Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4726

1 Thursday, 15 April 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. If I could remind you, Admiral, of

7 the affirmation.

8 Yes, Mr. Rodic.

9 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.


11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 Cross-examined by Mr. Rodic: [Continued]

13 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] May I start off by asking for the

14 usher's assistance to distribute a document and hand one copy to the

15 witness.

16 Your Honour, I have to say at the outset that this document has

17 not been translated into B/C/S. We were disclosed the document by the

18 Prosecution during the cross-examination, so we were not able to have it

19 translated, and I'll just briefly be asking a few questions and introduce

20 it by the witness.

21 JUDGE PARKER: Did you mean to say it had not been translated into

22 English?

23 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I misspoke. I said B/C/S, but

24 what I meant was English.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Well, that's the one mistake you're allowed today,

Page 4727

1 Mr. Rodic.

2 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Q. Mr. Jokic, is this document familiar to you?

4 A. Yes, this is a regular combat report from my command. It is dated

5 the 6th of November.

6 Q. Did you take this document from the military archives?

7 A. I don't know about that. I didn't take anything from the

8 archives. You cannot take anything out of archives, so I wasn't able to

9 take a single piece of paper out of the archives.

10 Q. But you received a copy of this document, did you not, from the

11 military archives?

12 A. I don't know about that. I think that the Defence counsel might

13 have been given copies, but I haven't see it. But I did see it in the

14 archives, yes.

15 Q. Are you familiar with the contents of this document?

16 A. Yes, I am.

17 Q. And the signatory is the chief of staff, captain of the

18 battleship, Milan Zec; is that right?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 Q. And it's a regular combat report of the command of the 9th VPS.

21 Is that right?

22 A. Yes, it is.

23 Q. Tell me now, please, under point 1, what do we have there? What's

24 this about? Could you make things a bit clearer, because as I said, we

25 don't have the document in English, so I should like to ask you to explain

Page 4728

1 it to us.

2 A. In point 1, it is stated that the enemy went into the following

3 action: From 1330 to 1515 hours, from the position -- from a position 150

4 metres left of the Libertas Hotel, from Srdj and Nuncijata and Lokrum,

5 82-millimetre mortars were used, and 100-millimetre ones. And our

6 positions at Dubac were fired at, Zarkovica, Brgat. Dubac, Zarkovica, and

7 Brgat were targeted. 80 --

8 Q. It says 50 here.

9 A. Yes, approximately 50 fell on Dubac, about 60 on Brgat, and at

10 Zarkovica, an unascertained number of mines. The enemy recorded our

11 positions exactly because the mines fell to within 5 metres of our front

12 line, front flank. At the same time from the positions at Bosanka,

13 machine-gun fire was opened at the Zarkovica position, and rifle fire as

14 well.

15 Q. Tell me now, please, the facts contained in point 1 of this

16 regular combat report dated the 6th of November 1991, do they correspond

17 to the facts and figures that we read out and saw yesterday in document

18 D54, which you recognised by its style, the style in which it was written

19 and you said that yes, quite possibly it was compiled by your assistant

20 for political affairs. First of all, with respect to the figures, the

21 numbers of shells falling on JNA positions and the positions from which

22 the JNA was targeted.

23 A. Well, they do correspond in part, but I must say why I reacted

24 yesterday when it came to the number of shells that were listed, and I'm

25 going to be, as I always am, very frank and open and honest. Under my

Page 4729

1 level of professional soldier -- or when I read that the assistant for

2 political affairs in my command --

3 Q. Could you speed up a bit, please.

4 A. As I say, when he says that 61 shells fell on one position and 63

5 or 53 - I can't remember the exact number - shells, and on the 3rd, 100 or

6 200 shells, it is not possible to ascertain this exactly. So it's a

7 little suspect, or rather, I did not accept this piece of information

8 readily. However, we see here the exact figures as they would be compiled

9 by a professional, objectively acceptable facts and figures. It says,

10 "approximately 50," "approximately 60," and so on and so forth. So that

11 is the professional attitude, and that is my explanation along with it.

12 Q. So the difference is in those precise figures.

13 A. Yes, absolutely correct.

14 Q. Thank you. I should now like to ask you to look at point 2 of

15 this same document and to tell us what point 2 is about. Once again, it

16 refers to JNA units, a description of JNA unit activities.

17 A. It says here that our units from the position -- from their

18 positions targeted Bosanka, the sports hall, and Hotel -- the sports hall,

19 Hotel Libertas, Srdj, and Bosanka with cannons and from tanks. And Srdj

20 and Bosanka were targeted with a cannon of 130 millimetres and

21 122-millimetre cannons.

22 Q. This 122 millimetres, is that 12 shells of a 122-millimetre

23 Howitzer?

24 A. I don't really know.

25 Q. It says 12 HA 122 millimetres. Would that be Howitzers?

Page 4730

1 A. I can't really tell you. I don't know.

2 Q. You have the figures, the digits, "1 times 130 MX," and then "12

3 HA 122 MM." So what would that be?

4 A. Well, the deployment, or rather the unit at Srdj and several

5 houses in Bosanka from which they opened fire. On our side, there were no

6 casualties. We mined the area and placed obstacles on approaches to the

7 Trapit hill.

8 Q. Tell me, please, did the JNA units open fire only after there was

9 fire, as described -- extensive fire and targeting of their positions as

10 described in point 1?

11 A. Yes, that's right. From this, we can see that on our side we

12 opened fire only after we had been fired on and targeted by the enemy

13 side, after 1515 hours.

14 Q. Was this legitimate action on the part of the JNA?

15 A. Absolutely correct, yes.

16 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] May I have the usher's assistance

17 again, please, and could he please hand D49, Defence Exhibit D49, to the

18 witness, please.

19 Q. Mr. Jokic, we've already seen this document. It is your order for

20 the deployment of the artillery issued on the 6th of November, once again,

21 at 9.00 in the morning. It says "urgent," and it was sent to the 472nd

22 Brigade. This is -- rather, we now have this regular combat report as

23 well in front of us.

24 Tell me, please, are there any contradictions between these two

25 documents? How is it possible that you forbid something, whereas the army

Page 4731












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Page 4732

1 goes into action, into operation?

2 A. Yes, I understand. You mean how -- I'm forbidding something here,

3 and yet the army is going into operation.

4 Q. Yes, you forbid the use of the artillery because of the

5 negotiations underway with the EC mission.

6 A. Yes, I understand that now.

7 Q. And you issued this order at 9.00 in the morning, and you marked

8 it urgent. Is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. Tell me now, please, looking through this regular combat report

11 which was signed by the chief of staff Zec, that the action your units

12 went into are described under point 2, they are completely legitimate and

13 lawful?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Would you explain that to us, please. How can that be possible?

16 A. Well, here, what is stated is the following: This order does not

17 exclude the obligation of the units and command of the 472nd Brigade to

18 suggest the use of artillery if they evaluate it as necessary.

19 And in the combat report issued on the same day at 1700 hours, we

20 can see that operations from the opposite side, from the enemy side, by

21 using artillery between 1300 hours and 1500 hours targeting the Dubac,

22 Zarkovica, and Brgat area was so strong that we needed to react.

23 Q. Now, your command, did it give the okay to go into action and

24 react?

25 A. From this report, we can also see that the artillery battalion

Page 4733

1 didn't go into action, the 130-millimetre ones or the 122-millimetre

2 batteries. All that happened was an order that was issued for two cannons

3 to go into action. And I can't read the third one. It's probably a

4 120-millimetre mortar. But at all events, there were two or three

5 artillery pieces which were intended for precision targeting of point-like

6 or dot-like targets with the aim of neutralising fire at one location, at

7 one position, and not as support to a unit engaged in an attack or to go

8 into operation in a broader area.

9 Q. Mr. Jokic, under item 2 of the regular combat report, it says that

10 your units opened fire against the following: Srdj, Bosanka, and the

11 sports hall near the Libertas Hotel with cannons from tanks while Srdj and

12 Bosanka, with 1 times 130 millimetres and 12 HA. That is -- that

13 designates a Howitzer, and it's 122 millimetres.

14 So it is not one objective; it is several objectives or targets.

15 A. I said it was two cannons, not two targets. I said it was two

16 cannons that were supposed to fire. These are very precise cannons from

17 the technical experimental centre. It is not a tactical unit. That was

18 my point.

19 Q. Just tell me, is HA a Howitzer? A 122-millimetre Howitzer?

20 A. Instead of that number 2, it's probably supposed to say 1 times HA

21 122 millimetres.

22 Q. Is it perhaps 12 shells from a Howitzer of 122 millimetres?

23 A. I don't think so because there is no number of shells, how many

24 shells were fired from the 130-millimetre piece. So probably it's just a

25 mistake, a typo.

Page 4734

1 Q. At any rate, a Howitzer is not an artillery piece that is intended

2 to engage point objectives or targets.

3 A. Why not? Why not? A Howitzer of 105 millimetres and 150

4 millimetres are real Howitzers, whereas this is the so-called Gvozdika

5 Howitzer of 122 millimetres, so it's not a classical Howitzer.

6 Q. In accordance with your morning report of the 6th of November,

7 artillery could only be used on orders coming from the command post and

8 the forward command post of the 9th VPS. Is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's right. But that was for the 472nd Brigade. It was

10 addressed to it specifically, and this report does not refer to that

11 brigade. That's what I wanted to say.

12 Q. And which unit does this report speak of?

13 A. It is obvious that there are two cannons. It is well known where

14 these two cannons were. These are only two cannons. A brigade cannot use

15 two cannons only for firing.

16 Q. Can a battalion, a company?

17 A. No, they cannot. A brigade and a battalion did not have

18 130-millimetre cannons or Howitzers. It's only a command brigade that has

19 this, and also an artillery battalion, and that is 10 to 15 kilometres

20 from the area where it is used.

21 Q. Which unit was then engaged in this shooting?

22 A. I've said already that these were two cannons of the technical

23 experimental centre under the command of the sector 130-millimetre

24 battery. That is the chief of staff Zec. He had it under his direct

25 command. It was used rarely, only for engaging point targets where it is

Page 4735

1 necessary to have very precise targeting, without any deviation or error.

2 These cannons were used only a few times.

3 Q. What about when Srdj was targeted? Was there a danger of hitting

4 the Old Town?

5 A. No, not with these cannons, no. Only if a battery that has that

6 large margin of error in the ellipsis, or if there are misses as such,

7 then it is possible.

8 Q. Could this cannon also miss a target?

9 A. The cannon could miss a target, but it doesn't have an ellipsis;

10 it is one shell. So that's why I said that with this, that it's not a

11 reservist or some squad leader who used this cannon for targeting. It was

12 done by a specialist from the technical experimental centre, and he only

13 used that cannon.

14 Q. And he could not miss. That's what you're claiming?

15 A. He could not.

16 Q. So this cannon did not have any shell dispersion?

17 A. Any one can, but his was minimal, perhaps up to 20 metres, 30

18 metres. But not a hundred metres or 200 metres.

19 Q. But since you say that this was directly under the control of your

20 chief of staff Zec --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- he was not afraid that due to the targeting of Srdj and the

23 sports hall near Libertas there could be mistakes, errors, that the shells

24 would fall too far away or too close?

25 A. No, he certainly had no such fear. That is why he took these

Page 4736

1 cannons, as I said, and these two specialists who were trained to such an

2 extent that they certainly could not have had any misses.

3 Q. Can you tell me the names of these two specialists?

4 A. I don't know. They are civilians. They did have one

5 noncommissioned officer there. I remember that. But they had two

6 civilians, too, I think, who belonged to the Military Technical Institute,

7 and their task, even in training, was to maintain with maximum precision

8 these cannons.

9 Q. What about the guns from the tanks that you refer to that opened

10 fire?

11 A. At Zarkovica, in the area of Zarkovica, we had two tanks - I think

12 they had been brought there by then - that were within the 3rd Battalion

13 because the battery -- or rather, the tank company that the tactical

14 group, the 2nd Tactical Group had was disbanded, this company was, and

15 only four tanks remained.

16 Q. Are these tanks of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Motorised

17 Brigade?

18 A. At that time, they were not within the battalion because this

19 battalion had not been brought in as such. It was on leave. However,

20 they were at Zarkovica then for defence. They were dug in for defence of

21 the area of Zarkovica.

22 Q. Under whose command were these tanks?

23 A. Probably the unit that was there, the 4th Battalion was there

24 then.

25 Q. Of the 472nd Motorised Brigade?

Page 4737












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Page 4738

1 A. Yes, that's right. It was there then.

2 Q. Are these old tanks, the old type of tanks?

3 A. Yes, T-32.

4 Q. How precise are their guns in terms of targeting anything in town?

5 A. These are guns, cannons, that have a particular trajectory. They

6 can only target the targets they see. They cannot target anything they

7 cannot see. They are precise for 3 to 4 kilometre distances, although the

8 tanks -- so if the tanks themselves are in a very bad condition, the

9 cannons could nevertheless take any objective. They could fire straight.

10 Q. Are these tanks from the Second World War?

11 A. Yes, T-32s are, yes.

12 Q. In view of how old these tanks and guns were, how could the chief

13 of staff allow to have targets engaged in town by such weaponry?

14 A. No engaging of targets in town is referred to here.

15 Q. Where is the Libertas Hotel?

16 A. The Hotel Libertas is by the sea. Well, in all fairness, yes,

17 it's a part of town, but it's a very protruding building, and there was an

18 85-millimetre cannon near that hotel, and it was targeting our positions

19 all the time. It was right by the sea, 100 or 200 metres away. That is

20 absolutely at a distance from the settled area.

21 Q. Was there no risk of this tank missing that particular target by

22 the Libertas Hotel and hitting, say, a civilian building?

23 A. There was a risk. There's always a risk. I agree. However, I

24 say that these are not mortars or cannons that shoot from a long-range, 10

25 or 15 kilometres. For example, from Zarkovica, they look through

Page 4739

1 binoculars and if they were targeting one particular gun, they can see

2 exactly through binoculars where they had hit. This is not battery

3 gunfire.

4 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I would like to have

5 this document tendered into evidence, please.

6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

7 THE REGISTRAR: This document is marked D55.

8 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the usher to help

9 distribute the following document.

10 Q. Are you familiar with this document, Mr. Jokic?

11 A. Yes, I am. This is a regular combat report. I see. It pertains

12 to the 8th of November.

13 Q. Who was it sent to?

14 A. To the superior command of the 2nd Operational Group.

15 Q. Who else?

16 A. The IKM, that is to say, the forward command post of the command

17 of the 9th VPS.

18 Q. So in addition to the 2nd Operational Group, it is also sent to

19 the forward command post of the command of the Military Naval District.

20 Is that right?

21 A. Yes, that's right. We sent documents to them so that they would

22 keep abreast of what was going on.

23 Q. Did you regularly report to the command of the Military Naval

24 Sector?

25 A. Yes.

Page 4740

1 Q. Did you submit these regular combat reports to them, all of them,

2 and the orders you issued?

3 A. No, only combat reports.

4 Q. What about combat orders?

5 A. I don't think so.

6 Q. Can you tell me why you sent this to the command of the Military

7 Naval District?

8 A. I've already said at least once. In order to keep my command

9 abreast of all developments in the units of the 9th VPS, because my

10 command in terms of establishment was and would certainly return to the

11 command of the Military Naval District. And it once again would become

12 subordinate to it. So it would not be all right if combat reports,

13 regular reports, were not sent to that command.

14 Q. Did anybody order that kind of thing, to have it sent to the

15 command of the 9th --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, interpreter's mistake.

17 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. -- the Military Naval District?

19 A. I don't know if that was the order, but it was the practice, the

20 everyday practice that all reports that were sent to the superior command,

21 the command of the 2nd Operational Group, that also they be sent to the

22 Island of Vis to the forward command post there.

23 Q. Who established this practice?

24 A. Probably Admiral Kandic and the previous commander of the 9th

25 Sector because that can be seen there. It dates back all the way to the

Page 4741

1 1st of October and even before that, as a matter of fact.

2 Q. Isn't it strange that you report to two superior commands?

3 A. There are no two superior commands. I never said that, either.

4 There is only one superior command, and that is the command of the 2nd

5 Operational Group. That is my command.

6 Q. And do you have approval from the command of the 2nd Operational

7 Group to send regular combat reports along parallel lines, not only to

8 them but also to the command of the Military Naval District?

9 A. I don't think that that approval is required. And I don't know if

10 my predecessor had it, General Ruzinovski. I don't know. But I think

11 that it is absolutely a particular practice that had no effect whatsoever

12 over the performance of combat duties.

13 Q. Tell me, when you were in -- the commander of the 9th VPS from

14 1983 to 1989, who was your superior commander?

15 A. The commander of the Military Naval District.

16 Q. And in 1991, when you came to the 9th VPS, who was your superior

17 officer?

18 A. The commander of the 2nd Operational Group.

19 Q. And who did you receive orders from, or rather orders and other

20 command documents?

21 A. From the commander of the 2nd Operational Group.

22 Q. Why did you send combat reports and information to two addresses

23 rather than one; and in this way, did you jeopardise the elementary

24 principle of military command, and that is the principle of singleness of

25 command?

Page 4742

1 A. This principle of singleness of command was not jeopardised in any

2 way.

3 Q. What about the practice of vertical communication from you, as

4 commander of the 9th VPS, to two commands that are formally at the same

5 level, the Military Naval District and the 2nd Operational Group? Was

6 that one of the hindrances in the effectiveness of command in your

7 particular command?

8 A. It was not a hinderance of any kind. You cannot even understand

9 this. The combat orders I got from my superior command were not sent to

10 the command of the VPO of the Military Naval District. That would be

11 jeopardising the rules. This simply meant keeping them abreast of what

12 was going on. My -- keeping my former command abreast of what was going

13 on.

14 Q. All right. Let's not waste any time over this. You've already

15 given me an answer. Let's go on.

16 In the regular combat report, under point 1, enemy, it says that

17 on the 8th of November -- rather, the 8th of November, one is enemy; two,

18 the activities of our units. Now, do you describe there an attack that

19 had taken place on the village of Bosanka and that members of your units

20 were wounded?

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. So what actually happened?

23 A. Well, an attack on Bosanka had been ordered, and in the fighting,

24 eight JNA soldiers were wounded.

25 Q. Which units took part in that attack?

Page 4743

1 A. Those units were a mixed detachment of the Territorial Defence

2 which was established on the 6th of November.

3 Q. Is that the mixed detachment of the Territorial Defence that you

4 yourself established?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. Tell me, please, within the frameworks of that mixed TO

7 detachment, was there a unit of Territorial Defence from Herceg-Novi, for

8 instance?

9 A. Yes, that's right. There was a platoon.

10 Q. Tell me, please, were there any casualties from that unit of the

11 Territorial Defence of Herceg-Novi, I mean?

12 A. Yes, there were. Two dead and two wounded.

13 Q. Tell me, please, did it take two or three days for the dead and

14 wounded members of that unit to be pulled out from those positions?

15 A. Yes, that's right.

16 Q. Why did it take such a long time to pull the dead and wounded out

17 from the area?

18 A. Because the ridge, the Dubrava Greben between Bosanka and Srdj is

19 a completely bare area, no trees growing there, no vegetation, just rock.

20 And from town, and from Srdj, you could see anybody moving around, any

21 soldier moving around the area. So we tried, we did our best, to contact

22 the Crisis Staff of Dubrovnik and to request that they allow a Red Cross

23 ambulance to go in and pull out the dead and wounded. However, we did not

24 succeed in doing that, in having that agreement.

25 Q. What did you do then amidst the fighting?

Page 4744

1 A. For two days we tried by using volunteers. We tried to pull the

2 dead and wounded out with the help of volunteers. There was a great deal

3 of pressure coming from Herceg-Novi itself. And finally, I sent the chief

4 of staff to see General Strugar to prevail upon him to give us one or two

5 APCs because we weren't able to do what we intended even with tanks.

6 Q. So were you unable to do this for such a long period of time

7 because the enemy side was targeting you all the time?

8 A. Well, yes, that was the most important reason, the basic reason.

9 There was so much heavy firing, and two more soldiers were killed and

10 three more wounded from all the firing at us. So we ended up having more

11 casualties pulling these out than we did in the combat itself.

12 Q. And you had to pull out the dead and wounded, didn't you?

13 A. Yes, of course.

14 Q. Now, as a result of all this, was there dissatisfaction among the

15 members of that territorial Herceg-Novi detachment -- company?

16 A. Yes, that's right. Up until then in the fighting it was usually

17 the Montenegrins who were killed outside the Bay of Boka. This was the

18 first time there were casualties from Herceg-Novi and Boka, and one or two

19 dead from Kotor.

20 Q. Were there some very well-known sportsmen among the casualties?

21 A. Yes, that's right. The commander of the platoon himself was one.

22 His name was Vojica Pejovic, and there was another sportsman from one of

23 the sports clubs, the Zvezda sports club. I've forgotten his name now.

24 He was a volunteer from Herceg-Novi.

25 Q. Tell me, please, after that, were there protest in front of the

Page 4745

1 headquarters at Kumbor staged by members of that unit and civilians from

2 the town of Herceg-Novi?

3 A. Yes, that's right. There was a protest rally. It was the result

4 both of what had happened and this general dissatisfaction because of the

5 casualties, and also because I prevented the attack on Srdj. I did not

6 wish to allow an attack on Srdj to go forward by any means. But also,

7 that attack was inspired by the letter that we read out here yesterday

8 from Mr. Vucurevic, because people get to hear about it in the units. The

9 soldiers hear about all this.

10 Q. These are your conclusions, because in Mr. Vucurevic's letter

11 there's not a single word about this situation at Bosanka.

12 Now, I'm going to ask you about another protest staged in front of

13 your headquarters --

14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Rodic, you've then just given your

15 interpretation of things. If you want that to be posed as a question to

16 see whether that is the view of the witness, you can. But otherwise, your

17 summary is not relevant.

18 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you. I'll

19 move on.

20 Q. Tell me, please, in front of your headquarters, in front of the

21 command during those days, were protests staged by the reservists as well

22 who had returned from the Lora port, military port or wartime port in

23 Split?

24 A. Yes, it wasn't during those days. It was in October, the month of

25 October. And they did not succeed in staging protests in front of the

Page 4746

1 headquarters because I had ordered that they line up and that the police

2 confiscate their weapons as soon as they left the vessel, left the ship.

3 But what they wanted to do was to stage protests in front of the

4 headquarters, that's true.

5 Q. Very well. Now, tell me this, please: In this regular combat

6 report, it is stated that in the fighting around the village of Bosanka, a

7 wounded ZNG member was captured. He was given medical attention and

8 examined and questioned, and he informed the 9th VPS that in the village

9 of Bosanka there were 74 members of the ZNG, the Croatian National Guards

10 Corps, and that he himself had come on a ship upon which Stjepen Mesic,

11 the president of the Yugoslav state Presidency, had sailed with him. Is

12 that the soldier you told us about here in Court? His name was Damir Kos,

13 unless I'm mistaken.

14 A. Yes, that's right. That is the soldier, Damir Kos, the one we

15 spoke about. Yes, indeed.

16 Q. Tell me, please, now, because of this operation and action and the

17 casualties was the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Motorised Brigade introduced

18 because of that? Was it launched into the fighting in the further

19 operations because of that?

20 A. Yes, that was from the aspects of the 2nd Operational Group. And

21 I accepted that, although that was not the demand I had made.

22 Q. And from your viewpoint, did you feel that those units of the

23 Territorial Defence should have continued to have casualties of that kind

24 and not to accomplish their goals and targets? Is that what should have

25 been continued?

Page 4747

1 A. This unit suffered losses without any reason and through the error

2 of its commander. Its commander was to blame. The Bosanka fortress had

3 been taken control of without a single soldier being killed.

4 Q. Mr. Jokic, what I'm asking you is this, and it is something you

5 yourself said: That you were not able to pull your dead and wounded out,

6 and that you had to go to the command of the 2nd Operational Group for

7 assistance, to help you out. Is that right?

8 A. Yes, that's right.

9 Q. And when those killed and wounded were being pulled out, some more

10 soldiers were killed and wounded in the process. So were these

11 considerable losses?

12 A. Yes, they are losses. But I'm saying that Srdj was attacked

13 counter to my orders, and that is why these casualties and losses came

14 about. They were completely unnecessary, without any military or tactical

15 need.

16 Q. And who ordered the attack on Srdj?

17 A. Well, nobody ordered the attack on Srdj. That's what I'm saying.

18 The platoon commander, instead of setting up an ambush, which is what it

19 said in the order to him, instead of that, he started to attack Srdj, to

20 make himself famous.

21 Q. What did you do with that platoon commander?

22 A. That platoon commander was killed. He's the one we're talking

23 about.

24 Q. All right, fine.

25 A. Pejovic is his name.

Page 4748

1 Q. And what was undertaken to prevent anything like that happening in

2 future?

3 A. Well, the unit was pulled out from combat. It was a platoon,

4 actually, a special platoon, that was what it was referred to, from a

5 Herceg-Novi company. And the steps that were taken are these: Until the

6 very end, I didn't allow Srdj to be taken control of, the facility at

7 Srdj. And if there is occasion, I should be happy to explain this.

8 Despite the order from the 2nd Operational Group, I did not allow that

9 facility at Srdj to be taken.

10 Q. Tell me, please, during this period of time, your chief of staff

11 was very active, was he not, in the field, in the area where the units of

12 the 9th VPS were deployed? That's right, isn't it?

13 A. Why, yes, it is. Those are the orders he was given. He was at

14 the ridge with Colonel Kovacevic. And he was in charge of carrying out

15 those tasks.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'd like to tender this

18 exhibit into evidence. May it be given a number, please, as a Defence

19 exhibit.

20 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

21 THE REGISTRAR: This exhibit will be D56.

22 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] May I have the usher's assistance,

23 please, in distributing the next document.

24 Q. Is this your order for attack dated the 9th of November 1991?

25 A. Yes, it is.

Page 4749

1 Q. There's some -- the document starts off with some handwriting, and

2 then the typed out text is identical to that. This order for attack was

3 addressed to the 472nd Brigade, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade, and

4 the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade, the mixed TO detachment, and the

5 16th Border Naval Detachment. Is that right?

6 A. Probably, because I haven't seen this document for a long time,

7 so I have to look through it. But I assume what you say is correct.

8 Q. Tell me, please, under point 1, you are describing the situation

9 linked to the enemy, the enemy positions.

10 A. Yes, that's right.

11 Q. Does it state here under point 1, referring to the enemy, that the

12 fortress of the Old Town centre is being -- is using mobile MB

13 82-millimetre mortars and 60-millimetre mortars?

14 A. Yes, that's what it says.

15 Q. Is that how it was? Is that what actually happened, Mr. Jokic?

16 Now we have your order for attack. That's it. So you stand behind it.

17 It doesn't say Zec or anybody else.

18 A. Yes, I stand behind this order. But I can't stand behind every

19 nonsensical thing. I didn't think all this was nonsense.

20 Q. Is this true?

21 A. Well, the truth has been imprecisely stated. If you want to hear

22 the real truth, the 82- and 60-millimetre mortars cannot target from the

23 fortress. There is no theoretical possibility of that being possible.

24 Q. So why did you write that?

25 A. I didn't write that. It says from the shelter of the fortress.

Page 4750

1 But a mortar has to be on firm ground. It cannot stand on stone. It has

2 to be placed on a platform. But, yes, it says on the fortress or from the

3 shelter of the fortress.

4 Q. And were they in the shelter of the fortress?

5 A. Well, yes, but as I say --

6 Q. The mortars attacked your units, did they not?

7 MS. SOMERS: Objection, Your Honour. It was an interrupted

8 answer, and it would be good if the witness could finish his answer.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Are you able to conclude that, Admiral?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. In order to be more precise,

11 from the shelter, the fort in the Old Town was being used, as it is stated

12 here, by the enemy. This doesn't necessarily mean that they were firing

13 on that same day, but the fort was being used to shelter the mortars they

14 were using. That would be more precise reading of the document, if that's

15 our intention.

16 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. What is it you just told us, Mr. Jokic? What are these mortars

18 doing in relation to the forts inside the Old Town?

19 A. They were using the turrets as shelter in the Old Town. And from

20 those sheltered positions, they were able to fire on our targets, on our

21 units.

22 Q. Under point 1, you say "enemy." Was the enemy, too, in a position

23 to fire, to target you from there, your units?

24 A. The enemy is firing by 82- and 60-millimetre mortars from the

25 forts inside the Old Town centre.

Page 4751

1 Q. What is stated here is that they are using mobile mortar units.

2 A. Mortars as a rule are always mobile. They are not stationary

3 weapons. Well, yes, firing; what else should they be doing?

4 Q. They are firing on your units; isn't that right? Or are they

5 perhaps firing into the sea?

6 A. I think we would probably do well to stay serious. Of course they

7 were firing on my units, but not every single thing is stated here.

8 Q. But why are you not saying it? I'm asking you for the third time

9 in a row now. That is the only thing you're supposed to say. Enemy

10 mortars firing on your units.

11 A. What I'm telling you is that it's not stated literally here but

12 that is understood, it's implicit in the text. They're not just there for

13 purposes of a military parade

14 Q. So why are you not stating that? You are telling your units about

15 the positions of the enemy, aren't you, under point 1?

16 A. I don't know, I'm just reading the same thing that you've just

17 read out, and this is what it says. Now that you're asking me, I'm

18 telling you exactly what you want to hear. You're asking me, what were

19 they doing there? Well, they were firing. But I'm only reading what it

20 says here, what is written. It is not stated here that they are firing;

21 they are using shelters, from which they were probably firing.

22 Q. The objective of the 9th VPS, the task of the 9th VPS, according

23 to this report, was to complete a total blockade of Dubrovnik from both

24 sea and land and force the enemy to surrender. Isn't that correct?

25 A. Yes. What I received as a task from the commander of the 2nd

Page 4752

1 Operational Group is stated here accurately in this point.

2 Q. Under point 4, you state what your decision was. You describe

3 what your decision was, to introduce the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade

4 into the combat disposition of the battalion, of the Trebinje Brigade, and

5 so on and so forth.

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 Q. In your decision under point 4, is it not stated that those units

8 should break out of the line, Zarkovica, Srdj, Strincjera, Gradci,

9 Komolac, Rijeka Dubrovacka, and establish full blockade of Dubrovnik from

10 land and sea and force the enemy to surrender?

11 A. Yes, indeed.

12 Q. So Srdj was included in the definition of this line that your

13 units should have reached?

14 A. This was an order given by the command of the 2nd Operational

15 Group. The line is defined on the ground when you look at the features,

16 at the facilities providing the specific positions of that line. But in

17 my order it is never stated that the facility of Srdj should be taken. I

18 simply did not allow Srdj to be taken.

19 Q. So how can you reach a line including also Srdj without taking the

20 facility itself?

21 A. Well, yes, of course, you can. It can be 500 metres in front or

22 behind the feature itself. It doesn't mean that every single facility,

23 every single feature along the line must be taken. If you write that down

24 - and you have failed to provide us with a document of the 2nd

25 Operational Group, we don't know what that one says - take the fort of

Page 4753

1 Srdj.

2 Q. Where can you see that?

3 A. That's the order of the command of the 2nd Operational Group for

4 this day and for the following day.

5 Q. Where do you have that order?

6 A. It's probably somewhere in the files.

7 Q. Well, why didn't you simply bring the document if that's indeed

8 what it says?

9 A. I could not take that document or any other document.

10 Q. What about the documents that you handed over to the OTP?

11 A. Only the ones that I was given, but I did not take anything

12 myself.

13 Q. Mr. Jokic, is it your submission that you and your Defence team

14 did not receive the copies of documents you required from the Belgrade

15 military archives?

16 A. What I told you is that we requested 700 documents and were only

17 given 60.

18 Q. Yes, I've heard that explanation before. But all I'm asking you

19 now is whether you obtained from the military archive copies of those

20 documents, regardless of whether it was just one document or 50 of them.

21 A. We requested about 700, but the ones we could actually use

22 amounted to less than 30. These were not handed over to me personally,

23 but rather to my Defence team, so I don't know.

24 Q. And the ones you were actually given -- the one that's somehow

25 missing is precisely this command of this 2nd Operational Group. Isn't

Page 4754

1 that the case?

2 A. Yes, it is true that we did not receive even a poor copy. It's

3 simply not even there in relation to the 10th, 11th, or 12th.

4 Q. Where is it that it's missing; in the files?

5 A. No, it must be in the files. It's just that we weren't given it.

6 Q. So if the task was not to take Srdj when talking about reaching

7 the Srdj-Strincjera-Zarkovica line, what was your task, then? To try to

8 take your units as close as possible to enemy positions at the Srdj fort

9 itself, wasn't it?

10 A. No. The aim was to take the series of forts along the Dubrava

11 ridge. Gruska Glava, Gradci, Strincjera, and to get close to Srdj itself

12 along the ridge but not take the facility itself. And I believe the order

13 was for me to take it, but in my decision I refused to do it.

14 Q. Can you please explain this distinction between the ridge of Srdj

15 and the facility at Srdj, the feature. What's the difference between the

16 two and what exactly does it amount to?

17 A. It's a huge difference. The facility of Srdj itself is just a

18 small part of the ridge, which comprises the so-called Imperijal Fort.

19 It's a massive fort dating back to Napoleon's time, and then there is an

20 underground tunnel linking the fort to the town of Dubrovnik itself.

21 Q. In the fort itself, there were Croatian forces, weren't there?

22 A. Yes, and when the fort of Srdj falls -- it has a central position

23 in defending Dubrovnik from land. As soon as the fort falls, the whole

24 defence of Dubrovnik collapses, and the units are free to walk down

25 straight into town. There is no other line of approach. The distance

Page 4755

1 between the fort and the Old Town is about 500 metres as the crow flies.

2 Q. But Mr. Jokic, I wasn't asking you about any of that. What I'm

3 asking you about is to explain the distinction between the ridge of Srdj

4 and the fort of Srdj because you are bringing your units there, as you

5 say. They are supposed to reach the Srdj line. How far is it from the

6 actual fort?

7 A. The ridge from which they could have fired on the fort, but not

8 actually take it, from Strincjera -- between Strincjera and Srdj, there

9 are about 500 metres.

10 MS. SOMERS: He has interrupted.

11 JUDGE PARKER: I wouldn't have called that an interruption. It's

12 a difficult line to draw between interruption and trying to direct

13 attention to a particular issue. I think Mr. Rodic was doing that.

14 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Yes, that's

15 precisely what I have been trying to do, and I'm doing my best to have my

16 answers as brief and concise as possible.

17 Q. Therefore, Mr. Jokic, this ridge, is it just a barren ridge?

18 A. No, not on that side. It's the lee side, and these are actually

19 positions in front of the Strincjera fort facing Nuncijata and Srdj.

20 Q. All I want to know is the following, the distance between that

21 position being reached by your units at the ridge, what is the specific

22 distance between that position and the fort of Srdj itself?

23 A. Between five and six hundred metres, I believe.

24 Q. Awhile ago you said 300 metres, didn't you?

25 A. Well, listen, you want me perhaps to give you specific positions

Page 4756

1 for each of the individual trenches, don't you? No units being brought

2 there, are they? Only weapons are being placed there, and there is a

3 trench at the Strincjera fort so the side of Srdj itself. Weapons are

4 being placed there to prevent weapons from Srdj from strafing across

5 Dubrava and inflicting losses in our units. This is all about the

6 communication between these various forts, Bosanka, Gradci, Strincjera,

7 and so on and so forth.

8 Q. Can you please try to be succinct. If I understand you correctly,

9 your unit reached the position at the ridge in order to fire on enemy

10 forces deployed at the Srdj fortress. Those enemy units were disrupting

11 your units, the work of your units on some other positions, weren't they?

12 A. Well, that's partially true, but --

13 Q. So can you please tell us the entire answer. Can you please

14 perhaps explain, if that's any easier for you, where your units had been

15 positioned prior to this order for attack. Where were they supposed to be

16 once this order was carried out?

17 A. Prior to this attack, the units had been positioned at Bosanka.

18 Q. So what is the distance between Bosanka and Srdj?

19 A. About 700 metres. Six or seven hundred metres.

20 Q. If we look at your order for attack, what were they supposed to be

21 doing from this position, given that they were already at Bosanka? What

22 were they supposed to be doing in relation to Srdj? Where were they

23 supposed to go from there?

24 A. The problem is that you can't see the overall picture, and I can.

25 I know the context. I'm familiar with that area. I had crossed it a

Page 4757

1 hundred times. From Bosanka you can't see Srdj. You can't target Srdj.

2 What they were supposed to do is pass along the whole series of forts;

3 Gruska Glava, Gradci, Strincjera. This is a wreath of fortresses which

4 you use to reach Srdj from Strincjera, and that's how you gain access to

5 Rijeka Dubrovacka. As for the units at Bosanka, those were not supposed

6 to move towards Srdj. They were not supposed to even budge. It would not

7 have been possible anyway, without taking Srdj, without taking the town of

8 Dubrovnik itself.

9 Q. So tell me, please, how exactly was this supposed to be carried

10 out pursuant to your order? Which lines exactly were they supposed to

11 reach?

12 A. My order was carried out precisely as I had planned, these forts

13 that I had talked about were taken.

14 Q. Can you please give us the specific lines that pursuant to your

15 order dated the 9th of November your subordinated units were supposed to

16 reach?

17 A. As I said --

18 Q. If you want to refresh your memory, I think we're talking about

19 point 4.

20 A. We're talking about the Dubrava ridge; Gruska Glava, Gradci fort,

21 Strincjera. This is the line. From that line, I would have been able to

22 secure access to Komolac, Tikovici [phoen], and taken control of the

23 various settlements in Rijeka Dubrovacka.

24 Q. Very well. Thank you.

25 A. There was a great deal of pressure to take Srdj on the part of the

Page 4758

1 3rd Battalion also. And that's what the situation was, roughly, that the

2 line was to be taken, including Srdj.

3 Q. We'll get back to that later. But what I'd like to ask you next

4 is the following: Under point 4, what is stated is: "Use the remaining

5 part of the forces to control the territory and to carry out tasks in

6 terms of the logistic support for the units of the 9th VPS and the

7 Military Naval District." What exactly was supposed to be done in

8 relation to units of the Military Naval District?

9 A. At the outset, I spoke about this briefly, I believe. My task, in

10 addition to my involvement in the Dubrovnik operation, was to receive the

11 forces of the Military Naval District being evacuated from the Italian

12 border, from the port of Kotor, down through Pula, Rijeka, Zadar, Split,

13 Sibenik and all the way down to Dubrovnik. The entire Military Naval

14 District had hundreds of battalion-level units, platoon-level units, and

15 so on and so forth.

16 Q. Mr. Jokic, we've heard this before, and I'm not going to challenge

17 this. I just wanted you to tell me briefly in this order you wrote, this

18 order for attack, you also make provisions for the logistical support for

19 the units of the 9th Military Naval District being evacuated from Croatia

20 at the time.

21 A. Yes, that's true, plus providing security for the vessels relying

22 on ports within my area. We were providing their supplies also.

23 Q. Under point 5, the tasks of units, specifically here in relation

24 to the 472nd Motorised Brigade, the 1st and the 2nd Battalions in

25 cooperation with the mixed detachment, the 16th Naval Border Detachment

Page 4759

1 and forces of the 9th VPS. From the Bosanka village area on to the

2 village of Ivanica, the attack is to be carried out along the following

3 axis: Bosanka-Mulin Do-Strincjera, and by 1600 hours reach the line

4 Srdj-Strincjera-Gradci. There is an elevation given for Srdj, trig point

5 403, and in relation to Strincjera K412, and for Gradci K413. Can you

6 please tell us specifically where this elevation 403 was.

7 A. Srdj is 412, trig point 412, that's Srdj. Maybe on a different

8 map, it would have been given this other number, 403. I'm telling you

9 again the line is defined here, but it does not state anywhere take the

10 actual facility. That's a very important distinction. And furthermore,

11 what we see here is the axis towards Srdj, but it's not actually stated

12 anywhere that the facility itself, Srdj, is to be taken.

13 Q. Perhaps it's not explicitly stated, as you say, and the actual

14 wording is not there, "take Srdj."

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. But the order is to reach the Srdj line by 1600 hours, and then

17 the following elevation and trig point are provided, 403. Is that then

18 the task?

19 A. Yes, of course. I'm telling you again, this was the task but not

20 to take the actual feature, the actual feature of Srdj. If you insist, in

21 relation to that, I can tell you exactly what steps I took and what

22 explanations I demanded from the order of the 2nd Operational Group in

23 relation to this order to take Srdj itself.

24 Q. Could you please just explain the following --

25 JUDGE PARKER: I think it might be preferable for that to happen

Page 4760

1 after the break, Mr. Rodic. I think what you're about to put will take --

2 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Very well, then, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE PARKER: We'll have the first break.

4 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Rodic.

7 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 And may I have the usher's assistance again, please, to hand the

9 witness a document from tab 22. It is the Jokic Prosecution Exhibit P132,

10 tab 30, actually. P132, tab 30.

11 Q. Mr. Jokic, we said under 5.1 that the task of the 3rd Battalion of

12 the 472nd Brigade was to get out of Bosanka to Biljavaca, and to attack

13 towards Mulin Do-Strincjera, and by 1600 hours to reach the line

14 Srdj-Strincjera-Gradci. Srdj is trig point 403. Can you point this out

15 on the map, this trig point.

16 A. [Indicates]

17 Q. Srdj. This trig point 403?

18 A. Yes. On this map, yes. It's a very small-scale map, and yes, it

19 is 403.

20 Q. Is this an inaccurate map?

21 A. It's an accurate map, but I'm saying that on larger scale maps,

22 the place is the same but it is 412, an elevation of 412. But never mind.

23 Q. When you say that by 1600 hours, they have to reach the line Srdj

24 trig 403, does that mean that your unit should take that position, get

25 that position?

Page 4761

1 A. No.

2 Q. In your order, does it say or does that mean that that unit should

3 get 300 or 500 metres from point 403?

4 A. The map shows that there is no other feature that could be marked

5 except for Srdj.

6 Q. I would like to ask you to answer my question, please. Did you

7 order them to reach the line that was 300 to 500 metres away from point

8 403?

9 A. I ordered them, or rather, the chief of staff who was in charge of

10 this operation and Colonel Kovacevic, that they must not take Srdj, if you

11 want a precise answer from me. Ask the command of the 2nd Operational

12 Group why it says "take Srdj." The chief of staff of the 2nd Operational

13 Group, General Damjanovic, signed that order, not only for that day but

14 also for the 11th and the 12th.

15 Q. You say that you said that to the chief of staff Zec and Colonel

16 Kovacevic, who was your assistant for land forces. Is that right?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. Is it correct that in your order for the attack on the 9th of

19 November, there is no mention of that? In the written order, that is.

20 A. Yes. In the order, it does not say "take the feature of Srdj."

21 For all of those three days, the fighting went on, but for every one of

22 these days the order was "Do not take the feature of Srdj."

23 Q. Mr. Jokic, it is no longer necessary for you to mark anything on

24 the map so would you please focus on the questions now.

25 In your order, it says "Reach Srdj at point 403," in this order

Page 4762

1 dated the 9th of November that we're reading. But if I understand things

2 correctly, apart from what it says here, you said to your chief of staff

3 and your assistant commander for land forces not to take Srdj.

4 A. Yes, absolutely.

5 Q. Can you tell me why you did not write that in your written order

6 for the attack?

7 A. Well, that's what I have been trying to explain to you, but you

8 won't let me explain. As soon as the order came from the command of the

9 2nd Operational Group, I asked for an explanation why Srdj is being taken

10 and whose order this is. Is it the order of the command of the 2nd

11 Operational Group or of the chief of General Staff? Since the commander

12 was not at the OKM, General Strugar was not there, and the signator of the

13 10th of November, there was a decision on action to be taken by the 2nd

14 Operational Group, and it was signed by General Damjanovic. It was his

15 signature that was there. He said to me that this was the order of the

16 command of the 2nd Operational Group but that also in the directive of the

17 General Staff, there is mention of that. I said that we would carry this

18 out, but that we would not take the feature itself.

19 In these operations, I was by the 3rd Light Brigade that was

20 operating in the Sumet/Komolac area. I was with Colonel Bojovic, because

21 this was the first time that that unit was being brought into combat, this

22 3rd Light Brigade.

23 Q. You said all of that to General Damjanovic, who is deceased now,

24 or rather he has been deceased for a long time now.

25 A. Well, look, that decision bears the signature of General

Page 4763

1 Damjanovic who was alive then, and his signature is on that document.

2 Q. Did you write anything to the chief of staff of the 2nd

3 Operational Group, Damjanovic, or to the commander of the 2nd Operational

4 Group? Did you object in writing in relation to that? Did you give your

5 reasons why you thought otherwise? Are there any written traces of that?

6 A. No, there aren't.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Further on, under 5.1, it says that the objective is to break

9 enemy forces in the broader region of Srdj/Dubrava. And when reaching the

10 ordered line, should be fortified at the line of Zarkovica point 315, Srdj

11 point 403, Strincjera point 412, and Gradci trig point 353. And in this

12 way, establish full blockade from Dubrovnik land and Gruz from the

13 southern side of Rijeka Dubrovacka. Is that what it says here?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you see that section?

16 A. Yes, I said yes.

17 Q. Now, tell me, when you say "upon reaching the lines ordered, take

18 inter alia Srdj, point 403," where was that supposed to be? Where were

19 they supposed to fortify themselves there?

20 A. I said --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his answer

22 because the interpreters did not hear the first part.

23 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me, Your Honour. The witness is not wearing

24 his headphones, so perhaps that is why the -- if we could just go back and

25 repeat the question. Thank you.

Page 4764

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for your capacity to observe, Ms. Somers.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.

3 MS. SOMERS: A whole line of questioning appears to have been

4 missed. If we could perhaps repeat that.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is only the witness's

6 last answer that we did not hear from the beginning, all the villages

7 mentioned.

8 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. I'm going to repeat the last question. When reaching the lines

10 ordered, it says "To be fortified on the line of Zarkovica, Srdj,

11 Strincjera, Gradci." Can you tell us, in relation to Srdj, point 403 as

12 it says here, where were they supposed to be fortified? Where were your

13 units supposed to be?

14 A. I said that the front part should take the ridge, between the fort

15 of Strincjera towards Srdj, so that they could target Srdj from the flank

16 and Nuncijata on the right. But without taking the actual feature.

17 Q. Please, how far away is this ridge from point 403, Srdj?

18 A. I cannot give you the exact number of metres. Is that what you

19 want?

20 Q. No, you don't have to speak in terms of a single metre, but say 10

21 metres or so.

22 A. Where a position can be established and where there can be proper

23 shelter for artillery pieces to shoot at a given target but be protected

24 at the same time. That is to say, without reaching the fortress. And for

25 them to be able to operate successfully from the flanks by machine-guns

Page 4765

1 and so on.

2 Q. So what distance was this? Where were they supposed to stop, your

3 units? Where were they supposed to stop?

4 A. 500 or 600 metres away from the fort itself.

5 Q. Tell me, why did you not write this in your order for attack?

6 A. You cannot write in an order every single thing. My basic

7 intention was to take this line of fortresses that prevented the entry of

8 the 3rd Light Brigade into Rijeka Dubrovacka, to disable fire from Srdj

9 and action from Srdj, but not to take the fort itself. That was the basic

10 tactical concept that I abided by for all the three days of these

11 operations.

12 Q. All right. Could you please explain to me whether the units of

13 the 9th VPS sustained any losses. Did they have any soldiers who were

14 killed or wounded due to fire coming from Srdj, due to Croatian forces

15 firing from Srdj, to be precise?

16 A. Yes, yes. There was a constant fire in that period, before that

17 and after that. That was the most heavily fortified position for the

18 defence of Dubrovnik.

19 Q. Let's not elaborate this any further. We've already heard that.

20 Tactically speaking, how did you envisage stopping the action of

21 Croatian forces from Fort Srdj if you came within 500 metres of them?

22 A. By gunfire. That we can always cover the fort with gunfire so

23 that they cannot operate. That was very possible because our fire was

24 several times stronger than theirs. It was possible to do that from a

25 shelter without getting to the fort itself.

Page 4766

1 Q. And is that why you came within 500 metres of them?

2 A. Yes, that was the underlying idea. Absolutely.

3 Q. Tell me, in terms of their points of departure where the units

4 left from on the 9th of November, were there also some shelters from where

5 action could be taken towards Srdj?

6 A. Yes, of course. Yes.

7 Q. And from these initial positions, on the 9th November, from those

8 shelters, did you use firearms and artillery pieces in order to shoot at

9 Srdj, and could you reach Srdj in terms of range?

10 A. Yes, of course. This was not on the 9th. The order was written

11 on the 9th for the 10th. The operations took place on the 10th. There

12 weren't any on the 9th in this attack.

13 Q. When I say the 9th, I'm referring to the date when the order for

14 attack was written.

15 A. And the attack was taking place --

16 Q. On the 10th, and that is what it says in your order.

17 A. Yes, this could happen from the initial position. It was within

18 range. And now if you want to know what the underlying idea was, why the

19 attack was launched, if that was the question.

20 Q. No. My question is as follows: Since you could from those

21 initial positions shoot at Srdj from shelters, too, and actually reach it,

22 then why did you move closer, a very little bit only, so that you would

23 get to a distance of 500 metres from the Croatian forces?

24 A. Well, we did not move from Bosanka towards Srdj. We went around.

25 If you look at the map, you can see that this line of forts goes along the

Page 4767

1 ridge. Gradci, Strincjera. So it's that ridge, it's these forts. That's

2 where the Croat forces were that were operating not only towards Bosanka

3 and Zarkovica, but also Dubrovacka, Rijeka. From that ridge, they were

4 preventing the 3rd Light Brigade from getting down to Rijeka. That is the

5 basic tactical idea for this attack. We were not attacking from the

6 Bosanka/Srdj line, but from Strincjera/Srdj, on the flanks. Because the

7 ridge -- I mean, this part where Bosanka is, it is completely bare and

8 open, and no movement was possible there.

9 Q. Can you please tell me when Strincjera was taken.

10 A. It was taken on the 12th, entirely taken, including the broader

11 area surrounding the fort. On the 11th, Captain Kovacevic reached the

12 fort with certain elements of his unit, but as for taking the entire

13 broader area surrounding the fort, that took place on the 12th.

14 Q. Can you please look at point 5.3 of the order for the mixed TO

15 detachment. We can read here that the task of the mixed detachment was to

16 support the attack by the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Motorised Brigade by

17 using a tank company to attack Zarkovica, the village of Bosanka, and

18 Srdj, Dubac, Orsula, the village of Sumet and the village of Komolac; is

19 that the case?

20 A. Yes, by all means.

21 Q. So does this constitute an attack on Srdj, then?

22 A. Yes, you can use a tank company to carry out an operation along

23 that axis, but this is only the axis. This is not about elements of the

24 infantry moving because they cannot operate in this area. The infantry

25 elements moved along the succession of forts past Strincjera and that's

Page 4768

1 where they took up adequate positions. But not from the direction of

2 Bosanka because there you could only use tanks. This was probably not

3 even a company, there were just three or four tanks there.

4 Q. Did you then order that tank company to attack along this axis,

5 Zarkovica, Bosanka village, Srdj?

6 A. Yes, by all means. That would have been the only possible axis of

7 attack. Use tanks to fire to make it impossible [as interpreted] for

8 infantry elements of the 3rd Battalion to carry out an attack from the

9 forts of Strincjera, Gradci, and Srdj, and the access to the feature of

10 Srdj itself. That was the idea, for the firing to focus on the feature of

11 Srdj and to make it possible for elements of the infantry to get as close

12 as possible to the ridge, in keeping with the law and to make it

13 impossible for them to fire on us from the fort itself, but it could have

14 taken any number of axis, the attack itself from Srdj then.

15 Q. What about the tank company? In this order that we can see here,

16 was it firing in a stationary manner from where it was, without ever

17 moving, or was it supposed to simply move along down this axis, Zarkovica,

18 Bosanka village, Srdj?

19 A. There was no moving there. There were two tanks that were dug in

20 at Zarkovica this whole time, and two of them were mobile. And probably

21 they were moving about, yes. Quite naturally. I can't be familiar with

22 every single detail.

23 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me, Your Honours, I need to bring to your

24 attention a transcript error which needs to be attended to I think

25 urgently. On page 40, line 23, I believe the witness said "use tanks to

Page 4769

1 fire to make it possible for infantry elements of the 3rd Batallion..."

2 The transcript reads "impossible," and I wonder if that could be cleared

3 up, please. Again, that was page 40, line 23.

4 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Jokic, can you please clarify this for us. The task of the

6 company, of the tank company, was to attack down the axis Zarkovica,

7 Bosanka village, Srdj. What was this supposed to make possible?

8 A. This attack by the tanks was supposed to use tank fire on the

9 feature of Srdj, and this was to make it possible for the infantry

10 elements to operate from the flank, from Strincjera, to fire on Srdj and

11 get as close as possible to it. The tanks were there to link up their

12 fire to the fire from Srdj in order to ensure for a successful attack from

13 the right flank for infantry elements. That was the tactical idea behind

14 this particular piece of support.

15 Q. What about the tank company, then, pursuant to this order? Does

16 it have the task, among other things also, to attack Srdj?

17 A. Yes, that's precisely what I said. To fire on Srdj, to attack

18 Srdj by firing, and thus ensure the link-up between the defending forces

19 and Srdj and make it possible for the infantry elements to attack from the

20 direction of the Strincjera fort.

21 Q. Further, LAV PVO 20/3 millimetres and LAV PVO 40/1 millimetres

22 should be maintained at their current positions and provide fire support

23 for the attack of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Trebinje Brigade. Can

24 you please tell us, which weapon exactly are we looking at here and where

25 was it positioned?

Page 4770

1 A. These are two incomplete batteries, 20 and 40 millimetres

2 respectively, that were used for anti-aircraft defence of the entire

3 Zarkovica area and Bosanka. And at the same time, they were part of the

4 mixed detachment as they had no artillery of their own.

5 Q. Where were these weapons positioned?

6 A. These pieces were at Zarkovica, at the Batutovo fort. I believe

7 that was the name of the fortification. It was in the Zarkovica area.

8 They had their positions in the Zarkovica area, and anti-aircraft defence

9 is what their task was, as well as providing support.

10 Q. In terms of this specific task, were they supposed to fire along

11 these axes, the axis that the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade was

12 moving along?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 Can you please look at point 5.4 now. This is in relation to the

16 16th Border Naval Detachment with RTOP 403, isn't it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In the second sentence, it says: "Prevent the movement of enemy

19 forces during the night from Dubrovnik towards Zarkovica, Bosanka, and

20 Srdj. Discover the enemy's combat positions in the area --"

21 A. North-west.

22 Q. Is that a position?

23 A. Yes. North-west of the island of Lokrum.

24 Q. North-west of Lokrum. The passage near the Belvedere Hotel, the

25 [Realtime transcript read in error "forces"] fortresses in the Old Town,

Page 4771

1 and the coastal area between the old port and Cape Petka, and these are to

2 be destroyed, keeping in mind that the Old Town should not be fired on.

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. These units of the 9th VPS, were they not supposed already during

5 the previous night, during the 9th and 10th November, to prevent any

6 movements by enemy units along the Dubrovnik axis and once it was

7 ascertained that there were manoeuvres by these units.

8 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me, Your Honours, I'm sorry to interrupt but

9 there is a misleading reading in the transcript. Page 43, lines 13 and

10 14. It says "forces in the Old Town." That is not to be found in 5.4

11 paragraph.

12 JUDGE PARKER: I think the word may be "fortresses" rather than

13 "forces."

14 MS. SOMERS: I'm terribly sorry; "fortresses."

15 JUDGE PARKER: I see there's general agreement by Mr. Rodic and

16 the witness. Yes.

17 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] We have no choice but to agree because

18 that's precisely what the document states, Your Honour.

19 MS. SOMERS: I believe that what it says is "forces within the Old

20 Town" on the transcript, as opposed to "fortresses." If the Chamber --

21 JUDGE PARKER: That's precisely -- that is precisely where we'd

22 got to. Thank you.

23 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. May we continue, please, Mr. Jokic. These units of the 9th VPS,

25 was their task already during the previous night, between the 9th and 10th

Page 4772

1 of November, to prevent any manoeuvres by enemy forces from Dubrovnik

2 along these axes, as we said a while ago?

3 A. Yes. Any time of day and night, there were two boats patrolling

4 the line.

5 Q. Very well. Thank you. What about these positions that are marked

6 here, that are referred to in this item, this point of the order? These

7 navy units, where were they supposed to operate?

8 A. Well, it says here "firing on possible forces," the reference here

9 is to possible reinforcements that may be brought in along the Zarkovica,

10 Bosanka, Srdj axis. This is a special reference to artillery forces that,

11 from the area of new town, Petka, Lapad, could be sent towards the Old

12 Town. And the only way to discover this is from the sea. If you patrol

13 the lines, the sea lines.

14 Q. Is this also a reference to a position of the enemy forces at one

15 of the forts inside the Old Town?

16 A. Yes, the Belvedere Hotel, the passage there, it is completely

17 isolated by a concrete wall. It is impossible to target from land, and

18 the fortresses inside the Old Town, yes, as well as Cape Petka, where the

19 weapons were positioned for the support being given to their defence.

20 Q. And as soon as firing points were discovered, these were to be

21 reported to the forward command post of the 9th Military Naval Sector in

22 order to coordinate the remaining mortar and artillery fire. Isn't that

23 correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you very much.

Page 4773

1 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we would like to tender

2 this document into evidence, and may it please be given a number as a

3 Defence exhibit.

4 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

5 THE REGISTRAR: This document is D57.

6 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the usher's assistance,

7 please. I would like the witness to be shown Exhibit P126 from tab 24.

8 Q. Mr. Jokic, you've seen this document during the

9 examination-in-chief, haven't you? This is a combat order by the command

10 of the 9th VPS, dated the 10th of November 1991, isn't it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Under point 1, we can see the following: "Use the forces of the

13 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Motorised Brigade, extend the attack along the

14 general axis of Bosanka village, Dugi Doci, Strincjera --" again we have

15 the trig point defined here, 412 -- "and by 1700 hours break through to

16 the following line: Bosanka village, Srdj trig point 403, Strincjera trig

17 point 412, Gradci elevation 353." Is this the same axis that we talked

18 about in the previous combat order dated the 9th of November?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. Just underneath, does it not say that the remaining forces should

21 stay at the lines reached and support the actions of the units taking part

22 in the attack?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can you please tell me which artillery weapons were supposed to

25 keep supporting this attack by the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade,

Page 4774

1 which specific pieces?

2 A. Well, what it says here is support by the mobile border naval

3 battery, 130 millimetres, from the 107th coastal artillery battery, as

4 well as the 122 Howitzer and a 130-millimetre gun from TOC as well as a

5 120-millimetre mortar from TOC.

6 Q. Are these heavy artillery forces?

7 A. This is one battery and three guns. Certainly, this could be

8 defined as heavy forces. But this is not, for example, an entire division

9 taking part in the operation.

10 Q. But I assume this would have been sufficient?

11 A. Yes, by all means.

12 Q. And this was the task in relation to the 11th of November?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can you please look under point 1.4 where again the order is

15 specified, the order to the artillery. What it says here is "Pursuant to

16 the command -- to an order of the commander of the artillery of the 9th

17 VPS, support the combat activities of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd

18 Motorised Brigade with the emphasis on artillery hits on the enemy in the

19 Srdj, Strincjera and Gradci sector in accordance with the firing as

20 planned."

21 In the course of the 10th of November when this order was written

22 in relation to the next day, was any firing by these artillery weapons

23 being planned on these positions or in terms of the time and quantity of

24 the firing?

25 A. Yes, that's right. Because they were fortresses, fortified

Page 4775

1 facilities, so the firing was planned in advance with all the elements and

2 weapons. And the forts had not been taken at that time, so this was how

3 matters were regulated.

4 Q. Were you afraid, in view of the strength of the artillery pieces

5 and the axis of attack in the Srdj area, that hits could have been

6 possible to the town of Dubrovnik or the Old Town itself? Were you afraid

7 that that might have happened?

8 A. No. The fire positions of the 130-millimetre battery and the

9 artillery pieces from the TOC were located at Cilipi airport and in the

10 village of Mocici near Cavtat. The axis of attack of that artillery fire

11 went via Srdj, or rather at Srdj, Strincjera, and Gradci. Therefore, it

12 was leading towards Rijeka Dubrovacka, towards the Greben ridge and

13 further on to Dubrovacka Rijeka, whereas the Old Town and the city of

14 Dubrovnik would remain to the left, more than 90 degrees that way. So

15 there was absolutely no possibility of a shell falling into the city of

16 Dubrovnik at all.

17 Q. What was the distance from which these artillery pieces were

18 active in that situation?

19 A. Between 8 and 12 kilometres.

20 Q. Do you know how far it is, what the distance is from the runway at

21 Cilipi airport, which was where the pieces were located, artillery pieces,

22 to Srdj, the target?

23 A. Well, it's between 10 and 12 kilometres, 12 or 13 kilometres

24 perhaps, as the crow flies. The greatest danger for the Old Town, if I

25 could put it that way --

Page 4776

1 Q. May I just ask you this: What was the nearest distance from Srdj

2 to the first houses in Dubrovnik? On the slopes of Mount Srdj, in the

3 direction of the Old Town? What was the distance from Srdj to the nearest

4 houses?

5 A. Well, a very small distance because the houses on the slope, if

6 you go down from the top of Srdj, they lie at two to three hundred metres.

7 You would find the first houses at two to three hundred metres.

8 Q. Is that in the direction of the Old Town?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. Can you tell me where the 120-millimetre mortar was located?

11 Where was that positioned? That is mentioned under point 1.

12 A. I don't understand your question.

13 Q. The 120-millimetre mortar position that was supposed to give

14 firepower support to the 3rd Battalion, where was that?

15 A. All those three artillery pieces from the TOC were at the Cavtat

16 fire positions, firing positions at Cavtat.

17 Q. What about this 120-millimetre mortar? Did it open fire from

18 Cavtat?

19 A. You're asking about one mortar, whether it went into operation,

20 whether it fired, and at what targets.

21 Q. Well, I'm asking you because it says here very precisely in great

22 detail in your order. So I'm not construing anything. I'm just asking

23 you on the basis of what I have read here. It says that the mortar lent

24 support -- a 120-millimetre mortar from the TOC, lent support or was

25 supposed to lend support to the forces of the 3rd Battalion along the axis

Page 4777

1 of attack. Is that correct? So I'm interested in knowing where that

2 mortar was positioned.

3 A. That mortar did not have that range, an effective range. It's

4 effective range was 6 kilometres. It can target at 10. But for an

5 effective range, the effective range was up to a maximum of 6 kilometres.

6 So it could have targeted the Hotel Belvedere, which was fortified, but it

7 couldn't have targeted Strincjera, for example. And it probably didn't

8 open fire on Strincjera.

9 Q. Was it able to reach the Old Town at all?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Why do you say no if you say that it could have reached a target

12 at a 10-kilometre distance away?

13 A. That was its -- the furthest it could have reached, the absolute

14 furthest point. With a rifle, your range would be 6 kilometres. But of

15 course, you use rifles to target targets of up to 1.000 metres, whereas a

16 bullet can hit effectively at 6 kilometres.

17 Q. All right. Well, perhaps this person manning the mortar could

18 have extended himself in targeting that. But tell me something else:

19 Where was the artillery of the 3rd Battalion --

20 MS. SOMERS: Objection, Your Honour; speculative and comment.

21 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. -- of the 472nd Brigade?

23 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] I accept that, Your Honour, yes.

24 Q. Can you tell us where the artillery of the 3rd Battalion of the

25 472nd Brigade was when the battalion was going into an attack along the

Page 4778

1 prescribed axis?

2 A. I don't think the axis was prescribed. It was ordered.

3 Q. Yes, I apologise. As it was ordered. Pursuant to the order.

4 A. The firepower of the mortar battalion of the 3rd -- of the battery

5 of the 3rd Battalion were Ivanica-Uskoplje. That was the axis. I think

6 that they were at the Uskoplje at the time, because that's where the

7 positions were designed and were not changed practically throughout the

8 entire operation.

9 Q. Were those the same positions at which the -- on the 6th of

10 December -- at which they were on the 6th of December 1991?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. The artillery battalion, was it also supposed to lend support to

13 its battalion in the attack?

14 A. Yes, that's right. That was its basic task. The battery's basic

15 task was to lend support to parts of the battalion.

16 Q. And did it indeed lend its support pursuant to this combat order?

17 A. Yes, it did. Absolutely so.

18 Q. Under point 1.6, which relates to the artillery and mortars of TOC

19 Prevlaka, and it says, "Under the leadership of the chief of the artillery

20 and the commander of the Prevlaka TOC, in coordination with the unit

21 commanders, during the attack provide support to units attacking in the

22 Srdj Dubrava sector and the wider Rijeka sector."

23 Is that right?

24 A. Yes, that's right and clear.

25 Q. When it says "in coordination with the unit commanders to provide

Page 4779

1 support in the attack," were there direct links and communication between

2 the commanders of individual units taking part in the attack and this

3 artillery?

4 A. Yes, that's right, there were. Of course they existed, but if you

5 want me to explain how you give support and who maintains links and

6 communication with whom, I can.

7 Q. Well, what you've just said is sufficient. Now, with the

8 artillery battalion, the artillery of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd

9 Brigade, and you said that it lent support to its battalion's attack, tell

10 me please whether from those positions at which it was, did it have a

11 range which would reach the town of Dubrovnik and the Old Town in

12 Dubrovnik?

13 A. From the firing positions of this area -- of the area of Uskoplje,

14 that particular battery could reach the Old Town area and another

15 kilometre further perhaps.

16 Q. Were you afraid of this danger, of the danger of firing possibly

17 at the Old Town when you ordered the deployment and use of that unit and

18 the artillery? Weren't you afraid you might hit the Old Town?

19 A. I did not order the deployment and use of that artillery. I was

20 in command only of my own artillery, and that was the artillery that you

21 enumerated. And from this document, you cannot see the artillery of the

22 3rd Battalion coming into use because that was regulated by the commander

23 of that particular battalion. But I can explain this if you want me to.

24 Q. Tell me, please, according to this order, pursuant to this order,

25 is it true and correct that you ordered an attack of the 3rd Battalion of

Page 4780

1 the 472nd Motorised Brigade?

2 A. Yes, I did. Certainly.

3 Q. But tell me something about the doctrine of the deployment and use

4 of units in the JNA. According to that, would an artillery battalion take

5 part in lending support to its infantry forces within the battalion?

6 A. Yes, absolutely so. That is its purpose.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] May I ask for the usher's assistance,

9 again, please. Another document to be distributed.

10 Q. Mr. Jokic, is this a regular combat order of the command of the

11 9th VPS for the 10th of November 1991?

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Combat report. Interpreter's correction:

14 Regular combat report.

15 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Was this document compiled at your command?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you familiar with the contents of this document?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Under point 1, describing the enemy, you report, or it is being

21 reported that on the circular basis of -- the defence has been persistent,

22 great persistence in defending and fired at our positions on Zarkovica,

23 Dubac, Brgat, Ivanica with MB 82 and 120 MM, and with one to two cannons

24 76 MM ZIS, fired from the region of Bosanka village and the region of --

25 it says Svet, perhaps that's an error, on to our positions at Zarkovica,

Page 4781

1 Batutovo, and Koratak [phoen].

2 A. Well, yes.

3 Q. From mortars at Lazaret used to target positions. Now, can you

4 tell me what it says here, "region of Svet." Perhaps that's a typing

5 error. What do you think?

6 A. I think it's Sumet, Sumet.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Now, in the next sentence, does it state that the hotel resorts

9 and walls of the Old Town are still used for mortar positions?

10 A. Yes, that's right.

11 Q. And was that noted during the combat operations? I assume, since

12 it was included in your regular combat report.

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. From the island of Lokrum, from fire from a 20-millimetre cannon,

15 sniper fire, were the JNA positions at Dubac being fired at?

16 A. Yes, they did have a 20-millimetre cannon in the forest at the top

17 of the hill on the island of Lokrum.

18 Q. And you can also see that there was strong sniper and machine-gun

19 fire that the enemy resorted to and that they had the Zolja type and Offa

20 [phoen] type weapons, hand-held rocket launchers, basically.

21 A. Yes, anti-tank-type guns.

22 Q. And under point 2, it says that the units of the 9th VPS, along

23 with support from the artillery, as well as vessels from the sea, and

24 first of all the 3rd Battalion of the 472rd Brigade, Motorised Brigade,

25 launched an attack at 7.00 in the morning, 0700 hours, and that by 1800

Page 4782

1 hours it had reached the line of Kriz, Bosanka village, trig point 326.

2 Is that right?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. When it says "Kriz" is that the crossroads above town?

5 A. No. Not by Srdj fort. This is another Kriz, or cross, near

6 Bosanka. A small settlement. It's the cross.

7 Q. And what direction did it reach the Kriz or cross position?

8 A. How do you mean, what direction? It says here "line."

9 Q. It says "broke out on to the line of Kriz."

10 A. Bosanka village had been taken control of, and you can see what

11 the line was. Bosanka was taken control of by this date, the 10th of

12 November. Bosanka wasn't taken on that particular day, it was taken

13 control of between the 8th and 9th. But you couldn't draw a line

14 otherwise but drawing it Kriz-Bosanka because that is the only point on

15 the earth, on the ground, that he could have stipulated.

16 Q. Where is Kriz, or cross, in relation to Bosanka?

17 A. It is to the left of Bosanka. You have Kriz, then you have

18 Bosanka, Gruska Glava, and then trig 326. And then it goes to Gradci,

19 Obod, the ridge, the edge of the ridge, and so on.

20 Q. When you say that it is to the left of Bosanka, is that looking

21 towards town? Towards the town of Dubrovnik?

22 A. Yes, you could put it that way. It was closer to town, at any

23 rate. But it was not the Kriz or cross up at the fort itself.

24 Q. Yes, we understood that. How far is this cross or Kriz away from

25 Bosanka? What is the distance?

Page 4783

1 A. Several hundred metres. I can't be preciser than that. It is

2 situated between Zarkovica and Bosanka. That's where it ought to be.

3 Q. And how far did we say Bosanka was away from Srdj? What's the

4 distance between Bosanka and Srdj?

5 A. You mean Bosanka and Srdj?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Well, between seven and eight hundred metres. Less than a

8 kilometre anyway, as the crow flies of course.

9 Q. And Kriz is situated between --

10 A. It's not on that axis. It's a line, curved line. You can see it

11 on the map if you take a map.

12 Q. Very well.

13 Have a look at what it says underneath, "PS of the 9th VPS held a

14 blockade at the port of Dubrovnik." What does "PS" mean?

15 A. It means naval forces.

16 Q. So the naval forces of the 9th VPS held a blockade and supported

17 the firepower of the land forces. Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, do you know what the axes were there?

20 A. In the previous document, we said that from the sea, if you have

21 artillery pieces which reinforce the first line of defence, and what can

22 be seen from the sea, then those ships were active with those pieces, such

23 as at Cape Petka, the Libertas Hotel, the Belvedere Hotel, the Usek, the

24 passage there, and you can only target that from the sea. Then there was

25 the island of Lokrum. All these were artillery pieces or weapons which

Page 4784

1 prevented the units of the 3rd Battalion from gaining control of the fort

2 and fortresses.

3 Q. Was there any artillery around the Belvedere Hotel itself?

4 A. Yes, of course.

5 Q. And was that artillery in a shelter or screened? If you look at

6 the area in which the JNA units are targeting from the land?

7 A. Yes, absolutely correct. You couldn't reach them.

8 Q. Is that why the ships of the 9th VPS had to be deployed and act

9 from the sea, targeting those artillery positions of the Croats at the

10 Belvedere Hotel?

11 A. Yes, that's just how it was.

12 Q. Were there any refugees in the Belvedere Hotel?

13 A. No. As far as I know, no, there weren't, because the Belvedere

14 Hotel was at the front line of defence. That was the Belvedere/Srdj line,

15 Nuncijata line, and no refugees were allowed to be there.

16 Q. Were there any Croatian forces, forces of the Croatian army put up

17 at the Belvedere Hotel?

18 A. Oh, yes, that there were.

19 Q. Do you know, since this report relates to the 10th of November,

20 and previously we saw your order of the 9th of November for the units and

21 their deployment for the 10th of November, do you happen to remember,

22 compared to the previous day and what happened on the 9th of November and

23 activity going on there, whether there was a step forward made; and if so,

24 what advancement had been made by the units in their attack between the

25 9th and 10th of November?

Page 4785

1 A. No major progress had been made. And you can see from the line

2 given in this report.

3 Q. Very well. Thank you.

4 Now, can you tell me why there was no major progress? Was there

5 strong resistance perhaps?

6 A. Yes, one of the reasons was, of course, strong resistance. And

7 the second reason was this: The firing of the 3rd Battalion, the actions

8 of the 3rd Battalion weren't best expressed with respect to placing the

9 -- the way in which they placed the companies introduced into battle.

10 Q. Now, along with the 3rd Battalion, was your assistant for the land

11 forces there, Colonel Kovacevic?

12 A. Yes, that's right. He was there throughout.

13 Q. And what about the chief of staff, captain of the battleship, Zec?

14 Was he at the positions and axes of attack of your units, especially the

15 3rd Battalion?

16 A. Yes, that's right. He was at Zarkovica himself, which was where

17 they had a vantage point for the commander of the 3rd Battalion, a lookout

18 post. And from there, they were able to maintain constant links and

19 posts, from that observation post, in fact.

20 Q. And the chief of staff, Zec, did he happen to inform you that

21 there had been some artillery hits perhaps on to the Old Town in view of

22 the fact that he was at the observation post at Zarkovica?

23 A. No. He informed me in the evening when he reported to me and when

24 we were preparing for combat action the following day.

25 Q. Can you tell us what he reported to you about? What did he tell

Page 4786

1 you?

2 A. Well, he informed me that there was targeting towards town by the

3 chief of staff, Major Komar. He didn't know exactly -- he couldn't say

4 exactly whether it was the Old Town in actual fact, but he did speak about

5 targeting towards Srdj and towards the town. Now, we didn't know at the

6 time about the hits in the Old Town. But already the next day, you could

7 see on television and in the press and in the protests by the Dubrovnik

8 Crisis Staff that that was what had happened, that there were hits, that

9 there were shells which fell on to the Old Town basically.

10 Q. Tell me, please, is it correct that in the regular combat report,

11 there was no mention about that, the one that's in front of you?

12 A. That's right. There is no mention of that. Well, he did not even

13 know that shells had fallen into the Old Town. At least, that's what he

14 reported to me. But he thought that the chief of staff acted

15 independently.

16 Q. How come he didn't know then if he was observing from Zarkovica

17 what was going on in town? All of town can be seen from up there at

18 Zarkovica, especially the Old Town.

19 A. You were asking me what he saw?

20 Q. Do you know where the position -- the observation post is on

21 Zarkovica?

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. From that observation post can the Old Town of Dubrovnik be seen?

24 A. Yes, it can.

25 Q. Can even Stradun be seen from there?

Page 4787

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. On that day, was Zec at the observation post at Zarkovica?

3 A. Yes, he was. His duty was to coordinate the action taken by all

4 units, and he was not stationary at one particular point. He went from

5 one unit to another; he changed places.

6 Q. And during the course of the day, was it possible, because we see

7 here now that, for example, the attack of the 3rd Battalion lasted from

8 7.00 in the morning until 1800 hours in the evening. So within that time

9 span, could he notice that something had happened, that a shell had fallen

10 into the Old Town?

11 A. Well, he certainly could have, if he looked, certainly he could

12 have seen it. I cannot say what he was looking at. I was telling you

13 what his task was and where he was.

14 Q. And what was the exact information he gave you?

15 A. He told me that the brigade artillery had opened fire beyond

16 orders and that Komar particularly used artillery fire from the area of

17 Vrastica. That's a ridge below Uskoplje. It's a hilly area where the ZIS

18 cannons were.

19 Q. Did he include that in the regular combat report?

20 A. Of course not.

21 Q. Why not?

22 A. Because he did not establish what he had opened fire at, what

23 Komar opened fire at, and we discussed that at the command post in Kupari

24 when I came from the position of the 3rd Light Brigade from Rijeka

25 Dubrovacka.

Page 4788

1 Q. In relation to Uskoplje, or rather Vrastica, and the artillery of

2 the 472nd Brigade, you mentioned ZIS cannons. Are they 76-millimetre

3 cannons?

4 A. Yes, they are.

5 Q. And what did Zec tell you? Where were these cannons operating?

6 A. He established that Major Komar, with his radio transmitter, was

7 issuing orders and guiding the gunfire of that artillery. He stopped him

8 from doing that any further, and then he reported to me when I came to the

9 IKL in the evening, to Kupari.

10 Q. That was the evening of the 10th of November?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. The shell of a ZIS cannon, in terms of its line of operation, from

13 those positions of Vrastica, can it hit the Old Town of Dubrovnik?

14 A. Yes, it can, if it misses Srdj. If it misses Srdj. And if,

15 objectively speaking and professionally speaking, speaking in expert

16 terms, if fire had been observed and if one did not want to hit the Old

17 Town, there is no way it could have been hit.

18 Q. Did Zec establish exactly that a possible hit in the Old Town

19 came from a ZIS cannon at the position of Vrastica, that is to say, a ZIS

20 76-millimetre gun from Vrastica?

21 A. No, no, he didn't establish anything. He just established that

22 Komar was handling the fire, and he asked him what he was doing and what

23 it was that he was targeting. And he said to him that he was setting the

24 sights of the cannons on Srdj, or rather the antenna, that that is what

25 was being sighted, a pillar like that. Obviously, that was not true.

Page 4789

1 Q. What do you think? If some shells did fall into the Old Town,

2 where could this have come from, bearing in mind all that artillery and

3 the artillery support given to the attacking units during those days?

4 A. Looking at the possibilities, the firing possibilities and the

5 range of the guns, the cannons, that were in this encirclement at that

6 time, on the 10th, 11th, and 12th, it could have been all the cannons of

7 the 472nd Brigade. It could have been the artillery pieces of the 3rd

8 Battalion; that is to say, its mortars. Less probably tanks. And it

9 could have been the ZIS cannons that we were discussing.

10 But there was also another possibility. From the firing positions

11 of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, notably the 1st Battalion, which was in the

12 Golobov-Kamen area above Rijeka Dubrovacka, because that was also within

13 the range of the Old Town. It should be borne in mind that the entire

14 brigade was around Dubrovnik then, and the units that were taking over

15 from that brigade, they had already arrived, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th

16 Brigade, and two battalions as well of the TO Trebinje, which is quite

17 unlikely. The 3rd Light Brigade could not have because it was not within

18 range.

19 Q. Was it only your artillery that could not manage to engage such a

20 target, to hit that far?

21 A. My artillery could have targeted the Old Town if they wanted to do

22 it on purpose, because they were within range. However, when I spoke a

23 short while ago about the risk involved in the operations of my artillery,

24 that is to say, whether there could be any misses in terms of the Old

25 Town, I precluded that possibility because what should be borne in mind is

Page 4790

1 where the firing positions of these artillery pieces are. It's all clear

2 to me now, but I'd have to show it to you on a map, why I exclude this

3 artillery, my artillery, and I do include all the other artillery.

4 Because the cannons of my artillery are facing Rijeka Dubrovacka. To the

5 left is the town of Dubrovnik at a 90-degree angle. And all the cannons

6 from Trebinje are facing the Old Town. And all the cannons of the 3rd

7 Battalion are facing the Old Town. It is such an obvious thing.

8 Q. But is it correct that then the Old Town was within everybody's

9 range?

10 A. Yes, it can be put that way.

11 Q. Is it correct that you cannot say with any degree of certitude

12 from which artillery piece a shell possibly fell into the Old Town? You

13 cannot say that with any degree of certainty?

14 A. I cannot speak with 100 per cent certainty. But when an estimate

15 is made, say, within 80 or 90 per cent, then it can certainly be said

16 which artillery pieces they are. As I said, I cannot say 100 per cent,

17 but those artillery pieces that were operating against Srdj, those

18 artillery pieces could have caused the falling of one shell, one

19 particular hit or, say, 20 or 30 shells. And it is well known which

20 artillery pieces do that.

21 Q. And did these artillery pieces operate in accordance with your

22 order to attack Srdj?

23 A. I've told you already that I commanded my own artillery and the

24 commanders of the subordinate units used their own artillery, and they

25 have their own targets which they receive through my combat order. I was

Page 4791

1 not in charge of the entire artillery or is that my obligation. If we

2 were to pursue that logic, then the commander of the 2nd Operational Group

3 gave orders to take Srdj.

4 Q. We are not going to proceed according to that logic.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Nor are we going to proceed just at this moment,

6 Mr. Rodic. We'll have the second break.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.24 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 12.55 p.m.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Rodic.

10 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. Mr. Jokic, we established before the break that this regular

12 combat report dated the 10th of November does not contain the suspicions

13 of a possible information as to the effect that the Old Town had been hit.

14 Isn't that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was this perhaps included in some other combat report of the 9th

17 VPS?

18 A. No, it wasn't.

19 Q. In that period of time, between the 10th and 12th of November, the

20 chief of staff, Zec, and the assistant for land forces, Colonel Kovacevic,

21 were they staying at the command post of the 3rd Battalion and did they

22 organise the coordination of units?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did they coordinate artillery fire of the 9th VPS?

25 A. No, they were not in charge of that. That was not part of their

Page 4792

1 remit.

2 Q. By coordinating the attacks carried out by the units, since if we

3 look at this order we see that the artillery units, too, had certain

4 tasks, were they in a position to be in touch with those units that were

5 at the time providing artillery support?

6 A. Yes. They were at an observation post from where the firing was

7 being controlled. Artillery officers were doing just that, and they were

8 in a position to make sure that the tasks given to the units were carried

9 out. And that includes the tasks of artillery fire.

10 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we would like to tender

11 this document into evidence and be marked as a Defence exhibit.

12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

13 THE REGISTRAR: This document is D58.

14 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Can I have the usher's assistance,

15 please. May the witness be shown Exhibit P118 from tab 18.

16 Q. We have gone through this document during the

17 examination-in-chief. I will ask you in relation to point 1 of this

18 combat order dated the 11th of November, what about the 472nd Motorised

19 Battalion, were they supposed to provide artillery support by using

20 122-millimetre Howitzers between 8.00 and 8.30 to fire on the Srdj

21 feature, and to use the 120-millimetre mortar to fire on Komolac between

22 8.00 and 9.00? Is that correct?

23 A. I'm not sure where you're getting this from. Where precisely is

24 this stated?

25 Q. From the combat order.

Page 4793

1 A. And the point?

2 Q. Point 1, 472nd Motorised Battalion. This is the second sentence.

3 It says 120-millimetre Howitzers. Can you see that now?

4 A. No, no, that's not the document I have in front of me.

5 472nd Brigade, without the 3rd Battalion. Is that what you mean?

6 Q. Do you have in front of you --

7 A. This is dated the 20th of November.

8 Q. The one I'm talking about is dated the 11th of November. Do you

9 have that document now?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Yes.

12 Q. After preparing the artillery, forces of the 3rd Battalion,

13 together with a Territorial Defence platoon from Niksic, were to continue

14 the attack along the Gruska Glava-Bosanka village axis with the focus on

15 the Gruska Glava-Srdj axis, weren't they?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Under point 2, in relation to the 3rd Battalion of the 5th

18 Brigade, the last sentence, I'm reading in relation to artillery, it says:

19 "120-millimetre mortar, this battalion was supposed to support the attack

20 of the 3rd Battalion of the 472 Motorised Brigade, carrying out strikes,

21 firing on the broader Nuncijata sector, and provide troop reinforcement

22 from Nuncijata towards Srdj." Is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In relation to the 3rd Light Infantry Brigade, the last sentence,

25 it enjoys the artillery support of a 120-millimetre battery belonging to

Page 4794

1 the 472nd Brigade in the Komolac area, 120-millimetre Howitzer from the

2 TOC, and a 120-millimetre mortar. Is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Under point 4, is any artillery firing from the Prevlaka TOC

5 specified using Howitzers and mortars, both 120 millimetres, that were to

6 provide support for the attack of the 3rd Light Infantry Brigade?

7 A. Yes, indeed.

8 Q. On page 2 of this document, it reads: "Between 8.30 and 9.00 on

9 the 12th of November, carry out strikes on Srdj using 122-millimetre

10 Howitzer and 120-millimetre mortars." Isn't that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Under point 6 of this combat order, it states: "The units are

13 forbidden from using weapons on parts of the Old Town, except in case fire

14 is coming from there that is lethal for the unit."

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Does this not in theory create a possibility for firing on the Old

17 Town in case the unit was under lethal fire?

18 A. No. This is only a possibility to neutralise firing coming from a

19 certain weapon that was firing on the unit and, thus, inflicting lethal

20 fire on unit.

21 Q. If I understand you correctly, the JNA then is free to use its own

22 weapons against weapons positioned inside the Old Town, or rather, around

23 the Old Town, weapons that are inflicting losses on these same JNA units,

24 that is.

25 A. We had no information, nor did anyone ever tell us that there were

Page 4795

1 weapons from inside the Old Town that were firing. In all the documents

2 that have been made available so far, the only reference was to a

3 20-millimetre gun that was mounted on a lorry that was from time to time

4 moving about inside the Old Town. As for any other weapons inside the Old

5 Town or any firing by those weapons from inside the Old Town, there was no

6 such thing. However, it was from the direction of the Old Town, from

7 sheltered positions behind the forts, and the ramparts, yes, that's

8 another thing, and that's something we had in our documents.

9 Q. Can you tell me specifically in relation to this lorry with an

10 artillery piece mounted, this lorry that was moving about the Old Town, if

11 it fires at JNA units, in that case, would your unit enjoy the right to

12 return fire, rather to neutralise that weapon as a firing point?

13 A. No, that 20-millimetre weapon was not used to inflict any fatal

14 losses. This was merely a weapon used for carrying out acts of

15 provocation. They would fire a volley, and then they would take shelter

16 again to fire another one. But this sort of weapon, a 20-millimetre

17 weapon, could not have been used to inflict any losses from that kind of

18 distance, let alone fatal losses. Therefore, this weapon could in no way

19 have been neutralised or fired on.

20 Q. Was this a three-barrel gun, in this case, a three times

21 20-millimetre three-barrel gun?

22 A. We did not have this information. We did not know if this was a

23 single-barrel weapon, a double-barrel, or a three-barrel weapon. We did

24 not know for sure what sort of weapon this was.

25 Q. Were there several such weapons mounted on lorries moving about?

Page 4796

1 A. Yes. In the Grude area, we captured two trucks with weapons

2 mounted when Admiral Djurevic's helicopter had been shot down. But we

3 didn't find anything like that again until we approached the Old Town.

4 Q. What about the sort of weapons that was mounted on those trucks

5 you captured?

6 A. One of them was a single-barrel weapon. The other had two or

7 three barrels, but I can't be sure. One was a single-barrel weapon.

8 Q. So this sort of weapon is being used to fire from the Old Town on

9 Zarkovica. Can this fire possibly kill one of your soldiers?

10 MS. SOMERS: Objection, Your Honour. It's talking about from

11 Zarkovica.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a hypothetical question. A

13 soldier could also be killed by rifle fire, sniper fire from the Old

14 Town. Of course this is possible. The answer to your question is yes.

15 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, the objection goes to the fact that the

16 witness never said there was firing from the Old Town. And the question

17 poses specifically to Zarkovica. There's nothing in evidence to suggest

18 that.

19 JUDGE PARKER: As I understand it, it's put on a hypothetical

20 basis.

21 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous interpretation continues]...

23 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. In the reports of the 9th VPS, is there ever any reference to

25 enemy fire coming from the Old Town of Dubrovnik?

Page 4797

1 A. Yes, there were such reports. And we continued to carry out

2 assessments. Our intelligence, information coming from our observation

3 posts, indicated that from sheltered positions behind the ramparts and

4 fortifications, some mortars were positioned, because that's where the

5 fire was coming from. But not from inside the Old Town, as I said before.

6 Q. The walls or ramparts surrounding the Old Town, in your opinion,

7 is it part of the Old Town itself or not?

8 A. The walls or ramparts are without a doubt part of the Old Town.

9 But I'm talking about from behind the ramparts, from behind the walls of

10 the Old Town.

11 Q. More specifically, which side?

12 A. Our information, our intelligence at the beginning, when we

13 reached the Dubrava ridge, was that between the Argentina Hotel and the

14 Excelsior Hotel there was a 120-millimetre mortar positioned and that they

15 had a warehouse there, because from time to time there was a lorry

16 shuttling between Ploce and positions outside the Old Town. That's one

17 piece of intelligence that we had. This has been verified and is

18 considered to be reliable.

19 Another piece of intelligence that we had was that from the west

20 of the Old Town, from the old hospital area, at about two or three hundred

21 metres from there, there were two weapons positioned. And in our

22 assessment, those were 120-millimetre mortars. Also, at the Pile gate, if

23 you approach the town from the west, in the Bogisica park - we checked

24 this and we know this for sure - there were firing positions with mortar

25 positioned there, 80- and 120-millimetre mortars, three pieces altogether.

Page 4798

1 Q. In your order of the 9th of November, the combat order, under

2 point 1, and we've already referred to this sentence, you say: "Enemy,

3 from the towers or turrets of the Old Town nucleus, uses mobile mortars of

4 80 and 162 millimetres -- 120 millimetres."

5 A. Well, I reacted because it's really nonsensical. A mortar cannot

6 be used from a fortress, from a turret. Otherwise, everyone is mobile.

7 So that's why I reacted. But I said that the turrets and towers were used

8 as a screen because it's behind the walls, ramparts, and turrets. So they

9 were positioned behind this shelter.

10 Q. Why under point 1, when you give out information about the enemy,

11 what is the purpose of this piece of information vis-a-vis your own units

12 then?

13 A. Well, the purpose is to inform the units of the location of the

14 weapons and the fire that can be expected to come from those weapons.

15 Q. And when it says here from the fortress of the Old Town nucleus,

16 what does that imply? What's meant by that?

17 A. Different people think different things. It depends.

18 Q. But you signed this document.

19 A. Well, I've stated my own views. It is impossible to -- for

20 mortars to be fired from a fortress or turret. That is clear to every

21 soldier. I don't know if it's clear to you. The only weapon that you can

22 use from a turret is a rifle, a missile, but not a mortar. It cannot be

23 deployed.

24 Q. Not even the light ones, light mortars?

25 A. No. It must have a soft foundation. You can't place it on stone,

Page 4799

1 concrete, or the like.

2 Q. But can it have a provisional soft base, foundation?

3 A. Well, I don't really know what you mean. But I don't think it can

4 have anything like that.

5 Q. Can a mortar be fired from a truck, for example? That's what I

6 mean.

7 A. Very difficult, because it is -- it has a recoil which, when a

8 shell is fired, it must have 2 or 3 metres free space in front of it for

9 the trajectory. It can't be fixed. So that's the greatest problem that

10 you encounter with mortars. That's the problem. They have to have a soft

11 basis or foundation upon which to be positioned.

12 Q. Well, what does this piece of information, what purpose does

13 serve, then, that these mobile mortars were placed along the turrets or

14 towers of the Old Town? Was this false information on your part? Were

15 you giving out false information to your units and superior command?

16 A. That is what you say. I had nothing to do with that assertion.

17 Q. It's my question to you.

18 A. And I've answered it. I've already told you.

19 Q. Well, I assume that the -- you didn't mention mortars up on

20 turrets as a tourist attraction but as a potential danger to your units.

21 Am I right?

22 A. Well, we can say what we like now. You can speak about tourist

23 attractions now if you like. But if we're having a serious conversation

24 and dialogue, then I have already stated reasonable arguments, put forward

25 reasonable arguments, professional arguments, sensible arguments which

Page 4800

1 other people will believe. If you don't believe me, now, there were

2 thousands of documents like this. It's not possible to have every word

3 and sentence absolutely exact and correct. And of course, all the reports

4 that were written, do you think they were correct in every aspect? They

5 cannot be 100 per cent correct. 800 Ustashas within the walls of the Old

6 Town? I don't know if you've ever visited the ramparts themselves. Have

7 you? Do you know what they look like? Do you know whether that would be

8 possible? Can you put up 800 people there? So that's another thing we

9 found among one of the documents. I think we mentioned the document

10 yesterday.

11 Q. Now, is this information coming from your units, from your

12 intelligence sources, from your command? Is that where that information

13 comes from?

14 A. It is unreliable, incorrect data which has not been checked out,

15 or first-hand information that was never verified.

16 Q. But they go down the chain of command to subordinated units. Is

17 that right?

18 A. Well, yes. You have information coming from the highest level

19 which is not always correct, let alone other levels.

20 Q. Tell me another thing now, please. Now, a truck with a

21 double-barrel gun or with three barrels, what was it doing in the Old

22 Town? You said that was checked out and verified and that it had been

23 seen.

24 MS. SOMERS: Objection, Your Honour, that was not said by the

25 witness.

Page 4801

1 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps I heard

2 otherwise. But I don't mind, I'll repeat the question again, if need be.

3 But I think that the witness did say something like that.

4 Q. Now, Witness, did you say that you had information about the

5 movement of a truck with weapons on it moving around the Old Town?

6 A. Yes, I did say that we received information to that effect within

7 the context of your question when you asked whether it could be a source

8 of fire that led to the death of some men, lethal fire, so then I said

9 what this kind of weapon was used for.

10 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, the objection went to the number of

11 barrels. The witness never indicated the number of barrels as to Old

12 Town.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Your question at line 8 and 9 of 73 did

14 specifically mention a double or triple barrel.

15 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I really do think the

16 witness mentioned on page 67 and 68 of the transcript, of the LiveNote,

17 the kind of weapons and what calibre they were on the truck. But

18 regardless of that, let's give the witness a chance to say what he knows

19 about that once again, to repeat it.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that we received

21 information according to which on that truck there was a 20-millimetre

22 weapon, probably the Erlikon that they had because those were the ones

23 that we seized, but I don't know whether it was a single-barrel,

24 double-barrel, or triple-barrel gun. And I said as a soldier what such a

25 weapon could have caused at the distance from which it was fired, and the

Page 4802

1 firepower that it had to jeopardise our units.

2 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Did you say that it was a weapon placed on a truck in the Old Town

4 and that it was used for provocation?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And in what way was provocation effected towards the JNA from this

7 weapon on this truck? How was that achieved?

8 A. Well, when there's a cease-fire, the weapon fires a volley and

9 masked behind the buildings in town, or sheltered and screened behind the

10 buildings, you don't know where this volley of gunfire came from. But it

11 is firepower as provocation. So you can't actually target anything with

12 that weapon, that wouldn't be possible from the Old Town, and you can't

13 inflict any lethal bullets, lethal fire. And that's what we were

14 discussing.

15 Q. Let's make ourselves quite clear here. So when they engage in

16 this type of provocation, does that in fact mean that they open fire from

17 the Old Town and that then they hide behind the buildings within the Old

18 Town of Dubrovnik? When I say "Old Town," I mean the Old Town nucleus of

19 Dubrovnik. Does that mean that?

20 A. Yes, that's quite right, it does, absolutely.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, from the Old Town of Dubrovnik, what is the

22 distance, as the crow flies, to Zarkovica?

23 A. About 2 kilometres, 2.000 metres.

24 Q. By firing from weapons of this kind, of a 20-millimetre calibre

25 weapon, at that distance, can anybody be killed who is at Zarkovica from

Page 4803

1 that position in the Old Town? Could you kill anyone?

2 A. Well, yes. I've told you that you can even hit someone with a

3 sniper and kill them, from the Stradun, and kill a man up at Zarkovica.

4 Of course you can.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] May I have the usher's assistance

7 again and present P128 exhibit from tab 26 to the witness.

8 Q. This is a combat order dated the 12th of November, and it was

9 intended for the following day, the 13th of November.

10 A. No. On the 13th of November, there was no combat because a

11 cease-fire came into force, the truce.

12 Q. And what about the 1st Battalion? Take a look at point 1, please.

13 The 1st Battalion, in coordination with parts of the forces of the 3rd

14 Light Infantry Brigade, was it supposed to improve the combat deployment

15 and carry out a blockade of the villages of Prijevo and Bracevo Selo

16 pursuant to the combat order of the 12th of November?

17 A. Yes, all that's true and correct. That's what it says. However,

18 during the night, an order arrived -- I don't know exactly what it was,

19 but if we look at the next date, the 13th of November, that was when the

20 cease-fire came into force, and the order came from the General Staff in

21 actual fact during the night, so I don't think these tasks and assignments

22 were ever carried out.

23 Q. All right. Very well. But it was a combat order nonetheless,

24 regardless of what happened the next day. Is that right?

25 A. Yes, that's right.

Page 4804

1 Q. Was this combat order sent to the 2nd Operational Group and the

2 command of the Military Naval District at the forward command post? Was

3 it also sent to them so that they could be informed of its contents?

4 A. That's what it says here. As far as I know, we just sent in a

5 report. So this could be a mistake as well. I can't really say whether

6 it was an omission, an error, or whether it was intentionally compiled in

7 this way.

8 Q. A moment ago you just said that the regular combat reports were

9 sent to the commander of the Military Naval District.

10 A. Yes, that's quite right.

11 Q. This is a combat order, a combat document.

12 A. Yes, that's what I'm just saying. I think that that might have

13 been a mistake because I don't think that we sent out combat orders, but I

14 didn't pay attention to that. There was no need for us to send out this

15 type of document. But of course, I couldn't be a hundred per cent sure.

16 Q. All right. Thank you.

17 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me, Your Honours, there is a translation error

18 I want to bring to Your Honours' attention. In the English version, where

19 it says "two," it says 472nd, and instead of having -- well, it should

20 read "the 2nd Operational Group" instead of 204th. It's not Mountain

21 Brigade, after 472nd, it's Motorised Brigade. It seems to have omitted

22 altogether the 2OG and mistaken it for 204th, which is not a relevant

23 unit. It is conceded by the Defence, it was mentioned, of course, that

24 there was the 2OG as well as the KVPO.

25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that for

Page 4805

1 purposes of exactitude, my colleague should indicate the third mistake as

2 well that's in that sentence. And that is that the KVPO is not the tank

3 platoon but it is the command of the Military Naval District.

4 MS. SOMERS: That's correct, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We seem to have tidied up a lot of

6 translation.

7 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] May we have the usher's assistance

8 again, please, for the next document.

9 Q. Is this the document that according to which the subordinate unit,

10 the 472nd Motorised Brigade, is sending to the command of the 9th VPS?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. Are you familiar with the contents? Or rather, did the

13 subordinate units have the duty of informing you and reporting to you?

14 A. Of course. This was a soldier who was seriously wounded in the

15 Osojnik region, and he died, succumbed to his wounds, at the hospital in

16 Trebinje.

17 Q. Did the command of the 9th VPS regularly receive reports of this

18 kind from their subordinate units?

19 A. Yes, that's quite right.

20 Q. You had records and lists of the dead and wounded, I assume? Kept

21 records?

22 A. Yes, we did.

23 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

24 May I tender this document into evidence as a Defence exhibit and

25 it be assigned a number.

Page 4806

1 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

2 THE REGISTRAR: This document is marked D59.

3 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment. I'm sorry.

4 Can I have the usher's assistance, please. May the witness be

5 shown the following document, P125 from tab 23.

6 Q. Mr. Jokic, under point 1, you can see an order on setting up a

7 joint detachment of the Territorial Defence. Is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Further, you can see that the task of this mixed detachment on the

10 6th of November by 1500 hours to take the area of Vrastica and Cibaca and

11 take over from the 4th Battalion of the 472nd Motorised Brigade. Was this

12 carried out as ordered?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is it not further stated that in coordination with the special

15 detachment of snipers and the special platoon of the Niksic TO company,

16 they are to improve the combat deployment and break through to the

17 Srdj-Bosanka sector, fortify there, and organise the defence and control

18 of the city of Dubrovnik? Is that what the task was of this mixed

19 detachment?

20 A. That's what it says.

21 Q. Is that what actually happened?

22 A. You can't have a mixed detachment organising the control of the

23 town of Dubrovnik. Observation, perhaps.

24 Q. Observation. Would that imply the positions at Srdj and Bosanka

25 where the defence was to be set up?

Page 4807

1 A. It is not stated anywhere explicitly that their task was to take

2 Srdj. Their task was to take up this position and reach the Srdj-Bosanka

3 area, not to take Srdj.

4 Q. Does it not say that they should fortify at Srdj and organise the

5 defence and control of the town of Dubrovnik?

6 A. No, that's not what it says.

7 Q. But you can see that sentence right there.

8 A. What it says is where they are to fortify, but it doesn't say that

9 they should take the Srdj feature. How in the world could a mixed

10 detachment carry out a task like that, on the 5th of November of all

11 days? This is a Territorial Defence unit. They do not have the capacity

12 for that.

13 Q. So why is that what is stated in the document, then?

14 A. What I'm telling you is that it is not stated anywhere that they

15 should take the feature of Srdj itself. It only says that they should

16 reach the area, the sector.

17 Q. Which sector do you have in mind?

18 A. The Srdj-Bosanka sector. In fact, they didn't even take Bosanka

19 to begin with.

20 Q. Then what was the idea about this detachment setting up the

21 control of the town of Dubrovnik?

22 A. This detachment held Zarkovica, and they observed the town from

23 there, as did the 4th Battalion.

24 Q. From those positions in the Srdj area, as you say, where they were

25 supposed to dig themselves in, the mixed detachment, and to organise the

Page 4808

1 defence, were they in a position from there to control the town of

2 Dubrovnik?

3 A. Yes, they could carry out observation.

4 Q. Observation, in your opinion, is it the same as control? These

5 two different terms, do they have the same meaning?

6 A. As I said, observation is a concept that means exactly what it

7 says: You're able to observe. Whereas control is something entirely

8 different.

9 You can read it any way you like. You can take it to mean exactly

10 what it says.

11 Q. We do agree that control and observation are two different terms

12 with different meanings, don't we?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Under point 4, if you could have a look, please, the last

15 sentence, the Territorial Defence platoon from Niksic is to be used in

16 combat reconnaissance on the Zarkovica-Bosanka-Srdj axis; readiness:

17 Immediate. Which means that as early as on the 5th of November, they were

18 supposed to go out and carry out that task, didn't they?

19 A. I don't know about that. You're talking about point 4, right?

20 Which page is that?

21 Q. Page 3, point 4, last sentence. Have you found it?

22 A. No, unfortunately. Page 3, but I can't pin it down.

23 Q. On page 3, you can see points 3, 4, and 5, can't you? This --

24 A. Command of the republican TO staff units.

25 Q. Yes. Please have a look at the last sentence, point 4.

Page 4809

1 A. The Niksic TO, yes.

2 Q. Was it supposed to carry out this reconnaissance task along the

3 Zarkovica-Bosanka-Srdj axis immediately?

4 A. Yes, that's what it says.

5 Q. But is this what happened?

6 A. Well, I can't say. But this combat order is absolutely unusual

7 because tasks are being given here in relation to the 7th of November,

8 what was supposed to be done, and the 10th of November.

9 Q. Mr. Jokic, I'm afraid I must interrupt you. This is an OTP

10 exhibit, and this was tendered during their examination-in-chief, an

11 occasion on which you failed to express your surprise when examined by my

12 colleague about this document.

13 A. I don't think I've seen this one before. This document says 1800

14 hours, the 5th of November. If you look at page 4 -- rather, page 2, it

15 says "The remaining units of the 472nd Brigade by the 10th of November

16 will carry out the following tasks..." Please, the 7th of November.

17 Q. Just for the sake of brevity, during the examination-in-chief on

18 the 26th of March, this document was given an exhibit number. This is

19 P125. My apologies. P125.

20 A. Oh, yes. Yes.

21 Q. [No Interpretation]

22 A. [No Interpretation]

23 MS. SOMERS: There's no translation.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is about the engagement of

25 units over the following period. I was not paying attention.

Page 4810

1 MS. SOMERS: Excuse me, Your Honour. Much of that exchange was

2 not translated before. I wonder if we could go back. The Admiral did say

3 some points that were significant.

4 JUDGE PARKER: I must ask you to try and repeat what you said

5 then, Admiral.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was simply not

7 careful enough, and I failed to notice what this document was really

8 about. So I can only offer my apologies in relation to my remarks a

9 moment ago.

10 What we see in this document is the engagement of units of the 9th

11 VPS over the following period of time, which means between the 5th and as

12 late as the 11th, as I have been able to observe, the 11th of November,

13 which covers a period of the next six days.

14 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Jokic --

16 A. But this is not an executive order and it's not a combat order.

17 Q. But there was no question about that in the first place. No one

18 asked you about this being or not being a combat order. Please, let's not

19 waste time. I merely asked, in relation to this document, talks about the

20 deployment of units of the 9th VPS over the next period of time, dash,

21 order. No one said anything about a combat order. I'm just asking about

22 what this document is about. And we only have two brief questions left in

23 relation to this document.

24 Under point 9 --

25 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may just be allowed

Page 4811

1 to clarify point 9 of this document, in view of the time remaining.

2 JUDGE PARKER: No time remains, but carry on.

3 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Q. Under point 9, Mr. Jokic --

5 A. Yes, I can see that.

6 Q. -- is it true that artillery units were given the task of

7 fortifying the combat deployment on the firing positions and organising

8 communications system and also to carry out orders from the Kupari forward

9 command post and Kumbor command post?

10 A. Yes, indeed.

11 Q. If you can just look briefly at point 10 now, the same period of

12 time, the remaining units, the remaining part of your units, were they to

13 provide logistical support for the units that were being evacuated from

14 Croatia during that period of time?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that completes my

17 examination in relation to this document, so...

18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. That will be time then. We

19 will break until tomorrow.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Friday, the 16th day of April,

22 2004, at 9.00 a.m.