Page 17257
1 Thursday, 25 August 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody.
6 The witness should be brought in, please.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Butler. Welcome back again. I
9 know it's boring, but I have to remind you again that you have to tell
10 the truth. Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.
11 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We left
13 off yesterday just as we were about to show a video-clip. May there be
14 peace in this house and may God's will be done in these proceedings
15 today.
16 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]
18 Q. [Interpretation] and I wish a comfortable stay and a pleasant
19 stay to Mr. Butler here amongst us here in the courtroom.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show the second video
21 clip, namely P2125. The footage has to do with the abuse of convoys in
22 Ilidza. It is 1D217.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] At the Ilidza check-point the
25 Serbian army discovered 24.500 bullets in United Nations trucks
Page 17258
1 authorised to transport humanitarian aid to Muslims in Hrasnica.
2 "A convoy transporting humanitarian aid from the airport to
3 Butmir in Hrasnica was stopped today in Ilidza. Following a routine
4 check by the Ilidza military police members, it was discovered that the
5 container with flour had a false bottom with steel boxes. This was a
6 good enough reason to question the regularity of the convoy.
7 "Members of the French Battalion who were escorting the convoy
8 were not able to tell us what was in the bunkers beneath the containers.
9 "The convoy was held up, members of UNPROFOR, the UNHCR and
10 police were called and, in their presence the check was carried out. The
11 containers were off-loaded from the trucks, and with the help of a crane,
12 the upper part of the containers were detached from the platform to which
13 they were attached.
14 "Journalist: Mr. Popovic, the check is now complete, tell us
15 what have you discovered in the trucks transporting humanitarian aid to
16 Hrasnica.
17 "Mr. Popovic: Found in the trucks which left for Hrasnica this
18 morning at 0945 hours were 5.000 rounds of 12.7 ammunition and 19.540
19 rounds of 7.9 sniper ammunition. They were discovered, as you could see
20 for yourself, in the false bottom under the containers. This is the
21 second time that we have found aid for the Muslim forces' side, in
22 weapons and ammunition in the humanitarian aid in the area of
23 responsibility of the Ilidza Brigade.
24 "Journalist: Did you see whose ammunition it is? Do you know
25 where is it from?
Page 17259
1 "Mr. Popovic: All the ammunition was produced in Konjic and was
2 transported by air to the Sarajevo airport and then by land. On this
3 occasion, it was being transported and escorted by the French forces and
4 this is the quantity of ammunition that was discovered.
5 "We asked for official information from the gentleman from the
6 UN, but we got none because, as they explained to us, they are not
7 authorised to give information.
8 "In an informal conversation with an UNHCR representative we were
9 told that they have nothing to do with the trucks or containers and that
10 they were responsible solely for the load being transported in the
11 containers and they are not interested in what is under the containers.
12 "The representatives of the Foreign Legion excused themselves by
13 saying that they only escorted the convoy and the UN police claimed that
14 they would examine the case and inform us of the results as soon as
15 possible.
16 "Right now, we do not yet know who loaded the trucks at the
17 airport and where the ammunition was loaded. We do not know what is
18 happening with the checks at the airport and how many such convoys have
19 gone past. But one thing is certain and that is that this is the
20 umpteenth time that we see UNPROFOR is transporting and distributing
21 weapons and ammunition to the Muslims under the guys of humanitarian
22 aid."
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just one clarification. You gave us the number
Page 17260
1 of this video. It is P -- one moment. P2125, and then you added another
2 number, 1D217. Is that the same video -- is it the 65 ter number of the
3 same video or is it the transcript?
4 Mr. Gajic.
5 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, 1D217 is merely the
6 transcript of the video. When uploading the surrogate sheet for the
7 video footage, we saw the OTP omitted to upload the transcript as well.
8 We have had it from before and that is the number it was given.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That clarifies the situation. Thank you very
10 much.
11 Mr. Tolimir.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now show D281 in
13 e-court, please.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In this case, I would like to ask you if you are
15 tendering the transcript of the video we have seen?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. With
17 your leave, yes, we tender these into evidence.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
19 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to
20 suggest that the transcripts be assigned the corresponding P number of
21 the footage and then, perhaps, with the addition of an A at the end so as
22 to avoid a situation where the video-clip itself would bear an assigned
23 number and its corresponding transcript a different number. Or perhaps
24 we should merely ask the Prosecution that the OTP should, in addition to
25 the surrogate sheet, also upload the transcript of the video footage.
Page 17261
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe.
3 JUDGE NYAMBE: I was just wondering if it's possible for the
4 Defence to give the date of the incident that has been shown on
5 video-clip, unless it would become apparent subsequently?
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge Nyambe. We will
8 do our best to attach a date to it, but we do have original documents
9 indicating when it happened.
10 Can we have --
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter isn't sure if it's D or P78.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This has to do with yesterday's
13 video-clip.
14 Q. The date is the command of the 1st Light Infantry Brigade, the
15 8th of June, 1995. This command reports to the Drina Corps the incident
16 that we just discussed.
17 Under 3 --
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, let me interrupt you for a moment
19 before you go ahead. Is it D78 or P78?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D78.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. And after conferring with
22 Mr. Registrar, the transcript of the last video will be attached to P2125
23 so that we have only one document with this number. That means it's not
24 a separate document but attached to the video itself.
25 Now, you may go ahead, Mr. Tolimir.
Page 17262
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. At the Rogatica check-point, the Ukrainian convoy comprising
3 three vehicles went past.
4 "A UNHCR convoy from Karakaj to Zepa, which arrived at the
5 check-point yesterday, is still in Rogatica because on the earlier day a
6 certain amount of ammunition was found in the convoy."
7 So the date is the 7th of June, 1995. That is the date which is
8 the date of the incident of yesterday's video footage. As for today's
9 footage, my legal assistant will let you know the exact date it has been
10 mentioned within this news report broadcast on TV.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So can we please bear in mind that
12 D78 is the document underpinning the video footage of yesterday in terms
13 of the date.
14 We now have a document of an attempt to prevent the smuggling of
15 fuel in convoys. It's a document that relates to the UNHCR, UNPROFOR,
16 and international organisations.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, good morning, and I apologise but it is not
19 clear to us if the video P2145 or these -- are both these transcripts
20 from that same video or different? 1D217 is one transcript and 1D234 is
21 the other transcript. Are they both from video P2145? That's a little
22 unclear.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic. Mr. Gajic?
24 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as for P2145, the
25 transcript is 1D217. This is -- as for yesterday's video, P2126, the
Page 17263
1 transcript of that video-clip is 1D234.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I don't know if that is a slip of the tongue.
3 Mr. McCloskey and you, you mentioned P2145. I thought we have seen
4 P2125. Please clarify that.
5 Mr. Gajic, you should not always follow Mr. McCloskey.
6 Mr. Gajic.
7 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I misread it, perhaps.
8 No. Video is P12 --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Gajic repeat the number.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We are going to have an additional problem.
11 Please repeat the number correctly.
12 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Let me repeat it all. The video
13 footage P2125 has the corresponding transcript 1D217.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That's correct.
15 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Now, video P2126 has the
16 corresponding transcript 1D234.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I am not sure if that was already decided
18 yesterday, but the latter transcript will be attached to P2126. I hope
19 that clarifies the situation.
20 Mr. McCloskey.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, that all fits. Ms. Stewart and Mr. Gajic
22 are all on the right page and we all made a few little mistakes but
23 that's now just right.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That was a really difficult exercise.
25 Mr. Tolimir, please continue, and bear in mind that we have
Page 17264
1 Mr. Butler here to answer questions.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we show D281, a
5 document regarding the smuggling of fuel in the UNPROFOR and UNHCR
6 vehicles. Thank you. We have the document before us.
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
8 Q. It's issued by the command of the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade,
9 dated the 12th of May, 1995, signed by commander Colonel Svetozar Andric.
10 If we scroll down we will see it, Svetozar Andric. In paragraph 1 he
11 writes:
12 "We have received information that members of the UNPROFOR,
13 UNHCR, and other international organisations have been transporting fuel
14 illegally to Muslims in the enclaves of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and
15 Srebrenica.
16 "They smuggle fuel in double or large tanks on combat and
17 noncombat vehicles which they empty in the enclaves, leaving just the
18 quantity needed for their return journey from the enclaves to the
19 territory of the FRY or Republika Srpska."
20 And his order is:
21 "Train and prepare personnel at the check-point in the area of
22 Crni Vrh," that's his area of responsibility, "with a view to
23 international representatives of UNHCR, UNPROFOR and others past these
24 checkpoints."
25 Under 2:
Page 17265
1 "Check combat and noncombat vehicles thoroughly in order to
2 measure accurately the quantities of fuel in their double and basic tanks
3 and other secret storage places."
4 I will not be reading through the rest.
5 Mr. Butler, did you read any document either by the UNHCR or the
6 VRS or do you have any other knowledge about fuel being smuggled in
7 hidden storage tanks or double storage tanks? Thank you.
8 A. Yes, sir, good morning. I am generally aware from my research
9 that the VRS believed that fuel was being smuggled in in both ways that
10 are depicted in this particular report. One of them was that fuel was
11 being potentially smuggled in through hidden or secret tanks on various
12 vehicles. The second was a practice where vehicles would be travelling
13 to the enclaves with full fuel tanks in excess of what they might be
14 expected to actually consume in a one-day trip back and forth to the
15 enclaves, whichever enclave they were going to, and then in that enclave
16 excess amounts of fuel would be drained out.
17 So that was a concern that the VRS had, and again it's amply
18 illustrated in this particular document.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Having viewed the two video-clips
20 concerning the smuggling in Rogatica and Ilidza, can you tell me if the
21 activities conducted by the UNHCR and UNPROFOR in smuggling ammunition,
22 could they have remained unknown to the UNPROFOR since there was media
23 coverage of it at the time and in view of the fact that protest letters
24 were written as well?
25 A. I would have to - again, I have not read UN reporting related to
Page 17266
1 this issue - but I would have to assume that given the media coverage,
2 and I am aware that the UN monitored the media reporting from the various
3 parties, as well as complaints coming from the VRS, again I have to
4 assume that the leadership of the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo was given notice
5 of these allegations as well as provided proof by the VRS that such
6 violations were occurring.
7 Q. Please, if this was the case, tell us: Did you come across any
8 material dealing with investigations in the UNPROFOR and UNHCR because of
9 the smuggling of weapons and fuel?
10 A. I did not come across that material, but in fairness I didn't
11 look for it. It may well be out there as part of the broader body of
12 documents and information, but since that was not a particular focus of
13 my research work with respect to Srebrenica, like I said, if I came
14 across it it didn't register.
15 Q. Thank you. If both the VRS and you are ignorant of any measures
16 that may have been taken against perpetrators of these activities, is it
17 only justifiable for the VRS to carry out thorough checks in order to
18 look for possible ammunition in goods such as flour, et cetera?
19 A. Well, notwithstanding my particular ignorance on this issue, and
20 as I have said, I believe a number of days, certainly by January of 1995
21 the VRS believed it had more than adequate cause to institute an
22 inspections regime to ensure that these type of supplies, be it
23 ammunition, be it extra fuel, was not going into the enclaves where it
24 would be used for military purposes. And, in fact, they did that.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Several days ago, you referred to
Page 17267
1 directives 7 and 7(1) and I said that we would be discussing those later.
2 You specifically quoted the portion of the directive as to what the
3 prospects for future life in Srebrenica were, and this was mentioned in
4 Directive 7 but not in Directive 7(1).
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at
6 Directive 7, P1214, page 15 in Serbian and 10 in English.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Mindua has a question.
8 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Sir, while we wait for the next
9 document to appear, I would like to come back on document P2125. This is
10 the video footage that we have seen, and it deals with the smuggling of
11 ammunition and weapons that were found in a container of the HCR, of the
12 UNHCR, and in fact, I would like to mention or talk about all the other
13 ammunition and weapons that had been discovered in other convoys.
14 As far as you are concerned, and as far as you know, were
15 investigations launched by the United Nations or by the local police in
16 order to establish who was responsible for these types of acts? Were
17 these individual actions from the drivers or the people who were
18 transporting the goods? Or do you think that it might have been a
19 deliberate action from the UNHCR or from other international
20 organisations who were present on the ground? Because when we see
21 document P2125, P2125, as I have said, and when we see that there was a
22 false bottom in the container, one could think that it might not just be
23 one driver or one person who was trying to hide these things. It might
24 not be just one driver who manufactured this double-deck or false bottom.
25 So I think that it might be important in order to understand the
Page 17268
1 reaction of the of the VRS. Thank you.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. As evidenced and as you indicated in
3 your question, and when one goes back to, I believe, yesterday morning
4 when we were looking at a number of documents produced by General Tolimir
5 relating to the situation in the smuggling of fuel and munitions into the
6 Bihac enclave, it is clear that as a matter of policy within the Bosnian
7 Muslim military forces and their political organs that there was an
8 organised campaign in order to use whatever means necessary - and in this
9 case it was through an international organisation - what they needed to
10 do in order to smuggle weapons, smuggle ammunition, and other military
11 supplies, to isolated military forces, many of whom can only be accessed
12 by the United Nations because of their presence in safe areas in or other
13 surrounded areas.
14 Obviously when one looks at those documents relating to Bihac,
15 the reports make it clear that the UNHCR is not a witting partner, they
16 don't know that they are being used for this purpose, although certainly
17 some individuals within the UNHCR organisation at some level have to be
18 complicit in this, but certainly the organisation does not seem to be
19 aware of it.
20 I assume the UN did investigations when these issues were brought
21 to their attention, but I am not aware of the details of them. So, I
22 mean, we are back to the similar situation, whether organizationally the
23 United Nations was complicit in the efforts to bring ammunition or
24 whether, just like in any other organisation, elements within the
25 organisation were corrupted by the various parties for their various
Page 17269
1 reasons, and coerced or encouraged or bribed to take part in these
2 smuggling activities. But without having a detailed knowledge of the
3 investigations and any results received, I don't know that I can answer
4 the question any further.
5 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You have,
6 indeed, answered my question.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe.
8 JUDGE NYAMBE: I just want a bit of clarification on your part of
9 your answer in line 14, where you say:
10 "The UNHCR is not a witting partner."
11 Can you elaborate on that? Thank you.
12 THE WITNESS: My -- the information that I have and that I
13 believe is that, as an entire organisation, the UNHCR in Bosnia was not a
14 voluntary participant in a process which would smuggle ammunition to
15 various warring parties. It obviously would fly directly against their
16 mandated charter. However, clearly within the UNHCR organisation in
17 Bosnia as well as in other parts that were Serbian Bosnia, individual
18 members or groups of members had been bribed or otherwise coopted by ABiH
19 military or civilian bodies into this effort for whatever reason they
20 were doing it. I suspect the short answer is it was profitable.
21 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you, Mr. Butler, for your answer.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Butler, we are now looking at Directive 7. The relevant page
Page 17270
1 with information about the Drina Corps. Could we scroll down to see the
2 Drina Corps in English? Thank you. It says:
3 "With the daily planned combat operations, create an unbearable
4 situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life
5 for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
6 I'm sorry, I started reading before saying that this is in line 5
7 from the top through line 9. So if you all found it ...
8 My question is: As you have studied this thoroughly, is the same
9 assignment given in Directive 7(1)?
10 A. I believe the language in Directive 7(1) does not quote this
11 passage verbatim, it is a more technical accounting or recounting of the
12 language.
13 Q. Thank you. In that case let's look first at the heading of this
14 Directive 7(1) to see that it's a document from the Supreme Command.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we see the last
16 page of this directive. Last page says Dr. Radovan Karadzic.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: I heard that this was referred to as
19 Directive 7(1) and of course this is Directive 7. That's, of course, an
20 important distinction.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed we have now Directive 7. This is P214 on
22 the screen.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now play
24 Directive 7(1) as well. That's P2196, to compare both paragraphs for the
25 headings and the signatures.
Page 17271
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone, your microphone.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There must be a mistake in the
3 displaying of Directive 7(1).
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Is it just a technical mistake, a technical error in
6 Directive 7(1)? Is there a single word of creating unbearable conditions
7 like in Directive 7?
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think you should check the number
9 of the document you are asking for.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We've just checked. I
11 called the wrong number. P119 should be Directive 7(1). 1199. We now
12 see the Serbian version. We see that it's Directive 7(1), issued on 31st
13 March, 1995. That's page 1.
14 Q. And we should now look at paragraph 3, the decision, or perhaps
15 paragraph 4. No, it's paragraph 3 -- sorry, 5.3, both in Serbian and in
16 English. Page 5. Paragraph 5.3. Here we see paragraph 5.3. It reads:
17 "The Drina Corps: Prevent an enemy breakthrough along selected
18 operative tactical axes with persistent defence and active combat actions
19 on the north-west part of the front and around the enclaves and tie down
20 as many enemy troops possible through diversionary -- through sabotage
21 actions and operative tactical camouflage measures.
22 "In co-operation with the Eastern Bosnian Corps, complete tasks
23 from Operation Spreca 95 as soon as possible and break through in the
24 first phase of the operation to the Vis-Kalesija line, then regroup
25 forces and in the second and third phases of the operation in
Page 17272
1 co-operation with forces of the Eastern Bosnian Corps, the
2 1st Krajina Corps, the air force, and air defence, by an appropriate
3 manoeuvre, infiltrating strong groups into the enemy rear, and
4 introducing strong armoured mechanised forces, execute an attack in the
5 general direction of Kalesija-Dubrava-Tuzla, reaching as soon as possible
6 the Serici village-Zivinice-Jasicak-Ravno hill line, thereby cutting off
7 the forces of the 2nd Corps of the so-called BH army south of that line.
8 Support from the air force and PVO."
9 Is this a technical error --
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please slow down while reading. The court
11 reporter can't follow at the same speed. Now your question, please.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Butler, is this a technical error since Zepa and Srebrenica
15 are not mentioned at all? Is there any reference to any attack on Zepa
16 and Srebrenica?
17 A. The first answer is no, I do not believe this is a technical
18 error at all. It is correct. There is not any specific language
19 pertaining to an attack on Zepa and Srebrenica. What this document and
20 this passage represents in more technical military terms than Directive 7
21 is not necessarily what is going to be accomplished from a broader
22 perspective, but in this particular case, in more military terms, how
23 it's going to be accomplished. What are specific articulatable
24 objectives within a military planning and execution process.
25 I would remind both you and the Court that the goal of
Page 17273
1 Directive 7 was a document to be endorsed by the political leadership and
2 the Supreme Command of the Republika Srpska. The members of the
3 Supreme Command were not professional soldiers. They were civilians.
4 Therefore, the language in Directive 7 had to at least be nontechnical so
5 they could understand, in general terms, what the military was seeking to
6 accomplish. Directive 7(1) is the amplification of Directive 7 and it is
7 primarily designed to go to a military audience. As a result, you know,
8 the text pertaining to these activities is for more technical in nature
9 and ultimately would lead to those same results.
10 Q. Mr. Butler, I am asking you: Does Directive 7 and Directive 7(1)
11 make reference to these difficult conditions of life in Srebrenica. Is
12 there any mention of it in Directive 7(1) written by the military
13 leadership?
14 A. No, sir.
15 Q. Thank you. Do Directive 7 or 7(1) mention any direct attack on
16 Zepa and Srebrenica?
17 A. No, sir. My understanding is that the guidance is to create the
18 conditions to make life unbearable within the enclaves. It does not call
19 for a direct military assault of them.
20 Q. Did the Main Staff transmit the message to its units that they
21 should create such conditions through Directive 7(1) which relies on
22 Directive 7? I am repeating the question, did the Main Staff in
23 Directive 7(1), written based on Directive 7, tell the units to create
24 difficult or unbearable conditions in Srebrenica?
25 A. In Directive 7(1) they did not use that language as a specific
Page 17274
1 order to the units. It does not surprise me that they didn't use that
2 language because from a military perspective, there is no direct military
3 act that creates unbearable conditions. You -- in order to achieve that
4 goal, you have to begin to issue a number of orders through a period of
5 time which then are implemented by the military organs, and many of those
6 acts, particularly with respect to the UNPROFOR, were not acts that could
7 be directed by the specific corps. They were acts that had to be
8 accomplished at the Main Staff level.
9 So when you look at the language of 7(1) it specifically gives
10 various corps orders --
11 Q. Excuse me. While we are at this point, I asked you, did the Main
12 Staff order them to create such conditions at all? Because we are
13 dealing now with what the Main Staff did, and then we will discuss
14 perhaps later whether other language was used somewhere else in
15 Directive 7 to indicate that?
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I object to interrupting the witness. He was
18 making a good-faith effort to answer that specific question.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to ask Mr. Butler to continue with
20 his answer. The -- you see the beginning of the sentences:
21 "So when you look at the language of 7(1), it specifically gives
22 various corps orders ..."
23 Please continue.
24 THE WITNESS: It specifically gives the various corps orders to
25 attack on various lines of advance. It gives them specific objectives.
Page 17275
1 It tells them specifically which units to co-ordinate with, and those are
2 proper orders to give to subordinate military units; that is, terminology
3 that they understand and the terminology that military professionals are
4 trained to make supplemental plans for and operate under. The thing
5 going back to the language between Directive 7 and Directive 7(1) is that
6 had the language of Directive 7 - "create a situation that makes life
7 unbearable in the enclaves" - been transmitted to the Drina Corps, as
8 verbatim, the Drina Corps would have had a very broad list of questions
9 back to the Main Staff asking just what that means and what you would
10 want us to do.
11 It's the same scenario, militarily speaking, that arguably the
12 United Nations people in Srebrenica found themselves in. They had a very
13 clear or very broad political mandate, but as military personnel, you
14 know, they did not have clarifying data as exactly what that meant in
15 missions that they were trained and capable of performing. So that's why
16 I go back to the fact that 7(1) is a technical order which lays out a
17 list of concrete military tasks to the Corps in a manner that they can
18 understand and prepare for. Directive 7 is meant for a broader political
19 and military audience that lays out the broader goals in terms that the
20 civilian leadership understands and can endorse.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
22 Mr. Tolimir, your next question.
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
24 Q. My question remains the same: Does Directive 7, yes or no,
25 contain any reference, any word about creating unbearable conditions
Page 17276
1 issued by the Main Staff to subordinate units? I apologise, I meant
2 Directive 7(1). Directive 7 was issued by the Supreme Commander and
3 Directive 7(1) by the Main Staff. Does Directive 7(1), issued by the
4 Main Staff, contain a single word amounting to an on order to attack Zepa
5 and Srebrenica and to create unbearable conditions there? Is there such
6 an assignment given?
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The witness has answered this question already
8 several times, but you may repeat your answer like Mr. Tolimir repeated
9 his question.
10 THE WITNESS: Again, sir, it does not, and it does not for the
11 reasons that I have previously articulated.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I am happy the Trial Chamber understands.
14 Little matter that I don't understand, because I am not the one who will
15 make the judgement. So you say that --
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, it's not a question of
17 understanding. If you look back to page 17, lines 7 through 11, you
18 asked:
19 "Does Directive 7 and Directive 7(1) make reference to these
20 difficult conditions of life in Srebrenica? Is there any mention of it
21 in Directive 7(1) written by the military leadership?"
22 The witness answered clearly:
23 "No, sir."
24 And all the other answers were his explanation why, about his
25 understanding about the purpose of Directive 7(1). I think he has
Page 17277
1 elaborated on that quite a lot. Please continue.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I am
3 glad you have noted this.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. My question is: Does Directive 7, written by the Supreme
6 Commander, order an attack on Zepa and Srebrenica? Yes or no.
7 A. I have to basically first say that I disagree with your assertion
8 that Directive 7 was written by the Supreme Commander. It was not.
9 Directive 7 was, as noted, drafted by General Milovanovic. It was
10 forwarded to the Supreme Command for the approval ratification and
11 signature of the Supreme Commander but that document was written by the
12 Main Staff for the Supreme Commander. So having prefaced that, the next
13 answer is my understanding is that the order to the Drina Corps is to
14 create an unbearable situation. It does not call for a direct attack on
15 Zepa and Srebrenica.
16 Q. If it doesn't call for a direct attack on Zepa and Srebrenica, do
17 Directives 7 and 7(1) constitute a basis for an attack on Zepa and
18 Srebrenica?
19 A. My opinion is that those documents create or call for the
20 creation of the climate necessary to eliminate the enclaves. It does not
21 necessarily mean by physical attack. As I have testified previously, the
22 VRS laid out that what they believe the best case scenario was going to
23 be was that they could create such unbearable conditions that the UN
24 would quit the enclaves and in essence take the civilian population out
25 with them.
Page 17278
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. Could we just at this point
3 ask Mr. Butler to clarify who he believes drafted Directive 7? He --
4 just so that --
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: He said that. And you may deal with that in your
6 re-examination.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I understand.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Butler, concerning assignments from Directive 7, who is
12 responsible? Is it only the signatory or can those who participated in
13 the drafting of the directive also be responsible? I believe that's the
14 answer that Mr. McCloskey wanted.
15 A. Well, first off I can clarify I did misspeak. It's not
16 General Milovanovic, it was General Miletic. Other at that time I
17 believe it was still Colonel Miletic, the chief of operations of the
18 Main Staff. Getting back to your question, obviously, Directive 7 was
19 not drafted by -- it may be physically drafted by a single individual,
20 but Directive 7 is going to be a compilation of the work of all of the
21 organs of the Main Staff as they are the technical experts for the
22 military. So it would be expected that for operational issues it would
23 be then the chief of operations; for issues pertaining to intelligence
24 and security, it would be assistant commander for intelligence and
25 security; for logistics, it would be the assistant commander for
Page 17279
1 logistics. So each various body of the Main Staff would have significant
2 input into that document as they represented the military's technical
3 experts.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let me ask you again: We are in court,
5 would every individual who placed as much as a comma in that directive be
6 held accountable or responsible before a court of law, or would it be the
7 person who authored the document?
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think, Mr. Tolimir, this has to be answered and
9 decided at the end of this trial by the Chamber. It's not for the
10 witness to decide about personal responsibility, criminal responsibility
11 for certain actions related to the indictment.
12 Please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
14 thought that we could hear the opinion of the expert because he did speak
15 of responsibility, too, in his writing, but I do accept what you said. I
16 have no difficulty with it.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Butler, since these are strategic documents, do Directives 7
19 and 7(1) contain strategic objectives of the operations detailed within
20 on a strategic level?
21 A. Yes, sir, they do.
22 Q. Thank you. If that is the case, can you tell us, then, based on
23 the item which starts with words: "I hereby decide ..." What is the
24 decision stated therein, to mount an attack on Srebrenica and Zepa, or to
25 launch several operations, and if so, which and how many?
Page 17280
1 A. I'm sorry, sir, could you refer me to where in the document you
2 are discussing?
3 Q. Let me assist you in answering my question. There is a section
4 which details the decision by the author, and it starts with the words:
5 "I hereby decide ..." Can you comment on that?
6 A. Again if you --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could we have that on the screen, please.
8 THE WITNESS: That's what I am asking, yes.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please give the reference where that can be found
10 in the document.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let's look at paragraph
12 4 of Directive 7.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: P214.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. There we have it: "I have decided to:"
17 This is something else. We are looking to read from directive 7,
18 D1214. Let's see if the commander has decided which strategic operations
19 need to be conducted and whether he assigned them names.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please give a clear reference. What document do
21 you want to have on the screen and which paragraph you are referring to.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We have P1214 on our --
23 D1214 on our screens. And we need item 4 or paragraph 4. We have it.
24 That's page 8 in English. Where it reads: "I hereby decide:"
25 Q. Under 1:
Page 17281
1 "Through a decisive Defence by the 30th Infantry Division,
2 22nd Infantry Brigade," et cetera, "and toward the Republic of Croatia
3 forces, and by putting up a resolute defence in other sectors of the war
4 front coupled with intensive operation on the segment of the front line
5 within the areas of responsibilities of other corps, inflict on the enemy
6 as much personnel, materiel, and equipment damage as possible," et
7 cetera, "and by one to two strategic level operations with forces of up
8 to corps strength."
9 And then in the brackets we have the respective corps,
10 Eastern Bosnia Corps, Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Herzegovina Corps, et
11 cetera:
12 "And three to four tactical level operations, advance as far as
13 possible toward major enemy administrative and industrial centres, crush
14 and destroy his forces, and thus create conditions for a triumphant end
15 to the civilian war."
16 And now he proceeded to define what the brunt of the activities
17 of the Sarajevo Corps would be. Let me now reiterate my question. And
18 you see the last line where he mentions the Drina Corps. We can read the
19 entire thing. The last paragraph:
20 "When carrying out strategic level operations,
21 Operation Sadjestvo co-ordinated action 95 shall be carried out first,
22 followed by Operation Prozor-95, Operation Spreca-95 is to take place in
23 the run up to Operation Sadjestvo-95 and in the run-up to
24 Operation Prozor-95, planned operations within the responsibility of the
25 two corps will take place."
Page 17282
1 This is my question: Did he define precisely which strategic
2 operations need to be carried out on a strategic level and did he name
3 them, too?
4 A. Yes, sir, he laid out the broad strategic situation where he --
5 or where the Supreme Command in this case saw the strategic offensive and
6 defensive activities, where they were going to take place, and laid out a
7 number of strategic-level operations that would take place in time
8 through the conduct of this plan.
9 Q. Thank you. Quite apart from these operations, was it possible
10 for anyone to do anything? Was it possible for someone to define what
11 strategic operations are to be carried out and what they should be called
12 and what areas they should cover?
13 A. Yes, sir. Again, this being strategic guidance, the expectation
14 was in not only Directive 7(1) but in supplemental orders that it would
15 be the Main Staff who took these larger strategic objectives and turned
16 them into military guidance for the execution by subordinate corps and
17 other formations. So we weren't changing -- or they are not changing
18 anything. What they are doing is taking a broad general objective and
19 then turning it into specific plans and activities that can be militarily
20 accomplished.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One clarification with the number of this
22 document is necessary. There was quite a lot of confusion which I
23 created as well. The number of Directive 7 is P1214.
24 Please carry on.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That is correct. And
Page 17283
1 Directive 7(1) is P1199.
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. My next question has to do with Directive 7(1). We were reading
4 item 5.3, the decisions. Were you able to see there if the Main Staff
5 detailed, in any of the items of 7(1), the attack on Srebrenica and Zepa?
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we have P1199 on the screen.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have P1199, page
8 5, paragraph 5.3, which contains the decision for the Drina Corps because
9 it is within its area of responsibility that Srebrenica and Zepa lie.
10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Is there mention of Srebrenica and Zepa anywhere here? Yes or
12 no.
13 A. In paragraph 5.3, there is no specific mention of Srebrenica or
14 Zepa.
15 Q. Thank you. In that case, can these directives be the basis for
16 Operation Krivaja and Stupcanica which are not mentioned in any of the
17 decisions of the Supreme Commander or the Main Staff?
18 A. Sure they can, yes, absolutely.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: And just if the general could give a slow
21 description of the other operation so the court reporter can get it down
22 directly. We clearly see Krivaja which we all know but the other one is
23 a little harder to say, but I think its important to say to catch it here
24 in the record.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you repeat the names of these
Page 17284
1 operations.
2 Mr. Gajic.
3 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Tolimir mentioned Operations
4 Krivaja and Stupcanica, S-t-u-p-c-a-n-i-c-a.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. Krivaja is the operation in the direction of Srebrenica and
7 Stupcanica in the direction of Zepa. Are they at all mentioned in the
8 directive? That was my question to Mr. Butler?
9 A. No, sir, they are not.
10 Q. During the examination-in-chief did you not say that they were
11 the basis for the activities in Srebrenica and Zepa? Do you recall that
12 or do you want me to give you the references? Did you not speak of them
13 as a basis for the activities taken in respect of the civilian
14 population?
15 A. In answer to the first part of your question, yes, I do recall
16 saying that 7 and 7(1) were the basis of the activities in Srebrenica and
17 Zepa. And I also believe, yes, Directive 7 specifically lays out the
18 framework for the basis of activities taken with respect to the civilian
19 population. That's correct.
20 Q. Thank you. Your testimony will be the basis on which the
21 Trial Chamber will take its decision. Can you refer precisely to the
22 portions of Directive 7(1) which the Main Staff sent to its subordinate
23 units which speak to the attitude to be taken toward the civilian
24 population, or, better said, where exactly does Directive 7(1) deal with
25 this issue?
Page 17285
1 A. As I've said before, Directive 7(1) does not specifically deal
2 with those issues, at least in the sense of laying them out in a military
3 sense or military terminology.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We have completed the analysis of
5 Directives 7 and 7(1). This is my question: The units which receive
6 these directives, do they use them to extract their own tasks or
7 assignments on this basis? Thank you.
8 A. Yes, sir, they do. Their -- they can either extract them
9 directly or in cases, based on these documents, the Main Staff itself may
10 issue further orders directing the corps to do this.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you list any element of Directive 7(1) which
12 would serve as the basis for further activities intended to create
13 unbearable conditions? Can you list at least one?
14 A. If possible, before I answer a document based on the entire --
15 you know, a question on the entire document, I would like to see the
16 entire document just to quickly refresh my memory on it. It is a
17 somewhat lengthy document, and before I just give a quick yes-or-no
18 answer I would like to just scan through the it for a minute or so.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Since we are pressed for time, we will
20 give you an opportunity to answer the question after the break during
21 which you would be able to consult the text, if Their Honours are in
22 agreement.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I would be satisfied with that. I do think
25 it's important that he be allowed to do that, and I think that that's a
Page 17286
1 good idea.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document should be given to the witness when
3 we break.
4 Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Butler, during your direct examination you were asked what
8 the role of the assistant commander for intelligence would be in
9 implementing the directives, and your answer was in relation to security,
10 specifically; that's page 16483, lines 1 to 9, of the transcript of the
11 12th of July 2011.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 12th of July, 1995, 2011.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. And I'm quoting:
16 "From the point of view of security, one needs to make sure of
17 what the actual plan and intention of the VRS is and to make sure that it
18 remains concealed from the UN and the international community, and this
19 requires for its security and counter-intelligence sector to make assure
20 that there is no leakage of information which is key to that plan.
21 Therefore, it needs to be privy to the details of the plan in order to
22 ensure that the intelligence and security sector may carry out all the
23 missions required to be achieved in order to support these objectives."
24 I am asking you this as a military expert: Is it the security
25 organs that are charged with protecting the confidentiality and secrecy
Page 17287
1 of information or is it within the purview of the commander of the units
2 carrying out these operations? Under whose charge are all the personnel
3 involved? Is this the role of the security organs or is their role to
4 exercise control?
5 A. Within the concept of the VRS, the commander's always
6 responsible. However, particularly with technical issues like security,
7 the commander heavily relies on and uses his trained security officers to
8 implement these security measures. So again while the commander is
9 always responsible, security falls well within -- and the protection of
10 information and counter-intelligence, those types of things, fall well
11 within the security technical chain and while all individuals have a role
12 in it, the predominant role is going to be played by those individuals
13 who are members of the security organs.
14 Q. Mr. Butler, should intelligence and security organs be aware of
15 all the details of a military operation in order to do
16 counter-intelligence work which constitutes 80 per cent of their duties?
17 This is something that you stated during your direct examination.
18 A. Yes, sir. I believe they do. I base my belief on the doctrinal
19 writings of the JNA, and as they were applied by the VRS, which gives the
20 assistant commander of intelligence and security at the various levels,
21 it puts him as part of the commander's primary staff. That gives him
22 that ability to keep fully apprised of what is going on. Again, going
23 back to the practical aspect of both collecting information as well as
24 counter-intelligence, it's vital for the person who is protecting the
25 information or seeking to collect information to support the plan to know
Page 17288
1 what the plan is. Without that basic knowledge, these individuals would
2 not know how to structure or organise their activities to support the
3 plan.
4 Q. Mr. Butler, if security organs propose measures to commanders,
5 who ultimately carries out these measures, these same security organs or
6 the commanders of their units? Let's say if one of the measures is
7 confidentiality and protection of confidential data.
8 A. Then, using that particular issue and keeping in mind that there
9 are some security tasks that the security branch doesn't have to
10 co-ordinate with the commander, a task like this would be proposed to the
11 commander, the measures that they would take to secure the
12 confidentiality and protection of data, for example, classified
13 documents, it would certainly be customary for the security officer to
14 propose a plan for the commander, to have the commander's authorisation
15 of that plan, and it to be implemented in that manner. It would not be a
16 situation, normally, where the security officer in and of itself
17 implement a plan effecting the remainder of the command and not do so
18 without having the approval of the unit commander.
19 Q. Can you please answer my question: Who is the one who carries
20 out the measures proposed by the security organ, the security organ
21 himself or the commander and his subordinates? Thank you.
22 A. Again, it depends on the task. In this particular scenario that
23 you have laid out, the security organ would propose the procedures to be
24 implemented, the commander would approve them, and they would be carried
25 out by the individuals who actually had to deal with the documents to
Page 17289
1 make sure that they were secured, keeping in mind that it will be more
2 than security officers, other officers will be involved. The security
3 officer's role then becomes to ensure that the plan, as it has been
4 written, is being followed by those other officers.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think this is the appropriate time
6 for our first break. The Chamber is grateful, Mr. Butler, if you would
7 look through the document.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Don't forget it here in the courtroom. We
10 adjourn and resume at 11.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we continue with the examination, I would
16 like to raise one matter. This morning we received a response of the
17 Defence in relation to the subpoena motion for Witness X. We would like
18 to -- I would like to ask you, Mr. McCloskey, at the end of today's
19 hearing, if you have additional information in relation to that witness,
20 if the Prosecution was able to contact the witness, for instance, through
21 VWS or another way. But perhaps the OTP is able to prepare some
22 additional information if there is some available at the end of today's
23 hearing.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please continue.
Page 17290
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Butler, you've looked at these documents. Could you now
4 provide an answer, please.
5 A. Yes, sir. The document again that we are referring to is P1199,
6 and I would draw your attention to the English language translation page
7 4. In context it is found in paragraph 4 where it relates to the
8 strategic decisions of the commander of the VRS discussing his general
9 goals and how they will be carried out, and in this particular passage -
10 which is the second paragraph from the top of page 4 in the English
11 language translation - it states as follows:
12 "Other forces of the VRS shall contribute to the conduct of
13 Operation Sadjestvo 95 with the goal of operative strategic camouflage
14 and correcting the operative tactical position by carrying out planned
15 combat battle and operations in accordance with Directive number 7 and
16 active combat operations toward Bugojno, Travnik, Kladanj, Olovo, and
17 Vares and around the Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde enclaves and the Bihac
18 Pocket."
19 So in this context, General Mladic is raising as part of his
20 general strategy that he anticipates that there will be offensive combat
21 operations to some degree directed against the enclaves. Now, finally,
22 to circle it back around with the issue of Krivaja 95 and its association
23 with Directive 7 and 7(1), I would remind the Court that in the documents
24 that the Drina Corps produced where they laid out the plan Krivaja 95,
25 they specifically referenced in this operations plan that this plan was
Page 17291
1 in response to or in furtherance of the guidance that it received under
2 Directive 7 and 7(1). So in light of the fact that the corps staff and
3 the corps plan that are planning and implementing Krivaja 95 they believe
4 that that plan is in furtherance of Directive 7 and 7(1). I am just not
5 sure how it can be divorced.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you help me with one explanation. You are
7 referring to Krivaja 95. In this paragraph you have read into the
8 transcript, there is a reference to Operation Sadjestvo 95. Could you
9 explain that?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I don't believe that this operation as
11 envisioned has to do specifically with Krivaja 95. I believe this is a
12 larger operation that has to do with another area, particularly around
13 the Posavina corridor or other areas. I don't believe that --
14 essentially what this paragraph is saying that while Sadjestvo 95 is the
15 major operation, other corps units are going to be involved in other
16 actions that will have some general supporting function, even if it's
17 simply by attacking in other areas keeping the Bosnian Muslim or
18 Bosnian Croatian forces from being able to reinforce what their main
19 attack is.
20 So it's not directly connected, but just like everywhere else
21 within VRS, when you attack in one area of the country, you are creating
22 the circumstances where your enemy has to defend and is not available
23 then to be transferred to where you believe your main objective is.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
25 Mr. Tolimir.
Page 17292
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Butler, I have just heard you when you were reading saying
3 around Zepa and Srebrenica. It reads "around Zepa and Srebrenica," not
4 "in Zepa and Srebrenica." Am I right or did you read something
5 different?
6 A. No, sir. The English language translation that I have
7 specifies -- the language that it uses is:
8 Combat operations towards three various locations and "around the
9 Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde enclaves and the Bihac Pocket."
10 Q. Thank you. Thus it is "around the enclaves," not "in the
11 enclaves." Correct?
12 A. That is correct. I don't believe that in this document that they
13 envision actually violating the safe area. Their object is combat in and
14 around -- or, I'm sorry, to be clear, on the perimeter and around the
15 safe area. This is not a call to actually attack the towns of Srebrenica
16 and Zepa.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You've also said in this context: Is
18 General Tolimir supposed to know about what lower commands are writing or
19 should lower commands derive their orders from higher level directives?
20 Is the Main Staff supposed to know what brigades and other lower level
21 units are ordering their men, or is it the other way around, should
22 brigades and subordinate commands be guided by what the Main Staff is
23 ordering?
24 A. The first part of your question, sure, the -- it is the Main
25 Staff which provides the broader guidance down to the subordinate levels,
Page 17293
1 in this case the corps and two brigades. The other side of the coin is,
2 yes, absolutely, it's the Main Staff's responsibility to know and to
3 monitor whether or not those plans are being implemented properly. For
4 example, using the command and staff processes that were in place at the
5 time, when a corps develops a large plan, the Main Staff is going to be
6 aware of the details of this plan. It's customary within the context of
7 the VRS when putting together plans that, at the level that the brigade
8 or the level of whatever it was planned, that the next higher formation,
9 you know, would be briefed on what the commander's plan was, how he
10 proposed to carry it out, so the higher level command would have an
11 awareness of what was going on, why it was happening, and to ensure that
12 it was in compliance with the broader strategy.
13 So, I mean, specifically I can't envision is a situation where
14 the Drina Corps command and staff would have created the operations plan
15 for Krivaja 95 and that the Main Staff would have had no awareness of
16 that plan. It would have had to have been brought to the attention of
17 the Main Staff.
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would you kindly look at 16330,
20 lines 12 through 15, dated 8 July.
21 Q. Where you say in response to Mr. McCloskey's question:
22 "Does Tolimir's assignment have to do with the protection of the
23 plan of operations? Is it a kind of military secret?" He said.
24 And you replied:
25 "Yes, absolutely," and so on?
Page 17294
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could the witness please wait for the transcript.
2 Now we have the relevant portion on the screen. Thank you. Please
3 continue.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. You said "yes." Now, I should like to ask you, in the documents
6 that you spoke about, is crime treated as a military secret and should a
7 plan on crimes be protected by the security organ although it is
8 forbidden by international conventions?
9 A. I'm sorry, sir. The quote that you read me is so short that I
10 don't recall exactly what context we were discussing when I gave the
11 answer. Is it possible to read a larger passage of that transcript?
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do you have the transcript?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I do now.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: On the screen?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I do. Thank you very much.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sorry that we didn't provide you with it earlier.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Look at the transcript before you. Reference 16331, lines 12
19 through 15. Sorry, reference 16330, lines 12 through 15.
20 Now, I am asking you if General Tolimir is protecting these
21 plans --
22 A. Sorry, could I ask you to just wait until I've finished reading
23 it and then please ask your question, if I may? Thank you. Okay, sir.
24 Q. My question is: Is crime a military secret and should security
25 organs be involved in the protection of such a military secret if it is
Page 17295
1 forbidden, prohibited by international conventions as a crime?
2 A. In the context of crime, I assume you're referring to issues like
3 war crimes and things of that nature, correct? Not strictly domestic or
4 other forms of crimes?
5 Q. Thank you. Is war crime a military secret?
6 A. In many jurisdictions, military jurisdictions, the fact that
7 military forces may have comitted war crimes would be considered to be
8 confidential. It would not be an issue that would often want to be
9 disclosed. Legally, there are obligations under international law, but
10 practically speaking, for those individuals who were seeking to evade
11 responsibility, one of the methods that they would use to evade
12 responsibility would be to make any information about the conduct of
13 those crimes secrets, so they would have the official powers of the state
14 to classify those types of secrets as a way to cloud the details of the
15 acts that occurred. So there is a legal answer and then there is the
16 practical reality of the scope of these crimes.
17 Q. Mr. Butler, if you say a war crime is not a secret but would be
18 considered confidential, could it be contrary to the legislation of the
19 country concerned and the legislation of the international community
20 stipulating that crimes must be prosecuted?
21 A. Absolutely. Those countries obviously, and most states for that
22 matter, have laws that will require them to investigate and prosecute
23 those responsible for war crimes. Having said that, the practical
24 reality is that the public disclosure of war crimes that have been
25 comitted by forces of a particular state can have a particularly damaging
Page 17296
1 impact on a nation's war effort. One, which is why they are to be
2 avoided but also why that knowledge of them tends to be restricted to
3 very limited circles because of their immediate impact on war objectives.
4 I think if one goes back and brings this back into the context of
5 what we are talking about, if one looks at the document that were drafted
6 by the VRS itself in 1992 where they discussed the measures -- in part of
7 that document where they discuss the measures relating to the prevention
8 of war crimes by the VRS, they very candidly acknowledged what the impact
9 of being involved in those crimes could be to the struggle of the
10 Republika Srpska.
11 Q. Mr. Butler, if something is secret to the perpetrator, is it also
12 secret for the state and the organs who are bound to act in accordance
13 with the law?
14 A. I can certainly envision that if the perpetrator were the state
15 that it could be.
16 Q. I am talking about an individual. Would security organs and
17 services in the army be duty-bound to prosecute perpetrators of offences
18 and crimes or would they be inclined to protect them as you claimed a
19 moment ago?
20 A. Within the context of the VRS, as laid out, security organs as
21 part of their crime prevention and investigation responsibilities, are
22 duty-bound to investigate allegations of war crimes against an
23 individual. That is correct.
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I would appreciate it in order to save
25 time if you could give brief answers whenever possible so that we avoid
Page 17297
1 repeating explanations that have already been given. My question is:
2 Since you refer to crimes in documents from 1992, have you seen documents
3 from July 1995 that speak about the prohibition of perpetrating crimes?
4 Yes or no.
5 A. There are a number of documents that raise that issue. I mean, I
6 think the one you are referring to might possibly be the order by
7 President Karadzic on 10 July 1995 where he directs that the military
8 forces moving into Srebrenica operate in conjunction of the
9 Geneva Conventions. Is that the document you're referring to, sir?
10 Q. Thank you. We finally got an answer.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at D41. It's
12 a document from the Main Staff of the VRS, dated 9 July. Sent to the
13 president of Republika Srpska for his information.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So you can see I am not lying, he ordered it, to the forward
16 command post of the Drina Corps, Generals Gvero and Krstic personally.
17 Conduct of combat operation, and it says:
18 "In keeping with the order of the President of Republika Srpska,
19 issue an order to all combat units involved in combat operations around
20 Srebrenica to provide maximum protection to UNPROFOR members and the
21 Muslim civilian population. Order your subordinate units to refrain from
22 devastating civilian targets unless they are forced to as a result of
23 strong resistance from the enemy. Prohibit the torching of residential
24 buildings, and treat the civilian population and prisoners of war in
25 keeping with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
Page 17298
1 "Signed, Major General Zdravko Tolimir."
2 Is it the case then that units involved in operations around
3 Srebrenica received this order in good time that was sent to them through
4 their superior commands as early as 9 July? Does the stamp show that
5 they have received it?
6 A. I can't speak to the units, but certainly with respect to the
7 individuals named who it was sent to, Generals Gvero and Krstic at the
8 Drina Corps IKM, the stamp reflects that they would have received this
9 order in the time that you specify. I mean, certainly before the
10 operation would have gone down on 10 July.
11 Q. Thank you. Since they received it, were they required to forward
12 it to their subordinate units, this order from the Supreme Commander, as
13 all other instructions for further combat operations?
14 A. In the last paragraph of the document, the first page, it
15 specifies that "in accordance with the order ... you must issue an order
16 to combat units ..." So an order had to be issued. Whether it was
17 nearly are a retransmission of this order, as we have seen in other
18 documents signed by General Krstic or as the Drina Corps -- or the
19 commander of the IKM or whether he chose to draft his own order
20 reflecting these principles, I don't know.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Can you answer this question:
22 General Tolimir, as a signatory of this document, did he not openly write
23 about war crimes and propose public measures aimed at preventing those
24 from happening at the same time as these measures are carried out?
25 A. Well, sir, in this particular document you did lay out in
Page 17299
1 paragraph 3 the expectations of the President of the Republika Srpska,
2 and in paragraph 4, again, it appears that you are amplifying the
3 expectations or the directions of the President of the Republika Srpska,
4 and you lay out specific concrete issues relating to actions that have to
5 be taken so that crimes are avoided.
6 Q. Thank you. Are security organs here referring to what the lawful
7 conduct in these units should be? Aren't they publically pointing their
8 finger to these issues, or are they concealing and suppressing these
9 facts in the documents sent out to the various units?
10 A. If I take your question correctly, what you are doing is relaying
11 the instructions of the president of the Republika Srpska to the
12 subordinate individuals, in this case General Gvero and General Krstic -
13 more General Krstic since he's the actual commander of the operation at
14 this time - and you're laying it out in clear terms. It is not being
15 handled as a document, and this material is not being kept from him or
16 anyone else. And, in fact, as you noted, the fact that the president of
17 the Republika Srpska has directed that supplemental orders be issued
18 reflects the fact that there was a desire on the part of the president of
19 the Republika Srpska to ensure that not only did the Drina Corps command
20 have this but their subordinate formations understood what the
21 expectations were upon them.
22 Q. Thank you. If up and down the chain of command and information
23 there is a flow of information about the respect for the
24 Geneva Conventions and the ban on the commission of war crimes, are in
25 that case the security organs under an obligation to comply with these
Page 17300
1 instructions and are not the perpetrators of such crimes going to try to
2 conceal their crimes from Tolimir and others?
3 A. In the context of July 1995, I am not sure how impart -- the
4 security branch -- you know, the security branch's interest in concealing
5 the crimes is a direct result of their involvement in them. So I am not
6 sure -- I mean, in an abstract theory where non-security organs are
7 seeking to investigate a crime that have been comitted by others, I agree
8 that those people perpetrating the acts are going to seek to keep them
9 secret from the security branch. However, as the evidence is laid out
10 with respect of these events, the security branch was complicit in the
11 actual conduct of the crimes.
12 Q. Thank you. And such organs, if they were perpetrators, did they
13 not conceal their crimes also from those who issue orders that crimes be
14 prosecuted and who ask that measures be taken to prevent the commission
15 of crimes? Thank you.
16 A. Again, in abstract, perpetrators of those crimes would seek to do
17 that. Again, with July 1995 as the context, given the widespread scope
18 of the crimes and the thousands of people that were killed in such short
19 days, I believe that the evidence that is out there has made it clear
20 that the widespread knowledge of the crimes was so large because so many
21 people were involved that to a large degree it was impossible for that
22 information not to believe to be available to anybody who chose to look
23 for it.
24 Q. Mr. Butler, do you know that an OTP witness and a convict for the
25 war crimes, Momir Nikolic, said in -- during this trial that he was not
Page 17301
1 aware of the contents of the information dated the 9th, which refers to
2 the Geneva Conventions and the prohibition of war crimes, and are you
3 aware of him stating this in front of this Trial Chamber? I am asking
4 you this because his testimony was given in open court.
5 A. No, sir, I did not follow his testimony, so I am not aware of
6 what Momir Nikolic may or may not have said.
7 Q. Thank you. I will show his testimony to you now. Or let me
8 first show you the document that he personally received.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D64 displayed, thank
10 you. This is D64.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. It speaks about the registration of the prisoners of war which is
13 a proper measure to prevent any abuse. Is not the registration of
14 prisoners of war one of the first steps in a series of measures to ensure
15 that crimes are not comitted against POWs?
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think the section that the general is referring
18 to is on the next page in the English, so it would -- I am not sure where
19 it's on the B/C/S, but it may be helpful for all parties for us to see
20 that section he's speaking of.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Could it be enlarged a bit, please.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
24 Q. The last paragraph that the OTP wanted to see reads:
25 "In view of the importance to arrest as many of the dispersed
Page 17302
1 Muslim units as possible, it is also necessary to register all the
2 able-bodied men in the UNPROFOR base in Potocari.
3 "The organs for security affairs will inform the MUP units in
4 their areas of responsibility of their tasks and co-ordinate their
5 activities with them."
6 Is not the involvement of the MUP in this issue, as well as all
7 the other measures taken, including the registration of the POWs, one of
8 the first steps taken with a view to ensuring that the public character
9 of the activities surrounding the POWs rather than secrecy?
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I note that the interpretation we have received
11 was not exactly the same as the translation of the document in front of
12 us.
13 Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, and I know the translators do their best,
15 but I think the problem is if the general could, especially on such
16 important paragraphs, point out to the translation -- well, to all of us
17 what paragraphs he's talking about, because they weren't obviously able
18 to catch -- otherwise they would have read it. And I -- and this is
19 important because the official version says "make lists of," it doesn't
20 say "register." And I don't know if that's a translation or what that
21 is, but if we could try to make sure that something like this that the
22 translators have a chance, otherwise we are getting these conflicting
23 versions of an important document.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The relevant part is in paragraph 3, and
25 especially that one that Mr. McCloskey is referring to is the following,
Page 17303
1 I quote:
2 "It is equally importantly to note down the names of all men fit
3 for military service who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in
4 Potocari."
5 Mr. Butler, are you able to answer the question which is still on
6 the screen?
7 THE WITNESS: The question just went off the top of my scene,
8 sir. If I could ask for a little assistance.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The question was, I read it to you:
10 "Is not --"
11 Perhaps the transcript is not correct.
12 It's related to the involvement of the MUP in this issue and as
13 well as other matters taken, including the registration of POWs, is one
14 of the first steps taken with a view to ensuring that the public
15 character of the activities surrounding the POWs rather than secrecy.
16 That was more or less the question. Can you provide us with an
17 answer, please?
18 THE WITNESS: I am not sure whether it's an issue of public
19 character versus secrecy. The requirement to register prisoners of war
20 has to do with accountability. I guess perhaps getting closer to
21 General Tolimir's intention, prisoners who are not registered technically
22 do not exist, and as a result, without registering them and without an
23 acknowledgment that they are in the custody of a warring party, there is
24 no provision or there is no way that the protections offered by the
25 Geneva Conventions through the offices of the ICRC or any other body can
Page 17304
1 be enforced.
2 So in that context I think that's the right answer. I mean, it's
3 for accountability because, once they are accountable, the warring party
4 incurs a responsibility for their treatment and for their safety.
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Thank you. Is this a reference to the lists that are to be drawn
7 of all those who are being evacuated or all those who are to become
8 prisoners of war but who do not surrender?
9 A. No, sir. In this particular document what is being laid out is
10 that if one looks at the context of the prior paragraph, it specifically
11 says that the Muslims wish to portray Srebrenica as a demilitarised zone
12 with nothing but a civilian population. As a consequence, the following
13 paragraph said, therefore, it's equally important to note down the names
14 of all men fit for military service who are being evacuated from the UN
15 base at Potocari.
16 So for the first component, it's a very strict definition of
17 whose names need to be -- or which group of individual men have to be
18 listed. And, to your second point, while I agree that listing those
19 names would raise the issue of their accountability as potential
20 prisoners of war, I take it from this document that the primary purpose
21 of those lists was to be able to come back at such future point in time
22 and make the case on behalf of the VRS that the people who were in
23 Potocari and in this Srebrenica demilitarised zone were, in fact,
24 military members as well as civilians.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. The document is there for the
Page 17305
1 Trial Chamber to decide on rather than me or you. I have no more time to
2 spend on this. This is my question: Did not General Tolimir clearly
3 express his view here that as many Muslim formations -- formations that
4 do not mount any resistance should be arrested, and those that do, that
5 they should be liquidated, and that a record should be made also of those
6 that are being evacuated from the base in Potocari? And if they are
7 arrested, that doesn't mean that they would be killed -- at least that
8 was not my order that they should be arrested and killed; is that right?
9 Or is this something that slipped your mind?
10 A. To answer your last part of your question first, I agree this
11 order does not specifically have an order from General Tolimir to kill
12 prisoners. Again, it also talks about -- the second part of it discusses
13 the importance to arrest or, I take it, capture as many members of these
14 units as possible. The third part, of course, is, when we are talking
15 about listing the names down, again - and it may be the way that the
16 document is translated, I hold that open, obviously - but you are
17 specifically noting in this document that the lists are those individuals
18 who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari. There is not
19 a specific reference in the document that all men captured will be
20 listed.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Do you see the memo where it says the
22 command of the 2nd Brigade, and it says Motorised Brigade, strictly
23 confidential, 13th of July, 1995. Does it not indicate that the units
24 received it on the 13th of July, 1995? At least that's what the stamp
25 testifies to.
Page 17306
1 A. Yes, sir, I believe that the stamp, as you've mentioned,
2 indicates that this particular document was received by that particular
3 unit, on 13 July 1995.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show page 1 for the witness?
6 Thank you.
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
8 Q. You see that it says in the addressees -- among the addressees
9 are the Pribicevac IKM and the Bratunac IKM, and all the intelligence and
10 security organs which are then listed below. Does it not mean that the
11 document was delivered to all the subordinate intelligence and security
12 organs of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, East Bosnian Corps, and the
13 Drina Corps?
14 A. No, sir. The way that I take this, the document -- if you look
15 at the second line of the addressee list, "to the command of the SRK and
16 IBK," it's to their corps commands. So from your question I don't agree
17 that it was delivered to all the subordinate intelligence and security
18 organs of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and East Bosnia Corps.
19 I would -- then further down it lists the specific intelligence
20 organs within the framework of the Drina Corps as well as the state
21 security apparatus which received this.
22 Q. Please, let me read this so that we can save time. I will read
23 it out and then you can say whether what I read out is correct or not.
24 Is not the telegram sent to: "The intelligence and security
25 departments of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, East Bosnia Corps, the
Page 17307
1 Pribicevac IKM, and Bratunac IKM, and the intelligence and security
2 organs of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade," that was Nikolic's,
3 "the Milici Brigade, Zvornik Brigade, the Romanija Podrinje, Rogatica,
4 and the RDB of MUP including the MUP of the RS."
5 Is that not stated among the addressees ahead of the body of
6 text? Thank you.
7 A. Yes, sir. But again I would remind you that that was not your
8 original question. Your original question was whether or not the
9 document was delivered to all the subordinate intelligence and security
10 organs of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, East Bosnia Corps, and
11 Drina Corps.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the record. I followed your reading,
13 Mr. Tolimir. I found most of the units you were referring to, but not
14 the Rogatica brigade. I don't find it in this list.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it's stated as the
16 "1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade."
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, but in addition you were referring
18 Rogatica Brigade. I don't find it in the list. Please carry on.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But this is its document. And the
20 stamp says:
21 "The command of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade."
22 And somebody probably omitted the Rogatica Brigade. I suppose
23 that the person who drafted it omitted the Rogatica Brigade.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. But this is my question for Mr. Butler: The extent of addressees
Page 17308
1 to which the document was sent, does it not guarantee to the person who
2 drafts the document that as many units as possible will receive the
3 document and carry out the assignments contained within?
4 A. The -- what it guarantees is that the person who drafted the
5 document and created the addressee list is that it is that person's
6 intention that those formations or those units receive this order. So if
7 you list down who the addressees are on this particular document, it is
8 your intent that the communications centre send it to those subscribers.
9 Correct.
10 Q. Thank you. Is this a way to suppress or conceal activities and
11 measures or is the purpose of the document to make them public since they
12 are described in written documents?
13 A. To be clear, we are not talking about public or concealed. The
14 reality is this document is a strictly confidential military document.
15 It is not public. But within the context of the military, what this
16 document is and what the author is doing is ensuring that all of the
17 units who he believed had a relevant role in the process were as fully
18 informed as what were going on as possible.
19 Q. Thank you. You said "public or concealed." Is strictly
20 confidential not a designation available to all the documents available
21 to personnel and addressees -- or, rather, does it not mean that it is
22 available to personnel and the addressees and should remain concealed
23 from those outside of the army and is this not standard practice in the
24 armies world-wide? Thank you.
25 A. Yes, sir. And I think it's a terminology issue between what I
Page 17309
1 would view public and maybe perhaps what you view as public. Those
2 individuals within the military who were appropriately cleared, as most
3 officers would be, this document is a document that they are designed to
4 see, if it is addressed to them. So in that sense it is not a protected
5 document that it's going to be concealed from them.
6 Q. Can this document be concealed from the prosecutors and
7 investigators in the army who work on the detection and prosecution of
8 crimes?
9 A. If those individuals were appropriately cleared, and the
10 appropriate authority designated that they were to be given this document
11 as part of a war crimes investigation, it would be given to them, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Tell us, please, did you see this document when you
13 were reviewing other documentation? Yes or no?
14 A. Yes, sir, I did.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at the transcript
16 of 7 April, page 12531, to see what Nikolic said in lines 13 and 14.
17 12513 is the number of the page. Thank you, Aleksandar.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If you have had a look at his statement,
20 could you tell us whether it is the case that even before this Court he
21 said he had not received that document and he could have received it in
22 two ways. First of all, his brigade is among the addressees; and second,
23 he was at the forward command post of Bratunac where Popovic was also
24 with him because Popovic was one of the addressees?
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think in the first part of your
Page 17310
1 question it was a misrepresentation of what we can see in the transcript.
2 Literally, Mr. Nikolic says, I quote:
3 "I cannot state with full certainty, but I think I have not seen
4 this document before, although I see that my brigade is one of the
5 intended recipients. But I cannot state with any certainty that it
6 arrived or did not arrive."
7 This is different from what you said.
8 Please carry on.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I was
10 speaking based on my own notes, but if you are reading the transcript
11 then you must be right. Thank you.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Should Mr. Nikolic have been aware of this document, in your
14 opinion, Mr. Butler?
15 A. Yes, sir. It is addressed to the security organ of the
16 Bratunac Brigade, he was the assistant commander for intelligence and
17 security. Assuming that it arrived there and that there weren't any
18 communication difficulties, and I take it that it probably did arrive,
19 communications were relatively good. It should have been brought to his
20 attention, yes, sir.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Is Mr. Nikolic answerable to his
22 commander who also received the telegram and his own security organ, or
23 is he answerable to someone outside that command? Thank you.
24 A. As discussed within the various regulations, I mean, he's always
25 answerable to his immediate commander at the brigade, which was
Page 17311
1 Colonel Blagojevic, but for a strict line of technical supervision he
2 would have been answerable to Colonel Popovic, who was his superior
3 within the Drina Corps security organ.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Could General Tolimir assign his powers
5 to others and vice versa in keeping with rules of engagement?
6 A. As a general principle --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphones should be switched off while you
8 are discussing with your assistant.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 THE WITNESS: As a general principle of command, you are entitled
11 to delegate various authorities to subordinates in order for them to
12 accomplish missions. Again, as part of that, the fact that you delegate
13 certain authorities to subordinates still leaves you responsible for the
14 overall success or failure of the subordinates to accomplish those tasks.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D202. It's the rule
16 on the powers of a corps of land forces in peacetime. We see the first
17 page in both versions. It's the book of rules on the powers of a corps
18 command of land forces in peacetime. We need page 4, paragraph 4 -- in
19 fact, Article 4.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. It says:
22 "The organs of the command may not assign their powers to other
23 command organs or transfer their responsibility to the organs of a lower
24 command unless specifically authorised to do so."
25 My question is in view of this stipulation, could General Tolimir
Page 17312
1 be held responsible for what was within the purview of lower-ranking
2 units, corps, and brigades, and were they able to transfer to him affairs
3 that were within their area of responsibility which would make him
4 answerable for what they were supposed to be responsible for?
5 A. I am not sure that this particular article refers to the
6 proposition that you laid out. This particular article lays out the
7 proposition that a commander cannot unilaterally transfer the scope of
8 responsibility -- or command organs to other command organs take on tasks
9 of the appropriate organ or of a different command until specifically
10 authorised to do so. I don't take that in the same manner as the issue
11 that we've discussed before, which is your ability to delegate the
12 authority to your subordinates to implement orders and your
13 responsibility to ensure that those subordinates have carried out the
14 orders, or to take measures that they have not. I think this is a
15 completely different issue.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us look at the transcript of
17 the 8th, page 16340, lines 24, 25, and see what you said there. And then
18 I can ask my question.
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
20 Q. When you've read it, let us know. Thank you. Can you tell us
21 what you meant by this when you said he orders security organs and
22 General Tolimir receives authorisations? Who do I get them from?
23 A. Have I had -- do I have the right part highlighted? I don't
24 understand the question in context of the transcript. Okay. Let me go
25 further down. I'm sorry. Okay. I think I know what you are getting at
Page 17313
1 now. Could you repeat your question?
2 Q. Thank you. I am saying did you say here, when you're saying,
3 "he's not ordering in this document," are you saying that the commander
4 is not giving orders to security organs but that it is General Tolimir
5 who issues orders to them?
6 A. In the context of the document that we were discussing, this
7 document had to do with the various interrelationships between the corps,
8 the Main Staff, and the security organs and the security organs' roles
9 and responsibilities. And as part of the discussion, it was related to
10 which authority -- under what circumstances it would be the commander who
11 issues orders to the security organs for those tasks that are under the
12 commander's purview, and then the commander -- in this case the commander
13 of the Drina Corps, I believe, yes, was saying back that for those
14 specific tasks that are directly related to your counter-intelligence and
15 security function, those particular tasks will be regulated back through
16 the security chain, ultimately General Tolimir.
17 So the context of the document and the discussion is to the
18 security organs so they understand that the Drina Corps, so they
19 understand who regulates which specific tasks and under what
20 circumstances.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Tell us, please, was General Tolimir able
22 to issue orders to the organs of the Drina Corps or can he only -- could
23 he only give them guidance in their work? Could he only professionally
24 train them to carry out that order of the corps commander?
25 A. The answer to that question entirely depends upon the specificity
Page 17314
1 of the task. And again, for the examples that were laid out, I believe
2 question discussed one particular example where the task at hand was
3 strictly a counter-intelligence task related to a potential security
4 threat to various senior officers of the VRS. And when one looks at the
5 orders that were issued there, it's clear that they were coming directly
6 from the Main Staff and through the security chain to the various
7 subordinates. In that case, General Tolimir is issuing direct orders to
8 those security officers because it falls within the confines of that
9 narrow and already designated responsibility.
10 In the essence, for example, where the security organ is
11 discussing issues related to the use of the military police, it would be
12 far more appropriate for General Tolimir and the Main Staff to publish,
13 through the security channels, guidance and recommendations to the corps
14 commanders as to how the military police should be organised and how they
15 should be trained. But ultimately because that task belongs to the
16 command side and does not fall on the strictly technical side, again, the
17 best that you would be able to do is to advise and recommend. It
18 ultimately would be the corps commander who was responsible for the
19 military police, his decision.
20 Q. Thank you. If he's responsible, does he then also issue orders
21 whereas I only provide guidance? Isn't it the case that security organs
22 only provide guidance to his subordinates? Is he the one who issues
23 orders based on those proposals?
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we be more specific? He said "to his
Page 17315
1 subordinates," but I believe we have been talking about a corps
2 commander. So Mr. Butler doesn't have to guess what subordinates we are
3 talking about and so the answer makes sense, could we ask for more
4 specificity.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, if you make your question more
6 precise, then you will be able to receive a very precise answer, I
7 suppose. Perhaps you can rephrase your question.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Butler, in any situation whatsoever, could General Tolimir
11 issue orders to the subordinate units of the Drina Corps or was he only
12 able to give them professional guidance?
13 A. With respect to actual units, you were not authorised to give
14 orders to those subordinate units. You're only authorised within the
15 purview of the intelligence and security organ to directly give orders to
16 individuals who are members of the intelligence and security branch
17 within the confines of their specific counter-intelligence and other
18 security functions. So there is not a situation where I envision where
19 General Tolimir could call down, for example, and give direct orders to
20 the commander of the Drina Corps Military Police Battalion. Those would
21 have to go through the corps based on General Tolimir's recommendations.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You said during examination-in-chief
23 something about plans for killing. Do you recall that? If you recall
24 that, could you tell us whether a plan for the killing of Muslims existed
25 at all, and if so, have you seen it?
Page 17316
1 A. During my examination-in-chief, I discussed a great deal about
2 plans for killing. If I take your question, was there actually a written
3 order laying out a plan, if there was I have not seen it.
4 Q. Have you heard evidence that a plan existed and that certain
5 individuals were involved in it?
6 A. Yes, sir. As -- not withstanding what evidence I have heard, as
7 a result of my research and as a result of the various documents that
8 I've assembled as part of that research, I believe that those show clear
9 evidence that a plan did exist, the plan was implemented, and there were
10 various numbers of individuals who took actions, in part, in support of
11 this plan.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You believe it, but could you present to
13 the Court any reference, any evidence showing that a plan, a verbal or
14 written one, existed, and can you tell us who were the participants in
15 that plan? Who made it? When? Where? When was that meeting held,
16 because a plan has to be discussed and accepted somewhere at some time,
17 at some place?
18 A. The primary presentation that I would offer the Court with
19 respect to that is the Srebrenica revised military narrative that I have
20 offered where I lay that document out as the foundation of what I believe
21 are the circumstances and the inherent plan that led to those
22 circumstances. I have also laid out in the course of my testimony here
23 and discussed a broad variety of documents that were not available to me
24 at the time when I drafted the military revised narrative, and I've
25 testified to how I believe those documents that were not available to me
Page 17317
1 at the time further support the conclusions that I made in my previous
2 narrative. So that's the short answer.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. To provide a clear and
5 concise answer to that would take days on Mr. Butler's part, literally.
6 I think he gave us an outline, but of course that's possible, but in this
7 context it's really not -- it was never what he was called for about to
8 make those conclusions based on the evidence that you're hearing. So I
9 just want to -- he, of course, can answer that in detail if the Court
10 wishes, but I am not sure it's really appropriate.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler has spent a lot of days with us here
12 in the courtroom, and Mr. Tolimir asked the witness to provide him with
13 short answers. He did.
14 Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. On transcript page
16 16326 of the 8th, lines 18 through 15.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. The Prosecutor asked you this. He said:
19 "I suppose Tolimir was aware that Muslim men were being separated
20 from women with certain intentions," et cetera, et cetera.
21 And you replied, on page 16363, lines 1 through 10:
22 "That proves that at that time that General Tolimir did not know
23 of that plan."
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think we don't have the right part
25 on the screen. Please check again the page and wait for the -- that this
Page 17318
1 will appear on the screen.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 16326, lines 18 through 15,
3 Mr. McCloskey asked the question --
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Wait a moment. Now we have it on the screen.
5 Thank you. It's really a different page than the first one you have
6 mentioned. Now please continue.
7 It can't be lines 18 through 15. Perhaps through 15 of the next
8 page. Please be precise.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In my notes I noted that it was in
10 lines 18 through 15. Page 16362, lines 18 through 15.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Lines 18 through 15 is reading back. Perhaps you
12 mean 15 through 18.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, I'm sorry. Well noted, but it
14 actually begins at 18 and goes on until line 25. I noted it down wrong.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps let Mr. Butler have the opportunity to
16 read that part and then put your question.
17 Mr. Tolimir, your question, please. The last one before the
18 break.
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Butler, you said in your answer:
21 "The plan had not yet reached Tolimir."
22 Does it mean that Tolimir was completely unaware of the plan?
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I am not sure that, Mr. Tolimir, is informed in
24 this way in this part of the transcript. I have to correct myself. I
25 wanted to say, please, tell us where exactly you find that part.
Page 17319
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From line 18 on page 16362 until
2 line 25.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In these lines there is no mention of
4 Mr. Tolimir. I would suggest that you check that with your assistant and
5 we break now and we will resume at 1.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please continue, but please bear in
11 mind that we have to stop some minutes earlier than usual to enable us to
12 discuss some procedural matters.
13 Please continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Butler, to shorten the time necessary in view of what
17 Their Honours said, can we now show 16360, that's the page of the
18 transcript of the 8th, up until 136 -- up until 16361, ending up with
19 line 17 on page 16361.
20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the starting line
21 from the previous page of the transcript.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please repeat the starting line on page
23 16360.
24 Mr. Gajic.
25 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] The line is 22 and the court officer
Page 17320
1 has marked it correctly.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Please, Mr. Butler, in the section as marked here, did you not
6 state that Tolimir had not been aware of the plan at the time because it
7 had not reached him at that point? Otherwise, you say he would not have
8 been reporting to, et cetera, et cetera, had he been privy to the plan.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is clearly in relation to a document which
11 talks about the time and place that this answer has to do with. So if we
12 could have that document it will make it much more clear so the answer
13 will make more sense to everyone, because we were dealing with that
14 document at the time and I don't think that there is any contest about
15 the document.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This is
18 document D64 and we'll display it. The date is the 7th of April, 2011.
19 D64.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think you misspoke. It can't be the year 2011.
21 It's the 12th of July, 1995, this document.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Butler, would General Tolimir have been writing this document
24 had he been familiar with the plan you're referring to?
25 A. As noted in the transcript, the Prosecution had raised the
Page 17321
1 proposition that if a plan had been made in the early hours of 12 July to
2 kill the people that were being assembled or kill everybody, and that
3 later on 12 July, if General Tolimir drafted this document reflecting his
4 expectation that lists should be made of the people in Potocari, does it
5 indicate that he had been told at that point in time that an order had
6 already been given that there would no lists because the individuals were
7 going to be killed, my answer was that this document does not indicate
8 that General Tolimir at that time would have been aware that the plan
9 was -- that the people who were being separated in Potocari, the
10 military-aged men would ultimately be killed.
11 As I said in my original answer, I don't believe that if
12 General Tolimir was aware that that was the plan as directed by
13 General Mladic at the time, that he would have placed the guidance that
14 he did with respect to registering -- or making a list of the
15 military-aged men in Potocari in the document.
16 Q. Thank you. Mr. Butler, please look at page 2 of the document in
17 order to see at what particular time this document was handed over to be
18 coded and sent out to units. We can see that in the lower right-hand
19 corner of the original. Where it is stated the 12th of July, 1995, at
20 2150. Does this mean that nothing could have been known of this
21 so-called plan of which you say was made in the morning of the 12th at
22 the time when I was in Rogatica at 2150 of the 12th when this document
23 was made? Thank you.
24 A. Could the Court please go back to the first page of this document
25 in English and scroll to the top? To answer the second part of your
Page 17322
1 question first, I believe I have testified on this document that by
2 virtue of it having a number of the Drina Corps command 17/897, that when
3 you drafted this document you were at the headquarters of the Drina Corps
4 in Vlasenica, not Rogatica. So I don't agree with your assertion that at
5 that time that this document was done, it was -- that you were not in
6 Vlasenica. I believe that's exactly where you were. I don't know at
7 what point in time after you drafted this document -- okay. I don't know
8 at what time after you drafted this document which contains information
9 up to 1945 hours in the body of it. So it kind of puts a timestamp on
10 the internals of the document between that time and then when you may
11 have left afterwards for Rogatica, but when this document was physically
12 drafted by you and written for the communication centre, you were in
13 Vlasenica.
14 So now getting back to the first part of your question, again
15 using the prospect that the Prosecution has laid out about when a plan
16 was to kill the individuals who were being separated at Potocari, the
17 men, I again go back to the fact that I don't believe that you would have
18 written the guidance related to making lists of those military-aged men
19 if you were aware that General Mladic already made a decision that they
20 were to be killed.
21 Q. Mr. Butler, so this document was made on the 12th and reached the
22 units only on the 13th. Did you know about a document according to which
23 on the 13th Mladic had brought over the journalists to film the prisoners
24 of war? Would Mladic have done so, would he have brought the journalists
25 over to film the scene had he made the plan and did he make the plan at
Page 17323
1 all to begin with?
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is a compound problem. You should split it
3 up into different questions. It is easier to answer.
4 Mr. McCloskey.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, and if he could refer to what he -- where in
6 the record we have a film that Mladic has filmed prisoners of war in
7 Potocari or what, in more in particular, he means by that because it's
8 not clear.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir doesn't say that Mladic filmed
10 prisoners of war but that he brought over journalists to film prisoners
11 of war.
12 Mr. McCloskey.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, thank you, I apologise for my inartful way,
14 but what is he specifically referring to, if he could.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please try to rephrase your question
16 so that it is easier for the witness to answer the question.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. The Main Staff and General Mladic taken the decision on the 12th,
20 as the Prosecutor claims, would Mladic have asked that journalists be
21 allowed access to the area on the 13th to film them and take statements
22 from them, and would Mladic himself have decided to appear on that very
23 location himself, as he did? This was stated by Mr. Zoran Malic [as
24 interpreted] as OTP witness. Thank you.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
Page 17324
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry. We got Zoran Malic. Does the General
2 mean Zoran Malinic? Because that will have some meaning for the witness,
3 perhaps. I see Mr. Gajic.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
5 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, errors happen in the
6 transcript, especially when it comes to name. It is Mr. Malinic's
7 statement.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
9 Mr. Butler.
10 THE WITNESS: I am unaware of the testimony of Mr. Zoran Malinic
11 in this case, so I cannot comment as to what he did or did not say. And
12 I certainly cannot comment with respect to what General Mladic was or was
13 not thinking with respect to journalists. I can say that, as the Court
14 is aware and has been discussed, there were various orders that were
15 going out from the Main Staff with respect to controlling access to
16 ensure that prisoners weren't being exposed and journalists weren't being
17 permitted to come in unless they had authority. And I guess as a
18 practical aspect General Mladic, in order the get what he wanted, was
19 willing to assume the risk, that those cameras may have picked up parts
20 of what was going on that were not intended to be seen by General Mladic,
21 which is, in fact, exactly what happened in the Petrovic video which took
22 place on 13 July, 1995.
23 So I am not aware of the details that you are talking about with
24 respect to Mr. Malinic or why General Mladic may or may not have made
25 decisions as to video cameras and what his intent was.
Page 17325
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Microphone.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at
3 Exhibit D289. Thank you.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. We have Mr. Malinic's statement there.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 18. Or,
7 actually, page 17 in English and 16 in Serbian. The last paragraph in
8 English. Thank you, Aleksandar.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I quote Zoran Malinic:
11 "I don't know why it had to be issued. I told you I received an
12 order that the TV crews can come. And I think these TV crews came
13 through the press-centre of the Main Staff that was located in
14 Han Pijesak. And I think they did come and videotaped. It is possible
15 that they were forbidden to videotape since it was combat activities
16 taking place. Especially if we are talking about foreign TV crews that
17 could be the source of intelligence for the enemies. I think the
18 individual who decided that filming should be allowed said I don't know
19 what, but I think he approved it. I think it's the Main Staff who
20 approved it. I think the commander of the protection regiment could not
21 have decided to allow these TV crews to come and videotape."
22 Mr. Butler, this statement by Mr. Malinic, D289, which was taken
23 on the 2nd of December, 2005, does it not clearly indicate that TV crews
24 were present at the stadium in Kasaba and that they were filming? Thank
25 you.
Page 17326
1 A. I don't know whether they were or not. I am aware that
2 Colonel Milutin Milutinovic - I believe I have his name correctly - who
3 was the head of the VRS media center was in Srebrenica as a member of the
4 Main Staff and that there was at least one camera crew from the
5 Main Staff's press-information centre taking various footage. I don't
6 recall that I've ever actually seen that, and I am not sure whether or
7 not the Office of the Prosecutor has ever interviewed
8 Colonel Milutinovic. If they did, it's not an interview I am aware of.
9 So again, Colonel Malinic has his view of what he saw or did not
10 see. I mean, I am aware generally that there was some military media
11 there, as well as Zoran Petrovic, but I don't know that I can comment any
12 further than that.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. The context of the question needs to be
15 made more clear. What particular area is General Tolimir talking about,
16 because it's clear where Zoran Malinic is and where he is talking about
17 in his answers, but that part was not shown to him. So I think the
18 general will get a better answer from Mr. Butler if he at least tells
19 Mr. Butler the area that we're talking about, the geographic area that we
20 are talking about, or that Zoran Malinic is talking about.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Butler, do you know that Colonel Malinic was in Nova Kasaba
24 and that that was the point of crossing for the Muslims making their way
25 from Srebrenica towards Kladanj and that they surrendered and that as
Page 17327
1 prisoners they were located in Nova Kasaba. What is your knowledge of
2 it?
3 A. Yes, sir, I agree. Then Major Zoran Malinic was the commander of
4 the 65th Protection Regiment's Military Police Battalion. They were in
5 Nova Kasaba, and that particularly on the 13th of July that
6 Bosnian Muslims who were surrendering in that area were being assembled
7 at the football pitch.
8 Q. Was Mr. Malinic in that case able to see them and able to speak
9 with them? Was he able to see the crews and the Muslims surrendering in
10 Nova Kasaba? Thank you.
11 A. I believe that what Mr. Malinic could and did see is outlined in
12 his statement. I am not confirming or refuting any of that with respect
13 to Colonel Malinic, or then Major Malinic, says he saw or did not see.
14 Your question was my awareness of the rationale behind General Mladic
15 approving the use of cameras to film prisoners in Nova Kasaba if, at the
16 same time, General Mladic was aware that the prisoners were going to be
17 killed or had given the order to be killed, and my answer goes back to:
18 I can't explain that rationale, why he did it or what he was thinking.
19 Q. Thank you. If someone went about creating a plan of crimes,
20 would that individual then bring over journalists to interview the same
21 individuals that he intends to commit crime against and to make a media
22 release on the 13th informing the general public of the presence of
23 prisoners there. Is that a logical way of proceeding?
24 A. I am kind of perplexed as how to answer that. Based on my
25 experience with the OTP in this case, as well as my present experience,
Page 17328
1 logically you would never want to have -- if you were committing a war
2 crime, you would never want to have people around with videotapes and
3 other forms of media to take pictures, and yet they are. I suspect with
4 respect to the VRS media people, the press media people, they knew that
5 any footage that they shot would be subject to censorship by the
6 military, in fact, they were the military media, and that regardless of
7 whatever footage they were to take, that at some point in time a further
8 decision would be made as to what footage ultimately became public.
9 I am not aware that -- while I am aware that Colonel Milutinovic
10 and his VRS camera crew did do extensive videotaping in and around the
11 Srebrenica areas to include those roads on the 12th and the 13th, I am
12 not aware that very much, if any, of the actual footage that they shot
13 has ever been publicly released.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us look at D49. I don't know
16 if we plan to resume -- to adjourn earlier today or if I can still show
17 you the document and I can put my question to you.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You may -- we should finish the examination of
19 the witness 20 minutes before 2.00.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. What we see here is a telegram sent from the command of the
22 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade in Rogatica to the Main Staff,
23 personally to General Gvero. The document is entitled: "Accomodation of
24 prisoners of war," and it is signed by assistant commander
25 Major General Zdravko Tolimir. In the upper right-hand corner we tell
Page 17329
1 that it was submitted on the 13th of July, 1995, at 2230 hours. And we
2 are now reading the body of text.
3 "If you are unable to find adequate accomodation for all
4 prisoners of war from Srebrenica, we hereby inform you that room has been
5 found and arranged for 800 prisoners of war in Sjemec in the premises of
6 the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade."
7 This is my question: If General Tolimir sent this telegram out
8 on the 13th of July, 1995, at 10.30 p.m., is it possible that he drafted
9 the telegram based on the TV footage that he viewed and upon seeing
10 prisoners of war at the football pitch, therefore suggesting alternative
11 accomodation for these prisoners? Thank you.
12 A. For that proposition to be true, one has to assume first of all
13 that on the evening of 13 July, or at some point as you mention on the 13
14 July, the television footage from the Nova Kasaba pitch was publicly
15 released and was being aired on the television. I don't know that that's
16 the case.
17 Second, in light of your position as the head of intelligence and
18 security for the entire army, the idea that your primary source of
19 information with regard to the capturing of thousands of prisoners would
20 not be from your own military channels and conversations with various
21 intelligence and security people in and around that whole area but would
22 be off of the basis of a news report. I just don't see that proposition
23 making sense that that's your basis for writing this order.
24 Q. All right, Mr. Butler. Since your assumptions may be right, as
25 you say, whereas these documents are not necessarily correct - and I
Page 17330
1 indicated the time - would General Tolimir write this document if he had
2 known about the so-called plan of execution at 2232 hours?
3 A. To be clear, this particular document has -- has a transmission
4 stamp of 2230 hours. It's not evident within the actual document when
5 you actually would have drafted this document. You would have written
6 this document if you were aware of the plan to execute the prisoners, but
7 not necessarily aware yet that it had already been decided that for
8 various reasons that the prisoners would be going to the Zvornik area
9 rather than other locations.
10 So I hold open the possibility that at the point in time that you
11 are writing this proposal about housing prisoners at that location that
12 decisions that are being made with respect to other suitable locations
13 are being made and that you have not yet been informed of them.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We'll come back to those decisions later.
15 Just tell me what would be adequate accomodation for prisoners of war,
16 and does that mean their execution or does it mean placing them into
17 residential facilities?
18 A. As I've previously testified, placing them in residential
19 facilities is but one step. There are other actions that need to take
20 place, for example, troops need to be identified to guard the prisoners,
21 food, medicine, and other life support has to be identified and then
22 brought to the location where the prisoners are so they can be food --
23 can be provided with food, water, and necessary medical care, as many
24 prisoners taken at Srebrenica or the follow days afterwards would have
25 required medical care. So it's a number of steps. And again, when one
Page 17331
1 looks at these locations and tries to make a determination what the point
2 of putting these prisoners at a various location was, that is why I look
3 at more than simply, you know, is it a suitable building as opposed to
4 just a field. If the intent is to properly care for the prisoners within
5 the best ability of the VRS to do so in compliance of the law, there are
6 other things that have to take place for that to occur.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, is it possible to continue with this
8 important issue on Monday?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, indeed.
11 Mr. Butler, this is all that we have for you this week, but
12 regrettably we have to continue on Monday in the afternoon, 2.15 in this
13 courtroom. Now you are free to leave the courtroom. Please be informed
14 that on Tuesday there is an UN holiday. We have no hearing on Tuesday
15 next week.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I understand.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Goodbye, and have a good
18 weekend.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to go to private session.
21 [Private session]
22 (redacted)
23 (redacted)
24 (redacted)
25 (redacted)
Page 17332
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11 Pages 17332-17333 redacted. Private session.
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Page 17334
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session. Thank
3 you.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One last question.
5 Mr. Tolimir, the Chamber by Mr. Cubbon has sent an e-mail to the
6 Defence on the 2nd of August, 2011, and has asked whether you are able to
7 give us an update about your plans in relation to a possible 98 bis
8 submission. I would like to invite you to update us about your plans on
9 Monday, at the beginning of the hearing on Monday, because it is
10 essential for the Prosecution and the Chamber, and they are preparing
11 work for such a possible submission. It would be very helpful if you can
12 provide us with your intentions.
13 Thank you. This concludes the hearing of today. We adjourn and
14 will resume on Monday, 2.15, in this courtroom.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Monday, the 29th day of
17 August, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.
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