1 Tuesday, 8 December 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.14 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
6 IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Good morning to all.
8 May we have the appearances, please.
9 MR. DOBBYN: For the Office of the Prosecutor, Gerard Dobbyn,
10 along with Joanna Korner and our Case Manager, Crispian Smith.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic and
12 Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for Stanisic Defence.
13 MR. PANTELIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For Zupljanin
14 Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.
15 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The microphone needs to be
17 adjusted for the Prosecutor, we can't hear anything.
18 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, the next witness --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Prosecutor, please, needs to
20 be adjusted. He is very far from it.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: There's a problem with your microphone. It's not
22 well directed. It's not well directed. Okay. Now, if you have just a
23 moment, please, we have a ruling.
24 On the 4th of November, the Trial Chamber ordered that written
25 motion be filed identifying the documents put to Branko Djeric during
1 cross-examination which are sought for admission into evidence. On the
2 12th of November, the Stanisic Defence and the Zupljanin Defence, by way
3 of e-mail to the Chamber's Legal Officer, submitted lists of documents
4 that they sought to have admitted. It is noted that this was not done
5 through a formal written motion as ordered. Nevertheless, in the
6 interest of expediency, the Trial Chamber has reviewed the list submitted
7 and will issue its ruling now. Several of the documents are already in
8 evidence and need not to be considered by the Chamber. They are
9 Rule 65 ter numbers 180, 606, 609, and 1229.
10 The Chamber has reviewed the testimony of Branko Djeric and the
11 parties' submissions as to the admissibility of the remaining Defence
12 documents. It decides to admit into evidence as Stanisic Defence
13 exhibits the following documents: 1D00-0496, 1D00-0507, 1D00-0515,
14 1D00-0552, 1D00-0769, 1D00-3812, 1D00-4266, and Rule 65 ter numbers 176,
15 194, 306, 932, 1285, 123 -- sorry, 1350, 1398, and 3033.
16 The Trial Chamber does not find that the remaining documents
17 submitted by the Stanisic Defence meet the requirements for admission
18 through Branko Djeric, and they will not be admitted at this time.
19 The Chamber decides to admit into evidence as Zupljanin Defence
20 exhibits the documents numbered 2D07-0049, and 65 ter number 2673.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsels on both sides, today we are going to
22 hear the expert witness on the Crisis Staffs, and the Chamber wonders if
23 it would be useful to ask the parties before we bring in Mrs. Hanson to
24 summarise in a nutshell their position on the Crisis Staffs so that we
25 know where the parties agree on the role of the Crisis Staffs, and where
1 they disagree, because I think this will enable us to have a more focused
2 examination and cross-examination of this expert.
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, although Mr. Dobbyn is actually
4 calling Mrs. Hanson, Your Honours, it's all very well to spring that on
5 us at 10 past 9.00 in the morning, but if we'd known about this in
6 advance, we could have actually thought about it more carefully. I think
7 it's not terribly helpful off the top of one's head to -- to put a
8 position with respect to the Crisis Staffs.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: I would imagine that you are well prepared, then,
10 and that you have the main points ready in your head.
11 MS. KORNER: Yes, well, Your Honours, I'm afraid -- I mean, if we
12 start saying something without thinking about it in advance, it becomes
13 much longer, more diffuse, and we can certainly do it if that's what
14 Your Honours want to do after the break. I mean, we just need time to
15 sit down and deal with it. But, as I say, I don't think it's a terribly
16 productive exercise just to do it off the top of one's head. Sorry about
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, I'm a bit surprised about your
20 position, but I will take your words for it. And so the Chamber still
21 thinks that it is a useful exercise to ask the parties to summarise their
22 main views on the role of the Crisis Staffs because, as I said, this will
23 enable the Chamber to ascertain where the parties agree and where they
24 disagree so that we can focus on these points during the examination and
25 cross-examination and also through the questions by the Judges.
1 But if this poses a problem to you, then we would suggest that we
2 have this exercise in the first -- after the first break. If you could
3 get together during the break and see if you can line out just, you know,
4 in bullet points, the three or four or five main points that you may
5 agree or disagree on in relation to the Crisis Staffs.
6 MS. KORNER: Sorry, is Your Honour suggesting that we should get
7 together with the Defence and work this out?
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: It's up to you. I think it would be useful but
9 we --
10 MS. KORNER: Well, otherwise, Your Honour, how are we to know
11 where we disagree, if you see what I mean. We can't -- at the moment, as
12 we've said over and over again, rather, we don't actually know what the
13 main points of disagreement are, although we can guess.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Because we ran through the pre-trial briefs but
15 did not find very clearly set out the parties' views on the role of the
16 Crisis Staffs, and this is why we wanted actually to have this summarised
17 or crystallised a bit. But let's bring in Ms. Hanson and then in the
18 break we kindly ask you to see if you can summarise for yourself and then
19 get together with the Defence to see if it's possible to find out where
20 you disagree and where you agree. Thank you.
21 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, while --
22 MR. ZECEVIC: I am sorry, but, Your Honours, in due -- all due
23 respect, I don't think -- I mean it makes a lot of sense what Your Honour
24 is suggesting and I guess we should sit down with our friends from the
25 Prosecution and discuss the matter, but it's -- I don't think it's
1 realistic that we can do it in 20 minutes and be prepared to make a
2 submission for Your Honours. As Ms. Korner rightly said, we should have
3 put on notice then we could have used --
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: To be honest --
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: To be honest, Mr. Zecevic, the Chamber had
7 expected that you would have done this anyway.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, but, Your Honours, with all due respect, we
9 ask for more time in the preparation of this case and we were rushed into
10 the beginning of this case by Your Honours' decision. We said we were
11 not prepared. Therefore, I -- with all due respect, I decline that we
12 should have done anything more than we are doing right now because we are
13 working around the clock, Your Honours. And it's physically not possible
14 for us or the Prosecutor's Office to even engage into the things which I
15 suggested should have been done in the pre-trial phase. That is why the
16 Defence of Stanisic insisted that we prolong the start of the trial for
17 one month where we -- we guaranteed to the Trial Chamber that this one
18 month will help shorten the trial for five months. That wasn't accepted,
19 and I -- I mean, we are here where we are now.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: That is a good statement. We are where we are.
21 That's always nice to know. As a sailor and a navigator, I certainly
22 appreciate the notion that you have to know where you are. But,
23 Mr. Zecevic, the Chamber did whatever we felt we could do by postponing
24 the testimony of Mrs. Hanson until you have had sufficient time to
25 familiarise yourself with it. This was the whole exercise about the ban
1 and I really don't think that the parties getting together for a couple
2 of hours at some point to just sit down and discuss where you disagree
3 and agree on the role of the Crisis Staffs would have been such a
4 tremendous effort by the parties.
5 So, you know, I'm not blaming you or Mr. Pantelic or Ms. Korner
6 for not having done it. It's just that we would have expected that this
7 would be a very natural thing to do, to actually get together and see
8 where we are in relation to role of the Crisis Staffs. Especially
9 because, as I said, neither of the parties have lined out very clearly in
10 their pre-trial briefs what they think about the role of the
11 Crisis Staffs. But be that as it may, I mean, we are, as you said, where
12 we are, and let's have Mrs. Hanson brought in, and if possible, in the
13 break you can get together, you can have -- we can have an extended break
14 if that's acceptable to you. But I really think it makes very good sense
15 to do just what the Chamber has proposed because it helps understand
16 better where you stand -- the positions of the parties against each other
17 and it helps the Chamber to understand what to look for in her testimony.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: We understand, Your Honour.
19 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all we are saying is, we certainly
20 could have done it. We could have done it yesterday afternoon, but
21 Your Honours didn't tell us this is what you wanted. So, I appreciate
22 what Your Honours say, that you expected it to happen. Your Honours know
23 that there have been difficulties getting agreement on anything, so
24 that's the situation. But if in future Your Honours want something like
25 this, perhaps if you would be kind enough to let us know at the end of
1 the previous session.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes, I understand, but again, especially when we
3 deal with experts, I think it would make very good sense for both parties
4 anyway always to just pick up the phone, you know, a couple of days in
5 advance and perhaps arrange for a meeting and take an hour or two to sit
6 down and go through the expert's report in order to find out where the
7 points of contention are. And if we hadn't made ourselves very clear on
8 this aspect, then it's a good time to do it now. And so for the
9 remaining experts, the Chamber would expect the parties to be ready to
10 line out their positions prior to the expert's arrival. So we have
11 Christian Nielsen next week and we have a couple of other experts coming
12 further down the road, and when the Defence cases are going to start, the
13 Defence will also bring their experts, and so there again we expect the
14 parties to be able to summarise their positions before the experts come
16 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, just before the witness does come in,
17 I'd just like to clarify, I did request -- seek leave to spend two hours
18 with this witness, I just wanted to check before she came in that that
19 was --
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: You have one and a half hour, if I'm not
22 MR. DOBBYN: That had been the request when she was going to be
23 called the first, which, I believe, was a couple of months ago. From
24 that time, having spent more time speaking to Ms. Hanson, going through
25 documents, we feel that two hours would be on the safe side. Certainly I
1 would try to get it done within an hour and a half, but seeking an extra
2 half-hour was really to be on the safe side to try to get through this
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Dobbyn, are you asking for an extra half-hour
5 on top of the two hours that you have asked for previously?
6 MR. DOBBYN: No, no, Your Honours. We had asked for a total of
7 two hours, it's an extra half-hour on top of the one and a half hours
8 that had been asked for some weeks ago.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: That is granted.
10 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Good morning, madam. Will you please make the
13 solemn declaration.
14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, madam. You may sit down.
17 WITNESS: DOROTHEA HANSON
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Hanson, you have been called as an expert in
19 this trial and an expert for the Prosecution, I should add. And the
20 Chamber has granted the Prosecution a total of two hours to take you
21 through your expert report which we have read and accepted as an expert
22 report, and after that the Defence teams have asked for altogether six
23 hours for their cross-examination.
24 You have testified already in a number of cases so you know the
25 game. I don't need to instruct you further on that. But before we
1 proceed, I would like for the record, would you state your name and the
2 your date of birth and your current occupation.
3 THE WITNESS: Dorothea Curtis Hanson. Date of birth,
4 August 10th, 1962
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much. I pass the word to
7 Mr. Dobbyn.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm terribly sorry to interrupt. Your Honours, I
9 understand you said that the Trial Chamber have read and accepted as an
10 expert report. I thought the ruling was that the Trial Chamber will
11 decide on the acceptance of the expert report only after the
12 cross-examination of this witness.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, I said that we have accepted the
14 report as an expert report. The question of admission is a different
16 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, I am sorry.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: We have not admitted the report but we have
18 accepted the report and Mrs. Hanson's status as an expert. So that
19 before she begins to testify, she knows and you know that she will be
20 testifying as an expert with the qualities that come with that
22 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand. I'm sorry.
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm so sorry. Mr. Zecevic reminded me
24 that that had been your ruling. It was something I meant to raise
25 because it's the same problem as with the 92 ter witnesses. If the
1 report is not accepted as an exhibit and has to wait until after
2 cross-examination, then we don't know, from examination-in-chief, how
3 much we have to go through. That's the problem
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: We will MFI the expert report at this time and
6 then come back to the final ruling once Mrs. Hanson's testimony has been
8 Examination by Mr. Dobbyn:
9 Q. Good morning, Ms. Hanson.
10 A. Good morning.
11 Q. Before we start, can I just ask you that when you're responding
12 to my questions that you speak slowly and also observe a gap between my
13 questions and your answers just so the translators are able to keep up
14 with us. First of all, I don't intend to go through your CV in any sort
15 of detail but I just want to briefly highlight some of your work since
16 you've been with the OTP.
17 And is it the case, Ms. Hanson, that you've been employed by the
18 OTP as an analyst since 1999?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And in 2005, you testified as an expert in the Krajisnik case?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did you also testify earlier this year as an expert in the
23 Bosnian state court in the K lickovic case?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. DOBBYN: If we could show 65 ter 10019. And if I could also
1 have Madam Usher's assistance, I prepared a binder for Ms. Hanson, and
2 this contains a copy of Ms. Hanson's report as well as documents that
3 will be shown, used with Ms. Hanson.
4 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson on the screen in front of you and also in the
5 binder, is this a copy of your expert report that you've prepared in this
7 A. Yes, it appears to be.
8 Q. And in the course of preparing that report, what were the source
9 materials that you used?
10 A. I used the documents in the possession of the OTP, documents of
11 the Crisis Staffs, Municipal Crisis Staffs themselves, as well as
12 documents of other Bosnian Serb state organs, institutions, and
13 individuals such as Assembly minutes, minutes of the government, some
14 contemporary records in open source. But mostly it was the documents
15 generated by the Crisis Staffs themselves.
16 Q. And were you working with the original B/C/S documents in any
18 A. Yes, almost exclusively.
19 Q. Do you read and understand B/C/S?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. And what about Cyrillic?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, I understand we have a couple of corrections that you would
24 like to make to this document.
25 MR. DOBBYN: So if we could please go to page 28 of the English
2 Q. I understand that the B/C/S version is fine.
3 A. Yes, I apologise for this. It was -- at one point the report had
4 been -- every time Variant A and B was -- appeared, it was replaced by
5 the full name of the document and it should not be here in Karadzic's
6 quotation where he --
7 Q. I'm sorry, if we could just stop, just to get it on screen. We
8 are looking at paragraph 63, which it is at the bottom of the page?
9 A. It's the very last line. He says: "You will remember," and here
10 the text reads, "instructions for the organisation and activities of
11 organs of the Serbian people," on to the next page to the end of "under
12 extraordinary circumstances." That's the full title of Variant A and B,
13 and here he just says -- in the original he says: "Variant A and Variant
14 B." I have the correct quotation earlier in the report and I apologise
15 that slipped in there. The correct version is on page 10, paragraph 20.
16 So here it should simply read Variant A and Variant B.
17 MR. DOBBYN: If we could next go on to page 36 in the English and
18 page 38 in the B/C/S.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise for interruption. We have problem
21 with the e-court. Actually, we have problem with the screens so we
22 cannot follow and our client also are not able to follow. So please can
23 you fix it.
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters have the same. The screens
25 are blinking all the time.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: And so do we. We are being told that the
2 technician is on his way to the courtroom.
3 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, I have the suggestion that we could
4 perhaps use the witness's copy on the ELMO to go until this is resolved.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: The problem is that we are not very good at
6 reading B/C/S and so if we show the English version, the accused won't be
7 able to read it, and if we show the B/C/S version, then we won't be able
8 to understand it, but ...
9 MR. DOBBYN: Certainly, Your Honours. I think it would be
10 preferable perhaps if we could wait until the technician could sort this
11 out. We do have several documents to go through.
12 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Dobbyn, I understand that the problem has been
13 temporarily solved, so we may continue.
14 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson, sorry for the delay. We were looking at
16 paragraph 80 of your report, and I understand that you have a correction
17 to make there?
18 A. Yes. I made a poor choice of words when I say that the police
19 were financed in the municipality. I really meant to say materially
20 supported, given equipment, uniforms by the municipal authorities, but
21 not that they were the sole source of -- not that the municipal
22 authorities were the sole source of finance for the police. So
23 materially supported is what I should have written.
24 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you. And with those two changes in mind,
25 Your Honours, I'd ask that this expert report be MFI'd at this time.
1 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So ordered. Marked for identification.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P434, marked
3 for identification.
4 MR. DOBBYN:
5 Q. Ms. Hanson, just to be clear, does your -- just to be clear,
6 Ms. Hanson, does your area of expertise include the structure and
7 function of the RS MUP?
8 A. No.
9 Q. So it's limited solely to the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs?
10 A. As a specialised area, yes.
11 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move on now to a couple of questions
12 about the origins of the Crisis Staffs. And can you tell us, Ms. Hanson,
13 were the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs that were operating from 1991 an
14 entirely new phenomenon or did they have some kind of legal precedent?
15 A. There was a legal precedent, two perhaps, in the form of one -- a
16 collective municipal Presidency. Many -- the constitution of Bosnia
17 foresaw that if the Municipal Assembly could not meet, there would be a
18 collective Presidency. There was also the idea of the -- from the
19 communist era, the All People's Defence committees which were a larger
20 group to include all the leaders in the municipality including the party
21 leadership, military police. This was to allow some kind of defence to
22 continue even when communication was lost with the central organs. That
23 was a legacy of the partisan area.
24 Nowhere in the legislation have I seen the term "Crisis Staff."
25 But I know that people have testified in the past that the term was
1 known. I do not claim that the term was invented here. Crisis Staffs
2 could be apparently some ad hoc small groups to deal with specific
3 crises, but I see that the legislative origin in the municipal collective
4 presidencies and the All People's Defence committees.
5 Q. Can you explain briefly to the Court how the SDS Crisis Staffs
6 came to be formed?
7 A. They were formed on the basis of instructions dated the
8 19th of December, also known as the A and B instructions.
9 Q. Under these instructions, what was the role of the Crisis Staffs?
10 A. The role of the Crisis Staff was to organise the defence of the
11 Serb -- interests of the Serbian people to perform essentially as a
12 shadow government creating -- undertaking preparations for establishing
13 Serbian municipal authorities.
14 Q. Was there a specific goal that the Crisis Staffs had?
15 A. To establish Serbian municipalities and municipal organs. To be
16 the organs of power in a Serbian municipality.
17 MR. DOBBYN: Could we call up now, please, Exhibit P69.
18 Q. Ms. Hanson, this is already in evidence and it is a copy of the
19 Variant A and B instructions. And it's in tab 1 of your binder. Thank
20 you. Now, Ms. Hanson, we can see that these instructions are from the
21 SDS Main Board. They have a copy number 93, and the heading is:
22 "Instructions for the organisation and operation of organs of the Serbian
23 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in emergency conditions."
24 Now, Ms. Hanson, the copy number 93, can you tell us how many
25 municipalities there were in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war?
1 A. I believe about 107, less than 100. Between 100 and 110. I
2 think it was 107.
3 Q. What was the highest number of any copies of the Variant A and B
4 instructions that were found in the OTP's collections?
5 A. 104.
6 Q. And what inference, if any, do you draw from the numbering of
7 these A and B instructions?
8 A. Different numbers have been found in different municipalities and
9 my inference is that it was one per -- one copy per municipality was
11 MR. DOBBYN: Could we now please go to page 2 in both the English
12 and B/C/S of the document.
13 Q. And in particular I'm looking at item 4, Ms. Hanson, at the
14 bottom of the page.
15 A. Item?
16 Q. Item 4.
17 A. It calls to --
18 Q. Sorry, Ms. Hanson, if we could wait for it, to make sure it's up
19 on the screen.
20 A. The English is not matching the B/C/S. No, it's not the same.
21 The B/C/S says:
22 "Call and proclaim an Assembly of the Serbian people in the
23 municipality made up of deputies from the ranks of the Serbian people in
24 the Municipal Assembly."
25 MR. DOBBYN: And we're --
1 A. Or did you want the --
2 MR. DOBBYN: -- still waiting for page 2 of the English.
3 THE WITNESS: It's numbered -- it's page 3 of the document itself
4 that is --
5 MR. DOBBYN: Okay. We have it now.
6 THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. That's what you wanted.
7 MR. DOBBYN: Yes.
8 Q. Item 4 reads, Ms. Hanson:
9 "In order to ensure the consistent and timely implementation,
10 tasks, measures and other activities shall be set forth in two variants,
11 A and B, and at two levels."
12 A. Yes, I was ahead of you there. Yes, Variant A is for the
13 municipalities where the Serbs are in a majority. Variant B, where they
14 are in a minority. And the two levels, the first is the initial
15 preparations, and the second is the actual take-over of power.
16 Q. Now, did the instructions say anything about the composition of
17 the Crisis Staffs?
18 A. Yes. They spelled out the composition. The president of the
19 Crisis Staff -- well, the composition is slightly different between
20 Variant A and Variant B, but the purpose is very much the same, that the
21 municipal leaders -- the Serb -- the leading Serbs in the municipal
22 authorities are to be part of the Crisis Staffs. The president of the
23 Municipal Assembly, or the president of the SDS Municipal Board in the
24 case of B, to be the commander of the Crisis Staff to include the head of
25 the police station or the commander of the police or the SDS candidate
1 for that position. Members of the Main Board of the SDS, delegates to
2 the National Assembly of the SDS, all those who carry some function in
3 the municipal -- in the municipality, the head of the municipal staff of
4 the TO, the head of the -- the secretary of the Municipal Secretariat of
5 National Defence.
6 Q. And just to be clear, Ms. Hanson, was it foreseen in the
7 instructions that there would be police representation under both Variant
8 A and Variant B municipalities on the Crisis Staffs?
9 A. Yes, it was.
10 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move on from the actual instructions
11 themselves now to look at the Municipal Boards acting upon instructions.
12 Now, what did your examination of the materials show with regards to how
13 this report was distributed and to whom it was distributed?
14 A. There -- I have evidence that it was distributed on the
15 20th of December, or thereabouts, and was received by the Municipal
16 Boards or municipal presidents and implemented. There are many instances
17 of the SDS Municipal Boards, in the last days of December, receiving and
18 implementing these instructions.
19 MR. DOBBYN: Perhaps if we could look at an example of that. If
20 we could show 65 ter 398.
21 Q. And this is in tab 2 of your binder, Ms. Hanson. And this
22 document -- these are abridged minutes from a meeting of the Prijedor SDS
23 Municipal Board from the 27th of December, 1991. We'll just wait for
24 that to come up on the screen.
25 Okay. If we could look at point 1. Sorry, at the bottom of the
1 page on the English. This says:
2 "Simo Miskovic, president of the Prijedor SDS Municipal Board,
3 gave a brief introduction. President Miskovic then read out the
4 instructions forwarded to the Prijedor SDS Municipal Board by the
5 Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
6 MR. DOBBYN: And if we could now go to the next page on the
7 English, remaining on the same page in B/C/S.
8 Q. "Since there are only two versions, only version 2 which is
9 relevant for Prijedor municipality was read out. Having read out all the
10 items in sections A and B of version 2, Miskovic explained what had been
11 done so far with respect to the instructions."
12 Now, Ms. Hanson, having read over that portion, do you have any
13 comment to make about that and how that is relevant to implementation?
14 A. It appears that Miskovic received a copy of A and B and is
15 implementing it in the municipality. He -- as recorded in the minutes,
16 they do seem to have switched Variant A and B, level 1 and 2, but the
17 usage and, moreover, the steps taken afterwards including forming a
18 Crisis Staff make it clear to me at least that it's a question of the A
19 and B document.
20 Q. Now, remaining on page 1 of the B/C/S and page 2 of the English,
21 another portion that I'd like to read to you, and this is towards the
22 bottom of the page in English, and likewise in the B/C/S.
23 "Reasons and functions were stated for establishment of the
24 Municipal Crisis Staff and local staffs on territory of the municipality.
25 The decision was made to introduce around-the-clock duty in the SDS
1 offices according to the chart which had been established: Prijedor 2 on
2 27 December, Cirkin Polje on 28 December, et cetera."
3 Now, Ms. Hanson, these points refer to forming a Crisis Staff in
4 Prijedor and introducing duty watches.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.
6 MR. DOBBYN:
7 Q. Are these continue with 19 December instructions?
8 A. Yes, they are.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Dobbyn, the interpreters ask that you put
10 your headphones on so that you can receive their observations about the
11 speed in which you speak.
12 MR. DOBBYN: Yes, Your Honours. My Case Manager had just pointed
13 that out to me and I'll certainly keep them on now.
14 Now if we could go over to page 3 of the English.
15 Q. And you'll see at point 2 at the top of the page, Ms. Hanson, it
16 sets out the composition of the Prijedor Crisis Staff. How did this
17 composition compare to that set out in the 19 December instructions?
18 A. It is consistent with the 19 December instructions.
19 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you. I'd seek to tender this document at this
20 time, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it will be Exhibit P435.
23 MR. DOBBYN: Could we now call up 65 ter 3430.
24 Q. Which is tab 3 of your binder, Ms. Hanson.
25 A. I have a small window on my screen, does everyone have that?
1 Blocking part of the document. Okay.
2 Q. This document, Ms. Hanson, is entitled: "Conclusions of SDS
3 Zvornik Municipal Board Meeting Held on 22 December 1991."
4 I'll just wait a moment for --
5 A. It's not a problem, I have the original here but -- I have the
6 original. I can check it on the break.
7 Q. Ms. Hanson, do you see any relationship between this document and
8 the 19 December instructions?
9 A. I do, indeed. I note that it's dated the 22nd of December,
10 shortly after the distribution of the A and B document. The first item,
11 "Round-the-clock duty," matches the A and B instructions. The Crisis
12 Staff is chosen with the municipal president or -- I'm sorry, I can't
13 confirm Grujic's position at the moment. He is named as komandant. The
14 next person mentioned is the deputy at the Bosnian Serb Assembly. A
15 co-ordinator with the SDA is also part of the A and B instructions.
16 Item 5, "Calling a Municipal Assembly," is also part of the A and B
17 instructions. So I find it entirely consistent. Yes, he is president of
18 the SDS, not of Municipal Assembly, Grujic.
19 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, I'd ask that this be tendered at this
21 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P436, Your Honours.
23 MR. DOBBYN: Could we look next at 65 ter 3431.
24 Q. And this is at tab 4 of your binder, Ms. Hanson. And this is a
25 decision regarding the formation of the Serbian municipality of Zvornik
1 and it's dated 27 December 1991
2 the preamble, which is on the right -- the top paragraph on the
3 right-hand column of the English page, and could you tell us if there's
4 anything of significance in that?
5 A. Yes. The preamble cites explicitly the A and B. It says that:
6 "This decision is based on Article 4 of the instructions of the
7 organisation and activities of the organs of the Serbian people in BiH in
8 extraordinary circumstances from 19 December 1991."
9 So not only have they received the A and B and are implementing
10 it, but they are citing it as the legal basis for their actions.
11 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, I tender this document at this time.
12 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P437, Your Honours.
14 MR. DOBBYN: And finally on this topic, if we could pull up
15 65 ter 1496.
16 Q. This is in tab 5 of your binder, Ms. Hanson. This is a
17 transcript from the 50th Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly, held
18 on 15th, 16th April 1995. And we are just waiting for it to come up on
19 the screen, Ms. Hanson.
20 MR. DOBBYN: Could we please go to page 306 of the English.
21 Page 278 in B/C/S. Thank you.
22 Q. Now, I particularly want to focus on a quote that is about
23 halfway down the page on the English, about a third of the way in B/C/S.
24 And this quote states:
25 "At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were
1 in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
2 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
3 up secret government, Municipal Boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents
4 of Executive Boards. You all remember, the A and B Variants."
5 Now, Ms. Hanson, can you tell us who is speaking?
6 A. Radovan Karadzic.
7 Q. And can you explain the significance of this quote?
8 A. In the Assembly, they were, at the moment, debating something
9 about the army and he -- this is in 1995. He is looking back to the
10 outbreak of the war and he is recalling the A and B Variants, reminding
11 the deputies, You all remember the A and B and how it enabled us to set
12 up secret governments and hold power.
13 MR. DOBBYN: And, Your Honours, I'd seek to tender this at this
15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it will be Exhibit P438.
17 MR. DOBBYN:
18 Q. I'd like to move now to the section in your report, Ms. Hanson,
19 starting at page 12. It's headed: "From party organ to municipal
20 government, January to April 1992."
21 Now, at the time that they were formed, were the SDS Crisis
22 Staffs public? Were they public bodies in the sense that the general
23 public was aware of their existence?
24 A. No, they were not. They were secret organs within the SDS.
25 Q. And in your report you describe the evolution or change in the
1 character of the Crisis Staffs from January to April 1992. Could you
2 briefly summarise what happened over that period?
3 A. This is the period when the SDS at the top level is similarly
4 forming state organs, transforming the party into -- transforming the
5 organs of the party into the organs of the Bosnian Serb state. And as
6 more concrete measures were taken at the republican level, so also we see
7 the Crisis Staffs by the end of this period, by April 1992, they are no
8 longer secret party organs. They are public organs declaring themselves
9 to be the municipal authorities.
10 MR. DOBBYN: And if we could look at 65 ter 920 now, please.
11 Q. And this is in tab 6 of your binder.
12 MR. DOBBYN: And can we go to page 22 in the English, page 39 in
13 the B/C/S. Thank you.
14 Q. Now, this is a relatively lengthy quote. It's about halfway down
15 the page in the English. It's on much of the page of the B/C/S, so I'll
16 read through it and try not to go too fast. Continues partway through
17 the second line of the, I believe, third full paragraph.
18 "This will be very soon. We can form whatever we want. There
19 are reasons why this could happen in two or three days. Such are the
20 forecasts but I cannot tell you the reasons now. At that moment, all the
21 Serbian municipalities, both the old ones and the newly established ones,
22 would literally assume control of the entire territory of the
23 municipality concerned." Continues on:
24 "Then at a given moment, in the next three or four days, there
25 will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the
1 municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done, as
2 well as how to do them. How to separate the police force, take the
3 resources that belong to the Serbian people, and take command. The
4 police must be under the control of the civilian authority. It must obey
5 it. There's no discussion about that. That's the way it must be. I
6 think we shall hear it today in the form of instructions at the
7 Deputies' Club."
8 Ms. Hanson, can you tell us who is speaking here and what the
9 significance of this passage is?
10 A. It's Radovan Karadzic speaking. What we see in the Assembly
11 sessions by the end of March is an eagerness to seize control on the
12 ground. Some of the municipalities or representatives are saying, We are
13 more than ready, just give us the order. Karadzic here is saying, You
14 will get instructions, it will be the same instructions for everywhere,
15 but it will be secret. That is in the Deputies' Club, not here in the
16 Assembly, and we will take over the municipalities, take over the police
17 -- that is, form our own police. So they are getting ready for the final
18 take-over, and, as I say, some municipalities are champing at the bit and
19 begging for instructions, begging for the sign to take over. Others
20 apparently need to be brought up to speed. But it is being direct --
21 they are waiting from the word from on top, and Karadzic is going to give
22 them the instructions.
23 MR. DOBBYN: I seek to tender this, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P439, Your Honours.
1 MR. DOBBYN:
2 Q. Can we now move on to tab 7 in your binder, Ms. Hanson.
3 MR. DOBBYN: And if we could call up 65 ter 2744.
4 Q. This is a press release of the National Security Council. And
5 it's dated 4 April 1992
6 Ms. Hanson, can you explain what the significance of this press
7 release is?
8 A. As you can see, it's from the Council for National Defence or
9 Security, National Security, and it is issued by Karadzic as the
10 president of the National Security Council, not as the president of the
11 SDS, which I'd see as part of this pattern from moving from party organ
12 to state organs. And in the last paragraph he calls for the activation
13 of Crisis Staffs.
14 Q. Just to, sorry, stop you there for a second. Could we go to
15 page 2 in the English and I believe the passage you are talking about is
16 in the last paragraph in the English there, Ms. Hanson.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, if you could please continue on with
19 what that paragraph talks about.
20 A. "Crisis Staffs in those area should be activated and the Serbian
21 People's Territorial Defence, civilian protection and reserve police
22 raised primarily for the purpose of maintaining order, peace and safety
23 of civilians of all nationalities."
24 So although we saw Karadzic as president of the SDS ordering the
25 formation of Crisis Staffs in December 1991, now at the beginning of
1 April 1992 as president of the National Security Council, he is calling
2 for activation of Crisis Staffs in the municipalities.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DOBBYN: And could I tender this document, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P440, Your Honours.
7 MR. DOBBYN:
8 Q. Now, I'd like to move on with a few questions about the document
9 known as the 26 April instructions, Ms. Hanson. Now, as the Crisis
10 Staffs came out into the open, did they receive any direction from the
11 republican government as to how they should operate?
12 A. Yes. The National Security Council received a report on the work
13 of Crisis Staffs, discussed the need for instructions, and on the 26th of
14 April, Branko Djeric, as president of the government, issued the extract
15 for instructions for the work of Crisis Staffs of the Serbian people in
16 the municipalities.
17 MR. DOBBYN: And could we call up please Exhibit P70, marked for
19 Q. And this is tab 8 in your binder, Ms. Hanson. And is this the
20 document that you are referring to?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. We see that this is headed: "Extract from the instructions for
23 the work of Crisis Staffs of the Serbian people and municipalities," and
24 I'm just waiting for it to come up. Now I'd like to go through a few of
25 these specific instructions, Ms. Hanson. If we could look at item 1,
1 this is on page 1 both English and B/C/S.
2 "In wartime conditions, the Crisis Staff shall take over all the
3 prerogatives and functions of Municipal Assemblies when they are not in a
4 position to meet."
5 Can you explain what that means?
6 A. That means that the Crisis Staffs are the highest municipal
7 authority. They are to replace the Assembly as a smaller collective
9 Q. Moving on to item 2, this set us out the composition of the
10 Crisis Staffs. Now, is this composition consistent with that set out in
11 the 19 December instructions?
12 A. It's consistent with the 19 December instructions. It is a
13 little more detailed for some of the more specific municipal duties
14 towards the end, the food supplies, war crimes and so on, but it's
15 consistent with the tasks set out also in the -- not just the composition
16 of the Crisis Staffs but also the tasks as set out in the 19 December
18 Q. And does this again include a representative of the police --
19 A. Yes, it does.
20 Q. -- being on the Crisis Staff. Now looking at item 3, this
22 "The Crisis Staff shall co-ordinate governmental functions for
23 the purpose of the defence of territory, safety of the population and its
24 property, establishment of authority and organisation of all other
25 aspects of life and work. Through its co-ordination efforts, the Crisis
1 Staff shall create the conditions for the Municipal Executive Board to
2 exercise legal executive power, manage the economy, and other aspects of
4 Now, can you comment on that particular paragraph, Ms. Hanson?
5 A. It shows that the Crisis Staff is given a fairly wide tasking of
6 co-ordinating the authorities. So it's a co-ordinating body that is
7 responsible for making sure the municipality is running, including the
8 defence of the territories and everything else, all areas of life and
10 Q. I'll move on now to item 6. This states:
11 "The work of the Crisis Staff shall be based on the provisions of
12 the constitution and the law, and on the decisions of the Assembly, the
13 Presidency, and the government of the Serbian Republic
15 Can you comment on that article?
16 A. Yes. It says that the Crisis Staff is clearly supposed to be
17 part of the Serbian -- Bosnian Serb state system, is to base its work on
18 the decisions at the republican level and therefore is the legal
19 municipal authority.
20 Q. Can we move to page 2 of the English, remaining on page 1 of
21 B/C/S, and look at paragraph or item 11. And this states that the:
22 "The Crisis Staff shall be obliged to gather information on the
23 situation in the field, and notify and consult the competent authorities
24 in Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e., commissioners of the government
25 appointed for the areas and regions especially threatened by war."
1 Now, can you explain something about the role of the
3 A. Yes, we see the commissioner for the first time in these
4 instructions. We see them more in the later decisions on the municipal
5 organs, but essentially the commissioner is to make the link between the
6 republican level and municipal level even closer and tighter. He is
7 somebody appointed at the republican level to go to the municipality, get
8 information on the situation there, and pass on the directives and
9 policies of the republican level, and then report back to the republican
10 level on events in the municipality and raise the municipal concern. So
11 he is a personal link but conveying the policies and instructions and
13 Q. Thank you. And finally on this document, I'd like to look at
14 item 14. This states:
15 "The Crisis Staff shall make decisions and hold sessions in the
16 presence of all its members, keep official records of proceedings, issue
17 written decisions, and prepare weekly reports submitted to the regional
18 and state organs of the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina."
19 And can you comment on that, Ms. Hanson?
20 A. They are tasked to report to the regional and the republican
21 level, which once again indicates their role in the Bosnian Serb state
22 and their position in the hierarchy below the republican level. I would
23 also note, "make decisions in the presence of all of its members," we'll
24 see this later, that it's a collective body that reaches a collective
1 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, this has been marked for
2 identification. I'd seek to tender it at this point.
3 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
4 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you.
5 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson, according to the instructions we've just looked
6 at, how did the role and the operation of --
7 MR. DOBBYN: Sorry.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Could we just have the number.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Exhibit P70.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, it wasn't in the transcript, that is why
11 I -- thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Madam Registrar, would you please announce it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. The document will retain its
14 P70 number.
15 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you.
16 Q. Ms. Hanson, according to these instructions, how did the role and
17 operation of the Crisis Staffs at the municipal level compare to the
18 operation of the government at the republican level?
19 A. At this point you have the National Security Council and the
20 government operating very similarly as a collective emergency body,
21 bringing together the party, the police, the army, the leadership of that
22 at a republican level and the Crisis Staff mirroring it at the municipal
23 level, bringing together all of the leaders of the forces on the ground,
24 the party, the government, to co-ordinate their work.
25 Q. Thank you. So having looked at the 26 April instructions now,
1 I'd like to turn and ask you some questions about Crisis Staffs whether
2 they actually received and acted upon these instructions.
3 MR. DOBBYN: And for Your Honours and co-counsel and my learned
4 colleagues, I'm referring to paragraph 36 of Ms. Hanson's report.
5 Q. Now, in the course of reviewing the OTP's collection of
6 documents, were you able to establish whether the Municipal Crisis Staffs
7 actually received and acted upon these instructions?
8 A. Yes, I have found several indications that they were received and
10 MR. DOBBYN: Could I call up Exhibit P179.9.
11 Q. And this is in tab 9 of your binder, Ms. Hanson. It's the
12 decision on the organisation and work of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor
13 municipality. You see this is dated May 1992.
14 Ms. Hanson, to what extent, if at all, does the wording in this
15 document reflect that of the 26 April instructions?
16 A. Some of the articles of the Prijedor decision are almost literal
17 transcriptions of the 26 April instructions.
18 MR. DOBBYN: Could we turn to page 2 of both the English and
19 B/C/S. And look at Article 2.
20 Q. And this states:
21 "The Crisis Staff of Prijedor municipality is being established
22 for the purpose of co-ordinating the functions of government, defending
23 municipal territory, providing security for the population and their
24 property, establishing power and authority, and organising all other
25 aspects of life and work."
1 Now, is this consistent with what was contained in the 26 April
3 A. Yes, it's consistent with item 3 of the earlier instructions.
4 MR. DOBBYN: And if we could turn to Article 4 now, this is the
5 same page in English and page 3 in B/C/S.
6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Dobbyn, it's 10.25. At an appropriate point you
7 can --
8 MR. DOBBYN: Certainly, Your Honour. I just have perhaps two
9 questions on this document.
10 Q. Now this article, Ms. Hanson, sets out the composition of the
11 Prijedor Crisis Staff, and again, was this consistent with the April
13 A. Yes, it's consistent with item 2 of the April instructions.
14 Q. Thank you. So, Ms. Hanson, what does this document indicate to
15 you, at least with regards to whether the instructions were being acted
16 upon in Prijedor?
17 A. It indicates that me that they were received and acted upon in
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DOBBYN: And we could break at this time, Your Honours.
21 MS. KORNER: Do Your Honours want to have a longer break so that
22 we can see if we can reach any --
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: What about 45 minutes, would that be okay?
24 MS. KORNER: Yes.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Great.
1 [The witness stands down]
2 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 11.25 a.m.
4 JUDGE HALL: The -- I don't know whether we are still having some
5 technical problems but have the parties -- I assume the parties have been
6 productive during the break and have something to inform the Chamber as
8 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, we did meet with our colleagues from
9 Defence over the break. With regards to what the Trial Chamber has
10 requested, a summary of our position with regards to the Crisis Staffs
11 and any points of agreement or disagreement, what I can say is that the
12 Prosecution's position regarding the Crisis Staffs themselves is set out
13 in the executive summary of Ms. Hanson's report. This is at page 3, and
14 it's very succinct and probably clearer than I could do it myself,
15 shorter and clearer than I could do it. We talked about points of
16 agreement and disagreement, what we -- effectively the position we came
17 to, through my understanding from the discussions, is that the major
18 points of contention that we have with Defence on the role of the Crisis
19 Staff or the issue of Crisis Staffs is firstly, the legality of the
20 establishment of the Crisis Staffs, and secondly, the conclusions that
21 our expert, Ms. Hanson, draws in her report. I think those are the two
22 points where we have the issues. And I'm sure my colleagues will correct
23 me if I'm wrong on that.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Which conclusions in particular?
25 MR. DOBBYN: I think it's many of the conclusions. It would
1 really be the thrust -- much of the thrust of the whole of the report.
2 But perhaps my colleagues could be more specific, if they are able, about
3 the conclusions that they do disagree with.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, that is correct. We met and we
5 discussed. You will remember, Your Honours, that we -- that we objected
6 to the qualifications of this expert, as number one. We say that this
7 expert is an employee of the Office of the Prosecutor and that her
8 expertise basically amounts to the submission in support of the case of
9 the Prosecution.
10 What we are saying is that the expert is using the material, the
11 factual material, on a highly selective and biased way, and we say that
12 due to this fact and the fact that the expert witness does not have
13 expertise for this kind of expert report, all the conclusions from
14 this -- from her report are basically flaw.
15 In that respect, we -- we certainly, as my colleague said, we
16 certainly oppose that the conclusion that the Crisis Staff were illegal,
17 secret bodies created by SDS and so on and so on, and we intend to
18 cross-examine the witness on this basis. And we have enough documents to
19 support our position and we are sure that we will be able to -- to
20 establish that either in our cross-examination or within our Defence
21 case, at the end of the case.
22 So I don't know how helpful we were, but we definitely agreed
23 that it would take us much longer time in order to achieve some kind of
24 stipulation on the -- on the wording of this document, or in general
25 positions. I mean, we can't do this in such a short period of time, I am
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic, and thank you,
3 Mr. Dobbyn.
4 It seems to me that there are a couple of issues that spring to
5 mind based on the evidence that we have heard so far from other
6 witnesses, which I thought are essential to understanding the expert
7 report and which I thought also would be relevant to put to her when she
8 comes back in the stand. One issue is the issue of the degree of
9 co-ordination between the Crisis Staff and the army, and between the
10 Crisis Staff and the paramilitary groups. There's a -- Ms. Hanson is not
11 very clear in her report about these issues, and so there is obviously
12 something that needs to be clarified with her.
13 The other issue is the evidence that we have been given about the
14 lifespan of the Crisis Staffs because we have had evidence to suggest
15 that at one point the Crisis Staffs were simply not performing the way
16 they were supposed to function, and that, therefore, the Serbian
17 leadership wanted them demolished and replaced by another body, the war
18 commissions or the War Presidencies which were easier to control from the
19 top. And this is another issue which Ms. Hanson does not deal with very
20 clearly. So here is also an area that I think would have been considered
21 as useful to explore with the expert.
22 And so I was also - how can I say it? - fishing for -- trying to
23 find out if the parties have any positions about these matters and
24 possibly other matters, but, you know, going into the details of the
25 report, are there issues where the parties agree. For instance, do you
1 agree that the Crisis Staffs at one point simply became so unruly and
2 uncontrollable that they had to be dismantled and replaced by something
3 else, is that a point agreement or disagreement between the parties? Do
4 you agree or disagree on the degree -- on the level of control or
5 co-ordination between the Crisis Staffs and the armed forces?
6 So these were points that I was hoping we could perhaps have
7 clarified. But now the Chamber has given some indication as to what we
8 think are matters to be explored with the expert witness, and so I see no
9 better solution than to just bring her in and continue.
10 Mr. Pantelic.
11 MR. PANTELIC: Your Honour, just for the record, the
12 understanding of Zupljanin Defence regarding the issue of Crisis Staff is
13 as follows, just in a few points: The part of Prosecution theory with
14 regarding to creation of Republika Srpska is that Republika Srpska and
15 all its organs are non-legitimate. Contrary to this position of the
16 Prosecution, the Defence is of the opinion, and this is our position,
17 that Republika Srpska was formed fully in accordance with the right of
18 people for [indiscernible] and also in accordance with the general
19 principles of public international law, which, during the period of 1992,
20 at the start of international mediation in this process, was finalised by
21 the adopting of another source of international public law which is the
23 stage, like a state internationally recognised but with certain
24 specifics. And these specifics are like, one used to say that the devil
25 is in details, is that practically on the basis of two entities of Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina
3 Of course, Defence is not challenging undisputed facts, of
4 course, in various cases where certain crimes occurred for no -- by known
5 or unknown perpetrators. This is a part of individual criminal
6 responsibility of these people. However, in light of the issue of
7 Crisis Staff, the OTP is -- has its theory of joint criminal enterprise
8 where the certain segments of Republika Srpska, I would say, society or
9 government, were taking certain part. Politicians, army, police, and
10 other components. We strongly oppose this theory and this is the Defence
11 case that we are going to present and we are going challenge all
12 Prosecution submissions.
13 In addition to that, my personal opinion is that not only this
14 case, but in various cases within this Tribunal, we are actually to some
15 extent wasting time with this political framework which is posed by
16 Prosecution in presenting of its theory. And that's why we have to deal
17 with political aspects, with the origins of Crisis Staff, with the roles,
18 et cetera. But the main point for Zupljanin Defence is the particular
19 and specific position of Mr. Zupljanin in his function as the chief of
20 SJB Banja Luka, and particular CSB, sorry, Banja Luka, and particular
21 relations with local police stations in regard to his mens rea and with
22 regard to his personal knowledge of what actually happened in various
23 locations, and this vice-versa relation. So that's, in short, is the
24 position of the Zupljanin Defence. Thank you so much.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. The idea was that we will now proceed
1 and we will go on until 12.30 and then have a 20-minute break. Before we
2 bring in Ms. Hanson, I have been notified by the French interpretation
3 booth that since we all attend these hearings in this trial in English,
4 it is simply that the parts of the documents - and I'm looking at you
5 Mr. Dobbyn - are read out so fast that the French interpreters have no
6 chance of following because they don't have the documents and they have
7 to wait for the documents to come on the screen.
8 So to the extent in which you will be reading passages from
9 document, then make eye contact with the French booth if you can see them
10 and make sure that -- or even listen to the French, if you can, make sure
11 that they can follow. Thanks.
12 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, while the witness is being brought,
13 may I ask for -- just for five minutes at the end of the day to raise one
14 matter that came out of one of your rulings last Friday.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 MR. DOBBYN:
17 Q. Good morning, Ms. Hanson. When we left off, you had been talking
18 about the establishment and the evolution of Municipal Crisis Staffs.
19 Now I'd just like to ask you a couple of questions about regional Crisis
20 Staffs. First of all, if I could ask you now, apart from Municipal
21 Crisis Staffs, were Crisis Staffs also established at the regional level?
22 A. Yes, they were.
23 Q. And do you address this in any detail in your report?
24 A. Not in detail because the documentary record is so unbalanced.
25 There's a great many documents from the ARK, from the Krajina and so few
1 from other regions that I don't feel -- I don't feel I can draw any firm
2 conclusions on what was a pattern for regional Crisis Staffs.
3 Q. From the documents that you have been able to review, can you
4 explain what the role of the regional Crisis Staff was?
5 A. It was similar at a regional level to the role of the Municipal
6 Crisis Staff; that is, it was a small collective body acting in the name
7 of the regional Assembly and similarly bringing together the regional
8 leaders of the party, the regional government, the military, and police.
9 Q. And did the regional Crisis Staffs play any sort of role between
10 the municipal level and the republican government?
11 A. Yes, we see them passing on instructions from the regional level
12 to the -- from the republican level through the region to the municipal
13 level and implementing policies set by the republican level and informing
14 the municipal levels.
15 Q. Now, I'd just like to show you one document.
16 MR. DOBBYN: If I can call up 65 ter 147.
17 Q. This is in tab 10 of your binder, Ms. Hanson. I'm just waiting
18 for the document to come up.
19 Now, Ms. Hanson, can you tell us what this document is?
20 A. It's the decision on the formation of the Crisis Staff of the
21 Autonomous Region of Krajina.
22 Q. And under point 1, we can see the composition of this Crisis
23 Staff. And can you say how the membership of this Crisis Staff compares
24 to the composition of Municipal Crisis Staffs?
25 A. It is very congruent to that composition. If you notice there
1 are military members, Lieutenant-Colonel Sajic, General Talic, a mayor.
2 There are members of the Main Board of the SDS, Kupresanin, Radic, Vukic.
3 Vukic is also a member of the Executive Board of the SDS. So you have
4 those leaders who are tied to the republican centre as well as the
5 military, and then under number 10, Zupljanin of the police.
6 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you. I'd like to tender this document at this
8 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it will be Exhibit P441.
10 MR. DOBBYN:
11 Q. At this point, Ms. Hanson, I'd like to turn to the question of
12 War Presidencies and war commissions, which are addressed in your report,
13 and in your report you talk about these War Presidencies and war
14 commissions. Can you explain what the difference or what the
15 relationship was between Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and war
17 A. They represent essentially the same organ. We never have them
18 operating in one municipality at the same time. It's either a Crisis
19 Staff or a War Presidency or a war commission. What we see is in
20 May 1992, the republican level taking further measures to establish their
21 laws, their state institutions, and to assert control over the municipal
22 organs that they've already created. So they are formalising the status
23 of Crisis Staffs by sending instructions. And then 31 May, the
24 Presidency forms -- orders the formation of Municipal War Presidencies to
25 replace the Crisis Staffs. But the formation and the taskings are
1 essentially the same, and indeed, we see an emphasis on the continuity
2 between them. We see Crisis Staffs saying, Well, we are supposed to be
3 War Presidencies but we are still calling ourselves Crisis Staffs, or,
4 oops, Today we are a War Presidency. So they are essentially the same
5 organs but with more explicit instructions on their formation and more
6 explicit ties to the republican level as War Presidencies and war
8 Q. Are you aware or have you found if there was any particular
9 reason or particular need to make this change from Crisis Staffs to war
11 A. Well, it was Crisis Staffs, then War Presidencies and then war
12 commissions. The commissions appear to be in those places where the
13 municipal organs were functioning the worst, the weakest, and the
14 commissioner had -- was delegated by the republican Presidency to go to
15 those municipalities and get things organised. But we don't see
16 commissions everywhere, by a long shot.
17 The explicit -- I haven't seen an explicit explanation of why the
18 change other than, as I say, making it more -- simply legislating it
19 more, giving a legal basis for it.
20 Q. Now, on the ground, to the person, the average person in the
21 street or -- was there any clear understanding of any distinction between
22 these different bodies?
23 A. I have not seen such -- evidence of such a distinction being
25 MR. DOBBYN: Could I call up at this point 65 ter 2627.
1 Q. And this is at tab 126 your report, Ms. Hanson.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Are you moving on to something else?
3 MR. DOBBYN: No, this is still the same topic.
4 Q. And can you tell us what this document is, Ms. Hanson?
5 A. This is an instruction apparently from the ARK Crisis Staff to
6 the municipalities, dated 11 June, so I take it to be having received and
7 now passing on the 31 May Presidency decision on the formation of
8 War Presidencies, because it's saying -- ordering the -- specifying the
9 composition of War Presidencies, that is Crisis Staffs. It shows that
10 they are clearly interchangeable. The Municipal Crisis Staff, that is
11 the War Presidency, and then lists the formation which is consistent with
12 the formation we've seen so far of Crisis Staffs. And it says that -- in
13 the text, the War Presidency, that is the Crisis Staff, will lead All
14 People's Defence in the territory of the municipality. So it ties it all
15 the way back to the idea of the All People's Defence committees. But it
16 clearly shows that War Presidencies and Crisis Staffs are essentially
18 MR. DOBBYN: Could I tender this document.
19 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
20 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours --
21 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit P442, Your Honours.
22 MR. DOBBYN: I was going to move on from this particular topic,
23 unless Your Honours had some questions.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, I would like to kick in a question in
25 pursuit of the questions put to you by Mr. Dobbyn, namely, in respect of
1 your testimony that the War Presidencies or war commissions were -- were
2 established where the Crisis Staffs had appeared to function the worst.
3 What did you mean by that?
4 THE WITNESS: I'm referring to the decision on the formation of
5 war commissions, and that's the last of the decisions, the 10th of June.
6 And it says that the commissioner is tasked with getting the municipal
7 organs functioning again. So my understanding is that's where the -- the
8 Municipal Assembly had not been able or didn't look like it was going to
9 be able to meet where the Crisis Staff did not perhaps have -- had not --
10 did not have an Executive Committee, municipal executive committee.
11 It's not specified in what ways they're not functioning. We see
12 most of the commissions being formed upon this decision in Eastern
13 Bosnian, Birac [Realtime transcript read in error "Bihac"] area is where
14 we first see war commissions formed. They weren't formed everywhere.
15 But the decision is not as extensive as the earlier instructions and it
16 simply says, Republican commissioner is to go where those places where
17 the municipal organs are not functioning.
18 But where we see war commissions actually functioning, where we
19 have documents of them, they are functioning exactly the same as
20 Municipal War Presidencies in Rajlovac, or in Ilidza. They just can't
21 even keep the terminology straight sometimes. It seems to be quite
22 interchangeable. So although the text of the decision on war commissions
23 makes it sound like they are rather a different body, where we see them
24 operating in the documentary evidence, they are operating like a War
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. You also said that one difference in
2 the way in which Crisis Staffs and war commissions were established was
3 that the war commissions seemed to be tied more closely to the republican
4 level. How was that?
5 THE WITNESS: Because of the emphasis on the role of the
6 commissioner. We see the commissioner mentioned already in Djeric's
7 instructions of 26 April. The instructions in May are a little more
8 explicit, but again the war commissioner decision -- or decision on
9 formation of war commissions is a shorter, briefer decision but it
10 explains more about the role of the commissioner.
11 And I'm not trying to say that he skips the regional level, it's
12 just that the places where we see war commissions at first are -- we
13 don't see much of a regional Crisis Staff there. I have so little
14 evidence on regional Crisis Staffs outside of the ARK that I can't say --
15 when I say that he tightens the ties to the republican level, I don't
16 mean to say that he is skipping the regional level, I just don't know
17 what the regional level was doing in those places.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. You just told us that the difference
19 was the role of the commissioner. What do you mean by that? Was it the
20 powers he had or was it the way in which he was appointed?
21 THE WITNESS: The role was the same. I meant it was the emphasis
22 on him, just the amount of time and the text that is devoted to
23 explaining the role of the commissioner. In Djeric's instructions it's
24 very brief. It's just, Report to the authorities, that is, the
25 republican commissioner. But if you look at the text of the decision on
1 war commissions, it says more about what he should do. It doesn't
2 contradict earlier instructions, it is simply fuller. And therefore I
3 feel it places more emphasis on the commissioner. But always his role is
4 to be the link, the personal link between the republican level and the
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: So that does suggest somehow a bypassing of the
7 regional level, doesn't it?
8 THE WITNESS: As I said, I'm very reluctant to make any
9 conclusions about the regional Crisis Staffs as a pattern because of the
10 imbalance in the evidence. But I don't see commissioners in the ARK
11 until much later. I see them -- maybe one or two appointed in some areas
12 that were kind of peripheral to the ARK
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. And my final question is, was there
15 any difference? Did the appointment of commissioners and war commissions
16 instead of having the Crisis Staffs, did that imply any difference in the
17 way in which the local areas were managed? Did it help?
18 THE WITNESS: Where I see a war commission functioning, I do not
19 see any difference in its functions between that and of a War Presidency
20 or Crisis Staff, but there's a difference between a commissioner being
21 there and a war commission actually operating.
22 So I do see some reference to the commissioners working well,
23 being effective links, but I don't see that war commissions -- I don't
24 have enough on war commissions operating in places where there hadn't
25 been an effective government before, I don't see that. So it's hard to
1 say that they made a difference or what the difference was.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: So if I understand you correctly, the situation
3 on the ground in the municipalities didn't change, but did the links
4 between the local level and the republican level improve by virtue of the
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is my understanding.
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: And what impacts did this improved correspondence
8 have on the situation on the ground?
9 THE WITNESS: Better information between the municipal level and
10 the republican, better lines of communication of policy, financial
11 assistance in that they would be able to raise their issues, what they
12 felt needed fixing in their municipality, what they needed money for
13 better. That's my understanding.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: I am sorry, just before you start there is one
16 intervention in the transcript. I am sorry, I didn't want to disturb the
17 Judge's question. 42 -- page 42, line 23. It says here: "... the
18 commissions being formed upon this decision in Eastern Bosnia, Bihac
19 area ..."
20 There's something because Bihac is Western Bosnia, so if you can
21 please clarify this with the witness, please. Thank you.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Hanson, you are quoted in the transcript to
23 say the following on page 42, line 21, and I quote from your testimony:
24 "It's not specified in what ways they are not functioning. We see most
25 of the commissions being formed upon this decision in Eastern Bosnia,
1 Bihac area, is where we see war commission. They weren't formed
2 everywhere." Can you recall what you said?
3 THE WITNESS: Birac, not Bihac but Birac, that's the name of the
4 region in Eastern Bosnia to which I was referring.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much. I think this clarifies it.
6 MR. DOBBYN:
7 Q. Ms. Hanson, I'll move on now to the section of your report,
8 starting at page 20 in English, the role of the Crisis Staffs and the
9 Bosnian Serb state. Now, once these Crisis Staffs were fully
10 established, from about April 1992, what was their level of authority at
11 the municipal level?
12 A. They were the highest municipal authorities. They replaced the
13 Municipal Assembly and were the municipal government.
14 MR. DOBBYN: And could we call up at this point 65 ter 2615.
15 Q. And this is at tab 13, Ms. Hanson.
16 And we can see, Ms. Hanson, that this is -- this document is
17 titled "Conclusions" of the ARK Crisis Staff, and it's dated 18 May 1992
18 Now, could you please look at item 2. It states:
19 "The crisis headquarters are now the highest bodies of authority
20 in the municipality."
21 And what, if anything, does this then say about the authority of
22 the Municipal Crisis Staffs within the ARK?
23 A. It show that is the ARK Crisis Staff itself is then recognising
24 or authorising the Municipal Crisis Staffs as the municipal authorities.
25 Q. Does this document provide any indication of communicative or
1 operational links between the ARK Crisis Staff and the republican
3 A. Yes, the first and, I believe, the last items indicate travel to
4 Pale, communications with the republican level. So, the first one says a
5 delegation of the ARK
6 MR. DOBBYN: Just before we carry on, if we could in the English
7 turn to page 2, please. Sorry, 2 in the B/C/S also.
8 THE WITNESS: And it says that the following week, Karadzic,
9 Koljevic, Krajisnik, Subotic, and Mladic are coming to Banja Luka
10 with representatives of ARK. So that shows the communications with the
11 republican level.
12 MR. DOBBYN: And I'd like to tender this document now,
13 Your Honours.
14 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P443, Your Honours.
16 MR. DOBBYN:
17 Q. Moving on now, I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about
18 the Crisis Staffs receiving orders or instructions from the regional and
19 republican organs. First of all, during this period after April 1992,
20 were the Municipal Crisis Staffs completely autonomous or did they
21 continue to receive direction from above?
22 A. They received orders from above which they acknowledged and
23 implemented. They were autonomous in the sense of within the
24 municipality they were the highest authority and could do it, but they
25 were responsible -- they saw themselves as part of the state system. The
1 state leadership saw them as part of the system and passed orders and
2 instructions on, yes.
3 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to call up now 65 ter 1501.
4 Q. And this is at tab 16 of your binder.
5 MR. DOBBYN: Sorry, I understand that this is Exhibit P427.16.
6 Q. Ms. Hanson, can you tell us what this document is and explain its
8 A. It's instructions from the government of the RS to the Ilijas
9 Crisis Staff. The government is arranging the transport of a group of
10 prisoners from Pale to Visoko and is intervening with the Crisis Staffs
11 along the way to organise their transport.
12 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you. If I could now call up 65 ter 1753.
13 Q. And this is the following tab, tab 17, Ms. Hanson.
14 MR. DOBBYN: Sorry, that's also an exhibit. It is 427.25.
15 Q. Can you tell us what this document is, Ms. Hanson?
16 A. It's from the same day, apparently the same operation because it
17 mentions moving prisoners from Pale to Visoko via Ilijas. It's an order
18 from the president of the government to the Crisis Staff of Sokolac to
19 provide trucks to transport the prisoners.
20 MR. DOBBYN: Now, I'd like to move on from that document and call
21 up 65 ter 1262.
22 Q. And this is at tab 18, Ms. Hanson.
23 And you see, Ms. Hanson, that this document is dated the
24 20th of May, 1992, from Sarajevo
25 us what this is and explain its relevance?
1 A. It's an order from the president of the government implementing
2 the Presidency decision on general mobilisation. So you can see the
3 links in the chain quite clearly. The Presidency passes a decision, the
4 government implements it, and it orders Crisis Staffs and the Ministry of
5 Internal Affairs to receive this and carry it out on military recruits --
6 recruiting men for the mobilisation.
7 Q. And is this an order that went to an individual Crisis Staffs or
8 all Crisis Staffs?
9 A. All Crisis Staffs. It simply addresses Crisis Staffs as a
10 blanket category, which indicates that the government saw Crisis Staffs
11 as a category of state organ, someone whom they could order. Just all
12 Municipal Crisis Staffs are to carry this out.
13 MR. DOBBYN: Could I tender this document, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the exhibit has been assigned
16 Exhibit P262 through the internal memo of the Court Officer dated
17 4 December this year.
18 MR. DOBBYN:
19 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson, we've just looked at some examples of the
20 government issuing instructions to Crisis Staffs, individual or as a
21 whole. In return, in your review, were you able to find anything
22 indicating that Crisis Staffs explicitly recognised the authority of the
23 RS government?
24 A. Yes. They many times cite decisions and say that they are
25 following the policies of the RS government, Presidency, Assembly, and
1 republican-level bodies.
2 MR. DOBBYN: Could we please call up Exhibit P372.
3 Q. This is in tab 20 of your binder.
4 Ms. Hanson, these are conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis
5 Staff, dated 22 May 1992
6 see anything there to indicate that the Sanski Most Crisis Staff was
7 recognising the authority of the government?
8 A. Yes. They appear to be acting upon that earlier order. They are
9 saying on the basis of a proclamation by the president, they'll implement
10 the decision on general mobilisation, and the steps they take are
11 consistent with the steps in the previous document.
12 Q. Thank you. I'll move on from there. I'd like to look now at the
13 issue of Crisis Staffs reporting to central organs. And we've looked at
14 Municipal Crisis Staffs receiving instructions. Have you found any
15 evidence of them reporting back then to the state organs?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. DOBBYN: And in particular at this time, could I call up
18 65 ter 1350.
19 Q. This is at tab 24, Ms. Hanson.
20 MR. DOBBYN: Sorry, that is an exhibit by this morning's order
21 and it is -- was admitted this morning but I don't believe we have an
22 exhibit number on the record yet.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document has been assigned
24 Exhibit 1D95.
25 MR. DOBBYN:
1 Q. And Ms. Hanson, this is a letter from Dr. Nikola Poplasen to the
2 War Presidency, dated 24 June 1992
3 was Nikola Poplasen?
4 A. He was the republican commissioner named by the RS Presidency for
6 Q. And what, if anything, does this report show with regards to
7 reporting up to the republican level?
8 A. He is reporting as the commissioner in Vogosca to the
9 republican-level Presidency which he terms "the War Presidency," so you
10 can see the similarity of the structures at the municipal and republican
11 level. He is describing some of the problems that he is encountered on
12 the ground in the municipality, including an illegal prison. So it's an
13 example of a written report. We also have -- I refer to the Assembly
14 discussions in my note that show most of the reporting was done orally,
15 but this is an example of a written report.
16 MR. DOBBYN: And if we can move on there to pull up 65 ter 1168.
17 And this is in tab -- which is Exhibit P209. Actually, we'll move on
18 from there. Thank you.
19 Q. The next issue I'd like to look at, Ms. Hanson, is the role of
20 the issue of the military role of the Crisis Staffs. So we are skipping
21 over some other points, some other documents in your binder. And can you
22 explain what role, if any, the Crisis Staffs played in the municipal
23 take-overs in 1992?
24 A. In the take-overs themselves, we see Crisis Staffs planning the
25 take-over, meeting -- bringing together the various forces involved, the
1 military police, reserve police and so on, to take-overs. In some places
2 it was an actual military action, and sometimes it was more peaceful,
3 less violent, but we see the Crisis Staff as the co-ordinating body for
4 these take-overs.
5 Q. And in your view, is it possible to describe a single pattern of
6 relationships between the Crisis Staff and the military forces from
7 municipality to municipality?
8 A. No. As I made clear in my report, this is one area where I see a
9 great deal of variation depending on the situation in the municipality
10 and the presence or absence of the JNA. What we see everywhere at a
11 minimum is this co-ordination and practical support, mobilisation,
12 getting the men, getting the goods the army needs, to the far end of the
13 spectrum, which we don't see in many places, is the Crisis Staff
14 president calling himself an commander and actually commanding the TO
15 forces personally. So it's a spectrum. The most important factor, as I
16 indicate, is time, that if we are talking April, the Crisis Staffs tends
17 to be more assertive and leading the forces. By June, as the VRS is
18 established and setting up its own command structure, we see the military
19 roles of the Crisis Staffs declining accordingly. So there's no one
20 pattern, but everywhere a commonality of purpose.
21 Q. And specifically in relation to the TOs or Territorial Defence
22 forces, what was the relationship between the Crisis Staffs and those,
23 and what was the basis of that relationship?
24 A. The commander of the TO was a member of the Crisis Staff, so that
25 was a force more easily directed by the Crisis Staff than the JNA unit if
1 there was one there. In some places where the Serbs were a minority and
2 did not feel they controlled the TO staff, they would set up sometimes
3 their own parallel or secret TOs. So we often see a closer relationship
4 between the Crisis Staff and the TO than with the regular JNA forces.
5 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to call up 65 ter 2611.
6 Q. And this is at tab 28 of your binder.
7 Ms. Hanson, you'll see that this is an announcement of the
8 Vogosca Crisis Staff. It's dated 11 May 1992. Can you tell us exactly
9 what this announcement is?
10 A. It's an announcement that the Crisis Staff is ordering the
11 general mobilisation of the Serbian TO of Vogosca. I would also note
12 that the president of the Crisis Staff is Tintor, a member of the Main
13 Board. He uses the SDS Municipal Board stamp, showing the close
14 relationship between the Crisis Staff and the SDS, and clearly the
15 relationship with the Serbian TO. And he is sending it to the Serbian
16 news agency SRNA, asking them to broadcast it several times. So it's all
17 part of the Serbian state system, that they are using the state radio to
18 broadcast this.
19 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to tender this document now, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P444, Your Honours.
22 MR. DOBBYN:
23 Q. I'd like to move on now to asking you some questions about the
24 relationship between Crisis Staffs and paramilitaries. First of all, was
25 there any relationship between Crisis Staffs and paramilitaries?
1 A. Certainly. In some places we see Crisis Staffs inviting
2 paramilitaries from outside or funding paramilitaries that were in the
3 municipality. Of course, the term "paramilitary" itself, one man's
4 paramilitary is another man's Serbian TO, so in some places the
5 relationship was quite close.
6 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to look at a couple of examples now from
7 Ilijas municipality. If we can call up 65 ter 2629.
8 Q. And this is in tab 30 of your binder.
9 A. This is --
10 Q. Sorry, if we could just -- giving a chance for the French
11 interpreters to catch up and for the document to come up on the screen.
12 Okay. Ms. Hanson, can you tell us what we are looking at here?
13 A. This is a letter from the president of the Ilijas Crisis Staff,
14 Ratko Adzic, again a member of the SDS Main Board, to a Serbian party in
16 He says that the Crisis Staff will give them arms if they come. So it's
17 an appeal from paramilitaries from Serbia to come to Ilijas.
18 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to tender this document now, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
20 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit P445, Your Honours.
21 MR. DOBBYN: And I'd like to call up now 65 ter 2630.
22 Q. And that's in the following tab of your binder, Ms. Hanson.
23 Ms. Hanson, can you tell us what we are looking at here?
24 A. This is a similar appeal, I believe, from the same day. This, to
25 the Serbian volunteer guard which was the official name of Arkan's group,
1 asking for -- again for manpower, giving -- saying that they can give
2 them housing and arms. And note here that it's asking for assistance to
3 "continue the blockade of Sarajevo
4 to Arkan to send volunteers.
5 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to tender this document, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P446, Your Honours.
8 MR. DOBBYN:
9 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson, are you able to say if there was any general
10 situation with regards to the co-ordination or co-operation between
11 Crisis Staffs and paramilitaries from municipality to municipality?
12 A. I haven't seen enough documents on paramilitaries throughout to
13 say firmly, but I have seen evidence of them supporting them, paying
14 them, appealing for them, considering them part of the forces, the
15 Serbian forces under their control or part of their effort.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DOBBYN: I was going to move on at this point, Your Honours,
18 I know this may have been an area of some interest. Do Your Honours have
19 any questions before I proceed? And I'm moving on to a fairly important
20 topic, I see it's only 12.20, would you like me to continue for
21 10 minutes or take a break now and complete the topic in one bulk group
22 of sessions after the break?
23 JUDGE HALL: How long do you think you would be, because we are
24 8 minutes ahead of the break, of the indicated break.
25 MR. DOBBYN: I would say it would be 10 to 15 minutes on this
1 particular topic.
2 JUDGE HALL: I think we can make a start.
3 MR. DOBBYN:
4 Q. Ms. Hanson, I'm turning now to the question of the Crisis Staffs
5 relations with the police force. And can you tell us how did the SDS
6 envisage that the relationship between the Crisis Staffs and the police
7 should work?
8 A. Well, we can see from the original instructions on Crisis Staffs
9 that the chief of police or commander of the police station was to be a
10 member of the Crisis Staff. We see Karadzic saying that the Crisis
11 Staffs will take -- establish the Serbian police forces, take over the
12 police stations and that they will be under the -- the police will be
13 under civilian authority. He stated that quite clearly.
14 So as part of the formation of Serbian municipalities, the Crisis
15 Staffs were to form or enable the formation of Serbian police stations.
16 Q. In the course of your research, did you find anything to indicate
17 that the SDS intended the Crisis Staff to take over from the republican
18 level Ministry of the Interior as having ultimate authority over the
19 municipal police?
20 A. No, they were to co-ordinate, they had their own parallel
21 channels of communication and -- but that they were replaced -- they were
22 replicating at the municipal level the same co-ordination and
23 co-operation that we see at the republican level.
24 Q. Now, we looked at the Variant A and B instructions before and we
25 saw that there was an SJB chief or police station commander to be a
1 member of the Municipal Crisis Staffs; isn't that -- do you recall that?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like now if we can go back to a document that
4 we've already looked at. This is the 26 April instructions. It's
5 Exhibit P70.
6 Q. It's in tab 8 of your binder. Looking at paragraph 2, this sets
7 out the composition of the Crisis Staffs, and again, do we see any police
8 members in the Crisis Staffs?
9 A. Yes, it says the head of the MUP is a member of the Crisis Staff.
10 Q. Sorry, I'm just looking for a particular point. Now, at the
11 start of that paragraph it states:
12 "The Crisis Staff shall consist of members, each of whom has an
13 individual responsibility."
14 What do you take that to mean?
15 A. It's their tasking, it's their area of expertise, so all these --
16 the leaders of these different forces come together, each with his area
17 of expertise or area in which he can implement the decisions of the
18 Crisis Staff, but the -- and the decisions are moreover brought, as far
19 as we can see, collectively. So they all had their input into the
20 policies of the Crisis Staff.
21 Q. And we could now look at paragraph 4, and this states:
22 "Command of the Territorial Defence and police forces shall
23 exclusively be within the competence of professional personnel.
24 Therefore, it is necessary to prevent any interference in the command of
25 the Territorial Defence or in the use of police forces."
1 So, Ms. Hanson, how did these instructions envisage the
2 relationship between the police and the Crisis Staffs?
3 A. My understanding is the TO -- sorry, the head of the police
4 forces would be a member of the Crisis Staff which would decide what
5 needed to be done, but it was left up to him to make sure that his men,
6 that the police forces would carry out those orders, and that the Crisis
7 Staff or other outside influences were not to be micro-managing and
8 insisting that orders be executed in a certain fashion but they were to
9 be sure that they were executed.
10 Q. If we compare the Crisis Staff to the government, how did the
11 role of heads of governmental organs such as the police chief and the
12 Municipal Crisis Staff compare to that of ministers at the republican
14 A. Very similar. You can see each of these members of a Municipal
15 Crisis Staff as parallel to the ministers at the republican level. We
16 have minister of defence, the MUP, industry and other things coming
17 together, meeting as a government to establish power, solve problems, set
18 policies, doing this -- the Crisis Staff doing the same thing with, as it
19 were, a group of municipal ministers coming together.
20 Q. And I think you may have touched on this already, but how did
21 Crisis Staffs reach their decisions?
22 A. As far as I could see, collectively. I see no evidence of voting
23 at any time. And that was also, I would emphasise, the tradition from
24 the former Yugoslavia
25 Q. Now, the decisions that were taken at the republican level, did
1 they have any influence on Crisis Staff decisions?
2 A. Yes, the Crisis Staff saw themselves as operating on the basis of
3 republican-level decisions.
4 MR. DOBBYN: If we could look at one more document before the
5 break, perhaps, and this is 65 ter 1262.
6 Q. And that's in tab 18 of your binder, Ms. Hanson.
7 MR. DOBBYN: It's now Exhibit P262.
8 Q. As we saw before, this is an order from the -- from Branko Djeric
9 to all Crisis Staffs. And if we could turn to point 3, this is at the
10 bottom of page 1 in the English, also in B/C/S, and it states:
11 "This order becomes effective immediately and is delivered to the
12 Ministry of National Defence and to all the staffs and units of the army,
13 to the Ministry of the Interior of Serbian Republic of Bosnia
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina municipalities."
16 If we could turn on to the next page in English and it continues:
17 "The municipalities' Crisis Staffs shall deliver this order to
18 the competent organs in the local communes and the Ministry of the
19 Interior shall deliver it to all the public security stations in the
21 Now, this last line that I've just read, what do you take this to
22 indicate as far as how chains of command are concerned?
23 A. It indicates to me that there's parallel chains, parallel
24 channels for the government to implement its orders, both through the
25 Ministry of the Interior down to all police stations and to all Crisis
1 Staffs. And then once again at the municipal level, those two channels
2 would come together, the Crisis Staff president would have received this,
3 the chief of police would have received it, and they would come together
4 in the Crisis Staff to implement it. So I see the parallel chains here.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DOBBYN: And that's an appropriate time to stop,
7 Your Honours.
8 JUDGE HALL: So we resume in 20 minutes.
9 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
11 MR. DOBBYN:
12 Q. Ms. Hanson, now I'd like to look at the Republika Srpska Law on
13 Internal Affairs and this is 65 ter 53 and it's in tab 32 of your binder.
14 MR. DOBBYN: Actually, if we could go to page 5 of the English
15 version, page 4 of the B/C/S. And I'm focusing on Article 27.
16 Q. Ms. Hanson, I'll just read this article and one other to you,
17 fairly short articles. Article 27 states:
18 "A public security station shall also execute the regulations
19 issued by the Municipal Assembly pertaining to law and order, traffic
20 safety, as well as other legal regulations issued by the Municipal
21 Assembly and which are related to internal affairs."
22 MR. DOBBYN: Now, if we could look at Article 31, and that's on
23 page 6 in the English, still page 4 in the B/C/S.
24 Q. Article 31 reads:
25 "Upon the request of the Municipal Assembly, the centre of public
1 security services and the public security station shall submit
2 information, notifications and other data on the situation and problems
3 within a district and region for which they have been established."
4 Now, Ms. Hanson, in your view, were the interactions between the
5 Crisis Staffs and the police consistent with these two articles that
6 we've looked at?
7 A. Yes. They were consistent bearing in mind that the Crisis Staff
8 replaces the Municipal Assembly. It issues orders to the police
9 regarding security in the municipal and receives information from the
11 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, can I tender this document at this
13 JUDGE HALL: We had previously [Microphone not activated]
14 determined that documents such as this --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, we previously determined that the acts of
17 parliament and documents of a similar public nature didn't have to be
18 formally admitted as exhibits. It's just a question, at the end of the
19 day, of agreeing a list of those to which the Chamber should have
21 MR. DOBBYN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Could we next call up Exhibit P179.9.
23 Q. And this is back in tab 9 of your report, Ms. Hanson. Sorry, of
24 your binder. And the document we'll be looking at shortly is the
25 decision on the organisation and the work of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor
1 municipality. And if we could go to Article 9, and that's on page 4 of
2 the English and page 5 of the B/C/S. Article 9 reads:
3 "The Crisis Staff shall maintain constant co-operation with the
4 units of the JNA, the Territorial Defence, civilian protection, and the
5 public security system via the senior officers of these institutions and
6 organs, and, through the municipality's executive committee with all
7 other economic and social subjects in the municipality."
8 Now, Ms. Hanson, this phrase "maintaining co-operation via senior
9 officers of these institutions," to you, what does this indicate with
10 regards to the lines of command of the police and other bodies?
11 A. Well, as we said before, it means that the commander of the
12 police or the police station is a member of the Crisis Staff. He has his
13 own responsibility. He has his own forces. He represents the personal
14 link. He is on the Crisis Staff and he has his forces to carry out what
15 the Crisis Staff decides has to be done, so we see the parallel command
17 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you. If we could now look at Exhibit P82.
18 Q. Sorry, Ms. Hanson, I'll just find where in your binder that is.
19 Sorry, this is at tab 33. What we are looking at is a bulletin of the
20 Kotor Varos Crisis Staff, dated 26 June 1992.
21 MR. DOBBYN: And if we could move over to page 2 of the B/C/S and
22 also page 2 of the English. And we are looking right at the bottom of
23 the page in both B/C/S and English, last paragraphs.
24 Q. And I'll read this paragraph:
25 "At the 36th meeting of the Crisis Staff, issues related to the
1 work of the Kotor Varos SJB were discussed, and problems were raised
2 concerning ..." and if we could go over to the next page in English.
3 "... concerning personnel, organisational and other matters. The
4 Crisis Staff concluded that it does not have the right to interfere in
5 the professional work of the police and army, nor does it wish to do so,
6 but it does require them to undertake security and the creation of
7 conditions for complete safety on the municipal territory."
8 Now, Ms. Hanson, is this description of the interaction between
9 the Kotor Varos Crisis Staff and the police consistent with that set out
10 in the 26 April instructions?
11 A. Yes. It echos the 26 April instructions, as it says that the
12 professional -- that the command of the police is a matter the for
13 professional cadres. Similarly here you see the Crisis Staff is
14 concerned with problems in the work in the SJB, it's its business to
15 see -- to find out if the SJB is able to function, but the solution and
16 the professional work lies with the police itself.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, I'm going to leave this subject now. I'd like
18 to just return very quickly to something we discussed earlier, and this
19 was the relationship between Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and war
20 commissions. And just to follow up on some questions that His Honour
21 Judge Harhoff was asking you, when these bodies evolved from Crisis Staff
22 to war commissions, did the personnel remain the same?
23 A. The personnel between Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies remained
24 essentially the same. We do see as Crisis Staffs become public and take
25 over the actual running of the municipality, we see some additional
1 members added but they are with very specific taskings such as local
2 industries or specific concerns like that. The make-up of war
3 commissions as specified in the decision on war commissions is much
4 smaller. They say only four people. But where I've seen war commissions
5 actually running with the documentary evidence to show it, they are much
6 larger. They are operating like War Presidencies, and they seem to
7 regard that only as a difference in terminology. In Rajlovac, we see
8 this as the tasks were the same. So Crisis Staff to War Presidencies, no
9 significant difference in composition. War Presidencies to war
10 commissions, according to the normative documents, yes, according to the
11 practice I've seen, no, no significant difference.
12 Q. Thank you. What I'd like to do now is perhaps take the various
13 areas that we've -- that you've been explaining, talking about, and look
14 at them in the context of one municipality. So what I'd like to look at
15 is a series of documents from the Kljuc municipality.
16 MR. DOBBYN: First of all, could we pull up 65 ter 2592. This is
17 in tab 36 of your binder.
18 Q. We can see that these are minutes of the 6th meeting of the
19 executive committee of the Kljuc SDS Municipal Board held on
20 23 December 1991
21 today, Ms. Hanson, could you explain the significance of this document?
22 A. As we see, it's just a few days after the issuance of the
23 19 December instructions. In agenda item 1, the president of the
24 SDS Municipal Board is passing on the instructions. He informed the
25 meeting of the instructions for the organisation and activities of the
1 Serbian people. He makes it clear that these are to be implemented, all
2 organs will be required to act in accordance with the instructions. In
3 fact, the enthusiasm to carry out Karadzic's instructions can be seen in
4 the comments of Brane Vojvodic, partway down the page, that he can accept
5 all Karadzic's proposals without even seeing them. The steps taken are
6 clearly those of the 19 December instructions, composing a Crisis Staff
7 and so on. So it gives an insight into not just how they were received
8 but the enthusiasm with which they were carried out.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to tender this document now.
11 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
12 MR. DOBBYN:
13 Q. If you -- sorry.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P447, Your Honours.
15 MR. DOBBYN:
16 Q. If you could go over to the next tab, Ms. Hanson.
17 MR. DOBBYN: And I'd like to call up 65 ter 3072. Sorry, I'm
18 just taking a minute, it seems that I'm calling up a document that's not
19 on the list, if I understand correctly, so I just want to see if I can
20 sort this out from my end and identify the document.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, among -- thank you very much, I wasn't aware
22 of that fact. I was actually trying to raise another issue. But I
23 appreciate that. Your Honours, I don't have a problem admitting this
24 document. I'm just wondering, I mean, there is a little nexus between
25 this witness and the handwritten notes of the Crisis Staff meeting in
1 Kljuc. I know that we are going to have some witnesses from the Kljuc, I
2 guess, from the Kljuc Crisis Staff and I think that would be more
3 appropriate that they are the ones with which these documents are
4 introduced. So I'm not saying that I'm objecting to it, I'm just saying
5 that just that we have a strict line as we did before or stand when it
6 comes to the admission of certain documents. Thank you very much.
7 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, actually, that's one of the matters
8 that we've been discussing. We don't actually have at present a witness,
9 a linkage witness from Kljuc. It's one the few municipalities where we
10 are lacking that at the moment. So the witnesses who are coming from
11 Kljuc are, if I can put it that way, from the other side.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay. In that case, I understand and I withdraw my
13 objection, well, view.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 MR. DOBBYN:
16 Q. Okay. Ms. Hanson, the document in tab 37 which I'm trying to
17 call up is actually 65 ter 823. And these are -- it's a book of minutes
18 from the Kljuc Municipal Assembly Crisis Staff.
19 MR. DOBBYN: Can we please go to page 7 in the English, and
20 page 33 in the B/C/S.
21 Q. Ms. Hanson, you'll see that these are minutes from a session of
22 the Kljuc SO Crisis Staff, dated 1st of June, 1992. First of all, could
23 I ask you what SO refers to?
24 A. Municipal Assembly.
25 Q. Okay. And what -- again in relation to what you've been talking
1 about today, what do you see has been significant about the minutes of
2 this particular session?
3 A. The first item, the president is acquainting the staff,
4 Crisis Staff members with the Crisis Staff operating instructions here,
5 SO, meaning the Municipal Assembly Crisis Staff operating instructions.
6 I would take this to be a reference to Djeric's instructions and the
7 Crisis Staff is clearly the Municipal Assembly Crisis Staff.
8 Q. And Djeric's instructions being the 26th April instructions?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DOBBYN: Could I tender this document now, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P448, Your Honours.
14 MR. DOBBYN:
15 Q. If we could go now to tab 38, Ms. Hanson.
16 MR. DOBBYN: And I'd like to call up 65 ter 2642.
17 Q. Ms. Hanson, could you explain what this document is and what its
18 relevance is to the Crisis Staffs?
19 A. It's a decision of the Kljuc War Presidency, you can see by the
20 21st of July. They've changed the from Crisis Staff to War Presidency
21 but it's still of the Municipal Assembly. And they are deciding that
22 only Serbs can hold positions, important positions -- hold places of
23 importance for the functioning of economic entities and also in the
24 police, it can be only Serbs.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DOBBYN: I'd seek to tender this.
2 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P449, Your Honours.
4 MR. DOBBYN: Next I'd like to look at 65 ter 795.
5 Q. This is in tab 39, Ms. Hanson. And this document is a public
6 announcement of the Kljuc Crisis Staff and you've touched on the
7 Municipal Crisis Staffs receiving orders or instructions from regional
8 and republican organs, and Municipal Crisis Staffs recognising the
9 authorities of these organs. Is there anything in this document you've
10 seen indicating that the Kljuc Crisis Staff recognised the authority of
11 the regional and republican organs themselves?
12 A. Yes, and they make it very clear by using capital letters all the
14 MR. DOBBYN: Just to get to the right point, if we could go to
15 page 2 of the English and also B/C/S.
16 Q. And if you could lead us to that point, Ms. Hanson.
17 A. Yes. The second full paragraph says that the Crisis Staff -- it
19 "All decisions will be reached and all jobs carried out in
20 accordance with the regulations and decisions of the ARK and the Serbian
21 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." So they are very explicitly, as I
22 say, using capital letters to emphasise, I think, there the importance of
23 both the region and the republican level.
24 MR. DOBBYN: And I'd seek to tender this document now.
25 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P450, Your Honours.
2 MR. DOBBYN:
3 Q. Now, the final document I'd like to look at is in tab 41 of your
4 binder, Ms. Hanson. It's 65 ter 813. We can see that the title of this
5 document is: "Report on the work of the Crisis Staff (War Presidency )of
6 the Kljuc Municipal Assembly in the period since 15 May 1992." And it's
7 dated July 1992.
8 Now, this reference in the title to "Crisis Staff (War
9 Presidency)," now the fact that these names are used together, what does
10 that indicate?
11 A. Indicates to me the continuity between the two and in fact that's
12 emphasised in the first few paragraphs.
13 Q. Well, if we could go over to the paragraphs.
14 MR. DOBBYN: Could we turn to page 2 of the English and B/C/S.
15 Q. And I'd like to look at the second paragraph. This states:
16 "The Crisis Staff of the Municipal Assembly continued its
17 activities in the newly arisen war conditions as the highest government
18 organ which had all the prerogatives of the Assembly and issued all
19 decisions and conclusions within the Assembly's competence."
20 And this would be consistent, wouldn't it, with what you were
21 saying earlier on about the Crisis Staffs being the highest municipal
23 A. Yes, consistent.
24 Q. And you were pointing to earlier the -- what is reflected in the
25 heading on the previous page about Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies,
1 and how is that reflected in what you see here?
2 A. The following paragraph, it numbers how many meetings it met
3 before the war as a Crisis Staff, during the war as a Crisis Staff, three
4 meetings as a War Presidency, and earlier meetings of the Crisis Staff
5 while an organ of the SDS. So it really demonstrates quite clearly the
6 continuity I was talking about. An SDS Crisis Staff, a Municipal Crisis
7 Staff, a Municipal War Presidency; all the same organ, essentially the
8 same people. It notes that a few people were added in late May.
9 MR. DOBBYN: And could we move on to page 3 in the English,
10 remaining on page 2 in the B/C/S.
11 Q. I'm looking at the first full paragraph in the English, the last
12 paragraph in the B/C/S, and can you tell us the relevance or what is
13 stated in this particular paragraph, Ms. Hanson?
14 A. The reference to collective work, I believe, team work in the
15 English, that it worked collectively and that it met at the beginning on
16 a daily basis.
17 MR. DOBBYN: Now, if we could go to page 3 in the B/C/S,
18 remaining on page 3 in the English.
19 Q. I'll just read a portion which is from the middle paragraph in
20 the English page. It says:
21 "All important and significant issues in the military and police
22 domain were not resolved outside the Crisis Staff of the Municipal
23 Assembly. This period could be described as a period of very successful
24 co-operation between the Crisis Staff and military bodies in defeating
25 the armed resistance of Muslim extremists."
1 How does this relate to what we have seen in previous documents
2 on chains of command and co-operation between police and Crisis Staffs?
3 A. Here the Crisis Staff says that it was involved in all important
4 and significant issues in the police domain. If the police were having
5 problems in carrying out their duties, the Crisis Staff would be involved
6 in the resolution of those issues, is how I understand it. That the
7 Crisis Staff was where all these people would come together and air their
8 particular problems from their domains.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DOBBYN: Next portion I'd like to look at is page 4 of the
11 English and also of the B/C/S. And in the English I'm looking at the
12 bottom paragraph.
13 Q. It states:
14 "At every meeting, the Crisis Staff (War Presidency) of the
15 Municipal Assembly considered the conclusions of the Banja Luka
16 Crisis Staff which were binding as regards all issues connected with life
17 and work in the municipality."
18 So it seems fairly straightforward but I'll just ask you to
19 explain what you see is this saying about the authority of the
20 regional-level Crisis Staffs.
21 A. Well, clearly it say that is they were binding, the conclusions
22 of the regional Crisis Staff were binding for the municipality, so they
23 dealt with -- the Crisis Staff would deal with those in their meetings.
24 Q. Carrying on from there it states:
25 "Furthermore, the Crisis Staff (War Presidency) of the Municipal
1 Assembly resolved certain personnel issues in the judicial system, the
2 public prosecutor's office, the misdemeanour court, the municipal
3 administration organs ..." and so on.
4 What do you see is the relevance of that or the importance of
5 that particular sentence?
6 A. What I see in many municipalities as well as here is the Crisis
7 Staff taking over the -- changing the judicial system, firing non-Serbs
8 from the local courts and prosecutor's offices, and replacing them with
9 Serbs. So this is consistent with a pattern I've seen elsewhere.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DOBBYN: If we can now move on to page 5 in the English,
12 remaining on page 4 in the B/C/S.
13 Q. This is the last point I'm going to ask you about, Ms. Hanson.
14 And the first paragraph in the English reads:
15 "During the Crisis Staff meetings, issues concerning the
16 organised relocation of the citizens of Muslim nationality were
17 frequently discussed and resolved, as well as the issue of the actual
18 status of citizens of Muslim nationality which resulted in certain
19 conclusions being reached."
20 Now, can you perhaps explain this, and is this something that
21 you -- the type of thing that you saw in many Crisis Staff documents?
22 A. Yes. As I indicate in my report, Crisis Staffs were heavily
23 involved in debating the status of Muslims, and in the organised moving
24 out of the Muslims. So we can see that the Crisis Staff saw this as its
25 issue. The organised relocation and status of citizens -- status of
1 Muslims was Crisis Staff business.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DOBBYN: I'd like to tender this document now.
4 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P451, Your Honours.
6 MR. DOBBYN:
7 Q. Ms. Hanson, I've just got one final question before I finish, and
8 that's to ask: In the preparation of your report, at the time you were
9 preparing that report, were you aware of or was anything in that report
10 based on any evidence that has come out in testimony in this case?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you, I have no further questions, Ms. Hanson.
13 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Dobbyn.
15 Before I invite counsel for the accused to begin their
16 cross-examination, would this be a convenient point, Ms. Korner, to deal
17 with the matter you had indicated you wanted to raise.
18 MS. KORNER: Certainly, Your Honour. It relates to the decision
19 that you issued on the Prosecution application to add or exchange, as it
20 were, witnesses. Decision was delivered on the 4th of December, so last
21 Friday. In paragraph 28, you ordered that we had to remove a witness
22 from our witness list. You didn't give us a time-limit there, but you
23 then ordered in the decision -- disposition, rather, that we file a
24 revised list of witnesses within seven days.
25 Now, Your Honours, if that means you want us to remove a witness
1 between now and Friday, we'd ask for reconsideration of that.
2 Your Honour, we obviously appreciate the overall length of time that
3 you've given us and that is the -- effectively the deciding factor. The
4 difficulty is if we arbitrarily remove one witness within the seven days,
5 with a -- as I -- if I may put it this way, we are still discovering what
6 the real issues in this case are. And additionally, at a time when it
7 may well be we are not able to get some of the witnesses who are on our
8 list. Your Honours are aware of the problems we are having with one
9 particular witness. We anticipate that the Defence are preparing for
10 witnesses as we give them the list, further witnesses who are to be
11 called. So we simply ask that at this early stage still in the case, we
12 should not have to arbitrarily remove a witness from our list at a later
13 stage. We are not saying we are not going to comply with the order; we
14 are simply saying can we not do it within the seven days.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Very shortly, I assume you would like to hear the
16 Defence position on this. We find this very reasonable and we don't
17 object to this.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Could you give us an indication as to how much
20 time you would need for this?
21 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, we'd certainly ask that it not
22 be until -- I wouldn't like to give a definitive answer at this stage,
23 but certainly perhaps not until February, given that we are not sitting
24 for a bit of time in January.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: 1st March.
2 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: May I, Your Honours?
4 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
6 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:
7 Q. [Interpretation] Ms. Hanson, my name is Slobodan Zecevic. I
8 appear for the accused Mico Stanisic.
9 You are an historian and political analyst, aren't you?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You are not a lawyer, are you?
12 A. Correct, I am not.
13 Q. In your report, I believe it's chapter 1, there is a section
14 called: "The legal grounding of Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies."
15 Would you kindly tell me who authored that part of your report?
16 A. One paragraph -- the research on one paragraph was done by a
17 colleague. Colleagues of mine in the leadership research team
18 contributed to that section. But I confirmed all their findings, I
19 looked at all the sources. That's the only section in which I received
20 some assistance from the colleagues.
21 Q. So if I understood correctly, they wrote this section and you
22 checked and verified what they had written?
23 A. I can't remember the exact drafting of the sentences. I think
24 that paragraph 6, the first two sentences were actually written by a
25 colleague. This has been in my report since the first version of the
1 report for Krajisnik, so I can't say exactly which -- I don't recall
2 exactly which sentences I drafted, which sentence others did. But in
3 general, this part is the only part of my report which does represent
4 some collective work.
5 Q. If that is the only part of the report which is a product of
6 collective work, as you put it, what about para 83? If I may remind you,
7 in that paragraph you quote the legislation that was mentioned in your
8 discussion with my learned friend from the Law on Internal Affairs of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina and you gave a comment. Is that a comment that you
10 drafted or is it again a product of collective work?
11 A. Paragraph 83 is almost entirely a citation from the law, but the
12 first sentence and the last are my work. But I cited the law.
13 Q. When you say the first and the last sentence, you mean your
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Mrs. Hanson, what, in your view, gives you the right to claim
17 that you have the requisite expertise to create an expert report like
19 A. I have read all available documents that I've been able to find
20 from Crisis Staffs throughout Bosnian Serb republic. I don't know if
21 there's anyone who has read across the board as widely on Crisis Staffs
22 as I have. So I base my expertise on the research I've been carrying out
23 here for many years.
24 Q. That was precisely the point of my question. You are telling us
25 here that your education is not really adequate for this sort of expert
1 report, but you are so well informed that that enables you to make this
2 expert report?
3 A. I didn't refer to my education. I think my education and
4 training in history and the analysis of documents is a start, but it's
5 always -- expertise is a combination of, you know, the theoretical
6 ground -- background and the practical experience. So I have the
7 educational background to become an analyst, and as an analyst, I have
8 read into the subject of Crisis Staffs.
9 Q. Mrs. Hanson, I'm asking you what education and training gives you
10 the right to claim that you are an expert qualified to make an expert
11 report about the state organs of a country? Is it your training as
12 political analyst, or your training as historian, because you told me you
13 are not a lawyer. That's all I want to know.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry.
15 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you, Your Honour. I wonder about the
16 relevance of these questions. It's already been established by the
17 Trial Chamber that Ms. Hanson is an expert. If there are questions going
18 to bias or something along those lines, I can understand the questions;
19 but in light of the fact that it's already been determined that she is an
20 expert, I don't know where these questions really take us.
21 JUDGE HALL: I thought of asking Mr. Zecevic that same question,
22 the Chamber having deemed her an expert, the -- it wouldn't be open
23 [Realtime transcript read in error "even"] to him to revisit that
24 finding. But I thought, as I heard him proceed, that he was --
25 Mr. Zecevic you can tell me if I am reading more into this than in fact
1 exists, that he was laying the groundwork for challenging the conclusions
2 that she is offering on the basis of her accepted expertise.
3 Is that where we are, Mr. Zecevic?
4 MR. ZECEVIC: A hundred per cent right, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE HALL: So we'll see where he goes.
6 MR. DOBBYN: Thank you.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Go ahead, Ms. Hanson.
9 A. As I repeat, I'm not a lawyer. I think my education has given me
10 the tools and my reading has given me the experience to call myself an
11 expert on this one matter of Municipal Crisis Staffs.
12 Q. Isn't it true, Ms. Hanson, that your employer, and that is the
13 Office of the Prosecutor as we know, tasked you with drafting an expert
14 report that would justify their case, the Prosecution case in these
15 proceedings, and then you reviewed this extensive documentation, read it,
16 and selected only those portions from that bulk of documents that fit the
17 Prosecution case and took them out of context?
18 A. No, that is not true. I was not tasked with drafting a report
19 that would justify their theory of the case. I was tasked with
20 explaining to them what are Crisis Staffs, what role did Crisis Staffs
21 play in the Bosnian Serb state. As far as I know, before I started they
22 had no theory. If they did, they didn't give it to me.
23 JUDGE HALL: If I may intervene, the transcript records at
24 line 16 of page 77, my having said that it wouldn't be "even" to him,
25 that is Mr. Zecevic, to revisit the question. What I thought I said and
1 what I intended to say wouldn't be "open" to him. Not even. Thanks.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Moreover, on the question of taking
3 things out of context, I did not, to the best of my abilities. I always
4 showed what I understood to be the situation and I made the Prosecution
5 aware of evidence that would go against their case when I would come upon
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. Since you have just explained how that worked, in
9 practice you made a draft report, submitted it to the Prosecution for
10 their review, and when you were acquainting them with certain documents
11 that you deemed important, I'm surprised that you did not place those
12 documents in context as an historian, as a trained historian. Did you
13 place them in the contemporaneous context?
14 A. Yes, I did place them into context.
15 Q. All right, then. Let us discuss the first document that was
16 shown to you today. Perhaps it's easiest to call it Variant A and B.
17 The date on it is 18 December 1991
18 A. No, it's the 19th of December.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up the document on the
20 screen, P69, please.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, if I may, in your previous question
22 you started with: "Since you have just explained how that worked," and
23 then you explain how that work. My question was, was that a question or
24 was that something else? I read it to you:
25 "Since you have just explained how that worked, in practice you
1 made a draft report, submitted it to the Prosecution for their review,
2 and when," et cetera. But I don't read that in the witness's answer. So
3 my question is: Was that a question? Then she didn't answer it.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, that was a question, but I was
5 laying a foundation. I was referring to the witness's answer -- let me
6 just -- it's page 78, 4:
7 "No, that is not true. I was not tasked with drafting a report
8 that would justify their theory of the case. I was tasked with
9 explaining to them what are Crisis Staffs, what role did the Crisis Staff
10 play in the Bosnian Serb state. And as far as I know, before I started
11 they had no theory."
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: I personally can't read there what you said
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I understood it and obviously the witness
15 shared that with me, that she was tasked with preparing a report. She
16 prepared a report and only after that the Prosecutor created a theory of
17 the case. That was my understanding. And based on that, I said did she
18 put to the Prosecutor's perspective the context of when the certain
19 documents which she would rely on were created.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can we ask the witness, perhaps, to --
21 MR. ZECEVIC: By all means.
22 Q. Ms. Hanson, would you be so kind to answer --
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Did you draft -- did you write a draft and
24 submitted it for review to the OTP?
25 THE WITNESS: I would -- I wrote this report in various stages.
1 The first was for the case against Momcilo Krajisnik. I don't recall
2 submitting it as a draft report so much as I first wrote it as a memo to
3 the prosecuting team to give them -- to brief them. And then they said,
4 Would you make this an expert report and it would form part of our case.
5 So it was not written as an expert report, it was written, as I said,
6 an -- to explain to the Prosecutors what a Crisis Staff was, what they
7 did. It became an expert report, and it was after the Krajisnik version
8 was submitted, I maintained it. I updated it with new documents that
9 came to my attention. So the version for this case represents an updated
10 version of the Krajisnik report.
11 But I don't -- I didn't write a draft report on which then I got
12 feedback from the prosecuting team, no.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I note the time, maybe --
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you.
16 MR. PANTELIC: And, Your Honour, before --
17 MR. ZECEVIC:
18 Q. Thank you, Ms. Hanson.
19 MR. PANTELIC: Before you excuse, Ms. Hanson, please, it's a
20 rather specific situation because Ms. Hanson is, my understanding, is
21 working or is a part of Prosecution office, so please make necessary
22 direction how and when she will be in the meantime. I'm really not
23 asking that maybe she be --
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I can assure --
25 MR. PANTELIC: -- remunerated for this day or tomorrow but, I
1 mean, in terms of salary, and then I don't know where she is, in a hotel
2 or here, there in the building or her [indiscernible]. This is specific
3 situation, so please give her a precise instructions. Thank you.
4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I don't think Ms. Hanson needs to move
5 into a hotel for the period. She knows, as does everybody else in this
6 office, she is in the middle of giving evidence and nobody can discuss
7 anything with her while she's giving evidence. The problem only arises
8 if for some reason cross-examination gets delayed into well into the new
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, correct me if I'm wrong, I think I
11 recall that one of your other experts - was it Mr. Theunens? - offered to
12 simply not be in his office as long as he was under examination as a
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, it may be thought slightly insulting
15 to professional people that we can't abide by the rules of the Court, the
16 witness and counsel alike. But if Your Honours feel that -- I think
17 Mr. Theunens, it was a very special case.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Okay. So instruct her.
19 JUDGE HALL: You have something else?
20 Well, Ms. Hanson, the usual warning of which you would be aware
21 is that having been sworn as a witness, you are not permitted to discuss
22 your testimony with anyone and you certainly can have no contact with the
23 lawyers, but we proceed on the presumption that everyone would behave
24 correctly until it's shown otherwise. Thank you.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day of
2 December, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.