1 Monday, 11 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.
6 I think there is nothing to discuss before the witness enters the
7 courtroom. The witness should be brought in, please.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon, Mr. Butler. Welcome back to the
12 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, sir.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell
14 the truth still applies.
15 Mr. McCloskey is continuing his examination-in-chief.
16 You have the floor, Mr. McCloskey.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
18 Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours, everyone,
19 Mr. Butler.
20 Could we start with P125.
21 Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]
22 Q. And as we are waiting: We are still on the topic of prisoners
23 and documents and materials specifically related to General Tolimir and
24 that subject. We had just talked about the document from
25 General Tolimir, where he briefly mentioned the able-bodied men being
1 evacuated, in his words, from Potocari, and we had a brief discussion of
2 a Popovic document on that same topic.
3 And now continuing on the topic of prisoners, and we now see a
4 document that the Court has seen many times, so I hope not to spend too
5 much time with it. It's the 13 July proposal from General Tolimir and
6 from Borike, at 1400 hours, which we all know is in the Zepa area, and
7 it's to the commander of the Main Staff - I'm sure we'll all agree that's
8 General Mladic - and for his information, the assistant commander for
9 Morale, Religious and Legal Affairs of the Main Staff. Can you remind us
10 who that is?
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone is switched off.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May there be peace on this house,
15 and may these proceedings end according to God's will.
16 The Prosecutor said that I was the one who sent this document.
17 Could the Prosecutor please give us a reference, because I'd like us to
18 be able to see from the document, itself, whether it was, indeed, me who
19 sent this document, or, in the alternative, if Mr. McCloskey cannot
20 confirm this, then this should be stricken out of the transcript.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps there is a misunderstanding.
22 Mr. McCloskey.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. If I said "sent" in the terms of actually
24 sending it, that would have been incorrect. It would have been more
25 correct to say that this was a proposal from General Tolimir to
1 General Mladic.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We see, in the transcript, page 2, lines 5 to 6:
3 "... it's the 13th July proposal from General Tolimir and from
4 Borike, at 1400 hours ..."
5 That was the relevant sentence.
6 Mr. Tolimir.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
8 The Prosecutor again said that this was General Tolimir's
9 proposal to General Mladic. Could he tell us on the basis of what he
10 claims this, and whether Tolimir signed any of this, and whether there is
11 any document confirming that this was, indeed, the case? Otherwise, it
12 should be just deleted out of the transcript. Thank you.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I think the general is very familiar with
15 the Prosecution's position on this, and I really -- and we know he's
16 questioning the authenticity, but I'm just talking about, right now, the
17 document, on its face. And we can see, on its face, that it's to the
18 commander of the Main Staff, and it's saying, on the fourth line in the
19 English "assistant commander for security and intelligence affairs of the
20 Main Staff proposes the following measures:" So really what I'm doing
21 is, I'm just saying we see this document, it's dated the 13th, it's to
22 Mladic, it's a proposal from the assistant commander for security and
23 intelligence. I hadn't gotten to that part yet, but I was going to ask
24 Mr. Butler to tell us who the assistant commander for morale was, or
25 remind us. And if it's going to be an issue, I can ask him who the
1 assistant commander for security and intelligence is.
2 So we're just talking about the document. I think the Court is
3 fully aware of the authenticity arguments. It's not something I really
4 intended to go into with this witness in any great degree. I just want
5 to get some of the basic information that's in it and ask Mr. Butler
6 about that.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We all recall that Witness Savcic testified about
8 this document, and it was his position that he didn't sign this or a
9 similar document, if I'm not mistaken in my recollection.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I think that's correct, and no one is
11 suggesting that anyone signed this. I would, of course, take you back to
12 the witness whose initials are on this as the person who sent it and who
13 identified their inked initials on the original to go into that subject.
14 But, really, that subject of authenticity, inked originals, who signed
15 what, wide open for cross-examination, but I think I -- I didn't want to
16 get into that with this witness on this document. We've got many more to
17 go, so I hadn't gotten there with him, and I didn't really intend to.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And you are referring now to Witness Gojkovic.
19 There was some dispute if there was a forward command post, IKM, at this
20 location. But, nevertheless, we have the document in front of us, and
21 I think the Prosecutor may use this document in putting it to the witness
22 and asking questions. We don't know yet the questions. You should wait
23 for what kind of questions he will put to the witness, Mr. Tolimir.
24 Mr. Tolimir.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have no problem with
1 the Prosecutor putting questions to the witness the entire day about this
2 document, but he should not premise it with the words that this is a
3 document coming from the assistant commander because this is a document
4 from an unauthorised source. And we've shown here -- we've proven that
5 it's not an authentic document, that it didn't go through the coded
6 messages system, and I believe that we need to have an expert who can
7 actually speak to the handwriting on the document, itself, as well.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, the position of the Defence in
9 relation to this document, you may take this into account as you, of
10 course, do, and please continue your questions.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Mr. Butler, can you remind us --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, I gave now the floor to Mr. McCloskey. Your
15 position is clear on the record. The position of the Prosecution is also
16 on the record. I would like to ask Mr. McCloskey to continue with his
17 questions. There is no need to repeat your position. We have it on the
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to address you.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do not wish to
22 repeat my position here. I just would like the Trial Chamber to order
23 that that portion of the transcript, where it says -- where
24 General Tolimir's name is mentioned, and saying that it's his proposal, I
25 would just like that to be deleted out of the transcript because it's not
1 true. I would like what is not true to be deleted from the transcript,
2 because if it cannot be proven by any documents or in any other manner,
3 then it's not true.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you know that the transcript is a
5 clear reflection of what was said in the courtroom, and Mr. McCloskey
6 said that, notwithstanding if that was true or not. Your name is not
7 mentioned in this document. That is very clear, that is his assumption,
8 but we cannot delete anything from the record. It's a clear reflection
9 of what was said in the courtroom.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: To make a long story short, I would like to read
12 this relevant part of the document into the record. I quote:
13 "Assistant commander for security and intelligence affairs of the
14 Main Staff of the VRS proposes the following measures:"
15 It's clear that the name of Mr. Tolimir is not included in this
16 document, and, Mr. McCloskey, I would kindly ask you to rephrase your
17 question. But it was not a question yet. You have put something on the
18 record, and then you wanted to put a question which was not answered yet.
19 Mr. Tolimir, it is technically not possible and it would be
20 against our Rules to delete anything from the transcript. The transcript
21 is a clear reflection also of different statements in the courtroom.
22 They may be correct or not correct, but we can't delete anything.
23 Mr. McCloskey, please continue. We all agree that the name of
24 Mr. Tolimir is not mentioned in this document.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. And, Mr. President, I think the general's
1 thinking that I am making some kind of a conclusion here or some sort of
2 analysis, when, in fact, I'm just fundamentally repeating what is in the
3 document. And I'm sure General Tolimir is not challenging that he or
4 someone else is the assistant commander for security and intelligence,
5 but I -- and -- but I will take, of course, all of that into
7 Q. But, Mr. Butler, can you remind us, if you know, who the
8 assistant commander for Morale, Religious and Legal Affairs for the
9 Main Staff is, the second person in this address on this document?
10 A. That individual would be General Gvero.
11 Q. All right. And then the next person on the list of addressees is
12 commander of the Military Police Battalion of the
13 65th Protection Regiment. Do you recall who that was at the time?
14 A. Yes, sir. That commander was Major Zoran Malinic.
15 Q. All right. And then we see in the first paragraph that there is
16 a reference that says:
17 "There are over 1.000 members of the former 28th Division of the
18 so-called BiH Army captured in the area of Dusanovo (Kasaba). Prisoners
19 are under the control of the Military Police Battalion of the
20 65th Protection Regiment."
21 These over 1.000 members referred to here in this document, of
22 the 28th Division, where, in your view, are they coming from, and who are
24 A. These particular individuals would be those members of the column
25 who were either captured by or surrendered to the army and police forces
1 along the road between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995.
2 Q. All right. In the next line we see:
3 "Assistant commander for Security and Intelligence Affairs of the
4 GS VRS proposes the following measures:"
5 Who was the assistant commander for Security and Intel Affairs of
6 the Main Staff in July of 1995?
7 A. That would be General Tolimir, sir.
8 Q. And given that this statement says the "assistant commander for
9 Security and Intelligence Affairs," et cetera, "proposes the following
10 measures," and then we see four measures: Militarily, if General Tolimir
11 is making this proposal, would this document be an indication that
12 General Tolimir was aware of the 1.000 prisoners referred to in the first
13 line of this document?
14 A. Yes, sir, it would have to be.
15 Q. Why?
16 A. As part of any process by which an officer makes a proposal to
17 his superior, that officer is expected to have some knowledge of the
18 situation in order to make the most intelligent proposals possible. It
19 doesn't do a commander or a decision-maker any service to have proposals
20 which aren't grounded in reality sent to him for his potential decision.
21 So in this context, he knows about the number of prisoners and their
22 location as well as the impacts of -- that these prisoners at that
23 location might have on other potential issues which he addresses in the
24 specifics of the things that he is proposing.
25 Q. If General Tolimir is, in fact, in the area of Borike or the Zepa
1 theatre at around 1400 hours, as we see in this document, why would he be
2 dealing with issues related to Srebrenica Muslims if he is dealing with
3 issues related to Zepa, which I think he'll agree the 13th was the day
4 before the major attack on Zepa, which was the 14th?
5 A. Certainly, as a general and the assistant commander for Security
6 and Intelligence of the Main Staff, General Tolimir is going to have the
7 ability to multitask. These are issues, as they are occurring on the
8 13th of July, that are of some significance not only to the Drina Corps,
9 but to the army, in general. The idea that General Tolimir could only
10 focus on a narrow aspect of Zepa, to the exclusion of military events
11 happening in other areas of the country, doesn't seem to be, you know,
12 within the context of his job as the overall head of Intelligence and
13 Security for the army. He wouldn't set those duties aside just to focus
14 on one particular function.
15 Q. And as we look at - and I won't go over all of them, the Court's
16 seen them - the four points of this document, are they consistent with
17 his job as assistant commander for Security and Intel?
18 A. With respect to points 1, 2 and 3 -- I'm sorry, points 1 and 2,
19 those would be completely consistent with his position. Point 3, given
20 the fact that the document is entitled and it is signed by Colonel Savcic
21 seems to be a point that Colonel Savcic, as the superior of Major
22 Malinic, would be directing the Military Police Battalion commander, as
23 is point 4, where he's telling the battalion commander who receives the
24 order to make contact with other individuals and then verify that the
25 proposals have been accepted. So in this context, you see
1 General Tolimir's giving out proposals which were in line with his
2 position, and the actual commander of the 65th Protection Regiment giving
3 orders to his subordinate, which is in line with his position.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please repeat the name of the commander
5 of the Military Police Battalion? It was not recorded.
6 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, sir. That would be Major Zoran Malinic.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
8 Mr. McCloskey.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: And can you tell from this document who made the
10 comment or proposal or order to -- in number 3, to -- and referring -- it
12 "... shall take measures to remove the war prisoners from the
13 main Milici-Zvornik road," and the part I'm asking you about is "place
14 them somewhere indoors or an area protected from observation from the
15 ground or the air."
16 Now, if this is a proposal, who, if you can tell, would have made
17 this proposal?
18 A. Well, sir, with regard to point 3, I don't know that I read that
19 as a proposal. It inflects that the commander of the Military Police
20 Battalion shall take measures directive in nature, so in the context I
21 would say that that point 3 would be directed by Colonel Savcic, as Major
22 Malinic's immediate superior.
23 Q. All right. And would -- in the context of this document,
24 should -- let me say: Should General Tolimir have been aware of that
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. And given the context, if he is aware of the order, can you give
3 your interpretation on whether or not he would have agreed with that
4 order or approved it?
5 A. Since these first two -- since, first, the document is titled
6 "Dealing with procedures for treatment," and points 1 and 2 deal with
7 prohibiting access particularly to unauthorised individuals filming and
8 photographing prisoners, point 3 would be consistent with that earlier
10 Q. But my question is: Should General Tolimir have approved --
11 would he have approved this order from Savcic?
12 A. Given that it's -- I'm sorry.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please continue your answer.
14 THE WITNESS: Given that it is consistent with his guidance, I
15 would say yes, sir.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, these questions and
18 answers, based on a document not signed by Savcic, not recognised by
19 Savcic, so a document by an imaginary author to the chief of staff, are
20 being asked by Mr. McCloskey in the form of hypothetical questions, Would
21 he approve? How can we know whether I would or would not approve
22 something that was not signed? And a Prosecution witness said here
23 before the Court that he did not sign it. I kindly ask you to disallow
24 these hypothetical questions that are not based on any real grounds, not
25 to allow speculation.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this document, as you'll recall,
3 is in court. You have seen the original. It was part of the Drina Corps
4 collection, as you'll recall, from Tomasz Blaszczyk's testimony.
5 Danko Gojkovic testified that on this document were his inked initials,
6 and that, while he didn't remember this document in particular, this
7 meant that this document was something that he would have sent over the
8 telecommunications system. We have had an expert that has found other
9 typewritten documents and found that this particular document matched
10 those typewritten documents, so if this is some forgery, there are other
11 forgeries from the same typewriter. It's the position of the Prosecution
12 that this is an absolutely genuine document reflecting a genuine
13 proposal. And I completely understand the general and why he is
14 challenging this, and that he is challenging it, as is his right, but
15 there is certainly a firm foundation from this document that is in
16 evidence that it is real and true. And the fact that in wartime someone
17 doesn't sign a document or someone puts their name in place of someone
18 else when they're asking for a proposal, you've heard evidence on that.
19 Things like this happen in war. It's our view that this is absolutely
20 genuine and these questions are appropriate.
21 This is an argument for a later day, in my view, but since the
22 general has made it, I'm giving you mine. But I think there is certainly
23 enough genuine, solid evidence for Mr. Butler to give us his military
24 view on these issues.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm not interpreting your lines of questions as a
1 way to authenticate this document. I understand your line of questions
2 in a different way: that you try to find out the areas of responsibility
3 of certain members of the VRS, in relation to possible orders reflected
4 in such a document, who would be responsible for certain orders. The
5 Chamber is aware of the fact that there are different testimonies of
6 witnesses in relation to this document; Witness Malinic,
7 Witness Gojkovic, Witness Savcic. It is for the Chamber to decide, at
8 the end of the day, if anybody can rely on this document or not. This is
9 not the day to do that now.
10 Discussing speculation, you could say, Mr. Tolimir, that every
11 answer from this witness is speculation because he was not an eye-witness
12 and he was not on the ground. He provides his testimony, and we have to
13 be aware of this fact, on the basis of studying material. This is the
14 basis of his expert opinion which is used by the Prosecution. And,
15 Mr. Tolimir, you have every right to challenge the testimony, and you
16 will have the opportunity, during your cross-examination, to do that also
17 in relation to this document or in relation to the answers given by this
18 witness in relation to the content of this document.
19 Mr. McCloskey, please continue.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY:
21 Q. Mr. Butler, we see again from the document that there is a time
22 on it, 1400 hours, in the top left, and at the bottom it says:
23 "Delivered at 1510 hours." This would be the 13th of July, and it's, of
24 course, talking about over 1.000 prisoners at Kasaba. Are you aware,
25 from your knowledge of the investigation, whether or not by the evening
1 of 13 July there were more prisoners in the area from Nova Kasaba along
2 the road towards Bratunac?
3 A. Yes, sir, I'm aware from the investigation that through the
4 course of the day, the number of prisoners that were being captured
5 between Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje and further down towards Bratunac,
6 including Sandici, by the end of that day probably numbered at least
7 2.000, and on subsequent days those numbers increased.
8 Q. All right. Now, in reviewing and studying and analysing this
9 document, did you find any documents by General Mladic that you felt were
10 related to this document?
11 A. Shortly after these proposals are made, there is a document from
12 the Main Staff, under the signature of General Mladic, where those
13 various -- I believe it's under the signature of General Mladic. I'm not
14 sure if it's personally his or -- or perhaps just another officer at this
15 juncture, but where these proposals are, in fact, accepted, some of them
16 are modified, and orders are sent out to subordinate formations of the
17 Drina Corps and other units.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to the next document, P655,
19 the next tab.
20 Q. This document, we see, is dated 13 July, and we see a "Received"
21 stamp of 2250 hours, 13 July, up in the right-hand corner. And if we
22 look at the -- well, we can look at the original B/C/S and see that it's
23 in the name of Commander Colonel General Ratko Mladic, and that stamp is
24 dated the 14th of July.
25 Now, in your view, in taking a look at this document entitled
1 "Preventing leakage of military secrets in the area of combat
2 operations - order," and it says:
3 "In order to ensure the organised conduct of planned combat
4 operations and other activities in the general sector of Srebrenica and
5 Zepa, and in order to prevent the leakage of confidential information
6 classified as military secrets, I hereby order:"
7 And then various things.
8 Is this, in your view, at all related to the previous document?
9 A. Yes, sir, it is.
10 Q. And on what do you base that?
11 A. If one were to look at the actual steps of the order, it
12 discusses which various roads, for example, in points 2 and 3, which
13 various roads are to be closed, except for military and police traffic,
14 where check-points are to be set up, and point 5 discussing a ban on
15 giving out any information on activities in that area, particularly
16 related to prisoners of war, evacuated civilians, escapees and similar,
17 so I believe that these particular directions are, to a large degree,
18 based on the recommendations of General Tolimir, as outlined in that last
19 order we discussed or last document we discussed.
20 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document, which is the same
21 time-frame, but I just want to ask you briefly something about it. It is
22 65 ter 43. It should be under tab 21, another 13 July document with a
23 stamp at the back of 1335 hours. But it is, as we can see, from the
24 Main Staff, and it's to the Command of the Drina Corps and the various
25 brigades, entitled "Order to prevent the passage of Muslim groups towards
1 Tuzla and Kladanj." And we see that it describes what is now familiar
2 facts to us; the Muslims going through the area and, as we can see, an
3 order to engage people, to protect the Serbian area, to capture the
4 disarmed Muslims -- to capture and disarm Muslims, et cetera. I won't go
5 into the detail.
6 We get to number 7, which is page 2 in the English. It's a note
7 that says:
8 "Use secure channels to communicate information about captured or
9 blocked groups."
10 And then number 8:
11 "Send interim reports with specific details of the situation in
12 the area of responsibility of all units so that the corps command and
13 Main Staff can act in a timely manner."
14 And this is in the name of Assistant Commander Lieutenant
15 General Milan Gvero.
16 Now, what, if anything, can you make of the fact that
17 General Gvero is sending this direction -- or, excuse me, order? It's
18 actually entitled "Order."
19 A. Well, as I've discussed in earlier testimony, those senior
20 officers who are performing their duties are not going to be issuing
21 orders that are outside of their particular competence to issue. In this
22 particular case, you know, General Gvero, for whatever reason, has
23 obviously been empowered, presumably by General Mladic, to issue this
24 order. It may very well be, in part, that at the time, with the absence
25 of General Milovanovic, he is the senior official at the Main Staff,
1 assuming at this time General Mladic isn't there and General Miletic may
2 or may not be otherwise occupied, so General Gvero could give out this
3 order. I take it the fact that General Gvero has issued the order, and
4 that the order is properly accepted by the subordinate units, that at the
5 time it was issued no one questioned whether or not General Gvero was
6 authorised to make such an instruction.
7 Q. Where would this order indicate that General Gvero was at the
8 time it was made?
9 A. It would indicate that he's at the physical location of the
10 Main Staff.
11 Q. If we assume, for the purpose of this question, that on the
12 evening of -- or, excuse me, the afternoon of 13 July, that
13 General Mladic is still in the Bratunac/Srebrenica area, and
14 General Tolimir is in the Zepa/Borike area, and General Milovanovic is in
15 the -- out in the West Krajina area, does that fit with your conclusion
16 or counter it in some way?
17 A. No, sir. I believe that is very consistent with what I've
18 indicated. For example, on the 9th and 10th of July, General Gvero was
19 at the IKM at Pribicevac to, in part, take a look at what was happening
20 with the Srebrenica operation. The pattern of the Main Staff sending its
21 generals to various combat locations to do -- and observe various issues
22 is one that is seen throughout the conflict. From a command-and-control
23 perspective, it certainly is a prudent practice. So, I mean, I don't see
24 anything inconsistent about that at all, sir.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this 65 ter 43 into evidence.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 43 shall be
3 assigned Exhibit P2487. Thank you.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now staying on our topic of 13 July
5 and prisoners, the location of prisoners, the knowledge of prisoners, if
6 we could go to P4136. Excuse me, that may be a 65 ter number.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We haven't received more than 4.000 documents
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 And, I'm sorry, that's P413B, as in "Bravo."
11 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was told it's confidential and should not be
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
15 Q. And this, as we're getting to it, Mr. Butler, is a 2nd Corps
16 intercept, dated 13 July, at -- we should have the one at 1730 hours.
17 And I believe this is an intercept you're familiar with and have talked
18 about before. Is that correct?
19 A. Yes, sir, it is.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I interrupt you for a moment.
21 Judge Nyambe has a question.
22 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you. I just wanted a clarification.
23 At page 17, lines 14 through to 19, you have stated that:
24 "For example, on the 9th and 10th of July, General Gvero was at
25 the IKM to, in part, take part and look at what was happening in the
1 Srebrenica operation."
2 How do you come to know this fact? Thank you.
3 THE WITNESS: There is one particular document, and I believe
4 it's dated the 9th of July, that is sent to the IKM Pribicevac, and it is
5 addressed to both General Krstic and General Gvero, which reflects
6 General Gvero -- that the people who are sending him that document are
7 aware that he is physically present at that location.
8 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, Your Honours, much of what
11 I'm doing is a chronology of the events, so these documents are there,
12 and I'm sure we'll get to July 9th sooner than later. And, of course,
13 Mr. Butler jumped the chronology slightly, which, of course, is going to
14 happen as he's answering questions. But just to let you know, we will be
15 in the chronology that should help us there.
16 Q. All right. So this, we see, is X and Y, and it starts out:
17 "Is it possible for us to send about a dozen buses from
19 Then Y says:
20 "Call them to come immediately. There are now about 6.000 of
22 And then X says:
23 "Fit for military service."
24 Y says:
25 "Quiet, don't repeat."
1 X says:
2 "All right, then I am to send."
3 And it goes on. We best go over in English on the computer. And
4 it talks about:
5 "Go ahead, send. I have three check-points, fuck. I have the
6 one where you and I were when there is up there where the check-point at
7 the junction is, and there is halfway from the check-point to the
8 boarding point."
9 It goes on to say, Y says:
10 "According to a rough estimate, there are 1500 to 2.000 in each
12 X says:
13 "And are they still transporting those women and children?"
14 And it goes on to talk about some information. It mentions that
15 X says, after a few lines:
16 "So I am sending them, and they are to report there in the Kasaba
17 at the back."
18 Then Y says:
19 "They should report to the stadium."
20 Then there's talk about Kundasevic and Radakovic collecting. The
21 last few lines:
22 "Fine. They are to drive away and come back."
23 Y says:
24 "They are to drive until they disappear."
25 X says: "Fine, okay."
1 So let's go back to the beginning.
2 Have you -- in your analysis, did you make any conclusions about
3 what this reference to "6.000 of these" were in this context of where X
4 says "fit for military service," and Y says: "Quiet, don't repeat"?
5 What do you make of that?
6 A. Yes, sir. The two correspondents on the intercept are discussing
7 their estimates of the number of military-aged Muslim men who are being
8 captured or who are surrendering to the VRS at various locations.
9 Q. All right. And can you make out -- well, do you know, from the
10 investigation -- this says that there are -- the first line on the next
11 page in English:
12 "I have three check-points ..."
13 It mentions a check-point at a junction. It mentions Kasaba and
14 a stadium. Can you -- do you recall, were there any assembly points that
15 revealed themselves from the investigation that are all consistent or
16 inconsistent with the comments in this intercept?
17 A. Yes, sir. I mean, from my work with the investigation years ago,
18 we were able to note and verify that there was certainly one check-point
19 at the intersection of Konjevic Polje on the Nova Kasaba road, there is a
20 second check-point a few kilometres to the north-west of Bratunac along
21 the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, and I believe that there is a third
22 check-point somewhere around where the 65th Protection Regiment's
23 military police unit were. I'm sure of the two check-points along
24 Bratunac and Konjevic Polje. The third one I seem to recall, but it's
25 been a few years since that one. But there were a number of check-points
1 there that were designed to stop civilian traffic from going into the
2 area, so that part is consistent with my knowledge.
3 Q. How about assembly points for prisoners on the 13th?
4 A. Again, based on my work with the investigation, I'm aware that on
5 the 13th, prisoners were assembled at the -- on the soccer pitch at
6 Nova Kasaba. There was a smaller assembly of prisoners in
7 Konjevic Polje, at the school location there. There was a large number
8 of prisoners assembled on the meadow at Sandici, and they were later
9 taken down to Privica [phoen]. So, again, those assembly points are
10 consistent with this intercept as well.
11 Q. So if this intercept and the other evidence in the case is
12 roughly correct that there are now 4.000 to 6.000 prisoners at this time
13 that are being collected, is this information that -- and that goes up
14 from the 13 July proposal that we saw. Would this increased
15 information -- should that go to General Tolimir, the chief of Intel and
17 A. Yes, sir. I mean, given the staggering number of prison ers
18 being captured, I can't see how he would not be notified of that fact.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer -- this is in evidence.
20 This has a P number.
21 All right. Let's go now to D49, another document that everyone
22 has seen many times. I know Mr. Butler has. I don't want to deal with
23 it at length.
24 Q. But we see here a document that says it's from the Command of the
25 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade. Remind us the town associated with
1 that brigade.
2 A. That would be Rogatica, sir.
3 Q. Okay. And we see that it's in the name of Assistant Commander
4 Major General Zdravko Tolimir, and it's to the Army of Republika Srpska
5 Main Staff, to General Gvero personally. Now -- and it's entitled
6 "Accommodation of prisoners of war," which they abbreviate "r/z" and
8 "If you are unable to find adequate accommodation for all r/z's
9 from Srebrenica, we hereby inform you that space," with a word that we've
10 learned has to do with beds and cots of some sort, "has been arranged for
11 800 prisoners of war in the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade in
13 Now, we see that General Tolimir has addressed this personally to
14 General Gvero. What, if anything, do you make of that?
15 A. Again, part of that practice, he knows where General Gvero is and
16 that he's engaged in these types of issues, and he wants to ensure that
17 this particular proposal that he's making goes directly to General Gvero.
18 Q. We see a stamp dated 2230 hours. Do you recall that at the late
19 evening of 13 July, where most of the known prisoners from Srebrenica
20 were being held?
21 A. During that period, based on the investigation and survivor
22 accounts, at that particular time most of the prisoners were being held
23 in either facilities in Bratunac, various schools there or hangars, or
24 they were actually in buses, in trucks, parked in front of other
25 locations where they could be more easily guarded.
1 Q. And in those locations, could any of those individuals in those
2 vehicles or schools be seen from the air?
3 A. Certainly, when -- I believe, as part of various exhibits that
4 have been tendered in other trials, we've seen overhead imagery of
5 clusters of buses in and around Bratunac on 13 July, so they are readily
7 Q. But are the people visible that are being held in those buses?
8 A. I don't believe that they're looking through the tops of the
9 buses, so I would say, at face value, no, the people would not be
11 Q. All right. Now, I want to, on this same topic, go ahead a few
12 days and ask you some questions about July 17th.
13 And if we could go to P554A.
14 And this is an intercept where it's the Prosecution's position
15 it's from 17 July, 2055 hours, and we see that it talks about Trivic,
16 telephone exchange, Colonel Jankovic. And it starts out and says:
17 "It's Badem."
18 Do you remember what this term "Badem" is?
19 A. Badem is the telephonic code word for the Bratunac Infantry
21 Q. And so T says:
22 "Give me Colonel Jankovic."
23 Now, on 17 July, 2050 hours, are there any documents or
24 information that reveal who this Colonel Jankovic is?
25 A. Yes, sir. There is a document that reflects, when one looks back
1 at 12 and 13 July previously, that Colonel Jankovic is a member of the
2 Main Staff intelligence organ. He is a subordinate of General Tolimir.
3 Q. Okay. And then C says:
4 "Just a second. Zlatar, the extension is still busy."
5 What is C, first of all, or who is C, if you can tell from this?
6 A. It's not exactly clear. It might just be a switchboard operator.
7 Q. And what is Zlatar?
8 A. Zlatar is the telephonic code-name for the Drina Corps Command.
9 Q. Okay. Then the intercept says:
10 "You have the colonel on the line."
11 T says: "Hello."
12 And then now we have J: "Yes, I'm listening."
13 And T says: "Well, Jankovic ..."
14 So under this intercept, who should J be?
15 A. One of the correspondents would be Colonel Jankovic.
16 Q. All right. And then it says: "Yes?"
17 Jankovic says: "Yes?"
18 T says:
19 "Listen here. Miletic said," and then it's "...," so we don't
20 know what Miletic said."
21 Jankovic says: "Yes."
22 T says:
23 "That you should write what you want to do."
24 Jankovic says: "Yes."
25 T says:
1 "And send it urgently by code up to Tolimir."
2 Now, in this context, who is Tolimir in your view?
3 A. This would be General Tolimir.
4 Q. And then Jankovic says:
5 "I'm in no position, man, to write. I'm calling here, and there
6 is ..."
7 And T says:
8 "Listen to what I'm telling you ..."
9 Jankovic says: "All right."
10 T says:
11 "And the commander will decide with Tolimir and send you a --"
12 and I think it may be "reply."
13 So in this context, what is Jankovic being told to do?
14 A. He's being directed to make a proposal on how to deal with a
15 particular situation to his superior, General Tolimir, and that
16 General Tolimir, with the commander, will make a decision on how to move
17 forward with a particular course of action.
18 Q. In your view, who would the commander be in this context?
19 A. General Mladic.
20 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Now, keeping in mind this is 2050 hours on the
21 17th, let's go to the next document, P2168.
22 Actually, could we go to the next page and get the handwritten
23 one to try to avoid an issue. This, we can see, is a typewritten one
24 with Momir Nikolic's name in the bottom. But could we go to the
25 handwritten one, which should be the next one.
1 There we go. And can we see the last page of the handwritten
3 All right. And we see the initials down there.
4 Now, can we go to the translation for the handwritten one, if we
5 have it. It should be the next -- I think it's next to this English
6 version, but the next English -- there we go. Okay. That's where we
7 want to be.
8 Q. Now we do see a written document, and in your knowledge, who is
9 this "RJ"?
10 A. This is Colonel Radovan Jankovic.
11 Q. Radovan?
12 A. I'm sorry, Radoslav. My mistake.
13 Q. Okay. It won't be the last that any of us make.
14 Now, we see the next day, after that conversation where he was
15 told to write something down, he's now, according to this, written
16 something to the Main Staff of the VRS and the Drina Corps Intelligence
17 and Security Department, called "Situation in the Srebrenica Region." I
18 won't go through all of it, but we see, in point 1, it's talking about
19 the wounded Muslims from the 28th Division that were evacuated by the
20 ICRC, which the Court will remember some evidence on. Number 2 talks
21 about the Dutch Battalion commander sending a message concerning the
22 evacuation of the Dutch. Then number 3 talks about an MSF convoy that
23 arrived on the 18th, but was sent back for procedural reasons; and
24 there's a request that:
25 "Will you please use your influence to see to it that all UN and
1 international organisation transports go via Ljubovija; otherwise, we'll
2 have difficulties providing them with an escort."
3 A logistic request, obviously.
4 And this is what I want to ask you about, the question:
5 "Will you please tell me what stand to take in terms of
6 authorisation for evacuation of the international organisation MSF; in
7 fact, how to deal with the so-called local staff? This also applies to
8 the interpreters of the Military Monitors and UNPROFOR."
9 And it mentions that:
10 "The State Security has passed on to us an opinion that
11 President Karadzic had allegedly abolished all local staff who used to
12 work for UNPROFOR."
13 And Jankovic said:
14 "It is our opinion that they should not be held."
15 First of all, who do you think Jankovic is asking this question
16 to? All we see is it's to the Main Staff, "ObP," the Intelligence and
17 Security Section.
18 A. My opinion is he is asking General Tolimir for guidance in this
20 Q. And if you know, do you recall who these MSF people are, the
21 local staff?
22 A. Yes, sir. I'm aware from my work with the investigation that
23 there was some issue related to whether or not the local staff members,
24 those individuals who are Bosnian Muslims but who were working with or in
25 support of both the United Nations observers and the MSF organisation, if
1 they would be permitted to depart when those organisations left
2 Srebrenica after the fall of the enclave.
3 Q. Do you recall whether these people were male or female?
4 A. They were a mixed number, but there was some -- there is a
5 listing of them and a number of them are people who would be considered
6 of military age from the Muslim side.
7 Q. All right. So this is a document, and if we go --
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment, please. Judge Nyambe has a question.
9 JUDGE NYAMBE: I wonder if you could assist with some
11 At page 28, line 13/14, you've stated just now that:
12 "My opinion is he is asking General Tolimir for guidance in this
14 I assume, and you may correct me if I'm wrong, that your opinion
15 arises from the document on the screen. And if I'm correct, can you just
16 show us where this reference is made which leads you to this opinion or
17 conclusion? Thanks.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. It's actually a constructive opinion
19 not only based on this document, but based on the prior intercept that
20 was discussed, where the individual correspondents are discussing the
21 fact and Colonel Jankovic gets the guidance that he needs to write up
22 this proposal for General Tolimir. I see the two documents, one exhibit
23 and then the follow-on document, they are linked.
24 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I take the opportunity to ask you,
1 Mr. McCloskey, about the two different documents, P2168 we have in the
2 binder. We have, of course, the original B/C/S, the handwritten version,
3 but are these two English versions the translations of the handwritten
4 and the typed version?
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: That is my understanding, and I believe that
6 because we see the initials of "RJ" on the English version up on the
7 screen, and we see the handwritten initials on the left side, and the
8 other one is -- Momir Nikolic is on both of them. And I know it goes a
9 while back, but you'll remember the testimony of Momir Nikolic on this
10 point. I can recall it -- well, Mr. Butler may remember it as well,
11 which may be more appropriate.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I see now that the second English page with the
13 initials "RJ" has, on top, an explanation: "Handwritten document." That
14 clarifies the situation. Thank you very much.
15 Please carry on.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY:
17 Q. And, Mr. Butler, I just -- in going back to Judge Nyambe's
18 question, when this document, entitled "Situation in the Srebrenica
19 Region," when it's specifically addressed to the Main Staff Intelligence
20 and Security Sector, who, in your view, would that be? Who is the
21 Intelligence and Security Sector? Who would be the eyes that would see
22 it when a document like this was sent there?
23 A. Well, sir, the head of the sector is General Tolimir.
24 Q. And did that -- did you incorporate that fact into who Jankovic
25 was sending this to?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now --
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Could Mr. McCloskey please ask the witness to clarify whether
8 General Tolimir, on the date as mentioned here, the 18th, was at the
9 Main Staff, and if he did, did he know that this actually reached
10 General Tolimir? On the basis of what is he claiming this? Is that just
11 another supposition of his?
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There are always two possibilities, Mr. Tolimir.
13 You may put these questions during your cross-examination, because it's
14 the right of Mr. McCloskey to put the question in a way he wants to do
15 it. Or Mr. McCloskey may do it in accordance with your advice, but it's
16 up to Mr. McCloskey to decide.
17 Please continue.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
19 Q. Mr. Butler, on the general's point -- no, I think I'll wait a few
20 questions. I don't want to lose my train of thought on these documents,
21 and we'll come back to the general's concern.
22 MR. MCCLOSKEY: If we could now go to 3070D. That's a 65 ter.
23 It's an intercept -- excuse me, that's 3070A. In the English, 3070 --
24 sorry, in the B/C/S, 3070A will do it.
25 And I want to go -- it's at the bottom there, between X and Y,
1 and it's the position of the Prosecutor that this is 18 July at
2 1617 hours and that there are -- the intercept documents show this, but I
3 won't spend the time to do all that again. It's been done. And it says:
4 "Y says that MSF appeared on the bridge with a permit to go to
5 the UNPROFOR base to evacuate the personnel."
6 "X says they cannot go through until they've checked with Toso,
7 'who are they going to treat there'."
8 Q. And who, in your view, is this Toso?
9 A. I understand that "Toso" is a nickname for General Tolimir.
10 Q. And this short intercept, do you connect it with any of the
11 documents we've just looked at?
12 A. It reflects that these two unnamed correspondents have an
13 awareness that there is an issue with the MSF and that before anything
14 can occur, they are awaiting guidance from General Tolimir.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I offer that into evidence.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 3070A shall be
18 assigned Exhibit P2488. Thank you.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: So if we could go to P383A, and this is another
20 intercept. The Court has seen this, and I know Mr. Butler has. It's an
21 intercept that starts off with a note that Jankovic's voice was heard on
22 a certain channel and Colonel Djurdjic was heard at another frequency
23 between channels 3 and 4 at 1432 hours.
24 "Participants: Jankovic and Colonel Djurdjic."
25 Q. And can you remind us, if you know, who Colonel Djurdjic was at
1 the time?
2 A. Colonel Djurdjic was a Main Staff officer who was the focal point
3 for dealing with the UN and other international organisations.
4 Q. All right. And we see Djurdjic saying: "Is this Jankovic?"
5 And Jankovic says: "Speaking."
6 Djurdjic says: "Hello."
7 Jankovic says: "Speaking."
8 Djurdjic identifies himself as: "Colonel Djurdjic speaking."
9 They go on for a bit. Djurdjic refers to him as "Janko."
10 And then as we go down the page a little bit, Djurdjic said:
11 "Regarding what you were asking."
12 Jankovic says: "Yes."
13 "The boss has ordered that they be halted."
14 And then we go down and we see more information regarding
15 Kristina Smit, a nurse that can go, and a person named Daniel O'Brian, a
16 physician. And it goes on, which I will ask you about as it goes on, but
17 what do you think they are beginning to talk about here in this
19 A. This intercept discusses the authorisation for at least some
20 members of the MSF organisation that was there in Srebrenica to be given
21 permission to depart the former enclave.
22 Q. Does this have anything to do with the previous documents that
23 you've spoken of?
24 A. Yes, sir. This is -- this document -- or this particular
25 intercept is related to the previous documents and intercepts that I've
2 Q. All right. So they continue to talk. Djurdjic, at the bottom of
3 the page, says:
4 "You hear me well?"
5 Jankovic says:
6 "I can hear you."
7 Then let's go to the next page in the English, and I think we
8 need to go to the next page in the Serbian as well.
9 Djurdjic says:
10 "And only women and children can go. Understand?"
11 Jankovic says:
12 "And what about these young men?"
13 Djurdjic says: "Others. No."
14 Then he says:
15 "I don't know. They might require the whole group to go."
16 Now, I'm sorry, but if we could just go back to the first page
17 again. I wanted to put in that context to get your opinion on that line
18 in the middle of the page, when Djurdjic said:
19 "Regarding what you were asking."
20 Jankovic says: "Yes."
21 And Djurdjic says:
22 "The boss has ordered that they be halted."
23 Can you tell who Djurdjic is referring to when he says "the
25 A. Generally, when we see the phrase "the boss" in intercepts, it
1 refers to the appropriate-level commander. So in this particular
2 context, I would say that "the boss" would probably be a reference to
3 General Mladic.
4 Q. All right. So let's go back to the second page, where Djurdjic,
5 as we've noted, says: "Others. No."
6 And then he says:
7 "I don't know. They might require the whole group to go."
8 Jankovic -- all we get from there is an "E." Djurdjic says:
9 "Say again."
10 Jankovic says:
11 "That they will require, but they have the government's
12 permission for all of them to go."
13 Now, do you relate -- what do you believe that this comment from
14 Jankovic: "They have the government's permission for all of them to go"?
15 A. As you go down, in the context of the intercept it makes it clear
16 that there's a potential discrepancy between what Colonel Jankovic has
17 heard from -- or is hearing now from the army versus what he's heard
18 previously from civilian organs of the government.
19 Q. And so as we go down there, and we see Djurdjic is getting upset,
20 he swears, and he says:
21 "Can we do this through the girl? I have to ask her to act as
22 mediator here, and now I -- we can't, we can't, we're having a one-way
24 Jankovic says: "Listen."
25 Djurdjic says: "Yes."
1 Jankovic says:
2 "So they have permission from the Koljevic government?"
3 And Djurdjic says: "Yes."
4 Can you remind us who the Koljevic government is a reference to,
5 in your view?
6 A. That's the civilian government of the RS at the time. I'm not
7 exactly sure how that places in with Karadzic as the supreme commander,
8 but Koljevic is a high-ranking member of the civilian government.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right.
10 Mr. President, do you want me to finish this intercept up - I've
11 noticed it's break time - or would you like to take the break now?
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It depends on the minutes you need for finishing
13 this document.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Maybe five, at the most, I hope.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's better to have a break. Then you
16 are not under time pressure.
17 We must have our first break now, and we will resume in half an
18 hour, quarter past 4.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, sorry, but I have to take you back
22 again to the document behind tab 25, P2168.
23 Do you have any explanation -- perhaps we dealt with that in the
24 courtroom at an earlier stage. I don't recall. We have the B/C/S
25 handwritten version and the typed version. The handwritten version has,
1 at the end, "RJ," and the typed version, and this is reflected in the
2 translations as well, the name "Captain Momir Nikolic." I think
3 Mr. Nikolic testified about that. Can you just explain for today how you
4 see this difference between "RJ" and "Captain Momir Nikolic"?
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.
6 And I recollect back to the testimony of Momir Nikolic, who, in
7 my recollection, says that Radoslav Jankovic comes to the
8 Bratunac Brigade around the 8th, 9th, or 10th and takes up residence in
9 Momir Nikolic's office to do his work, and that Momir Nikolic, when shown
10 these documents, testified, basically, that this was a handwritten
11 document, the one with the initials, by Radoslav Jankovic that was taken
12 to the Communications Centre, and the Communications Centre, when typing
13 it up on the teleprinter, put Momir Nikolic's name because that's what
14 they were used to doing. And so it went out under Momir Nikolic's name,
15 but it was a document that was drafted by Radoslav Jankovic. And that's
16 at T -- transcript 12434 through 12435. So that's the -- my
17 recollection, that's the fundamental reason why we -- why we see it the
18 way we see it, according to Momir Nikolic, which is the Prosecution's
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much for reminding me.
21 Please carry on.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would also say that Radoslav Jankovic is not on
23 the Prosecution witness list, but I believe he does reside in Serbia.
24 All right. Now, we're -- we should be still at the page 2 of the
25 English of this document. We just -- he just described the Koljevic --
1 we need to go back to the intercept, which should be --
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: P383A.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Thank you. Tab 27.
4 Q. And in the middle of the page, we see that Jankovic says they
5 have permission from the Koljevic government, who you'd mentioned was, I
6 believe, a member of the -- it's page 2 in both.
7 Okay. So Jankovic says they have permission from the
8 Bosnian Serb government, according to what your knowledge is.
9 Then Djurdjic says: "Yes."
10 Jankovic says:
11 "That they can all go, they have a list."
12 Djurdjic says:
13 "Yes, I know, but ... here, man, I can see the names of a certain
14 Abdulah Kurtovic, Ibrahim Ibrahimovic ...."
15 Are those male or female names, to your knowledge?
16 A. I believe those are male names, sir.
17 Q. And then they go on and Jankovic says: "Yes."
18 And then Djurdjic says:
19 "Muhidin Husic, Muhamed Hasic, Masic, Sahin Talovic,
20 Hajrudin Kurtic, Omer Talovic."
22 And Djurdjic says: "Two, four, six, seven men."
23 Jankovic says:
24 "Yes, they are taking them as local staff, and they have the
25 permission from Karadz ... Koljevic."
1 Djurdjic says: "All right --"
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Slow down. Some parts of your reading is
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think we need to go to the next page in the
6 Q. And Djurdjic says:
7 "All right. They have the permission, but you know that the
8 procedure you, too, took part in ..."
9 Jankovic says: "Great."
10 Djurdjic says: "Pardon?"
12 "Great, if that's your position, it's good."
13 Now Djurdjic says:
14 "The procedure is such, God damn it, that it should be checked
15 whether those who ... are they able-bodied or older than 60?"
16 And Jankovic says: "They are able-bodied."
17 Djurdjic says: "They are?"
18 Jankovic says: "Yes."
19 We need to go to the next page in English.
20 Djurdjic says:
21 "So that's the procedure. And you saw what you left behind in
22 Bratunac the other day."
23 Jankovic says: "Okay."
24 Djurdjic says: "Am I right?"
25 Jankovic says: "Okay."
1 Then Djurdjic says:
2 "And they, if they agree, let them go in their vehicles and take
3 those women and children."
4 And I'll ask you about the rest of this a bit later. But what,
5 in your view, is Djurdjic and Jankovic talking about when they're
6 mentioning these Muslim names and Djurdjic is asking if they're
7 able-bodied, older than 60?
8 A. Based on what had been occurring in the previous days, there was
9 a process in place where, as men were coming into the custody of the army
10 and police at various locations, if they were considered to be
11 able-bodied, those between, roughly, 15 and 60, they were detained. If
12 they were children, if they were older than 60, if they were infirm, they
13 were then allowed to board buses and trucks and be transported out of the
14 enclave. So this is the process that I believe that they are referring
16 Q. So when Djurdjic says: "So that's the procedure," what, in
17 particular, do you think he's talking about in relation to these
18 able-bodied men?
19 A. The separation of the men.
20 Q. And those men that were separated on 12 and 13 July from their
21 families in Potocari, what, as the investigation revealed, happened to
23 A. They were subsequently placed on buses and trucks and sent to the
24 Zvornik Brigade area, where they were -- or almost all of them were
25 executed in the subsequent days.
1 Q. Okay. Let's continue on after Djurdjic confirms:
2 "So that's the procedure. And you saw what you left behind in
3 Bratunac the other day."
4 What do you think this reference "and you saw what you left
5 behind in Bratunac the other day" -- what, if anything, to your
6 knowledge, was left behind in Bratunac, in the context of this
8 A. When the men were separated, starting the 12th and 13th, they
9 were -- after their separation in Potocari, they were then placed into
10 schools and other facilities in Bratunac. Those were the men left
11 behind. Those people who did not fit the criteria of able-bodied men
12 were allowed to be removed from the enclave.
13 Q. Okay. And I made reference to the comment about "vehicles, take
14 those women and children." There's a reference to a little orphan.
15 Jankovic talks about two elderly persons. Djurdjic says -- or it says:
16 "Yes. Two elderly, let them go, let the elderly go."
17 Jankovic says: "Okay."
18 And then Djurdjic says:
19 "Let the elderly go, and tonight, when Toso arrives, you and him
20 must make sure you consult some more, please."
21 Who do you believe Toso is in this intercept?
22 A. General Tolimir, sir.
23 Q. And then Jankovic says:
24 "All right, I will. When is Toso coming?"
25 And Djurdjic says:
1 "In the early evening."
2 Now, can you tell, from these references to Tosomir [phoen] --
3 General Tolimir, where he is arriving to?
4 A. In the context of who's saying it, it could be the Main Staff
5 headquarters is what they're referring to, but it is not evidently clear
6 whether they're referring to General Tolimir arriving at the Main Staff
7 headquarters or Bratunac.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, if we could go to P2222. If this could
9 be --
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is, again, a confidential document. It should
11 not be broadcast.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: And out of an abundance of caution, could we go
13 into private session for just a few --
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Private.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- questions.
16 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours. Thank
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
18 Mr. McCloskey.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to 65 ter 4044.
20 This may help with the question that General Tolimir had earlier
21 about 18 July, as we see that we have a document from the Main Staff of
22 the Republika Srpska Army, Intelligence and Security Sector, 18 July,
23 titled "Intelligence Information."
24 And if we could go to page 4 of the English, and I think it's
25 page 3 of the Serbian.
1 Q. We can see that it is in the name of General Tolimir, and it's
2 drafted by someone with the initials -- I believe that's "MS." Do you
3 recall who that drafter might be?
4 A. I believe those initials correspond to Colonel Salapura.
5 Q. Does this -- and I think we can all just, as we flip through it,
6 see that it's a detailed intel report about Muslim forces from various
7 areas around Bosnia, including, on page 3 of the English, parts of the
8 28th Muslim Division had pulled out from Srebrenica and deployed in the
9 wider area of Zivinice. I won't go into all this, but does this provide
10 you any guidance at all whether -- about the locations of General Tolimir
11 at that time?
12 A. Yes, sir. It tends to provide additional weight to my view that
13 at the time he's at the Main Staff headquarters, versus Bratunac.
14 Q. All right. Now, I want to continue on this topic where we have
15 General Tolimir involved, according to the Prosecution, with prisoner
16 issues, issues of MSF staff and others.
17 And can we go to P --
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I ask one question, please.
19 Page 3 of the English, there's one short form which is "NDH," the
20 last paragraph, and also the longer paragraph in the middle. Mr. Butler,
21 do you know what it stands for?
22 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I do not. I believe it is initials
23 relating to territory related to Croatia, but I can't give you the exact
24 translation of those initials.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
1 Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would offer that document, 65 ter 4044,
3 into evidence.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received as an exhibit.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 4044 shall be
6 assigned Exhibit P2489. Thank you.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: So if we could have P2187 up there.
8 Q. And as we're waiting for it: We see that this is the Main Staff
9 of the VRS, Sector for Intelligence and Security, dated 29 July, saying
10 "Very Urgent," to the IKM of the Drina Corps, personally to
11 General Krstic, and Intelligence and Security at the Command of the
12 Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, and personally to Colonel Rajko Kusic
13 and Captain Pecanac.
14 Can you remind us who Rajko Kusic is, if you know?
15 A. Rajko Kusic is the commander of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry
17 Q. All right. And it's entitled "Disarmament of the 1st Zepa
19 And if we could go to page 2 in the English.
20 We can see, at the top of the page, they're talking about
21 exchange of prisoners. It should be that first page in the Serbian. The
22 paragraph I want to ask you about, and we've seen this before,
23 General Tolimir says:
24 "Continue combat operations in order to surround and destroy the
25 1st Zepa Brigade until the Muslims make the exchange and carry out the
1 agreement from 24 July related to their disarmament and surrender. Take
2 all necessary measures to prevent them from leaving the encirclement. Do
3 not register persons you capture before cessation of fire and do not
4 report them to international organisations. We are going to keep them
5 for exchange in case the Muslims do not carry out the agreement or they
6 manage to break through from the encirclement."
7 Mr. Butler, are you aware of any military reason or any reason
8 from the documents or materials of this case that would justify this
9 line, this direction:
10 "Do not register persons you capture before cessation of fire and
11 do not report them to international organisations"?
12 A. No, sir.
13 Q. And does the next line, how do you -- can you explain the next
15 "We are going to keep them for exchange in case the Muslims do
16 not carry out the agreement or they manage to break through from the
18 The first question: Are there any Muslim -- any prisoners that
19 can be exchanged that have not been registered with the international
21 A. If one goes back to some of the previous documents that we
22 discussed, it makes it clear that General Tolimir's understanding is that
23 some individuals who haven't been registered aren't open to be exchanged
24 in the earlier years, 1993/1994. If you're going to exchange prisoners
25 of war, you're going to do so, you have to have them at least registered,
1 at a minimum, with international organisations, such as the Red Cross, so
2 you can identify them and their numbers to start laying out your
3 negotiating position as to how many you have captured and how many you
4 wish to exchange.
5 Q. So what can you make, if anything, from this two sentences?
6 First, he says, Do not register persons, and then he says, We're going to
7 keep them for exchange in case the Muslims don't carry out their
8 agreement or break through.
9 A. They appear to be contradictory sentences. There's no logical
10 reason why you would not want to do it unless the goal was to keep the
11 prisoners, list them so you're aware of who they are, but deny that same
12 information to international organisations so they wouldn't know how many
13 prisoners you actually had captured.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to another document related
15 to this issue. This document, I see, does not have a previous 65 ter
16 number. The one we now have is 7438, 7438.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is there any objection to use -- to add this
18 document to the 65 ter exhibit list, Mr. Tolimir?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 We have no objection to any document that would confirm the
21 Prosecution case.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
23 Leave is granted to add it to the list.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. And, Mr. Butler, I won't read all this. We can look at it
2 We're not there yet. It should be on one page of English.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This should be 65 ter 7438.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Ms. Stewart tells me somehow it didn't get into
5 e-court, but I hope it's in everyone's binders on tab 31.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think you should proceed on that basis, and we
7 hope that it will be up-loaded into e-court soon.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I can put the B/C/S on the ELMO. I'm not
9 sure if the Defence has this.
10 Does the Defence have this document? If they do --
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic is nodding.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
13 Q. Mr. Butler, we can see that this --
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, if you could give a hard copy of
16 both versions, English and B/C/S, to the Registry if you are going to
17 tender this document.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I planned on that, and I will do that, yes,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
21 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm afraid I don't
22 have a printed copy of the document Mr. McCloskey intends to use. I
23 would be grateful if he could just identify the document in some way. I
24 have some documents that are not numbered. If he could just remind us
25 what the document is about.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This document is in the binder we all received,
2 behind tab 31.
3 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Precisely. There is no document
4 behind tab 31 in my binder. That's why I'm on my feet.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In our binder, it's a document from the
6 1st Krajina Corps Command, signed by a certain Momir Talic. The date of
7 this document seems to be the 26th of August, 1995.
8 Mr. Gajic.
9 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I've just found it among my copies,
10 so we can continue.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. And, Mr. Butler, I see that you have that in front of you. We
14 haven't heard a lot about the 1st Krajina Corps and General Talic. Can
15 you just brief us, what you believe this document's about?
16 A. The 1st Krajina Corps is -- was one of the six combat corps of
17 the Army of the Republika Srpska. General Talic at the time was the
18 corps commander. This particular document lays out General Talic's
19 awareness that a number of -- first, a number of Krajina Corps members
20 had been captured in the past and were in the custody of the ABiH, and
21 that his corps does not have enough captured ABiH members in order to
22 effect a trade for these prisoners. So based on his knowledge that they
23 are capturing runaway groups of Muslim soldiers from Zepa and Srebrenica,
24 and the interests in the Tuzla Prisoner Commission to exchange for these
25 types of soldiers, General Talic is asking the chief of staff of the
1 Drina Corps if certain prisoners from Zepa and Srebrenica can be
2 transferred to the custody of the 1st Krajina Corps so these prisoners
3 can then be subsequently transferred and exchanged for VRS prisoners.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this into evidence, and
5 I --
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 7438 shall be
8 assigned Exhibit P2490. Thank you.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go on, later in the year on
10 this same topic, to P2250, which, as we're waiting for it, you'll see
11 under tab 32 is another document from the Main Staff Intel and Security
12 Sector, dated 3 September, and it's to many of the corps; not all of
13 them. And it's entitled "Exchange of Prisoners, Report." And if we look
14 at the last page, we see that it's from Assistant Commander
15 Major General Zdravko Tolimir.
16 And I don't want to go through all of this report, but if we go
17 to page 2 in the English, it talks about the Main Staff approved
18 individual exchanges for the 1st KK and East Bosnia commissions on the
19 base of the "one-for-one" principle. And it talks about the Muslims are
20 blocking all exchanges on the "all-for-all" principle and the
21 "one-for-one" principle, making it, and I quote in the third English
23 "... making it conditional that a larger number of Muslims from
24 the area of Srebrenica and Zepa be exchanged and the number of Muslims we
25 have in our prisons."
1 Q. Can you explain to us -- we've heard about this before, but
2 what's going on here?
3 A. By this particular point in time, 3 September, both the
4 Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves have long since fallen, and there is an
5 issue between the number of prisoners that the Muslims claim must have
6 been taken versus the number of Muslim prisoners that VRS is claiming
7 that they have possession of in their prisons. So this is the issues
8 that they're trying to negotiate between the various prisoner
10 Q. Can you explain to us the "one-to-one" and the "all-for-all," and
11 what you recall about how that worked over time, just briefly?
12 A. Historically during the conflict, the VRS captured less prisoners
13 than the ABiH side did. As a result, when one looks at the documents
14 from 1993, 1994, and early 1995, prior to Srebrenica, the VRS position
15 was an "all-for-all" exchange, that both sides would essentially swap the
16 amount of -- all of the prisoners that they had, in which case it didn't
17 matter that the VRS had a lesser number of prisoners. The Muslim side,
18 for their part, trying to maximise the number of people they got back,
19 had always pushed more for a "one-for-one" exchange, knowing they had
20 more prisoners. Post July 1995, you start to see switch-overs of that
21 position primarily because the Muslims believe now that the Bosnian Serb
22 side has a far greater number of prisoners from both Srebrenica and Zepa
23 than the Muslims are holding.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right.
25 Now, if we could go to page 4 in the English. It should be the
1 last page in the B/C/S, above this signature block. It should be the
2 third paragraph up in Serbian.
3 Q. But I want to call your attention to the sentence that begins:
4 "The Exchange Commission chairman must view the exchange proposal
5 integrally, as does the Main Staff of the VRS, since so far the
6 Main Staff has made the necessary number of prisoners available for the
7 Corps Commissions in circumstances where they did not have a sufficient
8 number of captured enemy soldiers to exchange for all the captured
9 members of their corps. Security organs and Exchange Commission chairmen
10 must also avoid using parents' bitterness because it is not possible to
11 exchange prisoners who have been in prison for quite some time,
12 particularly because the GS VRS is not responsible for this situation,
13 rather it is the result of the small number of enemy soldiers captured by
14 our units."
15 Now, General Tolimir says here, basically, that this situation
16 they're in is not the fault of the Main Staff, but rather it's the result
17 of the small number of enemy soldiers captured by "our units."
18 If we go back to the document of 13 July, where, in the document
19 under Savcic's name, the assistant commander for Intel and Security is
20 mentioned, and there is an acknowledgment of over 1.000 prisoners in the
21 area of Kasaba. There is also an acknowledgement in General Tolimir's
22 12 July document of able-bodied Muslim men being "evacuated," in quotes,
23 from Potocari.
24 And if we take into account the prisoners captured along the road
25 near Kravica, Konjevic Polje, how do you explain, if you can,
1 General Tolimir saying that it's the "result of the small number of enemy
2 soldiers captured by our units"?
3 A. With respect to the other corps units, it is a sense of
4 frustration and admonishment that he's telling those corps that, You
5 haven't captured enough people to make favourable exchanges with people
6 from your own corps that have been captured. In the case of the
7 Drina Corps, which General Tolimir obviously is aware has captured
8 thousands of prisoners, I'm not sure how the Drina Corps would possibly
9 take that or how the other corps take it, given the fact that they, too,
10 are aware of thousands of prisoners who had been taken by the Drina Corps
11 from Srebrenica alone and they're now not available for exchange.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now, I want to go into a little bit
13 of a different area. Those were the areas specific to General Tolimir
14 and prisoner issues that I wanted to lead with for this testimony.
15 If we could now go to 65 ter 397. It should be on the next tab,
16 and we'll see that it's entitled "Analysis of the Combat Readiness and
17 Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska, 1992," and it's dated
18 April 1993.
19 Q. And I don't want to spend a whole lot of time on this,
20 Mr. Butler, but is this a document that you have reviewed and analysed
21 and speak about in your various reports?
22 A. Yes, sir, it is.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to page 83 in the English,
24 B/C/S page 74.
25 Q. Okay. We see this is the section of -- can you basically tell
1 us, briefly, what this is, this report I've just mentioned?
2 A. It was customary for every unit of the Army of the
3 Republika Srpska, on an annual basis, to do what is essentially a
4 self-evaluation of their combat capabilities and abilities. This
5 particular report represents the analysis that the Main Staff did of
6 their own capabilities for the prior year, 1992. As part of laying out
7 their analysis of their capabilities, where they've performed well, where
8 they've not performed well, the report lays out all of the relative
9 functions that the army and, by definition, the Main Staff manage. This
10 particular section here deals with the functions both under intelligence
11 and security that the Main Staff Sector for Intelligence and
12 Security Support has. It details the issues involved in setting up the
13 various sectors, individuals -- who they're needing to recruit to man
14 these sectors, as well as all of the other problems involved with where
15 they were in 1992, starting an army from, essentially, scratch as well as
16 projecting out how well they've done and where they're going in the
18 Q. Okay. Before we get into the intel and security section briefly:
19 Do you recall if there's anything in this document related to the use of
20 Main Staff senior officers at combat fronts? I may have that mixed up
21 with another document. I just -- you had talked about that earlier, and
22 I just wondered if you remembered that at all.
23 A. If I recall correctly, in this particular document, under a
24 section entitled "Command and Control," it does talk about the issue,
25 that it was viewed as a positive that at critical areas of the
1 battle-front Main Staff personnel showed up in order to monitor the
2 situation. As I indicated before, it was a fairly prevalent practice
3 during the war for that to occur.
4 Q. And, Mr. Butler, I know it's getting late, but you said they just
5 showed up. Do you want to clarify that?
6 A. Obviously, they are not accidental tourists. They're sent there
7 by the Main Staff, by the Main Staff's commander, in order to monitor the
8 activities that are going on, to synchronise those with the goals and
9 objectives of the Main Staff, to ensure that the corps is handling the
10 situation in the manner that they wish it to be handled. And if there
11 are problems, the physical presence of a Main Staff general there can
12 help deal with any potential de-conflictions or other problems as they
13 arise. It should be noted that when one looks at the combat activities
14 that occur, more often than not it's not just a single corps that is
15 involved. Some of these operations will involve two or even three corps
16 co-ordinating against a single strategic or an operational objective. So
17 having a Main Staff general officer or senior officer at a forward
18 location, forward command post, is very beneficial in being able to
19 ensure that everything is de-conflicted as it needs to be and that the
20 activities of those multiple corps formations are appropriately
22 Q. What's "de-conflicted" mean?
23 A. In a military sense, as part of the orders process, various
24 units, various roads, various objectives are all allocated to the units
25 that are participating in them. Where things can get problematic is that
1 after an operation has commenced, and as forces are moving forward or
2 achieving their objectives, and as new objectives are designated, there
3 will be a certain competition between the military forces as to who can
4 use what roads or who has priority over what ammunition or other
5 resources. So as an operation continues underway, there is a certain
6 amount of de-confliction that has to take place, where the senior
7 headquarters determines what are the primary objectives, which military
8 formation is going to achieve those objectives, and what other military
9 formations are going to support the achievement of those objectives, how
10 much resources that they're going to get, and who is the priority of
11 effort for getting those resources. It's just part of assuring that
12 military operations are undertaken as efficiently and as effectively as
13 possible, given the logistics and other constraints on them.
14 Q. Okay. Let's deal briefly with -- we see that we're at the
15 Intel and Security section, "Intelligence Support," paragraph 5.1.
16 Let's go to the next page in English. It's page 75 in the
18 Just one line down at the bottom of the page:
19 "The Department for Intelligence and Security Affairs circulated
20 instructions on the interrogation of prisoners of war to the relevant
21 organs in subordinated units."
22 Is this action described here consistent with your knowledge of
23 how the rules should work, that the intelligence unit would be involved
24 in instructions on the interrogations of prisoners of war?
25 A. Yes, sir, it would.
1 Q. Let's go to the next page - 76 in Serbian, 85 in the English -
2 just to show that this is the beginning of the security support section.
3 And if we could go to page 88, and page 78 in the Serbian, just in the
4 middle of the page again. Just one sentence I want to ask you about. It
6 "A particular problem, especially at the tactical level, is the
7 leakage of confidential military data by radio communications."
8 So in your view, as early as 1992, what do you think they are
9 concerned with? What is this problem of leakage? How is it leaking?
10 A. Because of a shortage of cryptologic security, keys and
11 equipment, particularly at the lower unit levels, it was recognised very
12 early on that the enemy was gaining valuable intelligence about the VRS
13 and their immediate intentions during operations by listening to
14 individuals talking over lines that are not secure. The obvious easy way
15 to solve that problem is to secure the communications, but in 1992 and
16 throughout the war, the VRS generally did not have access to the
17 equipment necessary to do that. So they had to assume the risk, as it
18 were, of using equipment that was not secured, in light of the fact that
19 they still had to effectively manage command and control of their
20 military formations. So they did their best to education their people
21 that their communications were subject to intercept, but at times of
22 stress or at other periods of times, I mean, it was unavoidable that
23 valuable information would leak to the enemy.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this document into evidence.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received. And I take it you're only
1 referring to those pages which are included in the binder, starting with
2 page 83 and the cover pages.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: That is correct, Mr. President. It is fully
4 translated in English, and if the Defence would like it all in, I have no
5 objection. But I think for our purposes, this should -- this should
7 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to invite the Prosecution to up-load
9 those parts of this whole document you are really tendering in a separate
10 document, and for today we mark it for identification. It will then be
11 received as a separate document after up-loading.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 397 shall be
13 assigned Exhibit P2491, and that exhibit number is assigned to the whole
14 document containing 142 pages in B/C/S. Thank you.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That was not the intention. That wasn't --
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It should be only marked for identification, the
18 whole document. And after up-loading the relevant parts, it will be
19 received as a separate document with this number. Thank you very much.
20 Please carry on.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Understood, Mr. President.
22 Q. Mr. Butler, I'm still on the topic of intel and security areas
23 and how it works. You've talked a bit about counter-intelligence.
24 Can we go to 65 ter 2224.
25 And this is a document that I know you're familiar with from the
1 20th of April, 1995, from the Command of the Drina Corps
2 Security Department, under the name of its chief, which is on the
3 second page in English, but I think we can just stay there. We should be
4 able to see it at the bottom of the Serbian,
5 Lieutenant General Vujadin Popovic. And it's to various brigades, we can
6 see, of the Drina Corps. And it says, and I'll just paraphrase: that
7 they have a reliable source that there has been an assassination
8 contracted on General Mladic and General Tolimir, and then it issues
9 various measures.
10 Where, if anywhere, would this kind of work or threat fit into
11 the task of the intel and security branch or organ?
12 A. This would be a classical counter-intelligence task.
13 Q. And can you tell from this whether this is a threat from the
14 enemy or a threat from inside the Republika Srpska?
15 A. My understanding, given the context of it occurring after the
16 50th session of the RS, this is a threat from inside the
17 Republika Srpska.
18 Q. And we see number 4:
19 "The Security Administration has designated this case operative
20 action 'Judas.'"
21 Does that support what you just said, just what they named it?
22 A. Code-names aren't supposed to give away the actual context of the
23 operation, but certainly in this case it tends to support the idea that
24 various members of the political side of the government might have
25 contracted out the assassination of these two members.
1 Q. Now, for something to be considered in the realm of
2 counter-intelligence, does it matter whether it's an internal threat,
3 like this document shows, or an external threat from the enemy?
4 A. No, sir, it would not.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to P2216, and I'm talking
6 about the -- some of the practices of the Security and
7 Intel Administration.
8 Q. And this is a -- as it will come up, a long document that I don't
9 intend to get into a lot of detail for you. The Court's seen it before.
10 But it's dated 18 March 1995, to the commander of the Main Staff and to
11 the assistant commander for Security and Intelligence of the Main Staff.
12 So that would be - I'm sure there's an agreement - General Mladic and
13 General Tolimir; is that correct?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. And we're a ways from there and I don't think we need to go to it
16 in the computer, but at the end of this we see that this is in the name
17 of the chief, Colonel Ljubisa Beara.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please wait a moment, because the
19 Registrar is struggling with some problems with the documents.
20 Now we have the document on the screen.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
22 Q. So we see this document that, apparently, from the face of it,
23 Colonel Beara has written to General Mladic and General Tolimir and to
24 the commands of the -- we see the various corps and others, entitled
25 "Analysis of the Situation in the Military Police Units of the Army of
1 Republika Srpska." And does the -- the various advice, recommendations,
2 comments set forth by Colonel Beara, is that consistent with your
3 understanding of how his job should work in relation to supervising the
4 work of military police forces throughout the VRS?
5 A. Yes, sir. And, in fact, if one looks at the English-language
6 version on page 2, it notes that this report follows inspections by -- or
7 of these particular units, and that the results of these inspections,
8 they're now doing an analysis to identify all of the various issues
9 related to the manning, use and employment. These are, again, the
10 typical functions that the security branch would have in this regard.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we can go to page 3 in the English, and
12 it's page -- it should be page 2 in the B/C/S.
13 Q. We see a handwritten section in this where someone has written in
14 hand addressed to Toso. Would that be the same Toso, the same
15 General Tolimir that you identified earlier?
16 A. Yes, sir, it would.
17 Q. And from the context of this, do you have an opinion on who would
18 be writing to Toso, to Tolimir, like this and saying it's a disgrace to
19 have a soldier commanding a unit after three years and such things,
20 commenting on the report of Beara?
21 A. Given the context of the particular comments, it would have to be
22 a military officer who's superior to General Tolimir. So that leaves you
23 either General Mladic, as the commander of the Main Staff, or
24 General Milovanovic, as the deputy commander of the Main Staff.
25 Q. All right. And I note, in my review of this document, I did not
1 see any references to the military police and the detention or
2 transportation or the securing of prisoners of war. Would that suggest
3 that the military police would not have those responsibilities?
4 A. No, sir. It simply suggests that within the context of this
5 particular report, that particular -- that particular issue was not
6 considered to be a problem at the time.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I see that that's already in
8 evidence, so let's go now to --
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you go to the next one, I have to come
10 back to 65 ter 2224. This is not in evidence yet you have used before.
11 Are you tendering it?
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Thank you for catching that, Mr. President.
13 Yes, I -- it was my intention to, and I just missed it. Thank you.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2224 shall be
16 assigned Exhibit P2492. Thank you.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I'm also informed by Ms. Stewart that
18 65 ter 7438 is now in e-court. I think it was given P2490.
19 THE REGISTRAR: And it has been updated in the e-court. Thank
20 you, Your Honours.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: So if we could now go to P1971.
22 Q. Still on the topic of the basic responsibilities of security
23 organs, we see another document from Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic,
24 the Drina Corps Command. This is dated 18 July 1995. We see it's to the
25 brigades that we know are part of the Drina Corps, and other units,
1 entitled "Dealing with reporter crews." And it talks about a large
2 number of foreign and domestic reporters expected to come, and how to
3 deal with them.
4 Is this -- does this document reflect, in your view, a normal
5 responsibility for a security officer such as Vujadin Popovic?
6 A. Yes, sir, it would.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to 65 ter 2223.
8 Q. This is another document from Colonel Popovic of the Drina Corps.
9 This one is 7 February 1995, and we can see he's sending it to the
10 brigades. And it's also entitled -- well, it's entitled "Command of the
11 Military Police," and it has various comments and suggestions in this,
12 and tasks.
13 Does this reflect a normal relationship of a security officer
14 with the military police in the brigades and in his -- and in the corps
16 A. Yes, sir. In fact, if one looks at the information that is in
17 that Main Staff report, I suspect one would find that this request for
18 the brigades' military -- to report about their military police, then
19 gets turn around and sent up to the Main Staff and is part of the
20 information they would analyse before making their observations. So this
21 is all part of -- within that military police, part of that technical
22 chain where requests are sent down and information is passed back up.
23 Q. And, again, if this is read carefully, you will not see any
24 references to prisoners of war. Does that have any significance to you
25 relating to whether or not security and MPs would have dealings with
1 prisoners of war in the normal course or as part of their job?
2 A. No, sir. Again, it reflects the fact that particularly this late
3 in the war, there's still a problem, structurally, with the military
4 police of the VRS, in that rather than being allowed to focus on
5 traditional military police tasks, they are still very often being used
6 in a combat environment as a military infantry unit because of shortages
7 of manpower in other units. So as part of identifying, you know, these
8 types of issues, as well as equipment shortages related to the military
9 police, this is all part of an effort by the Main Staff to try and get
10 military police units re-oriented back on their traditional functions
11 rather than have to be used as emergency infantrymen in combat locations.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I offer this document into evidence.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2223 shall be
15 assigned Exhibit P2493. Thank you.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: And now on the same topic, if we could go to
18 Q. And as it's coming up, I'll note this is another document from
19 the Drina Corps Command Security Department. This is 15 -- dated
20 "15/4/1995," to the various brigades and intelligence and security organ
21 heads, again from Chief Major Vujadin Popovic. It says "Major" in the
22 English translation. I'm not sure that's correct, but it's -- let me
23 just ask you about it.
24 It's entitled "Arrest and detention of POWs and other persons,
25 instruction." So now we have a specific reference to POWs. Let's look a
1 bit down it. I won't read all of it.
2 It says that:
3 "We received a telegram, strictly confidential ..." from the VRS
4 Security administration which outlines procedures during the detention or
5 arrest of persons violating rules and regulations, and says that:
6 "We submit to you the instructions in full."
7 And it says:
8 "Inform military police units with the instruction and act upon
9 the provisions listed."
10 And it begins, and I won't go through all of it, but it says:
11 "Based on information we received, negligent behaviour has been
12 noticed towards POWs from the moment they are captured to the moment they
13 are taken to Batkovic collection centre or to another place of detention,
14 as well as during detention itself."
15 And then it says:
16 "Namely, our soldiers often make captured enemy soldiers walk
17 along the front-line, then take them to the command posts for
18 interrogation. They drive them through the territory. They are held in
19 the barracks ..."
20 Then they're soon exchanged.
21 So what's the basic concern in this document that led to these
22 instructions being provided?
23 A. The concern is that even though these individuals are being
24 captured as prisoners, the way that they are being handled is exposing
25 the prisoner to information that would be of detriment to the VRS when
1 the individual is ultimately exchanged. The fact that an individual is a
2 prisoner of war doesn't mean that that person is not capable of knowing
3 where he is, ascertaining the locations of command posts or the names of
4 individuals within those command posts, the locations of other military
5 equipment or facilities, as part of his routine handling and processing
6 in interrogation, and that that information would be of value to the
7 other side when the prisoner is exchanged. So in this context, they're
8 directing them how to modify their handling procedures, or, more
9 accurately, how to enforce proper handling procedures so that after a
10 prisoner is captured, he's not inadvertently afforded the opportunity to
11 collect information sensitive to the VRS.
12 Q. If we look at page 2 of the English - it's under paragraph 2 of
13 the instructions in the document, so I think it's the next page in the
14 Serbian - and I won't, again, read all of it. We can see the various
15 things they're talking about the MPs are to do with the prisoners, and
16 make sure they're handcuffed and their hands are tied.
17 Then in the middle of paragraph 2, it says:
18 "The location where POWs are collected must be such that the
19 prisoners are fully secured, as well as the people from the security
20 organ, from the intelligence organ and the military police organ that
21 engages in the interrogation and guards the POWs."
22 Does this instruction reflect the actual practice of the MPs and
23 the security organs working in the securing of prisoners and the like?
24 A. Yes, sir. It reflects the fact that those particular elements
25 are -- have various responsibilities during this process.
1 Q. A last question. I believe it's been suggested in some of the
2 questioning by the Defence that it was the logistics branch that had
3 primary responsibility or significant responsibility for prisoners of
4 war. Is that correct, in your view?
5 A. The logistics or rear services branch would have a significant
6 role in feeding, water, life support, medical support, if necessary, to a
7 prisoner, but the logistics branch obviously would not have the expertise
8 necessary to interrogate a particular prisoner in that sense. I mean,
9 again, all partners -- all sections of the military have various roles
10 and responsibilities, so, I mean, they are a -- the logistics branch does
11 have a role, but it certainly wouldn't be engaged in roles outside its
12 area of competence, such as counter-intelligence or trying to gain
13 information from a prisoner.
14 Q. Or how about securing them, overseeing the securing and the
15 transport of them?
16 A. That falls more within the competence of the military police, in
17 so much as they would be securing the prisoners, as well as military
18 police traffic units, which would actually organise the convoys,
19 although, obviously, the rear services or logistics branch would provide
20 the physical vehicles and fuel necessary to move them. It's a
21 collaborative effort.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. I believe we're a little past break time,
23 Mr. President.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We must have our second break now, and we will
25 resume quarter past 6.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 5.47 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 6.18 p.m.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
5 Mr. President, 65 ter 397, that large document that you
6 mentioned, we have picked out the relevant pages, which is now
7 65 ter 7453, but it's been MFI'd as P2491. So we have the relevant pages
8 in e-court now.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Very good. And this one should now be received
10 as an exhibit, I think with the same number, P2491, if there is no
11 concern by Mr. Registrar.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: P2491 is no longer MFI'd. It's now used for the
14 up-loaded portion of the whole document.
15 Please go ahead.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Staying on this topic of security and
17 intel for now, the Drina Corps has -- as we've been going over
18 Colonel Popovic, let's go to 65 ter 5292, which, if we just all take a
19 look at that front page, is -- says "Analysis of Combat Readiness of the
20 Drina Corps for Each Element of the B/G for 1994."
21 Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Butler, briefly, what this analysis document
23 A. In a manner similar to the 1992 analysis done by the Main Staff,
24 this is an example of an analysis done by a corps-level command. In this
25 case, it was the Drina Corps, and it was the analysis of their work in
1 1994, published in January 1995.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Let's go to page 17 in the English and
3 page 16 in the B/C/S. This is just to get us on to the correct chapter,
4 which should be Chapter -- I think it should be Chapter 6. As we see,
5 the Serbian is correct. The English is wrong, in terms of the number.
6 So that's where their section begins, and I just want to go to
7 the next page. The B/C/S should be 16 and may catch 17 as well, and it's
8 page 18 in English.
9 Q. I want to just ask you briefly about this paragraph. We see, in
10 the middle of the page in the English, and it begins:
11 "Electronic surveillance in the Drina Corps ..."
12 And it just talks a bit about their electronic surveillance,
13 which the Trial Chamber has heard a lot about the BiH electronic
14 surveillance. But what I really want to ask you about is the section
15 that says:
16 "Intelligence data obtained by interrogating prisoners of war and
17 defectors constitutes the main element in information about the enemy,
18 his strength, composition, artillery support and intentions."
19 So we see this under the intelligence and security support.
20 Would this fit in according to the rules that you're aware of and
21 according to the basic procedures and guide-lines that you've been
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And it goes on to say:
25 "The processing of prisoners of war is being approached very
1 professionally and responsibly, with information being presented to the
2 commands and units in whose zone of responsibility the work is being
4 And, again, this is under the security section, working with
5 prisoners of war. Does that conform to the rules and practices as the
6 security organs should be involved in?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this analysis, this
9 document, into evidence.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received into evidence.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 5292 shall be
12 assigned Exhibit P2494. Thank you.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. And now I want to change gears a bit.
14 Q. And we get away from our discussion of the rules of command,
15 security, and intel organs, and some of the practical applications, as
16 we've seen, and get back or into the narrative of documents that relate
17 to this area that you have reviewed and have talked about in your
18 testimony and your narrative.
19 And could we start with -- I believe I see it as 65 ter 29.
20 And this, we can see, is from the Main Staff of the Army of
21 Republika Srpska, dated 19 November 1992, and it's entitled "Directive
22 for further operations of the Army of Republika Srpska," to the commander
23 and chief of staff personally, Directive Operational 4.
24 Mr. Butler, is this a document you've had a chance to study and
25 review over the years.
1 A. Yes, sir, I have.
2 Q. Now, it says "Directive number 4." Are you aware of other
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Can you tell us, to your knowledge, what are these directives?
6 And just for everyone's knowledge, if we -- if we looked at the end of
7 this particular directive, I believe we would see that it is drafted by
8 General Milovanovic, but it's in the name of Commander Lieutenant
9 General Ratko Mladic. So at this level, what are these directives? And
10 just tell us, roughly, do you know how many there were throughout the
11 war, just roughly?
12 A. If I recall correctly, there were a total of nine what's known as
13 strategic directives that were issued at various points during the armed
14 conflict. In general, what these documents are is they help define the
15 operational context of how the political will of the RS leadership is
16 being translated into broader military objectives. For example, you have
17 the six strategic objectives that we've talked about previously. What
18 you have, then, at this level of the military is more detailed planning
19 documents which lay out, in more concrete terms, how the army intends to
20 achieve those objectives as the conflict situation changes over various
21 points in time. In some cases, the directive had a life of, perhaps,
22 three or four months before it was superseded. In other cases, a
23 directive might have been valid for a year before it needed to be
24 superseded again, depending on the situation. So these are very
25 strategic documents that outline the military's conduct of the war.
1 Q. And as we begin to -- if we leaf through this, we see that
2 they -- it appears to go -- there's a paragraph 5 on page 4 of the
3 English, and on page 10 or 11, but it just says: "The task of the units"
4 and it starts with the 1st Krajina Corps, goes to the 2nd Krajina Corps,
5 then goes to the East Bosnia Corps. So on page 5 of the English, page 11
6 of the B/C/S, we get to the Drina Corps.
7 So how is -- can you explain why they go in by corps? What does
8 this have to do with the individual corps, this document?
9 A. The corps are the highest-level combat component of the Army of
10 the Republika Srpska. Obviously, their activities are controlled by the
11 Main Staff, but the Main Staff is just that, it's a staff. It's not a
12 combat command. It doesn't project combat power. That is done by the
13 corps commands. So while the Main Staff, you know, will direct how the
14 operations are to be done, the reality is that it will be the corps
15 commands who will have to fight those battles and achieve those
16 objectives in their designated zones.
17 Q. Okay. So we're at the Drina Corps, and recalling that this
18 document is dated 19 November 1992, we look at this, and it says:
19 "... from its present positions, its main forces shall
20 persistently defend Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while
21 the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region ..."
22 And the wider Podrinje region, would that include the Srebrenica
24 A. Yes, sir, it would.
25 Q. It says:
1 "... the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict
2 the heaviest possible losses on him, and force him to leave Birac, Zepa
3 and Gorazde ..."
4 I'll stop there for a minute.
5 Anything against the rules of the VRS or the rules, that you're
6 aware of, of the Geneva Conventions about exhausting the enemy and
7 inflicting the heaviest possible losses on him? Any issue you see there?
8 A. Not to that point, sir.
9 Q. And it says.
10 "... force him," meaning the enemy, "to leave the Birac, Zepa and
11 Gorazde areas ..."
12 Do you recall this Birac area, what area that includes?
13 A. It's Birac area would include, for example, the area of Sekovici,
14 Western Zvornik municipality, it would include Vlasenica. It's a part of
15 the upper Podrinje area -- I'm sorry, lower Podrinje area.
16 Q. All right. And then this line, well:
17 "... inflict the heaviest loss on him," meaning the enemy, "and
18 force him to leave the Birac, Zepa and Gorazde areas together with the
19 Muslim population."
20 How do you read that? What do you read that to mean?
21 A. As it's written, it reflects the fact that not only were the
22 military forces viewed to be a target for attack, but in this particular
23 context, so was the Muslim population.
24 Q. And what do you believe the intention was towards the Muslim
25 population, based on this document?
1 A. They wanted to significantly reduce the Muslim population that
2 was living in that area. At the time, even this late in 1992, the Muslim
3 population was still the dominant population group in these various
5 Q. Well, can you be more specific? When it says force him to leave
6 these areas together with the Muslim population, what is he saying, in
7 your view, about what to do with the Muslim population?
8 A. What he's saying is, essentially, they want to create whatever
9 conditions are required in order to force the Muslim population to flee
10 from those areas.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I offer this into evidence.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received as an exhibit.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 29 shall be
14 assigned Exhibit P2495. Thank you.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, if we could go to the next exhibit,
16 65 ter 2220.
17 Q. And as we're waiting for it to come up: We'll see it's dated a
18 few days after the last document. This is 24 November 1992, and this is
19 from the Drina Corps Command. And if we look at the last page in English
20 and in the Serbian, we'll see that this is in the name of the commander
21 of the Drina Corps, Milenko Zivanovic. And this is "Decision for Further
22 Operations," is the title, and it's to, in particular, the Zvornik
23 Light Infantry Brigade Command, personally to the commander or the chief
24 of staff.
25 MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm on the first page. Excuse me. If we
1 could -- thank you.
2 Q. And I want to direct your attention to the top of the page, where
3 it says:
4 "Pursuant to Directive of the Main Staff of the Army of
5 Republika Srpska Strictly Confidential 02/5 of 19 November 1992, and an
6 assessment of the situation, I have decided:"
7 This reference, is that related to the document we just saw?
8 A. If one looks at the document that we just saw, which is, I guess,
9 Prosecution Exhibit 29, we'll see Strictly Confidential 02/5, dated
10 19 November. Now, for some reason the document from the Drina Corps
11 Command does not include the "-210" in it.
12 Q. But, otherwise, do you think they're connected?
13 A. Yes, sir, I do.
14 Q. All right. In this first sentence:
15 "Launch an attack using the main body of troops and major
16 equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust
17 them, break them up or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim
18 local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and
20 How do you relate this sentence to the similar one where I read
21 that talked about the Birac and Podrinje regions?
22 A. Geographically, the area that he's talking about encompasses
23 those regions. From a command perspective, this is the corps commander
24 taking the general guidance that he has received from the Main Staff,
25 doing his own personal assessment, and then issuing his more detailed
1 orders to his subordinates to implement, so it clearly reflects the fact
2 that General -- or at that time Colonel Zivanovic, as the corps
3 commander, you know, understands the specific intent of the broader
4 document that -- you know, the broader guidance that's included in
5 Directive 4 and that he's making his supplemental orders down to his
6 brigades for implementation. This is, in a way, how the command staff
7 process works.
8 Q. So this statement, "enforce the Muslim local population to
9 abandon," these areas, based on your knowledge of the military rules that
10 we've gone over, the laws of the Geneva Conventions that we've gone over,
11 can there be anything legitimate in a statement in this decision by
12 General Zivanovic to force the Muslim local population to abandon the
14 A. According to the SFRY rules, and the application of those rules
15 on the armed forces, they clearly note that, you know, civilians are not
16 to be the objects of attacks. It's hard to square that particular
17 regulation and application of law against this particular directive,
18 where Colonel Zivanovic is making it clear that the intention is to force
19 the local Muslim population to abandon their home region.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this -- oh, it's P --
21 this document is P2434, I see, so it's already in evidence.
22 Let's go to the next document, 65 ter 688.
23 Q. And, again, we're still in 1992 and 1993, but did you look
24 through any documents to find any outline of what may have -- what
25 military activity may have occurred in the region just described by
1 General Zivanovic?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And can you tell us what this is that we see on our screen? We
4 see a Cyrillic picture of something.
5 A. Yes, sir. This is the copy -- or that's the front cover of what
6 is known as "Drinski" magazine, which in June of 1995 was being published
7 on a monthly basis by the Zvornik Infantry Brigade as an informational
8 product to the soldiers and the local municipality, promoting the
9 activities and the members of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Can we go to B/C/S page 6. It should
11 be page 2 in the English.
12 Q. Now, this is a section in the magazine. It's entitled
13 "Liberation of the Podrinje." Can you tell us what this is and how this
14 fit into your narrative or your knowledge of the area, and understanding
15 it's just a magazine?
16 A. Well, sir, the fact that it's just a magazine doesn't mean that
17 it does not have information of intelligence value, which is why we
18 looked at it first, along with other documents. But in this particular
19 article, as it discusses the three years of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade,
20 one of the most significant military actions that the Zvornik Brigade had
21 fought into up to date was what they called the liberation of the
22 Podrinje or Drina Valley area. And so as part of their discussion on
23 their unit history, they laid out in some detail what activities the unit
24 was involved in at that time.
25 Q. And from your review of materials, this and others, were you able
1 to determine whether or not there were combat actions that were taken
2 pursuant to General Zivanovic's decision that we just saw based on --
3 from November of 1992?
4 A. Yes, sir. Combat actions were initiated on that, and, frankly,
5 the first month, month and a half of combat did not go well for the
6 Bosnian Serb military forces. It was not until February of 1993 that the
7 military tide turned in favour of the Bosnian Serb military forces and
8 they were able to render a number of significant military defeats on the
9 Muslim forces in those areas and eventually force them out of large
10 portions of those areas.
11 Q. Can you very briefly describe to us -- you've talked about the
12 military defeats. Where, if anywhere, did the civilian population that
13 was the subject of General Zivanovic's decision -- where did those people
14 go, those Muslims from the areas that was described by General Zivanovic?
15 A. Generally, the Muslim population who were in that broader area
16 went in two different directions. Those that could, as a result of
17 geography and when weather permitted, essentially went due west and made
18 their way to ABiH lines near Tuzla, and effectively left that region
19 entirely. Those individuals who were further to the south or could not,
20 because of weather concerns, get out - it was a very bitter winter that
21 particular winter and a lot of snow fell, causing a lot of problems - in
22 fact went south and ultimately ended up in Srebrenica.
23 Q. Can you briefly describe your understanding of the conditions
24 that led to the creation of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves? Just
1 A. As February and March rolled -- 1993 rolled around, the
2 Drina Corps militarily had been able to eliminate most of the Bosnian
3 Muslim military presence north of the Konjevic Polje-Milici-Vlasenica
4 road, that area that's generally referred to as Cerska or Erdut. They
5 then -- as they began working their way back towards Bratunac and
6 Srebrenica, they slowly compressed the Muslim military forces, as well as
7 the accompanying civilian population, back into Srebrenica from the
8 north. At the same time, there were military operations coming up the
9 road from Skelani and the south, essentially squeezing the Muslim
10 military forces that were left there, as well as the Muslim civilian
11 population, into a pocket in and around the town of Srebrenica, which by
12 then was the last stronghold of the Bosnian Muslims from that area.
13 Q. And when did this situation reach its peak?
14 A. I believe it reached its peak in early May -- either late April
15 or early May, and it was when it developed into a rather large
16 humanitarian crisis is when you saw General Morillon made his unilateral
17 declaration of that area being a UN-protected safe area. Initially, the
18 plan was that -- or the plan was by the VRS to try to evacuate civilians
19 out. Approximately 8.000 of them were able to get out before that plan
20 fell apart, when the BiH government didn't want to de-populate the area
21 anymore, and then, under the circumstances, General Morillon felt he had
22 no choice but to make that, you know, declared safe area.
23 Q. And after Morillon's personal involvement, did the UN, itself,
24 follow up, the Security Council, with the formal designations?
25 A. Yes, sir, first in Srebrenica, and then supplemental declarations
1 were made that covered Zepa and other safe areas.
2 Q. And are those events described, in part, in your report?
3 A. I do discuss them to a limited degree in my report. However,
4 I think the best source of information on that I incorporated in my
5 report is the reference, which is the United Nations' own report on the
6 Srebrenica safe area, which I believe was published in 1999.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would offer this 65 ter 688 into evidence.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I need a clarification.
9 We have four pages' translation into English, but many different
10 articles in B/C/S.
11 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was told by Mr. Registrar that only pages 8 and
13 9 of the original B/C/S, which are translated, should be offered and
14 received into evidence. Is that your understanding as well?
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. And if you see the English
16 translation, it says "page 8 and 9," and the title is "The Third
17 Anniversary." I believe what they've done is they've just translated
18 that particular article on the third anniversary of the Zvornik Brigade
19 which gave that historical background, and so that's all that we were
20 offering in this particular segment.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. This will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 688 shall be
23 assigned Exhibit P2496. Thank you.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. And if we could now go to
25 65 ter 1979.
1 Q. Mr. Butler, we see that on the first page of this, we have a
2 document from the Main Staff to the corps, entitled "Combat Order for the
3 Liberation of Zepa and Gorazde." It's a long document. If we look
4 towards the end of it, we'll see that it was drafted by Colonel Miletic,
5 in the name of the deputy commander, General Milovanovic.
6 Can you just -- we see that it's May 1993, around that
7 time-period you've just spoken to. Can you just briefly put this in
8 context? Is this something that actually happened?
9 A. It was an attempt to make it happen. What you see is very
10 quickly, regarding Srebrenica, the VRS then attempted to move and take
11 down Muslim military and civilian populations in Zepa and Gorazde,
12 perhaps anticipating that they, too, at some point would be covered under
13 some form of a safe area, and so this reflects the combat order for that.
14 I'm not sure that -- given the timing, that significant combat activities
15 took place, because I believe it was within a week or two that the next
16 declaration of safe areas which will cover these two went into play. But
17 this reflects the plan to do just that.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would offer this document into evidence.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1979 shall be
21 assigned Exhibit P2497. Thank you.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, this is the end of the first
23 binder, and it's probably a good place to stop for the night. And I will
24 continue in the morning, if that's --
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We're looking forward to the next two binders we
1 will deal with tomorrow and perhaps after tomorrow.
2 Indeed, we should adjourn for the day and resume tomorrow, in the
3 morning, at 9.00 in this courtroom.
4 Mr. McCloskey.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we give -- excuse me. Could we give
6 Mr. Butler binder 2 for his review/study? It's the binder that we gave
7 to him already, but he hasn't really been able to have it. So everyone
8 knows what it is. I think it's binder number 2.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: With the assistance of the Court Usher, he shall.
10 And binder number 1 shall be given back to the Prosecution, I suppose.
11 Thank you very much. The binders were exchanged.
12 We adjourn for the day.
13 And I have to remind you, again, please, no contact to either
14 party about the content of your testimony during the break.
15 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We adjourn.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.57 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of July,
20 2011, at 9.00 a.m.