Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16385

 1                           Monday, 11 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

 6             I think there is nothing to discuss before the witness enters the

 7     courtroom.  The witness should be brought in, please.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, Mr. Butler.  Welcome back to the

11     courtroom.

12             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, sir.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell

14     the truth still applies.

15             Mr. McCloskey is continuing his examination-in-chief.

16             You have the floor, Mr. McCloskey.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

18             Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours, everyone,

19     Mr. Butler.

20             Could we start with P125.

21                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]

22        Q.   And as we are waiting:  We are still on the topic of prisoners

23     and documents and materials specifically related to General Tolimir and

24     that subject.  We had just talked about the document from

25     General Tolimir, where he briefly mentioned the able-bodied men being

Page 16386

 1     evacuated, in his words, from Potocari, and we had a brief discussion of

 2     a Popovic document on that same topic.

 3             And now continuing on the topic of prisoners, and we now see a

 4     document that the Court has seen many times, so I hope not to spend too

 5     much time with it.  It's the 13 July proposal from General Tolimir and

 6     from Borike, at 1400 hours, which we all know is in the Zepa area, and

 7     it's to the commander of the Main Staff - I'm sure we'll all agree that's

 8     General Mladic - and for his information, the assistant commander for

 9     Morale, Religious and Legal Affairs of the Main Staff.  Can you remind us

10     who that is?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

12             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone is switched off.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May there be peace on this house,

15     and may these proceedings end according to God's will.

16             The Prosecutor said that I was the one who sent this document.

17     Could the Prosecutor please give us a reference, because I'd like us to

18     be able to see from the document, itself, whether it was, indeed, me who

19     sent this document, or, in the alternative, if Mr. McCloskey cannot

20     confirm this, then this should be stricken out of the transcript.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps there is a misunderstanding.

22             Mr. McCloskey.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  If I said "sent" in the terms of actually

24     sending it, that would have been incorrect.  It would have been more

25     correct to say that this was a proposal from General Tolimir to

Page 16387

 1     General Mladic.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We see, in the transcript, page 2, lines 5 to 6:

 3             "... it's the 13th July proposal from General Tolimir and from

 4     Borike, at 1400 hours ..."

 5             That was the relevant sentence.

 6             Mr. Tolimir.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 8             The Prosecutor again said that this was General Tolimir's

 9     proposal to General Mladic.  Could he tell us on the basis of what he

10     claims this, and whether Tolimir signed any of this, and whether there is

11     any document confirming that this was, indeed, the case?  Otherwise, it

12     should be just deleted out of the transcript.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  I think the general is very familiar with

15     the Prosecution's position on this, and I really -- and we know he's

16     questioning the authenticity, but I'm just talking about, right now, the

17     document, on its face.  And we can see, on its face, that it's to the

18     commander of the Main Staff, and it's saying, on the fourth line in the

19     English "assistant commander for security and intelligence affairs of the

20     Main Staff proposes the following measures:"  So really what I'm doing

21     is, I'm just saying we see this document, it's dated the 13th, it's to

22     Mladic, it's a proposal from the assistant commander for security and

23     intelligence.  I hadn't gotten to that part yet, but I was going to ask

24     Mr. Butler to tell us who the assistant commander for morale was, or

25     remind us.  And if it's going to be an issue, I can ask him who the

Page 16388

 1     assistant commander for security and intelligence is.

 2             So we're just talking about the document.  I think the Court is

 3     fully aware of the authenticity arguments.  It's not something I really

 4     intended to go into with this witness in any great degree.  I just want

 5     to get some of the basic information that's in it and ask Mr. Butler

 6     about that.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We all recall that Witness Savcic testified about

 8     this document, and it was his position that he didn't sign this or a

 9     similar document, if I'm not mistaken in my recollection.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I think that's correct, and no one is

11     suggesting that anyone signed this.  I would, of course, take you back to

12     the witness whose initials are on this as the person who sent it and who

13     identified their inked initials on the original to go into that subject.

14     But, really, that subject of authenticity, inked originals, who signed

15     what, wide open for cross-examination, but I think I -- I didn't want to

16     get into that with this witness on this document.  We've got many more to

17     go, so I hadn't gotten there with him, and I didn't really intend to.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And you are referring now to Witness Gojkovic.

19     There was some dispute if there was a forward command post, IKM, at this

20     location.  But, nevertheless, we have the document in front of us, and

21     I think the Prosecutor may use this document in putting it to the witness

22     and asking questions.  We don't know yet the questions.  You should wait

23     for what kind of questions he will put to the witness, Mr. Tolimir.

24             Mr. Tolimir.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have no problem with

Page 16389

 1     the Prosecutor putting questions to the witness the entire day about this

 2     document, but he should not premise it with the words that this is a

 3     document coming from the assistant commander because this is a document

 4     from an unauthorised source.  And we've shown here -- we've proven that

 5     it's not an authentic document, that it didn't go through the coded

 6     messages system, and I believe that we need to have an expert who can

 7     actually speak to the handwriting on the document, itself, as well.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, the position of the Defence in

 9     relation to this document, you may take this into account as you, of

10     course, do, and please continue your questions.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   Mr. Butler, can you remind us --

13             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, I gave now the floor to Mr. McCloskey.  Your

15     position is clear on the record.  The position of the Prosecution is also

16     on the record.  I would like to ask Mr. McCloskey to continue with his

17     questions.  There is no need to repeat your position.  We have it on the

18     record.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to address you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do not wish to

22     repeat my position here.  I just would like the Trial Chamber to order

23     that that portion of the transcript, where it says -- where

24     General Tolimir's name is mentioned, and saying that it's his proposal, I

25     would just like that to be deleted out of the transcript because it's not

Page 16390

 1     true.  I would like what is not true to be deleted from the transcript,

 2     because if it cannot be proven by any documents or in any other manner,

 3     then it's not true.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you know that the transcript is a

 5     clear reflection of what was said in the courtroom, and Mr. McCloskey

 6     said that, notwithstanding if that was true or not.  Your name is not

 7     mentioned in this document.  That is very clear, that is his assumption,

 8     but we cannot delete anything from the record.  It's a clear reflection

 9     of what was said in the courtroom.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To make a long story short, I would like to read

12     this relevant part of the document into the record.  I quote:

13             "Assistant commander for security and intelligence affairs of the

14     Main Staff of the VRS proposes the following measures:"

15             It's clear that the name of Mr. Tolimir is not included in this

16     document, and, Mr. McCloskey, I would kindly ask you to rephrase your

17     question.  But it was not a question yet.  You have put something on the

18     record, and then you wanted to put a question which was not answered yet.

19             Mr. Tolimir, it is technically not possible and it would be

20     against our Rules to delete anything from the transcript.  The transcript

21     is a clear reflection also of different statements in the courtroom.

22     They may be correct or not correct, but we can't delete anything.

23             Mr. McCloskey, please continue.  We all agree that the name of

24     Mr. Tolimir is not mentioned in this document.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  And, Mr. President, I think the general's

Page 16391

 1     thinking that I am making some kind of a conclusion here or some sort of

 2     analysis, when, in fact, I'm just fundamentally repeating what is in the

 3     document.  And I'm sure General Tolimir is not challenging that he or

 4     someone else is the assistant commander for security and intelligence,

 5     but I -- and -- but I will take, of course, all of that into

 6     consideration.

 7        Q.   But, Mr. Butler, can you remind us, if you know, who the

 8     assistant commander for Morale, Religious and Legal Affairs for the

 9     Main Staff is, the second person in this address on this document?

10        A.   That individual would be General Gvero.

11        Q.   All right.  And then the next person on the list of addressees is

12     commander of the Military Police Battalion of the

13     65th Protection Regiment.  Do you recall who that was at the time?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  That commander was Major Zoran Malinic.

15        Q.   All right.  And then we see in the first paragraph that there is

16     a reference that says:

17             "There are over 1.000 members of the former 28th Division of the

18     so-called BiH Army captured in the area of Dusanovo (Kasaba).  Prisoners

19     are under the control of the Military Police Battalion of the

20     65th Protection Regiment."

21             These over 1.000 members referred to here in this document, of

22     the 28th Division, where, in your view, are they coming from, and who are

23     they?

24        A.   These particular individuals would be those members of the column

25     who were either captured by or surrendered to the army and police forces

Page 16392

 1     along the road between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995.

 2        Q.   All right.  In the next line we see:

 3             "Assistant commander for Security and Intelligence Affairs of the

 4     GS VRS proposes the following measures:"

 5             Who was the assistant commander for Security and Intel Affairs of

 6     the Main Staff in July of 1995?

 7        A.   That would be General Tolimir, sir.

 8        Q.   And given that this statement says the "assistant commander for

 9     Security and Intelligence Affairs," et cetera, "proposes the following

10     measures," and then we see four measures:  Militarily, if General Tolimir

11     is making this proposal, would this document be an indication that

12     General Tolimir was aware of the 1.000 prisoners referred to in the first

13     line of this document?

14        A.   Yes, sir, it would have to be.

15        Q.   Why?

16        A.   As part of any process by which an officer makes a proposal to

17     his superior, that officer is expected to have some knowledge of the

18     situation in order to make the most intelligent proposals possible.  It

19     doesn't do a commander or a decision-maker any service to have proposals

20     which aren't grounded in reality sent to him for his potential decision.

21     So in this context, he knows about the number of prisoners and their

22     location as well as the impacts of -- that these prisoners at that

23     location might have on other potential issues which he addresses in the

24     specifics of the things that he is proposing.

25        Q.   If General Tolimir is, in fact, in the area of Borike or the Zepa

Page 16393

 1     theatre at around 1400 hours, as we see in this document, why would he be

 2     dealing with issues related to Srebrenica Muslims if he is dealing with

 3     issues related to Zepa, which I think he'll agree the 13th was the day

 4     before the major attack on Zepa, which was the 14th?

 5        A.   Certainly, as a general and the assistant commander for Security

 6     and Intelligence of the Main Staff, General Tolimir is going to have the

 7     ability to multitask.  These are issues, as they are occurring on the

 8     13th of July, that are of some significance not only to the Drina Corps,

 9     but to the army, in general.  The idea that General Tolimir could only

10     focus on a narrow aspect of Zepa, to the exclusion of military events

11     happening in other areas of the country, doesn't seem to be, you know,

12     within the context of his job as the overall head of Intelligence and

13     Security for the army.  He wouldn't set those duties aside just to focus

14     on one particular function.

15        Q.   And as we look at - and I won't go over all of them, the Court's

16     seen them - the four points of this document, are they consistent with

17     his job as assistant commander for Security and Intel?

18        A.   With respect to points 1, 2 and 3 -- I'm sorry, points 1 and 2,

19     those would be completely consistent with his position.  Point 3, given

20     the fact that the document is entitled and it is signed by Colonel Savcic

21     seems to be a point that Colonel Savcic, as the superior of Major

22     Malinic, would be directing the Military Police Battalion commander, as

23     is point 4, where he's telling the battalion commander who receives the

24     order to make contact with other individuals and then verify that the

25     proposals have been accepted.  So in this context, you see

Page 16394

 1     General Tolimir's giving out proposals which were in line with his

 2     position, and the actual commander of the 65th Protection Regiment giving

 3     orders to his subordinate, which is in line with his position.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could you please repeat the name of the commander

 5     of the Military Police Battalion?  It was not recorded.

 6             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, sir.  That would be Major Zoran Malinic.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 8             Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And can you tell from this document who made the

10     comment or proposal or order to -- in number 3, to -- and referring -- it

11     says:

12             "... shall take measures to remove the war prisoners from the

13     main Milici-Zvornik road," and the part I'm asking you about is "place

14     them somewhere indoors or an area protected from observation from the

15     ground or the air."

16             Now, if this is a proposal, who, if you can tell, would have made

17     this proposal?

18        A.   Well, sir, with regard to point 3, I don't know that I read that

19     as a proposal.  It inflects that the commander of the Military Police

20     Battalion shall take measures directive in nature, so in the context I

21     would say that that point 3 would be directed by Colonel Savcic, as Major

22     Malinic's immediate superior.

23        Q.   All right.  And would -- in the context of this document,

24     should -- let me say:  Should General Tolimir have been aware of that

25     order?

Page 16395

 1        A.   Yes, sir.

 2        Q.   And given the context, if he is aware of the order, can you give

 3     your interpretation on whether or not he would have agreed with that

 4     order or approved it?

 5        A.   Since these first two -- since, first, the document is titled

 6     "Dealing with procedures for treatment," and points 1 and 2 deal with

 7     prohibiting access particularly to unauthorised individuals filming and

 8     photographing prisoners, point 3 would be consistent with that earlier

 9     guidance.

10        Q.   But my question is:  Should General Tolimir have approved --

11     would he have approved this order from Savcic?

12        A.   Given that it's -- I'm sorry.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please continue your answer.

14             THE WITNESS:  Given that it is consistent with his guidance, I

15     would say yes, sir.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, these questions and

18     answers, based on a document not signed by Savcic, not recognised by

19     Savcic, so a document by an imaginary author to the chief of staff, are

20     being asked by Mr. McCloskey in the form of hypothetical questions, Would

21     he approve?  How can we know whether I would or would not approve

22     something that was not signed?  And a Prosecution witness said here

23     before the Court that he did not sign it.  I kindly ask you to disallow

24     these hypothetical questions that are not based on any real grounds, not

25     to allow speculation.

Page 16396

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, this document, as you'll recall,

 3     is in court.  You have seen the original.  It was part of the Drina Corps

 4     collection, as you'll recall, from Tomasz Blaszczyk's testimony.

 5     Danko Gojkovic testified that on this document were his inked initials,

 6     and that, while he didn't remember this document in particular, this

 7     meant that this document was something that he would have sent over the

 8     telecommunications system.  We have had an expert that has found other

 9     typewritten documents and found that this particular document matched

10     those typewritten documents, so if this is some forgery, there are other

11     forgeries from the same typewriter.  It's the position of the Prosecution

12     that this is an absolutely genuine document reflecting a genuine

13     proposal.  And I completely understand the general and why he is

14     challenging this, and that he is challenging it, as is his right, but

15     there is certainly a firm foundation from this document that is in

16     evidence that it is real and true.  And the fact that in wartime someone

17     doesn't sign a document or someone puts their name in place of someone

18     else when they're asking for a proposal, you've heard evidence on that.

19     Things like this happen in war.  It's our view that this is absolutely

20     genuine and these questions are appropriate.

21             This is an argument for a later day, in my view, but since the

22     general has made it, I'm giving you mine.  But I think there is certainly

23     enough genuine, solid evidence for Mr. Butler to give us his military

24     view on these issues.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm not interpreting your lines of questions as a

Page 16397

 1     way to authenticate this document.  I understand your line of questions

 2     in a different way: that you try to find out the areas of responsibility

 3     of certain members of the VRS, in relation to possible orders reflected

 4     in such a document, who would be responsible for certain orders.  The

 5     Chamber is aware of the fact that there are different testimonies of

 6     witnesses in relation to this document; Witness Malinic,

 7     Witness Gojkovic, Witness Savcic.  It is for the Chamber to decide, at

 8     the end of the day, if anybody can rely on this document or not.  This is

 9     not the day to do that now.

10             Discussing speculation, you could say, Mr. Tolimir, that every

11     answer from this witness is speculation because he was not an eye-witness

12     and he was not on the ground.  He provides his testimony, and we have to

13     be aware of this fact, on the basis of studying material.  This is the

14     basis of his expert opinion which is used by the Prosecution.  And,

15     Mr. Tolimir, you have every right to challenge the testimony, and you

16     will have the opportunity, during your cross-examination, to do that also

17     in relation to this document or in relation to the answers given by this

18     witness in relation to the content of this document.

19             Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:

21        Q.   Mr. Butler, we see again from the document that there is a time

22     on it, 1400 hours, in the top left, and at the bottom it says:

23     "Delivered at 1510 hours."  This would be the 13th of July, and it's, of

24     course, talking about over 1.000 prisoners at Kasaba.  Are you aware,

25     from your knowledge of the investigation, whether or not by the evening

Page 16398

 1     of 13 July there were more prisoners in the area from Nova Kasaba along

 2     the road towards Bratunac?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, I'm aware from the investigation that through the

 4     course of the day, the number of prisoners that were being captured

 5     between Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje and further down towards Bratunac,

 6     including Sandici, by the end of that day probably numbered at least

 7     2.000, and on subsequent days those numbers increased.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now, in reviewing and studying and analysing this

 9     document, did you find any documents by General Mladic that you felt were

10     related to this document?

11        A.   Shortly after these proposals are made, there is a document from

12     the Main Staff, under the signature of General Mladic, where those

13     various -- I believe it's under the signature of General Mladic.  I'm not

14     sure if it's personally his or -- or perhaps just another officer at this

15     juncture, but where these proposals are, in fact, accepted, some of them

16     are modified, and orders are sent out to subordinate formations of the

17     Drina Corps and other units.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to the next document, P655,

19     the next tab.

20        Q.   This document, we see, is dated 13 July, and we see a "Received"

21     stamp of 2250 hours, 13 July, up in the right-hand corner.  And if we

22     look at the -- well, we can look at the original B/C/S and see that it's

23     in the name of Commander Colonel General Ratko Mladic, and that stamp is

24     dated the 14th of July.

25             Now, in your view, in taking a look at this document entitled

Page 16399

 1     "Preventing leakage of military secrets in the area of combat

 2     operations - order," and it says:

 3             "In order to ensure the organised conduct of planned combat

 4     operations and other activities in the general sector of Srebrenica and

 5     Zepa, and in order to prevent the leakage of confidential information

 6     classified as military secrets, I hereby order:"

 7             And then various things.

 8             Is this, in your view, at all related to the previous document?

 9        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

10        Q.   And on what do you base that?

11        A.   If one were to look at the actual steps of the order, it

12     discusses which various roads, for example, in points 2 and 3, which

13     various roads are to be closed, except for military and police traffic,

14     where check-points are to be set up, and point 5 discussing a ban on

15     giving out any information on activities in that area, particularly

16     related to prisoners of war, evacuated civilians, escapees and similar,

17     so I believe that these particular directions are, to a large degree,

18     based on the recommendations of General Tolimir, as outlined in that last

19     order we discussed or last document we discussed.

20        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next document, which is the same

21     time-frame, but I just want to ask you briefly something about it.  It is

22     65 ter 43.  It should be under tab 21, another 13 July document with a

23     stamp at the back of 1335 hours.  But it is, as we can see, from the

24     Main Staff, and it's to the Command of the Drina Corps and the various

25     brigades, entitled "Order to prevent the passage of Muslim groups towards

Page 16400

 1     Tuzla and Kladanj."  And we see that it describes what is now familiar

 2     facts to us; the Muslims going through the area and, as we can see, an

 3     order to engage people, to protect the Serbian area, to capture the

 4     disarmed Muslims -- to capture and disarm Muslims, et cetera.  I won't go

 5     into the detail.

 6             We get to number 7, which is page 2 in the English.  It's a note

 7     that says:

 8             "Use secure channels to communicate information about captured or

 9     blocked groups."

10             And then number 8:

11             "Send interim reports with specific details of the situation in

12     the area of responsibility of all units so that the corps command and

13     Main Staff can act in a timely manner."

14             And this is in the name of Assistant Commander Lieutenant

15     General Milan Gvero.

16             Now, what, if anything, can you make of the fact that

17     General Gvero is sending this direction -- or, excuse me, order?  It's

18     actually entitled "Order."

19        A.   Well, as I've discussed in earlier testimony, those senior

20     officers who are performing their duties are not going to be issuing

21     orders that are outside of their particular competence to issue.  In this

22     particular case, you know, General Gvero, for whatever reason, has

23     obviously been empowered, presumably by General Mladic, to issue this

24     order.  It may very well be, in part, that at the time, with the absence

25     of General Milovanovic, he is the senior official at the Main Staff,

Page 16401

 1     assuming at this time General Mladic isn't there and General Miletic may

 2     or may not be otherwise occupied, so General Gvero could give out this

 3     order.  I take it the fact that General Gvero has issued the order, and

 4     that the order is properly accepted by the subordinate units, that at the

 5     time it was issued no one questioned whether or not General Gvero was

 6     authorised to make such an instruction.

 7        Q.   Where would this order indicate that General Gvero was at the

 8     time it was made?

 9        A.   It would indicate that he's at the physical location of the

10     Main Staff.

11        Q.   If we assume, for the purpose of this question, that on the

12     evening of -- or, excuse me, the afternoon of 13 July, that

13     General Mladic is still in the Bratunac/Srebrenica area, and

14     General Tolimir is in the Zepa/Borike area, and General Milovanovic is in

15     the -- out in the West Krajina area, does that fit with your conclusion

16     or counter it in some way?

17        A.   No, sir.  I believe that is very consistent with what I've

18     indicated.  For example, on the 9th and 10th of July, General Gvero was

19     at the IKM at Pribicevac to, in part, take a look at what was happening

20     with the Srebrenica operation.  The pattern of the Main Staff sending its

21     generals to various combat locations to do -- and observe various issues

22     is one that is seen throughout the conflict.  From a command-and-control

23     perspective, it certainly is a prudent practice.  So, I mean, I don't see

24     anything inconsistent about that at all, sir.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer this 65 ter 43 into evidence.

Page 16402

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 43 shall be

 3     assigned Exhibit P2487.  Thank you.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Now staying on our topic of 13 July

 5     and prisoners, the location of prisoners, the knowledge of prisoners, if

 6     we could go to P4136.  Excuse me, that may be a 65 ter number.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We haven't received more than 4.000 documents

 8     yet.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10             And, I'm sorry, that's P413B, as in "Bravo."

11                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told it's confidential and should not be

13     broadcast.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

15        Q.   And this, as we're getting to it, Mr. Butler, is a 2nd Corps

16     intercept, dated 13 July, at -- we should have the one at 1730 hours.

17     And I believe this is an intercept you're familiar with and have talked

18     about before.  Is that correct?

19        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt you for a moment.

21             Judge Nyambe has a question.

22             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  I just wanted a clarification.

23             At page 17, lines 14 through to 19, you have stated that:

24             "For example, on the 9th and 10th of July, General Gvero was at

25     the IKM to, in part, take part and look at what was happening in the

Page 16403

 1     Srebrenica operation."

 2             How do you come to know this fact?  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS:  There is one particular document, and I believe

 4     it's dated the 9th of July, that is sent to the IKM Pribicevac, and it is

 5     addressed to both General Krstic and General Gvero, which reflects

 6     General Gvero -- that the people who are sending him that document are

 7     aware that he is physically present at that location.

 8             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, Your Honours, much of what

11     I'm doing is a chronology of the events, so these documents are there,

12     and I'm sure we'll get to July 9th sooner than later.  And, of course,

13     Mr. Butler jumped the chronology slightly, which, of course, is going to

14     happen as he's answering questions.  But just to let you know, we will be

15     in the chronology that should help us there.

16        Q.   All right.  So this, we see, is X and Y, and it starts out:

17             "Is it possible for us to send about a dozen buses from

18     Bijeljina?"

19             Then Y says:

20             "Call them to come immediately.  There are now about 6.000 of

21     these."

22             And then X says:

23             "Fit for military service."

24             Y says:

25             "Quiet, don't repeat."

Page 16404

 1             X says:

 2             "All right, then I am to send."

 3             And it goes on.  We best go over in English on the computer.  And

 4     it talks about:

 5             "Go ahead, send.  I have three check-points, fuck.  I have the

 6     one where you and I were when there is up there where the check-point at

 7     the junction is, and there is halfway from the check-point to the

 8     boarding point."

 9             It goes on to say, Y says:

10             "According to a rough estimate, there are 1500 to 2.000 in each

11     place."

12             X says:

13             "And are they still transporting those women and children?"

14             And it goes on to talk about some information.  It mentions that

15     X says, after a few lines:

16             "So I am sending them, and they are to report there in the Kasaba

17     at the back."

18             Then Y says:

19             "They should report to the stadium."

20             Then there's talk about Kundasevic and Radakovic collecting.  The

21     last few lines:

22             "Fine.  They are to drive away and come back."

23             Y says:

24             "They are to drive until they disappear."

25             X says:  "Fine, okay."

Page 16405

 1             So let's go back to the beginning.

 2             Have you -- in your analysis, did you make any conclusions about

 3     what this reference to "6.000 of these" were in this context of where X

 4     says "fit for military service," and Y says:  "Quiet, don't repeat"?

 5     What do you make of that?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  The two correspondents on the intercept are discussing

 7     their estimates of the number of military-aged Muslim men who are being

 8     captured or who are surrendering to the VRS at various locations.

 9        Q.   All right.  And can you make out -- well, do you know, from the

10     investigation -- this says that there are -- the first line on the next

11     page in English:

12             "I have three check-points ..."

13             It mentions a check-point at a junction.  It mentions Kasaba and

14     a stadium.  Can you -- do you recall, were there any assembly points that

15     revealed themselves from the investigation that are all consistent or

16     inconsistent with the comments in this intercept?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, from my work with the investigation years ago,

18     we were able to note and verify that there was certainly one check-point

19     at the intersection of Konjevic Polje on the Nova Kasaba road, there is a

20     second check-point a few kilometres to the north-west of Bratunac along

21     the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, and I believe that there is a third

22     check-point somewhere around where the 65th Protection Regiment's

23     military police unit were.  I'm sure of the two check-points along

24     Bratunac and Konjevic Polje.  The third one I seem to recall, but it's

25     been a few years since that one.  But there were a number of check-points

Page 16406

 1     there that were designed to stop civilian traffic from going into the

 2     area, so that part is consistent with my knowledge.

 3        Q.   How about assembly points for prisoners on the 13th?

 4        A.   Again, based on my work with the investigation, I'm aware that on

 5     the 13th, prisoners were assembled at the -- on the soccer pitch at

 6     Nova Kasaba.  There was a smaller assembly of prisoners in

 7     Konjevic Polje, at the school location there.  There was a large number

 8     of prisoners assembled on the meadow at Sandici, and they were later

 9     taken down to Privica [phoen].  So, again, those assembly points are

10     consistent with this intercept as well.

11        Q.   So if this intercept and the other evidence in the case is

12     roughly correct that there are now 4.000 to 6.000 prisoners at this time

13     that are being collected, is this information that -- and that goes up

14     from the 13 July proposal that we saw.  Would this increased

15     information -- should that go to General Tolimir, the chief of Intel and

16     Security?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, given the staggering number of prison ers

18     being captured, I can't see how he would not be notified of that fact.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer -- this is in evidence.

20     This has a P number.

21             All right.  Let's go now to D49, another document that everyone

22     has seen many times.  I know Mr. Butler has.  I don't want to deal with

23     it at length.

24        Q.   But we see here a document that says it's from the Command of the

25     1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade.  Remind us the town associated with

Page 16407

 1     that brigade.

 2        A.   That would be Rogatica, sir.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And we see that it's in the name of Assistant Commander

 4     Major General Zdravko Tolimir, and it's to the Army of Republika Srpska

 5     Main Staff, to General Gvero personally.  Now -- and it's entitled

 6     "Accommodation of prisoners of war," which they abbreviate "r/z" and

 7     says:

 8             "If you are unable to find adequate accommodation for all r/z's

 9     from Srebrenica, we hereby inform you that space," with a word that we've

10     learned has to do with beds and cots of some sort, "has been arranged for

11     800 prisoners of war in the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade in

12     Sjemec."

13             Now, we see that General Tolimir has addressed this personally to

14     General Gvero.  What, if anything, do you make of that?

15        A.   Again, part of that practice, he knows where General Gvero is and

16     that he's engaged in these types of issues, and he wants to ensure that

17     this particular proposal that he's making goes directly to General Gvero.

18        Q.   We see a stamp dated 2230 hours.  Do you recall that at the late

19     evening of 13 July, where most of the known prisoners from Srebrenica

20     were being held?

21        A.   During that period, based on the investigation and survivor

22     accounts, at that particular time most of the prisoners were being held

23     in either facilities in Bratunac, various schools there or hangars, or

24     they were actually in buses, in trucks, parked in front of other

25     locations where they could be more easily guarded.

Page 16408

 1        Q.   And in those locations, could any of those individuals in those

 2     vehicles or schools be seen from the air?

 3        A.   Certainly, when -- I believe, as part of various exhibits that

 4     have been tendered in other trials, we've seen overhead imagery of

 5     clusters of buses in and around Bratunac on 13 July, so they are readily

 6     visible.

 7        Q.   But are the people visible that are being held in those buses?

 8        A.   I don't believe that they're looking through the tops of the

 9     buses, so I would say, at face value, no, the people would not be

10     visible.

11        Q.   All right.  Now, I want to, on this same topic, go ahead a few

12     days and ask you some questions about July 17th.

13             And if we could go to P554A.

14             And this is an intercept where it's the Prosecution's position

15     it's from 17 July, 2055 hours, and we see that it talks about Trivic,

16     telephone exchange, Colonel Jankovic.  And it starts out and says:

17             "It's Badem."

18             Do you remember what this term "Badem" is?

19        A.   Badem is the telephonic code word for the Bratunac Infantry

20     Brigade.

21        Q.   And so T says:

22             "Give me Colonel Jankovic."

23             Now, on 17 July, 2050 hours, are there any documents or

24     information that reveal who this Colonel Jankovic is?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  There is a document that reflects, when one looks back

Page 16409

 1     at 12 and 13 July previously, that Colonel Jankovic is a member of the

 2     Main Staff intelligence organ.  He is a subordinate of General Tolimir.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And then C says:

 4             "Just a second.  Zlatar, the extension is still busy."

 5             What is C, first of all, or who is C, if you can tell from this?

 6        A.   It's not exactly clear.  It might just be a switchboard operator.

 7        Q.   And what is Zlatar?

 8        A.   Zlatar is the telephonic code-name for the Drina Corps Command.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Then the intercept says:

10             "You have the colonel on the line."

11             T says:  "Hello."

12             And then now we have J:  "Yes, I'm listening."

13             And T says:  "Well, Jankovic ..."

14             So under this intercept, who should J be?

15        A.   One of the correspondents would be Colonel Jankovic.

16        Q.   All right.  And then it says:  "Yes?"

17             Jankovic says:  "Yes?"

18             T says:

19             "Listen here.  Miletic said," and then it's "...," so we don't

20     know what Miletic said."

21             Jankovic says:  "Yes."

22             T says:

23             "That you should write what you want to do."

24             Jankovic says:  "Yes."

25             T says:

Page 16410

 1             "And send it urgently by code up to Tolimir."

 2             Now, in this context, who is Tolimir in your view?

 3        A.   This would be General Tolimir.

 4        Q.   And then Jankovic says:

 5             "I'm in no position, man, to write.  I'm calling here, and there

 6     is ..."

 7             And T says:

 8             "Listen to what I'm telling you ..."

 9             Jankovic says:  "All right."

10             T says:

11             "And the commander will decide with Tolimir and send you a --"

12     and I think it may be "reply."

13             So in this context, what is Jankovic being told to do?

14        A.   He's being directed to make a proposal on how to deal with a

15     particular situation to his superior, General Tolimir, and that

16     General Tolimir, with the commander, will make a decision on how to move

17     forward with a particular course of action.

18        Q.   In your view, who would the commander be in this context?

19        A.   General Mladic.

20             MR. MCCLOSKEY:  Now, keeping in mind this is 2050 hours on the

21     17th, let's go to the next document, P2168.

22             Actually, could we go to the next page and get the handwritten

23     one to try to avoid an issue.  This, we can see, is a typewritten one

24     with Momir Nikolic's name in the bottom.  But could we go to the

25     handwritten one, which should be the next one.

Page 16411

 1             There we go.  And can we see the last page of the handwritten

 2     one.

 3             All right.  And we see the initials down there.

 4             Now, can we go to the translation for the handwritten one, if we

 5     have it.  It should be the next -- I think it's next to this English

 6     version, but the next English -- there we go.  Okay.  That's where we

 7     want to be.

 8        Q.   Now we do see a written document, and in your knowledge, who is

 9     this "RJ"?

10        A.   This is Colonel Radovan Jankovic.

11        Q.   Radovan?

12        A.   I'm sorry, Radoslav.  My mistake.

13        Q.   Okay.  It won't be the last that any of us make.

14             Now, we see the next day, after that conversation where he was

15     told to write something down, he's now, according to this, written

16     something to the Main Staff of the VRS and the Drina Corps Intelligence

17     and Security Department, called "Situation in the Srebrenica Region."  I

18     won't go through all of it, but we see, in point 1, it's talking about

19     the wounded Muslims from the 28th Division that were evacuated by the

20     ICRC, which the Court will remember some evidence on.  Number 2 talks

21     about the Dutch Battalion commander sending a message concerning the

22     evacuation of the Dutch.  Then number 3 talks about an MSF convoy that

23     arrived on the 18th, but was sent back for procedural reasons; and

24     there's a request that:

25             "Will you please use your influence to see to it that all UN and

Page 16412

 1     international organisation transports go via Ljubovija; otherwise, we'll

 2     have difficulties providing them with an escort."

 3             A logistic request, obviously.

 4             And this is what I want to ask you about, the question:

 5             "Will you please tell me what stand to take in terms of

 6     authorisation for evacuation of the international organisation MSF; in

 7     fact, how to deal with the so-called local staff?  This also applies to

 8     the interpreters of the Military Monitors and UNPROFOR."

 9             And it mentions that:

10             "The State Security has passed on to us an opinion that

11     President Karadzic had allegedly abolished all local staff who used to

12     work for UNPROFOR."

13             And Jankovic said:

14             "It is our opinion that they should not be held."

15             First of all, who do you think Jankovic is asking this question

16     to?  All we see is it's to the Main Staff, "ObP," the Intelligence and

17     Security Section.

18        A.   My opinion is he is asking General Tolimir for guidance in this

19     situation.

20        Q.   And if you know, do you recall who these MSF people are, the

21     local staff?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  I'm aware from my work with the investigation that

23     there was some issue related to whether or not the local staff members,

24     those individuals who are Bosnian Muslims but who were working with or in

25     support of both the United Nations observers and the MSF organisation, if

Page 16413

 1     they would be permitted to depart when those organisations left

 2     Srebrenica after the fall of the enclave.

 3        Q.   Do you recall whether these people were male or female?

 4        A.   They were a mixed number, but there was some -- there is a

 5     listing of them and a number of them are people who would be considered

 6     of military age from the Muslim side.

 7        Q.   All right.  So this is a document, and if we go --

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.  Judge Nyambe has a question.

 9             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I wonder if you could assist with some

10     clarification.

11             At page 28, line 13/14, you've stated just now that:

12             "My opinion is he is asking General Tolimir for guidance in this

13     situation."

14             I assume, and you may correct me if I'm wrong, that your opinion

15     arises from the document on the screen.  And if I'm correct, can you just

16     show us where this reference is made which leads you to this opinion or

17     conclusion?  Thanks.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes, ma'am.  It's actually a constructive opinion

19     not only based on this document, but based on the prior intercept that

20     was discussed, where the individual correspondents are discussing the

21     fact and Colonel Jankovic gets the guidance that he needs to write up

22     this proposal for General Tolimir.  I see the two documents, one exhibit

23     and then the follow-on document, they are linked.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I take the opportunity to ask you,

Page 16414

 1     Mr. McCloskey, about the two different documents, P2168 we have in the

 2     binder.  We have, of course, the original B/C/S, the handwritten version,

 3     but are these two English versions the translations of the handwritten

 4     and the typed version?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That is my understanding, and I believe that

 6     because we see the initials of "RJ" on the English version up on the

 7     screen, and we see the handwritten initials on the left side, and the

 8     other one is -- Momir Nikolic is on both of them.  And I know it goes a

 9     while back, but you'll remember the testimony of Momir Nikolic on this

10     point.  I can recall it -- well, Mr. Butler may remember it as well,

11     which may be more appropriate.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I see now that the second English page with the

13     initials "RJ" has, on top, an explanation:  "Handwritten document."  That

14     clarifies the situation.  Thank you very much.

15             Please carry on.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:

17        Q.   And, Mr. Butler, I just -- in going back to Judge Nyambe's

18     question, when this document, entitled "Situation in the Srebrenica

19     Region," when it's specifically addressed to the Main Staff Intelligence

20     and Security Sector, who, in your view, would that be?  Who is the

21     Intelligence and Security Sector?  Who would be the eyes that would see

22     it when a document like this was sent there?

23        A.   Well, sir, the head of the sector is General Tolimir.

24        Q.   And did that -- did you incorporate that fact into who Jankovic

25     was sending this to?

Page 16415

 1        A.   Yes, sir.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Now --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Could Mr. McCloskey please ask the witness to clarify whether

 8     General Tolimir, on the date as mentioned here, the 18th, was at the

 9     Main Staff, and if he did, did he know that this actually reached

10     General Tolimir?  On the basis of what is he claiming this?  Is that just

11     another supposition of his?

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  There are always two possibilities, Mr. Tolimir.

13     You may put these questions during your cross-examination, because it's

14     the right of Mr. McCloskey to put the question in a way he wants to do

15     it.  Or Mr. McCloskey may do it in accordance with your advice, but it's

16     up to Mr. McCloskey to decide.

17             Please continue.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

19        Q.   Mr. Butler, on the general's point -- no, I think I'll wait a few

20     questions.  I don't want to lose my train of thought on these documents,

21     and we'll come back to the general's concern.

22             MR. MCCLOSKEY:  If we could now go to 3070D.  That's a 65 ter.

23     It's an intercept -- excuse me, that's 3070A.  In the English, 3070 --

24     sorry, in the B/C/S, 3070A will do it.

25             And I want to go -- it's at the bottom there, between X and Y,

Page 16416

 1     and it's the position of the Prosecutor that this is 18 July at

 2     1617 hours and that there are -- the intercept documents show this, but I

 3     won't spend the time to do all that again.  It's been done.  And it says:

 4             "Y says that MSF appeared on the bridge with a permit to go to

 5     the UNPROFOR base to evacuate the personnel."

 6             "X says they cannot go through until they've checked with Toso,

 7     'who are they going to treat there'."

 8        Q.   And who, in your view, is this Toso?

 9        A.   I understand that "Toso" is a nickname for General Tolimir.

10        Q.   And this short intercept, do you connect it with any of the

11     documents we've just looked at?

12        A.   It reflects that these two unnamed correspondents have an

13     awareness that there is an issue with the MSF and that before anything

14     can occur, they are awaiting guidance from General Tolimir.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I offer that into evidence.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 3070A shall be

18     assigned Exhibit P2488.  Thank you.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So if we could go to P383A, and this is another

20     intercept.  The Court has seen this, and I know Mr. Butler has.  It's an

21     intercept that starts off with a note that Jankovic's voice was heard on

22     a certain channel and Colonel Djurdjic was heard at another frequency

23     between channels 3 and 4 at 1432 hours.

24             "Participants:  Jankovic and Colonel Djurdjic."

25        Q.   And can you remind us, if you know, who Colonel Djurdjic was at

Page 16417

 1     the time?

 2        A.   Colonel Djurdjic was a Main Staff officer who was the focal point

 3     for dealing with the UN and other international organisations.

 4        Q.   All right.  And we see Djurdjic saying:  "Is this Jankovic?"

 5             And Jankovic says:  "Speaking."

 6             Djurdjic says:  "Hello."

 7             Jankovic says:  "Speaking."

 8             Djurdjic identifies himself as:  "Colonel Djurdjic speaking."

 9             They go on for a bit.  Djurdjic refers to him as "Janko."

10             And then as we go down the page a little bit, Djurdjic said:

11             "Regarding what you were asking."

12             Jankovic says:  "Yes."

13             "The boss has ordered that they be halted."

14             And then we go down and we see more information regarding

15     Kristina Smit, a nurse that can go, and a person named Daniel O'Brian, a

16     physician.  And it goes on, which I will ask you about as it goes on, but

17     what do you think they are beginning to talk about here in this

18     intercept?

19        A.   This intercept discusses the authorisation for at least some

20     members of the MSF organisation that was there in Srebrenica to be given

21     permission to depart the former enclave.

22        Q.   Does this have anything to do with the previous documents that

23     you've spoken of?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  This is -- this document -- or this particular

25     intercept is related to the previous documents and intercepts that I've

Page 16418

 1     discussed.

 2        Q.   All right.  So they continue to talk.  Djurdjic, at the bottom of

 3     the page, says:

 4             "You hear me well?"

 5             Jankovic says:

 6             "I can hear you."

 7             Then let's go to the next page in the English, and I think we

 8     need to go to the next page in the Serbian as well.

 9             Djurdjic says:

10             "And only women and children can go.  Understand?"

11             Jankovic says:

12             "And what about these young men?"

13             Djurdjic says:  "Others.  No."

14             Then he says:

15             "I don't know.  They might require the whole group to go."

16             Now, I'm sorry, but if we could just go back to the first page

17     again.  I wanted to put in that context to get your opinion on that line

18     in the middle of the page, when Djurdjic said:

19             "Regarding what you were asking."

20             Jankovic says:  "Yes."

21             And Djurdjic says:

22             "The boss has ordered that they be halted."

23             Can you tell who Djurdjic is referring to when he says "the

24     boss"?

25        A.   Generally, when we see the phrase "the boss" in intercepts, it

Page 16419

 1     refers to the appropriate-level commander.  So in this particular

 2     context, I would say that "the boss" would probably be a reference to

 3     General Mladic.

 4        Q.   All right.  So let's go back to the second page, where Djurdjic,

 5     as we've noted, says:  "Others.  No."

 6             And then he says:

 7             "I don't know.  They might require the whole group to go."

 8             Jankovic -- all we get from there is an "E."  Djurdjic says:

 9     "Say again."

10             Jankovic says:

11             "That they will require, but they have the government's

12     permission for all of them to go."

13             Now, do you relate -- what do you believe that this comment from

14     Jankovic:  "They have the government's permission for all of them to go"?

15        A.   As you go down, in the context of the intercept it makes it clear

16     that there's a potential discrepancy between what Colonel Jankovic has

17     heard from -- or is hearing now from the army versus what he's heard

18     previously from civilian organs of the government.

19        Q.   And so as we go down there, and we see Djurdjic is getting upset,

20     he swears, and he says:

21             "Can we do this through the girl?  I have to ask her to act as

22     mediator here, and now I -- we can't, we can't, we're having a one-way

23     conversation."

24             Jankovic says:  "Listen."

25             Djurdjic says:  "Yes."

Page 16420

 1             Jankovic says:

 2             "So they have permission from the Koljevic government?"

 3             And Djurdjic says:  "Yes."

 4             Can you remind us who the Koljevic government is a reference to,

 5     in your view?

 6        A.   That's the civilian government of the RS at the time.  I'm not

 7     exactly sure how that places in with Karadzic as the supreme commander,

 8     but Koljevic is a high-ranking member of the civilian government.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.

10             Mr. President, do you want me to finish this intercept up - I've

11     noticed it's break time - or would you like to take the break now?

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It depends on the minutes you need for finishing

13     this document.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Maybe five, at the most, I hope.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think it's better to have a break.  Then you

16     are not under time pressure.

17             We must have our first break now, and we will resume in half an

18     hour, quarter past 4.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, sorry, but I have to take you back

22     again to the document behind tab 25, P2168.

23             Do you have any explanation -- perhaps we dealt with that in the

24     courtroom at an earlier stage.  I don't recall.  We have the B/C/S

25     handwritten version and the typed version.  The handwritten version has,

Page 16421

 1     at the end, "RJ," and the typed version, and this is reflected in the

 2     translations as well, the name "Captain Momir Nikolic."  I think

 3     Mr. Nikolic testified about that.  Can you just explain for today how you

 4     see this difference between "RJ" and "Captain Momir Nikolic"?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.

 6             And I recollect back to the testimony of Momir Nikolic, who, in

 7     my recollection, says that Radoslav Jankovic comes to the

 8     Bratunac Brigade around the 8th, 9th, or 10th and takes up residence in

 9     Momir Nikolic's office to do his work, and that Momir Nikolic, when shown

10     these documents, testified, basically, that this was a handwritten

11     document, the one with the initials, by Radoslav Jankovic that was taken

12     to the Communications Centre, and the Communications Centre, when typing

13     it up on the teleprinter, put Momir Nikolic's name because that's what

14     they were used to doing.  And so it went out under Momir Nikolic's name,

15     but it was a document that was drafted by Radoslav Jankovic.  And that's

16     at T -- transcript 12434 through 12435.  So that's the -- my

17     recollection, that's the fundamental reason why we -- why we see it the

18     way we see it, according to Momir Nikolic, which is the Prosecution's

19     position.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for reminding me.

21             Please carry on.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would also say that Radoslav Jankovic is not on

23     the Prosecution witness list, but I believe he does reside in Serbia.

24             All right.  Now, we're -- we should be still at the page 2 of the

25     English of this document.  We just -- he just described the Koljevic --

Page 16422

 1     we need to go back to the intercept, which should be --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  P383A.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Thank you.  Tab 27.

 4        Q.   And in the middle of the page, we see that Jankovic says they

 5     have permission from the Koljevic government, who you'd mentioned was, I

 6     believe, a member of the -- it's page 2 in both.

 7             Okay.  So Jankovic says they have permission from the

 8     Bosnian Serb government, according to what your knowledge is.

 9             Then Djurdjic says:  "Yes."

10             Jankovic says:

11             "That they can all go, they have a list."

12             Djurdjic says:

13             "Yes, I know, but ... here, man, I can see the names of a certain

14     Abdulah Kurtovic, Ibrahim Ibrahimovic ...."

15             Are those male or female names, to your knowledge?

16        A.   I believe those are male names, sir.

17        Q.   And then they go on and Jankovic says:  "Yes."

18             And then Djurdjic says:

19             "Muhidin Husic, Muhamed Hasic, Masic, Sahin Talovic,

20     Hajrudin Kurtic, Omer Talovic."

21             "Yes."

22             And Djurdjic says:  "Two, four, six, seven men."

23             Jankovic says:

24             "Yes, they are taking them as local staff, and they have the

25     permission from Karadz ... Koljevic."

Page 16423

 1             Djurdjic says:  "All right --"

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Slow down.  Some parts of your reading is

 3     missing.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think we need to go to the next page in the

 5     B/C/S.

 6        Q.   And Djurdjic says:

 7             "All right.  They have the permission, but you know that the

 8     procedure you, too, took part in ..."

 9             Jankovic says:  "Great."

10             Djurdjic says:  "Pardon?"

11             Jankovic:

12             "Great, if that's your position, it's good."

13             Now Djurdjic says:

14             "The procedure is such, God damn it, that it should be checked

15     whether those who ... are they able-bodied or older than 60?"

16             And Jankovic says:  "They are able-bodied."

17             Djurdjic says:  "They are?"

18             Jankovic says:  "Yes."

19             We need to go to the next page in English.

20             Djurdjic says:

21             "So that's the procedure.  And you saw what you left behind in

22     Bratunac the other day."

23             Jankovic says:  "Okay."

24             Djurdjic says:  "Am I right?"

25             Jankovic says:  "Okay."

Page 16424

 1             Then Djurdjic says:

 2             "And they, if they agree, let them go in their vehicles and take

 3     those women and children."

 4             And I'll ask you about the rest of this a bit later.  But what,

 5     in your view, is Djurdjic and Jankovic talking about when they're

 6     mentioning these Muslim names and Djurdjic is asking if they're

 7     able-bodied, older than 60?

 8        A.   Based on what had been occurring in the previous days, there was

 9     a process in place where, as men were coming into the custody of the army

10     and police at various locations, if they were considered to be

11     able-bodied, those between, roughly, 15 and 60, they were detained.  If

12     they were children, if they were older than 60, if they were infirm, they

13     were then allowed to board buses and trucks and be transported out of the

14     enclave.  So this is the process that I believe that they are referring

15     to.

16        Q.   So when Djurdjic says:  "So that's the procedure," what, in

17     particular, do you think he's talking about in relation to these

18     able-bodied men?

19        A.   The separation of the men.

20        Q.   And those men that were separated on 12 and 13 July from their

21     families in Potocari, what, as the investigation revealed, happened to

22     them?

23        A.   They were subsequently placed on buses and trucks and sent to the

24     Zvornik Brigade area, where they were -- or almost all of them were

25     executed in the subsequent days.

Page 16425

 1        Q.   Okay.  Let's continue on after Djurdjic confirms:

 2             "So that's the procedure.  And you saw what you left behind in

 3     Bratunac the other day."

 4             What do you think this reference "and you saw what you left

 5     behind in Bratunac the other day" -- what, if anything, to your

 6     knowledge, was left behind in Bratunac, in the context of this

 7     conversation?

 8        A.   When the men were separated, starting the 12th and 13th, they

 9     were -- after their separation in Potocari, they were then placed into

10     schools and other facilities in Bratunac.  Those were the men left

11     behind.  Those people who did not fit the criteria of able-bodied men

12     were allowed to be removed from the enclave.

13        Q.   Okay.  And I made reference to the comment about "vehicles, take

14     those women and children."  There's a reference to a little orphan.

15     Jankovic talks about two elderly persons.  Djurdjic says -- or it says:

16             "Yes.  Two elderly, let them go, let the elderly go."

17             Jankovic says:  "Okay."

18             And then Djurdjic says:

19             "Let the elderly go, and tonight, when Toso arrives, you and him

20     must make sure you consult some more, please."

21             Who do you believe Toso is in this intercept?

22        A.   General Tolimir, sir.

23        Q.   And then Jankovic says:

24             "All right, I will.  When is Toso coming?"

25             And Djurdjic says:

Page 16426

 1             "In the early evening."

 2             Now, can you tell, from these references to Tosomir [phoen] --

 3     General Tolimir, where he is arriving to?

 4        A.   In the context of who's saying it, it could be the Main Staff

 5     headquarters is what they're referring to, but it is not evidently clear

 6     whether they're referring to General Tolimir arriving at the Main Staff

 7     headquarters or Bratunac.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, if we could go to P2222.  If this could

 9     be --

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is, again, a confidential document.  It should

11     not be broadcast.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And out of an abundance of caution, could we go

13     into private session for just a few --

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- questions.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 16427

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.  Thank

16     you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

18             Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we could go to 65 ter 4044.

20             This may help with the question that General Tolimir had earlier

21     about 18 July, as we see that we have a document from the Main Staff of

22     the Republika Srpska Army, Intelligence and Security Sector, 18 July,

23     titled "Intelligence Information."

24             And if we could go to page 4 of the English, and I think it's

25     page 3 of the Serbian.

Page 16428

 1        Q.   We can see that it is in the name of General Tolimir, and it's

 2     drafted by someone with the initials -- I believe that's "MS."  Do you

 3     recall who that drafter might be?

 4        A.   I believe those initials correspond to Colonel Salapura.

 5        Q.   Does this -- and I think we can all just, as we flip through it,

 6     see that it's a detailed intel report about Muslim forces from various

 7     areas around Bosnia, including, on page 3 of the English, parts of the

 8     28th Muslim Division had pulled out from Srebrenica and deployed in the

 9     wider area of Zivinice.  I won't go into all this, but does this provide

10     you any guidance at all whether -- about the locations of General Tolimir

11     at that time?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  It tends to provide additional weight to my view that

13     at the time he's at the Main Staff headquarters, versus Bratunac.

14        Q.   All right.  Now, I want to continue on this topic where we have

15     General Tolimir involved, according to the Prosecution, with prisoner

16     issues, issues of MSF staff and others.

17             And can we go to P --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I ask one question, please.

19             Page 3 of the English, there's one short form which is "NDH," the

20     last paragraph, and also the longer paragraph in the middle.  Mr. Butler,

21     do you know what it stands for?

22             THE WITNESS:  No, sir, I do not.  I believe it is initials

23     relating to territory related to Croatia, but I can't give you the exact

24     translation of those initials.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

Page 16429

 1             Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer that document, 65 ter 4044,

 3     into evidence.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received as an exhibit.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 4044 shall be

 6     assigned Exhibit P2489.  Thank you.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So if we could have P2187 up there.

 8        Q.   And as we're waiting for it:  We see that this is the Main Staff

 9     of the VRS, Sector for Intelligence and Security, dated 29 July, saying

10     "Very Urgent," to the IKM of the Drina Corps, personally to

11     General Krstic, and Intelligence and Security at the Command of the

12     Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, and personally to Colonel Rajko Kusic

13     and Captain Pecanac.

14             Can you remind us who Rajko Kusic is, if you know?

15        A.   Rajko Kusic is the commander of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry

16     Brigade.

17        Q.   All right.  And it's entitled "Disarmament of the 1st Zepa

18     Brigade."

19             And if we could go to page 2 in the English.

20             We can see, at the top of the page, they're talking about

21     exchange of prisoners.  It should be that first page in the Serbian.  The

22     paragraph I want to ask you about, and we've seen this before,

23     General Tolimir says:

24             "Continue combat operations in order to surround and destroy the

25     1st Zepa Brigade until the Muslims make the exchange and carry out the

Page 16430

 1     agreement from 24 July related to their disarmament and surrender.  Take

 2     all necessary measures to prevent them from leaving the encirclement.  Do

 3     not register persons you capture before cessation of fire and do not

 4     report them to international organisations.  We are going to keep them

 5     for exchange in case the Muslims do not carry out the agreement or they

 6     manage to break through from the encirclement."

 7             Mr. Butler, are you aware of any military reason or any reason

 8     from the documents or materials of this case that would justify this

 9     line, this direction:

10             "Do not register persons you capture before cessation of fire and

11     do not report them to international organisations"?

12        A.   No, sir.

13        Q.   And does the next line, how do you -- can you explain the next

14     line?

15             "We are going to keep them for exchange in case the Muslims do

16     not carry out the agreement or they manage to break through from the

17     encirclement."

18             The first question:  Are there any Muslim -- any prisoners that

19     can be exchanged that have not been registered with the international

20     organisations?

21        A.   If one goes back to some of the previous documents that we

22     discussed, it makes it clear that General Tolimir's understanding is that

23     some individuals who haven't been registered aren't open to be exchanged

24     in the earlier years, 1993/1994.  If you're going to exchange prisoners

25     of war, you're going to do so, you have to have them at least registered,

Page 16431

 1     at a minimum, with international organisations, such as the Red Cross, so

 2     you can identify them and their numbers to start laying out your

 3     negotiating position as to how many you have captured and how many you

 4     wish to exchange.

 5        Q.   So what can you make, if anything, from this two sentences?

 6     First, he says, Do not register persons, and then he says, We're going to

 7     keep them for exchange in case the Muslims don't carry out their

 8     agreement or break through.

 9        A.   They appear to be contradictory sentences.  There's no logical

10     reason why you would not want to do it unless the goal was to keep the

11     prisoners, list them so you're aware of who they are, but deny that same

12     information to international organisations so they wouldn't know how many

13     prisoners you actually had captured.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to another document related

15     to this issue.  This document, I see, does not have a previous 65 ter

16     number.  The one we now have is 7438, 7438.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is there any objection to use -- to add this

18     document to the 65 ter exhibit list, Mr. Tolimir?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             We have no objection to any document that would confirm the

21     Prosecution case.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

23             Leave is granted to add it to the list.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

25        Q.   And, Mr. Butler, I won't read all this.  We can look at it

Page 16432

 1     ourselves.

 2             We're not there yet.  It should be on one page of English.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This should be 65 ter 7438.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Ms. Stewart tells me somehow it didn't get into

 5     e-court, but I hope it's in everyone's binders on tab 31.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think you should proceed on that basis, and we

 7     hope that it will be up-loaded into e-court soon.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I can put the B/C/S on the ELMO.  I'm not

 9     sure if the Defence has this.

10             Does the Defence have this document?  If they do --

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic is nodding.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

13        Q.   Mr. Butler, we can see that this --

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, if you could give a hard copy of

16     both versions, English and B/C/S, to the Registry if you are going to

17     tender this document.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  I planned on that, and I will do that, yes,

19     Your Honour.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

21             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm afraid I don't

22     have a printed copy of the document Mr. McCloskey intends to use.  I

23     would be grateful if he could just identify the document in some way.  I

24     have some documents that are not numbered.  If he could just remind us

25     what the document is about.

Page 16433

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This document is in the binder we all received,

 2     behind tab 31.

 3             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Precisely.  There is no document

 4     behind tab 31 in my binder.  That's why I'm on my feet.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In our binder, it's a document from the

 6     1st Krajina Corps Command, signed by a certain Momir Talic.  The date of

 7     this document seems to be the 26th of August, 1995.

 8             Mr. Gajic.

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I've just found it among my copies,

10     so we can continue.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   And, Mr. Butler, I see that you have that in front of you.  We

14     haven't heard a lot about the 1st Krajina Corps and General Talic.  Can

15     you just brief us, what you believe this document's about?

16        A.   The 1st Krajina Corps is -- was one of the six combat corps of

17     the Army of the Republika Srpska.  General Talic at the time was the

18     corps commander.  This particular document lays out General Talic's

19     awareness that a number of -- first, a number of Krajina Corps members

20     had been captured in the past and were in the custody of the ABiH, and

21     that his corps does not have enough captured ABiH members in order to

22     effect a trade for these prisoners.  So based on his knowledge that they

23     are capturing runaway groups of Muslim soldiers from Zepa and Srebrenica,

24     and the interests in the Tuzla Prisoner Commission to exchange for these

25     types of soldiers, General Talic is asking the chief of staff of the

Page 16434

 1     Drina Corps if certain prisoners from Zepa and Srebrenica can be

 2     transferred to the custody of the 1st Krajina Corps so these prisoners

 3     can then be subsequently transferred and exchanged for VRS prisoners.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this into evidence, and

 5     I --

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7438 shall be

 8     assigned Exhibit P2490.  Thank you.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go on, later in the year on

10     this same topic, to P2250, which, as we're waiting for it, you'll see

11     under tab 32 is another document from the Main Staff Intel and Security

12     Sector, dated 3 September, and it's to many of the corps; not all of

13     them.  And it's entitled "Exchange of Prisoners, Report."  And if we look

14     at the last page, we see that it's from Assistant Commander

15     Major General Zdravko Tolimir.

16             And I don't want to go through all of this report, but if we go

17     to page 2 in the English, it talks about the Main Staff approved

18     individual exchanges for the 1st KK and East Bosnia commissions on the

19     base of the "one-for-one" principle.  And it talks about the Muslims are

20     blocking all exchanges on the "all-for-all" principle and the

21     "one-for-one" principle, making it, and I quote in the third English

22     paragraph:

23             "... making it conditional that a larger number of Muslims from

24     the area of Srebrenica and Zepa be exchanged and the number of Muslims we

25     have in our prisons."

Page 16435

 1        Q.   Can you explain to us -- we've heard about this before, but

 2     what's going on here?

 3        A.   By this particular point in time, 3 September, both the

 4     Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves have long since fallen, and there is an

 5     issue between the number of prisoners that the Muslims claim must have

 6     been taken versus the number of Muslim prisoners that VRS is claiming

 7     that they have possession of in their prisons.  So this is the issues

 8     that they're trying to negotiate between the various prisoner

 9     commissions.

10        Q.   Can you explain to us the "one-to-one" and the "all-for-all," and

11     what you recall about how that worked over time, just briefly?

12        A.   Historically during the conflict, the VRS captured less prisoners

13     than the ABiH side did.  As a result, when one looks at the documents

14     from 1993, 1994, and early 1995, prior to Srebrenica, the VRS position

15     was an "all-for-all" exchange, that both sides would essentially swap the

16     amount of -- all of the prisoners that they had, in which case it didn't

17     matter that the VRS had a lesser number of prisoners.  The Muslim side,

18     for their part, trying to maximise the number of people they got back,

19     had always pushed more for a "one-for-one" exchange, knowing they had

20     more prisoners.  Post July 1995, you start to see switch-overs of that

21     position primarily because the Muslims believe now that the Bosnian Serb

22     side has a far greater number of prisoners from both Srebrenica and Zepa

23     than the Muslims are holding.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.

25             Now, if we could go to page 4 in the English.  It should be the

Page 16436

 1     last page in the B/C/S, above this signature block.  It should be the

 2     third paragraph up in Serbian.

 3        Q.   But I want to call your attention to the sentence that begins:

 4             "The Exchange Commission chairman must view the exchange proposal

 5     integrally, as does the Main Staff of the VRS, since so far the

 6     Main Staff has made the necessary number of prisoners available for the

 7     Corps Commissions in circumstances where they did not have a sufficient

 8     number of captured enemy soldiers to exchange for all the captured

 9     members of their corps.  Security organs and Exchange Commission chairmen

10     must also avoid using parents' bitterness because it is not possible to

11     exchange prisoners who have been in prison for quite some time,

12     particularly because the GS VRS is not responsible for this situation,

13     rather it is the result of the small number of enemy soldiers captured by

14     our units."

15             Now, General Tolimir says here, basically, that this situation

16     they're in is not the fault of the Main Staff, but rather it's the result

17     of the small number of enemy soldiers captured by "our units."

18             If we go back to the document of 13 July, where, in the document

19     under Savcic's name, the assistant commander for Intel and Security is

20     mentioned, and there is an acknowledgment of over 1.000 prisoners in the

21     area of Kasaba.  There is also an acknowledgement in General Tolimir's

22     12 July document of able-bodied Muslim men being "evacuated," in quotes,

23     from Potocari.

24             And if we take into account the prisoners captured along the road

25     near Kravica, Konjevic Polje, how do you explain, if you can,

Page 16437

 1     General Tolimir saying that it's the "result of the small number of enemy

 2     soldiers captured by our units"?

 3        A.   With respect to the other corps units, it is a sense of

 4     frustration and admonishment that he's telling those corps that, You

 5     haven't captured enough people to make favourable exchanges with people

 6     from your own corps that have been captured.  In the case of the

 7     Drina Corps, which General Tolimir obviously is aware has captured

 8     thousands of prisoners, I'm not sure how the Drina Corps would possibly

 9     take that or how the other corps take it, given the fact that they, too,

10     are aware of thousands of prisoners who had been taken by the Drina Corps

11     from Srebrenica alone and they're now not available for exchange.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Now, I want to go into a little bit

13     of a different area.  Those were the areas specific to General Tolimir

14     and prisoner issues that I wanted to lead with for this testimony.

15             If we could now go to 65 ter 397.  It should be on the next tab,

16     and we'll see that it's entitled "Analysis of the Combat Readiness and

17     Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska, 1992," and it's dated

18     April 1993.

19        Q.   And I don't want to spend a whole lot of time on this,

20     Mr. Butler, but is this a document that you have reviewed and analysed

21     and speak about in your various reports?

22        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to page 83 in the English,

24     B/C/S page 74.

25        Q.   Okay.  We see this is the section of -- can you basically tell

Page 16438

 1     us, briefly, what this is, this report I've just mentioned?

 2        A.   It was customary for every unit of the Army of the

 3     Republika Srpska, on an annual basis, to do what is essentially a

 4     self-evaluation of their combat capabilities and abilities.  This

 5     particular report represents the analysis that the Main Staff did of

 6     their own capabilities for the prior year, 1992.  As part of laying out

 7     their analysis of their capabilities, where they've performed well, where

 8     they've not performed well, the report lays out all of the relative

 9     functions that the army and, by definition, the Main Staff manage.  This

10     particular section here deals with the functions both under intelligence

11     and security that the Main Staff Sector for Intelligence and

12     Security Support has.  It details the issues involved in setting up the

13     various sectors, individuals -- who they're needing to recruit to man

14     these sectors, as well as all of the other problems involved with where

15     they were in 1992, starting an army from, essentially, scratch as well as

16     projecting out how well they've done and where they're going in the

17     future.

18        Q.   Okay.  Before we get into the intel and security section briefly:

19     Do you recall if there's anything in this document related to the use of

20     Main Staff senior officers at combat fronts?  I may have that mixed up

21     with another document.  I just -- you had talked about that earlier, and

22     I just wondered if you remembered that at all.

23        A.   If I recall correctly, in this particular document, under a

24     section entitled "Command and Control," it does talk about the issue,

25     that it was viewed as a positive that at critical areas of the

Page 16439

 1     battle-front Main Staff personnel showed up in order to monitor the

 2     situation.  As I indicated before, it was a fairly prevalent practice

 3     during the war for that to occur.

 4        Q.   And, Mr. Butler, I know it's getting late, but you said they just

 5     showed up.  Do you want to clarify that?

 6        A.   Obviously, they are not accidental tourists.  They're sent there

 7     by the Main Staff, by the Main Staff's commander, in order to monitor the

 8     activities that are going on, to synchronise those with the goals and

 9     objectives of the Main Staff, to ensure that the corps is handling the

10     situation in the manner that they wish it to be handled.  And if there

11     are problems, the physical presence of a Main Staff general there can

12     help deal with any potential de-conflictions or other problems as they

13     arise.  It should be noted that when one looks at the combat activities

14     that occur, more often than not it's not just a single corps that is

15     involved.  Some of these operations will involve two or even three corps

16     co-ordinating against a single strategic or an operational objective.  So

17     having a Main Staff general officer or senior officer at a forward

18     location, forward command post, is very beneficial in being able to

19     ensure that everything is de-conflicted as it needs to be and that the

20     activities of those multiple corps formations are appropriately

21     synchronised.

22        Q.   What's "de-conflicted" mean?

23        A.   In a military sense, as part of the orders process, various

24     units, various roads, various objectives are all allocated to the units

25     that are participating in them.  Where things can get problematic is that

Page 16440

 1     after an operation has commenced, and as forces are moving forward or

 2     achieving their objectives, and as new objectives are designated, there

 3     will be a certain competition between the military forces as to who can

 4     use what roads or who has priority over what ammunition or other

 5     resources.  So as an operation continues underway, there is a certain

 6     amount of de-confliction that has to take place, where the senior

 7     headquarters determines what are the primary objectives, which military

 8     formation is going to achieve those objectives, and what other military

 9     formations are going to support the achievement of those objectives, how

10     much resources that they're going to get, and who is the priority of

11     effort for getting those resources.  It's just part of assuring that

12     military operations are undertaken as efficiently and as effectively as

13     possible, given the logistics and other constraints on them.

14        Q.   Okay.  Let's deal briefly with -- we see that we're at the

15     Intel and Security section, "Intelligence Support," paragraph 5.1.

16             Let's go to the next page in English.  It's page 75 in the

17     Serbian.

18             Just one line down at the bottom of the page:

19             "The Department for Intelligence and Security Affairs circulated

20     instructions on the interrogation of prisoners of war to the relevant

21     organs in subordinated units."

22             Is this action described here consistent with your knowledge of

23     how the rules should work, that the intelligence unit would be involved

24     in instructions on the interrogations of prisoners of war?

25        A.   Yes, sir, it would.

Page 16441

 1        Q.   Let's go to the next page - 76 in Serbian, 85 in the English -

 2     just to show that this is the beginning of the security support section.

 3     And if we could go to page 88, and page 78 in the Serbian, just in the

 4     middle of the page again.  Just one sentence I want to ask you about.  It

 5     reads:

 6             "A particular problem, especially at the tactical level, is the

 7     leakage of confidential military data by radio communications."

 8             So in your view, as early as 1992, what do you think they are

 9     concerned with?  What is this problem of leakage?  How is it leaking?

10        A.   Because of a shortage of cryptologic security, keys and

11     equipment, particularly at the lower unit levels, it was recognised very

12     early on that the enemy was gaining valuable intelligence about the VRS

13     and their immediate intentions during operations by listening to

14     individuals talking over lines that are not secure.  The obvious easy way

15     to solve that problem is to secure the communications, but in 1992 and

16     throughout the war, the VRS generally did not have access to the

17     equipment necessary to do that.  So they had to assume the risk, as it

18     were, of using equipment that was not secured, in light of the fact that

19     they still had to effectively manage command and control of their

20     military formations.  So they did their best to education their people

21     that their communications were subject to intercept, but at times of

22     stress or at other periods of times, I mean, it was unavoidable that

23     valuable information would leak to the enemy.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer this document into evidence.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.  And I take it you're only

Page 16442

 1     referring to those pages which are included in the binder, starting with

 2     page 83 and the cover pages.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That is correct, Mr. President.  It is fully

 4     translated in English, and if the Defence would like it all in, I have no

 5     objection.  But I think for our purposes, this should -- this should

 6     suit.

 7                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to invite the Prosecution to up-load

 9     those parts of this whole document you are really tendering in a separate

10     document, and for today we mark it for identification.  It will then be

11     received as a separate document after up-loading.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 397 shall be

13     assigned Exhibit P2491, and that exhibit number is assigned to the whole

14     document containing 142 pages in B/C/S.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That was not the intention.  That wasn't --

16                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should be only marked for identification, the

18     whole document.  And after up-loading the relevant parts, it will be

19     received as a separate document with this number.  Thank you very much.

20             Please carry on.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Understood, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Mr. Butler, I'm still on the topic of intel and security areas

23     and how it works.  You've talked a bit about counter-intelligence.

24             Can we go to 65 ter 2224.

25             And this is a document that I know you're familiar with from the

Page 16443

 1     20th of April, 1995, from the Command of the Drina Corps

 2     Security Department, under the name of its chief, which is on the

 3     second page in English, but I think we can just stay there.  We should be

 4     able to see it at the bottom of the Serbian,

 5     Lieutenant General Vujadin Popovic.  And it's to various brigades, we can

 6     see, of the Drina Corps.  And it says, and I'll just paraphrase: that

 7     they have a reliable source that there has been an assassination

 8     contracted on General Mladic and General Tolimir, and then it issues

 9     various measures.

10             Where, if anywhere, would this kind of work or threat fit into

11     the task of the intel and security branch or organ?

12        A.   This would be a classical counter-intelligence task.

13        Q.   And can you tell from this whether this is a threat from the

14     enemy or a threat from inside the Republika Srpska?

15        A.   My understanding, given the context of it occurring after the

16     50th session of the RS, this is a threat from inside the

17     Republika Srpska.

18        Q.   And we see number 4:

19             "The Security Administration has designated this case operative

20     action 'Judas.'"

21             Does that support what you just said, just what they named it?

22        A.   Code-names aren't supposed to give away the actual context of the

23     operation, but certainly in this case it tends to support the idea that

24     various members of the political side of the government might have

25     contracted out the assassination of these two members.

Page 16444

 1        Q.   Now, for something to be considered in the realm of

 2     counter-intelligence, does it matter whether it's an internal threat,

 3     like this document shows, or an external threat from the enemy?

 4        A.   No, sir, it would not.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to P2216, and I'm talking

 6     about the -- some of the practices of the Security and

 7     Intel Administration.

 8        Q.   And this is a -- as it will come up, a long document that I don't

 9     intend to get into a lot of detail for you.  The Court's seen it before.

10     But it's dated 18 March 1995, to the commander of the Main Staff and to

11     the assistant commander for Security and Intelligence of the Main Staff.

12     So that would be - I'm sure there's an agreement - General Mladic and

13     General Tolimir; is that correct?

14        A.   Yes, sir.

15        Q.   And we're a ways from there and I don't think we need to go to it

16     in the computer, but at the end of this we see that this is in the name

17     of the chief, Colonel Ljubisa Beara.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could you please wait a moment, because the

19     Registrar is struggling with some problems with the documents.

20             Now we have the document on the screen.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

22        Q.   So we see this document that, apparently, from the face of it,

23     Colonel Beara has written to General Mladic and General Tolimir and to

24     the commands of the -- we see the various corps and others, entitled

25     "Analysis of the Situation in the Military Police Units of the Army of

Page 16445

 1     Republika Srpska."  And does the -- the various advice, recommendations,

 2     comments set forth by Colonel Beara, is that consistent with your

 3     understanding of how his job should work in relation to supervising the

 4     work of military police forces throughout the VRS?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  And, in fact, if one looks at the English-language

 6     version on page 2, it notes that this report follows inspections by -- or

 7     of these particular units, and that the results of these inspections,

 8     they're now doing an analysis to identify all of the various issues

 9     related to the manning, use and employment.  These are, again, the

10     typical functions that the security branch would have in this regard.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we can go to page 3 in the English, and

12     it's page -- it should be page 2 in the B/C/S.

13        Q.   We see a handwritten section in this where someone has written in

14     hand addressed to Toso.  Would that be the same Toso, the same

15     General Tolimir that you identified earlier?

16        A.   Yes, sir, it would.

17        Q.   And from the context of this, do you have an opinion on who would

18     be writing to Toso, to Tolimir, like this and saying it's a disgrace to

19     have a soldier commanding a unit after three years and such things,

20     commenting on the report of Beara?

21        A.   Given the context of the particular comments, it would have to be

22     a military officer who's superior to General Tolimir.  So that leaves you

23     either General Mladic, as the commander of the Main Staff, or

24     General Milovanovic, as the deputy commander of the Main Staff.

25        Q.   All right.  And I note, in my review of this document, I did not

Page 16446

 1     see any references to the military police and the detention or

 2     transportation or the securing of prisoners of war.  Would that suggest

 3     that the military police would not have those responsibilities?

 4        A.   No, sir.  It simply suggests that within the context of this

 5     particular report, that particular -- that particular issue was not

 6     considered to be a problem at the time.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I see that that's already in

 8     evidence, so let's go now to --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you go to the next one, I have to come

10     back to 65 ter 2224.  This is not in evidence yet you have used before.

11     Are you tendering it?

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Thank you for catching that, Mr. President.

13     Yes, I -- it was my intention to, and I just missed it.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2224 shall be

16     assigned Exhibit P2492.  Thank you.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I'm also informed by Ms. Stewart that

18     65 ter 7438 is now in e-court.  I think it was given P2490.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  And it has been updated in the e-court.  Thank

20     you, Your Honours.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So if we could now go to P1971.

22        Q.   Still on the topic of the basic responsibilities of security

23     organs, we see another document from Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic,

24     the Drina Corps Command.  This is dated 18 July 1995.  We see it's to the

25     brigades that we know are part of the Drina Corps, and other units,

Page 16447

 1     entitled "Dealing with reporter crews."  And it talks about a large

 2     number of foreign and domestic reporters expected to come, and how to

 3     deal with them.

 4             Is this -- does this document reflect, in your view, a normal

 5     responsibility for a security officer such as Vujadin Popovic?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, it would.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to 65 ter 2223.

 8        Q.   This is another document from Colonel Popovic of the Drina Corps.

 9     This one is 7 February 1995, and we can see he's sending it to the

10     brigades.  And it's also entitled -- well, it's entitled "Command of the

11     Military Police," and it has various comments and suggestions in this,

12     and tasks.

13             Does this reflect a normal relationship of a security officer

14     with the military police in the brigades and in his -- and in the corps

15     units?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, if one looks at the information that is in

17     that Main Staff report, I suspect one would find that this request for

18     the brigades' military -- to report about their military police, then

19     gets turn around and sent up to the Main Staff and is part of the

20     information they would analyse before making their observations.  So this

21     is all part of -- within that military police, part of that technical

22     chain where requests are sent down and information is passed back up.

23        Q.   And, again, if this is read carefully, you will not see any

24     references to prisoners of war.  Does that have any significance to you

25     relating to whether or not security and MPs would have dealings with

Page 16448

 1     prisoners of war in the normal course or as part of their job?

 2        A.   No, sir.  Again, it reflects the fact that particularly this late

 3     in the war, there's still a problem, structurally, with the military

 4     police of the VRS, in that rather than being allowed to focus on

 5     traditional military police tasks, they are still very often being used

 6     in a combat environment as a military infantry unit because of shortages

 7     of manpower in other units.  So as part of identifying, you know, these

 8     types of issues, as well as equipment shortages related to the military

 9     police, this is all part of an effort by the Main Staff to try and get

10     military police units re-oriented back on their traditional functions

11     rather than have to be used as emergency infantrymen in combat locations.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I offer this document into evidence.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2223 shall be

15     assigned Exhibit P2493.  Thank you.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And now on the same topic, if we could go to

17     P1970.

18        Q.   And as it's coming up, I'll note this is another document from

19     the Drina Corps Command Security Department.  This is 15 -- dated

20     "15/4/1995," to the various brigades and intelligence and security organ

21     heads, again from Chief Major Vujadin Popovic.  It says "Major" in the

22     English translation.  I'm not sure that's correct, but it's -- let me

23     just ask you about it.

24             It's entitled "Arrest and detention of POWs and other persons,

25     instruction."  So now we have a specific reference to POWs.  Let's look a

Page 16449

 1     bit down it.  I won't read all of it.

 2             It says that:

 3             "We received a telegram, strictly confidential ..." from the VRS

 4     Security administration which outlines procedures during the detention or

 5     arrest of persons violating rules and regulations, and says that:

 6             "We submit to you the instructions in full."

 7             And it says:

 8             "Inform military police units with the instruction and act upon

 9     the provisions listed."

10             And it begins, and I won't go through all of it, but it says:

11             "Based on information we received, negligent behaviour has been

12     noticed towards POWs from the moment they are captured to the moment they

13     are taken to Batkovic collection centre or to another place of detention,

14     as well as during detention itself."

15             And then it says:

16             "Namely, our soldiers often make captured enemy soldiers walk

17     along the front-line, then take them to the command posts for

18     interrogation.  They drive them through the territory.  They are held in

19     the barracks ..."

20             Then they're soon exchanged.

21             So what's the basic concern in this document that led to these

22     instructions being provided?

23        A.   The concern is that even though these individuals are being

24     captured as prisoners, the way that they are being handled is exposing

25     the prisoner to information that would be of detriment to the VRS when

Page 16450

 1     the individual is ultimately exchanged.  The fact that an individual is a

 2     prisoner of war doesn't mean that that person is not capable of knowing

 3     where he is, ascertaining the locations of command posts or the names of

 4     individuals within those command posts, the locations of other military

 5     equipment or facilities, as part of his routine handling and processing

 6     in interrogation, and that that information would be of value to the

 7     other side when the prisoner is exchanged.  So in this context, they're

 8     directing them how to modify their handling procedures, or, more

 9     accurately, how to enforce proper handling procedures so that after a

10     prisoner is captured, he's not inadvertently afforded the opportunity to

11     collect information sensitive to the VRS.

12        Q.   If we look at page 2 of the English - it's under paragraph 2 of

13     the instructions in the document, so I think it's the next page in the

14     Serbian - and I won't, again, read all of it.  We can see the various

15     things they're talking about the MPs are to do with the prisoners, and

16     make sure they're handcuffed and their hands are tied.

17             Then in the middle of paragraph 2, it says:

18             "The location where POWs are collected must be such that the

19     prisoners are fully secured, as well as the people from the security

20     organ, from the intelligence organ and the military police organ that

21     engages in the interrogation and guards the POWs."

22             Does this instruction reflect the actual practice of the MPs and

23     the security organs working in the securing of prisoners and the like?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  It reflects the fact that those particular elements

25     are -- have various responsibilities during this process.

Page 16451

 1        Q.   A last question.  I believe it's been suggested in some of the

 2     questioning by the Defence that it was the logistics branch that had

 3     primary responsibility or significant responsibility for prisoners of

 4     war.  Is that correct, in your view?

 5        A.   The logistics or rear services branch would have a significant

 6     role in feeding, water, life support, medical support, if necessary, to a

 7     prisoner, but the logistics branch obviously would not have the expertise

 8     necessary to interrogate a particular prisoner in that sense.  I mean,

 9     again, all partners -- all sections of the military have various roles

10     and responsibilities, so, I mean, they are a -- the logistics branch does

11     have a role, but it certainly wouldn't be engaged in roles outside its

12     area of competence, such as counter-intelligence or trying to gain

13     information from a prisoner.

14        Q.   Or how about securing them, overseeing the securing and the

15     transport of them?

16        A.   That falls more within the competence of the military police, in

17     so much as they would be securing the prisoners, as well as military

18     police traffic units, which would actually organise the convoys,

19     although, obviously, the rear services or logistics branch would provide

20     the physical vehicles and fuel necessary to move them.  It's a

21     collaborative effort.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  I believe we're a little past break time,

23     Mr. President.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We must have our second break now, and we will

25     resume quarter past 6.00.

Page 16452

 1                           --- Recess taken at 5.47 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 6.18 p.m.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.

 5             Mr. President, 65 ter 397, that large document that you

 6     mentioned, we have picked out the relevant pages, which is now

 7     65 ter 7453, but it's been MFI'd as P2491.  So we have the relevant pages

 8     in e-court now.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Very good.  And this one should now be received

10     as an exhibit, I think with the same number, P2491, if there is no

11     concern by Mr. Registrar.

12                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  P2491 is no longer MFI'd.  It's now used for the

14     up-loaded portion of the whole document.

15             Please go ahead.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  Staying on this topic of security and

17     intel for now, the Drina Corps has -- as we've been going over

18     Colonel Popovic, let's go to 65 ter 5292, which, if we just all take a

19     look at that front page, is -- says "Analysis of Combat Readiness of the

20     Drina Corps for Each Element of the B/G for 1994."

21        Q.   Can you tell us, Mr. Butler, briefly, what this analysis document

22     is?

23        A.   In a manner similar to the 1992 analysis done by the Main Staff,

24     this is an example of an analysis done by a corps-level command.  In this

25     case, it was the Drina Corps, and it was the analysis of their work in

Page 16453

 1     1994, published in January 1995.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  Let's go to page 17 in the English and

 3     page 16 in the B/C/S.  This is just to get us on to the correct chapter,

 4     which should be Chapter -- I think it should be Chapter 6.  As we see,

 5     the Serbian is correct.  The English is wrong, in terms of the number.

 6             So that's where their section begins, and I just want to go to

 7     the next page.  The B/C/S should be 16 and may catch 17 as well, and it's

 8     page 18 in English.

 9        Q.   I want to just ask you briefly about this paragraph.  We see, in

10     the middle of the page in the English, and it begins:

11             "Electronic surveillance in the Drina Corps ..."

12             And it just talks a bit about their electronic surveillance,

13     which the Trial Chamber has heard a lot about the BiH electronic

14     surveillance.  But what I really want to ask you about is the section

15     that says:

16             "Intelligence data obtained by interrogating prisoners of war and

17     defectors constitutes the main element in information about the enemy,

18     his strength, composition, artillery support and intentions."

19             So we see this under the intelligence and security support.

20     Would this fit in according to the rules that you're aware of and

21     according to the basic procedures and guide-lines that you've been

22     discussing?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   And it goes on to say:

25             "The processing of prisoners of war is being approached very

Page 16454

 1     professionally and responsibly, with information being presented to the

 2     commands and units in whose zone of responsibility the work is being

 3     conducted."

 4             And, again, this is under the security section, working with

 5     prisoners of war.  Does that conform to the rules and practices as the

 6     security organs should be involved in?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this analysis, this

 9     document, into evidence.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received into evidence.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 5292 shall be

12     assigned Exhibit P2494.  Thank you.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  And now I want to change gears a bit.

14        Q.   And we get away from our discussion of the rules of command,

15     security, and intel organs, and some of the practical applications, as

16     we've seen, and get back or into the narrative of documents that relate

17     to this area that you have reviewed and have talked about in your

18     testimony and your narrative.

19             And could we start with -- I believe I see it as 65 ter 29.

20             And this, we can see, is from the Main Staff of the Army of

21     Republika Srpska, dated 19 November 1992, and it's entitled "Directive

22     for further operations of the Army of Republika Srpska," to the commander

23     and chief of staff personally, Directive Operational 4.

24             Mr. Butler, is this a document you've had a chance to study and

25     review over the years.

Page 16455

 1        A.   Yes, sir, I have.

 2        Q.   Now, it says "Directive number 4."  Are you aware of other

 3     directives?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5        Q.   Can you tell us, to your knowledge, what are these directives?

 6     And just for everyone's knowledge, if we -- if we looked at the end of

 7     this particular directive, I believe we would see that it is drafted by

 8     General Milovanovic, but it's in the name of Commander Lieutenant

 9     General Ratko Mladic.  So at this level, what are these directives?  And

10     just tell us, roughly, do you know how many there were throughout the

11     war, just roughly?

12        A.   If I recall correctly, there were a total of nine what's known as

13     strategic directives that were issued at various points during the armed

14     conflict.  In general, what these documents are is they help define the

15     operational context of how the political will of the RS leadership is

16     being translated into broader military objectives.  For example, you have

17     the six strategic objectives that we've talked about previously.  What

18     you have, then, at this level of the military is more detailed planning

19     documents which lay out, in more concrete terms, how the army intends to

20     achieve those objectives as the conflict situation changes over various

21     points in time.  In some cases, the directive had a life of, perhaps,

22     three or four months before it was superseded.  In other cases, a

23     directive might have been valid for a year before it needed to be

24     superseded again, depending on the situation.  So these are very

25     strategic documents that outline the military's conduct of the war.

Page 16456

 1        Q.   And as we begin to -- if we leaf through this, we see that

 2     they -- it appears to go -- there's a paragraph 5 on page 4 of the

 3     English, and on page 10 or 11, but it just says:  "The task of the units"

 4     and it starts with the 1st Krajina Corps, goes to the 2nd Krajina Corps,

 5     then goes to the East Bosnia Corps.  So on page 5 of the English, page 11

 6     of the B/C/S, we get to the Drina Corps.

 7             So how is -- can you explain why they go in by corps?  What does

 8     this have to do with the individual corps, this document?

 9        A.   The corps are the highest-level combat component of the Army of

10     the Republika Srpska.  Obviously, their activities are controlled by the

11     Main Staff, but the Main Staff is just that, it's a staff.  It's not a

12     combat command.  It doesn't project combat power.  That is done by the

13     corps commands.  So while the Main Staff, you know, will direct how the

14     operations are to be done, the reality is that it will be the corps

15     commands who will have to fight those battles and achieve those

16     objectives in their designated zones.

17        Q.   Okay.  So we're at the Drina Corps, and recalling that this

18     document is dated 19 November 1992, we look at this, and it says:

19             "... from its present positions, its main forces shall

20     persistently defend Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while

21     the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region ..."

22             And the wider Podrinje region, would that include the Srebrenica

23     area?

24        A.   Yes, sir, it would.

25        Q.   It says:

Page 16457

 1             "... the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict

 2     the heaviest possible losses on him, and force him to leave Birac, Zepa

 3     and Gorazde ..."

 4             I'll stop there for a minute.

 5             Anything against the rules of the VRS or the rules, that you're

 6     aware of, of the Geneva Conventions about exhausting the enemy and

 7     inflicting the heaviest possible losses on him?  Any issue you see there?

 8        A.   Not to that point, sir.

 9        Q.   And it says.

10             "... force him," meaning the enemy, "to leave the Birac, Zepa and

11     Gorazde areas ..."

12             Do you recall this Birac area, what area that includes?

13        A.   It's Birac area would include, for example, the area of Sekovici,

14     Western Zvornik municipality, it would include Vlasenica.  It's a part of

15     the upper Podrinje area -- I'm sorry, lower Podrinje area.

16        Q.   All right.  And then this line, well:

17             "... inflict the heaviest loss on him," meaning the enemy, "and

18     force him to leave the Birac, Zepa and Gorazde areas together with the

19     Muslim population."

20             How do you read that?  What do you read that to mean?

21        A.   As it's written, it reflects the fact that not only were the

22     military forces viewed to be a target for attack, but in this particular

23     context, so was the Muslim population.

24        Q.   And what do you believe the intention was towards the Muslim

25     population, based on this document?

Page 16458

 1        A.   They wanted to significantly reduce the Muslim population that

 2     was living in that area.  At the time, even this late in 1992, the Muslim

 3     population was still the dominant population group in these various

 4     areas.

 5        Q.   Well, can you be more specific?  When it says force him to leave

 6     these areas together with the Muslim population, what is he saying, in

 7     your view, about what to do with the Muslim population?

 8        A.   What he's saying is, essentially, they want to create whatever

 9     conditions are required in order to force the Muslim population to flee

10     from those areas.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I offer this into evidence.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received as an exhibit.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 29 shall be

14     assigned Exhibit P2495.  Thank you.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, if we could go to the next exhibit,

16     65 ter 2220.

17        Q.   And as we're waiting for it to come up:  We'll see it's dated a

18     few days after the last document.  This is 24 November 1992, and this is

19     from the Drina Corps Command.  And if we look at the last page in English

20     and in the Serbian, we'll see that this is in the name of the commander

21     of the Drina Corps, Milenko Zivanovic.  And this is "Decision for Further

22     Operations," is the title, and it's to, in particular, the Zvornik

23     Light Infantry Brigade Command, personally to the commander or the chief

24     of staff.

25             MR. MCCLOSKEY:  I'm on the first page.  Excuse me.  If we

Page 16459

 1     could -- thank you.

 2        Q.   And I want to direct your attention to the top of the page, where

 3     it says:

 4             "Pursuant to Directive of the Main Staff of the Army of

 5     Republika Srpska Strictly Confidential 02/5 of 19 November 1992, and an

 6     assessment of the situation, I have decided:"

 7             This reference, is that related to the document we just saw?

 8        A.   If one looks at the document that we just saw, which is, I guess,

 9     Prosecution Exhibit 29, we'll see Strictly Confidential 02/5, dated

10     19 November.  Now, for some reason the document from the Drina Corps

11     Command does not include the "-210" in it.

12        Q.   But, otherwise, do you think they're connected?

13        A.   Yes, sir, I do.

14        Q.   All right.  In this first sentence:

15             "Launch an attack using the main body of troops and major

16     equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust

17     them, break them up or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim

18     local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and

19     Gorazde."

20             How do you relate this sentence to the similar one where I read

21     that talked about the Birac and Podrinje regions?

22        A.   Geographically, the area that he's talking about encompasses

23     those regions.  From a command perspective, this is the corps commander

24     taking the general guidance that he has received from the Main Staff,

25     doing his own personal assessment, and then issuing his more detailed

Page 16460

 1     orders to his subordinates to implement, so it clearly reflects the fact

 2     that General -- or at that time Colonel Zivanovic, as the corps

 3     commander, you know, understands the specific intent of the broader

 4     document that -- you know, the broader guidance that's included in

 5     Directive 4 and that he's making his supplemental orders down to his

 6     brigades for implementation.  This is, in a way, how the command staff

 7     process works.

 8        Q.   So this statement, "enforce the Muslim local population to

 9     abandon," these areas, based on your knowledge of the military rules that

10     we've gone over, the laws of the Geneva Conventions that we've gone over,

11     can there be anything legitimate in a statement in this decision by

12     General Zivanovic to force the Muslim local population to abandon the

13     areas?

14        A.   According to the SFRY rules, and the application of those rules

15     on the armed forces, they clearly note that, you know, civilians are not

16     to be the objects of attacks.  It's hard to square that particular

17     regulation and application of law against this particular directive,

18     where Colonel Zivanovic is making it clear that the intention is to force

19     the local Muslim population to abandon their home region.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this -- oh, it's P --

21     this document is P2434, I see, so it's already in evidence.

22             Let's go to the next document, 65 ter 688.

23        Q.   And, again, we're still in 1992 and 1993, but did you look

24     through any documents to find any outline of what may have -- what

25     military activity may have occurred in the region just described by

Page 16461

 1     General Zivanovic?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.

 3        Q.   And can you tell us what this is that we see on our screen?  We

 4     see a Cyrillic picture of something.

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  This is the copy -- or that's the front cover of what

 6     is known as "Drinski" magazine, which in June of 1995 was being published

 7     on a monthly basis by the Zvornik Infantry Brigade as an informational

 8     product to the soldiers and the local municipality, promoting the

 9     activities and the members of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Can we go to B/C/S page 6.  It should

11     be page 2 in the English.

12        Q.   Now, this is a section in the magazine.  It's entitled

13     "Liberation of the Podrinje."  Can you tell us what this is and how this

14     fit into your narrative or your knowledge of the area, and understanding

15     it's just a magazine?

16        A.   Well, sir, the fact that it's just a magazine doesn't mean that

17     it does not have information of intelligence value, which is why we

18     looked at it first, along with other documents.  But in this particular

19     article, as it discusses the three years of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade,

20     one of the most significant military actions that the Zvornik Brigade had

21     fought into up to date was what they called the liberation of the

22     Podrinje or Drina Valley area.  And so as part of their discussion on

23     their unit history, they laid out in some detail what activities the unit

24     was involved in at that time.

25        Q.   And from your review of materials, this and others, were you able

Page 16462

 1     to determine whether or not there were combat actions that were taken

 2     pursuant to General Zivanovic's decision that we just saw based on --

 3     from November of 1992?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  Combat actions were initiated on that, and, frankly,

 5     the first month, month and a half of combat did not go well for the

 6     Bosnian Serb military forces.  It was not until February of 1993 that the

 7     military tide turned in favour of the Bosnian Serb military forces and

 8     they were able to render a number of significant military defeats on the

 9     Muslim forces in those areas and eventually force them out of large

10     portions of those areas.

11        Q.   Can you very briefly describe to us -- you've talked about the

12     military defeats.  Where, if anywhere, did the civilian population that

13     was the subject of General Zivanovic's decision -- where did those people

14     go, those Muslims from the areas that was described by General Zivanovic?

15        A.   Generally, the Muslim population who were in that broader area

16     went in two different directions.  Those that could, as a result of

17     geography and when weather permitted, essentially went due west and made

18     their way to ABiH lines near Tuzla, and effectively left that region

19     entirely.  Those individuals who were further to the south or could not,

20     because of weather concerns, get out - it was a very bitter winter that

21     particular winter and a lot of snow fell, causing a lot of problems - in

22     fact went south and ultimately ended up in Srebrenica.

23        Q.   Can you briefly describe your understanding of the conditions

24     that led to the creation of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves?  Just

25     briefly.

Page 16463

 1        A.   As February and March rolled -- 1993 rolled around, the

 2     Drina Corps militarily had been able to eliminate most of the Bosnian

 3     Muslim military presence north of the Konjevic Polje-Milici-Vlasenica

 4     road, that area that's generally referred to as Cerska or Erdut.  They

 5     then -- as they began working their way back towards Bratunac and

 6     Srebrenica, they slowly compressed the Muslim military forces, as well as

 7     the accompanying civilian population, back into Srebrenica from the

 8     north.  At the same time, there were military operations coming up the

 9     road from Skelani and the south, essentially squeezing the Muslim

10     military forces that were left there, as well as the Muslim civilian

11     population, into a pocket in and around the town of Srebrenica, which by

12     then was the last stronghold of the Bosnian Muslims from that area.

13        Q.   And when did this situation reach its peak?

14        A.   I believe it reached its peak in early May -- either late April

15     or early May, and it was when it developed into a rather large

16     humanitarian crisis is when you saw General Morillon made his unilateral

17     declaration of that area being a UN-protected safe area.  Initially, the

18     plan was that -- or the plan was by the VRS to try to evacuate civilians

19     out.  Approximately 8.000 of them were able to get out before that plan

20     fell apart, when the BiH government didn't want to de-populate the area

21     anymore, and then, under the circumstances, General Morillon felt he had

22     no choice but to make that, you know, declared safe area.

23        Q.   And after Morillon's personal involvement, did the UN, itself,

24     follow up, the Security Council, with the formal designations?

25        A.   Yes, sir, first in Srebrenica, and then supplemental declarations

Page 16464

 1     were made that covered Zepa and other safe areas.

 2        Q.   And are those events described, in part, in your report?

 3        A.   I do discuss them to a limited degree in my report.  However,

 4     I think the best source of information on that I incorporated in my

 5     report is the reference, which is the United Nations' own report on the

 6     Srebrenica safe area, which I believe was published in 1999.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer this 65 ter 688 into evidence.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I need a clarification.

 9             We have four pages' translation into English, but many different

10     articles in B/C/S.

11                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told by Mr. Registrar that only pages 8 and

13     9 of the original B/C/S, which are translated, should be offered and

14     received into evidence.  Is that your understanding as well?

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  And if you see the English

16     translation, it says "page 8 and 9," and the title is "The Third

17     Anniversary."  I believe what they've done is they've just translated

18     that particular article on the third anniversary of the Zvornik Brigade

19     which gave that historical background, and so that's all that we were

20     offering in this particular segment.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  This will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 688 shall be

23     assigned Exhibit P2496.  Thank you.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  And if we could now go to

25     65 ter 1979.

Page 16465

 1        Q.   Mr. Butler, we see that on the first page of this, we have a

 2     document from the Main Staff to the corps, entitled "Combat Order for the

 3     Liberation of Zepa and Gorazde."  It's a long document.  If we look

 4     towards the end of it, we'll see that it was drafted by Colonel Miletic,

 5     in the name of the deputy commander, General Milovanovic.

 6             Can you just -- we see that it's May 1993, around that

 7     time-period you've just spoken to.  Can you just briefly put this in

 8     context?  Is this something that actually happened?

 9        A.   It was an attempt to make it happen.  What you see is very

10     quickly, regarding Srebrenica, the VRS then attempted to move and take

11     down Muslim military and civilian populations in Zepa and Gorazde,

12     perhaps anticipating that they, too, at some point would be covered under

13     some form of a safe area, and so this reflects the combat order for that.

14     I'm not sure that -- given the timing, that significant combat activities

15     took place, because I believe it was within a week or two that the next

16     declaration of safe areas which will cover these two went into play.  But

17     this reflects the plan to do just that.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer this document into evidence.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1979 shall be

21     assigned Exhibit P2497.  Thank you.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, this is the end of the first

23     binder, and it's probably a good place to stop for the night.  And I will

24     continue in the morning, if that's --

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We're looking forward to the next two binders we

Page 16466

 1     will deal with tomorrow and perhaps after tomorrow.

 2             Indeed, we should adjourn for the day and resume tomorrow, in the

 3     morning, at 9.00 in this courtroom.

 4             Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And could we give -- excuse me.  Could we give

 6     Mr. Butler binder 2 for his review/study?  It's the binder that we gave

 7     to him already, but he hasn't really been able to have it.  So everyone

 8     knows what it is.  I think it's binder number 2.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  With the assistance of the Court Usher, he shall.

10     And binder number 1 shall be given back to the Prosecution, I suppose.

11             Thank you very much.  The binders were exchanged.

12             We adjourn for the day.

13             And I have to remind you, again, please, no contact to either

14     party about the content of your testimony during the break.

15             THE WITNESS:  I understand, sir.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We adjourn.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.57 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of July,

20                           2011, at 9.00 a.m.