1 Wednesday, 4th May 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.
6 As you can see, the Bench is complete again.
7 Mr. Vanderpuye, unexpectedly, we see you today.
8 MR. VANDERPUYE: Indeed, unexpectedly.
9 Good afternoon to you, Mr. President. Good afternoon,
10 Your Honours and everyone.
11 Mr. President, I know that you have information that
12 Mr. McCloskey is unavailable; he's sick today. He does expect to be here
13 tomorrow, so I just want to let you know that, in case you don't know,
14 and so I'm his stand-in for today.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Please forward our best
16 wishes for his health to Mr. McCloskey.
17 The witness should be brought in, please.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 WITNESS: PETAR SALAPURA [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon, sir, Mr. Salapura. Welcome back
22 to the courtroom.
23 I have to remind you that the oath to tell the truth that you
24 made at the beginning of your testimony still applies.
25 Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.
1 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
3 May God's peace reign in this house. May God's will be done in
4 these proceedings, and not necessarily mine.
5 I would like to welcome Mr. Salapura, and I would like to wish
6 him a pleasant stay in The Hague and then a happy return home.
7 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Salapura, yesterday we spoke about the areas
9 of responsibility because you mentioned those things in your statement,
10 and then that was one of the elements in the book, and that element is
11 very important for all of us. You said -- or perhaps you can tell us
12 something about what an area of responsibility is. This can be found in
13 document 00672, on page 13.5. This is where the zone of responsibility
14 is regulated.
15 My question is this: Do intelligence organs always have to know
16 what their zone of intelligence responsibility is?
17 A. Yes, because they work within that particular zone.
18 Q. Thank you. Are they responsible for what they do within the
19 framework of that particular zone?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Yesterday, you were asked whether you could go from Zagreb to
22 Vukovar. Can you please tell us, are these two different zones of
23 responsibility and intelligence responsibility, both military and
24 intelligence responsibility? Thank you.
25 A. Absolutely different, and I could not go from Zagreb to Vukovar.
1 I was not allowed to do that. I was not allowed to deal with the
2 intelligence work in that area. If I came by intelligence by chance,
3 then I would submit that to the superior command, the superior organ, who
4 would then know who to forward that intelligence to. They would forward
5 the intelligence to the intelligence organ responsible for that
6 particular area of responsibility.
7 Q. Thank you. While we have the book in front of us, could you
8 please tell us whether the Army of Republika Srpska was divided into the
9 intelligence zones -- zones of responsibility, and were they subordinated
10 to the corps commands?
11 A. Yes, the corps commands had their zones, and they were well
12 delineated. Intelligence zone responsibility did not have to overlap
13 strictly with the areas of responsibility of a corps. The intelligence
14 area is somewhat wider, but that is co-ordinated by the Intelligence
15 Administration of the Main Staff; in other words, the sector that you
16 headed at the time.
17 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us, when it comes to the
18 commander of the Main Staff, is he the one who defines the areas of
19 responsibility of the corps, and is it the Intelligence Administration
20 who issues an order for intelligence support to define the intelligence
21 areas of responsibility of a certain corps?
22 A. Yes. We are the ones who give such proposals to the commander,
23 and he can either adopt our proposals or not. He can either agree or
24 disagree. If he doesn't disagree, he corrects our proposal. And then
25 upon his approval, this becomes a document which regulates that area. It
1 becomes part of the decision on the intelligence support.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page,
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
5 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 I apologise to General Tolimir. I don't mean to interrupt his
7 examination, but it's going a bit fast and I can hear that the
8 interpreters are straining, and I'm having a little bit of trouble
9 following, at least listening to the testimony.
10 I would also point out, in relation to the last question, it was
11 a compound question. The witness gave one answer to two questions, and
12 I think if we slow down a little bit, we can probably get through this
13 more clearly and easily.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. I was going to remind both
15 speakers as well not to overlap and to pause between question and answer.
16 It's very difficult for the interpreters to interpret everything as you
17 tell us.
18 Please wait after hearing the question of Mr. Tolimir, because
19 you are using the same language, but we have to receive and the recorder
20 has to receive everything translated into English.
21 Mr. Tolimir, carry on, please.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, and thank
23 you, Mr. Vanderpuye.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Salapura, please, we were not clear, obviously, and we were
1 too fast. Let us summarise whatever we have said so far in just one
3 Do the commanders of the staffs and units organise intelligence
4 support in the areas of responsibility, and are they responsible for the
5 intelligence support?
6 A. Yes, absolutely. For example, the intelligence organ of the
7 Main Staff proposes the areas of intelligence responsibility for their
8 subordinates, which are corps. The commander -- or, rather, firstly, and
9 then the commander in our case adopts that and agrees to that, and that
10 becomes an order for intelligence support signed by the commander.
11 Q. Thank you. Mr. Salapura, we're now talking about the areas of
12 intelligence responsibility. When it comes to the armed forces of
13 Republika Srpska, would the intelligence zone of responsibility be wider,
14 and would it also encompass the entire international community that was
15 involved in the conflict?
16 A. Our area of intelligence responsibility went in depth, and it
17 also encompassed the territory of Croatia, the territory of the Army of
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina --
19 THE INTERPRETER: The accused's microphone is not off.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So it encompassed the entire
21 territory. We also monitored the international factor on the whole in
22 all that, because we were even exposed to air-strikes at one point in
23 time. This meant that we had to monitor and collect intelligence about
24 the airports from which the planes were taking off, the potential targets
25 of the air-strikes, and so on and so forth. In other words, our
1 territory was much wider and it went in depth.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. The Prosecutor introduced all
3 intelligence from Day 1, when the VRS was established, to the last day
4 the two of us worked, and all those documents were signed either by me or
5 you. When I was absent, those documents were signed by you. Your organ
6 and my organ, did we spend almost 95 per cent collecting intelligence,
7 and that intelligence was then presented to all the end users who are
8 mentioned in our documents' addressees?
9 A. That was our job, by and large. Our intelligence was submitted
10 daily to everybody. Our documents were not as secret as some other
11 information that was forwarded from the Security Sector, for example.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. In the course of the
13 examination-in-chief, you said that you were on sick leave during the
14 events in Zepa and Srebrenica, and that you were in Banja Luka most of
15 the time, and then you had to interrupt your sick leave because of the
16 urgency of some developments. Since you were in Banja Luka, and since
17 you said that I had told you that I should look after the zone in
18 Krajina, whereas I would be in charge of the eastern part of the
19 Republika Srpska, for the record, can you just tell us what you meant by
20 the western part and what you meant by the eastern part? Our statement
21 yesterday was not complete, your testimony was not complete. Could you
22 please assist us and tell us what is it that I told you, exactly? What
23 area were you to be in charge of, in geographical terms? Can you
24 explain? Thank you.
25 Thank you, I apologise.
1 A. Yes, you told me that I should look after the areas of
2 responsibility of the 1st and the 2nd Krajina Corps and the
3 410th Intelligence Centre, its base, and the elements within its area of
4 responsibility and the entirety of that area, and that would go along the
5 following line: From Brcko, that was the zone of responsibility of the
6 1st Krajina Corps, down the Una Valley towards Doboj, and then across
7 Teslic, Mount Vlasic, up to Jajce.
8 Q. Thank you. Was the Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Milovanovic
9 in that area of responsibility at that time?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can you remember whether we at that time -- bearing in mind the
12 specific nature of the intelligence that you brought us, and that
13 intelligence was not adequately treated, was that the reason why you were
14 supposed to get in touch with General Milovanovic and convey all the
15 intelligence to him directly?
16 A. Yes, and I did that. I conveyed the intelligence both to the
17 commander and him.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 A. If I may add to that, that when I spoke to him, I provided him
20 with a lot more detail.
21 Q. Thank you. Did he come under direct attack by NATO, the
22 Croatian Army and the Muslim Army, and was there something that was
23 contained in the intelligence that you received?
24 A. Yes, he was involved in combat all the time, and the combat was
25 going on at the time, and some of the offensives were being prepared by
1 the Croatian Army at the time.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown the
3 following page, which is page 16 in e-court.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And while this is being done, let me ask you this: Was the task
6 of the Intelligence Administration and were the objectives of the overall
7 intelligence support to collect intelligence about the strategic and
8 tactical intelligence, and did the strategic element overtake precedence
9 over all the other types of intelligence?
10 A. The administration and all of its organs exclusively dealt with
11 that type of intelligence mainly of strategic importance. The corps
12 organs dealt with intelligence of a lower level, mostly the intelligence
13 of tactical and operative significance. When it comes to the strategic
14 level, the international factor, all that was within the purview of the
15 Intelligence Administration.
16 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber whether you,
17 as the most capable body of our Intelligence Administration, were you in
18 charge of all the strategic intelligence? Were you in charge of
19 collecting strategic intelligence? Thank you.
20 A. Yes. A lot of time was spent on that. Approximately 80 per cent
21 of my time was invested in that, and approximately that quantity of
22 intelligence originated from me, personally.
23 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether over 80 per cent of
24 the contents of the intelligence that we forwarded to the corps were
25 strategic intelligence that we deemed important for the activities that
1 the army was involved in?
2 A. Not always. It's very difficult to say. In order to provide
3 complete information, we always included intelligence that was collected
4 by the corps intelligence. Some of the intelligence that we collected
5 also was included if they were of some interest for the corps. We also
6 provided some interim intelligence, not just the regular intelligence,
7 and we forwarded that to the leadership of the Republika Srpska, the
8 Ministry of Defence, and some other interested institutions.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Could you please tell us whether we, in
10 the Intelligence Administration, made sure that the corps command and the
11 brigade commands were capable of collecting their own intelligence
12 through reconnaissance activities and electronic reconnaissance, and we,
13 in the administration, mostly collected strategic intelligence and data?
14 Thank you.
15 My question is this: Were corps capable of collecting their own
16 intelligence that could be used for their own combat activities?
17 A. Mostly, yes, to a certain degree. We continuously worked on
18 that. This was a process that we were engaged in throughout the war.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you now look at the screen in front of us, and
20 can you please look at line 6 from the top of the page, where it says:
21 "Objectives of Intelligence." And I'm going to quote just one part of
23 "Objective of intelligence, in tactical and strategic scale, may
24 be geared towards planned, systematic, and co-ordinated collection of the
25 intelligence about the enemy and the area of combat which --"
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And this is the previous page in
2 English. We haven't got it on the screen. Thank you. I apologise for
3 not having said that immediately. Thank you, Aleksandar, for reminding
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I emphasised this, because I believe that this is very important.
7 My question is this: Did you and I make sure that the command
8 had timely intelligence based on which it could make adequate and timely
9 decisions? Thank you.
10 A. I think we tried our utmost, and I don't think that we
11 experienced any major surprises, and that is the goal of our work and of
12 our existence. We would propose things, and when we look at things from
13 this distance, we did provide quite reasonable and complete suggestions
14 in the military and the intelligence aspect.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we now look at page 18.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And while we're waiting, I'm going to put a question to you. Did
19 you and I in the administration take into account and do our best to
20 enable lower organs and commands to co-ordinate, in a planned manner, the
21 operation of their organs in order to be able to compile the required
22 data, and did we achieve any successes in that?
23 A. Yes, it was our co-ordinated task. We did manage, but we didn't
24 succeed entirely. You know that we had considerable problems with our
25 reconnaissance units. In some units, we didn't even have such units,
1 for example, in the Drina Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, because these
2 were units which had the greatest losses of all the units throughout the
3 whole war. Some were destroyed in that way and were never reformed
4 again. But for the most part, there was some things we didn't have any
5 effects on due to the erroneous use or misuse of these units, because
6 they were used in the most serious forms of combat, which was not
7 actually their intent and purpose. We are not those who are commanding
8 those units. We just control and propose, and those who use -- who
9 decide how to use them at lower levels are the chiefs of staffs. At the
10 level of the Main Staff, it's the commander of the Main Staff. We cannot
11 influence and were not able to influence these decisions, and that is why
12 I had these problems throughout the war.
13 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at the third paragraph of this
14 page that you can see. It's this paragraph below "Centralisation."
15 Is the principle of centralisation something that obliged lower
16 command staffs and institutions to co-ordinate, in a planned manner, the
17 activities of all the intelligence and reconnaissance organs and units in
18 their area of responsibility? Thank you.
19 A. Yes, and, of course, there had to be an exchange of data in order
20 to be able to compile it or generalise the data and in order to be able
21 to provide this data to its users at the proper time in its most useful
22 form. That is the data that was of the highest possible interest to them
23 at any given moment.
24 Q. Thank you. In view of the fact that the manpower was not up to
25 its full strength, and also the problem of the insufficient training of
1 the cadre, for example, the command cadre and the Drina Corps came from
2 the reserve forces and they comprised those who, before the war, did not
3 complete the intelligence and security schools, in that case, both you
4 and I, did we not try to organise them and, as much as possible, to help
5 them in this organisation of the intelligence activities in their area of
6 responsibility? Thank you.
7 A. We organised seminars, we organised courses. I regularly was on
8 the move in order to help them with any type of problem that they were
9 facing. I wanted to help them in the way and how they could resolve
10 these problems. They were learning as they went along. That's what the
11 situation was like. Everybody had the same kind of situation.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Since we have a very important book in
13 front of us, which is called "Intelligence Support of the Armed Forces,"
14 this is a book that is very important to us. My question is this: This
15 rule, Intelligence Support of the Armed Forces, was that something that
16 was the same thing and had the same weight as the Rules of Service for
17 other organs?
18 A. These have the weight of law. They are used as the basis for
19 activities, and they have to be respected. Any deviation from that
20 framework would imply sanctions for action or non-action. So failure to
21 respect these rules can imply any kind of sanction, or if they are
22 properly applied, a person can be commended.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.
24 Can we now look at page 21, which talks about the main
25 assignments of intelligence support in wartime. I don't want to dwell on
1 it too long. All I want to do is to emphasise that everything that you
2 were asked about by Mr. McCloskey is on that page, the questions pertain
3 to actually what your activities were. From A to P along the alphabet,
4 all the main assignments of intelligence support in wartime are
5 enumerated here. And perhaps the Trial Chamber can look at that so that
6 we can look at it as well. We don't have too much time. This is like
7 the basic manual, the Bible of intelligence work, and we can look at the
8 first type of assignment under A:
9 "Up to date -- timely discovery of activities and intentions of
10 the enemy in the front area."
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you please explain to us exactly what that means?
13 A. That means that we have the obligation to uncover enemy
14 preparations. If the enemy is preparing, we need to discover those
15 preparations in a timely manner, which forces they plan to use, along
16 which axis, and what the object of the action would be. Then we need to
17 warn or inform the command organs about that of units at all levels to
18 whom this information could be of interest. So we are obliged to
19 discover this in a timely manner so that our units could prepare in a
20 timely manner to respond to any possible action. This doesn't always
21 happen. It's not always that we are successful in our assignments.
22 There are surprises that can happen, especially when we're talking about
23 lower-ranking levels. At higher-ranking, the strategic levels, I believe
24 that we didn't have any surprises, I don't believe that we did. And as
25 for the lower levels, they were insufficiently trained, and little
1 missteps there are inevitable.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order not to go through the
4 whole rule, can we just look at page 24, paragraph 14, please, so that we
5 could see what was one of the topics of the examination-in-chief
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Several times, you were asked by the Prosecutor --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 18 in the English. Thank you,
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. You were asked by the Prosecutor what you ordered someone to do,
13 what you did, and so on and so forth. Let us here look at what this
14 paragraph 14 says about the responsibility of the intelligence organ and
15 can it issue orders, and we're going to see that from the rules of
17 Paragraph 14, here it is. It states:
18 "The intelligence organ of the superior command/staff of the
19 armed forces directs and co-ordinates the expert work of the intelligence
20 and reconnaissance organs and reconnaissance units in directly
21 subordinated commands, staffs and units, provides expert assistance, and
22 controls their overall intelligence and reconnaissance activity."
23 My question is this: The security organs in the administration,
24 which was the level that we were at, did they have any other rights,
25 other than professional overseeing and monitoring of the reconnaissance
1 organs in the units? Thank you.
2 A. No, these units are subordinated from the brigade up to the
3 corps, to the corps chief of staff. The detachment that we had at the
4 Main Staff is directly subordinated to the commander, and all of these
5 units were independent units. That was the status they had. A
6 detachment -- the detachment, for example, had the status that was the
7 same or equal to that of the brigade and the regiment, so they were
8 subject to all the rules applying to that particular level of command and
9 they were subordinate to the command. The intelligence organ can only,
10 in the expert sense, propose to the commander the use of the unit, but
11 exclusively in relation to sabotage and reconnaissance tasks. Other than
12 that, they don't have any other powers and cannot -- and I don't think
13 any commander would propose anything like that, because those who were in
14 charge of those units wanted these units to be used in the manner that
15 they were meant to be used. The use of units is something that is in the
16 domain of the commander or the chief of staff's duties.
17 Q. When you say that this is non-standard use, would you say that
18 expert organs are obliged to oversee the non-standard use of some unit;
19 for example, an artillery unit?
20 A. No, they are not. We are not able to monitor that either.
21 Something that is ordered by the commander or the chief of staff, or if
22 the unit is re-subordinated, then in that case that is not part of our
23 jurisdiction. We only participate in the preparation of a unit, a
24 reconnaissance unit, for reconnaissance duties, infiltration into enemy
25 areas, gathering of information in order for an attack to be carried out
1 in a certain area or at a military target, and we would check whether the
2 unit has been appropriately trained for such a task in order to prevent
3 excessive losses and to make sure that we send out the unit and that the
4 unit comes back safely.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.
6 Could the e-court please show page 27.
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
8 Q. While we are waiting to see that page, I would say this: Thus,
9 during the examination-in-chief, reconnaissance units were referred to
10 the most. This is 21 in English. I would kindly ask you, Mr. Salapura,
11 to say whose are the reconnaissance units, who commands them, in whose
12 jurisdiction they are, and what was the role of the intelligence organs
13 in relation to these organs? Thank you.
14 A. Well, I think I already said that. As far as I can remember,
15 they are at the level of the regiment and the corps, and they are
16 subordinated to the chief of staff, as staff units. Then at the level of
17 the Main Staff, there was a detachment. It was an independent unit, and
18 it was subordinated directly to the chief -- the commander of the
19 Main Staff. In the professional line, it was subordinated to the
20 Intelligence/Security Sector.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Now we're going to read paragraph 21 of
22 this Intelligence Support of the Armed Forces, which states, I quote:
23 "Reconnaissance units of the branches and arms are specialised
24 units of the armed forces whose purpose is to form reconnaissance organs
25 in order to gather intelligence about the enemy and the combat area, in
1 particular about the elements of the enemy combat/operational disposition
2 which the units of branches and arms will engage, primarily along the
3 main combat area in the front area, in the temporarily occupied territory
4 and in the enemy rear."
5 My question is this: You and I, or our organs, did we
6 not understand each assignment in enemy territory as the most complex
7 assignment in wartime that had to be carried out, pursuant to orders by
8 the commander, in the sense of carrying out the assignment without
9 sustaining too many losses or being discovered while in the field? Thank
11 A. All the assignments carried out by these units were legitimate
12 assignments, implying legitimate targets. And in the implementation of
13 these assignments, the main objective was to achieve the goal to make
14 sure, number 1, that there were no civilian casualties, that there were
15 no casualties among the UNPROFOR members at that time or members of any
16 international organisations - this was something that was strictly
17 emphasised in the order for execution - and to carry out the task and to
18 return to base complete.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you please say whether each of our assignments
20 and every day spent on data-gathering was, de facto, work in the
21 territory where our enemy was located and not our forces, and did this
22 not make the life and the work of the reconnaissance and intelligence
23 units even more difficult?
24 A. The intelligence organ usually doesn't operate on its own
25 territory. It sets off from there, but everything that is the subject of
1 its work and interest is actually located in the territory of the enemy
2 or the opponent. It doesn't necessarily just have to be the enemy.
3 Looking at it from a broader perspective -- okay, we're talking only
4 about the front here, but our work was actually much broader than that.
5 Other than these things, we also were busy with gathering other types of
6 information which was supposed to lead to this war ending, to communicate
7 with certain centres in the international community that could make it
8 possible for the war to be finished, to achieve a compromise, and to make
9 it possible and seek out ways to actually achieve this compromise. You
10 actually participated the most in these direct negotiations.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. In order to have as little of this
12 admitted, I would like to again just look at paragraph -- page 98,
13 paragraph 263, and then we will finish with this document.
14 Yesterday, during the cross-examination yesterday, you were asked
15 about a certain order that was written to the intelligence organ. This
16 book contains the template. I'm just going to look at paragraph 263 so
17 that we can see what the duties are of the intelligence organs, in terms
18 of issuing an order for any kind of intelligence task, in terms of
19 intelligence support, that they could take responsibility for those who
20 were going to be carrying out a certain assignment, and to be able to
21 cover all the duties and responsibilities arising from -- any
22 consequences that could be suffered by those who are going to carry out
23 such assignments.
24 So it's page 78, and it's form 3 that is attached.
25 THE INTERPRETER: We would just like the accused to point out in
1 the English where he's reading from.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you were asked by the interpreters
3 to tell us from which part of this document you are reading so that can
4 be displayed on the screen.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Please, it is item 263 in the Serbian, and we can see it also in
7 the English. It's at the bottom of the page, whereas in Serbian it's the
8 third from the top. I will be reading only that item. I don't want to
9 read the entire document. We have already discussed this topic. And I
10 will repeat for the interpreters:
11 "The intelligence support orders (Form 3) are drafted on the
12 basis of the intelligence support plan separately for each subordinate
13 command, staff and units. It is drafted in commands, staffs and units in
14 accordance with Attachment 2."
15 And then it is listed, what it contains, but we don't have time
16 to go into all that and read it all out.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So this is my question to you: Mr. Salapura, did we have an
19 obligation, after a commander has issued an order to reconnaissance units
20 that were part of the Main Staff, to prepare them, train them, and to
21 make them capable of carrying out his orders?
22 A. Yes. We would then start with detailed preparations and
23 organisation for the mission in order to make sure that the order would
24 be abided by. We would do that in a written form, but the units would
25 also get a verbal order.
1 Yesterday, a written form of order was shown here in the
2 courtroom, something that I signed instead of the commander, but that was
3 a document for the stage of preparation, what was necessary to be done to
4 make sure that the unit would be prepared, from a professional point of
5 view, for their mission, whereas the order for the mission, itself, first
6 of all, we informed the commander that the unit is prepared, and then
7 this order comes verbally to the commander of the unit or the commander
8 of the group that's carrying out the assignment.
9 Q. Thank you. Yesterday, the Prosecutor read out to you six items
10 from this order. I will not repeat them. Most of them referred to
11 Geneva Conventions.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to ask electronic
13 e-court to put page 104 in Serbian and the equivalent page in the
14 English. That is page 184 or 84.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please repeat the correct page.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 84, 84. Thank you. I apologise
17 for not being clear.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. As we can see, it's in both versions, and here is my question to
20 you: You and I, when issuing assignments, regardless of the level of
21 capability of commanders, and their training concerning the
22 Geneva Conventions, did both of us insist the provision should be
23 included in the order that would direct them to abide by the
24 Geneva Conventions?
25 A. Yes. I think those could be found in the orders, and I can say
1 that all the intelligence organs throughout the war never once
2 experienced any situation where any of our officers failed to abide by
3 the Geneva Conventions. This is part of our rule book, and I think it
4 was the only rule book that included it, namely, which included the
5 entire Geneva Conventions devoted -- parts devoted to the prisoners of
6 war. And all intelligence officers had to take a course and then pass
7 that course, course about the Geneva Conventions.
8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Salapura, yesterday, during the
9 examination-in-chief, while you were reviewing the order signed by you,
10 you were asked the following: Why did the soldiers fire on various
11 features there? And my question to you is: How many hand-held
12 rocket-launchers, Zolja, did they have at their disposal?
13 A. Well, I cannot answer that. And they weren't actually firing
14 against features or facilities. They were firing in the air. And I
15 don't think there were any casualties due to Zolja fire. The targets
16 were completely different.
17 In one of the reports we've seen, I think UNPROFOR reports, we
18 saw that a woman got injured or killed, but we don't know what killed
19 her. That was at 4.00 in the morning.
20 After our team carried out its mission, and I won't go into too
21 much detail about that, there was a lot of firing, with most of the fire
22 coming from the Muslim side, because they didn't know what was going on.
23 So it is possible that -- but, in any case, the mission, we carried it
24 out professionally, competently. And I think that during the Blagojevic
25 trial, it was evaluated as a legitimate mission.
1 And I would like to stress again, and you know this perfectly
2 well, Mr. Tolimir, that I was absolutely not aware of the directive in
3 question, nor was I aware of the attack that was being in the stage of
4 preparation, the attack against Srebrenica. And you asked me back then
5 what my views were, and I told you that I believe that it shouldn't be
6 done. And you said, I think the same. And that's when we said goodbye
7 to each other. You stayed in your office, and I went for sick leave.
8 But I was not aware that we were preparing anything of the kind, nor that
9 there was any directive drafted in March, because I did not take part in
10 any planning.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. The document that the OTP showed to you
12 today was a summary of events drafted by UNPROFOR, which was based on
13 comments by witnesses, Muslims. And in this document, there was no
14 mention of any facilities or buildings being damaged, which demonstrates
15 that the rocket-launchers were fired up in the air, because if it were
16 not so, the 15 or 16 rockets would have hit the buildings, which they
17 didn't, based on this document by UNPROFOR which showed how the events
18 took place.
19 My second question to you is: Is it possible that this woman got
20 killed through the activity or your team, because as far as I remember,
21 we didn't have any information about any casualties on their part or on
23 A. I'm sorry --
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sir, please wait that the interpreters can catch
25 the whole question of Mr. Tolimir. Otherwise, we will lose some of your
1 answers. Please repeat your answer now.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, we did not have such
3 information, nor did we have any information -- did we receive any
4 information later on in our contacts with the Commission for Negotiations
5 with UNPROFOR in Vlasenica, because the purpose of this mission was to
6 warn the other side and to alert UNPROFOR to enemy activity on our side,
7 and we had even reports by the 28th Division about their activities.
8 They sent it to their command at Tuzla, but we also had our reports which
9 we were forwarding to UNPROFOR all the time; namely, that we have
10 constant losses and casualties after activities that had been launched
11 from the so-called demilitarised area. But it wasn't a demilitarised
12 area. They were still being armed. And we knew, also, when they were
13 bringing it in. We even managed to shoot down a helicopter that was
14 bringing in weapons into the Srebrenica area.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 I'm on my feet really because the question that was put to the
18 witness, which --
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In fact, there were two questions.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: The question that I'm focusing on was, I think,
21 at page 23, line 11 -- or page 22, rather, line 11, and the question was
22 pretty simple, which was whether or not it was possible that this woman
23 was killed as a result of the activities of the witness's unit. He's
24 gone on now for it looks like the better part of 10 or 12 lines. He
25 hasn't answered that question at all. And I think it would be more
1 efficient if the witness could answer the questions that are put by
2 General Tolimir to the proceedings, and I think it will make the record
3 more clear, and I think the matter -- I think it's a better way forward
4 than this.
5 He's done it on a number of occasion, and that's the reason why
6 I'm on my feet now, because I think it would just be a better way to
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The best is always just to put one question at a
9 time and not a compound question or several questions at the same time.
10 I would like to repeat the question of Mr. Tolimir, Mr. Salapura.
11 I repeat:
12 "Is it possible that this woman got killed through the activity
13 of your team, because, as far as I remember, we didn't have any
14 information about any casualties on their part or on ours?"
15 That was the question. Could you please answer this question.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, we did not have any
17 information about any casualties on the Muslim side. It is possible,
18 though, but it's very difficult to say that with any certainty and to
19 determine whether this woman got killed due to our fire or as a victim of
20 Muslim fire in return. We don't even know where did she get killed. Was
21 it out there in the street, in a building? It was 4.00 in the morning.
22 And also, if it was our fault, well, it's wartime, it was part of a
23 combat activity. It is possible that some of our soldiers failed to
24 abide by the orders, failed to shoot up in the air. It was night-time.
25 It is possible. I cannot say, with any degree of certainty, no, it
1 wasn't, yes, it was.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
3 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
4 Mr. Vanderpuye.
5 MR. VANDERPUYE: Sorry, Mr. President. But hearing this answer
6 at line 13, page 24, the witness is -- it's recorded in the transcript
7 that he says that this was part of a combat activity. And I believe his
8 prior testimony, at least up until this point, was this was a sabotage
9 operation, and I'm not clear, from the record or from his testimony,
10 whether or not this is an accurate transcription of what he says or
11 interpretation of what he said.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye, I think you, respectively
13 Mr. McCloskey, should deal with that in re-examination. We have to rely
14 on the interpretation. Mr. Tolimir may put this question to that part
15 again or carry on.
16 Mr. Tolimir.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Q. Yesterday, Mr. McCloskey, on page 80 of the transcript,
19 yesterday's transcript - I don't know whether this page still bears the
20 same number - he said:
21 "You heard Karadzic say that Srebrenica needs to be terrorised.
22 Wasn't that the reason why it should be terrorised?"
23 And he was discussing -- he was referring to this sabotage
24 mission in Srebrenica. And you, on page 81, line 7, said:
25 "No, the projectiles were fired in the air. I was against the
1 use of weapons ..."
2 And so on and so forth.
3 Again, Mr. Vanderpuye is now asking you -- well, you've heard his
4 question, but this is my question to you: Sabotage units, are they a
5 part of a unit that can be used for any type of activity, including
6 demonstration of power and so on? Were they carrying out actions, and
7 did they receive orders?
8 A. Sabotage actions are combat activities, just like any other
9 combat activity, so they are only carried out behind the enemy lines, and
10 they are carried out by special units that are called sabotage or
11 reconnaissance units or just reconnaissance units. Maybe it would be
12 good if I explained that. They are something like special units. Like
13 in Pakistan, the killing of bin Laden was most probably carried out by
14 one such unit. These are units that are trained specifically for
15 missions behind enemy lines. Regular soldiers from regular units would
16 not normally go five, ten, fifteen, twenty kilometres behind the enemy
17 lines. That's not what they are supposed to do.
18 I hope I've been of assistance.
19 These are combat activities. The front-line units are carrying
20 out combat activities along the front-line, and these units are carrying
21 out their combat activities behind enemy lines, but all of them have
22 certain objectives and it's just one of the aspects of combat activities,
23 attacking activities.
24 I hope I've managed to help you understand this better.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura. We will
1 later show a document where we can see that Muslims are reporting they
2 have had no casualties. I will show that to the Trial Chamber after the
4 I would like to tender this Intelligence Support for
5 Armed Forces, which includes the Geneva Conventions. So can we please
6 have this tendered?
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, if I'm not mistaken, you indicated
8 you would tender the relevant parts you have used with the witness, and
9 not the whole document, which is really a lengthy document.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 I don't mind. However, the Prosecutor always objects if we
12 tender just one part because they believe that we only use the part that
13 suits us. If the Prosecutor doesn't object, the document has been
14 translated, all of it, so whatever you decide, I will abide by your
15 decision. And it is on the Prosecutor's 65 ter list, the whole document.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I don't see any objection by the Prosecution, and
17 I don't recall similar instances. It is only a question of
18 practicability. If you have such a big document in evidence, you have to
19 deal with that later on as well, like the Chamber and the Prosecutor. It
20 was only the question you indicated earlier today that you will only
21 tender those parts you have used with the witness, and I would like to
22 invite you to point out which pages you want to have in evidence.
23 Mr. Vanderpuye.
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 We don't have an objection to the admission of the entire
1 document, if that's what General Tolimir wants to do. I understand that
2 it is burdensome to the record and it is a lot of material, but I think,
3 as the proceedings continue, there will be other parts of this document
4 and also, indeed, other documents that will be referred to. So it might
5 as well serve all of our interests to have the document admitted in its
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, again, are you tendering the whole
8 document or only several parts?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 I would like to tender the entire document, because I can see
11 that the Prosecutor wishes to do the same. I don't want the Prosecutor
12 to say that I am tendering only that suits me. I want to avoid any
13 objections of that kind on the part of the Prosecutor. Therefore, I
14 would like to tender the entire document.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document 65 ter 372 will be received as an
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D229, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, carry on, please.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just briefly to show D202, item 6
20 or Article 6 on page 2. And while this is being done, I would like to
21 say that this is a book of regulations on the competences of the corps
22 commands in peacetime. Thank you. I'm interested in Article 6 on page 2
23 in Serbian and on page 4 in the English version, the corresponding
24 Article 6. Thank you.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. We can now see the first paragraph that you have quoted from on a
2 number of occasions. You were a commander, so you know it. I'm quoting
3 from the beginning of Article 6:
4 "The right to command units and institutions of the organic
5 compound of Land Army Corps is under the exclusive responsibility of the
7 Thank you.
8 Why am I quoting this? I am quoting this because on several
9 occasions yesterday, you were asked whether the Command of the
10 Drina Corps was abreast of the activities in the tunnel, about the
11 sabotage activities in the tunnel or through the tunnel. That was on
12 page 58, 19, of yesterday's transcript. On several occasions, you were
13 asked, although you had already said on page 58, 19, that it was the
14 Drina Corps Command that requested that, so I would like you to say that
15 for the record clearly, and then I'm going to quote from something else.
16 I'm going to quote from page 60, and this was on page 58. And later on,
17 I'm going to quote from page 60, where a question was put to you whether
18 the detachment was used in a proper manner, whether the command had been
19 informed about that.
20 Could you please tell us now whether Krstic was abreast of the
21 situation, and whether the activities in the tunnel and the use of the
22 Sabotage Detachment had been requested by the corps command, and whether
23 the request had ever been forwarded to the Main Staff?
24 A. Yes.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please wait with your answer. Now, continue,
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The action was carried out upon the
3 request of the Command of the Drina Corps. The commander of the
4 Main Staff approved the activity and issued his own order for me to look
5 at the overall situation and to see whether that operation was feasible,
6 what were the levels of risk, whether the desired effects could be
7 achieved, and so on and so forth.
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.
9 Let's look at page 60 now, all of us together. That's in the
10 transcript, page 60. That's part of your cross-examination, and you say:
11 "The Drina Corps chief of staff, Krstic, received from the
12 commander of the Main Staff approval to engage the sabotage unit in the
13 tunnel. I know that the commander, himself, gave it to me personally.
14 Tolimir was not there ..."
15 And so on and so forth.
16 Q. Please, my question is this: When it comes to all of those
17 activities tied with the tunnel and the engagement of the sabotage unit
18 in the tunnel, were they approved by the commander of the Drina Corps and
19 the commander of the Main Staff? Had they been planned in their plans of
21 A. Yes, absolutely. A clear order was issued, as you could see. I
22 signed it myself. The order was for the engagement of the detachment,
23 and it specified what else had to be collected. And an order was issued
24 to avoid any casualties among the civilian population and among UNPROFOR
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Likewise, during the
2 examination-in-chief about what Mr. McCloskey called as terrorising our
3 organs, who didn't know anything about that, as you said, on page 35 of
4 the court transcript, Mr. McCloskey started talking about a document
5 before he showed it and tendered it subsequently, and then he said, I can
6 quote. I would like to call up P124, where he says in the Cyrillic
7 version, on the 8th of March, 1995, Radovan Karadzic, the text was
8 drafted by General Radovan Miletic and it was signed by
9 Spasoje Zeljkovic, or rather, he typed it. And then he asked you whether
10 you knew Miletic and Zeljkovic.
11 Later on, on page 39 of the record, you were asked several
12 questions about your knowledge of Miletic's participation in this
14 My question is this: Did you personally -- from Prosecutor on
15 page 35, four pages before 39, that he had learned, through the document,
16 who signed it and who had drafted it? Thank you.
17 A. I didn't know who drafted it. I didn't know who typed it before
18 it was shown to me. I saw the initials on the document, but I didn't see
19 them before, before the Prosecutor showed the document to me. I repeat
20 that I was not informed by that, nor did I participate in any shape or
21 form in the drafting of that document. I didn't even know about its
22 existence. I only learnt about its existence after the war.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you are referring to different
25 pages. I take it that you are referring to the transcript of yesterday's
1 hearing, just for the clarity of the record. You mentioned
2 cross-examination on page 60 of yesterday's transcript. That was not
3 cross-examination. That was, indeed, examination-in-chief, just to make
4 it clear.
5 Please carry on.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for your
7 very correct corrections. I apologise for making mistakes. It happens
8 often. I get confused when it comes to cross-examination versus
10 I have another question for Colonel Salapura here.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. That part referred to by Mr. McCloskey, was that written in the
13 facility -- or, rather, in the document prepared by the security organs
14 or was it part of something that is drafted by other organs? Thank you.
15 A. I didn't understand your question. What are you referring to?
16 What are you talking about?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think it would be helpful to have
19 P124 up on the screen. Then you can put a question to this document. It
20 is very difficult for the witness to follow your kind of questions.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
22 We are heading towards the break. I can repeat the question, and
23 then if it's not clear again, then I will repeat it.
24 The document is P1214. We will see it later to jog the witness's
25 memory. Mr. McCloskey was quoting from the directive --
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I want to know the correct number. First, you
2 said "124," and now you say "P1214." Which is the correct number?
3 Mr. Gajic.
4 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is P1214.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We should have that on the screen, please.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 While we are waiting for that - we are very restricted on
8 time - could you please answer.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. McCloskey spoke to you about some terror. When it comes to
11 that part of the proposal dealing with the enemy elements, where it
12 says -- did you inflict terror on the entire inhabitants of Srebrenica
13 when you sent your sabotage unit there? Can you answer?
14 A. Please, that operation, in my mind, and I was the one who gave an
15 order for its preparation, and I had informed the commander that it could
16 be carried out, that it was feasible, it was, indeed, carried out. As
17 far as I'm concerned, that operation had nothing whatsoever to do with
18 any directives or with what Mr. McCloskey said yesterday, and that was
19 that General Karadzic wrote in that directive that life should be made
20 unbearable for the Muslim population.
21 Let me repeat, I didn't know anything about that directive. That
22 directive had nothing whatsoever to do with our operation, or, rather,
23 the operation did not constitute any infliction of terror. It was just a
24 classical form of a sabotage operation which was carried out very
25 carefully, very fairly. It was a very professional operation. It was a
1 textbook example of a professional military operation behind the enemy
2 lines. The weather conditions were very bad. Still, the operation was
3 carried out very correctly, without any casualties.
4 Yesterday, Mr. McCloskey told me that one woman got killed.
5 Well, it was war. I'm not denying that fact. However, I cannot claim
6 that the casualty was the result of our fire. Mr. McCloskey also knows
7 that there was a report from the Muslim side about no casualties, and we
8 received the same report from UNPROFOR, and that would be that. And that
9 had nothing to do with any infliction of terror. It was a classical
10 professional, superbly carried out and legitimate operation that was
11 carried out by a unit of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
12 I am very proud of it, and I can claim there were no casualties as a
13 result of that operation. We suffered casualties on our side, but that's
14 neither here nor there. There was casualties before the operation and
15 after it.
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. And while we have the document on the
17 screen, my question is this: Was it up to the intelligence organ to
18 formulate all the tasks for the VRS and the corps? Thank you.
19 A. No, it was the commanders who were tasked with that. It was not
20 up to us to do it.
21 Q. Are we looking at the first chapter entitled "Main
22 Characteristics of the International Military and Political Situation,"
23 and did we participate in the drafting of this paragraph together with
24 the other organs of the command who had information about the military
25 and political situation? Thank you.
1 A. The intelligence organ does provide the input for paragraph 1,
2 about the enemy army and the international factors, but it is not just
3 the intelligence organ. It could be done together with the organ for
4 morale, religious and legal affairs. We could do it jointly in order to
5 define that political part of the directive.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.
9 We no longer need this document which we see on the screen, but
10 we don't need it anymore.
11 Can we now see 1D743 instead.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is your statement that you provided in Banja Luka on the
14 21st of July, 2004, when you were interviewed by the investigators of
15 this Tribunal.
16 Thank you. Can we please look at page 14 first, lines from
17 7 through 13. That's page 13 in English. And I also have to give you a
18 reference because of what I asked you about the areas of responsibility,
19 and here, in lines 7 through 14, you spoke about the areas of
20 responsibility of the corps. That's why I'm giving you this reference.
21 My question is this: Since the security organs give proposals to
22 the commander, what would be the zones of intelligence security, do they
23 have any right to issue orders with respect to anything to the commands
24 of corps and brigades in these areas of responsibility, with the prior
25 consent of their commanders?
1 A. No, they don't have that right. And I, as the chief of the
2 Intelligence Administration of the Main Staff, did not have the right to
3 issue any organs [as interpreted] to the intelligence organ in the corps.
4 In other words, I can provide intelligence. That was my obligation. His
5 obligation was to provide me with intelligence. If there is something of
6 special interest to me, then I have to draft a document entitled
7 "A Request for Intelligence," and I address it to the chief of staff to
8 whom that intelligence officer is subordinated, the intelligence organ of
9 the corps. And then I can ask him to collect certain intelligence for
10 the Main Staff and to submit that intelligence to me. I have to do it
11 through the chief of staff, and it is the chief of staff who decides who
12 will collect that information or intelligence. In other words, we don't
13 have any authorities in terms of command responsibility over the
14 intelligence organs at the lower level, and we don't have that same
15 authority over lower units.
16 Q. Thank you. And now, while we're discussing this issue, could you
17 please tell us, who has the exclusive power of command over troops of the
18 corps and their subordinated units, according to the rules governing
19 powers of the corps of the land army?
20 A. Exclusively, the commander and, for the staff units, the chief of
21 staff. So there are only two persons who have that power.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Could we now have D202, or, rather, not D202, but D148, items 115
24 and 116. Thank you. D148, items 115 and 116.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have used 1D743, the OTP
1 statement of the witness. Will you use it again or what will you do with
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll use it again. I just would
4 like to illustrate the last answer provided by the witness. Thank you.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
6 Carry on, please.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have it in the
9 And here we have the rule book on corps. We can see item 115,
10 where the brigade commander is discussed, and item 116, which discusses
11 the staff. I will just read the first sentence:
12 "The brigade commander has the exclusive right to command all
13 brigade units and attached units."
14 The last line is as follows:
15 "The commander takes decisions, assigns tasks to units, monitors
16 their fulfillment, and demands their strict execution, regardless of
17 difficulties that arise."
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And this is my question to you: Is this a good reflection of
20 your comments in answer to my question about the powers of command?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Since we were a specific structure, the intelligence
23 organs of lower levels were commanded by chiefs of staff and commanders
24 of units, so let's see what does it say about the staffs. It says, under
1 "The staff is the main organ of the brigade command, and it
2 functionally links and integrates the operations of all command organs.
3 "The chief of staff directs the work of the staff. He is also
4 the deputy commander of the brigade. The chief of staff, in accordance
5 with the commander's decision, has the right to assign tasks to
7 And so on and so forth.
8 So this is my question to you: In addition to having the right
9 to command the subordinate units, upon being authorised by his commander,
10 did he also have the right to command the intelligence organs at lower
11 levels? Was that part of his powers, for instance, from corps to
13 A. Intelligence organs in the corps and the brigades were
14 subordinated to the chief of staff, and they were part of the staff. The
15 reconnaissance units within a brigade, or also the reconnaissance
16 sabotage unit within the brigade, was subordinated to the chief of staff.
17 It was different only at the level of the Main Staff, because we had a
18 sector there and the organisation was completely different. The Sabotage
19 and Reconnaissance Detachment of the Main Staff was subordinated directly
20 to the commander, instead of to the chief of staff. Because of the
21 existence of the sector, the intelligence organ which I headed was not
22 subordinated to the chief of staff, but to the sector, and then the
23 commander via the sector, and that was the specific situation with the
24 Main Staff.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura. We will
1 not embark on the next set of questions because it's time for the break.
2 We will continue after the break.
3 Thank you, Mr. President. If it's okay with you, I think we
4 could go for a break.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, it is time for the first break, and we
6 will resume quarter past 4.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 4.16 p.m.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 [Microphone not activated]
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You need your microphone, please.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise.
14 Before we move to another topic, I would like e-court to show
15 document 1D752, please. This is a statement by a Muslim about this event
16 in the tunnel. I remember seeing it. We didn't want to up-load it
17 immediately into e-court, not to burden the case with too many documents,
18 but now since there's a need, we have issued instructions that it be
19 up-loaded. Thank you.
20 We can see it on the screen. Could you please zoom in a little
22 I would like to state for the transcript that this document is a
23 document by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
24 28th Division Command, of the 27th of June, referring to the events in
25 the tunnel, and it was signed personally by the stand-in for the
1 commander, Chief of Staff Major Ramiz Becirovic, who was acting for the
2 commander because the commander was away. And I am quoting from the
4 "I received your letter of the 26th of June, 1995. I am glad
5 that you are all fine and healthy. The complete situation in our
6 encirclement is something that you're familiar with in detail. So far,
7 we are successfully coping with all the problems. The aggressor's action
8 in the depth really did surprise us, but it is a piece of luck that it
9 all ended the way it did. We took certain steps, and we will do
10 everything required in order to prevent this or something similar from
11 happening again. Activities are underway to seal the pit," talking about
12 the mine pit. "Engineers of Rudnik have been engaged, and promise has
13 also been helped by representatives of the UN forces. I am constantly
14 making efforts to camouflage the army in relation to the representatives
15 of the UN."
16 Right, so he's talking about how they're concealing the military
17 activities in this zone:
18 "And I can tell you that there are some incorrect things on their
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Salapura, please, does this report by Ramiz Becirovic, that
22 is being sent to Tuzla, to the commander of the 2nd Corps, on the
23 27th of June, does that refer to these events in the tunnel? Thank you.
24 A. Yes, yes, yes, it does.
25 Q. Mr. Salapura, please, is there any information in this report
1 about the losses and about the death or killing of a woman in this
2 action, or is it just talking about the surprise element?
3 A. Well, we can see here that there is no such data there, and it
4 says that it was a piece of real luck that that's how it turned out.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Could I tender this document, 1D752, into the evidence. Thank
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be marked for identification, pending
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D230, marked for identification,
11 Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can we look at 1D743, 1D743. This is the witness's statement.
14 He referred to the statement also during the examination-in-chief by the
15 Prosecutor during the first two days of his testimony. Thank you.
16 Thank you.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. We can see your statement here that we partially already
19 attempted to utilise, so, please, during your examination -- actually,
20 the cross-examination, and during the resume, on page 6 -- on page 4 of
21 the 2nd of May, the Prosecutor briefly referred to your CV. So on
22 page 4, lines 9 -- on line 5.7, you said what you did, and at one point
23 you said that you happened to be in Zagreb when the war broke out in 1981
24 and 1982 [as interpreted], that you completed your education, and so on
25 and so forth.
1 Can you please tell us: During the war, were you in Croatia in
2 the 5th Military District Command in Zagreb?
3 A. Yes, I was.
4 Q. Could you please tell us whether the District Military Command
5 had any losses, and what were these loss, and what was the conflict?
6 What can you tell the Trial Chamber about this conflict that was taking
7 place in Zagreb?
8 A. You mean in the command building? We did have casualties. Is
9 that what you're referring to? Two people, two men. They were
10 attacking. We were inside. In the evening, we were attacked by the ZNG.
11 This would begin at nightfall and then last all night until dawn.
12 Observers were there, international observers, only in day-time, and
13 I think one of the European observers was injured, wounded, when he was
14 in the building where we were. And this went on for about a month.
15 Q. For the transcript, could you please tell us what the ZNG is?
16 Who is that? Who did that armed formation belong to?
17 A. These are the Croatian National Guards, and they belonged to the
18 Croatian forces. That was the name of the Croatian Army in the
20 Q. And the Croatian National Guard, according to the rules at the
21 time, were they a paramilitary unit and did they present themselves as a
22 legitimate military force in relation to the JNA in the Republic of
24 A. At the time, that military force was not recognised as a
25 legitimate military force, and Croatia was not recognised either.
1 Q. Could you please tell us, from the transcript, when were you
2 transferred to Slunj from Zagreb, and then when were you transferred from
3 Slunj to Sarajevo? And I'm talking about the Command of the 5th Military
4 District. This is something you talked about yesterday.
5 A. Yes, that's right, but it's a bit difficult --
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I have to interrupt you again.
7 It is very difficult. Again, you are overlapping, you are too
8 fast. Please pause between question, answer, and the next question.
9 Now your answer, please.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 It would be hard for me to give you the exact time and date. I
12 am having some problems with numbers. I've already mentioned that. I
13 have memory problems mostly in terms of numbers, so it's hard for me now
14 to say exactly when this was. 1991, yes.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Could you please answer this question:
17 Was this -- these events in Croatia, when you had to leave Zagreb as the
18 legal army and the military district command, and when you went to Slunj
19 and then from Slunj to Sarajevo, did this occur before the war in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 A. Yes, that's right, before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, before
22 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you happen to remember who was the supreme
24 commander to me, as well as to you, to all of those who were defending
25 themselves and those who were attacking?
1 A. It was Stipo Mesic -- Stipe Mesic.
2 Q. Could you please tell us, for the transcript, where was
3 Stipe Mesic from, from which state, Stipe Mesic, who was our
5 A. He was from Croatia.
6 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether it's a precedent that
7 the supreme commander happens to be from the republic that was trying to
8 secede legitimately, that he was trying to drive the legitimate military
9 forces out of the republic of Croatia, and how appropriate was it that he
10 was the commander to both me and you?
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sir, sir, sir, again, just now the translation
13 has stopped. It is impossible to catch everything if you are both really
14 speaking at the same time. I had to stop you again.
15 Please look at the transcript, and then you will see when the
16 record stops. Then you should start with your answer. Please bear that
17 in mind.
18 And now your answer, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, in essence, that's exactly how
20 it was.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Since we were interrupted, and you have to say for the
23 transcript, what is it that it was, the way it was, could you please give
24 us an entire sentence, the subject, the object, and all the other
25 relevant parts of the sentence, so that we know exactly what we are
1 talking about here? Thank you.
2 A. President Mesic, as the supreme commander, right from the
3 beginning, from the time he took up this duty, worked on the break-up of
4 Yugoslavia, and he gave a public statement that he was the bankruptcy
5 president, that he was going to dismantle the state as it was. So this
6 is what he was working on, and this is what actually happened, along with
7 the support from Tudjman and a number of European countries.
8 Q. I wanted to ask you this: Since you were working on gathering
9 data, did you have information as to whether the European Union and
10 others who participated in the achievement of a peaceful solution exerted
11 pressure on Yugoslavia that Stipe Mesic be elected president of the
12 Presidency for that particular period of the presidential term of office?
13 A. Well, I couldn't give you a firm answer to that question, because
14 in that time-period, I was not really carrying out these type of duties.
15 I know -- well, all right, it doesn't matter who was elected. Actually,
16 I really am not able to give you a specific answer.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. And now, please, do you remember the
18 statement that Stipe Mesic gave after the war between Croatia and
19 Yugoslavia ended, Croatia seceded, after it was recognised, and after he
20 left the post of supreme commander because he could no longer be the
21 supreme commander because he was representing a country that had seceded
22 from the main body of the country?
23 A. I couldn't say exactly, I couldn't quote to you the statement
24 that he gave. But later, when he was still at that post, I attended
25 negotiations in Pakrac, where he also was present. And, no, I know that
1 he was satisfied that the process was proceeding in that way, the process
2 of breaking up of Yugoslavia. He stated that openly at the time, stating
3 that these were the goals.
4 Q. Thank you. Mr. Salapura, do you remember if at the time, 1991,
5 until the war in Yugoslavia, were there any Muslim officers in Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina who later took up posts in the Army of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina? These were commanders like Delic, Dudakovic,
8 Hadzihasanovic, and so on and so forth.
9 A. They were in Croatia before the war. They were part of the then
10 legitimate army of Yugoslavia, the JNA. Then they -- with the transfer
11 of the 5th Corps units to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they
12 also were transferred, and then they stayed in units that were stationed
13 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the independence of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised. I don't remember the dates when
15 they were individually leaving. I think Enver Hadzihasanovic was the
16 last one to leave. He was the commander of the 49th Mechanised Brigade
17 in Sarajevo.
18 Q. Thank you. Mr. Salapura, as you were in Sarajevo, can you please
19 tell us, while the war was underway in Croatia, the UN observers and
20 other peace observers, were they located in Sarajevo, and did not the
21 federal state provide them with a fleet of vehicles that they could use?
22 A. Yes. These were representatives of the international community,
23 and then this military mission arrived from Zagreb. It wasn't a large
25 Q. Thank you. Are you able to tell us, were you following that?
1 How come that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an oasis of peace for
2 representatives of international community who were intermediating or
3 mediating in the international conflict until the war broke out in
4 Croatia, and then they transferred all of their people to Croatia, after
5 which the war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina? How could this
6 happen? Thank you.
7 A. I'm not sure I've understood your question fully. But upon our
8 arrival in Bosnia, there weren't that many peace forces present in
9 Bosnia, international peace forces. There were exclusively observers
10 present, and only later the military segment joined. I think it was with
11 the arrival of Satish Nambiar and some other officer,
12 General MacKenzie as well. Together with them, a larger group of
13 military people arrived to Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and some other
15 Q. Mr. Salapura, do you remember where the staff of Mr. Akashi was
17 A. I think it was in Zagreb, yes. Yasushi Akashi had his
18 headquarters in Zagreb. That was their headquarters.
19 Q. Thank you. The headquarters, Mr. Yasushi Akashi's headquarters,
20 was it there in Zagreb, in Croatia, during the war in Croatia as well, or
21 was it only that it was established after the war in Croatia?
22 A. After the war in Croatia ended. They were there during the war,
23 but they were called European Union observers. And after the war in
24 Croatia ended, the UN had its headquarters located in Zagreb. That was
25 the initial stages of UNPROFOR.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. That was the gist of my question,
2 namely, Mr. Akashi and the United Nations, and I do remember you telling
3 us about observers being there before them. Thank you.
4 Could you please tell us whether, in Yugoslavia, all republics
5 were recognised -- or, rather, that all the states that seceded from the
6 former Yugoslavia were recognised, except for Federal Republic of
8 A. Yes. The first state or republic that seceded was Slovenia, and
9 it was a relatively peaceful process. The next one was Croatia, and
10 after that, and I believe it was something that international experts
11 would agree with me, it was Bosnia and Herzegovina which seceded
12 according to a very urgent procedure. And then later on, it was
13 Macedonia, and then relatively recently, Montenegro as well.
14 Q. Thank you. You first said that Slovenia seceded. Were there any
15 troops of the 5th Military District deployed in Slovenia, and did they
16 have any casualties?
17 A. Yes, but there weren't many casualties because the attack was
18 launched against the JNA units, but the conflicts didn't last very long
19 and there were not that many casualties.
20 Q. Thank you. Since you were part of the institutions that were
21 charged with protecting the constitutional order, could you please tell
22 us whether all the republics of the former Yugoslavia were recognised by
23 the European Union before Serbia got its international recognition?
24 A. Yes, they were all recognised rather quickly, rather quickly,
25 very quickly. It was according to some kind of urgent procedure.
1 Q. Let us look at page 6 of your statement, lines 3 to 7.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the statement
3 on the screen, 1D743. Thank you. Thank you, Aleksandar. Page 6 in
4 B/C/S, page 5 in English. Thank you.
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. In line 3, you're saying:
7 "Well, after the Dobrovoljacka Street massacre in Sarajevo --"
8 The interpreter says: "Dobrovoljacka?"
9 And then you say:
10 "Yes, Dobrovoljacka. I was in that column, in that convoy.
11 Those who were there in the column know about it. Yes, I ended up in the
12 Military Hospital in Sarajevo, and about 15 days later I arrived in
13 Han Pijesak ..."
14 And so on. Now, this is my question to you: Could you please
15 tell us, for the record, where exactly is this Dobrovoljacka Street, and
16 when did this massacre take place in Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo?
17 What was that convoy that is being mentioned here, who attacked it and
18 who was the victim? Thank you.
19 A. Dobrovoljacka Street is a street in Sarajevo on the left bank of
20 the Miljacka River. I think that part of town is called Mejtas. I think
21 so. I'm almost certain. The attack was launched against a part of the
22 Command of the 5th Military District, together with the commander, who
23 remained in the area for the purpose of negotiations with the leadership
24 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, rather, the Muslim/Croatian leadership,
25 because the Serbian representatives in the leadership withdrew from all
1 BH institutions and went to Pale. The negotiations went on for days, I
2 don't know how many days exactly, and then suddenly we were being exposed
3 to attacks usually during the night, but occasionally during the day.
4 This went on for about 10 days. They switched off our electricity
5 supply, water supply, communications with our command. And during the
6 day, negotiations were going on with international intermediaries being
7 present. And towards the end, the president of the rump Presidency of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, late Alija Izetbegovic, came
9 to Dobrovoljacka Street, and he and General MacKenzie provided
10 guarantees, saying that the command can have safe passage to Lukavica,
11 where the barracks were.
12 We soon discovered that there were ambushes set up along our
13 route. And in the office of the commander, we had discussions, while I
14 was also receiving information from our operatives about MUP and
15 Green Berets. I was warning the commander that regardless of the
16 guarantees, there will be an attack.
17 We then received another set of guarantees. But as soon as we
18 set off in a convoy, we were attacked from both sides of the street.
19 There was video footage of that. It was in early May. I'm not sure
20 exactly what date it was, but it was early May. We had lots of
21 casualties. There were dead and wounded. There is, I think, a
22 proceeding going on about that.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, just a moment, please.
24 I'm not sure if we have really the -- if the translation reflects
25 exactly what we have in English on the screen. If you compare the
1 subsequent passages and paragraphs, I think that there is some
2 difference. I'm not sure about the accuracy of this translation. I just
3 want to put it on the screen -- on the record so that we have to check it
4 at a later stage.
5 Please carry on.
6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Q. Mr. Salapura, do you know which event started the
8 First World War?
9 A. Well, there was one cause, and there was a different thing that
10 started it. It was an assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian
11 emperor, that was carried out by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo on
12 Miljacka Bridge.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, bearing in mind the use of court
14 time, I'm not sure if you are on the right way at the moment. Dealing
15 with the outbreak of the First World War is a very interesting issue, but
16 I think not relevant for the indictment. You should focus on the
17 knowledge of this witness in relation to the allegations against you in
18 the indictment.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 We're discussing the attack against a military convoy, and these
21 are events that were relevant for the break-out of the war in BiH. A
22 military convoy was attacked. There were 23 killed, 47 wounded, and
23 still we haven't seen any proceedings being started -- initiated in
24 relation to this issue, whereas in the previous instance, a whole world
25 war broke out after that. And I'm asking the witness, Shouldn't there
1 have been some trial of these people who killed 23, wounded 47, and
2 captured more than a hundred officers that were officers of a legitimate
3 army of the state? If that was not enough cause for a criminal
4 proceedings to be launched, then --
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the question of, Because of a
6 certain historical event, it was necessary to carry out criminal
7 investigation proceedings, is not part of our trial, especially not the
8 outbreak of the First World War. You should focus on the indictment
9 against you and use this witness. He is very important for you to these
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
12 I put this question because I think that the beginning of the war
13 in the Balkans is the beginning of the Third World War. I will try and
14 prove that through witnesses during these proceedings. I will have
15 witnesses who will be able to speak about the start of the war in former
16 Yugoslavia and try to demonstrate whether it was initiated by the peoples
17 of the former Yugoslavia or someone else.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I repeat, you may call witnesses.
19 That will be proved. But at the moment, you have a witness here who can
20 testify about the relevant events in relation to the indictment against
22 Please carry on.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Could we please have 1D759 on the screen.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Salapura, we see a document here. You're most probably
2 familiar with it. It's a decision by Alija Izetbegovic, dated
3 27th April 1992, on allowing the army to withdraw from Bosnia. In your
4 response, you told us that MacKenzie and Izetbegovic allowed the army to
5 withdraw, yet four or five days after this decision, you were attacked.
6 Do you remember this decision by Alija Izetbegovic according to
7 which the army was free to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina? Thank
9 A. I haven't seen this decision before, but it is dated
10 27th of April. And, yes, I do know about their position, and I know what
11 requirements this decision brought about.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Please be so kind to look at the first
13 paragraph, the last line:
14 "At the session of the 27th of April, 1992, a decision was
15 reached concerning the withdrawal of units from the territory of the
16 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
17 And let me now read to you item 3:
18 "Members of the JNA who, for whichever reasons, do not want to
19 put themselves at the disposal of the state organs of the Republic of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina are required to leave the territory of the
21 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the direction they desire, with the
22 escort of the Ministry of the Interior of the BiH."
23 And then further on:
24 "The dynamics and the axis of their withdrawal will be determined
25 by relevant organs."
1 And so on and so forth.
2 Can you please tell us whether this decision was drafted only for
3 the eyes of the international community, or was it something that should
4 have been in effect, based on the decision reached at the session on the
5 27th of April, 1992?
6 A. Well, I don't know what the reasons were for drafting of this
7 decision, but it was not implemented. I do know that there were some
8 units that started with their withdrawal towards Serbia and were
9 attacked. I know that it was impossible to leave Sarajevo, that the
10 barricades were set up, and ambushes, that any unit attempting to
11 withdraw would have suffered the same consequences as the Command of the
12 5th Military District. This was, I think, only a farce. I don't know
13 how to call it. Alija was there personally, and still it did not prevent
14 them from attacking us.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Let us now look at decisions of the
16 ministers who were supposed to escort you, according to
17 Alija Izetbegovic, and who, instead, attacked the units of the JNA.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us look at document -- thank
19 you, Aleksandar. Document 1D750. Thank you.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Salapura, we can see a document dated 29th of April, which is
22 only two days after Alija's decision concerning so-called peaceful
23 withdrawal of the JNA. This is something drafted by his commander of
24 Territorial Defence, and it is stated:
25 "On the basis of the decision of the president of the Republic of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina," which is the document we've seen before,
2 "concerning the withdrawal of units of JNA, and because this decision was
3 violated, and because the property of the Republic of Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina was being stolen, I issue the following order:
5 "Along all the axes of withdrawal of JNA, blocks should be set
6 up. Military facilities should be also encircled and blocked."
7 Under 3:
8 "All unannounced convoys of JNA units, without Ministry of
9 Interior escorts, should be prevented for -- urgently plan and start
10 combat activities in the entire territory of the Republic of Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina. And in the framework of the planning, prepare all the
12 measures for protection of population and property."
13 So after this decision that may have been written for the
14 international community and maybe just for the public about peaceful
15 withdrawal of the JNA units, we can see that his minister of defence is
16 issuing an order to block the movement of JNA units, which, in effect, is
17 a declaration of war to JNA. So you, as a soldier, how do you assess
18 this, since you have had intelligence about all such actions by the other
20 A. I already mentioned that all the routes for withdrawal were
21 closed, that any attempt by any unit would end up in them being attacked.
22 You can see this order, and, yes, that's how things were in real life.
23 I can say with absolute certainty that none of the JNA units
24 opened fire first. They were all attacked in their facilities and
25 outside of their facilities, even before this order was issued, even
1 before the order by President Izetbegovic was issued. But that's how it
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's see what the minister of
4 interior - 1D753 - wrote in his order, and Alija's order also involved
5 him. So could we please have 1D753 on the screen.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This seems to be really illegible.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 We don't have a better version.
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's note: The text on the screen
10 is illegible, there's no English interpretation, and Mr. Tolimir is
11 probably going to read very fast.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is an order, and it says:
14 "To Security Services Centres, to all chiefs, public security
15 centres --"
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, if you want to read it into the
17 record, please do it slowly so that the interpreters can catch it,
18 because there's no interpretation. Slowly, slowly.
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. What we can see on the screen, the document that we see on the
21 screen, 1D753, is an order by the minister of the interior,
22 Alija Delimustafic, the minister of the interior of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina, that is, who also issued his order on the implementation of
24 the Presidency decision about the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia, as
25 you can see in the title, and he sent this order to: Security Services
1 Centres; to all chiefs; to all public security stations; and the
2 secretary of the Sarajevo SUP.
3 And now, in the first part or the preamble of the document, it
4 says -- and I'm reading from the third paragraph, where he explains that
5 there was a decision by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina about
6 the withdrawal of the JNA on the 27th of April. And we can see that this
7 an order.
8 Under 1:
9 "Carry out complete blockade of all roads in the territory of the
10 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on which the units of the former JNA
11 start to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina."
12 Under 2:
13 "Carry out a blockade of the general sector of military
15 Under 3:
16 "The announced convoys of JNA units, without any police escorts,
17 should be prevented from leaving the barracks."
18 Under 4:
19 "Plan and start combat activities in the entire territory of the
20 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a matter of urgency. Co-ordinate all
21 that with the Territorial Defence of the region."
22 And this is signed by the minister of the interior,
23 Alija Delimustafic. This is the minister of the interior of
25 My question, Mr. Salapura, is this: Mr. Salapura, bearing in
1 mind that now we have seen two documents -- or, rather, three documents,
2 the first one that was signed by Alija, which formally allowed the JNA to
3 withdraw, the second document, which was issued by the chief of the
4 Territorial Defence, preventing the withdrawal, and the third document,
5 in which the minister of the interior also intends to prevent the
6 withdrawal of the JNA, and both of the last documents order that combat
7 activities should be started as a matter of urgency, would you say that
8 there had been a plan to attack the convoy where you were, as a member of
9 the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo? You were attacked in that convoy.
10 Was that part of a plan? Thank you.
11 A. Yes, the attack was carried out in keeping with the orders or
12 directives. I can say also that the evening before the attack
13 happened - I believe that it was one evening before the attack - the
14 minister of the interior was still in our command, and he promised that
15 no attacks would ensue.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, what is the date of the document we
17 have in front of us?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 27 April, 27 April.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 The date is the same as the order issued by Colonel Perica on the
21 29th of April, 1992, because you can see it here, an order on the
22 implementation of the order of the Presidency of the republic. That
23 decision is referred to --
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm only asking for the date. No repetition,
1 Carry on with your next question.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Mr. President, could you please admit this document, 1D73 --
4 1D753, 1D750, 1D759? Thank you.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we don't have it on the screen correctly.
6 You should repeat the numbers.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, we have just seen 1D753,
8 1D750, 1D759. Thank you.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The three documents will be marked for
11 identification, pending translation.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D231, D232 and D233, all marked for
13 identification, Your Honours.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, just to be clear, 1D759 will be
16 Exhibit D231, marked for identification. 65 ter 1D750 will be
17 Exhibit D232, also marked for identification. And 65 ter 1D753 will be
18 Exhibit D233. Thank you.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, all marked for identification, pending
21 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Can we now see 1D00749. I repeat, 1D00749.
24 And while we are waiting for it to appear, I have to say that
25 this is an overall documentation about the attacks against this column as
1 well as all the other military facilities, even before the war broke out
2 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, rather, before the war from Croatia
3 spilled over onto Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 Let's first look at page 1 in this document, and then I would
5 like to look at page 31, where the attack on the military convoy of the
6 JNA members in Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo, on the 3rd of May, 1992,
7 is described. Thank you. The document was drafted by the
8 Documentation Centre of the Republika Srpska. Thank you.
9 Now we are looking at page 30. I asked for 32. We need 31.
10 Let's look at page 31. Let's look at the introduction. My apologies to
11 the e-court. 31 is the page number.
12 And now we can see where it says:
13 "The attack on the military convoy of JNA members on
14 Dobrovoljacka Street in the 3rd of May, 1992 ..."
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. My question, Mr. Salapura, is this: Did the attack, indeed,
17 happen on the 3rd of May, 1992?
18 A. Yes, there's no doubt about that. I didn't remember the date,
19 but you can see here the Documentation Centre has all the relevant
20 materials on which they base this document.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 A. I know that it was at the beginning of May, so this is the
23 beginning of May. It could have been on the 3rd or on the 4th, but, in
24 any case, it was in the early May.
25 Q. Thank you. And now we will see this. Paragraph 1:
1 "In a series of attacks on the units of the military formation,
2 which was legal and based on the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
3 the JNA, at the beginning of 1992, we have to look at the activities of
4 the so-called Patriotic League, the Territorial Defence, the Croatian
5 armed forces, on the military convoy of the JNA when the Command of the
6 2nd Military District in Sarajevo was withdrawing. That happened on the
7 3rd of May, 1992, around 1700 hours."
8 My question is this: Did the attack, indeed, happen in the
9 afternoon hours, as you can read in the text that I have just read out
10 for you?
11 A. Yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we go to page 33 in the
13 same document. Thank you.
14 We're looking at page 33. Can we please look at the
15 sixth paragraph. We cannot see it at the moment. Can we scroll up?
16 Yes, very well, thank you.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And the paragraph begins with the following words:
19 "In the course of the attack on the convoy, 23 people were
20 killed, 47 were injured, and about 170 officers, commissioned officers,
21 and soldiers were captured and then escorted to the Partisan facility in
22 Mis Irbina Street and into the Security Services Centre."
23 My question is this: Is the information about the number of
24 dead, injured and captured correct?
25 A. Yes. This was investigated, and this was proven. The evidence
1 was collected immediately after the event. This is the information
2 compiled by the Documentation Centre, and the information is absolutely
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, thank you.
5 And can the e-court display page 34 in the same document.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: While this is coming up, I would like to ask the
7 witness: What is the Documentation Centre?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Government of the
9 Republika Srpska set it up. Its members are members of the MUP, the
10 military lawyers, and all these people have been dealing with the
11 collection of relevant evidence and documents for a long time; not only
12 about volunteers, but also about crimes and execution sites. Actually,
13 they're dealing with the crimes committed against the Serbian population.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And when was this centre set up?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that that was sometime in
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you saying "1997"?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm not sure. I believe so.
19 I know that it was immediately after the end of the war.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I saw a date of the 3rd of May, 1992, on the
21 heading of this document. Can we go back to that.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know where that is.
23 This is May 2001, if you're referring to the first page of the
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was referring to another page, but that makes
1 it clear. Thank you very much.
2 Judge Nyambe has a question.
3 JUDGE NYAMBE: Yes. It's just a clarification.
4 At line 22 -- at page 22, line 1 and 2, you have referred to:
5 "... and I don't think there were any casualties due to," and
6 you've used the word "Zolja fire."
7 What does that mean?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A Zolja is a hand-held reactive
9 grenade-launcher. The calibre is .67 millimetres.
10 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Let's look at page 34, please, 34. Thank you.
14 This is 35.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. On page 35, in the second paragraph, there is a reference to the
17 fallen soldiers of the JNA, whose names are listed in here. We will see
18 that later. It also says that:
19 "In the Central Prison and in the cellars of the DTB Partisan
20 facility, and in other Muslim prisons, the following people were killed:"
21 A total of 26 of them who were also killed. So we're talking
22 about a total of 49 who were killed in the convoy that set out from
23 Sarajevo. And on this page, you can also find, in the third paragraph
24 from the bottom, who the suspects for the war crime were, in keeping with
25 Articles 144 and 146 of the Penal Code of the Republika Srpska, and you
1 can see their number and the names: Ejub Ganic, Sefer Halilovic,
2 Alija Delimustafic, whose order we saw, Jusuf Pusic. These are the
3 suspects, those who -- then Selim Hajric and Fikret Becirovic. And here
4 you can also see the names of the eight of them, with the relevant
5 information, their position, and the role they played during the attack
6 against the column.
7 My question is this: Do you know these eight people, especially
8 Avdo Paljeta, who was also a suspect in the commission of the war crime?
9 A. Do you mean personally?
10 Q. No. Do their names ring any bells? Do you know any of them
11 personally? Did you meet any of them personally, like
12 Alija Delimustafic, for example?
13 A. Well, I've heard of all of them, because they are performing
14 public functions, some are military functions, and so on and so forth. I
15 had two meetings with Delimustafic, personal meetings.
16 Q. Thank you. Since you've heard of all of these people, do you
17 know if any of the persons on this list was processed and were they
18 charged for war crimes, starting with the column in Sarajevo, whereas we
19 saw at the beginning 23 were killed, and then later 26 were killed
21 A. No, nobody ever was brought to trial.
22 Q. Do you know that Ejub Ganic was arrested in England, pursuant to
23 a warrant from Serbia, for crimes, but due to pressure and because of
24 other means, he was released and not charged?
25 A. Yes, yes, I am familiar that that happened.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you are putting lots of
2 questions outside the scope of this case. You should be aware of the
3 time you are using with this witness. This is, in fact, not relevant to
4 the period of time, relevant for the indictment we are dealing with.
5 Continue, please.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Can we please look at page 35 now so that we can look at the
8 names of officers and soldiers who were killed in the attack on the
9 military column, ranging -- starting from 1 to 33. Thank you.
10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
11 Q. My question to you is this: Let's not waste time. Do you know
12 anybody from this list? Were they all members of the JNA, consisting of
13 the Command of the 2nd Military District?
14 A. Yes, I know Radulovic, I know Sokic, I know Mihajlovic,
15 Labudovic, Gvozdenovic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Could we also look at the second part of the list on the
18 following page so that the witness could see -- this is page 36, and so
19 that he could see which active-duty military officers were captured.
20 There is a list of that, too. Thank you.
21 Can we also look at page 37, please, and then page 38. Thank
22 you. Can we also look at page 39, please.
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You've just seen the list of captured persons. At the end, I
25 would just like to read the remark:
1 "In this attack, accompanied by proper documentation, i.e.,
2 statements of eye-witnesses of the attack, casualties, testimony of those
3 captured, videocassettes, and also reports by commands and documents from
4 archives on accords, and on the basis of medical documentation, as cited,
5 a complete set of information was given, and this represents the ground
6 for criminal charges for suspects suspected of organising, issuing
7 orders, and executing the attack on members of the JNA army in Sarajevo."
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be asked to repeat the
9 second part of his question.
10 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You're again making some trouble for the
13 Mr. Tolimir, the last part of your question was not interpreted,
14 and the same happened to the answer. The witness was starting very early
15 with his answer. Please repeat the second part of your question.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. Mr. Salapura, can we not overlap, please. I asked whether
18 anybody was brought to trial on the basis of this file that is referred
19 to and on the basis of the last sentence that we can see in the last
20 paragraph of this document. Thank you.
21 A. So far, nobody has been brought to trial. And this statement by
22 the chief prosecutor of the court in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that
23 proceedings are underway.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.
25 Can we now look at page 7. We're just going to look at the
1 heading and also the location to which it refers. Page 7 is the attack
2 on the municipality of Brod, March/April 1992, and in line 4 it states:
3 "In Sijekovac, in the broader area of the Brcko municipality, on
4 the 26th of March, 1992, there was an attack."
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I wanted to know if you know anything about this attack. You
7 were a member of the 2nd Military District at the time, in whose area
8 this was. Can you please tell us anything about that? Thank you.
9 A. Yes, this attack was carried out even before the armed conflict
10 broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was carried out by members of
11 the HOS of the Croatian Army, from the Croatian part of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina. Sijekovac is a Serbian village close to Brod. It says
13 "Brcko" here, but actually it's not Brcko; it's Brod. The material for
14 this was submitted to The Hague Tribunal here, as far as I know. It's
15 now located at the court in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these proceedings
16 have not been started.
17 Q. Thank you. And on this page, we also see where these numbers
18 begin. This is the last four lines, 1 to 4. We can see the victims are
19 listed here, 1 to 19.
20 We can look at the second page here, number 8, where you can see
21 that the numbers start from 1 and end up at 19. These are the victims.
22 And then on the same page, again starting towards the bottom of the page
23 from 1 to 8, and then from 1 to 65, all information is provided about
24 those suspected of carrying out that attack, and most of them came from
25 Croatia, which is just what you said. And this is inclusive with the
1 number 69 --
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the name.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. -- living in Brod. The resident's address is [indiscernible].
5 And so on and so forth. Can you please tell us whether Slavonski Brod is
6 in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina?
7 A. Slavonski Brod is in the Republic of Croatia. It's on the other
8 bank of the Sava River.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we please look at page 13 of this document. Thank you.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. We can also see that an attack on Kupres is referred to here, and
13 it says, under the heading, that this happened on the 3rd of April, 1992,
14 and it says "Donji Malovan," and so on and so forth.
15 Please, can you tell us anything -- or can you tell the
16 Trial Chamber anything about this attack that took place on the
17 3rd of April, 1992, and was this before the secession and the recognition
18 of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Thank you.
19 A. Yes, this took place before. This is also among those initial
20 conflicts, armed conflicts. Those who participated here also belonged to
21 the Croatian paramilitary units and some units of the Croatian Army.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, would you please explain the purpose
23 of this line of questions? From page 41 up to page 67, you were dealing
24 with matters that happened -- events that happened in 1992. What is the
25 purpose of these lines of questions and the use of court time?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The purpose is to show how the
2 conflict from Croatia was transferred to Bosnia, and how the conflict was
3 not provoked by the Serbian side, but precisely by the Muslims, who were
4 supported by the international community and recognised as a socialist
5 republic that had seceded.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you please explain the relevance for this
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The context of the events is
9 this -- actually, the context of that event is something that later had
10 an effect on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later it
11 influenced all the activities that I was later involved in, as well as
12 Mr. Salapura, and the activities of the army that we were members of.
13 The event, in a way, was the source of the consequences that we were
14 forced to deal with later. Thank you.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to have an explanation from a legal
16 point of view. Of course, events in history have a deep influence on
17 actual events. This is normal. We are all part of history. But I would
18 like to have an explanation from a legal point of view. What is the
19 relevance for this trial? You may consult your legal assistant.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
21 We dispute the adjudicated facts. This is something that you are
22 aware of, as well as the Prosecution, and the completion -- the
23 completeness of the data that is stated there. And we are stating
24 information that is relevant in relation to this witness about the
25 arrival of NATO to our area, and later other areas, under the pretext of
1 peace organisations, and it also has to do with concealing information
2 and not publicly issuing the relevant information. Thank you.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye, does the Prosecution have a
4 position in that respect?
5 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I would not deign to advise
6 General Tolimir as to how to proceed in the cross-examination of this
7 witness. I think that's within his prerogative. I do share the Court's
8 concerns with respect to the relevance and the propriety of the questions
9 or the line of questions that is being put to this witness.
10 To the extent that General Tolimir disputes the adjudicated
11 facts, it would be helpful to know, in particular, which adjudicated
12 facts he is disputing with respect to the line of questions that he's put
13 to this witness. And I think if he's able to do that, then he can
14 establish at least some relevance -- legal relevance to the case.
15 However, I don't think, to the extent that this was not any substantive
16 part of the witness's direct examination, that it corresponds in any
17 respect to the questions that were put to him and, I think, would exceed
18 the permissible scope of cross-examination, of course, within the
19 discretion of the Court. But I think without any demonstrative relevance
20 to the salient issues with respect to his responsibility for the crimes
21 alleged in the indictment, then I think we're drifting a bit afield of
22 where we should be.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
24 Mr. Tolimir, are you -- Mr. Tolimir, are you in a position to
25 give us more details about the adjudicated facts you are disputing?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 The adjudicated facts refer to the path to independence of
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which specifically actually set off the war. The
4 witness is talking about how the attacks were started by Croats from
5 Bosanski Kupres, that they attacked a legal force that was protecting the
6 Constitution of the SFRY, and we are talking about the particular route
7 to this independence and that the Prosecution adopted as adjudicated
8 facts, facts that were provided to them by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thank
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you give us the numbers of the adjudicated
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
13 The first 10, I don't know precisely, but I know that I did read
14 them. And I did tell my legal assistant to dispute them, setting off
15 from this particular aspect or point of view. Thank you.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 First, at page 69, line 20, I think I said "without any
19 demonstrative relevance to the salient issues," so "without" is missing
20 from that sentence. It should read that:
21 "I think without any demonstrative relevance to the salient
22 issues with respect to his responsibility, then we're drifting far
24 With respect to what General Tolimir just represented concerning
25 the adjudicated facts, they are adjudicated facts. This is the point.
1 They have been previously and finally adjudicated in other proceedings
2 and found as such here. They are substantively background evidence
3 relating to the indictment and the conflict which is -- the result of a
4 conflict. I don't see, though, that it is directly related to the
5 evidence that this witness has given in evidence given during his
6 examination-in-chief. I don't see that it is a salient issue that needs
7 to be gone into to the extent that General Tolimir, it appears, intends
8 to go into during the cross-examination of this witness.
9 I don't dispute that to the extent that it rebuts any adjudicated
10 fact or challenges any adjudicated fact, it could be an appropriate
11 avenue for cross-examination, since he's obliged to put questions to a
12 witness that advance his position. I understand that, and we accept
13 that, as the Prosecution. On the other hand, I don't think, to the
14 extent that he's gone into it this far, it is necessary or appropriate
15 with this witness. Perhaps there's another witness that it would be more
16 appropriate to explore these issues with, a historian perhaps, but I
17 don't think it's appropriate, given the nature of this witness's direct
18 testimony, to pursue this avenue on cross-examination.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If I recall correctly, during
20 examination-in-chief the witness was asked about his career and about his
21 CV, his places and positions of service in the relevant armies from the
22 beginning of his career; nothing else in relation to this time.
23 Would you like to respond, Mr. Tolimir?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
25 I think that the Defence has the right to dispute, add to, or put
1 the adjudicated facts in a certain context, and this is what I'm doing
2 here. I've taken references from the summary, from the statement that
3 the witness provided to the Prosecution, and we are now on page 6 of the
5 And, secondly, pursuant to your request, I will stop doing that.
6 However, the facts, you can say that Serbia attacked NATO, that Libya
7 attacked NATO, and those statements can be adopted, but this is not
9 Secondly, during the examination here, all the information that I
10 wrote and that this witness wrote that referred to NATO activities have
11 been placed under the seal of protection. I'm talking about the
12 activities of NATO in Bosnia. I don't know why. Is this a way to
13 protect the concept of the spreading of NATO across protected areas that
14 is now being adopted in Libya and elsewhere?
15 The Ministry of Defence of Serbia, which is an organ authorised
16 by the government to make such a decision, and the Prosecution that
17 disclosed these materials -- have disclosed all the materials which are
18 now in e-court. I am asking Mr. Vanderpuye, is it -- or, rather, I'm
19 asking the witness.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Is the Government of Serbia there to protect NATO or its own
22 citizens by presenting them information that I wrote, that this witness
23 wrote, and we sent that information to them for their perusal? Thank
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, at the moment we are discussing
1 procedural problems. It's not the moment to put a question to the
3 I would like to know: What are you referring to when you say:
4 "All the information that I wrote and that this witness wrote
5 that referred to NATO activities have been placed under seal of
7 What do you mean by that? I don't understand that.
8 Mr. Gajic.
9 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'd like to greet
11 Mr. Tolimir is pointing to the following: You have our list of
12 evidence, which is rather lengthy. It is on 50 or so pages. Most of the
13 documents on the list are under seal, because the institutions of the
14 Government of the Republic of Serbia issued an order, pursuant to
15 Rule 70, that they can be used only in closed sessions, and that is why
16 Mr. Tolimir expresses his positions and views and his very righteous
17 revolt against such practices. And as we're going to see before the
18 course of the trial, there's a lot in the document corroborating the
19 involvement of NATO and some Western countries in the events in
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially when it comes to Srebrenica and the
21 developments that took place, and that we will have an opportunity to
22 discuss during our cross-examination.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic, can you please help me? Which
24 documents on this lengthy list are under seal? I don't see any
1 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I don't know what the
2 case manager has sent. In my file, it says that documents are under seal
3 or at least marked in red. Most of the intelligence reports signed by
4 Mr. Tolimir or Mr. Salapura are, indeed, under seal and can only be used
5 as Rule 70 material, pursuant to the order of the Government of the
6 Republic of Serbia. At least that's what I read on the 65 ter list
7 disclosed to us by the Prosecution.
8 I addressed the Government of the Republic of Serbia at one point
9 in time, asking them to be able to use these documents in open sessions.
10 I received their reply on the eve of the beginning of the trial some year
11 or so ago, in which it says that we could use the document in the same
12 way the Prosecution can use them in closed sessions, without disclosing
13 the documents to the general public.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is an important issue. We have to clarify
16 Mr. Vanderpuye.
17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 I have spoken to Mr. Gajic specifically about this issue. There
19 are a number of documents that we did receive that had Rule 70
20 restrictions on them. I can't tell you, off the top of my head,
21 specifically which documents they were, but there were quite a number of
22 documents, and we did discuss this issue before. The restriction is that
23 they can be used. However, they have to be used in closed session, and
24 that's basically it.
25 I can get you more specific information about that, and perhaps
1 we can clarify it, but I still think that this is a tangential issue to
2 the nature of the cross-examination, which is where we began. It's a
3 separate question all together than the propriety of the line of
4 questions that's being put to this witness.
5 I see that it's time for the break. It's probably a good
6 opportunity for everybody to take a breather and sit back and assess
7 where we are. And I'll talk to Mr. Gajic during that period of time and
8 see if I can get him appropriate information concerning the restrictions
9 that are in place and the extent of them, and I can inform the
10 Trial Chamber when we return.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's a good proposal.
12 Before we break, Mr. Gajic.
13 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just one thing in
14 order to avoid any confusion.
15 Most of the documents, as you can see, on our exhibit list bears
16 a 65 ter number of the Prosecutor. We'll use them during the
17 cross-examination of this witness. And this is the only thing I wanted
18 to add at the end of this discussion, and what I have in mind is the
19 further course of the cross-examination of this witness.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: At the outset of this discussion, I was reminding
21 the Defence to make the best use of the court time available.
22 We must have the second break now, and we will resume 20 minutes
23 past 6.00. And the Chamber will consider this situation in the meantime.
24 --- Recess taken at 5.49 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 6.23 p.m.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before the break, we dealt with three separate
2 issues. One was the matter of adjudicated facts the accused is
3 challenging, as he told us before the break, and he gave us a reference
4 for approximately the first 10 adjudicated facts.
5 We looked into it, and we see there is one chapter of the
6 decision of the adjudicated facts dealing with 1991 and 1992, the
7 break-up of the former Yugoslavia. These are the Adjudicated
8 Facts 1 through 8. In fact, 8 of the whole of 604 adjudicated facts.
9 Looking into these adjudicated facts, we see nothing which is in
10 any way putting the finger on one warring party. In that case, it is
11 dealing with, in very short terms, with the composition of the
12 Socialist Republic of the former Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1990, and
13 the ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Communist time,
14 the problems in the late 1980s, and then the declaration of independence
15 by Slovenia and Croatia and the break-off of Macedonia, and then, in
16 relation to our case, number 7, Bosnia began its journey to independence
17 with a parliamentary declaration of sovereignty on the 15th October of
18 1991. That is, in fact, all. And then you have dealt with it a lot, the
19 recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the
20 European Community and by the United States.
21 We don't see that the testimony of this witness is in any way
22 challenging these eight adjudicated facts. This was point 1.
23 The second point - I don't think that there is a need to deal
24 with that and to discuss it at the moment - is the fact that there are
25 restrictions, pursuant to Rule 70, by using certain documents. For sure,
1 we will not do that today, I think.
2 And the third is the use of court time during cross-examination.
3 To make it very clear, Mr. Tolimir, it's up to you to decide
4 which questions you put to a witness, but may I say this: As you are not
5 a lawyer, as you are representing and defending yourself, and because we
6 have a certain responsibility to look at the best use of court time and
7 to make sure that we have not only a fair, but also an expeditious trial,
8 we should assist you and give you some guidance. And we are not cutting
9 questions, but we wanted sometimes to give you a kind of warning. Do the
10 best to use the court time for your defence in the best way.
11 The last hour before we started this discussion, you were dealing
12 with matters which I had to ask you about the relevance and the purpose
13 to put these questions for your purposes. You should continue and bear
14 that in mind. That has something to do with the length of this
15 cross-examination and the hours indicated by you. You can't expect,
16 after this experience, that you will be given many more -- much more time
17 for continuation and concluding your cross-examination.
18 You should continue, and we should use the last half an hour of
19 today's hearing for your cross-examination. Please continue, and bear my
20 words in mind.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for all
22 these admonitions. I was at page 13, as we can see, and I will only
23 speak about the numbers -- well, rather, I will not discuss any other
24 issues. I will just ask the witness whether something is or is not
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Here, we have information about attack against Kupres between
3 3rd of April and 15th of May, 1992. At the time, did Bosnia secede from
4 Yugoslavia, and was Bosnia recognised by that time?
5 A. During the fighting on Kupres, no, not at that time.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Can we please turn to page 16. I will just put a question.
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation].
9 Q. Were all people captured at Kupres taken to prisons in Croatia;
10 Split, Zadar, Lora and so forth, and were the people who are listed here
11 by name among those missing? For instance, 28 persons were killed, and
12 their remains still haven't been found. We can find that on page 18.
13 A. I cannot tell you how many people were killed at Kupres. I do
14 know there was an on-site investigation carried out there by the military
15 police organs of the MUP of Kupres and the corps. I did not have an
16 opportunity to see the report, so I cannot comment on the details
17 therein, because Kupres was at the time in the area of responsibility of
18 the Knin Corps. I was at the time at Manjaca, in the Command of the
19 2nd Military District, and we did not have all the data -- detailed data
20 available, so I cannot comment this any further or respond to you.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether on-site investigations were
22 carried out and forensic examination during the autopsy of the bodies
23 that were found in the Kupres area?
24 A. Yes, I do know that they were fully processed.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you know that a criminal report was filed? We can
1 find that on page 24, and there it is mentioned that 74 people were
2 killed. And we can see on page 24 -- can we please have page 24 on the
3 screen. Up until number 73, we will see who were the perpetrators, and
4 in the further text on, 4 to 115, we can see other data.
5 So are you aware that the full criminal report was drafted and
6 that this report was sent to relevant organs?
7 A. I don't know whether this was sent to any court or any relevant
9 Q. On page 24, please take a look at numbers 1 to 3. Who were the
10 people who issued orders? Do you know anything about the people listed
11 here, and are these people listed as those who issued orders in the
12 criminal report we are discussing?
13 A. I can only tell you what I see on the screen. I did not know
14 their names. I have heard of Tomislav Filipovic, and only of him. I
15 don't know any of the others.
16 Q. Thank you. Please look at the names listed on pages 24 to
17 page 30. We have 115 people listed as direct perpetrators.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please turn the page. Thank
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do you have a question for the witness?
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. This is my question: Does this criminal report provide precise
23 data about those who issued orders and those who perpetrated the crimes?
24 Thank you.
25 A. I am not familiar with the names of the perpetrators. I have
1 heard of Vile [phoen], and there is also mention of a Croatian general,
2 and of several people by the surname of Vile. I have heard that they
3 were involved, but I wasn't following all the events and the criminal
4 reports because this was not part of my jurisdiction. This is something
5 that is the job of MUP and the Security Service.
6 Q. Thank you. Because all of this was drafted in the
7 Documentation Centre, and because it contains mainly the names of
8 victims, those who issued orders, and direct perpetrators, and it refers
9 to all the events that took place before the break-out of the war in
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, I will put to you this question: Do you know
11 that any organ of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina acted upon this
12 criminal report? Or to make it more precise, do you know whether any of
13 the organs in Bosnia and Herzegovina has processed the people that are
14 listed in document 1D00749?
15 A. I know for a fact that they were not processed in any way. And
16 what is the status of this case, I don't know anything about that.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Mr. President, because this is criminal and legal documentation
19 concerning the crimes that happened before the outbreak of war in Bosnia,
20 I would like to tender it into evidence.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you tell me, how many pages does this
22 document contain?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document has about 135 pages,
24 but about 80 per cent of it is just names of either victims, or
25 perpetrators, or people who were issuing orders. There is only criminal
1 reports and the summary text at the beginning.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The problem is the amount of work the
3 Translation Unit has to do. We should find a way to reduce this work of
4 translation. We need a translation, of course, but perhaps not the whole
5 document. If it has 130 pages, approximately, we should think about and
6 you should think about only to tender the relevant pages you have used
7 with this witness.
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
10 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Mr. President, I would object, actually, to the admission of this
12 document. I think the witness's testimony is quite clear with respect to
13 his familiarity with its contents, or lack thereof, I should say. He did
14 indicate that he recognised a couple of names that were shown to him, but
15 beyond that, I think he indicated quite clearly that he wasn't familiar
16 with this document, didn't know about the context or what it purports to
17 represent specifically. And I don't think that there's any basis of
18 relevance for the document to be admitted at this stage.
19 If, perhaps, there's another witness that knows more about it, or
20 even if another witness knows more about it, if General Tolimir can
21 establish a nexus between this document and any, as I say, salient issue
22 under the indictment, then I think it might be appropriate, but at this
23 stage I don't think he's established that.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the witness indicated several times,
25 like page 78, line 14, line 21; page 79, line 8; that he cannot tell, he
1 cannot comment, and he doesn't know, and it was not his area of
2 responsibility, but of the MUP.
3 You have heard the objection of Mr. Vanderpuye. What is your
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is my opinion:
6 If this document will not be entered into evidence, then maybe we could
7 have just a number of criminal reports and the number of victims, because
8 there is always an option that we use a different witness for this.
9 When Mr. Rupert Smith was testifying, you suggested that we
10 should ask some other witness, although he was here, but I don't know how
11 to tender a document if one cannot do it through a witness who
12 participated in the events, who was there. Thank you.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I would like to invite you - it is
14 not necessary to do that now - to indicate which pages you have used with
15 the witness, and then we will decide that later. For the moment, we
16 should give it a number and mark it for identification to be able to
17 identify it.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D234, marked for identification,
19 Your Honours.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
21 Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Can we please have -- or, rather, I'd first like to put a
24 question to the witness.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In the area of responsibility of your command, was Kupres within
2 that area of responsibility, and was I a member of a unit that was also
3 in the Kupres area?
4 A. Yes. I didn't say it was not part of the area of responsibility.
5 I said that it was in the area of responsibility of the Knina Corps, but
6 that was in the initial stages when the Knin Corps just entered the
7 2nd Army complement, when they moved to Kozara, and when the
8 communications were not fully functional. What I do know is that the
9 events at Kupres represented one of the first crimes against the Serbian
10 people at the time, and I do know that MUP and the military police were
11 involved in documenting all this. As an intelligence officer, I received
12 whatever information was available, but I did not have all the details,
13 and it was not part of my sphere of activity. I just received some basic
14 information at the time.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. For the sake of the transcript, could
16 you please say: Kupres, as the territory, and the Knin Corps, were they
17 in the area of responsibility of the Command of the 2nd Military District
18 in Sarajevo, where you were serving? Thank you.
19 A. Yes, yes, that is correct, and that's when it was actually
20 transferred as part of the 2nd. That's the 5th Military District that
21 became the 2nd.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Can we now look at 65 ter 3527.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Salapura, is this a document of the Command of the
1 2nd Military District of the 16th of May, 1992, which I signed as the
2 chief of the security organ, and was this document sent to the
3 10th Corps?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Was the 10th Corps part of the 2nd Military District?
6 A. Yes. I'm not disputing that. This just went along the security
7 line, not along the intelligence line, so I didn't receive the
8 information from on-site investigations which were carried out by the
9 MUP units.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. So we're talking about
11 the 16th of May.
12 Can we now look at 65 ter 3529, and can I tender this document
13 which talks about the 2nd Military District covering the area of
14 responsibility where the witness was? And the date of the document is
15 the 16th of May, 1992.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document 65 ter 3527 will be admitted into
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D235, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 We can see another document here which was created later. The
21 document bears the date the 20th of May, 1992. I also signed this
22 document, and the heading of the document -- actually, the document has
23 the heading "Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina," to the Intelligence/Security Administration.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Is that the transformation you were talking about in your
2 statement, when you talked about the 5th becoming the 2nd Military
3 District? Thank you.
4 A. Yes. As soon as I came to Han Pijesak, and I'm unable to tell
5 you the exact date, but this was in May, after the Dobrovoljacka
6 incident, shortly after that, so this Intelligence/Security
7 Administration was formed during that period. There were separate
8 security and intelligence departments, and then the administration was
9 formed separately for intelligence and security affairs.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 I would like to tender this document as well. Thank you.
12 Could we see --
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment, please. I would like to see the last
15 Thank you. It will be admitted into evidence.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D236, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Could we see 1D743 in the e-court now. We'll wait for it to
19 appear on our monitors.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. But until we see it, I would just like you, if you remember --
22 how were these intelligence and security organs created, and then how it
23 came about that the Intelligence and Security Administration was created
24 as one organ? This is on pages 6 and 7 in the Serbian and page 5 in the
1 A. This happened following an agreement and conversation between you
2 and me. When I came to Han Pijesak, I was by myself. I didn't have
3 anyone else in this department. There was just me. The same situation
4 was in three other corps. I didn't have enough cadres. Those who were
5 there before they had gone to Serbia, they joined the Army of Yugoslavia,
6 these officers left. I don't need to go into details, but those officers
7 from Serbia who were in that unit had left, gone back, so I was left
8 alone. And that's how we agreed then to form an administration to issue
9 instructions that security officers, since there were more of them, the
10 service was larger in terms of personnel, it was up to strength, so they
11 were given assignments to actually work on intelligence jobs as well, and
12 then that's how we began to create the security organ and the
13 intelligence organs, which then later grew into the
14 Security Administration organ, where you had one chief who was in charge
15 of both lines of activities.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, we mentioned the wrong
17 pages. It's page 9 in English and 10 in Serbian, page 10 in the Serbian.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. On that page, you speak about this from lines 10 to 32, and we
20 can all see that this is on page 10, where you say exactly what you said
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And that is how the Administration for Security and Intelligence
24 was created, and we can see that after we had our conversation and
25 agreement, two days after that this was actually implemented.
1 For example, what we see in lines 31 and 32, do you know how the
2 Intelligence and Security Sector was created and what was its role?
3 A. Later, when the sections grew into the administration, as the
4 Army of Republika Srpska began to grow and it began to be staffed, the
5 institutions developed. And along with that, the scale of our
6 assignments grew and expanded. Then it became a sector, because then
7 throughout the whole war, we had a lot of personnel problems,
8 particularly in the intelligence area. We ended the war without an
9 intelligence officer in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, where the security
10 officer was actually carrying out these tasks. We were unable to obtain
11 adequate suitable personnel, and we were unable to train people to be
12 able to carry out those assignments. The sector was the one who
13 co-ordinated both of these organs and regulated the exchange of
14 information, data, and so on and so forth between the two
15 administrations, and that was the link through the sector that led up to
16 the commander, who in that way controlled and commanded both of the
18 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, practically, what happens with the
19 information that the chief of the sector receives, data of an
20 intelligence nature, and what happens with counter-intelligence
22 A. When the Analysis Sector processes the information it receives on
23 a daily basis from the organs that gather such data, they process these
24 intelligence data every day. Then the information is sent to you. You
25 read the information first, and then you would note who the recipients
1 would be, other than the ones that are already mentioned, and to whom
2 specific data should be passed on to; for example, specific intelligence
3 data or counter-intelligence data. You would make a note on the document
4 to whom this data should be handed over, and then you would also issue
5 instructions regarding intelligence data and how the Intelligence Sector
6 would deal with that information; for example, would it be necessary to
7 continue to process or work further on a particular kind of trail or
8 information or should this be handed over to another higher body, who
9 would deal with that information, for example, the security organ.
10 Q. Can you tell us, briefly, what was the job of the intelligence
11 component in the staff, and what was the job of the security component?
12 A. I said that before. Intelligence Administration exclusively
13 worked on compiling intelligence about the enemy. We already mentioned
14 that. It had to do with the terrain, the timing, the facilities, the
15 plans, the intentions, the forces, and everything that relates to the
16 enemy. Of course, they also dealt with international relations, the
17 international factor, in particular with countries that had a significant
18 effect on the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the political
19 arena, during preparations for peace conferences, talks, because that was
20 also a problem. So these are the spheres of work of the intelligence
21 segment. The Security Service deals with internal matters, with
22 counter-intelligence and security matters within units of the Army of
23 Republika Srpska and on the territory of the AOR, where they co-operate
24 with the MUP, the State Security Service, and so on and so forth.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Can we now look at document 203, D203.
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. These are the Rules of Service, D203, Rules of Service of
4 Security Organs in the Armed Forces, since in the summary, you did say
5 that for a while you were a security organ.
6 A. Yes.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 9 of these
8 rules, which talks about the tasks and area of activity of the security
9 organs. Thank you. This is page 5 in the Serbian and page 6 in the
11 We're reading paragraph 1. Actually, we're looking at Chapter 1,
12 not Chapter 2, so we're looking at Article 1 of Chapter 1.
13 Can we please have that entire paragraph on the screen. Thank
15 I quote:
16 "Security organs, as specialist organs of commands, units,
17 institutions and staffs of the armed forces, carry out duties of state
18 security that are placed within their competence by the law and
19 regulations issued pursuant to the law, for the purposes of detecting and
20 preventing activities aimed at subverting or disrupting the social order
21 established by the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
22 Yugoslavia ..."
23 End of quote.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can you tell us, briefly, whether these are internal problems
1 that occur within the army in which the security organs are working, and
2 whether they are the ones who are exclusively responsible for internal
3 matters, rather than external and intelligence matters? This is what it
4 states here, doesn't it?
5 A. Yes, that is their main area of activity.
6 Q. Thank you. If, by their methods --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, it is 7.00. We have to adjourn for
8 the day.
9 We will resume tomorrow at 9.00 in Courtroom III, so that we have
10 the opportunity to sit in all three courtrooms this week.
11 We adjourn.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 5th day of May,
15 2011, at 9.00 a.m.