1 Wednesday, 27 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.13 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody.
6 This morning we start some minutes later than usual because of
7 technical problems here in the courtroom.
8 And the witness should be brought in, please.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Rave. Welcome back to the
11 courtroom. I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth
12 you made at the beginning of your testimony yesterday still applies.
13 WITNESS: EVERT RAVE [Resumed]
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, good morning.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please continue your
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 I greet everyone. I wish peace unto this house, and I wish that
19 this trial and the judgement and the day end in keeping with God's will,
20 not necessarily mine. I also welcome the witness and wish him a pleasant
21 stay here in the courtroom.
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]
23 Q. I have three questions left over from yesterday before I move on
24 to a new topic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, P996 is the exhibit I
1 need displayed in e-court, page 3. This relates to the question I asked
2 about the so-called Carter Agreement the witness said he was unable to
3 answer at the moment. And we'll see if this is going to remind him of
4 anything. What we see here is a diary. Can we see page 3, please.
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is Mr. Kingori's diary, where he mentioned, as a UN
7 observer, this Carter Agreement.
8 First of all, let me ask you, do you know Mr. Joseph Kingori, and
9 was he a UN observer while you were in Srebrenica?
10 A. Yes, I know him.
11 Q. From his diary we see that he refers to the control of movement
12 towards Zepa in keeping with the so-called Carter Agreement; that's the
13 four bullet point on the right side -- sorry, on the left side.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Aleksandar.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I asked you yesterday what the Carter Agreement means and we see
17 from this diary that the Carter Agreement had to do with controlling
18 movement towards Zepa.
19 Can you now remember what the Carter Agreement is about?
20 A. Yesterday I went to my diary and to my notebooks and I did not
21 find any information about a meeting in which the Carter Agreement was
22 mentioned, and I was not able yesterday to go, for example, on the
23 internet to read the Carter Agreement. And from my memory now, I really
24 don't know what is in the Carter Agreement. If there is information
25 about movements towards Zepa, I really don't know. I was not able to
1 find out yesterday. And I was not in a meeting -- at least I have no
2 notes about being in a meeting in which the Carter Agreement was
4 Q. Thank you. Since you know nothing about that agreement, I will
5 have no further questions about it.
6 Just in response to Mr. McCloskey -- it's 6526 page of the
7 transcript, lines 16 to 18, testimony of Mr. Kingori. Thank you.
8 You said yesterday that the commander of the UNPROFOR decided
9 that you should not control inside the area known as the Bandera
10 Triangle, and then you added it was not the commander of the UNPROFOR but
11 the commander of the DutchBat.
12 Can you tell us, finally, who decided you should not patrol in
13 the Bandera Triangle?
14 A. Of course, I got my orders from the commander of the
15 Dutch Battalion in the enclave and it might be possible that he got the
16 orders from commander UNPROFOR, but I really don't know. I know that
17 finally the commander of DutchBat ordered his troops not to patrol in the
18 area. Although we tried it several times and I figured out yesterday
19 some things in my notebook in which we tried to patrol inside the area,
20 but it was commander of the Dutch Battalion I got the information from.
21 Q. Did the commander of the DutchBat or perhaps the commander of the
22 UN force who gave orders to the commander of the DutchBat have the right
23 to change the mandate of the UNPROFOR force in Srebrenica?
24 A. I don't know if it was a change in the mandate. I think it was a
25 way of acting inside the enclave. And, of course, I think that the
1 DutchBat commander is free to do his job in the way he thinks is the best
2 to do, and I don't think that they changed the mandate by not patrolling
3 in an area. I think we tried several times do our job over there without
4 making casualties on both sides, and we tried to negotiate with, inside,
5 the army of the BiH, and outside with the VRS army, to do our job
6 properly. And I think it's not correct if you state that he changed the
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, sorry for interrupting you. You
9 were referring to page 6526, lines 16 to 18 on page 3 of today's
10 transcript, but, in fact, this is not the right page because Mr. Kingori
11 testified much earlier. Perhaps you should check at a later stage the
12 right reference so that Mr. McCloskey and everybody can find the
13 testimony of Mr. Kingori. But perhaps for now you should continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You said yesterday you had the mandate to disarm the Muslims in
17 the protected area in keeping with the agreement on demilitarisation.
18 Will you just answer me to the best of your knowledge, was it your
19 mandate or not?
20 A. Yes, it was our mandate to disarm the Muslims in the enclave.
21 Q. Thank you. Was that mandate consistent with the agreement on
23 A. If you don't mind, I don't know exactly what's in the agreement
24 because I don't know the agreement 15 years later, and -- from my head,
25 and I don't have it over here. So -- but I think, yes, it was in --
1 inconsistent with the agreement.
2 Q. Thank you. If that was consistent with the agreement, did one of
3 the parties, or perhaps the UNPROFOR commander who was in charge of
4 demilitarisation in keeping with the agreement, did any one of them have
5 the right to change that mandate?
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think everybody saw that in the transcript you
7 see the last answer of the witness.
8 "... but I think, yes, it was inconsistent with the agreement."
9 But I'm quite sure that this was not what you intended to answer.
10 THE WITNESS: No, it was consistent with the agreement.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. And now please answer the
12 last question of Mr. Tolimir, if you recall it.
13 THE WITNESS: I think that the agreement was signed by the UN and
14 not by commander UNPROFOR, so I don't think that commander UNPROFOR in
15 Bosnia or the commander of the Dutch Battalion had a right to change the
16 mandate, so I don't think they would change the mandate.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. For your information, do you know this agreement was
19 signed by General Morillon, the then force commander?
20 A. With respect, I think this is what I mean. Maybe we are talking
21 about different mandates, and I really don't know the mandate what we are
22 talking now about. But the only thing I can say after 15 years, I don't
23 have the mandate, I don't think that commanders on the ground are able to
24 change mandates given or signed by the UN.
25 Q. How do you then explain that the commander changed your mandate
1 as far as this Bandera Triangle was concerned when it was not stipulated
2 by the agreement and no one had the right to change the agreement without
3 the consent of all parties?
4 A. As you know, at the time I was a warrant officer 2nd Class,
5 sergeant-major in the Dutch army, I had a lieutenant-colonel as a
6 commander; and as you know, in the army it's not regular in a time that
7 you do your job that all the time you get orders from your commander, you
8 go into agreements or other things because you doubt about the orders
9 commanders are giving you. I think when you have the opinion that the
10 commander of the Dutch Battalion changed the mandate, I think you have to
11 ask him the question, because I can't answer it for you.
12 Q. Do you know whether the Serbs had given their approval to change
13 the agreement so that you do not control the Muslims in the
14 Bandera Triangle?
15 A. No, I have no information about that.
16 Q. Thank you. I have no more questions about this.
17 There was one more question left over from yesterday.
18 Mr. McCloskey asked for a reference concerning a witness who participated
19 in the attack on Kravica which you described as never having participated
20 in combat.
21 It's 6213, lines 18 through 20 of the 16 October transcript. My
22 question was:
23 "Can you tell us in which places your battalion Biljeg was
24 involved in combat?"
25 The witness answered:
1 "In Skelani and for a minor part in Kravica."
2 The rest is not relevant to this subject. This is just for your
3 information and for purposes of verification. We also discussed
4 Mr. Naser Oric yesterday. I asked the witness if he was aware that
5 Naser Oric had stated that he had not carried out demilitarisation.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now ask for 1D39 --
7 sorry, 329. 1D329.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
9 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] While we're waiting for the document,
10 I'd just like to correct the transcript. The reference is 5625,
11 lines 17 and 18. That's Mr. Kingori's testimony.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: While we are dealing with corrections, you see on
13 page 6, line 16, a reference to hearing of the 16th of October. At that
14 day, we had no hearing; but I think, Mr. Tolimir, you were referring to
15 the 6th of October, if I'm not mistaken. Perhaps you can clarify that.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. That's
17 right. I had in mind the 6th of October.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. Clearly the General has a
20 list of documents he's going to be using for cross, so could we be
21 provided that as per the court order.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We
23 provided Naser Oric's interview, 1D329. We provided it yesterday to
24 Mr. McCloskey. We see it on the right-hand side here.
25 And this is an interview given by Naser Oric to the daily --
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, may I interrupt you. The problem is
2 that it is not part of your list of potential exhibits to be used with
3 this witness. And I think Mr. McCloskey was asking for a complete list.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Immediately before this
5 witness appeared in the courtroom, that document was uploaded in e-court.
6 If it cannot be used, I can certainly take Mr. McCloskey's request into
7 consideration. Thank you.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I have no problem with this document or, really,
10 any others, but I would like General Tolimir to follow the orders and the
11 rules that we live by in this courtroom. We would like a list. We have
12 no list.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Didn't you receive any list?
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Ms. Stewart didn't, and I don't see one
15 immediately on my list. So if there is such a list, if they could send
16 it to Ms. Stewart, I -- we'd be fine.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The Chamber has received a list some days ago,
18 but this specific document is not included in the list of the documents
19 to be used with this witness.
20 Mr. Gajic.
21 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just before the
22 beginning of today's session, this document was uploaded in e-court.
23 Since we were not confident that we would be able to do it early this
24 morning, it's not on the list, and we didn't know whether we would be
25 using it at all. Since the document was mentioned yesterday, Mr. Tolimir
1 finally decided to show it to the witness today. An updated list will be
2 provided to the OTP hopefully during this session. Thank you.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
4 Mr. McCloskey.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Again, in cross-examination documents come up at
6 the last minute and I don't -- wouldn't expect every document to be on a
7 cross-examination list. I have no problem with that. I'm sure we'll be
8 doing the same. But Ms. Stewart cannot find any list because she has
9 none. So if we could just get whatever list you've got to her then we'll
10 be fine and there should be no problem.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this time there was just a mistake
12 because the Chamber has received a list. Perhaps it was not sent to the
13 OTP in time. But Mr. Gajic promised to do that during the first session
14 of today.
15 Mr. Tolimir, please continue your cross-examination.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As I've already said it -- thank
17 you, Mr. President. As I've already said it, this is an interview
18 entitled, "Naser Oric's confession." It was given to the daily
19 "Oslobodenje" on Friday, 23rd of August, 1996.
20 The ERN number is 0042-9641. I emphasise this because you can't
21 see it in the right-hand-side corner. Can the document please be
22 scrolled a little, the right-hand side to the left, and now you can see
23 the ERN number. And can the document now please be scrolled up a little,
24 we would like to see the entire content down to the signature. And I'm
25 going to be using that particular passage in the text. Thank you.
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. The last passage has been blown up, and we will be reading from
3 the text:
4 "When UNPROFOR troops set up their check-points and observation
5 posts, we immediately realised that we could not rely on them. A team of
6 my lads who were not militarily trained but they were reliable ..."
7 I can't read this, I'm sorry.
8 "... reserve units decided to establish our lines, our own lines,
9 to organise our own monitors. The system functioned in the following
10 way: When an UNPROFOR patrol was approaching, our guys on the lines
11 informed us so we could remove the weapons. If the UNPROFOR soldiers
12 asked about the presence of our lads on those lines, we answered that we
13 couldn't trust them and that we were afraid of Chetniks, so we wanted to
14 have our own guards. They showed understanding for that, which was not
15 the case when we dug our trenches and fortifications."
16 My question for you, sir, is this: Did you know that Muslims
17 were covering up all of their activities and that they were pretending to
18 be just common folks, unarmed civilians? Thank you.
19 A. I think that of course in the situation the former Yugoslavia was
20 in both parties played the same game. In this statement in the
21 newspaper, Naser Oric stated the way they acted. In a meeting from the
22 23rd of February, from the commander DutchBat with Naser Oric, he told
23 that -- he told the population of the enclave that he trusts the UN, he
24 will -- that the UN will defend the enclave so that they should hand over
25 their weapons.
1 And, of course, in the end we saw that they did not hands over
2 all their weapons because there still were weapons, and the enclave was
3 not demilitarised. But, of course, when they had weapons and when they
4 did military activities, they would not show it to us and they would hide
5 it, especially in the same way as also the Serbs did because we got the
6 same information, only information, from commanders who tell us that
7 nothing was going on and in the other way we discovered that they were
8 frequently fighting and had fire fights.
9 Q. Thank you. Since you are drawing a parallel here, were there any
10 Serbs in the demilitarised zone? Thank you.
11 A. As I stated yesterday, when I saw the map, I saw two lines. We
12 were not all talking about the same line of a demilitarised zone. The
13 Serbs had their own ideas about it, the Muslims had their own ideas about
14 it, and we were in between. We had our own map that we took over from
15 our predecessors, and it was discussed several times with the Muslims and
16 the Serbs.
17 On the 28th of February, we had a meeting with Major Nikolic, and
18 we had a discussion about the confrontation line, so also for them it was
19 not exactly clear. Of course, they wanted more into the zone and the
20 Muslims wanted them more out of the zone. The proposal was to look if we
21 were talking about the same line, and we proposed that, especially in the
22 western part, Major Sarkic from the Milici Brigade and an UNMO could go
23 into the field to check if we were talking exactly about the same line
24 and the same positions of the demilitarised zone.
25 Major Nikolic stated that we could not go into the area because
1 there were mines. And he stated that when you go in there it was not
2 very, very wise to do so. So we were not allowed to go with impartial
3 observers to check the line and see if we were talking about the same
4 line. So it's very difficult to say if Serbs went into the demilitarised
5 zone or Muslims went out because we are talking about different lines.
6 Q. And those lines that were manned by Serbs, were they included
7 into the demilitarised zone?
8 Could you please provide direct answers and short answers. And
9 only if the Trial Chamber allows you, you can go on talking. Otherwise,
10 we are going to waste time without completing our task. Thank you.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, if you ask a question, you should
12 allow the witness to answer in the way which is a proper way to deal with
13 the problems you raise with your questions. There may be some instances
14 that a witness is not answering just -- and focusing and the core of your
15 question, but this was not necessary to remind the witness at this stage.
16 Please continue.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Witness, please could you listen to this and answer my questions
20 that I will have after I have read the text. This is what Naser Oric is
21 saying, and I'm quoting from the penultimate paragraph, the one above the
22 last one.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the text please be scrolled
24 down a little so I can read from it. And it is the previous page in
25 English. Thank you. We can see it now.
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. This is the text entitled, "Guards Along the Lines." And I
4 "We didn't want Chetniks to see the weapons that we had not
5 handed in. That would have been an argument for them to refuse signing
6 the agreement, or to do who knows what. We had some 2.000 barrels; I
7 knew that for a fact. And I didn't even know about all of the weapons.
8 The weapons were being hidden. We kept some 20 cannons with four
9 barrels. We made single barrel cannons of them so in the end we ended
10 with a kind of anti-aircraft cannons. Let me explain. We hid every
11 single barrel that we managed to capture from Chetniks, and when there
12 was an action, we took them out. Everybody hid weapons from everybody
13 else. Only the boldest ones, real soldiers, reported what they had.
14 Others were keeping them in hiding until they were needed. It is all
15 understandable. So we had probably approximately 4.000 barrels."
16 And then he goes on to say that that became manifest during the
17 breakthrough towards Tuzla, without a brigade in Zepa.
18 Please tell us, were you aware of Muslims hiding the quantity,
19 such a large quantity of weapons, as described by Naser Oric in this
21 A. As I stated yesterday, we were aware that there were weapons
22 hidden by the Muslims inside the enclave. We were not aware of the
23 amount of weapons that were hidden, nor the sort of weapons that were
24 hidden. The only thing we could do is whenever we saw armed men or
25 weapons in houses where we were able to go into, to confiscate them and
1 store them in the weapon collection sites.
2 Q. Thank you. And when Muslims left the area, did it turn out that
3 they indeed had about 4.000 barrels as Naser Oric states in this
4 interview? Did that turn out to be true during the breakthrough towards
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Perhaps the General or the witness can give us an
8 idea of barrels. I know barrels of oil and barrels of wine, but barrels
9 of weapons, I'm not sure anyone here knows precisely what he's talking
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
12 Perhaps the witness should answer the question first.
13 THE WITNESS: I think when we are speaking about barrels, we are
14 speaking about long-rifled guns, long weapons.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The question was if it turned out "that they
16 indeed had about 4.000 barrels," whatever that is, "as Naser Oric states
17 in his interview."
18 Do you have any knowledge about that?
19 THE WITNESS: No. But when we are talking about 4.000 barrels,
20 in my imagination we are talking about 4.000 weapons, so that can be
21 pistols, that can be long rifles, but also rocket launchers, small rocket
22 launchers, or small hand-grenade launchers. That's, in my opinion, the
23 translation of the barrels he is stating over there.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: As you indicated earlier, you have no information
25 about the amount of weapons?
1 THE WITNESS: No, we have no information about the amount of
2 weapons. And maybe I can directly answer the question of Mr. Tolimir.
3 When a lot of men between 17 and 60 left the enclave on the 10th of July,
4 I saw a lot of men gathered in the town of Srebrenica, lots of them were
5 armed, but of course it was -- it was dark, and lots of them were already
6 moving in the north-western direction. We didn't know where they would
7 go. But at that moment we saw that there were armed men walking in the
8 north-western direction. And also at that moment we did not know the
9 amount of weapons they carried with them.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. People whom you saw, did they participate in the breakthrough
14 that is referred to by Naser Oric in his interview, or did they go in
15 some other direction?
16 A. The people I refer to went in a big column in the north-western
17 direction out of the town of Srebrenica, and I don't know where they
18 went. And, later, I heard that there was a try to break through in the
19 direction of Tuzla, but at that moment I did not know where they went.
20 Q. Thank you. During your patrols before the fall of Srebrenica,
21 did you see armed Muslims walking around, and how often did you see them?
22 A. Yes, we have seen armed Muslims walking around. I don't know the
23 frequency of it, but we saw them frequently. All the time we saw armed
24 Muslims. As I told you, we tried to disarm them and store the weapons in
25 the weapon collection points.
1 Q. Thank you. Could you tell how successful your attempts were?
2 Could you translate your success into a certain quality -- quantity of
3 weapons that were taken from the Muslims?
4 A. No, I can't give you a quantity because we did our utmost to get
5 the weapons without going so far that it was the ultimate goal to get the
6 weapon and even try to shoot people to get the weapons. We just tried to
7 catch them and disarm them.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce the
9 second column of this interview, the third paragraph, under the title:
10 "The Demilitarisation of Srebrenica." Can you see where it says "the
11 demilitarisation of Srebrenica," can you please move the document to the
12 right -- or, rather, to the left. Thank you. And it is page 2 in
13 English. Now we can see it.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Where it says "the demilitarisation of Srebrenica," I'm reading
16 the first paragraph -- or, rather, the second paragraph:
17 "So we handed over to the UNPROFOR only some of the weapons, for
18 instance, two tanks. We had had five tanks, but since we didn't have any
19 fuel for them, we had to burn some down."
20 Could you please look at the advice provided to him by Naser Oric
21 when it came to surrendering weapons. Could you please look at the
22 penultimate line in the interview just below the image depicted in the
23 text, the second paragraph.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And below the photo, could you
25 please show the second paragraph, the sixth line through the tenth line
1 in that paragraph. Thank you. Go a bit further to the right, please.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I'm not aware that the witness is
3 able to read Serbian language.
4 THE WITNESS: No, I'm not.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: So that you should give an indication where in
6 the English translation he will find this passage.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the third page in English.
8 And here we see the penultimate paragraph, line 6 in that paragraph, the
9 second from the bottom.
10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Sefer Halilovic also participated in this interview, and he says:
12 "I ordered that those things that were not in a good working
13 order be surrendered."
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now continue with the
15 column on the right-hand side.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I would like to know the exact part
17 in English. I don't find it. The witness will not find it as well.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President. It's
19 the fifth paragraph on the English side where it says, "Sefer Halilovic
20 intervenes." That's in the first line of that paragraph.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I read the part where it says:
23 "I ordered you to hand over the weapons that were out of order,
24 and that's what you did. And we're talking about 200 barrels all
25 together, including those home-made and useless rifles, plus some heavy
1 weaponry, which you couldn't hide."
2 My question is this: Firstly, does it transpire from this that
3 Naser Oric, when he mentions 200 barrels, uses that word to describe
4 long-rifled guns? Thank you.
5 A. I can't look in the mind of Naser Oric, but when we are speaking
6 about the barrels as stated before, I think we are talking about weapons,
7 long and short weapons, pistols, and all those kind of things. And when
8 we are talking about the 200 rifles now in this context, I think those
9 were also the small arms, so the pistols and the hand-made guns that were
10 stored in the weapon collection point. They were not only the hand-made
11 weapons in the weapon collection point but also a lot of very good and
12 useful weapons which were taken from the Muslims.
13 Q. Thank you. Does it transpire from the interview which also
14 involved Sefer Halilovic who was commander during the demilitarisation
15 that the commander of the BiH army ordered Naser Oric not to hand over
16 all the weapons to UNPROFOR?
17 A. That's what I read over there. But when we are talking about
18 the period that this happened, I think it started in the period when
19 General Morillon declared it as a safe haven in Srebrenica, a Canadian
20 company came in, and they started to disarm the Muslims. And I think
21 after that, from January 1994, the first Dutch Battalion came in and went
22 on with the demilitarisation.
23 Q. Based on what you have just told us, can you tell us whether it
24 was General Morillon who declared Srebrenica a safe haven or whether it
25 was owing to the Security Council and the agreement signed by the parties
1 to that effect?
2 A. Okay. Thank you, I think I have to -- mind my words a little
3 bit. As we all know, General Morillon was standing on the PTT building
4 in the town of Srebrenica and declared that he would take care of the
5 population and made a statement as if it was a safe haven. I think
6 that's what I remember now. And, of course, we come to the same point as
7 we stated before: it's not for a commander on the ground to declare an
8 area as a safe haven; it is a UN topic, and it has to be done by the UN,
9 of course.
10 Q. Thank you. We're not going to go into the origins of the
11 agreement on demilitarisation and who signed it and how the area fled.
12 We have already had testimony about that.
13 We will move now to a different topic that I announced yesterday,
14 mainly what I asked you yesterday: Was the attack on the enclave
15 announced to you beforehand.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But before we move on to that
17 topic, I would like to tender this document. 1D329.
18 Thank you, Aleksandar.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D126, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. We'll now go back to a passage that I quoted to you yesterday
24 from your statement, page 3, paragraph 5, where Colonel Vukovic told you,
25 if you remember, that due to constant incidents at Observation Post Echo,
1 the Serbian forces were forced to intervene. So it was announced to you.
2 Let me ask you, did the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo ever send a protest
3 note picking up on the information they got from Serbs about the attacks
4 emanating from the protected areas of Zepa and Srebrenica?
5 A. I think I cannot answer that question because I was not in the
6 direct line of command of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, so I think this is a
7 question for commander of the Dutch Battalion.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you then answer a question that you do know an
9 answer to.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we can see 1D350.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. It is a statement you gave in Zagreb on the 22nd July, 1995, just
13 after the end of your mission in Srebrenica, and you said something I'm
14 interested in on page 2 in Serbian.
15 I'm quoting what you said, and now we have it in English. Now
16 both are in English. In fact, it's Dutch and English. You say:
17 "The conduct of the BH army at OP-F was the straw that broke the
18 camel's back. As the Bosnian Serb army," you call it Bosnian Serb army
19 instead of VRS, "as the Bosnian Serb army continued to advance, the BH
20 kept taking positions behind the observation posts, but the personnel of
21 the observation posts were snappy after the fall of OP-E and the death of
22 van Renssen and kept calling Section 5 forward. Rave and Captain Melgers
23 had spent two days holding discussions with Ramiz, and that's
24 Ramiz Becirovic, the Muslim commander in Srebrenica. They kept holding
25 discussions with Ramiz to enforce freedom of movement for vehicles. But
1 Ramiz did not have central leadership of the troops and did not have any
2 information on the attacks. And Section 5 could not take over leadership
3 of the BH."
4 Have you read this passage in your language? Can you tell me
5 what does the acronym CE 5 mean?
6 A. The Section 5 was -- were the liaison officers.
7 Q. You say this communication section could not take over leadership
8 of the BH army. Was the situation so critical that somebody needed to
9 take over command of the BH army?
10 A. It was not the communication section, it was the liaison section.
11 The situation was that Ramiz was not able to order all his troops to
12 guarantee our freedom of movement, so, of course, we had a feeling that
13 nobody was really in charge, because when the highest commander on the
14 scene is not able to order his troops what to do, then you've got a
15 problem. And, of course, we were also not able to take over from Ramiz
16 and command the BiH army over there.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, after reading this, can you recall whether
18 van Renssen died at Observation Post E, how he died, and who killed him?
19 A. I think we answered the question yesterday. I don't know
20 exactly. I think it was OP Foxtrot he came from, when the manning of the
21 OP returned via dirt road. Muslim civilians tried to stop him on the end
22 of the road, they tried to stop the APC. The APC did not stop, carried
23 on, and at that moment either a hand-grenade was thrown or a gun was shot
24 that caused the death, at the end of the day, of the soldier van Renssen.
25 Q. Thank you. In this passage I read, you referred to
1 Ramiz Becirovic. Is that the Ramiz Becirovic who in practice and
2 officially stood in for Naser Oric?
3 A. Yes, that's the same person.
4 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us briefly what were these discussions
5 with Ramiz about?
6 A. What discussions are you referring to? Because all the time
7 during the six months we dealt with Ramiz. So could you be a little bit
8 more specific?
9 Q. I meant the discussions referred to in this passage I quoted
10 where you say that there was a straw that broke the camel's back and you
11 talked to Ramiz for two days to get freedom of movement for vehicles. If
12 you have anything to add to that, that would be nice. If not, I'll take
13 it that you have given your answer already.
14 A. Yeah, it is the same answer as I gave you yesterday. When the
15 OPs in the southern part were attacked, at that moment we also had no
16 freedom of movement to play the game of going back and going forward in
17 the way we used to do. That was the problem for us, that our hands were
18 tied to do our job in a normal military way because the Muslims stood
19 behind us and had only one thing, that was, UNPROFOR should go forward
20 and attack the enemy. That does not fit in our military way of acting,
21 and that was the reason, for example, why the southern OPs went forward
22 and surrendered to the Serbs. And, of course, that was -- this was going
23 on also in the western part - correction, in the eastern part - and we
24 had no freedom of movement and could not do our job in the way that we
25 wanted to do it.
1 Q. Thank you. Can you look at the last paragraph on the right page
2 which begins with the words "note," and it says, "Rave". NB, nota bene,
3 Rave. Rave says what is described in the next passage happened on the
4 11th of July, but the incident took place on 10 July. PG, according to
5 Rave, the BH army had taken an M-4S tank, or an M-48 tank, and were using
6 it to fire on Position B4. As a result, Hageman moved forward to the
7 south and took fire from the BH army tank. According to Rave, it later
8 became clear that this was a Bosnian Serb army tank.
9 S5 then went to Ramiz to calm the spirits among the ranks of the
10 BH army. Ramiz then went forward and came back with a message that the
11 BH Army did not have a tank there, and that the BH army in place had been
12 ordered to grant the UNPROFOR freedom of movement.
13 While pulling out one of the APCs of the UNPROFOR, Hageman again
14 took fire from - and there is something illegible, we don't know whom he
15 took fire from. So this is the end of the quote.
16 When exactly did the BH army seise that one tank that I -- that
17 is referred to in this passage?
18 A. I can't even remember that I ever stated that the BiH had an M-48
19 tank. And when I read this passage now, I think they also didn't. I
20 think there was a misunderstanding that maybe somebody thought that the
21 BiH had an M-48 tank, and the only thing I know from I think it was
22 Captain Hageman during that time, he was the one on the 11th of July,
23 early in the morning, went forward with his APC to see if the Serb attack
24 still was going on because that was one of the things we needed to be
25 aware of for asking support from our higher echelons.
1 Q. When you speak of support, can you tell us if you know when you
2 were able to ask for support from the higher echelons of your force?
3 A. In my knowledge, on the 10th of July we had a meeting, commander
4 DutchBat had a meeting and I attended also the meeting, with the Muslim
5 and the civilian leaders in the enclave, where command of DutchBat
6 informed them that there would be air support. When the VRS attack
7 continued the next morning by daylight, to be sure that the VRS was
8 continuing their attack, we had to send forward an APC to check if it
9 really was true. And when the APC was shot at by the VRS, it was
10 confirmation. And I think that was also the time that commander of the
11 Dutch Battalion asked for air support.
12 Q. Did you have to go into reconnaissance to see if it was an attack
13 on the -- of the Bosnian Serb army or could you see it with the naked
14 eye? If they were attacking you, you must have seen they were attacking.
15 A. During the night, the attacks stopped. And in the morning, early
16 in the morning, an APC went forward to see what would happen and to see
17 how far they could go forward. At least, that's the impression I've got
18 now. And at that moment when he was going forward, he was attacked by
19 VRS fire. So that was first confirmation that the attack was still going
20 on. And from that moment on, I remember that the attacks started again
21 and the VRS moved farther upward north.
22 Q. Did they, that APC, provoke the attack? Did it go into the VRS
23 territory without prior notification? Did it get out of bounds of the
24 demilitarised zone?
25 A. The APC was in the town of Srebrenica that night. It went to the
1 southern border of the town of Srebrenica, so it was inside the enclave
2 several kilometres. So the VRS was already several kilometres inside the
3 enclave. So normally we should have had freedom of movement over there,
4 because we were clearly visible as UN troops because we were in white
5 APCs with big UN letters on it.
6 Q. Can you tell us, on the 10th and the 11th, these white APCs with
7 the UN logo, did they fire on the firing positions of the Army of
8 Republika Srpska as they were ordered?
9 A. I was not on the spot and I think I can be for sure that they got
10 the order to fire overhead and not to fire on the positions of the
11 Bosnian Serb army -- the VRS army.
12 Q. Thank you. We'll look at that later. Can you now explain to the
13 Trial Chamber where is this B4 position from which the Muslim side fired
14 at you using seised M-48 tank, the incident after which you discussed
15 something with Ramiz?
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That is a misstatement of the record,
18 and it's contrary to the document he read from and contrary to the
19 witness's answer on that point. That's inappropriate thing to do. That
20 throws chaos and falsity into the record and should not be done. That
21 has been cleared up. Clearly, I've not objected to this time, but that
22 kind of injection of material is inappropriate.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, are you referring to this debriefing
24 note we had on the screen when you have formulated your question? And if
25 so, can you tell us which part of it.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm referring to this nota bene
2 from the text. In the Dutch version, it's the second sentence. And at
3 the end of the sentence, we see Position B4. I asked the witness to
4 explain where this B4 position is in relation to what I've just read. In
5 English, it's the previous page.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let's go back to the previous page.
7 Mr. McCloskey.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: I have no problem with the witness explaining B4.
9 The problem is General Tolimir's question assumed and contained the --
10 that there was a BiH tank. And there was no such BiH tank. The BiH did
11 not have a tank. That's clear in the thing he referred to, somebody at
12 first thought they might have had one and then by the end of the
13 paragraph it's clear that was mistaken; it was a Serb tank. The witness
14 cleared that up and said there was no tank. And now he's gone back and
15 said, Where is the -- or, Talk to us about the tank that the BiH had. I
16 mean, that's just absurd. It's game playing. It's the same games he was
17 playing with UNPROFOR at the time and it's not appropriate for the
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Rave, can you --
20 Mr. Gajic.
21 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe it is
22 completely inappropriate for Mr. McCloskey to say that it's the same game
23 that Mr. Tolimir had played with the UNPROFOR back in 1995. It's very,
24 very inappropriate, especially in this context.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Rave, can you explain the sentence:
1 According to Rave, the BiH had taken an M-4S tank and were using it to
2 fire on position B4?
3 Can you explain this sentence.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can do it in the same way as I did before.
5 I think there was a rumour that the BiH had an M-48 tank from the VRS and
6 that they were shooting at the position B4. The question was,
7 Position B4, I really don't know where it is because that's the
8 operational situation from the Bravo Company at that moment. Later on,
9 it seemed that it was not an M-48 tank that was in hands of the BiH, but
10 it was a VRS tank.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There's, again, a translation problem. In the
12 English text it is M-4S, but in the Dutch version it is M-48.
13 THE WITNESS: It's an M-48 tank.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. May I ask you, have you
15 seen this document called "Debriefing Sergeant Major 1B Rave" before?
16 THE WITNESS: No, I've never seen it before.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Has this debriefing taken place on the
18 22nd of July, 1996?
19 THE WITNESS: We had an operational debriefing in Zagreb on that
20 date. It was just an odd debrief. Never saw the results of those -- of
21 this debriefing.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Who was the person who interviewed you that day?
23 THE WITNESS: That day, I was interviewed by the
24 Colonel Lemon [phoen], the second in command of the 11th Air
25 Mobile Brigade.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do you know a person of the name
2 Professor Dr. P.H. Groen?
3 THE WITNESS: I've heard the name before. And as you can see, at
4 the end of the text, he is the investigation leader from the section
5 military history from the Dutch army, and I don't know if he was on the
6 spot at that moment. I only know that I was debriefed by the
7 Colonel Lemon at that moment. And all the, let's say, key players, I
8 think 20 or 25 persons who had possibly useful information were debriefed
9 at that moment in Zagreb.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You didn't sign this document?
11 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't sign it.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
13 THE WITNESS: And that's what's also stated in the end of the
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes.
16 Mr. Tolimir, have you finished your examination on this document?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I do not
18 intend to ask anything further about this document because the Prosecutor
19 seems to mind. I was not quoting my words, I was quoting from the
20 witness's statement given in Zagreb. But I have nothing further on it.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
22 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, just a moment. As
23 for notification of potential evidence and exhibits we wanted to use, by
24 mistake unfortunately it was not sent to Ms. Stewart but it was sent to
25 Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Vanderpuye, Mr. Elderkin, and other members of the
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You mean the list of exhibits to be used with
3 this witness? That may be checked by the OTP.
4 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: We've determined that is -- that is correct, and
6 I'm sure it won't be a problem again.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
8 Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering this document?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Thank you for
10 reminding me.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be admitted as an exhibit.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D127, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. There are some minutes left before
14 the break. Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Since there are just a few minutes, I won't move to the next
18 topic. I just want to ask you, Were you in Srebrenica on the 11th and
19 12th of July when the people gathered around the petrol station where
20 Ramiz Becirovic was giving his speech? Sorry, it was the 10th and the
21 11th July, 1995.
22 A. The 10th of July, I was in Srebrenica. I don't know if
23 Ramiz given a speech over there. I could look in my notes specifically
24 where I was at that time. In the evening, I think around 11.00, I went
25 with commander of the Dutch Battalion to the PTT building where the
1 military and civilian leaders of the enclave were assembled, and we had a
2 meeting over there and --
3 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that later.
4 Were you at the gas station when a mortar fire was opened? We
5 saw it in that video-clip, if you remember.
6 A. I don't know what video-clip you are referring to. And on the
7 gas station where mortar fire was opened, the only thing we talked about
8 yesterday was possible mortar fire, at least a grenade was falling on the
9 compound of the Bravo Company. So I don't know what gas station you are
10 referring to.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This part of the trial video was not used
12 yesterday during the examination of Mr. Rave.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had in mind the Muslim mortar
14 fire on the 10th, when people gathered in Srebrenica. We are going to
15 show you the scene or a still from the film. My assistant is going to
16 show you, and then I will continue putting questions. Thank you.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we should do that after the break. We
18 must have our first break now, and we will resume at 11.00.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Will the witness be brought in.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, Mr. Gajic, please continue.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Mr. Gajic will now play this footage so we can ask our questions of the
2 witness, because we seem to have put some questions to him that he was
3 unable to answer.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now, please, having seen this scene, can you tell us if you were
8 there, and do you remember that this mortar fired from this position at
9 the petrol station?
10 A. No, I wasn't there, and I have not seen this mortar fired. I
11 even don't know exactly where this spot is at this moment. So I was not
12 there, and I have not seen anything.
13 Q. Thank you. How far is it from the Bravo base?
14 A. As I just said, I really don't even recognise the spot exactly
15 where this is because I haven't been in Srebrenica for the last 10 or
16 12 years I think. So I don't recall the spot at this moment.
17 Q. Very well. Since you can't remember, I won't have any more
18 questions for you. I have to tell you that this scene depicts the mortar
19 fire from the position and it hadn't been provoked by the fire from the
20 VRS. I just wanted to ask you whether the monitors registered this
21 incident and whether they reported it or recorded it in their log-book
22 regarding firing activities on the ground?
23 A. I don't know if monitors registered it because I don't have the
24 possibility to look inside the registers of the UN monitors.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce D20,
2 page 38, paragraph 3.58.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 things -- and I'm going to quote once we receive paragraph 3.58 and when
6 we receive it in the English version for your benefit, sir. Thank you.
7 We will see it in a minute, I suppose.
8 Paragraph 3.58. Thank you.
9 It's the last paragraph, and we can see it now. It says in the
10 first sentence, and I'll read:
11 "On Monday 10 July, the commander of OP-M received orders from
12 the C-Company commander to co-ordinate with the BiH army. That same
13 evening, fighting broke out among the BiH army soldiers, resulting in
14 dead and wounded."
15 And thereafter, towards the end, it says:
16 "When the two BiH army soldiers with the anti-tank weapons
17 attempted to prevent their departure, they were shot in the head by the
18 BiH army leader."
19 Could you tell the Trial Chamber anything about what happened
20 there, about this fighting that broke out among the BiH army soldiers and
21 the resulting casualties? Thank you.
22 A. The only thing I know about this incident is approximately what
23 is stated in this debriefing. I was not there on the spot, and I have no
24 more information from my memories. I -- for sure nothing in my notebooks
25 about this incident, so I really can't give you any more information
1 about this.
2 Q. Thank you. Since you can't tell us anything, I won't have any
3 more questions with this regard.
4 And now could you please tell us whether, during the night
5 between the 10th and 11 July, 1995, the DutchBat commander held a meeting
6 with the military and civilian authorities in Srebrenica in the postal
7 office building?
8 A. Yes, that's correct.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order for me to be able to put
10 questions to you, I would like the Court to produce 1D351. This is an
11 additional statement that this witness provided in Assen on the
12 3rd of October, 1995. Thank you.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. You stated in Assen, and I quote:
15 "During the night between the 10th and 11th July" --
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, which page are you reading from?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please produce the second
18 page. I didn't notice that what we see is the first page only. Can we
19 see the first paragraph on page 2.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. It says here:
22 "On the night of 11 July 1995, he attended a meeting at which the
23 entire ABH military and civilian leadership and the civilian authorities
24 in the enclave were present. During that meeting,
25 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans stated that unless the Bosnian Serb army
1 withdrew from the enclave and stopped the attack on Srebrenica and the
2 blocking positions, a massive air-strike would ensue. There was no
3 mention of the number of aircraft, but, rather, of the fact that all
4 targets in the immediate surroundings of the enclave would be put out of
5 action. Colonel Karremans even spoke of sections of an area of one
6 square kilometre which would disappear from the map."
7 And based on what I've just quoted, could you tell us what you
8 remember from that meeting? What did Karremans say about NATO
9 air-strikes at that meeting?
10 A. I think that all I remember is stated in this debriefing. He was
11 speaking about a massive air-strike, so not close-air support but a
12 massive air-strike. And I think at that moment he explained to the
13 leaders in the enclave what he meant was a massive air-strike, there
14 would be a fixed-wing aircraft with a lot of arms, even cannons, in it,
15 and they would be able to wipe out a square kilometre in a part of the
17 Q. [Microphone not activated] ... thank you.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. How could Mr. Karremans promise such an intense air support and
22 air-strikes on the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska? What did
23 he base that on?
24 A. As you can see in the same point, I state over there that I
25 really don't know where the information is coming from, but I suspect
1 that the source is either not his command or BH command.
2 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us whether that meant any
3 changes to the agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica if NATO
4 used massive air-strikes on the Republika Srpska targets?
5 A. Again, I think I'm not the right person to ask that question. I
6 think that's a question that should be asked in the chain of command a
7 little bit higher up. I even think somewhere in Sarajevo or maybe even
8 in New York.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted,
11 please, in view of the fact that the witness speaks about the same things
12 in the following parts of his debriefing. Thank you.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, the witness is here testifying.
15 He certainly can be and should be questioned about his prior statements,
16 but putting in the complete statement of a witness each time he testifies
17 is really -- I don't know the reason for that. He's here to be
18 questioned, and it's a precedent that would potentially swamp you with an
19 untold number of statements.
20 So unless there's a particular reason, it would not be, in this
21 system, I think, appropriate. Unless there's a reason the Court wants to
22 see it. And we can also arrange, as I think I've done before, to provide
23 Courts with all statements of all witnesses, which it may be more
24 appropriate in other systems, though that would incredibly swamp you,
25 given how long this case has gone. So unless there's a particular reason
1 for this, I would -- I would object.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Rave, do you remember this statement? Have
3 you ever seen it before?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've seen this statement before.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Did you sign it?
6 THE WITNESS: I signed this one, yes. But I signed it -- I think
7 this is the debriefing. I don't know, is this from the summary or my own
8 debriefing? Because we gave our first debriefings in Assen during that
9 time, and I think this is from the debriefing in Assen, and I think this
10 is only a part of my statement.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we perhaps see the last page of it. If I'm
12 not mistaken, this is the third page.
13 THE WITNESS: Yeah, this is the last page, I think, because this
14 statement was made after a telephone call and not signed, on the
15 2nd of October, I think. But in my opinion it belongs to two or three
16 parts of the debriefing Srebrenica we gave. In the first part of the
17 debriefing, we had interviewers who were not exactly aware about all the
18 abbreviations and the whole situation in the enclave, so -- and in that
19 debriefing I also told at the end that the big lines were correct but in
20 detail there could be a lot of mistakes because of the interviewers did
21 not exactly know what happened during that time, did not know exactly the
22 acronyms and all those kind of things.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You see on the left side of the screen
24 handwriting, a signature. Is that your signature?
25 THE WITNESS: That's my signature.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have heard the objection by
2 Mr. McCloskey. Can you give us further information about the purpose of
3 tendering this?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. The
5 witness attended the meeting during which the UNPROFOR mandate was
6 changed, as well as the agreement which was unilaterally changed by the
7 UNPROFOR commander. I would like that to be admitted. The witness said
8 that he signed the statement, he said that he stated that, and that's why
9 I'm tendering this into evidence.
10 Besides, you can see that one side was being stopped by an
11 attempt to destroy everything within a one-kilometre zone. Did UNPROFOR
12 have the right to do that? Did they have the right to interfere and by
13 assisting one side, destroy the other side? Was that the UNPROFOR
14 mandate indeed? The witness did not want to respond; rather, he
15 suggested that I should ask others about that. Thank you.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Rave, did you attend that meeting of the
17 11th of July, 1995?
18 THE WITNESS: I think we are speaking about the meeting on the
19 10th of 1995 --
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: 10th, yes.
21 THE WITNESS: -- in which Colonel Karremans announced the possible
23 I also told that I'm willing to answer the question but I'm not
24 able to answer a question about decisions taken on the level of the UN --
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I just wanted to know if you personally attended
2 that meeting.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I attended the meeting.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This document will be received as an exhibit.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D128, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Of course, we can discuss at length if we need
9 every document. But on the other hand, this is a document signed by this
10 witness related to this case.
11 Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. On page 853 in the Krstic case transcript, and that's the same
15 page where the same meeting is discussed, it says, and I quote:
16 "At that moment, outside of the postal office building, there
17 were a lot of armed men who carried rifles, machine-guns,
18 rocket-launchers, and hand-held rocket-launchers. When we entered the
19 postal office building, the military and civilian authority members were
20 all there. They were all wearing uniforms. And there were a lot of them
21 who also carried arms."
22 My question to the witness based on what I have just read is
23 this: Did you ask anybody among them where all those weapons had come
24 from? How come they had so many weapons on them? Thank you.
25 A. No, we didn't ask that question. And I also don't know -- well,
1 I can imagine why we didn't ask that question, because there were a lot
2 of other important things that happened at that moment. The enclave was
3 attacked. So I think that's why we not even thought about it, at least I
4 didn't think about it.
5 Q. Thank you. Did you send a report to your superior command in
6 Sarajevo or in Zagreb about what you had seen in the postal office
7 building and also about what had been said at the meeting in the postal
8 office building?
9 A. I did not send a report because that was not up to me to do, but
10 I can imagine that Colonel Karremans, as battalion commander, sent a
11 message up in the chain of command.
12 Q. Were they informed that you had promised or threatened that you
13 would destroy everything within a one-kilometre zone around Srebrenica?
14 A. When you say "were they informed," I think you mean the higher
15 echelons. As I stated before, I don't know what was in the report of
16 Colonel Karremans to the higher echelons, so I can't answer the question.
17 Q. On page 857, lines 11 through 23, you explained some of the
18 events which took place on the 11th of July, and I quote:
19 "At that moment, we did not have any other option but to try and
20 take people to Potocari because Potocari was probably the only safe place
21 for us. We realised that the VRS army had taken over Srebrenica, and
22 that's why we asked them to start moving to Potocari. But there was a
23 problem there; they didn't want to leave the base because that was the
24 place where they felt safe. And then at 2.00 air-strikes began. There
25 were several aircrafts involved. And I believe that after that the local
1 population started trusting us a bit more because something had happened
2 and they tried to move in the direction of Srebrenica."
3 Based on what I have just read, my question is this: Whose idea
4 was it for you to take the population from the base where they were at
5 the moment to the base in Potocari? Just give us a name. Thank you.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we receive an answer, I would like to know
7 the page number of the Krstic transcript because it was not -- is not in
8 our today's transcript.
9 Mr. Gajic.
10 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that's page 857,
11 lines 11 through 23.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
13 Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we check to see if -- that "moving in
15 the direction of Srebrenica" is correct.
16 THE WITNESS: I can't see the document at all.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think, in the context, that might have been
18 Potocari. But, again, I don't know.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is P1004, page 857. We should have that on
20 the screen.
21 Mr. Gajic.
22 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, maybe to save time,
23 just as Mr. Tolimir said, and I quote from the transcript page:
24 "They did try to move in the direction of Potocari." That's what
25 Mr. Tolimir said.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We need page 857. Yes. Thank you.
2 Can you see that passage on the screen now.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've got it. Mr. Tolimir asked me the
4 question to give him a name who decided to send the people up to
5 Potocari. Well, I can't give him a name. I think it was something that
6 grew during that time.
7 The compound of Bravo Company was overcrowded, a lot of refugees
8 were around the compound. We were not able to bring the wounded who came
9 from the hospital to the trucks on the compound of the Bravo Company to
10 put the wounded in the trucks and then bring them to Srebrenica, so we
11 had to do -- to Potocari. We had to do something. And I think it grew
12 and we all together decided - and all together I mean the commander of
13 the Bravo Company; Major Boering, who was there; and myself - that the
14 best way was to get refugees towards Potocari because there was much more
15 space than on the small compound in Srebrenica.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So you can't give us any names. But could you tell us whether
19 that was at the initiative of UNPROFOR representatives from the
20 Bravo Company that you just mentioned? Just tell us that for the record,
22 A. Yeah, I think it was an initiative of the UNPROFOR to get the
23 people to the best place where they could stay.
24 Q. Had you already prepared that Potocari base for the accommodation
25 of the civilian population that would be sent from the Bravo Company base
1 to Potocari?
2 A. No, nothing was prepared. The only thing I know is -- was that
3 the base in Potocari was much bigger than the base in Srebrenica. And I
4 also don't think that we communicated with the base in Potocari, because
5 a lot of refugees were already going in the direction of Potocari. And
6 the only thing we tried to do is to get the people from the compound,
7 because they broke through the fences, also in that direction.
8 On the compound in Srebrenica, we had no possibility to do
9 anything else than dealing with refugees. So our normal military jobs,
10 for example, going in or out with APCs, was not possible at that moment.
11 Q. Thank you. Who was it who transported people from the Bravo base
12 in Srebrenica?
13 A. Most of the refugees went up to Potocari themselves, walking,
14 because we had no possibility to bring them. We had some trucks at the
15 Bravo Company. Most of the trucks were used to put wounded in, the
16 wounded from the hospital, to bring them up to Potocari. The other
17 trucks that were there were practically taken over by the refugees. They
18 climbed into it, could open the roofs, and then the drivers drove up to
20 At the end of -- no, in the middle of the afternoon, I think,
21 3.00 or 4.00, myself and Mr. Boering took a jeep because we couldn't do
22 anything more on the spot of the Bravo Company at that moment, we took a
23 jeep with a lot of refugees in it and also drove to Potocari.
24 Q. And did you use that jeep to transport refugees?
25 A. We used that jeep to take some elderly people who couldn't walk
1 themselves, to bring them to Potocari.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now play the video. And
4 let's see how refugees were being accommodated in the Potocari base.
5 After that, I'll have questions for you, sir. Thank you.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Aleksandar. That's
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Whose trucks are these which brought the refugees, and who
11 organised this?
12 A. Those were trucks who were at the spot of the Bravo Company and
13 went from the Bravo Company with the refugees, as you see most women and
14 children, towards Potocari.
15 As you can see, those trucks went into the compound and into the
16 factory where the headquarter of the battalion was stationed and also the
17 Charlie Company. Only, I think, about 5.000 refugees were able to go to
18 the compound; the rest stayed outside the compound in the several
19 factories around the compound.
20 Q. Can you tell us where the men were, because, as you mentioned, we
21 can only see women and children here?
22 A. As you might have read in some of my statements or testimonies,
23 in the night from the 10th to the 11th, most of the men between 17 and
24 60 years old went in the north-western direction and left the town of
25 Srebrenica. In the town stayed only women children, elderly men, or
1 wounded. Also in these trucks and also in our jeep we drove to Potocari
2 were those kind of people, so elderly people or very young people.
3 Q. Can you tell us whether the UNPROFOR assumed the obligation to
4 put up the women and children at their base in Potocari and to evacuate
5 them, as requested by General Nikolai and Karremans that was conveyed to
6 Mladic, while the men would go off with their weapons on foot from
7 Srebrenica to Tuzla?
8 A. I think we are mixing up now some things. We have to do it, I
9 think, in my opinion, in the right sequence. When the enclave fell in
10 the night, men with weapons on foot went from Srebrenica in a
11 north-western direction. We didn't know where they went to at that
12 moment. Then on the 11th, the VRS moved forward towards Srebrenica. A
13 lot of refugees were going northward. The best thing we could do to
14 provide them as much safety and security as possible was put them in the
15 vicinity of the compound or even on the compound in Potocari; although, I
16 also got the information that the VRS, and I don't really know how -- who
17 told this, that the refugees were not allowed to go onto the base in
19 So because of preventing that they would see that we let refugees
20 on the base, they made a whole in the fence in the south-eastern part of
21 the compound and the people, most of the refugees, went to the base, went
22 through the fence in the south-eastern part where the VRS in the northern
23 part not could see that they entered the compound.
24 And when you are talking about evacuation as requested by
25 General Nikolai, that is stated afterwards, because that's the first
1 thing that was brought up by Colonel Karremans in the 8.00 meeting in the
2 Hotel Fontana. So between the starting of the flow of refugees from
3 Srebrenica to Potocari, that's part one. Then we got the invitation for
4 a meeting or arranged the meeting that we -- was -- we discussed
5 yesterday. And then we went to Hotel Fontana, where Karremans told - and
6 that was also new for me - that he had had contact with the
7 General Nikolai to arrange an evacuation.
8 Q. Thank you. Since General Nikolai asked Colonel Karremans to
9 organise an evacuation, was that before this scene that we are now
10 looking at? And when exactly was this happening, this scene we are
11 seeing on the monitor now?
12 A. I can't specifically answer that question because I was in the --
13 with the refugees and Colonel Karremans had telephone calls with, I
14 think, north-east command and BH command where General Nikolai was. So I
15 think somewhere in the afternoon of the 11th General Nikolai and
16 Colonel Karremans had contact and discussed this, but I wasn't there, so
17 I can't answer this question.
18 Q. To avoid mistakes on the record, just tell us, the refugees that
19 you transported in your vehicle from Bravo Company, were they all coming
20 on the 10th, or was it also on the 11th?
21 A. It was only on the 11th. On the 10th, nothing happened. Of
22 course, people were walking around, but in the morning from the 11th,
23 people broke through the fence of the Bravo Company and after that, in
24 the end of the morning and the beginning of the afternoon, we tried to
25 get them off the compound in the direction of Potocari. And after this,
1 so on the 11th, you get the images from overcrowded trucks bringing
2 refugees into the compound in Srebrenica. The rest of the refugees are
3 walking the road from Srebrenica to Potocari.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm not sure if you really mean Srebrenica. You
5 are recorded having said:
6 "... after this, so on the 11th, you get the images from
7 overcrowded trucks bringing refugees in toward the compound in
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, in my opinion, it's the 11th that the video we
10 just saw, that the 11th in the afternoon, the trucks, the overcrowded
11 trucks, come to the compound in Srebrenica. The left compound --
12 correction, it's the compound in Potocari. Thank you.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is the reason why I asked you.
14 THE WITNESS: Thanks.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. That is corrected now. Thank you.
16 Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.
17 One question by Judge Mindua.
18 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, witness, you were there
19 during the evacuation of these people, evacuation to Potocari. Now, I
20 would like to know what you felt. Maybe you had the opportunity to talk
21 to some of these people. What was their feeling at the time? Did they
22 feel that they were leaving for good or that they would come back? Did
23 they feel that they were leaving on their own volition or were they
24 forced to leave? Were you able to talk to the people?
25 THE WITNESS: I was not able to talk to the people at that moment
1 because we hardly had no interpreters on the spot at that moment. The
2 attack was launched, and, of course, most of the people had experiences
3 with attacks from the VRS towards them, so they had very bad experiences.
4 And it was their free will to take what they could take and try to find a
5 safe place to go. For them, UNPROFOR was the only place in their mind
6 where it was safe to go, because they still had the idea that we were
7 able to protect them.
8 And I don't know if they had the idea that they were leaving for
9 good. I think they just fled because an attack was launched. Mortar
10 shells and grenades landed into the town of Srebrenica and for them that
11 was enough reason to try to flee.
12 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. A moment ago you said in one of your answers that Muslims from
15 the Bravo Company did not want to go to Potocari when you were trying to
16 persuade them, and you finally gained their confidence after the NATO
17 air-strikes and that is when they went to the Potocari base; is that
19 A. That's correct. A part of the refugees, of course, went in the
20 northern direction depending where they lived. But when they were on the
21 compound of the Bravo Company, they didn't want to leave because they
22 felt safe over there. We tried to convince them that we had to do our
23 job there and this was not the best place to be, but they didn't want to
24 leave. One way or another, after the air-strikes took place, they got
25 the confidence, well, something is happening, let's go a little bit
1 farther to the north. At least that's my feeling with it. And that was
2 the reason why they went to Potocari.
3 Q. Thank you. Could you explain to the Trial Chamber whether
4 Potocari is located in the centre of the demilitarised zone or on the
5 outskirts of the demilitarised zone relative to the Bravo Company
6 headquarters from which the refugees set out towards the base according
7 to your advice?
8 A. The Potocari compound is located in the northern part of the
9 enclave. It's about 5 or 6 kilometres north of Srebrenica. So north of
10 the base in Srebrenica from the Bravo Company.
11 Q. Thank you. We will not waste any more time on this.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see D20 in e-court.
13 Page 46, paragraph 4.13. It's about the activities of the BH army during
14 the attack on the enclave. That's written on the report based on
15 debriefing on events in Srebrenica. We'd like to see paragraph 4.13.
16 That's page 46. My legal advisor tells me it's on page 46.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. We see it now. It's the last but one paragraph. You say:
19 "BH army soldiers complete with blue caps came within a distance
20 of 15 metres from one of the observation posts. Resembling UN personnel,
21 they opened fire from this position in the direction of the BSA front
22 line so that it seemed as if the UN had opened fire. In this way, they
23 attempted to draw fire from the Bosnian Serb army on the observation
24 point and thus involve DutchBat in the combat actions."
25 Then in paragraph that follows, you say:
1 "It also happened that the BH army soldiers were not always
2 recognisable as military personnel."
3 And finally - we need to turn the page - the last quotation:
4 "These men had been seen in uniform, fighting in the southern
5 section of the enclave, were recognised by DutchBat personnel when the
6 former had mingled in civilian clothing among the refugees moving from
7 Srebrenica to Potocari or when they were on the compound in Potocari.
8 Local women, known to be members of the BH army, were also seen later
9 civilian clothing."
10 Would you tell us on what locations exactly were BH army soldiers
11 seen wearing UN insignia?
12 A. First I want to state that this is a summary from several
13 debriefings. I do not recognise this as my statements in this
14 debriefing. But I can explain that I don't know exactly, even I don't
15 know if it's true, that BiH soldiers fought in UNPROFOR uniforms. We had
16 rumours about this, but I have not seen them myself, and I can only tell
17 you that I heard the rumours that they did.
18 What I can tell you is that on several occasions we got reports
19 from the OPs that BiH men, not in uniform, were in the vicinity of our
20 OPs, firing to the VRS, tried to get fire on the UN OPs, to involve the
21 UN in fighting to the VRS.
22 Q. In paragraph 414 in the last sentence, you say:
23 "Some local women" -- that's part of your debriefing. It says:
24 "Some local women, known to be members of the BH army."
25 Now, my question is: Did the DutchBat have information, did it
1 have knowledge, that women were also members of the BH army?
2 A. First I want to state this is not my debriefing. This is a
3 summary. And I don't think I gave this statement in my debriefing. And,
4 no, we had, at least I had, no information that women were members of the
5 BiH army.
6 Q. In paragraph 4.14 that I quoted from, it says that the DutchBat
7 personnel recognised some people who had been seen in uniform before
8 fighting in the southern section of the enclave.
9 My question is: Did you know that there were such men, did you
10 see such men in Potocari as well?
11 A. No, the same answer again. This is not my statement, and I can't
12 remember that personnel what was recognised fighting in military clothes
13 in the southern part now showed up in civilian clothes in the Dutch
15 Q. Thank you. On page 850, line 21, and page 851, line 4 in the
16 transcript from the Krstic case, you said --
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is P1004.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [No interpretation]
19 Q. [Microphone not activated]
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. "On the 10th of July, we took up blocking positions in the
24 southern section of Srebrenica, and as I told you, intending just to
25 block the road to Srebrenica, to stop the Bosnian Serb army, we had,
1 again, discussions with Ramiz regarding freedom of movement which was a
2 big problem because the VRS continued advancing. We were looking for
3 close-air support, but they told us it was not available, and we did not
4 get it."
5 Now, my question is: Who gave you the order to take up the
6 blocking positions you mentioned here?
7 A. I think that the commander of the second in command of DutchBat
8 gave the order to the Bravo Company to take up blocking positions in the
9 southern part.
10 Q. Do you mean Franken?
11 A. When I'm talking about the second in command of the battalion,
12 then I mean Mr. Franken; yes, that's correct.
13 Q. Thank you. Did soldiers and officers of the DutchBat on the
14 ground know that without an attack by the Bosnian Serb army against
15 UNPROFOR positions there could be no close-air support, in other words,
16 the bombing of Bosnian Serb army positions?
17 A. Yes, I think this was common knowledge, and that was also
18 communicated by the battalion staff. We were attacked, and this was one
19 of the things we discussed this morning before when Captain Hageman went
20 forward to see if the VRS attack went on. He was shot at. So he got a
21 confirmation that the UN was attacked, and that was enough for close-air
23 And I can't exactly recall what happened the night before, from
24 the 10th to the 11th, how often UN personnel or vehicles were targeted.
25 But I can imagine that when battalion commander of the second -- or the
1 second in command gave -- asked for close-air support, they are convinced
2 that we were attacked, ourselves, so the UN battalion was attacked.
3 Q. Tell us, was the primary aim of taking up these blocking
4 positions to provoke the BH army into attacking the UNPROFOR so that
5 close-air support is obtained?
6 A. I think that taking the blocking positions was a new form of OPs.
7 The only thing we could do, we did in the confrontation line, so in the
8 line around the enclave, try to deter an attack. So it was not to
9 provoke the army, the BH army -- no, the VRS army, but only to deter the
10 attack and protect the people in the town of Srebrenica and the rest of
11 the enclave.
12 Q. Thank you. Did you, together with the order to take up blocking
13 positions, also get the so-called green order that the DutchBat engage
14 the VRS in combat?
15 A. I did not get that order because I was not in the line of that
16 military operation. We only had to deal as liaison officers with, in
17 this case, the BiH to create freedom of movement. The rest of the
18 military operation was in the hands of the commander of the
19 Dutch Battalion, his second in command, and in the southern part, the
20 commander of the Bravo Company. So I don't know exactly in what way the
21 military operation proceeded from blue to green.
22 Q. [Microphone not activated]
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Mindua wants to ask a question.
24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tolimir, I do apologise, but I
25 think that this is rather confusing.
1 Sir, the air-strikes. The air-strikes were targeting the Army of
2 the Republika Srpska at that stage; is that the case?
3 THE WITNESS: No, I think - at least I think you're looking at
4 me; I have to answer the question, I think - I think we have to follow --
5 we have to follow the right timetable in the night from the 10th to the
6 11th of July. The VRS was moving forward towards Srebrenica in the night
7 the attack stopped. Before it stopped - and I don't know exactly if that
8 happened - air-strikes were recommended, but we didn't get the
9 air-strikes. I think that the air-strikes were asked by the battalion
10 because the battalion was attacked by the VRS. This is the first part of
11 the air-strikes.
12 Then we get a night from the 10th to the 11th where it's rather
13 quiet. And the next morning, the Captain Hageman goes forward in his
14 APC, is attacked again, and that was the reason for the battalion to ask,
15 again, for -- or air-strike or close-air support.
16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. It's very good that
17 you are giving us the different dates, the 10th and the 11th of July,
18 because I could not understand why, according to you, some members of the
19 Muslim or the Bosnian army were firing or shooting at the DutchBat and
20 why the DutchBat was recommending air-strikes against the Serbs because
21 they thought that the Serbs had shot at him. In principle, the UNPROFOR
22 was supposed to be informed, and it must have known that sometime the
23 Bosnians were also shooting at them?
24 THE WITNESS: Again, I think we are mixing up some things. In
25 the night from the 10th to the 11th, we had not the idea that the Bosnian
1 army in the enclave was shooting at us. During that period, they
2 prevented us to do our military job in the way we wanted. We wanted the
3 freedom of movement, to go forward, backward, and take new positions.
4 They stopped us by pointing guns or even other weapons at us but did not
5 shoot at us. The only attack came from the VRS side, who went from the
6 south to the north to the town of Srebrenica.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I am -- there may be a translation issue
9 in -- with French because as the witness just said, that is the only
10 evidence there has ever been of any targeting by the BiH on the -- on
11 UNPROFOR, is the killing of van Renssen and what the witness has just
12 described. So if there's anything else that you've gotten, it's a
13 translation error, in my view. Aside -- as -- so, I just wanted to make
14 that clear, as the witness did, I'm sorry I can't follow the French.
15 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, sir, just correct me if I'm
16 mistaken. According to the Prosecutor, the Bosnians shot at the
17 UNPROFOR, just did it once, that's when the soldier van Renssen died.
18 But according to what you are telling us, in all the other cases it was
19 always the Serbs who shot at the UN, and sometimes there were
20 air-strikes; is that the case?
21 THE WITNESS: Two things I want to say to this: The Bosnian army
22 did not shoot our soldier; it was a civilian who killed the man. That
23 was the only case that we were shot at by the BiH, in my opinion. And
24 sometimes there were air-strikes in that case. We never had air-strikes.
25 The only air-strikes we had were on the 11th at 2.00 in the afternoon
1 with, I think, two airplanes for close-air support.
2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: But it remains quite unclear at the moment. You
4 said the soldier van Renssen was shot by a civilian. I suppose a Muslim
5 civilian. Then you said: "That was the only case that we were shot at
6 by the BiH."
7 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, no, it's not by the BiH. Shot at by the
8 Muslims from the enclaves. That's correct.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, that was the first confusion.
10 And the other, Judge Mindua asked you if only the VRS attacked
11 the UNPROFOR, the DutchBat, which was then the trigger for asking for
12 air-strikes; is that correct?
13 THE WITNESS: That is correct.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe has a question.
15 JUDGE NYAMBE: I need a further clarification on the issue of who
16 shot the DutchBat soldier. Correct me if I'm wrong, you were present at
17 the time when this soldier was shot?
18 THE WITNESS: No, I was not on the spot when the soldier was
19 shot. It happened when an APC from OP Foxtrot, I think, returned via a
20 dirt road to the big road in Srebrenica. The local population, so the
21 Muslims, tried to stop the APC. The people in the APC wouldn't stop. At
22 that moment, either a hand-grenade was thrown or a gun was shot or a
23 pistol was shot, but at least the soldier was hit and died that same day.
24 JUDGE NYAMBE: Do you know for sure that the hand-grenade or the
25 shot was shot by a civilian?
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was nobody in uniform, and that was the
2 information we got. So that's the only thing I can say for sure. That's
3 the information I've got. I've not seen it myself.
4 JUDGE NYAMBE: Okay. The second question I want to ask is
5 page 49 of today's transcript, lines 20, just a clarification.
6 "We were attacked, and this was one of the things we discussed
7 this morning ..."
8 You mean this morning or that morning when this happened?
9 THE WITNESS: I don't have the transcript, I think.
10 JUDGE NYAMBE: Page 49, line 22, actually. I just want a
11 clarification, which morning do you mean: this morning or a morning in
12 the past?
13 THE WITNESS: I still don't have it on the screen, so.
14 JUDGE NYAMBE: Okay. I'll just read the context.
15 "We were attacked, and this is was one of the things we discussed
16 this morning before when Captain Hageman went forward to see if the VRS
17 attack went on. He was shot at."
18 So I just want to clarify which morning you were talking about
20 THE WITNESS: Then I'm talking about the morning of the 11th.
21 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Based on what you have just said in your answer to the Judges'
25 questions, how can you tell that fire was opened on an UNPROFOR member by
1 a civilian as opposed to being opened by a soldier? How do you know?
2 A. The manning of the APC reported that they were stopped by
3 civilians and that one the civilians either threw the hand-grenade or
4 shot. So I only can quote the reports that came to me. And I think it
5 was even a verbal report.
6 Q. Thank you. Did Muslim soldiers in Srebrenica use civilian
7 clothes to camouflage themselves and portray Srebrenica as being
9 A. During the whole period which we were there, so from January til
10 July, we dealed with the civilian and military authorities in the enclave
11 and that all the time we saw Muslim men walking around in military
12 clothes, that it was not allowed. And I think we managed it for most of
13 the time not to see men in military clothes, so looking at military men
14 in the enclave. At the end of our tour over there, so from, I think, the
15 9th or the 10th, we saw more men in military clothes, because at that
16 moment I think there was a real war going on and at that moment they
17 changed from civilians into members of the ABiH.
18 Q. Thank you, in any case, for this answer of yours. Was the Dutch
19 soldier killed with a dum-dum bullet? And did civilians have any dum-dum
20 bullets, or was it only given to members of the army?
21 A. You are telling me now that you are aware that there were dum-dum
22 bullets in the enclave; I don't know that they were there. And as I
23 stated several times now, I don't know for sure if he was shot or hit by
24 a hand-grenade. So more specific, dum-dum, no information about that.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce D20,
2 page 47, paragraph 4.15. Thank you.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Please look at paragraph 15 and tell us whether it says here that
5 the soldier was killed by a dum-dum bullet. This is part of the
6 debriefing about Srebrenica.
7 A. Well, I can read the same as you do. I was not there. I was not
8 with the abduction of the soldier. And I don't know this information.
9 And when there's a medic, and I don't know if it's a medic or it
10 should be a doctor who does this kind of things, makes these statements;
11 and, again, this is a summary from several debriefings, I think, because
12 this is the end debriefing signed by the general [indiscernible]. This
13 is a summary. And when you want an answer on this one, I think you have
14 to go into the separate debriefings and especially, in this one, from a
16 Q. Thank you. I'm happy with your answer. During the critical
17 events, did the VRS cause the death of any UNPROFOR troops?
18 A. No, we had no losses during that period.
19 Q. Thank you. And when it comes to UNPROFOR troops, did they open
20 fire on the firing lines of the VRS during the critical period?
21 A. I think I have to make a little bit a statement to the former
22 point. When we talk about the critical events, I think we talk about
23 critical events in the enclave, from the 9th or the 10th up to the 13th.
24 In that period, we took several times the blocking positions.
25 And I know for sure that the commander of the Dutch Battalion gave the
1 order to fire overhead and not target the VRS during the attack, unless
2 they were attacked themselves and they were in a lot of danger.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe has a question.
4 JUDGE NYAMBE: I was just observing that you have not answered
5 the last question, which was that did the VRS cause the death of any
6 UNPROFOR troops? Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: I think in line 7 or line 6 I stated:
8 "No, we had no losses during that period."
9 So they didn't cause the death.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to thank Judge Nyambe.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. In this case, Colonel Franken, who was the second in command in
14 Srebrenica, on the 1st July, 2010, on transcript page 347, line 6,
15 answered the question about an order having been issued by him. That
16 must have been on the 9th of July. And then on page 343, he explained
17 what the green order meant. And I quote from line 16 through 19:
18 "The rules of engagement we were given as a UN unit specified the
19 use of weapons only in self-defence as one of the biggest problems, and
20 those were not applied anymore and we had to go back to the use of
21 weapons in engagement."
22 And then he continues to say:
23 "From the time when the green order was issued, we were in combat
24 with the VRS. For us, the VRS was a target and vice-versa. And that was
25 realistic and correct."
1 And then on page 3848, lines from 1 through 6, Mr. Franken said
2 the following, and I quote:
3 "My mandate changed considerably from the moment when the
4 United Nations had ordered me to defend Srebrenica, and that's why I
5 issued the green order. And after that rule of engagement and so on and
6 so forth, all the restrictions on the use of arms disappeared because
7 those rules went hand in hand with the order to defend something."
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic, I assume that there are some
9 corrections to be made. The page numbers can't be correct.
10 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Honour.
11 Mr. Tolimir read the correct references, and those are page 3473, line 6;
12 3453, lines 16 through 19; and then from 23 through 25; and, finally,
13 transcript page 3484, lines 1 through 6.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
15 Mr. Tolimir, now your question for the witness.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Are you familiar with the green order that Mr. Franken testified
18 about? Was that communicated to all UNPROFOR members, since it deals
19 with the engagement or combat between UNPROFOR and the VRS? And was that
20 communicated to you when you were issued order about blocking their
21 positions, because he said that that had taken place on the 9th?
22 Thank you.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: These were, in fact, three questions put
24 together, and this is quite complicated for a witness. The first one:
25 Are you familiar with the green order that Mr. Franken testified about?
1 THE WITNESS: I will try to answer all the three questions. I
2 know there was a green order. No, I've not seen the order myself. I
3 know that the order was given to the Bravo and Charlie Company
4 commanders. It was not communicated to us as liaison officers.
5 And how to deal with this, the only thing I know is the last
6 order to fire overhead and not target the VRS. And it might be possible
7 that Mr. Franken called blocking positions the places where the OPs
8 positions were taken in the southern part, because the attack, of course,
9 started on the 9th, and then we had to take positions, and you can call
10 them blocking positions, but they had to take the positions in the
11 southern part. The only thing I know were the last blocking positions in
12 the town of Srebrenica.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you know if UNPROFOR in Srebrenica had a mandate to defend
15 Muslims from VRS attacks and to change the balance of powers?
16 A. I don't think we had the mandate to defend. It was to -- of
17 course, the mandate was to protect the Muslims in the enclave. The
18 mandate was to deter attacks. And can you explain what you mean with "a
19 change of balance of powers"?
20 Q. Thank you. Let it be how you just explained it. Did you have a
21 mandate to protect Muslims?
22 A. I think the same mandate we had as protecting ourselves. I can't
23 remember exactly what the mandate was, but I think when the life of a
24 Muslim was threatened - not only a life of a Muslim was threatened by
25 Serbs, also when Serbs were threatened by Muslim - I think we had a
1 mandate to protect them because that's what we tried to do at least all
2 of the time, to be partial and protect as well the Muslims inside the
3 enclave and the Serbs outside of the enclave, by disarming Muslims in the
4 enclave and, of course, by talking as much as possible with the VRS
5 outside the enclave.
6 Q. The sides had given you the mandate to demilitarise the zone, and
7 that mandate could not have been changed without a prior consent of the
8 two sides. In this particular case, issuing an order on opening fire on
9 the VRS positions, did that mean that your mandate that you had been
10 given pursuant to the agreement was changed?
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think the witness has answered this question
12 already and in detail. Please move on to a next topic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Did you ever open fire on the Muslims when they threatened the
16 Serbs? And did they indeed ever pose a threat to the Serbs outside of
17 the enclave? Did they act from the inside of the enclave and pose threat
18 to the Serbs?
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Again, two questions put together in one
21 THE WITNESS: The first question, if you ever opened fire on the
22 Muslims when they threatened Serbs, no, we didn't. And I don't know if
23 they -- if there was a threat to the Serbs outside. Of course, we
24 discussed it several times because we got - and that's what I told you
25 several times - the information either from Mr. Nikolic or from the BiH
1 in the enclave that both sides attacked each other. And I don't have the
2 information that Muslims from inside the enclave posed a threat to the
3 Serbs outside the enclave. The only thing I can give you with a lot of
4 dates, when we got the information that fire fights were going on,
5 especially in the Bandera Triangle, between BiH and VRS soldiers.
6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
7 Q. You asked me what the balance of powers means, and I said the
8 ratio forces or the ratio of powers.
9 Let me rephrase my question and ask you this: Did UNPROFOR
10 change the ratio of forces on the ground if they put all of their
11 military potentials in the service of one of the sides, and if NATO
12 forces were also put on the side of only -- of one of the sides as
13 Mr. Karremans announced in his report?
14 A. I don't think that the ratio of forces on the ground put all the
15 military potential on one of the sides. I think we tried to deter the
16 attack of the VRS with our potential, and we kept on talking as much as
17 possible to the BiH to prevent that they were attacking the VRS.
18 No, I don't think that we changed our mindset and gave more
19 potential to one or the other sides. Of course, when you are attacked, I
20 think at that moment most of your potential is towards your attacker.
21 And, of course, when you are attacked, then I think that when
22 Colonel Karremans - and I don't know what report you are referring to -
23 but when Colonel Karremans is asking for air-strikes or air support,
24 well, he will do that because he wants to stop the attacking party.
25 Q. Did the commander change the mandate by asking NATO to destroy
1 all targets within one kilometre in Srebrenica? Did that change the
2 balance of power?
3 A. I don't know exactly how and where and when Colonel Karremans
4 asked this. I don't think that he asked for air support to destroy a
5 square kilometre in the enclave, so it's difficult for me to answer that
6 question again. I think the commander did not change the mandate. I
7 think he asked in the chain of command for military support, just to
8 deter and attack from the VRS towards the enclave.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have received this answer several times
10 already. Mr. Tolimir, we must have the second break now, and you should
11 be advised you should try to finish your cross-examination today. You
12 have used more than five hours up to now, and there are three-quarters of
13 an hour left. Are you able to finish your cross-examination today?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I can
15 finish, as long as the witness stops giving answers that are four times
16 as long as the question and if he stops talking beside the point.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have another opportunity to
18 shorten the cross-examination if you put a question only once and not
19 several times. It is up to the witness to answer the question and the
20 way he can provide you with an answer. Not all of your questions are to
21 be answered with yes or no. This is a very normal situation. Sometimes
22 an answer needs an explanation. Try to focus on your question and don't
23 repeat it so many times. You should try to finish today.
24 We adjourn now and resume at 1.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Please carry on.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I kindly ask the
4 electronic courtroom to show P1008. It's a transcript of the video of
5 the first meeting at Fontana Hotel. Page 16 in Serbian and page 7 in
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
8 Q. We see that General Mladic says -- it's the last paragraph we see
9 here. After the question on weapons, I quote General Mladic:
10 "What do you want? You asked for a meeting, now, let me hear
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I'm not sure we have the right
13 English page on the screen.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 19 in English. That's what my
15 legal advisor says.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is indeed different from page 7. Thank you.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So General Mladic says:
19 "You asked for a meeting, so let me hear what you have to say."
20 Colonel Karremans says:
21 "I spoke to General Nikolai two hours ago and with the national
22 authorities about the request on behalf of the population. It's a
23 request because I'm not in a position to demand anything. The Sarajevo
24 command said the enclave was lost, and I got orders from the UNPROFOR
25 command for Bosnia to take care of the refugees. At this moment in the
1 camp at Potocari I have 10.000 -- approximately 10.000 women and
2 children, and the BH command for Bosnia requests to negotiate the
3 conditions of evacuating these people. There are several women who speak
4 English, and what I've heard from all the soldiers who are now working
5 to, let's say, ease the pain for the population, is that there are --
6 they want to leave the enclave."
7 First, how did Karremans get these requests from General Nikolai
8 and from the command, and how did he hear about these requests and wishes
9 of the population, do you know?
10 A. I don't know, but I think that he got the request from
11 General Nikolai by a telephone call, because it was the only way to
12 communicate and to talk with him. And I don't know if he already at that
13 moment -- he is stating it, so it will be true, but if he already at that
14 moment had the information that people would like to leave the enclave.
15 Q. Since that's what he says, he says that some women speak English
16 and he presents that request, was he conveying the wish of the civilian
17 population at that first meeting with General Mladic at the Fontana Hotel
18 that you attended?
19 A. I don't know he was speaking for the civilian population. What I
20 can tell you, that in the months before we had several plans from the VRS
21 side that they gave us the opportunities to evacuate people from the
22 enclave, that they were free to go. Sometimes we managed to have talks
23 and create situations that we even knew what people would like to leave
24 the enclave and who would like to go. All the times it stopped and there
25 were no clearances to let people out of the enclave.
1 I don't know if Karremans is referring to all those things that
2 happened in advance, but at that moment I don't know if he was able to
3 speak to refugees on the compound, because I saw Colonel Karremans just
4 before we left the compound in Potocari towards the Hotel Fontana, so
5 that might be half an hour, three-quarters of an hour before. So I don't
6 know where he got this information from.
7 Q. Thank you. He says, speaking to General Mladic:
8 "But I heard from my soldiers who are working to ease the pain of
9 the people is that they are waiting for buses in order to be able to
10 leave the enclave." Doesn't this show that he is conveying what he heard
11 from his soldiers who are in direct contact with the civilians?
12 A. Yeah, of course it could be a wish that buses would come, or even
13 trucks would come, or maybe even an airplane or helicopters to take them
14 out. I think that most of the people want to be evacuated. And, of
15 course, most -- one of the most reasonable things is to do this in a bus.
16 I don't know what soldiers are working to ease the pain, where
17 they got the information from, but I can imagine that a lot of people
18 asked to be evacuated, because all the time people wanted to leave the
19 enclave, wanted to go to safe areas, and wanted to go to freedom.
20 Q. Is it now clear that the first meeting was initiated by Karremans
21 who addressed Mladic with these requests? Because you said at first it
22 was not clear to you. Isn't it now clear from this transcript that it is
23 Karremans who asked for the meeting? And Mladic indeed says, What do you
24 want, you asked for a meeting?
25 A. The only thing I know in this transcript is that General Mladic
1 is telling Colonel Karremans that he asked for a meeting, so I can
2 imagine that it's true.
3 Q. I did not quite understand. Could you repeat that? Did you mean
4 Karremans asked for a meeting or Mladic?
5 A. In the transcript is that General Mladic stated that
6 Colonel Karremans asked for a meeting, so I can imagine that it is true.
7 But in the same meeting and in the meetings afterwards, I heard several
8 promises and talks from General Mladic that seemed not to be true and
9 promises not be kept, so for me this is just a statement on a piece of
11 Q. Thank you for saying for the record which one of them asked for a
13 My next question has to do with the selection of Mr. Mandzic as
14 representative of the civilian population. On page 883, lines 8
15 through 13 of the transcript of the Krstic case, you said, I quote --
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I want to interrupt you. The first
17 sentence is not correct, when you say:
18 "Thank you for saying for the record which one of them asked for
19 a meeting."
20 This witness didn't say that. The witness said he can read on
21 the record that Mladic is quoted that he said you asked for a meeting.
22 This witness denied knowledge about the fact who asked for the meeting.
23 This is a misstatement. Please be careful with that and carry on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I read the transcript based on the
25 video footage shown to the witness. I just asked him because he used the
1 pronoun "he," which one asked for a meeting. I wanted the name instead
2 of the pronoun "he" on the record.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You got the answer. And please carry on.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. On page 883, lines 8 through 13 of the Krstic transcript, you
7 said, I quote:
8 "We knew Mr. Mandzic because we had seen him several times in the
9 secondary school in Srebrenica and we thought he would be a good
10 representative if he were willing to do it for us. We asked him, and he
11 said he was ready to come with us."
12 Now, did any one of the representatives of the VRS force Mandzic
13 to be a representative of the refugees, and had he been in any contact
14 with the VRS before he was elected representative?
15 A. I don't know if he was in contact with the VRS. I know that he
16 knows a lot of people living in the area who might be now members of the
17 VRS, so before the war or maybe in the beginning of the war he might have
18 been in contact with the VRS people. During the time we were in the
19 enclave, I don't have the information that Mr. Mandzic was in contact
20 with the VRS and -- because Mr. Mandzic was selected by us. He was not
21 forced to be selected or elected as a representative.
22 Q. Thank you. This will suffice. I have to shorten my questioning
23 on this subject.
24 We are moving on to the second meeting at the Fontana Hotel. At
25 the second meeting at the Fontana Hotel, General Mladic talked to
1 Mr. Mandzic. And on page 887, lines 10 through 13, you said, I quote:
2 "We were talking in general terms and Mladic explained to Mandzic
3 that the civilian population had to choose who wants to go where when
4 they leave the enclave. It was also a possibility for them to stay, but
5 I don't think it was a realistic option."
6 On page 883, line 2, you say:
7 "It was a calm conversation."
8 Now, my question is: Since you're talking about a meeting where
9 you yourself were present, did Mladic in any way threaten or humiliate
10 Mr. Mandzic in the presence of other negotiators including you?
11 A. I have here my notes from that meeting. About 2315 he shows us a
12 shield from the opstina he had taken, and he has a relaxed talk with the
13 director of the school, in this case, I mean Mr. Mandzic.
14 At 2322, there's a statement from Mr. Mandzic towards Mr. Mladic
15 in Serbo-Croatian. And after that a statement from Mladic. In that
16 statement, he has - and that's what I read from my notes now - a mean
17 look in his eyes, and he's accusing Mladic from -- Mandzic from several
18 things. I can't specify this any more or any further because I have no
19 more notes. But the only thing I added to it: it's the old story and the
20 old history. So I think accusing each other about committing crimes and
21 all those kind of things.
22 Of course, this was the Serbo-Croatian statement of
23 General Mladic, which I could only follow and look but I couldn't
24 understand it, of course, because there was no translation for me because
25 it was a statement from General Mladic towards Mr. Mandzic.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the record --
2 THE WITNESS: And I think, the second part of the question, if
3 Mr. Mandzic was threatened or humiliated, well, I think the way in which
4 General Mladic talked to him was very humiliating, and I think that all
5 the things that he told him, what I saw from the videos later on, that he
6 put the future of the Muslim people in the enclave in the hands of
7 Mr. Mandzic. And I just have to remember now, I think he even threatened
8 him that they had the possibility to disappear completely. But then we
9 should look at the video again because I don't know exactly, but that's
10 the feeling I've got now.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the sake of the record, the passage, the
12 quotation on page 67, line 18, it was a calm conversation. It's not to
13 be found on page 883, but 888 of the Krstic transcript, P1004.
14 Please carry on.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for this
16 correction. I don't have the time or the intention to watch the video
17 again, as the witness asks. There is a transcript, and the video is
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I just want to ask the witness if he can remember any other
21 threatening word from Mladic except his words "you can survive or
22 disappear, your fate is in your hands"?
23 A. No, at this moment this is the only thing that's in my mind now
24 from the videos I've seen. And, of course, as I stated, the statements
25 of Mladic were in Serbo-Croatian, so I couldn't understand them.
1 Q. Thank you. If Mladic says to Mandzic, Your fate is in your
2 hands, you can survive or disappear, on whom does it depend whether they
3 will survive or disappear?
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is very important to get this right. That's
6 not what was said. He needs -- and let's hope it's a translation issue,
7 but what he said was, "the fate of your people is in your hands." And so
8 by misquoting it, he is not taking us anywhere; in fact, he's confusing
9 the record. So he needs to get this right. He's not -- he's speaking
10 about the fate of your people is in your hands, they are the ones that
11 will survive or disappear. So take his time and get it right.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Please rephrase your question and put
13 it to the witness.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Prosecutor.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. If Mladic said exactly as the Prosecutor says, and I have no
17 reason to doubt it, the fate of your people is in your hands, you can
18 survive or disappear, on whom did it depends whether they would survive
19 or disappear?
20 A. I think at that moment it was clear that everything was in the
21 hands of General Mladic.
22 Q. Thank you. Why was then Mladic saying, Your fate or the fate of
23 your people is in your hands, you can survive or disappear? Aren't these
24 two options on an equal footing; aren't they two equal alternatives?
25 A. I don't think so. In my opinion, it's just a real threat from
1 Mladic towards Mr. Mandzic. He is giving him no opportunity, although
2 Mandzic tried to explain that he is not able to do all the things that he
3 could do, and he could not accept that the fate of his people are in his
4 hands now because he has no means to do anything for his people, only
5 follow the orders of the General Mladic. Because there was no
6 discussion, it was just dictating, This is the way we are going to do it.
7 And, of course, you can make a nice present of it, but at the end, it's
8 just a dictation of orders.
9 Q. Thank you. I will leave it to the Trial Chamber to decide
10 whether it was indeed "diktat" or whether Mladic was speaking indeed in a
11 threatening tone or a peace-loving tone.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the electronic courtroom
13 please show 1D350.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is part of your statement, page 5.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 5 in Serbian.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is now Exhibit D127.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I asked for 1D350.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And this is now D127.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. In English it's page 4.
21 I can't remember what is indeed an exhibit and what's still on the
22 65 ter.
23 The witness is able to view it now, and I will read in my own
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. 1200 hours:
2 "At 1200 hours C-5 Boering and Rave were supposed to go to
3 Bratunac to talk about evacuation. The idea was to gain time."
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the next page in English.
5 My assistant tells me it's not the right page now. I asked page -- for
6 page 5. Next page. It's in the first paragraph. It's just one
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
9 Q. "The idea was to gain time in this way."
10 Have you read the sentence?
11 "The purpose of this" - the interpreter found it in the text -
12 "was to delay proceedings."
13 The sentence begins: "At 1230 hours ..."
14 My question, based on this, is: Did the Dutch Battalion use
15 negotiations to gain time? And in such a humanitarian situation with a
16 large number of people accumulating in Potocari, why was it necessary to
17 play for time? Wasn't that prolonging the evacuation at the expense of
18 the civilian population?
19 A. I don't know in what direction this is going, because DutchBat
20 had lost the war at that moment with -- the negotiations were ordered to
21 us. We didn't try to gain time. The only thing we tried in the
22 negotiations to get information about the situation to improve the
23 situation for the civilian population.
24 In the session of 11.00 in the evening before, we talked about
25 food, medevac, UNHCR, diesel, buses, time schedules, and all those kind
1 of things. There were no specific answers on all those questions. The
2 next morning, there was a negotiation between DutchBat and the three
3 representatives of the Muslim population. I was not present, myself,
4 over there. And, again, I got, afterwards, the information that no
5 specific deals were made.
6 So at 12.00, after Karremans and Boering returned to the
7 compound, Mr. Boering and myself got the order to go to Bratunac to the
8 Hotel Fontana to see if there was anybody available to give us time
9 schedule and to give us information how to proceed, because the problem
10 of the buses and all those kind of things were still not arranged.
11 When we came in the Hotel Fontana, there was nobody over there.
12 Within a short period of time, Mr. Nikolic and Kosoric showed up. They
13 were a little bit confused that we were there. And at that moment they
14 told us that we had to go back to the compound because buses were already
16 So I don't think that DutchBat in any way tried to delay the
17 whole situation, but tried to improve the situation for the civilian
18 population. And the problem was that we only could ask. And for the
19 rest, General Mladic dictated how it should happen. And that what we
20 saw. When buses arrived, we had no influence at all how to arrange it,
21 although there was an appointment that when the evacuation should start,
22 first sick and wounded people would go out; after that, elderly people;
23 and after that, women and children.
24 Q. Thank you. Since you have used up the time during which you were
25 supposed to answer my several next question -- I just quoted from your
1 statement, I didn't add a word of my own. On page 897, line 15, to
2 page 898, line 5 in the Krstic case, you describe the events on the
3 12th of July, 1995, and you say the following, and I quote:
4 "Of course, the refugees were scared to death. When they saw the
5 buses, that was a sign for them that they would be taken to a safe place,
6 and that's why they hurried to the buses. And let's get on the buses as
7 soon as possible, I'll go first. There were some references as to how we
8 would board the buses. Mr. Mandzic insisted on the sick getting on the
9 buses the first and then women."
10 Did I properly quote you, and was it Mr. Mandzic who said that
11 the sick and the wounded would go first and that they would be followed
12 by women and the elderly?
13 A. It was part of the negotiations in what sequence people would be
14 evacuated from the enclave.
15 Q. Thank you. Was Mr. Mandzic the one who decided on the sequence,
16 and the sequence being first the elderly and then the women? Or was it
17 somebody else who made that decision?
18 A. I think it was already a discussion on the evening of the 11th in
19 the second meeting about the sequence we would use. After that, there
20 was a meeting with the civilian representatives, Mr. Nuhanovic, and
21 Camila - I don't know exactly her name - but -- and we talked about it,
22 and in our opinion, so from the civilian population, the representatives,
23 and DutchBat, it was the most normal sequence to follow. First of all
24 the elderly and the sick, then women and children.
25 And, of course, when you plan an operation like this, evacuating
1 or deportating [sic] so many people, then you have to make a nice time
2 schedule, planning, and you have to communicate with all the people who
3 are involved. When you don't tell people who are involved what you are
4 going to do and you surprise them with 15 buses and then open a gate and
5 give scared people the possibility to run into buses because that's their
6 goal, they want to go away from the terrible situation they were in, then
7 I think you create a problem yourself, and I think that problem was not
8 caused by the UN Battalion over there, nor by the civilian population.
9 Q. Thank you for the answer that you have just provided. I have no
10 more time, therefore I'll skip a few questions that you've already
11 answered for that matter.
12 I'm just going to mention those things that you, yourself, said.
13 In your answers, you mentioned Camila and you said that you didn't know
14 her last name. Did you mean Camila Omanovic, per chance?
15 A. I'm look at my notes now. Yes, Camila Omanovic; that's correct.
16 Q. Thank you. On page 914, line 22, and 915, line 3 in the Krstic
17 case, you described a situation on the 13th of July involving
18 Camila Omanovic and her brother, and I quote your words:
19 "Camila Omanovic broke down on that day. Her brother was also in
20 the base. He was a cook for the Medecins Sans Frontieres, and he was
21 also on the list of our local staff. He had the possibility to leave
22 with us. He was very frightened as to what would happen. He was so
23 scared that he carried a rope in his pocket and he said that he would
24 hang himself the moment the Serbs entered the base."
25 Did you inform anybody about what you heard from Camila's
1 brother, the one who worked for the Medecins Sans Frontieres? Thank you.
2 A. Yes, I did. Our medical personnel from the hospital were aware
3 of this situation, command of DutchBat, and also the second in command,
4 Mr. Franken, were aware of the situation, so I think most important
5 people who should know what was going on were aware of this.
6 Q. Thank you. Did they take any measures to prevent the gentleman
7 in question, Camila's brother, from following up on those words and
8 hanging themselves with that piece of rope in his pocket?
9 A. I don't know exactly what preventive measures they took. I spoke
10 several times to the brother of Camila. He would not hand over the rope.
11 But I think that at the end we managed that he was on a list of the local
12 personnel, just as the rest of the MSF. And Serb soldiers did not come
13 on the compound to get him or to take him away, so I think we solved the
14 problem, and he managed to go out of the enclave with the battalion.
15 Q. Could you please tell us whether the situation involving Camila's
16 brother had any impact on Camila and the way she felt? Because you
17 yourself said that Camila Omanovic had broken down on that day. Could
18 her brother's situation be the cause of her nervous breakdown on that
20 A. I'm not a doctor, but I think, just as a normal human being,
21 thinking that Camila was in a terrible situation, was with us to
22 General Mladic, saw the hopeless situation and -- so that we didn't get
23 the results we wanted. Then, of course, she saw the situation of her
24 brother and I think that should be enough in the situation they were in
25 to have a breakdown. It's not only for Camila; I think that was for a
1 lot of people inside the enclave.
2 Q. Could Camila also leave the enclave? Hadn't she been offered by
3 General Mladic that he himself would transfer both her and her daughters?
4 Do you know anything about that?
5 A. No, I don't know about that, but for me that's just words from
6 General Mladic. And as I stated before, General Mladic promised me what
7 would happen with a lot of people and a lot of men who were brought out
8 of the enclave in buses and who should have been brought to Bijeljina to
9 a prisoner of war camp and eventually being exchanged with Serb prisoners
10 of war, nothing of that came out. So I think that if Camila - and now
11 I'm speaking for her, I think - did not trust General Mladic, I think she
12 was right.
13 Q. Thank you. I'm asking you whether you know if Camila left
14 Srebrenica and arrived in the territory under the control of the BiH army
15 to which everybody was being evacuated? When she arrived there, was she
16 in a good state, was she healthy and sane?
17 A. I know that she was able to leave the enclave. I don't know in
18 what way she left the enclave, because I think in 1999 I met her in
19 Holland and she was not very willing to speak to me about the way she
20 left the enclave, but at that moment - in 2000, excuse me - in 2000 she
21 was in very good shape. And I don't know in what shape she was when she
22 left the enclave.
23 Q. So five years after she had left the enclave you met her in
24 Holland; right?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. Did you hear anything about her brother on that occasion? Did
2 she tell you anything?
3 A. Yes. After we returned in 1995 from Srebrenica, I went several
4 times to Bosnia for other missions and I was able to visit Srebrenica, I
5 think, in 2000. And also in 2000, I met her brother, who was living in
6 Srebrenica in his own house again. He was one of the brave men, I think,
7 as a Muslim, returning so short after the war to his own house and
8 starting up building the town of Srebrenica again.
9 Q. Thank you for the answers you have provided. Thank you for
10 coming here to testify in my case.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to
12 thank everybody who have been listening to us for the past few days. I
13 would like to thank the interpreters who have invested a lot of effort
14 into interpreting properly what we have tried to cover at a high speed
15 without making any pauses. I would like to thank everybody that has
16 helped me to bring this testimony to an end. As far as I'm concerned,
17 this concludes the cross-examination of this witness within the dead-line
19 As for the questions that I did not put to this witness, there
20 will be witnesses coming from the same contingent that Mr. Rave was a
21 member of, and I will put my questions to them. Thank you.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
23 Mr. McCloskey, do you have re-examination?
24 Before you get the floor, Judge Nyambe has a question. Sorry for
1 JUDGE NYAMBE: Just one small question for the witness. At
2 page 73, line 20 to 21, you are recorded as saying:
3 "It was part of the negotiations in what sequence people would be
4 evacuated from the enclave."
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 JUDGE NYAMBE: Was this sequence agreed at these negotiations,
8 the one that was followed at the actual evacuation of the people?
9 THE WITNESS: During the negotiations, we could not make any
10 clear appointments. And at the end, the things we wanted and the
11 sequence of the evacuation did not take place in the way we wanted it and
12 we planned it and we discussed it, at least. Because I tell you all the
13 time that we were negotiating. It was not negotiating; it was demanding
14 and further on getting orders how it would -- how it would be done.
15 JUDGE NYAMBE: What was the sequence that was arrived at, at the
17 THE WITNESS: First the wounded, then the elderly and the sick
18 people, then women and children.
19 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: I have probably 20 minutes. I might clear up one
22 last point, I think, there on Judge Nyambe's questions.
23 Re-examination by Mr. McCloskey:
24 Q. You mentioned, I think, two negotiations: negotiations between
25 you and the Muslim representatives and then negotiations between you and
1 the VRS and Mladic. You just said there was no real negotiations. Which
2 one were you referring to when you said there was no real negotiations,
3 just orders, et cetera?
5 Q. Okay. So the negotiations you had with the Muslim
6 representatives about, among other things, the order and the evacuation,
7 was that more of a real negotiation, if you recall?
8 A. Yes, it was a real negotiation. It was talking about
9 possibilities and non-possibilities, how to go on.
10 Q. All right. Thank you.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: I hope that clears up that issue. And I have
12 about 15 or 20 more minutes.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I tried to figure out, in the mean time, if we
14 can have 15 minutes' extended sitting today, if everybody would agree,
15 that we could finish with this witness. Or do you prefer to continue
16 tomorrow morning?
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I could go on, but it would be probably neater
18 and my references to the B/C/S pages and the English pages of things
19 would be neater. We might save some time that way. I've managed to try
20 to collect that as I go, but -- and we would be able to provide the
21 Defence with most of the documents I intend to use as well.
22 I hate to keep the witness one more day, but it looks like that's
23 where we are.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Okay. In that case, we should adjourn for today
25 and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.
1 You have to come back, I'm sorry for that, but I hope you can
2 finish quite early tomorrow morning.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00 in this
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of
8 October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.