1 Tuesday, 30 March 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. We are to commence this morning with
6 submissions in respect of the question of how to proceed with the motion
7 as to the fitness of the accused to be tried. Ms. Somers.
8 MS. SOMERS: Good morning, Your Honours. I have asked Mr. Weiner
9 to address the Prosecution submissions, and I will turn it over to him if
10 I may.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Not wanting to discourage you,
12 Mr. Weiner, I think I did say yesterday that we saw no need for lengthy
14 MR. WEINER: I will be brief, Your Honour.
15 It is our -- it is the Prosecutor's argument that an evidentiary
16 hearing is not required on three grounds. First, that there is no
17 requirement in the Rules or in the Statute for an evidentiary hearing for
18 this type of procedure. Number two, the comprehensive nature of the
19 medical reports eliminates the need for an evidentiary hearing. And
20 number three, the circumstances of this case indicate that an evidentiary
21 hearing is not required.
22 First, the Rules and Statute do not require a hearing. Rule 74
23 bis authorises a medical examination of an accused. The Rule, however,
24 has no provision requiring an evidentiary hearing based on the reports of
25 those experts or the examinations of those experts. Article 21(4)(e) of
1 the Statute states: "An accused has the right to examine or have examined
2 the witnesses against him." That's what it states in its pertinent part.
3 Here, the doctors are providing information as to the accused's competency
4 to stand trial or his fitness to stand trial and are not providing
5 information against him. They are not providing information to prove any
6 of the charges. They are not providing any information relating to the
7 indictment. Consequently, that Article does not require an evidentiary
9 If we look at the Rules, we look at the Statute, there is no
10 requirement for an evidentiary hearing. Rather, it's a matter in the
11 discretion of the Chamber.
12 Two, the reports in this case are sufficient for determining this
13 issue. The Defence has provided a psychiatric report, a supplement to it,
14 medical reports from Montenegro. We also have medical reports from
15 Bronovo hospital and the Detention Unit. The Prosecution has provided
16 reports, a psychiatric report from three eminent psychologists, two
17 neuropsychiatrists, a geriatric psychiatrist, as well as comments from a
19 With this extensive report, which includes not only an examination
20 but also discusses the issues which were raised or the tests which were
21 raised in Kovacevic which the Kovacevic court felt was the basis for
22 fitness, having these comprehensive reports, what would a hearing add?
23 What would be achieved from a hearing? We have all the facts before us.
24 We have sufficient facts.
25 And the third statement or the third matter for argument is the
1 circumstances in this case does not mandate a hearing or an evidentiary
2 hearing. This case is different from most matters where competency or
3 fitness to be tried is heard. Usually, it's a pre-trial matter. The
4 Court has had little or no opportunity to observe the accused in most
5 pre-trial matters. That isn't the situation here. We have been on trial
6 since December 16th. That's three-and-a-half months. The Court's had the
7 opportunity to observe the accused, to converse with the accused, and to
8 observe the accused's interaction with counsel. The Court's ability to
9 observe and listen to the accused, combined with the comprehensive
10 psychiatric reports are sufficient to determine the accused's competency
11 or fitness to stand trial. Therefore, it is our position that no
12 evidentiary hearing would be necessary.
13 Thank you.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Weiner.
15 Mr. Petrovic.
16 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 It is the position of the Defence with respect to this issue that
18 we hold a different position, in fact, of what my colleague said a moment
19 ago. So I'd like to start off by presenting certain facts linked to the
20 medical report which was submitted by the Prosecution. The Defence has
21 not understood this opportunity as being one occasioning putting forth
22 arguments contained in the report itself. I understood this hearing to be
23 one in which we should decide our future conduct on the issue and in the
25 Now, what springs to mind at first glance when we're talking about
1 the Prosecution medical report, and let me repeat that I'm not going to go
2 into detail. I'd just like to bring certain facets up. There are certain
3 shortcomings in that report which make it completely inappropriate and
4 unsuitable to the situation we find ourselves in.
5 Your Honour, I'm going to mention at this juncture just a few
6 points. The report which you have before you and which I'm sure you have
7 read through is quite simply a report which is based on one single
8 diagnostic method, that is to say, it is founded on a conversation and
9 interview with the accused held in the Detention Unit, and it is based on
10 quotations from the transcript and from the hearings in the courtroom.
11 Modern psychiatry, that is to say, in the last 50 years, has not based a
12 single of its conclusions on things like this, that is to say, what
13 somebody's mental capacities are in any respect, capacities generally and
14 mental capacities, are based solely and exclusively on a conversation held
15 with the individual.
16 I can see that no other diagnostic method was applied. There were
17 no psychiatric tests, and we all know that psychiatric tests have become a
18 basic instrument for establishing about what we wish to know about the
19 mental health and health in general of a patient. And that was not
20 resorted to or applied in this particular case. The Defence report that
21 you had before you was based on a whole battery of tests which were
22 applied, which were used with the patient on the basis of which we drew
23 our conclusions.
24 So, Your Honours, with all due respect to the work undertaken by
25 the medical experts of the Prosecution, they did not contain anything of
1 that kind. And therefore, the report is completely incompatible with what
2 the Defence report has done. And it is inadequate and does not
3 correspond -- it does not, as I say, correspond to the questions that
4 were broached and raised in the Defence report. So with all due respect,
5 it is a superficial, one-sided report which does not give us -- them the
6 possibility of drawing the necessary conclusions, conclusions necessary to
7 this Trial Chamber for it to assume a position with respect to the
8 capabilities of the accused to follow his trial.
9 As an illustration, l should like to mention the fact that, for
10 example, what pursuant to your instructions should be done, a scan -- a
11 head scan of the accused, the position in that regard was established by
12 the fact that somebody called up one of the experts and told them of their
13 view. There is no written trace, no document, no explanation on the basis
14 of which we would be able to weigh up how any of the conclusions were
15 drawn. How can a radiologist state his views with respect to a medical
16 problem over the phone? And the fact that this was communicated over the
17 phone, this can give us as the Defence team grounds to ask questions. How
18 can we speak in an argumented way when we are talking about a telephone
19 conversation and report? And another interesting point is that the
20 report does actually in basic terms confirm the Defence's position, or
21 rather the expert Defence witness with respect to dementia. The
22 consequences to be drawn from all this are, of course, quite different.
23 Since the other two diagnoses that were reached have been rejected
24 in -- that is to say, the diagnosis presented by the Defence with respect
25 to PTSD and depression, and there is no argumentation for that. There are
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 no tests on the basis of which something like that was established and
2 which would warrant a conclusion of that kind. So what is the Defence
3 position and proposal, faced with a situation of this kind? As the report
4 has these shortcomings, and as those shortcomings, as I have tried very
5 briefly, and I emphasise briefly, to address, the Defence sees no other
6 way but to tell the people who compiled the report that it needs to ask
7 them questions in cross-examination to hear their views with respect to
8 all the areas in which the report has its shortcomings.
9 Now, with respect to the arguments put forth by my learned
10 colleague, here, Your Honours, we are not dealing with Rule 74 and its
11 realm of expertise. What we were asked to do was that the parties should
12 tender their medical reports, and the Trial Chamber, Your Honours, when we
13 asked for an expert witness pursuant to Rule 74 to be brought in was not
14 accepted, which means that we're not dealing with something that was
15 clearly set by the Court, by the Trial Chamber. We are not in a situation
16 in which the expert witnesses where nominated and appointed by the Trial
17 Chamber. Quite the contrary. The parties were called upon to present
18 their arguments. So any conclusions drawn from that to the effect that
19 Rule 74 does not call for any examination or further examining of the
20 report stands at this point.
21 Let me just mention, Your Honours, something that I'm sure you
22 happened to notice in reading through this report. The report does not,
23 in a single word, mention the influences of somatic diseases which the
24 accused is suffering from which are exceptionally important for his
25 overall mental health and general health to follow this trial. So this
1 whole complex of questions have not been addressed. It has been left out
2 and set apart from the final conclusion that the psychiatrists reached,
3 those who were engaged by the Prosecution.
4 Similarly, the method in which they selected positions in this
5 report and the opinions from previous medical findings is highly
6 selective, very dubious, and therefore all those are the reasons for which
7 we wish to show the individuals compiling the reports their opinions and
8 to ask for their positions on other portions of all the other reports that
9 have been supplied. And this has been ignored to date. Their approach
10 has been a selective one. Their approach has been one which does not
11 enable you, Your Honours, should you wish to base your positions on their
12 report, arrive at the proper conclusions, one that would be -- conclusions
13 that would be just and fair.
14 Therefore, what we should like to suggest at this point is that
15 you enable us to examine all the medical experts provided by the
16 Prosecution, or one of them. This won't take up too much of the Court's
17 time. But it is something that we consider to be absolutely necessary.
18 From experience gained so far working at this Tribunal, in all similar
19 situations which have to do with the establishment of the psychological
20 capabilities and capacities of the accused, what I can say with absolute
21 certainty is that tests were conducted, psychiatric and psychological
22 tests were performed, so they are exact indicators. They can be measured.
23 And on the basis of such parameters, can an objective conclusion be drawn,
24 which would be rid of all other influences and implications that can come
25 into play in cases of this kind.
1 So all those reports were done on the basis of that. The
2 first that was offered to one of the Trial Chambers was the one that was
3 offered to you, too, in this particular case. I'm not going to go in an
4 open session into the details of which cases such tests were resorted to,
5 although I would be happy and glad to do so, in order to indicate how it
6 was done, even in those examples in which the Prosecution today or in the
7 previous days in addressing the matter applied and brought up.
8 Therefore, this is our request and our proposal to Your Honours:
9 It is that we are given the opportunity of considering the report in this
10 courtroom. We consider it to be unfounded, incorrect, and we desire to
11 present that to you, Your Honours. We have no other way of doing this but
12 to do it in court. So with the Court's indulgence, we ask that an
13 examination of those witnesses be organised so that we can question them.
14 Thank you, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.
16 Mr. Weiner.
17 MR. WEINER: Yes. I just want to respond in two sentences.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 MR. WEINER: That the tests performed by our experts were part of
20 a multidisciplinary evaluation by both American and European experts,
21 eminent American and European experts, one who is a B/C/S speaker, and
22 that the tests were sufficient and the report is, in fact, comprehensive.
23 And as previously stated, that there is no need for any additional
25 Thank you.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE PARKER: We will give some consideration to these
4 submissions and let you have a decision probably tomorrow. Thank you.
5 Right. Are you ready with the next witness, then?
6 MS. SOMERS: He should be here, Your Honour. I have not been
7 informed that he is.
8 JUDGE PARKER: If the witness could be called.
9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do apologise for
10 interrupting your instructions as to the next step in these proceedings.
11 But I'm wondering whether perhaps this would be a good moment for us to
12 say a few words about what is contained in our submission with respect to
13 the transcripts of the fifth and sixth interview of Admiral Jokic which we
14 were supplied under the circumstances that I'm sure you're aware of. So
15 may I address that matter now, or do you think another situation would be
16 more opportune?
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Petrovic, we have your submission. But it
19 didn't seem to us to be one that required further oral submission. You
20 have covered this ground quite a bit already in two lots of oral
21 submission. We grasp fully what you're saying, and we are going to
22 discuss it together later today.
23 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Is there any burning need on the part of the
25 Prosecution to put any submission about that? It seems to us you've
1 already spoken.
2 MS. SOMERS: The Chamber knows our position.
3 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the witness.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. And thank you for coming. I'm sorry
6 that you were not able to be reached yesterday.
7 Would you be kind enough to take the affirmation card and read the
8 affirmation, please.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. If you could be seated.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Somers.
14 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honours.
15 WITNESS: JOHANNES FIETELAARS
16 Examined by Ms. Somers:
17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Fietelaars. Would you please for the record
18 give us your complete name.
19 A. My name is Johannes Hubertus Wilhemus Fietelaars.
20 Q. And your date of birth, please, place of birth and nationality.
21 A. The 9th of December 1936, and my nationality is Dutch.
22 Q. Are you presently employed?
23 A. No, madam. I am retired, thank you.
24 Q. From what you have retired, sir?
25 A. From a diplomatic career in the Dutch foreign ministry.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. May I take you through with the Chamber's permission with a bit of
2 quickening your diplomatic career. Let us start from 1964. Would you
3 indicate, please, what assignments you had in the Dutch foreign ministry
4 at that time.
5 A. At that time, I was a trainee in the Dutch foreign ministry, and I
6 was appointed to my first posting in Wellington, New Zealand, as third
8 Q. For what type of affairs?
9 A. I did legal affairs, I did consular affairs, and I did trade
11 Q. Moving along to 1966, where was your next posting, sir?
12 A. Liberia, Monrovia.
13 Q. As what?
14 THE INTERPRETER: Can the Prosecution and witness make a pause
15 between their questions and answers, please.
16 MS. SOMERS: My apologies to the translation section.
17 Q. I'll repeat my question, Mr. Fietelaars, for the benefit of the
18 translators. Your second posting in 1966?
19 A. Monrovia in Liberia.
20 Q. In what capacity, please?
21 A. As number two and general dog's body [sic], because it was only a
22 two-diplomat post.
23 Q. 1967, your posting?
24 A. 1967, I went to London in Great Britain.
25 Q. And in what capacity, please?
1 A. Number two in the commercial section of the embassy.
2 Q. 1969.
3 A. 1969, I transferred to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as number two of
4 the embassy. In general charge of everything that was not a direct
5 responsibility of the ambassador.
6 Q. Then 1969 to 1970.
7 A. I transferred from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore because of the
8 political changes in that region. And I finished my four-year stint
10 Q. Were you also --
11 A. Number two in the embassy, yeah.
12 Q. 1974.
13 A. I went to Brussels with the Dutch representation with the European
14 communities, and I became first secretary and later in the assignment
15 counsellor for nuclear and environmental affairs.
16 Q. 1978.
17 A. 1978, I was transferred to the Royal Netherlands embassy in Lima,
18 Peru, as the number two and the officer in charge of the Dutch development
19 aid programme.
20 Q. 1981.
21 A. In 1981 I was transferred in preparation of royal visit and the
22 Olympic games to Los Angeles as consul general.
23 Q. 1985.
24 A. 1985 I was, after a career abroad, for the first time recalled to
25 the ministry in The Hague, and I became inspector of the diplomatic
2 Q. What was your rank while you held that position?
3 A. Ambassador, yeah.
4 Q. 1988?
5 A. 1988, I changed within the ministry to the chair of director for
6 European integration. My team started writing the Maastricht Treaty.
7 Q. 1990.
8 A. 1990, I was appointed Ambassador to Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
9 Q. And did you have any dealings with any other parts of the Balkans?
10 A. Yes, I was at the same time appointed Ambassador to Albania.
11 Nonresident, but operating out of Belgrade.
12 Q. 1992, what occurred with EU Ambassadors?
13 A. In 1992, the consul of ministers in Brussels decided that all
14 Ambassadors of the EU countries were going to be recalled for
15 consultations, which is in fact a cryptic remark for recall because of the
16 unhappiness with regard to the political developments in the region.
17 Q. Where did you come back to when you left Yugoslavia?
18 A. When I left Yugoslavia, I attended a number of assignments that
19 the then foreign minister Hans Van den Broek gave me in connection with
20 the Balkans for about -- a bit more than -- a bit less than a year. And
21 then I was transferred to my next post.
22 Q. Did you retain while you were outside of Yugoslavia the ambassador
24 A. Ambassadorial rank, yes. And also because my function in Albania
25 was uninterrupted and unaffected by the developments in the then
2 Q. And where were you physically operating from?
3 A. From The Hague.
4 Q. 1993.
5 A. 1993, I was appointed Ambassador to Ottawa, Canada.
6 Q. 1998.
7 A. Ambassador to Copenhagen, Denmark.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel and the witness please slow
9 down for interpreters. Thank you.
10 MS. SOMERS:
11 Q. Let me go back. 1993.
12 A. 1993, I was appointed Ambassador to Ottawa, Canada.
13 Q. 1998.
14 A. 1998, I was transferred to Copenhagen in Denmark.
15 Q. Did you retire after that posting?
16 A. Yes, ma'am. I retired in January 2001.
17 Q. Your formal post-high school education. What are you trained in
18 formally and where did you train?
19 A. I have a masters degree in civil and penal law at the Dutch
20 University of Leiden.
21 Q. Thank you very much. As ambassador to Yugoslavia, did you find
22 yourself having frequent contact, particularly in 1991, with the ministry
23 of Defence in Belgrade?
24 A. Yes, ma'am. In 1991, Luxembourg, one of the member states of the
25 European Union, had the Presidency of the European Union without having
1 a resident ambassador in Belgrade. Now, there is a custom and a treaty
2 between the Netherlands and Luxembourg that look after their interests in
3 such situations, which meant that a Dutch ambassador became the formal
4 representative of the presidency of the European Union, reporting to both
5 Luxembourg and to The Hague.
6 Q. When you had contact with the ministry of Defence in Belgrade,
7 with whom did you directly have contact?
8 A. Well, on the whole, it was at the level of -- not the Supreme
9 Command, which was the presidency of the Federal Republic, but with the
10 actual command of the JNA which at that time I think was General Kadijevic
11 and his number two, Admiral Brovet.
12 Q. Did you have regular or relatively regular contact with both of
13 those individuals?
14 A. Yes, ma'am. As the situation developed, the concern in the
15 capitals in Europe, and therefore the concern in Brussels increased, and I
16 received regular and in the course of time more frequent instructions to
17 go and discuss the military situation with the top of the ministry of
19 Q. Did you have face-to-face meetings with both General Kadijevic and
20 Admiral Brovet?
21 A. Yes, ma'am.
22 Q. Did you become aware of a conflict arising in the territory of the
23 area of Dubrovnik?
24 A. Yes, ma'am. This was very much public. You saw daily on
25 television in Belgrade and also all kinds of references in my direct
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 business instructions refer to the developments in that area.
2 Q. Did you have a military attache component to the embassy in
4 A. Yes, ma'am. We had a four-person office. The military attache,
5 the deputy military attache, a researcher, and an archivist.
6 Q. Did you come to learn of shellings by the JNA on Dubrovnik at the
7 end of October 1991?
8 A. Yes, ma'am.
9 Q. How did you come to learn about these incidents?
10 A. We had regular contact with two Dutch journalists who operated in
11 the region between southern Montenegro and the Albanian border and who
12 were at that time resident in Dubrovnik. And also, the then mayor of
13 Dubrovnik regularly phoned the Netherlands embassy informing us, me and my
14 collaborators, of the developments within his city.
15 Q. The Netherlands was holding the presidency of the EU at the time?
16 I'm sorry --
17 A. The Netherlands embassy handled the presidency in Belgrade on
18 behalf of Luxembourg until the 1st of July. After the 1st of July, I did
19 that on behalf of the Netherlands. So the time that we are talking about
20 now, early 1991, I did it on behalf of the Luxembourg presidency.
21 Q. What was your reaction to the information you had received about
22 the shellings in Dubrovnik? Let us say the 23rd of October, 23rd, 24th of
23 October. What, if any, action did you take?
24 A. Immediately informed The Hague and Luxembourg about this and
25 requested instructions in order to see whether or not I should verify in
1 Belgrade with the Yugoslav authorities what was reported to us as going on
2 by the Croatians in and around Dubrovnik.
3 Q. And then what did you do?
4 A. I sent them a telegram, a long telegram, and told them about what
5 we were receiving as information out of the region.
6 Q. Were you instructed to make contact with any members of the --
7 A. Yes, ma'am. Almost -- I think the day after I sent my report, I
8 got instructions to go and see the top of the defence ministry.
9 Q. And did you make an appointment and see someone at the top of the
10 defence ministry? If so, whom?
11 A. I did. And although I should refer to my notes before I say it
12 with absolute certainty, but I think I had an appointment with Admiral
13 Brovet then.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Please pause between question and answer. Thank
16 MS. SOMERS:
17 Q. What do you -- what, if you recall, and certainly we will
18 circulate as exhibits some of your notes, but what is your recollection of
19 your conversation with Admiral Brovet about the events in Dubrovnik?
20 A. Well, the long and short of it was that he denied ever taking any
21 initiative in shelling or damaging Dubrovnik, and that the only thing they
22 did was react to provocations by the Croatian irregulars. And they did
23 not recognise that Croatia at the time had an army, so they talked about
24 Croatian irregulars.
25 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me just a minute, sir.
1 Q. Can I take you back to a day -- well, do you remember the date you
2 called Admiral Brovet?
3 A. No, ma'am.
4 Q. Do you recall meetings on the 22nd of October with -- do you
5 recall a series of three meetings you had in connection with the --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Could you tell us, please, about those three meetings.
8 A. That is still rather clear in my mind because it was a very busy
10 My number two visited the JNA, the defence ministry in order to
11 meet Mr. Brovet. I think he was accompanied by one or two others of whom
12 the names are in my notes that I put at your disposal. In the early
13 afternoon, the head of the monitor mission of the European Union,
14 Ambassador van Houten, saw him, and late in the afternoon I went over
15 there for a general discussion on the things that had been discussed in
16 the course of the day.
17 Q. If I may ask the usher to please distribute documents -- they are
18 a packet of documents that was provided from Mr. Fietelaars, and the
19 particular letters we will be looking at are G and F. As well as H. H,
20 G, F, please.
21 Mr. Fietelaars, these three documents, I believe, may assist in
22 helping us run through the meetings. First of all, can you tell us about
23 the documents that you have in front of you. Are these documents that are
24 compiled by the embassy, by yourself, or by someone under your
1 A. Ma'am, before I answer may I ask you, am I supposed to have three
2 documents in front of me? I have G and H.
3 Q. You should have G, H, and F.
4 A. I have no F here.
5 Thank you.
6 Q. And they will also be put up on the Sanction as we go through
7 them, which is the computerised evidence.
8 I will repeat my question, sir. The documents that you have in
9 front of you, were these documents that were compiled by the embassy in
10 connection with its work, and particularly in connection with meetings
11 that may have taken place in the former Yugoslavia?
12 A. Let me say first that we had an extremely busy time in the
13 embassy. There was a lot of work, and we were not overstaffed. So we
14 developed the habit that once such a thing was done, the first thing was
15 to go back to the embassy, get your recollection down on paper, get them
16 typed out and everything, and then correct them for style and for
17 additional remarks. And then send them, the first possible of radio
18 contact to The Hague and to Luxembourg. At the times we're talking about
19 now, I'm talking about only The Hague because the Luxembourg presidency
20 was over. I did the same thing. These documents I wrote after my meeting
21 with Admiral Brovet. I corrected them first thing in the morning, of the
22 morning after when they had been typed out, and then they were sent in the
23 course of the morning to The Hague.
24 Q. You had taken notes then from which you compiled --
25 A. Yes, and recollections. Because what is on paper here is more
1 than the shorthand notes that I -- not shorthand, but very, very
2 abbreviated notes that I took during the meetings.
3 Q. Okay. And looking at these three documents that we have for
4 convenience marked as F, G, and H, can you please give us from them
5 indications of what meetings you had with Admiral Brovet or any other
6 high-ranking persons in the ministry of Defence in Belgrade concerning the
7 situation in Dubrovnik at that time.
8 A. The first meeting was a meeting that took place in the morning,
9 attended by my number two in the ministry -- in the embassy, Mr. Dirk
10 Hasselman. And Ambassador van Houten was present, and Ambassador Perrin.
11 Q. Now which particular document are you referring to?
12 A. I am referring to the first line in document F.
13 Q. Okay. Thank you.
14 And can you indicate what was the subject of discussion? What did
15 you bring to the attention of Admiral Brovet?
16 A. Well, we discussed more things than Dubrovnik. But about
17 Dubrovnik, I told Admiral Brovet that we had new information about
18 increased shelling of Dubrovnik and considerable damage in the suburbs
19 around Dubrovnik. And the stories about how threatened the civilian
20 population felt in Dubrovnik.
21 Q. I turn your attention to the English translation on page 2 of
22 document F.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Where it is said: "With regard to Dubrovnik, Brovet made clear
25 once again that the JNA troops have orders to spare the Old Town."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes, ma'am.
2 Q. How did the topic of the Old Town come up?
3 A. Because I reported that the telephone informations that I got
4 specifically to severe damage of the suburbs.
5 Q. We're talking about the 22nd of -- of the suburbs, I'm sorry.
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. Of course. Thank you very much.
8 Were you given earlier assurances about protections of the Old
9 Town, or was this the first time it had come up?
10 A. No, ma'am. This kind of thing came up regularly, whenever you
11 discussed conflict, it came up in discussions around Vukovar, about
12 Osijek, and other things. The first remark our discussion partners
13 usually made was that the JNA was not run by a number of uncultured people
14 and barbarians, but people who were very much aware how much culture there
15 was in the different parts of the Republic of Yugoslavia. And that they
16 were committed to protecting them and to -- to protect them as much as
17 possible. But of course, when they were provoked, then a retaliation and
18 self-protection had to be considered.
19 Q. In Document G, this is another -- does this also cover some of the
20 aspects of the meetings that were held the day before you contacted
21 Admiral Brovet about the shellings? We're talking about the 22nd now.
22 A. Could you rephrase -- yes.
23 Q. This is on the 22nd. Now, was there a second discussion or any
24 further discussion that the provisions of which are found in Document G
25 about the situation in Dubrovnik?
1 A. Yeah. On the 22nd of October, the Ambassador van Houten and
2 Mr. Brovet had a discussion together. And there, again, Mr. Brovet stated
3 that the actual leadership of the army was not always responsible for the
4 things that were decided, but that they were bound by instruction of the
5 supreme commander, which at that moment in time was Mr. Kostic, the
6 president of the presidency.
7 Q. I'd like to turn your attention, if I may, to the first page of
8 the English translation.
9 A. Yes, ma'am.
10 Q. Where there is a discussion about the chief of command acting out
11 of concern for the threat on Montenegro caused by the Croats, et cetera,
12 et cetera.
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. What was the position that the European delegations or the
15 Europeans were trying to protect relative to Dubrovnik? Was there a
16 concern in particular --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- that was being addressed?
19 A. In my telephone conversations that I had with The Hague, the point
20 of the Dubrovnik status in the context of world cultural Heritage came up,
21 and both within myself, but also within the mind of my contact at
22 The Hague side, it was obvious that this was a point that was going to
23 play very heavily in the discussions that European member states would
24 hold about the evaluation of the developments in and around Dubrovnik. So
25 I very specifically mentioned that this cultural heritage aspect and the
1 status that Dubrovnik had in the context of decisions of UNESCO as very
2 important and that it was totally unsupportable and unsufferable that
3 again such a status that had been agreed by all member states of UNESCO,
4 that that would be denied for tactical propositions and that that was
5 unthinkable. And in that context, they said that they had their major
6 strategic concerns as well, except for tactical things, and they were
7 protecting their -- the member states of the Federal Republic, and
8 especially the threat that was now becoming clearly visible towards
10 Q. In your discussions, was there a connection between this
11 particular set of comments and the representation by Admiral Brovet that
12 the JNA units had been instructed not to touch Old Town?
13 A. Would you repeat that, please, ma'am?
14 Q. Yes. In connection with the discussions you have just mentioned,
15 was there a nexus to Admiral Brovet's having indicated that the JNA had
16 been ordered -- the troops of the JNA had been ordered not to touch the
17 Old Town?
18 A. Well, the gist of what the commanders, because I don't
19 specifically remember if it was only Brovet or on another occasion also
20 General Kadijevic, it was that -- I should not be all that preoccupied
21 because the whole thing was already over as far as the JNA was concerned,
22 that what they wanted to achieve had been achieved. And that if any
23 further contrary happenings would take place there, it would be fault of
24 the Croats rather than the fault of the JNA.
25 Q. If -- I'd just ask you to turn your attention to H that you have
1 in front of you.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The introductory paragraph contains a comment that the -- I'm
4 sorry. "Along the lines of your 157 it was pointed out in advance that
5 there was no excuse to be found in a necessary defence of a Serbian
6 minority or that justification could be found for Croatian provocations,
7 lack of communication lines or uncontrolled acts of Serbian forces."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Was that communicated fully and forcefully to --
10 A. Oh, yes, ma'am, because by that time we had decided that things
11 had to be said clearly rather than diplomatically, because it was very
12 difficult to solicit an answer from the other side unless you indicated
13 precisely what you wanted and until you indicated the considerations that
14 moved you to pose such questions, that it was not insolence or anything
15 but real concern. And the feeling that things were happening here that
16 should not be happening in 20th century Europe.
17 MS. SOMERS: I would ask at this time to move these three
18 documents into evidence, please.
19 JUDGE PARKER: They will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The document numbers are as follows: Document F
21 is marked P138; Document G, P139; and Document H is P140. Thank you.
22 MS. SOMERS:
23 Q. Returning to your having been notified of shelling in the city of
24 Dubrovnik -- against Dubrovnik, on the 23rd of October, did you have a
25 meeting with anyone in the federal ministry? I'm sorry, yeah, the Federal
1 Ministry of Defence. If it would assist, Mr. Fietelaars, I would be happy
2 to present your A, Document A. It would probably be easier to go through
3 it this way, rather than rely strictly on...
4 Do you recognise this particular document, Mr. Fietelaars?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Was this a document that was compiled by the -- by yourself or by
7 someone under your direction in connection with your duties in Belgrade?
8 A. This document I've written myself on the night of the day that we
9 visited Dubrovnik and after we had come back to Belgrade.
10 Q. Now, the date of the visit is 29 October. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes, ma'am.
12 Q. In order to arrange this visit, was this visit raised at your
13 discussions with Admiral Brovet on the date of...
14 A. I think I inquired about status of this request that had been
15 originally talked about in a visit by the Italian Ambassador Sergio Vento
16 to Admiral Brovet, and that he said he would inquire. And I asked him
17 when I saw him, I think it was on the 22nd. The status of that -- no.
18 Yes, it must have been the 22nd because it was the last time I saw him
19 before, I think.
20 Q. Were you made aware of the shellings against Dubrovnik on the 23rd
21 of October?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And after having been made aware, did you see Admiral Brovet?
24 A. I did. And at that meeting it came up.
25 Q. And what did you request be done? What did you want to achieve by
1 that meeting and by discussing the --
2 A. Cessation of hostilities and protection of the civil population.
3 That was the object of the exercise all the time.
4 Q. Did you seek to have a visit to Dubrovnik to see for yourself what
5 had taken place?
6 A. No, I didn't take the real initiative. The real initiative was
7 taken a couple of days earlier by the Italian Ambassador. And he got a
8 reply from the JNA authorities at the lower level that they would inquire
9 whether or not such a thing would be possible. He told us, and so I
10 inquired the status of that request. And then on the 22nd, Admiral Brovet
11 said to me that they were processing that. And in principle, they would
12 take us there. And they didn't mention a date at the time, but we were
13 informed shortly before the 29th that the visit would take place and that
14 those ambassadors who had beforehand had been vocally critical of the JNA,
15 that they could come along and see for themselves.
16 Q. And which ambassadors would have been included in that delegation?
17 A. Well, I think at least the ambassador of Italy was there, because
18 he was the original initiator of the request. The Greek Ambassador was
19 there at his own request, even though he had not been all that critical of
20 the situation. And the United Kingdom was there, the Netherlands was
21 there. And Ambassador Warren Zimmerman of the United States asked if his
22 number two could take part in the trip in order to observe what was going
24 Q. And was -- were you concerned about the allegations of damage to
25 the Old Town of Dubrovnik?
1 A. Yes, ma'am. Because also the telephone calls out of Dubrovnik at
2 that time came in, and to our great surprise, telecommunications were
3 still functioning between Dubrovnik and Belgrade, so every concerned
4 citizen could ring everybody in Belgrade. So our telephone by that
5 time was -- I didn't register all the telephone calls, but the general
6 gist was they are shelling the Old Town, and we got wounded in town, and
7 there's a lot of damage. But that did not refer specifically to the Old
8 Town. That referred to Dubrovnik as the general living place of a number
9 of Croatians.
10 Q. So a visit was arranged through the JNA Ministry of Defence --
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. -- the Federal Ministry of Defence. And do you know at the local
13 level who agreed to the visit and who would -- well, who agreed to the
15 A. Admiral Brovet told me that he agreed to the visit, only the date
16 had not been fixed at the time when he told me that.
17 Q. And at the local level in Dubrovnik, were you given any
18 information about who was going to --
19 A. Well, we had in Belgrade Colonel Stojic who was the head of the
20 liaison section between the JNA and the Corps of Defence attaches. He
21 informed us and he briefed us beforehand about what was going to happen.
22 And one of the things that was going to happen was that we would meet in
23 the morning -- that we would meet two highly ranking -- high-ranking JNA
24 officers; one, Admiral Jokic, and the other one General Strugar.
25 Q. Had you ever had any contact with or any familiarity with Admiral
1 Jokic? Well, other than his name was mentioned.
2 A. Admiral Jokic, he was pointed out to me at one of my visits as
3 sitting behind General Kadijevic in a meeting where a number of
4 ambassadors visited the JNA. And of course, Admiral Jokic, especially in
5 that period, was rather visible on television in Belgrade.
6 Q. Had you ever seen or had any physical contact with General Strugar
7 at that point in time?
8 A. No, ma'am, at least not that I recall or correct. I don't even
9 recall ever --
10 Q. Now, how was the trip --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question
12 and answer. It's too fast. Thank you.
13 MS. SOMERS:
14 Q. Who was the actual trip arranged? What was the logistics to be?
15 A. We were picked up at Belgrade airport, the military part of it, by
16 a passenger plane with JNA markings, and we were brought to the air base
17 of Tivat in southern Croatia. And --
18 Q. I'm sorry, where is Tivat, in which republic?
19 A. I thought it was still Croatia. Or is it... must be. I don't
20 know, ma'am.
21 Q. Feel free to consult your notes certainly. It's not a problem. I
22 believe you have discussed the arrival in your notes. You're more than
23 welcome to take a look at them.
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. I would ask you, please, tell us, was it an overnight visit or
1 what was it a -- what was the duration?
2 A. No, ma'am. It was planned as a one-day visit. And you're right,
3 when I look at my notes here, it says it's in Montenegro.
4 Q. Did you arrive -- was it planned for morning to evening? What was
5 the general plan of the visit?
6 A. The general plan of the visit was to fly out as early as possible
7 and meet with the authorities at Tivat air base. And then take a launch
8 to Dubrovnik because land travel was too dangerous in view of the fact
9 that there was frequent sniper activity along that road, according to the
10 JNA authorities. The road itself was controlled by the JNA, but they
11 judged that it was too dangerous for us. And then they said after you
12 arrive, you will have until about 2.30, because you have to be back in
13 Tivat before 5.00 because you have to fly out during daylight. So we will
14 have an evaluative meeting at the end, and then you will fly back to
15 Belgrade, which would then have been around 5.00. That's what the Colonel
16 Stojic told us in Belgrade.
17 Q. Is the basic day as it happened captured or summarised in this
18 particular document which is --
19 A. Yes, ma'am.
20 Q. -- A. Okay. What time did you actually arrive in Tivat?
21 A. Well, we came there at 8.45. Quarter to 9.00 in the morning.
22 Q. And were you met by any officials of the JNA?
23 A. Yes, we were met by -- we were met by Admiral Jokic and a number
24 of colonels around him.
25 Q. And did Admiral Jokic carry on with the plan as you had understood
1 it to be arranged in Belgrade? What happened upon your arrival?
2 A. Well, he gave us a briefing, which did not bring very much new.
3 It was the official point of view of the JNA. And it was also the point
4 of view expressed by Admiral Jokic, that all this activity of the JNA was
5 based upon extreme provocation by the Croats, and that they had been
6 trying to negotiate for months already to come to a peaceful arrangement
7 which would allow them to retire their equipment and cease their
8 activities. And to no avail.
9 Q. How long did the briefing last, if you remember, or if it's noted?
10 A. I don't know if it's noted, but it must have been somewhere
11 between half an hour and three quarters of an hour.
12 Q. How did you actually travel to Dubrovnik? What type of boat was
14 A. No. It was a passenger launch of the JNA.
15 Q. When did you arrive in Dubrovnik, and at what part or what port
16 did you arrive?
17 A. We arrived at the Venetian port is the southern end, and we took
18 about two-and-a-half hours to get there because the launch was rather
20 Q. Now, did Admiral Jokic accompany you --
21 A. No, ma'am, he remained in Tivat.
22 Q. Did other persons from the JNA accompany you?
23 A. Yes, a number of officers. But they never disembarked with us.
24 They stayed onboard with the launch, and as soon as we had disembarked,
25 the launch pulled back and waited in open sea.
1 Q. Were there -- upon your arrival, were there Croatian members of
2 any delegation there to meet you?
3 A. Yes, ma'am. The mayor of Dubrovnik was there. And there was also
4 a representative of the Croatian government. I have his name in my notes,
5 if I may refer to that. Excuse me.
6 Well, I do not want to hold up.
7 Q. That's okay. We can come back to that. But there was someone,
8 another official --
9 A. There was another official who had come out specifically from
10 Zagreb to accompany us, also, and Mr. Bondioli who was the Dubrovnik head
11 of the monitor mission of the EC. He also was there at the quay to greet
13 Q. I see there's the name of Hrvoje Kacic mentioned there.
14 A. Yes, that's the man who met us. We had met him before, because
15 whenever an ambassador travelled to Zagreb he was, together with the chief
16 of protocol, was the first man that he would meet in his visit.
17 Q. Let me ask you, when you were having briefings, when you were with
18 the members of the JNA in Tivat, was all communication through
19 interpreters, interpreter/translators?
20 A. Yes, ma'am. The Yugoslavia side only spoke Serbo-Croatian as the
21 language was known then.
22 Q. And were there translator/interpreters?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. When you got to Dubrovnik, did you also --
25 A. Well, Mr. Kacic translated for the mayor, and Mr. Bondioli could
1 communicate with us in French and in English.
2 Q. What happened upon arrival at the Venetian port in Dubrovnik.
3 What did you do, by what means did you do it, did you ride, tell us
4 exactly --
5 A. We walked the full-length of the main street of Dubrovnik.
6 Q. When you say Dubrovnik, are you talking about the Old Town?
7 A. Yes, the Old Town, within the walls.
8 Q. And this was the 29th of October.
9 A. Yes, the 29th of October.
10 Q. What were your observations about damage, if any, that you may
11 have seen?
12 A. There were three points of damage in the Old Town that were
13 pointed out to us and that we saw ourselves. There was a small hole in
14 the bell tower, which is at one end of the main street. And some streaks
15 of black which indicated that it was caused by an explosion or something
16 like that. And there were two buildings along the street that were
17 identified by the people who accompanied us as a pharmacy and a library.
18 And they had apparently received a grenade or some device through the roof
19 which had blown off the tiles and exposed the beams of the roof
21 Q. As of that date, your overall observation about extent of damage
22 in the Old Town, just as of that time, what was your general observation?
23 A. Well, it was not very impressive, although one of the remarks that
24 we heard was that it was a good indication how precisely the JNA could
25 fire if they wanted, that they would hit three buildings which were main
1 parts of the Heritage idea of Dubrovnik. But there was nothing there I
2 personally thought that could not be repaired in a couple of days.
3 Q. Do you remember what time you finished the tour of Dubrovnik? Or
4 did you progress beyond the Old Town? Did you see --
5 A. Yes, we went beyond the Old Town. We walked also along -- outside
6 the street, outside of the ramparts that goes parallel to the ramparts and
7 the land side. We saw a couple of hotels that had been totally destroyed.
8 There were two refugee centres where all the glass had been blown out, a
9 lot of glass blown out in the streets, and grenade damage also on the
10 surface of the roads.
11 Q. How long all in all did you stay in Dubrovnik?
12 A. We managed to stretch out the visit until about half past 3.00 in
13 the afternoon, while Admiral Jokic had stressed that he needed us back on
14 the launches an hour earlier because of the sniper activity.
15 Q. So when you say an hour earlier, it must have been maybe half past
16 2.00, but you stayed a bit longer?
17 A. Yes, we stayed until half past 3.00.
18 Q. And you returned to what -- where did you return to? The same
19 place you had come?
20 A. The same place we came from, yes.
21 Q. That would be Tivat. How did you get back there?
22 A. Well, the same launch that brought us there picked us up, but then
23 we were told that because we were so late it could not be done leisurely
24 with the launch but that we and needed a faster means of transport. And I
25 think it was a motor torpedo boat that came alongside in mid-sea, and we
1 were invited to -- while they were proceeding, we were invited to step
2 over from one boat to the other. It was a bit of an undignified thing,
3 because it had been a long time since I had done such gymnastic exercises,
4 and some of the gentlemen were a bit older than I was, and it was really a
5 real experience, I can tell you, not to use another word.
6 Q. Excuse me. When you returned to Tivat --
7 A. That trip, by the way, from then on lasted less than an hour,
8 while the trip there was two and a half hours.
9 Q. When you got back to Tivat, was it still daylight when you
10 returned to Tivat?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did you hold an evaluation meeting to discuss with the persons,
13 with the JNA officials your observations from your trip to Dubrovnik?
14 A. Yeah. We were brought into a meeting hall where television
15 cameras were and a number of journalists, Yugoslav journalists, and we
16 were met by two apparently high-ranking officers there who we talked to
17 also by interpreter.
18 Q. And was -- again, this was a JNA interpreter?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Did you speak to Admiral Jokic at that time?
21 A. Well, I told him and the other gentleman was standing next to him,
22 so he must have followed it, too, in the translation of the interpreter or
23 direct if he understood anything -- any English, I told him that we were
24 quite upset about the visit.
25 Q. Now, you indicated two high-ranking officers. That would have
1 been Admiral Jokic and another person. Were you introduced by title to
2 the other individual that was there?
3 A. In my profession, you either call somebody Mr. with his name after
4 it, or by his title. You don't say Ambassador Fietelaars; you say
5 Mr. Fietelaars or Ambassador. So I said my name because I don't refer to
6 myself as Ambassador. But I don't know because we were listening to the
7 interpreters what the other two said exactly.
8 Q. Did you ever -- was a name of the other individual ever provided
9 to you?
10 A. Well, I thought it was provided to me in the morning by Colonel
11 Stojic who said that we were going to meet two officers, and one would be
12 Admiral Jokic and the other one would be General Strugar.
13 Q. But at that time, were you ever actually given the name?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Did you assume that the individual --
16 A. I did.
17 Q. -- was General Strugar. Okay. What did you tell these two
18 persons you were talking to? What did you communicate about your visit
19 that day?
20 A. Well, the gist of it was that even though the damage to the Old
21 Town was minor, the general view of Dubrovnik meant that the population of
22 Dubrovnik and the housing and the roads and everything were in severe
23 danger. There was severe damage. And that it was incomprehensible that a
24 civilian population could be so attacked and so threatened while we never
25 observed any military presence in that city.
1 Q. Let me ask you about the atmosphere at this particular meeting,
2 the review. Was it a formal briefing atmosphere or was it a social?
3 A. No, no, it looked very much like social. We remained standing in
4 little circles, and the people with cameras and microphones came up.
5 Q. Were there refreshments served?
6 A. Yes, we got drinks and...
7 Q. When you -- were you satisfied with the amount of time you had
8 gotten in the -- in Dubrovnik? Did you think your visit was sufficiently
9 long for you to gather as much information as you wanted to gather?
10 A. No, certainly not. Because a lot of people in the population had
11 hoped to talk with us, and we just had to say, "No, we have to walk on
12 because we want to see as much as possible, and please talk to your own
13 representatives, and they will transmit to us any preoccupation that you
14 have and we will try to act on it as much as possible." But yes, I would
15 have liked to remain there for a couple of hours more. And that is also
16 what caused the delay. We talked to people, and especially with people
17 who only spoke Serbo-Croatian, that slows down conversation quite a lot,
18 the interpretation.
19 Q. Excuse me. I'm terribly sorry. In your Document A, on the page
20 which bears the identifying number of 03521743, it would be -- the last
21 numbers are 1743, you have made a note that: "Now JNA forces surround
22 Dubrovnik looking down on it from positions..." - toward the bottom - "in
23 the surrounding hills at Dubac, at Ivanica (on the Bosnian border) and at
24 the opposite side of the Dubrovnik river. The Admiral...", is this
25 Admiral Jokic?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. "The Admiral said, that the JNA has no further objectives in the
3 Dubrovnik area. There was no threat any more to the JNA. The only thing
4 that had still to be done was to clear the region of all weapons and to
5 make certain that the tens of dead and hundreds of wounded had not been
6 sacrificed without cause. In the discussion that followed, the Admiral
7 admitted that the Croatians could not do any harm to the JNA forces in the
8 region, and that there had only been minor provocations since the
9 cease-fire since 29 October 1991 at 1700 hours."
10 A. Yeah, by then everything was silent, they said. So there was no
11 provocation, and there was no activity from the JNA side.
12 Q. Was there any further discussion about the continued presence of
13 the JNA if all objectives had been reached between you and the Admiral?
14 A. We underlined that if all objectives had been reached there was no
15 reason to give all that heavy ordinance in the hills directed towards
16 Dubrovnik, and what did they plan to do? The Admiral said, you know, we
17 have been here are our ordinance, and no gun was ever turned on the old
18 city of Dubrovnik, and not a single stone of Dubrovnik was touched except
19 when we retaliated rather than attack.
20 Q. Excuse me. Did you tell the Admiral about your observations of
21 the damage in the Old Town?
22 A. Yes, we did, very much so.
23 Q. And I note on the page after which we were just reading, that
24 would be the one ending in 1744, I believe you just said -- now, is this
25 the Admiral speaking, that no gun was ever turned on the old city of
1 Dubrovnik, no single stone in Dubrovnik was touched?
2 A. Yes. Except --
3 Q. Was this in the face of your having indicated that there was
4 damage --
5 A. There was severe destruction.
6 Q. Severe destruction. I'm talking about the Old Town.
7 A. In the Old Town, I told him about the three hits that we saw and
8 observed ourselves.
9 Q. It goes on to say that: "There is no destruction of Dubrovnik,
10 there will be none depending on how fast we can find a final solution."
11 What was your understanding, if any, about the continued presence of the
12 JNA heavy weaponry you just referred to? Was it -- was there an
13 indication that it would remain in the area?
14 A. There was no indication whatsoever. They didn't react to it. So
15 the next time I brought it up in Belgrade with Admiral Brovet. And he
16 said as soon as we find a general solution, all these movements will be
17 made and peace will be restored as soon as we have confiscated all the
18 illegal weaponry that's in the region. But that was the only answer we
19 ever got to the displacement possibilities of the ordinance that the JNA
20 had at its disposal in the region.
21 Q. I turn your attention to the page ending in 1745, that would be
22 the next page, where it appears -- is this your summary of observations
23 about the damage to the old city, the Old Town of Dubrovnik?
24 A. The first full linear --
25 Q. Yes --
1 A. In the old city, yes, ma'am, that's the...
2 Q. And the comment -- there's a comment made below that starts: "The
3 randomness of the damage seems to prove the point."
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What led you to make that comment about the randomness of the
7 A. There was no obviously directed fire to the suburbs. It was just
8 general destructions. There was not a single building of which one could
9 indicate it had strategic value, that it was a lookout post for military
10 activity or for snipers or for mortar locations. Nothing. There were
11 hotels --
12 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you. I'm really referring -- does this
13 refer to the Old Town, this comment about randomness? If it does not,
14 then --
15 A. It does not really.
16 Q. Thank you very much on that.
17 MS. SOMERS: I would ask to move this document into evidence. And
18 is this a convenient time after that, Your Honours, for a break.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Before that occurs, while you were Document A in
20 front of you, Mr. Fietelaars.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE PARKER: The second page, 1743 in English, very near the
23 bottom at the end of the last full paragraph, you speak of a cease-fire of
24 the 29th of October.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Your visit was on the 28th of October.
2 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
3 JUDGE PARKER: I see.
4 THE WITNESS: Our visit was on the 29th of October.
5 JUDGE PARKER: And so -- but this is a cease-fire at 5.00 in the
6 afternoon of the 29th.
7 THE WITNESS: That was negotiated directly between the JNA, the
8 head of mission for the monitor mission, and representatives that flew out
9 of The Hague, I think, and it was done in Belgrade and in Zagreb.
10 JUDGE PARKER: So the comment of Admiral Jokic that there had been
11 only minor provocations, he could only have been speaking of one or two
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 JUDGE PARKER: I see. Thank you.
15 THE WITNESS: When we were there, sir, it was silent.
16 JUDGE PARKER: All right.
17 The document will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: The document titled A will be P141.
19 JUDGE PARKER: We will now have a 20-minute break.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Somers.
23 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, I have been asked by the translation personnel,
25 colleagues, to please for both of us to speak slowly enough so that they
1 can catch question and answer.
2 A. I will try.
3 Q. Thank you very much.
4 Following your -- well, let's actually go back. What time did you
5 leave Tivat for Belgrade?
6 A. It must have been after 9.00 because we arrived in Belgrade at
8 Q. And on the 1st of November, did you have a meeting with Admiral
9 Brovet concerning your visit and other observations from the visit?
10 A. Yes, ma'am.
11 Q. May I ask you, please, to look at Document D, which will be
12 circulated and also is available on Sanction.
13 This document dated 1st of November bearing your name, are you
14 familiar with it?
15 A. Yes, ma'am.
16 Q. And was this document made in the course of your duties in
18 A. Yes, ma'am. This was a report of the embassy to The Hague.
19 Q. The subject of the document is a visit to Admiral Brovet on
20 1 November. What was the purpose of the visit? What was discussed? And
21 what did you come away from that meeting with?
22 A. Yes. The meeting happened because the British ambassador phoned
23 me early in the morning saying that he was under instruction to go to the
24 ministry of Defence and express Her Majesty's preoccupation with what was
25 going on in and around Dubrovnik. He phoned me then asking if that would
1 be feasible in the context of the fact that I was writing the general
2 report which would also reach London, being one of the capitals of the EU
3 countries. And how to go about it. I then suggested to him that we will
4 go with a number of EU ambassadors without actually defining the juridical
5 status of this group, and operate as a group of European nations also
6 accompanied by the US embassy because they were present at the visit on
7 the 29th in Dubrovnik. This is what we did. So the British ambassador in
8 the course of that meeting got the possibility to execute his instructions
9 and to express her British Majesty government's preoccupation with the
11 Q. On the first page of this document, the bottom, there is a
12 reference to the next issue to be discussed was how disconcerted the
13 western's world public opinion is with regards to the humanitarian
14 situation in Dubrovnik. Ambassador Hall pointed out that despite the
15 material damage to the old city being small, we regarded the situation of
16 the inhabitants as very precarious.
17 Can you elaborate a bit more. When you say inhabitants, are you
18 talking about the civilian population?
19 A. Civilian population of Dubrovnik, yes.
20 Q. And what in particular underlay this concern for the civilian
22 A. Well, our concern was that we had observed and that we had been
23 told that the city was being starved of supplies and of drinking water and
24 everything, and that survival within the city became more difficult by the
1 Q. What was -- or how was this addressed by Admiral Brovet?
2 A. Well, once again, we got the standard replies, that the function
3 of the JNA as one of the pillars of state was to re-establish calm and
4 peace in all the regions of the country. And they had to prevent that the
5 Serbian minorities in that area would be massacred. And --
6 Q. Excuse me, I'm sorry. Was this part of a reply by Admiral Brovet
7 commenting about the Serbian minorities?
8 A. Yes. Yes, ma'am.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. The other part was that also a lot of very precious and costly
11 equipment of the JNA was still within the reach of the irregulars in
12 Dubrovnik, and that had to be salvaged by the JNA as quickly as possible.
13 Q. This again was Admiral Brovet's --
14 A. A remark by Admiral Brovet, yes.
15 Q. At the top of the second page, Ambassador Hall, I believe is the
16 person referred to by "he."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Stressed the positions taken by the community, that the siege of
19 Dubrovnik should be lifted immediately and that the supplies and the
20 public services to the city have to be mended.
21 What was the response by Admiral Brovet to addressing these
23 A. Admiral Brovet said that he would love to do that, but it was
24 impossible because you cannot solve a little part of a big puzzle by
25 addressing only the little part. Everything was linked to everything, and
1 a general cease-fire, which would be justified by the European
2 authorities, had to be found in the cooperation of the member states of
3 the EU in The Hague, together with Yugoslavia, of course. And that
4 that -- in the context of that occurrence, the total withdrawal of the JNA
5 from that region could be considered. And until such time that there was
6 a solution, it could not because of the dangers for the large Serbian
7 minority that lived in the region.
8 Q. I note in the first full -- second full but fuller than the first
9 paragraph, there was nothing that the army would like to do more. This is
10 Admiral Brovet speaking, sir?
11 A. Yes, Admiral Brovet speaking.
12 Q. There is nothing that the army --
13 A. "That the army would like to do more than to retreat."
14 Q. "But until a definitive political solution in The Hague by the
15 European community would be found, withdrawing from the crisis areas in
16 Croatia was out of the question, because otherwise the so much dreaded
17 mass murder would start immediately."
18 A. Yes, ma'am.
19 Q. Did you -- a little bit below, did you respond to your views about
20 the civilian population as a -- I think the term used is reprisal? If you
21 look below in the paragraph starting with Admiral Jokic.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. For the benefit of the interpreters: "I have told him, being
24 emphatically seconded on this, and in strong wording by the American
25 second in this, that the holding hostage of a civilian population as a
1 reprisal for the mistreatment of JNA militaries was plainly unacceptable.
2 Dubrovnik did not have a military function."
3 The Admiral replied to this how? Admiral Brovet.
4 A. Well, he denied that that was the case. He said that there was a
5 danger emanating from there, that there were tens of deads and hundreds of
6 wounded in the JNA, and that the situation had to be brought under control
7 because Dubrovnik was a military target. It was a militarily reinforced
8 city. That was the little term that he used.
9 Q. If I could ask you, please, if you could slowly let us know what
10 the Admiral's assertion was, where it says, "The Admiral denied this."
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. If you could read from there.
13 A. And the following sentence is a direct quote from what he said:
14 "Dubrovnik is a militarily reinforced city with cannons and mortars and
15 with thousands of Croatian troops. While the authorities refused to
16 negotiate with the local JNA leadership about the reparation of the normal
17 functioning of the city."
18 Q. When you were in Dubrovnik, did you see thousands of Croatian
20 A. No, ma'am.
21 Q. The discussions that you had with Admiral Jokic at your meeting on
22 the 29th of October, are these also encapsulated in this particular
23 summary where you say, on the same page: "Admiral Jokic has assured us on
24 29 October last that all military objectives in the south Dalmatian region
25 have been attained, and that Dubrovnik did not pose a single threat any
1 more for the JNA. Why does the JNA insist on continuing military
2 operations in spite of that?" The response of Admiral Brovet to that was
3 how, in the next sentence, please?
4 A. Yes. Admiral Brovet could ultimately, because he hummed and hawed
5 a little bit, searching for words, he could only reply that JNA officers
6 and soldiers were threatened, captured, injured and killed everywhere in
7 Croatia, and that all was connected to one another.
8 In that context, we told him that to use a civilian population,
9 hold them hostage, shell them, destroy their houses, take away their
10 supplies, is not a way in which you respond to a military threat.
11 Q. Thank you very much.
12 MS. SOMERS: I would ask that this document be moved into
13 evidence, please.
14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Document D will be labelled as P142.
16 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.
17 Q. Moving on in time, did you become aware of a shelling -- of
18 shelling on Dubrovnik on the 6th of December 1991?
19 A. Yes. There again, contacts out of Dubrovnik, but I think also
20 general news missions in Belgrade referred to new unrest in the region in
21 and around Dubrovnik.
22 MS. SOMERS: May I ask, please, that Document C be distributed.
23 Q. Do you recognise this document, Mr. Fietelaars, which bears the
24 date of 6 December 1991 with the name Hasselman. And if you could remind
25 us who Hasselman is, please.
1 A. Mr. Hasselman was the second-in-command consular of embassy in the
2 Netherlands embassy in Belgrade.
3 Q. Was this document compiled at your request or at the request of
4 someone directly under you?
5 A. Yeah. It was prepared for my signature by -- for my authorisation
6 by the time I would come back to the embassy.
7 Q. It is called a demarche to General Kadijevic. Can you explain
8 what demarche is?
9 A. A demarche is an intervention with an opposite discussion partner
10 upon instructions received from the foreign ministry where you are
11 instructed to go and tell them of the concerns as enumerated by the
12 foreign ministry, and then leave a written note behind as a summary of the
13 things that you have said, a formal summary of the things that you have
15 Q. In the first part of this document called a demarche, there is a
16 reference made to the meeting with Admiral Brovet on 6 December 1991. And
17 the purpose of the demarche was to urge the JNA to comply with the
18 cease-fire agreement of November 23rd and with Security Council Resolution
19 71 of November 27th. Can you just give us briefly a little background to
20 the cease-fire negotiations that are discussed. And were they part of a
21 greater plan that would also have encompassed or had impact upon the
22 Dubrovnik region?
23 A. There was a -- I don't know exactly how to start to address your
24 question. Would you please --
25 Q. Let's take it in parts.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Let's take it in parts. Was there going on in other parts of
3 Europe a series of negotiations to try to bring the hostilities to an end?
4 A. Yes, ma'am. In The Hague, Mr. Lambuca [phoen] developed a plan to
5 try under the aegis of the European Union to broker an agreement between
6 the different parties without addressing any of the big political
7 questions, but just to make certain that the intensity of military
8 activities would be lowered to a full cease-fire. And that was -- was
9 kind of coordinated out of The Hague through meetings that took place both
10 in Brussels and in Belgrade.
11 Q. There is also mention in this document about a Geneva agreement.
12 It appears on page 03521752. That's the number in the upper right-hand
13 corner. Can you comment about that, please.
14 A. When other countries became involved and wanted to become
15 involved, for instance, the Soviet Union and the United States, it was
16 logical to make this into an activity that would be carried out in the
17 context of the United Nations. And for that, Geneva was the logical
19 Q. At this particular meeting, at the top of the same page, there is
20 an indication that it was asked to comment on reports received in the
21 course of the day concerning new shelling of Dubrovnik.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It says: "Kadijevic did not try to bring forward any
24 justification, but promised that an investigation would immediately be
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. Was there a -- any understanding about further reporting on
3 results of any such investigation?
4 A. Yes, ma'am. In the first place, I think that the gist of the
5 intervention of General Kadijevic was that he was not aware of the fact
6 that these developments were taking place and that that was why he could
7 not comment on it, and that is why he would have order a -- would order a
8 direct investigation.
9 Q. Was that your perception?
10 A. Yes, ma'am.
11 Q. Just your perception.
12 A. But the promise that we will be informed as quickly as possible
13 was not a perception because it was part of the intervention.
14 MS. SOMERS: I would ask, please, to move this document into
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Document C is labelled P143.
18 MS. SOMERS: May we please, before you sit down, Mr. Usher, ask
19 for the document bearing "B" to be distributed.
20 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, do you recognise this document, which is dated 13
21 December 1991.
22 A. Yes, ma'am.
23 Q. And what is it, please?
24 A. It is a report of Mr. Hasselman sent out under his name. He was
25 charge d'affair at the moment because I was absent from the post.
1 Q. And you ordered this to be done, or you --
2 A. -- this was when I -- when I left the post -- left out -- for
3 outside Yugoslavia, I gave him full powers to do exactly as I would do in
4 the circumstances.
5 Q. Okay. This is a summary of a meeting, is that correct, between --
6 between and among what persons?
7 A. EU -- EC representatives, we were still then I think, and the
8 Soviet Ambassador and the -- the Russian Ambassador and representative of
9 the United States, Warren Zimmerman.
10 Q. And it was with whom in the JNA?
11 A. It was with Admiral Brovet, as far as I recall. But it's
12 mentioned in the report, I think. And the -- and the same interventions
13 were going to be made in -- in Belgrade and in Zagreb.
14 Q. In this particular document, on the second page, there is a
15 mention -- the second page is ending in 1748, it -- there is a reference
16 to -- actually, it's the first full paragraph, "those who are" -- let me
17 back up, please. "As far as irregular armed forces are concerned, the
18 Admiral stated that the JNA has taken rigorous measures to bring all units
19 under strict control in the areas where the JNA is responsible.
20 Commanders who fail to implement these measures will be removed. Those
21 who are responsible for the recent shelling of Dubrovnik's old city are
22 now under criminal investigation and have been relieved of their command.
23 The Admiral expressed his regret for the damage inflicted. The JNA has
24 always and will always respect the cultural heritage."
25 Are you aware of what discussions may have taken place about the
1 damage to the Old Town that brought about this series of reactions from
2 Admiral Brovet? Did Mr. Hasselman inform you, or --
3 A. I think that this is an intervention by Admiral Brovet and is
4 based upon his internal instructions within the JNA to have an
5 investigation. I am not aware that before he came to his conclusions he
6 consulted any other source of information.
7 Q. Were you or any of the ambassadors with whom you had contact ever
8 informed specifically of the actual results of any investigation into the
9 shelling of Dubrovnik and criminal responsibility therefore by commanders?
10 A. No, Madam.
11 Q. Up until the time you retired -- let's back up. Up until the time
12 you left Yugoslavia, had you ever been presented with specific information
13 about investigations, the persons investigated, the persons removed, or
14 was there any follow-up to this representation that is contained in
15 Document B?
16 A. No, ma'am.
17 MS. SOMERS: I would move -- ask to move this document into
18 evidence, please.
19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Document B is labelled P144.
21 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.
22 If I may just take a moment, Your Honour. Thank you.
23 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, did you yourself have occasion to visit the old
24 city or the Old Town of Dubrovnik after the shelling of 6th of December?
25 A. No, ma'am.
1 Q. Had you received any information about the extent of the shelling
2 on the 6th of December?
3 A. The only things that I ever saw were on Belgrade TV, on that -- on
4 those occurrences. And the -- my impression, but it was only my
5 impression from the images that I saw on TV, was that the damage was far
6 more severe than the things that we observed on the 29th of October.
7 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much. At this time, there is no
8 further direct examination.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Somers.
10 Mr. Petrovic.
11 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 If I may, I would like to ask the usher to bring me the rostrum
13 that Ms. Somers has in front of her. Unfortunately, we don't have enough
14 of those plastic things in -- in the courtroom.
15 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrovic:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Fietelaars. My name is
17 Vlado Petrovic. I represent Mr. Strugar, and I'm going to ask you some
18 questions that arise from your testimony.
19 First of all, I would like to put to you some general questions
20 about your role in the relevant events between the years 1990 and 1992.
21 First of all, can you please tell the Trial Chamber which government took
22 your credentials during that relevant period of time.
23 A. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the form of the
24 then president, Mr. Jovic.
25 Q. Can you please tell us, if you remember, when was it that
1 Mr. Jovic received your credentials?
2 A. I can't give you the specific date, but it was within the first
3 two weeks of my arrival in Belgrade. And I arrived in Belgrade on the 3rd
4 of October 1990.
5 Q. As the Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, within your
6 regular duties in Belgrade, who was your regular official contact between
7 October 1990 and May or June 1992? Who was your point of contact for
8 communication with the government in Belgrade?
9 A. In -- in the beginning of that period, it was with the federal
10 government by way of Mr. Loncar, the foreign minister, and in the context
11 of occasional visits to Mr. Markovic who was then the federal president.
12 We also had contacts with different ministries on economic and consular
14 Q. Will you agree with me when I say that your contacts with
15 Mr. Loncar were regular up to the beginning of 1992?
16 A. Not regular, sir. They were diminishing from the middle of 1991.
17 The contact was less and less, and contacts about the real preoccupations
18 that the embassy had to express were mainly with the ministry of Defence.
19 Q. When did you meet Minister Loncar for the last time?
20 A. I met Minister Loncar for the last time around the same time that
21 the federal presidency was, in fact, reduced to four members. It was
22 Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and the representative of Kosovo was still
23 there. By that time, it ceased to be material in our daily dealings, and
24 Mr. Loncar had very little time for us. He was otherwise occupied. And
25 we were often referred to lower civilian contacts within the ministry with
1 whom the message couldn't, after trying to do so, could not be usefully
3 Q. Can you give us the time reference, if you remember. When was
4 this happening?
5 A. I can only say, because I did not keep any notes on that type of
6 meeting which did not result in direct reporting. I can only say that it
7 was from the middle of 1991 onwards. The last time I saw Mr. Loncar and
8 talked to him privately, it has just come up in my mind, I'm sorry that it
9 didn't come sooner, that was during the conference of Brioni. And I'm
10 sure that somebody can supply you the direct date of that conference. It
11 has escaped my mind as well. It's all 12 years ago.
12 Q. Prime Minister Anto Markovic at the time, did you have any
13 contacts with him at all?
14 A. Yes, I did. But not after the middle of the year, because he
15 spent more time in Zagreb than at Belgrade at the time.
16 Q. Where were the policies of your government and the European Union
17 with regard to the preservation of the former Yugoslavia?
18 A. Well, the Netherlands government has for quite some time been
19 trying to stay with the policy that started out as main point. The
20 salvage of the integrity of the Federal Republic. And for the rest, I
21 must say, there's not much that I can add to that because an embassy as
22 such does not deal with that kind of politics. We are there to do
23 incidental work upon instruction on direct issues rather than on general
24 policies. So neither am I an expert, nor do I feel myself qualified to
25 answer that.
1 Q. Were you informed, were you aware of the policies of your
2 government with regard to the preservation of that state, or was that
3 something that you didn't have to know anything about it, that you didn't
4 know anything about?
5 A. At that time, some personal representatives of our foreign
6 minister were travelling up and down Yugoslavia, and also touched
7 frequently upon Belgrade in order to try and have contact with everybody
8 involved in that process. The embassy on purpose was left outside to do
9 the traditional job of maintaining the relations with the authorities, as
10 we could. Several other people, as I said, were appointed, Hans Van den
11 Broek and travelled up to Belgrade and talked to the people. The embassy
12 never got involved in politics during all that time.
13 Q. What were your instructions as regarded contacts with the
14 governments of Croatia and Slovenia at that time? We're talking about
15 mid-1992 [as interpreted].
16 A. Well, they were parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I
17 travelled there as the Netherlands Ambassador to Yugoslavia and talked to
18 the authorities in the context of subjects that were in the main, the
19 competence of those states themselves. But with them, we neither talked
20 about the developments in the Netherlands policy because we had
21 insufficient awareness of it as an embassy.
22 Q. Did you escort the representatives of your government who arrived
23 in Belgrade to deal with political issues that had to do with either the
24 breakdown or the survival of Yugoslavia? Did you attend those meetings as
25 the ambassador and the highest representative of the Kingdom of the
1 Netherlands in that country?
2 A. No, sir, I did not.
3 Q. Did you have contacts with Stipo Mesic, the president of the
4 presidency of Yugoslavia, in the second half of 1992 [as interpreted]?
5 A. Would you rephrase the question, please. I don't understand what
6 you mean.
7 Q. As the Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, did you have
8 any official contacts with Stipo Mesic, the president of the presidency of
9 the SFRY? And did you have those contacts in the second half of 1991 [as
11 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me, Your Honour. I wanted to inquire of the
12 interpreting. The first time the date was raised, it said 1992. And now
13 it says 1991. My concern is that the earlier question about Croatia and
14 Slovenia also was referred to as 1991, but it came out as 1992 in the
15 transcript. Specifically page 53, line 25, seems to have a mid-1992 date
16 in translation. I believe I heard it as 1991. And there may be some
17 confusion. So I would ask that that be clarified.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Madam. I heard it as --
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my learned friend is
20 absolutely right on both occasions I inquired about the year 1991. The
21 first question that referred to your contacts with the governments of
22 Croatia and Slovenia was about 1991. And the way I understood your
23 answer, I believe you were referring to 1991. Am I right?
24 THE WITNESS: [Previous interpretation continues] ...
25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that. And the transcript will be
2 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, again in the
3 transcript, we do not have the witness's answer.
4 JUDGE PARKER: It probably got lost in the interruption,
5 Mr. Petrovic. We might have to have it again.
6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. My question was about the contacts that you had with the
8 governments of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991. And you gave your answer
9 about the year 1991. Isn't that so?
10 A. Yes, sir. And I'm quite willing to rephrase it if you want me to.
11 Q. That won't be necessary. Thank you.
12 My second question was as follows: In the second half of 1991,
13 did you have any contacts with the president of the presidency of the
14 SFRY, Mr. Stipo Mesic?
15 A. I attended a meeting that took place on the last day of June in
16 Belgrade where the foreign minister of Luxembourg and the foreign minister
17 of the Netherlands were both present to negotiate the federal presidency
18 of Yugoslavia. And the transfer of the European presidency took place in
19 Belgrade between Mr. Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg, and Hans Van
20 den Broek, foreign minister of the Netherlands. At that meeting,
21 Mr. Mesic was present, but he was not present as -- as such as a Croatian
22 official because he was going to be during that same meeting president of
23 the Federal Republic. So when I met him, it may well be that I met him
24 last there, but I'm not absolutely certain because it escapes my memory.
25 But it may well be that at that meeting that was the last time that I met
1 Mr. Mesic.
2 Q. Do you know when the Republic of Croatia was recognised by the
3 Kingdom of the Netherlands as an independent state?
4 A. It must have been in the early part of 1992, but I don't remember
5 the date. In the first half of 1992.
6 Q. Can you please tell us why did the government of the Netherlands
7 recognise the Republic of Croatia as late as the first half of 1992?
8 A. I think it has to do with the fact that the Netherlands, until the
9 end of 1991, held the presidency and felt that it was not for the
10 presidency to develop initiative that might either positively or
11 negatively influence other member states. But this is pure speculation.
12 I can't come up with another explanation.
13 Q. Did you have any instructions with regard to your relationship
14 with the governments of Croatia and Slovenia which pronounced their
15 independence unilaterally, regardless of the rest of the former
17 A. Whenever I spoke to people in Zagreb and in Ljubljana, and I spoke
18 to them on specific subjects. And this recognition aspect that you
19 mention was far outside the competency of the embassy. We didn't discuss
20 it, we didn't refer to it, and it never came up.
21 Q. Would you be so kind to tell us what were the topics of your
22 discussions in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana in that year, if they were
23 not to do with the status of those states, the breakdown of the state, and
24 the new political and state organisation in the area of the western
25 Balkans, as they are called today?
1 A. Yes, we were trying to resolve visum arrangements which had ceased
2 to be executed out of Belgrade, and we said that if that is the case, if
3 you want Dutch businessmen to travel to your area or vice versa, we have
4 to do something in order to make that work. Those were specific
5 instructions of the ministry of -- the section of legal affairs in the
6 ministry of Justice who runs that kind of things. And personal contacts,
7 people who had accidents, who died on the road, transport licenses in to
8 pass the autostratus of Slovenia and Croatia in that period because that
9 part of our collaboration had been broken down, and I was instructed to
10 keep it going as well as possible, and to reconstruct it as well as
12 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, you were not engaged in political discussions.
13 You only dealt with practical issues that cropped up day in, day out.
14 Would I be correct in saying that?
15 A. Yes, that's in essence correct.
16 Q. How did your government then create its positions about the issues
17 that I've just mentioned if they did not receive any information from you
18 as to what was happening on the ground? Who were the people that informed
19 the government if it wasn't you?
20 A. Well, Mr. Van den Broek had a special representative to Yugoslavia
21 by the name of Ambassador Wijnaendts who travelled regularly from The
22 Hague and touched upon the capitals of all the member states of the
23 Federal Republic and in Belgrade also had contacts with, for instance, the
24 ministry of Defence very frequently. He reported on that kind of
25 developments to The Hague. And very rarely did I even get a copy of those
1 statements. And (a) it was not necessary for my work, and (b), I could
2 not be drawn into discussions on which I had no authority, no knowledge.
3 Q. Did you send reports on political events in the former Yugoslavia
4 during the relevant period? Did you send those reports to your government
5 in The Hague?
6 A. My personal evaluations, I certainly did.
7 Q. And what were these personal evaluations about?
8 A. Mainly about the state of chaos that was slowly taking over, and
9 the difficulties there were for keeping normal administration and normal
10 work going on. And for that, of course, I had contact with ministries,
11 et cetera. But never on the subject that you refer to.
12 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, I have your report in front of me. The date is
13 15 October 1991. This report is nothing else but a political report on
14 what was going on in the state. I'm going to read to you several parts of
15 this report. In the first part, you're talking about the declaration that
16 was assigned by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Kadijevic.
17 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, would it be possible if the document is
18 one that has been tendered to at least put it in front of Mr. Fietelaars,
19 or if not, at least give him the benefit of looking at it.
20 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document has not
21 been tendered by our learned friends. We are going to tender this into
22 evidence. I'm going to give the witness a copy in Dutch. And I'm also
23 going to have enough copies for everybody. I didn't expect that this
24 witness is going to say before this Trial Chamber that he didn't know
25 anything about the political events in Yugoslavia. After the first break,
1 I'm going to make copies and tender it into evidence. And now, I would
2 like to give the ambassador the Dutch copy of his report for his perusal.
3 Can you please give the copy to the witness.
4 Q. Do you recognise this report?
5 A. Yes, sir. It's mine.
6 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what the subject of this report is.
7 And this is to be seen on the first page of this report.
8 A. The subject is, "Political developments in Yugoslavia."
9 Q. Can you please look at the first paragraph on page 1. Here, you
10 inform your government about the declaration that was signed in Igalo by
11 Milosevic, Tudjman, and Kadijevic after the meeting that was held there.
12 A. Yes, sir. I was there at that meeting. And I -- there has been a
13 report on that meeting. I think that Britain, Lord Carrington, was
14 presiding the delegation at the time. And I remind the people that I
15 report to about part of the text of the declaration of Igalo which was
16 free knowledge. So it's more of a journalistic remark than a reporting
17 remark. But this is -- this document, I have written. And it was true,
18 all parties stated that they recognised the -- the solutions proposed in
19 the declaration of Igalo as the last chance.
20 Q. Please, look at paragraph 5 in which you're talking about your
21 evaluations as for the hopes for a peaceful solution to the civil war that
22 was still going on. This is your evaluation and the way you described the
23 things that were going on.
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Your evaluation of what was happening at the time, is it the same
1 as described here? That is, that it was a civil war.
2 A. That was my personal opinion, yes, sir. But this was not based
3 upon meetings with high officials of either the Federal Republic or the
4 states of Yugoslavia. This was a concerned person living in Belgrade
5 watching the TV, talking to people, and coming to conclusions that I write
6 down here on paper.
7 Q. Is it possible, Mr. Fietelaars, that the ambassador of the Kingdom
8 of the Netherlands receives information mostly from the media? I assume
9 that you would have had numerous contacts with all the major players in
10 those events at the time?
11 A. Could you define "major players," sir.
12 Q. Members of the government, the federal government, the republican
13 governments, various governmental ministers, influential politicians,
14 heads of political parties. This is the way I perceive the job of an
15 ambassador. My perception may be wrong as to what the duties and contacts
16 of the ambassador of such a powerful and influential state as the Kingdom
17 of the Netherlands may be, especially in the light of the fact that your
18 state was presiding over the European Union at the time.
19 A. Your perception is correct insofar as that I talked to
20 representatives of political parties, just like the journalists did. I
21 did not give them any insight, and neither could I, in the thinkings of my
22 minister on future recognition or anything. I listened, I observed, I
23 evaluated, and I wrote. And that is the function of an ambassador.
24 Q. You have a lot of experience; you had a lot of experience already
25 when you found yourself in the turmoil of the civil war in the former
1 Yugoslavia. Wouldn't that be correct?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. Your evaluation that this was a civil war was based on your rich
4 experience and the facts that you saw all around you. Wouldn't that be
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Please look at paragraph -- the third or the fourth paragraph
8 talking about the process of political disintegration in Macedonia. Can
9 you see that paragraph, please.
10 A. Excuse me for a moment. The fourth paragraph -- yes, I've found
11 it, sir.
12 Q. Can you please look at that paragraph and tell us whether the
13 report of yours contains positions on the political processes which were
14 taking place in Bosnia and Macedonia at the time.
15 A. I don't really know what the question is. That I reported what I
16 heard? We heard from people within the cabinet of Mr. Izetbegovic
17 information about how the meetings actually went. I reported on that.
18 Q. Your role, judging by this report, was not what you told us, that
19 it was you were well informed about all the political processes that were
20 taking place in the former Yugoslavia at the time. Would I be correct in
21 saying that?
22 A. I was informed or I informed myself? I don't know. I was
23 informed. It was not that an avalanche of unsolicited information reached
24 the embassy. I talked to people, I travelled, and I observed what I saw.
25 Q. The reports that you sent to The Hague, were your conclusions
1 drawn from the truthful or truthful to the biggest possible extent facts
2 that you heard about, because you were sending reports to your government?
3 A. Yes. It would be pretty useless if only dry facts were presented,
4 while I had an embassy in Belgrade that lived there and worked there and
5 formed opinion on the basis of information and -- and experience received.
6 That is the function of an embassy. So not only documents with facts were
7 referred, but also my interpretation of them and my evaluation of them.
8 Q. Can you please finish your answer. I've interrupted you, and I
10 A. No. I just wanted to say that if you read the second part of the
11 paragraph that you refer to, that I tried to make a summary of a document
12 I received. And the second document also I give a summary that is
13 received, and then I say, "We will receive English translations from the
14 document, and that they will be faxed to the embassy as soon as they are
15 ready. As soon as they are ready, the embassy will make use of them."
16 Q. Please, look at one paragraph but last, towards the end of this
17 document, where you talk about Milosevic and the Greater Serbia. Can you
18 please explain the difference between the aspirations that Milosevic had
19 according to you and the aspirations of the Yugoslav People's Army. What
20 is this all about? Are these goals convergent? I am just trying to talk
21 about your report written on the 15 of October 1991.
22 A. May I read it, please, sir.
23 I think, sir, that this has to do with initiatives about finding a
24 solution to the rising problems between member states of the republic and
25 that the changes in border that could or would be used to find such
1 solution were not considered by all member states as identical. That
2 everybody had his own solution, and that it was noticeable, and maybe for
3 somebody living in Belgrade it was more noticeable what the Serbian
4 attitude was because we watched Serb television in Belgrade. That
5 solution by the change of borders was not at that time seeming to
6 become -- to become a solution of the problem. And that increasing hard
7 positions hanging on to initially made points of view were clear in all
8 the circumstances, in the press, in talks, in discussions, and on
9 television. And on the basis of this document, the last thing says also
10 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, that parliament does not believe in --
11 Q. I have to interrupt you. Can you please focus on my question. My
12 question was, what is the difference between the ambitions of the JNA to
13 preserve their role and what you describe here as Milosevic's aspiration
14 towards the Greater Serbia? Is there a difference? If there is, what is
15 the difference between these two sets of ambitions or these two
16 programmes? Milosevic's on the one hand, and those of the JNA on the
17 other, both of which you mention in your report.
18 A. Yes, but I don't have a clue about in how far they are identical
19 or converging or diverging. I make reports on what I see and what I
20 evaluate. And that has never been part of this kind of evaluation, to
21 compare points of view taken by the JNA and points of view taken by the
22 Serbian presidency in Belgrade. The JNA I dealt with on the basis of
23 instructions received on incidental things that happened, never on policy.
24 Q. Did the JNA, or rather, the leadership of the JNA that you
25 contacted with as opposed to Milosevic want to perform its constitutional
1 role and preserve the country as provided for by the constitution of that
2 same country? Is that the conclusion that can be drawn from what you say
3 in the penultimate paragraph of your report of the 15th of October?
4 A. No. It doesn't make any reference to the JNA, and I don't think
5 it has anything to do with the JNA. But every time that Admiral Brovet or
6 General Kadijevic has said to me that that was the function that you
7 describe was the function of the JNA and that they were executing their
8 function to the best of their ability and to the honour of their
9 profession, every time they said it, every time I reported that to
10 The Hague.
11 Q. This report, does it represent the sum total of what you were
12 told, or is it your synthetic analysis and work, your conclusions, your
13 understanding of the political processes and the role of the actors in
14 those processes? Because this is what you say here. You say apart from
15 that the aspirations toward a Greater Serbia by Milosevic would include
16 Serbia and Montenegro alone would preserve its -- the role it has occupied
17 until the present time, or words to that effect.
18 A. Yes, that's my conclusion. I think that the development and the
19 cost of the conflict was such that the JNA would also feel the
20 consequences of the tremendous cost of the conflict.
21 Q. So therefore you agree that there is a difference in the goals and
22 aims of the JNA on the one hand, and Milosevic on the other?
23 A. I don't refer to that. The fact that I say that it will have its
24 consequences for the viability for the JNA is a conclusion that I have
25 drawn, and the fact that Mr. Milosevic pushed with greater insistence his
1 original plan for the solution of the conflict is another subject.
2 Q. Perhaps it's a different subject. But they are two different
3 goals altogether, at least judging by what you have written here.
4 A. But I don't see where I talk about the goals of the JNA. The
5 goals of the JNA, I assume, are the execution of their functions. In the
6 execution of its functions, there are dangers when your money supply runs
7 out drastically. That's the only thing I say here. But it doesn't
8 necessarily change the objects of the JNA. I assume that the objects of
9 the JNA are defined by the Supreme Command in Belgrade, at that time being
10 Mr. Kostic.
11 Q. Could you tell us, please, whether in your opinion the time we're
12 discussing, that period, whether in your opinion the state with which you
13 communicated and to which you were accredited had all the formal
14 attributes of a legitimate, a legitimate state authority for the territory
15 we're discussing?
16 A. The embassy did not address that question, nor should it address
17 that question. That's not for the embassy. I as an ambassador have
18 observed that contacts at the highest level of the Federal Republic became
19 more difficult in the course of the time that I was accredited to
20 Belgrade. That's the only thing political, if you want to call it
21 political, that I have to say. The communication possibilities with the
22 top of the federal government, and including the JNA, became more
23 difficult as time went on. And that, in fact, is what I meant.
24 Q. If as an ambassador you didn't have the duty to follow political
25 processes, did you as an experienced individual have your own conclusions
1 as to whether you were accredited to a legitimate, existing, ordered state
2 or not? If you didn't deal with that pursuant to the descriptions of the
3 job you held, which I doubt; but if you say so, I believe you.
4 A. The last -- the last two-thirds of the last linea of this report
5 are exclusively for my responsibility. They are my conclusions on the
6 basis of what I heard, saw, was informed, by all kind of means, and by
7 what I observed myself. That, I think, is the function of an ambassador.
8 It's not the function of an ambassador to go into politics for himself.
9 It is to execute the instructions of his government and to gather
10 information, interpret that information, and get both the information and
11 his interpretation to his home government. And if the embassy is not
12 that, then I failed in my job.
13 Q. If we may conclude, your government didn't give you any political
14 instructions, but gave you only instructions which had to do with solving
15 problems such as visa problems, trade, the problems of businessmen,
16 et cetera. So the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the second
17 half of 1991 had no political instructions coming out from its ministry in
18 The Hague to you. Would I be right in concluding it that way? Whereas
19 this report represents your initiative on your part informing them on
20 subjects that surpass your competence and authorisation. Would that be
21 it, then?
22 A. No, sir, that would be the wrong conclusion. When I talked about
23 no political instruction, no political contacts, no political activities,
24 I was referring to your question about what I did in Zagreb and in
25 Ljubljana and in the capitals of the member state when I talked to people
1 there. In Belgrade, I received instructions, and of course they were
2 political to go and see Mr. Brovet and tell him about the worries and
3 preoccupations of the Netherlands, or of the European Union as the case
4 might be, and try and solicit an answer to these preoccupations from the
5 authorities that I transmitted these preoccupations to. In the course of
6 the discussions and the conversations that developed in those meetings, I
7 made my judgement about how the instruction -- the execution of the
8 instructions was received by the receiving authorities, and I added my
9 comments on the basis of what I listened to during those conversations.
10 That was the function of the embassy, and that's what I did. So
11 that part of it was political, but it had nothing to do with whether or
12 not my government was considering to recognise or derecognise any
13 authority in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
14 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, did your government in the autumn of 1991
15 persevere along the political position that the SFRY should be preserved
16 as a political community of south Slav peoples, yes or no, or did you
17 never receive instructions to that effect?
18 A. I attended the conference of Brioni in the company of my minister,
19 and there it a decision was made that for the next three months nothing
20 was going to be changed in the status quo of the political situation in
21 Yugoslavia. My government, as far as I could observe, acted along those
22 lines, and when further developments, both nationally in Yugoslavia and
23 internationally, warranted it, they adjusted to what was then already a
24 concrete actuality. But saying that we went on dealing with the federal
25 government and such, I told you communication was more difficult and more
1 difficult. And very often one had to choose between the departments that
2 were competent for certain issues or the Supreme Command of the JNA, at
3 the same time being the presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4 It was a difficult role most of the times. And it probably played a role
5 in recognising the constituting parts as new entities in the long run.
6 But this embassy I ran up to the middle of 1992 was not involved in that
7 process. For that, the Netherlands government had an gentleman called
8 Ambassador Wijnaendts, and he ran that part of the show.
9 Q. Is it true and correct that in November 1991, the position of the
10 government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands was that the SFRY should be
12 A. I don't think you can put that position as such. The Netherlands
13 acted upon their observance that the SFRY functioned at that moment to a
14 certain extent and could still be dealt with.
15 Q. Was the position the same of the government of Holland in December
17 A. I don't really know.
18 Q. Do you happen to know what the position was of your government in
19 January 1992, for example?
20 A. No, sir. At that time, there was no discussion going on about
21 that subject in the internal Netherlands administration as far as it could
22 be observed by this embassy.
23 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document, the one
24 that I showed to Mr. Fietelaars, I should like to tender into evidence
25 immediately after the break. It is a document that was otherwise
1 disclosed by the Prosecution, and my learned colleague I'm sure is aware
2 of its contents. But since I wasn't able to foresee the course that the
3 cross-examination would take, I haven't prepared it as yet. And I hope
4 you will understand my position in that regard and my explanation given.
5 Thank you.
6 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, may I now move on to some other aspects of the
7 topic we're discussing. Can you tell this Honourable Trial Chamber who
8 had Supreme Command over the armed forces of the SFRY during the period
9 we're discussing, that is to say, the second half of 1991?
10 A. According to the people that we talked within the JNA, they
11 received orders from the Supreme Command in the person of President
13 Q. Do you happen to know who pursuant to the SFRY constitution
14 actually embodies and represents the Supreme Command of the armed forces?
15 If not, we can move on straight away.
16 A. Well, sir, I'm aware of it, that it is the president of the
17 federal presidency.
18 Q. The president of the federal presidency, is he, then, therefore
19 the legitimate person in taking decisions with regard to the deployment of
20 the armed forces of the SFRY for the material time that we're discussing?
21 A. That is not a matter that can be judged neither by me or in the
22 attitudes of the embassy. I know that preoccupations existed, not only in
23 the Netherlands, but in many other states as well, for the diminishing
24 size of the federal presidency and the absence of what, in fact, was in
25 the end at least half of the presidency, so that majorities could not be
1 established any more.
2 Q. Did the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands assume the
3 position that the Yugoslav People's Army was a legitimate armed force of
4 the SFRY in the month of November 1991?
5 A. I think that the embassy, at least, and I can only speak for the
6 embassy, I can't speak for the government of the Netherlands, that the
7 embassy assumed that the JNA was our right opposite number because there
8 was no other authority that fulfilled that specific function in the
9 structures that remained upright in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
10 Q. Did your embassy in December 1991 consider the Yugoslav People's
11 Army to be the legitimate armed force of the SFRY?
12 A. The word "legitimate" doesn't come into it. It was the actual
13 force in Belgrade fulfilling that function. And the embassy has no
14 competence in judging the legitimacy of instruments of Yugoslav
16 Q. Do you, as the ambassador in the country, know how that country
17 functioned, what its organs and institutions were, what their competencies
18 and authorisation was?
19 A. I can only say that I observed what actually took place. I talked
20 to people who were closer to those instruments and institutions that you
21 refer to than I was. And on the basis of information received, I
22 probably -- I certainly, strike appropriate people [sic] -- I certainly
23 informed the Netherlands government that the JNA was the only military
24 authority that we could contact in order to discuss instructions with the
25 military dimension emanating from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
2 Q. Is it true and correct that with the Federal Ministry of Foreign
3 Affairs in December of 1991, and that was the sole and exclusive body that
4 you had official cooperation with as a representative of the Dutch
6 A. The only thing that I know is that by that time, there was nobody
7 in the building that houses the foreign ministry of the Federal Republic
8 of Yugoslavia with whom I could deal. There were a number of
9 functionaries who kept the building open. But appointments on any subject
10 were impossible.
11 Q. Does that mean that you didn't communicate with anybody in the
12 government, except for the representatives of the JNA at that time?
13 A. A grossa mora [phoen], that is correct. We dropped specific
14 letters in the hands of the people who still were in the building of
15 foreign affairs with a request to send them on to the competent
16 authorities. And I assume that they did.
17 Q. Who did you address them to, those letters? Who were the
18 addressees, the addresses, the president of the Yugoslav state Presidency,
19 the prime minister, who?
20 A. We did not communicate with the prime minister. We did
21 communicate to the temporary minister of foreign affairs who acted when
22 Mr. Loncar was not there any more. I do not remember his name at present,
23 but I am sure that you can look it up, who took over for Mr. Loncar.
24 Q. Is it true that the first time you communicated with Loncar's
25 deputy in 1992, the beginning of 1992, that that was the first time you
1 had any contacts with him? And there are written traces of that?
2 A. I don't know what "traces" mean, but if that is so, then that is
3 so. But I had contact with the gentleman already long before because he
4 was a foreign minister, the number two of Mr. Loncar.
5 Q. Do you know what his name was, the gentleman you mentioned?
6 A. I'm trying to dig it out, but I can't find it. I will let you
7 know as soon as it comes up.
8 Q. Do you know what the other organs and institutions were of the
9 state to which you were accredited, the federal government, who led the
10 federal government, what its function was, et cetera, et cetera, the
11 ministries, the federal ministries, and so on? Do you know anything about
12 that, the various departments?
13 A. Yes, of course. We had an organogram of the whole structures of
14 the federal government and we used it. However, there's not much use in
15 questioning me about it, because it's 12 years ago, and I wouldn't know
16 any more.
17 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may we take the break
18 perhaps now, because I shall be moving on to a different area.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. That's probably a convenient time,
20 Mr. Petrovic.
21 We'll have another break now, Mr. Fietelaars.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Petrovic.
1 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, I should now like to ask you to tell us what you,
3 during the material time, knew about the command structure of the Yugoslav
4 People's Army. How was it organised? Who headed it, et cetera?
5 A. Sir, I can't help you very much there.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Could the microphones be turned on for the witness.
8 Thank you very much.
9 A. The structure of the embassy was such that we had a military
10 attache and a number of people who worked for him who kept us up to date
11 insofar as it was possible on the basis of the information received from
12 the military authorities about who was where and who did what. Their work
13 as far as the organogram was concerned was mainly interesting for my
14 military attache for reporting to his authorities. And I had little or no
15 interest in that structure, except as far as it was necessary to identify
16 the people that I needed to speak with. And that I did with the help of
17 my military attache. And so if you want me to lecture on the structures
18 in the JNA, you -- I'll have to respectfully decline.
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Fietelaars, I, of course, do not expect you to do that. But I
21 would like you to answer some questions which in view of the position you
22 yourself held were quite logical, and I expect you know the answer to them
23 and will provide us with one. Your military attache, what did he tell you
24 with respect to who was at the head of the Yugoslav People's
1 A. For that, I didn't need any information. We got a briefing upon
2 arrival from a colonel of the JNA about the top of the ministry of
3 Defence, including the military officers who were on active service but
4 posted in Belgrade. And whom to address about what, we got a paper on
5 that, and I took that with me to the embassy and used it to decide which
6 gentlemen to telephone whenever I had to drop a message or whether -- and
7 my officers in the embassy used the same paper to decide which gentlemen
8 they had to approach with the messages that they had.
9 Q. Your answer is rather lengthy. So may I ask you to be more
10 specific in response to my questions, please. And along those lines, how
11 in the document that was presented to you obviously, how -- what were the
12 addresses? Who did you have to refer to for what within the frameworks of
13 the JNA structure? What were you told on this document, the one you had
14 before you?
15 A. The address of the ministry of Defence. I don't even know the
16 street any more. But this is one of the long main streets of --
17 Q. Just a moment, please. I'm not, of course, asking you about the
18 address literally. I'm not talking about that. I'm talking figuratively
19 who you would contact, of course, and not the address in the literal term
20 of the street.
21 A. Me being the ambassador, the logical contacts were the commander
22 of the JNA, which at the start of my presence in Belgrade was General
23 Kadijevic, or his number two who was Admiral Brovet. Officers of my
24 embassy usually dealt with the liaison officer of the ministry, which for
25 most of the time that I was there was a colonel named Stojic.
1 Q. And which questions were questions addressed to General Kadijevic
2 that merited his being involved?
3 A. Whenever I received instructions that I should contact the JNA at
4 the highest possible level, I approached General Kadijevic. There were a
5 number of preoccupations. There were a number of occasions to rise
6 questions, and a number of occasions where to give information. I did
7 that whenever I got in instruction to touch the highest possible level of
8 the JNA.
9 Q. Could you help us out, please. What type of problems did you
10 bring before General Kadijevic?
11 A. All problems that had to do with preoccupations concerning the
12 well-being of the people in certain regions, places where military
13 activities or irregular activities took place. And everything where the
14 information reached us that the JNA were involved in certain things where
15 we would want to verify what actually was the reality, which -- what
16 actually was the truth.
17 Q. Who else was there on your list of individuals whom you could
18 redress for information about certain matters, in addition to General
19 Kadijevic, of course, and Colonel Stojic, if I remember correctly. Who
21 A. As I said, Colonel Stojic. And for the rest, in the course of the
22 time, varying officers whose position started at the JNA headquarters or
23 stopped at the JNA headquarters, I don't recollect the names.
24 Q. In view of what you just told us and what you took to General
25 Kadijevic, could you tell us the problems you took to the others whose
1 names you can't remember today?
2 A. I personally only talked to Kadijevic and Brovet. The rest of the
3 embassy talked to the other officers, and they took every problem,
4 cooperation, presence at each other's exercises, all kind of military
5 stuff. And in general, detailed information that I did not occupy myself
6 with, but that I entrusted to one of my officers. That's why I have staff
7 in an embassy.
8 Q. In addition to what you have just told us, did you know anything
9 else about the organisation of the Yugoslav People's Army and the
10 structure of its command, or does this pretty much sum up all that you
11 knew about the JNA?
12 A. At the time, I think I recollected a lot more of the top of the
13 organogram of the JNA. But in the 12 years ago in between, all of that
14 has disappeared because it was never very relevant to me, and certainly
15 after leaving Yugoslavia it was not relevant to me. Thank you.
16 Q. Did you know what the competencies of the 5th military district
18 A. I don't even know what the location of the 5th military district
19 was, so the answer is no.
20 Q. And what about the military naval district? Did you know what was
21 the area of its authority?
22 A. Naval district, I assume you refer to the 9th district -- in that
23 case, I do not know.
24 Q. Did you ever hear the term, "military naval district"? Did you
25 ever hear this area referred to?
1 A. I can't recall.
2 Q. Do you know who General Raseta is?
3 A. Yes. I remember that he was rather visible on Yugoslav television
4 in the course of the military activities in Croatia, around Zagreb.
5 Q. Did you ever hear or are you familiar with the 1st Operational
7 A. No, sir.
8 Q. Did you ever hear of or are you aware of the units which were
9 stationed in the area of Vukovar?
10 A. I was aware of the presence of the JNA in the area of Vukovar, but
11 not which units were there.
12 Q. And what about the 2nd Operational Group? Did you ever hear of
14 A. I may have, but I can't recall.
15 Q. And what about the area of responsibility of the 2nd Operational
16 Group? Did you ever hear what that was?
17 A. I may well have, but I can't recall.
18 Q. Do you maybe know who the commander of the 1st Operational Group
20 A. No, sir.
21 Q. And the commander of the 2nd Operational Group, do you know who
22 that was?
23 A. No, sir.
24 Q. Are you familiar with any military unit in the territory of the
25 SFRY in the months of October, November, and December 1991?
1 A. No, sir.
2 Q. How come that in your report you mentioned the 9th naval sector or
4 A. We were briefed before our departure from Belgrade to Tivat by
5 Colonel Stojic, and I think that he referred to the 9th naval district.
6 And if my report says he referred to the 9th naval district, or I refer to
7 the 9th naval district, that is the source, and that was the expression
8 that was used. By the way, translation was being used because Colonel
9 Stojic addressed us in Serbo-Croatian.
10 Q. Are you familiar with any other military unit during the relevant
11 period of time in addition to this 9th naval district?
12 A. We had a military office in the embassy with a military attache, a
13 deputy military attache, an archivist and a researcher. Those people were
14 very much aware of the answers to the questions that you pose. I did not
15 occupy myself with those things.
16 Q. Kindly tell us, how come that after 14 years you can recall just
17 one military unit, and this being the 9th naval district? How is that
19 A. That is because I recently reread my reports from that time on the
20 basis of this meeting here. And in that report, it's explicitly mentioned
21 that we were going to meet the commanding officers of the 9th naval
22 district. So that is how that name came back to my mind. And the others
23 haven't come up yet because I have had no reason to re-research the
25 Q. In the reports that you reviewed, are there any other units
1 mentioned, except for the 9th naval district?
2 A. Sir, my recent research limited itself to the happenings around
3 Dubrovnik in the period of October, November, December of that year. And
4 I don't think that in the documents that I looked at in that context any
5 other area or any other units were mentioned. It would have been
6 irrelevant information because in the foreign ministry in The Hague,
7 nobody would have to know what to do with such detailed information. As I
8 said, for that, we had military attaches, also in Yugoslavia and in our
10 Q. The only military unit that you mention in reference to the events
11 around Dubrovnik is this one, the 9th naval district. Is that correct?
12 A. I thought the 9th naval district referred to a place, rather than
13 to a unit. An area. Which would make the word "district" appropriate.
14 Q. What about the 9th naval sector? Is that the only unit that is
15 mentioned in your reports with regard to the events around Dubrovnik, or
16 did you mention any other units as well?
17 A. I did not -- I just referred to JNA troops and Croatian people in
18 and around Dubrovnik. I never mentioned any units. The word I used was
19 put in my mind by Colonel Stojic. That's the only reason why it was used.
20 Q. Did Colonel Stojic tell you that the area of responsibility around
21 Dubrovnik was the area of responsibility of the 9th naval district?
22 A. I assume he did because I think -- I -- yes, I did [sic].
23 Q. Did he tell you that the commander of the 9th naval district would
24 receive you in audience?
25 A. He said we were going to be received by two high-ranking officers
1 in the region. And that was the reference that he used.
2 Q. During your visit, did you realise that it was Jokic who was the
3 commander of the 9th naval district because he was your host and he was
4 involved in all the aspects of your visit?
5 A. I didn't assume anything. I knew that high-ranking officers were
6 going to meet us upon arrival. There was a high-ranking officer upon our
7 arrival, so I assumed he was Mr. Stojic -- Mr. Jokic. And it went on from
8 there. I didn't draw any conclusions out of the fact of the way in which
9 we were received about the command structure of the region.
10 Q. What was your impression at the end of that day with regard to the
11 command and who was the leader who received you, who gave you all the
12 instructions, who told you to go back, and who organised a meal for you?
13 Did you draw any conclusions based on all that as to who was in charge
15 A. Sir, at the afternoon meeting after our return from Dubrovnik, we
16 met two high-ranking officers. I assumed, and that may have been just an
17 assumption in the way you pose your questions by now, that they were
18 Admiral Jokic and General Strugar. I had not met the gentlemen in person
19 before. I had seen Mr. Jokic in the ministry, and he was pointed out to
20 me. And I had seen him on television. I had never seen Mr. Strugar
21 before, nor have I ever seen him since. But when I was there, I assumed
22 that I was introducing myself to General Strugar and Admiral Jokic. And
23 if that was a wrong impression, the impression was created by the
24 introduction and by the fact that nobody contradicted that or introduced
25 themselves by a different name.
1 Q. When you say a high-ranking officer, what does that mean to you?
2 A. You should ask Colonel Stojic. He used the term, not I.
3 Q. Did you see the ranks on these two people that you're talking
5 A. Not that I remember.
6 Q. Before this event, where did you used to see Admiral Jokic?
7 A. On Belgrade TV. He had been reasonably visible in the weeks
8 before. And at one meeting that we had in the ministry, either with
9 Admiral Brovet or with General Kadijevic, where somebody pointed out to me
10 a general with the name of Jokic. And he looked quite similar to the
11 gentleman I met in Dubrovnik.
12 Q. Could you please describe this gentleman, this Admiral Jokic, very
13 briefly. Could you provide us with a very short description of this
15 A. Sir, it's 14 years ago. It's not -- I haven't been trained to
16 describe faces or anything. No, I can't. It was a military officer who
17 was obviously the centre of the presence at the Yugoslav side. I
18 introduced myself to him. He shook my hands and smiled. It limited
19 itself to that, except for the general conversation in the second meeting.
20 And I cannot describe him. No, thank you.
21 Q. Tell us, please, at the meetings where you saw Kadijevic, Brovet,
22 and Jokic, what topics were discussed at those meetings?
23 A. At that specific meeting, I don't remember. I just remember that
24 during one of the meetings he was pointed out to me, as I said before.
25 Q. Was one of the topics also operations around Dubrovnik?
1 A. I can't recall, sir.
2 Q. [No Interpretation]
3 A. There's no translation, sir.
4 Q. Would it be logical for one of the topics to be Dubrovnik, given
5 the fact that he was in command in the territory of the town of Dubrovnik?
6 A. I wouldn't want to speculate on the logicality or the probability
7 of such things.
8 Q. What was your impression about the role of Admiral Jokic in view
9 of the first meeting that you had with Kadijevic, Brovet, and Jokic? What
10 was your impression about his role in this entire military issue?
11 A. I wasn't introduced to him. He was pointed out to me during one
12 meeting. That was an admiral called Jokic. And was that the full extent
13 of my information. So I don't really know what he was doing there. There
14 were a number of officers sitting around and behind the spokesman that
15 were talking to me, and in this case I, Admiral Brovet or General
16 Kadijevic. And they were there. I don't know why they were there. For
17 decoration or supplying additional information or whatever. That's the
18 way these things are done, and I don't draw any conclusions from them.
19 Q. How come that you spotted Jokic immediately? There are probably
20 a lot of meetings, a lot of people. It was a long time ago. How come
21 you remember Jokic? How come you spotted him right away?
22 A. Because he was pointed out to me.
23 Q. Kindly tell us, what was the main source or what it is that you
24 refer to today when you tried to reconstruct the events that took place in
1 A. Could you rephrase the question, please. I don't understand what
2 you want.
3 Q. I'll try. I'll do my best.
4 I'm sorry that you didn't understand me the first time. What is
5 it that assists you today when you try to recall the events that you're
6 talking about here today?
7 A. I'm assisted by a number of papers that I kept because of the
8 modus operandi that I used when I was ambassador of Yugoslavia. Whenever
9 the day ended I put on paper the things that I wanted to put on paper,
10 facts, interpretations, or what have you. They got refined in the course
11 of the evening. And in the early morning, they were put into coded
12 messages and sent to The Hague. And the first drafts of my considerations
13 on the day before, I kept in a separate folder, and I stacked one on the
14 other. And I have been able to consult these things when they asked
15 me, "Do you recollect what went on in that period?" I said, "I will check
16 my sources and come back to you." And that is what I did.
17 Q. Can you please tell us whether your testimony would be practically
18 impossible without these notes? Could you remember the names, the places,
19 the events, or is your recollection mostly based on your notes and the
20 notes that you have recently referred to?
21 A. But the large lines of my memory, of course, stayed in my mind.
22 But all the details have been the result of recent research in things that
23 I wrote by hand myself at the time.
24 Q. In addition to the general impressions about the events, whatever
25 concerns, and people, dates, places, meetings, all of that is something
1 that you were able to remember while you were consulting your notes?
2 A. Yes, sir. The details and the specifics, you are correct.
3 Q. Can you please tell us, would it be correct that your notes and
4 your reports were done diligently, conscientiously, correctly, that they
5 contained the most important things, that you left no stone unturned, that
6 you didn't omit anything?
7 A. I don't know how you work, but that's not how I work. I try to
8 retain the most important things that I want to retain. And I write them
9 down, and I do not try to touch upon everything that happened that day. I
10 take the larger lines and the things that remain in my mind as important.
11 They are put on paper diligently and upon my honour as a hard-working man
12 who loves his country and does a job for it.
13 Q. Your notes and the information that you send to your ministry
14 contain everything that you deemed important about whom you had met and
15 what had been discussed at each and every of these meetings. Would I be
16 correct in saying that?
17 A. No, you would not be correct, sir, because that was what was
18 needed to be transmitted at the time. Very often other subjects came up,
19 and I used that information that hadn't been used before to insert it in
20 reports of the following weeks or months, or in consolidated reports based
21 upon my evaluation of what I saw going on in the weeks that were past. So
22 it was not the end of the use of my information by the time a message was
23 transmitted to The Hague.
24 Q. If, for example, you had had a meeting with a high-ranking officer
25 of the JNA, and if there was a need to report on that meeting, would your
1 information contain the name of the person that you talked to, when and
2 what the subjects of your conversation were?
3 A. Very often information was depersonalised, that we referred to
4 authorities in that or that ministry, or spokesmen of this or that. There
5 was no need to confuse the situation in The Hague by using names. We used
6 functions mainly in reporting in order to keep the information lines
7 clear. Lots of people share names, and you cause confusion if you start
8 to describe the events by name rather than by function.
9 Q. I absolutely agree with you. Therefore, in your reports, you
10 always mentioned only the most important names in order to avoid confusion
11 with your superiors in The Hague.
12 A. Information that I received from the top of the JNA, being
13 Mr. Kadijevic and Mr. Brovet, was always referred to by name because these
14 names were known in The Hague, and it indicated a phenomenon as much as a
15 person and a function. So on that basis, we used names. Below that
16 level, I never used names because, as I said, it confused people, and it
17 may well be that my officers in reporting directly to the authorities to
18 which they were supposed to report went further in detail because details
19 are shared, for instance, between military people who have served for a
20 long time and know each other across borders. But as far as political
21 information was, I had to have it to depersonalise it as much as possible.
22 Q. However, you did mention some most important military commanders.
23 Maybe one or two in addition to Brovet and Kadijevic. Would that be
25 A. Yes, sir. I mentioned, for instance, the name Stojic. I
1 mentioned the name Strugar. I mentioned the name Jokic in a report where
2 I spent part of the day with these gentlemen and where, for variety's sake
3 and for readability sake, the one time you say the Admiral, and the next
4 time you say Admiral Jokic, and the next time when you are in your
5 conclusions and you try to keep it short and concise, you only use the
6 name without reference to Mr. or rank. Everybody does it in his own way.
7 That's the way in which I did it.
8 Q. This is precisely what I wanted to ask you, sir. Did you ever in
9 any of your reports mention the name of General Strugar?
10 A. I think I did. But they are mainly in the context of relating
11 things that were told to me within the ministry of Defence, because
12 otherwise -- especially from the sources outside the ministry of Defence,
13 I never referred to officials by name because I might myself become the
14 subject of confusion rather than The Hague.
15 Q. I've tried to read 11 of your reports very carefully. All of
16 those reports refer to the months of October, November, and December 1991.
17 In none of them were I able to find the name of General Strugar. I may be
19 A. You asked me if I ever had used the name of Mr. Strugar in my
20 reports. You didn't put on the limitation of three months. And I said I
21 may well have. But that's as far as it goes.
22 Q. Did you read some other reports, or did you review any other
23 reports in addition to those that have been presented to us for this trial
25 A. What do you mean, "Did you read any other reports?" I read my own
1 stuff, and that's about it. So I haven't gone beyond the period which is
2 under investigation here. So I did not read some other reports beyond
3 those three months.
4 Q. Do you have any other report where Strugar's name is mentioned?
5 A. I may well have, but I haven't reviewed my documents, so I can't
6 say yes or no.
7 Q. However, if you only remember the most important names, it is
8 rather odd that after 15 years you still remember them in some other
9 reports, not the ones that we have before us, there may be General
10 Strugar's name.
11 In preparing for your testimony here, and in analysing your
12 reports from October, November, and December 1991, did you ever any where
13 come across the name of General Strugar?
14 A. I don't think so. I never scanned for the use of that name, so if
15 that is the case, then I never saw it.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Petrovic, in case it goes unnoticed,
17 Exhibit P141, Document A in the English, page 1744 mentions Admiral Jokic
18 and General Pavle Strugar.
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was just about
20 to come to that.
21 JUDGE PARKER: I thought you had put to the witness that you
22 hadn't ever been able to find the name Strugar.
23 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wanted to say that
24 the witness in his 11 reports never mentions anywhere having met General
25 Strugar at all. So that was -- or rather should have been the conclusion.
1 Nowhere in these reports did I come across that. I never saw him write
2 that he had met General Strugar anywhere. Perhaps I'm wrong. I allow for
3 that possibility.
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may --
5 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: I have stated explicitly that I never met General
8 Strugar before. I saw a person in Dubrovnik which I assumed on the basis
9 of information received from the JNA, that I assumed was General Strugar,
10 and I never saw General Strugar since. So I don't know whether we are
11 now --
12 JUDGE PARKER: Nor do I, Mr. Fietelaars. I'm not sure.
13 THE WITNESS: I'm slightly up the creek, without a paddle.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Did you say you had met the person you understood
15 to be General Strugar in Dubrovnik?
16 THE WITNESS: In Dubrovnik, in the second meeting --
17 JUDGE PARKER: Or during your Dubrovnik trip?
18 THE WITNESS: Yeah, my Dubrovnik trip.
19 JUDGE PARKER: I didn't think it was in Dubrovnik itself.
20 THE WITNESS: It was in Tivat, of course. But it was during the
21 day of our visit to Dubrovnik.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It's in this report and at that page that you
23 mentioned that you had been told --
24 THE WITNESS: The second meeting.
25 JUDGE PARKER: -- that Jokic was the real hardliner and that
1 Strugar was just a military man. So you go on to mention more than just
2 the name.
3 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm.
4 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I think Ms. Somers wanted to say
6 MS. SOMERS: My apologies, Your Honour. It appears that in the
7 document that was transmitted to the Defence, A, Document A, the copy may
8 not have come out very well. And on page 1745, it might be helpful if
9 Mr. Petrovic saw the original because there is -- it looks like a
10 pencilled notation that apparently did not copy. If you look at the
11 bottom of your pages, Your Honours, and that may just be a copying issue.
12 If that's the case, then I certainly have the --
13 JUDGE PARKER: Well, it's not just the copy that went to the
15 MS. SOMERS: You have the same problem?
16 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber has the same problem. So I can't tell
17 you what is there.
18 MS. SOMERS: It may clear up one of the inquiries for Mr. Petrovic
19 which we...
20 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, unfortunately I failed
21 to notice that, so I don't know what you want me to look into. I can't
22 see that here at all.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Nor can we at the moment, Mr. Petrovic. Just as I
24 can't help the witness as to what the point of your questioning is, I
25 can't help you at to what the note is at the bottom of that page that
1 Ms. Somers is referring to. Maybe we will both learn more in due course.
2 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] It would appear so, Your Honour,
4 Q. So, Mr. Fietelaars, is there anywhere in your reports that you say
5 you met General Pavle Strugar? Is there any reference to that in those 11
6 reports of yours, the ones we're discussing here today?
7 A. No, sir. The reason being that except for meeting a gentleman
8 that I assumed to be Mr. Strugar at our second meeting in Tivat on the
9 29th of October, I never saw him before, nor ever did I see him since. I
10 have repeated that several times, but I think the question is now coming
12 Q. However, sir, you probably saw dozens of other people there, too,
13 whom you didn't see afterwards, nor had you seen them before. Would that
14 be correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. So could you explain to us, then, please why you claim today that
17 you saw General Strugar there, whereas at the time that you compiled your
18 reports you make no mention as to having seen General Strugar. There's
19 not a single word saying that. Could you explain that to us, please.
20 A. I would like to have the document that you refer to in front of me
21 in order to see if you are right in the final part of your statement.
22 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
23 Document 141, please.
24 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, excuse me, I have the original of that
25 if that would be of any assistance in clarifying this issue.
1 JUDGE PARKER: It might be helpful if Mr. Fietelaars is able to
2 see the handwritten notation.
3 MS. SOMERS: Yes.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.
5 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, might I be asked to
6 take a look at the original, please.
7 [In English] Mr. Usher.
8 THE WITNESS: That's what I was looking for.
9 Sir, the little note that is on page -- under the fourth page of
10 the document that I just get put in front of me, you will see, if you get
11 a good copy, that in the report I wrote to The Hague: "Admiral Jokic and
12 his staff," and I put in pencil at the time at the bottom: "I think
13 General Strugar was there as well."
14 This is on the basis of the fact that Admiral Jokic received us
15 with another gentleman next to him who shook our hands as well. Because
16 interpreters were used, I could not verify the name. We were -- I
17 introduced myself, and I was received with a gentle nod and a phrase in
18 Serbo-Croatian, which I assumed is, "Nice to meet you." The name was
19 never actually mentioned. And that is why after having sent that report
20 to The Hague, I put in pencil, "I think General Strugar was there as
21 well," because there were two gentlemen that we talked to, and the others
22 were standing around.
23 You know, when you come into a building where you're going to meet
24 somebody, there is a kind of a custom of a receiving line, and it is very
25 easy to identify the gentleman who is the number one of that kind of
1 group. You see it by the reverence shown by the group around him and you
2 see it by the location of that person in the group. There were two high
3 officers, and a number of officers below the rank of those two. And on
4 the basis of Mr. Stojic told us, I assumed that they were Mr. Jokic
5 and Mr. Strugar. Now, that's the only basis for that reference. And I
6 never saw him before, and I never saw him again. The highlighting, by the
7 way, is of a recent date, when I was studying the contents. But the thing
8 in pencil dates from my time in Belgrade.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Can I ask you, Mr. Fietelaars, the pencil note, is
11 that something you wrote at the time of this report.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, contemporary with the report.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, yes.
14 THE WITNESS: Because we were specifically told that these two
15 gentlemen were going to be there. There were two gentlemen. We shook
16 hands with them. But we never talked in names. We talked, again, in
17 functions. Hello, Ambassador. Hello, Admiral. Hello, General. Hello,
18 Ambassador. So when I was reviewing that paper in the morning after I
19 wrote it, I said, "I think Strugar was there as well." I could not say
20 nothing else than General Jokic [sic] and his staff, because he was the
21 one I recognised, and I had never seen the other gentleman before, nor had
22 I seen him since.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have any memory of the two people you met
24 today? Would you recognise them today, or not?
25 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I know that I would not expect
1 anybody to recognise me after 14 years.
2 JUDGE PARKER: You wouldn't have changed a bit.
3 THE WITNESS: I aged quite considerably.
4 JUDGE PARKER: I'm afraid we rather interrupted your
5 cross-examination, Mr. Petrovic.
6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Not at all, Your Honour. Never
7 enough agreeable conversation. However, there seems to be a major problem
8 in what this honourable gentleman is saying.
9 Pursuant to Rule 65 ter, we're dealing with August last year, and
10 the Defence was supplied the document that we're talking about, that's the
11 page from the document, Your Honour. It is ERN number 0086323. And it is
12 on that particular page where there is no signature, no ordinary
13 pencilling, nothing. Please take a look at it if you wish to do so. This
14 is the document we were disclosed on the 28th of August 2003. So that's
15 the page in question, and I'd like to ask you kindly to take a look at it.
17 THE WITNESS: August 2003? I never wrote anything in August 2003.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It's quite a different strike of --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.
20 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry. I've lost track of the microphone. I
22 It's quite a different strike of the document, because yours
23 finishes that you were provided with last year, it finishes two-thirds of
24 the way down the page, whereas the document in the original form that we
25 have been shown not only takes up the full page, but actually goes over
1 for four lines or more on to the next page. Also missing is the name and
2 number, and Belgrade and the 30th of October 1991.
3 So whatever you were shown in the 65 proceedings may have
4 essentially the same content, but is a different strike of document all
5 together. Now, I don't know that Mr. Fietelaars is able to help us with
6 that. I think it would be Ms. Somers, if anybody, who could.
7 MS. SOMERS: I'm sorry. I don't know what it is that is being
9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I be of assistance
10 in the matter. On the original that we have just seen, it says at the
11 bottom it might be General Strugar, but then there is an error going
12 across the text up to the word, "Jokic and his staff." That is visible,
13 where it's not visible on this other document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: We fully see the point you're making, Mr. Petrovic.
15 We don't quite know where the answer might lie yet.
16 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, it appears this is part of one of the
17 documents that may have come from this group. The language looks
18 familiar, and I will have to just check it. The last lines seem that way.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Given the time -- have you got an answer?
20 MS. SOMERS: Yes. It is the last pages of -- where the
21 language -- appears to be the language has -- "One can have some slight
22 hope," it bears a different -- well, the language is, "One can have some
23 slight hope that at least part of the message of deep concern," et cetera,
24 et cetera. And that is the last paragraph of Document A.
25 JUDGE PARKER: The words essentially are the same. But by strike,
1 I mean it's a different form of typewriting.
2 MS. SOMERS: I'm sorry, I didn't --
3 JUDGE PARKER: Two different documents.
4 MS. SOMERS: Unless it is some synthesis of it, and I cannot
5 accept the provenance of this format. The language appears the same --
6 JUDGE PARKER: The provenance is suggested to be what was provided
7 by your office last year to the Defence.
8 MS. SOMERS: Correct. Well, what I'm saying is I don't know if
9 it's a different ERN or whether it's a different version of the same
10 document. I'm not sure from looking at it.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Given the time, could I ask that you look at that
12 overnight, and perhaps you may be able to assist Mr. Petrovic and the
13 Chamber tomorrow morning.
14 I'm sorry, Mr. Petrovic. We have run out of time for today.
15 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, unfortunately I have
16 not succeeded in rounding off this area, but I do understand the time
17 constraints. The document referred to was in August. There is no record,
18 no line across it. What we have is a document that appeared several days
19 ago with all these remarks written in, in ordinary pencil. That's the
20 point, and I'll go into it further tomorrow, to investigate.
21 Thank you, Your Honour.
22 THE WITNESS: May I say something, Your Honour, with all these
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, indeed.
25 THE WITNESS: We have all these remarks. Where are all these
1 remarks? Because now I get confused.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Counsel is referring to your pencilled notes.
3 THE WITNESS: Oh. But it's one line. It is not, "All these
5 JUDGE PARKER: You say it was noted in Belgrade at the time of the
6 original document. Counsel hadn't seen the original document until
7 today. He was provided with a document last year.
8 THE WITNESS: [Previous translation continues]... I'm sorry, sir.
9 I was misled by the words, "All these remarks."
10 JUDGE PARKER: You get used to that in this Chamber.
11 We must adjourn now until tomorrow. We will resume at 9.00. I
12 must that you return once again. I'm sorry.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 31st day of
16 March, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.