1 Wednesday, 9 December 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
6 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-08-91-T,
7 the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Good morning to all. May we have the
9 appearances, please.
10 MR. DOBBYN: For the Office of the Prosecutor, Gerard Dobbyn with
11 Joanna Korner, and assisting us today as Case Manager is
12 Jasmina Bosnjakovic.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Eugene O'Sullivan and Ms. Paula Lynch appearing for Stanisic Defence
15 today. Thank you.
16 MR. PANTELIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For Zupljanin
17 Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Would the usher please escort the
19 witness back to the stand.
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, while that's happening I'm not seeking
21 to delay matters now, but I do want to raise the question with you, and
22 this is a joint application by the Defence and Prosecution about the
23 procedures of the admission of documents particularly in light of
24 Your Honours ruling yesterday in respect to the Sanski Most documents.
25 JUDGE HALL: You are alerting us that you are going to deal with
1 that at some point or you are going to do it now?
2 MS. KORNER: Well, as Your Honours asked for the witness to come
3 in, I thought I'll leave it to a later stage.
4 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
8 WITNESS: DOROTHEA HANSON [Resumed]
9 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Ms. Hanson.
11 A. Good morning.
12 Q. Mrs. Hanson, we discussed yesterday how your report came to be
13 written. At one point you said you had prepared a memo for the
14 Prosecution team in the Krajisnik case. Do you you remember?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. If I understand that well, that means you worked as part of the
17 Prosecution team in the Krajisnik case?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. And if I understood this right, when you submitted to them this
20 memo on Crisis Staff, they liked it and so they decided to instruct you
21 to write a report and represent that report as an expert; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I'm sure that when they were giving you these instructions, they
24 suggested what form the report should take and what particularly to focus
25 on; correct?
1 A. As far as form, it was mostly a question of the formal
2 presentation such as footnotes versus endnotes. I don't recall much
3 input on the topics to focus on. At that point, I think they thought I
4 had satisfied with the topics I had covered, but there was certainly some
5 discussion of what it takes to change a memo to an expert report, more
6 footnotes, footnotes in a certain form, table of contents, that sort of
8 Q. You also told us yesterday, I think on page 4044, that you drew
9 the attention of your Prosecution colleagues to documents that do not
10 support their case. Do you remember that?
11 A. Yes, that's part of my job. I do it all the time.
12 Q. Could you identify those documents, please, which do not support
13 the Prosecution's theory of the case in your report?
14 A. I note in my report the differences in the pattern but -- trying
15 to recall if I found documents specifically from Crisis Staffs because I
16 review many different documents as a member the team.
17 Q. Mrs. Hanson, if you say that there are documents that do not
18 support the Prosecution case and that you drew the Prosecutor's attention
19 to them when you were writing this expert report, I'm asking you, can you
20 tell me which are these documents reflected in your report. Can you
21 specify them?
22 A. They are not in my report, but I brought them to the attention of
23 the Prosecution team.
24 Q. So those documents that do not support the Prosecution case are
25 not reflected in the report. You did draw the attention of the
1 Prosecution to them but you did not include them in your expert report.
2 Don't you think that it is the duty of the expert in keeping with the
3 rules of this court to assist the Court in gaining knowledge of facts
4 that they are not aware of in an objective manner?
5 A. I feel that it is very much the duty of the expert to assist the
6 Court by presenting facts in an objective manner.
7 Q. How, then, do you imagine facts can be presented in an objective
8 manner if the facts that do not support the Prosecution case did not find
9 a place in your report? How does that make your report objective?
10 A. I did not find any documents that significantly changed the
11 understanding of -- my understanding of the pattern of evidence as
12 explained in my report. As I say, in the course of my review documents,
13 I know it is one of my duties to bring to the attention of the
14 Prosecution documents that appear potentially Rule 68. I'm not a lawyer,
15 it's not my job to decide whether a document is or is not Rule 68, but I
16 did not find anything significant enough to change my understanding of
17 the documents I use.
18 Q. You will agree with me that ultimately it is the Trial Chamber
19 that decides on the significance of these documents; correct?
20 A. My understanding is the Trial Chamber can only decide on the
21 documents presented to it. My job is to -- part of my job is to assist
22 the Prosecution team with identifying documents that should possibly be
23 disclosed as Rule 68.
24 Q. The key issue is precisely this one, since it is the
25 Trial Chamber that decides on the basis of the evidence led here, do you
1 believe it is not your duty to present to the Trial Chamber all the
2 documentation, including the documents that do not support the
3 Prosecution case? In other words, do you believe it is sufficient for
4 you to have informed the Prosecutor that some documents are potentially
5 68? That is the only issue. What is your position?
6 A. I cannot possibly present to the Court all the documentation even
7 relevant to Crisis Staffs. It's my job as an expert to make a selection.
8 It's my job as an expert to look at the -- all the documentation to
9 determine a pattern, and if there was a consistent pattern that one area
10 of my conclusions was quite wrong on the basis of documents that
11 contradict it, of course I take it out -- I would rewrite my report, take
12 it out of it.
13 I found no such consistent body of evidence which contradicted
14 what I wrote. On the contrary, looking at tens of thousands of documents
15 of which thousands came from Crisis Staffs, I made a selection that I
16 thought best represented the pattern I saw in the evidence. I would --
17 I've based my report on the evidence I found, so it's not that I started
18 with conclusions and looked -- presented only those documents which
19 supported them. Quite the opposite.
20 Q. [No interpretation]. [Interpretation] We will now go through
21 certain documents that I believe you did consider but for some reason
22 they did not find their way into your report.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Do we have the translation now? [Interpretation]
24 Should I repeat?
25 Q. Mrs. Hanson, thank you for this clarification. I will now try to
1 present to you certain documents that I believe you had access to, but
2 for some reason, they did not find their way into your report, although I
3 believe they have a considerable effect on the veracity of the claims in
4 your report.
5 I asked you yesterday whether you had shown your colleagues from
6 the Prosecution the context in which the instructions of the
7 19th December 1991 were issued. That's P69. Do you remember this
9 A. Yes, I remember the question. Part of my job as an analyst in
10 the leadership research team is to explain historical context to the
11 Prosecution team and I did often. My specific tasking on Crisis Staffs
12 was to present a report on the formation and operation of Bosnian Serb
13 Crisis Staffs. But in other forms of my work, I do explain the
14 historical context.
15 Q. Very well. Would you agree with me -- and I would appreciate
16 brief answers such as yes or no. I'll read out to you a couple of facts
17 and events which I believe to be important to the context in which these
18 instructions were given. Do you believe it's important, in terms of the
19 context, that on the 19th December, the non-constitutional declaration of
20 sovereignty adopted by the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina had a role to
22 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic, if I may, before you go into the
23 details of documents, there is -- Ms. Hanson, is there procedurally or
24 administratively a means of isolating your work as an expert from your
25 ordinary work in the Office of the Prosecution?
1 THE WITNESS: Once my report was identified as -- to be an expert
2 report, then certainly in this case I was -- very concrete steps were
3 taken that I not be part of team meetings, I not receive any team
4 discussions on the case. I would receive specific questions to answer,
5 but I was not told why -- how they would pertain to the case, once I was
6 identified as an expert.
7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
8 Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. [Interpretation] In the light of the Judge's question, let me ask
11 you one more thing. You said your first report was created on the basis
12 of a memorandum written by you as part of the Prosecution team in
13 Krajisnik, and then the Prosecutor's leading that case asked you to write
14 it in the form of a report, and that is your basic report, isn't it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And then this basic report from Krajisnik was amended, adjusted,
17 updated for the requirements of this case, and then finally, the last --
18 the latest version was made for the Karadzic case; correct?
19 A. After I -- my expert report was completed for Krajisnik, I
20 continued to update it according to materials, documents, that came to my
21 knowledge. I was not -- this was an ongoing project and I was not yet
22 identified as -- I had not yet been informed by Stanisic/Zupljanin team
23 that they would want my report for an expert witness, but it was simply
24 one of my taskings, ongoing taskings to keep my report updated. So it
25 was -- that was a matter of a couple of years, and then when the
1 Stanisic/Zupljanin team said they wanted to use my report, then I had a
2 more definite goal in the writing it, but it was an ongoing project
3 updating it. And then yes, there is another version which I have further
4 updated for Karadzic.
5 Q. Ms. Hanson, isn't it true that you drafted one report for the
6 Stanisic case and then subsequently updated it in April 2008?
7 A. As I say, this report for this case was based on my ongoing
8 revision and updating of the report as written for Krajisnik. So I don't
9 quite understand --
10 Q. Let me explain. In 2006 or 2007, you drafted a report on
11 Crisis Staffs for the needs of the Mico Stanisic case. That was the
12 first version. The version we are discussing now is the version of
13 15 February 2008
14 A. I know that this version here is essentially what I drafted in, I
15 believe, February 2008. I -- at this point, I do not recall whether
16 there was a version in 2006 or 2007. As I say, the Krajisnik report, I
17 think, I originally wrote in 2002 and kept reworking it. I don't
18 remember -- I don't recall giving -- drafting one in 2006 or 2007 for the
19 Stanisic Prosecution team.
20 Q. To conclude whether you remember or not, are you saying to us
21 that there were no instructions and no suggestions made by the
22 Stanisic/Zupljanin Prosecution team in the sense of direction that you
23 should take in writing your report?
24 A. I was -- received some oral instructions that it would be logical
25 to expand the police section because it was very brief in the original
1 report, and I was given a list of the municipalities in the indictment
2 with an indication that it would be preferable to draw my examples from
3 those municipalities where possible. I did not receive a written set of
4 taskings as I did in the Karadzic case, but this was from conversations
5 mostly with the former Prosecutor, Anna Richterova.
6 Q. You mean Richterova; correct?
7 A. Yes, that's what I said.
8 Q. So if I understood this correctly, you did not receive written
9 instructions but you received verbal instructions, and on that basis, you
10 adjusted your report?
11 A. On the basis of the oral discussions and suggestions, I looked at
12 the police, the issue of the police in more depth, looked at some more
13 police documents, and of the examples which I already had in my
14 footnotes, I gave more emphasis in the text to those examples from the
15 indictment municipalities. I did not change my conclusions or my
16 assertions in any fundamental way. It was simply the main change was
17 better organisation, but that I had already been working on myself and a
18 little more attention to the police section.
19 Q. Isn't it true, madam, that essentially the conclusions you made
20 in the Krajisnik case, you just expanded to include the police by
21 interpreting the documents related to the police, including the Law on
22 the Interior, in keeping with the conclusions you had already made?
23 A. The conclusions I had already made were based on the documents.
24 I looked at the documents one more time and wrote my conclusions. But I
25 certainly did not look at the documents in the light of proving
1 pre-existing conclusions. I always draw my conclusions from the
2 documentary evidence.
3 Q. All right. Let's go back to the context of the document P69.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If we can call it up on the screen.
5 Q. Mrs. Hanson, we were discussing the context of events which led
6 to this document on the 19th of December. I asked you whether you
7 believed that in the context of these instructions, the adoption of the
8 unconstitutional proclamation of sovereignty on the 15th of October by
9 the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is significant, yes or no?
10 A. I cannot answer that question because I do not -- I'm not in a
11 position to judge the constitutionality or not of it. As I understand,
12 it was not a direct proclamation [Realtime transcript read in error
13 "Prokuplje lamb maigs"] of sovereignty but a memorandum on sovereignty,
14 and it occurred two months before the issuance of this document.
15 However, it was one of the events and the interpretation of that
16 memorandum of sovereignty was one of the events which was, yes, part of
17 the lead-up to the conflict, part of the problems facing or the issues
18 facing Bosnia
19 Q. Thank you. In your view, did the signing of the plan on the
20 peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis on the 25th of November, 1991
21 under the leadership of Lord Carrington also have an impact on the
23 A. It was certainly part of the general political context at the
25 Q. Do you know that on the 9th of December, 1991, the conference on
2 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise to interrupt my learned friend. It
3 is a problem with transcript. This is page 10, line 9, the wording is:
4 "As I understand, it not a direct Prokuplje lamb maigs of sovereignty..."
5 It doesn't make sense to me so let's clarify that, please.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I think Mrs. Hanson, you actually said it was not a direct --
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: I think that in LiveNote it came out correctly.
10 MS. KORNER: No. It's line 7, Your Honours.
11 MR. PANTELIC: [Microphone not activated].
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Oh yes. Sorry, sorry.
13 MR. PANTELIC: Although maybe the topic is different.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Would you like me to clarify this, Your Honours?
15 THE WITNESS: Proclamation.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Yes. You said it was not a direct proclamation, it was a
18 declaration on sovereignty, memorandum?
19 A. A memorandum. But the word in question here is "proclamation."
20 Q. Thank you. So the question I was trying to ask before this was:
21 Do you know that on the 9th December 1991, the conference on Yugoslavia
22 continued precisely here in The Hague
23 A. I don't know that exact date, but, yes, I certainly know that at
24 this time of year, in that month, it was ongoing.
25 Q. Do you remember the statement made by the German government on
1 the 14th of December, 1991, wherein they say, despite the warning of the
2 UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar at the time, that they would not
3 give up on the recognition of sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia
4 practically undermined the efforts of the conference here in The Hague
5 A. I am not aware of that particular statement. I am aware of the
6 general policy of the German government at the time. Whether that
7 necessarily undermined peace efforts, I'm not -- I can't answer or I
8 would not agree that it necessarily meant all peace efforts were -- would
9 be undone.
10 Q. Ms. Hanson, you know that on the 17th of December, 1991, the
11 council of ministers of the European Union adopted a new declaration on
13 independence of all Yugoslav Republics
14 criteria of recognition for all new states in Europe and the former USSR
15 with a proviso that the application be made until 23rd December 1991
16 the promised date of recognition was the 15th of January, 1992
17 aware of this? Are you aware of this decision of the council of
19 A. I am aware in general terms, not of the specific dates and
20 dead-lines, nor the specific terms.
21 Q. Are you aware, since you are a trained historian, that on the
22 same day, the 17th December, when this declaration was made by the
23 council of ministers, President Izetbegovic declared that
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina would definitely apply for recognition of its
1 A. Again, I'm not aware of the exact date but I am aware of his
2 statement to that effect.
3 Q. Do you know that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the
4 highest body, indeed, despite the opposition of co-presidents from the
5 Serbian people really made that decision on the 20th December 1991
6 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina formally applied for recognition of
7 its independence. Do you know that?
8 A. Once again, I'm not sure of the specific dates, but that
9 generally accords with my knowledge, yes.
10 Q. Do you know that this decision of the government of Bosnia
12 adopted by simple majority, 12 ministers for, and 8 against?
13 A. No, I'm not aware of the procedural details of this decision.
14 Q. And the last thing I believe to be important for the context of
15 the instruction that we are discussing is the fact that on the
16 23rd December 1991
17 without waiting for other states of the European Union, recognised the
18 independence of Slovenia
19 this came three weeks before the Vatican
20 these republics. Do you know that?
21 A. Again, I don't know the specific date. I am aware that about
22 that time the German government unilaterally recognised Slovenia
24 Q. Did you draw the attention of your colleagues from the
25 Prosecution to this context and the events surrounding the adoption of
1 these instructions of 19 December, yes or no?
2 A. As part of the leadership research team, it's our job to make
3 sure that the Prosecution is aware of the historical context. I'm not --
4 the international negotiations were not part of my particular area of
5 expertise, but other members of my team certainly made the Prosecution
6 team aware.
7 Q. All right. Then let me ask you more specifically, you are a
8 historian, a political analyst, you made this report, you say you have
9 enough knowledge to provide an expert report on Crisis Staffs, you claim
10 that this document on Variants A and B is a fundamental document. And
11 tell me, in your view was the adoption of these instructions influenced
12 by all these facts that we've just mentioned?
13 A. It's conceivable, but the only larger historical context that
14 this document refers to is the Bosnian Serb plebiscite in November. But
15 obviously the production of any document is going to be influenced by the
16 historical context in which it's produced.
17 Q. But don't you think that it is precisely these facts and this
18 historical context were the key and basic reason for the adoption of
19 these instructions?
20 A. The question that concerned me was not so much the reason for the
21 adoption, but the consequences of the adoption of it.
22 Q. Well, you know, Ms. Hanson, when a document is issued, it is
23 necessary to know the intent behind it, and you are telling us that you
24 established the intent based on the consequences, not the intent per se?
25 Please answer briefly, yes or no. There's no need to go into any deeper
2 A. Well, when the question has two parts and I agree with one but
3 not the other, I have to -- I can't answer simply yes or no.
4 Q. Then go ahead.
5 A. Yes, it is necessary to know the intent behind a document if you
6 are analysing it. In this case, I was asked to look at the formation of
7 Crisis Staffs, not the historical context of this one document. I traced
8 the formation of Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs to this document. That's why
9 it's in my report.
10 Q. But if a document came into being, you must know in which
11 historical context and why it came to be. You cannot establish the
12 reasons for the production of a document based on the consequences that
13 followed, or am I wrong?
14 A. You are not wrong. I agree, you have to know the context, but
15 that doesn't mean that you put all of it in the report on the formation
16 and operation of Crisis Staffs.
17 Q. So if I understand this well, on one hand, your report is limited
18 to the consequences that these Crisis Staffs produced in your opinion; on
19 another hand, it's limited insofar as there are documents you did not
20 include in the report, and it is also limited because you did not present
21 the real historical context that led to the production of a key document
22 for this report; correct?
23 A. My document -- my report is limited to my tasking which is to
24 explain the formation and functioning of Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs. To
25 that end, I included all documents which I thought most representative,
1 most helpful, and I did not try to introduce the entire context of Bosnia
2 in late 1991.
3 Q. You will agree with me, Mrs. Hanson, to cut a long story short,
4 that history is very important for understanding the conclusions and
5 certain documents. When I say history, I mean the historical context in
6 which things are happening or documents are produced.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Let us look at this document. You claim, if I understand your
9 report correctly, as well as the assertions you made in your testimony in
10 other cases, you claim that this is a fundamental document prescribing
11 the pattern according to which Crisis Staffs of the Serbian Democratic
12 Party were established in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 in December 1991; correct?
14 A. As I make clear in my report, they were not established
15 everywhere in December 1991, but, yes, I do see this document as the
16 founding document for the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs of December 1991 and
17 early 1992.
18 Q. Mrs. Hanson, it seems to follow from paragraph 19 in your report
19 that you believe that this document is a binding instruction followed by
20 Municipal Boards of the SDS? It's the first page of your paragraph 19.
21 A. I believe that those who received the instructions regarded it as
22 binding upon them.
23 Q. Do you have any reason to believe, then, that some Municipal
24 Boards of the SDS did not receive these instructions? Did I understand
25 that correctly?
1 A. I'm unable to draw conclusions as to just how many did or did not
2 receive them. I know that they were received in many municipalities. I
4 ones did. There's not documentary evidence saying we didn't get these
6 As I indicate in my report, not all municipalities did form
7 Crisis Staffs in December 1991. Some were quite later. Whether that was
8 because they hadn't received the instructions or did not regard them as
9 applicable to their situation, I can't tell.
10 Q. But you claim, if I understood you correctly, that all Municipal
11 Boards of the SDS formed Crisis Staffs?
12 A. No, my sentence reads that SDS Municipal Boards received
13 instructions and formed Crisis Staffs. I cannot claim, nor do I, that
14 they all did. In fact, I make it clear in my report that some apparently
15 is it not until as late as March.
16 Q. Madam, I'm not asking you about the time when they set them up,
17 whether it was January, February, or March. I'm asking you: Is your
18 claim that all Municipal Boards of the SDS whenever, never mind when,
19 from January to March, did set up such Crisis Staffs?
20 A. No, I do not claim that because there are many municipalities
21 that did I not look at for which we have no documentary evidence. There
22 are many municipalities which were not directly affected by the war or
23 contested territory and for which I have no evidence, so I can't claim
25 Q. If I understand you correctly, the territories that were not
1 affected by the war and were not in contested areas, did not implement
2 these instructions to form Crisis Staffs; correct?
3 A. I don't know because I'm limited to the documentary evidence in
4 the possession of the OTP, and if the municipality was not one which was
5 a focus of document collection, I can't know that.
6 Q. Wait a moment. Are you telling us that as a Prosecution expert,
7 you were looking only at the municipalities from the indictment or you
8 were trying to establish whether there was a general approach to these
9 instructions in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
10 A. I was looking for a general approach to the entire territory.
11 However, my research is necessarily limited to the documents in the
12 possession of the OTP. Therefore, I cannot claim with any certainty
13 about what happened in municipalities for which I have not seen
14 documentary evidence.
15 Q. Well, you did not see any documents because it was your choice
16 not to look at them not because they are not accessible in the
17 Prosecution archives?
18 A. I looked -- I searched for all potentially relevant documents in
19 the possession of the OTP. I did not discard any municipalities which
20 were not in the indictment simply because they were not in the
21 indictment. I used what I had available to me and, yes, I did do
22 extensive searches for several years on everything available.
23 Q. Madam, I have to admit that I'm confused by your answers. On the
24 one hand, you are very clear, only to turn around and then in your
25 attempt to clarify it and explain it, you actually go in a completely
1 different direction, but because I don't really have too much time, I
2 won't dwell on this any longer.
3 Will you please take a look at the preamble of this document,
4 P69, items 1 and 2 of the instructions.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] That's on page 2 in the e-court.
6 Q. Isn't it correct that items 1 and 2 actually describe the context
7 and the intent of the Serbian Democratic Party and explains the reasons
8 why these instructions are actually produced, yes or no?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Since you had occasion to analyse this, you can agree
11 with me, can't you, that when we analyse the language and the terminology
12 used in this document, specifically on pages 2 and 4 in e-court, that's
13 chapter 2, items 1 through 11, you will see that these terms for the most
14 part relate to, or rather, point to this being a preparatory document.
15 For instance, items 2, 5, 7, 9, and 11; correct?
16 A. The first degree is the preparatory degree, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. The same is true of Variant B first level. For
18 reference purposes these are items 2, 5, 8, 9 and 10; correct?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. If I understood it correctly, and I'm sure that you've had
21 occasion to read through this document more times than I did, in fact the
22 binding character of these preparatory instructions applies only to the
23 instructions to establish the SDS Crisis Staff and to establish the
24 Assembly of the Serbian People in the territory of certain
25 municipalities; is that correct?
1 A. No, I don't see that qualification in the first degree. Another
2 element that they describe is the 24-hour duty watches, which we do see
3 introduced in many places along with the Crisis Staff and the formation
4 of the Serbian Assembly. So I see all the steps of the first degree as
5 being regarded as binding by those who received this. I don't see that
6 much distinction between or anything in the text or in the interpretation
7 of the text as in the documents that they separated those -- those
8 instructions from the rest of level 1.
9 Q. Obviously there was a misunderstanding due to the interpretation.
10 But you can agree with me, can't you, that for the most part, all the
11 instructions for the first level actually relate to preparatory steps;
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. In the -- at the second level, the only thing that is binding, in
15 fact, is - just bear with me for a moment, please - is the establishment
16 of Crisis Staffs and of the Assembly -- the Municipal Assembly; correct?
17 A. No. The formation of the Crisis Staff and the Assembly are part
18 of the first degree.
19 Q. All right. In any case, it is your position that this document
20 and everything that was done in connection with this document was
21 actually produced in strict confidentiality; correct?
22 A. I'm trying to recall. I know it was made public. The
23 declarations of Serb Assemblies, Serbian Municipal Assemblies may not
24 have been done secretly. It depended, I think, on the municipality. So
25 I can't say that there was complete confidentiality on all moves. At
1 that -- again, it's a question of the time-period you're talking about.
2 In December, more likely to be confidential; by March, more likely to be
3 open. It is certainly clear in the document that they intended this to
4 be confidential, that there would be secret instructions given to the --
5 for the next level. And the front page says, you know, strictly
7 Q. Madam, I am not going to quote your work but there are at least
8 15 occasions where you say this was done in strict confidentiality, and
9 then in one place you say that this was not done publicly. So tell me
10 this, and I am very clear, is it your position that these instructions
11 and what was done pursuant to those instructions was done in secrecy in
12 the course of January 1992, yes or no?
13 A. These instructions were secret. As I said, it may be that some
14 of the declarations of Serb Municipal Assemblies were not secret, but on
15 the whole it was regarded as secret. The instructions were regarded as
16 confidential. The actions were not made public, to the best of my
18 Q. Are you trying to tell me that an Assembly, a Municipal Assembly,
19 an Assembly of a Serbian municipality was established in secret? Is that
20 your claim?
21 A. Again, I'm limited to the documents in my possession. These
22 documents indicate that Assemblies were held and declared. How widely --
23 widespread they were announced depended on the municipality to
24 municipality; but they were not, as far as I know, announced that they
25 were made on the basis -- not publicly announced that they were made on
1 the basis of the instructions. So the instructions were kept secret, but
2 a Municipal Assembly could be declared, without reference to the secret
4 Q. Madam, it is quite clear to me, and you don't have to repeat
5 this, you have used a certain number of documents that you had at your
6 disposal, and that's quite clear. And whenever I put the question to
7 you, I too only referred to those documents that you actually had access
8 to. And I'm asking you again now: Was there a single case where you can
9 claim that the Municipal Assembly was actually established in secrecy?
10 Can you remember or recall any such specific instance, yes or no? If you
11 cannot, just say "I can't remember."
12 A. I have seen the documents declaring the formation of the
13 Assembly. I cannot see from the documents themselves how widely
14 disseminated this announcement was, so I cannot draw the conclusion on
15 how public it was.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please show the
17 witness P437.
18 Q. That's under tab 4 in your binder.
19 Yesterday you commented on this document.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] P437, please.
21 Q. These are the minutes, or rather, the decision on the
22 establishment of the Serb municipality of Zvornik
23 discussing this document yesterday with my learned friend?
24 A. Yes, I do recall.
25 Q. Very well. And I believe that you read out the preamble of this
1 document where, among other, it says pursuant to Article so and so of the
2 constitution and then decisions on territories of municipalities, and
3 Article 4 of the instructions regarding the organisation and actions of
4 the bodies of the Serb people in BH in a state of emergency of
5 December 1991, the Municipal Assembly of Zvornik at its session of so and
6 so adopted the following decision. Can you see here that they are
7 actually referring here to what you call the secret instructions? Can
8 you see that?
9 A. I see that, yes.
10 Q. Thank you. In item 2, we see the areas of the existing
11 municipality of Zvornik are to be considered the Serb municipality of
12 Zvornik; correct?
13 A. That's certain areas, not the entire municipality. Certain areas
14 are separating themselves from the current municipality.
15 Q. Very well. And that is also stated in item 3, it says, local
16 communes and inhabited places and parts of the town local communes
17 mentioned in Article 2 of this decision are being parted from the
18 inclusion in the municipality of Zvornik
19 item 3; correct?
20 So tell me, please, towards the end, the very end, in Article 9
21 of this decision, right above the signature. That's on page 4 in
22 e-court. I apologise. Very well, thank you.
23 Can you see there under 9 it says:
24 "This decision shall come into effect on the 8th day from the day
25 of its publication in the bulletin of the Serbian people Javnost and in
1 the bulletin of the Serbian municipality of Zvornik
2 In other words, not only was this decision on the establishment
3 of the Serbian municipality of Zvornik
4 the instructions are mentioned in preamble and referred to, it's obvious
5 that these instructions too were completely out in the open, that they
6 were public; correct?
7 A. I'm not your sure when the bulletin of the Serbian municipality
8 of Zvornik came out. I wanted to raise that earlier because I believe it
9 was not published until later in the spring, but certainly if it was
10 published in Javnost, yes, that's public, I agree.
11 Q. Well, madam, if a decision on the establishment of an Assembly is
12 to come into effect and it's to come into effect on the 8th day of its
13 publication. That's what is stated there. In other words, it has to be
14 made public so that it can come into effect. Do you understand?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Very well. Thank you. Would you now please comment briefly for
17 the benefit of the Trial Chamber the concept of Variant A and Variant B.
18 In other words, I will put it to you and I hope that you will agree with
19 me. Variant A had to do -- referred to municipalities that had a Serb
20 majority, uncontested Serb majority, and Variant B referred to
21 municipalities where Serbs were a minority group; correct?
22 A. I'm not quite sure what you mean by uncontested majority, but
23 yes, the general outline; Variant A, Serb majority; Variant B, Serb
25 Q. Now, Variant A, I believe, is not is a contested concept, but
1 Variant B implied that the territory of an existing municipality in which
2 the Serbs were a minority, those parts where they lived alone were to be
3 separated from the territory of the existing municipality and they were
4 to become a Serb municipality, for instance, as we saw a few moments ago
5 of Zvornik; correct?
6 A. Variant B says that the measures are to be applied in those
7 territories where the Serbs -- where they lived. But they never lived
9 Q. Madam, could you please answer my question. I'm trying to make
10 this clearer for the Trial Chamber and not actually make it even more
11 complicated. So is it true, we saw a few moments ago and we still
12 actually have it before us on the screens - if we can just go back to
13 page 2 of e-court - you can see that item 2 relates to -- refers to the
14 areas of Zvornik municipality where this decision will be applicable, the
15 decision to establish the Serb municipality of Zvornik
16 you very specifically: Does Variant B imply that those municipalities
17 that have a Serb minority in them, the Serb municipality will only be
18 established for those territories where Serbs lived; correct? So just in
19 parts of those municipalities?
20 A. I agree in essence with you, but I want to make something clear,
21 that Serbs lived -- that --
22 Q. But, madam --
23 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, I would just ask that the witness be
24 allowed to answer. She's made it clear that although she agrees with
25 part of it, she wishes to qualify that and she should be given the
1 opportunity to do so.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I do not wish to cut the witness at
3 all. I just want to stream-line the witness. I will give her the
4 opportunity to express herself and her views on the matter at any given
5 moment, believe me. But I just want to explain this concept.
6 Q. [Interpretation] In this case, madam, would you please -- I
7 apologise for interrupting you, would you please go on and provide your
8 full answer.
9 A. My understanding is Variant B is to be applied only in those
10 territories within the Variant B municipalities where the Serb population
11 lived in a majority. But you said earlier alone, where the Serbs lived
12 alone, and wherever Serbs lived, and even a minority -- Serb minority
13 municipality would have Serbs in many parts of the territory. There was
14 no part of the municipality that was purely Serb and no part that was
15 purely non-Serb. But I agree, it is to be applied only in those parts of
16 the territories where the Serbs were the majority population within a
17 larger Serb minority municipality.
18 Q. Madam, Mrs. Hanson, can we take another look at this document,
19 please. That's document P437. The last -- the last three lines of
20 paragraph 2 state, after mentioning the municipal communes -- the local
21 communes and settled places or inhabited places, it says "and also parts
22 of local communes in the town, in the towns of -- in the areas of Srpska
23 Varos, Zamlaza, Begusje or something like that, Versuje [phoen]. In
24 other words, only parts of some town local communes will enter and become
25 part of the Serb municipality of Zvornik
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. And these parts are parts of city local communes where Serbs
3 lived; correct?
4 A. My problem is with the phrase "where Serbs lived." Serbs lived
5 throughout the municipality of Zvornik
6 of -- general knowledge of that area and of such documents, these are
7 local communes in which the Serbs represent a majority population, but I
10 Q. Madam, I'm grateful to you because you have now anticipated my
11 next question. Thank you very much. So in other words, these are parts
12 of local communes where Serbs lived as a majority group, and I'm not
13 saying that the Serbs alone lived there, but they were the majority
14 ethnic group; correct?
15 A. Yes, that's exactly what I was trying to clarify earlier.
16 Q. Very well. Well, finally we have a common understanding of this.
17 Thank you.
18 Let us now go back to P69, that's document Variant A and B. I
19 see in your report --
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If we could just please pull it up
21 on the screen -- or rather, Your Honour, I note the time, would this be a
22 good time for a break?
23 JUDGE HALL: Well, if this is going to be a fairly lengthy
24 exchange we can break now.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I am afraid so. Thank you.
1 JUDGE HALL: 20 minutes.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.49 a.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 MR. ZECEVIC: May I proceed, Your Honours?
7 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
9 Q. [Interpretation] Mrs. Hanson, just before the break I wanted to
10 go back to P69 document about Variants A and B. I noticed that in your
11 report, you did not consider or comment upon point 8 of the instructions.
12 It's on page 6 in e-court. It's already up on the screen. It's the
13 second degree of Variant A which reads:
14 "In taking all these measures, make sure that national and other
15 rights of members of all nations are respected and that they are later
16 engaged in government organs established or to be established by the
17 Assembly of the Serbian People in the municipality."
18 It is a fact that you did not comment upon this in your report?
19 A. On the contrary, I comment on it in paragraph 16.
20 Q. I'm sorry, you are right. The thing that confused me was that in
21 paragraph 16, you say that Crisis Staffs were exclusively Serbian organs
22 established to defend the interests of the Serbian people. I am sorry.
23 Are you maybe aware because you focused on these municipalities
24 in the indictment, are you aware that Fadil Topcagic, a Muslim from
25 Bosanski Samac, was a member of the Crisis Staff of the Samac
1 municipality? Do you know that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have now page 10 of this
5 document. In item 2 -- I believe in English it's also the same page in
7 Q. Item 2 stipulated the obligation of these organs, or rather, all
8 government bodies to comply with the federal constitution, federal laws,
9 and other federal regulations, as well as republican regulations that do
10 not contravene federal ones. Do you see that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I think in several passages in your report, you emphasised that
13 you had not succeeded in finding a legal ground for the establishment of
14 these Crisis Staffs; correct?
15 A. I have not found the use of the term "Crisis Staff" itself.
16 Q. Well, when this is written in this document, did you explore
17 perhaps what the author might have meant when he said compliance with
18 federal legislation and republican legislation that is not contrary to
19 federal laws?
20 A. In my first section of the report, I indicate possible legal
21 origins of this kind of body, but as I say, I was not able to find the
22 use of the term "Crisis Staff" itself. This phrase of observing federal
23 laws and Bosnian republic laws only so far as they do not contradict the
24 federal laws. We see in many -- used a lot by various Serb organs and
25 bodies at this time. This phrase I've seen in several places, so I'm
1 familiar with it. But as I say, I did not find -- I was looking at the
2 federal legislation for the collective bodies that could possibly be
3 Crisis Staffs.
4 Q. I hope you are not trying to say that this provision in number 2
5 was placed in this instruction without any reason whatsoever? I hope you
6 are not trying to say that?
7 A. I'm not trying to say that.
8 Q. All right. My mistake then.
9 Since you did not manage to find the term "Crisis Staffs," I
10 believe in one of your testimonies you also said you did not find the
11 term "War Presidency" anywhere in literature.
12 A. No, I don't believe I say that. If I could go back to that
13 section of my report. Okay, they do not say "War Presidency" but they
14 say "Presidency" in -- yes, so I did not find -- okay, those two
15 sentence, as I indicated yesterday, were written by a colleague. I
16 checked his references, I did not see the term "War Presidency." I did
17 see reference to a collective Presidency.
18 Q. All right. So the situation is like this: You definitely did
19 not find the term "Crisis Staff" or the term "War Presidency" in
20 literature. You found some similar terms but not these two; correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Thank you. On that basis, you took the position that such
23 organs, namely Crisis Staffs, were designed and put into operation by the
24 Serbian Democratic Party in December 1991 precisely by virtue of this
25 document, Variants A and B?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Very well. You discussed the federal Law on the Basics of
3 National Defence and Social Self-Protection which envisaged certain
4 organs that call themselves commissions for national defence and social
5 self-protection that were formed in municipalities under extraordinary
6 circumstances, and that law, as well as another document that we will
7 discuss in due course, explains their place and role, and I believe you
8 described that in paragraph 7 and 8 of your report; correct?
9 A. Yes, in essence, but I don't cite the federal law, I cite the
10 republic law.
11 Q. At any rate, the federal Law on National Defence and Social
12 Self-Protection is a systemic law adopted at the federal level in the
13 former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and then, all the
14 republics passed identical laws for the purposes of the republics at
15 republic level?
16 A. Yes, that is my understanding.
17 Q. Have you ever read the Law on the All People's Defence and Social
18 Self-Protection, be it the republican law of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the
19 federal law?
20 A. I've read parts of it, specifically the parts referring to these
22 Q. Would you tell me, Mrs. Hanson, have you heard about a document
23 called "The Strategy of All People's Defence and Social Self-Protection"?
24 Have you heard about it?
25 A. I'm familiar with the concept of All People's Defence and social
1 self-protection. I have not read a specific document entitled that.
2 Q. Well, the strategy of All People's Defence and social
3 self-protection, as it says in the preamble, is the fundamental doctrinal
4 document and it was adopted by the Presidency on the 20th of May, 1987,
5 by the Presidency of the SFRY, and that document explains the doctrine of
6 All People's Defence, social self-protection, and stipulates in detail
7 the provisions of the law. Are you familiar with it or do you know
8 anything about it?
9 A. As I said, I'm familiar with the general concept of All People's
10 Defence. I'm not familiar with that specific book and the specific
11 provisions of it.
12 Q. Very well. Since you are not a lawyer, it is your colleague who
13 did the research into that documentation, and this document will
14 certainly be an exhibit in this case. I will, therefore, not bore you or
15 the Trial Chamber with individual provisions.
16 Since, as you say, you are familiar with the concept of All
17 People's Defence and social self-protection, you know that this concept
18 envisaged compulsory establishment of commissions for All People's
19 Defence and social self-protection in extraordinary circumstances on the
20 territory of municipalities, be it in the republics or in the whole
21 territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; correct.
22 A. As I say, I'm familiar with the legislation -- that these bodies
23 were foreseen. The mandatory formation I'm not familiar with. I can't
24 comment on it one way or another.
25 Q. Do you know that every segment of society, beginning with
1 schools, factories, health centres and such-like, let alone institutions
2 of the state system, had the obligation to draft a plan of All People's
3 Defence and social self-protection, the so-called Defence plan and to
4 have a rapporteur for this subject and to nominate potential members of
5 such commissions for All People's Defence and self-protection in the
6 event of war. Do you know that?
7 A. I certainly know they were required to draft a plan and had a
8 referent for those matters. The actual obligation to nominate members of
9 committee I am not aware of, but it certainly seems a logical conclusion.
10 Q. Tell me, isn't it true that these commissions for All People's
11 Defence and self-protection in terms of their composition, powers, and
12 role were very similar, if not identical, to the composition, powers and
13 role of the Crisis Staffs?
14 A. Yes, I find great similarities.
15 Q. Madam, didn't it seem logical to you that it is, in fact, these
16 bodies that are referred to when Crisis Staffs are mentioned, although
17 the name "commission" is avoided because that name was suggested or
18 invokes the communist heritage. Whereas all these parties that
19 established these things called themselves democratic, the Serbian
20 Democratic Party, the Party of Democratic Action, the Croatian Democratic
21 Union, et cetera. Didn't it seem logical to you that these parties
22 wanted to break away from the communist legacy and that is why they named
23 their bodies differently?
24 A. I agree that there was an attempt separate from the communist
25 legacy. I agree that the Crisis Staffs resemble these All People's
1 Defence committees very much, but I've never seen it explicated -- and I
2 rely on documents. I've never seen it explicated that, These are the
3 same things, we're changing the name. And I simply go by what the
4 Crisis Staffs called themselves and the way they operated, declaring
5 themselves to be the municipal authorities.
6 Q. In one passage in your report or perhaps in your earlier
7 evidence, I don't have the reference, I'm sorry, but you can confirm or
8 deny what I'm going to say, you stated that it is not important how the
9 bodies call themselves, whether it was a Crisis Staff or War Presidency
10 or a war commission because all that you said in your report concerning
11 Crisis Staff applies to all of them because they are basically identical
12 bodies. I believe that's your paragraph 48.
13 A. Yes, that's what I said.
14 Q. All right. Since you did say that, tell me why not apply the
15 same thinking, the same analogy to Crisis Staffs, or rather -- sorry,
16 strike that.
17 Explain to me why you did not apply the same analogy to the
18 relationship between commissions of All People's Defence and social
19 self-protection and Crisis Staffs? I mean, that those were identical
20 bodies in terms of powers, role, and composition.
21 A. I was tasked to look at the Crisis Staffs in the Bosnian Serb
22 municipalities. I did not observe these All People's Defence committees
23 taking over in the place of Crisis Staffs, declaring themselves to be the
24 municipal authority as Crisis Staffs did. I brought the Prosecution
25 team's attention to the parallels with this earlier committee in the
1 legislation, but I was writing on what Crisis Staffs did.
2 Q. All right. But after all this time and after your examination
3 and your evidence, you can agree with me now that between this committee,
4 these commissions for All People's Defence, and social self-protection,
5 and Crisis Staffs, there is a considerable analogy. They are practically
6 identical in terms of role, powers and composition.
7 A. I have agreed that they are identical. Even in my report I cite
8 the example of Bosanski Novi where they say, We changed our
9 self-defence -- our defence committee into a Crisis Staff. So I make
10 that clear in my report.
11 Q. Thank you. In your report, Mrs. Hanson, you claim that the SDS
12 by virtue of this Variant A and B initiated the establishment of Crisis
13 Staffs of the SDS in December 1991; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In your view, did Mr. Karadzic and the Serbian Democratic Party
16 have the same sort of influence on Alija Izetbegovic as the leader of the
17 SDA and the leaders of the HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union?
18 A. Did Karadzic have influence on Izetbegovic, no, not for ...
19 Q. Well, then, how do you explain the existence of completely
20 identical bodies, in terms of name, powers, de facto action, on the
21 opposite sides, on the Muslim side and the Croatian side, and on the
22 territory of municipalities controlled by Muslims and Croats in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina? How do you explain that?
24 A. I do not deny that there were Crisis Staffs on all sides. I say
25 that in my report. I'm discussing in my report the Bosnian Serb Crisis
1 Staffs, but I am aware that there were other Crisis Staffs.
2 Q. Will you then agree with me that Crisis Staffs established on
3 other sides, that is in other municipalities controlled by Bosnian
4 Muslims and Croats, were completely identical bodies with the same
5 powers, names, the same composition, and that they acted in exactly the
6 same way as the Crisis Staffs of Bosnian Serbs in 1991 and 1992?
7 A. I have no basis to agree or disagree with you as I was tasked to
8 look at Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs. And I did not look at the other
9 Crisis Staffs' operations.
10 Q. Well, Ms. Hanson, if you were aware that there were Crisis Staffs
11 on other sides too, and it is quite clear that the SDS and Mr. Karadzic
12 had no influence on Muslims and Croats, did you perhaps think that the
13 uniformity of this concept comes from the legislative text on the basis
14 of which they were formed, that is, the federal Law on All People's
15 Defence and Social Self-Protection that was in place both in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Federation as a whole?
17 A. No, because the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs that I saw formed at
18 this time, many of them clearly refer to Variant A and B as the basis for
19 their formation. And of the ones that don't explicitly cite A and B, I
20 do not see reference to the legislation on All People's Defence
22 Q. You know, as you confirmed in one of your previous testimonies,
23 that the Crisis Staff of Bratunac municipality was formed identically
24 with the same composition and all the other elements as all the others
25 but that happened before the 19 December 1991 instruction; correct?
1 A. It was the Crisis Staff of the SDS Municipal Board of Bratunac.
2 Yes, it's the only one where I see a Crisis Staff formed previous to
3 those instructions. However, when they do form the one in December, they
4 are clearly referring to instructions from the SDS leadership on the
5 formation of their Crisis Staff.
6 Q. Therefore, if I understood correctly, for awhile, sometime before
7 December, they already had a Crisis Staff, and then after the 19 December
8 instruction, they established one again, this time in keeping with the
9 instruction, but there is no essential difference between the two?
10 A. In the October Crisis Staff it is clearly based on the
11 instructions of the Main Board of the SDS as well. So it's not
12 spontaneously on their own initiative, it's on instructions from the
13 expanded session of the SDS Main Board, so that is the only reference I
14 find to that earlier Crisis Staff so I can't say with any certainty about
15 its functioning or even membership compared to the later one, whether
16 it's different or the same, I can't comment. It's such a brief mention
17 in October, but I don't see any essential difference between them.
18 Q. At any rate, it is your position that in both cases, the
19 establishment of such a body followed the instructions of the SDS?
20 A. Yes, that is my position.
21 Q. Let me show you one document dated 21st September 1991.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Did we call up 1D00-5388.
23 Q. Madam, this is a document which has in the heading "Presidency of
24 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," then we see the number,
1 the Presidency of the Socialist Republic Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it says,
2 among other people, there are president of the Presidency Alija
3 Izetbegovic present, members of the Presidency, Biljana Plavsic,
4 Stjepan Kljujic, Dr. Ejup Ganic, and some other people, in other words,
5 all of the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that moment,
6 21st September. On page 2, did you see this document before?
7 A. I may have. I don't recall specifically until I can see more of
8 the subject.
9 Q. We see here under item 3 that it reads as follows:
10 "The government of BH is requested to ensure in these crisis
11 situation normal living conditions and so on and so forth, and then it
12 says that Presidency member Biljana Plavsic did not agree with items one
13 and two, and then it reads as follows. The Presidency formed the Crisis
14 Staff composed of the following members: Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the
15 Presidency, staff coordinator, that's his function; then
16 Dr. Biljana Plavsic; then Franjo Boras, master of sciences; and then
17 Minister of the Interior, Alija Delimustafic; People's Defence minister,
18 Jerko Doko; and the BH Territorial Defence commander, Lieutenant-General
19 Drago Vukosavljevic. And then it says the seat of the Crisis Staff shall
20 be on the premises of the Presidency and assisted by the services of the
21 Presidency, appropriate ministries and other organs and organisations in
22 the republic. So you see this portion that I've just read out?
23 A. Yes, I see.
24 Q. In other words the Presidency of the Socialist Republic
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina established a Crisis Staff of the Presidency as the
1 highest organ of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as early as
2 September 1991, and its composition reflects absolutely the Crisis Staffs
3 that are established pursuant to SDS instructions or, as we shall see
4 later, Crisis Staffs established by the SDA and the HDZ. Do you agree
5 with me?
6 A. I agree that the composition is parallel to the other
7 Crisis Staffs. I don't see in this document that the Crisis Staff is
8 established as the highest organ.
9 Q. Very well. Thank you. If you could now please look at the last
10 page of this document. We see the signature of the president of the
11 Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. Can you see that?
13 A. I see a signature, yes. I assume it's Izetbegovic's.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
16 document into evidence, please.
17 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D108, Your Honours.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I would now like to show you another document, but before I do
21 that, let me ask you this: Do you know that before this day, the MUP of
22 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the head of which was
23 Mr. Alija Delimustafic, a Muslim, had adopted a decision on the
24 establishment of a Crisis Staff whose specific task had to do with the
25 possible arrest of Mr. Martic on the 8th of September, 1991. Are you
1 aware of this, madam?
2 A. No, I am not.
3 Q. All right.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please pull up
5 document 1D00-4569 on the screens. This is a document that we found
6 containing the earliest date of a Crisis Staff being established based on
7 the documents that we had at our disposal and access to. This is a
8 document from the Municipal Assembly of Ljubuski. For your information
9 let me say that this is part of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was under the
10 control of Croat forces. The document bears the date 26th of August,
11 1991, and it reads as follows:
12 "Decision to appoint members of Ljubuski municipality Crisis
13 Staff." And then we see that there are 11 members appointed. And under
14 item 2, it says the decision shall be published in the Official Gazette
15 of Ljubuski municipality.
16 Mrs. Hanson, reading this document, you can see under 3 that the
17 presidents of Ljubuski Municipal Assembly is a member of this. Under 4
18 we see the chief of the public security station, it says public,
19 "Javne Sigurnosti," because this is a Croatian translation, and under 5
20 is the commander of the Ljubuski Municipal Territorial Defence staff and
21 then some other members. Can you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Ms. Hanson, judging by its composition, this crisis too mirrors
24 exactly the Crisis Staffs that were later to be established by, as you
25 said, instructions from the SDS; correct?
1 A. Not exactly, no.
2 Q. Well, tell me then who is missing here. We see that we have the
3 president of the Municipal Assembly. We have the president of the
4 Executive Board. Under number 1, we have the municipal Secretary-General
5 administrator. Under 5, we have the commander of the Territorial
6 Defence. We also have certain party members. So how does it differ from
7 SDS Crisis Staffs?
8 A. I didn't say anyone was missing. I think it has members beyond
9 the scope of the SDS Crisis Staffs such as the -- probably the director
10 of the health centre, that's not unusual to see them on the later Crisis
11 Staffs, but specifically, the representatives of the SDA and HDZ and the
12 SDS -- HDS, sorry, were not members the SDS Crisis Staffs.
13 Q. Well, madam, you just confirmed to me a little earlier that
14 Mr. Fadil Topcagic, a Muslim from Bosanski Samac, was a member of the
15 Crisis Staff in Bosanski Samac. Are you saying that he was a member of
16 the SDS?
17 A. No, but I don't know if he was on it as a member of the -- as a
18 representative of the SDA or as a representative of his particular
19 employment. I am aware that I've seen his name on the Crisis Staff
20 minutes, but I'm just saying that I think it's a parallel to have
21 political representatives on the Crisis Staffs. But that is the
22 difference I see between an SDS Crisis Staff and these ones, is which
23 parties are represented.
24 Q. But wait a minute, the fact that it doesn't state what party the
25 president of the Municipal Assembly belongs to, the president of the
1 Executive Board or chairman of the executive committee, the secretary of
2 the Secretariat, the chief and the commander, that does not imply that
3 they are not members of the HDZ; correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, their positions were mentioned there and not
6 their party membership because that is something that is understood by
7 implication, because the HDZ in Ljubuski, as one of the municipalities in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Croatian population was in the majority, was
9 a party that was a dominant party, a majority party in that territory?
10 A. This is a Municipal Crisis Staff which includes members of
11 different political parties. The SDS Crisis Staffs as formed on the
12 A and B instructions included only SDS members and included members
13 purely for their function within the party and not in the municipality,
14 such as members of the SDS Main Board, deputies to the National Assembly.
15 This one includes different parties, that's the distinction I was trying
16 to make.
17 Q. Ms. Hanson, let's go through this slowly, we will come to that.
18 It is an uncontested fact, and I believe you mention it in your report -
19 I assume it's uncontested - that the SDS Crisis Staffs were only in
20 existence in a very short limited period of time, and that at the point
21 where the Assemblies are formed in these municipalities, at the same time
22 different bodies, government bodies would be formed in the municipality
23 as well; correct?
24 A. I don't see that in the -- that pattern in the documentary
25 evidence at all. I see the Crisis Staffs --
1 Q. We will come back to that a little later, if that's not a problem
2 with you. I don't want to interrupt you. If you wish to answer now,
3 please provide it, but as I've already said, we will revisit this issue.
4 But would you like to comment further?
5 A. I just would say that I see Assemblies declared in December in
6 some places along with the Crisis Staffs, but I see the Crisis Staffs
7 staying -- staying and becoming the municipal authorities and the
8 Municipal Assemblies not taking over until the summer of 1992. That's
9 the pattern I generally see.
10 Q. Madam, let us go back to this document. If we look at it, it is
11 uncontested that the most significant members or representatives of the
12 authorities are present here and members of this staff in Ljubuski
13 municipality; correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
16 document into evidence, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D109, Your Honours.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Bearing in mind your comment regarding this document, 1D109, the
21 Crisis Staff in Ljubuski municipality document, I would now like to put
22 to you a document from the Croatian Democratic Union of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, document number 002842. 1D00-2842.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please pull it up on the
1 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson, this is a document from the Croatian Democratic
3 party, which was au par with the Serbian Democratic Party and the Party
4 of Democratic Action in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 and 1991, and all
5 these three national parties had their own candidates in the elections in
6 1990. Now you can see in the heading that it says the Security Council
7 of the BH HDZ strictly confidential. The date we see is 18 September
8 1991. And it reads as follows, title:
9 "Conclusions of the Security Council of the BH HDZ held on
10 18 September 1991
11 And then it says under conclusions under item 1:
12 "The present Security Council shall be called the BH HDZ Crisis
13 Staff in the future. Its members shall be," and then it lists,
14 Mr. Kljujic, Mr. Boban, Mr. Kvesic, Jerko Doko, he was the minister of
15 national defence in the socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 government. Then we see Dario Kordic, Kost roman, Bruno Stojic. Can you
17 see that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. These individuals whose names I just read out were the leaders,
20 doubtlessly, of the Croatian Democratic Union and of the Croatian people
21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time; correct?
22 A. To the best of my understanding, yes.
23 Q. Now, in the second paragraph it says:
24 "In addition to the executive and political Crisis Staff the
25 staff must form a specialist command body which shall be a specialist
1 military body directly responsible for certain operations." And then it
2 says in paragraph 3:
3 "The Crisis Staff shall begin its duties immediately and is to
4 lead the entire defence system of the Croatian people in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and ensure the acquisition of armaments." And under
6 paragraph 4:
7 "The chairman of the Crisis Staff is Stjepan Kljujic and the
8 deputy chairman is -- rather, his deputy is Mate Boban." Can you see all
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Please tell me, did you have occasion to see this document
12 earlier, while you were drafting your report?
13 A. I can't be sure. I probably would have seen it because it would
14 have come up on the hit for Crisis Staff, but I did not use it because
15 it's not a Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff. It's not familiar to me, but I may
16 well have seen it just because it would have come up on the search.
17 Q. Well, that's all very well, but the earlier document that I
18 presented to you, you felt the need to say that this was a Municipal
19 Crisis Staff, but here we see that a party is establishing a Crisis
20 Staff. So I believe this is a very clear parallel to the positions that
21 you set forth when discussing Variant A and B documents and the role of
22 the SDS in establishing SDS Crisis Staffs; correct?
23 A. Yes, it's parallel.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now take a look at page 2,
2 Q. Ms. Hanson, it says under item 2:
3 "In the event of armed conflict in the territory where the
4 Croatian people are in the majority, the Crisis Staffs shall take over
5 all the duties of the authorities in the municipalities, and the work of
6 the BH HDZ shall cease temporarily until the threat of war has passed,
7 that is, until the Crisis Staff considers it to have passed."
8 Can you see any difference between this and the instructions
9 issued by the SDS? Isn't it true that the SDS, too, says that the
10 Crisis Staffs shall take over all the duties in municipalities, all the
11 powers in municipalities, and that once the conflict broke out, all party
12 activities shall cease. Can you recall that?
13 A. It sounds to me more like the instructions issued by the
14 president of the government, Djeric, in April 1992, but it certainly
15 seems parallel to what I see -- how the SDS Crisis Staffs and then the RS
16 Crisis Staffs are operating. I'd have to check A and B to see if -- I
17 don't recall that exact wording in A and B, but it is in the Djeric's
19 Q. In paragraph 4, in the last sentence, it says that the Crisis
20 Staffs have to understand the urgency of the serious situation and exert
21 or direct all their activities to the Defence of the Croatian people.
22 Isn't there a similar formulation in Variant A and B instructions and I'm
23 referring to the preamble itself where it says that all its activities
24 will be directed at the defence of the Serbian people and their interests
25 and their defence, the defence of the Serbian people; is that correct?
1 A. Yes, A and B says it's -- carry out the mobility in defence of
2 the interests of Serbian people, so it's similar phrasing, yes.
3 Q. Very well. Under 2 it says, in this document:
4 "Crisis Staffs shall be formed urgently for three regional
5 communities of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and
6 then it mentions the regions of Travnik, Posavina, and --
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the third region.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And it says then that the --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the last
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: The interpreters are asking you to repeat your
15 last sentence because they didn't get the name of the municipalities.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to the Trial Chamber
17 and to the interpreters.
18 Q. I've said the Sarajevo
19 and Herzegovina
20 Staff. That's the reading in the document; correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. You can see under item 3, that:
23 "Crisis Staffs must also be urgently established on the same
24 principles as those of the republican and regional Crisis Staffs," and
25 then it says it is advised that chairmen of Municipal Crisis Staffs be
1 presidents of municipals if they were appointed by the BH HDZ, otherwise
2 chairman of the Executive or Municipal Boards of the BH HDZ. Can you see
3 that, madam?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So the distinction between this concept and the SDS concept is
6 really non-existent; correct?
7 A. There are strong parallels.
8 Q. In item 4 it says:
9 "The appointed persons representing the BH HDZ in governing
10 bodies have the duty to continue carrying out their tasks
11 conscientiously, giving priority to the interests of the Croatian
12 people." And then under item 7, it says:
13 "All municipal authorities where the BH HDZ has an absolute or
14 relative majority is responsible to compile a list stating the state of
15 food, medical and sanitary supplies, state of weapons and ammunition
16 supplies, power plants, military locations, manpower, and programs of
17 Defence and civilian protection."
18 So, Ms. Hanson, aren't these obligations identical to the ones
19 that are envisaged in the Variant A and B instructions of the SDS?
20 A. Yes, they are very similar. Really quite parallel.
21 Q. And one final point, in item 8, it says:
22 "Municipalities are recommended not to send recruits to the army
23 and to forbid any mobilisation of forces except for mobilisation
24 organised through our own Crisis Staffs."
25 In other words, here the Crisis Staffs of the Croatian Democratic
2 the mobilisation; correct?
3 A. Correct.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see the next
6 Q. Where there is a comment saying that this document is strictly
7 confidential, and among other things, there is a chart provided of -- an
8 organisational chart of Crisis Staffs which we can find on the next page.
9 So as you can see, this document too is strictly confidential, although
10 we could see that on the first page as well; correct?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. So I have shown you now some of the key documents, and I will now
13 also follow this up with documents that were produced in the field on the
14 basis of these. Madam, this document is from September 1991. We've also
15 seen the Presidency document also from September 1991, and the document
16 entitled "Variant A and B instructions" is dated December 1991. All
17 these three documents absolutely speak to the establishment of
18 Crisis Staffs. There is nothing else that they discuss. They all
19 actually mention the establishment of Crisis Staffs.
20 So are you now trying to tell us here that a person who -- such
21 as you, who is interested and doing research into Crisis Staffs and has a
22 problem to determine where the term "Crisis Staff" comes from, how is it
23 possible that you did not review these documents as well, or at least
24 mention these documents in your report, saying there are documents coming
25 from the Presidency dated September 1991, and also HDZ documents as early
1 as September 1991, as well as SDA documents from sometime in 1991, which
2 also are used to establish Crisis Staffs, as the document that you
3 discuss in your report, but which actually predate by two months the SDA
4 instructions -- SDS instructions.
5 So how is it that this did not find its way into your report, and
6 how is it that you showed no interest in these documents while you were
7 preparing your report? Could you please tell us that.
8 A. I indicate in my report that there were Crisis Staffs on the
9 Croatian and Bosnian side. I say in my report that I have not found the
10 term "Crisis Staff" in the legislation. I am aware that it was used in
11 popular terminology, but I say that I do not find the phrase in the
12 legislation. These are instances of it -- certainly of Crisis Staffs
13 being formed, but not an indication of the legislative basis and this
14 last document, I don't believe I've seen. I said it would have come up
15 in a search but I haven't seen such an explication of the Croatian Crisis
16 Staffs, so I cannot say that I've seen it.
17 Once again, my tasking was to explain to the Prosecution team
18 Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs. I don't deny the existence of other Crisis
19 Staffs. Never have.
20 Q. It seems to me that the wording that you are using in your report
21 and in your evidence was that Crisis Staffs on the other sides were
22 established in the course -- during the war, but nowhere in your report
23 do you explicitly say or even mention that Crisis Staffs had been
24 established by the Presidency, the HDZ, and the SDA, even before the SDS
25 instructions of 19 December were issued; correct?
1 A. Had I been tasked to look at HDZ Crisis Staffs, I certainly would
2 find this document very interesting. But I do not mention the Presidency
3 Crisis Staff, correct, I do not mention it in my report.
4 Q. Madam, now we will go back to square one. When I asked you
5 whether you considered that the role of an expert witness is to present
6 their knowledge in an objective manner that will assist the Trial Chamber
7 in their decisions, you -- and whether you consider that these documents,
8 or documents such as these, provide a more balanced picture of the
9 situation which is something that you are discussing in your report?
10 A. As I said before, there are many, many, many documents that
11 provide a balanced situation -- a balanced view of the situation. My
12 report is devoted to Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs and it could perhaps --
13 had people felt the need to learn more about whether this was a brand new
14 term and whether there were Crisis Staffs on other sides, yes, I could
15 have given more attention to that. But that was not my tasking and that
16 was not an issue that emerged as something that needs explaining or
17 attention since it was -- since I was tasked to look at Bosnian Serb
18 Crisis Staffs.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mrs. Hanson. Since it
20 is our job here to establish the responsibility of our defendants, in
21 other words, we do not have to limit ourselves to certain segments as you
22 do, I propose that this document be admitted into admitted into evidence
23 as an exhibit in this case.
24 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D110, Your Honours.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Now, Ms. Hanson, I would like to show you a document that relates
3 to one of the municipalities that is scheduled in the indictment.
4 Document 1D00-4000. In other words, 1D00-4000. This is a document that
5 shows that the previous instruction of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, that
6 this is actually the implementation of that decision. This is the
7 Municipal Board of Kotor Varos, the Municipal Board of the Croatian
8 Democratic Union
9 there that a Crisis Staff is being established. The decision is dated
10 the 8th of March, and we see the members of the Crisis Staff there, there
11 are five individuals, as well as a stamp of the Croatian Democratic Union
12 of Kotor Varos; correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Have you seen this document before?
15 A. I can't say with certainty that I have but I know that I -- I can
16 see from its ERN that it's from a selection -- from an index I've
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
20 THE REGISTRAR: It's already Exhibit 1D23.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Oh, thank you very much. I
22 apologise. Could we now please show the witness document 1D00-3109.
23 This is a document dated 7 April 1992
24 Q. It has a similar ERN number, so my question to you is: Have you
25 seen this document? This document also comes from the Municipal Board of
1 the Kotor Varos Croatian Democratic Union confirming that a Crisis Staff
2 consisting of five members was established in March, and then it mentions
3 certain problems that they had, that there was another Crisis Staff
4 established subsequently. Can you see this document?
5 A. I can see it, yes.
6 Q. Do you remember or have you had occasion to review this document
7 in the course of your work?
8 A. Once again, it's from an index I've searched, but once again, I
9 was look at SDS and Serb municipality Crisis Staffs so I may well have
10 seen it, taken a look at it, identified it as an HDZ document and not
11 looked at it further.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document into
15 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, if I could be heard on that. I'm just
16 wondering where we are going with this. We've had documents that are put
17 to her from other ethnic group Crisis Staffs, and they are addressing a
18 certain point about where the phrase "Crisis Staff" came from. Now, it
19 seems we've gone beyond that, and is my learned colleague simply going to
20 put forward document after document of other ethnic group Crisis Staffs;
21 and if so, how is that really relevant to our case. They are not part of
22 our case. It sort of sounds like it's a -- a sort of a tu quoque defence
23 here. If we can find out the relevance of where we are going with these
24 documents, I would ask that perhaps that could be explained.
25 JUDGE HALL: Well, as I understand the thrust of Mr. Zecevic's
1 line so far is that the quality of the expert report on which the
2 Prosecution is relying is weakened by failure to have taken into
3 consideration these other matters, but I take your point that there comes
4 a point at which one must draw the line.
5 Mr. Zecevic, hasn't your point been made sufficiently?
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, well, I'm ready to explain, but I
7 think it would be proper that the witness is excused before -- before I
8 can provide you with my explanation why am I pursuing this line and I
9 don't know, maybe if you --
10 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Hanson, we are five minutes short of the break.
11 We would excuse you now and deal with this matter and ask you to return
12 for 12.25. Thanks.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is absolutely the
15 Defence position that the fact that a so-called expert did not feel it
16 necessary to, as far as we see it, consider these very important
17 documents which are important to understand the problem, the subject
18 matter in this case, and since this expert witness did not feel it even
19 necessary to mention these documents in her report, it is our position
20 that this absolutely weakens the value, if not the factual value of this
21 report, but in any case, not a single conclusion from this report can
22 actually stand based on these documents.
23 And especially, Your Honours, because from these documents --
24 from these documents we can see that Crisis Staffs, the roles of Crisis
25 Staffs, and all those things that Crisis Staffs actually did in
1 territories which were under Serbian control were identical in every
2 sense to what the other two communities did and how they proceeded and
3 what their Crisis Staffs in territories under their control did. And for
4 these reasons, because the establishment of Crisis Staffs and their role
5 is an important part of the Prosecutor's theory on the joint criminal
6 enterprise, I believe that these facts and these documents are really a
7 significant basis for the Defence to build their position that such a
8 joint criminal enterprise was non-existent.
9 And it is for this reason that I'm trying to tender these
10 documents and try and put them to the alleged expert witness of the
11 Prosecution who came here to provide her expertise on Crisis Staffs and
12 who is absolutely qualified, as least in that sense, to discuss these
13 documents, or to comment them and for these documents to be admitted
14 because if this witness is qualified to comment on documents of the
15 Serbian Crisis Staffs, then she is certainly qualified to also comment on
16 the documents of the other side because -- so that is our position and
17 this is where my line of questioning is leading. Thank you.
18 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honours, if I could be heard on that to respond
19 to my learned colleague's comments. First of all, he's raised a couple
20 of issues and what I would like to say, first of all, is that Ms. Hanson
21 is not an alleged expert witness. Your Honours have determined that she
22 is an expert witness, so I just wanted to put that on the record.
23 Secondly, my learned colleague has stated that the failure to include
24 these documents is a weakness in Ms. Hanson's report. As she has said
25 repeatedly on the stand, she was tasked with preparing a report on
1 Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs. She's also said that in that report, she
2 acknowledges that the other ethnic communities did form Crisis Staffs.
3 She didn't take that any further as she didn't feel it was particularly
4 relevant to this report. Beyond that. Now, my learned colleague has
5 raised that issue with her and has shown her documents, but to continue
6 showing more and more documents, I don't believe it advances that
7 particular issue any further, as to the weakness of her report. She's
8 already answered the -- the questions that have been put to her about
9 that and why there aren't documents like these in there.
10 Beyond that, Your Honour, I still don't see the relevance to our
11 case of actions that were taken by Crisis Staffs of the other ethnic
12 groups. The JCE in this case involves Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, and
13 the fact that Crisis Staffs from other ethnic groups may have been
14 forming, may have been taking actions, isn't relevant to our case here.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, I fully understand your point, but
16 my question would be that to the extent in which the Crisis Staffs formed
17 by the Bosnian Serb leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina became an
18 instrument in the commission of the crimes for which your client stands
19 accused, then what is the Chamber supposed -- or rather, which conclusion
20 is the Chamber, in your view, supposed to draw from the fact that
21 Crisis Staffs were also formed by the Muslims and by the Croats, and that
22 indeed at some point the republican leadership formed joint Crisis
23 Staffs? I see your point, but which conclusion are you getting at in
24 drawing our attention to this?
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, I don't know if I would be
1 ready to fully answer that question at this point, but I can certainly do
2 that after the break. But as a first thing that crosses my mind is that
3 I would expect that this line of examination -- cross-examination and the
4 in the future in your Defence case and these documents will show to the
5 Trial Chamber that there is no pattern which is exclusively linked to the
6 SDS or the Serbian Crisis Staffs. That the pattern, that the pattern
7 basically derives out of the essence of these organs doesn't matter if
8 they are Muslim, if they are Croatian, or Serbian. The essence is that
9 basically by this concept of All People's Defence, these small -- these
10 small Crisis Staffs were given immense, immense power in the territory
11 and that power by itself corrupted the performance of these Crisis
12 Staffs. And they -- they themselves got involved into the crimes, into
13 whatever, expulsions. This is the suggestion of the Prosecutor's case,
14 that this pattern is obviously a plan by the Serbs to forcibly expel,
15 murder and all that, commit crimes against humanity.
16 Now, when we see all these documents, you will see yourself that
17 it comes out of the essence of these organs. It doesn't have anything to
18 do with any plan. I'm not suggesting that the Muslims or Croats had any
19 plan, or Serbs. So I'm saying that this will -- we tried to show to the
20 Trial Chamber that that is the problem, and that is the problem, and the
21 consequence of that problem is what happened in the territory,
22 unfortunately. Unfortunately, yes.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do I understand you correctly if your point is
24 that the widespread commission of crimes committed with the assistance or
25 the participation somehow of the Crisis Staffs, that the commission of
1 these crimes were not a result of any plan from the top, but was a result
2 purely of the fact that they -- that these organs were established and
3 were given too much power, and so it was -- it just happened. Is that
4 your point?
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Exactly, Your Honours, because if it was a plan,
6 then this plan will apply to Croatian communities under the control of
7 the HDZ, and to Muslim communities as well. Therefore, if the Crisis
8 Staffs and the units in these territories were committing the very same
9 crimes, then I don't know. You will have to decide whether the plan
10 which somebody like Karadzic or SDS created, was followed in Ljubuski,
11 was followed in the territory which was controlled by the SDA and HDZ,
12 and why is that? I mean, that is my position.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.
14 MR. DOBBYN: Your Honour, our position is that there may well
15 have been Crisis Staffs formed in the other ethnic communities, they may
16 even have been part of the JCE or some sort of plan such as we are
17 alleging in regards to the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, but that's not an
18 issue before this Trial Chamber. It's not something which is --
19 Your Honours are really in a position to pass judgement on or to say
20 there's any relevance to what we are looking at here. I still don't see
21 how this evidence coming in is going to advance the case any further.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE HALL: We'll return in 20 minutes.
24 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, during the break, Mr. Zecevic and
2 myself and also in the background, Mr. Pantelic, discussed the issue
3 that's arisen. To what extent should evidence of Crisis Staffs relating
4 to the Croats and the Muslims be admissible in this case. And of course,
5 our position is that it is getting near to a tu quoque defence and it's
6 impossible for Your Honours to evaluate the significance of these
7 documents without hearing all the evidence that surrounds them; but we
8 hope that we may be able to perhaps cut matters short if Your Honours
9 give us an opportunity to consider that. I know that we're not
10 sitting -- no Court is sitting tomorrow morning, because I understand
11 there's a plenary. And therefore, we would like the -- to use the
12 opportunity to discuss the matter generally within the Office of the
13 Prosecutor, in particular, with those who are doing cases which, if you
14 like, are the other side.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Prlic.
16 MS. KORNER: Exactly, Prlic in particular. To see whether we can
17 reach some kind of consensus which may obviate the need for Mr. Zecevic
18 to continue on this line. I understand he is prepared to move to a
19 different topic on that basis and then come back to it if we can't reach
21 MR. ZECEVIC: That is correct, Your Honours. I mean, we hope
22 that that satisfied the requirement of the Trial Chamber to, well, not to
23 take the position on the objection that my colleague has made, and we are
24 trying to amicably sort this situation. If it would be possible tomorrow
25 morning, and I will continue then with other matters in course of my
1 cross-examination. Thank you.
2 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
3 MS. KORNER: And I've asked Mr. Zecevic if he could be very kind
4 and give us 15 minutes at the end to raise the matter of documents again,
5 I am afraid, the admission thereof.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, while the witness is entering court,
7 can I move the Trial Chamber to admit the last document that I commented
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: 3109, is that it?
10 MR. ZECEVIC: 3109, that is correct.
11 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D111, Your Honours.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 MR. ZECEVIC: May I proceed?
16 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Ms. Hanson, over the break I hope we succeeded
19 in finding a modality of dealing with this issue, and in keeping with the
20 understanding we reached with our learned friends from the Prosecution, I
21 will continue with other topics. You are probably aware, Ms. Hanson,
22 that the inter-party agreement between the SDA, SDS and the HDZ -- let me
23 first ask you this: You know that these three ethnic-based parties came
24 out at the elections together in 1991, in the first multiparty elections,
25 with the common objective of defeating the communist party; correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. These three parties had between them a certain inter-party
3 agreement; right?
4 A. I am not familiar with the specific agreement to which you are
6 Q. But I suppose you know from other facts that in keeping with that
7 agreement, they adopted a principle whereby a party that got the majority
8 of votes in a certain municipality would appoint the president of the
9 municipality, and the second-ranking party would get the post of chairman
10 of the Executive Board and so on. Do you know of that?
11 A. Yes, that's my general understanding.
12 Q. So if we take a municipality where the greatest number of votes
13 were won by the Serbian Democratic Party, then the SDS would provide the
14 president of the municipality; correct?
15 A. That's the usual pattern.
16 Q. At the same time, according to that logic of things or the usual
17 pattern, as you call it, the candidate for the president of the
18 municipality nominated by the Serbian Democratic Party or any other party
19 would usually be the president of the board of that party in a particular
21 A. Usually, but it's not always the rule.
22 Q. We agree about that, yes, usually.
23 Then after the elections in 1990, we had a common situation
24 wherein the president of the board of the victorious party would be
25 elected president of that municipality, to sum up.
1 A. My knowledge here is restricted to the municipalities relevant to
2 the SDS. I can't speak to other municipalities. But in general, that's
3 my understanding, but it's -- as you say, it's not always the rule.
4 Q. We have quite enough evidence to demonstrate that. I'm not
5 asking you to confirm, I'm just discussing the general situation. Thus,
6 at the moment when these Crisis Staffs are established, under the
7 instructions, and as we have seen it happened always everywhere, the
8 president of the party board would become president of the Crisis Staff;
10 A. Not always everywhere, but generally, yes.
11 Q. So in a certain way, we have a concurrence of functions in one
12 personality. One person can be, or rather, is at the same time president
13 of the board of the party, president of the Crisis Staff of that party,
14 and president of the municipality; isn't that so?
15 A. Generally, yes.
16 Q. All right. Since we have agreed on that, let us look at the
17 chronology of events. In December 1991, these instructions are given to
18 establish SDS Crisis Staffs. And one of the tasks of the Crisis Staffs
19 are to form Assemblies of the Serbian People in the territory of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
21 A. Assemblies of the Serbian People within the municipalities, yes,
23 Q. Now, on 9 January 1992
24 a declaration on the establishment of Republika Srpska; correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. That declaration on the establishment of Republika Srpska is
2 followed by the adoption of the constitution of Republika Srpska on the
3 28th of February?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So at the moment when the constitution of Republika Srpska is
6 adopted, towards the end of February 1992, the territory of
7 Republika Srpska had already been designated, the constitutional order,
8 the state system had already been identified, and the authorities are now
9 to be established, on the republic level, the government, the Presidency,
10 the Assembly already exists, and the authorities on lower levels on the
11 ground; right?
12 A. I believe the council of ministers was already formed before the
13 constitution was adopted, and as we see, the Municipal Assemblies are --
14 some of them formed the regions, formed all before the end of February,
15 but this is when the state was taking form at the highest level with the
16 decisions of the Assembly on the constitution. That we see the organs
17 forming at the highest level.
18 Q. Yes, but I'm trying to rely on what you've already said in your
19 evidence. It is a fact that not all Assemblies of the Serbian People
20 were formed in the period from December through end February 1992 in the
22 A. Correct, not all.
23 Q. Some were formed in May and in June even 1992?
24 A. Where I see an actual Serb municipality or Municipal Assembly
25 separating from an existing municipality, it was generally carried out
1 much earlier than June. What we see is those -- some municipalities
2 where the Serbs had an overwhelming majority didn't feel as much need to
3 rename or take some of the steps indicated in A and B simply because
4 their authority was -- they controlled the municipal organs and didn't
5 need to form parallel ones. So in those cases you might not see
6 something called a Serb municipality until later. By later, I mean at
7 the time you mention, May or June.
8 Q. Thank you. I'm only trying to clarify one particular fact which
9 I don't think is completely clear. Those party-led Crisis Staffs formed
10 under these instructions. At the moment when organs of Republika Srpska
11 at municipal level are formed, such as the Municipal Assembly and the
12 Executive Board, at that moment, the Crisis Staffs, because they are
13 party organs, not state organs, cease to have any influence on state
14 organs; do you agree with that?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. Madam, Crisis Staffs, there must be a distinction between
17 Crisis Staffs of the SDS and Crisis Staffs of the municipality. You've
18 said so yourself and you say so in the report. Is that correct, is there
19 such a distinction?
20 A. As I indicate in my report, there's a great deal of evidence to
21 see -- to show an overlap between those two, that when they are acting as
22 Municipal Crisis Staffs, that is Crisis Staffs of the Municipal Assembly,
23 they still use the party stamp, use the party head letter, don't make an
24 important distinction. We saw in the report on the work of the Kljuc
25 Crisis Staff that they saw a perfect continuity between SDS Crisis Staff,
1 Municipal Assembly Crisis Staff, Municipal Assembly War Presidency, I see
2 the continuity in the evidence. I see a difference in how it is
3 presented, a difference in terminology, that they, as I've indicated by
4 April we see them acting as declaring themselves to be the Municipal
5 Assembly Crisis Staff, but I don't see discontinuity in the makeup, in
6 the tasks, in how they viewed themselves. And moreover, these are the
7 Crisis Staffs of the Serbian municipalities, not of the pre-existing
8 municipality -- municipal organs as established after the elections.
9 Q. Madam, I'm sorry, I didn't want to interrupt you to avoid
10 objections, but my question was really very simple and you are giving me
11 a half-page answer. I'm kindly asking you to concentrate on the question
12 alone and give me a precise answer. I'm not asking you about the
13 continuity or discontinuity. That's not the issue. We will come to that
14 perhaps later. I'm just asking you, since you say that there is a
15 continuity, if there is a continuity, that means that there is a link
16 between two different organs, where one organ is the Crisis Staff of the
17 party and the other organ is the Crisis Staff of the municipality. Just
18 tell me, is it the case that there were Crisis Staffs of the party and
19 Crisis Staffs of the municipality?
20 A. The municipality -- the Serbian municipality was also a creation
21 of the SDS and I do not see a difference between the Crisis Staff of the
22 party and the Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality.
23 Q. Well, I suppose, madam, that the municipality is a creation of
24 the Serbian people, not of the party. The party just expresses the will
25 of the people?
1 A. The municipality or the Serbian municipality. We see the Serbian
2 municipality being formed by -- on the directions of the SDS party.
3 Q. Well, madam, that's because 99 per cent of Serbian voters,
4 99 per cent of Serbian electorate voted for the platform of the
5 Serbian Democratic Party, voted for that party, just as Croats and
6 Muslims voted for their own national parties. Isn't that true?
7 A. 99 per cent seems large to me because there were other parties
8 beside the national party, so I'm not prepared to say it was 99 per cent
9 of Serbian voters voted SDS.
10 Q. But in any case, the majority of Serbian voters did vote SDS;
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. Are you trying to say that the Serbian Democratic Party imposed
14 on the Serbian people against their will the establishment of Serbian
15 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Thank you, thank you, finally. So the Serbs in their majority
18 placed their trust at the elections in the Serbian Democratic Party. The
19 SDS has the majority in the parliament, the Assembly of the Serbian
20 People; correct?
21 A. Those are two different things. The elections were to the
22 Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina or to the -- if you are
23 talking about those elections, and that's different from the Assembly of
24 the Serbian People.
25 Q. Madam, the elections in 1990 were for the joint Assembly. Most
1 Serbian votes were given to the SDS. After that, in January 1992, the
2 Serbian people formed the Assembly of the Serbian People -- sorry, it
3 wasn't January. The Assembly of the Serbian People that had been formed
4 already adopts a declaration establishing Republika Srpska; correct?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. That parliament that took the decision to establish Republika
7 Srpska is the Assembly of the Serbian People where the SDS has the
8 absolute majority; correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Let's come back to the beginning of my question where we seem to
11 have gotten stuck. On the 28th of February, the constitution of
12 Republika Srpska is passed and after that the organs of Republika Srpska
13 are beginning to be set up in keeping with the constitutional
15 A. As I said before, you see some of them before the
16 28th of February, such as the council of ministers, such as the Serbian
17 Municipal Assemblies.
18 Q. Madam, the council of ministers is a provisional advisory body
19 formed just before the government was appointed, and it lasted for
20 another month after the formation of the government of Republika Srpska
21 and then it ceased to exist; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Madam, government bodies cannot be established before a
24 constitution is passed, a constitution of a country which sets down its
25 state and territorial functions; correct?
1 A. This Republika Srpska was a new creation and was to a large
2 extent writing its own rules. I don't see that there's a contradiction
3 to first form organs and declare your territory and then write a
5 Q. Very well, but be it as it may, a vast majority of the government
6 bodies in the territory of Republika Srpska were established in March,
7 April, and May of 1991 [as interpreted]; correct?
8 A. If by government you mean at the republic level, yes.
9 MR. PANTELIC: Just correction to transcript, page 67, line 3,
10 witness -- question was May 1992, not 1991, I believe.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Pantelic.
12 Q. Madam, at the moment when in the territory where government
13 bodies have been established, and I mean the Assembly, the Executive
14 Board of a municipality, so when in such a territory a conflict breaks
15 out, at that point in time a Crisis Staff would be established in that
16 municipality; correct?
17 A. That's not the pattern that I see.
18 Q. Madam, yesterday you commented on and today as well, and a few
19 moments ago you mentioned quotas or the key, and we --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Or Kljuc, the municipality of Kljuc
21 interpreter correction.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. And we saw here a report that was submitted to the Municipal
24 Assembly in Kljuc. Do you recall that document?
25 A. Yes.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Please bear with me. I want to try
2 and find that document.
3 Q. This is under tab 38 in your binder.
4 A. 39, I believe. Sorry.
5 Q. No, actually you are correct, it is 39.
6 A. That's the declaration. 41. 41.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I will provide the page reference
8 in just a moment, I apologise. That is 65 ter 813 and this document was
9 assigned a P number yesterday, but I can't find it right now.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P451.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 431.
12 Q. Madam, this is a report --
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please pull it up on the
15 Q. This a report on the work of the Crisis Staff, and then in
16 parenthesis War Presidency, Municipal Assembly in Kljuc in the period
17 15th of May, 1992, up until the present. And then at the bottom it says
18 July 1992. Do you recall us discussing this document yesterday?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And when speaking about this document yesterday, you actually
21 used this document to show that there was continuity between the Crisis
22 Staff of the SDS which then became the Crisis Staff of the municipality
23 and then became the War Presidency. Do you recall saying that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, here at the very beginning of the document, on page 2, we
1 see the following words:
2 "The Crisis Staff which was set up at the Executive Board of the
3 Kljuc Serbian Democratic Party on the 23rd of December, 1991, in
4 mid-May," and here they mean 1999, "was expanded at the meeting to
5 include a certain number of representatives of the local authority and
6 was transformed into the Crisis Staff of the Kljuc Municipal Assembly at
7 a meeting held on 14 May 1992
8 prerequisites to call a Municipal Assembly meeting to elect and endorse
9 members of the Crisis Staff of the Municipal Assembly."
10 Ms. Hanson, from this, it is clear that there are two different
11 Crisis Staffs in existence; correct?
12 A. They are not in existence at the same time. The Crisis Staff of
13 the SDS becomes the Crisis Staff of the Municipal Assembly.
14 Q. But, Ms. Hanson, it says that it is to be expanded, that the
15 current SDS staff is to be expanded and transformed. That's what it says
16 in the document.
17 A. Yes, that's what it says.
18 Q. From which it follows that the Crisis Staff of the SDS with a
19 number of government representatives that were added now becomes the
20 municipal Crisis Staff; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, tell me, isn't it true that on the 7th of May, 1992, and we
23 saw this document as well yesterday, the newly established Serbian
24 municipality of Kljuc was just established?
25 A. Where did we see that?
1 Q. Well, I will show you that document as well. You saw it
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, please bear with me.
4 That's document 65 ter 795. This document was assigned, I believe,
5 number 438?
6 THE REGISTRAR: If I may be of assistance, this is Exhibit P450.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Q. Madam, do you see that? You actually said that we can see in
9 capital letters Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina because it was on
10 that day that the Kljuc municipality actually joined this autonomous
12 A. This is a document which says Crisis Staff of the municipality of
13 Kljuc, although the date is the 7th of May which indicates that even
14 before that date they gave in the report, the SDS Crisis Staff was
15 calling itself the Kljuc municipal Crisis Staff, but I don't see here
16 the -- I'm familiar with this document, I don't see that it states that
17 the Serbian municipality of Kljuc
18 I'm looking for.
19 Q. It is possible that I also had in mind some other documents or
20 exhibits that we had occasion to see here and which is why I recall this
21 date as the date when the Serbian municipality of Kljuc
22 But I thought this was a fact that you were aware of. If not, I will
23 find those documents and put them to you.
24 Madam, if we go back to the earlier -- the previous document,
25 where the SDS Crisis Staff was transformed to become the Municipal
1 Assembly Crisis Staff and where it said, in the paragraph that I referred
2 to earlier, that at a meeting held on the 14th of May of that year, the
3 Crisis Staff of Kljuc municipality was established; in other words, on
4 the 14th of May. And it provides the reasons saying that there had been
5 no preconditions and prerequisites that would allow this to be done
6 earlier, to establish Crisis Staffs of Municipal Assemblies.
7 So my question to you again is whether -- do you still maintain
8 that even in this particular case, these were not two [Realtime
9 transcript read in error "too"] different organs?
10 A. Well, as I just pointed out, the previous document shows that
11 there was something calling itself the Crisis Staff of the municipality
12 before the 14th of May. I agree that in abstract technical terms the
13 Crisis Staff of a party should be different from the Crisis Staff of a
14 Municipal Assembly. As in practical terms as shown in the evidence which
15 I've looked at in the Serbian municipalities, I do not see a distinction
16 between the two. I see a great deal of overlap, confusion of
17 terminology, confusion of the procedures and the emphasis on continuity
18 such as in the third paragraph which says the Crisis Staff met as an
19 organ of the SDS.
20 Q. I'm glad that at least in this abstract and technical terms we
21 can agree. My question to you is: Isn't your misperception of this
22 being one and the same organ in continuity, doesn't that misconception
23 actually arise from the very fact that the same people were in fact
24 members of one and then the other organ? Isn't that the key element of
25 continuity that you are referring to?
1 A. I'm referring to the continuity perceived by the members of the
2 Crisis Staff. Karadzic himself said, You remember A and B at the
3 beginning of the war, we had our Crisis Staffs. And he is referring to A
4 and B, and they were the powers of the municipality. He said, We held
5 power firmly thanks to A and B, so that's the continuity I see from the
6 documents themselves.
7 MR. DOBBYN: Sorry, Your Honours, just a quick correction to the
8 transcript. It's minor, but it does change the meaning somewhat.
9 Page 70, line 25, the last word is "too," t-o-o, and I believe it should
10 be t-w-o.
11 JUDGE HALL: Line 23.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Madam, when you refer to the statement by Mr. Karadzic, do you
14 mean the statement before the Assembly in 1995 that was read out to you
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. That's in tab 5, I believe, in your binder. The document is
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have it on our
21 Q. You have been shown this document and you commented on it, the
22 portion that you reiterated a few moments ago, where Karadzic was
23 bragging about Variant A and B producing results and so on and so forth,
24 and you said that this was an Assembly session where military issues were
25 discussed. Now, madam, isn't it true that this was one of the most
1 serious episodes in the history of Republika Srpska where the well-known
2 rift between the then president of Republika Srpska, Mr. Karadzic, and
3 the army of Republika Srpska, in other words, General Mladic, actually
4 occurred; isn't that true?
5 A. The conflict was ongoing through the period from April through
6 August 1995, but that was one of the issues at this Assembly, yes.
7 Q. Madam, and I put it to you that 98 per cent of this document
8 actually refers to this conflict, the clash between Karadzic and Mladic.
9 And I would now like to read out to you --
10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the page number.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Page 184, where I will quote to you what President Karadzic said.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] So page 184 of the Serbian text,
14 and I assume that it is on the same page in the English version. 184.
15 It's probably page 185 in e-court.
16 Q. It begins with the words: "The political show-down in
17 Bosnia ..."
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I keep saying 184 and
19 not 83. Page 83. It says on top of the page 184.
20 Q. In any case, in order to save time, I will read the document to
21 you. Madam, you have it in front of you, that was under tab number 5.
22 It reads as follows: This is Karadzic speaking and he is quoting the
23 last paragraph on this page.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, that is the right page
25 in the Serbian version and I assume it's the same page in the English
2 Q. Karadzic is quoting the US news daily report of 20th April 1992,
3 and he says that this report is entitled "Political Clashes In Bosnia
4 and it says as follows. So it's Karadzic quoting the US news daily
6 "The current Muslim offensives [Realtime transcript read in error
7 "offences"] against Serb positions in central Bosnia has resulted in a
8 clash for power within the leadership of Bosnian Serbs. Apparently
9 Radovan Karadzic was defeated. Serb observers who recently visited Pale
10 and representatives of Bosnian Serbs report that the military leadership,
11 headed by Ratko Mladic, actually managed to control the president because
12 they felt that his leadership was misleading them too frequently. He may
13 give public pronouncements approved by the army, but no more than that,
14 the sources report. He is politically dead."
15 Do you recall or did you have occasion to read that part of this
16 document? These are Karadzic's words and you should have been able to
17 see it and read it. Do you remember?
18 MR. PANTELIC: Excuse me, before the witness is answer, I don't
19 think that on page 73, line 19, it's correct. I think instead of
20 "offences," maybe it's "offensive" or maybe "military action." Maybe
21 I'm ...
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, all right, in any case, we
23 can see the original quotation in the document. I don't want to waste
24 any more of our time because we have to actually finish earlier.
25 Q. So tell me, madam, have you read this part of Karadzic's remarks?
1 A. I've read it now. I'm not sure whether I read it before or not.
2 Q. Well, I will tell you, or rather, I will read another portion
3 from it. We have a minute or two left.
4 So on the next day, the session of the next day --
5 MR. DOBBYN: Sorry, Your Honours. I'm very sorry to interrupt
6 but I just want to point out that what we are seeing on the screens, the
7 English page is not matching up to the B/C/S. The English runs much
8 later. I only have the portion in front of me that I used with
9 Ms. Hanson yesterday so I can't direct it to the right page, but I just
10 want to make it clear that what you are seeing does not match up.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well. Your Honours, since it
12 is time for us to wrap up because Ms. Korner had asked to be given an
13 opportunity to address you, I would like to finish now and I will provide
14 the pages, the corresponding English pages tomorrow.
15 Thank you, Ms. Hanson, that will be all for today.
16 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Hanson, thank you. We are -- you are now
17 excused as a witness to return to this Chamber at 2.15 tomorrow. The
18 Chamber will not be sitting in the morning. The usher will now escort
19 you from the courtroom while we deal with some other matters. Thank you
20 very much.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 JUDGE HALL: And my usual warnings are repeated so to the extent
23 that it is redundant to say so.
24 THE WITNESS: Of course, Your Honour.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm sorry to raise the ever-vexed
2 question of the admission of documents. It really -- it's two separate
3 but related matters. Your Honour, the first is this: The list that
4 Mr. Dobbyn gave the Court was only the list of documents he was
5 specifically going to put to Ms. Hanson. But additionally, of course,
6 there are many documents which are on the 65 ter list submitted by the
7 Prosecution which are footnoted in her report. We went back to check
8 whether there was a ruling on how we were supposed to have these
9 documents admitted and I don't know whether Your Honours had printed out,
10 I am afraid the e-mail was sent this morning to the Court, to what
11 His Honour Judge Harhoff said in the 65 ter Conference on the
12 14th of October, 2009, where you set out a number of alternatives, but we
13 couldn't find a resolution anywhere of how this was to take place. It
14 may be we've missed it but we don't think so.
15 Of course it's important not only in respect of this witness, but
16 in respect of the next, Christian Nielsen, where again only a small
17 selection of the documents have been made to actually ask the witness
18 about, but there are many others which are footnotes in his report but
19 are also on our 65 ter list. So we are seeking the ruling or guidance
20 from the Trial Chamber as to how we are going to have these documents
22 The allied matter is the one that was dealt with yesterday in a
23 written ruling. Now, Your Honours, this arose through, if I can call it,
24 the Djeric mechanism of where you've got a large number of documents that
25 the witness can deal with but a limited amount of time, how are these
1 documents are to be dealt with. And we understood from Your Honours'
2 ruling which is set out on the 26th of October that -- it's set out in
3 the decision, the various steps that had to be taken. And I am afraid to
4 say that I had assumed that we had taken those steps, and so I was
5 somewhat surprised to have the application rejected on the basis that on
6 the 4th of November, it was said that if -- in cases where we are dealing
7 with a complex situation such as the introduction of a very large number
8 of documents, we will then require a motion.
9 It's fair to say that I had completely forgotten about that
10 ruling in November, because it was in the middle of a long discussion
11 again about the submission of documents. But in any event, Your Honours,
12 it begs the question of what is a very large number of documents? And
13 with Djeric it was 100, but with the witness with whom I was making this
14 application it was nothing like that.
15 And the motion is then being refused on the basis that we failed
16 to file a motion and also that we failed to say how they relate to the
17 indictment. Well, Your Honours, that may be our fault but we thought we
18 had set out that they fall into the various categories of Serb Crisis
19 Staff and whatever. What I'm actually coming to, and I think this is --
20 I can say this is really a position also taken by the Defence, is that we
21 really would be most grateful for a time to be set aside to fully deal
22 with and have a written direction in writing. It may be that we would
23 like some further discussion in front of Your Honours as to how we are to
24 deal with all the admission of these documents.
25 I mean, that really is our position at the moment. But the
1 urgency is, of course, how we now deal with the documents in Ms. Hanson's
2 footnotes and Dr. Nielsen's footnotes, which are on our 65 ter list.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Does the Defence have any objection to the
4 admission of further documents that are footnoted in the expert reports?
5 JUDGE HALL: And which one, the 65 ter list.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: They are all on the 65 ter list.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah, the one which are on the 65 ter list, we
8 don't have the objection. Yes, that is correct.
9 MR. PANTELIC: Let me think a minute because I always must to
10 analyse position of OTP, you know, maybe something is around the bush,
11 but at this stage, no, I don't have any objection.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: That's a wise man speaking, Mr. Pantelic, to
13 think before you speak.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I hope you are not suggesting anything,
15 Your Honour.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Certainly not. We are very well appraised of
17 your good thinking, sir.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: I was put on note before that's why I gave my name.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: In relation to the general aspect of admission of
21 documents through 92 ter witnesses and expert witnesses, the Chamber
22 agrees that it would be a good idea to have a discussion about this and
23 to provide you with clear guide-lines. We thought that it was all clear
24 but apparently it's not, so that in itself is a good reason to have a
25 discussion about it.
1 Maybe we should organise a 65 ter meeting for that purpose
2 sometime early in the new year, or alternatively, the Chamber may just
3 discuss it internally and then provide you with guide-lines. But in the
4 interest of efficiency, it might be useful to sit down all together and
5 discuss it before we adopt any final guide-lines.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I think it would be of assistance if
7 Your Honours perhaps were to issue - can we put it this way? - draft
8 guide-lines and then we can make submissions on it. I think that's
9 probably the most efficient way of dealing with it.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: That's exactly what we had in mind.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: That is definitely what we would prefer also and to
12 have a 65 ter in the new year, yes.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: In respect of the second issue relating to the
14 additional documents to be admitted through Hanson and Nielsen, the
15 Chamber's view was that this could cause prejudice to the Defence not
16 having been put on notice that these extra documents would also be sought
17 admitted into evidence. But since none of the Defence counsels have
18 taken an issue with it, we agree. So they are all admitted.
19 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE HALL: We rise until 2.15 tomorrow.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day of
23 December, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.