Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16303

 1                           Friday, 8 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody.

 6             If there are no procedural matters, the witness should be brought

 7     in, please.

 8             I see Mr. Gajic on his feet.  Mr. Gajic.

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, certain exhibits

10     marked for identification because there were no translation, whether into

11     the Serbian or into the Croatian language, have now been entered into

12     e-court.  So by your leave I will read out the exhibit numbers.  These

13     are D156, D175, D188, D189, D191, D194, D205, D207, D208, D223, D238,

14     D240, D242, D245, D246, D247, D250, D251, D270, D282, D283, D284, and

15     finally D285.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for that.

17             The witness should be brought in, please.

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just for the record, these exhibits are no longer

20     MFI'd, but in evidence.

21             Mr. McCloskey.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,

23     everyone.  If we could go back to P22, maybe it will save a little bit

24     time if we can get it up on the screen while Mr. Butler comes in.  It's

25     where we left off.

Page 16304

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Butler.  Please sit down.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell

 5     the truth you made yesterday at the beginning of your testimony still

 6     applies.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I understand.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

10                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]

11        Q.   I see you've got your same binder.  If you could go to where we

12     left off, it should be tab 4, the six strategic objectives.  We also see

13     them up on the screen.  And really for our purposes I just want to ask

14     you, looking at number 3:

15             "Establish a corridor in the Drina River valley, that is,

16     eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian States."

17             Can you tell us the Drina river valley as you understand it in

18     this document, does that include the area from Srebrenica to Zvornik?

19        A.   Yes, sir.  That area is generally referred to as the lower Drina

20     valley or lower Podrinje.  So that particular geographic area would be

21     encompassed on the west bank of the Drina river.

22        Q.   All right.  And you talked a little bit yet about the Assembly

23     session in May where these were talked about.  Let's go to tab 5, if we

24     could.  Were you able to review any minutes of that Assembly meeting?

25     And it should be 65 ter 25.

Page 16305

 1        A.   Yes, sir, I was.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to page 13 in the English and

 4     B/C/S page 12.  There we see the front page indicating minutes very

 5     briefly.  Now if we can go to 13 in the English and 12 in the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, could you take a look in the English, it's the

 7     middle of the paragraph -- it's the middle of the page, it's the second

 8     paragraph, sort of the last line, it says:

 9             "The first such goal is separation from the other two ethnic

10     communities - separation of states."

11             Now, if we go back - and I don't think we need to take the time

12     to do it - but if we go back to page 7 in English we can see that the

13     person that's speaking is Karadzic.  Does that fit your recollection of

14     the person that's speaking at this point?

15        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

16        Q.   All right.  And that is the first goal that we saw on the

17     previous document?

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19        Q.   All right.  And we see, as we go down, it's page 13 in the B/C/S,

20     paragraph 3 in the B/C/S, but it's still page 13 of the English, where it

21     talks about that -- that third strategic goal that we talked -- that

22     mentioned the Drina river valley and again mentions the elimination of

23     the Drina as a border between two worlds.  And we can -- I won't read it

24     all.  We can -- we can see it ourselves.  It talks about the possibility

25     of some Muslim municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in

Page 16306

 1     order for them to achieve their rights.  And it says:

 2             "But that belt along the Drina must basically belong to the

 3     Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina ..."

 4             And it talks about strategically useful.

 5             Was this a strategic area in your view in some way for the

 6     Serbian politic at this -- the politicians at this early stage?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, it was.

 8        Q.   And just briefly, what was your understanding of its importance

 9     to them?

10        A.   If one looks at a map of the Republika Srpska, the key geographic

11     feature is that area along the Drina River which is somewhat narrow but

12     connects the two main bodies of where the ethnic Bosnian Serbs were

13     residing in the Krajina and further down south in Herzegovina.  The Drina

14     river valley region in 1992 when the conflict started was primarily

15     populated by Bosnians of Muslim ethnicity.  Serbs were the minority in

16     those regions.  It was recognised that there could be no chance of

17     success of their political goals.  Early on it was to be joined with the

18     remainder of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time,

19     and then later their own autonomous state if the situation persisted,

20     that they remained the minority population in the Drina valley.  So they

21     understood from a geo-political sense that they had to become the

22     dominant force in population in that area in order to secure that

23     territory for the future of the state of Republika Srpska.

24        Q.   All right.  And I think I'll leave that subject alone for now,

25     but that -- I just -- that is important to get established early on.

Page 16307

 1     Now, in your review in your studies and your report, you did mention that

 2     you reviewed the laws applicable in the region at the time and the

 3     military rules.  In your view, did -- were you able to determine whether

 4     or not the SFRY, the former Yugoslavia, before the war had a system of

 5     laws that reflected the laws of armed conflict as promulgated in the

 6     Geneva Conventions?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  As a component of the criminal code of the former

 8     SFRY, one particular section of that code dealt with crimes that were

 9     consistent with the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions.

10        Q.   And were those laws -- were you able to determine whether those

11     SFRY laws were ever adopted into the RS legal system upon its formation

12     or shortly thereafter?

13        A.   Yes, sir.  And in 1993 the Bosnian Serb leadership formally took

14     the step of redesignating the criminal code of the SFRY to be the

15     criminal code of the Republika Srpska, with just minor variations.

16        Q.   And for the JNA officers, the professional military officers like

17     General Tolimir that were part of the JNA before the war, did they

18     receive any training from their military -- well, rules or programmes in

19     the laws of armed conflict, the Geneva -- the laws of the Geneva

20     Convention?

21        A.   The armed forces of the former SFRY did publish regulations on

22     how to apply the laws of armed conflict, and they were of course

23     distributed throughout the military.  And based on my research and

24     interviews with various former military officers, not only from the

25     Republika Srpska but from other republics that later became independent

Page 16308

 1     from Yugoslavia, as a component of the professional development and

 2     training of officers at various levels, refresher training was required

 3     in these particular conventions.

 4        Q.   Now, moving on to it becoming the VRS and people --

 5     General Mladic, General Tolimir, General Milovanovic, and the others, did

 6     the VRS in any way adopt any regulations themselves that would reflect

 7     the Geneva Conventions?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, very early on in the conflict,

 9     President Karadzic, as the president of the then-Bosnian Serb Presidency,

10     passed a decree which directed that the regulations on the application of

11     the law of war to the SFRY apply to the armed conflict and the forces of

12     the Army of the Republika Srpska.

13        Q.   All right.  And I know you deal with this in your reports, but I

14     would like to go over some of the materials that you have cited regarding

15     this topic.  And just briefly, briefly discuss, if we could -- go to tab

16     6, 65 -- and I'm sorry, thank you -- we need to tender 65 ter 25, the

17     Assembly minutes.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That will be received.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document number 25 shall be

20     assigned Exhibit P2477.  Thank you.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And now if we could go to 65 ter 28.

22        Q.   And it's the next tab, should be tab 6.  And we see here this

23     document entitled:  "The Main Staff of the Armed Forces of

24     Republika Srpska, Military Prosecutor's Office at the Main Staff of the

25     Armed Forces."  And it's entitled:  "Guide-lines for Determining the

Page 16309

 1     Criteria for Criminal Prosecution."

 2             And it's dated down at the bottom -- well, we can't see it on the

 3     screen, but it's --

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we could bring the screen up a little bit

 5     maybe we will be able to see the year there.  Yes, it should be in both,

 6     in the original -- 1992.

 7        Q.   Can you very briefly tell us what this document is, very briefly,

 8     and then we'll go over just a few pieces of it.

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  Early in the conflict, I believe this document is

10     dated to roughly October of 1992, the Main Staff, particularly the

11     military prosecutor's office - which at that time worked and served the

12     Main Staff before it was transferred to the Ministry of Defence - laid

13     out a number of provisions for prosecuting crimes against the armed

14     forces.  This not only included acts related to avoiding military service

15     or acts directed against the army, but also directed against crimes that

16     were committed in violation of international law during an armed

17     conflict.  This document lays out in general terms those different types

18     of activities and what provisions of law apply as well as in general

19     terms how both the military prosecutors as well as senior officers of the

20     army would be expected to counter these types of criminal acts.

21        Q.   All right.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Let's go to the next page in both languages.

23     Sorry, we need to go to the next page in the B/C/S.  I'm sorry, the

24     next -- we're fine in the English and, I'm sorry, I don't have the exact

25     B/C/S page.  I've just decided to go -- to do this is why.  Let's stay

Page 16310

 1     with page 2 in the English and I want -- let's go to the next page in the

 2     B/C/S -- actually, no, stay right there.  It's number 1 that I want to

 3     start with.

 4        Q.   So let's look at the bottom of page 2 in the English, it's also

 5     the bottom of the page that we have in the B/C/S, where, I think you'll

 6     agree, it lists three main criminal offence categories that it's

 7     concerned with prosecuting, and that is the failure to respond to the

 8     military call-up is number 1.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Then if we could flip the page in the B/C/S.

10     Could we go to the next page in the B/C/S.  Thank you.

11        Q.   And then number 2 is wilfully absenting oneself from one's post.

12     So I think we can all understand that failure to call-up and leaving your

13     post are two pretty critical parts of running an army in a war?

14        A.   Correct, sir.

15        Q.   All right.  So let's go to number 3 which is on the next page in

16     English.  And here we see number 3, the last number that they have is the

17     criminal offences against humanity and international law pursuant to the

18     chapter of the criminal code.

19             Is this what you were referring to earlier?

20        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

21        Q.   All right.  Let's go to page 7 in the English, should be page 25

22     in the B/C/S.  And this is the chapter in this document under number 3

23     that we just saw reflecting the criminal offences against humanity and

24     international law.  Yes, that's -- that's where it begins in the B/C/S,

25     but I think if we could just take a look at that in the B/C/S and then go

Page 16311

 1     to the next page in the B/C/S is where I just want to ask you a few

 2     things of what you think of these.  And of course it starts out that

 3     the -- as we see, that the legal classification of these criminal

 4     offences were adopted from the international conventions.

 5             And from your review of this document, would you agree with that

 6     first statement?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, I would.

 8        Q.   And it goes on in that first paragraph to say:

 9             "The unique nature of these criminal offences is also in their

10     seriousness, which is expressed in severe punishments, including the

11     death penalty for six criminal offences."

12             So did they actually have the death penalty for these offences?

13        A.   At that time under their law, they in fact had a death penalty

14     for these offences.

15        Q.   All right.  And now going to the next paragraph, and this is

16     where I have B/C/S page 25, paragraph 2, it says:

17             "Crimes against humanity and international law can be committed

18     by individuals acting on their own, but by their nature these criminal

19     offences are usually committed in an organised fashion in the

20     implementation of the policy of the ruling circles.  Most of these

21     criminal offences are committed only during armed conflicts or are in

22     some way closely connected with armed conflicts, which means that they

23     are committed within the context of broad military operations and on the

24     orders from superior officers."

25             And I don't want to get into this in any sort of detail,

Page 16312

 1     Mr. Butler, but when you read this and know what you know about the

 2     charges related to Srebrenica, does this paragraph reflect in any way

 3     the -- the allegations as you know them to be in -- regarding the fall of

 4     Srebrenica?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe it's a very accurate statement of the

 6     circumstances that occurred.

 7        Q.   All right.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we could go to page 8 in the English.  It

 9     should be B/C/S page 27, the last paragraph of page 27.

10        Q.   And it's that top paragraph, and we'll see from the -- just the

11     previous page it talks about the army is obligated to observe

12     international laws.  And then it says:

13             "From this follows the explicit responsibility of the officer

14     corps of the Army of Republika Srpska as the giver of orders in command

15     of the armed forces, whose members could commit or are committing some of

16     these offences, to take uncompromising action and prevent such conduct.

17     This responsibility belongs by its nature particularly to high-ranking

18     individuals and officials in state, military, or public organisations who

19     are in the concrete circumstances in a position to issue orders."

20             Now, looking at this -- and I want to see if you think this can

21     apply to General Tolimir, because I note that it's speaking of the

22     officer corps of the army as the giver of orders in command of the armed

23     forces.  Was General Tolimir in your view at the time of the events in

24     Srebrenica a commander?

25        A.   He was not a commander of a formation per se, but in the context

Page 16313

 1     of this particular paragraph he would certainly qualify as a senior or

 2     commanding officer, one of those high -- the highest-ranking officers on

 3     the Main Staff, those individuals who are the ultimate giver of orders,

 4     to use the phrase.

 5        Q.   Did he have any subordinates under him who he, under the rules,

 6     could issue orders directly to?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, he did.

 8        Q.   And who were those top people, as you recall them?

 9        A.   They would include his two principal deputies, Colonel Beara,

10     Colonel Salapura, and the other members of the intelligence and security

11     staff, Colonel Jankovic, Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic [Realtime

12     transcript read in error "Pesarevic"], all of those officers that worked

13     in that particular -- those particular branches, the intelligence, the

14     security, and the military police, those people fell directly under the

15     control of General Tolimir.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please repeat the second name you have

17     mentioned.

18             THE WITNESS:  Colonel Beara, Colonel Salapura and other members

19     of the security staff, that would include Colonel Jankovic,

20     Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic and all of those other officers.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was only asking you for the last name --

22             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  -- you just mentioned because that is not

24     recorded correctly.  Please repeat that name after Colonel Jankovic.

25             THE WITNESS:  Colonel Keserovic [Realtime transcript read in

Page 16314

 1     error "Kesarovic"], K-e-s-e-r-o-v-i-c.  Close.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please look at the screen if it is spelled

 3     correctly.

 4             THE WITNESS:  It doesn't look like it's spelled correctly, but I

 5     think it's close enough.  I think -- we have several documents in here

 6     which will actually list his name.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I do think that's important, as Your Honour

 8     knows, so we best -- for the record, if we could get the -- I think we'll

 9     all agree the correct spelling is K-e-s-e-r-o-v-i-c, and I think we'll

10     all remember him as testifying here.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I indeed have asked the witness to give us the

12     right spelling.

13             Would you agree that this is the man you were referring to?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

16             Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:

18        Q.   Could we go to the -- it's the bottom of page 8 in the English,

19     it should be page 31 on the B/C/S.  And it's just that last -- second to

20     the last sentence:

21             "So that the command of the Main Staff has a full understanding

22     of the types and number of these criminal offences, all unit commands

23     shall ..."

24             And then it says:

25             " ... work on uncovering all war crimes against humanity and

Page 16315

 1     international law on the territory in their area of responsibility.

 2             "Inform the closest military police, security, and military

 3     judicial organs about any crime they discover ..."

 4             And then we can see the rest.  I won't go over all of them.  In

 5     your review of all the materials in the Srebrenica case, did you find any

 6     indication that the VRS or RS authorities during the war time ever

 7     investigated or prosecuted or punished any VRS soldier for crimes against

 8     Muslims, civilians, POWs, related to the Srebrenica events?

 9        A.   No, sir.

10        Q.   And can you briefly explain the sorts of materials that you've

11     had a chance to review that would have indicated the presence of any such

12     investigations or prosecutions or punishments, just very briefly.

13        A.   As a component of the investigation at a certain point in time, I

14     believe approximately 1998 or 1999, we were able to obtain documents from

15     the various military prosecutor's offices of the Army of the

16     Republika Srpska or at that time is of Ministry of Defence, which laid

17     out their monthly reports and detailed their investigative activities,

18     the crimes that were under investigation.  And we were able to, of

19     course, do the same thing through interviewing various officials of the

20     military prosecutor's office and the military court system.

21             The general theme that came out of that was when one looked at

22     all of these documents and interviews, there was very little attempt,

23     despite the widespread knowledge of the crimes that occurred, for anyone

24     to take on an investigation or prosecution.  In fact, I'm only aware of

25     two pro forma, if you will, investigations that took place related to

Page 16316

 1     Srebrenica that were instituted by the government -- the Republika Srpska

 2     government and military in 1995 and 1996, one of which the RS MUP

 3     concluded that the victims had all killed themselves or were battle

 4     casualties.  And another one specifically related to the discovery of

 5     mass graves in Branjevo.  The person put in charge of investigating that

 6     incident was Colonel Beara, which led to a predictable result of that

 7     investigation going nowhere.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now I want to get back again briefly to our -- the

 9     area of law.  We saw a bit of what the prosecutor -- Office of the

10     Prosecutor had to say early on in the war.  Could we go to the next tab,

11     it should be 7, it's 65 ter -- oh, and I'm sorry, I keep forgetting to --

12     I want to of course tender that last exhibit, it's 28.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter number 28 shall be

15     accompanied Exhibit P2478.  Thank you.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:

17        Q.   Now if we go to 65 ter 401.  And I will -- we can see that this

18     is entitled:  "Law on the Amendments to the Criminal Code of the

19     Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia."

20             What is this?

21        A.   This particular document is an excerpt of the Republika Srpska

22     Official Gazette, which is the document by which the government publicly

23     announced its orders, decrees, regulations, things of that nature.

24        Q.   All right.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I will offer this into evidence.

Page 16317

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document number 401 shall be

 3     assigned Exhibit P2479.  Thank you.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we could now go to 65 ter 679.

 5        Q.   And as we're waiting for it, we can see that this is chapter --

 6     called chapter 16 of the criminal offences against humanity and

 7     international law."

 8             Do you recall, is this related to the previous document?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, if you were to look at Exhibit P2479,

10     Article 1, it specifically notes that the Criminal Code of the former

11     SFRJ is essentially renamed the Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska.

12        Q.   All right.  And as we can see - and I won't spend a lot of time

13     on it - we can see on this first page it's the genocide and that

14     definition of genocide is similar to that -- is it similar to that that

15     you're used to in this court?

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We should have the respective page in B/C/S on

17     the screen.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I -- if we could go to the next page.  I'm

19     sorry.  That's obviously not it.  Perhaps it's the next page.  Well,

20     let's go to page 66 in the B/C/S.  Sorry for that small glitch there.  We

21     have it.

22        Q.   So is that definition of genocide similar to what you're used to

23     dealing with in this court and other courts?

24        A.   Yes, sir.

25        Q.   And then we see the next war crimes against the civilian

Page 16318

 1     population, which, as we look at it, includes attack on a civilian

 2     population.  In the middle of the paragraph it says unlawful deportation,

 3     transfers, exposing the population to starvation.  And here we also see

 4     the punishments for genocide is not less than five years in prison or by

 5     the death penalty.  And as we go through these pages, we will see the

 6     other counts.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we could be -- go to page -- the other laws.

 8     Let's go to page 68 in the B/C/S.  It should be the third page in the

 9     English.  And this is a specific law against war crimes against prisoners

10     of war which is set out there.

11        Q.   And I don't think we need to go through this further except to

12     perhaps acknowledge, are there a whole panoply of international war

13     crimes in this section?

14        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer this into evidence, 679.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 679 shall be

18     assigned Exhibit P2480.  Thank you.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:

20        Q.   So those were the laws that became part of the Republika Srpska.

21     Now let's go to 65 ter 399.  That should be tab 9.  We have another

22     section of the gazette.  Can you tell us what this is?

23        A.   Yes, sir.  This particular section of the Official Gazette lays

24     out the order by President Karadzic on the application of the rules of

25     international law of war on the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia

Page 16319

 1     and Herzegovina.

 2        Q.   And can we flip the next page in the B/C/S.  We see it's -- this

 3     is number 198 and we've got to go over to finish up the 198 to see the

 4     president's name on the bottom and the full text.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer this into evidence.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received as an exhibit.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours 65 ter document 399 shall be

 8     assigned Exhibit P2481.  Thank you.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:

10        Q.   Now could we go to the next tab, and it's 65 ter 680.  And as

11     we're waiting I can note that this is entitled "regulations on the

12     application of international laws of war and the armed forces of the

13     SFRY."

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And we need to flip - I'm sorry - the next page

15     in B/C/S.  Thank you.

16        Q.   Does this -- is this related at all to the law we just saw?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  Based on those laws, laws of course being broadly

18     written, the military of the SFRY, the armed forces, subsequently took it

19     upon themselves to more clearly define in terms of rules and regulations

20     how those laws would be applied and followed within the military.  This

21     particular document reflects in a substantial amount of detail how that

22     is to occur.

23        Q.   All right.  Let's go to page 62 in English.  It should be B/C/S

24     page 56.  So did these rules apply to the VRS during the war?

25        A.   Yes, sir, they did.

Page 16320

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It should be paragraph 207 that I would like in

 2     the B/C/S.  Thank you.  And of course this is the same in English.  It's

 3     at the very bottom.

 4        Q.   And it's entitled:  "Basic rights of prisoners of war."

 5             And it's entitled:  "Responsibility of the State for Treatment of

 6     Prisoners of War by its Nationals."

 7             And it says:

 8             "Prisoners of war are under the authority of the Detaining Power,

 9     and not," we need to go to the next page in English, "and not of the

10     individual persons or military units which capture them.  The Detaining

11     Power shall be responsible for the treatment of prisoners of war.  This

12     responsibility does not rule out the personal responsibility of

13     individuals."

14             Now, Mr. Butler, we have moved into the area, as you've stated,

15     of military regulations.  Can you tell us, what does this mean?

16        A.   Essentially what this paragraph reflects is that individual

17     prisoners of war who are captured by either members of the other armed

18     forces or by other means become the responsibility of the state as a

19     whole to safe-guard.  The highest levels of the government, be they

20     military or civilian, cannot escape responsibility for overseeing the

21     proper treatment of prisoners of war by arguing that the responsibility

22     to safe-guard and properly detain those individuals rested with

23     lower-level individuals or with discrete military units.  So it is a

24     collective responsibility that ultimately is placed at the highest level

25     of political and military power of a state.

Page 16321

 1        Q.   In your view, would the Main Staff of the VRS and its members be

 2     included as an authority of the detaining power?

 3        A.   The Main Staff, being the highest body within the Army of the

 4     Republika Srpska, would certainly qualify as an authority of the

 5     detaining power in this context.

 6        Q.   All right.  And let's look briefly at 209:  "Prohibition of

 7     reprisals.

 8             "Reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited in all cases."

 9             In the context of armed conflict, what is your definition of what

10     a reprisal is?

11        A.   My understanding of a reprisal is a deliberate decision by a

12     warring party to deliberately commit a war crime for the select purpose

13     of seeking to prevent the continued commission of war crimes by the other

14     party.  It is, in essence, reciprocal treatment.  It is used only in very

15     limited cases when there is no other apparent alternative to prevent the

16     opposing warring party from engaging in their own commission of war

17     crimes.  The feature about it is, one, given that it is a deliberate

18     commission of a criminal act, those decisions are normally taken only at

19     the very highest levels of the military or the government to undertake

20     such a reprisal.

21        Q.   And in the specific situation that we're talking about here,

22     reprisals against prisoners of war, in this rule it says that it's

23     prohibited in all cases.  Is your understanding -- are there any

24     exceptions in the rules of the former Yugoslavia that would allow for

25     reprisals against prisoners of war?

Page 16322

 1        A.   No, sir.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we can go to just briefly again I -- to

 4     paragraphs 213, that should be 63 in the English, 57 in the B/C/S.

 5     Paragraph 213 talks about the beginning of captivity and that it's

 6     prohibited to wound or kill a member of the enemy armed forces, of

 7     course.

 8             And if we can go on to page 64 in the English, page 57 in the

 9     B/C/S, it talks about the personal belongs of prisoners of war.  I won't

10     read that, but it talks about protecting the personal belongings.  217

11     talks about evacuation.

12        Q.   So would these rules have been well known in your view to the

13     senior officers, the professional officers of the VRS, such as

14     General Tolimir, General Mladic, General Krstic, Colonel Blagojevic,

15     Colonel Pandurevic, Lieutenant-Colonel Obrenovic, and others?

16        A.   Yes, sir.

17        Q.   All right.  And there's another document on a very related topic

18     I wanted to ask you about, though I should offer this -- these

19     regulations into evidence.  They are 680.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  They will be received into evidence.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document number 680 shall be

22     assigned Exhibit P2482.  Thank you.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:

24        Q.   Now, if we could go to 65 ter 2226.  I believe as we're waiting

25     for that to come up and it should be 11 in the tabs, you were able to --

Page 16323

 1     were you able to identify an actual war time document that spoke of one

 2     of these rules that we had just gone over?  And I'll hope to get this up.

 3     That's not it.

 4        A.   The B/C/S version is correct.  The English version is not.

 5        Q.   Perhaps -- are you sure that's P --

 6        A.   Now the English version is correct.

 7        Q.   There we go.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Was that my numbers or -- just for my

 9     information?  It wasn't.  Okay.  Thank you.

10        Q.   Now, we see that this is from the command of the Drina Corps

11     dated 15 July 1993, a time-period we don't usually deal with too often,

12     but -- and it's -- if we go to the -- just look at the next page in

13     English.  I don't think we need to do that on the screen, but we can see

14     that it's from a person named deputy commander Colonel Milutin Skocajic,

15     pardon the pronunciation, and it's to all the commands, all the brigades.

16     I take it that's all the commands and brigades, units, in the

17     Drina Corps?

18        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

19        Q.   And it's entitled:  "Treatment of prisoners of war."  And it's --

20     begins by talking about the Muslim sabotage groups.  But what I want to

21     ask you about is in the middle of that first paragraph and this

22     statement:

23             "From the moment they are captured, enemy soldiers who are put

24     out of action must be treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the

25     Geneva Convention.  Actions contrary to international and domestic law

Page 16324

 1     constitute serious criminal offences.  In addition to criminal

 2     responsibility, persons acting in this way also incur all other types of

 3     responsibility."

 4             This is the part I wanted to ask you about.

 5             "This responsibility rests not only with the immediate

 6     perpetrators of criminal offences and inhumane treatment, but also by

 7     their superior officers, because prisoners of war are not the property of

 8     individuals or military units, but the responsibility of the VRS and the

 9     RS."

10             In your view, does this relate to one of the rules you just went

11     over?

12        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

13        Q.   Now, I think we'll recall from the rule we went over it mentioned

14     those in command that had the power to issue orders.  This does not say

15     that.  It says "... but also their superior officers ..."

16             What do you make of that difference?

17        A.   I believe that it reflects simply an issue of semantics in

18     language.  The phrase in the regulations and the applications define a

19     superior officer with respect to responsibility and does not limit

20     responsibility only to those individuals designated as a "commander."  It

21     also designates it as any superior officer being any officer who has an

22     ability to prevent the commission of crimes or to punish individuals

23     afterwards.  So a derivative responsibility for failing to ensure

24     prisoners of war in this particular case are not properly cared for and

25     that crimes are not committed against them.  That liability is not

Page 16325

 1     strictly limited to commanders.  It's limited to all officers who are in

 2     a position to have prevented such acts and failed to do so.

 3        Q.   Now, clearly this is a corps document going to its brigades, but

 4     taking this principle higher as we saw in that rule, in your view would

 5     General Tolimir have had the power to issue orders to stop any conduct --

 6     prevent or stop any conduct by Colonel Beara?

 7        A.   Absolutely, sir, yes.

 8        Q.   Same question for General -- as we know him now General Keserovic

 9     and Lieutenant-Colonel Radoslav Jankovic, Colonel Salapura?

10        A.   Yes, sir.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer -- excuse me one second.

12        Q.   Just take note of this last -- this will be the last sentence in

13     the bottom paragraph in the English.  It's the second paragraph in the

14     B/C/S.  It says:

15             "All violations of the provisions of the international laws of

16     war and humanitarian laws should be immediately reported and punitive

17     measures taken.  In this activity, it is extremely significant to point

18     out the political, moral, and humanitarian importance of our treatment of

19     prisoners of war, because we are fully justified in demanding that the

20     enemy side treat our prisoners of war in the same way."

21             What is Skocajic basically saying here to his people?

22        A.   Quite simply, he's noting the obvious fact that it's difficult to

23     demand the other party or parties to a conflict comply with the

24     provisions of humane treatment of prisoners of war when, as the other

25     side of the coin, your party is not doing the same thing.

Page 16326

 1        Q.   All right.  I -- oh, and Milutin Skocajic is not a name we've

 2     heard much about.  Do you know what happened to him after 1993?

 3        A.   During this period he is the Chief of Staff/deputy commander of

 4     the Drina Corps.  I believe at some point in 1995 he becomes a general

 5     and is appointed to the Ministry of Defence of the Republika Srpska.

 6        Q.   All right.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So I'd offer that into evidence, 2226.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document number 2226 shall

10     be assigned Exhibit P2483.  Thank you.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:

12        Q.   All right.  That -- well, I know you've dealt with that more in

13     depth in your report.  I think the basic rules, the Geneva Conventions

14     and the rules, as are set out by the VRS, I think I will leave that

15     section now and get into some more particular areas of concerns and the

16     rules associated more with intelligence and security and command, which

17     has of course been an issue in this case.

18             And to start off that I would like to go to P1112.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And this is, Your Honours, a document you're --

20     you've seen several times, so I won't ask Mr. Butler to go into it in a

21     lot of detail.  But I would like to ask him to help clarify some issues

22     which I think are important.

23        Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, we see this document is a 24 October 1994

24     document from the Main Staff and if we -- we see at the end of it, it was

25     signed for the commander.  Could we go to the last page in the B/C/S.  We

Page 16327

 1     don't need the English as yet.  And I believe that has been -- I think

 2     the general will agree with me, that has been identified -- that

 3     signature is that of General Tolimir.

 4             So getting back to the first page, now did you spend a fair

 5     amount of time in your reports and in your testimony outlining and

 6     analysing the regulations that define the roles and responsibilities of

 7     the security officer in relation to the -- working within a command, at a

 8     brigade, at a corps level?

 9        A.   Yes, sir, I did.

10        Q.   All right.  And we've seen a lot of those in this case, so I'm

11     going to save some time by not going over them.  But in that respect we

12     can see - and I'm sure the General will agree with me - that these rules

13     outline those basic rules.  Do you agree with that?

14        A.   Yes, sir, they do.

15        Q.   And based on your knowledge of the rules associated with the

16     security and intel branch, do you find anything different about these

17     instructions, that is, shortened view of the rules themselves?

18        A.   No, sir.  These are consistent with the broader regulations and

19     rules on the application of intelligence and security within the former

20     SFRY, which were adopted and utilised by the VRS.

21        Q.   All right.  Now, I just want to ask you to give us a hand with

22     some of these concepts.  Under "instructions," number 1 it says:

23             "The field work of the VRS security and intelligence organs

24     primarily includes intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks which,

25     depending on the situation, make-up about 80 per cent of their total

Page 16328

 1     engagement.  The remaining 20 per cent of their engagement consists of

 2     administrative and staff, military police and criminal-legal tasks and

 3     duties."

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, one correction.  Line 2 of page 25

 5     in your quotation the first words read as follows, "the field work of the

 6     VRS."  I see in the text "the field of work of the VRS."  I think this is

 7     a significant difference.  It's not "the field work" but "the field of

 8     work."

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I think you're

10     absolutely right, and when I said it, it didn't sound right, and I'm glad

11     you caught it because -- yes, it's much broader than field work and

12     I'm -- thank you for catching that.

13        Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, we have had VRS officers talk to us about each

14     of these concepts.  I think you have recently, as you described your job,

15     described what intelligence, military intelligence, work is.  So I won't

16     ask you to repeat that.  But as intelligence work is mentioned in this

17     document, is that similar or -- to the work you described?  When you

18     described what intelligence work was, I think it was in response to Judge

19     Mindua's question.

20        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

21        Q.   Okay.  Then we won't go over that again.  Can you tell us in the

22     context of this document and the VRS work, what is counter-intelligence

23     and what -- and we'll get to some examples.  But can you --

24     counter-intelligence is -- I sometimes find that a difficult concept.

25     But can you tell us fundamentally what your view of what

Page 16329

 1     counter-intelligence is?  What does it amount to be in the army?  And of

 2     course what I'm talking about is your understanding of the VRS.

 3        A.   In probably the most basic of language, it is the steps that in

 4     this particular context that the VRS undertook in order to prevent the

 5     opposing forces, in their case the armed forces of the Bosnian Muslims

 6     and the Croats, from learning about the plans, policies, and essential

 7     elements of information that the VRS sought to maintain for themselves.

 8     It, very simply, is defined as the steps that you take in order to

 9     prevent your adversaries from gaining intelligence information about your

10     friendly forces.

11        Q.   Okay.  And I -- would it be fair to define that as protecting

12     against threats from the outside from the forces?

13        A.   The term of art can run the range of activities from simple

14     security to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of confidential military

15     documents because they are left unattended, all the way to the most

16     sophisticated operations designed to uncover and neutralise opposing

17     espionage networks directed against your forces.  It covers a very wide

18     range of activities that are important for militaries to undertake in

19     order to safe-guard critical information about itself.

20        Q.   Okay.  And in each of those answers you've spoken of -- I believe

21     of the enemy finding out important information.  Can counter-intelligence

22     work involve looking into your own forces for threats from within, such

23     as traitors or that kind of thing?

24        A.   Yes, sir, the identification and elimination of subversive

25     elements within your own armed forces would certainly fall as a

Page 16330

 1     counter-intelligence-related task.

 2        Q.   If counter-intelligence work, as you've said, it would be to

 3     protect the secrets of an army, what was -- and just briefly, what was

 4     General Tolimir's role in -- first of all, at what level was he in the

 5     counter-intelligence hierarchy of officers?

 6        A.   As the assistant commander for intelligence and security of the

 7     Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, General Tolimir was the

 8     pinnacle of that effort by the Army of the Republika Srpska.

 9        Q.   Would General Milovanovic and General Mladic rely on him for

10     that?

11        A.   Absolutely.

12        Q.   Now, would a -- the plans associated with a military operation,

13     keeping those plans and details of that military operation, would that be

14     part of General Tolimir's job, to keep out of the hands of the enemy?

15        A.   Yes, sir.

16        Q.   How about an operation as charged in this indictment, to murder

17     able-bodied -- thousands of able-bodied men, an operation to detain them,

18     transport them to execution sites, summarily execute them, and bury them,

19     and re-bury them, would that be a kind of a military secret?

20        A.   In context, if you are seeking to prevent any public disclosure

21     of your involvement in those acts, your security and counter-intelligence

22     organs would play a very large part in making sure that disclosure did

23     not occur.  So again, as the head of the -- you know, as the -- more

24     accurately, as the assistant commander for intelligence and security for

25     the Main Staff of the army, General Tolimir -- that effort revolves

Page 16331

 1     around him.

 2        Q.   Well, I think we can all agree that finding out the date of an

 3     attack and the location of an attack is a critical detail that cannot

 4     fall in the hands of the enemy.  But would it be a military problem for

 5     the VRS if the enemy or the international community found out that the

 6     VRS had engaged in an organised effort to summarily execute thousands of

 7     able-bodied Muslim men?

 8        A.   As foreshadowed in 1992 and 1993 in some of the previous

 9     documents discussed, the army leadership recognised that it would have

10     dramatic negative consequences to the political and military conduct of

11     the war if -- I'm sorry.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please continue.  After that, Mr. Tolimir will

13     get the floor.

14             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Okay.

15             If they were involved in such activities -- and in 1995, in July

16     of 1995, when one looks at the activities and one then looks at the

17     consequences that occurred afterwards, they're factually correct.  The

18     public disclosure of the involvement of the Army of the Republika Srpska

19     in these crimes had a significantly negative impact on them militarily as

20     well as the political leverage the Republika Srpska had to end the war on

21     terms favourable to them.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I wish

24     peace onto this house, that this day of judgement should end in keeping

25     with God's will, not mine.

Page 16332

 1             And please, I would appreciate it if the Prosecutor would not ask

 2     leading questions in order to elicit an answer that is in the sphere of

 3     speculation.

 4                           [Defence counsel confer]

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I said speculative

 6     questions, speculative questions.  It was interpreted as "leading" and

 7     it's a big difference.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, your position.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think fundamentally my question was:  Would a

10     murder operation -- what effect, if any, would the public disclosure of a

11     murder operation have militarily on the VRS?  I don't think that's

12     speculation.  There's been a murder operation charged in this case.  I

13     think we -- that is certainly not speculation at this point in the

14     Tribunal, that large numbers of people were murdered.  So I think it's a

15     fair question and I don't think it's speculative.  What effect would that

16     have?

17             My point is:  A very large secret, be it the landing date or a

18     secret like this, could it be harmed if it gets out?  Not speculative in

19     my view.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think in this trial we have heard many such

21     questions by both parties.  For instance, would it be illogical or would

22     it be logical to draw a conclusion like this and that and that.  This

23     happens very often, and if a witness is capable to answer a question of

24     this kind, there is no concern about this kind of questions.  It's not

25     misleading.

Page 16333

 1             Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 3        Q.   Mr. Butler, were you thinking of anything in particular when you

 4     said -- when the -- did the -- well, let me ask you:  Did the

 5     international community, in your view, become aware of these crimes in

 6     any particular way that you think might have had a negative effect on the

 7     VRS or RS?

 8        A.   I believe that the public disclosure of these crimes,

 9     particularly as the scale, the numbers of missing, grew, did have a

10     political effect on the willingness of NATO to overtly engage in

11     activities against the Republika Srpska in the subsequent months, August,

12     September, October, leading up to the end of the war.  In part because of

13     those activities by NATO, coupled with the Croatian military invasion

14     Operation Storm, when the war terminated effectively with the Dayton

15     Peace Agreements, the Republika Srpska was somewhat smaller

16     geographically than it had been in July of 1995.  So in that context the

17     Srebrenica crimes had an extremely adverse military and political impact

18     in the future, in subsequent months, August, September, October, on the

19     Republika Srpska.

20        Q.   Do you recall any particular public announcement in August that

21     created this international awareness?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  I'm not sure of the exact date, but in August of 1995

23     then-secretary of -- I believe she was at the time either Secretary of

24     State or the Ambassador -- the US Ambassador of the United Nations,

25     Albright, disclosed US reconnaissance photographs, laying out

Page 16334

 1     photographic evidence of mass executions that had occurred related to

 2     Srebrenica before the UN Security Council.  And in going public with this

 3     information, it significantly had a -- it had a significantly adverse

 4     effect against political and the military interest of the

 5     Republika Srpska.

 6        Q.   So just one last question.  So had that operation to murder

 7     people been kept secret, would that have been better for the VRS and RS?

 8        A.   My opinion is:  Yes, it would.  And when one examines the

 9     activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska following the public

10     disclosure of those crimes where they engaged in an effort to essentially

11     exhume the primary mass graves and conceal the victims in more remote

12     secondary and tertiary sites, I would say that that opinion was also

13     shared by the leadership of the Republika Srpska and their military.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, I see it's time for the break.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You are right, Mr. McCloskey.

16             We must have our first break now and we will resume at 11.00.

17                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, before you continue your

20     examination-in-chief, I would like to remind you that we are expecting

21     some explanations in relation to six witnesses by the end of today's

22     hearing, especially Michael Hedley, Johan de Koeijer, and four female

23     witnesses from Srebrenica.  You promised that we get -- receive an update

24     by the end of this week, and hopefully we can get some more information

25     that will assist us in planning of the remainder of the Prosecution case.

Page 16335

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, of course, Mr. President.  I am expecting

 2     that.  I've been working on Mr. de Koeijer myself with Mr. Gajic and

 3     we'll try to resolve something on that, and I'm expecting clear

 4     information on the other five very soon.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What do you mean by "very soon"?  Can we expect

 6     to receive some update by the end of today's hearing?

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Absolutely, no question about it, and your

 8     enunciation of this is certainly helpful in that regard.  So I will get

 9     it and we will get it to you this afternoon.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

11             Please continue your examination.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

13        Q.   All right.  Still concentrating on this document P1112, the

14     instructions from 24 October that have left the screen for a bit, and

15     especially that paragraph number 1 that we've been talking about that

16     mentioned intelligence and counter-intelligence being 80 per cent of the

17     work of the security person.  Does -- in your judgement, do security

18     officers at the brigade, corps, Main Staff level have any

19     responsibilities related to prisoners of war?

20        A.   Yes, they do.

21        Q.   And is the topic mentioned -- is there any mention -- we don't

22     see any mentions of prisoners of war in this document or in this

23     paragraph.  Is the general topic mentioned anywhere that would include

24     this sort of work in any of these paragraphs?  I'm looking at -- starting

25     off with paragraph 1, of course.

Page 16336

 1        A.   Okay.  In the particular document and in the context of the tasks

 2     involved, due to their supervisory functions of the military police

 3     organs of the army and the role of military police in the handling and

 4     securing of prisoners of war, by extension security officers are part of

 5     that process.  It would be their responsibilities to advise the commander

 6     of -- and may essentially make proposals on the best way for military

 7     police or others to handle these prisoners, the processes and procedures

 8     to be used, particularly as they relate to the military police.  And then

 9     of course the commander would make these decisions as to whether or not

10     to follow these proposals or to modify them in some manner.  So in that

11     respect, due to the role of the military police in the dealings of

12     prisoners of war and securing them, the security officers do have a role.

13        Q.   Now, once a commander, be it a brigade, a corps, or the Main

14     Staff, makes a decision related to the military police and the securing

15     or dealing with prisoners, does the security officer have any

16     responsibility at that point?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  As a subordinate to the commander, the security

18     officer actively works to implement the commander's orders in that

19     respect.

20        Q.   And I don't want you to get into any of the facts and detail of

21     this case, but has your review and investigation revealed security

22     officers at the brigade, corps, and Main Staff level dealing with

23     prisoners and military police issues from July 12th through the 16th

24     and -- well, and beyond?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  There is extensive counter -- or basically activities

Page 16337

 1     related to security officers, military police, and prisoners of war.

 2        Q.   And -- so does this paragraph -- it makes a reference to this 20

 3     per cent.  Does that 20 per cent of your view that talks about

 4     administrative and staff military police, criminal illegal tasks and

 5     duties, does that include prisoners?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, it would.

 7        Q.   Let's go to page 2 of this document in the English and it's

 8     paragraph 5 in the B/C/S.  So it's going to be the next page in the

 9     B/C/S.  And I just want to call our attention to this under paragraph 5,

10     it says:

11             "Personnel policy and service guidance for members of these

12     organs are the exclusive province of the VRS GS commander and the VRS GS

13     assistant commander for security and intelligence.  In this regard, the

14     VRS GS security and intelligence sector takes decisions on transfers,

15     appointments, and assignments to special tasks from their field of work

16     for members of the security and intelligence organs."

17             So I think everyone will agree that at the time of this document

18     and throughout the war, that the assistant commander for security

19     intelligence was General Tolimir.  What is it saying he has

20     responsibility here for with -- along with General Mladic?

21        A.   In the realm of the technical tasking - for lack of a better

22     word - the specialised -- the intelligence and security specialised

23     orders that are given, that particular chain, that intelligence and

24     security chain, and the people who are assigned to that at subordinate

25     levels are assigned and are maintained by the security and intelligence

Page 16338

 1     sector of the Main Staff.  It prevents situations from occurring where in

 2     the event of undue tension between a brigade commander and his assistant

 3     commander for security, potentially because the commander is under

 4     investigation, having the ability to subvert these types of activities by

 5     simply removing that officer from his position.  So in effect, these

 6     provisions are in place to ensure that the ability to perform their

 7     specialised tasks related to intelligence and security can be protected

 8     from undue influence by the commanders of the various units.

 9        Q.   And where does Tolimir fit into this?

10        A.   Again, as the assistant commander for security and intelligence

11     on the Main Staff, he is the pinnacle of this process.

12        Q.   All right.  That is already in evidence, that document.  Let's

13     now go to 65 ter 2222, and I just, as we're talking about the

14     responsibility of General Tolimir in the security -- as the assistant

15     commander for security, are you aware of a -- at some point where they,

16     the VRS, decided to change the structure of the intelligence and security

17     sections and some of the subordinate units?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  In early 1995 there was a decision made that where

19     they had the ability to do so because they had adequate resources, that

20     it would be advantageous for them to physically split the intelligence

21     and security functions of, for example, a light infantry brigade from one

22     particular group of officers to two groups - the intelligence function

23     being one group, the security function being a separate group of

24     officers - as a matter of being more effective in their functions.  This

25     particular document dated 29 January 1995 from the Drina Corps lays out

Page 16339

 1     the details of that change.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And can we go to page 3 in the English and it's

 4     the next page, I believe, in the B/C/S.

 5        Q.   Yes, and we see that it is in the name of the commander of the

 6     Drina Corps at the time, General Zivanovic.  And I just wanted to call

 7     your attention to -- it looks like the last paragraph under item 7.  It

 8     says:

 9             "The Chief of the GS VRS security and intelligence sector shall

10     regulate the competence, contents, and the manner of preparation of the

11     aforementioned personnel through a special instruction."

12             Again, I think everyone will agree that this is at this time a

13     reference to General Tolimir?

14        A.   Yes, sir.

15        Q.   And what's he doing in this, something that may happen as low at

16     the brigade level, why would he be involved in that?

17        A.   The Main Staff recognised correctly, I believe, that intelligence

18     and security functions need to be synchronised throughout the entire

19     scope of the military.  Having one particular brigade or one particular

20     corps take certain measures and other units take separate measures

21     without them being fully synchronised is not an effective or an efficient

22     way to do military business.  These procedures lay out in part how all of

23     these issues are going to be synchronised by the Main Staff and how they

24     will be translated through the corps commands and through their

25     intelligence and security organs down to the brigades and even lower.  It

Page 16340

 1     also reflects the fact that there are going to be standardised training

 2     standards and other professional bench-marks that these officers are

 3     going to be required to meet and maintain, and that as part of this --

 4     those -- the responsibility for doing -- you know, appointing these

 5     qualified officers to ensuring that they are appropriately trained and

 6     qualified for the position is going to fall under the competence of

 7     General Tolimir and his staff.

 8        Q.   In your view would --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I ask one question in this point in time in

10     relation to this sentence and this order.  I would like to hear your

11     opinion about this paragraph.  It is an order by the commander of the

12     Drina Corps, and he is referring to the assistant commander of the VRS.

13     Is it an order he issued to the assistant commander of the VRS or is it

14     something else?  How would you try to understand and explain this

15     paragraph:

16             "The Chief of the General Staff of the VRS security and

17     intelligence sector shall regulate ..."

18             What does it mean?

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  As you -- if you refer back to the

20     previous page in English where it discusses the previous Main Staff

21     instructions and paragraph 5, clearly the commander of the Drina Corps is

22     not operating in a vacuum.  He has received guidance from the Main Staff.

23     He is essentially articulating that guidance from the Main Staff and

24     making it more directive to his subordinates.  He's not ordering in this

25     document the chief of the security administration and the Main Staff to

Page 16341

 1     do anything.  What he is, in fact, saying is that:  I'm directing my

 2     subordinates to undertake these activities; and as part of these

 3     activities, the chief of the staff -- of the intelligence and security

 4     directorate will be responsible for these other issues.  He's been told

 5     that by the Main Staff, that these powers and authorities are reserved to

 6     General Tolimir and his people.  He is simply reiterating that fact to

 7     his subordinates.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 9             Mr. McCloskey.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:

11        Q.   Mr. Butler, in -- going back to more personnel issues, which I

12     think we've seen in other documents.  In your view would General Tolimir

13     have any ability to control who was hired as a security officer at the

14     brigade level, such as -- could he do anything about Momir Nikolic being

15     in the Bratunac Brigade or Drago Nikolic in the Zvornik Brigade and

16     Milorad Trbic in the Zvornik Brigade?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  As stated in these documents, the appointment of those

18     officers, as well as many of the other specialised aspects of their

19     training and mission fall directly under the purview of the assistant

20     commander of the Main Staff for intelligence and security.

21        Q.   Would this include Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, chief of security

22     of the Drina Corps; and Lieutenant-Colonel Svetozar Kosoric, chief of

23     intel of the Drina Corps?

24        A.   Yes, sir.

25        Q.   As well as Colonel Beara, Salapura, Radoslav Jankovic,

Page 16342

 1     Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic that you've mentioned previously?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  The appointments of those individuals would fall

 3     directly and squarely into his competence.

 4        Q.   All right.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer this document, 2222, into evidence.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2222 shall be

 8     assigned Exhibit P2484.  Thank you.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:

10        Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, for the next section I would like to go back to

11     prisoners of war and the competence of the security branch in dealing

12     with prisoners of war, and in particular General Tolimir and some of the

13     documents associated with that.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So if we could start out with 65 ter 3753, it

15     should be 14 in the tabs.  And this is a document from the Main Staff

16     intelligence and security sector dated 25 October 1993.

17        Q.   Under chief -- by Chief Colonel Zdravko Tolimir.  And if we look

18     at the initials under the original, we see LJB.  Do you remember what

19     that means?

20        A.   I believe those are the initials for Colonel Beara.

21        Q.   And do you remember what it means for them to be there?

22        A.   Oh, in their convention you have two sets of initials.  The

23     initials on the left-hand side are those of the person who actually

24     drafted or authored the document, and then those on the right are the

25     individual who typed it.

Page 16343

 1        Q.   Now, we see that this is a Teletype version; is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.

 3        Q.   And so I think we all know and will agree that Teletyped versions

 4     that are received by someone else cannot have the signature on it.  So

 5     can you tell us if Beara -- Colonel Beara drafted this but

 6     General Tolimir's name is on it, could this have gone out without

 7     General Tolimir reading it and standing behind it?

 8        A.   There is of course the remote possibility that it might have gone

 9     out without him reading it in advance, but given the fact that it is

10     signed in his name, he is responsible for its contents.  Generally my

11     experience in this practice is that these types of things don't go out

12     without the concurrence of the man who's ultimately responsible for them.

13     Obviously the possibility exists, but it's highly unlikely.

14        Q.   All right.  And this document itself is, we see, to the Eastern

15     Bosnia Corps command, the commission for exchange of prisoners; the

16     Drina Corps command, commission for exchange of prisoners; Eastern

17     Bosnian Corps and Drina Corps OB department, it is noted here as

18     intelligence department; the central commission for exchange of

19     prisoners; and to D. Buljajic personally for information.

20             Now, as we read this, I -- it is said that:

21             "As opinions (regarding the exchange of the prisoners of war)

22     have been harmonised between the commissions of the 1st KK, the DK, and

23     the IBK commands, we hereby give our approval for the exchange, scheduled

24     for 28 October 1993 ..."

25             In your view, who is this "we" that is being referred to in this

Page 16344

 1     document?

 2        A.   This "we" is collectively the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska.

 3        Q.   All right.  And then it goes on:

 4             "... in which 63 captured Serbian soldiers will be exchanged for

 5     54 Turks, whom we are holding captive."

 6             Now, let me ask you about this term, "Turks."  We all know that

 7     this term is used.  We know that the Serbians were referred to as

 8     Chetniks.  Nobody is on trial here for calling people names, but is there

 9     any significance in your military opinion for a document from the Main

10     Staff, from Zdravko Tolimir, referring to the enemy as "Turks"?

11        A.   It generally is not a military acceptable practice to kind of use

12     colourful or derogatory language.  You know, military documents by nature

13     tend to be very terse.  It's a reflection of just how culturally accepted

14     the use of these pejorative terms were, again, by the rank and file chain

15     of command.

16        Q.   What kind of message does that send to the lower command when a

17     person of his rank is referring to the enemy in derogatory terms?

18        A.   One of the more universal tenets of leadership is that

19     subordinates take their cue from the actions and the conduct of their

20     superiors.  When the superior commands or organs use that type of

21     language or express those types of views, subordinates understand that

22     that type of behaviour and conduct will, in fact, be tolerated or

23     condoned and that they are free to engage it in themselves.

24        Q.   All right.  Getting back to the substance of the document, we can

25     all see that General Tolimir and really Colonel Beara play a role in

Page 16345

 1     these -- in the exchange of prisoners decisions.  If your view and in

 2     your study, would that fit into the normal role of General Tolimir and

 3     his sector for intel and security?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  Not only this but there are a number of documents that

 5     reflect the detailed role that the Main Staff, particularly the

 6     intelligence and security organ or sector, played in monitoring the

 7     process by which prisoners were exchanged between the various warring

 8     parties.

 9        Q.   All right.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer this document into evidence, 3753.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document number 3753 shall

13     be assigned Exhibit P2485.  Thank you.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:

15        Q.   And let's go on to another document 65 ter 3922.  It's the 15 in

16     our books, and it's another document from the Main Staff sector for

17     intelligence and security and dated in 1994 this time, 16 June 1994, to

18     the intelligence department of the Drina Corps entitled "Exchange of

19     Prisoners."  And we see it's a multi-page document especially in English,

20     but on the third page - which I don't think we need to go to now because

21     I think we can see it in the Serbian - that it is in the name of

22     Zdravko Tolimir, colonel.  And this one has a ZT as the drafter, and who

23     would that be as far as you know?

24        A.   At this time it would be Colonel Tolimir.

25        Q.   All right.  And again we can see this has to do with prisoner

Page 16346

 1     exchanges.  And the first line says:

 2             "Carry out all preparations for talks with the enemy side about a

 3     comprehensive exchange of POWs, captured civilians in the territory under

 4     the enemy's control, and bodies of dead Serbian soldiers."

 5             So what kind of document is this?  Is that a directive in nature

 6     to these people it's -- or is it just for information or what?

 7        A.   No, sir.  This is directive in nature to the intelligence

 8     department of the Drina Corps.

 9        Q.   All right.  Now if we could go to the next page in English.  And

10     we see in the original somebody seems to have underlined the original,

11     and that is reflected in the translation.  And it says:

12             "Prisoners from Vlasenica guarded by the MUP should not be shown

13     for familiar reasons."

14             Do you know what the -- and I don't want you to speculate, but do

15     you know what the familiar reasons are that General Tolimir is referring

16     to here?

17        A.   In the context of this particular order, no, I do not.

18        Q.   All right.  Does this -- so in 16 June 1994, does General Tolimir

19     and his staff continue to be involved in prisoner exchange issues?

20        A.   Yes, sir, they do.

21        Q.   All right.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'd offer this document in evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, it will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document number 3922 shall

25     be assigned Exhibit P2486.  Thank you.

Page 16347

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to P2272 now.

 2        Q.   This is another prisoner exchange issue document from the Main

 3     Staff sector for intel and security in the name of now assistant

 4     commander Major-General Zdravko Tolimir.  And it begins after saying:

 5             "Prisoner exchange authorisation.

 6             "We authorise the representatives of POW exchange commissions

 7     from the Drina Corps and the Eastern Bosnia Corps to establish contact on

 8     the front line with the prisoner exchange representatives of the

 9     2nd Muslim Corps."

10             What does this indicate to you the role of General Tolimir in

11     dealing with prisoner exchanges?

12        A.   He is both an active and informed participant in this process.

13     He is directing how these processes will take place.

14        Q.   All right.  I don't think I'll ask you to get into the details of

15     that.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  But I would offer that into --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is already in evidence.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Oh, I see there's a P in front of it, yes, thank

19     you, as there is the next document which I would like us to go to.

20        Q.   Now I'm --

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.

22             Mr. Gajic.

23             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I only wish to draw

24     attention to the following.  This is a draft translation and the sentence

25     that was just read out in Serbian is "we are in agreement that ..."

Page 16348

 1     whereas in the English translation it says "we authorise that ..."

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for that.  We are looking

 3     forward to receiving the final, authorised translation.

 4             Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 6        Q.   Given that possible explanation or possible alternative for --

 7     meaning, what is your view -- who has the final say in prisoner exchange

 8     issues from your review of these documents and your knowledge of the

 9     situation?

10        A.   Ultimately it's the commanders, the commander of the Main Staff.

11     If one were to look back at the previous document, which is the 16 June

12     1994 document, one of the lines that's specifically used where addressing

13     the issue to the commission of exchange is that the Main Staff is making

14     it clear that it is not up to them to decide who -- it is not up to the

15     exchange commission to decide who will be exchanged.  That decision must

16     be made by the corps commander on the basis of all relevant facts put

17     before him by the security organs.  So it's ultimately the commander's

18     responsibilities.  In this context General Tolimir presumably is speaking

19     on behalf of and with the authority of the commander, General Mladic,

20     when he relates these instructions to the subordinate formations.

21        Q.   All right.  Well, then if we go through this document -- I won't

22     go over each of the directions in there, but let's go to page 3 in the

23     English and it's the last -- should be the last page of the B/C/S where

24     you can see the signature -- or the signature block.  And we probably

25     have to go to the next -- the previous page in the B/C/S.

Page 16349

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

 2             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, on page 45, line 16, I

 3     notice in the transcript and I heard in the interpretation that the

 4     witness mentioned the corps commander.  I would like to ask

 5     Mr. Peter McCloskey to clarify whether this was a slip of the tongue or

 6     whether this is actually the witness's testimony.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, if we can go to that section - I think we

 9     can clear it up - in the document I was referring to.  And I'm -- I'm not

10     sure this is caught in the Serbian, but we see in the English that the

11     beginning of the last paragraph says:

12             "The chief of intelligence and security section of the

13     Drina Corps ..."

14             I'm sorry, that's not the section I was looking at.

15             Let's go back to what was 3922, if we could.  Page 2 in the

16     English.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which is now P2486.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

19        Q.   This is the 16 June 1994 document that I think you were referring

20     to, Mr. Butler.

21        A.   That is correct, sir.

22        Q.   And just to wait briefly until the -- perhaps we'll have that in

23     front of us, but it says that Colonel Tolimir, at the time, said:

24             "Your commission for exchange cannot decide who will be exchanged

25     and who will not.  That decision must be made by the corps commander on

Page 16350

 1     the basis of all relevant facts put before him by security organs."

 2             Is that what you were referring to in your last answer?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Could we

 6     look at page 45, lines 18 and 19, where Mr. Butler says that

 7     General Tolimir was doing this on behalf of General Mladic.  It's on the

 8     same page in the same passage.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is indeed on page 45, lines 18 to 20.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think that may be a ripe area perhaps for

11     cross-examination, but I believe --

12        Q.   Mr. Butler, can you reiterate what you said about that, about

13     General Tolimir acting in relation to General Mladic, just so it's clear.

14        A.   Yes, sir.  The overriding presumption that one makes when looking

15     at a military organisation - and to be specific the VRS Main Staff - is

16     that the officers and members of the Main Staff, being well educated,

17     competent, and diligent in their duties, are giving orders that they are

18     lawfully entitled to give and within their competence to give.  Prisoners

19     of war and their conduct within the military, the commander is always

20     ultimately responsible, General Mladic is the commander of the Main

21     Staff.  General Tolimir is an assistant commander subordinate to

22     General Mladic.  His involvement, his direction, that he provides to

23     subordinates in these matters, again presumably are not occurring in

24     isolation.  They occur with the knowledge and concurrence, if not

25     specifically, generally to the commander of the Main Staff.  That is how

Page 16351

 1     a military organisation has to function, just as subordinate officers

 2     fulfil the tasks assigned to them, not only the specific tasks but the

 3     intent behind those tasks by their commanders.  General Tolimir by his

 4     position and function is obviously fulfilling both the specific and

 5     implied tasks laid before him by General Mladic.

 6        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  And that last prisoner exchange document

 7     20 January I note is P2272, so it's already in evidence.

 8             Now I want to -- staying with the issue of prisoners of war, I

 9     want to go to July, July 12th, 1995.  And also with the topic of

10     General Tolimir's involvement.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we have P2203 before us.  It's the 17 -- tab

12     17.

13        Q.   As we're waiting for that I'll -- we can see that this is from

14     the Drina Corps command intelligence department, strictly confidential

15     number 17/896.  I say that because the next document you'll see is the

16     same except is 897, dated 12 July and it's to the Main Staff of the VRS,

17     sector for intelligence and security, and various other units and folks I

18     won't read, and it's regarding the statement of a prisoner of war named

19     Izudin Bektic, and it's providing information that Bektic gave.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to page 2 in English, we'll

21     see that this is from Major-General Tolimir, and he's in that page

22     continues to pass on information about the group of civilians, mainly

23     women and children, old people and wounded who had set off toward

24     Potocari.  And the -- he talks about the formations of able-bodied men

25     and their illegal breakthrough to reach Tuzla and the actual area which

Page 16352

 1     they've been told by this prisoner.

 2        Q.   And then what I want to ask you about is he goes on to say:

 3             "We have informed organs of the MUP of the RS in Konjevic Polje

 4     about the illegal corridor used by the Muslims of Srebrenica since it's

 5     their task to control the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road.

 6             "Brigade commands have the duty to fully inform the public

 7     security station in their area of responsibility."

 8             Now, it says:

 9             "Organs for OBP," which we know is security and intel, "shall

10     propose measures to be taken by commands to prevent armed Muslims from

11     illegally reaching Tuzla and Kladanj such as setting up ambushes along

12     the routes they use in order to arrest them and prevent possible

13     surprises against civilians and our combat units along those routes."

14             The next paragraph talks about regulating the traffic and

15     allowing passage of only VRS.

16             Now, this statement to the OBP organs in the area is to prevent

17     and -- or to propose measures to be taken by the commands.  I think we're

18     all familiar with that responsibility that security officers have.  And

19     in this case it says to prevent the Muslims from getting through to Tuzla

20     and set up ambushes in order to arrest them.  Is a proposal to set up

21     ambushes and arrest these people, basically capture them, is that within

22     the purview of General Tolimir and the security organ's job, to make

23     recommendations to commanders?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe this is a classic example of the division of

25     technical responsibilities between the security and intelligence organs

Page 16353

 1     and their role in giving some specific tasks to their subordinates and

 2     directing them to provide relevant advice to their commanders and making

 3     their own proposals to their commanders.  So I think this is a fair

 4     reflection of just how the inter-relationships work between the

 5     commanders and their intelligence and security organs.

 6        Q.   Now, can you tell from this document, is there any indication

 7     based on the practices you were aware of by the Main Staff where

 8     General Tolimir is when this document is made -- or sent from the

 9     Drina Corps command?

10        A.   Yes, sir.  From my prior work here, I am aware of the fact that

11     in 1995 the Drina Corps intelligence and security department used the

12     prefix number 17 in cataloguing messages that were -- originated from

13     that area.  Based on the fact that this document is signed by

14     General Tolimir or type signed in his name, and then its from the actual

15     Drina Corps command intelligence department with this number, I conclude

16     that at the time this document was put together that General Tolimir was

17     at the Drina Corps command in Vlasenica.

18        Q.   And we -- what, if anything, can you make from these stamps at

19     the bottom of it?  In the English we see a stamp 2nd Romanija Motorised

20     Brigade and then a number 13 July and then another stamp where there's

21     illegible material dated -- and then it's 12 July 2210 hours, and as we

22     can see 2215 hours, 2217 hours.  What, if anything, can you tell us

23     about -- can you glean from this stamp or these two stamps?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  We have had a number of individuals who have been

25     interviewed and I believe have testified in previous trials as to the

Page 16354

 1     process by which these documents were handled by the various

 2     communications personnel when they were received over their electronic

 3     and mechanical machines, their Teletype machines, so to speak.  The stamp

 4     on the right, that large square stamp, is the stamp emplaced by the

 5     telecommunications people at the communications centre reflecting when

 6     they received this document, time -- you know, date and time of receipt

 7     and when it was passed on to the organ it was actually addressed to.

 8     There's a second stamp noted from the 2nd Romanija Brigade, confidential

 9     number, that's dated a little bit later and that's the stamp that they

10     actually put on it to catalogue it as well from their command.

11             So by looking particularly from our perspective at when the

12     document was received at 12 July 1995 on 2210 hours, it gives an

13     indication, a rough indication, of when the document might have been sent

14     to that command, taking into account, you know, potential communication

15     delays and things of that nature.

16        Q.   When you say "potential communication delays," have you seen

17     situations with documents where they had trouble getting documents over

18     the Teletype, not unlike sometimes we have trouble getting faxes through,

19     things like that?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  There are a variety of technical issues that would be

21     at play, a machinery malfunction, the quality of the communications

22     channel between two corresponding network nodes, that would preclude the

23     passage of the message.  It may come in garbled and have to be

24     retransmitted.  So just a variety of things that tend to work against you

25     in the military when you're passing messages back and forth.

Page 16355

 1        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next document, it's D64.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, just for the record, the second

 3     page of this document on the screen in B/C/S is missing in the binder we

 4     have received, just left out.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  We'll take a note and make sure we

 6     get that, because that is important to have those stamps especially.  All

 7     right.

 8             We can go to D64, it's 18, tab.

 9        Q.   And I can -- again, this is -- and when I say "from the command

10     of the Drina Corps," I don't mean to be leading though -- Mr. Butler, do

11     we normally see who the document is from up in the left-hand corner?

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13        Q.   All right.  And this is similar to the last document in terms of

14     where it came from.  And if we look at the original in the B/C/S, we

15     should be able to see that it's also from General Tolimir.  We should go

16     to the last page in the B/C/S so that we can -- everyone can see that

17     clearly.  And again, looking at those stamps we see received 2150 hours,

18     slightly different than the times of the other document.  But going back

19     to the front page of this, we see that this is number 17/897, so what

20     does that tell you about the sequence of the creation of these documents?

21        A.   It indicates that this document was the very next document

22     created from the previous document we discussed.

23        Q.   All right.  And as we see that this is to the OBP organs, that's

24     security and intelligence organs?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 16356

 1        Q.   Also it's for the attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic and the

 2     attention of General Krstic.  On 12 July in the evening.  And then I

 3     won't go over all the details, but we see that General Tolimir is

 4     reporting on information they're gaining from a radio network where

 5     they're overhearing the Muslim 28th Division speaking and what

 6     information they're getting about Naser Oric's deputies and other

 7     communications.  He directs the radio surveillance of those three corps,

 8     including the Drina Corps, to focus on monitoring these communications on

 9     a particular frequency.  Would that be within his job description, to

10     direct radio reconnaissance of the enemy?

11        A.   Yes, sir.

12        Q.   What would you call that in terms of -- is that -- would that be

13     his intel hat, his counter-intel hat or something else, or is it just

14     security hat?

15        A.   That would be his intelligence hat.

16        Q.   Okay.  And then we see the OBP organs of the brigade commands

17     "will propose to the commanders of the units positioned along the line of

18     withdrawal of elements of the routed 28th Muslim Division from Srebrenica

19     to undertake all measures to prevent the withdrawal of enemy soldiers and

20     to capture them."

21             So the last document said make proposals to arrest them, this one

22     now in very particular terms says to capture them.  Is that also in his

23     purview, to make proposals for the army to capture the enemy or the

24     able-bodied men of Srebrenica?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 16357

 1        Q.   Now, I want to direct your attention to the last paragraph, but

 2     can you tell us, as best you can recall, take us back to 12 July around

 3     the UNPROFOR base in Potocari.  Let me read this out first so there's

 4     more context to my question.

 5             "Although it is very important to arrest as many members of the

 6     shattered Muslim units as possible or liquidate them if they resist, it

 7     is equally important to note down the names of all men fit for military

 8     service who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari."

 9             So I think there will be no disagreement that arresting the

10     shattered groups that are fleeing Srebrenica through the woods is the

11     reference to that first part of the paragraph.  Now, in -- around the

12     Potocari base on 12 July, what, if anything, were the Serb forces doing

13     with men that were fit for military service once the Serb forces got into

14     Potocari?

15        A.   Very early on in the process, as I believe a number of witnesses

16     have testified, those military-age men were being separated from women,

17     children, and elderly and put in other facilities.  And certainly from

18     previous trials I recall testimony from both the Dutch soldiers as well

19     as other UN observers who were there, that the identity documents of

20     those soldiers were being confiscated and in many cases destroyed.  There

21     was no systematic effort to catalogue the names of all of the

22     military-age male men who were being detained and separated at Potocari.

23        Q.   In your view does this reference to noting down names of --

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Go ahead.

25             JUDGE NYAMBE:  You want to finish first?

Page 16358

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No, that's fine.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.  I just wanted to ask the witness one

 5     question arising from your immediate answer.  You recall testimony from

 6     both the Dutch soldiers as well as soldiers -- other UN observers who

 7     were there that the identity documents whose systematic effort to

 8     catalogue the mass of all the military-aged males who were being gathered

 9     and separated at Potocari -- is this your own personal -- were you there

10     or you just heard it from other sources?

11             THE WITNESS:  Clearly I was not there.  The testimony that I am

12     referring to, since I have been associated with these trials for a number

13     of years, is the testimony of various Dutch soldiers and UN observers;

14     Major Kingori, for example, who has provided testimony in previous trials

15     to his observations of what were occurring.  So to be clear, that is the

16     context that I am explaining it in.

17             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  Thank you, Your Honours,

20     Mr. President.

21        Q.   Now, this reference that General Tolimir makes to the men fit for

22     military service being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari, do

23     you relate that reference to the separated men you've just referred to?

24        A.   Yes, sir.

25        Q.   All right.  And the previous documents that had the General

Page 16359

 1     making proposals by which to arrest and capture able-bodied men, now

 2     General Tolimir is making proposals on what to do with military men that

 3     are in the custody of the VRS.  Is that within his purview, to make

 4     proposals about captured people?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.

 6        Q.   All right.  Now I think you are aware, as everyone is aware, that

 7     it's the Prosecution's position that by the morning of the 12th July,

 8     General Mladic and his superiors had decided to summarily execute any men

 9     they could get from the crowd of Potocari.  And we see that this document

10     was received in the evening.  So if General Tolimir is writing this

11     document from the Drina Corps command in Vlasenica on the evening of 12

12     July, several hours after the Prosecution believes the plan to separate

13     and kill the man was hatched, what does his proposal to make lists of the

14     separated men mean to you?  And I know you've testified about this many

15     times.  So can you tell us what your analysis of that is?

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  In this

18     question by the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor takes out of context a

19     document which contains basic guide-lines and instructions as to how to

20     treat those who are being evacuated from Potocari.  There is no

21     distinction -- there is no mention of separation.  This document pertains

22     to the prevention of illegal activities.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The witness will be able to present his view in

24     reviewing this document.

25             Mr. McCloskey.

Page 16360

 1             Mr. Tolimir.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone.  Your microphone.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I kindly ask you as the

 6     Presiding Judge to look at this document and see if it contains a single

 7     reference to separation, whether I'm making things up or I'm stating

 8     facts.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Of course I can, as everybody else can, read this

10     document.  And you are talking about context and I think Mr. McCloskey is

11     trying to put this document into a context by putting this idea, and he

12     clearly states it's the position of the Prosecution in this respect to

13     put this to the witness.  And this witness of course is able to

14     distinguish between his own results of his review and what is written

15     down in the document and the position put to the parties and the Chamber

16     of the Prosecution by Mr. McCloskey.

17             Please continue.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And I will ask that

19     question in two different ways.  The one I think suggested by

20     General Tolimir as well, but if I could ask it with the first way, where,

21     as Mr. Butler has said, that there was a separation of able-bodied men.

22        Q.   And so the first question would be:  Assuming that

23     General Tolimir was aware of the separation of able-bodied men as they

24     were being moved out of Potocari and wanted to make lists of them, what

25     does that tell you, if anything, about his knowledge of the murder

Page 16361

 1     operation that the Prosecution alleges begins on the morning or is

 2     planned on the morning of 12 July?

 3        A.   I would say the same thing I've said when asked this same

 4     question in other trials, to me this is evidence that at the time that

 5     General Tolimir drafted this particular document he was not aware of that

 6     murder plan or it had not reached him.

 7        Q.   Why do you conclude that?

 8        A.   It stands to reason that had General Tolimir been informed of the

 9     details of the plan at the time that he was writing this document, he

10     would not have made proposals to his superiors and orders to the other

11     officers, related in the security intelligence branch, to make lists of

12     individuals if he had knowledge that they were going to kill those

13     individuals.  So given the fact that the proposals he's making seem to be

14     illogical in the context of the events occurring on the ground at

15     Potocari, again I believe it's a reflection of the fact that he has not

16     been made aware at that time he's writing this document of what the plan

17     was.

18        Q.   So if, as we know, General Mladic, General Krstic,

19     Colonel Blagojevic, and others were in Bratunac on 11 and 12 July and, as

20     the Prosecution has alleged, hatched this plan on the morning of the

21     12th, how can you explain that General Tolimir - the chief of intel and

22     security who is not far away in Vlasenica, and there is evidence that he

23     was actually on the road up and down towards Bijeljina that day - would

24     not know about it and would not have been told about it at that point in

25     time?

Page 16362

 1        A.   Well, I believe that last qualifier is the key phrase, "at that

 2     point in time."  A plan to conduct what is clearly a mass unlawful act of

 3     killing hundreds if not thousands of prisoners is not something that's

 4     going to make its way in routine correspondence and even over

 5     communications channels that are relatively unsecure.  It is going to be

 6     passed along by people, by trusted people, to various individuals.  As

 7     one looks at -- and again going back to my previous experience here, many

 8     of the orders related to this were personally passed from one officer to

 9     another.  They were not, particularly in the early stages, discussed over

10     the phone or in writing.  So General Tolimir is obviously not going to be

11     receiving a phone call to this effect, explaining that this is the plan.

12     At some point in time an officer who is aware of the plan is going to

13     presumably inform General Tolimir of what the actual plan is and whose

14     orders it's being undertaken by so he is aware of the situation.  At some

15     point he's going to need to be informed of this plan.

16        Q.   Why?

17        A.   As reflected in this particular document, if he is not informed

18     of this plan, he's going to continue to be in a situation where he's

19     giving orders and making suggestions that will run counter to what the

20     ultimate intent is.  One of the reasons why commanders and key staff

21     officers are briefed on plans, I guess both criminal and military

22     legitimate ones, is so that they understand the overall intent of the

23     plan and they can give guidance and orders in order to ensure the

24     successful completion of that plan.

25             It makes no sense from a military perspective - and again

Page 16363

 1     evidenced by this particular document - that they would -- the people who

 2     ultimately hatched this plan, General Mladic and his superiors, are not

 3     going to keep General Tolimir informed because at the very least by not

 4     telling General Tolimir you run the risk of General Tolimir giving orders

 5     that would cause that plan to have problems being implemented.  There's

 6     got to be, even in an unlawful operation, there has to be a degree of

 7     military synchronisation.  General Tolimir by position as a senior

 8     officer on the Main Staff and with the intelligence and security

 9     portfolio at his direction has got to be one of those officers that is in

10     the information loop.

11        Q.   Now, if, as has been alleged in this case, the security branch

12     officers from both the brigade, Momir Nikolic, the Bratunac Brigade;

13     Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic from the Drina Corps; Lieutenant-Colonel

14     Kosoric from the Drina Corps; and Colonel Beara from the Main Staff, if

15     the plan envisions them to organise the detention, transportation along

16     with the military police and others to carry this out pursuant to the

17     commander's orders, well how does that fit into your analysis on whether

18     General Tolimir would know and/or be involved in this process?

19        A.   I believe those factors support my analysis, that at a point in

20     time he was.  The idea that, one, in the case of Colonel Beara, an

21     officer directly subordinate to General Tolimir, and other members, key

22     members, of the Drina Corps and subordinate brigade security officers are

23     going to be engaged in this operation, and that it somehow is occurring

24     without, a minimum, the knowledge of General Tolimir, kind of flies in

25     the face of military organisation inefficiency.  This is an area that he

Page 16364

 1     is directly responsible for managing on behalf of General Mladic.  It is

 2     difficult to comprehend a series of circumstances where the subordinates

 3     of a particular officer are heavily engaged in tasks directed from the

 4     superior, in this case General Mladic, and that the intermediate officer,

 5     General Tolimir, is unaware of this.

 6             Under normal circumstances, while it is permissible for an

 7     officer in the chain of command to be skipped in the orders process when

 8     necessary, it's customary that when receiving those orders one of the

 9     very first things that the junior officer will do is to ensure that his

10     superior who was skipped is briefed on the orders that he has received

11     and who has given him those orders.  In a military environment it has to

12     be that way, otherwise you have various elements of command who are

13     operating at cross-purposes on the battle-field and that ultimately leads

14     to military disorganisation.  And in the context of military battle,

15     could lead to a catastrophic defeat.  That's the reason why the chain of

16     command exists in militaries, why it is organised and stratified as it

17     is, because these officers need to know this information in order to

18     successfully perform their missions.

19        Q.   So if General Mladic in Bratunac on the 12th of July issued

20     orders to General Krstic and Colonel Beara or Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic,

21     what, if anything, would Colonel Beara do?  First of all, would he be

22     obligated to -- well, first of all, in your view would he follow that

23     order, to take part in this operation?

24        A.   An interesting question only insomuch as under military rule,

25     even that of the VRS, an officer or a soldier is not obligated to follow

Page 16365

 1     an order that is recognised as unlawful, as such -- as an order like this

 2     would be.  Whether -- you know, Colonel Beara obviously did follow the

 3     order.  What Colonel Beara's next step would be down the line would be to

 4     advise his superior, General Tolimir, of the orders that he received; who

 5     gave him those orders; and what he is doing to comply with those orders.

 6        Q.   Why does Tolimir have to know that?  Why does Tolimir need to

 7     know what Beara is going to be doing pursuant to murdering hundreds of

 8     people?

 9        A.   By position, Colonel Beara, as the chief of the security

10     department of the Main Staff, works for General Tolimir.  He has to keep

11     his superior informed.  Again going back to my earlier discussion on

12     military effectiveness and efficiency, you cannot have a situation where

13     General Tolimir and Colonel Beara are working at completely

14     cross-purposes in attempting to follow the commander's orders.  Both of

15     them have to be aware of the commander's orders, both of them have to

16     work in concert to accomplish them.

17        Q.   Okay.  On that similar point, if the powers of the RS and the

18     VRS, President Karadzic, General Mladic, decide to murder the able-bodied

19     men of Potocari, what would be the normal chain of command that tasks

20     would have been distributed?  How would it have worked, through what

21     branches would it go, starting from the Main Staff, General Mladic, if it

22     was to go according -- sorry, to the rules of military practice.

23        A.   This has been an issue that I've discussed in previous

24     testimonies with respect to an order like this and the number of implied

25     tasks that have to be accomplished in order to carry it out.  Giving an

Page 16366

 1     order that says:  Pick up X-thousands many individuals and kill them is

 2     easy and abstract, but from a military perspective there's a whole lot of

 3     things that have to occur in order to accomplish that order, many of them

 4     that will leave, if you will, signatures that they have occurred.  You

 5     have to secure these individuals, and that will take soldiers and

 6     military police that have to be ordered to be at certain locations to

 7     secure these individuals.  You have to arrange for adequate

 8     transportation to be at the locations where the prisoners are, have the

 9     prisoners placed on these buses and trucks, and then taken to other

10     locations.  Those routes have to be guarded so the prisoners cannot

11     escape and that other people cannot see what is happening.  The

12     facilities that they're being taken to and other locations have to be

13     identified and secured, again with military police or other soldiers so

14     the prisoner cannot escape.  The act of executing the prisoners is going

15     to require somebody to physically carry out the execution; they will

16     require ammunition.  The act of burying the remains are going to require

17     engineer assets.

18             So when you look at all of the supplemental tasks that have to

19     occur in order to carry out your hypothetical mass execution, it's clear

20     that the tasks and competences are going to require the work of a large

21     number of officers at various levels of command and staff.  It will

22     require the work of rear services officers to arrange for the

23     transportation assets necessary and the fuel for them.  It will require

24     the work of the engineer and operative forces in order to ensure that the

25     requisite burial equipment is where it needs to be and when it needs to

Page 16367

 1     be there.  It will require the participation of the security organs to

 2     co-ordinate the work of the military police in guarding prisoners, in

 3     securing transportation routes to other areas.

 4             So these things, again, cannot happen in isolation.  It has to

 5     happen in a co-ordinated and synchronised process.  And given the amount

 6     of work necessary to make these happen, the commanders and senior

 7     officers have to be aware of what's going on and why it's going on,

 8     particularly in the context of what's happening at Srebrenica because not

 9     only do you have the murder operation, so to speak, you're also engaged

10     in a battle against the remainder of the 28th Infantry Division that's

11     fleeing the remains of the enclave.  And the resources that you're taking

12     to do the murder operation have to be withdrawn from combat operations.

13             So again, these things can't happen in isolation without a

14     disaster occurring militarily.  There is an enormous amount of

15     synchronisation and co-ordination that has to occur between a lot of

16     members of the military in order to pull something like this off.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Please,

19     in this question Mr. McCloskey put forward an assumption which is part of

20     the Prosecution case, but this is not based on the facts and the

21     evidence.  So I ask that this be borne in mind during the examination of

22     the witness because the witness was able to read all the documents that

23     we have here in court, so there is no need to speak of assumptions and

24     hypotheses.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think Mr. -- Mr. McCloskey.

Page 16368

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think it's appropriate for Mr. Butler to give

 2     his military view on how an operation would occur, the complex nature of

 3     it, the units that would have to be involved and such, and I think that's

 4     important for the Court to know in determining who was involved and who

 5     knew what when.  I think that's exactly what his military expertise is

 6     useful for, and I'm -- we're not basing his answer on any facts that are

 7     not in evidence.  The fact of the organised mass execution you've heard

 8     and has been proved over and over and over again.  I don't really think

 9     the general is contesting that, but perhaps he is.

10             So the facts that Mr. Butler are basing his view on are present

11     for the Court and it's exactly why we rely on experts to give us an idea

12     of militarily what would be involved in such a thing.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And if you look at the wording of this -- the

14     last question of Mr. McCloskey, page 62, lines 15 to 20, they are -- this

15     question is absolutely similar to many questions put to other witnesses

16     in this trial from both sides.  And I think Mr. McCloskey made very clear

17     that this is not an assumption, What would be the normal chain of command

18     that tasks would have been distributed.  How would it have worked, and so

19     on and so on.  I think this is an absolutely legitimate question to an

20     expert witness to explain his view on matters of chain of command.

21             We may come back to that.  We need our second break now and we

22     will resume five minutes past 1.00.

23                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 1.08 p.m.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you get the floor, Mr. McCloskey, I would

Page 16369

 1     like to put one question to the witness.

 2             Just before the break you explained the tasks, the measures, to

 3     be taken to prepare and carry out such a major operation as you described

 4     it.  Taking into account this explanation, I would like to ask you to

 5     explain one answer before you gave this explanation.  It is on page 62,

 6     line 1, I quote:

 7             "What Colonel Beara's next step would be down the line would be

 8     to advise his superior, General Tolimir, of the orders that he received,

 9     who gave him those orders, and what he is doing to comply with those

10     orders."

11             What do you mean by that, especially "down the line"?

12             THE WITNESS:  Probably an inartful phrase by me.  When we asked

13     this very question of a number of VRS military officers about what would

14     happen in circumstances where orders would be given by a superior officer

15     to a junior or a subordinate soldier or, more importantly, a soldier

16     who's not directly subordinate to that officer, the answer was that,

17     first of all, the person receiving the orders would carry them out.  And

18     as soon as he could, he would advise his immediate commander as to what

19     those orders were, who gave them, and what actions he has taken.

20             Obviously, it's not the place of a subordinate to question orders

21     he receives from a superior, particularly if those orders appear to be

22     lawfully given at face value.  If there is any question about who gave

23     those orders and the competence of the individual who gave those orders,

24     by informing that -- by that junior person informing his immediate

25     commander, he gives his immediate commander that opportunity to then

Page 16370

 1     reach back to the person who gave those orders and ask him:  By what

 2     authority are you giving those orders?  And that why -- in a military

 3     environment, you know, why did you not issue those orders through me as

 4     the immediate superior of the next person.  It is a customary practice

 5     that you do have to advise those individuals of the orders that were

 6     received because you cannot have soldiers or junior officers running

 7     around in a situation where they received one set of orders from one

 8     officer, who may be a superior officer but is not in the chain of

 9     command; and another set of orders that they're following that they

10     received from their chain of command.

11             So this is why this process works in a factual way, that, you

12     know, the officer follows the initial orders but has to immediately

13     advise their superior about what orders that they've received and it

14     gives the superior the option to question who gave those orders and under

15     what competence they are doing so.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for that clarification.

17             Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

19        Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, if this illegal order to kill many men, if it's

20     treated as a -- as a normal order despite its subject matter from

21     General Mladic, the -- we have commanders at one hand and we have

22     security branches at the other.  In your view, could either of the

23     command side or the security side be left out of these orders?  How would

24     it normally go, just the chain of orders, if it was to follow the normal

25     command chain?  Would commanders be involved?  Would security be

Page 16371

 1     involved?  Could either be left out in your view?

 2        A.   The -- the fact that a military has been ordered to carry out an

 3     unlawful order doesn't mean that they're going to carry it out in a

 4     nonmilitary manner.  A military organisation is just that, it is an

 5     organisation.  It operates along a defined structure and hierarchy.  A

 6     commander is overall -- in any echelon the commander is ultimately

 7     responsible for the acts and omissions of his subordinates.  A commander

 8     has to be advised what's going on because he is the one who has to give

 9     orders for various actions to take place.  Historically in these past

10     proceedings, commanders tend to try and put the blame for these acts on

11     security officials, saying that they happened in complete isolation; and

12     on the other hand, security officers tend to claim that the commanders

13     are solely responsible.

14             The truth in a military context is that everybody has to

15     participate.  A commander can no more organise this type of an unlawful

16     activity without the role of the security function any more than he can

17     do so without the assistance of his logistics commanders and staff

18     officers in order to arrange transportation.  Despite the involvement in

19     unlawful acts, the people that he needs to involve are those military

20     professionals who by training and by profession are responsible for

21     making certain activities happen within a military organisation.  I mean,

22     I guess the best practical way to put it would be to look at the scenario

23     of 16 or 15 July/16 July 1995, where you have Colonel Popovic requesting

24     500 litres of fuel in order to complete the work he is doing at Branjevo.

25     The fact that he is engaged in a patently unlawful act doesn't mean that

Page 16372

 1     he, of his own authority, can requisition fuel and do other things.  He

 2     has to depend on a logistics branch to organise that fuel and he's

 3     required to sign for it and be accountable for its use, despite the

 4     purpose it is being used for.

 5             So in part, yes, they're unlawful acts but they are undertaken

 6     within the context of the military organisation that's doing them,

 7     following the normal standards and procedures to the degree that they

 8     can.  It's the way people are trained; it is the way that they operate.

 9        Q.   So if General Mladic was to issue an order down the command

10     chain, who would be the next person down the command chain that he would

11     issue the order to on 12 July?

12        A.   Given the geographic context of the Drina Corps, that would be

13     General Milenko Zivanovic, who at that time is still the commander of the

14     Drina Corps.

15        Q.   And would that change with a new commander of the Drina Corps,

16     would there be another commander involved in the context of this case

17     after that?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  At approximately 2000 hours on 13 July 1995,

19     General Radislav Krstic, who is the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps

20     assumes command of the Drina Corps.  There is a change of command.

21     General Zivanovic is relieved and General Krstic is appointed the new

22     commander.

23        Q.   And if it continued down the command chain, who would

24     General Krstic in his command and, you know, pass that order down to

25     along the command chain?

Page 16373

 1        A.   Those would be the subordinate brigade commanders whose assets

 2     would have to be involved in various aspects of the commissions of the

 3     crime.  In the case of the Zvornik Brigade, Colonel Pandurevic and --

 4     because he wasn't physically with the brigade; the Chief of Staff,

 5     Major Obrenovic; in the case of the Blagojevic -- or, I'm sorry, in the

 6     case of the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Blagojevic as the commander.  These

 7     people have to have a knowledge of what's going on and what the

 8     commander's intent and orders are so they can facilitate that.

 9        Q.   Now, we have seen in this case evidence of the involvement of

10     Colonel Beara at the Main Staff and others at the Main Staff and Popovic

11     at the corps and the brigade security people.  How along the normal chain

12     of security and intel orders would it go, again starting with Mladic.

13     Who would he tell if he wanted to engage the security and intel branch to

14     manage the MPs and manage the prisoners with them along with their

15     commanders?

16        A.   With General Mladic as the point of departure, the first person

17     that he would engage would be his assistant commander for intelligence

18     and security, General Tolimir.  General Tolimir, in turn, would give

19     directions to his immediate staff members who were involved,

20     Colonel Beara, Colonel Salapura, others, as well as direction to the

21     subordinate assistant commanders of intelligence and security at the

22     corps levels.  So he would reach out through his technical chain and

23     provide those orders to Colonel Popovic, who in turn would be expected to

24     provide the necessary orders and direction to the assistant commanders

25     for intelligence and security at the brigade levels.

Page 16374

 1        Q.   Is it -- you've dealt with this somewhat so I don't need a long

 2     answer, but is it conceivable in your view that the command side with its

 3     troops could work separately from the security organ and their assets and

 4     vice versa, could the security organ work this with their few resources

 5     outside or separate and apart or without the knowledge of the command --

 6     the commanders?

 7        A.   No, sir.  It can't happen that way.  It has to be a collaborative

 8     process, as envisioned under the command and staff rules that the army

 9     follows.

10        Q.   All right.  Now, getting back to the document that started all

11     this --

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we go to page 1.

13        Q.   We see that General Tolimir sent this particular document to the

14     attention of both General Krstic and to Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic.  Now,

15     again going on what are the allegations by the Prosecution, if

16     Colonel Popovic - as the Prosecution has alleged - is engaging in the

17     separation of men in Potocari that day in order to detain them and have

18     them summarily executed and he receives this document from

19     General Tolimir, that according to you suggests that General Tolimir is

20     unaware of the plan to kill people because he's asking or he's proposing

21     that lists should be made, which you have said is not consistent with

22     awareness of a murder operation, what in your view would a military man

23     such as Popovic or Krstic do if they received this 12 July proposal and

24     identified the fact that General Tolimir was in Vlasenica and unaware of

25     Mladic's and Karadzic's plans?

Page 16375

 1        A.   They would have to tell him if, for no other reason, keeping him

 2     from issuing orders or making proposals that would run counter to

 3     General Mladic's orders.

 4        Q.   And can you remind us, if you know, roughly the route from

 5     Bratunac to Vlasenica on the 12th and 13th of July were -- was that the

 6     route that the Muslims were evacuated or transported out via?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 8        Q.   Do you remember how -- roughly how long it would have taken on

 9     the 12th or the 13th of July for someone to courier -- for an officer to

10     get into a car and drive from Bratunac to Vlasenica to inform

11     General Tolimir in person?

12        A.   Given the situation on the road that particular day and depending

13     on when the individual left, a maximum would be a few hours.

14        Q.   All right.  Now --

15        A.   Although I would -- just to clarify.  At some point later in the

16     evening the road was being crossed by the column or, you know, being

17     contested by the column.  So it would have had to have been at some point

18     during the daylight hours that this trip started because once the sun

19     went down, whatever time that would be, probably would be too hazardous

20     to make that trip.

21        Q.   Okay.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Your Honours, I would now like to use a

23     document that was in evidence but it was not on my list, but it's in

24     response to General Tolimir's objection concerning the issue of separated

25     men at Potocari and the questions on that topic addressed by

Page 16376

 1     Judge Nyambe.  I mentioned and showed the document to Mr. Gajic and, as I

 2     say, it's a document in evidence.  I would ask leave of the Court to

 3     allow Mr. Butler to see this document for his view.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I don't see an objection by the Defence.  You

 5     should call it up.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  It is P2069.

 7        Q.   And I frankly, Mr. Butler, don't recall if you have ever been

 8     shown this document, but if you could take a look at it and review it.

 9     And while you're doing that I'll just, for the record, show that it's

10     from the Drina Corps forward command post Bratunac.  The date of 12 July.

11     There's some handwritten notes about -- and some initials on the right

12     side, one of which is dated -- the initials is dated 13 of August.  It's

13     entitled "Very Urgent."  And it is to the Main Staff of the Army of

14     Republika Srpska, sector for intelligence and security affairs.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Your Honours, you may have observed this.

16     OB sometimes gets translated as intelligence affairs; other times it gets

17     translated as intelligence and security affairs.  It's one of those

18     interesting linguistic things that you will notice in translations.

19        Q.   It says the security administration and the command of the

20     Drina Corps security department.  And I think we know about the security

21     administration and the command of the Drina Corps security department.

22     And then it's entitled "Enemy."  And it says:

23             "In the course of the day our forces and MUP forces did not have

24     any heavy exchange of fire with balijas forces" -- excuse me.  "MUP

25     forces entered Potocari in the morning without combat."

Page 16377

 1             From your knowledge of the documents, is that a correct

 2     statement, those two statements?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.

 4        Q.   All right.  "The positions for destruction of the remaining

 5     groups is currently being established towards Suceska and Ravni Buljim."

 6             Can you tell us is the direction Suceska and Ravni Buljim the

 7     same or are those two different directions for the remaining groups of

 8     remaining Muslims; do you recall?

 9        A.   As I recall, those are the routes related to the path that the

10     column of the 28th Division and military-aged men were taking in order to

11     leave the fallen enclave in an attempt to make it back to Bosnian

12     Muslim-held territory.

13        Q.   And it says:

14             "We don't know at the moment the exact" --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, only now the translation to B/C/S

16     has finished.  Therefore, I would kindly remind both speakers again to

17     pause between question and answer and the next question.  Please carry

18     on.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20             I know that's particularly problematic when I'm reading, so I'll

21     tell myself that.

22        Q.   It goes on to say:

23             "A contact with Ejub Golic's group was established; we believe

24     that a part of the group withdrew through Bokcin Potok towards Siljkovici

25     with intention to move via Kravica towards Udrc to Tuzla."

Page 16378

 1             Who is Ejub Golic, if you recall?

 2        A.   As I recall, he was one of the senior military officials of the

 3     28th Infantry Division.

 4        Q.   Is that direction they're talking about, Bokcin Potok via Kravica

 5     towards Udrc, is that a direction that you're familiar with from the

 6     investigations and the records that the Muslims were going in?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.

 8        Q.   All right.  And then I think we have to go to the next page in

 9     English.  It's paragraph 2 which is listed as number 2 conveniently.

10     Under "UNPROFOR."  I won't read it all, but do you see anything in that

11     paragraph that is not correct or not -- something that -- not whether

12     it's correct or not, but something that you think may not be accurate

13     based on your knowledge of the documents and the evidence?

14        A.   No, sir.

15        Q.   As this underlined part:

16             "UNPROFOR soldiers are assisting in loading women and children

17     into vehicles."

18        A.   I'm sorry, I thought you were talking about the final paragraph.

19     That line is not quite accurate.  My understanding from the video

20     evidence is that it was the Bratunac Brigade military police and other

21     special police units that were in Potocari at the time.

22        Q.   But were the Dutch UNPROFOR forces in and around Potocari during

23     the transport of the women and children?

24        A.   Yes, sir.

25        Q.   All right.  In paragraph 3 now, the first part about the refugee

Page 16379

 1     group I won't ask you about, just if there's anything contested there.

 2     And it talks about:

 3             " ...  5.000 women and children were evacuated so far ..."

 4             So as far as you know in the afternoon and evening of 12 July

 5     were some women and children transported out of Potocari?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.

 7        Q.   And then this last line from Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic:

 8             "We are separating men from 17 to 60 years of age and we are not

 9     transporting them.  We have about 70 of them so far and the security

10     organs and the DB are working with them."

11             Now, does this separation of men 17 to 60 years of age connect in

12     any way in your mind to the 12 July report of General Tolimir, D64, that

13     says:

14             "It is equally important to note down the names of all men fit

15     for military service who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in

16     Potocari"?

17        A.   Yes, sir.

18        Q.   Now, going again to the first page of this Popovic document.

19             We see the time, 1730 hours on the front --

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please.  It says here exactly when

22     the document was received at the Drina Corps.  It's not 1700 hours, it's

23     1935.  Could this be clarified with the witness, please.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey is just referring to the heading of

25     this document where it says 1730 hours.

Page 16380

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, and I was interrupted on my way to -- that's

 2     when the time in the left-hand corner is.  And if we go to the stamp at

 3     the back, it's a little hard to make out.  Perhaps it will be better if

 4     we blow it up.  The translators have seen this as 1934 received.

 5        Q.   So, Mr. Butler, if General Tolimir was at the Drina Corps

 6     command, command of the Drina Corps as this is addressed to, after 1934

 7     hours, in your view would he have received this?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  It's addressed to him, not specific by name but to the

 9     Main Staff, sector for OBP.

10        Q.   And the same question, had he been at the -- if he got back to

11     the Main Staff at Crna Rijeka that evening of the 12th, would this have

12     been something he should have seen?

13        A.   Yes, sir, but I don't believe that that's the case.  I believe

14     that he was at the Drina Corps at the time that this arrived.  If you

15     look at the 12 July document 17/897, D64, it specifically notes

16     information received at 1945 hours on 12 July.  Logically the report or

17     this document written by General Tolimir is going to be written sometime

18     after receiving this information about the radio network at 1945 hours on

19     12 July.  Consequently, he is at the Drina Corps command when this

20     message, at a minimum, arrives at the communications centre of the

21     Drina Corps command.

22        Q.   All right.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Your Honours, for your information, the --

24     we -- the Prosecution does not believe that there -- any of those

25     initials on this document are those of General Tolimir.

Page 16381

 1        Q.   All right, let's go in the remaining time to P125.  We're still

 2     on our issue of prisoners --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, just a question.  You indicated

 4     that you would update the Chamber in relation to six witnesses on your

 5     list.  Will you do that now, at the end of this session orally, or can we

 6     expect some written update later this afternoon?

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think it would be a good idea to do both and so

 8     it's probably a good idea to let Mr. Butler go and I'll get you better

 9     information later, but I have some now.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

11             I think this is all for the day and for the week.  Thank you very

12     much that you came here.  We will resume our hearing on Monday, 2.15, in

13     this courtroom.  Now you are free to leave the courtroom.  Thank you very

14     much.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, no.  No, no.  Only the witness should leave

17     the courtroom.

18                           [The witness stands down]

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, Your Honours, the one witness that

21     I've been personally dealing with Mr. Gajic about is the Dutch document

22     expert Johan de Koeijer, number 16.  He has written a report on an

23     important military document that shows erasure marks of the MPs at

24     Orahovac on 14 July and MPs at Rocevic on 15 July, where you can see that

25     originally an O, which equals Orahovac has been erased, and a T, which

Page 16382

 1     means terrain, has been replaced.  That's basically what his report says.

 2     90 per cent of his conclusions are evident from the naked eye, by looking

 3     at the original document.  We discussed that -- Mr. Gajic and I discussed

 4     that yesterday and I showed him the document, and I think his response to

 5     our original 94 bis largely agreed with us.  The one person that you

 6     can't see from the naked eye is the commander of the MP battalion,

 7     Miomir Jasikovac, and you can't quite out -- make out the erased O with

 8     the naked eye but the expert says with his microscope he can see it.

 9             I have discussed this with Mr. Gajic to see if we can agree on

10     that and that you could just see it and that the report would go in and

11     he feels it's best that we call the expert on this point.  So long story

12     short, we'll be calling the expert on that.  It won't take very long, but

13     we couldn't reach an agreement on that so I imagine we're going to have

14     to call the expert, unless you want to review the document yourselves to

15     make the final decision.  I'm not sure from our records whether the Court

16     made a final decision on that.  We were not quite sure.  That may have

17     just slipped through the cracks.  But it won't take long in any event.

18     He's close by, if Defence feels they need to cross-examine on that point.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If I'm not mistaken, the Chamber hasn't issued

20     any decision on that.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's -- thank you for confirming that because

22     we couldn't find any record on it.

23             So that is -- that's -- I think we'll just plan on calling him

24     unless you review the decision and change it.  And of course this witness

25     is available for the Defence if they choose to put on a case.

Page 16383

 1             We're also -- we've evaluated the expert report of Mr. Hedley and

 2     it's information that Dusan Janc counts on in his report, so we would

 3     like to call him as well given that you did make a decision on that and

 4     required his presence.  And the Defence would like to cross-examine him.

 5             Further, of the four Srebrenica women, we are -- we have reviewed

 6     their packets and we are dropping number 63, number 67, and number 80.

 7     Number 72 we believe is possible that we will be able to fix the problem

 8     relatively easily, but we're -- haven't been able to find the key to that

 9     yet.  But I'm hoping we'll be able to figure that out very soon and we'll

10     let you know on that last remaining witness.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for that clarification.  I

12     take it that you withdrew the witnesses number 63, 67, and number 80?

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And would you like us to file something on this

16     or --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In my view, it is sufficient that you just did it

18     now and we have it on the record, if there 's no objection by the

19     Defence.  I don't think so and I don't see any objection.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  After having heard your explanation in relation

22     to the two expert witnesses and there was no different statement by the

23     Defence, the Chamber would appreciate if these two expert witnesses would

24     be called, and I think there is no need for issuing any written decisions

25     on that.  Thank you.

Page 16384

 1             We are at the end of today's hearing and we will adjourn.  We

 2     resume on Monday, 2.15, in this courtroom, number 3.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 11th day of

 5                           July, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.