101102IT

Page 7147

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And please tell me, is it high enough?

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: First of all, good afternoon again.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And I have to remind you that the affirmation to

6 tell the truth you made at the beginning of your testimony still applies.

7 WITNESS: VINCENTIUS EGBERS [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And Mr. Tolimir is continuing his

10 cross-examination.

11 Mr. Tolimir.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Presiding Judge. May

13 there be peace in this house. I greet everybody present, especially the

14 witness, and I wish that today's proceedings conclude in keeping with

15 God's will and not mine.

16 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

17 Q. [Interpretation] We shall presume where we left off yesterday.

18 Yesterday we left off where you were saying on the first page, you were

19 describing a situation, and I am quoting. That is the last paragraph of

20 page 2 of document 1145.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can that be brought up on the

22 screen. It is Exhibit P1145, page 3 in the Serbian language. In actual

23 fact it is page 2 in the Serbian language, the last paragraph which is

24 the fourth one. And it is page 3, the first paragraph in the English

25 version. Thank you. We now see in English -- we should be seeing page 3

Page 7148

1 in English, the first paragraph, and page 2, paragraph 4 in the Serbian

2 version, lines 9, 10, and 11. Thank you.

3 Q. This is a situation where you state, describe, what you saw, and

4 I should like to quote it but I still cannot see it on the screen. You

5 can but I cannot -- well, now, yes. Well, we now cannot see the English:

6 "There were between eight and ten Muslims there. At a certain

7 point they -- at a certain point we were shot at by a tank or artillery

8 coming from a south-easterly direction. They fired in succession.

9 "The Bosnian Serbian soldiers might have been shooting at the

10 Muslim fighters. The attack took place about five or ten metres away."

11 Then you go on to say that:

12 "The Muslim commander was seriously wounded in the shooting and

13 was hit by a piece of shrapnel in his tarmac, and two of the Muslims were

14 slightly wounded, one got a shrapnel in his neck and the other in his

15 arm."

16 Please be so kind as to clarify this, you say they fired in

17 succession?

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

19 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, just -- we all have the document in

20 front of us, but just for the sake of the transcript, I think

21 General Tolimir misread the portion. It's not two of the Muslims were

22 slightly wounded, but "two of my men," that is, UN peacekeepers, were

23 slightly wounded, just so there is no confusion if one is reading the

24 record later on.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer, for

Page 7149

1 correcting the transcript. The last sentence which I quoted was:

2 "Two of my men were slightly wounded, one got a shrapnel in his

3 neck and the other in his arm."

4 And that's how I read it.

5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

6 Q. And now I would like to ask you this: In this paragraph which I

7 read out, you said that there was firing in succession. Do you think

8 that that was fire exchanged between you and the Serbs or the Serbs and

9 the Muslims? What exactly did you refer to when you say there was firing

10 in succession?

11 A. What I intend to describe there is that we were at a spot that

12 was clearly visible to everybody, also for the crew of a Serb tank that

13 was firing in our direction. As for the question of whether I was 100

14 per cent certain that the shooting was at me and at my people or whether

15 the shooting was at the Bosnian warriors in our surrounding, I can't tell

16 you exactly with respect to that moment.

17 The tank was firing at us, the grenades hit, and we took up a

18 different position. At the time, I wasn't certain whether they were

19 shooting at us or at the Muslim warriors. This became clear only later

20 when the route to the point where we positioned ourselves concealed

21 the -- was also shot at, but at that other moment I was not sure.

22 Q. Thank you. In this part which I quoted, you said that the

23 Muslims were 5 metres away from you. Was the gunner on the Serbian

24 army's tank able to discern from what point he was being fired at from

25 the 5 metres' point away from you or from your firing ordinance, from

Page 7150

1 your weapons?

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

3 MR. THAYER: Again, Mr. President, I didn't object yesterday when

4 General Tolimir made this misstatement, but -- and we have the statement

5 in front of us. But, again, for the record, that is not what the

6 statement says. That is a misstatement. The Muslim fighters were

7 clearly positioned at a different distance which is recorded here, and

8 General Tolimir needs to cite the paragraph correctly in his questions

9 and not misstate the clear language of the paragraph.

10 I understand Colonel Egbers was there and he's an experienced

11 officer, but we simply need to make sure that this transcript is accurate

12 and not being misstated.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer, for your

15 assistance. Thank you, Presiding Judge.

16 Can we now look at page 3, second line. Page 3, first paragraph,

17 second line.

18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. It says:

20 "The attack took place about 5 or 10 metres away from where we

21 were."

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And where is it --

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Where is this part in the English translation?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is in the first paragraph on

Page 7151

1 the page which is now on the screen at the top.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

3 MR. THAYER: Again, Mr. President, that is misstating what is

4 clearly in the paragraph. He did this yesterday, and Colonel Egbers

5 corrected him yesterday as well. Colonel Egbers was clear that the

6 Muslims were at a position, as you can see in the statement, 40 metres to

7 the north-west. He said again yesterday that they were perhaps 50 to 60

8 metres from there and that the shells were landing at that distance

9 that's indicated here. The reference to the attack is, as Colonel Egbers

10 said yesterday, where the shells landed, not where the Muslims were.

11 This is the third time that General Tolimir is trying to imply

12 that the Muslims had positioned themselves 5 metres from the DutchBat

13 position which is clearly not the case. Again, it is misrepresenting

14 both what's in the statement, it's misrepresenting what Colonel Egbers

15 clearly clarified yesterday. That is why I am making this objection,

16 because we cannot have this transcript distorted by misstatements of

17 fact.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Egbers, perhaps you can help us. I am also

19 referring to the sentence:

20 "The attack took place about 5 or 10 metres away."

21 What does that mean in your understanding? Could you please

22 explain it again.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a distance between the

24 Dutch and the Bosnian warriors. That distance was, say, 50 metres. The

25 hits that injured us were 5 to 10 metres away, so the shells fell very

Page 7152

1 close to our vehicles but because there were Bosnian warriors 50 metres

2 away, I was unable to say that the firing was only at me. That's why I

3 wrote it down and explained it this way, so the attack was directed at my

4 position and the Bosnian warriors were 50 metres away from that.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And when you say "Bosnian warriors," you are

6 referring to Bosnian Muslim fighters; correct?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were indeed men dressed in

8 civilian attire armed with rifles pertaining to the Muslim group within

9 the enclave.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

11 Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Witness, can you tell me this: Can a soldier aboard a Serbian

15 tank know whether he was being shot at by the Muslim positions or by you?

16 Was he suppose or was he able to exactly determine the firing line in

17 order to be able to return fire, meaning the firing line from which shots

18 came at him?

19 A. I was taught that such a tank cannot fire further than about 1500

20 metres, direct fire, but this Serb tank targeted its barrel upward and

21 was able to fire fairly accurately at our location. I am not sure how

22 good the Serb tank crew was, but the shells hit very close to us. I am

23 not sure whether it was his intention to hit us or the Muslims, the only

24 thing I can tell you is that the shells landed 5 to 10 metres away from

25 our position.

Page 7153

1 Q. Thank you. So you were not hit directly by this tank shell which

2 fell a few metres away from you?

3 A. I was not personally hit directly, but several soldiers sustained

4 minor injuries. All I had was damage to my hearing. We were very lucky

5 that morning.

6 Q. Thank you. So I got as part of the answer: You were not

7 directly hit, but how far was the Serbian tank which fired this shell

8 which landed near you?

9 A. In a previous testimony, I stated about the Serbian tank. It was

10 certainly a few kilometres away from my position near an altitude of, off

11 the top of my head, on the map known as 757, 15 years ago. The tank was

12 in that area and it was not directly emitting fire, but the barrel of the

13 tank was pointing upward so that an artillery fire was emitted by the

14 tank.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I would like to take you back to

16 your last question, page 10, line 1. You said, and that was the

17 interpretation we received:

18 "So I got as part of the answer: You were not directly hit."

19 Were you at this question referring to Mr. Egbers personally and

20 only to him or to the UNPROFOR, the DutchBat soldiers present at this

21 spot?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Presiding Judge.

23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Please clarify for us: Were UNPROFOR soldiers then in the

25 vehicle in which you were, and was that vehicle hit at that point by the

Page 7154

1 shell which was fired from Serbian position, from a tank on Serbian

2 positions?

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the witness said:

4 "I was not personally hit directly, but several soldiers

5 sustained minor injuries. All I had was damage to my hearing."

6 You got the answer that some of the soldiers were, indeed, hit,

7 and sustained injured. I just wanted to make clear because in your next

8 question you said:

9 "... you were not injured directly."

10 This can only refer to the witness personally and not to the

11 other soldiers.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Earlier I noticed, and you can correct me, that the shell landed

15 by you, near you. This shell from the tank. Did it land among the

16 soldiers, UNPROFOR soldiers, on the vehicle or on the ground around you?

17 Thank you.

18 A. The armoured vehicles were not hit directly, only a bit of

19 shrapnel from the grenade hit them. The Muslim warriors did not have the

20 protection of armoured vehicles, and some of them were seriously injured.

21 We sustained only minor damage, the UNPROFOR soldiers sustained minor

22 injuries. Muslim warriors sustained serious injuries. We had armoured

23 vehicles, APCs, they did not have those.

24 Does this answer your question sufficiently?

25 Q. Thank you. Yes, this is a sufficient answer. Tell me, from --

Page 7155

1 did you see the wounded Muslims from your vehicle or did you get off the

2 vehicle in order to establish what wounds the Muslims had sustained?

3 A. I saw the injuries only later on. When the shooting started,

4 everybody fled. We drove away as quickly as possible. Later, when the

5 firing stopped and we returned to the original position, I saw the

6 injuries among the Muslim warriors.

7 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 2 on page 3, in Serbian, you first say

8 that you took up positions about 400 metres further on. What does this

9 "further on" refer to, towards the Serbian positions or in some other

10 direction? Thank you.

11 A. At the time I was on a road with two 180 [Realtime transcript

12 read in error "280"] degree turns. The road from Srebrenica to OP Alpha.

13 I stood 400 metres further down protected in the -- proceeded in the

14 direction of Srebrenica outside the view of the tank.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

16 MR. THAYER: Just a quick correction. I don't think there will

17 be any dispute about this. In the witness's answer, at page 12, line 6,

18 it reads:

19 "I was on a road with 280 degree turns."

20 I think he said "two 180 degree turns," not "280 degree turns."

21 So I think that needs to be corrected and we can perhaps confirm with the

22 witness, but I am pretty sure we all heard two 180 degree turns.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Egbers, is that correct?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct. Perhaps if the

25 General has a map, I could point it out to him.

Page 7156

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. There is no need to belabour this point. Please be so kind as to

3 take a look at page 3, paragraph 2, line 5 where then you say:

4 "I then received an order to support the other four vehicles in

5 Srebrenica. We left our positions and the Muslim fighters started

6 shooting at us. About 30 metres below the arm of the gunner, a bullet

7 hit the turret of our vehicle. Metal splinters flew into his arm. I

8 think that the Muslim fighters shot at us out of fear because they

9 thought that we were abandoning them."

10 Are you able -- can you see this text in the English version

11 which I've just quoted?

12 A. I listened to what you told me. I know exactly what you are

13 talking about, but I don't know exactly what I have in front of me

14 because I don't see any line or page numbers. But I understand it should

15 be all the way at the top of the page.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is on the left side of the screen. One

17 moment, Mr. Tolimir.

18 It is on the left side of the screen, second paragraph, and the

19 first half of the second paragraph. You see there a small sign.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see it clearly. Do you have a

21 question about this paragraph?

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I do have a question for you: Did you return fire when Muslims

24 had opened fire on you, representatives of UNPROFOR? Thank you.

25 A. At that moment, I did not fire back.

Page 7157

1 Q. Thank you. Did there come a moment when you returned fire and

2 opened fire on the Muslims who had shot at you?

3 A. We were fired at already when we were driving toward the city of

4 Srebrenica, and only 100 metres after we were out of the view of the

5 warriors did I hear that the gunner had been injured. I did not return

6 to become involved in the exchange of fire.

7 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at page 3, paragraph 3, line 1.

8 It is below the paragraph that is now marked for you. You say:

9 "In Srebrenica, I saw many armed Muslims."

10 The cursor is next to that paragraph now.

11 "I recognised anti-tank weapons RPG 7 and nonautomatic firearms

12 such as the AK-47. Some pointed their weapons at us and through arm

13 movements made it clear to us that we should continue in a southerly

14 direction. We drove to another four vehicles which belonged to us and

15 which were under the command of Captain Hageman. He told me over the

16 radio that he was under fire by the local Muslim combatants and therefore

17 he could not move his vehicles."

18 My question to you, sir, is this: Was that a large-scale

19 attack launched on all members of UNPROFOR on that day, and the day is

20 the 9th? Did all the other soldiers, UNPROFOR soldiers, telephone you

21 just as Colonel Karremans did, that they had come under Muslim fire?

22 Thank you.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the name Karremans be changed

24 into Hageman. I said Hageman because the witness, in his statement,

25 stated that it was Captain Hageman who had telephoned him to tell him

Page 7158

1 that he had come under fire by the local Muslims. Thank you.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I drove to the city of

3 Srebrenica I arrived on the square which was filled with people in a

4 state of utter panic. There I saw armed men and while the Bosnian

5 Serbian troops were approaching the city from the south, the Muslims

6 hoped that we would protect them there. They wanted us to drive as much

7 as possible to the south of the square to take up positions there. It

8 was a state of chaos that day. And only one of them might have shot at

9 us and the consequences would have been disastrous. That's why I stood

10 on top of my vehicle to let them know that I needed to pass. Because of

11 the total chaos, several of them ensured that our APCs remained there.

12 They also did this by physically restraining Captain Hageman there and

13 they also tried to restrain my vehicle there, because in their eyes we

14 were the only hope of rescue for them. There was total chaos. There was

15 no attack on our vehicles.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at paragraph 3, line 5 -- or,

18 rather, line 4 and 5 where it says:

19 "We drove to another four vehicles which belonged to us and which

20 were under the command of Captain Hageman. He told me over the radio

21 that he was under fire, under fire by the local Muslim fighters and

22 therefore he could not move his own vehicles."

23 Thank you.

24 Does this mean that he was physically blocked or was he only

25 blocked by the fire that was opened on them?

Page 7159

1 A. My impression on the square at that time was that there was no

2 shooting at him physically but that he was physically threatened by

3 weapons. If weapons are aimed at you then you receive the message loud

4 and clear. There was no shooting at my vehicle. Captain Hageman told me

5 over the radio that he was stuck and he was afraid to move anywhere

6 because around him there was total panic and people were armed and that's

7 why I drove to him to help him there. These people were in such a state

8 of panic that they even climbed onto my vehicle to keep me there. They

9 wanted us to act to stop the approaching Bosnian Serb tanks. Among all

10 those armed men were women in utter panic. I remember that the day was

11 very, very hot. It was a very hot day and that made a deep impression on

12 all of us.

13 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us very clearly for the record

14 was Captain Hageman exposed to the fire by the local Muslim fighters, as

15 it says here in the text, or not?

16 A. I didn't see anybody shooting at his vehicle. I do note that he

17 told me that he was threatened and that's why he was stuck and could not

18 take up a different position. That's what I remember. But there was no

19 attack. There was panic, and the population was trying to keep us there.

20 Q. Thank you. I couldn't know that this statement is not correct.

21 Does it mean that this statement is not correct or, at least, this part

22 where Captain Hageman is referred to and what he allegedly told you over

23 the phone? Let's not waste anymore time if the statement is incorrect.

24 Thank you.

25 A. Well, I might be able to make a remark about that, even though

Page 7160

1 you're not asking me a question. There it reads that: "He told me over

2 the radio that ...," and that's all there is. I didn't perceive it so I

3 can't determine whether or not that happened.

4 Q. Thank you. Let's not waste any more time on this. Let's now

5 look at the next paragraph, again on page 3, you say:

6 "We stayed there the whole night."

7 The cursor is next to that line now:

8 "The promised air-strike did not take place."

9 And then you say:

10 "A mortar shell hit the ground that night about 10 metres away

11 from the vehicles. Nobody was wounded. The rest of the night was calm."

12 My question is this: You say here the promised air-strike did

13 not take place. Please, who was it who had promised you that there

14 would, indeed, be an air-strike and who was supposed to be the target of

15 that air-strike? Thank you.

16 A. In such a situation, I speak only with my commander, and my

17 commander promised that there would be air support to ensure that the

18 Bosnian Serb tanks did not advance any further.

19 Q. Thank you. Tell us, please, who your commander was in that case?

20 Thank you.

21 A. I was under the direct command of Captain Groen, and I

22 communicated with him.

23 Q. Thank you. Did Captain Groen ever tell you who it was who had

24 told him that the air-strikes would happen and why they didn't happen?

25 A. All I can do now is reason that his commander, the battalion --

Page 7161

1 the battalion commander would have told him that, but at the time I

2 didn't know who said that and I don't know, to answer the second part of

3 your question, why this didn't happen. I don't know.

4 Q. You say here, "We stayed there the whole night." Is that night

5 the night between the 9th and the 10th? Thank you.

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Thank you. Had you already received an order for the so-called

8 Green Alert? Thank you. Green order? Had you already received the

9 green order from your Captain Groen? Thank you.

10 A. He didn't give me the direct instructions, but we had to use all

11 means to ensure that the -- that additional advances by the Bosnian Serbs

12 were stopped, and I assumed that air support was essential in this

13 process. We couldn't do anything on the ground with our weapons. At the

14 time, we were on a market square surrounded by houses with hills around

15 us, and behind the hills the Bosnian Serb troops were advancing

16 northward.

17 Q. Thank you. Tell us, please, on the 9th in the evening and during

18 the night, was the so-called green order in effect?

19 A. I assume so.

20 Q. Thank you. In that case I don't have to remind you what

21 Major Franken said about that as he testified before this Trial Chamber.

22 Let's move on to the follow paragraph.

23 It says here:

24 "The next day, Monday, the 10th of July, 1995, I returned with my

25 group to a safe place in the vicinity of our original location. The

Page 7162

1 forward air control in my vehicle received instructions to prepare for an

2 air-strike again. Once again, nothing happened."

3 Thank you. Could you please tell us, where did you return and

4 where was it that you were instructed to prepare for another air-strike?

5 Thank you.

6 A. When I was on the market square, I was instructed to return to

7 blocking position 1 because from that position we had a clear view of the

8 south of the enclave where Bosnian tanks and other units were situated.

9 We had to mark our vehicles so that we would be clearly visible from the

10 air. And we were preparing for air support.

11 Q. Thank you. Did the VRS launch attacks from behind the hill where

12 their tanks were? Were there any attacks on that morning?

13 A. I wasn't fired at on that day by the Bosnian Serb tanks. I don't

14 remember whether those tanks did fire at other locations at that point.

15 I will speak for myself.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Egbers, on page 18, line 22, you are recorded

17 to having said:

18 "Where the Bosnian tanks and other units were situated."

19 You are referring to Bosnian Serb tanks or what you are talking

20 about? Because on page 19, line 2, you use the term "the Bosnian Serb

21 tanks."

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The only army with tanks was the

23 Bosnian Serb one, so in this case I use the words Bosnian Serb army, BSA.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

25 Mr. Tolimir.

Page 7163

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You said that in the course of the 10th, fire was not opened on

4 you personally. And now, in paragraph 5, beneath that, it says:

5 "We then got the order to return to our original positions. We

6 were in full view of Bosnian Serbian soldiers. Ten minutes later, we

7 came under tank and mortar attack. Our escape route to a safe place was

8 also under fire. We did, however, manage to return to our safe place.

9 Our vehicles had been hit several times."

10 If we look at this paragraph 5, can you please tell us why were

11 you ordered to return to your original position where we were -- where

12 you were in full view of the Army of Republika Srpska whom you refer to

13 as Bosnian Serbian soldiers?

14 A. I believe now that conceivably they wanted to be 100 per cent

15 sure that we were being shot at.

16 Q. Thank you. I didn't understand you. Did they want to be certain

17 or did they want to expose you to fire? Did they want to have you in

18 full view and is that why they had told you to change your position?

19 Thank you.

20 A. A hypothetical line had to be drawn that could not be crossed by

21 Bosnian Serb troops. I was on that hypothetical line and I had to stand

22 there with my vehicles and people, even though I was in full view and was

23 being fired at. At that moment we had to draw a hypothetical line that

24 could not be crossed by the Bosnian Serb army. I was part of that border

25 in full view and that's why I was fired at.

Page 7164

1 Q. Thank you. Talking about that hypothetical line that you drew,

2 can you tell us where the Muslims were with regard to that hypothetical

3 line?

4 A. The Muslims were north of that line; the Bosnian Serb army south

5 of that line.

6 Q. Thank you. How far were the Muslims from that line? Were they

7 armed, could they open fire at you? Thank you.

8 A. I noticed that many men were already north of this hypothetical

9 line, and perhaps they were preparing to go to Bosnian area, Muslim

10 area, on foot. At that time not many Bosnian soldiers, Bosnian warriors,

11 were in my surroundings.

12 Q. Were there any Bosnian combatants around you at all around that

13 hypothetical line? Could they open fire, did they open fire at you?

14 A. No. What we did see was a Bosnian Serb tank to the south, we

15 heard a bang, we saw smoke, and we saw the hits near us. That was also

16 the information that we transmitted later that day to the F-16s.

17 Q. How did you receive information about the positions of the Muslim

18 forces and they were -- and where they were at that moment? Thank you.

19 A. At that point, all I could do was look around me and did not see

20 many people in my surroundings anymore. So exactly where they were

21 north of the enclave, later on I heard that they were in the surroundings

22 of Observation Post Alpha. But I didn't know that at this time, and all

23 I saw was a tank in the south firing at me.

24 Q. Thank you. How far was Observation Post Alpha away from you, and

25 you say that Muslims were gathered around that observation post, how far

Page 7165

1 was it from you?

2 A. A few kilometres.

3 Q. Again, let's go back to the hypothetical line that you drew.

4 Where did you draw it? Did you draw it somewhere in the centre or did

5 you draw that line somewhere between the Serbs and the Muslims?

6 A. That hypothetical line is a line in between the blocking

7 positions. So I could remain standing in blocking position 1. I've

8 testified about this in previous trials and pointed it out on a map.

9 Q. Thank you. Since you drew a hypothetical line on the ground, how

10 did you do it and how did you make it visible to the Serbian forces?

11 Could you please explain that.

12 A. I did that by making myself visible with my white vehicle. For

13 our own aeroplanes I placed a cloth on top of the vehicle that was

14 visible from the air.

15 Q. And how did you make the Serbs know that there was, indeed, a

16 hypothetical line there?

17 A. That must have been agreed at your level between UNPROFOR and the

18 Bosnian Serb army, not at my level on the ground as lieutenant.

19 Q. Thank you. When was that agreed, do you know anything about

20 that? When was it agreed with the Army of Republika Srpska that there

21 would be a hypothetical line drawn? A hypothetical line would be

22 something as a hypothetical assumption, wouldn't it? Thank you.

23 A. I was told by my own commander that a large aeroplane from the

24 air would be firing at the armoured positions of the Serbs that were

25 located south of the blocking positions. It was not a hypothetical line

Page 7166

1 on the map. It was very easy to draw on the map, and I was part of it,

2 as blocking position number 1 with my white vehicle. Basically, I was a

3 target for everybody and, nonetheless, we stood there to indicate that

4 that was where the line was.

5 Q. Thank you. You said that the Muslims were about 2 kilometres to

6 the north of that line and that the Serbs were to the south of that line.

7 How far were the Serbs from that line?

8 A. The Muslims were very close to that line because the entire

9 marketplace at Srebrenica was still filled with people, thousands and

10 thousands of people. The Bosnian Serb tanks drove about a kilometre

11 south of me and were firing at me. Exactly where the largest number of

12 men was exiting the enclave on foot, I couldn't tell you at that time.

13 At that time I didn't know.

14 Q. Thank you. Tell us, how far were you from the marketplace where

15 these people, these civilians were in Srebrenica when you were drawing

16 this hypothetical line?

17 A. I'd point that out to you on the map, but I didn't draw a

18 hypothetical line. I had to take up blocking position 1 in the middle

19 of the road with the white vehicle to ensure that it was clearly visible

20 to everybody that UNPROFOR was there and that that line could not be

21 crossed.

22 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, as this is the 10th, how could the

23 VRS know that you had --

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the speaker.

25 Could the speaker please be asked to repeat his question.

Page 7167

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The interpreters didn't catch your last question.

2 Could you please repeat it.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Presiding Judge.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. So, please tell me, how did you shift from a position of someone

6 who had been given the green order to open fire on the Serbs to the

7 position of someone who is going to be neutral and be seen by everyone

8 standing on the road with a white sheet which was to be a signal for the

9 aircraft?

10 A. I was told that the Bosnian Serb army was informed that the

11 hypothetical line could not be crossed and that if that happened

12 aeroplanes would be used to neutralise the armoured vehicles of the

13 Bosnian Serbs. If we were to operate in green surroundings, we would not

14 be clearly visible. But in the idea of giving the Bosnian Serbs a final

15 warning not to cross that line, I could understand that, and I basically

16 used my -- I placed my men in the armoured vehicles, basically, as

17 targets on the road as a signal to the Bosnian Serb army so that they

18 would go no further than the positions that we had taken up.

19 Q. Thank you. But I have understood you -- but tell me who informed

20 you that the Bosnian Serb army had been informed that they were not to

21 cross that hypothetical line?

22 A. I don't know that yet. At high level the battalion commander, or

23 perhaps even higher than that, that was communicated with the Bosnian

24 Serb army. I can't say who did that. All I was told was that it had

25 happened.

Page 7168

1 Q. Thank you. Did Colonel Franken play any commanding role in that

2 chain of command? Was he above you in that chain?

3 A. Major Franken was deputy battalion commander at that time and was

4 above Captain Groen.

5 Q. Thank you. Let me remind you what Mr. Franken said on the

6 1st of July, 2010, on the transcript page 3473, line 6. Asked when he

7 had issued the order, he said, and I quote:

8 "That must have been in the evening of the 9th of July."

9 And on page 3453, he explained what the issuance of a green order

10 meant in this way. That is in line 16 to line 19, and I quote:

11 "The rules of engagement that we had been issued as a

12 United Nations unit, according to them one of our problems was that we

13 could use weapons only for self-defence. Those rules were no longer in

14 force and we returned to the rules governing the engagement of troops in

15 combat."

16 And in lines 23 to 25, he says the following, and I quote:

17 "Since the issuance of the green order, we were in combat with

18 the VRS, with the Army of Republika Srpska. The Army of Republika Srpska

19 was a target for us and vice versa and that was realistic and true."

20 And on page 3484, lines 1 to 3, he says the following, and I

21 quote, and I'm quoting Colonel Franken:

22 "My mandate changed substantially since the moment when the

23 United Nations issued the order to me to defend Srebrenica. That was the

24 reason why I issued the green order. Following that rule of engagement,

25 et cetera, all restrictions on the use of weapons were lifted because

Page 7169

1 that is consonant with an order to defend something."

2 Thank you. My question is: If all the rules as Mr. Franken

3 states had been revoked following the issuance of the green order, had

4 such rules also been eliminated in respect of the Army of Republika

5 Srpska also if they had been lifted in respect of UNPROFOR troops?

6 Thank you.

7 A. That sounds like an excellent question for Colonel Franken.

8 Q. Thank you. But did he tell you, you who were in combat, that

9 all rules had been cancelled by the very issuance of the green order and

10 by engaging in combat with the VRS and that now, or from that point on,

11 you had to act in accordance with the green order rules?

12 A. I did not see that order, as I mentioned earlier. All I said was

13 that, should we be in a position to stop the advance of the Bosnian Serb

14 tanks, we should about accordingly. Still, I was instructed to draw a

15 hypothetical line there and I did so. And that's what I have to say

16 about that.

17 Q. Thank you. In view of the fact that you had been ordered, that

18 for you, as Mr. Franken, your superior states here, that you had been

19 ordered that the VRS would be your target and you would be -- were their

20 target, did you then have to adapt on the ground, your conduct on the

21 ground, to the rules of combat of rules of engagement, combat with an

22 enemy?

23 A. The answer is no. We were still driving in our white vehicles.

24 We still wore our blue helmets. We were still positioned in the middle

25 of the road until on July 10th, 1995, a tank fired at me. And I took up

Page 7170

1 a position elsewhere. Nothing changed for me. The bearing of the arms

2 was 800 metres. I didn't have any anti-tank shells with me -- excuse me,

3 the range of the arms was 800 metres. All I could do was speak with

4 aeroplanes if there were any.

5 Q. Thank you. You said that you comported yourselves as if you were

6 still members of UNPROFOR, you wore blue helmets, you were in white

7 vehicles, et cetera. But if you had been issued a green order to open

8 fire on the Army of Republika Srpska, as Colonel Franken says, didn't

9 that mean that in self-defence the Army of Republika Srpska would return

10 fire, would also open fire at you? Thank you.

11 A. I have no idea what I could have used to shoot at tanks.

12 Q. Thank you. But why did you go to a position where you were in

13 full sight of the VRS, as you say in paragraph 5? Why did you leave your

14 shelter and went there where you would be in their full sight? Can you

15 explain that to me.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I remember that that was very well explained by

17 the witness why he was visible at that point. I think half an hour ago

18 he explained that in detail.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Presiding Judge. Then I

20 shall rephrase my question.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Did you place yourself in full sight of the VRS in order for them

23 to open fire at you as you were already at war with them, and was the

24 order that you received such that you were to provoke fire on the part of

25 the VRS by placing yourselves in that position?

Page 7171

1 A. We were not at war with the VRS at that moment. That's what

2 you're referring to. I received my orders at that moment from

3 Captain Groen, and he told me to return to that position to indicate to

4 them, and by "them," I mean the VRS, that a line was drawn on the map

5 that they were not supposed to cross. That's why I was standing there

6 with my vehicle.

7 When we talk about this 15 years afterwards, I understand clearly

8 that we were very, very fortunate that we were not hit head-on with the

9 tens of soldiers being killed.

10 Q. Thank you. Can you say here, now, was it maybe foolish from a

11 soldierly aspect to place ones self in a position which is unsheltered,

12 unprotected, and which is in full sight of the other side's fire?

13 A. No. If my instructions were to destroy the Bosnian Serb army,

14 or, in any case, to make such an attempt, I would have acted differently.

15 In this case, my instructions were to return to that blocking position to

16 indicate clearly to the Bosnian Serb army that UNPROFOR was there, would

17 remain there, and that there was a line that they were not allowed to

18 cross. If I had thought green, as you're describing, then we would have

19 acted differently. And I would not have positioned myself in the middle

20 of the road, wearing a blue helmet in a white vehicle.

21 Q. Thank you. You said that ten minutes later you came under mortar

22 and tank fire. Then in paragraph 5 you say:

23 "The escape route also came under fire; however, we returned to a

24 safe place. Our vehicle was hit several times."

25 Why did you return to your safe place if everything was the way

Page 7172

1 you have just explained to us?

2 A. Of course I was aware that it was not safe to return. Still, I

3 was explicitly instructed to return to make clear that we were staying

4 there.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it is time for our first break. Before

8 we do that, I have to give the floor to the Registrar to assign an

9 exhibit number to document 65 ter 3484. We are dealing with that at the

10 outset of today's hearing.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours. This will be

12 Exhibit P1304.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Marked for identification, pending translation.

14 We adjourn and resume 20 minutes past 4.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 [The witness takes the stand]

18 --- On resuming at 4.21 p.m.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Egbers, I was told that it was not quite clear in the

23 transcript where this marketplace that you spoke about was in Srebrenica.

24 Where exactly near your base was it, how far was that marketplace from

25 your base, or how far was your base from that marketplace, if you would

Page 7173

1 be so kind to tell us?

2 A. I can. There was a marketplace in the city itself, in the city

3 of Srebrenica, about 1 kilometre from the compound of the Bravo Company,

4 that was also the UNHCR's storage site. Have I explained that

5 sufficiently that way?

6 Q. Thank you for your explanation. How far was that in kilometres

7 from the position which you took up on the road where you charted the --

8 what you referred to as the hypothetical line?

9 A. I was at blocking position 1 at that moment en route from

10 Srebrenica to Observation Post Alpha in a hairpin turn, perhaps 2

11 kilometres, but I would have to check that on the map, from the position.

12 In any case, the road went sharply upward. On the map it looks closer.

13 Q. Yes, but please tell us how far was that from your base in

14 Srebrenica in kilometres?

15 A. In Srebrenica we had the Bravo Company compound, and it would

16 probably be 2, perhaps 3 kilometres - again, I would have to check that

17 on the map - away from it.

18 Q. Thank you. We should take a look at page 3 of your statement.

19 We shall take a look at the last paragraph on page 3 where you refer to

20 the aircraft attack on VRS tanks. You say, and I quote:

21 "The Dutch F-16s, they knocked two Bosnian Serbian tanks out of

22 action. This made it possible for us to return to the compound of the

23 Bravo Company in Srebrenica."

24 Thank you:

25 "At that moment there were dozens of people on the road in

Page 7174

1 Srebrenica. We directed them towards Potocari. Chaos reigned," et

2 cetera.

3 My question is: Bearing in mind what you say here, who actually

4 showed the target to these aircraft, who on the ground actually pointed

5 the targets to the aircraft?

6 A. Forward air controllers did that.

7 Q. Thank you. I did not receive a translation. Thank you. Were

8 the forward air controllers in the vehicle which you placed on the road

9 and which flew a white flag, this armoured personnel carrier that you

10 referred to?

11 A. No. At that moment I had one forward air controller on my crew,

12 but he was difficult to deploy, and from different positions others

13 guided the F-16s to the tank.

14 Q. Thank you. Were -- where were these different positions that

15 from which the aircraft were guided to the Serbian tanks?

16 A. One position was with me, we included this in the net, and two

17 other commands -- commandos did this from a position that at the time was

18 not visible to me. I couldn't point it out on the map.

19 Q. Thank you. Could you please --

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment, please. Judge Mindua has a question.

21 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I apologise to the Defence.

22 Witness, I have a question for you. I would like you to clarify

23 something that I didn't quite understand. On page 32 of today's

24 transcript, line 11, that's where your witness statement is quoted and

25 you are talking about an F-16, about the Dutch -- the Dutch F-16, which

Page 7175

1 destroyed two Serb tanks. Did that F-16 belong to the Dutch Battalion or

2 to UNPROFOR or to NATO? Could you please clarify this distinction and

3 let's look at the command chain in that military structure that was on

4 the ground.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, perhaps a misinterpretation. Judge Mindua

6 was referring to page 30 and not 32.

7 Now, please answer this question, if possible.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The F-16 that was deployed was a

9 NATO F-16. Coincidentally, it was a Dutch F-16. And this makes

10 communicating in Dutch between the pilot and the people on the ground

11 much easier, but the -- it was a NATO F-16 that was deployed. It could

12 have been a different F-16 or a different fighter plane. Ordinarily, we

13 communicate with them in English.

14 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to thank Judge Mindua

17 for clarifying this very significant issue.

18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Could you please tell us whether the communication between the

20 Dutch soldiers who were on their positions and the F-16 aircraft was

21 exclusively in Dutch? Did they communicate in Dutch or in English?

22 Thank you.

23 A. I listened in with the forward air controller at my position, and

24 he started in Dutch -- excuse me, he started in English and subsequently

25 spoke in Dutch with the pilot. There may be audio recordings of that.

Page 7176

1 Q. Thank you. It is true that there is an audio recording. Do you

2 remember the contents of their communications, if you remember, please?

3 Thank you.

4 A. I can't remember that.

5 Q. Thank you. Did NATO get involved as a third party in the

6 conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims when they opened fire on the

7 positions of the VRS? Thank you.

8 A. What I understand is that the concept of the safe area of

9 Srebrenica could not exist without the airforce. We were very poorly

10 armed, could not shoot at anything, and all we could do was to request

11 close air support. That was an essential element of the concept. When

12 we were fired at in the enclave, we asked -- we requested that air

13 support via the line. The battalion did that. It was not done by me on

14 the ground. I was fired at and I reported that. Afterwards, F-16s

15 arrived, and I'll leave it at that. That's what I can state.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether on the 11th of July a massive

17 air-strike or a massive air support was expected? Were there rumors that

18 all targets are -- 1 kilometre around Srebrenica would be destroyed by

19 those air-strikes? Thank you.

20 A. I was promised many, many times that air support would arrive,

21 and I prepared for that. All I saw were the F-16s. There was a rumor

22 that there would be more air support from larger planes, but they were

23 never seen and they never flew.

24 Q. In your statement you said that you had never received the

25 expected air support. Did you have in mind the large-scale air support

Page 7177

1 when you said that?

2 A. I spoke about any type of air support. The only thing that came

3 was at the very last moment two F-16s, and that was far too little and

4 far too late to stop the Serb advance.

5 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us whether you heard that

6 Colonel Karremans had informed both the Muslims and your officers alike

7 that there would be an air support that destroy all targets within an

8 area of 1 square kilometre around Srebrenica? Did you ever hear of any

9 such thing? Thank you.

10 A. Yes. It was said that a gun-ship would arrive that would

11 neutralise armoured targets in the south of the enclave; however, that

12 was never carried out.

13 Q. Thank you. And now tell us this: Those aircrafts that would

14 have arrived on that gun-ship, were they on the strength of UNPROFOR or

15 on the strength of NATO? Thank you.

16 A. When I mentioned a gun-ship, it was explained to me that that was

17 an aeroplane, a gun-ship from which armoured vehicles could be destroyed.

18 Because UNPROFOR units were being fired at, we could expect air support,

19 close air support, or other forms of action from the air. How it was

20 organised above me, UNPROFOR or NATO, I have no idea. What I do know is

21 that we stood there waiting, helplessly, were fired at multiple times

22 waiting for air support that never arrived.

23 Q. Did UNPROFOR have aeroplane carriers on its strength that could

24 undertake a number of sorties and that could destroy an area of 1 square

25 kilometre around Srebrenica?

Page 7178

1 A. At that time I didn't know and I still don't know whether

2 UNPROFOR had its own combat planes. That didn't matter to me. We were

3 promised that if we were fired at on the ground support would be provided

4 from the air.

5 Q. Thank you. When it comes to the engagement of NATO and aeroplane

6 carriers, was that a air support or a large-scale use of NATO airforce?

7 A. All I can say in response to this question is that after repeated

8 reports by us on the ground in blocking position 1, two F-16s appeared on

9 the horizon. That's the only thing that was deployed. So there was no

10 massive deployment of multiple planes, only two.

11 Q. Thank you. We are talking about announcements that you would be

12 supported by an aeroplane carrier, and if that had materialised, if an

13 aeroplane carrier had been engaged, you're a colonel, you certainly know

14 what an aeroplane carrier has on it. So if such a device had, indeed,

15 been deployed, would that constitute an air support or a large-scale

16 attack?

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

18 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I don't quarrel, I think, with the

19 gist of General Tolimir's question, but there may be a translation

20 problem that's complicating matters. I don't know how this term

21 "gun-ship" is getting translated to General Tolimir. I think the witness

22 tried to explain that he was referring to a single aeroplane with the

23 capability of destroying multiple armoured targets. That is my

24 understanding, and I think we are all agreed, that that is how

25 Colonel Egbers defined his use of the term "gun-ship," because in his

Page 7179

1 response to his first use of that term as we saw it, General Tolimir

2 began speaking about what I think he may have perceived to be aircraft

3 carriers which we all know are deployed at sea.

4 Now, if, in fact, General Tolimir is referring to aircraft

5 carriers, we have no problem with him asking those kind of questions. I

6 think the Trial Chamber has already heard testimony from a couple of

7 witnesses and will hear more testimony from other witnesses, such as

8 General Smith, about NATO's capabilities, about the fact that aircraft

9 carriers were available to NATO, among other resources. But I sense that

10 there may be some speaking at cross-purposes presently where

11 General Tolimir is insisting on this idea of aeroplane carriers and

12 insisting that Colonel Egbers has been referring to aeroplane carriers or

13 aircraft carriers. I think the transcript could bear some clarification

14 on that point before we go any further.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Egbers, you could perhaps help everybody by

17 telling us what is your understanding of the word "aircraft carrier" and

18 of the word "gun-ship"?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would be happy to. I never used

20 the word "aircraft carrier." I did use the word "gun-ship." And in

21 1995, I was told that that was an aeroplane, not an F-16, but a large

22 plane from which armoured vehicles, tanks, could be destroyed. So it's a

23 single aeroplane that would fly over the enclave. I am not referring to

24 massive actions and massive planes. And what, in fact, came were two

25 F-16s. I hope that it's sufficiently clear that way.

Page 7180

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you should carry on your

2 examination.

3 My problem with the last question before the intervention of

4 Mr. Thayer was that it is really a hypothetical question, and I am not

5 sure if this witness is in the position to explain what your

6 understanding could be or the understanding of those who are in the

7 position to order such an action by aircraft. But you have received an

8 answer from this witness what happened on the ground from his point of

9 view.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I am not

11 interested in who could have issued that order. I am only interested in

12 who was it who informed UNPROFOR that there would be a large-scale use of

13 a NATO airforce.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Could the witness please answer, who was it who informed them

16 that a large-scale NATO airforce exercise would be carried out?

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would prefer to receive, first, the affirmation

18 by the witness if he got information that there would be a large-scale

19 NATO airforce exercise. Did you, at that time, receive such an

20 information and, if so, from whom?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not receive that at that

22 time. All we did was report that we were being fired at, that there was

23 a tank at a maximum of 2 kilometres distance firing at us, and

24 subsequently two F-16s arrived and contacted our forward air controllers

25 and tried to neutralise that tank.

Page 7181

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, carry on, please.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Egbers, I asked you if you had heard that a large-scale NATO

5 operation was announced for the 11th and that Colonel Karremans told both

6 the Muslims and the UNPROFOR that an area of 1 square kilometre around

7 Srebrenica would be destroyed and that he demanded the withdrawal of

8 certain forces. And did that also apply to UNPROFOR forces? Thank you.

9 A. I did not know that there was a NATO exercise, an exercise of

10 NATO aeroplanes in 1995 in the area of Srebrenica. All I was told was

11 that a large aeroplane might come that could destroy armoured vehicles

12 and tanks. That large aeroplane never arrived. All that came were two

13 F-16s.

14 Q. Thank you, sir. I understood your question and I proceed. If

15 that large plane had, perchance, arrived and destroyed all those targets

16 around Srebrenica, would that be -- would that have been a large-scale

17 NATO operation or would that have been close air support for the forces

18 that had come under threat? Thank you.

19 A. You're asking me to give an answer about a situation that never

20 took place. I don't even know whether we have such a plane in the air.

21 All I obtained was close air support, and you need to ask such questions

22 at your own level, to generals, who do indeed take those actual

23 decisions. I was standing on the ground, I was fired at and reported

24 that to my captain.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Egbers. You were on the ground. Did you receive

Page 7182

1 instruction to leave such an area that would be a designated target

2 because such instruction was provided to the Muslims, and Captain Egbers

3 [as interpreted] said that the ship returned, and so on and so forth. I

4 could quote him if you wish. I am just asking if you received an order

5 to withdraw from the area that was designated as the target of an attack

6 and did the Muslims also withdraw from that area? Thank you.

7 A. I was only at blocking position 1. I was at the market in the

8 city of Srebrenica, and I was never south of that hypothetical line. I

9 was on that line, so I was never removed from an area south of Bravo 1.

10 So I cannot give you an answer that is any different from this one. I

11 don't know - because you're suggesting that - I don't know that Muslims

12 had to withdraw from a certain area. I don't know whether that happened.

13 You would have to ask Colonel Karremans.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Egbers. We will ask him when he comes to testify.

15 But you should know this. Did you know on the 10th that the Muslims had

16 left and had gone through the forest? Thank you.

17 A. I was not in contact with the Bosnian Muslims in the enclave at

18 that time. I was on the market in the city and later in blocking

19 position 1.

20 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at page 3, in the statement

21 that is on your screen now, line 14 which is the last line in the Serbian

22 translation where it says -- or, rather, you say, and I am quoting your

23 words:

24 "Many people had already been -- had already fled through the

25 forest in the direction of Tuzla."

Page 7183

1 That will be on the next page in English. Thank you, Aleksandar.

2 You can see the first paragraph in English where it says "of Tuzla."

3 That's the activity which took place on the 10th, an activity that you

4 speak about. In the next paragraph, you already speak about the 11th.

5 I repeat my question: Did you learn from somebody, did you hear

6 from somebody on the 10th that many people had already fled through the

7 forest, through the woods, in the direction of Tuzla? Thank you.

8 A. This statement was drafted in October 1995, sometime after I had

9 returned from the enclave. Then additional information was available

10 that is also set forth in writing, but at that moment when I was there I

11 did not know that large groups of men were gathering in the north-west of

12 the enclave.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

14 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President. And I would note for the

15 record, and I think we can save a little bit of time, or at least I hope

16 we can, that the portion of the witness statement from which

17 General Tolimir just quoted is part of the witness statement that deals

18 with events that occurred on 11 July. And there, again, is no dispute

19 among any of the parties that the close air support about which

20 Colonel Egbers has been testifying at some length now occurred on

21 11 July. That is not nor can it reasonably be placed in dispute. It is

22 a matter of historical record and I do not think that the Defence is

23 disputing that part of the Prosecution's case.

24 And if we look at the statement, the events that are described in

25 the paragraph from which General Tolimir just quoted all concern events

Page 7184

1 on 11 July: The F-16s arriving, the F-16s taking out the VRS tanks, the

2 witness returning to Potocari, the column of civilians fleeing from --

3 pardon me, from Srebrenica to Potocari, that is all happening on the 11th

4 of July and there is no dispute between the parties among that.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Presiding Judge. We

7 shall now ask the witness a very simple question without any suggestions.

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Does he know when the Dutch F-16 actually opened fire on the two

10 tanks? Was that on the 10th or on the 11th of July? I shall repeat my

11 question: When did the Dutch F-16 fire at the two tanks of the VRS, was

12 it on the 10th or on the 11th? Thank you.

13 A. It was on the 11th.

14 Q. Thank you. Did you state in your statement that it was on the

15 10th as you said and that you wrote it immediately after the event?

16 A. If you have such a horrible experience involving many, many

17 emotions, it's difficult to pin-point it on a time chart. I don't have

18 any notes as to when that happened. Later on in an interrogation you

19 start reconstructing it for yourself when exactly -- what happened. And

20 let me tell you --

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please continue.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me tell you that the refugees

23 gathered, the women, children, old men, and young boys at the

24 Bravo Company, the F-16s arrived, carried out their attack. That's why I

25 was able to proceed to the Bravo Company, together with thousands of men,

Page 7185

1 women, and children, to proceed from Srebrenica to Potocari to receive

2 the refugees there. That happened in succession and I've stated about

3 that before.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Page 3 of the statement in Serbian,

7 paragraph 4, where the witness says, and I quote --

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please give us the reference -- please give us

9 the reference on the English page as well, for the sake of the witness.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's paragraph 4 in Serbian and

13 paragraph 5 in the English version, on the previous page relative to the

14 one that we now have on the screen. Because here he follows a

15 chronology. Thank you. It is the third paragraph from the top where it

16 is stated the 10th of July, 1995, and it also says the next day. There

17 the witness describes events which took place on the 10th of July, and he

18 does so until all the way into the next page up to the events which

19 transpired on the 11th of July.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. My question is: Is this statement incorrect relative to the

22 events that you are talking about here or is there a possibility that it

23 might have been otherwise? Thank you.

24 A. As I said, and I stand by that, perhaps the date is indicated

25 incorrectly here but the attack of the F-16s was on the date that we

Page 7186

1 proceeded from Srebrenica to Potocari. Several times before that we were

2 promised air support and that never arrived. So are you concerned about

3 the date or the events?

4 Q. Thank you. Let us move on to the next page where events were

5 described which took place on the 11th and 12th. Thank you. Can you see

6 where it is stated:

7 "On Tuesday 11 July 1995 ..."

8 It is the second paragraph in English, and it is also the second

9 paragraph on page 4 in the Serbian version.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What is your question, Mr. Tolimir?

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. My question is -- or was whether the events of the 11th have been

13 faithfully recorded or reflected in the witness's statement or not? In

14 which case my question would be superfluous. My question is: Did you,

15 on the 11th, on Tuesday the 11th of July, help refugees to the base?

16 A. On 11 July, 1995, we proceeded from Srebrenica with thousands of

17 men and women to Potocari and they were received at the DutchBat

18 headquarters. Is that your question?

19 Q. My question is: On the 11th of July, did you help the refugees

20 at the base and at what time were you engaged on that task?

21 A. What I remember is that thousands of people were in Srebrenica

22 were unable to move one way or another. They were fired at in the south.

23 Our entire column walked 5 kilometres to the north. In the afternoon it

24 was about 35 degrees centigrade. I saw old men pushing forward their old

25 wives in a wheelbarrow, I was given a baby by a mother asking if I would

Page 7187

1 take care of the baby. I saw total panic and everybody was climbing over

2 everything. I was given the sick and the injured from the hospital, and

3 together we proceeded from Srebrenica to Potocari. And I drove near the

4 front of that column, and I dropped off all the sick and injured that

5 afternoon, at the hospital that afternoon. Does that answer your

6 question?

7 Q. Thank you. In your statement, you say that on the 10th in the

8 evening around 1700 hours you dropped off the wounded to the first aid

9 station at the base in Potocari. Is this statement of yours incorrect in

10 terms of the date?

11 A. All this happened on the 11th, and it does, indeed, appear

12 incorrectly in the statement and that's unfortunate. But the events that

13 I described obviously did take place. The attack by the F-16s and the

14 flight of the women and children and older men from Srebrenica to

15 Potocari took place.

16 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether on Wednesday, the 12th of

17 July, 1995, you received an order to help evacuate the refugees as you

18 state on page 4, paragraph 3, line 1? You can also see it on the screen

19 where it is dated Wednesday, the 12th of July. Thank you.

20 A. It's true that I escorted the very first convoy of refugees.

21 Q. Thank you. That's not what I asked. I asked whether it was on

22 the 12th that you escorted refugees and whether it was a Wednesday.

23 A. The day after the attack on the enclave we escorted the first

24 columns with buses. The first column with buses I escorted that, whether

25 you are asking what time it was on Wednesday or was it on the 12th, do

Page 7188

1 you have a substantive question about how that happened or are you trying

2 to carry over the aforementioned error in the time-line?

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Egbers, do you recall the date when this

4 occurred?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I assume that it was Wednesday the

6 12th, but I could check this in previous and different testimonies if

7 the -- if General Tolimir wants me to.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

9 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, the reason I rose a moment was, and

10 hopefully again we can save a little bit of time. The witness testified

11 very clearly about all of this subject matter and the dates in his prior

12 testimony in the Popovic case at transcript page 2716 to 2719. All the

13 events that are contained in this paragraph that was unfortunately not

14 properly dated, all the events that are described in the subsequent

15 paragraph, and all the events that are described in this paragraph that

16 General Tolimir is currently questioning him on. It is all described in

17 his prior testimony, transcript page 2716 to 2719.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Egbers, it is really of no consequence to me on what date it

21 was or whether it was a mistake or not. What matters to me is to

22 actually correlate the events that you are talking about with the

23 participants in those events. As we cannot speak about exact dates, I

24 will ask you this: You say here that on the 12th, as you say, you follow

25 the route which was taken by the refugees, the road taken by them, you

Page 7189

1 follow the buses, that one bus broke down, and that a Serb officer helped

2 you gets the refugees off this bus that had broken down and into a bus in

3 good repair.

4 And then you go on to say that you were stopped, you were

5 intercepted in the evening, that you had to spend the night at a school

6 where there was a unit of the Army of Republika Srpska, that Muslims

7 actually broke through the woods and that you saw a number of captured

8 Muslims and that they opened fire at the school in which you spent the

9 night.

10 Did all these events that you describe happen on -- in the night

11 between the 12th and the 13th? Did all these events happen that you

12 describe in your statement on page 4 as having happened on the 12th?

13 A. The very -- I escorted the very first transport of refugees. I

14 drove via Bratunac to Kladanj, and every hundred metres I tried to

15 maintain contact with UNPROFOR to report where we were going. I stated

16 earlier about unloading the buses, and I've stated earlier that that

17 evening I drove back to Srebrenica again.

18 The next day I received instructions to escort another transport

19 of refugees. I've told you that men were separated from women, that I

20 was in the house with the men, that I told the men that they would be

21 going to a Muslim area as well, and, later on, with that transport 4 once

22 again, via Bratunac, I drove to Kladanj again. Along my return, I was

23 stopped at Nova Kasaba.

24 Have I given you a better chronological account of what happened?

25 Q. Thank you. In order for us to establish what happened on the

Page 7190

1 12th and what on the 13th, I will read page 4, paragraph 6, that's lines

2 1 to 3 in Serbian and in English it is page 5, the first paragraph. In

3 fact, it is the last paragraph that we now see in English. I apologise.

4 Actually, now it is the first one.

5 "There were more buses near Kladanj. Refugees got out at the

6 stop, three buses at a time. From this point they were allowed to walk

7 to freedom. I saw some ten Bosnian Serbs at the stop, but I did not see

8 them treat anybody badly."

9 Then it goes on to say:

10 "I stayed at Kladanj for an hour or so, then I went back with

11 Lutke and another vehicle followed. I radioed in saying that there the

12 refugees were still sitting in the football field in Nova Kasaba. The

13 situation along the road remained unchanged."

14 Tell me, does this refer to the first day of evacuation, the 12th

15 of July, and was that the end of July, the 12th?

16 A. That was on the first day of the evacuation at the end of the

17 day.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. On page 5, the first paragraph in line 1, that is in the Serbian,

21 you say that:

22 "... on Thursday, the 13th of July, 1995, I had to report to

23 Captain Melchers at 0600."

24 My question is: Was that the beginning of the 13th of July, in

25 terms of your activities for that day?

Page 7191

1 A. Yes, that was indeed on the second day I was escorting convoys,

2 and I was expected to report to Captain Melchers at 6.00.

3 Q. Thank you. Please tell us who this captain was and was he a

4 member of UNPROFOR?

5 A. That was indeed a Dutch UNPROFOR captain.

6 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 1 you described how you went to the

7 house where men were separated from the women to check out the situation,

8 and so on and so forth. We shall now move on to paragraph 3, on page 5,

9 to look at lines 10 from 14 which I shall quote. In fact, just the

10 penultimate and the ultimate lines, 13 and 14. You say that you saw a

11 black Volkswagon and a man in black:

12 "And I asked him whether he could stop an empty bus for me so

13 that we could actually take the refugees in them and he did so, and I

14 took that bus to Kladanj."

15 My question is: Was that the last bus that you dispatched to

16 Kladanj on that 13th of July or were there any others or any other

17 activities following that?

18 A. On the second day I escorted convoys, I did not see a black but a

19 red Volkswagon with a colonel on board who was able to help me arrange a

20 different bus to replace a bus that broke down. Presumably, the bus had

21 broken down and something else had to be arranged for those people. I

22 drove behind that bus up to Kladanj. Does that answer your question

23 sufficiently?

24 Q. Thank you for your answer. Was this the last day that you

25 escorted refugees or sent the refugees to Kladanj, since later refer to

Page 7192

1 being stopped together with Captain Lutke, if I am right?

2 A. On the return journey from Kladanj I was stopped at Nova Kasaba

3 by a roadblock. A gun was pointed at me, and I had to surrender my

4 vehicle. And you mentioned Captain Lutke but it was Sergeant Lutke.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, on page 47, line 22 and 23, you were

6 recorded to have said:

7 "You say that you saw a black Volkswagon and a man in black."

8 The witness answered that he didn't refer to a black but to a red

9 Volkswagon, and just for the sake of the record I would like to note in

10 the document on the screen we can see there, and I quote:

11 "Shortly thereafter, a red Volkswagon wagon stopped. A man

12 dressed entirely in a black uniform got out."

13 Just to clarify the situation about the colours.

14 Please carry on.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. My next question: On the 12th and the 13th, these last two days

18 when you escorted this column to Kladanj, did you take to Kladanj all the

19 people that you had actually taken in Srebrenica?

20 A. I spoke with Major Franken about the escorts for the buses. He

21 wanted to have an UNPROFOR soldier on each bus. He told me that that was

22 prohibited by the Bosnian Serbs. The very first convoy of buses was

23 escorted by UNPROFOR from the front and the rear, that was allowed, but

24 later on only by a vehicle that would drive behind the buses.

25 Transport 3, which transported the men from the white house, according to

Page 7193

1 Lieutenant Versteeg, did not arrive in Kladanj. The two transports of

2 women and children I escorted were, as far as I saw, they did arrive in

3 Kladanj. Later, when I was detained in Nova Kasaba in the school, all

4 buses rode without escorts, and I can't say anything about them.

5 Q. Thank you. I asked you about these first two days, whether all

6 the buses transported all the people and came back up to the point when

7 you were stopped. Did the buses return to Srebrenica in order to

8 continue with the evacuation on the next day as well, the third day? And

9 I'm not mentioning any dates because of the chronology which is lacking

10 in your statement. Thank you.

11 A. Well, I can give you a brief answer. On the two days that I

12 performed these escorting duties, the first day, the very first

13 transport, something happened to one of the buses. One of those buses

14 was broken down by the side of the road. I talked about that. When a

15 replacement bus arrived, I drove behind that bus to Kladanj. All other

16 buses were there and the people alighted, and then I drove back in my

17 vehicle along the football field in Nova Kasaba back to the compound in

18 Srebrenica.

19 The next day the transport with men was number 3. They were not

20 escorted. I did the fourth transport. These buses arrived in Kladanj.

21 I drove back in the direction of Potocari but was stopped at the school

22 of Nova Kasaba.

23 Does this answer your question sufficiently?

24 Q. Thank you, thank you. Is there a written report on behalf of

25 UNPROFOR soldiers who escorted convoys from Srebrenica to Kladanj? Thank

Page 7194

1 you.

2 A. Immediately upon my return from the school of Nova Kasaba where I

3 spent the night with my 12 colleagues, I compiled an internal report and

4 I presented that to the head of the section 2/3 as entered here

5 yesterday. There were no instructions regarding escorting the buses.

6 The situation was as follows: We saw all those people standing and

7 waiting in the burning Sunday, and all of a sudden 12 buses showed up

8 from Zvornik and other places, and we were expected to follow them. I

9 didn't even know where those buses were headed. I couldn't tell those

10 people what was going to happen with them and where they would be

11 brought, so there were no written instructions.

12 Q. Thank you. Did those people know where they were going? They

13 knew the area, they were familiar with the communications, did they know

14 where they were going? Did they ask you where they were going?

15 A. Of course they wanted to know, and they asked me, but I didn't

16 know. Only the bus drivers knew where they were going. Not until the

17 second day could I tell them that I had been near Vlasenica.

18 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us whether those people who

19 attended the meeting on the 12th at the Fontana Hotel, did they make

20 arrangements as to where those people would be taken? Did they know

21 where they would be taken, and did they inform you about that?

22 A. I don't know. All I know is that I didn't know.

23 Q. Those who transported the people, were they supposed to tell

24 every UNPROFOR soldier what was going on, or were they only supposed to

25 convey that to Karremans and depend on him to inform his soldiers what to

Page 7195

1 do? Thank you.

2 A. I asked the captain that you just mentioned. He was instructed

3 to assign the transport on the first day, and he told me, that's

4 Captain Melchers, he told me that he didn't know where the transports

5 were headed. I -- in any case, I had to bring enough food, drink, and

6 sleeping bags along.

7 Q. Thank you. So you didn't know what had been agreed by the

8 representatives of the Muslim community and the representatives of the

9 VRS about that evacuation? Please answer by just saying yes or no.

10 Thank you.

11 A. I can't say yes or no to that because I don't know whether -- I

12 don't know whether those agreements were reached, all I can say is that I

13 didn't know that at the time.

14 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you answered Mr. Thayer's question and you

15 spoke about a woman who had died on one of the buses and you spoke about

16 the others leaving the bus and walking through the forest. Bearing in

17 mind what had happened, was that a forcible death or was the death of

18 that woman the result of the temperatures, the high temperatures in the

19 bus and the heat on the bus?

20 A. I would have to guess what the cause of death was, and I am not

21 in a position to do that. All I can say is what I observed, and I

22 described to you yesterday what the conditions were and what the

23 temperature was.

24 Q. Thank you. Also you told us yesterday that the others had been

25 chased out of the bus and that they had been forced to walk through the

Page 7196

1 woods. What can you tell us about that?

2 A. I didn't say that others were chased out of the bus. In fact, it

3 was very orderly. The buses were all stationary. The first three buses

4 drove up, the doors opened, and people were allowed to walk down a

5 certain road. Once those buses were empty the next ones arrived and the

6 ones after them. They didn't know exactly where they were walking, and

7 later on it turned out that they were walking to the Muslim area of

8 Bosnia.

9 Q. Thank you. Thank you for the explanation. Thank you for

10 clarifying the situation for us. And now could you answer another

11 question.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce

13 Exhibit P1143. Thank you.

14 Q. The document describes a situation on the 13th of July, Thursday,

15 as you say, in Nova Kasaba. Some of the people were loaded on the busses

16 and left in the direction of Tuzla. I am going to read from the

17 document.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We need --

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's page 18 in English and 27 in

20 Serbian. The paragraph number is 287. Thank you.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. We will see the paragraph shortly. The paragraph is 287. Now we

23 see it on the screen. You say this:

24 "No."

25 And I quote, I quote what you said:

Page 7197

1 "No. But one thing about Nova Kasaba is mentioned. I have it

2 here before me. It says, 'Thursday, 13 July, at least one of the convoys

3 was stopped at the football field in the surroundings of Nova Kasaba.

4 The Army of Bosnian Serbs,'" as you call it, "'set up a place there where

5 able-bodied men were gathered. A number of men were allowed to get on

6 the buses and they were transferred to Kladanj.'"

7 "Yes."

8 And now I'm reading from paragraph 288:

9 "Yes. That was another convoy. I was not with it. But I did

10 indeed hear that -- the story that some men were allowed to get on the

11 buses. Maybe they were friends or acquaintances or something like that."

12 My question is this: In these two paragraphs, 287 and 288, you

13 speak about a certain number of people who had gathered in Nova Kasaba

14 who were allowed to board the buses and leave for Tuzla. Do you have any

15 more information about the stories that you had heard? Can you tell us

16 how many people boarded the buses, and so on and so forth? Thank you.

17 A. As you see, the question under paragraph 287 appears in italics.

18 This was information from the investigator of the Dutch Institute for War

19 Documentation. He probably obtained that information elsewhere and was

20 asking whether I can tell him anything about that. In 1999 when this

21 report was drafted, all I could say was that I had heard about it at the

22 time but that I was not present there. All I can say is that that didn't

23 happen on my transports. I can't tell you anything more about that.

24 What I say, starting with maybe, is, of course, an interpretation of an

25 interview question because you start thinking about what could possibly

Page 7198

1 be the reason. In retrospect, that's an awkward addition. It would have

2 been better for me to say that I didn't personally experience that, only

3 heard about it.

4 Q. Thank you. In order to complete this information, bearing in

5 mind what the Dutch institute asked you, let's look at paragraph 292

6 where you say:

7 "No. Yes. Precisely so. When we stopped by the burning bus,

8 you could see also that the Muslims and the Serbs who had lived together

9 for a number of years before that and knew each other and were still on

10 friendly terms. They hugged each other. I can very well imagine. It

11 was a state of chaos. And I can very well imagine somebody stopping

12 buses and crying, 'These Muslims have to stay alive.' And that's quite

13 possible."

14 And now let me quote the other paragraphs, but before that did I

15 quote the Dutch investigator's words correctly? Did I quote their

16 question correctly? Thank you.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What I take from this document is that was the

18 answer of the witness and not the question by the Dutch representative.

19 Mr. Thayer.

20 MR. THAYER: Yes, precisely, Mr. President. And just to

21 follow-up on Colonel Egbers's previous answer, he tried it himself and

22 said that perhaps his answer was a little clumsy. But if General Tolimir

23 is going to be quoting from this document then I think the record should

24 reflect that, in fact, the following question at 289, paragraph 289, is:

25 "Yes."

Page 7199

2 And Colonel Egbers responds:

3 "But I wouldn't know who did that."

4 Which I think is precisely what Colonel Egbers was trying to

5 communicate in his last answer.

6 And then furthermore, in fact, General Tolimir did not read the

7 question at paragraph 291 into the record. He simply quoted

8 Colonel Egbers's answer. And the question is, from the NIOD interviewer:

9 "I don't know who reported that either, but I found that really

10 remarkable."

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. And now your next question,

12 Mr. Tolimir.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Since

14 I've been asked to read everything, let me read paragraph 296, the last

15 one on page 18.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. It says here:

18 "Yes, but in the beginning there was no selection. In the

19 beginning they let everybody in. Only later did they start to select

20 people. On the second day."

21 My question is this --

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer. Go ahead.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

24 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President. Honestly, this is

25 atrocious. General Tolimir well knows that the next question, if we turn

Page 7200

1 the next page in English, paragraph 297, is:

2 "It really only started on the second day."

3 And the witness's answer is:

4 "Yes, as far as I know. Don't hold me to that. I wasn't there."

5 And I just point that out for the record to save a little bit of

6 time in potential redirect because this is nonsense and it's misleading

7 cross-examination. General Tolimir just claimed that he was being forced

8 to read all of the paragraphs, and we will require him to place these

9 paragraphs in the fair and accurate context in which they should be

10 placed by an Officer of the Court, in this case, a self-represented

11 accused.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think you shall take that into consideration,

13 but we have our second break now and we will resume at quarter past 6.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 5.48 p.m.

15 [The witness stands down]

16 [The witness takes the stand]

17 --- On resuming at 6.18 p.m.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Go ahead, please.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. On page 2906, lines 15 to 20 from Popovic case, it says and I

22 quote:

23 "Q. Were you taken hostage by the Muslims while you were in

24 the enclave?"

25 Your answer to that was this, and I quote:

Page 7201

1 "I was in the Bandera Triangle when we entered the enclave in

2 January 1995."

3 I'll skip a few questions because they are illegible, and now it

4 says, and I quote, the question by the Defence:

5 "Is it fair to say that the person who took you hostage was under

6 the command of a person called Zulfo?"

7 And your answer was this:

8 "That's correct. That's what I was told.

9 "Q. Muslim forces under Zulfo's command, were they responsible

10 for the area between observation posts Alpha and Charlie?"

11 Your answer was this:

12 "That was something that we thought, that Zulfo was one who was

13 superior to those who were he in the enclave."

14 My question, based on what I have just quoted, is this, and the

15 question is to you, sir -- I have just been informed that something was

16 mis-recorded:

17 "You said that's what I was told, that Zulfo was in charge of the

18 men who were in that part of the enclave."

19 I apologise to the interpreters for speeding up. I believe that

20 that was the cause of the error.

21 My question to you, sir, is this: Zulfo, who is referred to in

22 here in this transcript, is that Zulfo Tursunovic? Thank you.

23 A. In reading out your -- reading out the statement, there is

24 another small error. In -- I hear that in July 1995 I was in the

25 Bandera Triangle, but now once again were you talking about a time at the

Page 7202

1 start of the enclave. Yesterday, at the request of the OTP I responded

2 that upon entering, as a new Dutch battalion, we faced advancing Serbs.

3 We are talking about the period January and February 1995 and not during

4 the fall of the enclave.

5 I was told that in that period, if that's what you mean, somebody

6 named Zulfo was responsible for Muslim operations in that

7 Bandera Triangle. I don't know his surname.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I take it that you quoted from the

9 Popovic transcript, that was P1142. We have another document on the

10 screen still and this is not the right one. I just wanted to make that

11 clear for the record.

12 Mr. Thayer.

13 MR. THAYER: And just so the record is completely clear on this

14 point. At page 2906, line 12, the witness's answer was, in fact:

15 "I was at the Bandera Triangle in the west of the enclave as we

16 entered the enclave in January 1995."

17 That was the witness's answer in the Popovic case.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to thank everybody for

19 supplementing. I would not waste anymore time.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. My next question is this: Did the OTP ask you to recognise this

22 man, Zulfo, who is referred to herein? Did they ask you to recognise him

23 in a photo? Thank you.

24 A. No, I did not meet him.

25 Q. Thank you. Why were you taken as hostage in January 1995 in the

Page 7203

1 Bandera Triangle? Thank you.

2 A. As I said yesterday, we were denied access to that triangle on

3 the argument that we were not acting as UNPROFOR against the Serbs or

4 Bosnian Serbs, that with each new battalion commander took away a section

5 of the enclave, according the view of the Muslims.

6 In January 1995 in the surroundings west of the enclave, known as

7 the Bandera Triangle, that was said to be the case. There the Serbs were

8 said to have advanced in the direction of the enclave without any action

9 by UNPROFOR. When we entered that triangle nonetheless, in our vehicles,

10 the roads were blocked by the Muslims.

11 Does that answer your question sufficiently?

12 Q. Thank you. Yes, you've answered my question. We know that

13 UNPROFOR's movements were restricted in the Bandera Triangle. Did

14 UNPROFOR react to that? Did they announce that there would be

15 air-strikes because of that? Did they ever say that to the Muslims?

16 A. At the time we were not fired at, the roads were blocked and the

17 rank of the battalion of Major Franken led this operation to enter that

18 area, nonetheless, with UNPROFOR troops. At that level, negotiations

19 were conducted with representatives of the Bosnian Muslims who lived in

20 the enclave, and those negotiations led to restoring freedom of movement

21 for the Dutch groups.

22 Q. Thank you. Do you know if UNPROFOR informed Serbs about the

23 restriction on their movements in the so-called Bandera Triangle?

24 A. I was told later that the observers were in contact with the

25 Bosnian Serbs and spoke about this in Bratunac, but at the time I didn't

Page 7204

1 know that.

2 Q. Thank you. Did UNPROFOR ever try to secure the freedom of

3 movement in the zone demilitarised according to the agreement with the

4 help of one of the sides that were guarantors to that agreement, and that

5 was the Serbian side? Thank you.

6 A. I don't know whether that happened. All I know is that there

7 were UN observers and they spoke with both the Muslims and the Bosnian

8 Serbs.

9 Q. In the Popovic case on page 2907, lines 14 through 17, you speak

10 about Zulfo Tursunovic, the organisation that he had established in the

11 Bandera Triangle area, and about him as a person, that everybody was

12 afraid of.

13 My question is this: Did you see Zulfo Tursunovic after the

14 events in the Bandera Triangle? Did you see him in Srebrenica?

15 A. I read what you are referring to.

16 Q. Thank you. Did you ever see Zulfo later, either in Srebrenica or

17 while discharging your tasks?

18 A. I'd like to get back to the surname that you use in line 16,

19 Tursunovic, you make it appear as if I mention that name in the Popovic

20 case. Well, I just explained that I don't know that surname. And as I

21 re-read lines 14 through 17, the surname doesn't appear there. But let

22 me tell you which stories were being told about Zulfo. At the time we

23 heard that he was said to be a criminal. He may have served time in

24 prison. Those were the stories we heard, a criminal. I did not meet

25 him.

Page 7205

1 Are we talking about the same Zulfo?

2 Q. Thank you. We are talking about the same Zulfo. I refer to the

3 surname for the transcript. Was he in prison whilst -- while UNPROFOR

4 was -- [B/C/S spoken on English channel] Zulfo?

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.

6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I apologise. Obviously

7 some of the interpreters have not switched off their microphones in some

8 of the booths so that we have some strange input in our earphones.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Was Zulfo, on account of his criminal activities, in prison

12 before the war or during the war?

13 A. All I can tell you is that there was a rumor, and I don't know

14 whether it was true, but rumor had it that he was said to have served

15 time in prison before the war. During his stay in the enclave, there was

16 no prison.

17 Q. Thank you. Will you please tell us whether the UNPROFOR command

18 demanded from the Muslim political leadership for the military commanders

19 who were organising the army in the enclave to leave the enclave as a

20 demilitarised zone?

21 A. Could you please reformulate this question more clearly so that I

22 know exactly what you mean, because I have read this twice now and I

23 don't understand exactly what you want from me.

24 Q. Thank you. Did the UNPROFOR command ask the military Muslim -- I

25 mean the political leadership of the Muslims in Sarajevo and Srebrenica

Page 7206

1 that any of the military commanders leave the enclave on account of

2 activities which were in contravention of the agreement?

3 A. I don't know. You would need to ask the UNPROFOR generals who

4 might have spoken with you about this subject.

5 Q. Thank you. According to the agreement were not all military

6 activities prohibited in the Srebrenica enclave, was that not the case?

7 A. All I can tell you is what I saw in the enclave. I did not

8 observe any military activities except that the weapons were allowed to

9 be maintained in the weapon collection point. I don't know -- I don't

10 understand exactly which activities you mean that would not be prohibited

11 in the enclave. Could you perhaps clarify that?

12 Q. Thank you. Did you meet with military representatives in the

13 enclave or did other officers of the UNPROFOR meet with them or liaison

14 officers?

15 A. I know that Naser Oric was in the enclave. He called himself a

16 commander. Ramiz was there. He held a military rank as well. And

17 locally in the area of Observation Post Alpha, I was in contact with a

18 local authority, somebody who spoke on behalf of the people. But I was

19 not in contact with other superior military representatives or liaison

20 officers.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have called up in

23 e-court D66. Until it is brought up on the screen, I should say that it

24 is a document which Naser Oric signed as his report which he dispatched

25 to Tuzla and the chief of the General staff to Enver Hadzihasanovic, a

Page 7207

1 brigade general. We now see it on the screen in the Serbian. I believe

2 it is there now in the English as well, yes it is. I shall now quote a

3 portion of this report which was sent on the 28th of January, 1995, to

4 the addressees indicated in Kakanj and Tuzla.

5 Q. I quote:

6 "Due to the situations in the area of Podgaj village on 9 January

7 1995 of which you were informed in a timely manner, the command of the

8 8th Operations Group has restricted the movement of the -- of UNPROFOR

9 forces in the wider region of Suceska and Podgaj.

10 "At about 1100 hours today, the commander of the Dutch Battalion

11 in Srebrenica ordered his patrols to enter the movement restriction area.

12 In co-ordination with the commander of the 8th Operations Group,

13 respecting the agreement reached with the UNPROFOR liaison officer, after

14 the warning was issued not to move in the aforementioned area, the

15 commander of the 281st Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade blocked all UNPROFOR

16 patrols and is still keeping them blocked. It was requested from the

17 Dutch Battalion commander that this area be immediately visit by the

18 UNPROFOR commander for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

19 representatives of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 2nd Corps command all with a view to

21 finding a peaceful solution to the situation which has arisen in the

22 Podgaj village sector and the General area of Suceska, i.e., the area of

23 responsibility of the 281st Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade.

24 "Please give us immediately instructions for further steps to be

25 taken regarding UNPROFOR.

Page 7208

1 "Commander Brigadier Naser Oric."

2 My question is: It is obvious from this document that UNPROFOR

3 had been issued a warning. It had been prohibited movement in the area

4 of Bandera Triangle. My question is whether Enver or Evert Rave, who is

5 referred to in this document, was the liaison officer at the time?

6 A. Your question is, because I have read this document together with

7 you, you're asking whether there is a liaison. Can I find the same name

8 in the document that you just mentioned?

9 Q. Thank you. That is not what I asked. But thank you for

10 commenting on it. Was, at that time, Mr. Evert Rave the liaison officer?

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think the name should be Evert Rave.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think you mean -- the name Rave

13 rings a bell. That's a colleague from UNPROFOR in the lower ranks and

14 upper.

15 THE INTERPRETER: "Wachtmeester," interpreter apologies, checking

16 translation of "wachtmeester."

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's a sergeant-major. Whether

18 he was the one who remained in contact with Naser Oric, I don't think so.

19 I think it would have been Karremans's responsibility to maintain that

20 contact, but all I can tell you is that I was there at that point and was

21 unable to proceed. I've never seen that document before.

22 Q. Thank you. The document proposes that the commander of UNPROFOR

23 for Bosnia and a representative of the General Staff; namely, a

24 representative of the Army of the BH and the commander of the 2nd Corps

25 should meet in order to bring about an early resolution to the situation,

Page 7209

1 to the problem. Are you aware -- do you know that they indeed did meet

2 in order to deal with the situation?

3 A. At any rate, not in the enclave.

4 Q. From this document of Naser Oric that's sent to Tuzla and the

5 General Staff, is it obvious that the Muslim army in Srebrenica was --

6 maintained an organised link with representatives of the Army of Bosnia

7 and Herzegovina and the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina?

9 A. Is that question directed at me or is that for the Judge?

10 Q. Thank you. I have no right to ask the Judges. I put this

11 question to you.

12 A. Then I would have to interpret this document and, as I read this,

13 it appears that there is a link between Naser Oric, the sender of this

14 letter, and the General Staff to whom the letter is addressed. I can't

15 say anything else about it. That was way above my level in 1995.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether the Serbs knew or had been

17 informed that the Muslims were prohibiting your movement in the

18 Bandera Triangle area?

19 A. As I told you earlier, I heard that our observers in Bratunac

20 spoke about this with the Bosnian Serbs. I even believe I remember that

21 the Bosnian Serbs offered their assistance, but I don't remember that

22 very clearly.

23 Q. Thank you. Was this restriction of movement, in a zone such as

24 the Bandera Triangle was, was it -- sorry, I made a mistake. Was the

25 prohibition on UNPROFOR's movement in a sector which was called the

Page 7210

1 Bandera Triangle, was it contrary to the provisions of the

2 demilitarisation agreement?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Did the Muslims conduct any illegal activities in the

5 Bandera Triangle that they did he not want UNPROFOR to be aware of, and,

6 if so, and if you know that that was the case, can you tell us what it

7 was?

8 A. There were no indications to that effect.

9 Q. Thank you. Did there exist a possibility that the Muslims did

10 conduct any illegal prohibited activities there which representatives of

11 UNPROFOR and UNPROFOR patrols were to have sanctioned?

12 A. The activities and shooting incidents were in the area of

13 Observation Post Alpha, north of the triangle. We had patrols in the

14 area and looked around the area with binoculars, but we had no reason to

15 assume that other activities, illegal activities as you describe them,

16 were taking place. Otherwise, I assume that the Bosnian Serbs would have

17 notified our observers in Bratunac so that we would have been able to

18 take action.

19 Q. Thank you. You have frequently referred to observers in your

20 answers. Did you mean UN observers in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina

21 or UNPROFOR observers who were part of the Dutch battalion? Thank you.

22 A. Our people who were regularly outside the enclave were the UN

23 observers. We also had people from other countries, African nations

24 carrying out these duties. I don't remember their names clearly, but I

25 am sure they are in the file. They would leave the enclave and were in

Page 7211

1 contact with both the Bosnian Serbs and with the Muslims in the enclave.

2 You'll find them as UNMOs, United Nations Military Observers.

3 Q. Thank you. Please tell me whether at any time after that

4 incident you had a right to move around the -- or within the

5 Bandera Triangle?

6 A. I wasn't there after that and I don't know for certain whether

7 other UNPROFOR soldiers were there later on, but I assume that Zulfo, in

8 his section, did not allow the UNPROFOR patrols. I would have to check

9 that in previous statements, but if you are asking me I was -- I did not

10 go back there.

11 Q. Thank you. Were you able to disarm armed Muslims within

12 so-called Zulfo's zone or brigade when you observed such -- any armed

13 Muslims?

14 A. That was not there anymore because it was not in my company's

15 sector. It was Captain Groen's area. I was responsible with my company

16 for the northern part of the enclave, but when you can't get there you

17 can't confiscate arms either, if that's the answer you want.

18 Q. Thank you. That is the answer which I wanted. Colonel Franken

19 certainly knew the answer to what I am interested in. In 1995 he was

20 Karremans deputy. And in June 2010, on page 338 --

21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter cannot follow the speaker. He

22 should slow down, please, please.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you are much too fast again. The

24 interpreters can't follow you.

25 What is your question?

Page 7212

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. My question was: Were you allowed to disarm Muslims when you

4 found yourselves outside that zone, in any area outside Zulfo's zone?

5 A. We were entitled to confiscate weapons from Muslims throughout

6 the enclave and store them in the weapon collection point.

7 Q. Thank you. If you saw a Muslim going into a house and carrying

8 weapons, were you entitled to follow him into that house?

9 A. I know that that happened. I don't know specifically whether

10 that was officially regulated.

11 Q. Thank you. I shall quote what Mr. Franken said on the 30th of

12 June, 2010, 3384, lines 12 to 15 of the transcript. And he said this,

13 and I quote:

14 "We had a minor problem. The moment we entered a house we were

15 not authorised to enter that house, and we were to call the local police

16 in order to search that house so that that was not very effective."

17 My question is: Was this actually the practice, the procedure

18 throughout the Srebrenica zone as described by Mr. Franken in what I have

19 just quoted?

20 A. That sounds like a good question for Major Franken. All I know

21 is that special forces did go after the people, also into their house, to

22 confiscate weapons. I understand based to Major Franken's statement that

23 they weren't entitled to do so.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think there's a correction necessary. On page

25 68, line 20, you quoted Mr. Franken in the following way, I quote:

Page 7213

1 "We had a minor problem. The moment we enter the house."

2 It should read, "They entered the house."

3 Mr. Thayer.

4 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I am standing now just so we don't go

5 over time too much. I just wanted to raise one proposal with the

6 Trial Chamber and, frankly, with the witness. As I mentioned at the

7 outset, we do not have the Dutch interpreters available for tomorrow, but

8 I wanted to at least provide the alternative to Colonel Egbers, if he so

9 chooses, and this is without any indication of any preference on the part

10 of the Prosecution, because we have none with respect to this issue, for

11 him to return tomorrow if he desires to testify in English.

12 Obviously he has chosen to testify in Dutch, and we understand

13 that, and again we have got no position. But if Colonel Egbers is

14 available tomorrow and would prefer to get the completion of his

15 testimony accomplished tomorrow, that is an option. Not a satisfactory

16 one, I expect, but I just wanted to put that out there because the

17 alternative is that he has to come back on another day when we can

18 schedule the Dutch interpreters which, again, is fine with the

19 Prosecution as well.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Thayer. I note that the

21 cross-examination lasted up to now around four hours. Mr. Tolimir, you

22 indicated earlier that you will need seven hours altogether. Can I take

23 it that you need again three hours for cross-examination?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. That is

25 the time within which we could conclude with our questioning, given the

Page 7214

1 situation that we are in. Thank you.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And before I ask the witness if he would be able

3 to testify in English, I would like to know, Mr. Thayer, there is another

4 witness from abroad scheduled for tomorrow and Thursday. Would that not

5 cause another problem if we will continue with Mr. Egbers?

6 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, my understanding from the Defence is

7 that the best estimate is that that other witness's testimony can be

8 completed in one day.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You are referring to Mr. Baraybar?

10 MR. THAYER: Affirmative.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is that the case, Mr. Tolimir?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. If that witness comes,

13 we will finish him. And if Colonel agrees to come tomorrow, we will

14 finish him as well. That's the position of the Defence.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Egbers, you have followed the discussion

16 about the different options how to conclude your testimony. One is that

17 you testify in English tomorrow for around three hours and some more

18 time, or that you come back at a later day when the Dutch interpreters

19 will be available. What is your position on that?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At previous trials I testified in

21 English, but I often had to search for words. For example, when I

22 explain that a man is pushing forward his wife in a wheelbarrow to

23 Potocari, then I have to describe the word "wheelbarrow" which I don't

24 often use in English. And now I can speak my own language, I am able to

25 be clearer about what I mean, and I think that both Mr. Tolimir and the