Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17025

 1                           Monday, 22 August 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody.  Welcome back after

 6     the long break.  It's good to see you all again, and I hope very much

 7     that we will proceed in the same constructive way as we did before the

 8     summer recess and in the past of this trial.  Yes.  Let's look forward to

 9     the last part of the Prosecution case, probable 98 bis submissions, a

10     possible Defence case, and let's co-operate in the same way.

11             And I would like to mention again, that we appreciate the

12     assistance and the support by all the staff of the different sections of

13     this Tribunal.

14             Before the witness will be brought in, I would like to raise one

15     matter.  On the 4th of July this year, the OTP notified us regarding

16     remaining witnesses.  One part of this notification was related to six

17     proposed 92 quater witnesses.  In this chapter, in fact, there is a list

18     of seven witnesses.  I quote:

19             "The Prosecution will file prior to the summer recess a

20     Rule 92 quater motion regarding the following six," in fact seven,

21     "witnesses, all of whom are suffering from bodily or mental condition

22     rendering them unable to testify orally."

23             We received one motion by the Prosecution regarding one witness,

24     PW-006, but we didn't receive any other motion by the Prosecution.  And

25     therefore, I would like to ask you, Mr. McCloskey, if you can give us an

Page 17026

 1     update if you are intending to file any other motions, which should be

 2     quite urgent now as we are approaching the end of the Prosecution case,

 3     or if the Prosecution intends to withdraw these six remaining witnesses.

 4             Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours.

 6     Hello.  It's good to be back.  General Tolimir, Mr. Gajic, everyone.

 7             I have talked with the team about a couple of those witnesses,

 8     and I will check with them and get a better answer for you at the break.

 9     If we could go into private session just briefly.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

11                           [Private session]

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19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session, Your Honours.  Thank

21     you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In the meantime, I would like to ask you,

23     Mr. McCloskey, about the witnesses to be called in September.  Usually,

24     we receive such a list in the middle of the previous month.  We didn't

25     receive something like that in the middle of August.

Page 17028

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps you can inquire what is the case.

 3             Mr. McCloskey.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  Our list that we filed for

 5     July, I am told it's the same.  It's the same list of people that are

 6     remaining and -- but we will file that over again, and I have gone over

 7     the -- I saw six remaining witnesses, and I noted that they are all

 8     scheduled and those schedules have been confirmed, and we had based that

 9     on Mr. Butler testifying about the same time for the Defence as he did

10     for the Prosecution, which Mr. Gajic has just confirmed to me that they

11     expected to take the same time that the Prosecution took.  So the

12     schedule for those remaining people, it seems to be fairly solid as these

13     things are based on the time that the Prosecution took for Mr. Butler,

14     and I will have those as a reminder for us and something we'll send to

15     you as well so you can see that.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would appreciate that.  Thank you very much.

17             Good afternoon, Mr. Butler.  Welcome back.

18             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, sir.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I hope for you, as well as all the other

20     participants in this trial, that you have had a good vacation with some

21     relaxation and recovery.  Welcome back again, and I have to remind you

22     that the affirmation to tell the truth you made at the beginning of your

23     testimony still applies for this remainder of your testimony.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.

Page 17029

 1             Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  May

 3     there be peace in this house for all those present, and may God's will be

 4     done in these proceedings and not mine.  I extend my greetings to the

 5     Trial Chamber, to Mr. President, Judges Nyambe and Mindua.  I extend my

 6     greetings to Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Butler, and all the representatives of

 7     the Registry.  And I wish all of you a good day's work today.

 8                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Butler, last time we completed a portion of

11     the document concerning the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its

12     attempts to link up with the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica.  You stated

13     that you had seen the document, and this was a document by the

14     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was, in fact, an activation of

15     attacks out of the protected areas, safe areas, against the Army of

16     Republika Srpska and the Main Staff.

17             Perhaps we should look at this document once more e-court, thank

18     you.  And I have several questions for you on this issue.  Thank you.

19     D53.

20             We can see it in both versions.  This is a document issued by the

21     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its General Staff, Main Staff, dated

22     the 17th of June, 1995.  In other words, it was issued 15 days before the

23     commencement of combat activities in the safe area of Srebrenica.  It is

24     entitled "Preparations for offensive combat operations, order."

25             Let me quote this again:

Page 17030

 1             "Based -- or pursuant to a verbal order issued by the commander

 2     of the General Staff of the BH Army, army general Rasim Delic, and on the

 3     occasion of the great success achieved by units of the BH Army in the

 4     wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as on the basis of

 5     intelligence, et cetera, I hereby issue the following order:

 6             "1.  Execute all preparations in the command of the 28th Land

 7     Army Division to execute offensive combat operations with a view to

 8     liberating the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, overextending the

 9     aggressor forces and inflicting losses on them, co-ordinating action with

10     the BH Army forces carrying out operations in the broader Sarajevo area."

11             This is my question for you:  Does it follow from this order that

12     also the forces present in Gorazde as well as those in Srebrenica and

13     Zepa were activated under this order?  Thank you.

14        A.   Good afternoon, sir.  I don't know if you could make that

15     conclusion specifically.  As you can see at the bottom of the page, it is

16     addressed to the 28th Division Srebrenica, the 285th Brigade in Zepa, and

17     to the command of the 2nd Corps.  There is not a specific designator or

18     anything that would indicate that the message or this order went directly

19     to the forces in Gorazde.  It may very well be that the command of the

20     2nd Corps did, in fact, pass these orders on and make such plans, but

21     it's not inherent in this particular document.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  You -- do you know that there was only

23     packet communications systems present in Srebrenica and that it could

24     only communicate with Tuzla?  Could there have been a circular

25     communication from Srebrenica via Tuzla to Gorazde, if you know?  Thank

Page 17031

 1     you.

 2        A.   I am only aware of the communications as they existed with

 3     respect to Srebrenica and Zepa.  I do not know the specifics of the

 4     communications network for the ABiH dealing with Gorazde.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  You do see that in line 2, behind the

 6     comma, it is stated:

 7             "... on the occasion of the great success achieved by units of

 8     the BH Army in the general area around Sarajevo and Gorazde."

 9             Does this mean that these units were involved in active combat

10     activities and that they were successful to a certain degree in the

11     Gorazde area?  Thank you.

12        A.   During that time-frame certainly the ABiH 1st Corps in and around

13     Sarajevo was very active, and by their definition, they thought they were

14     being somewhat successful.  Although, quite frankly, they didn't achieve

15     their ultimate goals.  There were military operations around Gorazde, as

16     indicated by the VRS documents, which necessitated the Drina Corps having

17     to send at least one composite unit to the Trnovo battle-front in order

18     to hold a portion of the line.  So that is generally what I'm aware of of

19     this one.  Again, defining success or not, I think, as it goes,

20     ultimately the ABiH 1st Corps was not successful because they ultimately

21     were not able to break through the VRS siege line around Sarajevo.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  My question didn't have to do with the

23     extent of their success, rather, whether from the demilitarised area of

24     Gorazde there were combat activities being carried out, as is stated in

25     this document.  Would you deny what the document states?  Because it does

Page 17032

 1     allow for that possibility.  Thank you.

 2        A.   No, sir, I mean the document says what the document says.  I am

 3     not aware of any of the specific details of ABiH military operations out

 4     of Gorazde at that time.  I just don't know the specifics of them.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Please answer my question.  Were there combat

 6     activities taking place from each of the safe areas in Bosnia; namely,

 7     Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde?  Were you aware of this and did you see

 8     any documents to that effect?  Thank you.

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  During the course of this time there were military

10     operations out of the demilitarised areas by the ABiH, certainly from

11     Srebrenica.  We've talked about at length operations out of Zepa at about

12     the same time.  This has been the focus of my -- my study is in

13     Srebrenica and Zepa.  Again, I assume that they were out of Gorazde, but

14     I am just not aware of the details in the same manner that I am for

15     Srebrenica and Zepa.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Do you know that Srebrenica, Zepa, and

17     Gorazde were in the rear of the Army of Republika Srpska and that they

18     were separated from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  In other

19     words, do you know that Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde were enclaves deep

20     within the territory of Republika Srpska and separate from the Federation

21     of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Thank you.

22        A.   Yes, sir, you're correct.  They all were.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us as a soldier, should the Army of

24     Republika Srpska have tolerated the attacks out of the enclaves into its

25     rear, the attacks being directed against its population and the army?

Page 17033

 1     Thank you.

 2        A.   Setting aside my own personal views, which aren't really relevant

 3     to that answer, the fact is that the VRS did have to garrison the

 4     perimeters of those safe areas.  As noted in their own documents, they

 5     were desperately short of manpower and believed that those forces could

 6     be used more successfully in other areas of the battle-field.  So having

 7     to garrison those around the perimeters around those safe areas was

 8     causing a problem for the Army of Republika Srpska.  Along the same vein,

 9     they were being attacked by the ABiH and having to respond to those

10     various attacks.

11             So whether or not they were tolerated or should have been

12     tolerated or could have been tolerated, from a military perspective, the

13     maintenance of those forces outside of the safe areas had a significantly

14     detrimental impact to at least the military forces of the Army of

15     Republika Srpska in Eastern Bosnia.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Can you tell us, did you arrive at a

17     conclusion that the Muslim army attacked out of the enclaves the rear of

18     the Army of Republika Srpska thanks to the fact that they could not have

19     been persecuted after the sabotage actions were taken in an area

20     protected by UNPROFOR?  Thank you.

21        A.   I am not sure I understand your question, sir.  Could I ask you

22     to just repeat or it or rephrase it.  I just -- I'm not sure what you are

23     trying to get at.

24        Q.   Very well, thank you.  Let me repeat the question.  Could the

25     Army of Republika Srpska have destroyed the Muslim armed formations in

Page 17034

 1     the enclaves or would it have been prevented from doing so by UNPROFOR?

 2     And I mean as a result of these combat activities that would take place

 3     in the territory of Republika Srpska.

 4        A.   Certainly as evidenced by the events of July 1995, the VRS could

 5     and did have the physical capability of doing just that when the

 6     United Nations Protection Forces did not defend the safe areas.  Whether

 7     the VRS recognised that earlier and could have done so earlier is always

 8     going to a question of history.  But militarily speaking, the VRS did

 9     have the ability to do that.  When they recognised that they had the

10     ability is the question.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Butler, did you come across documents where, for

12     instance, observers of the United Nations, like Kingori and others,

13     stated that there were no combat activities in Srebrenica up until the

14     commencement of the operation directed toward the strongholds held by

15     personnel involved in sabotage actions?

16        A.   It has been a while since I've reviewed the actual UN reports for

17     the Srebrenica enclave for the first part of 1995.  Keeping that in mind,

18     even if I assume your point is true, the reality is that starting in the

19     early part of 1999 [sic], the ABiH did start to restrict the ability of

20     the United Nations forces inside the enclave to actively patrol the

21     entire enclave and to monitor those forces.  For example, restricting

22     movement of the UN so they could not go into the Bandera triangle area

23     where the bulk of the 28th Division was.  So the fact that the UN may

24     have been reporting that there was no activity or very limited activity

25     is a reflection of what they were seeing because their view was limited

Page 17035

 1     by the ABiH in many respects.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think Mr. Butler said "1999" and I think that

 5     was just a mistake.  It's page 10, line 14.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's "1999" in the record.

 7             THE WITNESS:  It should be 1995, sir.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  In view of the fact that in 1995, from

11     the spring until the fall of the Srebrenica enclave, the Muslim army

12     carried out sabotage actions and even restricted UNPROFOR movement within

13     protected areas, would you agree these were indicators that even within

14     the protected areas the ABH opted for offensive actions as this report

15     seems to indicate?

16        A.   Yes, sir, to the degree that I've testified that the ABiH, the

17     28th Division, was not demilitarised and did continue to conduct

18     offensive combat operations outside of the enclave in support of broader

19     ABiH objectives to tie down as much of the VRS as possible.  So I believe

20     that I've been consistent in that position that the 28th Division did, in

21     fact, conduct those offensive operations through the early spring of

22     January almost all the way up until July of 1995.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  It's not really a question, it's just for my

25     benefit.  I am never very clear when people are talking about spring and

Page 17036

 1     fall.  This is both to the Defence, so for my benefit I would appreciate

 2     if you could be more precise like mention a month and that sort of thing.

 3     I would appreciate, thank you.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes ma'am.  And in this respect, I would say you

 5     certainly start to see that uptick in offensive activities by early March

 6     of 1995 consistent with the beginning of the major ABiH operation in and

 7     around Sarajevo.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thank Judge Nyambe for shedding

10     light on this issue and correcting my mistake.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Butler, were UN forces, with the authority of the

13     United Nations, able to stop offensive operations from protective areas

14     and thus prevent a conflict between the forces within the protected areas

15     and the VRS?

16        A.   What I would say to that is, referring back to the United

17     Nations' own report dealing with Srebrenica, one of the underlying themes

18     that runs through that report is that there seemed to be a difference of

19     opinion between the various organs of the United Nations that were

20     responsible for administering the safe areas and defining what exactly

21     that mandate meant on the ground.  For example, as General Tolimir

22     indicated, there was one group of people who thought that that particular

23     mission was to enforce the demilitarisation.  There was another group of

24     people who believed it was to be a peacekeeping force.

25             Quite frankly, one of the lessons learned out of Srebrenica from

Page 17037

 1     the United Nations' perspective is that they went into this particular

 2     mission not having a clear vision of what they were trying to accomplish

 3     after moving into Srebrenica and the other safe areas in 1993.  With that

 4     as the background, I don't know in that context whether or not the UN in

 5     particular, or specifically the Dutch Battalion, felt it was their job to

 6     stop those offensive operations.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us whose offensive operations, offensive

 8     operations originating from the enclaves or the offensive operations by

 9     the VRS aimed at the enclaves?

10        A.   Yes, sir, that would be the ABiH military operations originating

11     from inside the enclaves.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Considering that you've just

13     outlined the problems the UN faced within the enclaves, did you perhaps

14     come across documents where the UN forces, the UNPROFOR, informed the

15     United Nations that the Muslims wanted practically their protection from

16     the VRS while continuing to mount their own operations?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  I can't right off of memory come to a specific

18     document, but in doing this and doing this research, one of the themes

19     that the UN believed was occurring was that the ABiH from inside the

20     enclave was conducting military attacks and then seeking the shield of

21     the United Nations forces in the enclaves in an effort to potentially

22     forestall any retaliation by the Army of the Republika Srpska.  The

23     degree that has happened or did not happen is always going to be a matter

24     of speculation, but it certainly was a generally widely-held opinion by

25     the UN that that practice was going on, at least with respect to the

Page 17038

 1     Srebrenica enclave.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Before we move to the next document, I

 3     should like to ask you:  Does this order practically activate operations

 4     from protected areas against the VRS on the part of the BH Army?

 5        A.   What it specifically says and implements, this document, is that

 6     they want elements of the 28th Division, specifically the

 7     285th Light Infantry Brigade in Zepa, to conduct offensive operations

 8     with a goal of preventing the protection regiment in Han Pijesak, which

 9     is the 65th Protection Regiment, from being able to disengage from that

10     area of the battle-field and be available for use elsewhere.  So that is

11     what this document specifically says or directs.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Perhaps I was not very clear in my

13     question.  If so, I'm sorry.  But did the command of the BH Army

14     deliberately involve the protected areas in the struggle against the VRS?

15        A.   Yes, sir.  By virtue of the orders that were to the military

16     units with -- inside the safe areas, the command of the ABiH did, in

17     fact, involve them.  That's correct.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Does this order refer to active operations from

19     Gorazde and Sarajevo, where they are scoring successes, and does this

20     speak of the commencement of an offensive and creating conditions for

21     linking up the enclaves of Srebrenica and Gorazde with the BH Army and

22     the territory held under its control?

23        A.   No, sir.  I believe it is a very limited order.  While it

24     references many of those broader issues, I believe that the paragraph

25     that best illustrates that is paragraph 2, where it discusses the

Page 17039

 1     planning of realistic tasks which will assure certain success on the

 2     basis of an accurate assessment in the potential of our forces in

 3     Srebrenica and Zepa.

 4             At the time the forces in Srebrenica and Zepa did not have those

 5     broad types of abilities.  So in the context of what they could actually

 6     accomplish on the ground, this order lays out the broader framework of

 7     that but directs them to plan realistic combat operations which would

 8     have the goal of preventing the VRS from moving forces from the

 9     Srebrenica-Zepa area to Sarajevo and Gorazde.  But I don't think that

10     they anticipated that those realistic tasks would be to link both of the

11     enclaves and liberate vast areas of territory then under control of the

12     VRS.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  My question was:  Did the BH Army order

14     demilitarised zones to mount active operations behind the lines of the

15     VRS?

16        A.   As this document says, paragraph 2 is to plan realistic tasks.

17     Paragraph 3 is that the General Staff will regulate by ordering the

18     commencement of those tasks.  So in that context, the General Staff of

19     the army is ordering the forces in Srebrenica and Zepa to come up with

20     realistic alternatives or realistic plans of what they can do and letting

21     them know that at some future point that the ABiH would direct them to

22     implement those tasks.  That is what the order says.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us as a soldier, did the author of the

24     order realise that he would activate armed combat groups within the

25     protected areas which would in turn cause the VRS to start pursuing these

Page 17040

 1     groups?

 2        A.   I don't ascribe to that type of a cause-and-effect situation,

 3     only in part because the way that you phrased that question it implies

 4     that before this, those particular combat forces were not active or that

 5     they had somehow been deactivated.  The reality is that well before

 6     June of 1995, ABiH military forces did conduct combat operations and

 7     raids out of the enclave.  2nd Corps, their apparent headquarters were

 8     aware of those operations, and presumably the General Staff was aware of

 9     them as well.  So I don't take it as a point in time in June of 1995 that

10     the General Staff of the ABiH is flipping a switch with this order, so to

11     speak, and activating those units.  They were never deactivated for that

12     purpose.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Please tell us, did the UNPROFOR then

14     know that the BH Army had combat units within demilitarised areas?

15        A.   Certainly the United Nations leadership in Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina, as well as the Dutch, recognised that within the Srebrenica

17     enclave and the Zepa enclave, the ABiH military units did exist, were

18     armed, and did participate in combat activities.  As I discussed earlier,

19     that wasn't a big secret, particularly given the fact that the Dutch in

20     the Srebrenica enclave were prevented by the ABiH from observing certain

21     parts of the enclave where those military forces were.

22             So while the UN might not have had an accurate picture of the

23     units and their combat capabilities, they obviously were aware that they

24     existed.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  I apologise for not having shown you a

Page 17041

 1     document about this, because this is the second time you speak of this.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D66 is the document I would like to

 3     see in e-court.  It's a document from the 28th Division, dated

 4     29 January 1995.  Here we'll see it now on the screen in both versions.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   You see the document was signed by the commander of that brigade,

 7     Naser Oric, in January of 1995.  It says:

 8             "In view of the situation in Podgaj village, the situation that

 9     occurred on 9 January 1995, of which you have been informed in a timely

10     manner, the command of the 8th Operations Group has restricted the

11     movement of the UNPROFOR forces in the wider region of Suceska and

12     Podgaj.

13             "At about 1100 hours today, the commander of the Dutch battalion

14     in Srebrenica ordered his patrols to enter the movement restriction area.

15     In co-ordination with the commander of the 8th Operations Group,

16     honouring the agreement reached with the UNPROFOR liaison officer after

17     the warning was issued not to move in the aforementioned area, the

18     commander of the 281st Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade blocked all UNPROFOR

19     patrols and is still keeping them blocked.  The Dutch battalion commander

20     in this area was requested that ..." Et cetera, et cetera.

21             Commander Naser Oric.

22             Tell us, did you review such documentation?  Why was the UNPROFOR

23     banned from moving in the area of these villages, Suceska and Podgaj?

24        A.   I didn't review this document specifically, but again, as I have

25     testified, I am generally aware that the UN was being restricted from

Page 17042

 1     various parts of the enclaves.  I couldn't tell you in this particular

 2     document or these particular villages.  I don't know why they would have

 3     been banned at that time.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Have you seen any documents showing that the command

 5     of the UNPROFOR for Bosnia informed the UN Security Council that a

 6     certain number of their men were detained and their entry into the

 7     demilitarised zones was prohibited?  And that was precisely what they

 8     were there for.  It was their mandate to be in the demilitarised areas.

 9        A.   I think -- I recall I am generally aware of the incident you are

10     talking about, but I don't know specifically that that issue was elevated

11     to the UN Security Council.  I am just not aware of that fact.

12        Q.   Thank you.  As a soldier who has been in several theatres of war

13     and served in other countries as well, would you say that an army under

14     blockade and unable to perform its mission would inform its command, in

15     this case the UN, about the problem, like Naser Oric informed his

16     superiors?

17        A.   I am aware that the Dutch at some juncture elevated this to their

18     command in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Your specific question had to deal with

19     the United Nations Security Council and whether they were informed.  And

20     my answer is, I don't know how far up the chain of the UN that that

21     particular notification went.  I mean, I just don't know the answer to

22     that.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  But in the chain of command, does one

24     need to inform one's superior and was the superior authority for the

25     UNPROFOR commander the UN Security Council?

Page 17043

 1        A.   The chain of command as it deals with forces that are part of the

 2     United Nations is a little less clear than that.  And I guess maybe the

 3     best example to use would be what happened in July of 1995.  As the

 4     various investigative commissions following Srebrenica at both the

 5     United Nations and the Dutch government noted, the Dutch Battalion, when

 6     their soldiers started to be placed under the custody of the VRS, on the

 7     7th and 8th and 9th of July, those facts were being transmitted not only

 8     to the UN to be elevated to the UN people in Bosnia and beyond, but were

 9     also being transmitted to the Dutch national government through their

10     Ministry of Defence.

11             So clearly with respect to the Dutch military units in

12     Srebrenica, they were keeping the United Nations informed, at least their

13     superiors within the United Nations informed, as well as their own

14     national governmental organs here in Holland.  Again, going back to your

15     question, did that elevate itself all the way up to the United Nations

16     Security Council?  I just don't know the answer to that.

17        Q.   Thank you.  This problem of 9 July, when the UNPROFOR issued the

18     green order on operations against the VRS, will be discussed later when

19     we come to another subject.  Now, in this set of questions I would like

20     to ask you:  Did the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo know that Muslims were

21     making it impossible for the UNPROFOR in Srebrenica to carry out their

22     mission?  You say that Naser Oric is saying precisely this and he is

23     inviting UNPROFOR commanders responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to

24     come and solve the problem.

25        A.   Again, sir, I am generally aware that the Dutch were reporting

Page 17044

 1     this issue up to Sarajevo, to the UN command there.  I don't know a

 2     specific point in time where they would have gained awareness and I don't

 3     have a document that I can say that they knew on this particular date.

 4             But again going back to the United Nations report relative to

 5     Srebrenica, it does discuss the fact that the Dutch were reporting back

 6     to their superiors in Sarajevo that there were restrictions of movement

 7     as well as other issues that they were having with the 28th Division.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us as a soldier, did Rupert Smith as the

 9     UNPROFOR commander and his successors have the duty to report to their

10     immediate superior, namely, the United Nations, that the UNPROFOR was

11     disabled from carrying out its mandate?  Were they supposed to do that?

12        A.   I suspect that would be a better question for General Smith than

13     it would for me.  My knowledge of the UN and how it relates to Srebrenica

14     is pretty limited to the actual issues related to the enclave.  The

15     broader issues of how the UN operated in Bosnia and the relationships

16     General Smith had with other people with regard to that was just not a

17     topic that I had to get into as part of my analysis, so I'm just not

18     aware of it.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe, please.

20             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  I just need to get back to the last

21     question.

22             Based on your experience as a military analyst, and I would like

23     to believe expert, do you think the UN commanders, either in Srebrenica

24     or in Sarajevo, had a duty to report to their superiors in the

25     United Nations that the UNPROFOR was disabled from carrying out their

Page 17045

 1     mandate?

 2             I would like your answer to that question, if I may.  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I expect that they would have a duty to report this

 4     up their chain of command.  As I -- again, I recall from the

 5     United Nations report, it was known in Sarajevo.  It was known in Zagreb

 6     [Realtime transcript read in error "Zvornik Brigade"], which was the

 7     headquarters for the entire UN operation dealing with the former

 8     Yugoslavia.  What I don't know the answer to, and I expect it's readily

 9     available, is whether or not the entire story from the UN command in

10     Zagreb was relayed in that manner to the United Nations Security Council

11     in New York.

12             I think when one goes and looks at that United Nations report

13     about Srebrenica, it is very clear that there was a difference of opinion

14     as to what should be reported and what to make of those reports and

15     proposals afterwards between General Smith, who was in Sarajevo starting

16     his tenure there, and the United Nations -- his superiors which were in

17     Zagreb.

18             General Smith, I think as history notes, was not afraid to draw a

19     more clear line in the sand than some of his superiors were within the UN

20     framework and that caused a certain degree of friction.  So while I can

21     say that certainly at the tactical levels that people like

22     Colonel Karremans or General Nicolai or General Smith would have been

23     reporting these facts up the United Nations chain of command, what I

24     don't have a picture on is how accurately their concerns at Srebrenica

25     and Sarajevo were being relayed to United Nations in New York by, I

Page 17046

 1     believe it was, the UN command in Zagreb.

 2             JUDGE NYAMBE:  If I may have a followup question.  Again, talking

 3     to you as a military person with experience not only in the former

 4     Yugoslavia but in other areas, would you say that the failure of the

 5     commanders on the ground in the former Yugoslavia to report the

 6     encirclement of the UNPROFOR soldiers, their disablement, was a failure

 7     on their part?  To the soldiers especially who were put in harm's way.

 8     Thank you.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Again, what I would say is I am aware of what the

10     military commanders do and did and what they reported.  The problem that

11     you have, particularly within the United Nations chain of command as it

12     existed at the time, is that at some point above General Smith, the

13     military commander, his superiors were United Nations diplomats.  They

14     were not soldiers.  So again going back to the United Nations report,

15     there is a major disconnect between what the soldiers are reporting and

16     what they believe the proper remedies are versus what the diplomats and

17     the politicians in the UN bureaucracy are seeing or are perceiving the

18     situation to be.

19             So I don't know that the military commanders weren't reporting up

20     the chain of command.  What is unclear to me, and I would again refer you

21     back to the United Nations report, is at what level their view of the

22     situation was being watered down or modified by their superiors for other

23     reasons.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you, Mr. Butler.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I add a very small issue.  I need a

Page 17047

 1     clarification to the transcript.  On page -- you can't see it anymore, it

 2     disappeared from the screen.  Page 20, line 24.  I read from the

 3     transcript.  Your answer was:

 4             "As I -- again, I recall from the United Nations report it was

 5     known in Sarajevo, it was known in Zagreb Zvornik Brigade, which was the

 6     headquarters for the entire operation dealing with Yugoslavia."

 7             I think there could be a little mistake or misunderstanding.

 8     Could you clarify this sentence, please.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  When I said "Zagreb" -- I hope I didn't

10     say "Zvornik Brigade," but Zagreb was the apparent headquarters for the

11     United Nations forces dealing with the former Yugoslavia.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That was a necessary clarification.

13             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to the Judges and

15     Mr. Butler.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Please answer this question:  Is it possible that the UN

18     headquarters in New York was not informed of the restrictions imposed on

19     the UNPROFOR mandate in Srebrenica?  Thank you.

20        A.   Anything is possible.  I mean, I'm kind of -- I suspect the

21     answer that everyone is looking for is in that UN report.  I just can't

22     tell you off the top of my head at what point in time the UN leadership

23     in New York would have been made aware of that or if they were.  Again, I

24     would refer you back to the UN report on that where I -- where I believe

25     the answer is.

Page 17048

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe.

 2             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I'm sorry, Mr. Butler, I have to come back to you.

 3     I have read the Secretary-General's report that you are referring to

 4     which ultimately led to the establishment of this Tribunal to look for

 5     the truth, and it's through people like you that we hope, to the extent

 6     possible, that we can reach to the truth.  So I come back to the last

 7     question which was:  Is it possible, in the normal line of chain of

 8     command, whether it's military or in fact civil, that the events

 9     surrounding UNPROFOR were not communicated to the UN command in New York?

10             Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS:  It is possible.  But given the fact that not only

12     would one expect the United Nations to report that through their chain of

13     command but that the Dutch government, since their forces were in

14     Srebrenica, and they were receiving information directly from their units

15     there, that if the Dutch felt that the UN wasn't receiving an accurate

16     picture in the New York UN level, that the Dutch UN representatives would

17     take it upon themselves, if instructed by the government, to inform the

18     UN of just that.  So there were two possible reporting mechanisms, at

19     least, that would have allowed for the highest levels of the

20     United Nations to be aware of those restrictions of movement.

21             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to Judge Nyambe and

24     Mr. Butler.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17049

 1        Q.   If that was the case, if it was possible that the UN headquarters

 2     in New York had not been informed, was it also possible that based on

 3     incomplete information about the situation in the field, they made

 4     decisions about the engagement of NATO forces against the VRS in 1995?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry, yes.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If I could just ask for a little more

 8     particularity because NATO forces in 1995 is very general and they may

 9     each have a different story each time it was used.  If the general is

10     speaking of something in particular, it would be very helpful.

11     Otherwise, it's a vast area, as far as I know, NATO in 1995.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you help Mr. McCloskey to

13     clarify that?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Butler, if before the events in Srebrenica NATO forces

17     attacked the VRS forces, was it possible that this activity on their part

18     was the result of inaccurate information about the situation in the

19     field?  Was it possible that they had incomplete information about the

20     balance of forces?  Thank you.

21        A.   It is my understanding, if you're talking about the NATO

22     air-strikes in June of 1995, the trigger to that military activity was

23     the withdrawal by the VRS of artillery from a monitoring area around

24     Sarajevo, and since that artillery could no longer be monitored by an

25     earlier agreement between the United Nations, the VRS, and the ABiH, that

Page 17050

 1     that was the trigger to the bombing campaign related to June of 1995.  I

 2     don't know whether or not or how clear or how not clear that particular

 3     picture was in New York versus in Sarajevo or Zagreb.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  If NATO forces were activated pursuant to

 5     requests from the UN Security Council against the VRS, does this mean

 6     that -- what does it mean, really?  Was the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia to

 7     maintain peace or to impose peace?

 8        A.   The UN mandate was peacekeeping and not peace enforcement, so

 9     you're correct there.  And certainly while there was a supposedly

10     separate chain of command between the United Nations forces and the NATO

11     forces, it certainly blurs the line when you have that situation occur.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Tell us, was the use of weapons pursuant

13     to requests from the United Nations a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement

14     operation?  Thank you.

15        A.   I am not sure how they characterised that at the time.

16        Q.   We will now see what the testimony on this particular issue was

17     by Mr. Rupert Smith and what his understanding of NATO activities in 1995

18     in Bosnia was.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please call up D193, that's

20     General Rupert Smith's statement.

21             You can see page 1 here.  Can we now show page 9, paragraph 5, of

22     the statement by General Rupert Smith.

23             Thank you, Aleksandar.  It's page 9, paragraph 3 in English.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   It reads, and I'm quoting General Smith's words:

Page 17051

 1             "At the end of this series of meetings I had come to the

 2     conclusion that the Bosnian Serbs had concluded that further fighting was

 3     inevitable and that they had to reach some form of conclusion within the

 4     year.  The eastern enclaves were too strong and the Bosnian Army within

 5     them constituted a clear threat, particularly as the VRS felt that they

 6     were likely to face attacks on multiple fronts."

 7             And there's the sentence you referred to:

 8             "In the enclaves the UN were being used as a shield by the

 9     Bosnians and a hostage by the Serbs.  The intention of the Serbs appeared

10     to be to force the UN into a position of abandoning the enclaves to

11     enable the BSA to defeat or at least contain the Bosnian Army in

12     Eastern Bosnia and to release vital manpower for other areas."

13             This is my question:  Were you aware of Mr. General Smith stating

14     something like this?  This was a conclusion drawn by him in March of

15     1995, and that's something you can glean from further up in the text.  Do

16     you believe that the Security Council was informed of this too or was the

17     information concerning the combat readiness of the forces in the enclaves

18     withheld from them?  Thank you.

19        A.   The first part of your question, I am aware of this.  I have read

20     this statement a number of times before.  I believe that the particular

21     paragraph that you discussed is the view that General Smith had at the

22     time, and I believe it roughly correlates to the view that I have come to

23     based on separate materials.

24             As to your last question, I just -- I do not know if this

25     particular information was transmitted all the way up to the

Page 17052

 1     Security Council in New York.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  It was -- it is for your sake and for the

 3     sake of the Trial Chamber that I should draw your attention to

 4     paragraph 2 on page 9 in Serbian, where Mr. Smith says -- and that's

 5     page 8, paragraph 2:

 6             "I met with Mladic at his request in a hotel in Vlasenica on my

 7     return from Srebrenica to Sarajevo."

 8             So I'm drawing your attention to the time-frame.  So he went to

 9     Srebrenica, and on his return, on the 7th of March, he met up with Mladic

10     and arrived at that conclusion, which was his general conclusion about

11     the forces of the ABiH in the enclaves.

12             This is my question:  Is it possible that the UN Security Council

13     did not receive General Smith's report about the situation in the safe

14     areas and that he visited these areas, in fact, without the consent from

15     the Security Council?

16        A.   This time I guess I will answer your second question first.  As

17     the commander on the ground, General Smith should and would have had all

18     of the necessary authorities to visit any of the troops under his

19     command.  So I don't believe that he would have had to have asked for the

20     United Nations Security Council's permission at any level to personally

21     view the situation in enclaves or any other of the military units, the UN

22     peacekeeping units, under his direction.  So that would not have been

23     required.

24             Again, going to your first question, I don't know how far up the

25     chain of command that the information or that these observations, these

Page 17053

 1     specific observations by General Smith would have been transmitted.  So I

 2     mean, I know that he would have and should have reported these issues.

 3     They would have gone to his superiors in Zagreb.  What I just don't have

 4     any clarity on is whether or not the UN command in Zagreb passed these

 5     reports verbatim to the UN Security Council or the UN -- actually, their

 6     intervening headquarters would be the Department of Peacekeeping

 7     Operations in New York, not necessarily the UN Security Council, or

 8     whether General Smith had the reporting ability and exercised it that he

 9     would report directly to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New

10     York.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  In his statement - and I don't want to

12     quote it in its entirety - Mr. Smith says that he met up with all the

13     sides to see what the possibility was for maintaining the cessation of

14     hostilities agreement which was in force between January and April of

15     1994 and he did that because the United Nations were looking into the

16     possibilities for this agreement to be prolonged.  He says that he was in

17     meetings with civilian and military leaders on this particular issue.

18             So let's look at the very next paragraph, which reads -- and

19     that's page 9, and I'm quoting:

20             "The meeting with General Mladic" -- I'm sorry.  "The meeting

21     with General Blaskic at the HVO headquarters in Posusje was held on the

22     8th of March."

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, could you please give us the

24     reference to the English page.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English that's page 9,

Page 17054

 1     paragraph 4.  Thank you.  My apologies.  Thank you, Aleksandar.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   I will quote again:

 4             "On the 8th of March, a meeting was held with General Blaskic at

 5     HVO headquarters in Posusje.  The meeting was followed by a joint press

 6     statement for Croatian TV.  The main areas for discussion were the

 7     cessation of hostilities agreement process, the UNPROFOR mandate in

 8     Croatia, federation military matters, and the military situation

 9     currently in Bosnia."

10             And now, next he lists a meeting with Mr. Muratovic and states

11     that he was in Zagreb on the 11th of March with Mr. Akashi.  This is the

12     following paragraph.  The fifth paragraph lists his meeting with

13     Muratovic; the sixth, with Mr. Akashi in Zagreb; and the seventh, the

14     meeting with Mr. Akashi at Pale, et cetera.  Let us see when -- this is

15     what I quoted to you to see when exactly this happened.

16             Now, this is my question for you:  Did you review documents where

17     you found that the BH Army violated the cessation of hostilities

18     agreement and launched a comprehensive offensive on all the fronts?

19     Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just if -- if we could be made clear what year

22     this report is referring to?  He said 1994, which may be correct, but

23     frankly, it's -- from what I see on the screen I can't tell and I'm not

24     sure which year he's talking about.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

Page 17055

 1             Mr. Tolimir, could you clarify it?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to Mr. McCloskey for

 3     mentioning this issue.  It has to do with 1995, 1995.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   So I repeat my question:  Did the BH Army violate the truce and

 6     the cessation of hostilities agreement that was in force in January

 7     through to May 1995?

 8        A.   By April and May of 1995 there was a series of military

 9     operations undertaken by both the ABiH 1st Corps in and around Sarajevo

10     and by ABiH 2 Corps in north of the Tuzla area, so what I'm just not

11     clear of is exactly when the scheduled date of the cease-fire was

12     supposed to end or -- so I don't know whether it was technically a

13     violation of the cease-fire, whether they jumped the gun early, or

14     whether they waited for the cease-fire to expire and then militarily

15     moved on.  But I agree with your basic point, which is that by late

16     April, early May of 1995, at least in the 1st and 2nd Corps areas, the

17     ABiH did jump off to significant offensive military operations.

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

19             Let's now look at page 9, paragraph 3, the last line.  In

20     English, that's page 9, paragraph 1, which reads:

21             "The purpose of these meetings was to encourage the Bosnian

22     government to recommit itself to the cessations of hostilities agreement

23     and to inject new incentive to apply the agreement" -- or "comply with

24     the agreement."

25             This is my question:  Can it be concluded, based on the statement

Page 17056

 1     by General Smith, that the Muslims did not comply with the cessations of

 2     hostilities agreement in the course of 1995?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's page 9, the penultimate

 4     paragraph, the one that I quoted a moment ago, and I mean the English

 5     version.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The last sentence of the penultimate paragraph.

 7             Go ahead, please.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Well, sir, I mean, in that context, certainly the

 9     UN's interest was in maintaining any cease-fire because that, of course,

10     kept down civilian casualties.  Realistically, given the situation that

11     the ABiH found itself in its own territory, that a lot of the territory

12     it believed was theirs was, in fact, occupied by the VRS, I don't believe

13     the ABiH was ever serious about a long-term cease-fire that was going to

14     leave them in that particularly disadvantaged situation.  So I suspect,

15     at the end of the day, the answer was exactly what everyone thought it

16     was going to be, which was that the Bosnian Muslim military forces were

17     using the cease-fire as a means to resupply themselves, to reorganise

18     their military forces, and then seek to go on the offensive in the early

19     part of 1995, March/April, when the weather gave them the ability to go

20     on these offensives, with the goal of trying to put the Army of

21     Republika Srpska at a disadvantage.

22             So in the broader context I agree with General Tolimir that the

23     ABiH probably was never serious about maintaining a cease-fire that was

24     going to go through the summer, you know, through May, June, July, and

25     August of 1995.

Page 17057

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the time for our break and we

 4     will resume then.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Indeed, we must have our

 6     first break now and we will resume quarter past 4.00.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.  Please continue your

12     cross-examination.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Butler, at the end of the last session you said that the

16     BH Army never had a firm intention of honouring the cease-fire, the

17     cessation of hostilities agreement.  Did I understand this correctly?

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The transcript is slightly different,

19     Mr. Tolimir.  He said:

20             "... I agree with General Tolimir that the ABiH probably was

21     never serious about maintaining a cease-fire ..."

22             This is a bit different.  Therefore, I just wanted to have the

23     correct version on the record.  Please continue.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  In that

25     case I don't need an answer.

Page 17058

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   So you said "probably."  Now, concerning that whole situation, my

 3     question is:  With the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, did the

 4     VRS sign with the ABiH, the Croatian Army, and the representatives of the

 5     international community, such as the UNPROFOR commanders, an agreement

 6     that was a guarantee that the ABiH also undertook to honour?

 7        A.   I don't know, sir.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  We will also look at this agreement on the cessation

 9     of hostilities.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P1011 is the document we need in

11     e-court.  Here it is.  In English and in Serbian, page 1.  I should like

12     to ask for the last page to be shown, with the signatures.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you see on that last page that it was signed by

15     Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic, Rasim Delic, and Kresimir Zubak and

16     Vladimir Soljic on behalf of the Croats, and it was co-signed by

17     Yasushi Akashi on behalf of the United Nations, and Michael Rose on

18     behalf of the UNPROFOR command?

19        A.   Yes, sir, I do.  Or it says "witnessed" by them not on behalf of

20     them.  But just the same, I see their signatures.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the United Nations initiated and

22     advocated this agreement on the cessation of hostilities?

23        A.   I don't know the origins of the particular cease-fire agreement

24     or which side advocated it first.  I just don't know the answer to that

25     question, sir.

Page 17059

 1        Q.   Could we please look at Article 2.  That's on page 1.  I will

 2     quote:

 3             "The cessation of hostilities will be supervised and monitored by

 4     UNPROFOR through the establishment of joint commissions.  A central joint

 5     commission shall be established under the chairmanship of the UNPROFOR,

 6     with initial meetings at the Sarajevo airport.  And regional joint

 7     commissions shall also be established in permanent session as needed and

 8     as determined by the central joint commission."

 9             Paragraph 3:

10             "Liaison officers will be exchanged between UNPROFOR and the

11     parties by 15 January 1995 and afterwards where determined appropriate --

12     where deemed appropriate."

13             Is it clear from this that UNPROFOR was the guarantor and the

14     supervisor of this cessation of hostilities agreement?

15        A.   I agree with your phrase "supervised and monitored" because that

16     is what it states specifically in Article 2.  I am not sure,

17     contextually, whether that also means the guarantor of the agreement.

18        Q.   In that case let us look at paragraph 4.  It says:

19             "Cessation of hostilities will include the following measures:

20             "A. Separation of forces in conflict to mutually agreed positions

21     and the positioning of UNPROFOR forces for observation and monitoring to

22     include interpositioning."

23             My question is:  Did the UNPROFOR deploy its forces between the

24     parties in conflict in order to enforce this agreement?

25        A.   I am trying to picture back to Sarajevo, at least, where the UN,

Page 17060

 1     if they ever actually managed to achieve that, where they were able to

 2     put their forces or interpose them between the VRS and the ABiH.  I don't

 3     know if that ever happened.  If it did, it didn't happen to a large

 4     degree simply because, militarily, there was a lot of resistance to the

 5     idea of giving up certain key terrain features that had been hard fought

 6     over to a UN force that might then turn them over to the other side.  So

 7     there are a number of occasions that I'm aware of where there was serious

 8     contention between the VRS, the UN, and the ABiH over [Realtime

 9     transcript read in error "other"] the withdrawal of certain military

10     units or positions because of their perceived strategic value at a

11     certain area.  So if it did occur, I don't believe it occurred in large

12     numbers.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, did you say "over the withdrawal" or "other

14     the withdrawal."

15             THE WITNESS:  Over the withdrawal, sir.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this clarification.  It relates to

17     line 21 of page 35.

18             Mr. Tolimir.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Did you come across a UN document where

21     it says that in Sarajevo, during separation, the Serbs handed over the

22     Vrbanja bridge to UNPROFOR, which was followed by an incident when the

23     Serbs wanted to recover Vrbanja bridge into their control.  Rupert Smith

24     talks about it in his statement.  Have you read that?

25        A.   I am generally aware of the bridge incident, as it's described,

Page 17061

 1     but I do not know of the specific details of when the bridge was supposed

 2     to be turned over and by which parties to whom.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

 4             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, first of all, good

 5     afternoon to everyone.  On page 36, line 10, the name of the bridge is

 6     not recorded correctly.  The bridge is called Vrbanja, V-r-b-a-n-j-a.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Gajic.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Butler, if the river separated Muslims and Serbs, and the

10     Serbs and Muslims controlled parts of the bridge, each on their own side,

11     does it mean that the bridge was not, in fact, controlled by the Serbs

12     once the bridge was handed over?  Let's look at what Mr. Rupert Smith

13     says about this.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you put a question to the witness.

15     Are you expecting an answer?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked whether the witness has

17     read the statement of General Rupert Smith concerning the problem of the

18     Vrbanja bridge, because he said he was not sure there was a separation of

19     forces in Sarajevo and that was done precisely in order to separate

20     forces.  That's what I asked.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Butler.

22             THE WITNESS:  My apologies, I assumed we were going to go to that

23     part of the statement.  I don't recall offhand what General Smith said or

24     did not say about that.  I would suggest we go to the statement on that.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17062

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the electronic

 3     courtroom to display D193.  When we see the first page, let's see also

 4     page 15 of that statement in English.  It's the first paragraph.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   He says:

 7             "On the 27 May, Bosnian Serb troops disguised as French soldiers

 8     seized a French position at Vrbanja bridge in Sarajevo, killing two

 9     French soldiers and taking 11 prisoner.  The French counter-attacked,

10     killing four Serb troops and taking six prisoners.  At roughly the same

11     time, the Bosnian Serbs took 30 UNPROFOR personnel hostage with their

12     vehicles and equipment from the Gorazde area."

13             This was written by Mr. Smith.  My question is:  Were the French

14     able to hold any features in Sarajevo unless these had been handed over

15     by the warring parties, and was it their job to hold positions between

16     the warring parties and to separate them?

17        A.   Given the broad mandate, where the UN forces were placed and what

18     territory they held was ultimately at the discretion of the various

19     warring parties.  It was a peacekeeping mission, not a peace enforcement

20     one.  For example, the UN didn't occupy the Sarajevo airport.  It was

21     permitted to use that by the various warring parties for various

22     purposes.  So the positions and the check-points that were maintained by

23     the United Nations were done so with the consent of the warring parties.

24     If the warring parties did not consent to that, then the UN would not

25     have been able to maintain those positions.

Page 17063

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  You just mentioned the Sarajevo airport.

 2     Do you know which one of the warring parties held the Sarajevo airport

 3     before it was handed over to UNPROFOR?  Have you found that in any of the

 4     documents you reviewed?

 5        A.   My understanding is that the airport was initially held by the

 6     Yugoslav National Army military forces that were there at the beginning

 7     of the conflict.  I believe they are the ones who turned it over to

 8     the -- I believe they are the ones who turned it over to the UN forces at

 9     the very beginning of the conflict.

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  We'll show you that agreement and you

11     will see that it was handed over by Mr. Koljevic.  But that's not the

12     purpose of my question.  My purpose was to tell you that in Sarajevo

13     there also occurred a separation of forces at points such as Vrbanja

14     bridge, the airport and other points.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I am going to object to that style.  If he wants

17     to impeach the witness on a particular point that he thinks is important,

18     he should do it at the time that he brings it up, not make a comment

19     contradicting the witness and -- for some later time.  I mean, if he's

20     got something to contradict the witness, he should bring it up and use

21     it.  Otherwise, he's just testifying and he knows that he shouldn't be

22     doing it.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed, the way the last sentence was formulated

24     is problematic.  "My purpose is to tell you that," and then it's not

25     properly recorded.  You shouldn't tell him.  You should ask him about his

Page 17064

 1     experience and his knowledge.

 2             Please continue your interrogation.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

 4     you, Mr. McCloskey.  It is not my intention to make the witness

 5     uncomfortable.  I am just speaking of facts that I am going to show him

 6     in documents, such as this Vrbanja bridge incident.  So I'm not going to

 7     insist on getting an answer on these questions.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Let me ask this:  Did UNPROFOR representatives hand over to the

10     VRS the positions they had received from them during the separation

11     forces in areas between the ABiH and VRS?  If you know that.

12        A.   If you're talking about Sarajevo, then I don't know the answer to

13     that.  That was not a specific focus on what my military analysis was

14     doing on -- on the day-to-day with respect to what was going on with

15     Sarajevo, so I don't know the details of that.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know any details concerning Srebrenica?  Did

17     Muslims did out of the Srebrenica demilitarised zone in order to get more

18     advantageous positions and to mount attacks against VRS units?

19        A.   With respect to 1995, I would characterise most of the military

20     operations by the ABiH out of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa more

21     along the lines of raids.  Go out, launch a specific attack against a

22     discrete target, achieve those objectives, and then fall back into the

23     enclaves.  They did not have the military power necessary to go out of

24     the enclaves, generally, and hold territory in the face of a sustained

25     VRS counterattack.

Page 17065

 1        Q.   Let us look at the situation in Srebrenica on the 13th of July,

 2     discussed by Mr. Smith in his statement.  It's page 16.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which paragraph?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 3 in Serbian.  Page 16 in

 5     Serbian, last paragraph.  It's the 3rd paragraph in English.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Let me quote it, then you will maybe find it more easily.

 8             "Until 13 July, I believed the Muslims had managed to escape, but

 9     whether successfully or not I didn't know.  The BH Army told me nothing

10     about it."

11             And before that he says they had occasionally left the enclave

12     and taken up certain positions.

13             My question is:  Have you read any documents, any UNPROFOR

14     reports saying that Muslims in the enclaves went out of the enclaves,

15     across the front line, and took up positions in the territory held by the

16     VRS?

17        A.   I'm sorry, sir, I am still not finding the paragraph that you're

18     referring to.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I am in the same position.

20             Mr. Gajic.

21             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it's the second half

22     of the last paragraph.

23             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  I've read the paragraph.  Now what was your

24     question again, sir?

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The question was, I quote:

Page 17066

 1             "Have you read any documents, any UNPROFOR reports saying that

 2     Muslims in the enclaves went out across the front line and took up

 3     positions by the territory held by the VRS?"

 4             That was the question.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Are we talking in the period before the fall of

 6     Srebrenica or afterwards?

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   What about before the fall of Srebrenica?

 9        A.   As I testified earlier, before the fall of Srebrenica, the

10     military operations conducted by the ABiH were in the series of raids,

11     where they would go out, do discrete military operations, and then fall

12     back into the enclave.  It was not a goal of holding territory, so to

13     speak, and defending that territory.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Please, does that mean that they had to go across the

15     front lines to get behind the lines of the VRS?

16        A.   Well, sir, as you're aware, despite the military forces that were

17     around the enclaves from the VRS, there was never a cohesive series of

18     lines.  There were a number of gaps between various military units.  So I

19     suspect that the tactic that was used was not necessarily to breach

20     through where the military positions were, but it was to essentially

21     exploit the gaps in the lines and to go around those military positions

22     to get behind the VRS units.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Do you know that part of the agreement we

24     read envisaged the deployment of liaison officers from one territory to

25     the other?  Thank you.

Page 17067

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe in the agreement that was the prior exhibit,

 2     the phrase was that there would be liaison officers and other regional

 3     commissions as deemed necessary or as determined necessary.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Let me tell you that General Smith

 5     mentions this.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at page 11, the last

 7     paragraph of his statement, the version in Serbian -- or, rather, it's

 8     paragraph 3 of his statement in Serbian.  Page 11.  And that is page 11,

 9     the first three paragraphs in English.  Thank you, Aleksandar.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   "I informed Dr. Karadzic that as I could no longer guarantee the

12     safety of the Bosnian Serb liaison officers in Gornji Vakuf, I intended

13     to return them.  I delivered a letter to this effect.  Karadzic agreed to

14     this, and the BSA liaison officers were returned to the Bosnian Serb Army

15     at 1900 hours that evening."

16             This is my question:  A warring party, in this case the Muslims,

17     did they not give a clear indication of violating the cessation of

18     hostilities agreement by this and that they returned the liaison officers

19     to the territory of Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

20        A.   This particular document just mentions one instance at

21     Gornji Vakuf.  I don't know whether this applies to all of them or not,

22     and without knowing any of the context around that, I am just not able to

23     answer the question as whether or not this should be an indicator that

24     they were going to violate the cease-fire.  It's just not enough

25     information to go on.

Page 17068

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Let me avoid testifying and giving information.  It

 2     is not my purpose.  What I would like is to show you elements of the

 3     agreement that were violated.  This is what I tried to do.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us look at page 10, the last

 5     paragraph of the statement by General Rupert Smith where he speaks about

 6     the offensive activities of the Bosnian Muslims.  Page 10, paragraph 3,

 7     and page 9, paragraph 1, clearly indicates that this was on the

 8     13th of March.

 9             All these events happened on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of March,

10     as expressed in Mr. Smith's statement.  And page 9, the last paragraph

11     clearly indicates that it was the 13th of March.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which page in English?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 9, the last paragraph.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says:

16             "On the 13th of March ..."

17             Let's move to page 10 now, please.

18             I was showing you this to indicate the time-frame only.  We don't

19     want to go through the entire statement.  Let's look at the last

20     paragraph of page 10 in Serbian, which is paragraph 3 of page 10 in

21     English, which reads:

22             "Matters continued to deteriorate during the following week when

23     the Bosnian Army mounted an offensive in two directions claiming that it

24     was designed to relieve pressure on Bihac.  One attack on the Vlasic

25     feature was ultimately successful, but the attack on the Majevica hills

Page 17069

 1     from Tuzla was not."

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   This is my question:  Four locations are referred to here.

 4     Namely, Bihac; Vlasic, near Travnik; Majevica, on the border between

 5     Republika Srpska and the Federation, near Tuzla; and the offensive out of

 6     Tuzla in the direction of the borders of Republika Srpska.  Is that not

 7     the case, that these four locations are mentioned here?  Thank you.

 8        A.   Yes, sir, you're correct.  It mentions those four locations.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Let's see what General Smith has to say further down.

10             "I took the view that the Bosnian government had no intention of

11     extending the cessation of hostilities agreement beyond the end of

12     April."

13             He goes on to say:

14             "On the 22nd of March, I met with Dr. Ganic, Mr. Muratovic and

15     General Hajrulahovic.  I was accompanied by Mr. Aguilar.  The purpose of

16     the meeting was to assess the political stance of the Bosnian government

17     in relation to the cessation of hostilities agreement following the

18     Bosnian offensive in the Tuzla area.

19             "On the 23rd of March, I met with General Delic in order to gain

20     a clearer understanding of the Tuzla and Travnik areas and assess the

21     potential for maintaining the cease-fire in Bosnia."

22             This is my question:  Does it not follow clearly from this

23     portion of General Smith's statement that, in March, the Muslim army did

24     not want to honour the cessation of hostilities agreement?  Thank you.

25        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean this is General Smith's interpretation of

Page 17070

 1     events that were occurring on the ground at the time.  And again, as I've

 2     testified before, within the context of what was happening on the ground,

 3     how much territory the VRS controlled versus the ABiH, I don't believe

 4     that politically there was a will to maintain the cease-fire by the

 5     Bosnian government at the time.  It would have been politically

 6     unfavourable for them to do so, and militarily, they would not have been

 7     able to sustain those line indefinitely.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Does this not constitute a violation of the cessation

 9     of hostilities agreement?  Thank you.

10        A.   I guess in a technical sense it would constitute a violation.

11     If -- when one party goes over to the offence, again, depending on the

12     specifics of the agreement, you're -- you're violating the cease-fire by

13     taking offensive action.  That would be a technical violation.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's move to the next page, which

16     is page 12 in Serbian.  The last paragraph.  And the corresponding page

17     in English is 12, paragraph 4.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   I quote:

20             "Consultations with the Bosnian government included meetings with

21     Silajdzic, Muratovic, Ganic, and Sacirbey.  The Bosnians were quite clear

22     that an extension of the cessation of hostilities agreement was not in

23     their interest, and they took the opportunity again to criticise the weak

24     and contradictory UNPROFOR mandates and the strangulation of Sarajevo by

25     the Bosnian Serbs."

Page 17071

 1             Can you perhaps tell the Trial Chamber what the distance is

 2     between Sarajevo and the locations we mentioned earlier, Majevica,

 3     Vlasic, Tuzla, in order for them to have an understanding of it?  Thank

 4     you.

 5        A.   I can't give you a kilometre basis.  They are not in the Sarajevo

 6     area is what I can say.  They are in different areas of the country that

 7     are outside of the normal area that you would consider part of Sarajevo.

 8     So they are not related in that sense.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's move on to the next page.  In

11     Serbian, that's page 12, paragraph 1, the last sentence of the paragraph.

12     That's page 12 in English, paragraph 3 from the bottom.  Thank you.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I quote the last sentence of that paragraph.  There is a

15     reference to a meeting between Karadzic and Smith, and it is stated here:

16             "Again he offered a permanent cease-fire on condition that they

17     were treated equally in relation to the Bosnians and that sanctions

18     against themselves were lifted."

19             He said that:

20             "If the international community treated the Serbs like beasts in

21     a cage, then that is how they would behave."

22             Did General Smith state in this statement in the Serbs had agreed

23     to a permanent cessation of hostilities, unlike the Muslims, who refused

24     to do so and violated the cessation?  Thank you.

25        A.   In this paragraph he does reflect that that is what -- he sources

Page 17072

 1     that back to President Karadzic.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  As a military analyst, tell us this:  If a warring

 3     party agrees to a cessation of hostilities and the other does not, which

 4     of the two parties would be deemed responsible for the continuation of a

 5     war?  Thank you.

 6        A.   If only life were that simple.  The problem that you have to look

 7     at when you look at this in context is that, frankly, from November of

 8     1992 onwards, the Bosnian Serbs were, for the most part, looking to end

 9     hostilities.  Their position was that they had achieved all of their

10     territorial gains, they had unified their population group in areas that

11     they wanted under their contiguous control, but the other side of the

12     party didn't.  The Bosnian Muslim government particularly was

13     significantly disadvantaged by the military situation on the ground and

14     the political one.  That was inherent in that.

15             So the fact that the side -- or one party of the conflict, which

16     is achieving all of their war aims and has achieved them in their mind,

17     wants to end hostilities doesn't make it necessarily the fault of the

18     other party which is on the losing end of that stick to come to peace

19     because it's not advantageous for them.  In this particular context,

20     militarily neither side could administer the knockout blow; however,

21     neither side could sue for peace under the circumstances.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Tell us, if both parties signed a

23     cessation of hostilities agreement and one of the sides wishes to

24     continue complying with it whereas the other does not, which of the two

25     would be responsible for the continuing war?  Thank you.

Page 17073

 1        A.   Well, it would be -- the side that continued to conduct military

 2     operations would be technically in violation of the cease-fire.  So

 3     whether being in technical violation of the cease-fire equates to being

 4     at fault for the continuation of the war is a harder question.  Again,

 5     within the context of what was happening on the ground, I believe that

 6     the ABiH engaged in this cease-fire for the tactical purpose of being

 7     able to re-equip and resupply and retrain their military forces.  I don't

 8     believe they ever had the position was that the cease-fire and the

 9     military positions that they possessed when they agreed to it in late

10     1994 -- in November or December of 1994 and in early January of 1995,

11     were the military positions that they planned to end the conflict on.  I

12     don't believe that they believed that those positions, in December of

13     1994 and January of 1995, would have left them with a viable state.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe, please.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I don't see in the body of your answer the answer

16     to the question, which was:

17             "If both parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement and

18     one of the sides wishes to continue complying with it whereas the other

19     does not, which of the two would be responsible for the continuation of

20     the war?"

21             Thank you.

22             THE WITNESS:  Rather than in the abstract, technically let's just

23     say what it is.  The Bosnian Muslim side was not willing to live with the

24     cease-fire beyond a certain point when they believed that they could

25     achieve their objectives militarily.  That point started in March of 1995

Page 17074

 1     with the resumption of large-scale military operations in various

 2     locations.

 3             The cease-fire, it was just what it was.  It was a temporary

 4     agreement to stop military conflict.  It was not a precursor, and I don't

 5     believe the Bosnian Muslims ever viewed it to be the pre-cursor to a

 6     permanent peace agreement.

 7             So when the conflict began again in earnest in March of 1995 by

 8     the offensives in 1st and 2nd Corps area, they were done so by the

 9     Bosnian Muslims for their purposes.

10             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Which were the purposes?

11             THE WITNESS:  Their purpose was primarily to regain territory

12     that they believed was theirs.  Particularly with respect to Sarajevo,

13     when you look at where the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim military

14     positions were and the stranglehold that the Bosnian Serbs had over the

15     city, there should be no question that that situation would -- could

16     somehow continue in a non-conflict -- or in a post-conflict stage.  That

17     would not have left the Bosnian Muslim side with a viable capital, let

18     alone a viable country.

19             So their purpose was the same purpose that they had since

20     November of 1992, which was to continue military activities against

21     primarily the Bosnian Serbs for the purpose of recapturing or regaining

22     territory that they believed was rightfully theirs.

23             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Butler.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge Nyambe.

Page 17075

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you know that the Muslims fought in Bosnia both

 3     the Serbs and the Croats before the cessation of hostilities?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that during the cessation of hostilities

 6     an agreement was signed between the Muslims and the Croats about the

 7     establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a cessation of

 8     hostilities?

 9        A.   When you say "cessation of hostilities," you're referring to the

10     cessation of hostilities between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian

11     Muslims; correct, sir?

12        Q.   That's correct, Mr. Butler.  Thank you.

13        A.   Yes, sir.  I am aware of that, sir.  Yes.

14        Q.   Do you know who it was who imposed the cessation of hostilities

15     agreement in Bosnia?  Did it come about spontaneously among the warring

16     parties or was it imposed by someone?

17        A.   Are we talking about the one between the Bosnian Croats and the

18     Bosnian Muslims again?

19        Q.   Now we have moved on to the comprehensive cessation of

20     hostilities agreement in Bosnia.  Was it imposed by anyone, and if so, by

21     whom?

22        A.   I don't know the answer to that.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Let's see what General Smith has to say about it in

24     his statement.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 11, paragraph 2 in Serbian,

Page 17076

 1     and we will move on to paragraph 3.  As for paragraph 2, we are only

 2     interested in the date.  It's page 10 in English, the penultimate

 3     paragraph, as well as the last one.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   It reads:

 6             "On the 5th of April, I met privately with Dr. Karadzic at a

 7     hotel near Pale."

 8             So he's referring to the 5th of April during his term of office

 9     in 1995.  I referred you to this paragraph merely for the date.  In the

10     subsequent paragraph he speaks of the substance of the meeting and says:

11             "Karadzic took the opportunity to deliver a message to me in the

12     knowledge that I would pass it on through the UN chain of command.  The

13     message was that the Bosnian Serbs had decided that the cessation of

14     hostilities agreement had failed and that the Bosnian Serbs felt that

15     they had been let down by the former US President Carter, the

16     United Nations, and the international community."

17             This is my question for you:  Does it follow from this who was it

18     who exerted pressure on the Serbs to agree to the cessation of

19     hostilities agreement during the time when the Muslims were fighting both

20     the Serbs and the Croats?  Thank you.

21        A.   I don't know whether this particular phrase is meant to imply

22     that the former President Carter, the UN, and the international community

23     imposed the agreement or whether President Karadzic is reflecting his

24     disappointment because they had not been more forceful in trying to keep

25     the agreement.  So I don't know that I can answer your particular

Page 17077

 1     question there.  Also with respect to your last comment, "the Muslims

 2     were fighting both the Serbs and the Croats," I am not aware that that

 3     was happening as late as April of 1995.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] To bring clarity to this, let's

 6     look at page 19 of the statement of Mr. Smith.  Paragraph 5 in Serbian,

 7     and in English it's page 18, the penultimate paragraph.  Thank you,

 8     Aleksandar.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I quote:

11             "On the 23rd of July, on my way back from London, I met with

12     Mr. Sacirbey at Split airport.  The meeting was at Sacirbey's request and

13     followed the meeting and the Split agreement between Bosnian, Croatian,

14     and Federation ministers.  Sacirbey explained this agreement.  We also

15     discussed the situation in Zepa, the fighting in Bihac, the army of the

16     RSK offensive, and the arrangements for the rapid reaction force."

17             Can you tell on the basis of this reference to 1995 that this was

18     following the cessation of hostilities agreement when the so-called Split

19     declaration was signed by the Croats and the Muslims?  Thank you.

20        A.   Okay.  That helped clarify it for me, because I thought in your

21     prior question you were referencing the Bosnian Croats and Muslims.  I

22     didn't realise that you were discussing the actual Republic of Croatia in

23     that context.  So I am clear on that, yes, sir.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Since we are now clear on that, can you

25     tell us, as a military analyst, did the Muslims violate the cessation of

Page 17078

 1     hostilities agreement because they believed that they had created the

 2     necessary conditions for contiguous territory, for linking up with the

 3     enclaves, and liberating Sarajevo?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I don't know if all of those conditions are met, but they

 5     violated -- or they basically terminated the cease-fire and initiated or

 6     reinitiated hostilities against Bosnian Serb military forces because they

 7     believed that militarily they could defeat them and to achieve the

 8     territorial aims that they were looking for.  Liberating Sarajevo or

 9     breaking through the VRS siege lines that were there was one part of

10     them.  Enclaves were another part of the them, but there were territorial

11     aspects to it as well that were even beyond that.

12        Q.   Mr. Butler, did the enclaves then constitute a great problem in

13     the territory of Republika Srpska because they mounted attacks against

14     civilians at that same time that we are discussing, after the cessation

15     of hostilities agreement?

16        A.   They were a problem in the sense that, yes, they did target

17     civilians coming out -- or military forces coming out of the enclaves did

18     target civilians or civilian objects.  But within the framework of what

19     the larger levels of the VRS was looking at, and again as I discussed in

20     my report, along this same time-frame, the VRS, just as the Bosnian

21     Muslim military forces are seeing themselves growing stronger every day,

22     politically with their alliance with the Bosnian Croats and later with

23     Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs see themselves weakening every day.  The

24     Bosnian Serbs as early as March and April of 1995 were recognising the

25     fact that 1995 would be the decisive year of the war for them.  They were

Page 17079

 1     running to the end of their tether with respect to manpower, military

 2     equipment, so going back to well prior testimony, the military forces

 3     that were tied down around the enclaves were believed by General Mladic

 4     and the Army of Republika Srpska being squandered, if you will, when they

 5     could be used more profitably in other areas of the battle-field for the

 6     Republika Srpska.

 7             And, in fact, when one looks at what happens starting in August

 8     of 1995 with Croatian Operation Storm, in part, you know, they are

 9     successful because they are able to generate -- or I should make it clear

10     that the Republic of Croatia is successful, because it's able to generate

11     superior military force on those areas of the battle-fields that it

12     needed to while large components of the VRS are still tied down dealing

13     with the issues related to the eastern enclaves.

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  You have now clarified this problem in

15     Krajina and Croatia.  You probably meant the western part of Republika

16     Srpska.

17             My question is:  Did Serbs rightfully demand the demilitarisation

18     of these areas in keeping with the agreement if the Muslims were

19     attacking behind Serb lines from the enclaves?

20        A.   Yes, sir, in the sense that the cease-fire agreement -- and again

21     using Srebrenica as an example, the cease-fire agreement did call for the

22     forces to be demilitarised inside the enclaves, and it was recognised by

23     the local Bosnian Serb military forces that they were not demilitarised

24     and that the UN was not meaningfully enforcing the demilitarisation.  So

25     the Serbs did frequently raise that issue.

Page 17080

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Do you know that Serbs also raised it

 2     officially at meetings with UNPROFOR?  Do you know this from the

 3     documents you've seen?

 4        A.   I am aware, generally, that the VRS did complain about it.  I am

 5     not sure off the top of my head which documents would illustrate that,

 6     but I agree that on many occasions the VRS military leadership raised the

 7     issue of the failure of the United Nations to demilitarise forces inside,

 8     specifically, the Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Let me try to assist you by showing you

10     the statement of Mr. Smith, page 13, last paragraph, where you can see

11     that this issue was raised officially more than once.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at page 13.  It's the

13     fourth paragraph in English.  Thank you, Aleksandar.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Quote:

16             "On my return on the 21st May, I had a further private meeting

17     with Dr. Karadzic.  The discussion covered the future of UNPROFOR and in

18     particular the UN presence in the eastern enclaves as well as the

19     stabilisation process after the recent hostilities in Sarajevo."

20             I stress this covered the future of UNPROFOR.

21             "Karadzic confirmed that the Bosnian Serbs had effectively

22     withdrawn consent for the UN operation stating that he had no belief in

23     the impartiality, efficiency, and credibility of the UN.  On the issue of

24     the enclaves he said, 'They are a time bomb about to explode.'  He

25     maintained that the UN should get out but that UNHCR would be safe to

Page 17081

 1     remain.  UNPROFOR presence, he stated, was welcome only if the enclaves

 2     were demilitarised and became safe areas for the population."

 3             My question is:  In this specific case did the Serbs, the

 4     president of the Bosnian Serbs, make it clear to UNPROFOR commander that

 5     the UNPROFOR would not be welcome to stay there unless the Muslims

 6     stopped attacking from these enclaves and the enclaves were to be

 7     demilitarised?

 8        A.   What it specifically says is that UNPROFOR has no credibility in

 9     this respect anymore because it has not demilitarised the particular

10     enclaves and that their presence would be welcome only if the enclaves

11     weren't demilitarised.  I take it from your comment that obviously if

12     they are demilitarised, then the attacks would stop, but I mean, just to

13     be clear, it does not specifically say that's not why they are welcome.

14     It makes it clear that President Karadzic is upset about the fact that

15     his position was that the UN never effectively demilitarised the enclaves

16     and, as a result, they are no longer a credible peacekeeping force there.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I quoted a moment ago the words of Mr. Karadzic to

18     Mr. Smith, and Mr. Smith repeated it when he gave a statement to this

19     OTP.  But I don't mind if you look at it differently.

20             My question is:  Do you find it normal, as a military expert,

21     that demilitarised area be full of troops and weapons and mount attacks

22     against the side which granted it the status of a demilitarised zone?

23        A.   From a military perspective a demilitarised zone is supposed to

24     be just that.  It is supposed to be demilitarised for a purpose, and when

25     one party demilitarises an area, that area is afforded the protections of

Page 17082

 1     a civilian or open area.  Sadly, not only in the conflict in Bosnia but

 2     in many areas globally, apparently the new normal is that demilitarised

 3     areas are not effectively demilitarised and, as a result, combat activity

 4     continues to occur from it.  It's not supposed to be that way.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  This is an area that was controlled by UN

 6     forces.  So I'm asking you, was the entire international community

 7     supposed to be involved in their demilitarisation?

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think such a broad -- "this area is controlled

10     by UNPROFOR forces," what area has been controlled by UNPROFOR forces?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, if you want to have a precise answer

12     you should put a precise question to the witness.  Could you clarify it,

13     please.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thank Mr. McCloskey, and I thank

15     you.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Since the Srebrenica area was controlled by UN forces called

18     UNPROFOR, were they supposed to involve the entire international

19     community in the demilitarisation of this area that they were supposed to

20     control?  Thank you.

21        A.   Several different answers to that question.  The first one is, I

22     guess from a United Nations perspective, they are not sure, and when I

23     say "them," I mean the Dutch Battalion, they are not sure they ever

24     controlled the enclave.  They are certainly not sure if that was ever

25     their mission to do it.  The whole context of the United Nations' own

Page 17083

 1     evaluation of the Srebrenica enclave is full of -- is full of assertions

 2     about the fact that they were unclear themselves at both the political

 3     level in New York at the department of peacekeeping and in Bosnia exactly

 4     what the mission and the roles of the forces inside the enclave were

 5     supposed to be.  Whether they were there as merely a presence, which in

 6     effect was not much, or whether they were there to enforce a cease-fire,

 7     or whether they were there to enforce the demilitarisation of both

 8     parties or, in this case, of the Bosnia Muslim party.

 9             The problem in answering your question directly is the -- the

10     problem that I have is that when the United Nations themselves, as

11     evidenced in their own report, isn't clear on what their own political

12     objectives are with respect to their presence in the enclave, that lack

13     of clarity travelled all the way down the military chain of command so,

14     ultimately, the military commanders of the various Dutch battalions that

15     cycled through there themselves weren't clear exactly what their mission

16     was.

17        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  And did they know which agreement they

18     were implementing?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us look at D21.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In the meantime Judge Nyambe has a question.

21             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I am not quite sure whether I have a question

22     or -- I'm a bit confused by the last answer by Mr. Butler.  I thought

23     there was a specific UN resolution describing what the mandate of

24     UNPROFOR was, no?

25             THE WITNESS:  There is a specific resolution, I agree.  However,

Page 17084

 1     one cannot escape the reality that UN resolutions are written very

 2     broadly and they do not readily translate themselves into military

 3     missions.  I cite as an example, the recent UN mandate to protect

 4     civilians in Libya was not viewed by many of the people who voted for

 5     that mandate as an opening for NATO to engage in a bombing campaign in

 6     that country.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to invite you to refrain from

 8     testifying about Libya.  You should come back to this specific question

 9     by Judge Nyambe about the mandate of UNPROFOR.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir, and I only do it as a point of

11     example.  I mean, the UN, in their report, was very -- the one thing that

12     they were clear about was that at the political levels they didn't know

13     what the mandate meant with respect to being in the enclaves.  As you

14     will recall, it was not a United Nations Security Council decision to

15     declare Srebrenica a safe area.  It was an after-the-fact ratification of

16     a declaration and a commitment made by General Morillon.

17             I suspect that had they to do it over again, they would have

18     tried to provide General Morillon with more specific guidance about what

19     he was or was not authorised to declare.  Of course, you can't go back in

20     history and fix that.  In a perfect world, you could say and make the

21     argument that the UN had the mission of demilitarising the safe area and

22     that the Dutch military forces -- or first the Canadian military forces

23     and later the Dutch would then consequentially have the mission of

24     forcing the demilitarisation of that area.  And if they could not or did

25     not believe that forcing it was their job, they withdraw.

Page 17085

 1             But it's more than just a military problem.  The phrases were

 2     used generally.  First the Canadians and later the Dutch did not see it

 3     as their mission to enforce a cease-fire and to force compliance at the

 4     force of -- at the point of a gun, if necessary.  And the UN, for its

 5     part, didn't see that it was going to be in a position to either make

 6     national contingents risk their soldiers' life to enforce that, and at

 7     the other side, they didn't see that it was in their interest to actually

 8     pull their military forces out completely and have no presence there.

 9             It is a particularly confusing situation and it is a particularly

10     frustrating situation for military commanders who are used to very

11     concrete mission orders and objectives from their national commands.

12             I am not sure that the answer I am giving you helps to clarify

13     the situation.  I don't know that any answer could actually clarify it,

14     given the confusion that the United Nations themselves at all levels of

15     command had with respect to what they were supposed to be doing.

16             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Nevertheless, I thank you for your answer.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, indeed.

18             Mr. Tolimir.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Mr. Butler, here we see the agreement on the demilitarisation of

21     Srebrenica and Zepa concluded between Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic and

22     General Sefer Halilovic on the 8th of May, 1993.  It says exactly what

23     Judge Nyambe asked about.  It says:

24             "Confirming Resolution 824 of the Security Council in which it is

25     declared that the towns of Zepa and Srebrenica and their surroundings

Page 17086

 1     should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should

 2     be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act."

 3             Now, does this say that the Security Council dictated what

 4     Srebrenica and Zepa should look like?

 5        A.   What it says is, and again it is a perfect illustration of the

 6     problem, that it declares them to be safe areas and to be treated by all

 7     parties as such.  What it doesn't say is who is going to enforce this

 8     decision if one of the parties does not comply and how that enforcement

 9     will take place.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at section 1 of this agreement.  It says:

11             "To demilitarise the areas of Srebrenica and Zepa.

12             "The demilitarised areas will include the area within the current

13     lines of conflict."

14             Following consultations:

15             "The precise boundaries will be marked by the UNPROFOR commander,

16     and the demilitarised zone shall be marked on the ground by UNPROFOR by

17     means of boards on which it is stated in English, Serbian and Bosnian,

18     written in Cyrillic and Latin, as follows:

19             "Demilitarised zone."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page of this

21     document.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   "Any military operation is strictly forbidden (Article 60,

24     protocol 1, additional to the Geneva Conventions)."

25             Does this say clearly who is to designate the boundaries of the

Page 17087

 1     demilitarised area on the ground?

 2        A.   The document says -- at least the English language one says it

 3     clearly, and I'm hoping this isn't an issue with translation, but it

 4     specifically notes that:

 5             "The precise boundaries will be marked by the UNPROFOR commander

 6     on the ground after consultations."

 7             I assume in this context the consultations they are talking about

 8     are between the Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian Serb sides.  And then:

 9             "At a later stage the contracting parties can agree, verbally or

10     in writing, to enlarge the demilitarised zone."

11             As you are aware, all the way through to the beginning of the

12     military operation in July 1995, both the Bosnian Muslim side and the

13     Bosnian Serb side disagreed as to what the demarcated boundaries of the

14     enclave would be.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

16             Would you please look at paragraph 3, with the leave of the

17     Trial Chamber, or perhaps we should do it after the break.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We should indeed do that after the break.  We

19     must have the second break now and we will resume quarter past 6.00.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.

22                           [The witness takes the stand]

23                           --- On resuming at 6.17 p.m.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 17088

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Butler, we left off dealing with Article 3, which reads:

 3             "Every military or paramilitary unit will have either to withdraw

 4     from the demilitarised zone or submit/hand-over their weapons.

 5     Ammunition, mines, explosives, and combat supplies in the demilitarised

 6     zones will be handed over/submitted to UNPROFOR.  After

 7     submission/hand-over of all weapons, ammunition, mines, and combat

 8     supplies in the demilitarised zones, the contracting parties will declare

 9     that the demilitarisation is complete.  Submitting/hand-over will be

10     completed in Srebrenica by the 10th of May and in Zepa by the 12th of

11     May.  Submitting/hand-over of weapons will be observed by a team of

12     officers from both sides together with UNPROFOR officers who will arrange

13     the places where the hand-over will be done."

14             And one more line from Article 4:

15             "UNPROFOR shall take the handed over/submitted weapons into

16     custody."  And ammunition.

17             This is my question:  Article 4, does it not define the UNPROFOR

18     mandate in very precise terms in relation to the demilitarised zone?

19     Thank you.

20        A.   The answer to your question is that that particular question

21     itself raises the entire crux of the issue related to the UN forces in

22     Srebrenica and this particular cease-fire agreement.  The Bosnian Serb

23     side believed that these particular -- Article 3 and Article 4 gave the

24     United Nations forces in Srebrenica the mandate and mission to enforce

25     the cease-fire.  The broader United Nations didn't agree with that in

Page 17089

 1     that context.  Their view was that the contracting parties would turnover

 2     the weapons, the United Nations would monitor those weapons' containment

 3     areas, but they did not view it as their role to take the next step,

 4     which was to enforce compliance with this agreement in particular cases

 5     where particularly the Bosnian Muslims did not turnover all their

 6     weapons.

 7        Q.   Thank you for this interpretation, Mr. Butler.  Based on the

 8     provisions of the agreement, were they supposed to turnover all of their

 9     weapons to UNPROFOR?  Thank you.

10        A.   Yes, sir.  Article 3 is very specific.  It specifically says:

11     "All weapons, ammunition, and mines."

12        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now look at Article 5:

13             "UNPROFOR shall control the demilitarised zone.

14             "To be able to implement this, an UNPROFOR unit and United

15     Nations Military Observers with sufficient strength to control the area

16     shall be present in the demilitarised zone.  Until the contracting

17     parties agree otherwise, the UNPROFOR strength shall be of at least a

18     company group with command and supplying elements in each demilitarised

19     zone.

20             "In order to be able to resupply and rotate the unit, UNPROFOR

21     shall have freedom of movement to and from the demilitarised zone."

22             This is my question:  In view of Article 5, was UNPROFOR supposed

23     to furnish the forces which would make sure that the area is

24     demilitarised and which would provide units of a company level and that

25     they would have their companies complete with the respective commands?

Page 17090

 1     Thank you.

 2        A.   Article 5 specifies the minimum size will be a company.  And, in

 3     fact, the force that was initially in Srebrenica was a Canadian infantry

 4     company.  Later, it was increased to a battalion-level-sized force, a

 5     larger force because all the parties, for the most part, didn't think

 6     that a mere company could control the size of the area.  So Article 5 did

 7     set the framework for the size of the UN force that was believed to be

 8     sufficient to control the area.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Pursuant to the Security Council resolution, was

10     UNPROFOR able to provide sufficient forces for the demilitarised zone or

11     was the situation, in fact, such that they would say that they were

12     unable to control a demilitarised zone?

13        A.   Again, it started as a company level and that was increased later

14     on to a battalion-level force.  Whether or not a battalion, or even as

15     the Dutch a reinforced battalion, had the ability to control effectively

16     an area that big is always going to be a matter of dispute.  That's an

17     awful lot of territory for a battalion to control.  So while the UN's job

18     was to go in there and control that particular area, again, given the

19     ambiguity of what the phrase "control" meant in the context, it was

20     initially believed that a battalion was enough.  In fact, a battalion

21     probably was too little.

22        Q.   Mr. Butler, do the United Nations normally operate on the

23     principle of one soldier to one soldier, one civilian to one civilian, or

24     do they normally assess the situation as to how they would be able to

25     demilitarised an area -- demilitarise an area?  And do they, at that

Page 17091

 1     level, define the strength of the forces that are to demilitarise a zone,

 2     or is that left to those who are, in fact, present on the ground with the

 3     purpose of demilitarising an area?

 4        A.   I think the reality is that, one, there is no United Nations

 5     principle; and two, the cold, hard fact of the situation is that there is

 6     no United Nations army either.  The United Nations is completely

 7     dependent on donor military -- or donor countries to allow their military

 8     forces to be used under a UN mandate.

 9             One of the -- again, referring back to the UN report on this

10     issue, one of the underlying themes that is also part of that report is

11     that even after declaring these various areas safe areas, there was a

12     distinct reluctance by a number of countries that had loaned forces to

13     the United Nations for the mission in Bosnia to actually then agree that

14     their military units can be used inside of these enclaves.  It was seen

15     as being particularly -- having some particular risk to it.  So as a

16     result, there was a bit of an a shuffle and a serious amount of

17     diplomatic work involved at the UN trying to come up with the adequate

18     number of forces for the safe areas.

19             Again, if I recall the UN report correctly, the UN at some point

20     in time came up with a number of how many military forces it thought it

21     needed to adequately enforce the safe areas.  And again, if I recall

22     correctly, the forces that donor countries made available were

23     significantly less than what the UN thought it needed.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  If the party which designates an area

25     demilitarised is going about that business, is it not the obligation of

Page 17092

 1     the United Nations to state whether they are able to do that or not?

 2     Thank you.

 3        A.   One would think that if you're going to make that obligation that

 4     you're going to be able to back up that obligation.  In fact, again,

 5     going to the situation with Srebrenica, the UN Security Council was

 6     reacting to events that had already occurred on the ground with the

 7     establishment of the Srebrenica safe area.  It wasn't coming up with its

 8     own plan independently.  So to some degree, had it to do themselves, the

 9     United Nations Security Council may never have come up with this whole

10     safe area idea, but they were reacting to a decision on the ground

11     already made by General Morillon.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at D193 again, page 9.

14     That's the statement by General Smith, who was UNPROFOR commander at the

15     time.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   At page 9, paragraph 2, he states as follows -- that's page 8 in

18     English, the penultimate paragraph.  I quote:

19             "On the 7th of March, upon my return, I met up with Mladic."

20             Rather than me reading the whole paragraph, let me just read the

21     important line:

22             "The third most important issue that was discussed was the

23     demilitarisation of the safe areas of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa.  On

24     the issue of Srebrenica, Mladic asked that I should order the withdrawal

25     of all the UNPROFOR forces from the confrontation line south-east of

Page 17093

 1     Zepa.  He maintained that the movement of observer missions of UNPROFOR

 2     in this area made it possible for the Bosnians to occupy the area and a

 3     very important road that was under the control of the Serbs.  I refused

 4     to do so and explained that it was my duty to observe the confrontation

 5     line."

 6             This is my question:  If the side which conferred upon Srebrenica

 7     the status of demilitarised area, if it's asking to be withdrawn because

 8     its unable to control the area, under the Geneva Conventions, is the

 9     UNPROFOR commander able to say simply that he is unable to do so or

10     should he report that back to the authority that empowered him to be

11     there to begin with?

12        A.   Well, with respect, I am not sure what, if anything, the

13     Geneva Conventions have to do with that.  What I would say - and again,

14     not wanting to put words in General Smith's mouth - the fact is that

15     General Smith was the UN commander on the ground and would not make -- or

16     not make a commitment, but would not basically lay out what his position

17     were in that regard unless he believed that it was the position of his

18     superiors and that they would support his decision on this.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Butler, I said in keeping with the Geneva

20     Conventions, because each and every Geneva Convention envisages the

21     status of a demilitarised zone which can be conferred upon a given area.

22     You were able to see here a reference to Article 60 of the

23     Geneva Conventions in that very agreement we were reading.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D1005.  That's

25     Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention.  1D1005, thank you.  Article 60.  At

Page 17094

 1     page 20 in English and 26 in Serbian.  Thank you.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I agree with the context of -- that it mentions the

 3     Geneva Conventions.  Where I take issue is the fact that while those

 4     particular articles will deal with what are -- what is a safe area and

 5     how it's established, I mean, the same thing applies.  I mean, the

 6     Geneva Conventions don't have a particular enforcement mechanism.  For

 7     these provisions to work, it requires the willingness of both parties to

 8     agree to follow the concepts.

 9             So whether or not General Smith believes that his forces there

10     are enforcing a cease-fire or keeping warring parties apart, and the

11     decisions that General Smith takes in that regard are not enforceable by

12     the Geneva Conventions is the point that I'm trying to make.  And that's

13     why I say I don't see how one has to do with the other.  In

14     General Smith's decisions as to where he's going to maintain forces in an

15     effort to try and comply with the cease-fire agreement is dictated by

16     what his superiors in the United Nations are telling him, not by the

17     Geneva Conventions.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  You've started answering before I put my question to

20     you.

21             Let's now look at item 1 of Article 60:

22             "It is prohibited for the parties to the conflict to extend their

23     military operations to zones on which they have conferred by agreement

24     the status of demilitarised zone if such extension is contrary to the

25     terms of this agreement."

Page 17095

 1             This is my question:  Was it contrary to the provisions of the

 2     agreement for the Muslims from the demilitarised zones to carry out

 3     sabotage actions within Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Again, not being an international law expert but just being a

 5     military analyst, I mean the common-sense answer is that if you were

 6     conducting military operations out of a demilitarised area, it is no

 7     longer demilitarised, or at least the real estate that you are conducting

 8     your operations off of.  You open yourself up to military attack or

 9     retaliation in that effect by your armed enemy.

10             Now, whether or not conducting one or three or five military

11     attacks out of the safe area invalidates an entire safe area is a

12     question I am not capable of answering.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Let's look at paragraph 7 of this same article, which continues

16     on the following page.  I am quoting item 7 of Article 60:

17             "If one of the parties to the conflict commits a material breach

18     of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other party shall be released

19     from its obligations under the agreement conferring upon the zone the

20     status of demilitarised zone.  In such an eventuality, the zone allows

21     its status but shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the

22     other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of international

23     law applicable in armed conflict."

24             This is my question:  If the Muslim side violated the provisions

25     of the agreement, would the Serb side then be released from its

Page 17096

 1     obligation arising from the agreement?  Thank you.

 2        A.   In that context I believe that they would, and certainly within

 3     the framework of my own analysis, I've always conceded the fact that the

 4     28th Infantry Division was never disarmed and that it was an armed entity

 5     and, therefore, was subject to attack by the Army of Republika Srpska.  I

 6     mean, the division itself represents a legitimate military target.  So I

 7     don't believe we're in disagreement on that issue.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And just to try to make clear, nor is the

11     Prosecution in disagreement, as for many years now that's been our

12     position.  Just to remind the general on that particular point.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Prosecution has repeated this position quite

14     often.

15             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             In that case let's turn to page 9 of the statement D193, which is

18     General Smith's statement.  Page 9 in Serbian, paragraph 4.  Thank you.

19     That's page 9, paragraph 2 in English.  Thank you, Aleksandar.

20             Thank you.  We can see it.  In the paragraph above, which we

21     quoted a moment ago, Mladic referred to the need to demilitarise the zone

22     and stated what boundaries they should be reduced to.

23             And now paragraph 4 in Serbian and 2 in English.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   I am quoting Mladic's -- or, rather, Smith's words:

Page 17097

 1             "Mladic said that his concerns about Bosnian Army's intentions

 2     had led him to restrict the amount of food, medicine, and fuel for the

 3     enclaves and claimed that the United Nations was supplying the

 4     Bosnian Army.  I replied that any attack on the UN safe areas would be

 5     condemned by the international community ..."

 6             This is my question:  Is it the case that here Mr. Smith

 7     responded to Mladic's statement or in fact retorted by referring to the

 8     possibility of threat applied by the United Nations?  Thank you.

 9        A.   Well, again, not wanting to put words in General Smith's mouth, I

10     mean, what General Smith was -- at least in his own statement was saying

11     back to General Mladic was that any attack on the UN safe areas would be

12     condemned by the international community and would risk a response by

13     NATO air power against the Bosnian Serbs.  Whether that qualified as an

14     abstract laying out of the consequences or whether it's a retort with

15     nothing behind it is something you would have to ask General Smith.

16             I would say that when you look at what happened in June and July,

17     certainly in Sarajevo and to a far lesser degree in Srebrenica, NATO air

18     power was employed.  So General Smith was at least accurately laying out

19     that he had a capability to deal, or at least to inflict, those types of

20     consequences if he believed the safe areas were violated.

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  As you can see, General Mladic cautioned

22     about the Muslims violating the agreement, and Smith said that they would

23     be bombed if they attack.  Although, this is permitted for a party

24     conferring upon an area the status of a demilitarised zone under

25     Article 6 of Protocol 1.

Page 17098

 1             This is my question:  Did, by acting this way, General Smith

 2     comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions or did he in fact

 3     side with the Muslims who were mounting attacks out of the demilitarised

 4     zone, an issue that we were discussing earlier today?  Thank you.

 5        A.   Again, I can't tell you whether or not General Smith was or was

 6     not in compliance with the conventions.  What I can say is that the

 7     Bosnia Serb military leadership and political leadership at the time

 8     believed, particularly with respect to the enclaves, that UNPROFOR was

 9     biased towards the Bosnian Muslims in them and that this would be a

10     reflection of that.  That was a widely-held belief by many of the senior

11     leadership of the VRS, that, either directly or indirectly, the

12     United Nations forces were helping the Bosnian Muslim military forces in

13     the enclaves and in and around the Sarajevo safe area.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Let's see what the position of the political

15     leadership of Republika Srpska was in respect of the enclaves and what

16     Mr. Karadzic had to say.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 11, paragraph 4

18     in Serbian, which is page 11, paragraph 1 in English.  Thank you,

19     Aleksandar.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   I am reading from the third line of the paragraph.

22             "Karadzic said that the VRS would not be respecting the safe

23     areas and claimed that they were unlawful under international law.  He

24     also claimed that the BH Army was attacking them on a regular basis out

25     of Srebrenica and that the VRS was -- had sustained casualties."

Page 17099

 1             Is it not the case that here both the political and military

 2     leadership told General Smith that the areas were not demilitarised, that

 3     they were used for mounting attacks against the party which conferred

 4     upon them the status of demilitarised zones?

 5        A.   I agree with the fact that both General -- I'm sorry,

 6     President Karadzic and General Mladic were both consistent in their

 7     message back to General Smith that their view was because of the fact

 8     that the zones were not demilitarised, that they believed that they had

 9     the ability to militarily attack into them.  So both President Karadzic

10     and General Mladic delivered a very consistent message to General Smith

11     here.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Did they also send a message that they

13     would restrict the supplies to the enclaves, not only the message that

14     they were under attack?

15        A.   Again, as evidenced by the earlier paragraph that we read,

16     General Mladic made it clear that he was going to restrict humanitarian

17     supplies going in to the enclaves because it was his belief that those

18     humanitarian supplies were being used for military purposes.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look, while we still have time, at page 12 of

20     this statement by Smith, paragraph 2, the last three sentences.  It's

21     page 11 in English, towards the bottom of the page.  It says:

22             "He made a series of unrealistic demands such as the lifting of

23     sanctions in return for an extension of the cessation of hostilities

24     agreement.  I raised the issue of direct attacks on UNPROFOR and the

25     denial of supplies to the UNPROFOR troops in the enclaves.  Karadzic

Page 17100

 1     denied responsibility for attacks on UNPROFOR personnel, but accepted

 2     that there had been mistakes.  He then made the point that he could not

 3     respect United Nations safe areas, claiming them to be illegal in

 4     international law.

 5             "On the issue of fuel, General Gvero said that fuel was to be

 6     denied to UN troops in the enclaves because he had evidence that in

 7     particular the UN troops in Srebrenica were supplying the Bosnian Army

 8     with fuel.  Gvero also said that he had intelligence that UNPROFOR had

 9     adequate reserves of fuel."

10             At these meetings also with the political leadership, was it

11     announced to General Smith that supplies to the UNPROFOR in the enclaves

12     must be limited because they were making them available to Bosnian Muslim

13     army?

14        A.   Again, given the fact that this is General Smith's statement, he

15     is certainly coming away with that message.  So I take it from notes and

16     his recollections of the meetings that he was very clear in the context

17     of who was saying what and what the basis for those discussions were.  In

18     this particular case, he makes it clear that President Karadzic is citing

19     General Gvero and information that he has about fuel being diverting to

20     the Bosnian Army.

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at page 13, if you

23     please, paragraph 3 in Serbian.  And that's page 12 in English, the last

24     paragraph.  Thank you, Aleksandar.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17101

 1        Q.   I quote the beginning of that paragraph:

 2             "On the 9th of May, I had a further private meeting with

 3     Dr. Karadzic.  The discussions covered the recent Bosnian Serb army

 4     attacks on Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serb sanctions on the UN contingents

 5     in the eastern enclaves."

 6             And then he says:

 7             "I explained why I had recommended NATO air-strikes," et cetera.

 8             In this paragraph 2, isn't it the case that president of

 9     Republika Srpska announces and informs General Smith that he had imposed

10     sanctions on the UN troops in the enclaves -- in the eastern enclaves?

11        A.   Maybe it's just a language issue.  I take this that -- not

12     necessarily Dr. Karadzic making a declaration that he has made formal

13     sanctions against the UN contingents, but General Smith's discussion

14     which is, you know, his understanding of basically why that he considers

15     the -- that there are to be Bosnian Serb sanctions on the UN contingent.

16     Now, I guess taking this in line with the other exhibits that we've

17     discussed during the Prosecution case where as a matter of policy the

18     Main Staff was doing these types of things, I guess at the pinnacle of

19     that you're correct in saying that President Karadzic ultimately made

20     this decision.  But, I mean, when I read this paragraph in isolation,

21     that meaning doesn't come out.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I am forced to quote again his exact words.  He says:

23             "The discussions covered the recent BSA attacks in Sarajevo and

24     the Bosnian Serb sanctions on the UN contingents in the eastern

25     enclaves."

Page 17102

 1             He doesn't say the army imposed sanctions.  He says

 2     Bosnian Serbs.  And he discussed these two problems on the 9th May with

 3     President Karadzic, didn't he?

 4        A.   Yes, sir, the issues came up on the 9th of May.  The exact

 5     phrase, again, from -- this isn't General Smith quoting

 6     President Karadzic.  This is General Smith's statement where he says:

 7             "The discussions covered the recent attacks on Sarajevo and the

 8     Bosnian Serb sanctions on the UN contingents."

 9             Now, I don't know whether that's an exact quote from

10     President Karadzic or not.  I did not follow General Smith's testimony.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we have to come to an end for today.

12     It's 7.00.  We have to adjourn and we will resume tomorrow morning at

13     9.00 in this courtroom.  We adjourn.

14                           [The witness stands down]

15                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

16                           7.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the

17                           23rd day of August, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.