1 Monday, 31 January 2005

2 [Judgement]

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 12.10 p.m.

6 The Chamber is sitting today to deliver its judgement in the case

7 of Pavle Strugar. For the purposes of this hearing, the Chamber will

8 summarise briefly its findings, emphasising that this is a summary only,

9 and that the only authoritative account of the Trial Chamber's findings

10 and of its reasons for those findings is to be found in the written

11 judgement, copies of which will be made available to the parties and to

12 the public at the conclusion of this hearing.

13 Before turning to the merits, the Chamber wishes to thank the

14 translators and interpreters, the court management section, and the

15 Victims and Witnesses Unit, as well as counsel and the Chamber's legal

16 support team for having facilitated the conduct of the trial.

17 The accused Pavle Strugar is a retired lieutenant general of the

18 then-Yugoslav People's Army, JNA. He is charged in the indictment with

19 crimes allegedly committed on 6 December 1991 in the course of a military

20 campaign of the JNA in the area of Dubrovnik in Croatia in October,

21 November, and December 1991. It is alleged that in the course of

22 unlawful artillery shelling by the JNA on the old historic town of

23 Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991, two people were killed, two were seriously

24 wounded, and many buildings of historic and cultural significance in the

25 Old Town were damaged. These allegations support the six charges in the

1 indictment of violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of

2 the Statute of the Tribunal, namely murder, cruel treatment, attacks on

3 civilians, devastation not justified by military necessity, attacks on

4 civilian objects, and destruction of institutions dedicated to inter alia

5 religion and the arts and sciences.

6 It is alleged that the accused is guilty of each of these six

7 counts on two distinct bases. First, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

8 Statute that he personally ordered the shelling of the Old Town and that

9 he personally aided and abetted the shelling. Secondly, as a superior

10 responsible for the criminal conduct of the forces under his command

11 pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute, the accused's liability is

12 alleged to arise out of the position he then held as commander of the 2nd

13 Operational Group (2OG).

14 In September 1991, hostilities between the JNA and Croatian

15 forces began in the south coastal area of Croatia. A blockade of

16 Dubrovnik was established from 1 October 1991; it continued into 1992.

17 The JNA forces under the accused's command launched combat operations to

18 advance closer on the city of Dubrovnik, in particular from 23 to 26

19 October 1991 and from 9 to 13 November 1991. Both times, the wider city

20 of Dubrovnik in general and its historic Old Town in particular were

21 shelled. By 13 November 1991 the JNA effectively held all the territory

22 around the wider city of Dubrovnik except for Mount Srdj, the dominant

23 topographical feature of Dubrovnik immediately above the Old Town, where

24 there is a fortress from Napoleonic times.

25 In early December 1991, negotiations were held in an attempt to

1 resolve the problem of the blockade of Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik was but one

2 of several issues arising out of the conflict in the then-SFRY, with

3 which the highest Croatian and Serbian levels were occupied at the time.

4 A Croatian ministerial delegation led by Minister Rudolf and the JNA

5 represented by Admiral Jokic met in Cavtat on 5 December 1991. They were

6 to continue on 6 December 1991.

7 The events directly relevant to 6 December 1991 are the subject

8 of a great deal of evidence. Much of it is inconsistent or conflicting.

9 It has been necessary for the Chamber to determine where the truth lies.

10 Our reasons are set out in detail in the written judgement. The summary

11 of material events that follows reflects our findings as to what in truth

12 did occur.

13 Well before sunrise at about 0550 hours on the morning of 6

14 December 1991, residents of the Old Town of Dubrovnik awoke to the sound

15 of explosions. An artillery attack had commenced. While initially the

16 firing was mainly concentrated on the area around Srdj, some shelling

17 occurred on residential areas of Dubrovnik, including the Old Town and

18 the port of the Old Town, virtually from the outset of the attack.

19 However, the focus of the attack came to shift from Srdj to the wider

20 city of Dubrovnik, including the Old Town. The most intense shelling

21 occurred in the morning between 0900-0930 and about 1100 hours. At about

22 1115 hours a considerable drop in the frequency of the shelling occurred.

23 This lull was not long-lived, however, and shelling picked up again to

24 continue, though more sporadically. Shelling decreased noticeably a

25 little after 1500 hours and had substantially ceased by a little after

1 1630 hours. The shelling of Dubrovnik, including the Old Town, had

2 continued for over ten and a half hours on 6 December 1991.

3 On 6 December 1991, the JNA attempted to capture Srdj. The

4 attempt commenced between 0500 and 0600 hours on 6 December, under cover

5 of darkness. It was undertaken by two small infantry units of the 3rd

6 Battalion, 472 Brigade of the JNA. Each had close tank support. Less

7 than 40 soldiers made the attack. Even so, the defending Croatian forces

8 on Srdj were outnumbered. The JNA infantry and artillery actions that

9 day were overseen and coordinated by the commander of the 3rd Battalion,

10 472 Brigade, Captain Kovacevic, who was located at his observation post

11 on Zarkovica, a small plateau about 2 kilometres to the south-east of the

12 Old Town, with clear views to the north-west of Dubrovnik, especially the

13 Old Town and Srdj.

14 A little before 0600 hours, more than half an hour before

15 sunrise, JNA units commenced the mortar and other artillery barrage. At

16 first, the principal target was Srdj. As the two attacking units

17 approached Srdj, they came under defensive fire from Srdj. In time,

18 Croatian 82-millimetre mortar and machine-gun fire was commenced from the

19 wider city of Dubrovnik, but not from the Old Town, against the attacking

20 troops. As the JNA troops attacking Srdj came under increasing fire,

21 some JNA artillery fire was targeted at Croatian firing positions in the

22 wider city of Dubrovnik in an attempt to neutralise them.

23 By about 0800 hours, the JNA attacking forces had approached

24 sufficiently close to Srdj to be themselves threatened by the JNA

25 artillery barrage on Srdj. The barrage of Srdj was called off so that

1 the JNA troops could continue to advance. They were, however, still

2 under mortar attack from Croatian positions in the wider city of

3 Dubrovnik as well as defensive fire from Srdj. While there had been some

4 shelling by the JNA of Dubrovnik including the Old Town virtually from

5 the commencement of fire by JNA batteries, from the time of the cessation

6 of the JNA artillery barrage on Srdj at about 0800 hours, the full force

7 of the active JNA mortars and other artillery, including Maljutka rockets

8 or missiles, appears to have been directed at Dubrovnik including the Old

9 Town. There was no adequate control and direction of the fire of the JNA

10 mortars and other weapons. Fire was not confined to Croatian military

11 targets. Instead, they fired extensively, deliberately, and

12 indiscriminately at Dubrovnik, including the Old Town. This continued

13 for many hours, as has been indicated.

14 The infantry attack on Srdj was the scene of very intense and

15 desperate close combat by both Croatian and JNA forces. There were

16 fatalities and other casualties on both sides. The Croatian defenders

17 withdrew into positions underground in the stone fortress on Srdj and

18 called in Croatian mortar and other fire on the attacking JNA forces

19 surrounding the fortress. Attempts to overcome the Croatian defenders or

20 to force them to capitulate were made over many hours, but without

21 success. Eventually, after 1400 hours the exhausted attacking JNA forces

22 called off the attempt to capture Srdj and withdrew with tank support

23 under cover of another JNA mortar barrage on Srdj. The withdrawal was

24 completed by a little after 1500 hours. The attempt to capture Srdj had

25 failed. The JNA artillery attack on Dubrovnik, including the Old Town,

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1 had continued thought the attempt to capture Srdj.

2 It was a position advanced by the Defence at trial, as indeed it

3 was an explanation of the JNA attack on Srdj and the artillery attack on

4 the Old Town offered by the JNA in December 1991, that the attack was

5 undertaken solely on the decision of Captain Kovacevic of the 3rd

6 Battalion, 472 Brigade, a decision he made impulsively and contrary to

7 superior orders early in the morning of 6 December 1991. The reason

8 suggested for this remarkable conduct was that during the night of 5 and

9 6 December, Croatian forces at Srdj had offered provocations by firing at

10 his troops, killing one. He lost his self-control and ordered the attack

11 in an emotional response to the conduct of the Croatian forces.

12 It is the finding of the Chamber that this is entirely false.

13 Late in the afternoon on 5 December 1991 a meeting was held in the

14 forward command post of the 9 VPS at Kupari. The 3rd Battalion of the

15 472 Brigade was then under the command of the 9 VPS, commanded by Admiral

16 Jokic. Senior 9 VPS staff officers, including the chief of staff,

17 Warship-Captain Zec, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Captain

18 Kovacevic, and the commanders of other 9 VPS units were present at the

19 meeting. At the meeting a battle plan to take Srdj the following morning

20 and before 1200 hours was determined. Srdj was the dominant feature and

21 the one remaining position held by Croatian forces on the heights above

22 Dubrovnik. The plan involved the use of mortars and other artillery

23 against military targets, including those in the wider Dubrovnik as

24 required, to support the assault on Srdj. It involved 9 VPS units other

25 than the 3rd Battalion, 472nd Brigade. The evidence establishes, in the

1 Chamber's finding, that the attack on Srdj was entirely pre-planned and

2 coordinated on 5 December 1991 by 9 VPS staff officers and was not

3 initiated by Captain Kovacevic alone in the early morning of 6 December

4 1991 in response to provocations that night by the Croatian forces.

5 On 6 December 1991, repeated protests against the JNA artillery

6 attack on Dubrovnik, especially the Old Town, by Minister Rudolf leading

7 the Croatian ministerial delegation, the European Community Monitoring

8 Mission, ECMM, and the civil authorities of Dubrovnik were made variously

9 to the 9 VPS, to the accused, and in Belgrade to the Federal Secretary of

10 Defence, General Kadijevic. These were entirely ineffective to stop the

11 artillery attack.

12 In the Chamber's finding, however, a protest by the ECMM to

13 General Kadijevic led him to telephone the accused between 0600 and 0700

14 hours. The accused in turn, at around 0700 hours, telephoned Admiral

15 Jokic. These events and what passed between the accused and Admiral

16 Jokic at the time and later in the day are the subject of much

17 controversy in the evidence. It is unnecessary for present purposes to

18 attempt to summarise all the Chamber's consideration of these matters and

19 its reasons for the conclusions it has reached. The Chamber would

20 particularly note its finding, however, that at no time during the

21 morning of 6 December 1991 did either the accused or Admiral Jokic order

22 that the JNA attack to capture Srdj should cease. There were discussions

23 between Admiral Jokic and Minister Rudolf in the morning in which they

24 agreed to a cease-fire to take effect at 1115 hours. Following this, the

25 accused did order a cease-fire. This order only went to some JNA units.

1 In particular, there was no order given to the infantry units trying to

2 capture Srdj to cease their attack. As was inevitable because the JNA

3 attack on Srdj continued and not all JNA artillery units ceased fire, the

4 cease-fire was ineffective and both sides continued firing.

5 No further steps were taken by either the accused or Admiral

6 Jokic to stop the artillery attack on the Old Town or any other aspect of

7 the JNA assault. Instead, the accused and Admiral Jokic flew together to

8 Belgrade in the afternoon. General Kadijevic had ordered them to do so

9 that morning when the ECMM protest reached him. The three met in the

10 afternoon, the accused and Admiral Jokic returning to their commands at

11 about 1730 hours. It is apparent that the JNA was in what is

12 colloquially described as damage-control mode at that stage in respect of

13 the attack on Dubrovnik, especially the Old Town. The attack had

14 promoted immediate strong and adverse reaction.

15 Admiral Jokic was in immediate command of all the JNA forces

16 involved in the attack that day. He was also in communication with the

17 Croatian and international representatives. He was assigned the task of

18 trying to repair the damage and sort things out. He proposed an inquiry

19 which was an obvious step in deflecting adverse international opinion.

20 What followed, in the finding of the Chamber, evidenced the tenor and the

21 effect of the understanding or instructions Admiral Jokic took from the

22 Belgrade meeting. The next morning he signed a cease-fire agreement.

23 His immediate actions were to give unqualified assurances, citing the

24 authority of General Kadijevic, of a thorough investigation and action to

25 deal with the perpetrators, to Minister Rudolf, the Dubrovnik crisis

1 committee, and the ECMM. He quickly conducted what the Chamber has found

2 was a sham inquiry. He reported briefly to the Federal Secretariat on

3 the steps he took and generally on the action of 6 December 1991, in a

4 way which was quite out of keeping with the facts as revealed by the

5 evidence, so as to put the conduct of the JNA forces in a more favourable

6 light. The next day a commission of three 9 VPS officers visited the Old

7 Town to report on the damage. Admiral Jokic endorsed their report, which

8 sought to minimise the nature and extent of the damage and deflect

9 responsibility for its cause from the JNA. On the evening of 6 December

10 1991, he removed one acting battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel

11 Jovanovic of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Brigade, from his post. Strangely,

12 Lieutenant Colonel Jovanovic had only held this acting post for one day.

13 He was returned to his normal duties without any adverse disciplinary or

14 other action. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade had no responsibility

15 for the shelling of the Old Town, as the Old Town was beyond the range of

16 its mortars. Admiral Jokic took no other disciplinary or administrative

17 action to better determine the truth of what had occurred or to deal with

18 those responsible. The Chamber notes that no further investigative or

19 disciplinary action was undertaken by his immediate superior, the

20 accused, or in turn the accused's superior, General Kadijevic.

21 Numerous propositions were advanced as to why the Old Town came

22 to be shelled on 6 December 1991. In particular, in the course of the

23 Defence case, the view was pursued that in truth there had been little or

24 no damage to the Old Town. The Chamber, however, is satisfied by the

25 evidence there was extensive damage and that it extended over substantial

1 areas of the Old Town. One other position for which the Defence

2 contended was that any damage, alternatively some of the damage, to the

3 Old Town was in fact deliberately or accidentally inflicted by the

4 Croatian defending forces or other Croatian interests. However, there is

5 a strong body of evidence, indeed an overwhelming body, that the damage

6 inflicted in and to the Old Town of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991 was

7 caused by the JNA shelling.

8 Yet a further Defence submission and one which is somewhat

9 inconsistent with the submissions we have just been considering is that

10 any damage to the Old Town on 6 December 1991 was a regrettable but

11 unavoidable consequence of artillery fire of the JNA targeted at Croatian

12 military positions in and in the immediate vicinity of the Old Town. In

13 part, the JNA forces did target Croatian firing and other military

14 positions, actual or believed, in the wider Dubrovnik. But none of them

15 were in the Old Town. Despite some contrary evidence, these Croatian

16 positions were all too distant from the Old Town to put it in danger of

17 unintended incidental fall of JNA shells targeted at those Croatian

18 positions.

19 It is the finding of the Chamber that the cause of the

20 established damage to the Old Town was extensive, deliberate, and

21 indiscriminate shelling of the Old Town over some ten and a half hours on

22 6 December 1991, not only by JNA mortars but also by other JNA weapons

23 such as ZIS and recoilless cannons and Maljutka rockets.

24 Turning now to the specific charges. The indictment alleges the

25 murder of two civilians in the course of the attack. In this respect,

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1 the Chamber observes that where a town occupied by a civilian population

2 is subjected to a deliberate artillery attack which results in civilian

3 deaths, these deaths may constitute murder when the perpetrators had

4 knowledge of the probability that the attack would cause deaths. The

5 Chamber is satisfied that the fact and the cause of death are established

6 for both civilians. The actual JNA perpetrators deliberately targeted

7 the Old Town, knowing it had a civilian population. The elements of

8 murder have been established against those perpetrators.

9 The indictment further alleges an offence of cruel treatment

10 against two victims. Similar allegations relating to a third victim were

11 dismissed in the Chamber's decision on Rule 98 bis. The elements of the

12 crime of cruel treatment have been established against the actual JNA

13 perpetrators.

14 Offences of unlawful attacks on civilians and on civilian objects

15 are also charged. On 6 December 1991, the evidence is unequivocal that

16 the Old Town was, as it still is, a living town. Though a world

17 protected heritage site, it has a substantial resident population of

18 between 7.000 and 8.000. As stated earlier, the Chamber has found that

19 the Old Town was extensively targeted by JNA artillery and other weapons

20 on 6 December 1991 and that no military firing points or other objects,

21 real or believed, in the Old Town were targeted by the JNA. In the

22 Chamber's finding, the intent of the perpetrators was to target the

23 civilian population and civilian objects in the Old Town. The elements

24 of these two offences have therefore been established against the actual

25 JNA perpetrators.

1 With respect to the crime of devastation not justified by

2 military necessity and the crime of destruction of cultural property, the

3 allegation against the accused following the Rule 98 bis decision was

4 that damage or destruction was sustained by 116 specified buildings and

5 structures in the course of the 6 December shelling of the Old Town of

6 Dubrovnik. The Chamber finds that of those 116 buildings and structures,

7 it has been established that 52 were damaged, six of them being

8 destroyed, during the 6 December shelling of the Old Town by the JNA.

9 The nature and extent of the damage to these buildings varied. Moreover,

10 while several of the 52 buildings and structures had sustained some

11 degree of damage from earlier shelling in October and November, the

12 Chamber is satisfied that the previously damaged buildings sustained

13 further and significant damage during the 6 December attack.

14 In relation to the charge of devastation, the Chamber finds that

15 the Old Town sustained damage on a large scale on 6 December 1991. In

16 relation to the charge of destruction of cultural property, the Old Town

17 of Dubrovnik in its entirety was entered onto the World Heritage List in

18 1979 so that every building of the Old Town, including its walls, are

19 properly characterised as cultural property. It has also been

20 established that there were no military objectives in the immediate

21 vicinity of the 52 buildings and structures destroyed or damaged on 6

22 December 1991 or in the Old Town or in its immediate vicinity so that the

23 destruction or damage of property in the Old Town on 6 December 1991 was

24 not justified by military necessity. The elements of these two crimes

25 have been established against the actual JNA perpetrators.

1 The Chamber now turns to the crucial question: whether the

2 accused is proved to be personally criminally responsible for the

3 artillery attack on the Old Town, or indirectly criminally responsible as

4 commander of the 2OG for the conduct of the JNA troops who were the

5 actual perpetrators of these offences. It is established that all the

6 JNA forces involved in the military action at Dubrovnik on 6 December

7 1991 were components of or subjugated to the 9 VPS which was commanded by

8 Admiral Jokic on 6 December 1991. Further, the 9 VPS was in turn under

9 the operational command of the 2OG which was commanded by the accused.

10 As their superior commander, the accused had both legal and effective

11 control of the JNA forces which conducted the military action at

12 Dubrovnik, including the shelling of the Old Town.

13 The evidence does not establish, however, that the accused

14 ordered the shelling of the Old Town which occurred on 6 December 1991.

15 What is established is that the accused did order the attempt to capture

16 Srdj, which was undertaken on 6 December 1991. In the written judgement,

17 the Chamber has dealt with the evidence which establishes this and also

18 some evidence which sought to suggest that this was not so. In

19 particular, the Chamber accepts the evidence of Colm Doyle, then in

20 charge of the ECMM monitors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of a conversation

21 he had with the accused on 6 December 1991 shortly after midday, the

22 effect of which, in the finding of the Chamber, was an admission by the

23 accused that he had ordered the attack on Srdj. The actual words of the

24 accused could be understood to suggest that he ordered the shelling of

25 the Old Town. But for reasons set out in the written judgement, that is

1 not the finding of the Chamber. The accused, however, left the detailed

2 planning of the attack on Srdj to the 9 VPS, whose forces surrounded

3 Dubrovnik, and this is what occurred on late 5 December 1991.

4 While the circumstances known to the accused at the time of his

5 order to attack Srdj can only have alerted him to the possibility that as

6 had occurred in October and November his forces would once again ignore

7 orders and resort to deliberate and indiscriminate shelling, especially

8 of the Old Town, it has not been established that it was known to the

9 accused that at the time of his order there was a substantial likelihood

10 of this occurring. It has not been proved, therefore, that the accused

11 is guilty of ordering the attack on the Old Town.

12 The Chamber finds that it has not been proved that the accused

13 aided and abet the unlawful shelling of the Old Town. In particular,

14 while the accused did not take all necessary and reasonable measures to

15 ensure that the shelling ceased, he did issue a cease-fire order to take

16 effect at 1115 hours, although this order was not implemented

17 effectively. Further, the necessary mental element for aiding and

18 abetting is not established. It has not been proved, therefore, that the

19 accused is personally criminally liable for the attack pursuant to

20 Article 7(1) of the Statute.

21 We now deal with the accused's responsibility as commander of the

22 2OG pursuant to Article 7(3). On 6 December 1991, the accused had the

23 legal authority and the material ability to issue orders to the 3rd

24 Battalion, 472nd Brigade and all the other JNA forces involved in the

25 attack on Srdj and the shelling of Dubrovnik, including the Old Town, to

1 ensure that the Old Town was not shelled and that an existing attack

2 ceased. In the Chamber's finding, from about 0700 hours on 6 December

3 1991 the accused was on notice because of events detailed in the written

4 judgement of the clear and strong risk that already his JNA artillery was

5 repeating itself conduct and shelling the Old Town. By that time, the

6 risk that this was occurring was so real and the implications were so

7 serious that the accused should have seen the urgent need to determine

8 whether the JNA artillery was in fact shelling the Old Town without

9 justification, and if so to ensure the attack on the Old Town was

10 stopped. He did not do so. In particular, the finding of the Chamber is

11 that the accused did not give an order to Admiral Jokic at about 0700

12 hours on 6 December 1991 to stop the attack on Srdj. The Chamber has

13 already indicated an order to cease fire with effect from 1115 hours was

14 given to some JNA artillery units, but not all, and the troops trying to

15 capture Srdj were not ordered to cease their attack at 1115 hours.

16 The evidence further establishes, in the Chamber's finding, and

17 despite strong submissions to the contrary, that after the attack the

18 accused at all times had full authority to act himself, to investigate,

19 and to take disciplinary or other adverse action against the perpetrators

20 of the attack on the Old Town and also to require Admiral Jokic to take

21 more effective measures. Despite this, the accused chose to take no

22 action of any type. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that the elements

23 required for establishing the accused's responsibility under Article 7(3)

24 of the Statute, as the superior commander of the JNA forces who

25 perpetrated the unlawful shelling of the Old Town on 6 December 1991 have

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1 been proved. He failed to stop the attack on 6 December when he could

2 and should have done so, and afterwards he failed to ensure that the

3 perpetrators were punished.

4 In the present case, the elements of each of the six counts in

5 the indictment have been established. The Chamber observes, however,

6 that the essential criminal conduct was an artillery attack against the

7 Old Town. In the course of that attack, civilians were killed and

8 injured and protected buildings were damaged and destroyed. It is the

9 view of the Chamber that the essential criminal conduct is directly and

10 comprehensively reflected in counts 3 and 6, and that the interests of

11 justice and of sentencing are fully satisfied if convictions are recorded

12 only for those two offences.

13 General Strugar, would you please stand.

14 [The accused stands]

15 The Chamber finds you guilty pursuant to Article 7(3) of the

16 Statute of the following two counts:

17 Count 3: Attacks on civilians, a violation of the laws or

18 customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute;

19 and Count 6: Destruction or wilful damage done to institutions

20 dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences,

21 historic monuments and works or art and science, a violation of the laws

22 or customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute.

23 While the Chamber is satisfied that the elements of the following

24 four counts have been established pursuant to Article 7(3) of the

25 Statute, the Chamber does not record a finding of guilty against you in

1 respect of:

2 Count 1: Murder;

3 Count 2: Cruel treatment;

4 Count 4: Devastation not justified by military necessity;

5 Count 5: Unlawful attack on civilian objects.

6 Further, the Chamber does not find you guilty pursuant to Article

7 7(1) of the Statute in respect of any one of the six counts.

8 The Chamber has set out in some detail in the written judgement

9 the factors it has taken into account in determining sentence. In

10 particular, it has been conscious of the serious nature of the attack on

11 the Old Town of Dubrovnik and the consequences for its inhabitants and

12 for the cultural properties damaged or destroyed in the attack. The

13 Chamber would emphasise that you are not to be sentenced for ordering the

14 attack on the Old Town. Your criminal liability arises because you

15 failed to take adequate measures to stop the shelling of the Old Town and

16 because you failed to ensure that those responsible for the attack were

17 disciplined. In these regards, you were not the immediate commander of

18 those responsible; that was Admiral Jokic. You were Admiral Jokic's

19 superior and therefore one step further removed.

20 The Chamber takes into account that Admiral Jokic has pleaded

21 guilty to offences arising from his part in the attack on the Old Town

22 and has been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The Chamber takes

23 into account in particular your age and health, which is deteriorating,

24 and other mitigating factors which have been set out in the written

25 judgement.

1 The Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of eight

2 years imprisonment.

3 You can sit down.

4 [The accused sits down]

5 The accused has been in custody for 457 days. Pursuant to Rule

6 101(C) of the Rules, he is entitled to credit for the time spent in

7 detention so far.

8 Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, the accused shall remain in

9 the custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for

10 his transfer to the state where he will serve his sentence.

11 The hearing is adjourned.

12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.00 p.m.

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