Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11083

 1                           Thursday, 10 March 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.

 6             I was told that the Prosecution has some update for documents

 7     which have now a translation.

 8             Mr. Elderkin.

 9             MR. ELDERKIN:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning everyone

10     else.

11             Yes, there are nine new translations have been updated and I

12     think a paper has been distributed, but I can read through the relevant

13     exhibit numbers, if Your Honours would like that.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That would be helpful.  If you can, without any

15     explanation, just give the number -- oh, they all have already a P

16     number.

17             MR. ELDERKIN:  Yes, I see that from the list.  P1307, P1308,

18     P1311, P1542C, P1542D, P1562C, P1563C, P1565B, and P1569C.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  They are now exhibits.

20             MR. ELDERKIN:  One further matter, Your Honour, is that having

21     sent an e-mail last night about the sequence of witnesses, starting with

22     today's witness, today's witness is in fact indicated he has moved his

23     meeting on Monday and is able to continue, if necessary, on Monday, so it

24     will treat him as a normal witness, we don't need to break his testimony

25     in any way.

Page 11084

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for this information.

 2             If there is nothing further, we -- the witness should be brought

 3     in, please.

 4             Mr. Elderkin, in between, I have a question.  In the list of

 5     witnesses for this week, there was an indication that David Wood would be

 6     as 92 ter witness.  I think that should be a mistake.  If I'm not

 7     mistaken, the witness is a viva voce witness.

 8             MR. ELDERKIN:  That's absolutely right, Your Honour.  I

 9     understand that a revised list was sent correcting that error.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, sir.  Welcome to the courtroom.

13     Here is the Bench; I am speaking.

14             Would you please read allowed the affirmation on the card which

15     is shown to you now.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  I solemnly declare that I will speak

17     the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

18                           WITNESS:  DAVID JOHN WOOD

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down and make

20     yourself comfortable.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin, for the Prosecution, has questions

23     for you.

24             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

Page 11085

 1             MR. ELDERKIN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2                           Examination by Mr. Elderkin:

 3        Q.   And good morning to you, sir.

 4        A.   Good morning.

 5             MR. ELDERKIN:  Can I ask to briefly go into private session.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

 7                           [Private session]

 8     (redacted)

 9     (redacted)

10     (redacted)

11     (redacted)

12     (redacted)

13     (redacted)

14     (redacted)

15     (redacted)

16     (redacted)

17     (redacted)

18     (redacted)

19     (redacted)

20     (redacted)

21     (redacted)

22     (redacted)

23     (redacted)

24     (redacted)

25                           [Open session]

Page 11086

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just a moment.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now continue, please.

 4             MR. ELDERKIN:

 5        Q.   Sir, can you please state your name.

 6        A.   David John Wood.

 7        Q.   What is your nationality?

 8        A.   British.

 9        Q.   And what's your current occupation?

10        A.   I'm currently a non-executive director of a number of companies.

11        Q.   And what was your previous occupation?

12        A.   Previous to commerce or previous to my current position?

13        Q.   Previous to commerce.

14        A.   I was in the British Army for about 20 years.

15        Q.   And remind myself and for your information, because we're

16     speaking the same language I'll try to leave a pause after I finish my

17     question and if you could leave a pause as well.

18             Could you tell us what years you served in the British Army?

19        A.   I served from 1979 through to early 2001.

20        Q.   And what was your rank on your retirement?

21        A.   I retired as a lieutenant-colonel.

22        Q.   Where were you serving in 1995?

23        A.   In 1995, I was serving in Bosnia as part of the

24     United Nations Protection Force.

25        Q.   And what was your role?

Page 11087

 1        A.   I was in command of an organisation there known as the Joint

 2     Commission Observers, the JCOs.

 3        Q.   And, briefly, what did your role and the role of the JCOs

 4     involve?

 5        A.   Well, the JCOs were an organisation that were set up to try and

 6     overcome some of the communication and verification issues that were

 7     beset UNPROFOR at the time, and I was the commander of the unit that was

 8     assigned to the role of -- of joint commission observer, so I was a major

 9     at the time and I had about 20 or 30 soldiers that were acting under my

10     command as JCOs.

11        Q.   Where were you personally based?

12        A.   I was personally based in Sarajevo and I was based in the

13     residency there working directly for General Smith, who, at that stage,

14     was the commander of UNPROFOR, and I had with me a small staff of Joint

15     Commission Observers and I also had Joint Commission Observers who were

16     out in the various trouble spots, if you like, in the various enclaves at

17     the time who were reporting to me and I was able then to report to

18     General Smith and to tell him what was going on and to provide a sort of

19     focus for -- as I say, information, reporting, verification, and, indeed,

20     sometimes often a negotiation of action on the ground.

21        Q.   Did you work closely with General Smith?

22        A.   Yes, very closely.  I spoke with him every day, several times a

23     day.  I used to attend with him all of the various or certainly most of

24     the various meetings he had with the senior leadership of the

25     Bosnian Serbs, the Federation, the Bosnian Muslims, the Croats and so on.

Page 11088

 1     So I was with him -- I was with him for a large part much most days.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is it possible to move a little bit further to

 3     the microphone.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Is that better?

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, much better.

 8             MR. ELDERKIN:  Also ask that you try to speak a little bit slower

 9     so that the interpreters can keep up.

10        Q.   Who were the principle Bosnian Serb officials with whom you were

11     dealing?

12        A.   I personally, of course, wasn't dealing with any of them.  Well,

13     that is not quite true, I suppose.  Speaking personally then, I was

14     dealing regularly with a Bosnian Serb army officer called Milenko Indjic,

15     who was based at a barracks at Lukavica and who was the Bosnian Serb

16     officer responsible for liaising with UNPROFOR, so I dealt with him

17     personally frequently.  But General Smith, of course, was dealing, and I

18     was helping him deal, with everybody from Karadzic through Mladic,

19     Tolimir, and down the chain, effectively.

20        Q.   Did you meet then with some of the generals from the Bosnian Serb

21     army on occasion?

22        A.   Oh, yes, on occasions, yes.

23        Q.   And could you tell us about -- starting from the top down, did

24     you get to meet General Mladic?

25        A.   Yes.  I met General Mladic on several occasions, I would guess

Page 11089

 1     four or five in total, always with General Smith -- not always with

 2     General Smith.  Usually with General Smith.  On one occasion, with

 3     General Nicolai, who was the Dutch Chief of Staff.  And, generally

 4     speaking, we met him for the purposes of meetings between Smith and

 5     Mladic.

 6        Q.   And how about General named Milovanovic?

 7        A.   I am pretty sure I met him but I don't really remember him very

 8     clearly, to be honest.

 9        Q.   And General Gvero?

10        A.   Again, I know I met him because I have seen a video of me in --

11     with him, but I don't really remember him very clearly.

12        Q.   And how about General Tolimir?

13        A.   I met General Tolimir several times with General Mladic and I

14     have a clear recollection of him.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At this point I have to interrupt you.  I would

16     like to clarify one sentence, I'm not sure if that was recorded

17     correctly.  Page 6, lines 5 through 7, you are recorded as having said:

18             "But General Smith, of course, was dealing, and I was helping him

19     deal, with everybody from Karadzic through Mladic, Tolimir, and down the

20     chain, effectively."

21             Is that correct.

22             THE WITNESS:  It is probably my fault for speaking too quickly

23     again.  What I was trying to say was that -- I was trying to

24     differentiate between my own dealings with the Bosnian Serb authorities

25     which was mainly confined to dealing with Indjic and General Smith's

Page 11090

 1     dealing which were, obviously, with Karadzic, Mladic, Tolimir, and so on.

 2     And I met with these Bosnian Serb generals as part of General Smith's

 3     entourage on several occasions.  That was the point I was trying to make.

 4     I'm sorry if I didn't make it clearly.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 6             Mr. Elderkin.

 7             MR. ELDERKIN:

 8        Q.   In what circumstances did you first meet General Tolimir?

 9        A.   I first met General Tolimir at Pale on, I think, the 30th of

10     April or thereabouts.  When we went to Pale -- when I say "we" this was

11     General Smith, his entourage, myself included, and Mr. Akashi at the time

12     and his entourage, and we went to Pale to peak with Karadzic.  And there

13     was a joint press conference of some description there, and I met

14     General Tolimir on that occasion.  We had a lunch together and we had

15     lunch all together.  And I -- and I, in fact, I sat opposite

16     General Tolimir during that lunch.

17        Q.   And did have you any opportunity to speak to him on that occasion

18     or learn about his work?

19        A.   Yes.  I was introduced to him.  He either didn't speak English or

20     didn't want to speak English, so it was a limited conversation since my

21     Serbo-Croat is not extensive.  But he clearly knew who I was, because he

22     said to me at one point, You and me, we are in the same business.  And I

23     took that to mean that he recognised that I had a role that was linked to

24     intelligence of some sort.

25             He also took the opportunity to show me a little leather pouch he

Page 11091

 1     wore in his belt in which he had a grenade and he said something to the

 2     effect that, I carry this with me all the time.  They will never take me

 3     alive because I will use this to kill myself if they do.

 4             So that was the sort of conversation we had.  It wasn't a fluent

 5     conversation because we were sort of talking in different languages and a

 6     lot of it was by gesticulation and by a little bit of interpretation.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I remind you really to slow down while you're

 8     speaking.  It is very difficult to catch everything for the interpreters

 9     and the court recorder and please pause between question and answer.

10             Mr. Elderkin.

11             MR. ELDERKIN:

12        Q.   You mentioned that first meeting with General Tolimir was around

13     the 30th of April.  Could you just confirm for our written record what

14     year?

15        A.   I'm sorry, 1995.

16        Q.   And what role did General Tolimir have during this meeting?

17        A.   My understanding was that he was responsible for intelligence and

18     security for the Bosnian Serb army.  So my interpretation of that was

19     that he was General Mladic's right-hand man, if you like, with regard to

20     ensuring that Mladic knew all that he needed to know about what was going

21     on in Bosnia, going on in UNPROFOR, and so on.

22        Q.   Did you attend any other meetings at which General Tolimir was

23     present, other than the one around the 30th of April of 1995?

24        A.   Yes.  The next meeting that I can recollect meeting Tolimir at,

25     was on around the 19th of July when we met at a restaurant which I've

Page 11092

 1     subsequently discovered was called the Jela restaurant, but at the time I

 2     don't think I was aware of its name.  And at that meeting, Mladic was

 3     there, Tolimir was there, Smith was there, and Smith's entourage,

 4     including myself.  And the purpose of that meeting was to sign an

 5     agreement between Mladic and Smith and obviously the rest of us were

 6     essentially helping in that process.

 7        Q.   Based on your observation, how was Tolimir's relationship with

 8     General Mladic?

 9        A.   It seemed to me that there was a very close relationship between

10     them.  Certainly there appeared to be a mutual respect between them.  And

11     during the meeting of the 19th that I'm referring to, there was an

12     occasion where General Tolimir was interrupting the process of forming

13     the agreement and wanting to change little things in it.  And

14     General Smith made a joke to General Mladic and said words to the effect

15     that, General Tolimir is what we in the British Army would call a

16     military shit.  And by that what he meant was he is a -- that he is a

17     very picky officer, professional officer who wants to see everything done

18     perfectly.  And when this was translated to General Mladic,

19     General Mladic laughed very loudly and he held up his right arm like

20     this, and he said, Yes, General Tolimir, he is like my right arm.  And

21     then he looked around the room and he saw Colonel Indjic and he took

22     Colonel Indjic's head under his arm here and sort of patted him on the

23     head and said Indjic is likely little toe.

24             So he was appearing to make a contrast between the importance of

25     Indjic and the importance of Tolimir.  But it was very clear that he

Page 11093

 1     regarded Tolimir as his right arm.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic, I saw you on your feet.

 3             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would have a

 4     suggestion to make whether it's down to the speed or something else, we

 5     sometimes receive misinterpretation.  For instance, in Serbian we heard

 6     what the relationship was between General Tolimir and General Smith, and

 7     I see that the transcript reads something else.

 8             So we kindly ask the Prosecutor and the witness to adopt a slower

 9     pace.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  Both very fast speakers.

11             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  But, in fact, this question by Mr. Elderkin was

13     recorded as we heard it in the original English language.  Your

14     observation how was -- Tolimir's relation with General Mladic.

15             Please carry on, but slowly.

16             MR. ELDERKIN:

17        Q.   I'd like to ask if you attended any meetings accompanying

18     General Smith in Serbia during July of 1995.

19        A.   Yes.  I attended a meeting with him at Mrkonjic Grad.  I'm sorry,

20     when -- Serbia, yes, of course.  I attended a meeting with him in

21     Belgrade which -- or to be specific, I attended Belgrade with him.

22     However, I did not attend the meeting that Smith had with Milosevic in

23     Belgrade.  So I went to Belgrade with him as part of his group, but I was

24     not at that meeting.

25             Is that clear?

Page 11094

 1        Q.   Yes, it is, I'm just leaving a slightly longer pause.

 2        A.   Sorry, yes.

 3        Q.   Do you recall whether that meeting in Belgrade was before or

 4     after the 19th of July meeting that you've just mentioned?

 5        A.   I'm pretty sure the meeting was before.  But I can't recall the

 6     exact date.

 7             MR. ELDERKIN:  Could we now go to Exhibit P740, please.  And I'd

 8     like to start actually right at the beginning of that video, if we may.

 9     It's just a short extract.

10        Q.   I'll play a short piece of video and afterwards ask you some

11     questions on that.

12        A.   Sure.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             MR. ELDERKIN:  Pause here, please.  And that's paused at

15     1 minute, 19.8 seconds.

16        Q.   Sir, do you recognise the two men in that picture starting first

17     with the man wearing the camouflage uniform who has just been working at

18     the printer?

19        A.   Yes, that's me.

20        Q.   And the man who we see just in the centre right of the picture

21     with the moustache?

22        A.   This is someone called Milenko Indjic, who was either a major or

23     a lieutenant-colonel - it seemed to fluctuate slightly - who was the

24     person I referred to as the liaison officer based at Lukavica barracks

25     liaising between the Bosnian Serb army and UNPROFOR.

Page 11095

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. ELDERKIN:  And if we could continue playing the video a

 3     little further.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             MR. ELDERKIN:

 6        Q.   Sir, do you recall the meeting as we've seen it take place on

 7     that -- on that video?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             MR. ELDERKIN:  Could we see, please, Exhibit P603.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you continue with this -- with the next

11     video -- Mr. Elderkin, before you continue with the next video, I would

12     like to ask a question to the witness.

13             Mr. Wood, where was this meeting?  Just to clarify.

14             THE WITNESS:  Sir, the meeting was held at a restaurant called

15     the Jela restaurant which was close to a village called Han Pijesak,

16     which was the place where the Bosnian Serb army had its headquarters.  I

17     never went into Han Pijesak itself, and the restaurant was chosen by

18     Mladic as a meeting-point for this -- which was one of maybe two or three

19     meetings that we had with Mladic out of the glare of publicity, if you

20     like, and slightly private meetings.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you recall how you got there?

22             THE WITNESS:  We drove there.  We -- at the time, we tended to

23     drive in a two-vehicle convoy, usually a Range Rover with Smith, his

24     driver, myself, and Baxter in it.  And then a Humvee with a communication

25     team behind and we drove there from Sarajevo.

Page 11096

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You mentioned three persons: Yourself,

 2     General Smith and Mr. Baxter.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, and a driver as well.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Did that mean you were four people in this

 5     delegation arriving there?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Well, there was also the communication team which

 7     followed behind.  And in the communication team vehicle, usually a woman

 8     called Emma Bliss tended to travel as a translator, and if it wasn't her,

 9     it was sometimes a man called Tom Dibb, but there was almost always a

10     translator with us who tended to travel in the other vehicle.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  How many people from the Bosnian Serb side

12     attended this meeting which we have seen in the video?

13             THE WITNESS:  From my recollection, there was Mladic, Tolimir,

14     Indjic, plus a collection of drivers, body-guards and so on.  So there

15     was perhaps six or seven of them in total.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you recall how they got there to this Jela

17     restaurant?

18             THE WITNESS:  Well some of them were there when we arrived and

19     had already occupied the restaurant, if you like.  On this particular

20     occasion, I think I'm right in saying that Mladic arrived by helicopter,

21     in a Gazelle helicopter, more or less as we arrived.  He certainly

22     arrived at one of the meetings in a Gazelle helicopter.  On other

23     occasions, he arrived by car, like we did.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Elderkin, please

25     continue.

Page 11097

 1             MR. ELDERKIN:

 2        Q.   And while we're waiting for Exhibit P603 to come up onto the

 3     screen, we saw the scene where Generals Smith and Mladic were signing the

 4     agreement and making some comments about that.  Do you recall where you

 5     were in the room while they were sitting up and being filmed up at the

 6     top table?

 7        A.   I don't recall exactly where I was, but I was -- I mean, there

 8     were a number of us in the room out of shot, if you know what I mean, and

 9     I think I was one of them.  I had printed the agreement as you saw, so

10     I'm pretty certain I was there in the room but not in the camera shot.

11        Q.   Sir, could you now look, please, at the document on the screen.

12     Let us know when you have finished looking through the first page.  And

13     I'd ask then to move onto the second page.

14        A.   Yeah.  I'm familiar with the document.

15             MR. ELDERKIN:  Could we see the second page now, please.

16             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

17             MR. ELDERKIN:

18        Q.   Sir, is this the document that you printed out and which was

19     signed at that meeting?

20        A.   Yes, I believe so.

21        Q.   And at the point, C, at the top of that second page, the document

22     provides for DutchBat to withdraw on the 21st of July of 1995.  Were you

23     present on the occasion of that withdrawal?

24        A.   Yes, I was.  The -- I had two men -- sorry, two JCOs and an

25     interpreter who were in Srebrenica during the time of the Serb attack and

Page 11098

 1     capture of the pocket.  And so on the 21st, I went with General Nicolai,

 2     who was the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR based at Sarajevo, and we went

 3     to -- to -- to witness, if you like, or to help in the evacuation of

 4     DutchBat, including my two men from -- from the pocket.

 5        Q.   And did you have any opportunity to visit Srebrenica itself?

 6        A.   Yes.  On the way there, we stopped at a restaurant, and I can't

 7     remember exactly where it was, and met with General Mladic and his small

 8     entourage and had lunch at the restaurant somewhere outside Srebrenica.

 9     And after that lunch, Mladic led us down into the village of Srebrenica

10     which, by this time, of course, was occupied entirely by Bosnian Serb

11     forces and which -- and had no civilians in it anymore.  And Mladic took

12     us on what I would describe in military terms as a battle-field tour, so

13     a visit around all the key points, if you like, describing what had

14     happened and how the battle had unfolded and essentially telling us how

15     well his men had done.  And when that was finished, we then began to move

16     down towards the Dutch battalion camp at Potocari, I think it's called,

17     and as we neared there, Mladic said something like, I have another

18     appointment now, or There is something I must do, or something, and he

19     then left us at the point and that is the last time that I saw him at

20     Srebrenica.

21        Q.   And that was all on the 21st of July?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Apart from this point C at the top of the second page, what --

24     what was your view at the time of the rest of this agreement?

25        A.   Oh, the agreement was a -- was what we would call a paper

Page 11099

 1     exercise.  At the time, you must remember that Mr. Milosevic, in

 2     Belgrade, was giving orders to General Mladic, essentially, and telling

 3     him to sign whatever agreements needed to be signed in order to keep

 4     UNPROFOR happy at the time.  So my interpretation of this agreement

 5     signed on the 19th was that it was agreement that neither party attached

 6     any importance to and that both parties were signing because it was -- it

 7     was just part of a dialogue process, really.

 8        Q.   I'd like to turn now, please, to the 25th of July.

 9             Did you attend any meetings on that date?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And where did you attend a meeting?

12        A.   Let me just remind myself which meeting this was.

13             Can I just refer to my statement?

14        Q.   It may indeed help if I call up one document on the screen --

15        A.   Right.

16        Q.   -- which is Exhibit P1978, please.

17             And while that's coming up, sir, that's report of the 26th of

18     July from, I think from Colonel Baxter -- Colonel Baxter or Captain Bliss

19     and it describes a meeting on the 25th.  So take a moment to look at that

20     and let me know if that helps refresh your memory.

21        A.   Yes, of course.  Yeah.  Yes, this is another meeting at the Jela

22     restaurant.  I mentioned that we had two or three.  And at the end of

23     this meeting, we moved to Zepa.

24        Q.   And, indeed, if we look at paragraph 2, it describes how after a

25     two-hour meeting, General Smith decided to move to Zepa and resume the

Page 11100

 1     meeting with Mladic in order to assess the situation for himself and to

 2     initiate with Bosnian agreement the evacuation of the wounded.

 3             So as far as you recall, that exactly how the events unfolded?

 4        A.   Yes.  We had a similar meeting at the Jela restaurant that I

 5     described earlier.  And as Baxter has clearly said, we then moved from

 6     there, all of us together, to a point in the woods just above the village

 7     of Zepa where the meeting then continued.

 8        Q.   Can you describe that location, as far as you recall.  How did it

 9     look?  What, if any, facilities were there?

10        A.   Yeah.  The -- the village of Zepa is in the bottom of a very

11     steep valley, wooded valley.  And the road that ran down to it from the

12     direction that we arrived was a zigzag road that ran down through the

13     woods, and at the top of that slope, so we're talking about, you know, a

14     kilometre or two away from Zepa and quite a lot higher, in some woods

15     there, was a flat area in which there was some tents drawn up, some

16     vehicles parked, and that was where we had the meeting -- or, that was

17     where Smith had the continuation of the meeting with Mladic in order

18     to -- in order, as he says, to co-ordinate, if you like, the evacuation

19     of wounded.

20        Q.   How did you and General Smith and his entourage travel to that

21     location?

22        A.   By vehicle again.

23        Q.   Do you know how General Mladic travelled there?

24        A.   I can't remember exactly, and I mentioned before that he had

25     arrived and departed in a helicopter on a previous -- or, on one of the

Page 11101

 1     meetings.  It is possible that this is the meeting that he arrived and

 2     departed by helicopter; but, if not, then he drove.

 3        Q.   And who was present up at this -- this higher location above the

 4     town?

 5        A.   Mladic was there, Tolimir was there, Indjic was there.  Obviously

 6     from our side, Smith, Baxter, myself.  I believe Tom Dibb was there; I

 7     can't recall him there, but I believe he was there.  And I believe

 8     Emma Bliss may have been there.  And then there were quite a collection

 9     of other Bosnian Serb officers and soldiers that were there as part of

10     force that had captured the village of Zepa.

11        Q.   Sir, I'd just like to refer briefly to your statement and

12     understand whether when you say Tolimir was present at this hilltop

13     location, if that's actually your recollection, or whether you saw

14     Tolimir at another location in the vicinity that day?

15        A.   Well, I saw Tolimir -- I mean, remember that I was at that

16     location at the top of the hill for quite some time.  Later on, I went

17     down into the village of Zepa where, again, Tolimir was, but he certainly

18     had been at the top of the hill at other points in the day, because I --

19     I've been shown a video that shows him, I think, at the top of a hill at

20     some point on one of those days.  But that is not to say that he was not

21     in the village of Zepa later on when I went down there.

22        Q.   And apart from the UNPROFOR members and the Bosnian Serb army who

23     you saw at the location at the top of the hill, did you see any

24     Bosnian Muslims at that location on that day?

25        A.   There was one man who was -- I would describe him as being late

Page 11102

 1     30s, early 40s, tall, dark hair, wearing a pale-coloured shirt who was

 2     described as being the mayor or some sort of local head of the community

 3     down in Zepa.  And he was there at some point in the meeting in order

 4     to -- in order to make some agreement with Mladic, effectively, at that

 5     meeting.

 6        Q.   From what you observed, how was he behaving?

 7        A.   He looked shaken and frightened.

 8        Q.   Did you have any opportunity, yourself, to communicate with him?

 9        A.   Not that I can remember.

10        Q.   And you've mentioned already that you, at some point, were down

11     in the Zepa village.  How did you travel down to the village?

12        A.   At some point in the time spent at the top of the hill, I was

13     asked to go down into the village, I think to find some more people to

14     come up to be part of the meeting, but I'm not certain about that.  But I

15     drove down with Major Indjic and with the -- and with one of the Serb

16     officers, drove down in one of the vehicles, and drove down this zigzag

17     hill into the village of Zepa that was maybe a kilometre or two away.

18        Q.   Do you recall anything about this other Serb officer?

19        A.   No.

20        Q.   And can you describe for the Court what you saw as you travelled

21     down from the hilltop location towards the village.

22        A.   The first thing that I recall is that at the top of the hill,

23     having left the clearing area that I described and gone onto the track

24     that led down into Zepa, at the top of the hill, parked on the left, was

25     a captured British manufactured Saxon armoured personnel carrier, which

Page 11103

 1     had been obviously captured by the Bosnian Serbs at some point and had

 2     been re-sprayed green and black in camouflage, because, of course,

 3     previously it would have been white, that was parked up at the top of the

 4     hill with a collection of Bosnian Serb soldiers standing around it.

 5             We then drove down into the village of Zepa, and as we came into

 6     the village, we drove through various orchards and little fields that

 7     surrounded the village and in those fields I could see small groups of

 8     Bosnian Serb soldiers who were doing what I would call regrouping after

 9     an action.  So they were collecting themselves together, they were

10     refilling magazines, they were cleaning weapons, they were generally

11     sorting themselves out after having been busy.  And we drove on down into

12     the village itself where we stopped.

13        Q.   Can you go on to describe the scene when you arrived in the

14     village.

15        A.   Well, the village of Zepa is a very small village, very

16     primitive.  My recollection is that it consisted entirely of wooden huts,

17     wooden houses.  I remember a water wheel at one point that was turning

18     and, presumably, milling grain or something.  And in the middle of the

19     village was a slightly clear area, not really a village square, but a

20     slightly clear area, in which there were a number of buses drawn up.  I

21     remember maybe four or five buses drawn up, and what appeared to be quite

22     a large number of mainly women and children, but also some old people,

23     men and women, who were being organised in the square prior to being

24     loaded onto these buses and evacuated.  And these obviously were the

25     occupants of Zepa.

Page 11104

 1        Q.   Who was doing the organising; did you see?

 2        A.   Yes.  In the square was a group of about seven or eight

 3     Bosnian Serb policemen and they were being directed by General Tolimir.

 4     And General Tolimir, who I recognised, obviously very clearly, from

 5     having met him on previous occasions, was walking around, directing the

 6     movement of these women and children and directing the activities of the

 7     policemen loading the women and children into the coaches.  And he had

 8     his pistol out, sort of held up like this, and was -- was -- I saw no

 9     violence being visited on the people, but it was a very threatening

10     atmosphere.  And the people there, you know, were clearly very frightened

11     and distresses, and it was being directed, as I say, by General Tolimir.

12        Q.   For the record, sir, when you said that General Tolimir had his

13     pistol held like this, you had raised your right arm, bent upwards with

14     the forearm pointing towards the ceiling.

15             And so the Serb policemen --

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could you state that [Overlapping speakers] ...

17             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, I -- I --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

19             THE WITNESS:  I should explain, sorry.  He was -- I remember very

20     clearly General Tolimir.  I remember what he was wearing.  I remember him

21     walking around, and he had as -- as I have been -- as I have been

22     reminded, he had his right hand -- held his pistol in his right hand.  He

23     had it pointing up at the sky.  He wasn't pointing it at anybody.  He

24     wasn't overtly threatening people with it, but he had it in his hand and

25     it was held, you know, pointing up at the sky at about shoulder height.

Page 11105

 1             And the whole -- the whole episode was a little bit like -- was a

 2     little bit like being in a 1940s newsreel.  There was a sort of sense --

 3     there was a sense of the Holocaust about it.  If it had been black and

 4     white, it would have been more -- you know, it would have been more in

 5     keeping in sense with the scene that was unfolding around me.  And it was

 6     a very strange experience for me to be standing there as an UN soldier in

 7     a blue beret standing there amongst what was very obviously an unpleasant

 8     act of, admittedly non-violent at that stage, ethnic cleansing that was

 9     going on, directed by General Tolimir and his men.

10             MR. ELDERKIN:

11        Q.   How were the Serb policemen dressed?

12        A.   I don't remember exactly.  But I suspect -- I remember them as

13     Serb policemen and the Serb policemen at the time used to wear a sort of

14     blue and black camouflage uniform.  So my assumption is that's what they

15     were wearing, but I don't remember clearly what they were wearing.

16        Q.   Were they armed?

17        A.   Again, I don't clearly remember that they were armed, but I'm

18     almost certain they must have been armed.

19        Q.   You mentioned you recall how General Tolimir was dressed.  Could

20     you describe that.

21        A.   Yes.  He was wearing -- he was wearing the normal green

22     camouflage clothing that you have seen photographs of.  He was also

23     wearing a sort of sleeveless green top on top of that, and he was wearing

24     his little peaked Serb officer's cap with the short stubby peak on it.

25             MR. ELDERKIN:  And could we go back again, please, to

Page 11106

 1     Exhibit P740 and this time just play a short clip from 20 minutes and

 2     26 seconds.

 3        Q.   This is taken from a video shot on 26th of July, so I'd simply

 4     concentrate on the image rather than on the surrounding events.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             MR. ELDERKIN:

 7        Q.   Sir, did you recognise any of the individuals we've just seen in

 8     that footage?

 9        A.   Obviously I recognise Mladic and Tolimir.

10        Q.   And having seen how Tolimir was dressed in this footage, does

11     that correspond with how you recall he looked on the day you saw him in

12     Zepa town?

13        A.   Yes.  He -- he wasn't -- on the video, he wasn't wearing the sort

14     of little jacket on top, but --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can we perhaps go back a bit in the video and

16     stop at a certain point in time that you really can identify the persons

17     shown in this video.

18             THE WITNESS:  In fact, I am mistaken.  He is wearing the jacket.

19     There we are.  I didn't see it in the first instance when he came past.

20     That is Tolimir in the centre of it, wearing the cap that I described,

21     wearing the clothes I described, and wearing the little jacket that I

22     mentioned to you.

23             MR. ELDERKIN:

24        Q.   And for the record, the video is paused at 20 minutes,

25     36.8 seconds.

Page 11107

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question.

 2             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, sir.  Regarding this picture,

 3     you've given us a description of General Tolimir, because, see, there is

 4     a belt, and I see something near his belt.  Could you tell us what we can

 5     see there?  Is this -- what is this?  Is it a pouch for grenades?  Or

 6     what can we see there?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I think, looking at it, that that is the pouch that

 8     I mentioned to you earlier on, that -- in which he kept a small grenade.

 9     Perhaps if we advance the video a frame or two, it would make it a

10     clearer picture.

11             MR. ELDERKIN:  In fact, Your Honours, I think the clearest shot

12     is right at the beginning of the clip that we just played.  So it would

13     help to go back to 20 minutes, 26 seconds.

14             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  Yes.  You can see that is a little pouch,

15     and that is the pouch that he showed me when we met at Pale in April that

16     had a little round grenade in it.

17             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

19             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you very much.

20             Page 22 of today's transcript, lines 2 to 4, you were describing

21     General Tolimir.  You say:

22             "He had his right hand -- he held his pistol in his right hand

23     pointing up to the sky."

24             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, yes.

25             JUDGE NYAMBE:  In the circumstances in which you were, how else

Page 11108

 1     should he have held his gun?  Can you explain that to me as a soldier?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Well, as a soldier, myself, at the time, if I was

 3     supervising people, women and children to get on a coach, I wouldn't have

 4     had my gun out at all.  I'm not sure why he had it out, because he

 5     wasn't -- certainly, when I saw him, he wasn't actually pointing it at

 6     people to threaten them to do things.  He was just waving it around as a

 7     sort of a -- like a status symbol, like a sort of power symbol, if you

 8     like.  It's not something I would have done, but that is -- that is what

 9     he was doing.

10             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

12             MR. ELDERKIN:

13        Q.   Sir, just to follow up from Judge Nyambe's question, if a soldier

14     or officer has a handgun, where can they put it, apart from having it in

15     their hand?

16        A.   Well, most soldiers would have a holster.  Most of them would be

17     on the belt, some might have a shoulder holster.  And most of the time,

18     generally speaking, the rule is, that unless you want to use the pistol,

19     you leave it in the holster.  You only take it out if you want to

20     threaten somebody with it, or shoot somebody with it.

21        Q.   Were you carrying any weapons on the 25th of July, 1995?

22        A.   Yes, I had a pistol too, and it was in my holster.

23        Q.   Sir, did General Smith travel down to Zepa village on that day?

24        A.   No, he didn't.  As far as I recall, I was the only person of our

25     party who went down into Zepa that day.

Page 11109

 1        Q.   How long did you spend down in Zepa that day?

 2        A.   Probably no more than 20 minutes, half an hour or so.  And I

 3     don't really remember whether we achieved whatever it was we were sent to

 4     do.  I don't remember bringing somebody up from the village.  I think

 5     that -- I think that when we got there, it was clear that there weren't

 6     any other men that we could take up to be part of whatever was going on

 7     at the top.  So after 20 or 30 minutes, we simply drove back up the hill

 8     and rejoined the meeting.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt for a moment.  I just want to

10     know, we have this video and the still on the screen at the moment.  Were

11     you present during this situation when General Mladic, General Tolimir

12     were there?  What is depicted here?

13             THE WITNESS:  This video, I believe, is taken on the 26th.  Am I

14     correct?

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No.  At the moment it's a question for you.

16     Do --

17             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You have seen the video --

19             THE WITNESS:  Right.

20             JUDGE FLUGGE:  -- can you recall the situation which is depicted

21     in this video?

22             THE WITNESS:  No.  I don't believe that I was there on the 26th.

23     I'm not certain I was not there, but I don't believe I was there.  I was

24     there on the 25th and there on the 27th, and I may have been there on the

25     26th, but I have no clear recollection of it, and I don't recall being at

Page 11110

 1     the meeting that is depicted in the video.  I think that was an entirely

 2     Serb meeting.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 4             Mr. Elderkin.

 5             MR. ELDERKIN:

 6        Q.   Just to stay a moment longer with your time in the Zepa village,

 7     what was the atmosphere while you were down there?

 8        A.   Well, as I said before, and at the risk of sounding too dramatic

 9     about it, it was little bit like standing in a scene from the Holocaust,

10     in the sense that there were maybe 300, 400 women and children, around

11     about that number, and some old people, all of whom seemed obviously very

12     distressed, very frightened, a lot of children, and were all being herded

13     onto the buses prior to being taken away.  The atmosphere, therefore, was

14     one of -- was one of fear, threatening, no actual violence, but certainly

15     the threat of violence.  And, for me, it was very uncomfortable because

16     it was -- you know, it was clearly a very -- a very significant event and

17     standing there as a -- as the only member of UNPROFOR in amongst it, and

18     really unable to intervene and not in a position to intervene, it was a

19     very strange position to be in.

20             And I remember talking to Indjic, who stood beside me, and asking

21     him very pointedly whether he had children, because many of the people

22     were children, so there were lots of mothers with babies and with

23     toddlers, and so on.  And Indjic said to me, Yes, I have a daughter of

24     13 and a son of 7, or something like.  And I said to him, you know, So

25     how do you feel?  And he didn't say anything.  He didn't reply.  I don't

Page 11111

 1     know what he felt, but I felt that he ought to be ashamed of this sort of

 2     conduct being done, you know, in his name by his colleagues.

 3        Q.   Did you speak to General Tolimir at any point during your time in

 4     Zepa village?

 5        A.   At the time in the village itself, no.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

 7             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes, I just wonder if you can amplify on your

 8     statement at page 27, lines 19 to 21.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Could I --

10             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I'll read it out for you.

11             You state:

12             "As the only member of UNPROFOR in amongst it, and really unable

13     to intervene and not in a position to intervene, it was a very strange

14     position to be in."

15             As a member of UNPROFOR, if you had intervened what would you

16     have done?  Or what should you have done?

17             THE WITNESS:  It's a good question to which there isn't a very

18     good answer.

19             Had there been actual violence, in other words, if I had actually

20     seen one of the policemen beating or threatening or shooting one of the

21     non-combatants there, then I would have certainly intervened to prevent

22     that or tried to prevent that from happening.

23             As I said before, I didn't see that.  There wasn't any actual

24     violence that I saw while I was is there, and, therefore, there was no

25     practical intervention I could have taken, really.  In a sense, I felt

Page 11112

 1     that being there was probably acting as a slight deterrent from actual

 2     violence being visited upon these people by the Serb forces.  But,

 3     nevertheless, there was, as I described, this palpable sense of fear,

 4     threat, disruption, if you like.  And as to what I could have done about

 5     that, the answer is nothing much.

 6             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I put a follow-up question.  You said:

 8             "... then I would have certainly intervened ..."

 9             In a case, if you have observed any direct violence, what do you

10     mean by "intervened"?  What means did you have?

11             THE WITNESS:  Well, not very much, I accept.  And we're talking

12     here hypothetically, obviously, because it didn't happen.  But I would

13     like to think that, as a British Army officer and as a member of

14     UNPROFOR, if I had seen, let us say, one of the Serb policemen beating up

15     one of the women or children or taking her away, you know, for something,

16     then I would like to think that I would have at least been able to

17     verbally remonstrate.  And if the worst came to the worst, been able to

18     use force, although I was by myself, to prevent that from happening.

19             Remember, UNPROFOR was authorised to use force only in

20     self-defence, essentially, and remember that I only had a pistol with me,

21     so there is a limit to what I could have done.  But my experience in

22     these matters was that, generally speaking, if one confronted people with

23     the magnitude of what they were doing, they sometime would back down and

24     stop, so although this didn't happen, I do stress this didn't happen, I

25     think that had there been violence there, I might have been able to

Page 11113

 1     prevent some of it by simply being there and by simply witnessing it and

 2     remonstrating, if you like, with the people who were doing it.  That's

 3     what I meant.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for this clarification.

 5             Judge Mindua.

 6             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, you see very well that

 7     this portion of your testimony is extremely important for the Chamber and

 8     it's quite troublesome for me as well.  I'm wondering if we're talking

 9     about the same reality.

10             On page 27 of the transcript, you say - I'm going to try to

11     translated from French to English myself, or English to French, rather --

12     you're saying that this situation seemed like a scene from the Holocaust.

13     We all know what that means, of course.  But then, at the same time, in

14     answering a question put by Judge Nyambe, you say that you could not

15     intervene directly because there was no direct violence.  And you are

16     giving an example, a situation in which a member of the UNPROFOR would

17     have been violated upon.  So I would like to know, could you have reacted

18     against a very small amount of violence against a member of your mission,

19     of the UNPROFOR, or could you have not done anything with respect to

20     something that you, yourself, called the Holocaust?

21             So if I understood correctly, this is quite a dramatic situation.

22     I mean, I don't know if I understood you correctly.

23             THE WITNESS:  I'm not sure that I understand the question you're

24     asking me, but I can re-stress the fact that this was, as you say, quite

25     a dramatic situation.  There are relatively few points in one's live,

Page 11114

 1     certainly in my life, when you find yourself at the point of history, if

 2     you like.  You see something happening around you that you know is highly

 3     significant whether you're part of it or not.  And this is one of the

 4     occasions in my life where I have felt very strongly that I was at the

 5     point of history.  I was witnessing with my own eyes activity that was

 6     historic in the sense that it was something that people would pour over

 7     in the future and be brought to account for in the future, which is one

 8     of the reasons why I recollect it so clearly, because amongst all the

 9     episodes I witnessed in Bosnia, it was one of the most significant.

10             But I don't -- I may not have answered your question clearly

11     because I'm not quite sure what you were asking me in your question.

12     Perhaps you could rephrase it.

13             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] No, I will not rephrase my

14     question.  I will not put my question again.  Maybe I'll just make a

15     comment here.

16             You're talking about a very dramatic situation and you say that

17     this situation will be part of history.  At the same time, you, yourself,

18     recognised your incapacity of reacting because there was not a sufficient

19     amount of violence against somebody from your mission, for instance.

20     This is what astonished me.  This is why I am surprised.  I'm quite happy

21     with your answer, actually.

22             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You want to comment on that, please do.

24             THE WITNESS:  Well, thank you.  The only comment I would make, if

25     it helps, is that part of the problem with UNPROFOR was that it was

Page 11115

 1     insufficiently resourced and insufficiently mandated to do many of the

 2     things that one might have wished to have done in the whole episode of

 3     the Balkan wars.  What we're looking at here is one tiny episode that

 4     really encapsulates that.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a follow-up question.

 6             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes.  Just following up on my earlier question and

 7     on Judge Mindua's comments, and I may not refer to a particular page of

 8     the transcript, and if I recollect wrongly, please do not hesitate to

 9     intervene.

10             You have given evidence today which suggests that you met

11     General Tolimir on a number of occasions.  You had lunch, meetings that

12     were quite -- not as dramatic as the scene you are explaining now.  You

13     have told us about how he talked to you about the pouch with the hand

14     grenade, and what have you.  Here, you are standing at the point of

15     history, a situation which you are describing is ethnic cleansing

16     directed by General Tolimir with his gun.  Don't you -- is it possible

17     for you to have then have intervened by, saying, asking General Tolimir,

18     not to hold his gun in the way he held it because you perceived it as

19     something that was frightening the population around you.

20             Is that something that you could have done?  Thank you.

21             THE WITNESS:  With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps it is.  But

22     we're overlooking the fact that General Tolimir knew very well what he

23     was doing.  He was holding his gun that way in order to frighten the

24     population.  So me asking him not to do it would not have necessarily

25     been helpful.  It might have helped my conscience, but it wouldn't have

Page 11116

 1     helped the situation necessarily.

 2             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin, please continue.

 4             MR. ELDERKIN:

 5        Q.   Sir, did you go back to Zepa after the 25th of July of 1995?

 6        A.   Yes.  As I mentioned before, I certainly went back on the 27th.

 7     I may have gone back on the 26th, but I don't recall clearly.  But after

 8     those two days, I don't believe I went back at all, no.

 9        Q.   And, finally, do you recall attending a meeting on the 31st of

10     July of 1995 at Mrkonjic Grad?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Perhaps we could see, please, Exhibit P594.

13             MR. ELDERKIN:  And, again, this is a video, to start, please, at

14     1 hour, 2 minutes, and 39 seconds.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We don't have the video played.

17             MR. ELDERKIN:  We were just calling it up, Your Honours.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             MR. ELDERKIN:  And just pause the video at 1 hour, 2 minutes,

20     59.3 seconds.

21        Q.   Sir, can you tell us if you recognise anyone in the shot now?

22        A.   Yes.  In that room, you can see standing -- you can see

23     Colonel Baxter.  Sitting half turned from us is Emma Bliss.  Sitting

24     facing the camera, but half hidden, is myself.  And I think the blurred

25     figure sitting down is General Smith.  Go you rewind a frame or two, I

Page 11117

 1     will be able to confirm that.

 2             Yes, that is it General Smith then sitting between Emma Bliss and

 3     myself.

 4        Q.   And we have just gone back to 1 hour, 2 minutes 58.3 seconds.

 5             MR. ELDERKIN:  Your Honours, I understand that this video has

 6     already been admitted as P594.  What was not admitted at the time of the

 7     video's admission was the accompanying transcript.  I would propose that

 8     be admitted simply to make sense of what's already effectively contained

 9     within the video, and that's 65 ter 1757.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm not sure what was the reason why we just

11     MFI'd this document.  Perhaps we didn't have a transcript at that time.

12     Can you help me with that?

13                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

14             MR. ELDERKIN:  I believe the transcript was simply overlooked at

15     the time.  As for the reason this was MFI'd, I understand that because

16     it's a compilation video we're intending to present other witnesses to

17     cover the range of material.  Sorry.  I understand that the exhibit

18     itself isn't MFI'd at all.  So I'm referring to a different compilation.

19     This one, the video is admitted.  The transcript itself was overlooked.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You were giving us the 65 ter number as 1757

22     related to the transcript.

23             MR. ELDERKIN:  That's correct.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And that's uploaded and it should be part of the

25     video so that we have only one P number.

Page 11118

 1             MR. ELDERKIN:  Yes.  Yes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And this transcript will be part of P594.

 3             MR. ELDERKIN:  Thank you very much.  And I don't have any further

 4     questions at this time for the witness.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Wood, now Mr. Tolimir has the opportunity and

 8     the right to put questions to you during his cross-examination.

 9             Mr. Tolimir.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Good

11     morning to everyone.  May there be peace in this house and may God's will

12     be done in these proceedings and not mine.

13             We will follow up from what the witness has just been telling us.

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] You presented here this view of yours, your

16     vision that it was Tolimir who was walking across the village wielding a

17     pistol.  Do you have any eye-witness who would be able to confirm this?

18     We've had a number of witnesses appearing here, none of whom mentioned

19     this detail.  Thank you.

20        A.   If you mean eye-witnesses who are not members of the Bosnian Serb

21     army or, indeed, part of the Muslim population, then, as I said before, I

22     was the only member of UNPROFOR who was down in that village at that

23     time, as I recollect.

24             So apart from myself, the answer is no.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Was it Mr. Edward Joseph and Mr. Bezruchenko, as well

Page 11119

 1     as the president of the War Presidency of Zepa, Muharem Hajric, and

 2     Avdo Palic who boarded the civilians onto buses, or was the

 3     Army of Republika Srpska that was doing this?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I have no idea on whose authority it was being done.  I saw the

 5     actual boarding being done by the policemen I described earlier and you.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show D173.  This is a

 8     report by a witness appearing here before you, Mr. Edward Joseph, and we

 9     will be quoting from his statement as to what it was he had to say about

10     the evacuation.  Thank you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  You see the statement there.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we turn to page 3, please.

14     This is Mr. Joseph's statement.

15             Let's look at paragraph 14 on page 3 which reads:

16             "Evacuation started the same morning when several Serb-owned

17     buses and trucks arrived to the centre.  We started to organise the

18     civilians boarding in the vehicles ... Viktor, and at least one French

19     officer -- I, Viktor, and at least one French officer were very active on

20     this as well as some of the Muslim civilian leaders.  Can I recall seeing

21     also General Smith there, observing the evacuation.

22             "I remember a group of wounded ABiH soldiers being among the

23     evacuees.  Soon after the evacuations started, a medical examination was

24     conducted for them ... by a French and Serb ... doctor," et cetera.

25             Can you tell Their Honours, are you at all acquainted with

Page 11120

 1     Edward Joseph and Viktor Bezruchenko?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I don't remember either of them.  You might have to remind me

 3     about who Edward Joseph is.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Since you don't remember, there is no need for me to

 5     remind you.  Well, he was a civilian representative of UNPROFOR.

 6             Since you're not familiar with them, did you see any UNPROFOR

 7     representatives in Zepa at a time -- at the time that you arrived there?

 8        A.   I've already stated that I did not.  In Zepa.

 9        Q.   Can you give us the time and date of your arrival there?

10        A.   Well, the date you already have.  The time, I would be

11     estimating --

12        Q.   Can you please state it for the transcript, nevertheless.

13        A.   Let me just refer to my statement so I make sure I get it

14     correct.

15             It was the 25th of July.  In terms of the time, I would only be

16     estimating; but, given that we had -- well, in fact, in my statement, I

17     say later in the afternoon.  So it would simply be an estimate, but I

18     would say between 3.00 and 4.00 in the afternoon.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, could you tell us at which papers

20     are you looking at --

21             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.  I'm looking at my own statement

22     given -- I don't know -- has a reference number on it.  But the statement

23     I gave in --

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  When?

25             THE WITNESS:  The statement was given on the 14th of April, 2008,

Page 11121

 1     and given in London.  And I believe I'm looking at a version of the

 2     statement which I believe has been provided to the -- to the accused.

 3     And on page 2 of that, paragraph 5, I describe the meeting in the

 4     Jela restaurant and then the movement to Zepa.

 5             And I say about four lines down:

 6             "Later that afternoon, while Smith and Mladic met at the table on

 7     the top of the hill above Zepa, I went down into the village ..."

 8             So my estimate is that it would be sometime mid-afternoon.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This statement was given to representatives of

10     the OTP, of the Prosecutor's office of this Tribunal; is that correct?

11             THE WITNESS:  I understand so.  I understand that -- I forget

12     what the term is, but a version was given to them, yes.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

14             MR. ELDERKIN:  It would help to clarify, Your Honours, the

15     statement is an OTP witness statement provided during an interview by

16     members of the OTP with Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, and following the UK's

17     Rule 70 clearance of redacted version of the statement, it's been

18     disclosed to the Defence.  And I believe it appears on their list of

19     potential exhibits as 1D613.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

21             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. David, you shouldn't mind me asking for the exact time and

25     date.  Since this was registered by UNPROFOR and VRS, we know exactly

Page 11122

 1     where Tolimir was, whether he was in Zepa, accompanying the first convoy

 2     or the second.  You shouldn't mind me asking for that.  After all, I am

 3     defending myself in a court of law.

 4             Let's see what Joseph has to say about the weapons and this scene

 5     which gives you a sense of Holocaust.

 6             At page --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Can Mr. Tolimir repeat the transcript page of

 8     Mr. Joseph's testimony.  It was too fast.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At the moment we don't receive interpretation.

11     Please repeat the page number.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  It's

13     transcript page 10601, lines 6 through 7, where Mr. Joseph said:

14             "But, General Tolimir, you were in down-town Zepa.  I do not

15     recall whether you, yourself, carried any weapons."

16             My learned friend Mr. Elderkin can have his say now.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Elderkin.

18             MR. ELDERKIN:  It's only fair if General Tolimir is going to

19     refer to Mr. Joseph's evidence to state the date on which he is talking

20     about, and that's the 26th of July.  The witness has confirmed that he

21     was in Zepa on the 25th of July, the day before.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I said that

24     Edward Joseph testified on the 1st of March.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 11123

 1        Q.   My question is this: If he doesn't recall me carrying any

 2     weapons, how do you reconcile the fact that you remember me wielding a

 3     gun, so -- and that it was so firmly impressed in your memory that it

 4     reminded you of Holocaust?

 5        A.   Well, I think that it's been established we're talking about two

 6     different occasions here.  And on the occasion that I saw you with your

 7     gun in your hand, there was no one else of Mr. Joseph's description in

 8     Zepa with me.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You say that you weren't accompanied by anyone.  You

10     saw what he said in his statement, that he drew up lists in the morning.

11     Let's look at paragraph 16 and 17 of the statement you have on your

12     screen.  I'm quoting from paragraph 16, and this is what Edward Joseph

13     said:

14             "We created written lists of the evacuees, and, as far as I can

15     recall, we had a separate list for each vehicle.  I turned over those

16     lists at a later date, either to UNHCR or someone in UNPROFOR.  We tried

17     to place one UNPROFOR soldier on each vehicle, but I'm not sure if we

18     managed to do it throughout the time.

19             "The evacuation lasted probably three days or longer.  The

20     atmosphere was very tense throughout the time but we managed to board all

21     the people who had come to the centre and were willing to leave.  I

22     estimate that approximately 7.000 people were evacuated."

23             This is my question:  If Mr. Joseph, who was involved in the

24     evacuation and the drawing up of lists said, and I'm quoting only the

25     relevant portion, "We boarded all the people who had come to the centre

Page 11124

 1     and were willing to leave," does this mean that the Army of Republika

 2     Srpska did not engage in any sort of triage, screening, or separation of

 3     individuals but, rather, that it was done solely by the individuals I

 4     referred to earlier on:  Mr. Bezruchenko, Hajric, Avdo Palic, and they

 5     had a say in who was to leave or not?  Thank you.

 6        A.   I have no idea what process was used to organise the people who

 7     were evacuated from Zepa.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we must have our first break now, on

 9     technical reasons.

10             We adjourn and resume at 11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

13                           [Defence counsel confer]

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please continue your

15     cross-examination.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. David -- sorry, Mr. Wood, we have been discussing the

19     beginning of the evacuation for which you said happened on the 25th.  You

20     said you arrived at 3.00.  My question is whether the evacuation began

21     when you arrived or has -- had it already been under way?

22        A.   You remember that I estimated it was around 3.00.  No, the

23     evacuation appeared to have -- to be under way already.  But I hadn't

24     seen any evacuation prior to that, obviously.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us why, in your view -- or why do you

Page 11125

 1     believe there were only members of the VRS in Zepa and not those

 2     mentioned by Mr. Joseph in his statement, who organised the evacuation

 3     itself?

 4        A.   I have no idea.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You could see in his statement that he said he

 6     evacuated all those who arrived in the centre, so no one was left.  Do

 7     you know from any source whether anyone was singled out, taken off the

 8     buses and returned during the process of the evacuation you were able to

 9     observe?

10        A.   Well, going back to Edward Joseph's statement, I think it has

11     been established that his statement concerns the following day, not the

12     day I was there.  In answer to your question about whether I know of

13     anyone taken off the buses, the answer to that is no.

14        Q.   Thank you.  General Joseph's -- sorry, Mr. Joseph's statement was

15     given before the testimony and it concerns the entire evacuation.  I

16     quoted a particular part in which he says he cannot recall whether I had

17     any weapons on me.  It wasn't actually his statement but a single

18     sentence that I pointed out.  Actually, it was from his testimony on the

19     10th, I believe.  This is but a small excerpt.  I think he uttered it on

20     March 1 at transcript page 10601.

21             Did you know that the War Presidency, itself, and Avdo Palic, as

22     well as UNPROFOR representatives, organised the evacuation process from

23     Zepa and that it wasn't done by the VRS.  It wasn't the VRS soldiers who

24     carried out any screening or who decided who was to board the buses or

25     not.  Were you able to observe that in the centre of Zepa?

Page 11126

 1        A.   I've already told you what I saw in the centre of Zepa, which was

 2     you organising a group of, what I took to be, Bosnian Serb policemen,

 3     organising the loading onto vehicles of a few hundred women and children,

 4     mainly.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You said that I was wielding out a gun, thus carrying

 6     out ethnic cleansing.  I'm asking you, as a soldier, does a general

 7     secure the soldiers in his environment or that are a part of his escort;

 8     or are they there to secure, to provide security for the general?  Does

 9     General Smith take out his handgun when you are a part of his escort?

10        A.   I don't think there's much doubt that there's a big difference

11     between the sort of general that General Smith is and the sort of general

12     that you are.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  But this doesn't --

14             THE WITNESS:  The point I'm taking -- sorry.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... the real response to

16     the question of Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE WITNESS:  Well, I would not normally expect a normal general

18     to be wielding his pistol in these circumstances.  That's really my

19     point.  Why General Tolimir was wielding his pistol at that -- on that

20     occasion is something we can only speculate about.  But -- but the

21     question he asked is: Is this something a general would normally do, and

22     the answer is no.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, the question was slightly different:

24             "Does General Smith take out his handgun when you are a part of

25     his escort?"

Page 11127

 1             THE WITNESS:  No was the answer.  Sorry.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

 4     you, Mr. Wood.

 5             Let us look at D51, which is agreement of the 24th of July.

 6     We'll look into how it came about that the population was evacuated.

 7     We'll see the agreement itself.  It is on the screens now.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   This is the agreement on the disarmament of the able-bodied

10     population in the Zepa enclave, signed by the Rogatica Brigade commander,

11     Rajko Kusic; Dudnjik Semjon, who was there as the UNPROFOR commander for

12     Zepa; as well as Ratko Mladic and Hamdija Torlak.  It was signed on 24th

13     of July, 1995; that is to say, one day prior to your arrival.

14             Let's look at item 1.  It says:

15             "A cease-fire between the parties to the conflict shall be

16     implemented immediately."

17             My question is this: If there's cease-fire, why use weapons?  Of

18     what use are weapons in that situation?

19        A.   I'm sorry, I'm not quite sure how to answer that question.  If

20     there was a cease-fire, then I would not expect weapons to be used.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Would it be logical for General Tolimir to take out

22     his weapon surrounded by inhabitants of the area who were departing, who

23     were actually civilian?  Does it make any sense?

24        A.   Well, as I said earlier, I can only speculate as to why you had

25     your pistol out.  But it makes sense if the purpose was to frighten the

Page 11128

 1     population.  Otherwise, it makes no sense.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Why would I try to scare them if they were to leave

 3     for the territory where I lived and worked and they were supposed to

 4     traverse many kilometres?  Why would I try to scare them by pulling out a

 5     handgun?  Can you explain that to the Chamber perhaps?

 6        A.   Well, again, you're asking me to explain your actions and I'm

 7     unable to do that.  I can speculate that, for whatever reason, you wanted

 8     to continue the atmosphere of fear and intimidation that was evident in

 9     Zepa that afternoon, but I cannot explain your actions.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did the inhabitants start running away when they saw

11     me wielding the handgun and did they give up on being evacuated?

12        A.   No.  The inhabitants that I saw were thoroughly frightened, very

13     frightened, and many of them, as I mentioned, were either old or infirm

14     or they were mothers with children.  So I didn't see any run away.  But I

15     would question whether any of them could have run away, even if they'd

16     wanted to.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Please, you told the Chamber that you saw me wielding

18     a handgun, pointing upwards, conducting ethnic cleansing.  Let's look at

19     item 3 of the agreement, and there you can see perhaps whether I ordered

20     the ethnic cleansing to be carried out or was this a provision of the

21     agreement, mutually agreed to by both sides, and I merely took part in

22     it.

23             Paragraph 3:

24             "The civilian and able-bodied population of Zepa shall assemble

25     around the UNPROFOR base in Zepa, which will be a sign to the Army of the

Page 11129

 1     RS that the units under the command of Avdo Palic have accepted the truce

 2     and will not try to take advantage of it."

 3             My question is:  Were the VRS and its officers in any way

 4     outnumbered or in an inferior position, vis-a-vis the local population,

 5     so as to feel they had to defend themselves in this way?

 6        A.   No.  As I've already testified, there were probably 3- or 400

 7     people, local inhabitants there, and there were, in my estimate, about 8

 8     or 9 -- 7, 8, or 9 policemen and yourself there so they were not

 9     outnumbered -- so they were outnumbered, I beg your pardon.  But they

10     were outnumbered by women and children and old people.  There was not, in

11     my opinion, a reason to -- to use military force, by which I would mean

12     the brandishing of weapons or the using of weapons, in order to achieve

13     the objective that you appeared to be trying to achieve, which was

14     loading them onto the coaches.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Would such conduct divert people's attention away

16     from the process of evacuation or would they help evacuation in any way?

17        A.   When you say "such action," you mean waving guns around?

18        Q.   Precisely.  Would brandishing a weapon by any Serb officer

19     further persuade those Muslims to leave, or would it divert their

20     attention or put them in a position which they would decide not to

21     proceed with the evacuation?

22        A.   Well, as I've previously said, I can only speculate as to why you

23     had your weapon out.  But my speculation is that you may have wanted to

24     do so, in order to further frighten the people who were already quite

25     frightened so as to encourage them to conform with your instructions and

Page 11130

 1     to get into the buses and leave quietly.  But that is purely my

 2     interpretation of what it is you were doing.  I don't know what your

 3     purpose was.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Before we move on to a footage to see how it all

 5     began and whether they were, indeed, afraid of my gun, which, by the way,

 6     I did not even have, let's look at item 7 [Realtime transcript read in

 7     error "3"]:

 8             "In accordance with the Geneva Conventions of the 12th of August,

 9     1949, and the Additional Protocols of 1977, the civilian population of

10     Zepa shall be given the freedom to choose their place of residence while

11     hostilities continue."

12             My question is this: Since they were provided freedom of movement

13     during the hostilities, is it ethnic cleansing, indeed, because the

14     agreement is quite clear on the issue of evacuation only while

15     hostilities continue?

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

17             MR. ELDERKIN:  Just for the record, it seems that General Tolimir

18     is quoting from item 7, rather than item 3 as it appears in the

19     transcript.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Indeed.

21             Now the answer, please.

22             THE WITNESS:  I am not quite sure how I can answer this question.

23     The -- I don't have a definition of what "ethnic cleansing" is or means.

24     It is clear to me -- it was clear to me, standing in the square in Zepa,

25     that those who were being loaded onto the buses were being evacuated from

Page 11131

 1     Zepa against their will.  If that is what is defined by "ethnic

 2     cleansing," then that's what was occurring.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I'm asking you whether you said that General Tolimir

 5     ordered for the ethnic cleansing to take place.  I believe that was your

 6     formulation.  But telling us that I took out a gun and brandished it, did

 7     you try to present the situation as a situation of Holocaust in order to

 8     give a certain impression for the Court, or did you have any other

 9     motives for that, any other reasons?

10        A.   Well, you've asked two questions there.  As to the first one,

11     whether you ordered it or not, I do not know that.  I've only testified

12     that you were directing it.  I can only speculate as to whether you

13     ordered it, and I'm making a distinction between the physical carrying

14     out of the action on the ground which I saw you do and the orders for it,

15     which I did not see, and I cannot comment on who gave.

16             With regards to the second question, what I have tried to do for

17     clarity is to explain the sense that I got, as I stood in the square in

18     Zepa and saw the actions of you and your men, and I have equated it to

19     visions of the Holocaust simply to convey the sense of fear, the sense of

20     oppression that I witnessed.  As I've stressed already, I did not see any

21     direct -- any direct acts of violence, but what I did see was the use of

22     military force, fear, and coercion to evacuate a civilian population

23     which, at that point, consisted almost entirely of women, children, and

24     old people.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at P5704.  It is a footage taken in Zepa

Page 11132

 1     on the 25th of July.  Let's have a look at it at 36 minutes, 15 seconds,

 2     to 37 minutes, 50 seconds.  Actually, the exhibit is P740.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please stop.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   We see a person in uniform in the centre of the screen.  Do you

 7     know who it is?

 8        A.   Do you mean in the near ground?  Close to the camera?

 9        Q.   Thank you.  There's a single person in uniform in this still.  At

10     this moment, his back is turned to us, but when we play it again, we'll

11     see the face.

12             But, in any case, do you already know who that person is?

13        A.   I don't believe I do.  If you rewind it a couple of frames, I'll

14     have another look.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  We did rewind.  Do you know Avdo Palic, commander of

18     the Zepa Brigade?

19        A.   No.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Is this person part of the VRS in the way he is

21     moving about, or do you believe that he is freely moving about -- moving

22     among the population as part of that population?

23        A.   Are you talking about the person on the screen now?  This person?

24     Perhaps you could rewind the video so that I can see what you are talking

25     about.

Page 11133

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we need always for the record the time

 2     when the video was stopped.  I think this is at 37 minutes, .6.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We should rewind a bit more, as

 4     requested by the witness, so that he could see whether this particular

 5     person is escorting anyone.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You can see him move.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Can you see the person holding the papers in his hand?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please stop.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Did you see the person with some papers in his hand?

15        A.   I saw him.  If you could rewind again, I can get a better picture

16     of him.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Please stop.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   You saw it well, I believe.  You saw --

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.  Mr Tolimir.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   -- a number of sheets of paper --

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Again, Mr. Tolimir, we stopped at 37.21 minutes.

25     We saw two people with paper in their hands.  Are you referring to this

Page 11134

 1     person on the right-hand side of the screen in the blue shirt?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Yes, that is the

 3     person.  And there was another person whom I don't know.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Do you know who the person in the blue shirt is with the stack of

 6     paper in his hand?

 7        A.   No, I don't.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know the president of the War Presidency of

 9     Zepa, Mr. Mehmed Hajric?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   Thank you.  From the documents sent by UNPROFOR representatives

12     from Zepa, did you ever learn that he and the other person who we could

13     see created those lists and that they were in charge of evacuation,

14     deciding who was to board what bus at what time?

15        A.   Well, that is what your document appears to say, but you're

16     showing me a video of a different event from the event that I described

17     to you.

18        Q.   Thank you.  The Chamber will ascertain whether this footage was

19     taken on the 25th.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will go on playing the video.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please stop.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Am I holding a handgun or shaking hands with the gentleman who

25     was the Zepa Brigade commander?

Page 11135

 1        A.   You're shaking his hand.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The video was stopped at 37.45 -- 49 minutes.

 3             You should indicate that, Mr. Tolimir.  It's not my duty.  It's

 4     your examination.  But we need to have it clear on the record.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I've

 6     just only realised where it was that you were reading it from.  I can see

 7     it now clearly on the screen, 37.49.  My apologies.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you see three individuals here, one of whom is me?  Do you

10     recognise the other two?

11        A.   I don't recognise them, but you have told me that the man shaking

12     your hand was the ex-commander of the Zepa Brigade.  But I don't

13     refreshing either of the other two.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Please have a good look at the other individual

15     because you'll see him in another frame as a negotiator.  I can't

16     remember his name now.

17             Don't you see here that I'm in contact with representatives of

18     Zepa who signed the agreement on evacuation?  Since this is one of the

19     negotiators and the other person being the brigade commander, does it not

20     transpire that they agreed to the evacuation?

21        A.   Again, I cannot possibly comment on what they may or may not have

22     agreed with, with you.  What you have shown me is a video-clip of you

23     appearing to greet or maybe say good-bye to a man on the right who you

24     tell me is the ex-brigade commander.  I have no idea what passed between

25     you, either before or after that video.

Page 11136

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir.  That wasn't my question.  I wanted to tell you

 2     this:  Do they in any way exhibit fear?  We have the other individual

 3     smiling.  So did they react with fear when they saw me?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Again, I must emphasise, I was not present when this video was

 5     taken, so I can't comment on whether they were frightened or not.  In

 6     this particular frame, they don't look particularly frightened, I will

 7     agree.  But, then, again, they knew they were being video'd I cannot make

 8     a comment as to whether they were actually frightened or not.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  This is the beginning of the evacuation on the 25th.

10     And this is there for the Trial Chamber to ascertain.  The footage was

11     provided by the Prosecution, not by me.  Can we play it -- oh no, that's

12     the extent of the footage.

13             Let's read something to see how the evacuation came about.  Can

14     we have P740.  It's the same footage but we'll be reviewing the portion

15     from 25 to 26 minutes, and if the audio is too poor, I'll read out later

16     on what was said.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we stop there?  Thank you.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   A moment ago, in the frame showing the centre of Zepa, was it

21     this individual that you saw there?  Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the record, the video was

23     stopped at 25.19.  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  It looks like the same man.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 11137

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now continue playing the

 3     video?

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Please pay attention to what you can hear and read.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please pause there.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   When General Mladic asked, What do you want?  The person in the

10     white shirt said, He doesn't know.  I'll speak.  And that's

11     Hamdija Torlak, the signatory to the agreement I showed you a moment ago,

12     pursuant to which the evacuation took place.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we continue playing the video,

14     please.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Stop, please.  We need the time when you stopped

16     the video.  Every time you stop the video you should indicate, like all

17     parties have to do that.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

19     video was stopped at 25 minutes, 49 seconds.

20             Can we continue playing it, please.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we pause there.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Did you hear the representative or the signatory to the agreement

25     say, We called our government.

Page 11138

 1             Were you able to hear this, or read this?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I didn't see that, no.  Perhaps you could rewind it till --

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir --

 5             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] I have to say this was at

 6     26 minutes, 8 seconds when we stopped the footage.  And the witness wants

 7     it rewound in order for him to see and hear what Mr. Torlak said.  So can

 8     we rewind, please.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10              MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Rather than waste time by reviewing this footage which the

12     Trial Chamber has had occasion to look at repeatedly, I would like to

13     draw your attention to some of the interesting parts of the transcript.

14     We've stopped the clip at 27 minutes, 3 seconds.  And I'll tell you what

15     transpired in these several minutes, since the audio was quite poor, at

16     least from what I was able to hear.  The transcript says:

17             "We called our government," et cetera, "now we've come here to

18     try and arrange one thing.  We agreed that under the circumstances, the

19     issue of Zepa is best resolved by having the entire population of Zepa

20     leave safely and of free will."

21             That's what Hamdija Torlak said, who signed the agreement and

22     asked for the evacuation of the people.  He was the president of the

23     local government and, at the same time, the president of the

24     War Presidency of Zepa.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you should call up the transcript.

Page 11139

 1     In the subtitles we have seen, there was a different language.  There

 2     was -- I didn't see anything about that these people have called their

 3     government.  I didn't see that.  And if you are reading from text, you

 4     should call -- call it up on the screen.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I have a

 6     transcript of the video which I was reading from.  And as for the video

 7     footage itself, I don't know -- I don't speak English.  He said, We

 8     called the government.  He didn't say, We called the government in

 9     Sarajevo.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we need the document on the screen,

11     the transcript.  I don't have it.  We have to check it.  And if you want

12     to put a question to this part of the transcript to the witness, he

13     should see it.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 13 of the

15     transcript?  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which is the document number?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 740.  Thank you.  That's from

18     25 minutes to 26 minutes.  That's the portion of the footage.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This can't be the relevant part of the

20     transcript, at least in English.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I said page 13.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In both languages?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honour.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   As we can see, line 27, in Serbian, that's where I'm reading

Page 11140

 1     from.  In English, that's line 2 or 3.

 2             It reads:

 3             "Hamdija Torlak says [unintelligible]," so the person

 4     transcribing couldn't make it out.  "In our work," et cetera, "we came to

 5     try to arrange one thing.  We agreed that in this situation the issue of

 6     Zepa would be resolved in the best way if the entire population left the

 7     zone of Zepa safely."

 8             That's the line that I wanted to read out and that was the

 9     foundation for the question I was going to put.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

11             MR. ELDERKIN:  Your Honour, I still don't see any reference to

12     the government or any of the quote that General Tolimir previously read

13     out, and I think it would help, since he spent some time narrating that,

14     to identify where that is, please.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed, that was my concern as well.  Page 55,

16     lines 5 through 9, Mr. Tolimir, you told the Chamber the transcript says

17     and then you quoted:

18             "We called our government," et cetera, "now we have come here to

19     try and arrange one thing.  We agreed that under the circumstances, the

20     issue of Zepa is best resolved, by having the entire population of Zepa

21     leave safely and of free will."

22             I don't see this text here in the document in front of us.  It is

23     it quite similar, but without this mentioning of any government.  Could

24     you please clarify that.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11141

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   You see where it reads "unintelligible" as written by someone

 3     who, for the purposes of the Prosecution, transcribed this.  And then it

 4     goes on to say, "In our work," et cetera.  However, in Serbian, we can

 5     hear the person say, "We called our government," et cetera, and then from

 6     there continues the text.  "We came here to try to arrange one thing.  We

 7     agreed that in this situation the issue of Zepa would best be resolved if

 8     the entire population left the zone of Zepa safely."

 9             I don't know what the English reads because I can't speak

10     English.  Thank you?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  There's still a difference.  We can't make it

12     out.  You should put a question to the witness.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So based on what you see here, who asked that the civilian

16     population be evacuated, a representative of the VRS or a representative

17     of the civilian population, here in the person of Hamdija Torlak, in the

18     process of negotiating with General Mladic?  Thank you.

19        A.   Well, it appears from the transcript that you've offered and the

20     video that you've offered that that -- that the person who you've

21     identified as the lead Bosnian Muslim says, We come here to try to

22     arrange one thing.  So the implication is that they are seeking to

23     arrange something.

24             But you're asking me to comment on -- on a dialogue that I was

25     not present at, that I have no knowledge of, and so I can't really tell

Page 11142

 1     you what was meant by either party in that conversation.

 2        Q.   Thank you for your answer.  I put this to you because you said

 3     that I had ordered ethnic cleansing, whereas, it's the president of the

 4     executive committee of the municipal assembly doing that.  Thank you for

 5     your answer.

 6        A.   I am sorry.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

 8             MR. ELDERKIN:  I object to the question because the witness was

 9     very clear about saying he had no knowledge of who ordered the ethnic

10     cleansing.  He simply saw General Tolimir directing the process down in

11     Zepa town and it appears to be a deliberate misstatement of the witness's

12     answer.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We can go back to the transcript of today.

14     Page 22, lines 10 to 14, and I quote:

15             "It was a very strange experience for me to be standing there as

16     a UN soldier in a blue beret, standing there amongst what was very

17     obviously an unpleasant act of admittedly non-violent ethnic cleansing

18     going on directed by General Tolimir and his men."

19             This was -- the witness who has testified about this situation

20     this morning, this is the basic -- we are now discussing on and

21     Mr. Tolimir is putting questions in relation to that.

22             We should be very precise in choosing our words.

23             Mr. Elderkin.

24             MR. ELDERKIN:  I don't have the direct reference but I clearly

25     recall an answer where the witness distinguished, in his view, military

Page 11143

 1     terms between ordering and directing.  I think that should be reflected,

 2     if the question is put back to him.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, indeed, he was asked later in relation to

 4     this first answer.  The first answer included the words "directed by

 5     General Tolimir and his men."

 6              "Directed," I repeat.  So later on there was a more precise

 7     explanation.  I don't know where it is in the transcript, but you should

 8     continue, Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you remember a frame from the video featuring an individual

12     whose name appeared on the screen as Hamdija -- or, rather,

13     Mehmed Hajric, who had that blue shirt on and had those papers in his

14     hands that His Honour asked about?  So do you remember this individual

15     and the other one next to him carrying papers in his hand?  Thank you.

16        A.   I remember you showing me the video of these people, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you observe that they were the ones directing the

18     boarding and evacuation?  Did you see any members of the Army of

19     Republika Srpska present there or was there only the president of the

20     municipal assembly of Zepa wearing a blue shirt, accompanied by a man

21     with lists in his hand?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, there are two points to make here.  The first is that

23     earlier on in the same video, there was in the background a group of what

24     appeared to be soldiers from the Bosnian Serb army.  So they were present

25     at the video you have shown me.

Page 11144

 1             But, secondly, as I've said previously, you were showing me a

 2     video of an event that I was not present at, at that time.  I don't know

 3     exactly when this video was taken but it is not a video of the evacuation

 4     that I stood amongst.  So you're showing me two different things.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You had a camera and could have filmed it, and the

 6     Prosecution would have showed it then.  This is a Prosecution video, not

 7     mine.

 8                           [Defence counsel confer]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

10             MR. ELDERKIN:  [Microphone not activated] ... any basis at all

11     for the comment that General Tolimir just made.  If he has got a basis

12     for that, can he please put it, that if the witness had a camera and

13     could have filmed it.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We'll

16     show Mr. Gibb's statement later on about the equipment brought in

17     precisely by the members referred to by the witness.  Now, if we need to

18     show it now, we can drop this line of questioning for the time being and

19     present it at this stage.  I can put this question to the witness right

20     away.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Does he know what sort of equipment his colleague Dibb brought

23     into Zepa illegally or legally?  Thank you.

24        A.   I have no idea.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, did you have a camera with you, when you

Page 11145

 1     were in Zepa?

 2             THE WITNESS:  I personally did not have a camera.  I don't

 3     remember there being any cameras there.  I do remember some video'ing

 4     going on at the top of the hill during the meeting between General Smith

 5     and General Mladic that preceded my journey down into Zepa that was

 6     video'd by the Serbs, by the Bosnian Serbs.  But I certainly didn't take

 7     a camera down into Zepa myself, and I didn't have a camera, and I'm not

 8     aware of any other cameras that might have been down there.  And I don't

 9     know whether Mr. Dibb had a camera.  I would rather doubt it.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And my question and the answer of the witness was

11     in relation to -- was in relation to your question, Mr. Tolimir, page 60,

12     lines 13 through 15.  You said to the witness:

13             "You had a camera and could have filmed it and the Prosecution

14     would have showed it then."

15             And Mr. Elderkin was asking for a foundation for this statement

16     that this witness had a camera.

17             But we have received an answer now, that he didn't have a camera.

18     Please carry on.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I

20     apologise to the witness.  I said "you" and I meant UNPROFOR

21     representatives.  Later on, we'll show a document and a statement wherein

22     Mr. Dibb stated that he was able to bring in special equipment illegally.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please tell us, the frame where you saw the president of the

25     War Presidency of Zepa and other associates of his carrying papers, was

Page 11146

 1     it filmed in Zepa or outside of it, in your view, including the

 2     evacuation of civilians from Zepa?

 3        A.   I don't know, and, therefore, I can't give you a categorical

 4     answer.  It looks to me as if it was filmed in Zepa but I only went there

 5     once -- into the village once in my life, so I can't be certain about

 6     that.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question for the witness.

 8             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 9             At page 60 of today's transcript -- sorry.  Yeah, page 60,

10     lines 6 and 7, you have stated as follows:

11             "Well there are two points to make here.  The first is that

12     earlier on in the same video, there was in the background of what

13     appeared to be soldiers from the Bosnian Serb army."

14             Earlier in the same video, we were looking at another soldier in

15     uniform who you failed to identify.  Now, the uniform that was worn by

16     soldiers of the opposite sides how -- how would you be in a position to

17     distinguish between soldiers wearing Bosnian Serb army and soldiers

18     wearing the camouflage from the Muslim army?  Thank you.

19             THE WITNESS:  That's a very good question.  And one of the

20     problems in Bosnia at the time is that they all wore, more or less, the

21     same uniform.  The reason why I made the distinction in the video that I

22     was shown, and this is the first time I have seen that video that I can

23     recollect, was because the soldiers that I pointed out as soldiers were

24     armed.  They were carrying weapons.  And whilst you are quite correct, I

25     don't know for certain that they were Bosnian Serb soldiers.  I find it

Page 11147

 1     highly likely that they were Bosnian Serb soldiers because they were

 2     armed and, if not directly supervising the evacuation, they were

 3     certainly standing around and accompanying it.

 4             So it is a deduction, really.

 5             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             To be fully precise and correct, let's show D112, which is

 9     Mr. Dibb's statement.  Specifically page 2.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Let's see exactly what it was that Mr. Dibb said.  He didn't

12     refer to filming equipment but to highly sophisticated or sophisticated

13     equipment.  Let me quote.  We have is on our screen, and the last

14     paragraph on both pages of page 2 reads:

15             "On the 25th of July, I was -- I was woken up at midnight and

16     told that a plan had been created to send a team into Zepa.  This was to

17     include Joint Commission Observers, two men:  A SAS captain and a

18     staff-sergeant.  I was to accompany them.  I believe I was chosen to go

19     because of my language skills.  Our job was to report back directly to

20     General Smith's HQ exactly what was taking place in Zepa.  We had with us

21     sophisticated radio equipment.  I do not think that the VRS knew what

22     equipment we had or they may not have let us into Zepa.  We were told

23     that we were going to Zepa for two to five days with secure

24     communications to report back to BHC what was happening in Zepa.  I was

25     to report through the JCO's Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter and through him to

Page 11148

 1     General Smith."

 2             This is the reference I made to Mr. Dibb.

 3             This is my question:  Did you, and I mean your members, when you

 4     were in Zepa, were you members of the British Army?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I -- for the whole of my service, I was a member of the

 6     British Army, as were all of my men.  The -- the UN Protection Force in

 7     Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, was made up of contingents of different

 8     nationalities, soldiers of different nationalities, who were attached to

 9     UNPROFOR, seconded to UNPROFOR.  They remained members of their own army

10     in that period, but while they were working in Yugoslavia, they were

11     attached to UNPROFOR.  So my role there, and the role of my men, was to

12     remain a member of the British Army but be attached to the

13     UN Protection Force.

14        Q.   Thank you.  To be more precise, I believe we ought to say that

15     you were a member of the British Army, not a member of UNPROFOR.  Were

16     you officially a member of UNPROFOR; that is to say, of the international

17     peacekeeping force, or were you primarily a member of the British Army?

18        A.   I and my men were officially, and in all practical purposes,

19     seconded to UNPROFOR.  We were members of UNPROFOR by any definition you

20     might care to apply.  We were also, of course, members of the

21     British Army that we came from and that we returned to.  But if you are

22     trying to suggest that we were there as -- we were there and that we were

23     not members of UNPROFOR then that is not correct.  We were there and we

24     were members of UNPROFOR.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Who was your immediate superior?  Who were you

Page 11149

 1     subordinated to?

 2        A.   My immediate superior was General Smith.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Was he your superior with regard to the British Army

 4     or with regard to UNPROFOR?  Because each command has its own structure

 5     and unit.  So what structure did you belong to?

 6        A.   Well, as you know, and as you correctly state, each

 7     troop-contributing nation has a head of their contribution.  And in our

 8     case, in the British case, the head of the British contribution to

 9     UNPROFOR was for most of my time -- was a guy called Brigadier Pringle,

10     who was based in Gornji Vakuf.  He was technically in charge of all

11     military forces who were in Bosnia at the time.  However, in practical

12     terms, my -- my boss, my immediately superior was General Smith, because

13     I lived and worked in his headquarters in the residency in Sarajevo and

14     because my role and function, and those of my men, was to support his

15     work in Bosnia.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Had something happened to you in the war, who would

17     have been responsible for that?  The Security Council of the UN, the UN

18     command structure, or the British Army?

19        A.   You have to explain what you mean by something happened to me.

20     Do you mean -- what do you mean by that?

21        Q.   When serving with the UN, a soldier can suffer any kind of fate,

22     including the worst one.  Had something happened to you, who would have

23     provided for your pension to be paid out?

24        A.   Well, that's not something I paid much attention to.  But my

25     understanding is, and you would perhaps have to get a more expert witness

Page 11150

 1     to tell you about the detail of the status of forces agreement between

 2     the countries and the UN and so on.  But certainly my understanding is

 3     that in the event of death or injury of an UNPROFOR soldier, then the

 4     troop-contributing nation takes responsibility for his treatment, his

 5     care, repatriation of body and so on.  But I'm not really an expert in

 6     that so you would have to ask somebody who is.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt for a moment and put a question.

 8             Sir, who was the direct superior of General Smith during that

 9     time he served in Bosnia?

10             THE WITNESS:  As I recall, his direct superior, I think, was a

11     French General, called General Janvier, who, I think I'm right in

12     remembering, was based in Zagreb and who had responsibility for all of

13     the forces in the Balkans, I believe.  So General Smith, while he was

14     working in Sarajevo, was, if you like, an UN general and had a

15     responsibility through an UN chain of command up to General Janvier and

16     then to, I think, the Security Council.  The question that the defendant

17     asked me was in relation to the national command, which was sort of an

18     administrative and legal command, if you like, that went back through

19     heads of forces, back to their own countries and applied to all nations

20     that contributed forces there.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

22             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Please tell us this, Mr. Wood:  Could General Janvier issue

Page 11151

 1     orders directly to you?

 2        A.   To -- issue his orders directly to me?  No.

 3        Q.   I didn't ask you whether he did.  I wanted to know whether he

 4     could issue orders directly to you; whether General Janvier, who was

 5     superior to General Smith, could issue orders directly to you.

 6        A.   Again, you would probably have to ask somebody with a more

 7     detailed knowledge of the precise wording of the various status of forces

 8     agreements to see what the legal limits on orders were, and I don't know

 9     really.  Because for practical purposes, all the orders I received were

10     from General Smith and I cannot think of a scenario where General Janvier

11     would have asked me directly to do something.  But if there was a

12     scenario where he had a personal requirement to deploy the JCOs into some

13     particular area, then I'm sure what he would have done is told

14     General Smith and General Smith would have told me.  But I don't recall

15     that ever happening.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us this, please:  Could someone standing in for

17     General Smith, who otherwise was his subordinate, in General Smith's

18     absence, issue orders to you?

19        A.   Yes.  Because, like any military command structure, there is

20     scope to -- to operate successfully if a particular part of that

21     structure is missing or absent.  And if General Smith had been absent on

22     duty or unable to issue orders, then either his deputy who was a French

23     general, called General Gobillard, or his Chief of Staff, who was a Dutch

24     general called General Nicolai, would have given orders.

25             As it is, I can't remember any circumstances when they did give

Page 11152

 1     orders to the JCOs, but they could have done so, because they would have

 2     been acting in the name of and with the authority of General Smith.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall whether anyone issued an order to you

 4     personally by-passing General Smith?  Did anyone issue any orders to you,

 5     save for General Smith, while you were in Zepa and attending to your

 6     other duties?

 7        A.   I need to ask you to clarify.  Do you mean anyone within

 8     UNPROFOR?

 9        Q.   Anyone other than General Smith.  In practice, did that happen?

10        A.   Nobody in UNPROFOR that I can remember issued me any orders,

11     aside from General Smith.  If you want to get into the area of whether

12     there were in the national orders issued to me, then I think that we are

13     moving into an area that I'm not permitted to comment on under Rule 70.

14     (redacted)

15     (redacted)

16     (redacted)

17     (redacted)

18     (redacted)

19     (redacted)

20                           [Private session]

21     (redacted)

22     (redacted)

23     (redacted)

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 11153











11     Page 11153 redacted. Private session.















Page 11154

 1     (redacted)

 2     (redacted)

 3     (redacted)

 4     (redacted)

 5     (redacted)

 6     (redacted)

 7     (redacted)

 8     (redacted)

 9     (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Sir, can you tell us whether your stay in Zepa was legal from the

16     standpoint of the authorities of Republika Srpska?

17        A.   I -- the answer to that question is that I -- I can't comment

18     from the standpoint of the authorities of Republika Srpska.  I have no

19     idea what they would regard as legal or illegal.  I was there legally as

20     a member of the UNPROFOR under the orders of the UNPROFOR commander, and

21     that is as far as it goes.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Are you responsible or answerable to any warring

23     party for your actions in the time of war; or are you only answerable to

24     your own command and your own national forces while acting in a territory

25     controlled by the warring parties?

Page 11155

 1        A.   I'm not sure that I understand your question correctly.  Perhaps

 2     you could rephrase it.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I will.

 4             Do you have any obligations vis-a-vis the side whose territory

 5     you used while performing your tasks; or is your only responsibility

 6     towards the -- towards those superior to you within your national

 7     contingent or those you were directly subordinated to?

 8        A.   I see.  Again, you would have to refer to a more -- to a more

 9     expert witness than me to discuss the -- the detail of the status of

10     forces agreements between the various elements here.  But from a

11     practical personal perspective, my responsibility was to my commander,

12     and I had no responsibility as such towards any of the warring factions

13     within whose areas we operated.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Does it mean that you could stay illegally in the

15     territory of those warring factions, and that even in such a case you

16     wouldn't be called to task to explain your actions to any of the warring

17     factions but only to those you were subordinated to?

18        A.   Again, the details of the agreement by which UNPROFOR was present

19     in the former Yugoslavia are an area you should explore with somebody

20     else.  But my understanding of it is that UNPROFOR could go anywhere and

21     do anything for practical reasons without either needing the authority of

22     or being responsible to any of the warring parties.  In practice, of

23     course, that simply wasn't possible because many of the warring parties

24     failed to abide by the agreements that had UNPROFOR there in the first

25     place, and so UNPROFOR had very limited freedom of movement in practical

Page 11156

 1     terms.  But in legal terms, I believe, but I stand to be corrected if

 2     somebody more expert can do so -- in legal terms, I believe UNPROFOR

 3     could go where it wanted.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Somewhat later, we will show you the agreement on the

 5     movement of UNPROFOR across the territory of the warring factions; in

 6     this case, the RS.

 7             Could we next have 1D614, which is your statement, paragraph 4,

 8     on page 2.  You provided the statement to the OTP, and it will serve as

 9     the basis for my next question.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's have it on the screen first.

11     Yes.  Paragraph 4, please.  1D614.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Elderkin.

13             MR. ELDERKIN:  Your Honour, I'm seeing something on the screen

14     now that appears to refer to an unrelated protected witness and shouldn't

15     be broadcast.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It shouldn't be broadcast, indeed.  Mr. Tolimir,

17     you should check the right number.

18                           [Defence counsel confer]

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My legal assistant is telling me

20     that the number is 613, rather than 614.  Thank you, Aleksander.  I

21     apologise for having provided the wrong number for e-court.

22             It is 1D613.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Is this the statement you signed?

25        A.   Yes, it is.

Page 11157

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2, please, paragraph 4,

 3     lines 1 through 3.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   We can see it now in both languages.  This part was not redacted:

 6             "In Bosnia, I was based in the residency and commanded the JCO

 7     teams deployed throughout Bosnia."

 8             You stated as much in your statement.

 9             My question is this:  Why was it called "Joint Commission

10     Observers"?  Perhaps you can explain to the Bench why the word "joint"

11     appears.

12        A.   The establishment of the Joint Commission Observers preceded my

13     arrival.  It had been running for I think six or maybe nine months before

14     I arrived.  And my understanding is, remains, that the Joint Commission

15     Observers was set up to provide a verification reporting and facilitation

16     ability to assist the joint commission, which, if I remember correctly,

17     was made up of all parties and surrounded the Cessation of Hostilities

18     Agreement that was signed in, I think, 1994.  So the Joint Commission

19     Observers were sort of borne out of that Cessation of Hostilities

20     Agreement as a means of verifying, facilitating and reporting what was

21     going on, so that the agreement might hold together; in fact, of course,

22     it didn't, but the Joint Commission Observers continued after that time.

23             That's my understanding of the origins of the title.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us for the record who organised it and

25     why it was called joint?  Were there a number of forces from a number of

Page 11158

 1     countries, or did only the British Army participate in it; that is to

 2     say, the special unit of the British air force?

 3        A.   My understanding is that when it was originally conceived it

 4     would be a multi-national force.  It was to be a multi-national force; in

 5     particular, including the French and the Dutch.  The reality was that by

 6     the time that I came to command it and it was effectively a British unit,

 7     but it was serving as part of UNPROFOR and was, therefore, an UN unit.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please, whether the unit took part in

 9     guiding air-strikes, since it was a unit of the special command of the

10     British air force?

11        A.   The JCOs were governed by exactly the same rules of engagement as

12     applied to all UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, and they essentially were that

13     they could uses military force to protect themselves, that was

14     fundamentally the justification.  So they had no additional offensive

15     role, if that's what you're trying to imply.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did they take part in the guiding of the air-strikes?

17     Were they forward air spotters?

18        A.   Any soldier with a radio can direct an air-strike.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you whether you and your men directed any

20     air-strikes; for example, during Operation Srebrenica, or the operation

21     in Zepa?  Did you direct air-strikes?

22        A.   During the operation in Srebrenica, there was occasion for my men

23     to call air support in order to safe-guard themselves and those whom it

24     was their duty to protect, and on that occasion they used NATO air.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And in Zepa, during the operation in Zepa?

Page 11159

 1             THE WITNESS:  No.  I had no men in Zepa prior to the elimination

 2     of the -- of the enclave by the Bosnian Serb forces.  And, of course,

 3     after that, there was no fighting there anyway.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 5             Mr. Tolimir, we must have our second break now, and we will

 6     resume at 1.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please continue your

10     examination.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Wood, we left off when I was asking you if your soldiers in

14     Srebrenica had participated in guiding aviation.  Can you give me a

15     direct answer to that question, if you can?

16        A.   I thought I had given you an answer.  Yes, they had in Srebrenica

17     been involved in guiding a NATO air attack, yes.

18        Q.   Thank you for your repeating that answer.

19             Tell us, were they given the opposite order by the commander of

20     UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica, his deputy, or somebody from the UNPROFOR

21     HQ in Sarajevo?  Or, in fact, who was it who issued the order to them to

22     establish contact with the aviation?  Thank you.

23        A.   A soldier does not need to be ordered in order to defend himself.

24     They came under threat and they defended themselves.  Throughout that

25     action they were in touch with me directly and so if anyone was giving

Page 11160

 1     them order, it was me.  But they didn't needed to be ordered to defend

 2     themselves.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did any of them go out into the field to search

 4     tanks -- Serb tanks in Srebrenica?  Were they told by anyone that they

 5     had to search and detect tanks and indicate their position?  Were they --

 6     these sort of orders given to the soldiers in the field?  Thank you.

 7        A.   Well, you must remember, as I've stated before, that their job

 8     was to report accurately, clearly and in a timely fashion what was going

 9     on.  So in the case of Srebrenica, they provided minute-by-minute

10     response and information to me -- minute-by-minute response and

11     information to me and what was going on.  So to that extent, they

12     obviously were identifying all of the warring factions' forces and

13     reporting their positions to me.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were the one issuing orders, can you tell

15     us where you were located when NATO opened fire on the VRS tanks in

16     Srebrenica?  Thank you.

17        A.   I was in my headquarters in Sarajevo, in the Residency.

18        Q.   Thank you.  While you were in the Residency, does that mean you

19     were not a member of UNPROFOR at the time, since you were not billeted in

20     UNPROFOR quarters?  Thank you.

21        A.   I've already made it very clear to you that I was a member of

22     UNPROFOR at that time and all the times I was in Yugoslavia, and I was

23     billeted in UNPROFOR accommodation.  In the Residency, as you may

24     remember -- the Residency accommodated probably 150 people of UNPROFOR

25     within its grounds and I stay -- and that's where I lived.

Page 11161

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, who did you receive orders from to have NATO

 2     open fire on the VRS?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Again, I have already stated quite clearly, a soldier does not

 4     need to be ordered to defend himself.  The soldiers who I had under my

 5     command who were in Srebrenica during the period in which the

 6     Bosnian Serb army attacked Srebrenica came under fire themselves, and

 7     they were fully authorised to use whatever force they required in order

 8     to safeguard themselves or those whom its their duty to protect.  And

 9     they didn't need me to order them to do that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell the Trial Chamber this:  When your

11     soldier is in contact with a plane, is that soldier armed with the same

12     weapons that an aircraft would dispose of, such as rockets, et cetera?

13        A.   I think you know the answer to that very well.  Most soldiers do

14     not carry around rockets or bombs.  A soldier of this sort that I

15     described has a radio through which he can communicate to an aeroplane

16     that is able to deliver weapons carried on aeroplanes, such as rockets

17     and bombs.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Tell Their Honours then, does that mean that the

19     soldier would have at his disposal all the combat hardware that the

20     particular aircraft is equipped with?  Thank you.

21        A.   Well, if you take yourself back to the time in question, you'll

22     recall that UNPROFOR, operating on the ground in Yugoslavia, enjoyed the

23     protection when it required it of the NATO air forces that were based at

24     the time in -- mainly in Italy.  So that when and if UNPROFOR needed to

25     utilise air power in order to protect itself or those whom it was its

Page 11162

 1     duty to protect, then it had the option of requesting that air support

 2     which was then delivered by NATO.  So, in a sense, therefore, your

 3     question -- or the answer to your question is, did any soldier who has

 4     legitimately got reason to call for air support to protect himself or

 5     those whom it is his duty to protect has access to whatever weapons

 6     systems are available on the NATO aircraft at the time.  But, of course,

 7     the NATO aircraft at the time are operating to their own rules of

 8     engagement, and you have to have a witness here who is familiar with

 9     those to tell what they are or they were.

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Wood.  Does this mean that every soldier would

11     independently take decisions as to when a NATO intervention would be

12     warranted because of the actions of any of the sides?  Thank you.

13        A.   Well, as I recall there was a process by which UNPROFOR could

14     request the support of NATO in order to protect itself.  I was not part

15     of that process because it was a -- a request, I think, that had to be

16     made from General Smith to General Janvier, from General Janvier to

17     Admiral Smith, who was commander of the NATO forces in the area in order

18     to release air support.  So --

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let the witness continue with his answer.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  I was just, therefore, going to say

22     that -- that -- that clearly -- clearly you cannot have a situation, and

23     we did not have a situation, where every single soldier can ask for NATO

24     air power whenever they wanted.  That is not the case.  However, where

25     there was a case for airpower to be released to support UNPROFOR and

Page 11163

 1     where that request was made and was accepted and granted, then, as I said

 2     earlier on in my evidence, any soldier with a radio can then direct that

 3     air power on the ground.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You said that General Smith was in command of NATO, I

 6     may have misheard.  Who was it who demanded NATO?

 7        A.   No, sorry.  There is an understandable confusion there.

 8     General Smith was in charge of UNPROFOR and there was an America admiral,

 9     called Admiral Smith, who was the -- if I remember correctly, was the

10     senior NATO officer.  You are not the only person to be confused by that.

11        Q.   Thank you for clarifying the roles that Rupert Smith and

12     Layton Smith played respectively.

13             Is it necessary for the Security Council to approve the use of

14     NATO aviation as well?  Thank you.

15        A.   You're asking the wrong person here.  I'm not really familiar

16     with the operations -- or the operating of the Security Council.  I've

17     given you my understanding of how it worked at a local level, and you

18     would have to get another witness to describe to you how it worked at the

19     Security Council level.

20        Q.   Thank you.  My assistant said that it wasn't properly recorded in

21     the transcript where I said Layton Smith and Rupert Smith.

22             Once we rectify this error in the transcript, tell me, were you

23     subordinated to NATO and I mean your unit, the British contingent, or

24     were you subordinated to someone else in accomplishing missions involving

25     the use of aviation?

Page 11164

 1        A.   I repeat what I said before, which is that the unit that I

 2     commanded, the Joint Commission Observers, was seconded to UNPROFOR

 3     solely.  We worked for UNPROFOR, and we operated under the rules of

 4     engagement and the legal authority of UNPROFOR only.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I am told that the transcript doesn't reflect that I

 6     said combat use of aviation.

 7             My question was:  When air power is employed, in that instances,

 8     under whose command would your troops be, under NATO or UNPROFOR command?

 9        A.   You're making what in English we would say is a mountain out of a

10     mole hill here.  The -- as I've said to you very clearly, my soldiers for

11     the entire time they were in Bosnia were under UNPROFOR command and they

12     operated under UNPROFOR's command only, abiding by UNPROFOR's rules of

13     engagement.  On occasions when UNPROFOR required to use NATO air to

14     protect itself, then it was necessary for my soldiers, just like any

15     other soldiers to direct NATO air.  But, on those occasions, they were

16     still operating as UNPROFOR's soldiers under UNPROFOR's rules of

17     engagement.  There is no change in their status just because they

18     happened to be using an air-strike.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show D173.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   While we're waiting for it to appear, let me go back to your

23     answer.  You didn't answer my question.  I didn't ask what the status of

24     soldiers was, but, rather, who they would receive orders from while

25     aviation is used to engage land targets.

Page 11165

 1        A.   Well, with respect, I think I have answered that question because

 2     I have stressed several times now that throughout this period they were

 3     operating under UNPROFOR's command and under my command.  That did not

 4     change at any point.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And, Mr. Tolimir, indeed, the witness has

 6     answered this question in particular several times.

 7             Please go ahead.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 9             I apologise to e-court.  I called up the wrong number.  We need

10     D137.  My apologies.  Thank you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Wood.  What we see here is the transcript

13     entitled:  "Srebrenica's Death Fields," a documentary film of

14     Radio Television of Serbia, broadcast on the 9th of July, 2010.

15             Let me direct your attention to third paragraph where it reads:

16             "Hakija Meholjic, member of the Srebrenica War Presidency, 1993

17     to 1995, in other words during the relevant period of time.

18             "In the meantime, Karremans arrived requesting a meeting.  I told

19     him five more minutes so we can first agree amongst ourselves because we

20     have no reason to trust you anymore.  We arranged everything, then we

21     received him for talks and he said that NATO had informed him that on the

22     following morning at half past 5.00, a death zone would be set around

23     Srebrenica.  Everything that moves about on two, four, or 100 feet, or

24     100 wheels, one wheel, or on two wheels, that it would be destroyed."

25             This is my question:  Was this order issued by someone from

Page 11166

 1     UNPROFOR or was it NATO that determined when the death zone would come

 2     into effect?

 3        A.   The simple answer to that is, I don't know.  I don't recognise

 4     the term "death zone."  There were, as you know, some zones that were

 5     referred to as safe havens.  As to who gave the orders relating to those,

 6     I have no idea.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know if the planes took off from Italy to open

 8     fire on the Army of Republika Srpska in the demilitarised zone of

 9     Srebrenica at the time of the relevant events in Srebrenica?

10        A.   If you're asking me whether I know where the aeroplanes came

11     from, then, as far as I'm aware, most of them came from air bases in

12     Italy.  But I don't know that for a fact.  That is just my impression.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know if the aeroplanes took off from the air

14     bases in Italy in order to carry out the strikes as described by

15     Hakija Meholjic here, who was, in turn, informed about it by Karremans

16     who learned it from NATO?  Thank you.

17        A.   You are asking these questions of the wrong person here.  I have

18     no knowledge of NATO's orders at the time or the orders given to the

19     aeroplanes at the time.  If you want to know that, would you have to call

20     a witness that had knowledge of those things, and I don't.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Were your soldier given any sort of task related to

22     the mass scale engagement of aviation in Srebrenica at the relevant time?

23     Thank you.

24        A.   Well, what I've said to you already, several times, is that a

25     soldier does not need to be ordered in order to defend himself.  My

Page 11167

 1     soldiers that I had in Srebrenica came under direct attack from

 2     Bosnian Serb forces and they used all the means at their disposal in

 3     order to defend themselves, including NATO air.  They didn't need orders

 4     to do that; that's their job.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Did they need as many as 40 aircraft to defend

 6     themselves from the attack you referred to?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I don't know where you get the figure 40 from.  But they needed

 8     whatever they needed, in order to defend themselves, whatever that figure

 9     was and whatever NATO could provide.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In the paragraph below, it reads:

11             "Hasan Nuhanovic, UN interpreter in Srebrenica."

12             Please look at what he has to say.  He speaks of an ultimatum

13     given by the Serb side and then mention is made of some 40 to 70

14     aircraft.  Let's not waste time.  Does a single soldier require for his

15     own defence upwards of 40 aircraft?  Thank you.

16        A.   You -- you're asking a hypothetical question.  It depends

17     entirely on the circumstances.  In a scenario where one aeroplane under

18     one bomb will solve the problem, then that's all he needs.  In a scenario

19     where a hundred aeroplanes and a hundred bombs are needed to solve the

20     problem, then that is what he needs.  There is no fixed answer to that

21     question.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We'll put these questions to Mr. Karremans, who was

23     the source of information provided to the Muslim side.

24             Let's look at your statement again.  We had it on our screens

25     before.  It's 1D613.  Thank you.

Page 11168

 1             Thank you.  Can we show page 3, paragraph 6, lines 1 to 3.  Thank

 2     you.

 3             We have it in both languages.  You say:

 4             "Near the buses and trucks, I saw seven to eight Serb policemen

 5     in paramilitary uniforms lining up people to board the buses."

 6             A moment ago, we saw what was the first day of boarding.  Did you

 7     see in the footage today soldiers lining up civilians and boarding them

 8     on the buses?  Thank you.

 9        A.   In the video you showed me, which, as we've already established,

10     was not the same occasion which I described in my statement, but in the

11     video you showed me, then there were a number of armed men who I believe

12     were Bosnian Serb soldiers.  In the video you showed me, they were

13     standing around and watching.  However, on the occasion that I described

14     to you, I remember seeing people like that, and I don't know if they're

15     the same people or people like that who were organising and lining up

16     people, women and children, to get onto the buses in Zepa.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Does this mean that they were not members of the

18     Army of Republika Srpska since you saw them as you say in paramilitary

19     uniforms, or can you explain Their Honours -- to Their Honours what

20     paramilitary uniforms means?

21        A.   I have no -- I have no way of telling whether they were formally

22     members of the Bosnian Serb army or the Bosnian Serb police, or any other

23     group.  I can't tell that by looking at them.  Because as we've already

24     discussed between Their Honours and myself, the uniforms were very

25     similar.  It is very difficult to tell.  So -- but they were clearly

Page 11169

 1     paramilitaries, they were armed.  They were, in effect, soldiers, and

 2     that -- that's what I saw.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can you explain to the Trial Chamber as a soldier

 4     what the hallmarks of a paramilitary uniform would be, since you used the

 5     term in your statement?  Thank you.

 6        A.   Well, I use the term, really, to indicate that they were -- that

 7     it was a uniform, not necessarily a formal uniform as you would find in a

 8     formal army, where everyone dresses the same and looks exactly the same

 9     and there's a standard formula for the dress.  Paramilitary uniforms,

10     generally speaking, are more informal.  For example, they might not wear

11     hats or they might have different coloured T-shirts under their uniform.

12     My uses of the word "paramilitary" was merely to -- to make the point

13     that these were people who were clearly soldiers in one form or another

14     but were not necessarily regular soldiers, formal soldiers in any regular

15     army that I recognise.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just to clarify one thing, I see in paragraph 6

17     of your statement that you are referring to seven to eight Serb policemen

18     in paramilitary uniforms.

19             THE WITNESS:  Hmm.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What is the reason to classify them as policemen

21     rather than army soldier?

22             THE WITNESS:  No reason, really, Your Honour.  I think I had

23     assumed at the time that they were policemen.  I don't know now whether

24     they were policemen or soldiers, and I think the distinction between the

25     two is probably a fairly blurred distinction.  I can't be sure that they

Page 11170

 1     were policemen, but that's what I said in my statement.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 3             Mr. Tolimir.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you consider the VRS a para-army, a paramilitary, and is that

 7     what you meant to say in expressing this view in your statement?  Thank

 8     you.

 9        A.   Well it's a matter of record that Republika Srpska was an

10     unrecognised state with an unrecognised army.  Equally, it is foolish of

11     anyone to pretend there was no army.  So they seemed to me to fit quite

12     neatly into the definition of a paramilitary army in the sense that they

13     were not a formal army of a formally recognised state, but they were

14     clearly armed men going about military activity.  That is a pretty neat

15     description of a paramilitary force.

16        Q.   Please, tell us what does -- what do the laws of war envisage

17     that different warring parties need to be -- need to wear in times of

18     war?  What kind of uniform needs to be worn by, say, international forces

19     and by those present locally?

20        A.   Again, I don't pretend to be a legal expert on the basis of

21     uniforms in war.  The reality is that one expects any military force, and

22     UNPROFOR is an example, the British Army is an example, to wear a

23     recognisable and distinctive uniform and insignia so that it is possible

24     to distinguish friend from foe, combatant from non-combatant.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Since you used the terminology that was otherwise

Page 11171

 1     used by the Muslim side in the war, for their own purposes, did you just

 2     now express your own position about the VRS or the Muslim position; or

 3     did you rely in your answer on the laws of war, which state that any

 4     member of the army needs to bear the insignia of that particular army and

 5     that the insignia need to be displayed in open view and that they had to

 6     wear specific uniform and use specific weapons?

 7             Did you rely on the terminology as can be found in the laws of

 8     war or did you put forth your own personal position or the position of

 9     the Muslim side, or someone else, for that matter?

10        A.   In all of the evidence I have given, I have given my own personal

11     opinion and my own personal observation of what I saw.  In describing the

12     uniform as being paramilitary, whether that term is used by other people

13     or not is, frankly, of no concern to me.  My impression of it was that

14     the uniform worn by these people was, if you like, a casual non-standard

15     nature that I recognised as being generally worn by people like

16     Republika Srpska army.  I'm not trying to make a big thing about the form

17     of their uniform, and, to be frank, it seems to be something of a

18     diversion, really.  But I certainly am not using any terminology or

19     taking any position that is derived from anybody else.  I am giving you

20     my opinion and my observation.

21        Q.   Was General Mladic, too, a member of the paramilitary, given the

22     uniform he wore and given the fact that the other members of the army

23     wore the same uniforms?

24        A.   Well, I have to say that I'm not sure that we're -- that my --

25     I'm not sure that my opinion as to the legal status of the Bosnian Serb

Page 11172

 1     army is very relevant here.  But General Mladic was clearly a regular

 2     officer of the regular Yugoslavian army, and, generally speaking, he bore

 3     himself and wore his uniform and conducted himself in a manner consistent

 4     with being a regular officer of a regular army.  I'm making a

 5     distinction, really, between that sort of conduct and uniform and the

 6     sort of conduct and uniform that one finds in less -- in irregular forces

 7     or in paramilitary forces.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In order not to have to go back to the Zepa footage,

 9     because we will have ample opportunity to see it with some other

10     witnesses, I'd like to thank you now for having testified here and for

11     having come here.  Thank you for all the answers you provided.  I wish

12     you a safe journey home and may God bless you.  I hope you return home

13     safely in keeping with God's will.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is it, as far

15     as our questions go.  I would like to thank all those who assisted us

16     through the process today, and I believe I made a number of mistakes when

17     stating out numbers for e-court.  I apologise yet again.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

21                           Questioned by the Court:

22             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, I have one last question

23     for you.

24             Let's go back to your description of General Tolimir.  On page 8

25     of today's transcript, lines 11 to 14, you said that he was -- he carried

Page 11173

 1     a small grenade at the belt in -- in a -- sort of a pouch, and you said

 2     that he told you himself that he would use it against himself if he was

 3     captured so that he is not captured alive.

 4             So I would just have two questions for you, a few small

 5     questions, short questions.

 6             Can you please tell me why is it that that detail stayed engraved

 7     in your memory?  How come you told us about this?  What does it mean for

 8     you?  This gesture, the fact that he was carrying a small grenade in his

 9     pocket?  Why is that so important for you?

10        A.   Because it's unusual.  I have met many, many, soldiers from many,

11     many, armies all over the world in my military career.  I have never met

12     a man before who carries a grenade in his pouch or his pocket ready to

13     kill himself if he's going to be captured.  So what it said to me was one

14     of two things: Either General Tolimir was a fanatic and was concerned

15     that he knew things that he didn't want to be revealed were he to be

16     taken alive; or it meant that he was simply - how can I put this

17     politely - somebody who liked living a sort of macho part, if you like,

18     of having such a thing on his belt, so -- and I believed the former

19     instantly.

20             So it seems to me that it said something about the man that he

21     felt that he had to carry a grenade in a pouch at his belt.  And I would

22     also point out actually that he was the one that raised it.  He -- he

23     pointed it out, if you like, because it was part of -- my deduction is it

24     was part of him establishing himself in our minds as somebody who was

25     important and dangerous.

Page 11174

 1             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well.  I must say that you've

 2     answered to some questions that I wanted to put to you later.  I'm just

 3     telling you because I wanted to know what logic I was using here.

 4             But, in fact, this is what else I wanted to know.  Given your

 5     military experience, is it usual that armed forces in the country to see

 6     a high rank officers to behave this way in the NATO tradition and in the

 7     Soviet blocks, according to the Soviet block tradition.  But I think you

 8     have already answered in a way, didn't you?

 9        A.   I think so.  I mean, I think that there are big cultural

10     differences between the way that the Warsaw Pact generals would conduct

11     themselves, if you like, and the way in which NATO generals, roughly an

12     east/west sort of divide, and typically those ex-Soviet or ex-Warsaw Pact

13     officers that I have had the pleasure to know have tended to be much more

14     rigid, much less independently minded than the NATO officers that I have

15     met.

16             So in that sense, it is understandable that Tolimir should ask

17     questions about who gave orders, et cetera, because in the culture in

18     which he grew up, I would speculate that he is used to people having to

19     have orders before they do things; whereas in the NATO western culture,

20     there is much less requirement to give a specific order for someone to do

21     something, for example, defence themselves, because it is assumed that a

22     soldier of the British Army or the French army or the German army or the

23     Dutch army knows he has got to defend himself, but I can understand where

24     there is a cultural difference there between ex-Warsaw Pact and NATO.

25             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

Page 11175

 1             So I would like to know this as well:  General Tolimir was afraid

 2     to be captured by whom, by the BiH, or by NATO forces or by the UNPROFOR?

 3     What do you think?

 4        A.   He didn't say.  I would be surprised if it was by UNPROFOR

 5     because, of course, at the point I'm talking about, UNPROFOR had a very

 6     relatively passive role, and I don't think that Tolimir and his

 7     colleagues were very frightened of UNPROFOR.  So I don't think it was

 8     UNPROFOR he was concerned about.  It might have well have been the BiH

 9     that he was concerned about or it might just have been, if you like, a

10     general unwillingness to be captured.  But, I don't know is the answer.

11             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  And one last

12     question:  Were you convinced by this explanation?  Because you knew of

13     the situation and you knew him in a certain way.

14        A.   I'm sorry.  Convinced by the explanation about the grenade or

15     what?

16             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right, because I'm

17     under the impression that there was an exchange in the way that he told

18     you something private, so when he explained to you why he was carrying

19     the grenade, did you believe him, were you convinced that that was the

20     real reason why he had this grenade on him?

21        A.   No.  I think that -- I mean, I didn't sit down and analyse it at

22     the time.  But I think that my impression was that it was more an act of

23     bravado than a genuine attempt to make sure that he could be captured.  I

24     think it was slightly for show, if you know what I mean.

25             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much indeed.

Page 11176

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 2             Mr. Elderkin, have you any estimation about the length of the

 3     re-examination?

 4             MR. ELDERKIN:  Very precisely, Your Honour, nothing.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is an appreciated answer.  Thank you very

 6     much.

 7             Sir, you will be pleased to hear that this concludes your

 8     examination.  There is no need to stay during the next week in The Hague.

 9     You are now free to return to your normal activities, and the Chamber

10     would like to thank you that you were able to come here and to provide us

11     with your knowledge.  Thank you very much again.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much.  My pleasure.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And the Court Usher will assist you leaving the

14     courtroom.

15             But I have to come back for a short oral decision, an urgent

16     decision which both parties need in relation to another witness.

17                           [The witness withdrew]

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber is seized of the Prosecution's motion

19     to convert seven viva voce witnesses to Rule 92 ter witnesses which was

20     filed on the 22nd of February, 2011, and provided to the accused in B/C/S

21     on the 7th of March, 2011.

22             The Chamber notes that one of the seven witnesses referred to in

23     the motion is Witness 187, who is listed on the Prosecution's list of

24     witnesses for the month of March.  For this reason, the Chamber will now

25     issue an oral decision pertaining to Witness 187 only.

Page 11177

 1             The Chamber heard the position of the accused during the session

 2     on Tuesday, the 8th of March, during which Mr. Gajic submitted, inter

 3     alia, that the conversion of Witness 187 from viva voce witness to a

 4     Rule 92 ter witness would result in a much greater burden on the Defence

 5     while preparing for Witness 187's testimony.

 6             Although the Chamber acknowledges the Prosecution's effort to

 7     reduce the time required for its examination-in-chief of Witness 187, in

 8     light of the fact that Witness 187's testimony is now scheduled to occur

 9     in the week of 28th of March, in noting the additional preparation which

10     would be necessary for the accused to carry out in a short time-frame,

11     the Chamber is of the view that, in this specific circumstance, the

12     portion of the Prosecution's motion which pertains to Witness 187 should

13     be denied.

14             Witness 187 shall be heard viva voce.

15             This concludes the hearing of today and for the week.  We adjourn

16     now and resume next week on Monday in the afternoon, 2.15 in this

17     courtroom.

18                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 14th day of March,

20                           2011, at 2.15 p.m.