Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3961

 1                           Tuesday, 17 August 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody --

 6             [B/C/S on English channel]

 7             We are all looking forward to the next stage of our trial and

 8     hope that -- the Chamber hopes that we will be able to proceed in the

 9     same constructive way as we did before the summer recess.  And we hope

10     that you were able to enjoy the break we all had, but now we are back to

11     our business as usual, and we will proceed in the appropriate way.

12             Before the witness we know already could be brought in, we would

13     like to deal with a specific problem.

14             But first of all we have to turn to private session.

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20                           [Open session]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

23             There's another problem we have to discuss.

24             Last Friday, the 13th of August, the accused filed a reply to the

25     responses of the Trial -- and the Prosecutor and a request regarding the

Page 3970

 1     trial schedule.  This contains a request for a redaction in the trial

 2     schedule from four days to three days per week.  The Chamber would like

 3     to ask the Prosecution when it could file a response.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm prepared to respond orally if the

 5     Court wants to save a little bit of paper and time.  I think our -- I can

 6     say that our response -- our position is the same as it was, I believe,

 7     back in June when the accused challenged the Trial Chamber's decision to

 8     increase the number of sitting days in June.

 9             There accrue severe difficulties in scheduling witnesses on a

10     two-day-a-week schedule.  There's -- and three days a week isn't much

11     better, frankly, in terms of trying to have people arrange their lives

12     from far-flung parts of the world to come here for three or even four

13     days a week, particularly when the sitting days aren't necessarily

14     contiguous, like from a Thursday/Friday to Monday/Tuesday.  If it's a

15     Monday/Tuesday/Wednesday sitting and then the following week is

16     Wednesday/Thursday/Friday, they end up being here for close to two weeks,

17     typically, at a minimum.

18             So three days a week is also and has been very arduous on the

19     witnesses.  We're -- and again, we're having problems even on a

20     four-day-a-week schedule, frankly.  That is not so hard, but what

21     compounds the problem - and this is our own little quibble that's

22     somewhat related to the issue but I'll throw it out there anyway - is

23     when we do not have a monthly court calendar.  And I understand all the

24     Trial Chambers have to provide their input to Registry and then we get

25     the final calendar for each month, roughly around the 15th of the month.

Page 3971

 1     It makes it very difficult to schedule witnesses because we don't know

 2     whether we're sitting on a Monday or a Friday of the week.  And then they

 3     don't -- we can't make even the simplest travel arrangements to get them

 4     here.

 5             All that to say, our position remains what it was back in June.

 6     We understand that the accused complains of continued waking every

 7     30 minutes by the Detention Unit.  Our position remains the same.  We've

 8     seen the effects that that -- that has on our own witnesses in terms of

 9     their concentration and their well-being.  And unless there is some

10     justifiable, penological, health/medical reason for it, we can't see how

11     it's justified.  So our position on that issue.  And I understand that's

12     a component of the accused's most recent request to go down to three

13     days.

14             The bottom line is:  We'll live with whatever the Trial Chamber

15     tells us will be the number of sitting days.  Two days would be too

16     difficult.  I don't think the accused is even asking for two days.  Three

17     days we can live with, but I would just ask the Trial Chamber to

18     recognise the problems that it creates for our witnesses.  And as we

19     said, I think, in our June filing, we trust the Trial Chamber to adjust

20     the number of sitting days consistent with the accused's mental and

21     physical health situation and his rights to self representation.  And

22     I'll leave our position at that, but I think that's it in a nutshell.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber will make a decision very soon.

24     There are other decisions pending, and we will render them in the next

25     days.  But we have to decide about this week.  Taking into account the

Page 3972

 1     arrangements that have already been made for this week, the Trial Chamber

 2     is inclined to sit as planned on four days this week.  But the general

 3     problem will be dealt with in the decision, written decision, quite soon.

 4             Is there anything else by the parties to raise now?  Then the --

 5     Mr. Tolimir.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Since

 7     you have just emphasised the decision that you delivered in written

 8     form - I don't want to influence that - I would just like to remind you

 9     that I should be ensured equal conditions during the trial, and I should

10     be allowed to prepare just like in the past.  I don't intend to obstruct

11     the trial.  If you so decide, I can decide not to cross-examine the

12     witnesses and shorten the duration of the trial from four to three days.

13     But I don't want to obstruct the trial, but I would like to emphasise

14     that it is very difficult for me to prepare for the four days of the

15     trial.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  The Chamber will take that

17     position into account.

18             The witness should be brought in, please.

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President --

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

21             MR. THAYER: -- while that's happening -- they can continue; I

22     have just another housekeeping matter with respect to ongoing

23     translations which are now in e-court.

24             For the record, I can say that the following have been uploaded

25     into e-court:  P162C, P132, P143, P188, P189, P268, P424, P499, P519,

Page 3973

 1     P521, P522, P525, and P589.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  They will be now exhibits,

 3     no longer pending translation, marked for identification.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Welcome back again to the Tribunal.  I think

 8     there's a translation into Dutch provided.

 9             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  So that we can now continue with your examination

11     after a long break during the summer.

12             May I remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth you made

13     at the beginning of your testimony still applies.  And Mr. Tolimir has

14     some more questions for you.

15             Mr. Tolimir, please continue your cross-examination.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             I would like to greet everybody in the courtroom as well as

18     Mr. Nicolai, and I wish him a pleasant stay amongst us here in the

19     courtroom.  And may this trial end according to God's will.

20                           WITNESS:  CORNELIS NICOLAI [Resumed]

21                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

23        Q.   [Interpretation] As we continue, I would like us to look at the

24     statement that you provided on the 18th November 2006 [as interpreted].

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the exhibit number is D70, and

Page 3974

 1     the page number is 2.  Thank you.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   While we are waiting for the document to appear on the screen, I

 4     would like to remind you that in the statement you spoke about the

 5     preparations you underwent at the Dutch Institute for International

 6     Relations, and there you learned about the background of the conflict and

 7     that you were trained during a course or a seminar.  And we will now look

 8     at page 2 so you can see what you actually stated there.  You said that

 9     that had transpired about a month before you assumed your duties with

10     UNPROFOR.  Is that correct or not?  Thank you.

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  My question is this:  Before you were educated during

13     the courses you mentioned on page 2, had you had any information about

14     the history of the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia?

15     Thank you.

16        A.   Yes.  In any case, because the Netherlands was represented in the

17     mission in Yugoslavia for quite some time, so of course as an officer I

18     was interested in the nature of the conflict and how it came about and

19     what our role would be in that.  And before I became Chief of Staff, I

20     was on a visit to Yugoslavia for several months in another capacity as a

21     deputy director of staff.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Was that within UNPROFOR or within your own military?

23        A.   The previous visits were in the context of my own military.

24        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Do you think that a month was enough

25     for you to prepare for such a responsible duty and such responsible tasks

Page 3975

 1     that you discharged in the course of 1995; or perhaps you think that the

 2     course should have taken longer than that?

 3        A.   No.  I think that was sufficient.  The office that I served in

 4     was a purely military office.  I wasn't going there as a Yugoslavia

 5     expert, but as the Chief of Staff of the military headquarters.  And

 6     given the specific nature of the mission, of course it's always good to

 7     examine the material a bit more.  But I believe that the additional

 8     information I received was sufficient to equip me for my office as Chief

 9     of Staff.

10        Q.   Thank you.  You are discussing two institutions, one was the

11     institute and the other was the course for peacekeeping forces.  What do

12     you think; where did you gain more knowledge?  Was it at the institute or

13     at the course for peacekeeping forces?  And when you answer that, could

14     you please brief us about the contents of the education that you received

15     at both these institutions.  Thank you.

16        A.   Well, it was a long time ago.  I learned the most from the course

17     at the Clingendael Institute.  Two subjects were the most important, as

18     far as I was concerned.  First something was taught about the background

19     and origins of the conflict and the involvement of the Security Council

20     and the Security Council Resolutions that applied to that conflict.  Of

21     course, that was very useful knowledge.  And then we were also trained in

22     negotiation techniques and worked with an interpreter, and I greatly

23     benefitted from that in practice as well.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And what about the other members of DutchBat, did

25     they also have to undergo the same training courses that you undertook

Page 3976

 1     before being dispatched to Yugoslavia, or was attending such courses

 2     reserved only for the highest-ranking officers of UNPROFOR?  Thank you.

 3        A.   The courses that I attended were primarily intended for

 4     higher-ranking officers, not only for generals but also for the rest of

 5     the team that travelled with me to the headquarters.  At any rate, the

 6     officers from that headquarters attended the same course.  DutchBat had

 7     an entirely different role.  And for the record, I was not part of

 8     DutchBat.  DutchBat went there as a military unit, a peacekeeping force,

 9     and they were trained in entirely different way.  They certainly wouldn't

10     have had enough training in one month, so they were given almost a year

11     to prepare for the tasks they would be performing in Yugoslavia.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Just briefly, can you tell us about the picture you

13     gained about the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia based

14     on the education.  And then when you actually came to Yugoslavia, did

15     that picture change, in view of the duties that you discharged?

16        A.   Well, that's a difficult question.  I believe that the impression

17     conveyed during the course of the conflict corresponded well with what I

18     found in practice; some population groups that had great trouble

19     co-existing, and that had to be resolved.  At that time, the solution was

20     to keep them separate as much as we could and to ensure that they didn't

21     bother each other.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did you peruse any special literature during those

23     courses which provided you with an insight into the background of the

24     conflict and the history of the territory where you were deployed?

25        A.   Yes.  Well, I didn't have that much time to prepare, so I believe

Page 3977

 1     I read two books about the history.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Any title that you can remember?  Any book that you

 3     can remember?

 4        A.   No.  I could check for you because I still have them at home, but

 5     I don't know it off the top of my head.

 6        Q.   I apologise for having asked you this, but the answer would have

 7     clarified the matter.

 8             In your statement you said that you sent -- or, rather, that you

 9     were provided with daily reports and log-books.  That's what you stated.

10     Could you please tell us what log-books, what daily reports those were

11     that were given to you to peruse during the education course?  You can

12     find this in the last sentence of the second paragraph, briefing papers

13     and sitreps on the current situation.

14        A.   Yes.  As I believe is standard practice in every military in the

15     world, during a conflict daily sitreps are issued, summing up the events

16     of the day; and generally at the end an assessment is added to assess how

17     the situation might develop from there or a recommendation about

18     advisable courses of action.  We received the daily reports from the

19     sector commanders.  There were three sectors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

20     the commanders reported daily to the headquarters in Sarajevo.

21             The same happened with the UNMOs, the military observers, that

22     also reported to the UNMO head that was also part of the staff in

23     Sarajevo.  And there was another reporting system within UNHCR which --

24     that's not a military unit, but the representative UNHCR did attend our

25     daily morning meetings.  And if anything special had happened within

Page 3978

 1     UNHCR, that was mentioned there as well.  And as for the -- we didn't

 2     receive official reports from the International Red Cross, but in their

 3     morning briefing -- at the morning briefing they always had a

 4     representative present.  So if anything noteworthy had happened, then

 5     that would be mentioned at that morning briefing as well.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can you at all remember -- you said that you received

 7     reading material including briefing papers and sitreps before you even

 8     went to Bosnia.  Could you please tell us what kind of reading material

 9     did you receive, what kind of briefing papers and sitreps?  Thank you.

10        A.   Before I was deployed, I did not receive reports.  I was only

11     briefed upon arrival by my predecessor.  And before my departure, I was

12     briefed by that predecessor who was the deputy commander at -- with the

13     armed forces at the time.

14        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Before you were deployed in Bosnia, did

15     you receive any political instructions or guidance from the UNPROFOR

16     police or from the Dutch government about the conflict in the area where

17     you were being deployed?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did you receive just information about UNPROFOR in

20     the entire territory of Bosnia or the entire territory of the former

21     Yugoslavia, or just in the territory specified in your statement?

22        A.   Yes, I had some information.  And during my term we received some

23     information about Croatia or what was happening in Croatia, but the bulk

24     was focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And that's what I received the most

25     information about.  And we followed the course of events the closest

Page 3979

 1     there, too.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  My following question concern passage

 3     number 4, the last sentence in that passage where it says that your duty

 4     was to brief the commander about the entire situation.  What do you mean?

 5     And what information, what intelligence, did you convey to General Smith

 6     when you refer to the current situation that the commander had to be

 7     fully aware of?

 8        A.   Well, basically, the staff followed exactly what was happening

 9     that day, and throughout the day incidental reports would arrive and

10     regular reports at agreed times.  And based on that we were able to

11     ascertain what was happening on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory.  At

12     the end of the day, we always had an evening meeting chaired by

13     General Smith with his most important staff, officers, where he would be

14     informed about the main events of the day.  In the course of the evening,

15     he would then receive written reports.  But basically the idea was to

16     provide additional details.  And the most important things had already

17     been brought to his attention orally.

18        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  You're mostly referring to written

19     reports and also what was mentioned at those meetings.  Could you please

20     explain, for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, who sent you information

21     about the current situation from the field?  And when you conveyed that

22     information to General Smith, was it only orally or did you also have to

23     submit written reports to him?

24        A.   Well, I'll basically repeat what I stated earlier.  At regular

25     times, written reports were drafted daily.  This happened at every level

Page 3980

 1     of command.  Each level reported to the level above.  So in Sarajevo

 2     every day at fixed times we received written reports from the three

 3     sector commanders, and they would be compressed into one comprehensive

 4     report that we would convey to Zagreb.  But before that report was sent

 5     to Zagreb, of course it had to be approved by the commander,

 6     General Smith.

 7             Aside from that written information, every evening at those staff

 8     meetings the most important staff officers and the heads of the different

 9     sections reported what had happened under their area of responsibility.

10     That was discussed.  And based on that, a joint assessment was made as to

11     how the situation would develop from there and how we as UNPROFOR staff

12     in Sarajevo should anticipate.  And at the end, agreements were reached

13     regarding what we would disclose to the media, and that ended the

14     meeting.

15             And in the morning something similar happened with all the

16     reports that had arrived during the night; they would be processed as

17     well at the morning meeting.  Many staff officers attended that morning

18     meeting so that everybody was brought up to speed at the start of the day

19     about the current situation and what important things would be happening,

20     at least as far as the UNPROFOR staff could tell.

21             So that way, twice a day, everybody was brought fully up to

22     speed.  Nonetheless, if something really important happened, information

23     would be supplied during the interim either to the high-ranking staff

24     officers or to the commander, but then it had to be something exceptional

25     that it was so important that it couldn't possibly wait until the regular

Page 3981

 1     staff meeting.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  When it comes to daily reporting and

 3     daily written report, did those include reports about Zepa and

 4     Srebrenica, especially during those critical days in the month of July?

 5        A.   Yes, of course.  At that point, from our perspective, the most

 6     important events were taking place, and they were obviously subject of

 7     conversation at every daily meeting.

 8        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Were those descriptions, or was that

 9     reporting about the events that transpired every day?  What did you

10     include in your daily reports?

11        A.   Well, of course what had happened in those areas, any hostilities

12     that had taken place, shootings, whether there were injuries or whether

13     anybody had been killed, whether existing agreements had been violated,

14     how the supplies were.  Basically anything that was relevant on the one

15     hand for the military units in those areas to perform their duties, as

16     well as the well-being of the local population and the course of the

17     parties that were fighting each other.  It takes little imagination to

18     figure out that these would be the topics of conversation.  And, of

19     course, depending on what happened, afterwards it was discussed how we

20     should respond as UNPROFOR.

21             And I've already said, ordinarily we had two meetings a day, but

22     when the situation became very serious, especially in Srebrenica, from

23     Sunday the 9th General Gobillard went from his headquarters to our

24     headquarters in Sarajevo and he was present basically throughout the day

25     to keep track of the situation.  Through 12 July, multiple meetings took

Page 3982

 1     place each day and the course of events was very closely followed.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  I have one more question so that we can

 3     round off this subject.  Your command, the UNPROFOR command in Bosnia,

 4     did it have an intelligence service; and if so, what were its tasks and

 5     assignments, and in what way did it provide you with daily information

 6     and reports?  Thank you.

 7        A.   As UNPROFOR, we did not have a specific intelligence service.

 8     Every unit has an intelligence officer, though, who tries to gather

 9     information in all possible ways.  And the intelligence officer at the

10     Sarajevo headquarters was in touch with other levels, including the air

11     force, the headquarters in Naples, and other sources such as satellite

12     information and photographic reconnaissance were available to him.

13        Q.   General, since you spoke about anticipating events - or that's

14     how I understood it in your previous answer - could you use the

15     intelligence information, the intelligence you were getting from the

16     headquarters in Naples, for example, or the facilities you had for

17     interception, in compiling your prognosis of events?  Thank you.

18        A.   Well, that would be the -- can you hear me?  That's the standard

19     procedure, to gather all information from whatever sources and to compare

20     and to review whether the information is sufficiently reliable for

21     decision-making on that basis.  And I'm certain that General Tolimir,

22     with his background in intelligence, knows exactly how this works.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  It's not my intention to ask you anything

24     which would enter into any professional part of your life, but I just

25     wanted to know how you could arrive at information that are relevant for

Page 3983

 1     this trial and how I can now get the information I need to conduct my

 2     defence case at this trial, but thank you.

 3             Now, would you take a look at paragraph 6 of your statement,

 4     which is on page 2.  And there you talk about the new aspects.  You say:

 5             "A new aspect for me in my position was dealing with politicians

 6     and NGOs."

 7             And you go on to say that you had to negotiate with them.  Now,

 8     my question to you is as follows:  Those negotiations with the

 9     politicians, did they deal with daily reports on the basis of which later

10     on you informed one another at the meetings with General Smith and the

11     reports you sent further on to Zagreb, and what weight did they carry

12     with respect to the other events that were happening on the ground?

13     Thank you.

14        A.   When there were negotiations with politicians, these negotiations

15     could be about various issues:  They could concern our restoration of

16     infrastructure and either UNHCR and/or NGOs might be involved in those

17     and sometimes UNPROFOR served in a mediating capacity; they could also be

18     about supplying areas that were isolated, for example, through supply

19     flights or convoys; they could also relate to exchanges of POWs between

20     the different parties or exchanging casualties or injured or transporting

21     injured.  There could be a range of topics, ranging from very basic daily

22     events that needed to be resolved.  And that sometimes required decisions

23     at very high levels through negotiations about signing treaties between

24     the different parties.  So there was a wide range that covered

25     everything.

Page 3984

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now for me to be able to ask my

 3     next question, may we turn to page 3 of this statement so that the

 4     General can take a look at what it says in the last paragraph on page 3

 5     in both the Serbian and English version.  Thank you.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Here's what you say.  I'll quote just a portion:

 8             "I learned that the situation was not always what it seemed.  The

 9     shelling could be provoked by the Muslims or could be an act of

10     retaliation.  Sometimes the BH army would fire mortars from their own

11     barracks near the Ice Stadium.  I saw the Bosnians firing mortars from

12     near our headquarters using a small-calibre mobile mortar mounted in a

13     vehicle with an open roof.  This enabled it to move around the city and

14     to fire from different positions.  Very often these locations were very

15     close to UN positions, i.e., the PTT building (the HQ of Sector

16     Sarajevo) ... and the Zeta Ice Stadium, the Tito barracks, and so on.

17     One mortar does not really give protection.  Besides, if one wants to

18     fire a mortar accurately, this takes time.  One has to measure the

19     position and such."

20             Then you go on to say:

21             "This could only be classed as provocation, and the acts could be

22     seen by the Bosnian Serbs who would respond by shelling these positions

23     in the city ... and the Bosnian Serbs would fire at the city many more

24     shells in response."

25             Now, my question to you is this:  Since the situation that you've

Page 3985

 1     just described speaks of something quite different from what you were

 2     shown by one or the other side - it was what you observed yourself, and

 3     you were able to conclude this and describe it on the basis of what you

 4     saw.  So the reports of the politicians whom you talked to, were they

 5     mostly based on reports of that kind, about the activities that were

 6     designed to provoke an action, or were they based on true and real

 7     events?  Thank you.

 8        A.   Well, I can certainly confirm the latter.  These were actually

 9     observed facts, true and real events.  And I observed something like that

10     myself only once and that's logical, because I was generally at

11     headquarters so I wasn't in a position to see it for myself.  But most of

12     those reports came either from the UNMOs, the military observers that

13     were stationed throughout the city, or from the military Sector Sarajevo

14     that were positioned throughout the city.  And wherever possible, they

15     would act against such violations.  The UNMOs didn't, but the military

16     units did to the extent they were able.  But those reports were reliable,

17     and the reports came from the UNPROFOR organisation.

18        Q.   Thank you, General.  My second question linked to that same issue

19     is the following:  While you conducted your duties, were you able to

20     observe and conclude that one of the sides, Serbian or Croatian, used

21     every opportunity to include UNPROFOR and NATO into the conflict, and did

22     they use provocation to achieve that end and paint that picture?  Thank

23     you.

24        A.   Well, that question is difficult to answer.  You see events, but

25     the background to those events - you're not told about that background.

Page 3986

 1     So then it becomes an assessment of what the intention was of what was

 2     happening.  But, quite honestly, I can't exclude that now and then

 3     situations arose out of provocation, based on the hope that UNPROFOR

 4     would intervene, for example, by using air force.  And, of course, that

 5     was a serious risk, and it was a trap that we at UNPROFOR consistently

 6     tried to avert.  We tried to end the incidents without becoming involved.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now we're coming to a topic that is

 8     essential.  Were there any such situations in Srebrenica, that is to say

 9     as you said where NATO and NATO air support could take the part of one

10     party, take the side of one party, in the conflict?  Could you see that

11     in view of the activities going on on the ground?  Did that come about?

12        A.   Well, again, a difficult question.  To demonstrate how reluctant

13     UNPROFOR was in trying to avoid becoming involved -- excuse me, how

14     reluctant UNPROFOR was to become involved in this conflict, it's best to

15     describe that from 8 to 11 July, despite repeated incidents such as

16     shelling by the Serbs, that according to the rules of the

17     UN Security Council in their resolutions, we had been empowered to use

18     air force for a long time, but we kept postponing that to try to

19     de-escalate the conflict and to delay using the extreme measures until

20     the very last minute.  But, clearly, when you deploy something such as

21     air force against one of the two parties, then basically as a

22     peacekeeping force you've already become involved in the conflict and

23     you're no longer impartial.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  And staying with that question, could you

25     tell the Trial Chamber and all of us -- or, rather, could you describe

Page 3987

 1     the situation as you saw it, in view of the fact that the NATO forces

 2     were always the -- or, rather, the NATO air force always acted against

 3     the Serbs, not the Muslims.  Could you tell us whether there was any --

 4     whether there was an opportunity where you threatened the Muslims and

 5     said that they would come under NATO air force attack if they failed to

 6     do such and such?

 7        A.   Yes.  Once during a meeting around mid-May in the government

 8     building in Sarajevo with representatives of the Bosnian government - as

 9     you know, in May the number of acts of violence had increased

10     considerably compared to the preceding period and we wanted to stop

11     that - and one point the Bosnians suggested in that meeting that NATO

12     should use air force, and I mentioned that they should understand that if

13     they were the ones starting the provocations they could also be the

14     target of air attacks and they should bear that in mind.  And that

15     certainly made an impression on them.

16        Q.   Thank you.  As you're speaking about the events in Sarajevo,

17     could you tell us whether from Sarajevo there were any attacks carried

18     out, and in view of the fact that your forces were controlling the area,

19     attacks against the surrounding areas controlled by the Serbs?  And

20     because of that, did you ever issue threats and say that you would deploy

21     your forces or prevent the situation from escalating?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, in the period that I served there, I didn't experience

23     actual attacks, but I did experience periods -- especially in May and

24     later on in June, there were days that both sides exchanged heavy

25     gun-fire.  And from Sarajevo the Muslims tended to use small-calibre

Page 3988

 1     arms.  They didn't have other arms except occasionally they might have a

 2     mortar that they'd hidden somewhere.  But they didn't have any structural

 3     means of attack.  But the Serbs did have heavy arms, and they used them

 4     now and then.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Nicolai.  Now, General, sir, we heard testimony

 6     here before you by a member of the staff of the command of

 7     General Gobillard, and he said that for 20 days on a daily basis the

 8     Muslims attacked from Sarajevo the surrounding positions of the Serbs

 9     facing Ilidza and other places.  And I'm asking you this because it has

10     to do with an order issued by the BH army forces in Zepa and Srebrenica

11     to join forces with the other forces and to act against the Serb forces.

12             So do you have any information about that?  And do you have

13     information that from the Srebrenica and Zepa zone there was conjoined

14     action from Sarajevo along different axes moving towards the positions

15     held by the Army of Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

16        A.   No, I am not aware of any of that.  Nothing was reported to me

17     about that.  And given the extent of those armed forces and the means

18     available to them, I can't exclude that they would have been able to

19     carry out a raid or attack a village.  But as for focused actions from

20     those enclaves on Serb positions, I never received any reports of that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, while my assistant is looking for the statement

22     registered by this military assistant and while we find reference in the

23     transcript so that you can see that I am not lying, I'd like us to look

24     at document 1D179 in the meantime.  And there you can see the order that

25     I'm referring to, issued by the General Staff of the BH army to the

Page 3989

 1     enclaves to open fire at Serb positions.  I'd like you to see that in

 2     Serbian and in English.  Thank you.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  For the record, this is Exhibit D53.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   If you look at the left, you'll see the document.  And here it is

 6     on the right-hand side in English as well, because you speak English.  It

 7     was issued on the 16th of June, 1995, and it says:

 8             "Preparation for offensive combat operations" and "order."

 9             It says:

10             "To the command of the 28th Division" and is issued by the

11     General Staff of the BH army.

12             And I quote the contents:

13             "Pursuant to a verbal order issued by the command of the

14     General Staff of the BH army, army general Rasim Delic, and on the

15     occasion of the great success achieved by units of the BH army in the

16     wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde of which we notified you in our

17     document, et cetera, as well as the basis of intelligence of the

18     'Protection Regiment' in Han Pijesak, it's holding part of its units in

19     reserve to intervene in the event of an attack by our forces from Zepa, I

20     hereby issue the following order:

21             "1.  Execute all preparations in the command of the

22     28th Land Army Division, to execute offensive combat operations with a

23     view to liberating the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, overextending the

24     A/S and inflicting losses on them, co-ordinating action with the BH army

25     forces, carrying out operations in the broader Sarajevo area.

Page 3990

 1             "2.  Plan realistic tasks which will ensure certain success on

 2     the basis of an accurate assessment and the potential of our forces in

 3     Srebrenica and Zepa.

 4             "3.  The General Staff of the BH army will regulate by an order

 5     the commencement of offensive combat activities in the area of

 6     responsibility of the 28th Army Division.

 7             "Chief of Staff of the 2nd Corps Brigadier Sulejman Budakovic."

 8             And it is sent to the following addresses: --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Tolimir.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... again, it is

12     very difficult for the interpreters and the record.  Please slow down

13     while reading.  Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.

15             General, I thought they had translations of this document.

16             But I'll try and do my best to comply with your guide-line.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Now, my question is as follows.  I think you've had time to read

19     through this order.

20        A.   Yes, I've had that time.

21        Q.   Then please, General, tell us whether you had reports about the

22     activities of the Muslim forces from the protected areas of Srebrenica

23     and Zepa which they conducted immediately prior to the operation that

24     took place in Zepa and Srebrenica.  And we're talking about the month of

25     June and July.  Thank you.  So did your command have that?  Thank you.

Page 3991

 1        A.   When Muslim troops tried to carry out actions outside the limits

 2     of the enclave and it was observed by UNPROFOR, then of course it would

 3     be reported.  Now, we did receive some incidental reports about that, but

 4     except for noting that they had -- we couldn't do anything besides note

 5     that they crossed the borders of the enclave because we had no means to

 6     observe outside the limits of the enclave because we were denied access

 7     to the Serb territory.  So we couldn't see what they were doing there.

 8             And as I've stated at previous hearings, the means and

 9     opportunities for UNPROFOR units to observe properly were greatly

10     complicated by, first, the lack of fuel which made it impossible to carry

11     out motorised patrols; and because some of the UNPROFOR soldiers were

12     blocked by Serb troops and unable to return from leave, which had

13     seriously compromised the numbers of the troops, and they were no longer

14     able to perform their duties properly.  So the number of observations was

15     therefore undoubtedly more limited than what was actually happening.

16        Q.   Thank you, General.  I just asked you whether you had information

17     about those activities in the protected areas.

18             But before I go on to my next question, I'd like us to have

19     called up on e-court D52, please.

20             While you have time to look at it in the English - it's just

21     appeared in the Serbian on the left-hand side, but I'll give you a chance

22     to look at the English.  And I'm interested in paragraph 2.  It is

23     information about the combat results achieved by the units of the command

24     of the 28th Division, and it is reporting on the situation.  And the

25     2nd Corps, on the basis of that report, is carrying it on.  It says:

Page 3992

 1             "60 Chetniks were liquidated.  And according to unconfirmed

 2     reports, the aggressor suffered even greater losses and had many

 3     wounded."

 4             So this was written on the 8th of July, as we can see, 1995.  Did

 5     you have information, whereby as UNPROFOR commander, that action of this

 6     kind was being carried out in the protected areas and that such heavy

 7     losses were being suffered in the rear by the Army of Republika Srpska

 8     within this demilitarised status that Srebrenica and Zepa had?  Thank

 9     you.

10        A.   No, I did not receive information of this scope.

11        Q.   As you can see, these aren't sources of the Republika Srpska

12     army.  You know what they wrote in their protest notes about Muslim

13     action in those zones.  A letter by General Mladic was quoted where he

14     informed you that that was going on.

15             All I want to ask you is whether you were objectively informed.

16     And here you see the Muslims themselves saying what losses they

17     inflicted.  So could there have been differences in the information

18     coming in because you didn't have reliable information?  Thank you.

19        A.   I'll be the first to admit that the information that UNPROFOR had

20     regarding what was happening on Serb territory was extremely summary, but

21     that related directly to the restrictions on our freedom of movement in

22     that territory.  So we sometimes received complaints from the staff of

23     the Bosnian Serb armed forces, but we were rarely in a position to verify

24     that information.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, would that be a convenient time for

Page 3993

 1     the first break this afternoon?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, if I could prevail on the

 5     Trial Chamber and everybody who's helping with the interpretation and --

 6     for just a couple moments before we break.  We do have the requested

 7     documentation that we discussed earlier.  I'll try to keep it in open

 8     session.  I can hand copies up to the Court and to Defence counsel.  It

 9     needs to be treated with the utmost confidentiality.  These, I don't

10     think, are routinely disclosed, although certainly the content, as the

11     Trial Chamber will see, was summarised almost verbatim in our motion to

12     add the witness to the 65 ter witness list.  So I have these ready to

13     hand up to the Trial Chamber, Defence counsel.

14             The other matter, Mr. President, relates to the forthcoming

15     motion, whatever form it takes, for rescission or amendment of the

16     protective measures in place for that proposed witness.  The witness is

17     here, and I understand we're operating on a tight time schedule if we

18     want him to follow this witness.  We are right now looking into the legal

19     question of in whose lap this decision reposes, and I will liaise with

20     Mr. Gajic to make sure that we can get whatever the motion is to

21     whichever the hearing Chamber is as soon as possible so that hopefully we

22     can have a decision in time before the conclusion of General Nicolai's

23     testimony so that if we do proceed this week we can because the witness

24     is here.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, Mr. Thayer.  The Chamber would

Page 3994

 1     appreciate to receive this documentation, as well as the Defence, and you

 2     should indeed liaise with Mr. Gajic about, yeah, how to proceed and to

 3     send the application to which Chamber who is seized of this decision.

 4             We must have our first break now for technical reasons, and we

 5     resume quarter past 4.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 3.49 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 4.19 p.m.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please proceed.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10             Could the Court please produce 1D180.  It's a document issued by

11     the BiH army and the General Staff of the BiH army on the

12     17 of February, 1995.

13        Q.   We see it in B/C/S version, and in a minute you're going to see

14     it in the English version.  We're looking at the second paragraph,

15     line 4, and in the English version it is the third paragraph, where it

16     says:

17             "On the 16th of February, 1995, the aggressor filed a request

18     with UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a 'non-demilitarised zone' with the

19     following rationale:

20             "BiH army and helicopter flights supplying weapons and ammunition

21     have been registered.

22             "Movements of the BH army have been registered in the Zepa

23     sector.

24             "Accusing members of the Ukrainian Battalion that they are

25     covering up the activities and intentions of the BiH army which is why

Page 3995

 1     they no longer guarantee their safety.

 2             "On the night between 15 and 16 February 1995, our helicopters

 3     were seen flying over, and infantry fire was opened on them.

 4             "On the basis of the aforementioned, the aggressor informed the

 5     Sarajevo Sector UNPROFOR command that unless Zepa was declared a

 6     demilitarised zone they would start offensive combat operations within

 7     seven days.

 8             "The ultimatum is for 23rd February 1995."

 9             And there's something else that I'm going to read from this

10     order, where it says:

11             "Measures should be taken to cover up the helicopter and to put

12     in place security measures."

13             This finishes the quotation.  I apologise to the interpreters if

14     I was too fast.

15             My question is this:  This document was issued in

16     mid-February 1995.  You were already there in Sarajevo.  So do you

17     remember this document, and do you remember that the Army of Republika

18     Srpska very often reported activities from the Srebrenica and Zepa zones;

19     and if they did so, do you remember that you had to convey those messages

20     to General Gobillard?  Thank you.  Good luck.

21        A.   No.  I don't remember this document for the very simple reason

22     that at the time I was not yet in Sarajevo.  I arrived at my post only at

23     the end of February, and this order is dated 17 February, which is about

24     two -- well, in any case, over a week before I arrived, and I never saw

25     it.

Page 3996

 1             As for your remark that --

 2        Q.   Thank you --

 3        A.   -- we received regular reports about such matters, that -- I deny

 4     that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you deny the authenticity of this document because

 6     this document was not provided by the Army of Republika Srpska but,

 7     rather, by the BH army?  That's their document.  And in the order they

 8     say that the helicopter that was reported to UNPROFOR by the VRS should

 9     be masked.  Did your predecessor tell you anything about helicopter

10     flights in the protected areas as well as armed activities originating

11     from protected areas?

12        A.   He told me nothing about the helicopter flights concerned.  He

13     did tell me that now and then actions took place from the protected

14     areas.  But at this time I can't provide a more specific answer.

15        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  I don't want to make your life hard.

16     I'm going to jog your memory by showing you documents.  I'm going to move

17     on to the issue of communication.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But before that, could I please

19     tender this report of the BiH army into evidence.  We have it on the

20     screen, 1D180.  Could it please be tendered into evidence.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And now let's move on to communication.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, have you any comment to tendering

25     this document into evidence?

Page 3997

 1             MR. THAYER:  No objection to its admission, Mr. President,

 2     observing, of course, that I think the witness's familiarity with it is

 3     very limited.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That's a nice explanation, very limited.  We

 5     understood the witness that he doesn't know this document, that he hasn't

 6     seen it before today, and that he was not in the region at that time,

 7     17th of February, 1995.

 8             The Chamber is inclined to mark it for identification.  It may be

 9     used and tendered with another witness who can say something about the

10     authenticity and the content of the document.  The document will be

11     marked for identification.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D180 would be Exhibit D76, marked for

13     identification.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

15             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Please

17     bear in mind that this document speaks about the continuity of the

18     activities performed in the protected areas that later on came under

19     attack.  And I wanted General Nicolai to talk about it because I believe

20     that he had been informed about such activities from -- by his

21     predecessors.  I've never seen this document before.  I must tell you,

22     this is a document issued by the BiH army.  Thank you very much.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, there is no need for such an

24     explanation after the Chamber has ruled on it.  You may use this document

25     with another witness and then tender it.  Please carry on.

Page 3998

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  But

 2     witnesses who drafted these documents will not be called here.  Please

 3     bear that in mind.  But, in any case, I will abide by your decision.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Sir, could you please look at D70; that's your document, sir.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 6 in D70, that's

 7     General Nicolai's statement.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm very sorry I didn't see you.  Mr. Thayer.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Not at all, Mr. President.  I always like to get off

10     my chair during these sessions.

11             Just a quick correction for the record:  I think when -- now that

12     we're returning to this statement and I don't know whether

13     General Tolimir will actually tender the statement.  So if it's not going

14     to come in for the Chamber to see, I would just note for the record that

15     the date of the interview is 18 November 1996, not 2006, as I think was

16     recorded at the beginning of the General's examination of

17     General Nicolai.  Just so we have an absolutely correct record on that.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this correction.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer, for the

20     explanation.  This is D70, a Defence exhibit.

21        Q.   Could the Court please produce page number 6, the first passage,

22     in which you say that you mostly spoke to your peers, chiefs of staff,

23     and with generals who were authorised on behalf of the VRS to make

24     decisions.  Is that correct?  Thank you.

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.

Page 3999

 1        Q.   Thank you.  In order to make things very clear for the

 2     Trial Chamber, let's say that there is a contradiction here.  You mention

 3     your peers and also generals, but not all generals were chiefs of staff

 4     or chiefs of sectors.  So kindly explain to the Trial Chamber whether it

 5     is customary in the military in the diplomacy and in the police to talk

 6     at the decision-making level and also to talk to your peers, to those who

 7     are on a par with you, at the same level as you?

 8        A.   For the record, when we're talking about those on a par with me,

 9     we're talking about functioning at the same level within the

10     organisation.  So they needn't be equal in rank.  And the agreement was,

11     to avoid confusion, that at the sector level within UNPROFOR they

12     interacted with the army corps at the battling parties, from the

13     headquarters in Sarajevo, the UNPROFOR headquarters, they liaised with

14     the headquarters of the armed forces of the battling parties.  So with

15     the BA [as interpreted] army and the Bosnian Serb army.

16        Q.   Thank you.  My question is this:  Was it possible at all to talk

17     to those levels as well outside of Sarajevo representing all the three

18     warring parties, given the fact that the UNPROFOR command was in

19     Sarajevo?  Were you able to talk with BH army as well as the VRS and the

20     HVO?  The VRS and the HVO commanders were not so close to you as the

21     representatives of the BiH.  If you wanted to talk to the latter two, did

22     you have representatives or envoys who could represent you in the talks

23     with the other two armies?

24        A.   Well, first I'd like to be clear about the remark that we were

25     not as close with the other parties as we were to the BiH.  Our relation

Page 4000

 1     to the battling parties was the same -- on the same order.  We had no

 2     preference.  We didn't favour any party.  I want to say that first.

 3             Regarding opportunities to communicate with parties, there was a

 4     distinction there.  Clearly, wherever there were representatives of the

 5     headquarters of the -- from the headquarters of BiH army in Sarajevo,

 6     because that's where they had their headquarters, it was very easy to

 7     communicate.  We could do this by telephone.  But sometimes we could also

 8     have face-to-face contact.  And I regularly negotiated face-to-face, for

 9     example, with General Oralovic [phoen].  And there were also

10     representatives of the Croatian army present in Sarajevo.  I don't know

11     whether they were there continuously, but often they were and often I

12     had -- was in direct contact with them.

13             When we wanted to negotiate with representatives from the

14     headquarters of the Bosnian Serb army, then we had to make arrangements.

15     We could always contact them by telephone or by fax, but if we wanted to

16     negotiate with them face-to-face then we had to agree on a meeting-place.

17     And if it was on Bosnian Serb territory, then we had to be authorised for

18     that occasion to travel there with protection.  And obviously that was

19     trickier than contacts with other parties, especially in the period under

20     the aegis of my predecessor that happened regularly.  I know that he

21     negotiated regularly with you.

22        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  In order for us to make things clear

23     for the Trial Chamber, let's first quote from the transcript and then

24     I'll have a question for you.  First of all, in the transcript in the

25     Popovic case on page 3847 in lines 1 through 4, you said:

Page 4001

 1             "It was pointless to talk to the VRS army officers who were below

 2     the rank of general because apparently only generals were authorised to

 3     make decisions in the VRS."

 4             The second quote is from page 18.499, lines 10 through 16.

 5     You're talking about the protocol that existed in the UNPROFOR, and you

 6     say:

 7             "Yes, there was a protocol.  There was an agreement according to

 8     which the personnel was supposed to contact people at their own level.

 9     The commander of sector was talking to this" --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  The accused is kindly asked to read slowly in

11     order to be interpreted.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Thayer, go ahead.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, that was again a request to read

14     slowly.

15             Mr. Thayer.

16             MR. THAYER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Just again for an accurate

17     record:  The two pages from which General Tolimir is quoting from the

18     Popovic testimony are transcript page 18.448 and transcript page 18.449.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  That was my concern as

20     well.

21             Carry on, please.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer, for this

23     clarification.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Nicolai, for your patience.  I apologise for the

Page 4002

 1     confusion if you couldn't see things on the transcript.  After my

 2     question things will become clear.

 3             Since you were not always in a position to talk to a person who

 4     was your equal, who was on a par with you, was there a rule in place for

 5     the warring party to delegate representatives for meetings with you and

 6     that those representatives later on conveyed what was said at those

 7     meetings to their commanders who would be your equals?  Were those

 8     representatives authorised to make any decisions, or did they have to run

 9     things by their commanders before any decisions could be taken?  Do you

10     understand me?  If not, I will repeat and clarify and rephrase in order

11     to make things as clear as possible to the Trial Chamber.  Thank you.

12        A.   I'll answer and then you may infer from my answer whether I

13     understood you correctly or not.

14             In my day, not that many negotiations took place between the

15     battling parties -- well, with one party at once but never with all

16     parties at the same time.  They did under my predecessor.  Those

17     negotiations always took place with representatives at the headquarters

18     who were authorised to negotiate and obviously had received directives

19     from their commanders, and they could negotiate freely within those

20     directives.  And to the best of my knowledge, that never caused any

21     problems.

22             What I'm also referring to in my statement here is that when we

23     contact them by telephone, occasionally we had somebody at the other end

24     of the telephone who was apparently lower in rank and was apparently

25     manning the phone lines and was able to take a message but was not

Page 4003

 1     authorised or was apparently not authorised to take a decision

 2     independently.  And apparently he had to present that to one of his

 3     superiors first.  And if there was no other option then, we made do.  But

 4     clearly that caused delays and was less effective than when your

 5     counterpart on the telephone was authorised to take decisions.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I am happy with the answer.  I wanted to say that you

 7     were not always able to talk to your counterpart, but when you spoke to

 8     somebody else that person was authorised to convey a message or to make

 9     decisions -- or let me put it this way:  Did you some time talk to people

10     who were not authorised to make any decisions before running things by

11     their superiors who were then able to make decisions on behalf of their

12     military?

13        A.   Yes.  I remember that at one point I requested a medical

14     evacuation from Bosnian Serb territory -- or, rather, from an enclave

15     across Bosnian Serb territory, and my counterpart on the telephone said

16     he would convey the message and I would be called back with a response.

17     So apparently at that point I was talking to somebody over the phone who

18     was not authorised to take decisions, and sometimes those answers took a

19     long time.  And I remember specifically in this case that it was such a

20     long wait that it cost the victim his life.  That's why I remember this.

21             Another specific case when I did not have a general at the other

22     end of the phone was the evening of July 10 - and there's a report of

23     that telephone conversation -  when I mentioned that UNPROFOR had

24     requested air support.  All I could do was leave a message, and I was not

25     able to converse with a commanding general.  But, in any case, I was able

Page 4004

 1     to leave the message, and I assume that the message was transmitted,

 2     given its importance.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, for us to be quite clear -- well, I understand

 4     what you're talking about and you're very proper in your answers, but

 5     let's look at page 5 of your statement.  And it's page 5 both in the

 6     Serbian and in the English.  And I'd like us to focus on the last

 7     paragraph on page 5.  You say that there was no point in talking to the

 8     VRS officers under the level of general.  However, on page 5 in the last

 9     paragraph in Serbian and in English you state the following:  That in the

10     Lukavica barracks you frequently talked to officers from the

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  And you say, and I quote:

12             "We co-operated with this corps, and they were always in

13     contact -- we were always in contact with representatives at a higher

14     level.  Mr. Mladic insisted on that."

15             THE INTERPRETER:  May we have a reference for this quotation,

16     please.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It appeared that he had extensive

18     control in the area and everybody reported to him.  If there were any

19     problems, then he had to be contacted.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   So on the basis of what I've just read out --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we don't know where you found this

23     part you were quoting.  Can you indicate where -- from which part of the

24     statement you quoted.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.  It's on

Page 4005

 1     page 5, last paragraph on that page in the Serbian version.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not in the English text.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 6, first paragraph of the

 4     English.

 5             May I go ahead with my question now while you're reading that

 6     paragraph?

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you sure that that is the right paragraph?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've read it.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  It begins with, "Lukavica

10     barracks ..." as it does in the Serbian where it says, "Kasarna Lukavica"

11     is Lukavica Barracks.  And my question, since General Nicolai knows what

12     this is about:

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can you explain to the Trial Chamber that Major Ilic had the role

15     de facto of an officer, liaison officer, and he had to convey your

16     positions and the command's positions to you; but it wasn't up to him to

17     make any decisions.  It's only the commander with the authority to make

18     decisions to do so; isn't that right?  So did Ilic have decision-making

19     powers, or did he have to follow the proposals and orders of his

20     commander or Chief of Staff?  Thank you.

21        A.   Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic was, as we would call it, an LSO, a

22     liaison officer; so he was the liaison between the Sarajevo sector under

23     the command of General Gobillard and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  An LSO

24     is by definition not somebody with decision-making authority but somebody

25     who conveys messages or takes messages.  And that was the role of

Page 4006

 1     Colonel Indjic in this case.  He was also the counterpart for

 2     General Gobillard's staff, and he was -- he was not a counterpart for the

 3     UNPROFOR staff.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.  You have answered my question very properly.

 5     So we shouldn't ascribe to Mr. Indjic the powers that he did not have.

 6             Now let me ask you this:  Having this situation in mind, that is

 7     to say, in Sarajevo there were command Sector Sarajevo meetings and

 8     also --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just a moment, Mr. Tolimir.  We have a --

10     [Microphone not activated] ... we don't have anything on the screen at

11     the moment, after line 11.  Please repeat.  Please repeat your question.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.  Let me repeat my

13     question.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Since Colonel Indjic was a liaison officer of the

16     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps with the UNPROFOR sector in Sarajevo and since he

17     was not authorised to make any decisions, all he could do was to convey

18     your requirements and demands and the requirements of his command to you;

19     would that be right?  Is that the only thing that he could do?

20        A.   That's correct.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I think that it's been properly recorded now.

22             Let me ask you this:  The staff command or the staff's -- the

23     command of the staffs on all three warring sides, did they have their

24     authorised representatives who attended meetings where decisions were

25     made without having -- themselves having the power of decision-making on

Page 4007

 1     certain issues but that they just conveyed to their commands the

 2     positions and conclusions made at those meetings?  And did the Main Staff

 3     have its representatives there too who were in a similar position to

 4     Indjic, without their representatives being able to decide; they didn't

 5     have the power of decision-making in other words?

 6             If we're experiencing problems in any area, let me ask a short

 7     question:  Was the situation similar and did the staff commands have

 8     their representatives at meetings and contacts with UNPROFOR

 9     representatives who were not authorised to make decisions; they were not

10     your counterparts, they only conveyed positions and decisions to your

11     people?  So was that the case as you know it?

12        A.   Well, to be clear:  Unfortunately, that happened rarely during my

13     period, but it certainly happened during the period of my predecessor.

14     When negotiations took place, they were conducted by negotiators at a

15     level who, within the directives they had received from their commander,

16     were authorised to negotiate and to reach agreements.  Otherwise, there's

17     very little to discuss.  So they had some leeway to interpret or to

18     propose, but what was usual was that when at a certain point an agreement

19     had been reached, a treaty would be drafted and signed by the commanders

20     to actually ratify it.  And that's the standard procedure, not only in

21     the military but also in politics.

22        Q.   Thank you for your answer.  My next question is this:  Was it

23     custom -- is it customary in armies, especially in war time in the Dutch

24     army, for example, as in the VRS, that at certain positions officers can

25     issue -- can be banned from making decisions, can be prohibited from

Page 4008

 1     making decisions themselves, unless they're given specific authorisation,

 2     but that it is their job just to convey the situation to their superiors

 3     and ask them for instructions?  So do you know of that?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Well, to go back to the example earlier, one of those liaison

 5     officers, by virtue of his office, is somebody who takes and transmits

 6     messages but does not take decisions himself.  So that does happen.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.  And to wind up this set of questions, let me

 8     ask you this:  That means that it would always be advisable for

 9     representatives at a higher level that they negotiate with their

10     counterparts, people on an equal footing as themselves; is that right?

11     Would that be best?  However, because of the conditions that exist in war

12     time, were there situations whereby lower-level individuals would discuss

13     a problem on behalf of higher levels?  Let me give you an example:  That

14     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, for example, could talk to you about the

15     problem that you -- the problems you were dealing with with the

16     Main Staff?

17        A.   No, I can't imagine that.  I stated very clearly that it was

18     explicitly the agreement that negotiations would take place at the same

19     level of command.  So Sector Sarajevo dealt with the Romanija Corps and

20     not the UNPROFOR headquarters to prevent different levels from

21     simultaneously dealing with a single counterpart.  So you need to keep

22     that separate.  Otherwise, when we're talking about negotiations, it's

23     not about being equal in rank; it's about somebody's level of authority.

24     You need to negotiate with somebody who has decision-making authority,

25     and that works.  And we always tried to do it this way, but there's a

Page 4009

 1     very clear example of when that did not happen.  When the Srebrenica

 2     enclave fell, General Mladic, the supreme commander of the Bosnian Serb

 3     army, was negotiating with the DutchBat battalion commander Karremans.

 4     But those were people in positions that could not possibly be compared.

 5     At UNPROFOR we found that situation highly undesirable, and we urged that

 6     a representative of a higher level negotiate with General Mladic, and

 7     that should be either somebody from the UNPROFOR staff in Sarajevo - and

 8     they offered me for that purpose - as well as our head of civil affairs,

 9     or somebody from Zagreb.  But General Mladic himself rejected that

10     because he did not consider that to be necessary.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  I'm just talking about hypothetical,

12     possible situations.  Now, in the Popovic trial you said - and this was

13     also presented in the summary of the Prosecutor - that there was little

14     point in talking to officers of the VRS underneath -- below the rank of

15     general.  Now, in your report you say that when there were problems, for

16     example, with the -- in Sarajevo, you could contact Colonel Indjic in the

17     VRS.  So can you explain to the Trial Chamber whether some colonel in the

18     UNPROFOR command could make a decision without consulting

19     General Gobillard, and could he negotiate with the other side below the

20     rank of general, unless given specific instructions and authority to do

21     so?

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

23             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I -- number one, if we could have the

24     portion of the witness's statement that's being referred to shown to the

25     witness so we have a better understanding of exactly what we're talking

Page 4010

 1     about.  I understand that General Tolimir is trying to press the

 2     point - and he's entitled to do that with this witness - that there,

 3     hypothetically, as he has said, may have been -- could be an occasion

 4     where somebody from one rank was dealing with somebody from another rank.

 5     I think the witness has been very clear in his answers to those

 6     questions, but I think it's important for the witness to be shown this

 7     portion of the witness statement so that we don't have anything taken out

 8     of context or misunderstood.  And, again, I think this is at the top of

 9     page 6 in the English of the witness's OTP statement.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is on the screen.

11             MR. THAYER:  Oh, my apologies.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Witness, do you remember the question?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't understand where

14     General Tolimir is going.  I'd like to emphasise once again that from the

15     UNPROFOR staff where I worked there were no negotiations with

16     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.  The representatives of the Sarajevo staff did

17     do that.  And if you're talking about the colonels' level, the deputy

18     commanders at the Sarajevo sector were colonels and I'm sure that they

19     negotiated with Colonel Indjic.  But whether Indjic was the man with

20     decision-making authority on site, I doubt that for the reasons I

21     mentioned earlier.  But I can't provide any more information about that

22     because I was never there.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.  I'm satisfied with your answer.  And to be very

25     precise, nobody on behalf of General Gobillard on his staff could make a

Page 4011

 1     decision without him agreeing to it or issuing specific orders, and the

 2     same was true vice versa in the other staffs.  Isn't that right?

 3        A.   Well, I can imagine that if General Gobillard sent one of his

 4     deputies to attend negotiations, that person would have some

 5     decision-making authority within the directives provided to him by

 6     General Gobillard, just as this held true for negotiations at other

 7     levels as I stated previously in my response.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  General, can you tell the Trial Chamber what position

 9     General Brinkman [Realtime transcript read in error "Brigman"] occupied

10     in the command, in the command for BiH, and what his responsibilities

11     were?

12        A.   I assume that the name has been misspelled here and that you're

13     referring to General Brinkman.  Brigadier-General Brinkman was my

14     predecessor at UNPROFOR.  So in the six months before I arrived, he was

15     the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR, which at the time was known as

16     BiH command.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, you have made a proper assessment of that.  I

18     was referring to Brigadier-General Brinkman, but I might have been wrong.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now can we see 65 ter 6012.  Thank

20     you.  Thank you.  That's the right document, 6012, 65 ter document.  May

21     we have the last page of that document displayed, please, for the witness

22     to take a look at it.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And you see there, the signature of the general in question,

25     Brigadier-General Brinkman, he was your predecessor, and

Page 4012

 1     General Tolimir's signature.  So they weren't counterparts, but Tolimir

 2     was authorised to sign this agreement on unrestricted passage.  So that

 3     was the real situation.  So this was a case in which somebody was

 4     authorised to sign the agreement, although he wasn't the counterpart of

 5     the other participant.

 6        A.   Yes.  And that does not conflict with what I stated earlier.  I

 7     said that the representatives did not necessarily need to be of the same

 8     rank but needed to operate at the same level of command.  And if their

 9     commander authorised them to take certain decisions, then the rank is

10     basically irrelevant.  And in this case it's not strange for a

11     brigadier-general to reach an agreement with a general-major.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  Can you tell us -- well, we've dealt with

13     opposite numbers and counterparts and so on and so forth and what their

14     authority was, but do you know -- are you aware of the contents of this

15     agreement, the one I signed together with Brigadier-General, your

16     predecessor, General Brinkman, in view of the fact that the agreement was

17     in force both in June and July and March and following on during the

18     events that are of interest for us here?  Thank you.

19        A.   Yes.  I know this document well because it was a major obstacle.

20     Because if you read the document properly, it concerns the principles of

21     freedom of movement; but if you read the agreement, you'll find that

22     these are mainly restrictions to freedom of movement.  And I found this

23     document difficult to work with because it imposed a lot of restrictions.

24     And I can also confirm in retrospect that General Smith was also

25     particularly unhappy about this negotiating outcome.

Page 4013

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now, can you tell the Trial Chamber whether

 2     this document, which regulates, as you said, the movement of UNPROFOR on

 3     the territory of Republika Srpska, is it an agreement that UNPROFOR

 4     agreed to and was signed by your predecessor and therefore stating that

 5     they agreed to it?

 6        A.   Yes.  It's an agreement and it's signed, so we observed it.  But

 7     I can tell you that we did so very reluctantly because basically every

 8     displacement on Bosnian Serb territory required advanced permission.  And

 9     to be honest, that undermines the purpose of a force that is required to

10     supervise compliance with the agreements.  If you want to do your job

11     properly, you need the freedom to move around any part of the area any

12     time, and this restriction compromises that.  But because that was what

13     was agreed, we had no choice but to stick to that agreement.

14     General Smith asked me to try to get the parties to renegotiate this

15     agreement, given the fact that in my period of duty acts of violence were

16     merely on the rise.  Unfortunately, I didn't get around to that.

17        Q.   Thank you, General.  You've given us a very proper answer,

18     describing the situation as it was.  Now let's look at paragraph 2.c of

19     this same agreement.  It's on the previous page.  We have it now.  Point

20     2.c states:

21             "Approval for convoy movement will be given by the Serbian Army

22     HQ.  In case of disapproval of a convoy, the Serbian authority is obliged

23     to give a proper explanation, stating the reason or reasons of refusal of

24     the particular convoy."

25             My question is as follows.  We'll come to the next section,

Page 4014

 1     "control," in just a moment.  The agreement or some subsequent agreement,

 2     did they regulate the legitimate reasons for withholding free passage for

 3     the convoy or not, approval for the convoy or not?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I'm not sure I understood your question perfectly, but if we're

 5     talking about implementation of this paragraph, 2.c, well, it was

 6     particularly unsatisfactory.  Very frequently approval for convoys was

 7     denied or their size was restricted without a legitimate reason.  In

 8     fact, there were even cases where permission was granted and while the

 9     convoy was being carried out restrictions were imposed because -- parts

10     of the convoy were blocked at a check-point.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  This agreement was based on certain

12     principles then and procedure for approval for convoys held back or

13     allowed to pass through by the sides; right?  Tell me briefly, did both

14     sides have to adhere to the agreement and the stipulations in the

15     agreement?  Thank you.

16        A.   Well, when there's an agreement between two parties, then both

17     parties are required to observe that agreement.  But, in practice, the

18     only party bothered by this was UNPROFOR.  At any time desired, the

19     Bosnian Serb army could restrict the size or content of convoys; and

20     whenever they desired, they could block our movements.  Conversely, we

21     couldn't and didn't want to block anybody else.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document, 65 ter 6012,

24     please be tendered into evidence.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

Page 4015

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D77.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, you know from practice that there were UNHCR and

 5     UNPROFOR convoys.  Were UNPROFOR convoys primarily intended for the

 6     supply of UNPROFOR troops, and were UNHCR convoys primarily intended for

 7     the supply of the civilian population?  Thank you.

 8        A.   That answer [as interpreted] is basically correct.

 9        Q.   Thank you, General.  We will see what the difference was through

10     my next questions.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce

12     P689.  This document is part of 92 ter materials, and this is a decision

13     of the president of Republika Srpska on the establishment of the state

14     committee for co-operation with the United Nations and international

15     humanitarian organisations.  And the second document is the decision of

16     the appointment of the president, vice-president, and members of this

17     state committee.  Both decisions were issued on the 14th of March, 1995.

18             Could we please look at Article 6 of this decision.  Thank you.

19     Can this be blown up a little.  You see it in English as well as in

20     B/C/S.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   This is a -- the decision on the establishment of the state

23     committee.  In the B/C/S version it's on page 3.  Article 6 says:

24             "Permits for the movement of convoys and employees of the UN and

25     humanitarian organisations on the territory of Republika Srpska shall be

Page 4016

 1     issued by the co-ordinating body for humanitarian operations, pursuant to

 2     committee decisions."

 3             I don't think that we are seeing the same documents.  I can't see

 4     Article 6 that I've just read from.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please display page 2 or

 6     the second page.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I see it's another Article 6.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we can see it on the screen.

 9        Q.   And it says:

10             "Permits for the movement of convoys and employees of the UN and

11     humanitarian organisations on the territory of Republika Srpska shall be

12     issued by the co-ordinating body for humanitarian operations, pursuant to

13     committee decisions."

14             Did I read this properly?  And do you know that of the nine

15     members of this committee only one was a member of the VRS and that was

16     Colonel Milos Djurdjic?  The president of that co-ordinating body

17     would -- was Dr. Nikola Koljevic.  Do you know all that; yes or no?

18     Thank you.

19        A.   The answer is no.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Does the name Nikola Koljevic ring a bell?  Does the

21     name Milos Djurdjic ring a bell?  If those names do ring a bell, what was

22     their position while you were in Sarajevo?

23        A.   The first name sounds vaguely familiar.  I never spoke with him

24     personally, but I believe that the head of civil affairs at my staff was

25     in touch with him, although I can't remember any of the details.  And I

Page 4017

 1     was never personally in touch with him, and I don't know what his exact

 2     position was within the Bosnian Serb political structure.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Was the co-ordinating body in charge of regulating

 4     the movement of UNHCR convoys?  I spoke about that just a minute ago.  I

 5     and your predecessor signed an agreement on the movement of UNPROFOR

 6     convoys.  Did this apply to the movement of convoys, this decision that

 7     I've just spoken about, did this apply to the movement of UNHCR convoys?

 8     Was the co-ordinating body in charge of the movement of those convoys as

 9     well?  Did you have a representative in that committee just like the VRS

10     had its own representative, Colonel Djurdjic?

11        A.   No.  I wasn't even aware that this committee existed, let alone

12     that we had a representative on it.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know, for example, that that was not

14     regulated by the agreement that I and your predecessor signed, that that

15     had to be regulated by another agreement?  I'm showing you a document

16     that the president of Republika Srpska turned into a decision on the

17     establishment of a body for co-operation with the UNPROFOR and

18     co-ordination of the work of humanitarian organisations.  That's what

19     I've just shown you.  Thank you.

20        A.   What I find strange is that in January 1995 an agreement was

21     reached between General Brinkman and you, General Tolimir, and a few

22     months afterwards a committee was formed to deal with criteria for

23     admitting convoys.  Basically, it's not my concern.  We had to register

24     when we wanted to send convoys, and we were to be given an explanation

25     when such a permit was denied.  And who held final responsibility for

Page 4018

 1     that decision within the Bosnian Serb structure didn't really matter to

 2     us.  What mattered was whether or not we were given permission.  We had

 3     only one point of contact and that was your headquarters.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 5             MR. THAYER:  And, Mr. President, just to make sure there's no

 6     misunderstanding potentially left in the record, going back up to

 7     General Tolimir's question at line -- page 55, line 10 of my LiveNote,

 8     the question:

 9             "Did you have a representative in that committee just like the

10     VRS had its own representative, Colonel Djurdjic?"

11             I would like to know if there is an actual factual basis behind

12     that question to suggest that there ever was anybody from the UN that was

13     part of this RS committee.  If General Tolimir truly doesn't know and

14     he's just basically fishing, then that's fine as well; but if there is a

15     factual basis to support that question, I'd like to know what it is

16     because as far as Prosecution is aware there was never any involvement by

17     the UN in that committee.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I think the witness answered this

19     question very clearly.

20              "No, I wasn't even aware that this committee existed, let alone

21     that we had a representative on it."

22             I think it's a clear statement of the witness.

23             MR. THAYER:  Understood, Mr. President.  I just wanted to make

24     sure that the question itself didn't leave some ambiguity.  But that's --

25     I take the Trial Chamber's point.

Page 4019

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.  That happens sometimes that questions leave

 2     some ambiguity.

 3             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer, for pointing

 5     this problem out.

 6             In any case, an UNPROFOR representative could not be a member of

 7     a body of Republika Srpska on which a decision had been taken by the

 8     president.  My question was misinterpreted.  My question was whether the

 9     UNHCR had a body that decided on sending convoys to Republika Srpska.

10     The general answered my question, and I'm satisfied with that answer.  I

11     can repeat that question and ask him whether UNHCR had its

12     representative, whether they were in contact with him, whether UNPROFOR

13     co-ordinated its activities with the UNHCR with regard to this body that

14     was established by Republika Srpska.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, I find this question

16     somewhat confusing.  I've told you that a UNHCR representative

17     consistently attended our staff meetings, and, of course, we consulted

18     regularly with each other.  And, as needed, we tried to reach agreements

19     with each other, despite the fact that we had no command authority over

20     UNHCR.  It made sense to reconcile our activities.  If the question is

21     whether we were aware of contacts with UNHCR, with a committee that you

22     just mentioned, then clearly I'll have to deny that because I wasn't even

23     aware that such a committee existed, and I certainly wasn't aware of

24     contacts between UNHCR in that committee.  That's obvious.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4020

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you answer my next question very

 2     briefly.  Did you control UNHCR convoys?  Did you ever establish that

 3     there was any abuse and that those convoys also carried military

 4     equipment?

 5        A.   I understand what you're asking.  No.  As UNPROFOR, we had no say

 6     over UNHCR's convoys.  We didn't inspect them.  I do believe that when --

 7     as far as requesting permission for the convoys, we had a mediating role.

 8     I believe I remember that, although I can't say it with 100 per cent

 9     certainty, but I think that was the case.  UNHCR was an independent

10     organisation that could decide independently when and what it wished to

11     transport.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We'll now move on to very concrete things.  For

13     example, 3863 is the page in the transcript, lines 23, through page 3864.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which transcript are you referring to?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From this case.  Thank you.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  We see that you say, In special cases, the advantage

18     of Srebrenica was that they could be supplied with fuel by UNHCR, and

19     that was not intended for members of the armed forces but, rather, for

20     the locals.  However, we managed to convince the personnel in UNHCR that

21     it was necessary for part of the supplies to be used by the troops in the

22     enclave.

23             This is a quote from the transcript.  I don't know whether you've

24     found it or not.  If you have, then you can confirm whether I quoted your

25     words correctly or not.  But, in any case, my question is this:  When was

Page 4021

 1     it that the UNHCR delivered fuel --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Wait a moment, please.  You are referring to a

 3     previous hearing before the summer recess, I suppose?  I would like to

 4     know which date, and I would like to have it on the screen.  The witness

 5     doesn't have it, the transcript.  And I don't find the page number

 6     because it was -- in my version I don't have the page number yet.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  The microphone is off.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was on 12 July - now we can

10     see it on the screen - page 3863.  And I will repeat.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Look at line 23 and down to page 3864, ending with line 338 --

13     the page number is 3864.  My legal assistant has just corrected me.

14     Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have it on the screen, and please put the

16     question to the witness.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, sir, please, when was it that UNHCR delivered fuel to

20     the servicemen in the enclave?  And when I say "the servicemen," I mean

21     both UNPROFOR soldiers and soldiers of the BiH army.

22        A.   When UNHCR supplied that fuel, I can't tell you exactly when that

23     was because during my period not a single fuel convoy was admitted into

24     Srebrenica.  So this is fuel that was already in storage.  Within the

25     enclave, the fuel was in storage on the compound in Potocari but belonged

Page 4022

 1     to UNHCR and was intended for the local population.  Because at a certain

 2     point things became so desperate that there was a danger that UNPROFOR

 3     wouldn't even have enough fuel left to keep the communications devices

 4     going, we told the UNHCR representative that this would lead to an

 5     unacceptable situation because that would jeopardise UNPROFOR's

 6     performing its tasks.  So that's why UNHCR allowed fuel from its storage

 7     supply to be used by UNPROFOR.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that there were cases - and I'm basing

 9     this on your answer - that UNHCR declared fuel as fuel for the civilian

10     population, but it was used by the troops, either by UNPROFOR or by the

11     Muslim army?  Were there such cases?

12        A.   Well, the latter is too ridiculous for words.  We did not supply

13     fuel to battling parties; that should be clear.  It would be entirely in

14     conflict with the UN principles.  And the only example of UNPROFOR using

15     UNHCR supplies, as far as I know, is the case we just discussed

16     concerning the situation in Srebrenica.

17        Q.   Thank you, General.  Let's make things clear for the record.  I

18     didn't ask about UNPROFOR; I asked about the UNHCR.  And I asked you

19     whether the UNHCR supplied the militaries as well as the civilians in the

20     enclaves.  Thank you.

21        A.   The fuel was intended for the civilian population living in

22     Srebrenica.  Whether any fuel was given to the soldiers, I don't know

23     about that.  But I can't imagine how it would benefit them because they

24     had hardly any means of transport.  So there was no direct supply by

25     UNHCR the Bosnian Serb forces [as interpreted].

Page 4023

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  And now we'll look at the transcript,

 2     page 3545, lines from 1 through 12, again the transcript is from this

 3     case.  This is Mr. Franken's transcript.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, can -- I'm looking at my LiveNote at

 6     page 60, lines 22 and 23, and I think the last sentence of the witness's

 7     answer is -- I'm not sure if that was recorded correctly, translated

 8     correctly, or maybe I'm -- I just have jet-lag, but it doesn't -- it's

 9     unintelligible to me as it stands.  The line:

10             "So there was no direct supply by the UNHCR the Bosnian Serb

11     forces."

12             In the context of the question and the answers, I'm just not sure

13     if that's what the correct answer is.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, could you look at the transcript.  Is that

15     what you were talking about?  That's page 60, line 22 and 23.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that there was no direct

17     supply of fuel by UNHCR to the Bosnian forces.  I didn't say Bosnian Serb

18     forces.  None of the Bosnian forces was supplied directly with fuel.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You are referring to the BiH forces, BiH army?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Basically I was referring to

21     the BiH forces.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

23             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25             Can we look at the transcript of this case, page 3545, lines from

Page 4024

 1     1 through 2.  This was evidence by Mr. Franken on the

 2     6th of June, 2010 -- I apologise, 6th of July, 2010.

 3             Let me read.  Have you found it, Mr. President?  Mr. President,

 4     can you follow?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, we have it on the screen.  We are waiting

 6     for your question.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   To a question put to Mr. Franken, which was:

 9             How did they manage to acquire fuel?  Was there any legal channel

10     supply with fuel that could be used to supply the army?

11             And Mr. Fraken's answer -- and I -- answer -- then I quote:

12             I don't know how they satisfy their need for the fuel.  "There is

13     a possibility, but we checked that regularly, we supplied fuel for the

14     bakery in the town so it would be possible to make bread for the civilian

15     population in that bakery."

16             Thank you.  My question is this:  Were you aware of the fact that

17     UNPROFOR provided fuel for the civilian population and for the purposes

18     of keeping that bakery in operation?  Thank you.

19        A.   No.  I was unaware of this specific example, and I didn't need to

20     be aware of it.  But it seems very plausible that fuel from UNHCR was

21     used to keep a bakery going that was feeding the population.  It sounds

22     very logical.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  My question is this:  Did the DutchBat in

24     Srebrenica ever participate in the distribution of humanitarian aid to

25     the local population or in the establishment of criteria to be applied

Page 4025

 1     when the local population was supplied with humanitarian aid?

 2        A.   Yes.  Perhaps you should have asked the DutchBat representatives

 3     this question; for example, Colonel Franken or Colonel Karremans.  But I

 4     know that generally UNPROFOR sometimes assisted UNHCR in distributing

 5     goods to the local population.  But authority to distribute those goods

 6     rested with UNHCR.  And as for the -- we had no part whatsoever in the

 7     criteria for the distribution.  And the only aid provided directly by

 8     UNPROFOR to the local population in Srebrenica concerned medical

 9     assistance.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, would that be a good point for the

11     second break?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, we

13     can do that.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We will have our second break now and resume

15     quarter past 6.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 5.46 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 6.19 p.m.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.  Please carry on.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             May we have 1D231 called up next, please.  It's a regular combat

21     report dated the 8th of June, 1995, of the 1st Infantry Light Brigade

22     sent to the command of the 13th Corps.  Now, I'm interested in item 3

23     there, so may we zoom in to item 3.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And it says there:

Page 4026

 1             "The check-point at Rogatica -- the Ukrainian convoy number

 2     07-012/07 comprising three vehicles from Sarajevo to Zepa passed through

 3     the check-point in Rogatica.  The UNHCR convoy from Karakaj to Zepa which

 4     arrived at the check-point yesterday is still in Rogatica undergoing a

 5     detailed search since ammunition for infantry weapons was found

 6     yesterday."

 7             So that's the report sent by the brigade command in control of

 8     that check-point, and they discovered some ammunition.  Now, may we --

 9     well, before I ask my question, can we look at 1D232, please.  It's an

10     order issued by the president of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, on

11     the 13th of June, 200 -- and sent to the Main Staff.  And I'm just

12     quoting point 2.  And you can look at item 2 in English.

13             "On account of the incident concerning the ammunition found in

14     the UNHCR convoy for Zepa and Gorazde, a detailed investigation should be

15     allowed for the commission involving Milos Djurdjic, Momcilo Mandic, and

16     Dragisa Mihic.  The task of the commission is to submit a detailed report

17     to the State Committee for Relations with the United Nations and

18     international humanitarian organisations."

19             That's the committee that I mentioned earlier on and said that it

20     had been established.

21             Point 3:

22             "A positive opinion should be immediately given for all the

23     notifications that arrived through the co-ordination body for

24     humanitarian operations attached to the state committee, referring to the

25     weekly plan of deliveries of UNHCR from the 10th to the 17th of June that

Page 4027

 1     have already been examined by the committee."

 2             And now my question:  General, at your daily meetings and in

 3     other ways through reports and so on, UNHCR ones or those from your

 4     units, were you informed about the fact that in an UNHCR convoy in

 5     June 1995 some infantry weapons were found?  Thank you.

 6        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.  And it surprises me because that

 7     would be a serious infringement of standard procedure within the

 8     United Nations, and it would certainly have instigated measures.  And it

 9     also surprises me that I don't remember a complaint on that subject from

10     the Bosnian Serb army.  And if something like that had happened, I would

11     certainly remember it.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  Tell me now, were any measures undertaken to

13     prevent any abuse of the UNHCR convoy by UNPROFOR members?  Thank you.

14        A.   No.  In response to a previous question, I already said that we

15     did not do that; that was the responsibility of the UNHCR, and UNPROFOR

16     was not involved in that.  If, however, there had been a report of abuse

17     of the authority of UNHCR, then the UN certainly wouldn't have taken --

18     the UN certainly would have taken measures to prevent any such

19     recurrence.

20        Q.   Thank you.  General, since we dealt with these two questions and

21     to confirm whether this is -- what is said here is true - although you

22     said you didn't know - as confirmation of what I said, let's look at what

23     happened on the 8th of June and let's look at a video.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The video is 1D3234 [as

25     interpreted].  The transcript of the video is 1D234.  It's 65 ter 1D23 --

Page 4028

 1     1D233.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   And in order to confirm the authenticity and to establish that

 4     these are events that took place on the 8th of June, 1995, I'd like us to

 5     freeze the tape at the 14th second because this shows additional

 6     documentation for the UNHCR convoy which sees the date and destination on

 7     the convoy.  Otherwise, the footage lasts a little over two minutes.  So

 8     may we now play the video, thank you.  You see where it says the

 9     7th of June, that date there.  It's the Karakaj border crossing.  And it

10     says, as you can see, Srebrenica and Zepa -- cursor there.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   We can now see the convoy and the attending documents where it

14     says "Zepa" and "Srebrenica."

15             And there we see the ammunition uncovered by the soldiers hidden

16     in the flour.

17             We can't hear anything.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the audio, please, so

19     that we can hear what is being said.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

21             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to everybody.  I'd

22     just like to make one request.  Could the technical booth put the volume

23     up because we can't hear it properly.  On my computer, it's working

24     normally.  But for the purposes of the courtroom, could we increase the

25     volume.  Thank you.

Page 4029

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told that there's no possibility to have

 4     another volume.  This is the technical situation of the booth.

 5             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that the video

 6     speaks for itself.  So once we've viewed the video, we'll be able to

 7     continue with the cross-examination of the witness.  We'll be asking him

 8     questions.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here we can see the protest that

11     the Army of Republika Srpska and General Mladic sent to the command of

12     the UNHCR, the UNHCR office, regarding the latest abuse of the

13     humanitarian mission of the United Nations, the food convoy, to the

14     Muslim enclave of Zepa when in the convoy - and he mentions a date

15     there - when a routine check was carried out and ammunition was found

16     intended for the Muslim army.

17             Now we're going to see a representative of the UNHCR.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And we see the people who were

20     taking the humanitarian aid to the Zepa enclave.  And in the cabin we --

21     some ammunition was found as well, 7.9-millimetre bullets.

22                           [Video-clip played]

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Now, since we haven't got the audio and can't hear the UNHCR and

25     army representatives talking about the incident, we do have two documents

Page 4030

 1     written by the president of the republic and General Mladic as a protest

 2     to the UNHCR.  And having seen that, could you tell us, please, whether

 3     it was possible whether ammunition was found in the flour.  Did cases

 4     like that exist, and convoys in Sarajevo and other regions did -- were

 5     weapons found in UNHCR convoys?  Is that what happened?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember any report on the

 7     subject.  And specifically regarding the munition, I don't remember any

 8     report by the UNHCR representative at our staff meeting.  And in the

 9     event of such a serious violation, there should have been one.  But those

10     are all assumptions because I don't remember this incident.  But if it

11     happened this way, I'm not sure how rigid the inspection was of the UNHCR

12     representatives; for example, in filling bags of flour.  I don't know

13     that -- UNPROFOR was not involved in that.  But I do know

14     Mrs. Karen AbuZayd, the senior representative of the UNHCR in Sarajevo,

15     if she had been aware of such a case she would certainly have got to the

16     bottom of it.  And if UNHCR staff were involved in this incident, then

17     I'm certain that it would have led to their immediate termination.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you, General.  This was public footage.  It was broadcast

20     on television, made public on television.  And it was the subject of a

21     dispute in the co-ordinating body dealing with humanitarian aid.  And the

22     president of the republic wrote these two orders, questioning the

23     commission and asking the convoys to be released.  So those people who

24     conducted the distribution must have known about it because the convoy

25     was stopped while it was being established what had happened and while

Page 4031

 1     this case was being solved.  So I'm sure someone in your command was

 2     involved in this whole process.  Thank you.  Do you know anything about

 3     that?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I'll repeat what I stated earlier.  I can't remember this.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  Do you remember a single case that was

 6     reported to you as the UNPROFOR command which occurred where UNHCR

 7     supplies included ammunition or fuel or anything else like that?  Do you

 8     remember of any such footage or any such case?

 9        A.   No, definitely not.  And that surprises me because if I had known

10     something about that then I'm sure that it would have been taken very

11     seriously indeed because it is at odds with the operating principles of

12     UNHCR and the same holds true for the International Red Cross.  They

13     would have undermined their own position and work, and that's the very

14     last thing they want.

15        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now, do you know that after this incident,

16     the incident where ammunition was found in the UNHCR convoys, that over a

17     period of time the UNHCR convoy was controlled by DutchBat and that in

18     one instance the fact that the UNHCR refused DutchBat from exercising

19     control, one of the UNHCR convoys did not reach its destination with its

20     deliveries, and that destination was Srebrenica?  Thank you.  So do you

21     remember that incident?

22        A.   I don't remember that.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like 1D231 and 232 and 233

25     and 244 to be tendered into evidence.  Thank you.

Page 4032

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer --

 2                           [Defence counsel confer]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- what is the position of the Prosecution?

 4             MR. THAYER:  No objection, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the Chamber has a problem.  The

 6     first two documents, 1D231 and 1D232, we have seen on the screen, but the

 7     witness couldn't say anything about the content.  He told us that he

 8     doesn't know about this incident and the background.  And I think this

 9     witness is not the right one to admit this -- these two documents.  So

10     these will be marked for identification.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And after that, we will deal with the other two.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  1D231 would be Exhibit D78 marked for

14     identification.  1D232 will be Exhibit D79 marked for identification.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And, Mr. Tolimir --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- and the video.  I was told that this is already

18     part of the document D72 marked for identification.  What is now the

19     purpose of tendering it again without hearing the text of the video?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Then that can be MFI'd

21     along with the other MFI documents.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is already MFI'd as D72.  And the document

23     1D234 is the transcript of the video, but I don't see it and we haven't

24     seen it.  So that can be perhaps provided at a later stage.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We will

Page 4033

 1     supply it in due course because it's already on e-court.  Thank you.

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told the transcript is already part of

 4     D72 marked for identification.  All these documents are now marked.

 5             Please carry on.  And I was told that the Prosecution needs some

 6     minutes before we break so that we should -- you should continue until

 7     five minutes before 7.00 or something like that.  Please go ahead.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             May we now have 1D235 displayed, please.  It's a document of the

10     BH army dated the 5th of June, 1995, and it is entitled, "Records of

11     Donations," which the chief of the Department of Defence in Srebrenica

12     Suljo Hasanovic sent to the Secretariat of Defence in Tuzla.  The

13     signatory, Professor Suljo Hasanovic, sets out the humanitarian aid he

14     has received.  And the last sentence in that document, which you can read

15     in the English, says:

16             "Part of these quantities arrived through the Dutch Battalion.

17             "Till our ultimate victory!

18             "Chief of the defence sector,

19             "Professor Suljo Hasanovic."

20             So do you see that there in English?

21             "Contingent which arrived and was obtained from the

22     Dutch Battalion"?

23        A.   Yes, I've seen that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, were you aware of the fact that DutchBat

25     provided certain equipment to the BH army, as Suljo Hasanovic writes here

Page 4034

 1     in his report?

 2        A.   I'll stand by the statement I made earlier.  I said earlier that

 3     occasionally UNPROFOR assisted with food distributions by UNHCR.  And I

 4     assume that's what's meant here in this text as well.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  One more question:  Did you ever, during

 6     your mandate, issue any orders, whether oral or written, that control and

 7     checks should be conducted of humanitarian convoys by -- sent by UNPROFOR

 8     to the civilian population and to prevent it from coming into the hands

 9     of the BH army?  Thank you.

10        A.   No.  At least during my period the UNPROFOR staff never issued

11     such an order, but it's perfectly possible that a local commander had

12     reason at a certain point to perform inspections, especially if there was

13     an incident of abuse I would imagine that the local commander would take

14     measures to prevent any such recurrence.

15        Q.   Thank you, General.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could 1D235 please be admitted.

17     Thank you.

18             And can the Court now please produce P595, page 4.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think we are on the same position.

20     I didn't hear any answer of the witness about the content of this

21     document, so it will be marked for identification.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that he said that it was

23     possible and that it was possible that the local commander did check all

24     that for abuse.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to quote previous witness who said

Page 4035

 1     "everything is possible," but this is not a confirmation of the content

 2     or anything else.  It will be marked for identification.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  And

 4     can --

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please wait a moment.  We need the number.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  1D235 will be D80 marked for identification.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now please carry on.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

 9             Could the Court please produce P595, page 2, paragraph 2, both in

10     English and B/C/S.  The document is entitled "Delivery of Analysis of the

11     Fall of Srebrenica and Zepa," sent to Rasim Delic.

12             On page 4, paragraph 2, both in English and in B/C/S, it is

13     stated:

14             "Among the citizens of Srebrenica, there is an increasing

15     mistrust towards the military.  Naser Oric and municipal official

16     Osman Suljic, Adem Salihovic, and Hamdija Fejzic are brought into

17     connection with the smuggling of humanitarian aid, arms, oil, and similar

18     things, and that they co-operated with members of UNPROFOR and even with

19     the aggressor."

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   My question to you, sir, is this:  Did you receive reports or did

22     you have any information about the fact that members of military or

23     political leaderships in the enclave co-operated with members of UNPROFOR

24     in their smuggling, as it is stated here in the document drafted by the

25     BiH army?

Page 4036

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we have a problem.  We don't see the

 2     relevant part you are quoting.  Can you help us?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Page 4, paragraph 2.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  We have, now, the right page.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             My question to the witness:

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Did you receive any information or reports about the smuggling of

 9     commodities involving military and political officials who co-operated

10     both with UNPROFOR members as well as the aggressor?  Thank you.

11        A.   No, I received no information whatsoever about that.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  My next question is this:  Did you have any

13     information about the trade and smuggling of goods and humanitarian aid

14     in the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?

15        A.   No.  The only case known to me where UNPROFOR troops sold goods

16     took place in Gorazde by the Ukrainian unit.  And in this case, at the

17     time, the goods were sold to the Bosnian Serb army.  And I know that very

18     severe measures were taken leading in part to the English Battalion

19     commander to which the Ukrainian company reported, giving the Ukrainian

20     troops supplies for only one day at a time to prevent them from being

21     sold.

22                           [Defence counsel confer]

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that members of your battalion in

25     Srebrenica here before this Tribunal stated that they did have

Page 4037

 1     information about smuggling operations involving humanitarian aid, that

 2     they mentioned certain individuals?  Is it possible that they did not

 3     report to you about that, that they kept that information to themselves?

 4     Thank you.

 5        A.   That's the only explanation I would have because I know nothing

 6     of that.  But if something so serious happened, it certainly should have

 7     been reported.

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.  The Trial Chamber has heard testimonies of

 9     some commanders who may have not reported to you.  I would like to show

10     you an excerpt from the transcript, but our working day is almost over.

11     We will continue tomorrow.  I will show it to you.  You will see that I'm

12     not lying, that I'm just telling you the truth.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, you told me to bring

14     my cross-examination to an end for today.  This is where I would like to

15     stop, and I will continue tomorrow.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir.

17             Mr. Thayer, you have indicated to -- you wish to raise something.

18             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.  And the issue can

19     be raised in the absence of the witness if the Chamber chooses to dismiss

20     him for the day.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That's very helpful.

22             Sir, that doesn't conclude yet your examination, as you are

23     aware.  We have to continue the cross-examination tomorrow morning at

24     9.00 in the same courtroom, and you are now free to leave without contact

25     to the parties in the meantime.  Thank you very much for your attendance

Page 4038

 1     here.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, on the issue of the forthcoming

 5     protective measures rescission/amendment motion, we've done a little bit

 6     of homework to try to answer the question of before which Chamber this

 7     motion may fall.

 8                           [The witness stands down]

 9             MR. THAYER:  I have prepared a small packet for the

10     Trial Chamber.  I've already distributed it to my learned friend.  We

11     don't need to spend time looking at it now.  I'll just alert the Trial

12     Chamber to the contents of the packet and, if I may, make a proposal to

13     the Trial Chamber for potential course of action to resolve the issue.

14             For the record, what I've distributed is a decision of

15     22 June 2010 in the Karadzic case which dealt with protective measures of

16     a witness in that case and a request for rescission of protective

17     measures in that case.  This is a public decision.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Yes.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would it be appropriate to go into private

21     session to deal with this problem in a more simple way?

22             MR. THAYER:  We can.  We can.  Thank you, Mr. President.  That

23     will make things a little easier.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think it's better.

25             We go into private session.

Page 4039

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24                           [Open session]

25             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session.

Page 4043

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00 in this

 2     courtroom.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.06 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of

 5                           August, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.