091116IT

Page 3118

1 Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.

2 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.

3 Can the witness be shown 65 ter 78, please.

4 WITNESS: DRAGAN MAJKIC [Resumed]

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 Examination by Mr. Di Fazio: [Continued]

7 Q. Mr. Majkic, on Friday we were discussing -- I was asking you

8 about the events in April of 1992 concerning the division -- or rather,

9 the creation of Serb police stations, and this document touches upon that

10 issue. As you can see, it's dated 10th of April, 1992, and it goes to

11 the chief of the CSB department and all chiefs. And attention to various

12 chiefs of a number of municipalities. Sanski Most is not mentioned

13 there, but it is later. And if you look at --

14 MR. DI FAZIO: And Your Honours, please, this is the first

15 paragraph on the 2nd page, and it appears on the second page of the

16 document, the words beginning "tim povodom" Could you just have a look at

17 that paragraph, please.

18 Q. Now, that document describes a meeting of the SR BH collegium.

19 And it talks about an enlarged CSB advisory counsel being held in Banja

20 Luka CSB on the 7th of April where the security situation was analysed.

21 And then in the next paragraph it goes on to say that in addition to

22 members of the CSB collegium, the chiefs of various municipalities,

23 Banja Luka, Bosanska Gradiska, and so on, including Sanski Most attended

24 this meeting. Did you attend any meeting on the 7th of April, that is

25 the meeting that this document refers to?

Page 3119

1 A. I remember quite clearly a meeting held on the 6th of April, but

2 I can't believe that was even on the 7th in Banja Luka, I just can't

3 believe that, as it says here. I really don't remember bing there on the

4 7th.

5 Q. Very well. The document then goes on to state that a number of

6 conclusions had been adopted unanimously. And that various public

7 security stations are to come under the auspices, under the control,

8 under CSB Banja Luka. And number 11 --

9 MR. DI FAZIO: Which, if Your Honours please, is on the third

10 page of the document. And in the B/C/S it's on the third page in.

11 Q. You can see the Serb municipality of Sanski Most is to become

12 part of that --

13 MR. PANTELIC: Excuse me, Mr. Di Fazio, could you take a look on

14 the page second, line 18 and 19. There is no answer here so maybe you

15 can clarify that. Because maybe there was some problem with the

16 transcript. Your question started with "could you just have a look ..."

17 and then there is no answer. He answers something, and then there is

18 another question of yours. It's line 18 and 19.

19 MR. DI FAZIO: There's some problem with the transcript, but it's

20 been rectified, I believe, I'm told by the recorder. Yes. I'll just

21 continue. I think if there is any problem, we can return to it.

22 Does Your Honour -- my question I think was did you attend that

23 meeting?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I was there on the 6th

25 of April, and I'm almost certain that I wasn't there on the 7th. I know

Page 3120

1 that I was there for one day only, and I'm sure I wasn't on the 7th

2 there. I would have remembered something if I were there.

3 MR. DI FAZIO:

4 Q. Very well. I understand your position. Is there -- I hope that

5 suits Mr. Pantelic's concerns, takes care of Mr. Pantelic's concerns.

6 Yes. Anyway, the document then goes on to say that the

7 Banja Luka services centre is going to be organised in various ways, and

8 it's going to be joined by various public security stations. And number

9 11 on the list is Serbian municipality of Sanski Most. Do you have any

10 knowledge of that procedure being made known to you, that being known to

11 you sometime in early April of 1992?

12 A. Well, in the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most there was an

13 extensive debate about attaching Sanski Most to the Autonomous Region of

14 Krajina, but I know that it was never adopted by the Assembly. So it

15 seems to me that this is impossible. As far as I remember, until 10th of

16 April the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most hadn't been declared or

17 proclaimed. Therefore, I don't know who did this. It didn't happen

18 either in this joint parliament, or that any number of the Serbian

19 deputies got together and adopted such a decision. I really don't

20 remember any such thing taking place.

21 Q. Thank you. The Paragraph 3 of the English which is contained on

22 page 3 and which appears at -- also page 3 of the B/C/S says that

23 employees have to sign the solemn declaration - that's the interpretation

24 I have - the solemn declaration identical to the solemn declaration from

25 the previous law. And there's a dead-line of 15th of April, 1992. Was

Page 3121

1 that dead-line -- any such dead-line, any such dead-line, made known to

2 you by Mr. Zupljanin at any time or by any document?

3 A. Last Friday on several occasions I answered this question

4 pursuant to Mr. Zupljanin's order not to take anything in Sanski Most, so

5 it was not up to me to do anything. But rather, this gentleman was

6 afraid that someone else might try to do something and he wanted me to

7 know that this shouldn't happen. That is why he told me about Kljuc,

8 Bosanski Novi, and Prijedor, that we should stay together even for a year

9 if necessary without doing anything, regardless of what was going on in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, there was no need for me to abide by what

11 is written here.

12 Q. Thank you. And can you look now at paragraph 17.

13 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, that's the page 5 of the

14 English, paragraph 17, and it appears on the very last page of the B/C/S

15 version of the document.

16 Q. Paragraph 17 says that all authorised employees who don't sign

17 the solemn declaration and aren't going to return to the service have to

18 hand in their weapons. Were you tasked with any such -- did you receive

19 any such instruction?

20 A. I couldn't have received any such instruction. On the 6th of

21 April meeting when Mr. Zupljanin distributed these berets and these

22 copies of solemn declaration, he said something to the effect that these

23 solemn declarations, wherever that was to be put into practice -- but he

24 didn't think that should have been done the police, it was up to

25 Municipal Assemblies to declare themselves a Serbian municipality. And

Page 3122

1 then within that context, as we went along the police should get in line

2 with this kind of commitment of a municipality. So he -- something about

3 these solemn declaration for the employees who wished to remain, they

4 should sign them. I don't remember his saying that anyone who refuses to

5 sign should be laid off.

6 Q. All right. Thank you for that. But my question is more

7 confined. My question is simply this: Paragraph 17 says that authorised

8 employees - that's police - who don't sign the solemn declaration have to

9 hand in their weapons. Now, did you receive any instruction that

10 policemen who didn't sign the solemn declaration had to hand in their

11 weapons at Sanski Most police station?

12 A. I personally didn't receive any instruction. On this 6th of

13 April joint meeting, I heard that and everybody else who was present.

14 But Mr. Zupljanin said that you in Sanski Most should refrain from that

15 because it doesn't apply to you. Therefore, I had no obligation in that

16 respect.

17 It is true that I took these berets and solemn declaration, put them into

18 the boot of my car and locked it there, and that's how it happened.

19 Q. Fine. We've heard that evidence and no problem in understanding

20 that. That's okay. It's just, what I'm asking about is the handing in

21 of weapons by those police officers who don't sign the solemn

22 declaration. That's all. It's very focused. Not berets, not oaths, but

23 the handing in of weapons. Now, did you receive any instruction that

24 those who did not sign -- those policemen who didn't sign had to hand in

25 their guns and weapons?

Page 3123

1 A. I don't remember receiving that, and I never did that. When we

2 split up, all the Muslims and Croats left the station with all their

3 small weapons and rifles. Nobody asked them to do anything of the sort.

4 So the very act of separation on the 17th of April ...

5 Q. And you would agree, wouldn't you, that the effect of that, if it

6 were -- if it existed and if it were to be carried out would be to disarm

7 Muslim and Croat police?

8 MR. PANTELIC: Objection, leading question.

9 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, I'll withdraw it.

10 If Your Honours please, I seek to tender the document into

11 evidence. And without going into the arguments that we've spoken about

12 in recent days, if you're not with me, then I would ask at least that it

13 be marked for identification, but my primary application is to put it

14 into evidence as a full exhibit.

15 JUDGE HALL: Well, as I appreciate the witness's answers, it

16 seems to me that it should be marked for identification because he's

17 distanced himself from the contents of this document in large part.

18 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, yes, of course. It does of course contain

19 considerably relevant material, and it's signed -- or not physically,

20 doesn't have a handwritten signature, but it is a document authored on

21 the face of it by one of the accused, Mr. Zupljanin. And it deals with

22 all of the arrangements that were leading up to the division of the

23 police and the creation of the Serb police in mid-April, at least, in

24 Sanski Most. And the witness has spoken about all of those matters

25 including instructions and -- that he received from Mr. Zupljanin. Plus

Page 3124

1 that, some of the procedures mentioned in the document marry up with some

2 of his evidence.

3 So for that reason and given the fact that it's highly relevant

4 and probative value, I would seek to tender it, but that's as far as I

5 can take it.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Majkic, can I ask you, do you recall having

8 received this document?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't.

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: So it was sent by Mr. Zupljanin, as I understand

11 it, to all the chiefs of the SJBs, but it never reached you; is that

12 correct?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I don't recall this

14 kind of document. I don't remember it at all. And particularly, I

15 wasn't at -- because I wasn't at the meeting when this was decided.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 7th of April.

18 JUDGE HALL: The document is marked for identification.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P355, marked for identification,

20 Your Honours.

21 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.

22 Q. Just one last question on the document. The type face, the way

23 the document looks, the setting out of the document with headings, the

24 way the distribution list is written, and generally the format of the

25 document, does that accord with police documents that were being produced

Page 3125

1 in 1992, the sort of documents you saw day-to-day basis in carrying out

2 your duties?

3 JUDGE HALL: If I may relieve you of your anxiety, Mr. Di Fazio,

4 the Chamber bearing in mind the distinction between a document which is

5 admissible as opposed to admitted, the Chamber has no difficulty what

6 order in terms of the admissibility of this document. So I think I

7 understand why you're asking that question, but it probably isn't

8 necessary.

9 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes. Very well. Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you, I've finished with the document. I want to ask

11 you now about another topic altogether, the arrival of the 6th Krajina

12 Brigade. You touched upon this topic last Friday. You said that the

13 army arrived in Sanski Most, and I think it was on or about the day of

14 your meeting on the 6th of April. Do I understand correctly?

15 A. That was on the night between the 6th and 7th of April, during

16 the night.

17 Q. Thanks. And very briefly, how -- what sort of strength was this

18 army unit at? How many men was it at -- did it contain?

19 A. It was a complete 6th Krajina Brigade, made up of all the Serbian

20 soldiers who responded to the call-up, including a number of Croats and

21 Muslims. Many Muslims didn't respond to the call-up, therefore that was

22 a sort of rump brigade, particularly due to the reason to a large number

23 of Muslim and Croats not having responded to it. As far as I remember,

24 it's numbered about 3.000 troops, but I don't know the exact number. I

25 never saw them in one place all together.

Page 3126

1 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. 3.000. Thanks. That's what

2 I wanted to know.

3 And did you meet with the commander of that brigade?

4 A. I met up with him as soon as they arrived. I think he came to

5 have coffee with me the next morning. He went to see me and the

6 commander and tell us that he was there, and when I went to Palanka on an

7 errand, I also went there to see where the command was based. I think it

8 was in Palanka. That's where the brigade was. I found Basara there as

9 well, we had a coffee together, we had a conversation, and then I

10 returned.

11 Q. Basara was the commander, was he?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And what was the conversation about?

14 A. The situation in general. I don't remember any details. I came

15 to greet him. He offered me a cup of coffee. We had one together, and

16 then it was me, actually, who sent a letter to him and the brigade, the

17 6th Brigade should return to Sanski Most. And on that occasion when we

18 met up again he told me, "I am here to prevent a conflict in

19 Sanski Most." And we talked about other things, of course, but I

20 remember him repeating that that's why he was there with his brigade.

21 Q. Was he there also to assist police in maintaining order and

22 ensuring that conflict did not break out?

23 A. We did not see each other again until - what was it? - the 17th

24 of April when he came at 8.30 in the morning. Before that we did not

25 have any other contacts. On the 17th, though, he came early in the

Page 3127

1 morning to my office.

2 Q. I'll repeat the question. Was he there also to assist police in

3 maintaining order and ensuring that conflict did not break out?

4 A. I suppose so. If he had received an assignment to come and

5 prevent inter-ethnic conflict, then that would have implied cooperation

6 between the army and the police, each acting within their own purview.

7 Q. Thanks. And in fact you had written to him in mid-March, seeking

8 the return of the army to Sanski Most. That's what you testified on

9 Friday. What did you explain in your letter in mid-March that you wanted

10 the army to do when they returned?

11 A. Well, seeing how inter-ethnic tensions grew worse almost every

12 day and since Mr. Zupljanin had told me before that nothing should be

13 done in Sanski Most as in other municipalities, I, realising that

14 inter-ethnic conflict may break out, got the idea that I should invite

15 the brigade to come and help out. Nobody, I suppose, would be so willing

16 to incite a conflict if the brigade was there.

17 Q. Thank you. Did you report to Mr. Zupljanin, your regional chief,

18 that you had taken this step of inviting army formations, groups --

19 brigade, I should say, into your municipality?

20 A. I really can't remember whether I informed him or not. If I had

21 not, I certainly should have, but I don't remember whether I did. I

22 should have -- I must have sent at least a letter to him saying that the

23 6th Krajina Brigade was in Sanski Most.

24 Q. And would you agree with me that that is -- that sort of

25 information, the request and invitation to bring in armed formations into

Page 3128

1 the municipality is precisely the sort of thing --

2 MR. PANTELIC: Leading again. Objection.

3 JUDGE HALL: You must have anticipated that objection,

4 Mr. Di Fazio.

5 MR. DI FAZIO: I'll move on. Thanks.

6 Q. In the meeting where you actually met up with Mr. Basara and you

7 were discussing matters upon his -- when he first arrived, did you and he

8 discuss specifically how the army might help the police, what exactly

9 they might do?

10 A. At our first meeting, Colonel Basara dropped by just briefly. We

11 just had a coffee together and he said, "I'm here to prevent conflict in

12 Sanski Most," and that's -- that was all. We did not talk about it

13 anymore. It was quite enough for me that he was just there. I was quite

14 reassured and certain that nothing was going to happen in Sanski Most.

15 Q. The army was based -- the 6th Krajina Brigade was based at a

16 place called -- was it Lusci Palanka?

17 A. That's where the command was, and the brigade probably had its

18 own wartime deployment in the surrounding villages. You couldn't see

19 them. They were located and based on the surrounding hills and camps --

20 Q. All right. Thanks.

21 A. [Previous translation continues]... only the commander was in

22 Lusci Palanka.

23 Q. And how far away from the police station is Lusci Palanka?

24 A. Around 25 kilometres.

25 Q. Did you work out any procedures that you and Basara would follow

Page 3129

1 in the event that you had to call upon him for assistance in maintaining

2 law and order?

3 A. I can't remember talking or planning at all. In fact, I remember

4 we didn't. He said, "I'm here to prevent inter-ethnic conflict if it

5 arises," and for me that was a guarantee that nothing would happen. If

6 anything had happened in the meantime, of course we would have met again

7 and agreed what to do, each in our own jurisdiction.

8 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you now about -- move on past the 6th

9 of April. In the days immediately following the 6th of April and leading

10 up to the 13th of April, did you hear anything more about the activities

11 of the SOS in Sanski Most?

12 A. No. It was completely quiet in Sanski Most, at least those few

13 days between the arrival of the brigade until the 14th. It was

14 absolutely quiet in Sanski Most, as far as I remember. There were no

15 incidents or anything.

16 Q. Did you speak to Mr. Rasula in between the 6th and the 13th of

17 April?

18 A. I don't recall that I did.

19 Q. Did you see Mr. Zupljanin again?

20 A. If it was the 6th, I can't remember -- I don't think -- I don't

21 think I went to Banja Luka between the 6th and the 13th. Maybe we talked

22 on the phone, but I can't remember.

23 Q. All right. What about on the 14th?

24 A. On the 14th I met up with Mr. Zupljanin in Banja Luka.

25 Q. And how did that come about?

Page 3130

1 A. On the 13th of April, within the police station there was some

2 sort of panic. I was informed that the SOS had asked Rasula for an

3 urgent meeting of the Executive Board of the SDS, where they would come

4 with an ultimatum to take over the police. And that afternoon, since I

5 usually did not attend meetings -- and it was quite strange to me that

6 Rasula was informed about it rather than Vlado Vrkes, who was the

7 president of the SDS. But as soon as I was informed of that meeting, I

8 knew why he was inviting me to come. And then I replied that the next

9 morning I was going to the centre to see Mr. Zupljanin on official

10 business. He said, "Fine," and he knew probably that I was going to see

11 Mr. Zupljanin because of the information that was circulating that day.

12 Q. All right. Who told you? Who informed you that the SOS was

13 going to take over the police?

14 A. Well, I got that information from the police, and everyone talked

15 about it that day with quite a lot of anxiety and fear. I saw in

16 people's eyes that they were frightened.

17 Q. Thank you --

18 A. It was not an easy thing to hear.

19 Q. Thank you. You've testified -- so you had police intelligence

20 that the SOS were going to take over the police, and you've told us that

21 the police thought there were about seven or eight people, and you knew

22 one of the leaders or some of the leaders. Did you take steps to -- in

23 those circumstances to go out and arrest them on that very day, put them

24 in prison and charge them with something?

25 A. I've already said that I believed, and we in the police believed,

Page 3131

1 that there were about seven or eight of them because we never saw them as

2 a group. But we never had any verified information about it. Those were

3 rumours circulating around town and at the police, that it was the SOS.

4 We did not know much about them. We knew that there were about seven or

5 eight people who met frequently. We had no verified official reports,

6 and we did not dare make any estimates or plans, precisely because we

7 didn't know how many of them there were.

8 Q. Okay. Well, thanks for that.

9 Did you consider at least going out and talking to them, sending

10 some police officers out to talk to the seven or eight SOS members about

11 this new intelligence you had, perhaps make some inquiries?

12 A. I said last Friday that those seven or eight we knew about had no

13 criminal records, they did not have even a misdemeanour record. They

14 were not violating law or public order. Even when these crimes of

15 bombing happened, when explosive devices were set, we couldn't catch

16 anyone. And they acted quite normally, like any other citizen. I didn't

17 see any reason to go and interview them. What would I tell any one of

18 them?

19 Q. Well, perhaps you might have told them something to the effect

20 that the police suspected them of throwing bombs and that they've

21 received information to the effect that they are going to take over the

22 police station, is there any truth in this? Did you consider asking them

23 that?

24 A. Well, I couldn't talk to them because we had no such reports

25 before the 13th of April. There were no reports that they might attack.

Page 3132

1 They went around town and acted quite normally, like the most peaceful of

2 citizens. We had no reason to believe that they might be responsible for

3 any incidents.

4 Q. All right.

5 A. If we had had such information, then we could have invited them

6 for an interview.

7 Q. Thanks. Thanks. Well, one thing you did do is you went off and

8 spoke to Mr. Zupljanin the following day; do I understand your evidence

9 correctly?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And what did you tell him?

12 A. Well, I went to see him precisely because I needed to tell him

13 what the SOS was planning and to ask him for advice, what we were

14 supposed to do next.

15 Q. And what advice did you receive?

16 A. Well, first he tried to persuade me that I should talk to them,

17 impress upon them my authority to dissuade them from whatever they might

18 be planning, and I said, "What authority?" I had done my best to catch

19 them at whatever they were doing, and if I failed, then what possible

20 authority would I have in their eyes? On the contrary, any such action

21 might get me killed.

22 Q. Can you just explain to the Trial Chamber why the issue of

23 authority and sufficient authority arose as an issue, because they

24 were -- they were the most peaceful of citizens. Why was it -- why did

25 authority arise as an issue between you and Mr. Zupljanin when discussing

Page 3133

1 what to do?

2 A. Well, Mr. Zupljanin tried to talk me into meeting with them and

3 act as someone who has authority. I said I have no authority as far as

4 they're concerned because I didn't know any of them personally. I knew

5 them only by sight. I had no arguments. And if they were really those

6 SOS members, as we suspected, then there's no reason to believe that I

7 would have any authority. That's one.

8 And second, after what happened in Banja Luka, what the SOS did,

9 and if we know that all these SOS men used to be members of the 6th

10 Krajina Brigade and the 6th Krajina Brigade was already in Sanski Most -

11 and we now know that the 6th Krajina Brigade had been in various theatres

12 of war before - it's quite clear that most of them had been elsewhere, in

13 battle-fields, and they were in Sanski Most only on leave. But only now

14 when the whole brigade was in Sanski Most we were able to see how many of

15 them were actually there, in the brigade. And we realised that it might

16 be the biggest mistake possible to clash with them. And then the third

17 thing is if the army was already there, then the army should take care of

18 it; why me?

19 Q. Are you saying that the SOS membership -- members of the SOS in

20 Sanski Most were also members of the 6th Krajina Brigade? Do I

21 understand you correctly?

22 A. Well, all of them were soldiers of the 6th Krajina Brigade, very

23 few of them were in the TO, the Territorial Defence. Most of them had

24 already been in various battle-fields in Croatia for the past ten months.

25 And if they were involved in such crimes, that means that they were the

Page 3134

1 sort of people who dared to -- we can only suppose what would happen if

2 we risked a big clash with them. People already talked around town,

3 saying that they were some sort of paramilitary organisation. People in

4 town actually knew more than we did.

5 Q. All right. Well, when you went and had the meeting with

6 Mr. Zupljanin following the news that the SOS is going to take over the

7 police station, did you know or have any intelligence or information that

8 the SOS membership was -- basically SOS members were also members of the

9 6th Krajina Brigade? Because your evidence up till now has been that

10 there were seven or eight lads as far as you were concerned. So when did

11 it become clear to you that you weren't dealing with seven or eight local

12 lads, but a group that existed within the 6th Krajina Brigade?

13 A. We did not have any knowledge, any reports, about the way SOS was

14 organised. They acted as the SOS, but they never held out themselves to

15 be the SOS. It's the people who labelled them SOS. None of us in the

16 police had ever received any information from them directly that they

17 were the SOS. They did not identify themselves.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. It was only on the 14th when they asked for a meeting with the

20 SDS did they identify themselves as the SOS.

21 Q. Thank you. Just try and answer the next few questions very

22 briefly, if you would. At the 14th of April meeting with Mr. Zupljanin,

23 did you receive any instruction from Mr. Zupljanin to disarm the SOS in

24 Sanski Most, yes or no?

25 A. I can't answer this with a yes or no. When Mr. Zupljanin

Page 3135

1 realised I don't actually dare to do what he was suggesting - he was

2 quite aware of it, that I didn't dare to - and when after all the talking

3 when he realised I didn't even dare go back to Sanski Most if he made me

4 do that, he said, "I know these people, they're very dangerous.

5 If they really had set their mind to it, they're going to do it. Go

6 back, Majkic, and try to settle things down in a quiet way, without

7 shooting. And at least try to have this thing handled peacefully."

8 Q. Thank you. Could you just explain to the Trial Chamber just one

9 part of your previous answer. You said this:

10 "When Mr. Zupljanin realised that I don't actually dare to do

11 what he was suggesting ..."

12 You went on to say other things. Now, what -- what in a

13 nutshell, in brief, clearly, was Mr. Zupljanin suggesting that you do?

14 What did he want you to do in the face of this situation?

15 A. I'll try to quote him. He said, "Majkic, go, and if there's any

16 way to do it without a shoot-out, do it. If it can't happen without a

17 shoot-out, then try to take care of both," he probably meant Croats and

18 Muslims, "and keep them safe. If you are not able to save everyone, then

19 at least try to minimise the casualties."

20 That's approximately what he said. I'm trying to quote him. And

21 finally he said, "God help us."

22 Q. Okay. But -- and I'll return to my other questions then. He

23 gave you no specific instruction to disarm the SOS?

24 A. How on earth were we supposed to disarm the SOS, a paramilitary

25 unit, when the 6th Krajina Brigade was already there? They had to have

Page 3136

1 the entire security situation under control.

2 Q. Thank you --

3 A. And finally it wasn't even our job.

4 Q. Thank you. Did you or he suggest that you enlist the aid of the

5 6th Krajina Brigade to make sure that these SOS members don't take over

6 the police station or attack this public building in the centre of town,

7 enlist their help?

8 A. On the 14th at 4.00 p.m. at that meeting, just after I had met

9 with Mr. Zupljanin in the centre and came to that other meeting, there

10 were members of the Executive Board of the Serbian Democratic Party,

11 three members of the SOS, and there was the intelligence officer of the

12 6th Krajina Brigade. He was there, he was present. I don't think that

13 the SOS had invited him or the SDS had invited him. Colonel Basara must

14 have sent this intelligence officer, which means that Colonel Basara knew

15 what was going on. The intelligence officer from the brigade was at that

16 meeting.

17 Q. I'm going to ask you about the meeting, we'll get into that. But

18 all I'm asking you is a very simple question: On the 14th when you were

19 sitting in the office with Mr. Zupljanin, did you and he before the

20 meeting, before the meeting, before you went back to Sanski Most, there

21 in Banja Luka face-to-face with Mr. Zupljanin, did you and he discuss the

22 possibility of enlisting the aid of the 6th Krajina Brigade to stop this

23 take-over of the police station? Was that raised?

24 A. I already told you the whole story about what he tried to get me

25 to do. When he realised I didn't have the guts, he said, "I know these

Page 3137

1 people. They're very dangerous. If they had set their mind to it,

2 they're going to do it. So go try and handle it peacefully. If it's not

3 possible to handle it peacefully, if there's a shoot-out, try to keep

4 everyone safe. If that is not possible, then try to minimise the

5 casualties." That was our whole conversation.

6 Q. All right. Well, let's turn to the meeting that you've already

7 alluded to. This is a meeting on the 14th, and after the meeting with

8 Mr. Zupljanin - and I don't think there was any dispute that it was at

9 the Orthodox church - about what time did the meeting start? Just give

10 us the time, just the time.

11 A. It wasn't in an Orthodox church, it was in the parish residence,

12 which is next to the Orthodox church. Before and now, this is a school

13 for priests. That's one thing. Secondly, the meeting was convened for

14 1600 hours, and I arrived there at 1730 hours.

15 Q. Thank you. And were any members of the SOS present?

16 A. I already said earlier, the SDS executive committee, three SOS

17 members, and the brigade intelligence officer were at the meeting when I

18 arrived.

19 Q. Thank you. Who were the SOS members?

20 A. Those were Dusan Saovic, a.k.a. Njunja; Dusan Modrinic, a.k.a.

21 Medeni; and the third one had the nickname Cirija. I don't know his

22 name, not even to this date.

23 Q. So you arrived late. Did you learn anything that had happened in

24 the time prior to your arrival at the meeting?

25 A. No, I couldn't have learned of that. At the time I arrived I saw

Page 3138

1 this ultimatum that was put forth by the SOS and I had the information

2 about that from the day before, and I realised that they were discussing

3 this ultimatum because I see that the people from the SDS Executive Board

4 were very worried. I saw that on their faces. I assume that they were

5 even more afraid of the SOS than the others.

6 Q. Was there any discussion about a Crisis Staff?

7 A. When they accepted this initiative, or rather, when they

8 discussed it, since Mr. Rasula knew that I had seen Zupljanin, he asked

9 me what Zupljanin had to say. Although I never told him why I met with

10 Mr. Zupljanin, I responded by saying that Mr. Zupljanin wanted this to be

11 done in a peaceful way if possible. I didn't say anything other than

12 that, and that is when some of them said that a Crisis Staff needs to be

13 set up and this Njunja, as a kind of SOS leader, said, "We have a

14 proposal for the Crisis Staff as well." So not only did they come with a

15 proposal for the ultimatum, they also came with a proposal for the Crisis

16 Staff and then he read this proposal. Once the Crisis Staff was set up,

17 the Executive Board of the SDA [as interpreted] decided to start

18 negotiations with the SDS -- SDA and the HDZ about a peaceful split, and

19 this is what happened in the days afterwards.

20 Q. Thanks. There's just one aspect of your answer that I'd like you

21 to clarify for the Trial Chamber. Rasula asks you what happened between

22 you and Zupljanin. You responded by saying that Mr. Zupljanin wanted

23 this to be done in a peaceful way. What? What was to be done?

24 A. Given that these men came with an ultimatum, they had to accept

25 this ultimatum, but they were nevertheless waiting for me to come and see

Page 3139

1 what news I had. And when I said that Mr. Zupljanin --

2 Q. Mr. Majkic --

3 A. [Previous translation continued] ... asked for this to be done by

4 -- in peaceful way if possible --

5 Q. Mr. Majkic, my question is simple. There's no need -- it's very

6 simple. It's only this, it's only this. You said that Mr. Zupljanin

7 wanted this to be done in a peaceful way if possible. What did he want

8 to be done in a peaceful way?

9 A. I said that Mr. Zupljanin wanted them to do it in a peaceful way,

10 the thing that they had planned. I was never thinking about how and

11 what. When they said that they intended to take over the public security

12 station - and despite all our discussions and thinking - he did ask me to

13 have it done in a peaceful way. How? The only peaceful way is through

14 negotiations. What I said was sufficient for the SDS to decide to enter

15 the negotiations with the SDA and HDZ about division of power and

16 peaceful separation.

17 Q. Thanks. We'll get on to the SDS and SDA later, but just focus on

18 the meeting now at the parish building.

19 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, in fact, perhaps what I'll do is just ask

20 that the witness be shown P60.13, which is the diary that we've looked at

21 earlier.

22 Q. And I want to ask you about entries that appear at page 13 of the

23 English, and that in the B/C/S are exactly 16 pages into the document, so

24 it's 16 pages in. It's a handwritten document.

25 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours just give me a moment. I've got

Page 3140

1 to make sure that I've got the right portion of the B/C/S.

2 [Prosecution counsel confer]

3 MR. DI FAZIO: On the B/C/S I think it carries the date

4 26 November in print at the top. I think that's the correct part in the

5 B/C/S, which I think -- page 32. I'm told it's page 32.

6 Q. Now, I think you can see it there -- I hope you can. I'm

7 referring to an entry dated the 14th of April, 1992, and heading above

8 that says:

9 "Course of action in taking over power and establishing the

10 Serbian municipality of Sanski Most."

11 Can you see that?

12 A. I can't see that in the B/C/S version.

13 Q. I think it might be --

14 A. Yes, yes, now I see it.

15 Q. Got it?

16 A. "Course of action of taking over power ..." --

17 Q. Thanks --

18 A. [Previous translation continues] ... "and establishing Serbian

19 municipality of Sanski Most."

20 Q. Thanks. I apologise for that delay. Right.

21 Now I want to ask you about that entry. It says -- it refers to

22 a radical mode of attaining objectives being undertaken. Do you know

23 what reference that might be to -- to what that might be referring?

24 A. I can't read this. If you can read it out for me, then I'll try

25 to answer your question.

Page 3141

1 Q. All right. It says:

2 "Following extensive and continuous inter-party agreements based

3 on the principles, based on electorally agreed on regulations, and on

4 basis of electoral results dictated by political events in Yugoslavia and

5 Bosnia, a radical mode of attaining objectives has been

6 undertaken ..."

7 Have you any idea what that radical -- what those objectives

8 might be?

9 A. I really can't answer that. You should ask the author of this.

10 I really don't know what kind of answer I can give you. I have no answer

11 at all.

12 Q. All right. Can we go down to point 4, and I think we can see it

13 there on the B/C/S in front of our screens. Point 4 in the B/C/S. It

14 says:

15 "The Crisis Staff consisting of the following members shall be in

16 charge of all actions ..."

17 Thank you. All right. Now, you can see all of the names, some

18 of them you've mentioned. And you're mentioned there. Were you on the

19 crisis --

20 A. I see that, yes.

21 Q. Okay. Simple question: Were you on the Crisis Staff? Can you

22 account for that entry?

23 A. Well, when the SOS suggested -- rather, Njunja suggested and read

24 their proposal about establishing a Crisis Staff, this proposal, apart

25 from Rasula and Vrkes and myself, it included also Dr. Nikolic. But

Page 3142

1 Rasula and Vrkes were not in the SOS proposal. So when they read their

2 proposal, there were eight of us excluding Vrkes and Rasula. After that

3 I immediately got up and said that I -- and offered some explanation why

4 I wouldn't like to be on it. The same happened with Dr. Nikolic. He

5 gave some kind of explanation, and it was immediately accepted by the

6 SOS. After that, Vlado Vrkes, as the SDS president, got up and proposed

7 that he and Rasula should become part of the Crisis Staff based on their

8 posts and positions. The SOS accepted that, and then the executive

9 committee of the SDS party took a decision to adopt this proposal. That

10 is how the Crisis Staff was established, without me, and the last one,

11 not Nikolic Zvonko, but his name was actually Nikolic Viko.

12 Probably Mr. Rasula had some instructions from the top, that is

13 to say from Mr. Karadzic, about who should be on the Crisis Staff and

14 that should have included the chief of police. I didn't know that, and

15 that is why I proposed that I should be excused. I think that Rasula

16 knew that, and that is why he put me on the list. That could probably be

17 found in some SDS records. That's the only explanation of how my name

18 got there.

19 Q. Okay. Thanks for explaining that.

20 You mentioned that Vlado Vrkes and Boro -- sorry, not you. The

21 document mentioned Vlado Vrkes and Boro Savanovic are there to conduct

22 negotiations with the SDA from 10.00 to 1.30.

23 Do you know what negotiations they were tasked with?

24 A. I don't think it was Vrkes and Savanovic. I think that Rasula,

25 Savanovic, and a third member - I'm not quite sure - were tasked with

Page 3143

1 this assignment. But it was Savanovic and the other one who met with the

2 SDA and HDZ. The very following day, they decided to split in a peaceful

3 way because they had been informed about what happened on our side the

4 day before, and I think the dead-line was --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness is kindly asked

6 to slow down, please.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The dead-line was the 17th of

8 April, noon. And I think that after that they started dividing the

9 villages and everything else.

10 MR. DI FAZIO:

11 Q. All right. Negotiations are mentioned there to last until about

12 half past 1.00 in the afternoon, and then it describes a process that is

13 to start at 2.00 in the afternoon. And that is measures taken in

14 relation to the building and public -- police employees. It says that

15 entrances and stairwells and so on shall be secured by reliable men. The

16 6th Krajina Brigade is going to lend a hand by providing a platoon of

17 reservists. Full alert of the 6th Krajina Brigade. And the building is

18 to be secured from within by the national defence secretariat, and the

19 Crisis Staff is to have a liaison man, namely Braco Papric. Do you

20 recall all of those plans being discussed?

21 A. I didn't attend these negotiations at all. The Wednesday 15 --

22 14th and Thursday the 15th, the commander and I went to the municipal

23 building where these negotiations were taking place to see how they

24 progressed. The second or the first day we arrived, we were told that

25 there was an agreement but there was some outstanding matters. So I

Page 3144

1 don't know what they actually agreed, and I don't know if the 6th Krajina

2 Brigade was mentioned in these negotiations at all.

3 Q. Thanks. I'm not talking about the next day or negotiations.

4 We'll get on to that in due course, and you can tell us about that. I'm

5 just talking about the meeting there in the parish house next to the

6 Orthodox church. This document says at that meeting, that various

7 measures were planned. Negotiations lasting until 1.30, and then at 2.00

8 in the afternoon a session of the public service employees begins at 2.00

9 and various matters are to be taken care of, entrances and stairwells and

10 the warehouse secured, et cetera. You can see them written there. Were

11 those measures discussed at the meeting, while you were present anyway?

12 A. Well, you have to tell me exactly what meeting you're referring

13 to, what is written here --

14 Q. The meeting on the 14th are -- when you came back, having met

15 Mr. Zupljanin earlier that day, and you went to the parish house where

16 the SOS were and the 6th Krajina intelligence guy was and SDS Executive

17 Board, that meeting.

18 A. As far as I remember - and I remember very well - when I came

19 there an usher asked me what had Zupljanin said, and I responded as I

20 did. The Crisis Staff was set up on the spot and the SDS and its

21 executive committee decided to establish a commission to conduct

22 negotiations, and that is where the meeting ended. Whether this -- these

23 things happened in the one and a half hours that it last before I

24 arrived, I don't know. When I arrived -- and this second part of the

25 meeting that I attended ended very quickly with all these decisions

Page 3145

1 taking place.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 MR. DI FAZIO: Your Honours, do you propose to take a break

4 shortly? Because this might be a good moment to.

5 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]

6 Are you saying that your next line is going to take longer than

7 five minutes?

8 MR. DI FAZIO: No, but I can continue if you wish. I'm not quite

9 sure what time you would like to take the break.

10 JUDGE HALL: 10.25 is the usual.

11 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay. All right.

12 Can we go to the English page 15 of the document. That's an

13 entry dated after the 17th of April. I'm not entirely sure where it is

14 in the B/C/S.

15 Q. But I'll read it out to you and -- anyway, I'll read it out to

16 you. It's an entry saying:

17 "Responsibilities and implementation of agreed actions from

18 17 April 1992.

19 "Carry out separation of the police forces by 1200 hours.

20 Dragan Majkic in charge."

21 Were you tasked with any particular responsibility relating to

22 separation of police forces?

23 A. On the 15th and the 16th, negotiations took place. At about 2.00

24 or 2.30 on the 16th when the commander -- I arrived at the building and

25 asked them if they had made any agreements, they told us, yes, but there

Page 3146

1 was some unresolved things. Then we went home. In the evening at around

2 2300 hours, after I'd gone to bed, the telephone rang and somebody called

3 me from the Crisis Staff to come to a house that was a couple of hundred

4 metres from the police station and that I had been summoned by the Crisis

5 Staff. I went there, and I saw that all members of the Crisis Staff were

6 there. I didn't want to interrupt what they were discussing.

7 I just sat down and listened to what they were talking about. They were

8 planning to attack the police building. I suddenly interrupted them and

9 said, "Excuse me, what is this that you are planning?" I think that it

10 was Vrkes who chaired this meeting, judging by the way where he was

11 sitting. He said that, "We have to attack the police building." I asked

12 him, "How can you do that? Because at any moment I always have 20 people

13 outside and 20 people, fully armed people, inside the building." And he

14 said, "We have to." And I said, "Why?" He said, "The negotiations had

15 failed. Once we agreed everything else, the only outstanding, unresolved

16 issue, was the police building. We offered them to move to the Sip

17 building and that we retain the present building. However, they refused

18 that, but they insist of having the police building for them, one floor

19 should belong to them, and the other to us. And since this failed, I

20 said we have to attack."

21 On that Thursday I already had the information that the Muslim

22 and Croat policemen who already had collected all their personal stuff

23 and took them home were saying openly because -- saying openly that they

24 were not coming back because everybody knew that the division was to take

25 place the following day. I told Vrkes, "Please don't attack. There's no

Page 3147

1 need for that. I will agree with the commander for a split in order to

2 avoid this." He was very happy that I suggested that because he,

3 himself, was completely frightened. He was pallid, just like everybody

4 else. I looked at them while they were discussing this, but I just saw

5 that they were frozen with fear. They were just relieved to hear what I

6 wanted to suggest.

7 They immediately accepted my proposal not to launch an attack at

8 5.00 a.m. the next morning and to allow me to agree with the police to

9 split in a peaceful way, and that is where this meeting ended.

10 Q. What precisely was terrifying the Crisis Staff?

11 A. Well, it's not an easy thing to enter into a conflict and attack

12 police at that. When I asked them who's going to attack with them they

13 said, "SOS." I told them I had 20 people fully armed outside the

14 building and 20 fully armed people inside the building. How do you think

15 you can do that? But he said and his voice was shivering, he said, "We

16 must do that." And I said that, "Let me settle this with the commander."

17 And Vrkes told Majkic, "If you manage to pull this through, I will be in

18 debt to you for the rest of my life. And it's on my -- I'll take you to

19 a restaurant, my treat."

20 Q. So presumably the Crisis Staff was looking for any solution to

21 avoid an armed attack and jumped at your offer to negotiate; I understand

22 correctly?

23 A. As I said, it was really something out of the heaven. They were

24 relieved immediately and they were not in such a bad mood as they had

25 been when I arrived.

Page 3148

1 Q. Thank you. And perhaps one last question before I leave this

2 topic, and then I imagine the break. Presumably the Crisis Staff, then,

3 and not the SOS, was in a position to decide if and when an attack would

4 take place, because they delayed it once you made your offer; correct?

5 A. There was no one from the SOS at that meeting. That was the

6 Crisis Staff. I'm talking about the meeting in the evening, the Crisis

7 Staff and no one else.

8 Q. Thanks. But from what you've told us, it's clear, isn't it, that

9 the SOS -- sorry, the S -- the Crisis Staff was the body calling the

10 shots on when the attack should take place, from what you've said?

11 MR. PANTELIC: Objection. It's -- first of all, I think it's

12 time for a break, and then after that my learned friend can rephrase the

13 question because it's two-fold, multi-fold, it's loaded. It's unclear,

14 the question.

15 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, I was trying to clarify evidence that

16 occurred earlier -- that came earlier this morning concerning the

17 influence of the SOS on this body. And now we've had some evidence from

18 the witness to the effect that the Crisis Staff is deciding on times for

19 the attack, an attack in which the SOS is to participate. Now, it's

20 those two pieces of evidence that I'm trying to get a further

21 understanding of. That's why I asked that question. I want to know who

22 it was.

23 JUDGE HALL: Perhaps we could return to this after the break

24 because it struck me that the objection would not have been as

25 Mr. Pantelic articulated it, but that it was having regard to the

Page 3151

1 I'm aware, dictating what this particular witness did. So I don't need

2 to pursue the question any further.

3 Q. Thanks. We were talking about Thursday night, the 16th of April,

4 and you talked about this meeting. Was -- just final clarification on

5 the meeting. Was every member of the Crisis Staff present from what you

6 can recall?

7 A. Yes. I think they were all there. To the best of my

8 recollection, they were there.

9 Q. Thanks. And I might have asked you this before but I just want

10 to be absolutely clear, there were no SOS members present at the meeting?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Now the following day, that's the 17th, did you go to the police

13 station?

14 A. Well, that morning I came to work at the usual time, 7.30 or 7.00

15 perhaps.

16 Q. All right. Did you discuss anything with Enver Burnic, the man

17 who was your commander of police?

18 A. When I came to work, first I looked through the reports to see

19 what had happened the previous 24 hours, reports that the duty officer

20 put on my desk, and then I invited him to talk. When he came, I informed

21 him about everything and I told him, "Commander, just so that we don't

22 provide any provocation for a conflict, as some people seem to expect, I

23 give you approval that you, Croat and Muslim policemen, take leave until

24 Monday morning to force the SDS to accept what Mr. Vrkes had told me

25 about, that proposal that Sip building be given to them as a location for

Page 3152

1 their bodies. I will put pressure on the SDS to clean out the building

2 until Monday morning, the beginning of working hours, so that you can

3 resume work normally on Monday there. And in the event that the SDS

4 fails to vacate the Sip building, then on Monday you come here to work

5 normally, business as usual."

6 The commander liked the proposal. He accepted it willingly. He

7 seemed happy. And then suddenly he jumped from the chair and said, "I

8 have to call the SDA to ask them." I told him, "Enver, don't," because I

9 thought the SDA would not accept it. It was just a hunch. So I told

10 him, "Don't do that, please. Let's do as we agreed. I hope it's for the

11 best." But then he told me, "I really have to call the SDA." He went to

12 his office, he called, came back, and said, "The SDA ordered me not to

13 leave this building." I told him very frankly, "I told you not to call

14 them because now you have to do as they say."

15 So we went on talking and then at 8.30 Colonel Basara came into

16 the office, and as soon as he sat down he said, "I came here to prevent

17 an inter-ethnic conflict. I will not have any inter-ethnic conflict here

18 in town."

19 So we went on talking and we were happy that he joined our effort

20 to prevent the conflict, and for a full three hours he kept sitting in my

21 office and we kept talking until 11.30. Around 11.00, the duty officer

22 from downstairs called me and there was a Muslim officer on duty that

23 day. That policeman asked me whether to go home now or to wait for -- to

24 wait until 12.00. And I told him, "Whatever you decide. It's up to

25 you." I don't actually know what they decided.

Page 3153

1 At that time there was only Enver Burnic and that policeman in

2 the duty room. They were the only Muslims there. Enver left the police

3 building around 11.30, and by that time the SOS were already deployed

4 around the police building. I don't know how he could have failed to see

5 them as he was leaving the police building. He must have seen them and

6 he should have intervened. Did he ever wonder what they were doing

7 there? I can't answer for him of course.

8 But then the commander and I stayed in my office and kept

9 talking, and then at about five to 12.00 two policemen came to my office

10 and told us, "The police downstairs are demanding a meeting. The

11 employees are demanding a meeting." I looked at him uncomprehendingly

12 and said, "Which employees?" And he said, "Everyone, Serbs, Muslims,

13 Croats." It seemed quite illogical to me if at 11.00 there were only the

14 commander and that other Muslim in the duty room. What employees? But

15 anyway we went down and it was true, everyone was in the hall. So I

16 addressed these people and told them all the same things that I told the

17 commander. I put forward my proposal, and everyone accepted it gladly,

18 just as the commander had, they all agreed. But for some reason, they

19 did not dare to leave the building; why, I don't know.

20 So we were stuck. People began telling jokes. I know the

21 commander always had his passport in his breast pocket, and as soon as

22 his banter started, he took it out and said, "I'm always ready to run."

23 At exactly 3.00, Rasula came through the door and pointed at his

24 watch, looking at me. And he tells me, "Majkic, the separation was

25 planned for 3.00." And I said, "We were just talking about that." And

Page 3154

1 he says, "What is there to talk about? You were supposed to be separated

2 by noon. All those who want to stay in this building and work had to

3 sign this declaration. Those who won't have to leave."

4 Then Zikrija Bahtic got up --

5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter does not understand this.

6 Could the witness slow down and repeat.

7 MR. DI FAZIO:

8 Q. Slow down. Slow down. Slow down. The interpreters can't hear

9 you.

10 A. When Rasula said that a separation had been agreed, then this

11 Zikrija Bahtic got up and said, "Is that so, President?" And Rasula

12 said, "That's what we agreed." And at that, everyone got to their feet

13 and left.

14 Q. Thank you. Did you see a gentleman named Tomo Delic that day?

15 A. As soon as they were gone, Delic who was alone or with someone, I

16 think he was with someone, came into the room and said, "Don't even think

17 of any -- putting up any opposition. We'll put the Serbian flag on the

18 police building." And I told him, half jokingly, "You are the only one

19 who dare do such a thing." And that's what they did.

20 Q. Thanks. Was a member of the executive board, SDS Executive

21 Board?

22 A. I think he was a member of the Executive Board because he was

23 always present at those meetings. I can't remember all 25 of them.

24 Q. Thanks --

25 A. But I think he was a member of the Executive Board.

Page 3155

1 Q. Thank you. Did you do anything in respect of the berets and the

2 declaration, the oaths, or declarations, or whatever they were

3 concerning -- that you'd been given?

4 A. After the Croat and Muslim policemen left, we remained on our

5 own. I went to my office and everyone followed me. I thought at the

6 moment that the separation had taken place, and all those berets that

7 were still in the boot in my car, I had one policeman fetch them together

8 with the solemn declarations. And that policeman brought them. And then

9 we proceeded to sign these solemn declarations, and everyone who signed

10 got this beret with insignia on it --

11 Q. Thank you --

12 A. [Previous translation continues] ... two Croats were left at that

13 time --

14 Q. Thanks. How did you know to distribute the declarations and the

15 berets at that point?

16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Mr. Di Fazio, I wouldn't like to

17 interfere, but I believe the witness wanted to say something else, and he

18 was cut in the middle of a sentence.

19 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut him off, but I am

20 conscious of time. And -- but --

21 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand.

22 MR. DI FAZIO: I'll make sure that the witness --

23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.

24 MR. DI FAZIO: -- fulfils his answer.

25 Q. I cut you off. You were talking about the solemn declarations

Page 3156

1 and everyone who signed the beret -- and everybody who signed got a beret

2 with insignia. Did you want to say anything more about that particular

3 topic?

4 A. I was about to say this: As I was to distribute these berets,

5 the policemen said, "Vlado Lopar," one of the two Croats who remained,

6 "wants to be the first to sign." And I said, "No problem." So this

7 Vlado Lopar signed the solemn declaration and received a beret, and then

8 they all followed, one by one. All those who remained in the building,

9 in other words, signed.

10 Q. Thanks. Can you just tell the Trial Chamber what it was that

11 triggered you at that point to go and get the berets and the

12 declarations.

13 A. Well, at that moment I was aware that the separation had

14 happened. There was an inter-party agreement between SDS on one hand and

15 the HDZ and the SDA on the other hand. They had all agreed on this

16 dead-line, 12.00.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 A. Whichever way, it did happen. Mr. Rasula was practically in

19 charge.

20 Q. Thank you. Witness, we want to --

21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm not -- there is an

22 intervention in transcript. 39, line 13, I believe the witness gave

23 the -- "they had all agreed on this dead-line," and he gave the date as

24 well and the time.

25 MR. DI FAZIO:

Page 3157

1 Q. What was the date of the dead-line for the separation?

2 A. 17 April, 12.00.

3 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you now, Witness, we're going to move to

4 another topic, to keep your answers as brief as you can. We've got

5 limited time, and we need to try and wrap this up.

6 How far away -- just give us a short answer. How far away is the

7 municipality building from the police station?

8 A. Around 300 metres.

9 Q. Thank you. Direct your mind to Saturday, 18 April 1992. Did

10 anything happen in relation to that building?

11 A. On that day, Friday, the 17th -- in fact, in the small hours on

12 the Saturday after, around 1.00 a.m., Muslim and Croat policemen headed

13 by the HDZ and SDA respectively went into the municipal building and took

14 it over. They made their base there and said it was their building now,

15 and that's where they would locate their bodies.

16 Q. During that day, the Saturday, did you go to the building?

17 A. That morning the police called me up and informed me of what had

18 happened. I had just come to work and I was waiting -- in fact, I don't

19 know what I was waiting for, but these people from the Crisis Staff also

20 came. And they were going to the municipal building to negotiate with

21 those HDZ and SDA people. And that Saturday, once or twice I stopped by

22 this large office where many policemen were sitting. I sat down with

23 them, had a drink, we talked, and we were waiting for the outcome of

24 these negotiations. By that time the Crisis Staff was leading the whole

25 thing and the HDZ or -- and the SDA. In fact, I'm not sure whether the

Page 3158

1 SDS was negotiating with the Croats and Muslims or the Crisis Staff. In

2 any case, I was sitting there in the room of the policemen.

3 Q. Thank you. Did these negotiations continue over the Saturday and

4 into the Sunday? Just answer yes or no.

5 A. Saturday and Sunday the negotiations lasted.

6 Q. Thank you. Turn your mind now to the events of Sunday night,

7 Sunday, 19 of April, please. On that night did you see Mr. Rasula?

8 A. Around 8.00, Mr. Rasula came to my office and Boro Savanovic from

9 the Crisis Staff and Mirko Vrucinic, the three of them came to my office.

10 Mr. Rasula sat down in my chair, and there was a discussion about these

11 negotiations, that they had talked, that they had failed to agree. I

12 don't remember the details. Anyway, that's what the discussion was

13 about. It lasted until about 9.00 p.m., and then at 9.00 p.m. Rasula

14 took the -- picked up the receiver and said, "Now I'm going to give them

15 an ultimatum that they have to leave the building until" --

16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the hour.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Until 10.00." The SDA president

18 took the call and Rasula told him, "If you don't vacate the building by

19 10.00, we will take the building over." And he hung up. Around 10.00

20 Mirko Vrucinic went to the municipal building to see what was going on.

21 At 20 to 10.00 the telephone rang. Mr. Rasula picked up the phone and

22 somebody informed him that SDA and HDZ members had left the building, but

23 the police remained inside. Hearing that conversation, I intervened with

24 Mr. Rasula immediately and warned him that the police was probably not

25 informed of the ultimatum; they were not aware of it. I picked up the

Page 3159

1 phone. I called the police room and Commander Burnic answered. I asked

2 him, "Enver, do you know about the ultimatum?" He said, "What

3 ultimatum?" I told him, "At 10.00 the building will be attacked.

4 Collect your men and leave the building." He said, "Fine," and hung up.

5 At ten to 10.00 the telephone rang again. Rasula answered and somebody

6 told him that the commander and another three men left the building, got

7 into one police car that they had taken, and two other men who had driven

8 their own cars to work also left. The others were still in the building.

9 At 10.00, when shooting started, those who were still inside the

10 building were probably frightened because the SOS was already on the

11 other side of the building. They did not dare escape that way, so they

12 jumped through the window and ran in the opposite direction. That way at

13 10.00 there was no one left in the building, just the guard. There was

14 not much shooting. I don't think any bullets actually hit the building.

15 Most of the shooting was in the air. The guard was crouching in a

16 corner, terrified.

17 Then Rasula got another call around 10.30 and somebody told him,

18 "President, here I am, I'm sitting in your office." So it was all over.

19 I went home around 11.00.

20 Q. Thanks. And was a Zolja rocket-propelled grenade weapon used?

21 A. Well, first of all, one Zolja was heard. An SOS man did not want

22 to shoot at the building. He was shooting at a tree next to the

23 entrance. He did that on purpose. He didn't want to shoot at the

24 building because they probably knew there was no one inside.

25 Q. Okay. So essentially there was -- I'll withdraw that question.

Page 3160

1 MR. DI FAZIO: I want to show the witness a document, please,

2 it's 65 ter 597.

3 Q. Okay. Well, we can see it's a Crisis Staff document. It's dated

4 20 April 1992, and it's gone to the chief of Public Security Service in

5 Banja Luka and a Serbian newspaper agency. Who was the chief of Public

6 Security Service Banja Luka at that time?

7 A. Zupljanin.

8 Q. Thanks. And it's an announcement, and it says - and I'm looking

9 at the third paragraph - that:

10 "The Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most is

11 of the opinion that force had to be used during the liberation of the

12 Sanski Most Municipal Assembly building from armed formations of the

13 extreme faction of the SDA leadership. Long and exhausting talks simply

14 failed to bear fruit."

15 Now, do you recall any such announcement being made by the

16 Crisis Staff?

17 A. I don't remember this being proclaimed, but it probably was. It

18 could have been in the newspapers, on the radio, but I wasn't aware of

19 it.

20 Q. Thank you. And --

21 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, I seek to tender the document into evidence,

22 if Your Honours please.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P356, Your Honours.

Page 3161

1 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay.

2 Can the witness be shown 65 ter 602.

3 Q. Witness, I'd like to get through this document as swiftly as we

4 can because we're -- got time constraints. So I'd just like to ask you

5 to answer a few questions about this document and be as brief as you can.

6 It's dated 22nd of April, 1992, and it's got -- it's apparently signed by

7 the Crisis Staff. And I think if we look at the bottom of the B/C/S you

8 can see a stamp there, Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina, Sanski Most Municipal Board.

10 Now, the document, firstly -- some of the names here you've

11 already spoken about, and we know some of their names, Ned Rasula,

12 Vrucinic, Vrkes, Savanovic. There's a man there named Mile Gutes, and

13 paragraph 3 concerns his assignment at Sanski Most Serbian radio station.

14 All I want to know is very simple thing, I don't want a big long

15 explanation, all I want to know is do you know of a gentleman actually

16 named Mile Gutes, and was he in some way connected with radio in Sanski

17 Most? That's all I want to know, nothing more.

18 A. Well, he was the husband of one of our employees who worked on

19 ID cards, and at that time I had heard that he was enlisted to become the

20 director of the radio station because he was a Muslim.

21 Q. Right. Thank you --

22 A. Even if he was in that position, I think he didn't stay there for

23 long.

24 Q. Thank you. One other name that we may not have mentioned to the

25 Trial Chamber thus far is in paragraph 5. Vrucinic is mentioned again

Page 3162

1 and then Mladen Lukic. Who was Mladen Lukic?

2 A. Well, he was a member of the Crisis Staff, a lawyer by

3 profession. He worked for the utility company in charge of general

4 affairs there.

5 Q. Thanks. Go to paragraph 6.

6 "The Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most

7 adopts a conclusion that the Serbian defence forces are to be placed at

8 the disposal of the commander of the Serbian Territorial Defence and

9 engaged as a special unit ..."

10 Is that a reference to the SOS, the Serbian defence forces?

11 A. It says clearly Serbian defence forces, therefore SOS -- but it's

12 not clear to me how come that all of a sudden a paramilitary unit is

13 attached to the Territorial Defence because all of them were fighters

14 with the 6th Krajina Brigade. I don't know how this decision was taken.

15 Maybe Colonel Basara wanted to get rid of them, but I find this decision

16 rather odd. But yes, at that time they were attached to the Serbian

17 Territorial Defence.

18 Q. Okay. So on the face of it, on the face of it, this document

19 would indicate that the Crisis Staff was able to exert control over the

20 SOS?

21 A. Well, probably they decided to put them under their control,

22 because before that they were not under the control, and with decision

23 they were put under the control and they ceased to be paramilitary unit,

24 if they were one, and to become part of regular forces.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 3163

1 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I seek to tender that

2 document into evidence. In support of my application, he's made -- the

3 witness has given esoteric information that tends to bolster the

4 authenticity of the document. The evidence relating to Gutes, his some

5 somewhat particular occupation. It's got a stamp on it as well. And the

6 characters are all men that he has discussed and spoken about.

7 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P357, Your Honours.

9 MR. DI FAZIO: Thanks.

10 Q. Let's move along swiftly.

11 The following day, Monday, that's Monday, the 20th of April, did

12 you go to Banja Luka?

13 A. No. I don't know whether I went to Banja Luka on the second or

14 the third day to see Mr. Zupljanin, but I doubt it was on the second day.

15 So it would be a few days after these events that I went to see him.

16 Q. Thank you. Whenever it was, whether it was the -- Monday or the

17 second or third day, what did you discuss with him?

18 A. I simply went there to inform him about everything that had taken

19 place and how it all went. I know that he was very glad that it was

20 finished in a peaceful way. He was very satisfied that it went

21 peacefully without shooting.

22 Q. And he was satisfied with what in particular, the taking over of

23 the police station and the municipality building or just one or both?

24 A. I don't know what he was satisfied with, but as I say, that it

25 went without any shooting except for a few shots fired around the

Page 3164

1 municipality building. He was happy to see that no one was injured or

2 hurt. He was extremely happy that there were no casualties incurred.

3 Q. Did he give you any instructions?

4 A. I don't recall him giving me any instructions. I simply informed

5 him that the entire territory of the municipality was covered by the

6 active-duty police force; that the situation was very quiet and there

7 were no problems; and that I had erected certain check-points, were only

8 meant to check vehicles not citizens. Therefore, the police work as such

9 went as usual, only with reinforced numbers. And all through to May I

10 don't recall any incident or any problem arising or any complaints coming

11 from the citizens to me. So everything was under control and people went

12 to work normally. I'm not sure only about that first Monday after the

13 event, but the day after, when we saw that the situation was back to

14 normal, everybody came to work, the employees, the supervisors, and

15 everything else. It all lasted until the 1st of May.

16 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you now about the period of time

17 between Monday, the 20th -- yes, Monday, the 20th, and Thursday, the 30th

18 of April, 1992, that period of time. You told us already that you

19 started to carry out your police work. In that time, did a gentleman

20 named Simo Drljaca visit the police in Sanski Most?

21 A. I know that it happened five or six days later or three or four

22 days later. Anyway, the Crisis Staff called me to attend a meeting in

23 that period. When I arrived there, I saw representatives from Prijedor,

24 one of them was Simo Drljaca. I don't remember who the other one was.

25 And Vinko Kondic from Kljuc, the chief from Kljuc, had come accompanied

Page 3165

1 by somebody from the SDS. So there were about four or five new faces on

2 the Crisis Staff.

3 The meeting --

4 Q. Can I just interrupt you. Could you just explain to the

5 Trial Chamber what occupation and position Simo Drljaca and Vinko Kondic

6 held.

7 A. Vinko Kondic was the chief of the Kljuc SJB, and Simo Drljaca was

8 in Prijedor, he was a lawyer not working for the police. That's all I

9 know.

10 Q. Okay. And what did -- okay, please, go on and explain to the

11 Trial Chamber what these men were here for -- were there for, and in

12 particular what Drljaca was there for.

13 A. They came there simply to see the model of how we took over

14 power, in order to apply the same model in their municipality. So after

15 this lengthy explanation, they went away without comprehending at all how

16 we did it, and I noticed they were really not happy with that, how was it

17 possible for them not to do what we did, because they didn't understand a

18 thing. And that is why later on in Prijedor during the take over of

19 power, a lot of policemen got killed.

20 Q. So they weren't very pleased with your model of taking over and

21 they went on -- they had their own, as events later bore out?

22 A. Well, they were not displeased with our model. They only

23 couldn't understand how we managed to reach this outcome. It was

24 impossible for them to do that, not in a million years. They probably

25 wanted to apply the same model, having seen that there were no

Page 3166

1 casualties, and they wanted to do it the same way; but it was impossible

2 under their circumstances, in their situation. That's as much as I can

3 tell you.

4 Q. Okay. Thanks.

5 Boro Savanovic is a relative of yours, is he not?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. And we're still focusing on those ten days, 20 to 30 of

8 April. During that period of time did he give you any information about

9 your -- security of your position as police chief?

10 A. In the course of those ten or so days, I had no idea that the

11 Crisis Staff was meeting, except for the meeting attended by people from

12 Prijedor and Kljuc. However, Boro Savanovic and Nemanja Tripkovic would

13 come to see me every evening and try to persuade me to resign. However,

14 I didn't want to accept that. I had some arguments with them, some

15 light-hearted arguments, I have to say, and then on the evening of the

16 29th, when they came again to try to persuade me, and I again told them

17 that I didn't want to withdraw, Boro Savanovic, a relative of mine, told

18 me, "Man, if you don't resign, they're going to kill you." Then I

19 realised how serious it was, and then on the following day when they

20 called me to the Crisis Staff I told them that I was willing to resign.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 MR. DI FAZIO: Can the witness be shown 65 ter 2366. Yes, 2366.

23 Q. Okay. So another Crisis Staff document. This one is indeed

24 dated 29 April, and -- I only want to direct your attention to two

25 paragraphs in particular. First, paragraph 5. And it says:

Page 3167

1 "In connection with appointing the chief of the public security

2 station and the functioning of the Sanski Most STO, Nedeljko Rasula and

3 Nedjo Anicic are instructed to visit Banja Luka."

4 Do you know anything about that?

5 A. I don't.

6 Q. And paragraph 4 above says:

7 "That a sharp statement to be issued on punishment in connection

8 with the disarming of paramilitary formations in Sanski Most ..." and

9 that your relative Savanovic was in charge of this. Do you know anything

10 about that?

11 A. I don't remember. I wasn't at that meeting. I know nothing

12 about these decisions. I didn't even know before the 30th of April that

13 the Crisis Staff was meeting occasionally. Therefore, I cannot comment

14 on that.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 MR. DI FAZIO: And can we just scroll down on the B/C/S version

17 and perhaps look to the next page of the B/C/S version and the page after

18 that, please. Thank you.

19 Q. This document has got a stamp there. Do you recognise that

20 stamp?

21 A. Well, that resembles a stamp of the Serbian Democratic Party, at

22 least the coat of arms that I see in the middle. Around that, it's a bit

23 blurred. I cannot read it.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. DI FAZIO: I seek to tender that document into evidence.

Page 3168

1 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and --

2 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, objection, because -- I turn to

3 Serbian.

4 [Interpretation] The witness did not identify a single portion of

5 this document, nor did he admit to knowing anything about these

6 meeting -- about these decisions. And he also knew nothing about the

7 meetings taking place, therefore there is no nexus between what is said

8 in the document and the testimony given by this witness.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE HALL: Yes, the document is marked for identification.

11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P358, marked for identification,

12 Your Honours.

13 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.

14 Can the witness be shown 65 ter 1846, 1846. All right.

15 Q. All right. This document is ...

16 [Prosecution counsel confer]

17 MR. DI FAZIO: Would Your Honours just bear with me for one

18 moment, please.

19 Thanks. While we're waiting for any problems to be sorted out in

20 relation to that document, I can move on to 606, 65 ter 606. Okay.

21 Q. Again, on the face of it a Crisis Staff document. This one's

22 dated 30th of April, conclusions of the Crisis Staff. And the one that

23 concerns you is paragraph 2. And it says that:

24 "The Crisis Staff ... hereby appoints and certifies that

25 Mirko Vrucinic is going to start his job as acting chief of the public

Page 3169

1 security station ... from the 1st of May ... at 9.00 ..." and that they

2 undertake to find a position for you. Does that correspond with what, in

3 fact, happened? Did, in fact, Vrucinic start as acting chief of public

4 security station on the 1st of May?

5 A. This Crisis Staff meeting that I was invited to attend was

6 precisely for the purpose of informing me that Vrucinic was to become

7 chief, and I was offered the position of the chief for national defence.

8 However, I told them I didn't want to leave the police force. And then

9 during all these wrangling and during my explaining to them that this was

10 not the way to dismiss them, they didn't want to listen to reason. They

11 just wanted to dismiss me. I at least asked them to send a telegram to

12 Zupljanin so that he knows, and then they refused to do that. They even

13 refused to call him by phone. They just said, "Please get up and Mirko

14 will sit in your chair." They offered me different positions, but I

15 refused them. So there was a kind of stalemate. They simply didn't know

16 what to do with me. I, myself, knew, but I didn't want to accept that.

17 So we just sat there staring at each other. When I realised that they

18 didn't know what to do, I told them to tell me to take a five-day annual

19 leave, during which time Vrucinic would find an appropriate position

20 within the public security station that was corresponding to my

21 qualifications. Finally they accepted that, and I decided to resign and

22 I left the meeting. Therefore, I only stayed there while this item was

23 on the agenda, and after it has finished I left.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. DI FAZIO: I seek to tender that document into evidence.

Page 3170

1 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]

2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the President.

3 JUDGE HALL: Sorry.

4 I suppose inasmuch as he was present for part of this, he is

5 saying, that this is slightly a different category from the --

6 MR. DI FAZIO: It is, at least to that extent, and it has got --

7 his evidence accords with paragraph 2 from that basis.

8 JUDGE HALL: Admitted.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P359, Your Honours.

10 MR. DI FAZIO: And could I just quickly show the witness 2741,

11 65 ter 2741.

12 Q. Okay. It's really the first page that I'm interested in, first

13 and last page. So on this page, the first page of this document, which

14 is entitled: "Job specification and employment overview in Sanski Most

15 SJB on 13 May 1992," the first page shows that Mirko Vrucinic is chief

16 from the 4th of May, 1992. Again, without reading out anything just cast

17 your eye down the page, look at those names of those police there,

18 typists, finance, maintenance people, were they all police working in

19 Sanski Most at the time? We know about Vrucinic. I'm talking about the

20 others.

21 A. Yes, they were all the employees working at the police station at

22 the time, at least those on this page.

23 Q. Okay. Thanks. And just go to the very last page, it's the last

24 page on both documents, English and B/C/S. Perhaps the second-to-the --

25 perhaps the second-to-last page of the B/C/S. Yes, I think that's

Page 3171

1 better. It says -- well, first of all, do you recognise those names as

2 employees of the SJB?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Thank you. And we don't need to dwell on this. I can simply

5 lead you through this. On the last page your name appears, it says

6 unassigned and 4th of May, 1992, previously chief, all of that is true.

7 You were in the police and you were previously the chief of police?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MR. DI FAZIO: I tender the document.

11 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P360.

13 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay.

14 Q. Now turn your mind to the period of time after all of these

15 events that you've been talking about, after you were dismissed from your

16 position as police chief. Firstly, do you know of a place in Sanski Most

17 called Betonirka garages?

18 A. Well, Betonirka garages, that was actually company making

19 concrete products. It was close to the public security station, not more

20 than 50 metres. Those were the garages belonging to this company. I

21 suppose you are referring to them, they were close to the road.

22 Q. Yes. Thanks. And do you know of a place called Krings Hall in

23 Sanski Most?

24 A. I do. That was a company established before the war. It was a

25 German company and it was in operation before the war. That's why it was

Page 3172

1 called Krings Hall.

2 Q. And do you know of a sports hall in Sanski Most?

3 A. Yes, I do. It's a town sports hall in Sanski Most.

4 Q. In the months after the end of April, were prisoners taken there,

5 to those places?

6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Honours. Both my

7 and Mr. Pantelic's LiveNotes are not working, therefore we are not in a

8 position to follow both the transcript and the witness's testimony.

9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10 JUDGE HALL: I understand it's a technical problem which is

11 affecting everyone, and they're trying to sort it out now.

12 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I didn't realise.

13 Q. Okay. Sports hall, Krings Hall, and Betonirka. Were those

14 places used to detain prisoners in the months after your dismissal?

15 A. I was not going to work. I only went once a week. As for the

16 Betonirka building, I never went there. I did hear that there were

17 prisoners there. As for the Krings Hall, on the way towards

18 Lusci Palanka, when I was passing by in my car, I could see people inside

19 the hall. I saw a few reservists and soldiers standing guard. I went to

20 the sports hall once to intercede for one young man to get him out of

21 there. I went on that occasion with Nemanja Tripkovic, who was kind of

22 in charge of that hall, humanitarian sort of thing. So when I went to

23 get that young man out, I saw the place. I don't know anything about

24 Betonirka; I never went there.

25 Q. Thanks. What was the ethnicity of the people in those three

Page 3173

1 locations? The prisoners I'm talking about.

2 A. Muslims and Croats -- I mean probably. You know, who else?

3 Q. Right. Thank you. And you said that you interceded on one

4 occasion for a young man. What was the young man's ethnicity?

5 A. Muslim.

6 Q. And were you successful in getting him out?

7 A. He was released a few days later I think -- in fact, I don't

8 think, I know. But, look, those people were from Mahala. There was a

9 sort of skirmish on the 4th. People left the Mahala, there was no one

10 there anymore. People dispersed around town, everybody found

11 accommodation somewhere, and then the army rounded them up around town,

12 put them into the hall, and then they were transported via Bosanska Krupa

13 towards Cazin and Bihac. So I interceded that time for a young man from

14 Mahala. His mother was friends with my wife --

15 Q. Okay. Thanks.

16 A. [Previous translation continues] ... and that was the connection.

17 Q. Thanks. Do you have any recollection who was --

18 MR. ZECEVIC: Again, the witness was cut in the middle of his

19 answer, Your Honours. I believe he should be -- I understand the

20 concerns my friend is having with the time, but I still believe that the

21 witness should be allowed to answer in full. It's --

22 MR. DI FAZIO: No, I understand --

23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.

24 JUDGE HALL: It struck me that the witness was interrupted

25 because he was going off into peripheral information which isn't

Page 3174

1 particularly helpful.

2 MR. DI FAZIO: That's precisely what I was doing. I didn't want

3 to get into the relationship between the mother and the boy, and so on.

4 It just wasn't germane to any of these issues.

5 Q. Were prisoners also taken to the police station?

6 A. At the police station, statements were taken from them -- I mean,

7 as far as I know. I would come once a week only for about a half an hour

8 or an hour. Statements were taken from these people, and if nobody had

9 a -- someone had a record, then they were kept and detained in those

10 facilities. And if you did not have any record, then they were released.

11 Q. What ethnicity were these people?

12 A. Muslims and Croats. I don't know if there were any Serbs among

13 them. That's what I heard from the people in criminal investigations.

14 Q. Was there any problem with accommodating these prisoners at the

15 police station?

16 A. There was a remand facility adjoining the building of the police

17 station, and that's where I heard all the leading people from the SDA and

18 the HDZ and even some policemen were detained.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours. 57 -- page 57, line 3 and

20 4, it's entered into the transcript that somebody who had a record then

21 they were kept and detained in those facilities. I don't think that the

22 witness had said exactly that. Maybe my friend can re-address. Thank

23 you.

24 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.

25 Q. You mentioned earlier, just a moment ago, that -- in answer to

Page 3175

1 the question of whether prisoners were taken to the police station, that

2 you would go there about once a week for an hour and a half, statements

3 were taken from the police -- from these people, and if somebody had a

4 record then they were kept and detained in those facilities. Is that

5 what you said, or has it been misunderstood?

6 A. Well, when they were giving statements, if the investigators

7 found them responsible, liable, for some sort of offence they were kept;

8 others who were found to be clean were released. This was done not only

9 by the police station, the public security station, but also the military

10 police who were based at the police station. I believe that in fact it

11 was the military police who was, in that matter, senior. On the

12 occasions when I stopped by, I heard from the men working in the criminal

13 investigations department that those who were found to be guilty of

14 something were kept, while the others were allowed to go home.

15 Q. Okay. So military police and police were working together

16 insofar as these prisoners were concerned?

17 MR. KRGOVIC: I mean, objection, Your Honour. It's a leading

18 question. The witness didn't say -- said [indiscernible] the senior was

19 the military police. He didn't say they were working together.

20 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay. Perhaps I'll withdraw the question.

21 Q. Let me ask you this: Were the military police interrogating

22 prisoners as were the police?

23 A. Well, I would see them. I saw even some of our own agents who

24 had been retired. They were ex-investigators who were now mobilised by

25 the military police for this work. I saw one such person who was

Page 3176

1 conducting questioning upstairs in one room. He was taking statements

2 for these prisoners at the public security station. The investigators

3 were only helping the military police. The military police was in

4 charge, as far as I can remember my conversations with the investigators

5 from the criminal investigation service.

6 Q. Were police involved in arresting prisoners and feeding them into

7 these detention -- or these places, the police station, sports hall,

8 Krings Hall, and Betonirka?

9 A. I was never able to see any policemen going around and rounding

10 up people, but I did see military police getting out of their cars,

11 walking up to houses and taking people out. I saw the military police

12 doing that. Whether anyone from our police station did the same work, I

13 don't know. I would just drop by once a week to see if a job was found

14 for me, some suitable position, the man would tell me, "No," and I would

15 go home.

16 Q. Where did you see the police -- military police rounding up

17 people?

18 A. Around town, around villages. The village next to me was a

19 Muslim village. I saw a couple of times military police vehicles, four

20 or five military policemen getting out and going up to a house and taking

21 someone out. I saw that more than once.

22 Q. All right. Do you have any --

23 A. I saw Muslims being detained, arrested.

24 Q. Thanks. Do you have any recollection of the police cells

25 becoming full and that triggering the use of Krings Hall, Betonirka? Do

Page 3177

1 you have any recollection of that?

2 A. Of course that was the reason, when this remand facility by the

3 police station was full you couldn't put any more people inside. They

4 probably decided that it was only able to hold up -- to hold a certain

5 number of people, and after that number was reached, first they used

6 Betonirka, and then they involved the Krings Hall as well when Betonirka

7 was full.

8 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to finish up with that document that I

9 referred to earlier --

10 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Di Fazio, it's time for the break.

11 MR. DI FAZIO: Oh -- well, I can indicate -- I think we need to

12 address you about that. I can indicate I've got one minor topic to

13 finish, and that's it.

14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may I just raise the question of what

15 happens tomorrow. It's clear that this witness will go into tomorrow. I

16 understand he's expressed some disquiet, not surprisingly, about the

17 length of time he's been here. This came from VWS. So what we're going

18 to suggest is that this witness, in fact, his cross-examination is

19 completed before we start the videolink. We should still start the

20 videolink tomorrow, but just not at 9.00. I think it would be somewhat

21 unfortunate because the next witness is likely to take a long time -- or

22 certainly longer than this witness.

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: How much time did the Defence ask for?

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: They asked for five hours in total, so we can't

25 do that tomorrow.

Page 3185

1 Cross-examination by Mr. Pantelic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Majkic. My name is

3 Igor Pantelic. I am appearing here for Mr. Zupljanin.

4 A. Nice to meet you.

5 Q. We've already seen each other, it was last week at a meeting

6 organised by the Victims and Witnesses service. We went through a couple

7 of documents and we are going to do so again to clarify certain points

8 that the Prosecutor has questioned you about. One more thing, answer --

9 after each answer, please - and after each question - pause for about

10 five seconds so that both can be interpreted properly.

11 Mr. Majkic, if I remember well, you were appointed as chief of

12 the public security station of Sanski Most sometime in July, more

13 precisely on the 9th of July, 1991?

14 A. Right.

15 Q. And from that time until the 30th of April, 1992, you were chief

16 of the Sanski Most public security station, and as such you attended the

17 so-called expanded meetings of the collegium of the security services

18 centre in Banja Luka at regular intervals?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. At those meetings at the CSB Banja Luka, there were discussions

21 about the state of affairs in and the work of individual police stations

22 within the CSB Banja Luka?

23 A. Not individual police stations, but all police stations were

24 represented at the meetings that took place once a month and were

25 convened by Mr. Zupljanin.

Page 3186

1 Q. And in that whole period while you were chief of the police

2 station in Sanski Most, you had occasion to get to know Mr. Zupljanin.

3 Could you give the Trial Chamber your personal view of Mr. Zupljanin and

4 his professional work as much as you were able to learn about it in that

5 relatively short time.

6 A. Myself, I can say that Mr. Zupljanin, in regard to us who worked

7 in police stations and for most of the citizenry, was an example of a

8 good person and a good policeman. We all appreciated him and held him in

9 high esteem. Whenever any of us had a work-related or even a

10 non-work-related problem, we knew that we could address Mr. Zupljanin

11 personally, come to see him, call him on the phone, and he was always

12 helpful and forthcoming towards everyone. And that's precisely what we

13 respected him for.

14 Q. To your knowledge, did Mr. Zupljanin treat equally all three

15 ethnic communities, given that in the police in that area there were

16 members of all three ethnicities in high positions?

17 A. Whenever I was in contact with him, never ever did I notice any

18 hint of his being biassed on an ethnic principles, and that is why I

19 liked him as a person because for him ethnicity was in the last place.

20 He must more appreciated professionalism and everything else. So he

21 treated all the chiefs, the Serbs, the Muslims, and others, equally.

22 Q. Therefore, we can conclude that Mr. Zupljanin was in his work,

23 insofar as you were able to see, always tolerant towards all his

24 co-workers regardless of their ethnicity?

25 A. Yes.

Page 3187

1 Q. Now, Mr. Majkic, we have to address a topic, an area, that has

2 been imposed on us primarily by the Prosecution because they have certain

3 theory on that, and we are going to waste time on this, but what can we

4 do? That's our job. The Prosecution submits that Republika Srpska and

5 all its organs, including the police, are a totally illegal structure,

6 and that is why we have been spending so much time discussing this issue.

7 Now, what I want to ask you is this: Do you agree with me that Bosnia

8 and Herzegovina had been designed as a republic, made up of three

9 constituent peoples: Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Is that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina as such, it was always important to

12 provide the protection of the interests of each constituent people; is

13 that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Sometime towards the end of 1991, more precisely in October, the

16 Serbian people were out-voted in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

17 when the deputies of Serbian ethnicity walked out. Do you remember that?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Bearing in mind the grave situation that prevailed in the former

20 Yugoslavia which threatened to spillover into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

21 international community made an effort in order to try and solve these

22 tensions in a certain manner; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. One of the solutions proffered was in February 1992, where the

25 so-called Cutileiro's Plan was adopted which envisaged the formation of

Page 3188

1 three ethnic entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You may not know this, but I'm going to tell you and then you can

4 agree or disagree with this and that is: According to this plan, each

5 ethnicity or entity was to have its own police force. Is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, let us move to the present. At the moment there are two

8 entities existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Republika Srpska and the

9 Muslim/Croat Federation.

10 A. Only Federation. It's not called the Muslim/Croat Federation.

11 Q. All right. To all intents and purposes, this Federation is

12 actually made up of the Muslim and the Croat peoples?

13 A. Including some Serbian returnees.

14 Q. On the other hand, the other entity is Republika Srpska; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Each of these entities nowadays has its own police force; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you know what kind of emblem is worn by the police officers in

19 the Federation, what do they have on their caps and on their armbands?

20 A. On their caps they have a metal star which has a coat of arms in

21 it with three fields. One is chequered part, the other one is

22 fleur-de-lis, and the third one is the emblem of the international

23 community, and they have the same patches on their sleeves.

24 Q. The chequered flag is the symbol of the Croatian people in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

Page 3189

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The fleur-de-lis is the symbol of the Muslim people in the

3 Federation; right?

4 A. Yes.

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Where are we heading with this, Mr. Pantelic.

6 MR. PANTELIC: We are heading, Your Honour, to the issue which

7 was raised by the Prosecution in its theory regarding the symbols of the

8 police uniforms in Republika Srpska.

9 My next question will conclude this issue, simply because it is

10 indisputable fact that in 1992 all three parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina

11 got their own flags, symbols, coat of arms, et cetera, like in

12 Republika Srpska with three-coloured flag, in Muslim/Croat Federation the

13 respective -- their respective symbols. So simply, to show that at least

14 it was not -- there is not any discriminatory intent from the Serbian

15 part to introduce relevant symbols on uniforms, simply as that. Because

16 obviously OTP is dealing with this issue, trying to create this sort of

17 discriminatory intent on the part of Serbian authorities. So I will just

18 clarify this issue and conclude this topic, with your permission of

19 course, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm not convinced that this is entirely relevant,

21 but if you can round it up quickly, then please do so.

22 MR. PANTELIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: I mean, be aware of the constraints of time on

24 us.

25 MR. PANTELIC: Thank you.

Page 3190

1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Majkic, let us conclude. In 1992 as well,

2 practically all the three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina had their

3 own police emblems. The Serbs had their tri-colour, the Muslims had the

4 fleur-de-lis, and the Croatian police had the chequered flag; is that

5 right?

6 A. Yes. I know about the Serbian police for sure, but as for the

7 others you're probably right.

8 Q. In your statement you mentioned that while you were the SJB chief

9 in Sanski Most, that that was more of a function of a coordinator for

10 various departments within the station.

11 A. We were not officials. We were management, so to speak, and our

12 duty was to coordinate the work of all constituent part of the police,

13 that is the police, the administrative service, the communications

14 centre, et cetera. So our role was simply to coordinate their work.

15 Q. And the same principle was applied at the level of the CSB;

16 right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Tell me this, Mr. Majkic: Your commander at the Sanski Most

19 station had a direct operative connection with the Banja Luka CSB, with

20 the official who was in charge of public security. You can tell me what

21 his title was.

22 A. Bajazid Jahic was head of the public security sector. In other

23 words, he was in charge of all the authorised officials, both the CID and

24 the police. And he had a job title of the deputy chief of the centre.

25 Q. He was a Muslim and he was in the Banja Luka CSB; right?

Page 3191

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The commander of your station practically had a vertical

3 operative connection with Bajazid Jahic; is that right?

4 A. Yes, as well as the head of the CID.

5 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I'm not objecting at all

6 in terms of this -- the content, the topic. But it's not clear to me and

7 it should be clear, I submit, what precisely a vertical operative

8 connection is. Is Mr. Pantelic talking about subordination within the

9 police force; if so, that should be made clear. And if the implication

10 is that there was no subordination between the head of the --

11 MR. PANTELIC: I will clarify that --

12 MR. DI FAZIO: Just let me finish. We've also got to be clear

13 that there is -- if the suggestion is being made that the commander at

14 the Sanski Most police station did not have any subordinate relation with

15 this witness, if that's the implication, then that also should be clear,

16 so that you can understand that evidence and you can understand exactly

17 what a vertical operative connection is.

18 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation] Very well. Let us clarify this.

19 Q. In your public security station in Sanski Most, you had a

20 co-worker of yours who was the station commander; right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You also had your assistant who was in charge of the criminal

23 investigation service?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Of course you were in charge of other sectors, like

Page 3192

1 administrative ones and such-like, but we are not going to talk about

2 them now. What I am interested in is the following. The head of the CID

3 in Sanski Most had a direct operative relationship with the Banja Luka

4 CSB, but along their line of work, that is, the criminal investigation.

5 A. Yes, with Bajazid Jahic, who was in charge of both the police and

6 the CID.

7 Q. Precisely so. Let's make an example. If there is an operation

8 aimed at breaking up the smuggling ring, the drug smuggling ring, the

9 people from the CSB Banja Luka coordinate, the whole operation with your

10 respective head in your police station, and they carry out what is within

11 their purview?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When you became chief of the Sanski Most SJB, you and your

14 associate introduced a practice of holding the so-called morning staff

15 meetings in order to see what happened on the previous day and to

16 coordinate your activities?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You would certainly then be in a position to institute certain

19 proceedings if you were told at these staff meetings that a policeman has

20 abused or violated conduct of -- or duty -- conduct or behaviour. For

21 example, that one of the policemen had beaten up somebody who had been

22 brought into the police station, and you would have a report on that

23 immediately the next morning on your desk.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You would then suspend such a police officer and compiled an

Page 3193

1 official report for further measures to be taken. If the circumstances

2 were such that it constituted a criminal offence, then you would report

3 this to the public prosecutor.

4 A. Yes, of course. Any criminal offence should be forwarded to our

5 prosecutor, whether it had -- it was committed by a policeman or by an

6 ordinary citizen.

7 Q. Well, that was exactly my point. If you had any knowledge that

8 there was a breach of authority within your police station, you would

9 take measures within the rules and regulations and the Law on the

10 Interior?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Within your regular report at the collegiums at the Banja Luka

13 CSB, your written reports and statistical analysis, there would be a note

14 saying that, for example, certain members of the SJB Sanski Most were

15 subject to disciplinary or any other proceedings?

16 A. If something of that sort happened in our police station, that

17 would be contained within the relevant daily report. And in addition to

18 that, we in the police would take statements from all other policemen

19 concerning the circumstances, and we would establish whether there was

20 any breach of official duty or not. We would investigate it, and if it

21 has been established that there was an offence committed it would be

22 forwarded to the commission in the centre, and this commission was in

23 charge of conducting disciplinary procedure. If a criminal offence was

24 committed by a police officer, of course the report would go to the

25 public prosecutor, and then it would be up to him to decide how to

Page 3194

1 proceed further.

2 Q. That was exactly my point. Stojan Zupljanin, as the head of the

3 CSB, if he hasn't received any dispatch from you or any report from you

4 that a procedure has been instituted, then he cannot guess about anything

5 going on if he hadn't received this information from the lower instance?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. I have a couple of questions for you about the situation in

8 Sanski Most. Tell me if you agree or not with the following conclusions

9 of mine. One of the conclusions is that there was an intensive political

10 activity in Sanski Most carried out by the SDS, SDA, and the HDZ

11 concerning resolving the situation and the tensions in Sanski Most; is

12 that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And members of all these three political parties were in

15 negotiations and trying to agree how to carry out a division along ethnic

16 lines, not only of power but also of territory in Sanski Most?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So there was no talk about any forcible take-over of power. That

19 was an ongoing negotiating process and looking for agreement on the

20 conditions under which these three ethnic communities in Sanski Most

21 would continue to live?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR. PANTELIC: Could we have -- [Interpretation] Could we please

24 now look at 5355 [as interpreted], MFI.

25 Q. You have reviewed this document with my learned friend, the

Page 3195

1 Prosecutor. This refers to the meeting at the CSB held on the 6th of

2 April. And now in paragraph 1 it says that major problems have arose in

3 B&H and that certain principles that were established at the level of the

4 international community and that the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is seen

5 as the form of co-existence of these three constituent units.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Further on in this dispatch it says that Republika Srpska has

8 been established, that its constitution was promulgated, and that the

9 Assembly also adopted the Law on the Internal Affairs of the Serbian

10 Republic of BH; is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. On page 2 of this dispatch it reads that the previous dispatch

13 from the Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina of the 2nd of April actually recommended that the entire

15 transformation be implemented peacefully and without any incidents or

16 excesses. Correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In the spirit of these principles, you, too, in Sanski Most made

19 efforts to divide your work with the other two chiefs?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. However, already in April 1992 we are facing some indisputable

22 facts: One, Republika Srpska is in existence.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. There is a constitution of Republika Srpska.

25 A. Yes.

Page 3196

1 Q. There is a government of Republika Srpska.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And finally, there is a Ministry of the Interior of

4 Republika Srpska.

5 A. Right.

6 Q. Now, in para 8 of this dispatch it is stipulated -- look at

7 para 8.

8 A. I can't see it yet.

9 Q. It's page 4.

10 A. I see it now.

11 Q. In that paragraph, 8, we read, among other things, that a very

12 rigorous test will be held to select candidates for active duty, and

13 priority shall be given to the employees of the former Ministry of the

14 Interior who for any reason whatsoever were forced to change their place

15 of residence.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, I'm putting it to you that a large number of MUP members

18 from the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian members, had been

19 expelled from towns where Muslims and Croats had taken over, and they had

20 all flocked to Republika Srpska. And herein the instructions of the

21 ministry, we see that those people who had been expelled from their towns

22 and their homes, who were professional, who were former policemen, will

23 have priority in the filling of vacancies at the Ministry of the Interior

24 of Republika Srpska.

25 A. Yes.

Page 3197

1 Q. There is also a reference to Serbian policemen expelled from

2 Croatia who would also be eligible for jobs at the Ministry of the

3 Interior of Republika Srpska; correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation] Could we now get 65 ter 83.

6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Pantelic.

7 MR. PANTELIC: Yes.

8 JUDGE HALL: Before you move on, this document, I'm reminded, was

9 marked for identification.

10 MR. PANTELIC: Yes.

11 JUDGE HALL: You having used it for your own purposes, do you

12 wish to, as it were, join the Prosecution in asking that it be tendered

13 as an exhibit at this stage?

14 MR. PANTELIC: Yes, I would do that, yes.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE HALL: So we would now mark it as an -- enter it and mark

17 it as an exhibit.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D78, Your Honours.

19 MR. DI FAZIO: And it doesn't matter much, I suppose,

20 Your Honours, but shouldn't this be a Prosecution exhibit? We originally

21 sought its admission. Now events have -- at that stage marked for

22 identification. Now events have allowed it --

23 JUDGE HALL: Yes, yes, yes.

24 MR. DI FAZIO: P355, yes.

25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 3198

1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P362, Your Honours.

2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I think Mr. Di Fazio

3 called that this document was already admitted, MFI'd, P355, so therefore

4 he shouldn't -- this document shouldn't have a new number.

5 THE REGISTRAR: I was confused. The counsel is correct. I

6 apologise.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.

8 MR. PANTELIC: [Microphone not activated]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 MR. PANTELIC: [Microphone not activated]

11 Sorry. So now this exhibit is P355. Just for the record. My

12 microphone was off.

13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Majkic, now on your screen you see another

14 dispatch sent by the CSB Banja Luka to all public security stations and

15 also to the MUP of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It

16 refers to a variety of activities in April of 1992, but what is important

17 to me here is the passage that is underlined, namely, that the

18 obligations mentioned in this telegram do not apply to Prijedor and

19 Kotor Varos police stations and that authorised officers at these

20 stations may continue to wear the current insignia, pending the

21 resolution of the political situation in these municipalities. Do you

22 see that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I infer from this that Sanski Most and the other municipalities

25 you mentioned in your answers to the Prosecution practically were subject

Page 3199

1 to the same principles as Prijedor and Kotor Varos; right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Therefore, Zupljanin is not talking about attacks, about violent

4 take-overs, about any kind of violence; on the contrary. He's talking of

5 the need to find a solution in a peaceful and tolerant, civilised way

6 with the agreement between political parties and the communities in the

7 given municipality.

8 A. Correct.

9 MR. PANTELIC: May we have, Your Honour, a number for this

10 exhibit. I would like to tender it because it's -- corresponds to the

11 previous explanations of this witness of the previous municipalities.

12 And now we shall have a more broader picture.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 MR. PANTELIC: If there is no objections from Prosecution's side.

15 MR. DI FAZIO: No, there's no objection, but I just wonder if we

16 could be clear so that I'm -- did this have a 65 ter number?

17 MR. PANTELIC: 65 ter 83.

18 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. No objection.

19 JUDGE HALL: So it -- admitted and marked.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D78, Your Honours.

21 MR. PANTELIC: Much obliged, Your Honours.

22 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry --

23 THE REGISTRAR: I do apologise, Your Honour, this is indeed 2D18.

24 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation]

Page 3200

1 Q. In your statement given to the Prosecution in 2001 and an annex

2 in 2008 -- or rather, a supplemental statement in 2008, and today as

3 well, you mentioned that you were facing serious risk to your life,

4 serious threats to your life at the time you resigned; is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber if Mr. Zupljanin perhaps had

7 similar problems with his associate Vlado Tutus who was then a police

8 official and member of SDS in Banja Luka? Can you perhaps make a

9 comparison between your own personal situation and the situation of

10 Mr. Zupljanin. Could you tell that in your own words to the

11 Trial Chamber, the problems both you and Mr. Zupljanin were facing.

12 A. That day, on the 30th of April when the Crisis Staff practically

13 replaced me, that evening around 7.00 p.m., I called Mr. Zupljanin at his

14 home and told him how I had been treated at the hands of the

15 Crisis Staff. In that conversation, Zupljanin told me, "Majkic, if

16 you're quite sure that you can win this challenge at the Assembly

17 meeting," which was scheduled for the 4th of May, "if you can win, if you

18 have a chance, go to the Assembly, you have my full support. But if

19 you're not sure, run or they will kill you." He actually said the same

20 thing as my relative, Boro Savanovic. And then Zupljanin continued to

21 say, "I am in a similar plight. Your fellow, this Tutus," happens to be

22 from the same town as I, "is preparing my replacement. I cannot

23 guarantee that I will stay in my position because there is great pressure

24 from certain fractions in the SDS that I be replaced." That was the end

25 of that conversation. I resigned -- I was replaced, rather, whereas he

Page 3201

1 managed to stay in his position, fortunately or unfortunately for him, I

2 don't know anymore.

3 And I know that during those days there was a major fight in the

4 CSB about who will be the chief, Tutus or Zupljanin.

5 Q. [Microphone not activated]

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. During that phone call, did Zupljanin mention that he had also

9 received death threats as part of this political play?

10 A. I can't recall. If he had received threats, I don't know why he

11 would have shared it with me. He said, "Only I am in the same situation

12 as you are. I cannot know whether I'm going to stay in my position or

13 not." But if he was really in the same situation as I, then he might

14 have well received threats as well.

15 Q. All right. Tell me now ...

16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Pantelic.

18 MR. PANTELIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. [Interpretation] When Mirko Vrucinic replaced you as chief of the

20 police station in Sanski Most and you had occasion to talk to him and

21 consult with him and exchange opinions, tell the Trial Chamber what

22 advice did you give to Mirko Vrucinic for his future work as a

23 professional, and what did he tell you? Tell the Trial Chamber briefly.

24 A. First of all, he mentioned one case, something that happened

25 after the military operation in Hrustovo and Vrhpolje when people left

Page 3202

1 that area and when raids started on those two villages and the looting

2 began. I told Mirko that he had enough policemen to seal off these two

3 villages, to stop the looting, because refugees were coming in every day

4 and they could well use the accommodation available in these villages.

5 Not everyone could be accommodated in town. And indeed, Mirko took my

6 advice. He provided enough men to guard and seal off both villages.

7 Later on I noticed that some policemen tend to take orders from

8 other policemen and do other business around town. I told Vrucinic to

9 disregard those people at the municipality and to listen more to

10 Zupljanin and police officials. There were two or three cases that

11 prompted me to tell him that, and his answer was - I'll try to quote

12 him - he says, "Majkic, you can't mean it about the centre and Zupljanin.

13 The municipal government is the real power. They are the state." And he

14 told me that two or three times, which means that I must have spoken to

15 him two or three times, trying to give him professional advice.

16 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] Mr. Pantelic.

17 MR. PANTELIC: Yes.

18 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]

19 MR. PANTELIC: No, it's --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the President, please.

21 MR. PANTELIC: Just one more question, and I'm finished for

22 today.

23 JUDGE HALL: Yes.

24 Q. [Interpretation] So in conclusion, despite the fact that as a

25 colleague and a professional and a friend you advised Vrucinic to stick

Page 3203

1 to the professional line of command, he refused and he coordinated and

2 cooperated instead with the local mandarins?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR. PANTELIC: Your Honour, I think it's time now for

5 adjournment, I believe it's the time.

6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Majkic, your testimony is still not at an end

7 because you appreciate you're being cross-examined by Mr. Pantelic.

8 The -- you remember that at the last adjournment I had alerted you to

9 certain procedural matters which we are trying to resolve. I am advised

10 that the current arrangements are that it is expected that your

11 cross-examination would be completed by tomorrow. So we rise now for the

12 day, and I repeat -- I remind you of the warnings about not speaking to

13 anyone outside the Chamber about the case or speaking with the lawyers on

14 either side. But you would return to this chamber at 9.00 tomorrow

15 morning. Thank you.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day of

18 November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.