1 Tuesday, 12 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody in the courtroom and to
6 those who are following our hearings.
7 The witness should be brought in, please.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Butler. Welcome back.
11 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Again, I have to remind you that the affirmation
13 to tell the truth still applies for today's hearing.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey is continuing his
17 You have the floor, Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. President,
19 Your Honours, everyone.
20 Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]
21 Q. And, Mr. Butler, I note you have binder 2, which I recall the
22 Judges would like binder 2, as we have them here.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, indeed, we are looking forward to receiving
24 them. We are dreaming on them already.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, that happens.
1 Q. And as we're collecting ourselves I'll -- we left off yesterday
2 in the narrative of documents --
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the record, I take it that the Defence
4 is in the possession of the binder as well. Is that correct, Mr. Gajic?
5 I see you nodding. Thank you.
6 Mr. McCloskey.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
8 We had left off in the documentary narrative where the Srebrenica
9 enclave had been created by the Security Council. There was a VRS attack
10 planned for Zepa and Gorazde which, according to Mr. Butler, didn't
11 really go very far because the Zepa enclaves were -- the Zepa enclave and
12 Gorazde was created. So now I would take us into the year, and we won't
13 spend much time in this year, in 1994.
14 If we could go to P2158. It should be 44 of the tab. And this
15 is a document the Trial Chamber has seen at least one or two times,
16 I think, so I won't spend a lot of time on it, but it is a document from
17 the Bratunac Brigade Command, dated 4 July 1994, entitled "Report for the
18 Brigade Members." So we can see what that is.
19 And if we can go to page 2 in the English and it should be page 3
20 in the B/C/S. Actually, it was the previous page in the B/C/S. If we go
21 back one in the B/C/S, we should catch it.
22 Yeah, that's where it is. And we're going to need to go to the
23 next -- well, soon the next page in English.
24 Q. And it's this section that the Court has heard before that I want
25 to ask you about: "We have won the war in Podrinje," and I think you've
1 explained where that is already, "but we have not beaten the Muslims
2 completely, which is what we must do in the next period. We must obtain
3 our final goal, an entirely Serbian Podrinje. The enclaves of
4 Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde must be defeated militarily."
5 Now, Mr. Butler, briefly, to your knowledge, were there
6 military -- Muslim military activities coming out of those enclaves
7 during this time that the Serb forces felt like they needed to engage?
8 A. Yes, sir, there were.
9 Q. All right. And then it goes on to say:
10 "We must continue to arm, train, discipline and prepare the
11 RS Army for the execution of this crucial task, the expulsion of Muslims
12 from the Srebrenica enclave."
13 I think that speaks for itself.
14 Then it says:
15 "There will be no retreat when it comes to the Srebrenica
16 enclave. We must advance. The enemy's life has to be made unbearable
17 and their temporary stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the
18 enclave en masse as soon as possible, realising that they cannot survive
20 In your view, does this include or not include a reference to
22 A. They're not specifically noting just the military forces, so as a
23 result I read this as they are also including the surrounding civilian
25 Q. Now, let's -- if we just look at the end of this document, we see
1 that it's from the commander of the Bratunac Brigade at the time,
2 Lieutenant-Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic. As a brigade commander -- in your
3 opinion, would a brigade commander be able to give this direction to his
4 troops on his own?
5 A. No, sir. He's receiving guidance from higher levels of command.
6 And, again, when one looks at this particular document, it is drafted
7 specifically to provide information not only to lower levels of the
8 brigade, but actually to individual members of the brigade, as the
9 leadership of the army explains out in detail, the objectives of the war
10 in a way and in a manner that each soldier can understand. So this isn't
11 something that the brigade is doing in isolation. This is something --
12 part of a larger strategy in order to positively influence the morale of
13 the soldiers, not only the Bratunac Brigade but of all the military
15 Q. Let's go to page 1 of this document. And we can see that it
16 begins by saying:
17 "During his recent visit to the corps command, the commander of
18 the VRS indicated that he would soon visit some of the corps units,
19 including the Bratunac Brigade."
20 Now, you say this brigade commander would not have received
21 this -- would not have done this on his own. Where, along the chain of
22 command, should he have received -- who should he have received this
23 direction from before he passed it on to his troops?
24 A. In all probability, he would have received guidance relating to
25 this from the Drina Corps Command; more specifically, the Drina Corps
1 assistant commander for Morale and Religious Affairs at the time.
2 Q. And would the Drina Corps, in your view, have been able to
3 enunciate a policy to expel the Muslims of Srebrenica on their own or
4 would they have -- would they have received direction from someone else
5 or some other body?
6 A. No, sir. My view is that they would have received their guidance
7 in this regard from the Main Staff.
8 Q. And Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic, can you tell us where he went
9 after his stint as the Bratunac Brigade commander or where he was in
10 July 1995, to your knowledge?
11 A. After completing his tour as the commander -- or his stint as the
12 commander of the Bratunac Brigade, and I believe it was May 1995, he then
13 went back to the Drina Corps, and he was an operations officer or a
14 member of their operations staff in July of 1995 at the Drina Corps.
15 Q. All right. Let's continue on to the next document, which I
16 believe is 65 ter 31. And we're now -- or at last getting into 1995 in
17 our narrative.
18 And we can see that we have a document from the Main Staff,
19 Intelligence and Security Sector, dated 19 March 1995. We can see from
20 the original that it's in the name of General Tolimir, and we see from
21 the initials "ZT" of the drafter, which, as I think you've told us, that
22 should be drafted by General Tolimir. Is that correct?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And we can see in this document, it's entitled "The Establishment
25 of the Security System and Control of the Territory," and the first
1 paragraph talks about the area of Konjevic Polje and the forces based
2 there to establish a security system. It talks about Cerska, Udric,
3 Glogova, places we're all familiar with.
4 Then the next paragraph says:
5 "Because of the need to engage the VRS units at the front of the
6 SRK and the Drina Corps, we are forced to relocate the unit based in
7 Konjevic Polje ..."
8 Can you tell us what General Tolimir is doing in this document,
9 what's happening here?
10 A. At this particular point in time, particularly the Drina Corps is
11 completely stretched with regards to available manpower and units, and
12 particularly those units that are surrounding the enclaves, maintaining
13 the outer perimeter, if you will. In March of 1995, a particular
14 situation arose on the Sarajevo battle-front where they had to
15 re-allocate units to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, in effect creating a
16 gap between military positions held between the Bratunac Brigade and the
17 Milici Brigade, a gap which the Bosnian Muslim military forces can and
18 did exploit. So in this context, the army, the Main Staff, is requesting
19 that the Ministry of the Interior be tasked to provide police forces to
20 cover that specific segment of the gap, in light of the security threat
21 that, you know, the opening of that gap has created to the surrounding
23 Q. Have you seen documents that indicate that the Bosnian Muslim
24 army had a particular policy and strategy to engage the military outside
25 of Srebrenica in order to tie down Serb forces, to prevent them from
1 going to the Sarajevo front?
2 A. Yes, sir, that is correct. The -- one of the stated missions of
3 the 28th Infantry Division was to conduct military operations in such a
4 manner that it would force the VRS to maintain military forces
5 surrounding the enclaves rather than have the ability to redeploy those
6 forces to what it considered to be more critical areas of the
8 Q. Was the -- was this action by the 28th Division, inside the
9 enclave, going outside the enclave, in your view, a violation of the
10 demilitarised agreement that was in place at -- when the enclaves were
12 A. Clearly, it was, sir, yes.
13 Q. Okay. And if we look at this document, we see that the general
14 is referring to -- and I would say the second page in English is what I'm
15 looking at especially. He's making very specific references to Birac,
16 Podrinje, Milici, Konjevic Polje. What would this indicate to you about
17 General Tolimir's knowledge of the geography and the strategic importance
18 of this area?
19 A. It reflects that he is quite well versed in the military
20 geography, where the Drina Corps units are, where there are potential
21 gaps in the line, and what the military threat those particular gaps
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this document into
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 31 shall be
2 assigned Exhibit P2498. Thank you.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. On the same subject, could we go to
4 65 ter 00007.
5 Q. And as we're waiting for that to come up: We will soon see that
6 this is from the Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior, the Cabinet
7 of the Minister, and it's to the president of the Republika Srpska,
8 Dr. Karadzic, and someone has signed for the minister, Zivko Rakic. What
9 is this, and how does it fit in with -- if at all, with what we just saw?
10 A. This particular document is the response of the Ministry of the
11 Interior back to the president, and further through the army, informing
12 them that based on their request, the police have dispatched the 2nd PJP
13 or Police Company from the Zvornik Public Security Centre to that area,
14 where they will be responsible for establishing control over the security
15 of the various roads that are listed there. So this is, in effect, the
16 Ministry of the Interior stepping up to provide forces to deal with the
17 previously-mentioned threat.
18 Q. All right. And we see a reference to:
19 "We have dispatched the 2nd Company of the PJP of the
20 Zvornik Public Security Centre."
21 Now, are we going to be hearing more information about the
22 2nd Company of the PJP as we get to the attack on Srebrenica?
23 A. Yes, sir, particularly in the period following the attack on
24 Srebrenica. Because of their physical location on the battle-field, that
25 particular unit has a number of interactions with individuals who are
1 captured later.
2 Q. Can you tell us how a PJP unit is assembled? What is it?
3 A. In addition to the normal police functions that were undertaken
4 by the Ministry of the Interior, they were also expected, as a component
5 part of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, to be able to engage in
6 combat activities, to a limited extent, when necessary. In order to
7 accomplish this, what each CSB or Sector for Security did was to take its
8 existing municipal police forces and organise them in a series of
9 mobilisation companies that could be called up at a time when they were
10 needed to perform combat or combat-related operations. These were not
11 permanent establishments. They were designed to be called up as needed.
12 The way that it was organised in the Zvornik Security Sector was
13 a total of six companies, the first company being organised out of the
14 youngest and fittest of the police officers, and by the time you got to
15 the fourth, fifth and final company, you're getting to the oldest and
16 least capable of the police officers. So by organising in this manner,
17 you could quickly put together the requisite company-sized military force
18 that you needed, but you could also do so in a way that you did not
19 completely take all of the police out of a certain region. Some of the
20 members of the company would come from Bratunac, some from Milici, some
21 from Vlasenica, Zvornik, so that when you mobilise one of these companies
22 for combat activities, you didn't denude a certain area completely of
23 police coverage.
24 So this was how the police in the sectors -- in the security
25 sectors -- or the public safety sectors organised themselves to be able
1 to also perform military-related duties on an ad hoc basis.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I put one follow-up question to that.
3 Sir, you just explained how these PJP units were composed and
4 established. Was that, in the Republika Srpska, done in the same way as
5 in the former Yugoslavia?
6 THE WITNESS: I don't know the answer to that, sir. I'm not
7 aware of and I just haven't looked at the issue of how, in the former
8 Yugoslavia, the police were organised or put into the military, so I just
9 don't have the ability to answer that question, sir.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
11 Mr. McCloskey.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY:
13 Q. We see, in this document, that the translation -- the translation
14 side in the English has noted that "PJP" meant "Special Police Unit," and
15 the Court has heard quite a bit of evidence about Ljubisa Borovcanin as
16 the deputy commander of the RS Special Police and their activities around
17 Kravica, the location there, and in Srebrenica, as he was the subject of
18 the Petrovic video in some degree.
19 Can you tell us, this English translation as "Special Police
20 Unit," has this anything to do with the Republika Srpska Special Police
21 units that were commanded at the time in Srebrenica by
22 Ljubisa Borovcanin?
23 A. That particular Special Police Unit is part of the Special Police
24 Brigade that answered directly to the Ministry of the Interior. So in
25 that sense, the best way, perhaps, to describe it is that the PJP units
1 answered directly to the head of the Sector for Security, in this case
2 the Zvornik CSB, while the Special Police units, if you've heard the
3 2nd Sekovici Detachment Special Police Unit, those answered directly to
4 the Special Police Brigade and then the Ministry of the Interior. So
5 while they're both Special Police units, they are subordinated to
6 different people.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Your Honours, for your knowledge, the term
8 "PJP" and the term "Special Police" are two different words in the
9 Serbian language, but English ended up translating them as both
10 "Special." So this lends to -- has lent to quite a bit of confusion over
11 the years, so we tried just to use the abbreviation "PJP" so we don't get
12 them mixed up with the Special Police, as Mr. Butler has described. I'm
13 sure Mr. Gajic will agree with me on that point. And we will get more
14 into the detail as we see some more documents on that.
15 So I would offer this document into evidence.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 7 shall be assigned
18 Exhibit P2499. Thank you.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY:
20 Q. And now, Mr. Butler, if we could go to P1214, known as
21 Directive 7.
22 Could we go -- we see in the English that, if you recall, this is
23 where the translations got slightly mixed up. Could we go to the next
24 page in the English, because that's the -- as you may recall, that's the
25 cover page by which this document was sent out.
1 All right. And the document was sent out -- the cover page, as
2 you just saw, was dated 17 March 1995, but this first page, we can see,
3 Mr. Butler, that this is dated 8 March 1995, and it's -- we see the title
4 "Directive for Further Operations, OP Number 7."
5 Is this related to the kind of directive that you talked about
6 before when you talked about Directive 4?
7 A. Yes, sir, it's exactly a continuation of the series of directives
8 that were published.
9 Q. And this document, I think we can all agree, at the last page of
10 the document we see that it's in the -- it was drafted by
11 Colonel Miletic, but it's in the name of the supreme commander,
12 Dr. Radovan Karadzic. Can you explain why, I believe, Directive 4 was in
13 the name of the -- General Mladic, this is in the name of
14 President Karadzic, and what do you make of that, if anything?
15 A. In the very early year of the war -- years of the war, the
16 political bodies, to a large degree, allowed the military to draft the
17 strategic plans based on very general political guidance. As the war
18 progressed and as the Supreme Command, as it were, became more
19 experienced and took a greater hand in directing the war effort, they
20 took a larger role in overseeing the strategic -- the creation of the
21 strategic plans to ensure that they were aligned with the political
22 objectives of the state. So in this particular situation, which made it
23 different from Directive 4, which was strictly the military drafted it
24 and published it, in this particular case you have Directive 7, which
25 although drafted by the military, is approved by the political leadership
1 of the state. And then what you'll see is a more detailed version of
2 Directive 7, known as Directive 7/1, which the military itself then
3 drafts to provide amplifying guidance to military units and corps
4 commanders. So, I mean, this is just a mature -- a maturing of the
5 military/political apparatus of the Republika Srpska as time goes on.
6 Q. All right. Let's go to page -- as we know, these are divided up
7 by different tasks to the different corps. Is that correct? Like
8 Directive 4, Directive 7 is setting out tasks for the various corps?
9 A. Yes, sir, in general terms.
10 Q. All right. Let's go to page 10 in the English and page 15 of the
11 B/C/S, which is the Drina Corps section, which the Court has seen many
12 times. And just to call your attention to the section, in the middle of
13 the page:
14 "While in the direction of Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, complete
15 physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out as soon
16 as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two
18 Can you tell us what that means and why, if you know, the VRS
19 would have made this an objective, that one sentence?
20 A. Yes, sir. Because of the terrain and a lack of manpower, as
21 discussed earlier, particularly the Drina Corps could not completely
22 encircle both enclaves. As a result, it was well known that individual
23 soldiers, civilians, military supplies, could travel over land through
24 various valleys and paths from the Srebrenica enclave to the Zepa enclave
25 and then back. So as any part of ultimately militarily defeating the
1 Muslim forces in the enclave, they recognised that they were going to
2 have to block those paths to be able to keep people from being able --
3 people and supplies from being able to physically move back and forth
4 between the Zepa enclave and the Srebrenica enclave.
5 Q. What is your view on whether or not this objective was a
6 legitimate military objective?
7 A. That particular aspect is certainly a legitimate objective, to
8 cut the lines of communications between two military forces.
9 Q. All right. Let me continue the next part:
10 "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an
11 unbearable situation of total insecurity, with no hope of further
12 survival or life for the inhabitants of the Srebrenica and Zepa."
13 What, in your view, is this -- does this mean?
14 A. Given that the phrase "inhabitants," in my view, encompasses both
15 military and civilian population, this is where you start to cross the
16 line and you start to make the civilian population in those areas part of
17 the objects of attack.
18 Q. Now, when it says "by planned and well-thought-out combat
19 operations, create an unbearable situation," in your view, does that
20 include -- is that suggesting a plan to take out the entire enclaves is
21 an objective at this point?
22 A. No, I don't -- at this point in time, I do not believe that their
23 intention is to actually physically take over the enclaves at this
24 juncture. What I believe that they are attempting to do at this point in
25 time is to create the conditions similar to they had in April of -- May
1 in 1993, whereby compressing the enclaves into smaller and smaller areas
2 and creating that type of humanitarian crisis, it forces the
3 United Nations, themselves, to declare that the enclaves are not tenable
4 and to evacuate them themselves.
5 Q. Does this next sentence -- how do you read the next sentence in
6 this -- in your evaluation?
7 And we need to, I'm sorry, go over to the next page in English.
8 Thank you.
9 "In case the UNPROFOR forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the
10 Drina Corps Command shall plan an operation named Jadar with the task of
11 breaking up and destroying the Muslim forces in these enclaves and
12 definitively liberating the Drina Valley region."
13 So how does that fit into your previous opinion?
14 A. I incorporate that line, as well as other language in
15 Directive 7, that I believe we're going to get into in a bit, as all part
16 of my analysis that at this point in time, the objective wasn't to
17 militarily conquer the enclaves, it was to create the conditions where
18 the United Nations forces would come to the conclusion that they could
19 not sustain the enclaves and that the impetus would then be on the
20 United Nations to end the enclaves and remove the populations themselves.
21 This, in fact, was just part of it, that the military was being
22 instructed that should the United Nations abandon the enclaves, that they
23 should be prepared to rapidly engage in military activities against any
24 remaining BiH Army forces.
25 Q. All right. You mention another part of the directive. Let's go
1 to -- should be Serbian page 21, page 14 in the English.
2 But before we get to this section, let me ask you: From that
3 last section and the Drina Corps, in your military opinion, would
4 General Tolimir, who was, as we know, the chief of Intel and Security at
5 the time, would he have been aware of this directive and aware of the
6 specific language that we've just gone over for the Drina Corps?
7 A. Yes, sir, he would have had to have been.
8 Q. Why?
9 A. Inherent in both Directive 7 and in the supplemental
10 Directive 7/1, there are a number of specific tasks which the security
11 branch will have to be a part of in order to realise these plans not only
12 for the Drina Corps but for all of the corps, so he has to be aware of
13 what the general political/military objectives are in great detail in
14 order to ensure that he can synchronise the work of the Sector for
15 Intelligence and Security to support those missions.
16 Q. Remind us, just briefly, what it is that he would be doing to
17 support those missions, in particular? I mean -- well, not particular
18 facts, but what would his job be?
19 A. His portfolio, as the assistant commander for Intelligence and
20 Security, would cover all of those aspects related to, for example, with
21 the enclaves, monitoring the United Nations presence and their
22 willingness to continue to remain in those enclaves is going to be a
23 classic intelligence function. The intelligence organs of the various
24 military units, and particularly the Main Staff, is going to be
25 responsible for obtaining information relating to the United Nations'
1 willingness to continue these missions. From the security perspective,
2 one making sure that what the actual plan and intent of in the VRS
3 remains camouflaged from the United Nations or the international
4 community is going to require the work of his security sector and
5 counter-intelligence to make sure that they don't leak information that
6 would be of detriment to this plan. So he has to be aware of what the
7 plan is in great detail in order to ensure that the Sector for
8 Intelligence and Security can implement all of the missions that they are
9 going to be required to do in order to support these objectives.
10 Q. Okay. Now, that gets us to the next section which is under the
11 larger heading of "Support for Combat Operations," and the smaller
12 heading, "The Morale" -- or "Moral and Psychological Support." If we
13 could go down to the fourth paragraph, and it says:
14 "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with
15 UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and
16 unobtrusively-restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the
17 logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material
18 resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good
19 will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international
20 community and international public opinion."
21 Now, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence about convoys and
22 supplies, and issues that were being faced in this regard. Can you tell
23 us, Mr. Butler, who is being targeted by this paragraph?
24 A. The declared target is the UNPROFOR and their ability to resupply
25 the enclaves, but it makes it clear that ultimately the target or the
1 people who are going to feel the impact is going to be the Muslim
3 Q. What do you think they meant by "reduce and limit the logistics
4 support of UNPROFOR"?
5 A. As time goes on, and it actually started, literally, a month or
6 two earlier, what begins to become clear is a pattern where the UNPROFOR
7 forces in the enclaves are -- their combat and other abilities to protect
8 the enclaves are degradated [sic] as a result of a policy of not letting
9 the UN units resupply personnel, resupply equipment that has been damaged
10 or is broken, and to resupply logistics, ammunition utilisation,
11 particularly personnel rotation through the units when their tour of duty
12 is completed. And by doing this over a sustained period of time, you
13 greatly impact the combat ability of the United Nations units to perform
14 their missions. That is what this particular paragraph discusses. And
15 when one looks in the intervening months at what happened to the
16 United Nations Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica, you'll be able to see the
17 complete manifestation of that plan and how it impacted or limited the
18 Dutch Battalion's ability to do their missions.
19 Q. Did fuel play a role in any of this?
20 A. Yes, sir, it did. In fact, fuel became so acute for the
21 Dutch Battalion that they were forced to abandon patrols of various areas
22 of the enclaves simply because they did not have enough fuel for their
23 armoured vehicles to go on patrol.
24 Q. And what purpose does disabling UNPROFOR in this way serve, in
25 your view?
1 A. By limiting UNPROFOR's mobility, one, militarily UNPROFOR can no
2 longer effectively police the safe area and prevent either Bosnian Serb
3 or Bosnian Muslim military operations from occurring, and the second is
4 that by degrading the UN's operations and its ability to protect itself,
5 it has a significantly adverse impact on the UN's ability to sustain the
6 civilian population within the enclaves.
7 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document, P1199, and we can see
8 that this is now Directive 7.1. And is this what you had been referring
9 to earlier?
10 A. Yes, sir, it is.
11 Q. And does this document in any way negate or undermine
12 Directive 7?
13 A. No, sir. It -- in fact, it is -- it amplifies and supplements
14 Directive 7 with more specific tasks for the units to accomplish.
15 Q. And I think we'll all agree that in Directive 7/1 there's no
16 discussion specifically related to the enclaves, or making life
17 impossible for the Muslims, or reducing the logistics support and the
18 humanitarian aid in this document. Does that suggest to you anything in
20 A. No, sir, it doesn't suggest to me that they've abandoned the
21 mission. It just simply is a reflection of the more specific military
22 tasks that are outlined in 7-1. For example, when one discusses a
23 concrete military task, there's no way to perform a military mission
24 related to make life unbearable in an enclave. That's not a military
25 sensical order. Where that language will be incorporated is more
1 specific tasks relating to, you know, limiting convoy amounts, or
2 tightening security in certain areas, or closing certain areas. So it's
3 just a military -- it's just, again, more specific military language
4 relating to how to accomplish those broader tasks, because some of the
5 broader tasks don't lend themselves to military orders.
6 Q. All right. And let me take you briefly back to that paragraph
7 that talks about reducing support for UNPROFOR and the Muslim population.
8 Would that be a section that General Tolimir would have known about?
9 A. Yes, sir. In fact, when one looks at Directive 7-1, on, for
10 example, page 7 of the English language one, paragraph 6(3), there is --
11 6(2) and 6(3), there is specific tasks related to intelligence support
12 and security support. General Tolimir obviously has to be aware of what
13 those tasks are.
14 Q. Now, the convoy system supporting those enclaves, was there a
15 legitimate security element related to those that would be of interest to
16 General Tolimir and the security branch?
17 A. Yes, sir, there would.
18 Q. Can you explain that?
19 A. Those particular convoys transited through the military areas
20 under the control of the VRS. Many parties that made up the
21 United Nations were believed by the Republika Srpska and the VRS at the
22 time to be hostile to the interests of the Republika Srpska. It would
23 certainly be within the realm of the intelligence and security branch to,
24 first of all, want to make sure that those UN forces transiting through
25 those areas would not be collecting information or intelligence that
1 could be used later to the detriment of the Army of the Republika Srpska.
2 Also, it was believed by the VRS that much of the supplies that were
3 supposedly going to civilians in the enclaves was somehow being diverted
4 to the military forces of the Muslim side. So as a result, the VRS had a
5 vested interest in monitoring those convoys and monitoring, in great
6 detail, the equipment that was going in there, to take whatever steps
7 that they believed they could take to ensure that items that could be
8 diverted for military use against them were either eliminated from those
9 convoys or were reduced to as small amount as possible. Obviously, some
10 issues, like food -- food is always going to be a two-use item, so to
11 speak. It has military and civilian applications, depending on who it's
12 feeding. Fuel is the same way. It has both civilian and military
13 applications. Obviously, the UN was not providing ammunition overtly to
14 the warring parties, but those were the issues that the VRS was concerned
15 with relating to those items which would be designated as for the
16 civilian population but could be diverted for use by the Bosnian Muslim
18 Q. So if we have a situation where, as you've just testified, the
19 VRS has a legitimate concern and responsibility to control illegal or
20 military goods into the enclaves, on one hand, and we have what was
21 mentioned very clearly in Directive 7, on the other hand, a policy to
22 reduce the logistics to the UNPROFOR and the Muslim population in such a
23 manner as to not -- as to make them dependent on their goodwill, but not
24 condemn them in the international community, or words to that effect, if
25 we have these two practices going on, one, the legitimate one that
1 clearly would be a security responsibility, as you have suggested, would
2 security know or be -- and/or be involved in the other one, the reduction
3 as described in the Directive 7?
4 A. Yes, sir. As you lay out, this is a rather sophisticated plan
5 that the army is attempting to pull off to achieve this objective. It's
6 going to require a good amount of co-ordination at all levels of the
7 intelligence and security organs and at the Main Staff in order to
8 successfully do this without it becoming evident to the international
9 community that it is part of a pattern of deliberate obstruction. So,
10 yeah, given what's going to have to happen, it's going to require a great
11 deal of support and involvement by the Main Staff organs of intelligence
12 and security.
13 Q. Okay. Now, have you had a chance over the years now to review
14 and analyse what we refer to as convoy documents related to convoys going
15 in and out of the various areas, such as Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde,
16 and Zepa?
17 A. Yes, sir, I have.
18 Q. Can you give us the briefest description of your understanding
19 how this system worked?
20 A. The process that had to be undertaken at the actual level where
21 the convoys were organised, put into motion to the enclaves, and then
22 returned, required a good deal of co-ordination between the Main Staff of
23 the Army of the Republika Srpska and the relevant organs of the UNPROFOR.
24 The UNPROFOR would be responsible for assembling a convoy and its
25 manifested equipment that it was going to take, identifying the
1 personnel, and then notifying the Main Staff of the VRS as to the convoy,
2 the equipment involved, the cargo, even the names of individual soldiers
3 and the weapons that they would be carrying, and the fuel amounts that it
4 would be carrying. The UN had to do this in great detail. The VRS then
5 reviewed these requests for movement and could approve them as is, could
6 disapprove them, or could modify the cargos by directing that certain
7 amounts be increased, decreased, whatever.
8 Once the VRS approved these convoys, the convoy departure times
9 and routes would be transmitted to the UN, and at the same time the
10 various Republika Srpska military and police units that would have
11 check-points established along the various routes and the check-points
12 into the enclaves would be notified as to the identity of the convoy, who
13 was travelling with the convoy, what the cargo was, how long it could
14 remain in the enclave, and if any cargo or supplies were to be taken
15 back, what those were. The intention, of course, from the VRS side was
16 to not only manage the cargo being brought into the enclaves, but at a
17 designated inspection site before entering the enclaves, they would
18 inspect the convoy to ensure that the United Nations, in fact, complied
19 with the approved manifest.
20 Q. And as your review of these documents, and we'll go over some,
21 did you form a conclusion or an opinion as to whether or not there was
22 any restriction of logistics support reflected in these documents,
23 consistent with or not consistent with Directive 7's language that we've
24 talked about, reducing support to UNPROFOR and the civilian population?
25 A. Yes, sir. I believe that as some of these convoy documents come
1 to light, it is evident that cargo that was disapproved or restrictions
2 placed on cargo going in made it clear that those restrictions were being
3 done in general compliance to the goals of Directive 7, in so much as
4 they were directed, in part, if not completely, against the civilian
6 Q. And what about UNPROFOR?
7 A. Certainly in the case of UNPROFOR, when one looks at these convoy
8 documents, there will be many situations where the approval to move
9 people or soldiers from the UN out of an enclave will be followed by the
10 disapproval to allow replacement soldiers in, or to allow fuel or
11 technical parts for vehicles into the enclaves, or to allow, for example,
12 some weapons - you know, the explosive or propellant in the weapons
13 expires at a certain point and the weapon needs to be replaced - you
14 know, by not permitting those replacements to take shape. So as you look
15 at the convoy documents, you can see the pattern which I believe falls
16 right on track with what is outlined in Directive 7 and Directive 7-1.
17 Q. All right. Let's look at some of those documents. If we could
18 go to tab 49, 65 ter 1784. And we see that this is a document, the
19 original in the B/C/S, from the Main Staff of the Army of
20 Republika Srpska, dated 6 March 1995. This is just a few days before the
21 8 March date of Directive 7, two days before, and it is to the SRK and
22 the Drina Corps Command. And we see that it -- if we look at it, it's
23 page 3 in the English, but we can see in the B/C/S that it is sent out by
24 Colonel Miletic, who we know from previous evidence. And Miletic talks
25 about -- in that first line, about UNPROFOR teams approved for
1 7 March 1995, and he also notes that convoys have -- there are convoys
2 that have not been approved.
3 And I don't want to spend a lot of time on this, but if we look
4 through this list in the English, we'll see references in number 2 to
5 Sarajevo, where fuel was disapproved; number 3, Gorazde, where fuel was
6 disapproved; number 4, to Zepa, where fuel was disapproved; number 6,
7 Sarajevo, fuel. If we go to the next page in the English, number 8,
8 Gorazde, fuel disapproved; number 9.
9 What do you make of these fuel disapprovals?
10 A. These types of fuel disapprovals directly impact the ability of
11 the relevant United Nations forces in the enclaves to perform their
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer that document into
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1784 shall be
17 assigned Exhibit P2400. Thank you.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It should be 2500, I think.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to P2162. This is a document
21 the Chamber has seen before.
22 Q. All right. Two things I want to ask you about.
23 We see, in this document from the Main Staff, the Army of
24 Republika Srpska, dated 2 April, and in the text it says:
25 "We hereby inform you that we consent to the request of the
1 RS Co-ordinating Body ..."
2 Can you tell us what your understanding is of the co-ordinating
3 body that's referred to here and the interaction between it and the
4 Main Staff?
5 A. With respect to civilian or humanitarian goods, the UN wasn't the
6 only body that was dealt with in that sense. There was a civil body
7 under the RS government, a commission, set up that would also deal with
8 requests from the various non-governmental organisations or other
9 humanitarian organisations that were also requesting access to the
10 enclaves or any access to the territory of the Republika Srpska either
11 from the Sarajevo side or from their bases in the former -- in the
12 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia out of Belgrade. So the RS commission, in
13 and of itself, could not make unilateral approvals of these requests.
14 They also had you reach out and go to the Main Staff of the army in order
15 to co-ordinate these requests with the army to ensure that the army was:
16 one, aware of the requests and, two, that they would not be approving
17 anything that the army did not want them to approve.
18 Q. So who, in your opinion, had final control in what made it into
19 the enclaves?
20 A. On a day-to-day basis, the Main Staff exercised that final
22 Q. All right. And looking at this document, the handwritten note
23 that we can see in the English translation is -- it says:
24 "Not a single convoy or ICRC team or MSF may enter Srebrenica
25 without my permission and presence. M. Nikolic."
1 Who, in your opinion, is "M. Nikolic"?
2 A. That would be Momir Nikolic, who at the time, captain first
3 class, was the assistant commander for Intelligence and Security for the
4 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.
5 Q. And can you explain why Momir Nikolic would be in such a position
6 to be able to make this statement? Is it consistent or inconsistent with
7 what you have been telling us about, Security's involvement in these
9 A. This is completely consistent with the role of the security organ
10 in monitoring the convoy movement. There was a military police
11 check-point manned by the Bratunac Brigade at the Yellow Bridge, the
12 entrance to the Srebrenica safe area. This was Momir Nikolic making it
13 clear to his subordinates, in this case from a technical chain, the
14 military police, that they were not authorised, without his personal
15 presence there, to allow any convoy or any other vehicles into the
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I note for the record that we have in the binder
18 only one page and three lines of English translation. This is, in fact,
19 the translation of the first page of the B/C/S version. The other pages
20 are missing in the English.
21 But could we please move to the last page of the English
22 translation on the screen to see if there is any.
23 That's all. That means that the other pages are missing,
24 especially with the name of the person who is supposed to have signed it,
25 Manojlo Milovanovic. And even in e-court, the other pages are missing in
1 the translation.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's correct, Mr. President. We did that as a
3 resource-saver. The main thing we wanted you to see was the -- in fact,
4 it's a convoy approval, and Momir Nikolic's comments on it, and who it is
5 by, Milovanovic. But we can have also have this translated. It
6 shouldn't a problem at this point.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think that was only a remark for the record,
8 not a criticism. And, therefore, we have now put on the record that this
9 document was signed by Manojlo Milovanovic.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is sufficient.
12 Please carry on.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, let's go to another document, 65 ter 4115,
14 getting away --
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 May this day of trial end in keeping with God's will.
18 I apologise to Mr. McCloskey for interrupting. I would like the
19 Trial Chamber to be shown the whole document to see if this was ordered
20 by Milovanovic, this order given by Nikolic. Is that the reason why not
21 the whole document was published? Because according to the
22 interpretation, it says that this order is in keeping with Directive 7/1.
23 We should see whether it is, indeed, so in the documents.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: I believe the full document in Serbian is present
1 in the record, and --
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We see, on the left side of the screen, the last
3 page with the name "Manojlo Milovanovic."
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't see a reference to Directive -- a
5 specific reference to any directive here, so I'm not exactly sure what
6 the general's concern is.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you help us to understand your
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I can
10 assist you.
11 The witness, in his reply, said that this was consistent with a
12 directive - he literally said that on page 27 - and that these tasks were
13 carried out by security organs. So now let's see whether that was,
14 indeed, contained in the order, that that's how it should be done at all
15 levels and all units, or whether Mr. Nikolic just took it upon himself to
16 order such a thing. Thank you.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, you may put a question in this
18 respect to the witness.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Mr. Butler, in your view, did Momir Nikolic do this on his own,
21 or do you have any indications to the contrary?
22 A. I'm not sure in the sense -- what you mean by "on his own."
23 Given the guidance of Directive 7 and 7/1 to undertake a programme, in
24 this case, the fact that Momir Nikolic is taking it upon himself to
25 personally oversee the convoys going through and would ensure that
1 they're complying with orders, that may be, individually, his decision.
2 It may be a decision that Colonel Popovic, his immediate superior in the
3 security organ, has directed. I'm not aware of any document which would
4 indicate that one way or another. My point is that whether he's
5 personally physically present at the convoy site or has delegated the
6 authority to inspect these convoys and allow them to go through or not go
7 through if their cargo is what is authorised, is part of the broader
8 theme outlined in the various Directive 7 and 7-1. It's not an
9 individual decision on the part of Momir Nikolic that contrary to any
10 guidance received from anywhere else, that he, individually, will hold up
11 international convoys going into a safe area. He does not have the
12 authority to do that.
13 Q. And I think -- do you recall a document that is, I believe, in
14 this binder where the Bratunac Brigade provides an annual report, where
15 they talk about this topic?
16 A. Yes, sir. As part of their report that they do assessing the
17 activities of the Bratunac Brigade, one of the issues that they note is
18 that they are complying with orders related to monitoring UN and other
19 international convoys going into the safe area. I believe we'll see that
20 down the line at some point.
21 Q. All right. Let's go to this document that we now have. We got
22 away, briefly, from the Main Staff convoy documents. Now we're at a
23 regular combat report from the Zvornik Brigade, dated 2 April, under the
24 name of Vinko Pandurevic, and, of course, it's to the Drina Corps
25 Command. And there is a section we can see on paragraph -- it's noted as
1 paragraph 10, so we'd best go over to the next pages.
2 Actually, we -- I guess I'm still waiting for 65 ter 4115.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The reason why it took some time is that you
4 didn't give the number.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. We're fine in the B/C/S.
6 Q. And paragraph 10, we can see there's a section on humanitarian
7 convoys, and it -- is this something that is normally reported on by the
8 Zvornik Brigade?
9 A. Yes, sir. The daily combat reports are a reflection of the daily
10 activities that occur within the Zvornik Brigade, or at least those
11 activities that the command deems is necessary for the superior command,
12 in this case the Drina Corps, to be aware of.
13 Q. And if we could go to the next page in the English, we can see
14 here a reference to an UNPROFOR convoy, the Dutch Battalion, en route
15 from Banja Koviljaca to Srebrenica. Two vehicles, four soldiers. They
16 left at 1900 hours on 1 April. And it says:
17 "One Veld steriliser," and it gives a number, "was seized from
18 the Dutch Battalion."
19 What do you make of that, a sort of sterliser being seized?
20 A. Yes, sir. It's a medical device. Either it was not properly
21 manifested or the army just decided to appropriate it for themselves and
22 their own medical centre. They're noting, as a routine course of
23 business, that they've done this.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer that into evidence.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 4115 shall be
2 assigned Exhibit P2501. Thank you.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: And one last document, I think, before the break,
4 41 -- 65 ter 4116.
5 Q. And this is another combat report from Pandurevic dated 4 April.
6 And it's the second page of the English that I wanted to refer you to,
7 and that is the bottom part that talks about an MSF team going to
8 Srebrenica, and it states that they confiscated the following from the
9 team of MSF. And we can see it's laundry detergent, floor detergent,
10 shampoo, towels, beer, wine, vodka, coffee, cigarettes, lighters, rolling
11 papers. What's your comment on seizing this kind of material?
12 A. A reflection, first of all, that it confirms that these convoys
13 are being inspected, and, presumably, items that are not properly on the
14 cargo manifest and have not been approved are being pulled off of
15 vehicles and are being confiscated by the Army of the Republika Srpska.
16 Q. On this one, can you tell whether or not this material was not --
17 not on the manifest or not or whether it was just being pulled?
18 A. No, sir, it's unclear as to the reason why this material is being
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this into evidence.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 4116 shall be
23 assigned Exhibit P2502 [Realtime transcript read in error "P2402"].
24 Thank you.
25 Correction for the transcript. It's P2502. Thank you.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I see it's 10.30, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. We should have our first break now, and
3 we will resume at 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, please continue.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 If we could go, staying on the topic of convoys, to P2411. It
9 should be in the 53 tab.
10 Q. And we'll -- as we get there, we'll see that we now have a
11 main -- we're back to the Main Staff of the VRS, dated 7 April. And if
12 we go to the end, we see this is in the name of General Milovanovic. And
13 this is to the Command of the Drina Corps, and that we can see that this
14 is a -- it begins as a concurrence with the co-ordinating body, and we
15 see it sets out some of the concurrence. We also see handwritten, up in
16 the right-hand corner, "OB."
17 Mr. Butler, do you see -- we can see that it's been -- is a
18 possible translation of "Security Organ." Do you make anything of "OB"
19 written up here?
20 A. Given the context of the electrical message or the telex going to
21 the Command of the Drina Corps, they are being passed over to the
22 security branch of the Drina Corps so they are aware of these convoy
24 Q. All right. And we see, in that first paragraph, that:
25 "... we concur with the implementation of permits of the
1 Co-ordinating Body ..."
2 Does this fit into your opinion, one way or another, about who
3 was actually controlling these -- the final say for these, the body or
4 the Main Staff?
5 A. Yes, sir, it does.
6 Q. And how so?
7 A. As I indicated in my prior testimony, the co-ordinating body for
8 the Republika Srpska could not, in and of themselves, authorise these
9 movements. They would have to forward them to the Main Staff. The
10 Main Staff would then either concur or non-concur. So, again, in this
11 particular case, they're allowancing that, you know, they are concurring
12 with the requests by the co-ordinating body of VRS to do this and, in
13 effect, granting them the authorisation.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise to
16 Mr. McCloskey, but it would be good to clarify with the witness what is
17 "approval" and what is "authorisation," because the two words have been
18 used. And, second, to see whether the security organs received this
19 telegram or what we see up above are the initials of someone to who it is
20 addressed, because it doesn't say "Security Organs" at the top, it says
21 "The Drina Corps." Where can Mr. McCloskey show us that it was sent to
22 the security organs of the Drina Corps?
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I stand by Mr. Butler's answer to
25 the questions. This is the evidence. There is a reflection of
1 "OB/Security Organ" on this, and it is what it is.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you should take notice of the fact
3 that nobody suggested that this typewritten document was sent to a
4 security organ, and Mr. McCloskey dealt with a handwritten entry.
5 Mr. Tolimir asked you, Mr. McCloskey, to discuss the words
6 "approval" and "authorisation." If you would do that at this point in
7 time, that's fine. Otherwise, Mr. Tolimir may do that during his
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
10 Q. Maybe, Mr. Butler, could you just reiterate what -- which, if
11 either term, is more appropriate for the Main Staff's action or
12 authority? Are they approving, or are they authorising, or are they
13 both, or are they neither?
14 A. I guess I don't split the two terms up, "approving" and
15 "authorising." The -- under the methodology used with respect to
16 convoys, it was the responsibility of other organs to propose which
17 convoys would travel and what their cargo are, and ultimately it was the
18 responsibility of the Main Staff to approve those requests. Now, whether
19 one calls them "approval" or whether one calls them "we concur with that
20 request," in my understanding of the phraseology, it's the same thing.
21 The ultimate authority as to whether or not a convoy travels is vested
22 with the Main Staff.
23 Q. All right. Let me ask you something. We see that -- on that
24 first page, for example, we see that it's approved to send flour both to
25 Gorazde and to Srebrenica, and I think it has been shown or mentioned in
1 this case that there's a video of ammunition being pulled out of flour on
2 one of the convoys to I can't recall which enclave. Would the security
3 branch be concerned about ammunition going to the enclaves inside flour,
4 as apparently occurred based on a video that is believed part of this
6 A. Yes, sir, it would be absolutely prudent for them to inspect even
7 those types of cargos to ensure that elements of the UN or ABiH had not
8 gotten access to those goods and had sought to smuggle in weapons. So
9 the fact, particularly, that the VRS had evidence that it occurred in the
10 past is a good indicator that they should continue to look for evidence
11 of that and inspect the cargos in the future.
12 Q. Okay. And I don't want to be repetitive, but to make sure
13 General Tolimir understands your opinion: Given, as you've just said,
14 there is a legitimate security concern for the security branch to control
15 what goes in these convoys, is it militarily possible or practical that
16 the security branch would be cut out of a system that actually restricted
17 humanitarian and support for UNPROFOR?
18 A. No, sir. They would have to be involved in the process in order
19 to perform that duty.
20 Q. Couldn't General Mladic or Milovanovic appoint a special task
21 force to be involved in the restrictions of -- the illegal restrictions
22 of convoys that was totally separate and apart from the legitimate
23 controlling and restrictions of illegal goods? Is that imaginable in a
24 military context?
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was about to ask, could we have a
4 reference? Where are security organs controlling convoys?
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: That is part of the process of the evidence, and
7 Mr. Butler has talked at length about it already. And I think that's a
8 good point for cross-examination.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We agree.
10 Please continue.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY:
12 Q. Do you remember my question, Mr. Butler? It basically comes down
13 to: Can you have security involved in this legitimate control of
14 material and have some other -- complete other unit acting -- doing the
15 same fundamental thing, but illegally restricting?
16 A. General Mladic or Milovanovic could organise it, obviously, any
17 way that they elect to, but it doesn't make sense that you would have
18 two separate organs essentially involved in the same act, which is
19 dealing with the issues of cargo, and the inspection of that cargo, and
20 the dealing of convoys. It seems to be -- it seems to be repetitive.
21 And given the fact that the security organ, you know, has an ability to
22 accomplish these missions, it would make sense for them just to allow
23 them to do both.
24 Q. All right. Let's go to page 2 in the English.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise for
2 objecting again, but it says here -- or, rather, in the question just
3 asked by Mr. McCloskey on page 37, line 5, he says, Can you have security
4 involved in control? Can we get a reference where exactly are security
5 involved in the control of convoys? And then he goes on to say that
6 Milovanovic and others could organise it, and the witness answered that
7 question, but we need to see first where exactly and how the security
8 organs controlled the convoys. I want to establish the facts. Maybe the
9 question could be rephrased to sound something like, Can we suppose that
10 security organs, and so on and so forth, but we need to establish the
11 facts. We need to stick to facts.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the Prosecution is trying to
13 establish facts. It's their examination of the witness, and later on
14 it's your turn to cross-examine the witness. This is not a real
15 objection, and there's no foundation for this objection to the last
16 question, which is already answered.
17 Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY:
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, untruths are being
20 presented here, and you approve.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I ruled on that. The witness has
22 given his answers, and Mr. McCloskey may continue. Please don't
23 interrupt in that way. If that is in your opinion, and this is -- you
24 are absolutely entitled to see it as untruths, you should and you have
25 the opportunity for that, to challenge this part of the
1 examination-in-chief during your cross-examination.
2 Mr. McCloskey, please continue.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
4 Q. And just to remind us all, Captain First Class Momir Nikolic,
5 when he made the comment that we saw on the convoy document, was -- in
6 what capacity do you believe he was acting when he made that comment
7 about no convoys would go through without his approval?
8 A. He made that comment in his capacity as his role as chief of
9 security for the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. He's exercising his
10 authority, as it's been delegated to him, to ensure that the contents of
11 those convoys contain no more cargo than is authorised on the manifest.
12 So, I mean, maybe I'm not saying it as clearly as I need to with respect
13 to control, but, I mean, at that point at that Yellow Bridge, at that
14 point where the convoy goes into UN territory, Captain Nikolic is
15 exercising control over that convoy. If he were to find material that
16 was not in compliance, he would be within his authority, as granted to
17 him by the Main Staff, to inform the Main Staff that the convoy does not
18 contain material as manifested and leave it up to the Main Staff as to
19 whether or not that convoy should continue to go forth, or whether or not
20 that convoy will be turned around, or, as we saw in the case of the
21 Zvornik Infantry Brigade, whether or not the material that was not on the
22 manifest would be off-loaded.
23 Q. Let's -- we should be on page -- are we on page 2? Yes, we are,
24 of the English. And the B/C/S may be the next page. The important part
25 that I want to go for is a comment that says "Remark," and:
1 "We did not approve the following in this weekly plan."
2 So we started --
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That is still on the first page of the B/C/S
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. We started with an approval that we've noted, and now we're
7 seeing material that is not approved. And it says:
8 "Material for the Swedish construction project for Srebrenica and
9 Drinjaca on 9 April, 11 April and 13 April for Srebrenica, until we
10 receive the position of the state committee for co-operation regarding
11 this matter."
12 Can you remind us what this Swedish construction project is?
13 A. It's often referred to in documents as the Swedish shelter
14 project as well. It was an NGO programme where this particular group was
15 constructing temporary housing for those individuals residing both inside
16 the Srebrenica area as well as Bosnian Serbs who had been displaced
17 outside, temporary housing, rather than -- because they were refugees.
18 So, I mean, this NGO was involved in that project of the construction of
19 temporary housing.
20 Q. And then it says:
21 "In addition to the above, we did not approve beef, salt, oil and
22 clapboards for the enclave ..."
23 And it gives several dates.
24 These basic foodstuffs, salt, oil, beef, was hunger an issue in
25 the enclave in the summer, in June and July of 1995 for the civilian
2 A. Yes, sir. I understand that as a result of the investigation,
3 there were a number of issues that were raised with the fact that the
4 food stocks within the enclave were at dangerously low levels as the year
5 was wearing on because the food products weren't being brought in as fast
6 as they were being consumed.
7 Q. And what's your understanding of this term "clapboards"?
8 A. I take it at this juncture we're talking about drywall,
9 construction material type of --
10 Q. Okay, all right, and that is already in evidence.
11 Let's now go to 65 ter 1925. This is also a document from
12 7 April, and we see again it's from the Main Staff, in the name of
13 General Milovanovic, and we again -- if we see the Serbian, we see "OB"
14 up in the right-hand corner. Again, tell us what's your understanding of
15 what "OB" stands for.
16 A. The notation for "OB" would define as "Security Organ."
17 Q. And in your view, the fact that someone would write
18 "Security Organ" on this document, does that have any meaning to you?
19 A. Again, sir, while, obviously, the compliance of all orders is
20 with respect to, you know, the role of the commander, in these particular
21 cases monitoring convoy movements and ensuring compliance would be a
22 security function.
23 Q. All right. And let's just see this. We see that this really --
24 this starts out as a document where they have not approved several
25 UNPROFOR convoys and teams. And I won't go over it all in detail, but
1 number 1, we see to Sarajevo, fuel; Sarajevo, diesel, number 2; number 3,
2 Gorazde, fuel, kerosene, unleaded fuel and gas; number 4, Sarajevo, and
3 it talks about 27 vehicles and 63 persons which was supposed to transport
4 12 containers with humanitarian aid, bed, food, clothes, medicines, and
5 school supplies.
6 If we go to page 2 in the English, still on B/C/S page 1, I
7 believe, it talks about more Sarajevo material, oil, solvents,
8 maintenance supply, and it says:
9 "In view of the fact that UNPROFOR did not deliver a drop of the
10 agreed 13.000 litres of oil for the winter season for road maintenance
11 work in winter, we demanded that they fulfill their obligation and said
12 that we would then discuss approving oil for their needs."
13 What do you make of that?
14 A. Well, sir, as part of the various access agreements, one of the
15 agreements made was that UNPROFOR would provide fuel to -- or oils to the
16 Republika Srpska which, in their view, would be used, in part, in order
17 to keep the roads clear for UN convoys as well their own traffic. In
18 this particular document, it reflects the fact that their view is that
19 none of the promised oil supplies from the UN have been delivered to the
20 Republika Srpska, and, as a result, they're going to retaliate by cutting
21 the supply of fuels going to the UN until such time as the UN makes good
22 on their promise.
23 Q. All right. If we continue to go down, we see that number 9,
24 Srebrenica, on April 8th, a convoy compromising seven vehicles and
25 eighteen persons which were supposed to transport diesel fuel, it got
1 denied. And according to this paragraph, Milovanovic says:
2 "We told them that they had 79 tonnes of fuel with Oric."
3 What does that mean, that last comment?
4 A. Naser Oric is the commander of the 28th Infantry Division inside
5 the Srebrenica enclave. This is a rather flippant remark that the
6 Main Staff is making to their Drina Corps counterparts which essentially
7 is telling them that from their perspective, they're not approving fuel
8 going into the enclave because the military forces of the ABiH already
9 have more than enough fuel, and they're not going to provide them any
11 Q. Do you have any indication that the BiH had such amounts of fuel?
12 A. I would certainly hold open the possibility that the ABiH, and
13 specifically the 28th Infantry Division, was seeking to divert fuel going
14 to either UNPROFOR or to civilians in Srebrenica for military use, but
15 I've not come across anything which reflects that at any given time they
16 had this much fuel on hand.
17 Q. Were you aware of any military vehicles they had that would use
19 A. The 28th Infantry Division was primarily light infantry because
20 they did not have very many vehicles. They couldn't, under the
21 demilitarisation, actually be driving vehicles back and forth in front of
22 the Dutch, so in this particular context, just not a military use. I
23 suspect that if the 28th Military Division was using fuel in these
24 quantities, it was primarily for the purpose of selling it on the black
1 Q. And who would be the consumer in Srebrenica for 28th Division
2 fuel black market, if there was such a thing?
3 A. The civilian population would be the primary consumer. It
4 certainly wouldn't be unheard of to find out that some elements of the
5 28th Infantry Division might have even been selling fuel back to the
6 Bosnian Serbs.
7 Q. All right. Let's look at paragraph 10. This is page 3 of the
8 English, page 2 of the B/C/S.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment, please. Judge Mindua would like to
10 put a question.
11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed. In fact, I wanted to
12 put a question now because I thought that the Prosecutor wanted to get to
13 the next document. But, nevertheless, since I was given the floor, I
14 will put a question now.
15 So, Mr. Witness, you just talked about the black market. And if
16 I look at the document that I have before me, 1925, paragraph 4,
17 General Milovanovic says the following: He's, in fact, not authorising
18 the passage of convoys, number 07-181/04, because the activities by the
19 UNPROFOR are already carried out by a great number of international
20 organisations, or NGOs, actually. So according to him, according to
21 General Milovanovic, the UNPROFOR is supposed to take care or carry out
22 tasks within its mandate. So here we see that the UNPROFOR, or at least
23 when it comes to the convoy we're talking about, was composed of
24 12 containers with humanitarian aid, beds, food, clothes, medicines, and
25 school supplies. So could you please tell us: How do you explain this
1 attitude by General Milovanovic?
2 THE WITNESS: From the document, it reflects that their view,
3 particularly in Srebrenica, you know, what they believed to be the
4 limited mandate of the United Nations forces there, the Dutch Battalion
5 forces, which were to essentially maintain the boundaries, as undefined
6 as they were, of the Srebrenica enclave and to enforce the
7 demilitarisation of the 28th Infantry Division inside the enclave, not
8 necessarily that it was the UNPROFOR's job to maintain and support the
9 civilian population. That's about as much as I can read into that
10 particular comment. I mean, obviously General Milovanovic would be a
11 better source of information on that.
12 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand. I understand,
13 in fact, because the problem, in fact, is the following, and this is what
14 the Prosecutor is seeking to establish: is that the VRS was attempting to
15 block various convoys in order to create an impact on the Muslim
16 population, and here we have General Milovanovic who's supporting
17 something else or who says something else, so this is why I wanted to get
18 your opinion. But according to you, only General Milovanovic can explain
19 his own thoughts. Is that what you are saying?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, in the sense that General Milovanovic is
21 the best to explain his own thoughts. What I would reiterate again for
22 you, sir, is that as part of the plan that the VRS is undertaking, it
23 wasn't just enough to restrict the flow of goods going into the enclaves.
24 As articulated in Directive 7 and 7/1, it had to be done in such a manner
25 that the Republika Srpska would not be unduly criticised in the way that
1 they did it.
2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much indeed.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
5 Q. Just one last paragraph in this document, paragraph 10, and this
6 is a convoy that was refused to Srebrenica, comprising 13 vehicles and
7 24 persons, which were supposed to transport various goods; a water
8 trailer, a large quantity of field beds, hospital beds, an X-ray machine,
9 beams for construction, nails, light fittings, a satellite telephone
10 system and cables, signalling equipment, roofing material, office
11 supplies, and cleaning goods.
12 In your understanding, Mr. Butler, did UNPROFOR share their
13 medical abilities with -- by helping provide medical treatment for the
14 Muslims of the enclave?
15 A. Yes, sir, I believe that a number of the Dutch medical personnel,
16 who've testified, I'm not sure in this trial but certainly in other
17 trials, have indicated that they often shared their medical supplies and
18 support and treated the civilian population.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. I offer this into evidence.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1925 shall be
22 assigned Exhibit P2503. Thank you.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, I'd like to temporarily --
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment, please.
25 Mr. Gajic.
1 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, excuse me, but I
2 cannot help noticing, on page 44, line 7, where Judge Mindua asked the
3 question, and the witness's answer begins with line 23 and straddles
4 page 45, I think there was a slight misunderstanding because the number
5 mentioned by Judge Mindua relates to the convoy from Kiseljak to
6 Sarajevo, and the witness's answer makes it looks like it was related to
7 Srebrenica, because he also mentioned the 28th Division. I believe it
8 would be good to have a clear record on this issue, because Judge Mindua,
9 on page 44, line 14, mentioned Convoy 07-181/4, and the document says
10 this convoy was supposed to go from Kiseljak to Sarajevo on the
11 8th of April.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this is a correct statement. Number 4 in
13 this document -- or item number 4 is related to a convoy from Kiseljak to
15 Mr. McCloskey.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, to me, it was very clear that
17 General Mindua was -- excuse me, His Honour Judge Mindua --
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: He's not a military judge.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- was referring to the Srebrenica section, where
20 General Milovanovic had made the remarks that he didn't feel that this
21 humanitarian material was part of the mandate. I think that was very
22 clear on the record. If there was a mistake in the reference, I think we
23 can all -- we all remember what the question was about, and I think it
24 was very clear. So I prefer not to go back there, unless someone thinks
25 it's necessary.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we have the different views on the
2 record. Everybody is able to check the document, itself.
3 You may continue, Mr. McCloskey.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
5 Q. Now I would like to temporarily go past many of these documents
6 and save them for the end, and go now to tab 60, which is 65 ter 1933.
7 And we see that this is a -- from the Main Staff, dated 22 April. It's
8 to the Command of Military Post 7111.
9 Mr. Butler, do you remember which military post that is?
10 A. Military Post 7111 should be the Command of the Drina Corps, sir.
11 Q. Thank you. And we note that this says:
12 "We wish to inform you that we have approved the travel of the
13 following UNPROFOR convoys and teams:"
14 And then it lists that under number 1. And then it goes on to
16 "At the same time, we wish to inform you that we have not
17 approved travel of the following convoys."
18 And then we see, on the English, number 1 is a Sarajevo convoy
19 for fuel.
20 Then we need to turn the page, and we see a long list of convoy
21 disapprovals for -- as we take a look at this, we see that there's
22 Sarajevo for fuel - I won't read them all out - Gorazde, Gorazde,
23 Gorazde, Zepa regarding the transfer of UN VP from Zepa.
24 What do you take "VP" to mean?
25 A. "VP" in this context is "Military Police."
1 Q. And that's from General Milovanovic.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, if we could go to -- and if we note -- try
3 to remember the numbers that we're seeing here, "23-309/04" is the first,
4 and then we see "23-331/04," in sequence. If we go to the next document
5 under tab 61, we see the Main Staff is sending this to UNPROFOR. The
6 last one went to the Drina Corps, and we see some of the same numbers.
7 The first ones that have not been approved is "23-309/04," and describes
8 various -- and it's a list.
9 And I want to go over Convoy 1, Convoy 6 and Convoy 10, which we
10 will find as we go through the B/C/S. So if we could first go -- it
11 should be page 3 of the English, page 2 of the B/C/S. And this should
12 be, if I didn't say it - I'm sorry, it may have been the
13 problem - 65 ter 5243. I apologise. That was covered up.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Now we have it on the screen.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. And if we could go to page 2 in the B/C/S,
16 page 3 in the English.
17 Q. And if we -- this is number 23-309/04, which was number 1 on the
18 first page which was not approved. And for this question, Mr. Butler, I
19 will tell you that the top of the B/C/S page, where we see in Cyrillic
20 "ne" or "no," and initials, it's the Prosecution's position that those
21 initials are those initials for General Tolimir. So in this particular
22 document, we see that fuel is being disapproved. If the Prosecution is
23 correct and these are, in fact, General Tolimir's initials with a "ne"
24 next to it, would this -- his involvement in the approval or disapproval
25 of convoys be consistent with his position as chief of Intel and
2 A. Yes, sir, I believe it would.
3 Q. All right. Now, let's go to Convoy 6, which should be page 7 of
4 the B/C/S, page 13. This is number 23-349/04, which is another document,
5 Kiseljak to Gorazde, that was refused. And we can see what the request
6 was that was refused; the British convoy, supplies for the British
7 soldiers. And if we look at the B/C/S, we see "ne" up at the top written
8 in, and it's the position of the Prosecution that those initials that
9 look something like a coat hanger are those of General Tolimir. And as
10 we look down at the B/C/S, we see various comments and "ne" written
11 throughout that document. And if we turn the page in the English, we get
12 the translation's effort to reproduce those "ne"s, and we can see the
13 materials here; tools, wire, 11.000 litres of packed water, a music
15 Would this be consistent with General Tolimir's position, as
16 chief of Intel and Security, in your view ? Why would a general be
17 involved in disapproving such a -- such a request, or, excuse me,
18 proposing a disapproval?
19 A. I believe the document is a reflection of the importance that was
20 placed on the monitoring of materials going into various enclaves that
21 the Main Staff placed upon itself, that they paid very close attention to
22 detail. Each individual item was examined with respect to where --
23 whether or not it was justified to be on the manifest, in their view.
24 And as you'll note, in some cases where even requests are approved,
25 amounts might be reduced. So, again, I believe this is a reflection of
1 how important this particular job was within the Main Staff and that
2 General Tolimir is personally involved in the monitoring of the cargo
3 that is potentially going into these enclaves.
4 Q. The Trial Chamber has seen evidence of these convoy requests with
5 the initials. Witnesses have testified identifying the initials of
6 Ratko Mladic on them, I think General Milan Gvero, and others. Would it
7 be consistent for other senior members of the Main Staff, including
8 General Mladic, himself, to be involved in this -- in this process?
9 A. Yes, sir. Given the gravity of the situation as it was
10 approached by the Main Staff, the fact that other senior members of the
11 Main Staff are taking a hands-on approach to this would be consistent.
12 Q. All right. Let's go to number -- which is --
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we for a moment stay with this document,
14 please. I would like to put a question to Mr. Butler, and I would like
15 to ask him to make some markings on this, with the assistance of the
16 Court Usher.
17 Mr. McCloskey referred to some handwritten parts of this
18 document. We see, in the top, the "ne," and then a slash, and then some
19 handwritten markings. Could you please indicate which part of these
20 handwritten marks you suppose that they are from General Tolimir? Please
21 encircle these parts.
22 THE WITNESS: [Marks]. I understand that that particular set of
23 initials the investigation has attributed to General Tolimir. Those are
24 the only comments that I can personally attribute to. I note that -- the
25 writing here, the "no," and that is consistent, but I don't know
1 General Tolimir's handwriting to any degree necessary to be able to
2 conclude that those individual comments are, in fact, his handwritten
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: How do you know, if at all, that these initials
5 on top of that page are from Mr. Tolimir?
6 THE WITNESS: Again, sir, my understanding of whom that signature
7 comes to is derived from the work of the investigation, that they have
8 sourced that through a variety of methods. I don't have personal
9 knowledge that that is his signature.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this explanation.
11 Mr. McCloskey, are you tendering this marked map --
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, please.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- to have a consistent record?
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, please.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This marked page will be received as an exhibit.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, e-court page 7 of the
17 65 ter document 5243 shall be assigned Exhibit P2504. Thank you.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
19 Now please continue, Mr. McCloskey.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 And my question was -- it was the position of the Prosecution
22 that that was the initials, and that's the reason why I did that. And I
23 would refer you to the testimony of General Milovanovic, who you may
24 recall identified initials. I don't think he identified this particular
25 page, but he -- you will recall him identifying that General Tolimir had
1 two sets of initials, Cyrillic and Latin.
2 All right. Then if we could -- I believe we need to now go to
3 number 10 on this initial list, which is number 23/03 on the Serbian
4 document, and that should be B/C/S page 11 and page 21 in the English.
5 Q. And we know to refer you back to the front page of 5243 that this
6 is one of the numbers that was disapproved by the VRS. And again,
7 Mr. Butler, if we look at this, we see that this is a request from -- or
8 to the Main Staff, from Nicolai - if we go to the second page on the
9 English - requesting this, which was disapproved. Number 1 was the
10 movement from Sarajevo to Zepa. The journey will take place en route
11 from Sarajevo via Pale. The purpose of the movement was to transfer to
12 Zepa. And then it identifies the persons that are travelling in this
13 movement as UN military observers.
14 So can you just tell us what this is, and is it consistent or
15 inconsistent with any knowledge you had of what was going on at
16 Srebrenica related to military observers?
17 A. Yes, sir. This is consistent with the overall plan to reduce the
18 effectiveness of UN military monitors and observers, in part, by not
19 allowing personnel replacement of observers who finished their tour of
21 Q. And like you did the last one, could you circle -- and, again,
22 it's the Prosecution's position that we see the initials next to the "ne"
23 up in the top. Can you circle what you have learned from the
24 investigation to be, according to the investigation, the initials of
25 General Tolimir?
1 A. [Marks]
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: And now could I offer that into evidence?
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This marked page will be received as an exhibit.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, B/C/S page 11 in e-court of the
5 65 ter 5243, marked by the witness in court, shall be assigned
6 Exhibit P2505. Thank you.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: And to be consistent, let's go to the first
8 document. It should be page 2 in the B/C/S, page 3 in the English, I
10 I'm not good at going backwards, but I think we've got it.
11 Q. And for this, can you circle what you have learned the
12 investigation has identified as General Tolimir's initials?
13 A. [Marks]
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
15 And I would offer this into evidence.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This marked page will be received as an exhibit
17 as well.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, B/C/S page 2 of the 65 ter 5243,
19 marked by the witness in court, shall be assigned Exhibit P2506. Thank
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would offer the whole exhibit, 65 ter 5243,
22 into evidence.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 5243 shall be
25 assigned Exhibit P2507. Thank you.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, and what about 65 ter 1933?
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me. Apparently I've forgotten one of the
3 documents that we've just spoken to.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I just asked you. What about 65 ter 1933?
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Ms. Stewart got me at the same time. I
6 apologise. I would offer that into evidence.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received, too.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1933 shall be
9 assigned Exhibit P2508. Thank you.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, I'm going to go forward but -- and I will
11 continue to discuss with Mr. Gajic the possibility of saving some time
12 with these documents. But he has very fairly said to me that he thought
13 it was important for each of the documents to be seen and commented by
14 Butler, so it is my intention to come back. But it's a time-consuming
15 effort, so I'd like to get on with the chronology and come back to the
16 convoy documents, if that's necessary.
17 So I'd like to skip ahead to tab 70, and it's P2167.
18 Q. And as we're waiting for that to come up: We'll see that it's
19 from the Command of the Bratunac Brigade on the 4th of July, 1995, and
20 it's entitled "Analysis of combat readiness in the first half of 1995,"
21 and it's delivered to the Drina Corps, and it's in the name of
22 Commander Colonel Blagojevic.
23 Now, this is -- we've seen combat readiness reports from the
24 Main Staff, from the Drina Corps. Is this similar to those in some way?
25 A. Yes, sir. But rather than in this context of being an annual
1 evaluation, this particular report is a semi-annual evaluation, covering
2 the first six months of 1995.
3 Q. All right. And let's go to page 16 in the English and page 29 in
4 the B/C/S.
5 And we can see that this is the chapter on intelligence and
6 security support, and would Momir Nikolic have played a role in the
7 drafting of this section of the report?
8 A. Yes, sir. Given that it relates to intelligence and security
9 support, I would expect that he would be the primary drafter of this
10 particular section.
11 Q. All right. And I won't go through all of it, but as we see
12 six paragraphs down from the top, there's a mention of intelligence data
13 is collected through reconnaissance of combat dispositions by
14 reconnaissance squads, interrogations of prisoners of war, and
15 surveillance of forward positions. So would the security support, under
16 the rules and practices, as you've talked about, include interrogation of
17 prisoners of war, as noted here?
18 A. More under the intelligence function of it, but generally as part
19 of the intelligence and security branch, that's correct, sir.
20 Q. Okay. And it also -- the last paragraph on the English talks
22 "The Military Police Platoon has been engaged as planned on the
23 orders of the brigade commander. Training was also planned and completed
24 in accordance with the possibilities and appropriately to the situation."
25 So now here is -- we have a section under the intel and security
1 support of the mention of the military police, and its use and training,
2 on orders of the brigade commander. Can you just wrap that up for us a
3 bit and -- it's something that we've heard a lot of, but how does the
4 brigade commander and the security support connect into the command
5 structure of the military police, and based on this practical application
6 that we see in this document?
7 A. The application in this document, how it was, again, practically
8 applied reflects how it was envisioned under the broader regulations that
9 were published under the SFRY with respect to their regulations on the
10 military police, their use and functions. The police, as part of that
11 organisational formation, are ultimately subordinate to and responsible
12 to the commander of that unit; in this case, the brigade commander.
13 However, it is the security officer who is responsible for proposing
14 methods of training, the employment of the use of the police, and all of
15 those other associated technical issues, one, to the commander for his
16 approval, and subsequent to the commander's approval, carrying them out.
17 Q. When you say "subsequent to the commander's approval, carrying
18 them out," what are you saying is the responsibilities of the security
19 officer, vis-a-vis the military police, in carrying out the commander's
20 orders, just specifically?
21 A. When -- after the commander approves a proposal, the security
22 officer or, in fact, across the staff, any officer at any of those
23 technical services, you know, is going to issue supplemental orders in
24 order to more concretely define the tasks that have to be done and how
25 those will be accomplished. He is doing so -- he is giving those orders
1 as a security officer, but he's doing so in light of the orders that he
2 has received from the commander. So in a practical sense, where you will
3 have instances of Momir Nikolic, for example, giving orders directly to
4 the military police, you know, in the competent performance of his
5 duties, he is giving those orders in the light of the guidance and
6 directions he has received from his superiors, in this particular case
7 related to training and implementation of the military police, from the
8 brigade commander.
9 Q. Do the rules envisage him receiving directives from his superior
10 in the security chain or branch; in this case, Vujadin Popovic?
11 A. Yes, sir, they do.
12 Q. And where would Vujadin Popovic be getting his orders from along
13 the command chain?
14 A. Along the command chain, Vujadin Popovic would be receiving his
15 orders from the Drina Corps commander.
16 Q. On the evening of 13 July and afterward, who would that have
18 A. From 2000 hours onwards on 13 July 1995, his commander would have
19 been General Radislav Krstic.
20 Q. And for Popovic, aside from his commander, Krstic, could he be
21 receiving, under the rules, directives and instructions from his superior
22 along the security branch chain, Ljubisa Beara?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And who was Ljubisa Beara's direct supervisor and superior?
25 A. July of 1995, that would have been General Tolimir.
1 Q. Now let's go to page -- it should be 17 of this same document.
2 We're still under the "Intelligence and Security Support" section. It
3 should be page 31 of the B/C/S, and I hope this will help General Tolimir
4 in the question he had earlier.
5 This says:
6 "In the brigade's area of responsibility, a check-point was
7 established for the control of all international organisations entering
8 and leaving the enclave of Srebrenica. This check-point functions in
9 accordance with the orders of the Main Staff of the VRS and instructions
10 and orders of the brigade commander."
11 Now, does this paragraph suggest in any way to you that there is
12 any intel or security involvement in the control of the check-point?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. How so?
15 A. From the lowest level, the check-point is manned by the military
16 police, again, under the command of the brigade commander, but, from a
17 technical perspective, answerable to the security officer as to how they
18 conduct their activities. This particular paragraph is a good reflection
19 of how that works.
20 Q. We see this paragraph is under the section of "Intelligence and
21 Security Support." Could it have been anywhere or, in your view, is it
22 under this section for a reason?
23 A. It's under this section because it belongs here, because these
24 are classical duties and responsibilities of these types of officers.
25 Q. And taking us back to that document that we recall, a convoy
1 approval, where there's a note where Momir Nikolic says, No MSF can go in
2 without my approval, something to that effect, how does that fit into
3 this brigade report and your conclusion you've just given us?
4 A. I believe it's consistent with it.
5 Q. All right. Now we're going to change gears a bit and go away
6 from convoys and their control, back to the narrative of -- where you
7 have identified various documents occurring and the chronology as we go
8 towards July 1995. And the first one I'd like to take you to is tab 71.
9 It's 65 ter 2094.
10 And as we're waiting for that, I will note that this is from the
11 Drina Corps Command. It's a regular combat report identified as
13 If we go to the last page in English, we don't need to for these
14 purposes, but we'll see it's under the name of Deputy Commander
15 Colonel Radislav Krstic. And I don't want to go into all the detail of
16 it, but I do want to ask you about this one reference under paragraph 2:
17 "We are continuing with preparations for stabilisation of defence
18 around the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, in accordance with your
19 order. We are currently unable to implement your order to fully close
20 off the enclaves and carry out attacks against them because we do not
21 have sufficient forces ..."
22 Then it goes on.
23 Now, we see that this regular combat report is to the RS and the
24 forward command post of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,
25 so can you tell us, in a nutshell, what you believe Colonel Krstic at
1 this point is telling the Main Staff?
2 A. In this particular segment of the report, Colonel Krstic is
3 alluding to the fact that they've been given previously orders to fully
4 close off the enclaves, and he's informing them that based on the current
5 situation, and specifically the fact that they do not have enough
6 resources, military units in this particular context, that they're unable
7 to comply with that particular mission. But what they are attempting to
8 do is to still interdict, at least sporadically, those lines of
9 communication back and forth and attack those enemy forces.
10 Q. All right. This reference to "your order to fully close off the
11 enclaves" --
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me, Mr. President. I see Mr. Tolimir.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. I didn't see it.
14 Mr. Tolimir.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 My apologies to Mr. McCloskey, but could he explain where it is
17 that mention is made in this document of "Muslim forces attack"? Can
18 that be cleared with the witness, please?
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
21 Q. I think the general's asked you to explain what you meant by your
22 last -- I think the last comment, that you said that -- something about
23 the Drina Corps was continuing to attack the enemy.
24 A. Reading back my last answer, and that's -- I don't think I said
25 "Muslim forces attack." My last answer was that in this particular
1 segment of the report, Colonel Krstic is alluding to the fact that
2 they've been given an order previously to close off the enclave, and he
3 is informing them, based on the current situation, he does not have
4 enough resources or military units to complete that mission. And then
5 the next thing I said was what they are attempting to do is to still
6 interdict, at least sporadically, those lines of communication back and
7 forth and attack those enemy forces. And where I derive that from is the
8 line in paragraph 2 of the document, which specifically says:
9 "... but we are continuing to take specific measures to uncover
10 enemy groups in the gap ..."
11 The presumption that I have being if they are able to identify
12 those groups infiltrating back and forth into Srebrenica, between
13 Srebrenica and Zepa, that once identified, if they have the ability, they
14 will attack them.
15 Q. All right. And back to my question. This language there that
16 says that they're unable to implement the Main Staff order to -- well,
17 that's my language. What I want to ask you about is: This language
18 about "fully close off the enclaves," that particular language, do you
19 tie that in or relate that to anything from Directive 7 or some other
20 documents previous to this that we've looked at?
21 A. Yes, sir. That's those tasks or those tasks articulated in
22 Directive 7 or 7/1.
23 Q. Do you remember the wording -- I don't want to go back to those,
24 but do you roughly remember the wording of Directive 7?
25 A. I think it specifically said to ensure the physical separation of
1 the enclaves.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this document into
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2094 shall be
6 assigned Exhibit P2509. Thank you.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this is a good stopping time, if
8 you will.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. We must have our second break now, and
10 we'll resume at 1.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. McCloskey, please carry on.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY:
15 Q. Mr. Butler, we left off with this document where Colonel Krstic
16 tells the Main Staff they're unable to attack Srebrenica and Zepa. It
17 was on 16 May. I'll jump ahead a bit, but at some point later on did the
18 Drina Corps -- was the Drina Corps able to gear up for an attack on the
19 Srebrenica enclave?
20 A. Yes, sir. By the end of May of 1995, the Drina Corps did
21 undertake a limited military operation against the enclave, particularly
22 the military operation related to the capture of what's known as
23 UN Observation Post Echo.
24 Q. All right. And we'll get to that momentarily, but I want to get
25 to another document that relates to some prisoners and the intel branch.
1 So could we go to P2140. It should be 72 tab.
2 And we see -- I hope people have a better B/C/S version. I know
3 it's a very bad version all the way around. But we see that this is from
4 the VRS Main Staff, Intelligence and Security Sector. That's
5 General Tolimir's sector; is that right?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And it's in the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Jovica Karanovic?
8 A. Correct, sir.
9 Q. Do you remember who he was?
10 A. He was an officer on the Main Staff. He worked in the
11 Intelligence Department.
12 Q. All right. And this is entitled "NATO air-strikes," and it talks
14 "We have information that the NATO session was finished on 27 May
15 at around 1600 hours, and it was decided that massive NATO air-strikes
16 against VRS positions and features would continue."
17 It talks a bit more about that and where they believe that the
18 attacks will occur; on ammunition dumps, fire positions, anti-aircraft
19 defence equipment, artillery, and such. And it says, the last line:
20 "Familiarise commanders with this information and recommend that
21 captured members of UN forces be placed in an area of a possible NATO
23 What do you know about that?
24 A. Well, sir, towards the end of May of 1995, related to issues
25 around Sarajevo, NATO launched a series of air-strikes against military
1 positions of the Army of Republika Srpska, primarily fixed positions,
2 ammunition bunkers, communications facilities. In retaliation to these
3 attacks by NATO, the VRS, where they had the opportunity to do so, took
4 members of UN military forces into custody. What this particular last
5 line of the paragraph reflects is that those individuals who are captured
6 should be placed at facilities or installations which they believe will
7 be targets of attack.
8 I'm aware that there is video footage that exists which, in fact,
9 shows members of UN forces, restrained by handcuffs or other means, at
10 VRS military installations, and that those videos were publicised as a
11 way to convince NATO to not bomb those particular facilities.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, can we try to blow up the B/C/S, where we
13 have the signature block? It's to the left of the stamp. Not the stamp,
14 the -- yeah. Maybe one more time, because we have an English translation
15 that says: "On the authorisation of the chief," and then:
16 "Lieutenant-Colonel Jovica Karanovic."
17 Q. Do you have an opinion on who the chief is in this sentence?
18 A. Yes, sir. I believe in this context, the head of the sector,
19 which is General Tolimir, he is the assistant commander for Intelligence
20 and Security Sector.
21 Q. Could this be Mladic as well, the chief?
22 A. I don't recall ever seeing any written document, the context of
23 "the chief" and being General Mladic. In Main Staff documents of that
24 nature, I would more likely attribute the phrase, if it's from the
25 Main Staff directly, "the chief" to be General Milovanovic. So I've
1 never seen General Mladic associated with the phrase "the chief."
2 Q. And does this document reflect work that would be associated with
3 intel and security work?
4 A. Yes, sir. The fact that it's talking about the receipt of
5 strategic intelligence, that information they have received from the NATO
6 session, and that the decision has been made that NATO will continue
7 air-strikes on the VRS. And the second paragraph, an intelligence
8 assessment of what the potential targets are in the future.
9 Q. And how about the third paragraph?
10 A. Captured members of the UN forces would, presumably, be handled
11 along the same measures that they would handle other detainees or
12 prisoners of war, which, as you're aware, did fall under the purview, to
13 some degree, of the Security Sector.
14 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document. It's 65 ter 3277.
15 This on the same subject. It's from the Main Staff, "Very Urgent," to
16 the command of various corps, including the Drina Corps, entitled "The
17 reception and deployment of the UNPROFOR members in the corps area of
18 responsibility." This is in the name of the deputy commander,
19 Lieutenant General Milovanovic, and he is ordering -- we see in number 1:
20 "I hereby order corps commands and the VIPVO --"
21 Can you tell us what "VIPVO" is, if you recall?
22 A. Yes, sir. It would be Air and Anti-Aircraft Defence Forces."
23 Q. All right.
24 "... shall in agreement with commanders of the logistics bases
25 place the captured UNPROFOR staff, as well as the staff of other
1 international humanitarian organisations, in their areas of
2 responsibility ..."
3 And it talks about various places.
4 And if we go to the next page in English under paragraph 4 it
6 "The Command of the Drina Corps shall place the captured UNPROFOR
7 troops and members of the other humanitarian organisations at the
8 installations in its area of responsibility."
9 Do you in any way relate this order by General Milovanovic on the
10 27th of May with this document by Karanovic that was made, according to
11 him, on the authorisation of the chief?
12 A. Yes, sir. I mean, they are related documents. The first
13 document reflects the proposal. The second document reflects the command
14 of the VRS acting on that proposal and, in effect, adopting that proposal
15 and issuing implementing orders.
16 Q. Now, we see this document that we're looking at now in the name
17 of Deputy Commander Milovanovic, but the Court has learned, as I'm sure
18 General Tolimir will agree with me, that his title is chief of
19 staff/deputy commander. So going back to the Karanovic document, and it
20 says: "On authorisation of the chief," could this be Milovanovic?
21 A. Are you referring to the first document where the phrase is
23 Q. Yes, that Karanovic writes up.
24 A. I don't believe it is, sir, no. And one of the reasons why that
25 I think is relevant is if you were to look back at that particular
1 document, which is P2140, and look who originated it, it comes from the
2 Intelligence and Security Sector and it has their coding number on it,
3 12/45-596. So it is a document originated by the Intelligence and
4 Security Sector. Their chief is not General Milovanovic. Their chief is
5 General Tolimir.
6 The second document is not -- which is, I guess, what, Papa 3277,
7 the second document is not originated by the Intelligence staff. It's
8 directed -- it's issued by the Main Staff, their operative branch, and it
9 has the number 03-4. And, of course, on this particular day, they're
10 both dated the same day, and General Milovanovic is identifying himself
11 specifically on that day as the deputy commander.
12 Q. All right. In any event, Karanovic's document, P2140, would
13 General Tolimir, in your view, be fully aware of this document and
14 approve its content?
15 A. Again, given the gravity of this particular situation, where they
16 are taking UN personnel hostage, they're involved in being bombed by
17 NATO forces, General Tolimir should very much be involved in at least
18 knowing what is in this document and what the ramifications of it are.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer 65 ter 3277 into
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 3277 shall be assigned
23 Exhibit P2510. Thank you.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to tab 74. It should be
25 65 ter 3981.
1 Q. And this is a document from the Main Staff of the VRS, Sector for
2 Intelligence and Security, 13 February 1995, to the East Bosnia Corps,
3 the Drina Corps, and to the chief of the Intelligence and Security
4 Department of the East Bosnia Corps by messenger, the chief of the
5 Security and Intelligence Department, the Drina Corps, by messenger, and
6 the Krajina Corps Command. It's called "Demarcating the front-line,
7 instructions." And if we go to the last page, page 4 of the English,
8 which we don't need to as yet, we'll see that this is in the name of
9 Assistant Commander Major General Zdravko Tolimir, and we'll see his
10 initials, "ZT," under the document.
11 Just looking at the first page of this document, we see that it
12 starts out with:
13 "The Drina Corps Command will not mark the front-line around the
14 Muslim enclaves in Zepa and Srebrenica, since these enclaves have been
15 marked and defined with the agreement on the demilitarisation of Zepa and
17 And then it says:
18 "You are to explain to the representatives of UNPROFOR and the
19 Muslim forces in the ZRK that the status of Zepa and Srebrenica will be
20 resolved in accordance with the agreements on their demilitarisation."
21 It goes on and talks about that a bit and then makes references
22 to a hamlet, Podraveno [phoen], and a village with a trig point. And he
24 "In addition, it is unclear who is in control of the Zeleni Jadar
25 factory, considering its significance and the fact that only the UNPROFOR
1 check-point is located inside it and that the Muslim forces are
2 approximately one kilometre away from the factory ..."
3 Now, you had just mentioned Zeleni Jadar as an important
4 location. Does this reference by General Tolimir have anything to do
5 with what you were talking about, in terms of the strategic location, or
6 is this the same place or something different?
7 A. It is the same place, sir.
8 Q. And when the general says "considering its significance," what do
9 you believe that means?
10 A. When one looks at the terrain in and around the Srebrenica
11 enclave, and the logical routes by which an attacking force can get to
12 Srebrenica, perhaps the most important one, from the Bosnian Serb
13 military perspective, was the road leading from the south through
14 Zeleni Jadar and then onwards to Srebrenica. In early January 1995, then
15 Drina Corps commander, General Zivanovic, had actually made a comment to
16 UN observers that he had at the Drina Corps, that they would know when
17 the Serbs were ready to take Srebrenica, because the first thing that
18 they would do is take Zeleni Jadar.
19 When one looks at the military operations in 1993 against
20 Srebrenica before the enclave was established, the main axis of attack
21 came through that route. And if one looks at how the main military
22 attack occurred in July of 1995, you will again note that the main axis
23 of attack came through that particular area. So the Bosnian Serb
24 military was well aware that controlling Zeleni Jadar was an important
25 precursor to the ability to launch a military operation against
2 Q. And so does General Tolimir note what the problem is regarding
3 Zeleni Jadar here, or as he describes the location, does he identify what
4 units are there?
5 A. In this particular document, what he's referencing is the fact
6 that apparently, according to the map graphics that were forwarded, it's
7 not clear to the Main Staff who's actually controlling the facility or
8 the town of Zeleni Jadar. He notes that they have the UN check-point
9 there, but that the lines seem to reflect the fact that the Muslims don't
10 control the town, certainly the Serbs don't control the town, so, again,
11 this is his response back to the Drina Corps saying, in a sense, that,
12 The graphics that you have sent me are not accurate, to my knowledge.
13 Q. And then as we look at this document on the next page in English,
14 I just note that as you look through it, talking about the -- as he talks
15 about the area and the demarcation lines, there is an amazing amount of
16 detail. There's trig points, there's villages, there's streams,
17 elevations. And if we go to the next page, page 3, similar amazing
18 detail. And this is actually drafted by General Tolimir.
19 What, if anything, can you say about the amount of detailed
20 knowledge that is going into this document from General Tolimir for such
21 a small place?
22 A. Certainly, if one assumes that General Tolimir, personally, did
23 not spend hours parsing over these things and that one of his
24 subordinates did, it certainly reflects the fact that these graphics,
25 when they came in from the corps to the Main Staff, someone paid a great
1 deal of attention to them to make sure that they were very accurate.
2 General Tolimir was made aware of this long laundry list of inaccuracies
3 in the lines and felt it was of enough significance to send a response
4 back to the Drina Corps and the East Bosnia Corps, requesting that they
5 send more accurate graphics or positions to more accurately reflect where
6 the front-lines are and who's in control of what particular points of
7 territory. So it does -- it reflects an amazing attention to detail.
8 Q. On whose part?
9 A. If not General Tolimir, certainly his subordinates.
10 Q. What about General Tolimir? Does this show that he has an
11 attention to detail, or can you separate him from the document in some
13 A. I don't separate from -- him from the document, in the sense that
14 he has signed it and he is sending it forward. The whole reason why a
15 military -- or that staff officers exist to support their superior
16 commanders is because it is recognised that commanders don't have time to
17 handle everything personally. So, again, I mean, I don't exclude the
18 possibility that General Tolimir, personally, spent the necessary time to
19 come up with this type of detail, but I think it's more likely that one
20 of his subordinate staff officers was directed to do so by him, came up
21 with this particular response, and when General Tolimir was appraised on
22 the large number of inaccuracies, he took it upon himself to then go back
23 to the Drina Corps and East Bosnia Corps and request clarifications.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this into evidence.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 3981 shall be assigned
2 Exhibit P2511. Thank you.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: And can we now go to P625. This is a document
4 the Trial Chamber has seen more than once. It is from the Command of the
5 Drina Corps, Forward Command Post Pribicevac, dated 2 June 1995, entitled
6 "Restoration of the control over the facilities and the Zeleni Jadar
7 asphalt road," and it's an order in the name, as we can see from page 2
8 of the English and of the B/C/S, that it's the commander of the
9 Drina Corps, General Zivanovic.
10 Q. And it starts out:
11 "Considering, from the military/security aspect, that the
12 conditions have been created for the entry into Zeleni Jadar industrial
13 facilities ..."
14 And it goes on and describes the background, and then it gives an
15 order that we're familiar with about taking down the UN OP that is there.
16 Is -- does this relate to the area of Zeleni Jadar that you were
17 talking about previously?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And what does this indicate? And I don't mean the particulars of
20 it. We've all seen how they -- what the recommendation is on how Legenda
21 and the troops are to act. But what does this indicate is going on at
22 this time or planned to go on?
23 A. This, in general, indicates how the Drina Corps Command expects
24 elements of the Bratunac Brigade and the Drina Corps Manoeuvre Battalion,
25 in this case the Drina Wolves, to successfully capture the town, and how
1 to successfully neutralise the United Nations' check-point there using as
2 little violence and risk of casualties to the UN as possible.
3 Q. And what, in your view, is the overall objective to taking
4 control of this area at this time?
5 A. The objective is to take control of Zeleni Jadar, again with the
6 knowledge that controlling Zeleni Jadar is a precursor to launching
7 larger operations against Srebrenica. Was that in the mind of the two
8 lieutenants or captains who were part of this operation at the low end?
9 No. But certainly it was in the mind of the Drina Corps Command at the
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's briefly go to P2199, another
12 Drina Corps Command -- a document from the Drina Corps Command, forward
13 command post. It's a regular combat report, and it's under the name of
14 Major Milenko Jevdjevic.
15 Q. Can you tell us who Jevdjevic is?
16 A. Milenko Jevdjevic is the chief of Communications. I believe, if
17 I recall correctly, he was the chief of Communications for the
18 Drina Corps.
19 Q. And can you explain why his name would be on a daily combat
20 report from the Drina Corps, from the forward command post?
21 A. Just like in the context of the Main Staff sending officers down
22 to subordinate command posts to observe the military actions, the corps
23 did the same thing. It was not uncommon for the Drina Corps Command or
24 any of the other corps to send corps staff officers down to subordinate
25 brigade or lower formations in order to personally observe the operations
1 that were being carried out and to ensure that they were being carried
2 out in compliance with the orders from, in this case, the corps command.
3 So the fact that Major Jevdjevic would be there as part of a forward
4 command post and would write this report is not remarkable.
5 Q. And I just call your attention, in the first page of the
6 document, to the Drina Corps -- to the Command of the Drina Corps, to the
7 chief of staff personally. And the chief of staff at that time was who
8 of the Drina Corps?
9 A. I believe at that time the chief of staff was -- June, it would
10 probably still be Colonel Radislav Krstic.
11 Q. Okay. And it says:
12 "After a successful operation and the forceful expulsion of
13 UNPROFOR from the Zeleni Jadar post, the enemy was observed building up
14 large forces and moving them from Srebrenica sector towards the general
15 sector of Zeleni Jadar. Their formation included two armoured personnel
16 carriers and one tank."
17 Did the Muslims ever have armoured personnel carriers or a tank
18 that was actively being used?
19 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.
20 Q. Do you remember a Drina Corps formation called the
21 5th Communications Battalion?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Do you remember who the chief of that was?
24 A. I think I just got confused. Nedjo Blagojevic was the chief of
25 communications, which meant Milenko Jevdjevic would have been the
1 commander of the 5th Communications Battalion.
2 Q. Okay. So what does this first sentence indicate to you? Is it,
3 in your view, related at all to General Zivanovic's instructions on how
4 to approach an OP? And I mean after the successful operation and
5 forceful expulsion of UNPROFOR from the Zeleni Jadar post.
6 A. I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand that particular question.
7 If you could ...
8 Q. What does this sentence mean? What do you think it's referring
9 to, aside from the obvious? Is it related to the previous order of
10 General Zivanovic?
11 A. It's related to the order in so much as it's reporting about
12 events in Zeleni Jadar and around Zeleni Jadar after they have captured
13 it, and what, in this respect, given where it's relating to the enemy,
14 they're talking about a potential build-up of what might be a
15 counter-attack force.
16 Q. All right. And going to the next page in English, it should be
17 near the -- it's identified as paragraph 3 right near the bottom of the
18 document in B/C/S. Probably have to go to the next page in the B/C/S.
19 Yes. Number 3, it says in the English:
20 "We have had no casualties. We have expended small amounts of
21 ammunition and three Zoljas," which the interpreters say are hand-held
23 Can you tell us what your understanding of a Zolja is?
24 A. It's a manned portable rocket-launcher primarily used for
25 anti-armour purposes.
1 Q. Is it anything like what we've heard of an RPG, rocket-propelled
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. All right. And if we look back to the Zivanovic document, P625,
5 we see, referring to UNPROFOR:
6 "If they do not comply with this order, fire a hand-held
7 rocket-launcher" - "Zolja," actually, is what he said - "at the
8 generator, and be ready to neutralise the APC," the armoured personnel
9 carrier, "paying attention to not hurt physically UNPROFOR soldiers."
10 So firing a Zolja at a generator or an APC, how significant is
11 that to the members of the APC crew or the OP?
12 A. If you're firing at a stand-alone generator, you're going to get
13 hit, you're going to lose electricity. Depending on where the generator
14 is, it's going to appear, potentially, that you're being fired on
15 directly. When you're firing at an APC and there's a crew inside the
16 armoured personnel carrier, they're certainly going to take it as they
17 are being directly attacked.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I'd offer that into evidence, 2199.
19 Oh, I'm sorry --
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There's a P number.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: I see a "P" in front now. Thank you.
22 All right. If we could go now to 65 ter 4034. It should be 78.
23 I've skipped one on the -- in the book.
24 Q. And we see that this is a Main Staff Security and Intelligence
25 Sector document from Chief Major General Zdravko Tolimir, is how the
1 English translation has it. And can you tell us what this is? I don't
2 need a whole lot of detail, but can you just tell us what purpose this
3 serves, if any, in the work of the -- General Tolimir's sector? We see
4 that it's sent to Forward Command Post 2 of the Main Staff,
5 General Milovanovic personally. That's in the last page. Where is that,
6 as far as you know?
7 A. At this point in time, I believe this IKM is either physically in
8 Banja Luka or somewhere in the Krajina area.
9 Q. All right. So just generally tell us what this is coming from
10 General Tolimir.
11 A. This is -- you know, just like the corps commands had to publish
12 their daily operational reports, the Intelligence Sector -- Intelligence
13 and Security Sector published a daily intel report which laid out, for a
14 variety of customers, all of the relevant intelligence that had been
15 collected, analysed, and was being again sent out for operational
16 purposes by -- not only to the Main Staff, but to the civilian
17 government, to the Ministry of the Interior, to the corps commanders, and
18 to other customers which would include, in this particular instance,
19 members of the Main Staff of the Serb Krajina Army, and, I believe at
20 this juncture, even members of the Security Administration of the federal
21 army in Belgrade. So this was their daily intelligence report.
22 Q. All right. And what I want to direct your attention to is page 4
23 in the English and probably about the last page or the second-to-the-last
24 page -- second-to-the-last page, page 2, in the Serbian, and that middle
25 paragraph in the English that begins:
1 "In the area of Srebrenica," thank you, "there is increased
2 distrust among the population in relation to the military and civilian
3 leadership, and also accusations that they have caused the reprisal of
4 the VRS by the infiltration and action of the sabotage and terrorist
5 groups in Serbian territory. The 28th Division Command is circulating
6 disinformation that the VRS carried out a sabotage attack on civilian
7 features, wanting to cause condemnation by the international community.
8 According to unverified information, they have blocked UNPROFOR units,
9 accusing them that they are not protecting the so-called demilitarised
11 Now, this is dated June 25th, 1995. Are you aware, Mr. Butler,
12 of any sabotage action by the 10th Sabotage Detachment into the
13 Srebrenica area?
14 A. Yes, sir, I am.
15 Q. All right. Let's quickly go to P961.
16 And I see we're running out of time, but this is a UN document
17 dated 24 June 1995, the day before the last one, and we see this, that it
18 talks about a group of unknown strength came in through a mine and fired
19 upon an area and killed a woman.
20 Does this UN report have anything to do, to your knowledge, with
21 this action by the 10th Sabotage Detachment?
22 A. Yes, sir. This particular document is describing the attack that
23 took place by the 10th Sabotage Detachment, although, obviously, they're
24 not aware of who the actual perpetrator was at the time.
25 Q. So if the 10th Sabotage Detachment, on the day before Tolimir's
1 intelligence report, had gone into the enclave and made this attack,
2 would this be a correct statement of General Tolimir, that the
3 28th Division Command is circulating disinformation about the VRS
4 carrying out a sabotage attack on civilian features?
5 A. It raises one of two possibilities. The first possibility is
6 that it is a form of disinformation, and given the fact that there are
7 customers for this report outside the Republika Srpska, to influence
8 their opinions in that regard. The second is that the person who drafted
9 the report might not have been -- read into the fact that the
10 10th Sabotage had conducted this act and, in fact, it had occurred as
11 such. One kind of discounts the second course of action only because
12 somewhere along the line during the review process of this document, it
13 should have reached a level where somebody who was aware of it, as
14 obviously Colonel Salapura would and General Tolimir would be aware of
15 it, would notice that, you know, that was incorrect and direct it to be
17 Q. When you say "this is disinformation," what do you mean is
18 disinformation or could be disinformation?
19 A. "Disinformation," in a military sense, is the production of
20 incorrect or false or misleading materials or statements that are
21 designed to cause an adversary to look in a different direction, to focus
22 resources in a different area, or even, in a more political sense, to
23 hold an opinion that's not correct.
24 Q. So would General Tolimir be sending disinformation out to
25 possibly these -- his own people or other entities, as the address list
2 A. It is a possibility, sir, yes.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this into evidence,
4 65 ter 4034.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 4034 shall be assigned
7 Exhibit P2512. Thank you.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And the UN document is already in evidence.
9 And we're five minutes past, but I'm told there's nobody after
10 us, so I don't think we've interfered with anyone. Thank you,
11 Mr. President.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, Mr. McCloskey.
13 We have to adjourn for the day, and we will continue our hearing
14 tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this Courtroom III.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of
18 July, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.