Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14917

 1                           Wednesday, 1 June 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom,

 6     especially to you, Mr. Thayer.  Welcome back.  We haven't seen you for a

 7     long time.

 8             Is the next witness ready to go?

 9             MR. THAYER:  He is, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Okay.  Then the next witness should be brought

11     in, please.

12             MR. THAYER:  And good morning to you, Mr. President,

13     Your Honours.  It's a pleasure to be back before this Honourable Chamber.

14     I think the last time I was here, Mr. Monkhouse was clean-shaven.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is not the only development that's taken

16     place in the meantime.

17             MR. THAYER:  A significant one, nevertheless.

18             Mr. President, while the witness is being brought in, I can let

19     the Trial Chamber know that the Prosecution will move orally now to

20     withdraw two witnesses from its witness list as a result of our review

21     pursuant to the Trial Chamber's instructions.  Those witnesses are

22     Witness 130, and Witness 191.

23                           [The witness entered court]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

25             Good morning, sir.

Page 14918

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning to you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Welcome to the Tribunal and to the courtroom.

 3     Would you please read aloud the affirmation on the card which is shown to

 4     you now.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 6     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7                           WITNESS:  MIKAJLO MITROVIC

 8                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down and make

10     yourself comfortable.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer for the Prosecution is conducting now

13     your examination-in-chief.  He has the floor.

14             Mr. Thayer.

15             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16                           Examination by Mr. Thayer:

17        Q.   Good morning, sir.  Would you please --

18        A.   Good morning.

19        Q.   Would you please state and spell your name for the record.

20        A.   Your Excellencies, Your Honours, my name is Mikajlo Mitrovic.  Do

21     I need to provide any additional information?  I am a retired colonel.  I

22     was born on the 22nd of July, 1955, in Zelinje, Zvornik municipality,

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I'm a Serb by ethnicity.  I'm Orthodox by

24     religion.  I completed the technical military academy in Zagreb where I

25     received the status of an engineer in electronics.  I completed primary

Page 14919

 1     and secondary school in Belgrade.

 2        Q.   And thank you for that information, Colonel.  Do you recall

 3     testifying in this courtroom for a little over a day in September 2008?

 4        A.   Yes, I remember.  It was in the Beara case, and I was a Defence

 5     witness.

 6        Q.   And, Colonel, have you had an opportunity recently to listen to

 7     that testimony?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And can you attest that the testimony that you listened to was

10     accurately recorded and reflected in what you heard?

11        A.   Yes, the testimony was correct.

12        Q.   And, Colonel, can you attest before this Trial Chamber that were

13     you asked the same questions today that you were asked back in 2008 in

14     the Popovic case, that your answers would be the same?

15        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

16             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender

17     65 ter numbers 7406 and 7407, Colonel Mitrovic's prior testimony in the

18     Popovic case.  The former being under seal.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Both will be received as exhibits.  The first one

20     under seal.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7406 shall be

22     assigned Exhibit P2258 admitted under seal.  And 65 ter document 7407

23     shall be assigned Exhibit P2259.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

25             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, we have some associated exhibits to

Page 14920

 1     tender which are reflected on the Prosecution's list of exhibits.  There

 2     are approximately eight of them listed there.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  These eight documents will be received.  The

 4     first one is 65 ter 2816.  It will be received under seal.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President --

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.

 7                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Registry will provide us with the document

 9     numbers.  One moment, please.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, associated exhibits shall be

11     assigned exhibit numbers from P2260 to P2267.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And P2260 is under seal.

13             Mr. Gajic.

14             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] A small technical problem.

15             I wish to greet everyone.

16             Mr. President, I just wish to turn your attention to the fact

17     that the documents which are on the Prosecution list with 65 ter numbers

18     7408, 7409, and 7400 are already Defence exhibits as follows.  D197,

19     D199, and D198.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for this information.  I

21     think you misspoke when you said 65 ter 7400.  It should be 7410, if I'm

22     not mistaken.  Is that correct?  Or are you referring to 7400?

23             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] 7400, yes.  At least that is what I

24     have on my list, yes.  7400.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

Page 14921

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Registrar will check if this reflects -- is

 3     also reflected in our documents, and, in that case, we would withdraw the

 4     P numbers and leave with it with a D number.

 5             Mr. Thayer, please go ahead.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             Mr. President, with respect to the remaining exhibits on the

 8     Prosecution's list of exhibits, the four associated exhibits we do not

 9     need to tender.  Three have already been admitted.  We won't seek to

10     tender 65 ter 169.  In addition, in the last category, the first two

11     exhibits, 2681 and 2682, we will not seek to tender either.  That leaves

12     the transcript of Colonel Mitrovic's 2004 interview.  I anticipate that

13     both parties during the course of his testimony will refer to it,

14     probably put it up on e-court.  I don't think we intend to tender the

15     entire transcript.  However, if the Defence seeks to do that, we won't

16     object to that.  But we will be relying on it.

17             That leaves one exhibit in the non-associated category that was

18     not on the 65 ter list for the Prosecution.  It is a handwritten

19     organisational chart of the security and intelligence organs in the VRS

20     that was sketched by the witness during that 2004 interview.  I do intend

21     to use that with Colonel Mitrovic today.  We've put the Defence on

22     notice.  I don't think they have any objection to us using that with

23     Colonel Mitrovic, and I would orally move to add that exhibit to the

24     65 ter list of exhibits.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I take it that this is 65 ter 7415; is that

Page 14922

 1     correct?

 2             MR. THAYER:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we should come to that document later

 4     when you use it.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             And I'll proceed with the 92 ter summary of the witness's prior

 7     testimony.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please.

 9             MR. THAYER:  As a JNA officer, the witness joined the security

10     organ in 1983 and served in various security and counter-intelligence

11     posts until the war started.  In 1985, he met Ljubisa Beara and the

12     accused.  Beara was the witness's second superior officer and served as

13     deputy chief and later chief of the JNA Naval Military District based in

14     Split.  The witness would see Beara several times a year when Beara

15     toured the security organs or summoned the witness to the command.

16     During this period, Beara was a superior officer to the accused, who was

17     chief of the Naval Military District's counter-intelligence group.

18             In September 1991, the witness was wounded by Croatian forces,

19     taken prisoner, and held for 45 days in solitary confinement, during

20     which time he was beaten daily, not registered, and hidden from the ICRC.

21     Following his exchange in November 1991, the witness was appointed chief

22     of the counter-intelligence group of the JNA 9th Knin Corps, where the

23     accused was his immediate superior and chief of the Knin Corps' security

24     department.  General Mladic was Chief of Staff and later commander of the

25     Knin Corps.  General Mladic and Colonel Beara knew each other from this

Page 14923

 1     time because the Knin Corps was part of the Split military naval district

 2     in which Beara served.

 3             When the witness joined the VRS in May 1992, he was transferred

 4     from Knin to Drvar and became chief of intelligence and security affairs

 5     of the 2nd Krajina Corps serving in that capacity until the end of the

 6     war.  Although Colonel Beara had been the accused's superior prior to the

 7     war, the accused arrived at the VRS Main Staff earlier than Beara and

 8     became Beara's superior officer at that time.

 9             The witness, in his Popovic testimony, described the structure of

10     the VRS intelligence and security organs, the relationship between the

11     subordinate and security organs in the VRS and the reporting and

12     transmission of information between them.  He also testified about the

13     relationship between the security organs and their unit commanders, the

14     relationship of the security organs to the military police units in the

15     VRS, as well as the tasks of the VRS military police units, the

16     relationship between the security organs and the MUP security services,

17     and the importance of not withholding information or secrets from the

18     accused.

19             The witness also testified that he holds Colonel Beara in high

20     esteem, as an officer, and that Beara and the accused held each in high

21     esteem.  Tolimir and Mladic valued Beara's work.  The witness also

22     testified that he held Vujadin Popovic in high esteem as an officer.

23     Popovic at one time served as a desk officer in the 2nd Krajina Corps

24     intelligence and security department, and the witness recommended Popovic

25     for the post of chief of the Drina Corps intelligence and security

Page 14924

 1     department.

 2             Finally, the witness also testified about information he had

 3     concerning the smuggling of weapons and other contraband in humanitarian

 4     assistance and also by parachute air-drops.

 5        Q.   Now, Colonel, I have some follow-up questions for you; some, in

 6     part, based on your testimony in the Popovic trial, and some based on

 7     your 2004 OTP interview.  And before we get started, did you have a

 8     chance recently to also review the transcript of your 2004 OTP interview?

 9        A.   Yes.  I had a chance, in fact, to remind myself a bit of this

10     interview.

11        Q.   Okay.  The first topic we'll address this morning is your capture

12     and imprisonment in September 1991.  I know this is a difficult subject

13     for you, so let's go through it first.

14             As you testified in the Popovic case, you were taken prisoner by

15     the Croats and mistreated the entire course of your imprisonment.  I want

16     to just focus on a couple of things you said in your 2004 interview.  The

17     first concerns, just generally, the training which you received as a JNA

18     officer in the Geneva Conventions and the proper treatment of prisoners.

19             Can you tell the Trial Chamber just a little bit about what kind

20     of training you received in that regard.

21        A.   Your Honours, Your Excellencies, in the introductory part, I said

22     that I graduated from the technical military academy in 1979.  And I

23     finished it as an engineer of electronics.  After that, during my work, I

24     continued my education and when, in 1983, I was admitted into the

25     security and intelligence service of the then-JNA and I was subsequently

Page 14925

 1     sent to Pancevo to the intelligence education centre where I completed

 2     the security school which lasted for six months.  In addition to that, I

 3     had to take exams which lasted for two and a half years to obtain the

 4     rank of major.  And after the war I also attended master's degrees

 5     studies of contemporary sociology at the faculty of philosophy in

 6     Banja Luka.  During work, we had to undergo various kinds of training.

 7     There were seminars, lecture, and so on, and we had occasion to come

 8     across the provisions of the international law of war; that is to say,

 9     the Geneva Conventions.  So I am familiar with them in general terms.

10        Q.   And to your knowledge, was the training provided by the JNA, with

11     respect to the international laws of war and the Geneva Conventions,

12     something that was given only to members of the security services or was

13     it training that was given across the board, shall we say, to JNA

14     officers and soldiers?

15        A.   Yes.  That was given to all members of the JNA.

16        Q.   Now, you testified in the Popovic trial that, in addition to

17     being physically abused daily and being beaten and having tear gas thrown

18     in your cell, you were also never registered by the ICRC and were

19     blindfolded and hidden from them when the ICRC came to visit the

20     facility.

21             Do you recall that testimony, sir?

22        A.   Yes, that is correct.  I was wounded and taken prisoner.  And in

23     Sibenik, what I considered to be paramilitary forces, the ZNG, they first

24     took me to a hospital.  I was only semi-conscious due to my wounds.  I

25     was wounded in the head, and I still have pieces of shrapnel in my head

Page 14926

 1     and they still cause problems for me.

 2             I was also wounded in my leg and shoulder.  There were many

 3     Croatian soldiers who were wounded and who were in the hospital and they

 4     started threatening me, so I was happy when they came and took me to

 5     prison because I do not think I would have survived if I had stayed at

 6     the hospital.  In prison, I was in solitary confinement, number 79, as

 7     you said, and I had severe pain in my head, probably due to my wound.  I

 8     never received any sort of assistance.  That is to say, the assistance

 9     was reduced to daily beatings.

10             In addition to physical mistreatment and mental torture, there

11     were situations in which they would bring me food, tinned food, but not

12     the tin opener, because they would say that I could use the tin opener to

13     inflict wounds on myself, so that I would just leave tins aside and

14     occasionally they would take them away.  It is true that I would hear

15     when the ICRC would visit, because I could hear that.  It's a long

16     corridor.  You could hear sounds of conversation and noises, and they

17     would take me somewhere.  I was blindfolded, and they took me downstairs,

18     somewhere, probably to the basement, but I could hear from the guards

19     also that it was the ICRC.

20             Then when there were attacks on Sibenik by the JNA, they always

21     threw tear gas into my cell.  All other prisoners and detainees would be

22     taken to a shelter but they would leave me there and they would tell me,

23     Let your people kill you, and so on.  I was not the only one who was

24     imprisoned there.  Of course, there were other officers and there were

25     also civilians who used to work in Sibenik who were in prison, but they

Page 14927

 1     were in a common cell as opposed to me.

 2             Before the war, I knew the prison warden and also the chief of

 3     the MUP.  We used to socialise up until the time when fighting broke out

 4     in Croatia.  It was normal socialisation.  And it ended by me being

 5     exchanged on the 2nd of November, after 45 days in prison.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Colonel, I want to go directly to the transcript of your

 7     2004 OTP interview.  This is P2258.  And we won't be showing any part

 8     that needs to be under seal.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Oh, I beg your pardon.  This is 65 ter 2785.  2785.

10             And if we could go to page 15 in the English.  And this should be

11     page 16 of the B/C/S.

12        Q.   And I'll just read the question in English, and we'll see -- and

13     you'll have an opportunity to read your answer in your own language in a

14     moment.

15             On page 15 of the English, you were asked the question:

16             "And the treatment that you received while in custody, was that

17     in violation, in your opinion, of the Geneva Conventions and the

18     internationally recognised standards of combat?"

19             And again that's page 16 now and we'll look at the answer.  It's

20     page 16 in both versions.

21             And in your version, Colonel, we can see the question being asked

22     about little more than halfway down the page.  In the English version,

23     your answer is at the very top of page 16.  And your response, when asked

24     whether the treatment you received was in violation of the

25     Geneva Conventions, your answer was:

Page 14928

 1             "Yes, yes, because every time that an ICRC team would come for a

 2     visit, because the Red Cross would come and visit, I would be

 3     blindfolded, taken out, and taken somewhere to the cellar, because I

 4     could feel, you know, I was walking down and descending."

 5             You were asked if you were hidden.

 6             You answered, "Yes."

 7             And then you stated that you were only registered on the day of

 8     exchange.

 9             Is this transcript accurate, in terms of what your answer was at

10     the time, sir.

11        A.   If fully reflects what I said, and I believe I repeated most of

12     it today.

13        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

14             MR. THAYER:  We're done with this exhibit for now.

15        Q.   When you were exchanged, Colonel, you testified about this in

16     Popovic, you were exchanged for 50 soldiers and a major.  Can you explain

17     why that was, how -- how it was that 50 soldiers and a major were

18     exchanged for one colonel?

19        A.   You see, it was my luck that the Knin Corps command knew of me

20     being taken prisoner and probably it was for that reason that I stayed

21     alive.  The corps commander, or, rather, the Chief of Staff of the corps

22     at the time was General Mladic.  General Tolimir, who was a colonel then,

23     was at the helm of the security department of the corps.  At that time, I

24     was the most important prisoner of the Croatian paramilitary forces

25     following General Aksentijevic, who was captured in Zagreb, whereas I was

Page 14929

 1     captured in Sibenik.  When I was released, I was told this story you

 2     mentioned which was that General Mladic and the Knin Corps command,

 3     before I was exchanged, twice scheduled me to be exchanged but I simply

 4     was not brought to the location.  They only managed to release me on the

 5     third occasion.  So in exchange, a major and 50 soldiers were released

 6     who had been taken prisoner in Sinj.  That was simply my price.  An

 7     exchange of prisoners, to put it in plainest and most vulgar of terms, is

 8     an exchange of goods.  There is a careful weighing of who is worth what,

 9     and then an exchange occurs.

10        Q.   And, Colonel, was your value based on your rank, on your

11     position, or on something else?

12        A.   I don't know.  Probably both, the rank and position.  I really

13     couldn't tell you how they decided on it.

14        Q.   Let's talk a little bit very quickly about some geography just to

15     orient ourself.  There are reference throughout your testimony to Sibenik

16     and Split.

17             They are both located on the coast of Croatia; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes, they are.

19        Q.   Let's look quickly at an a map book.

20             MR. THAYER:  And, Your Honour, this is just a late addition to

21     the exhibit list.  We actually didn't think it would be useful to crank

22     out another list to just add the map book.  I've advised the Defence that

23     we're going to throw up P104 and just look at a map very quickly.  So if

24     we could do that.

25             It's P104, page 5.  And if we could blow up the map just a little

Page 14930

 1     bit.  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Sir, do you see this map of the various VRS corps in front of

 3     you?

 4        A.   Yes, I can.

 5        Q.   Okay.  And during the time that you spent as chief of

 6     intelligence and security affairs or chief of the intelligence and

 7     security department of the 2nd Krajina Corps, where did you spent most of

 8     your time?  Was it behind a desk, or were you out in the field within

 9     your corps's area of responsibility?

10        A.   While working or serving with the 2nd Krajina Corps, for the most

11     part, I was in the field.  I also had to spend a certain amount of time

12     at the command post at Ostrelj.  I have to point out something, though.

13     As a superior command, that is to say, the corps command, we toured our

14     subordinate units daily.  It was mainly the brigades and we visited the

15     front lines.  Occasionally, we also spent the night in the commands of

16     those subordinate units; whereas, on other occasions, we returned to our

17     command, to our base.  But in any case, I used most of my time to be at

18     the front lines, visiting our subordinate units; that is to say, the

19     brigades.

20        Q.   And we can see here on this map the 2nd Krajina Corps depicted in

21     the west on the border of Croatia.  In July and August of 1995, Colonel,

22     generally speaking, where were you during that period of time,

23     July/August 1995?

24        A.   In July and August 1995, I was in the area of the corps.  I'm not

25     sure at what location exactly.  It may have been Drvar, but probably not

Page 14931

 1     just Drvar.  I was probably also at Grahovo and Livno axis, because, at

 2     the time, we fought the HVO which was trying to break through to Grahovo

 3     and Glamoc.  I know that on the 27th of July, we lost both Grahovo and

 4     Glamoc to them.  It was a chaotic period of our attempts to defend the

 5     corps's area of responsibility.  Therefore, at that time, I was in the

 6     corps area.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, it is perhaps a very interesting

 8     story we are listening to.  I'm a bit concerned about the relevance to

 9     our case and the indictment against our accused.

10             MR. THAYER:  I --

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What is the purpose of this line of questions?

12             MR. THAYER:  The purpose of this line which is now at an end,

13     Mr. President, was just to let the Trial Chamber know where this witness

14     was during the period of time of the events that are charged

15     specifically, July /August 1995.  Just to give you an idea --

16     Your Honours an idea of what he was up to.  I thought it might be a

17     question that would be in the back of your mind.  You've heard a lot of

18     other witnesses who were more involved and physically located near the

19     events.

20             So I just wanted to place that in some sort of geographical

21     context for Your Honours.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this explanation.

23             MR. THAYER:

24        Q.   Now, Colonel, let's talk a little bit about the actual work that

25     you and your organs performed during -- during the war.  If we could

Page 14932

 1     start, generally, talking about the tasks of the intelligence organs.

 2             If you could briefly provide the Trial Chamber with how you would

 3     describe the basic intelligence tasks of the VRS intelligence organs.

 4        A.   Your Honours, the intelligence organs of the VRS, like any other

 5     intelligence service, primarily busied itself with collecting

 6     intelligence about the enemy and its forces.  In times of war, it is done

 7     by reconnoitring at the tactical level.  One needs to know where the

 8     positions and deployment of enemy forces is, or are.  Next, we also

 9     surveyed radio communications and monitored movements of units and

10     received information about the enemy from the -- from friendly countries

11     through operative work, as well as analysing the media.

12             The intelligence organs followed anything that would physically

13     take place between the front line and the enemy and deeper into the enemy

14     territory.  Whereas, counter-intelligence organs worked on everything on

15     the other side, that is to say, from the front line and into our

16     territory.

17             I don't know how clearly I am explaining this, but I hope you

18     understand.

19        Q.   And although it might sound, at least as it is interpreted in

20     English, a little counter-intuitive, what you described as

21     counter-intelligence is work that was actually performed, generally

22     speaking, not by the intelligence organs but by the security organs; is

23     that correct?

24        A.   I am not following.  If intelligence organs received

25     security-related information, they forwarded it to the security organs,

Page 14933

 1     and the other way around.  If the security organs, through operative

 2     work, received intelligence information, they were duty-bound to forward

 3     it to the intelligence bodies.  In that respect, they had a very close

 4     co-operation.

 5        Q.   Understood, Colonel.  When you say in your answer:

 6             "... whereas, counter-intelligence organs worked on everything on

 7     the other side, that is to say, from the front line and into our

 8     territory," that responsibility lay, essentially, with the security

 9     organs and not with the intelligence organs.

10             Is that fair to say?  That's the only point I'm trying to

11     clarify.

12        A.   Yes.  Their area was from the front line and into enemy

13     territory.  That is the simplest explanation.

14        Q.   Okay.  So front line into enemy territory is intelligence.  Front

15     line back into your own territory is security.  Is that fair to say?

16        A.   Yes, that is correct.

17        Q.   Okay.  I just want to follow up on a couple of specific

18     intelligence methods that you spoke about in your interview.

19             MR. THAYER:  If we could go to 2785; 65 ter 2785.

20        Q.   Again, this is your 2004 interview.

21             MR. THAYER:  And we'll be going to page 21 of the English and

22     page 22 of the B/C/S.

23        Q.   Now, here you've described in your interview some of the things

24     you've already spoken about.  The electronic reconnaissance, and that's

25     just basically intercepting radio communications; is that correct?

Page 14934

 1        A.   Yes.  We monitored enemy communication.  We had devices which

 2     made it possible.

 3        Q.   And in the VRS, was that done by professionals, amateurs, or

 4     both?

 5        A.   Both.  Those who were in charge were professionals in the field.

 6     But we also relied on the knowledge and skills of ham radio operators.

 7        Q.   Okay.  You also refer in your answer - and this is on page 22 of

 8     the English, and we'll need to go to page 23 of the B/C/S - to relying on

 9     information and intelligence gathered by -- from seized documents from

10     the enemy as well as interviewing prisoners of war.

11             Can you tell the Trial Chamber a little bit about the importance,

12     in your experience, of information that was gathered from interviewing

13     POWs?

14        A.   Information gathered from POWs are, for the most part, credible.

15     Like the information you may find in enemy documents.  In addition to

16     that, POWs could provide us with troop information, so to say.  At least

17     those of them who were plain soldiers could not provide any crucial

18     information, but what is interesting for any command at the front line is

19     to know the number of trenches manned by that many people who have those

20     specific weapons.  This may be very important if you're planning to break

21     through the front line or engage in any other combat operation.

22        Q.   Okay.  Let's focus just for a couple of moments on the tasks of

23     the security organs.

24             MR. THAYER:  If we could go to page 25 in the English.  And this

25     will be page 26 in the B/C/S.

Page 14935

 1        Q.   We can see in -- in English at the top of the page 25, and it's

 2     about the middle of your page.  We can see in the interview, you say

 3     pretty much what you just told us a moment ago, that:

 4             "The security service was engaged in issues dealing with, or on

 5     this side of the front line, in other words, things that were happening

 6     on our own [sic] territory?"

 7             And the question was put to you:

 8             "So protecting the secrets of your forces then?"

 9             And your answer was:

10             "Yes.  The territory and the forces, yes."

11             And then you go on and describe what counter-intelligence entails

12     in general.

13             Do you see that, sir?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   Now, I want to focus on one part of your answer here, after you

16     talk about counter-intelligence and security being involved in revealing,

17     monitoring and preventing enemy agents and their activities in our

18     territory and our units, a little further down you say:

19             "However, there was also, in addition to that, the

20     counter-intelligence protection of documents, plans and people."

21             Can you just provide a little bit more detail, please, for the

22     Trial Chamber about what you meant there?  What are you talking about

23     when you talk about "counter-intelligence protection of documents, plans

24     and people"?

25        A.   The tasks of security organs are complex, and you specified a

Page 14936

 1     number of such tasks.  Basically, such activities are aimed at detecting

 2     possible agents functioning in the area of responsibility of the units in

 3     question.  There were such agents who, for different reasons, forwarded

 4     information to the enemy, be it by radio communication or through

 5     couriers.  They would forward information on the deployment and situation

 6     in our area of responsibility and in our units.

 7             In that regard, security organs undertook counter-intelligence

 8     measures to protect their units.  What does that mean?  It means that

 9     those units should be kept safe so as not to be surprised by the enemy.

10     Command posts had to be protected so as to enable competent people to

11     work there.  One could not have unknown and uninvited people moving about

12     command areas.

13             There was another measure in place, which was the protection of

14     commanders, especially that of the corps commander.  He was protected in

15     his capacity as such.  In his immediate environment, there could only be

16     checked personnel, and this applies to couriers, secretaries, and all

17     assisting personnel.  We could not allow to have someone in that circle

18     of people who had not been checked and was not to be trusted.

19             Counter-intelligence protection of territory involves the

20     following:  One needs to control the territory to prevent any sabotage

21     and terrorist incursions.  There were such attempts and groups on a

22     number of occasions, and not only in the AOR of our corps.  Such groups

23     can cause great damage.  They can set up ambushes, kill personnel,

24     destroy infrastructure and materiel resources.  Those were the most

25     important tasks, in addition to staff security.  This means the

Page 14937

 1     participation of staff security organs in the decision making process of

 2     the command, in terms of certain operations, as well as information which

 3     has to do with managing the military police.  Those were the principle

 4     tasks during the war.

 5        Q.   And, Colonel, it may be that you've touched upon this in the

 6     answer you just provided, when you spoke about, in your answer in your

 7     OTP interview about counter-intelligence protection of plans, what --

 8     what are you talking about there, sir?

 9        A.   Your Honours, primarily any work and elaboration on combat

10     documentation is carried out in the corps command in a specific room

11     under certain measures.  When that work is being carried out, first and

12     foremost, no uninvited personnel is allowed in the room, including VRS

13     officers who are not directly involved in the process and work on that

14     future project or task.

15             In other words, the number of personnel involved needs to be

16     narrowed down so as to have a minimum number of people.  Also, no

17     documents may be taken out of that room unless strictly checked.  Such

18     plans were protected in that way.  They were held in a separate safe in a

19     room within the staff.  Such rooms were guarded round the clock.  Such

20     measures were in place until the plan became implemented.  The most

21     important part of the process is preparation and elaboration of command

22     decisions, in order to put together a plan.  Once the plan is in its

23     operational phase, then many things are no longer secret.

24             That is it, for the most part.

25        Q.   And understanding what you just said, that once the plan is under

Page 14938

 1     way and being implemented, necessarily certain information becomes known.

 2     Can you describe for the Trial Chamber what role the security and

 3     intelligence organs would continue to play during the course of an

 4     operation to maintain the secrecy of an operation?

 5        A.   Your Honours, in the process of decision making all security and

 6     intelligence organs participate.  Intelligence organs usual provide

 7     information about the enemy which are normal part of the corrected --

 8     decision on the part of the commander for possible combat activities.

 9     And security and intelligence organs also provide the assessment of the

10     situation in the field, whether the communications are working, whether

11     roads are such that military convoys can travel.  How about traffic

12     nodes, are there any dangers for units of in the territory, and so on and

13     so forth.  So, more or less, these would be the duties.

14             So a proposal is also given to the commander on how to use a

15     military police unit.  That is the proposal, and then the commander

16     approves, or, rather, orders the use of the military police unit.  That's

17     the preparation stage.  Security organs also say what are the security

18     measures which all subordinate units must implement as part of the

19     commander's order.  So it is not my decision as the chief of the security

20     but it is one of the points which is called security support, in order to

21     prevent a counter-attack and anything else that might obstruct such an

22     operation.  So measures are outlined how not to communicate by radio or

23     just through courier, not to use telephone lines, and so on, to step up

24     reconnaissance in depth in the territory, to keep the plans where

25     prescribed, not to carry documents to combat tasks if not necessary for

Page 14939

 1     the operation.  Because our superiors would often put everything they had

 2     into their bag, all the documents they had, and carried them with them to

 3     the front.  So sometimes they would lose them or they would be killed,

 4     and that was a way for information to leak.

 5             So, more or less, that was the role of security organs in the

 6     preparatory stage and during the carrying out of an operation.

 7        Q.   And to what extent would the security and intelligence organs be

 8     responsible for monitoring the course of an operation to ensure that the

 9     security was maintained properly of an operation?

10        A.   Intelligence and security organs participated in these

11     operations.  They monitored what was happening, in a way.  They followed

12     the movements of enemy forces, the situation in the territory.  And it

13     was always envisaged that you would have some forces as a reserve so that

14     you could intervene possibly if a problem should arise in some section of

15     the front or on a particular axis.  And they were also at the command

16     post.  If it's a brigade, and if a brigade carried out combat activities,

17     then they were most often at the command post of the brigade, together

18     with the brigade staff.  They were also with the units, if the units were

19     those that carried out the combat operations, and so on.

20             After that, an analysis would be made and one could see exactly

21     where any problems or shortcomings may have occurred.

22        Q.   Okay, Colonel.  Let's take a few moments and look at a sketch you

23     drew.  We spoke about this a little earlier.  I think it will be helpful

24     to have you explain it.

25             MR. THAYER:  If we could have 65 ter 7415 on e-court, please.

Page 14940

 1             And we'll just work with the original B/C/S version.

 2        Q.   I will be asking you to explain, in any event, so I don't think

 3     we need to put up a translation.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At this point in time, I would like to ask the

 5     Defence if there's any objections to add this document to the 65 ter

 6     exhibit list?

 7             Mr. Tolimir, do you have any objection?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I greet

 9     everyone present.  And may God's will be done in these proceedings and

10     today and not according to my wishes.  I especially wish to greet

11     Mr. Mitrovic and wish him a pleasant stay among us.

12             The Defence has nothing against presenting any document which

13     points to anything that is incorrect.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Leave is granted to add this document to the

15     65 ter exhibit list.

16             Mr. Thayer.

17             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18        Q.   Colonel, if could you explain the title you've written across the

19     top of this chart.  It begins "nacelna ..."?

20        A.   Your Honours, this is a general chart, organisational chart, of

21     the intelligence and security system of the VRS from mid-1993 to the end

22     of the war.  But I added in brackets that it is possible that it was from

23     1994 onwards.

24             Why?  Perhaps Mr. Prosecutor might ask me that.  Because, in that

25     year, 1993 or 1994, there was a separation of the intelligence component

Page 14941

 1     from the security component at the corps level.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now, in the top box that we have there, we see

 3     General Tolimir's name.  And what have you written above his name there?

 4        A.   In this general chart at the top of the pyramid is the

 5     intelligence and security sector which was a part of the Main Staff.  At

 6     the head of this sector was the assistant commander for intelligence and

 7     security affairs.  At the time, that was Major-General Zdravko Tolimir.

 8     Directly subordinated to this sector were the security administration of

 9     the Army of Republika Srpska which was headed by naval

10     Captain Ljubisa Beara; and intelligence administration, headed by Colonel

11     Petar Salapura.

12             In the security administration, professionally speaking - and I

13     emphasise this because there may possibly be a question later on who were

14     the security organs subordinated to and how - professionally speaking,

15     they were subordinated to corps security departments of all corps.  So we

16     have the security departments of the 1st Krajina Corps, the 2nd Krajina

17     Corps, then third is the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Well, they were

18     specific because they still had this intelligence and security department

19     joined to the end of the war, probably because they were few and they

20     were close to the Main Staff.  And in numerical terms, they were few.

21             Then the Eastern Bosnia Corps security department.  Then the

22     Drina Corps security department.  The Herzegovina Corps security

23     department.  And also subordinated to the security administration was the

24     counter-intelligence group of the VRS Main Staff.  That's how it was

25     called.  And the Department of Security of the Ministry of Defence of

Page 14942

 1     Republika Srpska.

 2             These were the security departments.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Let's go through these boxes that you've drawn on the

 4     left-hand side of the chart and put some names to the boxes.

 5             You started off with the 1st Krajina Corps security department.

 6     And you've abbreviated that 1 KK; is that correct?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And in July 1995, who was the chief of the security

 9     department of the 1 KK?

10        A.   If we are talking about 1995, the chief of security in the

11     1st Krajina Corps was Colonel Stevo Bogojevic [Realtime transcript read

12     in error "Bogovic"].  The department chief in the 2nd Krajina Corps was

13     myself.  The chief of department in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was the

14     then-Colonel Marko Lugonja.  Chief of department in the

15     Eastern Bosnia Corps was Colonel Milenko Todorovic.  I think his first

16     name was Milenko.  And the chief of the security department in the

17     Drina Corps was Vujadin Popovic.

18             I don't remember who was the chief of the department in

19     Herzegovina Corps because there were several people in that position

20     during the war.  I don't remember who was last among them.  And the chief

21     of the security department at the Ministry of Defence was -- I'm not sure

22     if he was a reserve lieutenant-colonel --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please repeat the last name.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know his first name and the

25     chief of the counter-intelligence group was the

Page 14943

 1     then-Colonel Petar Jakovljevic.  These were the persons.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to stop you, because -- the interpreters

 3     didn't catch the last name you mentioned.  Could you please repeat this

 4     name.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  Do you mean the

 6     Department of Security -- or, rather, which chief?  Colonel

 7     Petar Jakovljevic was mentioned.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was referring to the security department at the

 9     Ministry of Defence.  Who was that?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think his name was Pereula at the

11     Ministry of Defence, yes.  I'm not certain.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to clarify two other things.  You

13     mentioned, line 1 of page 26, "the chief of security in the

14     1st Krajina Corps was Colonel Stevo ...," and the family name was not

15     correctly recorded.

16             Please repeat the name.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Colonel Stevo Bogojevic.  Perhaps

18     it said Colonel Milan Stevilovic on this page.  He was the predecessor of

19     Stevo Bogojevic.  Perhaps that's what was recorded on the page.  I didn't

20     pay attention to that, really.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  We need everything on the

22     record.  With these names, it is quite difficult to put everything

23     correctly into the transcript.

24             And you were talking about the chief of department, the

25     Eastern Bosnia Corps Colonel Milenko Todorovic.  You added one sentence

Page 14944

 1     to that which was not recorded.  You said you are not sure if the first

 2     name was Milenko; is that correct?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you are right.  I think that

 4     that was his name, but ...

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  But?  You're not sure about that, I take it.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm not.  I think that it is,

 7     but I'm not quite certain.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 9             Mr. Thayer, please continue.

10             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11        Q.   And just two quick follow-up questions about this side of the

12     chart, Colonel.  The box that's the second from the bottom, you've used

13     the abbreviation KOG GS - with what we refer to as the full banana on

14     top - VRS.  That abbreviation, I take it, stands for the

15     counter-intelligence group of the VRS Main Staff; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes, you are correct.

17        Q.   And the last follow-up question about this side of the chart, you

18     I think explained this in part.  The third box down where it refers to

19     the Department of Security -- well, let me put it this way.  You've

20     written department SRK OBP, and you've drawn a line from that box to the

21     box containing Colonel Salapura's name.  Could you just explain to the

22     Trial Chamber why you've drawn that line?

23        A.   Yes.  Your Honours, I drew this line because, as I said in my

24     answer when I was explaining the general chart, it was only in the

25     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that until the end of the war the function of

Page 14945

 1     security organs and intelligence organs was not separated.  It was one

 2     and the same department.  Namely, to clarify, up until 1993, that is to

 3     say, since the establishment of the security system in the VRS up until

 4     at some point in 1993 and the arrival of naval Captain Beara to the

 5     Main Staff, that is the connection that I make, at least once he became

 6     the chief of the security administration, until his arrival, all the

 7     departments in all the corps were joined.  They had intelligence and

 8     security personnel and character.

 9             After his arrival, a separation was made of these two functions,

10     the intelligence one and the security one.  This is why there are two

11     lines here.  One is connected to Beara.  These are the security

12     departments, whereas the intelligence departments are connected with

13     Colonel Salapura.  But as the department remained one for intelligence

14     and security department in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, they had to

15     submit their reports to Salapura as well.  As the chief of security, I

16     did not have to submit my reports to Colonel Salapura but exclusively to

17     Beara and that's the difference.

18        Q.   So when you use the abbreviation OBP in the box for the

19     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps' chief, literally what does OBP stand for?  What

20     does that abbreviation that you've used stand for?

21        A.   It's at the beginning, intelligence and security affairs.

22     Intelligence and security system is what it says here.  But this is

23     intelligence and security affairs.

24        Q.   Okay.  We've got a couple of minutes before the break so I think

25     we should be able to finish talking about the chart.  And let's turn to

Page 14946

 1     the right side of the chart under Colonel Salapura's name.  Now, the

 2     Trial Chamber has heard testimony already about the operation of the

 3     intelligence department.  But, if you would, to the extent that you can

 4     remember, can you provide the Trial Chamber with the names of any of the

 5     corps chiefs of intelligence.  If you can't remember, that's okay.  But

 6     if you can, if you would provide the names for the Trial Chamber.

 7        A.   I'll try to state some names.

 8             The chart is basically similar to the chart which relates to the

 9     security administration, their-intelligence departments in all corpses

10     plus the 410th Intelligence Centre.  I think it was seated in Banja Luka

11     at the time, or perhaps Bijeljina - I'm not certain - and the 10th

12     Sabotage Detachment.

13             The chief of the intelligence department was Colonel Djuric.  I

14     don't remember his first name.  I knew him.  That was in the

15     1st Krajina Corps.  The chief of the intelligence department in the

16     2nd Krajina Corps -- in the first one it was Colonel Djuric.  In the

17     second, it was Colonel Milan Atlagic.

18             The chief of the 410th Intelligence Centre -- I don't remember

19     the other people, as I didn't know them.

20             The chief of the 410th Intelligence Centre was

21     Colonel Cedo Knezevic.

22             And the commander of the 10th Sabotage Detachment was

23     Lieutenant Miso Pelemis.

24             These are the names that I can remember from the intelligence

25     branch.

Page 14947

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please repeat the name of the chief of

 2     the 410th Intelligence Centre.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The chief of the

 4     410th Intelligence Centre was Colonel Cedo Knezevic.  That's what he was.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Was it Knezevic or Knezovic?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first you said, Knezevic.

 7             MR. THAYER:

 8        Q.   Now, Colonel --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

10             Mr. Thayer.

11             MR. THAYER:

12        Q.   Colonel, we can see that there's an arrow that points upwards

13     next to these boxes indicating the various intelligence organs.  Does

14     that arrow mean anything?

15        A.   Yes, it indicates for both branches what the reporting system

16     was.  That is to say, all the departments or the units which are listed

17     here in -- on both sides reported upwards.

18             And the horizontal arrow above the number, 358736, means an

19     exchange -- an exchange of information between the administrations,

20     between the departments, generally speaking.

21        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Colonel.

22             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender

23     65 ter 7415.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be marked for identification, pending

25     translation.

Page 14948

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7415 shall be

 2     assigned Exhibit P2265, marked for identification.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At this point in time, I would like to ask

 4     Mr. Registrar to provide us with the correct numbers of the associated

 5     exhibits used in the Popovic trial.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Having in mind

 7     Mr. Gajic's remark regarding the identical documents that were tended by

 8     the Prosecution, I have reassigned exhibit numbers in the following

 9     order:

10             65 ter document 2816 shall be assigned Exhibit P2260, admitted

11     under seal.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Thank you for speaking slowly.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 2818 shall be assigned Exhibit P2261.

14             65 ter document 2854 shall be assigned Exhibit P2262.

15             65 ter document 3324 shall be assigned Exhibit P2263.

16             And 65 ter document 7410 shall be assigned Exhibit P2264.

17             Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And for the sake of the record, please give us

19     again the D numbers of the three remaining documents.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Just one moment.

21             65 ter number 7400 that was tendered by the Prosecution was

22     previously admitted as Defence Exhibit D197.

23             65 ter document 7408 was previously admitted as D198.

24             And 65 ter document 7409 was previously admitted as Defence

25     Exhibit D199.

Page 14949

 1             Thank you, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I take it the numbers, the P numbers, given

 3     to the three Defence exhibits are now vacated.

 4             Mr. Thayer, is this perhaps an appropriate time for our first

 5     break?

 6             MR. THAYER:  Yes, it's, Mr. President.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Because I assume you are moving to another part

 8     of your questioning.

 9             We must have our first break now, and we will resume at 11.00.

10             And the Court Officer will assist you during the break.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, please continue.

14             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15        Q.   Good morning again to you, Colonel.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   Colonel, you testified in the Popovic trial, and just, for the

18     record, this was at pages 25141 to -42, about the daily intelligence

19     reporting that went from the subordinate units all the way up to the

20     Main Staff, and you also testified about how the Main Staff transmitted

21     its information down through the subordinate units for your use.

22             Was there a particular time of day by which your intelligence and

23     security department, or departments when they got split, were required to

24     submit your daily intelligence reports?

25        A.   Yes.  It was as follows -- following:  Informing and reporting is

Page 14950

 1     one of the more important aspects of the system of chain of command in

 2     any army.  We were duty-bound to draft a report by 6.00 p.m. every day

 3     and send it from the level of the corps security department.  We were

 4     supposed to send it to the security administration and its intelligence

 5     and security sector at the level of the Main Staff.

 6             Before 6.00, we needed to gather information from our subordinate

 7     units, that is to say, the brigades and regiments, by way of their

 8     reports, on the basis of which, we drafted our own.  Those reports, for

 9     the most part, contained some standard points that were prescribed by the

10     regulations, and most of the answers were rather typical in that sense.

11             The first item was the situation at the front line.  Next, combat

12     readiness.  Then the situation in the territory, as well as logistics and

13     its situation in the unit and in the field.  Then the state of morale in

14     the unit and so on and so forth.  All of those elements were contained in

15     the report.  In other words, the command would be send such reports to us

16     and then to the Main Staff.

17             As for our security organs, we received their information from

18     our subordinate units about the situation in their respective units and

19     what security issues they had, and such security issues could have been

20     of different types.  We also wanted to know whether there were any

21     counter-intelligence problems and whether they were being addressed and

22     in what way.  We also wanted to know what the situation was in the units

23     of the military police, in terms of training, equipment, et cetera.

24     Those would all be parts of our daily reports that we sent to the

25     Main Staff.

Page 14951

 1             The Main Staff did something that you mentioned in the sector

 2     part of your question.  In other words, they sent daily intelligence and

 3     security information to the corps commands.  Those were information

 4     bulletins about the situation at the level of the RS and the VRS.  By

 5     nature of my work, I was unable to know what was going on in the

 6     East Bosnia Corps, for example, because I was all the way to the west.

 7     By the same token, I wasn't privy to developments in the

 8     Herzegovina Corps.

 9             We received such information from the Main Staff enabling us to

10     see at least partially what the situation was throughout the territory

11     and the armed forces.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

13             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, page 34, line 5, we

14     see you repeat the intelligence problems, whereas it should have been

15     counter-intelligence, as interpreted.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

17             Mr. Thayer.

18             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Now, Colonel, just to be clear about the different types of

20     reporting that were going on, is it the case that there was a daily

21     combat report which was issued by the corps command that went to the

22     Main Staff, in addition to the daily security report that your department

23     would send up to the Main Staff's security and intelligence sector?  Were

24     those two separate reports or are you talking about one report?  Just so

25     we're clear.

Page 14952

 1        A.   There were two separate reports.  But the command report also

 2     contained elements pertaining to the security situation.  There was a

 3     standard item in that report, the title of which was: Security.  Within

 4     that particular paragraph, there were always a few sentences stipulating

 5     what took place during that particular day at the corps, in terms of

 6     security, and it usually concerned general security, as regards the corps

 7     command.

 8             In the reports that were sent by the intelligence -- by the

 9     security department when we sent them to our administration, we were more

10     detailed in them, providing more precise, for the lack of a better word,

11     information about the security situation in the corps area, including

12     counter-intelligence issues, as well as general security issues.  I'm

13     trying to say that there was a difference which was obvious only in that

14     part in which the reports of the command were general in nature.  There

15     were no counter-intelligence issues specified in any detail.  I can use

16     an example to illustrate that.

17             In the command report, perhaps it would be included that, in an

18     X/Y area, an enemy operational position of -- was detected.  And then in

19     the other report that we sent to our administration, we specified in

20     detail what the position was and what measures we would take to address

21     it.

22        Q.   Now, in the -- in your interview with the OTP in 2004, and to

23     save a little bit of time, I won't put it up on the screen, you mention -

24     and this is at page 43 of the English and page 46 of the B/C/S, if

25     anybody wants to look at it later -- you mentioned that the brigades

Page 14953

 1     within your corps had to brief the corps command twice a day on the

 2     situation in their area of responsibility, and that each corps had an

 3     operations centre with communication links with the subordinate units.

 4             Do you remember telling us that in 2004, Colonel?

 5        A.   Yes, that's how it was.  Each command post - and this goes for

 6     all armies in the world - there is an operational centre where all

 7     communication means are placed to communicate with the subordinate units.

 8     All subordinate units would channel their information to that hub

 9     regarding the situation in their respective areas.  That operational

10     centre monitored events and noted them and it included entire corps area

11     of responsibility.  Usually, such reporting was done twice in the morning

12     and in the evening before 6.00 p.m. because I've already said that by

13     that time we should have produced a report already.  We also wanted to

14     know how the night went in their areas, whether there were any problems.

15     So the morning briefing was usually not of that much importance; whereas

16     the afternoon reporting usually contained much more information and

17     detail.  That was the only difference.  And we also received reports as

18     needed, not only on those two occasions.  If the enemy broke through our

19     lines, the command of the corps was notified immediately.  Also, if the

20     enemy stepped up its activities, the command would be informed as well.

21             The two particular briefings we addressed simply offered an

22     overview of the situation in general terms up to that particular time of

23     day.

24        Q.   All right.  Let's look at 65 ter 2785 again, please.  That is the

25     transcript of your OTP interview.  I want to follow up on this topic of

Page 14954

 1     communications and look at a portion of your interview in that regard.

 2             MR. THAYER:  And we'll be going to page 81 in the English and

 3     page 85 in the B/C/S.

 4        Q.   And, sir, just take a moment, if you would, to read in your

 5     language approximately from line 9 or so down to the bottom of the page.

 6     Just take a moment, reacquaint yourself with this portion of your

 7     interview, please.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In B/C/S, it would be, if I'm not mistaken,

 9     line 15 downwards; is that correct?

10             MR. THAYER:  Approximately.  Maybe even up a little bit, line 9.

11     But that's the general area.  Thank you, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Line 9 in B/C/S.

13             MR. THAYER:  In B/C/S.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I was referring to the English text.

15     Line 15.

16             MR. THAYER:  I beg your pardon, Mr. President.  In English, yes,

17     line 15, exactly.

18             And we can stay on the one page in B/C/S but Colonel Mitrovic's

19     answer in the English transcript goes to the next page.

20        Q.   Colonel, have you had a chance -- okay.  I see that you're

21     nodding yes.

22             The -- you refer to this Neven communications system, this

23     encrypted or protected system, and if we can - yes - go to the next page

24     thank you.  In the English, it's at the top of page 82.  You state that:

25             "All the corps were connected through Neven with the

Page 14955

 1     security administration with Tolimir."

 2             Can you explain what you're talking about there, how all the

 3     corps were connected with General Tolimir through this Neven system.

 4        A.   This is correct.  Excuse me.  The Neven system was a computer

 5     system.  It was a coded software that could only be used by the

 6     administration sector at the Main Staff and security departments in the

 7     corps.  The communication was direct, and we could rely on it by using

 8     our codes to pass on information to our security administration.

 9             The system was rather simple to use.  I believe I also mentioned

10     that in our reporting we used the same code as was used by the corps

11     command.  The Neven system was to communicate between the security

12     department in the Main Staff and its security administration.  In other

13     words, the different corps could not communicate using that system

14     horizontally.

15             That would be the best explanation I can give.

16        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Let's turn to another topic now, and we'll

17     stay with your interview for a little while.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt you for a moment.  I have an

19     additional question.

20             Throughout the time-period from June to August 1995, did this

21     system, this Neven system, work all the time, or were they -- were there

22     any problems?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I cannot be specific

24     because July and August was a different -- difficult period for our

25     corps.  We were constantly in combat and had to move.  I believe in

Page 14956

 1     August or September we abandoned the corps command post.  Probably the

 2     Neven system was not in operation by that time.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you have specific knowledge about that?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't recall anything specific,

 5     but I believe that if we had to move from our command post, it affected

 6     the system.  I no longer remember whether we were able to set it up later

 7     on.  In that period of time, we probably reported by way of codes and the

 8     command line.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You just told us that in August or

10     September you - that means your unit - abandoned the corps command post.

11             Could you be a bit more specific?  What does that mean, in fact.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in August and

13     September, we were under constant attack, and we lost territory.  In late

14     August and in early September, we abandoned our command post at Ostrelj

15     because we were exposed to artillery fire on a daily basis.  It was for

16     that reason that we had to leave Ostrelj and go to Bosanski Petrovac,

17     which is some 10 kilometres away.

18             Later in September, when the Muslim and Croat forces attacked

19     Petrovac, we withdrew toward Kljuc.  In that period of time, so from

20     August and until the end of the war, we no longer had a permanent command

21     post.  We simply set it up in different locations depending on where we

22     happened to be.  When I say that we set up different command posts, I

23     mean to say that it was never a standing command post as it had been at

24     Ostrelj.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  After you moved to Bosanski Petrovac, did you set

Page 14957

 1     up the Neven system again?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember.  But I don't

 3     think we were able to.  I think we only used the code system.  I can't

 4     say anything with any certainty.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you recall if the Neven system was working at

 6     any other location where you moved with your command post after August or

 7     September?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is possible that it worked when

 9     we were in Banja Luka later on.  Basically that system resembles regular

10     e-mail, only that this one is protected.  You needed communications, and

11     at that time, we could only use radio relay communication.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you have any information if at other command

13     posts, wherever in that region, the Neven system was in place when it was

14     abandoned in your command post?  I'm referring specifically to the same

15     time-period, from June to August 1995.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe it worked in Banja Luka,

17     as part of the 1st Krajina Corps, because they did not move.  I also

18     believe, since the situation there was stable, it worked in the

19     East Bosnia Corps, as well as in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, so all

20     those corps which stayed within their areas.  Since they didn't need to

21     move, they probably could still rely on the Neven system.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for that clarification.

23             Mr. Thayer.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

25             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 14958

 1        Q.   And just to follow up on your last answer, would you include the

 2     Drina Corps as one of the corps that didn't have to move outside their

 3     area of responsibility, as your corps did in August and September?

 4        A.   I probably would.  As far as I recall, their command post was in

 5     Vlasenica and it remained in that location until the end of the war.

 6        Q.   Okay, Colonel.  Let's turn for a little while to the topic of the

 7     command and control of the security organs.

 8             MR. THAYER:  I'd like to turn to page 93 of 65 ter 2785, in the

 9     English, and page 97 in B/C/S.

10        Q.   Colonel, and if you'll focus on the portion on the page in front

11     of you, it's about halfway down the page.  It begins, "vidite ..."

12     There's a large paragraph.  Thank you.  Right there.  And in the English,

13     it's in the top paragraph and it begins, "You see ..."

14             And you provide the investigators with an explanation of how

15     command and control applies to the security and intelligence organs.  And

16     in your answer, you say that -- and I quote:

17             "The corps commander commands me, and Tolimir controls me, or he

18     runs me.  And this is the professional line, the professional chain.

19     These are the two lines that we're talking about when it comes to command

20     and control."

21             Can you explain for the Trial Chamber what you mean when you say

22     "The corps commander commands me, but General Tolimir runs me"?

23        A.   Your Honours, security organs of the former JNA worked in

24     accordance with the rules of security organs of the former JNA.  The

25     rules decidedly state, I don't have the rules here, so I cannot tell you

Page 14959

 1     which item it is within the rules, but the rules say that intelligence --

 2     that is to say, security organs are subordinated to the commander of unit

 3     which they are a part of, and that professionally speaking, they are

 4     controlled by the immediately superior security organ.

 5             To clarify, within a corps command, I was commanded by the corps

 6     commander in war time.  The corps commander is - let me put it that way -

 7     the lowest instance which has a full overview and a full insight into the

 8     work of security organs.  That is to say, that he has a right to have an

 9     insight into counter-intelligence tasks of a security organ, which a

10     brigade commander, for instance, does not have.

11             In war time, the corps commander approves the implementation of

12     secret working methods for security organs.  In peacetime, an army

13     commander would do that.  That was the level in question.  The corps

14     commander would also assess me in the professional sense.  It wouldn't be

15     Mr. Tolimir, but, rather, the corps commander.

16             That's command.  So I am obliged to perform the tasks and duties

17     which are assigned to me by the commander.

18             But there is something specific I need to say.  The former JNA,

19     in security sense, trained unit commanders so that future brigade or

20     regiment commanders came to the intelligence educational centre in

21     Pancevo and they listened to lectures about working with security organs

22     and on control with security organs.  Likewise, brigade commanders at

23     Command Staff academies, and these are all people who had graduated from

24     these academies because it is a higher level than the basic academy, they

25     were also given lectures by security organs by command and control in

Page 14960

 1     terms of security organs, and they could see the book rule of security

 2     organs.  Other officers, officers of any rank who were outside of the

 3     security service and were not at the brigade commander or corps commander

 4     level, were not allowed to have an insight into the rule-book of security

 5     organs.

 6             That was the command element.

 7             As for control of security organs by the immediately superior

 8     organs, in this case, it was Tolimir, in relation to me, or Beara in

 9     relation to me, that is professional guidance in discharging

10     counter-intelligence and security tasks and resolving related issues.

11     General Tolimir and Colonel Beara were exceptionally professional, in

12     terms of security service.  This is undoubted.  But, in general, the

13     superior security organ is considered to be more educated, more

14     intelligent, more experienced than the subordinate one and that it can

15     properly guide him in discharging counter-intelligence tasks and

16     resolving counter-intelligence problems.

17             These were the two lines that I mentioned.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

19             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Indeed.  Excuse me, for

20     interrupting you, Mr. Prosecutor, at this juncture.

21             Witness, I did understand the difference you explained between

22     the task of a corps commander and those of a brigade commander.  I saw

23     that a corps commander has a complete overview of the

24     counter-intelligence activities, which is not true for a brigade

25     commander.  But I can't understand why a brigade commander should not

Page 14961

 1     have a complete overview of the situation.

 2             If we remember that counter-intelligence work is to know what

 3     happens in the opposite camp.  A brigade commander has to fight the enemy

 4     facing them.  So, in your view, he doesn't need to know what is happening

 5     in the enemy's camp?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Have you finished?

 7             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes.  I just want to know why a

 8     brigade commander cannot have a complete overview and insight into

 9     counter-intelligence work.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The security organs' rule-book is

11     defined in such a way that the corps commander may know this, whereas a

12     brigade commander may not.  It is believed that a brigade commander is a

13     lower command level, which does not need to know this.  It was a

14     misunderstanding.

15             Counter-intelligence tasks are not just what you mentioned; that

16     is to say, collecting information about the enemy.  That's a task for the

17     intelligence service.  The counter-intelligence tasks are, for example,

18     implementing secret working methods, focussing on a specific person who

19     is working within the brigade command.  In order to apply these methods,

20     the corps commander is informed about that but the brigade commander

21     isn't, because, according to the rule, the brigade commander is not the

22     level which needs to know this, regardless of the fact that this is a

23     person from his own brigade.

24             And why is that so?  We had cases in which the brigade commander

25     would become aware of the method which is applied to a person who is

Page 14962

 1     being observed, in intelligence terms, from his own unit, which is quite

 2     bad because not even all brigade commanders were mature enough for this

 3     position, even though they may have been discharging it.

 4             And another thing.  There were brigade commanders to whom one

 5     could tell; that is to say, this could have been applied selectively.

 6     They could have been told that something was being done in their

 7     environment; that is to say, in their unit or something like that.

 8             But the remaining part of the answer to your question is this:

 9     The rule from the rule-book decidedly defined that a corps commander is

10     one level and that the brigade commander is another level which cannot

11     know this.  And I just tried to elaborate that.  And brigade commanders

12     were aware of this, that they were not allowed to know that.

13             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well.  Therefore, a brigade

14     commander is just somebody who carries out orders and doesn't need to

15     know what is being designed at the level of the Main Staff or at the

16     level of the corps.

17             Is that so?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are right, Your Honour.  This

19     is the principle probably an all armies that a certain command level also

20     has a specific level of information.  Not everyone can have the same

21     amount of information.  I think that is perhaps the best explanation to

22     it all, including your question.

23             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has another question.

25             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

Page 14963

 1             I needed a clarification, just to understand something that you

 2     said in -- at page 41, line 1 to 4, on today's transcript.  And you

 3     stated there:

 4             "I also believe, since the situation there was stable, it worked

 5     in the East Bosnia Corps, as well as in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, so

 6     all those corps which stayed within their areas.  Since they didn't need

 7     to move, they probably could still rely on the Neven system."

 8             My question is:  Do you know for a fact that the Neven system

 9     worked, as you state, in the East Bosnia Corps, or are you just supposing

10     because they did not move?  Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that I may

12     reduce that, because I said probably, so it's an assumption, which is

13     most probably correct because they didn't move, so that means there was

14     no reason to interrupt the system.  They were simply stable and they were

15     in their own area, as opposed to us.

16             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This relates also to the Drina Corps, as

18     Mr. Thayer was asking you, in addition; correct?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Yes.  Because

20     when I was listing the corps, I just mentioned the others as examples.  I

21     didn't list them all.  I suppose it was also the Drina Corps because they

22     were also not moving.  And the counter-intelligence group, for example,

23     was also using the same system, and probably there were not any changes

24     of that kind within their remit because they were in Banja Luka, I mean,

25     all the corps and units which stayed in their zones of responsibilities

Page 14964

 1     and had no need to leave their command posts at all.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 3             Mr. Thayer, please continue.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   Colonel, I want to follow up on Honourable Judge Mindua's

 6     question about the brigade commanders not being privy to certain

 7     information that the corps commander was privy to.

 8             The -- and I think you've spoken about this in your interview and

 9     you touched upon it in the Popovic trial a little bit.  When we -- or

10     when you speak about the brigade commander not being allowed to know

11     certain information, are we talking about, in specific,

12     counter-intelligence information first?  That's my first question.

13        A.   Your Excellency, brigade commanders could not know

14     counter-intelligence information.  They could if, as I earlier said, they

15     were mature, responsible, as I could say.  So they could be -- said

16     something general.  But there were all other security issues that the

17     security organ was obliged to inform them about.  It was obliged to

18     inform them about all other security problems which arose within the unit

19     and in the territory.

20             As I say, the counter-intelligence problems were a very narrow

21     area, especially when a specific secret working method was applied on

22     someone from the brigade command or someone who was a member of the

23     brigade.  All other security information was something that the security

24     organ had to be relayed to a brigade commander, just as I had to inform

25     the corps commander about it all.

Page 14965

 1        Q.   And I think you spoke earlier in your testimony about having to

 2     protect the commander from people that might have been infiltrating his

 3     inner circle, so to speak.  So when we speak of this counter-intelligence

 4     information that the brigade commander couldn't know about, are we really

 5     talking about internal threats, as opposed to external threats?  Is that

 6     fair to -- fair to say?

 7        A.   These were both of those threats, as you have phrased your

 8     question.  Most often, we talked about threats coming from within because

 9     that was closest and also most frequent and most painful eventually.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question.

12             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.  Sorry once again,

13     Mr. Prosecutor.

14             Your follow-up question after the question I raised forces me

15     into uncertainty once again.

16             Because, Witness, in the army, we have a principle, the one of a

17     single command.  And I believe that in the JNA, as well as in the VRS, it

18     was very well applied.  The JNA officers were among the best, at least

19     the best trained, officers in the world.

20             My problem now is at the level of a brigade.  Because you said

21     that at all levels a commander commands, whilst in the professional chain

22     you have the superior who controls.

23             So here we have a brigade with a commander who commands, and we

24     have an officer of the security or counter-intelligence department who

25     hides something from his own commander and is bound to undertake actions

Page 14966

 1     sooner or later, actions that the commander is not aware of.

 2             So what happens if you have an officer under the orders of a

 3     brigade commander who might wish to start something without his commander

 4     not knowing about it, and then refuses, because he has not been informed

 5     of the actions?

 6             Have you come across such cases?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have not fully

 8     understood your question.  In particular, the last part of the question.

 9             Can you please be more specific?

10             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I will be more specific.

11             At the brigade level, you have a brigade commander with, under

12     his orders, a counter-intelligence department officer.  The latter would

13     like to undertake a task, and this is refused.  This is not authorised by

14     the brigade commander because he has not been informed.

15             Could such a case occur or not?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, now I have understood the

17     question.

18             It did occur, and, as a consequence, once, or, perhaps, twice, we

19     received instructions from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska

20     on command and control of security organs.  This document was produced

21     precisely as a consequence of this internal misunderstanding, or to be

22     more precise, misunderstanding between a brigade commander and the

23     security organ, in terms of the duties of the security organ.  This

24     document warned about such occurrences as there were cases that, for

25     example, the mail, which is indecent in private life to open somebody

Page 14967

 1     else's mail -- that brigade commanders opened the mail for security

 2     organs which was addressed specifically and personally to the security

 3     organ.  There were such cases.  There were cases where they did not allow

 4     the use of the command code to send security reports.  There were such

 5     cases, too, and, therefore, you are right in what you said.

 6             Let me also try to clarify something about your previous question

 7     and also the question of Mr. Prosecutor.  To repeat, the security organ

 8     in the brigade had to, was obliged to, relay all security information

 9     relating to the territory and the unit that was collected.  The commander

10     had to be presented all this information and informed about it.  But, by

11     contrast, there was no such obligation relating to the

12     counter-intelligence information.  As the chief in the corps, I had the

13     right to go and meet with the brigade commander and inform him about

14     something if I believed that he needed to know that.  Of course, I would

15     have done that after talking and obtaining approval of the corps

16     commander.

17             I'm not sure if I managed now to clarify some of the issues

18     following from the questions which you have asked.

19             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, it's much clearer now.  Thank

20     you very much.  I understand much better now.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

22             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   So using the example that you and Honourable Judge Mindua just

24     shared, could it have been the case that you had a security chief of a

25     brigade, an assistant commander for security in a brigade, who is the

Page 14968

 1     brigade commander's subordinate, privy to information because of his

 2     status as a security officer, that the brigade commander does not himself

 3     know, such that the brigade commander's subordinate knows something and

 4     you know something about counter-intelligence issues but the brigade

 5     commander himself doesn't know?

 6        A.   It was possible.  Because, as I told you, this is what is set out

 7     in the security organs' rule-book, and we had to work in accordance with

 8     these rules.  When answering the Honourable Judge, I said earlier that it

 9     was possible for me to meet with a brigade commander and inform him about

10     a certain problem, if I was sure that he was mature enough and that he

11     would not abuse this information in any way.  There were brigade

12     commanders who believed that they were the subject of interest of

13     security organs and that security organs were dealing with them, and that

14     was why they did the things that I mentioned earlier.  And essentially

15     they were commanders whose account from the war should have been looked

16     at.  That was why they expressed concern or they had doubts that they

17     were the subject of investigation which was not correct.  There was no

18     need for them to act in that way.

19        Q.   So from -- from what I understand from your answer to

20     Honourable Judge Mindua's question, the fact that a subordinate of a

21     brigade commander has information that he is not sharing with his

22     commander, doesn't necessarily cripple that commander's ability to

23     command.  Because, as you said, the commander is still receiving all of

24     the other security and intelligence information which he needs to

25     exercise his command as a commander.

Page 14969

 1             Is that a fair way of putting it?

 2        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, you have made an excellent observation.

 3     Essentially this was not information, at least that is my view, that

 4     might have a significant impact on command and control in a unit.  If

 5     there was information that would have a significant impact on the command

 6     and control of a unit, then somebody would have reacted immediately.  For

 7     example, the enemy activity which may have occurred within a unit would

 8     have been eliminated immediately.  But it had to be proved first that it

 9     was really enemy activity.

10             So while the time when this was monitored, the brigade commander

11     would not feel the activity so it wouldn't have an impact or affect his

12     orders, the use of the unit.  He wouldn't feel the activity was ongoing,

13     nor was he even aware of it.

14             I'm not sure if I was precise enough and clear.

15        Q.   Okay.  Let's go back to the command and control of the security

16     organs.  You had spoken about the command line versus the professional or

17     expert line wherein General Tolimir ran you professionally.

18             I want to save a little bit of time and just quote to you from

19     your interview.  And this is at page 87 of the English and page 91 of the

20     B/C/S.  And, again, you, I think, encapsulate in your answer, to some

21     degree, what we are talking about.  You said:

22             "It is the corps commander to whom I am responsible for my

23     activities, but when it comes to the expert side of the whole thing, it's

24     Colonel Beara who is in charge of me and the second superior officer is

25     General Tolimir."

Page 14970

 1             And then you say for intelligence matters:

 2             "I had to report to Colonel Salapura as well, and, naturally,

 3     again, Tolimir above him."

 4             Let me just pause for a moment and make sure that is getting

 5     translated to you and that you understand what I've quoted from.

 6        A.   Yes, it was interpreted correctly.  What I said then is something

 7     that I stand by now.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And it wasn't the case that you would have to report

 9     twice:  Once to Salapura; and then once to General Tolimir, was it, sir?

10     You reported to Colonel Salapura and then he would, in turn, report to

11     Tolimir; is that correct?  Or did it work some other way?

12        A.   Your Honours, in principle, it was so.  As a subordinate of the

13     security administration, I was supposed to draft reports sent to that one

14     single place.  And then both administrations, security and intelligence

15     administrations, draft a report for Tolimir and for the commander of the

16     Main Staff.  This was according to the rules.

17             At the time when we were still joined, then both knew all

18     information, of course.  Later on, when the functions were separated,

19     they exchanged information.

20        Q.   Let's go to page 107 of the English in 65 ter 2785, please.  And

21     we'll need to look at page 112 in the B/C/S.

22             And, again, this is on the topic of command and control within

23     the security and intelligence organs in the VRS.

24             In the English, we'll be looking at the bottom of the page; and,

25     as well, in the B/C/S.

Page 14971

 1             Colonel, if you would focus, please, on the paragraph that

 2     begins, "Ne ne" at the bottom of the page?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And in the English, it's the paragraph that begins, "You see ..."

 5             You say here in your answer:

 6             "I cannot issue orders to the brigade commanders.  I can issue

 7     orders to the security organs, to be careful about the communications

 8     through phone lines and other types of communications ... I could inform

 9     the brigade commanders to sign an information or a document that would go

10     to the brigade commanders, to address them in my capacity as the chief of

11     security in order to make them more serious in respect of the security

12     situation.  But I could never say, I order to them."

13             My first question is: Has this transcript accurately reflected

14     your explanation; and if it has, can you just explain to the

15     Trial Chamber what you're talking about here, please?

16        A.   Your Honours, this is correct and accurate.  It reflects what I

17     said.

18             As far as I could see here, we were discussing information sent

19     from the Main Staff concerning the interception of electronic

20     communication and radio reconnaissance conducted by the enemy.  That

21     information was probably a summary of all the information that security

22     departments from the corps sent to the security administration.  And

23     based on that, the summary was made and then the information

24     disseminated.

25             What was it all about?  Well, it was a sort of warning to pay

Page 14972

 1     more attention to protect secrecy in radio communication.  In other

 2     words, to prevent leaking secret military information by way of radio

 3     communication.  In a way, it seems that people became too lax, having

 4     forgotten that their radio systems they used did not all have encryption.

 5     They forgot that what they said could be openly heard, including all

 6     information they referred to.  It was customary at the time in the army

 7     to use the so-called TKT documents.  This was an abbreviation for secret

 8     telecommunication code which basically consisted of a code list,

 9     including terms and words that were important, as well as numbers.

10             Obviously this was not used, and secret military information was

11     leaked.  That is why this information notice was sent, and it was signed

12     by Boric, the corps commander.  He sent it to the brigade commanders.  As

13     the security service, we realised there was a security issue to deal

14     with.  One of the ways of dealing with it was to send an order by the

15     corps commander to the brigade commanders to pay attention and to

16     undertake measures.  That is why I wanted to stress that I was not a

17     superior to the brigade commanders.  It was the corps commander who could

18     do this.  I was not authorised by the law, and I was not their superior.

19     I could only propose to the corps commander to draft a document of this

20     kind which would then be sent by way of his orders to his subordinate

21     commanders.

22             This is what I wanted to explain in the interview.

23        Q.   And in this example that you've told us about from -- from your

24     interview, you said that -- and I quote:

25             "I can issue orders to the security organs to be careful about

Page 14973

 1     the communications through phone lines and other types of

 2     communications."

 3             Can the tell the Trial Chamber what other types of orders you, in

 4     your capacity as security chief, could issue?

 5        A.   As the chief of security, I could issue orders to my subordinate

 6     security organs, or directives.  To say that I could order would make it

 7     part of command, but I could tell them to do something by applying a

 8     specific method in specific circumstances.  Then I could ask for

 9     information to be passed to me on, say, an incident of theft in the unit

10     if it was of any importance.  It included everything that fell within the

11     scope of activities of security organs.  Since at the corps level, we had

12     more information as compared to the levels of brigades, we frequently

13     received information from the security administration that in the

14     territory of a specific brigade there was somebody doing something for

15     the enemy, or that there was a radio device there.  We would then include

16     that in our instructions to the chief of security in the brigades to

17     verify that.  Once verified, we would then propose measures.

18        Q.   And what ability did the subordinate - to whom this directive

19     from you was issued - have to disregard your directive going down to that

20     subordinate organ?

21        A.   I don't think he could ignore it or disregard.

22        Q.   And why not, Colonel?

23        A.   Because it was a superior/subordinate relationship.  And we all

24     know what consequences one may face if refusing to carry out an order in

25     times of war.

Page 14974

 1             Also, well, how should I put it?  This relationship between me

 2     and my subordinate security organs was not a very firm or inflexible

 3     relationship.  It was a matter of agreement and a matter of discussion on

 4     how to deal with a certain problem.  It's a specific job which includes

 5     different work methods to, say, the use of a gun, rifle, or a tank.  This

 6     is rather specific.  It is primarily a mental task, and it is specific in

 7     that regard.

 8             I don't recall having had such situations in which anyone from my

 9     subordinate security organs refused.  There were other situations in

10     which some brigade security personnel had to be removed from their posts,

11     but those situations were different.

12             This is what I can tell you about it.

13        Q.   And just to follow up on your answer, Colonel, you said:

14             "And we all know what consequences one may face if refusing to

15     carry out an order in times of war."

16             What were the consequences, Colonel?

17        A.   Well, you know, unfortunately, at the time, we had no

18     court-martial during the war.  This is my personal remark.  But it would

19     entail removal from duty, detention, prosecution.  Those were the

20     measures that were applied in war time.  There was no time to place any

21     other measures.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

23             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, page 57, line 1, it

24     seems that the answer of the witness was not interpreted as precisely as

25     we would wish.

Page 14975

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, could you please clarify with the

 2     witness if this interpretation reflects correctly what he said to your

 3     answer [sic].

 4             MR. THAYER:  Well, on my LiveNote, Mr. President, the answer is:

 5             "I don't think he could ignore it or disregard."

 6             I'm not sure if that is the line in question.  If it is, it is

 7     what I heard.  So I'm not sure what the -- what the alleged error is.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic, could you explain your concern?

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I am unable to recall the precise

10     answer.  In interpretation, it seems that some terms were missing or some

11     terms were extra.  I don't think the witness mentioned the command

12     relationship in that part.

13             MR. THAYER:  Well -- Mr. President, I think --

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To avoid any problems, please put your question

15     again to the witness, Mr. Thayer.

16             MR. THAYER:  All right.  I'll start from the bottom of page 56,

17     Mr. President.

18        Q.   My question was, Colonel:  What ability did your professional

19     subordinate have to disregard your directive, going down to that

20     subordinate organ.

21        A.   I said that they weren't supposed to.  Perhaps that expression

22     was missing from the translation.  As for the other terms, that's

23     something that I can accept.  They fully reflect what I intended to say.

24        Q.   Now, when you said, "We all know the consequences of disregarding

25     an order in a time of war," Colonel let's -- I'll be frank, if not a

Page 14976

 1     little vulgar, here in the Court.  Did you ever hear of anybody being

 2     shot for failing to carry out an order in a time of war?

 3        A.   No.  I've never heard of anything like that.  That is why I

 4     specifically mentioned summary court-martials.

 5        Q.   Now, when you say you've never heard of anything like that, are

 6     you referring to war in which you were participating only, or is it the

 7     case that you've never heard of soldiers being shot in a time of war?

 8     Let's just go back to conflicts in the 20th century, don't have to go

 9     further than that.  Have you heard of that method being applied to

10     soldiers in a time of war, who failed to carry out an order?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think, Mr. Thayer, you're going a bit too far

12     to refer to all possible wars in the 20th century.  You should restrict

13     your questions to the relevant period of the indictment.

14             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  I'll move on, Mr. President.

15             Let's look at page 83, if we could, of this interview.  And it

16     will be pages 86 to 87 in the B/C/S.  And in the B/C/S, we'll be starting

17     at the very bottom of the page, please.  The paragraph beginning,

18     "malo ..."

19             Okay.  Have you had a chance to read that?  And if we could go to

20     the next page in B/C/S, please.

21        A.   I see -- I've seen it.

22        Q.   Okay.  And if we can go to the next page, top of the page, in

23     B/C/S.

24             And we are at the top of the page in English.  You state,

25     Colonel, that:

Page 14977

 1             "General Tolimir could also order us to do things through his own

 2     chain, with his own signature."

 3             And then you're asked:

 4             "Tolimir could order forces, actually?"

 5             And your answer is:

 6             "Security organs and the intelligence organs."

 7             And the follow-up question is:

 8             "Including the military police?"

 9             And your answer is:

10             "Yes.  So he could."

11             Can you explain a little bit what you're talking about here in

12     this answer, Colonel?

13        A.   Your Honours, in this part of the interview, we were discussing

14     who had the right to assign what documents and who could sign for someone

15     else.  Specifically, we were discussing who could sign a document for

16     Mladic or who could sign documents within my command.  I said then that

17     General Tolimir could issue an order to the security and intelligence

18     organs as their superior officer.  He could also issue orders to the

19     military police following an approval of the Main Staff commander.  This

20     is something I need to add to what I said then.

21             When it comes to the use of a military police unit in combat,

22     this is -- this would be a situation in which he required an approval.

23     As for the training and equipping units of the military police, in such

24     instances, he could issue direct orders because equipping and training a

25     unit was part of the work of the security organ.  I don't know whether at

Page 14978

 1     the level of the Main Staff there was a MP unit.  If there was one, it

 2     was probably part of the protection regiment.

 3             If we go back to the issue of orders, that was the sense of my

 4     answer then, and I just tried to explain it again.

 5        Q.   You gave us an example a few moments ago of issuing a directive,

 6     to use that term, and you've also used the term "order," although I

 7     understand you want to distinguish your role from that of a commander.

 8     But you gave an example a little while ago of a directive in connection

 9     with proper use of communications.

10             Can you provide the Trial Chamber with any other examples of

11     where you would issue directives or orders down your subordinate chain.

12        A.   Basically, as I said, I could issue a directive, or order, to

13     those who were in the security department as part of the corps command

14     and to my subordinate security organs in the commands of brigades,

15     regiments, and independent battalions.  Following the corps commander's

16     approval, I could issue an order to the military police unit, or, to be

17     more specific, to the MP battalion, as regards training, equipment, and

18     similar issues.  I could also suggest or propose to the commander how to

19     use the military police unit, but it was his sole discretion to order any

20     such use.  While the intelligence and security organs were still merged,

21     they could put such proposals to the commanders to use reconnaissance

22     units, although it was more under the competence or in co-ordination with

23     the Chief of Staff of the corps because it was usually the Chiefs of

24     Staff of corps and brigades who were in charge of reconnaissance units at

25     troop level.  In other words, as the security organ, I had no right to

Page 14979

 1     order to anyone in the MP battalion or to order any brigade or battalion

 2     commander.  I was only a superior officer to those who were in the

 3     security and intelligence departments, and such departments had five to

 4     six people.  And I was also a superior to those who were placed in the

 5     different brigades and regiments.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Now in the -- I think we're pretty much at the

 7     break, but if I could just ask one more question, and we'll be done with

 8     this topic, I think.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please.

10             MR. THAYER:

11        Q.   You said in your interview and this is at page 97 of the English

12     and pages 101 to 102 of the B/C/S.  You said that the corps' military

13     police battalions had to report to the Main Staff military police

14     service.  That's then-Colonel Keserovic.  They also had to report to you

15     as the security chief and they had to report to the corps commander.  I

16     just wanted to ask you, number one, is -- is that accurately reflected in

17     the -- in the transcript, that the corps' military police battalions had

18     to report to all three of those levels?

19        A.   It is correct, what I said then, and what you just said now.

20             In military police battalions, you had the duty military police

21     service.  It would compose reports about the events and military police

22     duties which the military police battalion had carried out during the

23     day.  These reports were sent to the corps command, to the operative duty

24     officer, where all reports from units were collated.  Then by telegram,

25     they would be sent to the security administration directly and to us,

Page 14980

 1     security organs, for our information.

 2             Why were they sent directly there?  So that we wouldn't duplicate

 3     reports.  So that we wouldn't, as security organs, send reports about the

 4     military police unit.  That was why it was done in this way.  And this is

 5     the system that we inherited from before the war.  I think it is also

 6     regulated in the rule-book for military police.

 7             If I need to repeat, one was the corps operational duty officer,

 8     the other one was the chief of the department for military police duties

 9     at the security administration because it was at the level of Keserovic

10     where all the information about the activities of military police were

11     collected --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  And could the witness please repeat the third

13     addressee.

14             MR. THAYER:

15        Q.   And there were three that we were referring to and we just need

16     to pick up, for the record, the third addressee.  We just didn't catch it

17     on the record.  Who was the third?

18        A.   The corps command, the corps security department, and the

19     military police department at the security administration of the

20     Main Staff of the VRS.

21        Q.   Okay.

22             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I see we're a couple

23     minutes beyond the break.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We must have our second break now, and we will

25     resume at 1.00.

Page 14981

 1                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Thayer.  Please continue.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good afternoon again to

 5     you and to Your Honours.

 6        Q.   Good afternoon, Colonel.

 7        A.   Good afternoon.

 8        Q.   I want to ask you about one topic about which the Trial Chamber

 9     has heard some testimony, and that has to do with the combat readiness

10     analyses which were conducted in the VRS.

11             You spoke about it during your OTP interview, and just to save a

12     little bit of time, if you could just tell the Trial Chamber a little bit

13     about what these combat readiness analyses were all about, what their

14     purpose was and how the VRS went about conducting them?

15        A.   Your Honours, the analysis of combat readiness was a planned

16     activity which was carried out once or twice per year at the level of the

17     VRS.  The analysis was preceded by an order.  I'm talking about the corps

18     command now.  An order to make the analysis, which the Main Staff of the

19     Army of Republika Srpska would submit to corps commands.  This order

20     precisely specified the issues which the analysis needed to deal with.

21     On receiving the document - and I will be talking about the process - I

22     hope I understood the character of your question properly.  You want me

23     to talk about the procession of analysing combat readiness.  On receiving

24     the document, the corps command would compose its own document on the

25     basis of the one received from the Main Staff, and it would send it to

Page 14982

 1     brigade commands and its subordinate units, brigades and regiments, of

 2     course with a deadline, which allowed the corps command to have

 3     sufficient time to make its own analysis.  Once the brigade commander has

 4     received such an order, they would make their own orders and send it down

 5     to battalion commands, and also give a deadline which would allow them to

 6     collate all the reports in a timely fashion and submit their own report

 7     to the corps command.  It was a process, beginning with the moment when

 8     you received the order to make the analysis of combat readiness from the

 9     Main Staff to the moment when the order was disseminated through the

10     lower units.  The contrary process, after informing brigade commands,

11     there would be a brigade command meeting at which, collectively, each in

12     his own area of responsibility, people would provide answers to certain

13     questions and make an analysis of combat readiness for the corps level.

14     This analysis of combat readiness would be taken by the corps commander

15     to the Main Staff at the specific ordered time.  He would take it there,

16     and he would defend it at the Main Staff.  He would defend it verbally.

17     Regardless of the fact that it was composed in writing, he had to defend

18     it.  That is to say, he had to state verbally what the analysis included,

19     what problems the unit has been facing, and how these specific problems

20     were overcome.

21             So, more or less, that was the process by which this analysis was

22     made, if that is what you had in mind.

23        Q.   Indeed, thank you, Colonel.  And was there specific input at the

24     various levels, brigade and corps, by your organs, the security

25     intelligence organs, into this analysis?

Page 14983

 1        A.   Yes.  As part of the combat readiness analysis, the security

 2     organs and intelligence organs had their own points, their own questions.

 3     Security support and intelligence support, because, in addition to these

 4     supports, there was also morale support, logistical support, engineering,

 5     AVHO, and so on and so forth.  So all the elements which command and

 6     control implies had to be included and answers had to be provided

 7     concerning each of these.

 8             Let me also emphasise another detail.  When the brigade command

 9     made the analysis of combat readiness, a meeting would be held at which

10     somebody from the brigade command would often be present.  I apologise, I

11     meant the corps command.  Either the commander or his deputy would be

12     present, and so would some other members of the command, of course.

13     Likewise, when the corps made its own combat readiness analysis, usually

14     somebody from the superior command, that is to say, from the Main Staff

15     of the Army of Republika Srpska, would attend the meeting.  Sometimes it

16     was the commander himself, if it was possible, and so on.  That was the

17     principle.

18        Q.   Can you tell us, what was the essential purpose of these combat

19     readiness analyses?

20        A.   Yes.  The essential purpose of any combat readiness analysis was

21     to plan further combat operations.  When we're talking about war time to

22     see how ready any unit was, because through the analysis of combat

23     readiness, you would get a picture of a unit, what it was like.  Of

24     course, if the analysis was realistic, what the unit was like, and

25     whether it was ready to carry out combat operations or not.  In other

Page 14984

 1     words, could you count on that unit when planning specific combat

 2     operations, actions and so on.  That is the basic element.

 3        Q.   Let's turn to another topic.

 4             In both your Popovic testimony, to some degree, and in your

 5     interview with the OTP, and the Trial Chamber heard a little bit of this

 6     in my summary this morning of your Popovic testimony, you spoke about

 7     when you met certain high-level VRS officers, such as Colonel Beara,

 8     then-Colonel Tolimir, and when General Mladic also worked with those

 9     officers before the war broke out.

10             Do you recall telling us in the Popovic trial and the

11     investigators during your interview about that topic?

12        A.   Yes, I remember that.  I also remember my answers, which I will

13     repeat now.

14             Namely, by way of introduction, I said that I graduated from the

15     academy in 1979 and, later on, I went to the Postina Garrison in

16     Slovenia.  That was where I was appointed.  Around 1985 or 1986, I was

17     redeployed to the Sibenik Garrison.  I was already working for security

18     organs at the time.  I was their member.

19             I met General Tolimir in Belgrade.  I saw him for the first time

20     in Belgrade when he was in the foreign languages school, together with my

21     friend, the late Colonel Milan Stevilovic.  That was when I saw him for

22     the first time.  I believe that he held the rank of major.  Whether I was

23     already in the military naval district at the time or was I still at the

24     Postina Garrison, I'm not certain, but it was in 1985 or 1986.

25             As for the naval Captain Beara, I met him in Sibenik.  After I

Page 14985

 1     arrived there, and after I had been working there fore a while, perhaps

 2     one month, I'm not sure, the naval captain was touring and he was

 3     controlling the work of security organs at the military naval district

 4     Sibenik.  And this district was responsible for the zone from Kornati, a

 5     part of Zadar.  Kornati, as I said, Sibenik, all the way down to Ploce,

 6     if you are familiar with the coast, including all the islands such as

 7     Hvar, Brac, Solta, Lastovo, Vis, and so on.  So it was quite a big area.

 8             And I note that because of your question why they gave one major

 9     and 50 soldiers, why I was important at the time, I was deputy chief of

10     security for this whole territory.  So naval Captain Beara arrived and he

11     was, at the time, deputy chief of security of the military naval

12     district, or navy, just to put it more simply.  He was the deputy for

13     counter-intelligence affairs.  That was our first contact.  Later on, we

14     also had other contacts.  More frequently, regularly, it was professional

15     and sometimes we met in Sibenik and on other occasions in Split.  Later

16     on, I used to see General Tolimir in Split.  At the time he was already

17     chief of the counter-intelligence group of the Naval Military District.

18     Later, I used to see him in Knin, especially after I had been released

19     from detention because at the same time General Tolimir was chief of the

20     security department in the Knin Corps.  Let me repeat, General Mladic was

21     at the time the Chief of Staff of the Knin Corps.

22        Q.   So, it is it fair to say that, in addition to yourself,

23     Colonel Beara, then-Colonel Tolimir, and General Mladic all knew each

24     other, to some degree, worked with each other, during this time in Knin?

25        A.   You see, it was a short period.  Until I was taken prisoner, I

Page 14986

 1     had been in Sibenik, not in Knin.  Tolimir had been in Knin, and Beara

 2     had been in Split.  After I was released from custody, I came to Knin,

 3     and I was appointed the chief of the counter-intelligence group of the

 4     corps, and Tolimir became my first superior.  I believe that at the time

 5     Beara was down in Boka Kotorska on the Montenegrin coast where navy

 6     command had moved from Split.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And when the JNA broke up, can you tell the Trial Chamber,

 8     among the various ethnicities of the officer corps that made up the

 9     JNA -- among the various ethnicities, which ethnicity had the greatest

10     number of professional officers within the JNA and which had the least?

11     If you could just provide the Trial Chamber with some idea.  I think you

12     talked about that in your interview.  If you could just share that with

13     the Trial Chamber.

14        A.   Yes.  In the then-corps command, there were most Serbs, officers

15     and non-commissioned Serbs, specifically Serbs who were born in Bosnia

16     and Herzegovina.  All those who had not been born in Bosnia-Herzegovina

17     left the territory of the corps, its zone, on the 19th of May.  The corps

18     had not existed yet at the time but they left the territory of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20        Q.   I'm sorry, if I could interrupt you.  I see a problem in the

21     transcript which happens from time to time.

22             I used the word core, in English, c-o-r-e, meaning the officer --

23     I beg your pardon, no, no.  Let me start over again.  Let me follow up on

24     what you just said Colonel.  You referred specifically to the corps which

25     had not existed at the time.  My question is a little bit more general.

Page 14987

 1             When the JNA broke up -- can you just give the Trial Chamber an

 2     idea of when the VRS was formed, the officer class instead of -- I don't

 3     want to use the word "corps" because I don't mean a specific corps, as in

 4     East Bosnia Corps, Knin Corps, but in terms of a group of officers from

 5     the JNA, can you just give the Trial Chamber an idea of the percentage of

 6     ethnicity, who had the most highly trained -- most of the highly trained

 7     officers, who had the least.  And then I'll ask -- I'll move on to a

 8     different topic.

 9        A.   I just said these were Serbs as the most numerous, and, more

10     specifically, Serbs born in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  If we talk in more

11     general terms, the general situation, I can tell that you in the

12     Knin Corps, there were also officers who were not just Serbs but also

13     Muslims, including Mr. Dudakovic, who was one of the officers there, the

14     Muslim general.  There were Croatian officers.  There were soldiers who

15     were ethnic Albanian from Kosovo and so on.  That was the situation in

16     Knin.

17             In our corps, in addition to Serbs, there was a small number of

18     Croats and Muslims, both among the officers and among the soldiers.

19             The military police unit, the military police battalion, also

20     included some soldiers who were Muslims and an officer who was a Croat.

21     But at the corps command, we had one officer who was a Muslim.

22        Q.   Now, you testified in the Popovic trial that you held Colonels

23     Beara and Popovic in high esteem, and the Trial Chamber has the record of

24     what you said about them as officers.  You also told us in the 2004 OTP

25     interview about how you regarded General Tolimir as an officer.  And if

Page 14988

 1     you could share with the Trial Chamber your personal assessment, as you

 2     did in 2004, with the Trial Chamber.  And rather than put it up on the

 3     screen, I'll just ask you to share that with the Trial Chamber.

 4        A.   Yes, I said then and I repeat today that I have had a high

 5     opinion about the personality of naval Captain Beara, who, at the time

 6     before the war and later during the war, was a figure of authority for

 7     security organs.  Undoubtedly, he was highly professional and a man who

 8     knew how to control security organs.

 9             I can say the same thing for General Tolimir.  He is very

10     knowledgeable, a great expert, and we had to learn many things from him.

11     We had to and we needed to.  And regardless of the situation that he is

12     in now, Tolimir, and also Beara and Popovic -- Popovic was my

13     subordinate.  You noted there that it was at my proposal that he was

14     appointed as the chief of security in the Drina Corps because I was the

15     one who was supposed to go there.  That was one of the possible

16     combinations.  But I asked General Tolimir not to transfer me to that

17     part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina because, by origin, that's where I'm from.

18     I'm a native of that area, and I did not wish to go there because I could

19     have come into conflict with some of my relatives, the closest and more

20     distant relatives.  Because you know how it is, sometimes some people

21     think you are right, others think you are wrong, and I wanted to keep as

22     far away from that as possible.  So I stayed where I was.  And at the

23     time, Major Popovic, I think he was major, was a man who was working

24     well, who was responsible, and who needed a higher position, and he

25     couldn't get one in the 2nd Krajina Corps.

Page 14989

 1             So that is an explanation of sorts.

 2        Q.   Now, and just so the record is clear, do you remember

 3     approximately what year that was that you recommended Popovic for that

 4     position?

 5        A.   Well, you see, the Drina Corps was the last of these corps that

 6     was established.  Was it late 1992 or early 1993?  I'm not sure about

 7     that.

 8        Q.   Okay.  For my last couple of questions, Colonel, I'd like to go

 9     back to your interview.

10             MR. THAYER:  This is 65 ter 2785.  We'll be going to page 95 in

11     the English; page 99 in the B/C/S.

12        Q.   And, Colonel, we'll be focussing about in the middle of the page

13     where you're asked who commanded the 410th, referring to the

14     410th Intelligence Centre.  And in English, that's at the very top of the

15     page.

16             If you would, just take a moment to read this section.

17        A.   Yes, I've read it.

18        Q.   And we'll need to go down just a little bit more in the B/C/S

19     just to catch the very bottom.

20             Now you were asked -- and, again, this goes back to the issue of

21     command and control that we were talking about before.  You were asked

22     who Colonel Knezevic reported to.  And you answered that he reported

23     first to Salapura and then Tolimir.  And you clarify that Knezevic could

24     go directly to Tolimir if Salapura was not present, but as a matter of

25     principle he had to go to Salapura first and then Salapura would inform

Page 14990

 1     Tolimir.

 2             You were then asked the question:

 3             "Is there any reason you can think of where there would be any

 4     secrets from General Tolimir, any intelligence or security-related

 5     matter?"

 6             And your answer was:

 7             "In my case, there definitely wasn't any.  I can't tell you

 8     anything about other organs, but, in principle, there shouldn't have been

 9     any, because also, General Tolimir would have surely found out if

10     something had been kept a secret.  And in that case, I wouldn't like to

11     be in the skin of the person who tried to keep secrets from him."

12             Now, I asked you about this passage in the last trial.  What I

13     want to ask you today is:  Can you tell the Trial Chamber why it was so

14     important not to keep secrets from General Tolimir?

15        A.   First of all, as for myself, there were not any such situations.

16     And I believe that concealing any information or an attempt to conceal

17     them may have caused harm, not just personal harm to the security organ

18     that would do such a thing, but it would be harmful for the assessment of

19     the situation, a specific situation, perhaps.  It is certain that on the

20     basis of the information which he received, General Tolimir made

21     counter-intelligence assessments all the time and security assessments as

22     well, because that is the main task of any security organ.  Should it

23     happen that an information which is available was not presented to him, I

24     don't think that ever happened but I think that the consequence would be

25     that he wouldn't have a full picture about something, an event, or

Page 14991

 1     something similar.

 2             As for what I said here, you quoted about the 410th and all that.

 3     Who did Colonel Cedo Knezevic report to?  I said that he could say

 4     something directly to Tolimir, in case Salapura was absent.  He could

 5     have done that, but that does not mean that Salapura would be bypassed.

 6     It was just a way to relay information more quickly.  Perhaps that caused

 7     some doubt on part of the investigator, and so he asked the question

 8     whether it happened and what would have happened if any information was

 9     concealed from Tolimir.  No, that did not happen.  And that was why Cedo

10     reported to Salapura and Salapura normally reported to Tolimir as his

11     superior.

12             I'm not sure if I now managed to explain this a little bit to

13     you.

14        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  I think that does clarify the matter.

15             Now, in the event -- and let's just follow up with what you

16     mentioned last there.  In the event that Colonel Knezevic couldn't get a

17     hold of Colonel Salapura and had to go directly to General Tolimir, would

18     it have been the practice that Colonel Knezevic would at the earliest

19     opportunity that he had to contact Colonel Salapura, would then also

20     inform Colonel Salapura, even though he had already talked to

21     General Tolimir, in Colonel Salapura's absence?

22        A.   Yes.  In principle, that could have happened, and it probably

23     did.  There was no harm in conveying the same thing twice.  Perhaps

24     Salapura received such information from Tolimir in the meantime and then

25     Knezevic would inform him by just repeating it.  But we as subordinates

Page 14992

 1     don't know whether our superiors communicated with each other and when.

 2     So just in case, we, again, report the same thing to the first superior,

 3     the immediate superior.

 4        Q.   Now, for my last question on -- on this topic, Colonel.  When you

 5     were serving -- again, we're talking about the corps level.  When you

 6     were the corps chief of the security department or, indeed, when the two

 7     departments, security and intelligence, were unified, when you were chief

 8     of security and intelligence affairs, how important was it for you to

 9     know everything that was going on?  You've spoken about how a brigade

10     commander didn't necessarily have to know everything that was going on,

11     but you've told us previously that the corps commander had to know

12     everything that was going on and you had to know everything that was

13     going on.

14             Why was it important for you as that corps officer to know

15     everything that was going on?

16        A.   Your Honours, it is very important to know everything that was --

17     that is going on in the corps so as to be able to produce an adequate,

18     proper security assessment.  I was supposed to be informed if, say, a

19     unit abandoned its positions or refused to take food or refused to take

20     up a position.  These are all security issues which may imply losing

21     ground, victims and casualties among our ranks, or our soldiers being

22     captured and equipment lost.  This is just a segment of the reasons why

23     we needed to know everything that was going on.

24             I also had to receive such information from my subordinate

25     security organs, in order to inform the corps commander appropriately.

Page 14993

 1     It was on the basis of that information, provided by the security

 2     service, and some other information, the commander conducted his daily

 3     procedure of command and control over his units.  I had to know it all so

 4     that I could report it to my superior command.  They needed to know what

 5     some things were about and what their nature was, as well as whether it

 6     could reflect on the morale of the unit, its combat readiness, et cetera,

 7     although it was up to the corps commander to assess combat readiness and

 8     morale.  In that regard, it was very important to have information

 9     because by knowing you prevent being surprised, caught unawares.

10        Q.   And what were the consequences of secrets were kept from

11     you [sic]?

12        A.   When it happened, and it rarely did, well, you know what our

13     people say, that liars don't stand their ground too long.  Truth always

14     outs.  Of course, regulations are one thing, and practice is another.  If

15     I had to remove a chief of security in a brigade for such an omission,

16     there were no substitutes, there were no people you could choose from to

17     replace him.  So, for the most part, when there were serious omissions or

18     infractions, people were removed from their positions and criminal

19     reports submitted.  And in cases when it involved information which could

20     not immediately or significantly affect the situation at the front line

21     or combat readiness, then we usually resorted to the disciplinary and

22     advisory measures.

23        Q.   And why was it so important for General Tolimir in his position

24     as assistant commander for security and intelligence to know everything

25     that was going on, not to have secrets kept from him?

Page 14994

 1        A.   An answer to that question could be brought down to what I said a

 2     moment ago, as to why it was important for me to know.  The same applies

 3     to Tolimir's level, which was higher up.  He also had to inform the

 4     commander and the command with its staff with what was going on and what

 5     the situation was like in certain parts of our territory and in certain

 6     units.  Based on his information, the commander made decisions and

 7     assessments on whether there would be any combat engagement and where.

 8     Basically, it all boiled down to whether you can engage a particular unit

 9     in combat or not.  If you can, how; and if you cannot, why.  And what can

10     you do to enable that unit to engage in combat.

11             In a time of war, nothing else is as important.

12        Q.   Okay.  I have just one more question for you, Colonel.

13             MR. THAYER:  If we could stay on page 95 in the English.  If we

14     could scroll all the way down.  And we'll need to go to page 100 in the

15     B/C/S of the interview.

16        Q.   And, Colonel, if you could focus on the next couple of questions

17     you were asked that have to do with places of worship being destroyed.

18     Just take a moment and read that section, please.

19             MR. THAYER:  And in English, it starts at the bottom third and

20     continues onto the next page.  And we'll move on in a moment.

21        Q.   You were asked about mosques being blown up and destruction of

22     homes and so forth.  And you answered that:

23             "Especially at the beginning of the war, religious buildings of

24     all confessions and all three sides were being destroyed.  I'll be honest

25     with you, it wasn't reported ... it was a normal occurrence."

Page 14995

 1             And you were asked if the Main Staff knew that this was

 2     happening.

 3             MR. THAYER:  And we have to go to the next page in English.

 4        Q.   And your answer was:

 5             "Well, they visited the territory, they'd see that the mosque

 6     wasn't there, the Catholic church wasn't there, the Orthodox church

 7     wasn't there.  It was a well-known thing.  Everybody did it.  We did it.

 8     The Muslims did it.  The Croats did it.  The locations where these

 9     religious buildings were preserved are rare."

10             My question to you, Colonel, simply is:  Do you stand by what you

11     said in your 2004 interview about houses of worship of all religions were

12     destroyed by the other side during the war?

13        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  This was so on all three sides.  There were

14     very few settlements in which an enemy army went that managed to preserve

15     their religious buildings.  As I said, it was a standard occurrence.

16     There was a lot of fear on all sides and -- well, what can I tell you?

17     It is sad.  I said so then.  It is sad that many historical monuments

18     were destroyed.  Many of them were religious buildings.  It's a sad

19     thing, and I was very much against that.

20             That's it.

21        Q.   Colonel, we're at the end of my time.  And I'm at the end of my

22     examination.  And I thank you again for your insight and experience.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Thayer.  You're just in

24     time before we adjourn for the day.

25             Mr. Tolimir, you may commence your cross-examination tomorrow.

Page 14996

 1             We have to adjourn.  Let me remind you that the -- that there's

 2     no permission to have contact about the content of your testimony to

 3     either party during the break.

 4             We adjourn and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.

 5                           [The witness stands down]

 6                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 2nd day of June,

 8                           2011, at 9.00 a.m.