    Captain Kovacevic and "ordered Kozaric to pass me the commander of the 3rd

14    Battalion so that I could speak to him.  He said, however, that Captain

15    Kovacevic had hung up and that he left to go back to his own unit, or

16    perhaps a shell had interrupted communications and that's why the line

17    broke down."

18            And then another sentence:  "After that, Captain Kozaric informed

19    me that the chief of staff was not at the command post, nor was Captain

20    Kovacevic, who was another person that I asked to speak to."

21            Did you mean Captain Kovacevic or Colonel Kovacevic?

22       A.   No, Colonel Kovacevic.

23       Q.   And what is the first name?  Who is Colonel Kovacevic, if you'd

24    remind us, please.

25       A.   Colonel Kovacevic, Gavrilo Kovacevic, my assistant for the land

Page 4046

 1    forces, who was in charge of control and monitoring operations by the 3rd

 2    Battalion throughout the operation.

 3       Q.   Thank you, Admiral, for straightening that out.

 4            Were you ever able to reach Chief of Staff Zec?

 5       A.   I issued an order to Captain Kozaric to find for me the chief of

 6    staff and Colonel Kovacevic, to find them, to bring them back to the

 7    command post, and to -- for the chief of staff to immediately get in touch

 8    with me.  As time went by, this became an urgent matter.  This became a

 9    top priority for me to stop the attack by the battalion.  But time went

10    by, and at about 7.00 -- it's very difficult for me to say now.  It was at

11    about 7.00, give or take a minute or two, I received a call from the

12    commander of the 2nd Operational Group, General Strugar.

13       Q.   What did General Strugar say to you?

14       A.   He told me that he had received a call by I believe General

15    Kadijevic or the chief of the General Staff, it could have been either of

16    those two, and that they asked him about the attack on Dubrovnik, what

17    sort of attack it was, who was carrying out the attack and what the whole

18    situation was about.  I was really very surprised.  I was stunned.  I told

19    him what I had heard, what I had heard from the operations centre, that

20    the commander of the 3rd Battalion was about to launch an attack on Srdj

21    because he could no longer put up with heavy fire, that he was sustaining

22    heavy losses, and so on and so forth.  He told me that General Kadijevic

23    was furious, that an agreement had been signed for a cease-fire to take

24    place and how, given that, could a battalion be launching an attack under

25    those circumstances?  I told him that I would look into the matter, that I

Page 4047

 1    ordered the chief of staff to get back to me, and that I would stop the

 2    attack.

 3            I don't know if it was already then that he told me - I believe he

 4    did - that General Kadijevic had ordered for us as soon as we dealt with

 5    the situation to come to Belgrade as soon as possible and that he would be

 6    sending a plane over to fetch us for consultations.

 7       Q.   Given the critical nature of the situation, why did you not

 8    contact General Strugar immediately, before he contacted you?

 9       A.   First of all, I did not know that the town was being attacked.

10    The attack was limited to Srdj, that is one matter.  Secondly, the most

11    urgent thing for me was to resolve this combat situation; namely, to stop

12    the attack and to prevent any damage in town, to prevent losses in the

13    unit, not to inform my superiors.  It was more important for me to prevent

14    worse things from happening rather than make telephone calls and lose

15    time, waste time.

16       Q.   What time did the attack start?

17       A.   The attack itself, as the battalion commander said, started around

18    6.00, perhaps a few minutes earlier.

19       Q.   When you say that:  "The most urgent thing for me was to resolve

20    this combat situation; namely, to stop the attack to prevent any damage in

21    town, to prevent losses in the unit," what did you mean?  What damage and

22    -- "not to inform my supervisors."  Explain, please, what you meant by

23    that.  Why would you not inform your head of the operational group?

24       A.   I did not mean that I was not supposed to inform my superiors; I

25    thought that the priority of my steps, the steps I'm supposed to take was

Page 4048

 1    the following:  First to stop a worsening, an urgent worsening of the

 2    situation.  Because I had the picture before my eyes.  I knew where the

 3    units were, and I knew that it was a question of minutes rather than hours

 4    and that the most important thing for me was to stop the attack and to

 5    prevent attacks on Srdj, knowing that attacks on Srdj were attacks on

 6    town, too.  That's the way it was in November.  Every shell that missed

 7    Srdj hit the Old Town.

 8       Q.   When Captain Kozaric telephoned at 5.45, had the attack started?

 9    Could you hear --

10       A.   No, I --

11            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honour.

12            JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Rodic.

13            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] The witness never said that he was

14    informed at 5.45.  He said 4.45.  The Prosecutor is saying "5.45" without

15    any foundation.

16            JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

17            MS. SOMERS:

18       Q.   When next you heard from Captain Kozaric about an attack underway

19    -- or that an attack was to be started, could you hear any evidence of an

20    attack in background or could you, from any source, hear evidence of an

21    attack?  Do you know if Captain Kozaric may have heard evidence of an

22    attack or shelling?

23       A.   No.  Of course I couldn't hear anything, because I was very far

24    away.  Kozaric did hear some sounds, but he was not sure at 4.45 who it

25    was and from what side.  He could establish that only at 6.00 when he made

Page 4049

 1    his second telephone call.

 2       Q.   Did you come to learn that the Old Town of Dubrovnik was attacked?

 3    At any point in time, did you come to learn that the Old Town of Dubrovnik

 4    had been shelled or attacked?

 5       A.   I heard that only later.  After having spoken to General Strugar,

 6    I received one or two calls from Dubrovnik.  The first call was that the

 7    Old Town was being shelled.  And I said to them that it was impossible,

 8    bearing in mind that this was around 8.30 perhaps.  I'm not sure of the

 9    time now.  It was between 8.00 and 9.00.  I said that I am trying to

10    establish what the situation was and what was going on, but that I did not

11    believe that the Old Town was being targeted.  The subordinate commander

12    said that he was going to attack Srdj.  After a certain amount of time - I

13    don't know exactly, the communications were very poor - about half an hour

14    later, the Crisis Staff of Dubrovnik called again and on the line was

15    Minister Rudolf Davorin.  He said to me:  Admiral, this is now indeed an

16    operation against the Old Town.  He even turned the receiver that way.

17    And I then had to believe it, because in the meantime I had received

18    information that units were already at Srdj.  I said to him that I was

19    very sorry at that moment.  If all of this proves to be true, this is an

20    arbitrary attack of a lower-ranking commander.  I would stop that attack,

21    I would try to resolve that as soon as possible, because the communication

22    links were broken.  He said that an effort should be made to do this

23    straight away.  I said I think around 11.00, I think that we are going to

24    resolve the situation by 11.00.

25       Q.   Admiral, you indicated that Minister Rudolf turned the receiver.

Page 4050

 1    What did you hear when he turned the receiver of whatever phone he was

 2    using?

 3       A.   I heard the sound of shelling.  I assumed that -- I mean, I know

 4    where the municipality is, the municipality building of Dubrovnik, and

 5    that is within the Old Town.

 6       Q.   Do you know how General Kadijevic -- sorry.  You indicated that --

 7    I believe that General Kadijevic had telephoned from Belgrade, angry.  How

 8    would he have known about the attack?

 9       A.   At that time, I simply could not believe how it was possible for

10    General Kadijevic in Belgrade to know about the attack on town and I did

11    not know about this, and General Strugar, too.  And of course this was

12    astonishing to me.  And I couldn't figure it out then.  However, later I

13    realised, from talking to Minister Rudolf, how this happened.  The

14    representative of the European Community - I don't know whether it was Di

15    Mistura - used a satellite telephone to make a call because he could not

16    reach [Realtime transcript read in error "General Strugar"] me or General

17    Strugar.  He telephoned Belgrade directly, and that is how Kadijevic found

18    out quite early.

19            MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, page 81, line 12,

20    "and me," the witness said.  And here it says only "General Strugar."

21            JUDGE PARKER:  Could you confirm that, Ms. Somers.

22            MS. SOMERS:  Yes.

23       Q.   Admiral, if I can just ask you again.  My question was:  "Do you

24    know -- I'm sorry.  You indicated that I believe General Kadijevic had

25    telephoned from Belgrade, angry.  How would he have known about the

Page 4051

 1    attack?"

 2            Then I'll begin to read back.  "At that time, I simply did not

 3    believe how it was possible for General Kadijevic in Belgrade to know

 4    about the town and I did not know about this.  And General Strugar, too.

 5    And of course this was astonishing to me."

 6            We move on, it says:  "The representative -- and I did not know

 7    about this and General Strugar, too.  Then the representative from the

 8    European Community - I don't know whether it was Di Mistura - used a

 9    satellite telephone to make a call because he could not reach General

10    Strugar."  Then the question was:  "Was there anyone else he could not

11    reach?"

12       A.   Yes.  They called the command at Kumbor.  They called me, too, but

13    they could not reach me.  And they had the telephone of General Kadijevic,

14    so they managed to reach him.

15       Q.   Thank you for clarifying that.

16            Was there a system of some sort in place for communications that

17    would have allowed the 2nd Operational Group command to receive

18    information about the attack when it happened?

19       A.   Yes.  The command of the 2nd Operational Group had telephone links

20    with my command in Kumbor and with my command post in Kupari.  A direct,

21    secure telephone link and also another system of radio communications.

22       Q.   What was the state of the communications system at that time?

23    Just up to that time in general, what was the state of the communications

24    system within the 2nd Operational Group?

25       A.   Well, the communications system did function between the 2nd

Page 4052

 1    Operational Group and the 9th Sector.  There were no problems there in

 2    relation to its functioning.

 3       Q.   Did General Strugar issue any orders to you concerning the

 4    shelling or issue any orders to anyone else to stop the shelling at that

 5    time?

 6       A.   I don't know which orders he issued to his organs at the command.

 7    Actually, I don't know exactly where General Strugar was, whether he was

 8    at the command post in Trebinje or in Podgorica, but I know what he

 9    ordered me.  He ordered to have the attacks stopped, and he agreed with

10    the measures that I had taken.

11       Q.   Are you able to give us an approximate time when this happened?

12       A.   Well, that was during the first telephone call when I spoke to

13    him.  And when I told him that what was underway was the sending of the

14    chief of staff to the observation post of Captain Kovacevic and that I

15    would send Colonel Kovacevic, who was in charge of that unit, and I

16    believe that the two of them will manage to resolve this situation in the

17    fastest possible way.  I informed him that I was going to Cavtat, from

18    where the links to Dubrovnik were the best.  At the same time, waiting for

19    the helicopter that was supposed to come and fetch me so that I could go

20    to the Golubovci airport in Podgorica in order to go to Belgrade.

21       Q.   Admiral Jokic, you indicated that you had been informed by

22    Minister Rudolf that the Old Town was being shelled.  Did you issue any

23    orders to your units to not shell the Old Town, to protect it according to

24    all orders that mandated its protection?  That morning, during that

25    attack, did you issue orders to those units that were involved that were

Page 4053

 1    under your command?

 2       A.   Yes.  Immediately in the morning, I conveyed to Kozaric that he

 3    should relay to the division -- or rather, the two batteries that were

 4    possibly within the range of the Old Town of Dubrovnik - this is the

 5    130-millimetre battery and the 85-millimetre battery - that he should

 6    prohibit them from using any of this and to tell Captain Kovacevic that he

 7    is not going to get any artillery by way of support.

 8       Q.   Did you specifically issue an order that said:  Do not shell the

 9    Old Town, specifically?

10       A.   Absolutely.  What I'm saying is not a dialogue that I'm lining up

11    now.  The basic elements of all these orders are part of the war diary.  I

12    read this after these events were over, and also in preparation for my

13    defence.  This document does exist in the archives, and I analysed it in

14    detail.

15       Q.   Speaking about the morning of the 6th, are we speaking about the

16    same date?  Did you on the morning of the 6th, when this attack against

17    the Old Town took place, did you issue, after you learned about the

18    attack, on order not to attack the Old Town?

19       A.   Absolutely, yes.

20       Q.   Did General Strugar issue, that morning, an order not to attack

21    the Old Town?

22       A.   I don't know.  I mean, in his order, in his written order, in the

23    Decision to Order Operations, that's the name of the document, that was

24    written on the evening of the 5th for the 6th and it is valid for the 6th,

25    his organs wrote that what is prohibited is the opening of fire, starting

Page 4054

 1    from 1200 hours on the 6th of December.  That is what it says quite

 2    literally in that order.  As for other orders of his, I mean, I don't

 3    know.

 4            JUDGE PARKER:  Is that a convenient time, Ms. Somers?

 5            MS. SOMERS:  I think so.  I just want to see if it might help to

 6    get one more -- I think so.  I think the next line will take a little too

 7    long.  Thank you.

 8            JUDGE PARKER:  We will then adjourn until --

 9            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

10            JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Rodic.

11            MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.  I'm sorry I

12    interrupted you.  I think that it would be necessary to resolve the

13    question of the witness's communications over the weekend, namely whether

14    the witness is aware of fact that he cannot discuss the subject of his

15    evidence with anyone.

16            JUDGE PARKER:  I would expect that he's been duly advised of his

17    position during his briefing.

18            But you will understand, Admiral, that over the weekend you should

19    not discuss your evidence with anyone.  And I must ask you to return again

20    on Monday morning.  Thank you.

21            We will adjourn for the weekend.

22                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

23                          at 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,

24                          the 29th day of March, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.