Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6361

 1                           Tuesday, 16 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon

 6     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case IT-08-91-T, the

 7     Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.

 8             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

 9             Good afternoon to everyone.  May I have the appearances, please.

10             MS. KORNER:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Joanna Korner,

11     assisted by Crispian Smith, Case Manager.

12             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic and

13     Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for Stanisic Defence this afternoon.

14     Thank you.

15             MR. PANTELIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  For

16     Zupljanin Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

18             And if there are no preliminary matters to concern us, could the

19     Usher please escort the witness back to the stand.  Thank you.

20             MR. ZECEVIC:  May the record show that Mr. Cvijetic has joined

21     us, in Stanisic Defence.  Thank you.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24                           [The witness takes the stand]

25             JUDGE HALL:  Good afternoon, Mr. Vlaski.  Before I -- I invite

Page 6362

 1     Ms. Korner to continue her examination-in-chief, I remind you you're

 2     still on your oath.  You are may take your seat.  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4                           WITNESS:  NEDJO VLASKI [Resumed]

 5                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 6                           Examination by Ms. Korner: [Continued]

 7        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, we were looking at the barricade incident yesterday,

 8     beginning of March.  I would like you to have a look, please, at a

 9     newsreel footage, please.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Armed and masked people are

12     blocking traffic.  In the city, around 20 barricades have been put up.

13     The shooting lasted the whole night, particularly in the municipality of

14     Novo Sarajevo.  Behind the barricades made of transport vehicles, there

15     are civilians armed from head to foot who told foreign companies that the

16     reason for barricades was the murder which took place in Bascarsija the

17     day before.  Ten minutes before midnight, Sarajevo Television broadcast

18     information by our journalist who noticed stopping of trolley-buses and

19     putting up of the barricade at the beginning of Mice Sokolovica Street.

20     Police patrol returned in front of the pointed barrels.  People were

21     killed during last night fire-fight.  Now it only has been confirmed that

22     Pandurevic and two more citizens were killed on the barricades.  Foreign

23     agencies said that there had been six people killed.

24             "In the morning, traffic was blocked in the city, schools didn't

25     work.  They didn't even let ...

Page 6363

 1             "On behalf of Crisis Staff, Rajko Dukic, chairperson of SDS

 2     executive committee, spoke about the reasons to put up barricades,

 3     demands by Serb people and activities of the Crisis Staff:

 4             "A lot happened over the last couple of days what incited,

 5     provoked Serbian people who unfortunately have chosen the only possible

 6     option and that is to take to the barricades, and one can easily say, to

 7     bring attention to something that would be normal in a democratic and

 8     civilised society, and that because of one's independence, identity, and

 9     sovereignty, nobody has the right to deprive somebody else of that same

10     right.  The Serbian people did not expect that in addition there

11     would -- their flag would be shot at, which is what unfortunately

12     happened yesterday at 1600 hours, so to speak, in the centre of Sarajevo.

13             "The demands of the Serbian people from Sarajevo and the whole

14     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been manifested through the

15     Crisis Staff under the conditions that have certainly be pointed out.

16     According to the communiqué of the information service of the

17     BiH Presidency, the demands of the Serbian people were only partially

18     met.  The Crisis Staff ..."

19        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, who are the people flanking Rajko Dukic?

20        A.   I don't see anybody applauding Mr. Dukic.  I can see that this is

21     a press conference.

22        Q.   No, flanking, on either side.  Like the Judges.

23        A.   That's a different matter.  They were the participants in the

24     conference, together Mr. Rajko Dukic, the person who spoke of this

25     unfortunate incident.  To his right is Mr. Todor Dutina and

Page 6364

 1     Velibor Ostojic, the minister of information, to his left.  He was on the

 2     government of what was still, at the time, the Socialist Republic of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Mr. Dukic was the president of the executive board

 4     of the Serbian Democratic Party.

 5        Q.   And who was Mr. Dutina?

 6        A.   I don't recall what his official title at the time was.  I know

 7     that he was a representative there.  But what his actual position was, I

 8     don't remember.

 9        Q.   All right.  Yes, we can stop the video, thank you.

10             I have just got a couple of other things to ask you, Mr. Vlaski.

11     First is to look at a document -- firstly, you listened to an intercept

12     yesterday.  This is one of the ones that is on our 65 ter list.

13             MS. KORNER:  Could we have up, please, 1056.

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, Your Honours, we lost the LiveNote.

15             MS. KORNER:  Oh, so we did.

16                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17             MS. KORNER:  It's back again.

18             All right.  Could we have up on the screen, please, 65 ter 1056.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, it's not back again on our side.

20             JUDGE HARHOFF:  We're also blank.  [Microphone not activated]

21             MS. KORNER:  Do Your Honours want me to continue?  I don't

22     whether ... all right.

23             Your Honours, before we look at this one, can I -- I'm not clear

24     what the situation was.  You allowed me to use this video.  Am I allowed

25     to exhibit it?  It wasn't on the 65 ter list.  No, this is one -- you

Page 6365

 1     gave me permission to use this because it was open source material.  But

 2     I'm just asking whether I can exhibit it, because I'd like to exhibit it.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE HALL:  It would be marked for identification.

 5             MS. KORNER:  So Your Honours would like an application in writing

 6     to add this to our 65 ter list?

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  Yes, I expect so.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P980 marked for identification,

 9     Your Honours.

10             MS. KORNER:  All right.

11        Q.   Now, first of all, sir, you listened to this intercept, is that

12     right, which is said to between Stojan Zupljanin and Mico Stanisic?

13        A.   That's right.

14        Q.   Were you able to recognise the voices?

15        A.   I was.

16        Q.   As those of Mr. Zupljanin and Mr. Stanisic?

17        A.   Right.

18        Q.   This was on the 2nd of March of 1992, and the conversation refers

19     to the barricades.

20             MS. KORNER:  If we look, please, at the second page in English,

21     and I think it's the second page -- yes, it's the second page also in

22     B/C/S.

23        Q.   Stojan Zupljanin says:

24             "We're a listening a bit to how things are going over there."

25             And Mico Stanisic says:

Page 6366

 1             "Well, you can hear."

 2             "We are following and listening," as they say, "and waiting for

 3     further instructions."

 4             Now you said the barricades were a spontaneous incident in

 5     Sarajevo for the Serbs to, as it were, protect themselves.  Do you know

 6     why, because you were with Mico Stanisic in the Holiday Inn during this

 7     period, Stojan Zupljanin was saying, We're waiting for further

 8     instructions?

 9        A.   It was logical, since the security situation was so complex.  I

10     said earlier on that it was a political assassination and that's one of

11     the gravest qualifications of crime which calls for an appropriate

12     reaction on the part of the authority, and it wasn't forthcoming.  The

13     police didn't show the willingness to do its job, and the barricades were

14     a response to a political assassination.  The barricades had not been

15     organised before the murder took place but afterwards, and it had

16     occurred as a spontaneous event.

17             It is difficult in moments such as these when such a large

18     overbearing incident happens to ease the tensions that had come to the

19     fore in the country anyway.  An adequate reaction on the part of the

20     Ministry of the Interior and the authorities in general to launch an

21     investigation to identify the perpetrators and punish them, such a formal

22     intervention, especially of the Presidency, was not forthcoming.

23             MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... I'm sorry, I

24     didn't want to interrupt the witness.  But we are facing a lot of

25     problems now without the LiveNote because we cannot follow what -- I

Page 6367

 1     mean ... we need to watch the document at the same time and ... the

 2     LiveNote.

 3                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 4             JUDGE HALL:  I gather that it's going to take about ten minutes

 5     for this -- for the technical problem to be corrected.  So in the

 6     interests of the Defence who is particularly handicapped, perhaps we

 7     should rise.

 8                            --- Break taken at 2.33 p.m.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           --- On resuming at 2.47 p.m.

11                           [The witness takes the stand]

12             MS. KORNER:

13        Q.   Now, Mr. Vlaski, I would like you to concentrate, please, on the

14     question and not make a speech.

15             The question I asked you is why, if this is a spontaneous

16     outbreak in Sarajevo, Stojan Zupljanin should be saying - could we go

17     back to the intercept - We're waiting for further instructions.  And then

18     Mico Stanisic says, Be ready and we'll be in touch.  Zupljanin:  For the

19     most part, everything is ready on our side.  Stanisic:  Yes, we are

20     waiting for a sign.  If a total blockade is needed, all the rest, it will

21     be done.

22             Now, if this is a spontaneous outbreak in Sarajevo, why is

23     Stojan Zupljanin in Banja Luka awaiting instructions from Mico Stanisic

24     to set up a blockade in Banja Luka?

25        A.   The answer is only logical.  An organised response had to match

Page 6368

 1     an organised incident.  If somebody organises a political assassination

 2     and if this is done by the criminal underworld which is in collusion with

 3     the political leadership, then such a murder can happen anywhere in the

 4     country.  This wasn't a murder as the result of a -- a brawl in a cafe.

 5     This was a wedding party which was sporting a Serb flag, and they were

 6     the object of the attack, and so there was message behind that.  Action

 7     will always provoke a reaction.

 8        Q.   This is about the fourth or fifth time you have described this as

 9     a political assassination.  You had a chance to listen to your interview

10     in Banja Luka.  Do you agree this is the first time in this court that

11     you have described this killing as a political assassination?

12        A.   At the time, we didn't speak about this incident in specific

13     terms.  It has all -- it bears all of the hallmarks of a political

14     assassination, and I have a degree -- I hold a degree in criminology and

15     I know what I'm talking about and I can give you a definition of a

16     political assassination.

17        Q.   Thank you very much.  The only question was:  Do you agree -- you

18     never mentioned the words "political assassination" in the interview in

19     Banja Luka when this very incident was discussed.  And the answer to

20     that, you've already said, is yes.

21             You yourself, you told this Court, were skiing at the time that

22     the murder of the wedding guest took place.  How, therefore, by the

23     following day did you know this was a political assassination?

24        A.   It -- it was evidently a political assassination.  We had

25     intelligence to the effect that the party of democratic action had

Page 6369

 1     mobilised criminal structures in the city of Sarajevo.  Every criminal

 2     structure was in control of a specific neighbourhood in the city of

 3     Sarajevo.  I can explain to you in great detail which particular criminal

 4     structure had control under which quarter of the town and was headed by

 5     which criminal individual.  We had intelligence to the effect that there

 6     was disagreement within the MUP as to why criminal structures were being

 7     involved in certain activities.  This was a conflict between Mr. Alibabic

 8     and Dautbasic about whether the criminals should be involved into this or

 9     not.  Mr. Alibabic was a professional and was opposed to this, and Mr.

10     Dautbasic said that if need be, he would even forge an alliance with the

11     devil himself.

12        Q.   You told us you went skiing, you got the phone call when you

13     returned on the Sunday afternoon, and you went straight over to the

14     premises of, first of all, the Deputies Club in the Assembly and then to

15     the Holiday Inn.  How, by that stage, did you acquire all this

16     information about this being a political killing?

17        A.   It was only too clear.  The policeman who was right on the spot

18     when the murder took place, he identified the murderer and the murderer

19     was not apprehended by the police at all.  In other words, the police was

20     aware of his identity and was protecting the murderer and that's where

21     the problem lay.  Had the police reacted in a professional way, right on

22     the spot, this response would not have ensued.  Had we received

23     information about the apprehension of the perpetrator, the events would

24     have taken a different course that's for sure.

25             MR. PANTELIC:  I'm sorry, it's line 8 -- sorry, it's page 8,

Page 6370

 1     line 19, in transcript we have a following sentence:  Mr. Alibabic was

 2     and if need be he would even forge alliance with the devil himself.

 3             I believe that this witness didn't say this particular sentence,

 4     and I would kindly ask my learned friend to clarify this.

 5             MS. KORNER:  What, that Mr. Alibabic would forge an alliance with

 6     the Devil himself; is that what you say he didn't say?  Anyhow,

 7     Mr. Vlaski speaks some English so perhaps he could tell us.

 8        A.   No, I didn't say that Mr. Alibabic did that, but Mr. Dautbasic

 9     did.  Mr. Alibabic was a professional, and he was opposed to such an

10     alliance with the criminals.  And it Mr. Dautbasic who said that he would

11     forge an alliance even with the devil himself, let alone with criminals.

12             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I was under the impression -- I was

13     under the impression, before we leave the intercept, that it already had

14     been made an exhibit, but through Mr. Zepinic.  But I'm told not.  So, in

15     which case, can I have it made an exhibit now.

16             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, I think we took the -- there is a

17     ruling under which conditions the intercept can be -- can be admitted.

18     This is not the case.

19             The witness was not a party, he was not -- he was not present at

20     the time, nor was he -- was he privy to the contents of this particular

21     conversation.

22             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, as I --

23             JUDGE HALL:  That was my recollection, Mr. Zecevic.  On what

24     basis are you seeking to have this admitted, Ms. Korner?

25             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, as I understand it, on the

Page 6371

 1     2nd of March -- Mr. Zecevic, you know, Mr. Zecevic, it's polite to sit

 2     down if somebody else is standing up.

 3             Yes, my understanding is this conversation took place on the

 4     2nd of March at the time when this witness and Mr. Stanisic are at the

 5     Holiday Inn together, or in the same place.  In addition to that, he's

 6     able to speak as to the contents and he's able to recognise the voices.

 7             Can I say, I can't think of any more criteria for making a

 8     document admissible.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, the ruling that the Chamber has made is

10     that where a person -- although a witness might purport to identify the

11     voices on a transcript -- on an intercept, if he was -- if he -- was

12     himself not a party to the exchange, or was present, was otherwise

13     present, then it is not admissible by -- through that witness.  It may be

14     admissible otherwise.  Do I understand you to be saying that the

15     testimony of this witness is that he was, in fact, present?

16             MS. KORNER:  That he was there in the Holiday Inn with

17     Mico Stanisic.  He gave evidence yesterday.  I don't know whether he can

18     say he was actually present at the time of the call.  I -- probably not.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE HALL:  Consistent with -- with the ruling that the Chamber

21     has made -- [French on English Channel]

22     MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]

23                           [French on English Channel]

24             MS. KORNER:  Can we have English.  Could we have English, please.

25     I didn't -- I'm afraid because the French was going on while Your Honour

Page 6372

 1     was talking, I didn't catch what Your Honour said.  Was the ruling that

 2     it was admitted or not admitted?

 3             JUDGE HALL:  That it is marked for identification.

 4             MS. KORNER:  All right.  Thank you.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P981 marked for identification,

 6     Your Honours.

 7             MS. KORNER:

 8        Q.   I want you, finally, to look, please, at a letter that you were

 9     shown in interview, which is -- is -- is 65 ter number 3370.

10             It's dated 10th of October -- I'll just wait for the English to

11     come up.

12             It's dated 10th of October, 1994.  And it's addressed to the

13     Government of the Republika Srpska, to Mr. Brdjanin.

14             Did you know Mr. Brdjanin?

15        A.   I had the opportunity to meet him, as a deputy in the

16     Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the first multi-party

17     elections.

18        Q.   All right.  And the letter is signed by Mr. Kesic.  Did you know

19     him?

20        A.   Of course.

21        Q.   All right.  And, effectively, what it is, is it's asking for an

22     apartment to be allocated to you.  But it's the middle paragraph I want

23     to ask you about.

24             He was amongst the first people in the former state security of

25     the former Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP to organise the Serbian personnel

Page 6373

 1     in order to oppose the Croatian-Muslim coalition, as it's put.

 2             Is that an accurate description of your activities during the

 3     course of 1991 and early 1992?

 4        A.   I can say that I was in that group of desperate people who were

 5     working in an institution that was called the MUP of the

 6     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and who were completely

 7     marginalised and who had a need to self-organise for reasons which were

 8     then later verified and recognised by international agreements.

 9        Q.   Now can you answer my question, please.  Is that description an

10     accurate one?

11        A.   Well, I was that -- deserving that, in 1994, I was forced to

12     temporarily resolve my housing issue.  Had I really been deserving,

13     somebody would have adequately dealt with that matter before that.  But

14     in 1994, at the end of the war practically, I was seeking a temporary

15     solution for my housing problem.

16        Q.   No.  I'll ask for the third time, please, Mr. Vlaski.  Mr. Kesic

17     describes you as one of the -- among the first people in the former state

18     security to organise Serbian personnel in order to oppose what is

19     described as the Croatian-Muslim coalition.

20             Were you one of the first people to organise the Serbs within the

21     MUP against the non-Serb members?

22        A.   We did not organise against other members of the MUP.  We

23     organised ourselves in order to protect, as I said, our personal and

24     professional interests, as well as the interests of the people that we

25     represented.  Yes, and I was in that group.

Page 6374

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,

 3     please.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P982, Your Honours.

 6             MS. KORNER:

 7        Q.   You told the Court yesterday, in one of your many speeches, about

 8     the Muslims and Croats - and this is at page 6350 of the transcript:

 9             "That the SDA and the HDZ in the MUP played with me,

10     humiliated me."

11             Is that what you feel about what happened to you in the MUP

12     during 1991 and early 1992?

13        A.   The best illustration for that would be my appointment and the

14     issuing of the decision and the abolishment of that post.  I mean, that

15     was only just me, but that was the fate of many others.  But I had the

16     misfortune, let's say, to experience what I did experience, not for some

17     personal problems that I had with those people, but because of

18     nationalist and political reasons.

19        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... [Microphone not activated]

20             MR. ZECEVIC:  I believe I heard Ms. Korner said, No further

21     questions, but ...

22             MS. KORNER:  I did.  [Microphone not activated]

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  It was not recorded in the transcript.  That's why

24     I wanted to know.

25             JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]

Page 6375

 1             JUDGE HALL:  I wasn't sure either, Mr. Zecevic, yes.

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  May I?

 3             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, please.

 4             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

 5                           Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:

 6        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Vlaski.

 7             I'm going to put a couple of questions to you.  But, first of

 8     all, I have to ask you, because you and me are speaking the same

 9     language, to make a pause so that the interpreters would have time to

10     translate.

11             I'm going to show you, yesterday, during the day, you talked

12     about the situation in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina.  You talked about that today a little bit as well.  I'm

14     going to show you document 1D114.  This is an inter-party agreement

15     within the coalition of the HDZ, SDA, and the SDS, from January 1991.

16             MR. ZECEVIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... please give to

17     the witness a binder of the documents in order to facilitate for the

18     witness only, if there is no objection from my learned colleague.

19        Q.   [Interpretation] You have it on the screen, but I can also give

20     you a hard copy.

21             You can see that the heading of the document states in

22     handwriting, January 1991.  And then, in item 2, we have a list of the

23     leading posts in the Ministry of the Interior.  Do you see that?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And you can see, under B, deputy of the minister.  And then on

Page 6376

 1     the one hand it says SDS and then it says Zepinic.  And then E we have

 2     assistant to the minister for crime fighting SDS.  And then we have

 3     Momcilo Mandic.  Do you see that?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And that corresponds to the situation in the MUP after 1991, in

 6     the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 7        A.   Yes, it corresponds for the most part.  There are elements here

 8     which were not verified until later.  I'm talking about some personnel

 9     options.

10        Q.   I asked you deliberately only about these first two.  Mr. Zepinic

11     and Momcilo Mandic.  Do you agree that they really performed those

12     duties, as stated here on this list?

13        A.   Yes, they did perform those duties.

14        Q.   Under letter L, there is the assistant -- or the deputy for the

15     under-secretary for the State Security Service, then it says that the

16     post belongs to the SDS.  And then we see the name Boro Susic, I think.

17             If I understood your testimony correctly from yesterday and

18     today, precisely that is the post that you were supposed to be appointed

19     to and were appointed to but then that post, after your appointment, was

20     deleted from the classification of posts in the Ministry of

21     Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22        A.   That is correct.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   Can I give an explanation?

25        Q.   Yes, of course, but I'm just asking you to go slowly, please.

Page 6377

 1             Go ahead.

 2        A.   Mr. Zepinic was appointed deputy minister from the ranks of the

 3     Serbian people, and he was nominated by the Serbian Democratic Party

 4     which won a share of the power after the multi-party elections.

 5             Mr. Zepinic was a member of the Ministry of the Interior, and he

 6     was among the professionals, according to his experience as well as his

 7     education.  Mr.  Momcilo Mandic did finish police schools.  He worked in

 8     the judiciary after that -- in the police and then in the judiciary, and

 9     he was dealing with the issues of crime.  So because of his professional

10     qualifications, he was elected or appointed as assistant minister as

11     opposed to the person from the ranks of the SDA, who was a man, who was

12     highly educated but performed work which had nothing to do with the

13     police.  He had worked in our health centre in the process of recruiting

14     staff into the police forces.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to repeat his

16     last sentence.

17             JUDGE HALL:  The interpreters need the witness to repeat his last

18     sentence, please.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't want to analyse any

20     further.  I could provide a broader analysis for each of the posts in the

21     Ministry of the Interior.  I said about the assistant minister for

22     uniformed police, from the ranks the SDA, a person was appointed for that

23     post, of a high education, but without any experience or any expertise

24     for the duties that such a post would imply.

25             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 6378

 1        Q.   I would just kindly ask you for the name of that assistant from

 2     the SDA.

 3        A.   Avdo Hebib.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  The organisational structure of the MUP of the

 5     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was customary in those

 6     areas, and it had two parts:  Public security and state security.  Isn't

 7     that right?

 8        A.   Yes, that's right.

 9        Q.   State security, where you worked, was headed by the

10     under-secretary for state security.  I am talking about the MUP of the

11     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12        A.   Yes, that is correct.

13        Q.   And that post, the under-secretary for state security, was

14     assigned, pursuant to this coalition agreement, to the HDZ, and

15     Mr. Branko Kvesic came to that post.

16        A.   Yes, Mr. Kvesic assumed that post.

17        Q.   You were the chief of the 5th Administration in the

18     State Security Service; is that correct?

19        A.   Yes.  This is a lower ranking organisational unit that is part of

20     the state security organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21        Q.   You were supposed to be given a decision as deputy -- as --

22     deputy under-secretary for state security, and you were supposed to be

23     the assistant to Branko Kvesic and the main operative in the

24     State Security Service.  Is that correct?

25        A.   Yes, that is correct.  May I just give a slightly more detailed

Page 6379

 1     explanation for this organisational structure?

 2        Q.   Yes, you can, but please be concise.

 3        A.   This coalition agreement, as we can see, followed the multi-party

 4     elections, and it was supposed to be the parameter for the distribution

 5     of the key positions in the institutions of the Socialist Republic

 6     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it still was at the time.  The

 7     under-secretary for state security was appointed to Branko Kvesic, who

 8     was a representative of the HDZ, and represented the Croatian people.

 9     Pursuant to the agreement, the deputy under-secretary for state security

10     should have been assigned to a representative of the Serbian people, and

11     that person was supposed to be nominated by the Serbian Democratic Party.

12             This post was not filled for half a year, and that was a

13     deliberate action by the coalition partners who tried in all possible

14     ways to obstruct this particular appointment.  The reasons for such

15     conduct could be seen in the fact that the existing rules on

16     classification of posts, according to the laws in effect at the time, the

17     deputy under-secretary is actually the most important position in state

18     security.  The person assigned to that post is responsible for the work

19     of the operative force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20             No operative measure, wire-tapping or any other kind of action,

21     could be carried out without the knowledge of that particular person.

22     Precisely this fact speaks to the scale of obstruction that was being

23     carried out in relation to this service.  There was no person who was

24     professionally in charge of this particular aspect of the work.  This was

25     given to the internal agreement of representatives of the Bosniak Muslim

Page 6380

 1     people and the Croatian people for as long as they shared common

 2     interests.

 3             The representatives of the Serbian people were given the sole

 4     important post in that service, and that is the security for persons and

 5     facilities.  This was a very difficult job because it's very easy to make

 6     mistakes in that work, whereas, that person had no influence in the

 7     shaping and performance of the most sensitive duties from the area of

 8     state security.

 9        Q.   If I understood you correctly and to summarize, you, as you have

10     told us several times till now, never actually assumed those duties as

11     deputy under-secretary for state security, even though that should have

12     happened.  And, in essence, on the basis of what you have told us, the

13     Muslims, primarily, and the Croats, practically controlled the

14     State Security Service of the Socialist Republic of

15     Bosnia and Herzegovina almost entirely at that time?

16        A.   At that time, the absolute control of the work and all the

17     activities of that service was in the hands of the Muslims.  I'm talking

18     about the top leadership, because it was up to them would be done and

19     what would be accorded significance.  Serbian representatives did not

20     have any influence at all in that area.  They were even bypassed in some

21     purely banal matters.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We have a document here, 1D118.  This is a document

23     from March 1992.  It's information about the abuses, illegalities, and

24     manipulation by the SDS cadres in the State Security Service of the MUP

25     of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That document is an

Page 6381

 1     exhibit in this case, since, I, in our conversation yesterday --

 2             MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]

 3             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry?  Madam Korner, you said

 4     something?  I'm sorry.

 5             MS. KORNER:  Yes, I asked for a number.  [Microphone not

 6     activated]

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  It's 1D118.

 8        Q.   [Interpretation] Yesterday, when I showed you that, you told me

 9     that this information was something that you were not familiar with, and

10     that is why I'm not going to present the entire document to you.  I'm

11     going to read some of the characteristic excerpts so that you could

12     confirm whether you agree with them or not.

13             On page 1, it says:

14             "Since the multi-party elections until today, the personnel

15     policies in the State Security Service of the MUP of the

16     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted by

17     Hilmo Selimovic, Asim Dautbasic, Alibabic --

18             MS. KORNER:  Can I please have the bit that you're reading out on

19     the screen.  Thank you.

20             MR. ZECEVIC:  This is page 1.  It's the first -- it's the

21     first -- the second paragraph.

22             "The personnel police of the BiH MUP ..."

23             Have you found that, Ms. Korner?

24             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  Thank you very much.

25             MR. ZECEVIC:  You're welcome.

Page 6382

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] The personnel policy of the BiH, has been run by

 2     Hilmo Selimovic, Asim Dautbasic, Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic.

 3             Do you agree with that?

 4        A.   Yes, that is the most tragedy aspect because they are at the head

 5     of the SDS.  So they should have also taken it upon themselves to

 6     interpret the policies of the SDS too.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  A little bit lower on that page, we're looking at the

 8     fourth paragraph from the top, discusses this case of yours.  And it

 9     says:

10             "When drawing up the new structure and systematisation of the SDB

11     in March 1991, Asim Dautbasic, Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic pushed

12     through two insignificant assistant places instead of the place of the

13     SDB deputy under-secretary, which belonged to the SDS, according to the

14     inter-party agreement."

15             Isn't this correct?

16        A.   Yes, it's correct.  Because they did what they wanted, because

17     nobody could have any influence over what they would write in the rules,

18     that draft rules that then they would submit to the government for

19     adoption.

20        Q.   In the next paragraph, sometimes -- somewhere in the middle of

21     that paragraph it states -- I think this is the third or fourth sentence

22     after that paragraph, it says that Asim Dautbasic practically, from the

23     level of the State Security Service of the MUP of the Socialist Republic

24     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the agreement of the under-secretary,

25     completely took over the coordination of the work of the service,

Page 6383

 1     creating such channels of the flow of information where the SDS cadres

 2     were bypassed so that the information from the bottom to the top and the

 3     leadership of the SDA and the HDZ went exclusively by way of these two

 4     parties.

 5             Is this correct?

 6        A.   Yes.  In such relations, there was no need for us even to come to

 7     work.  They could have sent our salaries to us at home.  We could have

 8     been out there skiing or sitting at home because we were not even needed.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to the next page.  We're

11     talking about page 2 in the e-court as well.

12        Q.   The second paragraph from the top says:

13             "With a view to enforcing discipline among certain cadres, Serb

14     staff, various methods were applied, failure to issue rulings as

15     prescribed in the new rules of procedures on the internal organisation of

16     the SDB, withholding parts of completed rulings until the person was

17     transferred to another less significant post, and, outside the SDB,

18     attempts of classic recruitment, taking statements, et cetera."

19             Were you familiar with this?

20        A.   This was a concept which was previously planned and which had the

21     objective of bringing the Serb staff into an unfavorable position.  This

22     was the SDA strategy, and Alija Izetbegovic wanted the Serbs to reduce

23     them to a minority.  And a way to that was to clear the state security of

24     any Serb staff.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 6384

 1             The following paragraph is paragraph number 5 on a the page.  And

 2     you say that focus in the work of the service is placed almost

 3     exclusively on the operative inquiries of the activities within the SDS

 4     from the lowest organisational units to the higher levels of leadership.

 5             Do you agree with that?

 6        A.   I fully agree.  Precisely this sentence, this piece of

 7     information, prompted the press release which the -- the incumbents of

 8     the state security leadership only inform, addressing the public at

 9     large, and distancing themselves from such activities of the state organs

10     and from such manipulations as performed by the MUP and the

11     State Security Service.

12        Q.   The last paragraph on this page states that as of the month of

13     May 1991, the telephone line in the Deputies Club of the SDS had been

14     wire-tapped and so on and so forth.  And, on the following page, mention

15     is made of some secret intercepting points that had been set up.

16             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] This is page 3 in e-court,

17     paragraph 1.

18        Q.   Can you see that, and can you tell us anything about it?

19        A.   I can recount the entire story surrounding such practice, since I

20     was one of the persons who had extensive experience in such activities

21     because I had been working on precisely such duties for a long time.

22        Q.   First of all, speak slowly, and be very concise.  Give us only

23     the key points.  Thank you.  Go ahead.

24        A.   The legislation in force regulated the application of operative

25     and technical measures and means.  They were defined by the law in very

Page 6385

 1     precise terms as well as with the rules governing the work of the

 2     State Security Service.  However, the rules and laws were one matter, and

 3     the practice was another altogether.  It was in quite an unlawful way

 4     that representatives of the leadership were eavesdropped on, the members

 5     of parliament who were duly elected, including us, I'm sure of that.

 6             Every individual who showed or exhibited any sort of activity

 7     aimed at safeguarding the interests of either the profession, the law, or

 8     national interests was the subject of the activities of this structure,

 9     which misused the means it had in order to meet the requests issued to

10     them by their leaders.

11             A vertical system was established from the assistant leader of

12     state security, Mr. Dautbasic, all the way down to the lowest level of

13     operatives who applied various operative means and measures.  The matter

14     was so dramatic that members of the Party for Democratic Action were

15     directly involved in such unlawful activities.  Representatives of the

16     party intercepted communications from specific sights which were placed

17     outside of state security facilities, namely in private homes and various

18     buildings.  We have documents to prove that.

19             These same representatives of the party, having obtained, through

20     unlawful means, various information, forwarded to Mr. Munir Alibabic

21     these -- the same information once or twice a week.  This was documented

22     in the log-book, registering the movement of different persons.  This was

23     in the MUP building, where Mr. Alibabic was the minister.  The public

24     security forces, that's to say the police, were duty-bound to register

25     every individual who entered the building, as well as the person they

Page 6386

 1     were visiting.

 2             In this particular book, we found information to the effect that

 3     three members of the Party of Democratic Action would enter the building,

 4     in the context that I'm speaking of, and bring in material.  The purpose

 5     behind this was for the material to be processed and then forwarded to

 6     the political leadership and, in part, to the media.

 7             We have proof that on a weekly basis Mr. Senad Abdic, editor of

 8     "Slobodna Bosna" paper, came there routinely.  They published this sort

 9     of information in order to justify the activities taken by the party

10     leadership in relation to the Serb staff.

11        Q.   Let me interrupt you here and put several questions to in

12     relation to what you just told us.

13             If my understanding of what you said is correct, and please tell

14     me if it's not, the wire-tapping measures, the interception measures,

15     which the State Security Service was authorised to carry out under the

16     law and in keeping with specific procedure, in the course of 1991 and

17     1992, were, in actual fact, privatised in the service of the -- of a

18     political party, namely, the SDA.

19             Just tell me if I'm right or not.

20        A.   Yes, it is fully privatised in the service of the SDA, and, in

21     part, the HDZ as well.  Insofar as it was needed by the Croats or,

22     alternatively, by the Bosniaks.

23        Q.   Moreover, if my understanding is correct, these eavesdropping

24     measures, which were applied from, as you put it, the certain sites that

25     had been set up ad hoc, were not applied by technicians who were employed

Page 6387

 1     by the State Security Service but, rather, by certain individuals who

 2     were members of the Party of Democratic Action.  Is that right?

 3        A.   No, that's not right.  Expertise is required to apply these

 4     measures, as well as a series of conditions that needed to be met.  In

 5     order for such an operation to be conducted, there had to be coordinated

 6     activity from a number of individuals, from telecommunications operators,

 7     and so on and so forth.  Let me not go into explaining the techniques

 8     behind the work because it -- they will take us too far.  The gist of the

 9     matter is that in the application of these measures SDA members were

10     involved, and they were the ones producing the end product.

11        Q.   The SDA staff who yielded the end product worked together with

12     Munir Alibabic, whom they visited once or twice weekly, at least, at the

13     very least, in his office.  That's what you told us, right?

14        A.   Yes.  Certain representatives of the Serb people were involved in

15     this as well, who were performing their regular official duties.  They

16     also had some involvement in these unlawful activities, and they informed

17     us of them.  They were afraid of doing anything, however, because they

18     were afraid for their own fate.

19        Q.   You also said that Mr. Munir Alibabic, who created these

20     documents together with his SDA colleagues, forwarded the -- some of

21     these documents to the media, which was in violation of the regulations

22     that were in force at the time.

23        A.   There were certain rules in place in relation to the media.  In

24     order for certain information to reach the media, it had to go through

25     the analysis department first, which would decide whether the material

Page 6388

 1     was apt to be publicised or whether it should only be forward to the

 2     leadership staff.  However, here it was Dautbasic, Alibabic, and Kvesic

 3     who decided which of the information needed to be published in the media,

 4     such as "Slobodna Bosna," or any other media that suited them.

 5             MR. ZECEVIC:  [Previous translation continues] ...

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

 8             JUDGE HALL:  We will resume in 20 minutes.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

12             JUDGE HALL:  Our delay in resuming, the Bench was -- we were

13     doing other work in the interim.

14             Yes, please continue, Mr. Zecevic.

15             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm waiting for the witness, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE HALL:  [Microphone not activated]

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, before the break, we were just about to discuss

20     "Slobodna Bosna" and the media in general.  But let me put one other

21     question before we move to that topic.

22             The SDA activists, who, together with Mr. Alibabic, were involved

23     in these, as you call them, unlawful intercepting activities, can you

24     tell me, were they individuals called Behman, Arnautovic, Skalonja, and

25     Osman?  Do you recall that?

Page 6389

 1        A.   I do remember that very well, because I had occasion to see the

 2     names of these individuals in the book registering visitors entering the

 3     MUP building in Sarajevo.

 4             I also had occasion to see them later on, on the MUP payroll,

 5     when this became common knowledge, and their presence in the MUP was

 6     legalised by them being -- becoming employees of the MUP.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Let us go back to the media.

 8             You said that Messrs. Alibabic, Dautbasic, and Kvesic decided

 9     independently which information would be provided to the media.  Can you

10     tell us what media was involved?  Was it "Muslimanski Glas,"

11     "Slobodna Bosna," and "Hercegovacki Tjednik" and similar papers?

12        A.   Yes, these two as well as others; the dailies, such as the

13     "Sarajevo Oslobodjenje."

14        Q.   When you say "involved," they were used for the purposes of a

15     propaganda war, was it not?

16        A.   Yes.  It was part of the political, military, and media

17     preparations for the takeover of power in Bosnia by the HDZ/SDA coalition

18     and to the detriment of the Serb people.  The representatives of this

19     particular policy believed that they ought to be the masters in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It seems that for Bosnia-Herzegovina the

21     relationship between the master and the servant was a historical

22     category, and they believed that it was time for them to become masters.

23        Q.   Thank you.  If my understanding of your testimony is correct,

24     this discussion of ours, concerning 1D118, shows that you substantially

25     or -- agree with what is contained in the document.  Is that right?

Page 6390

 1        A.   I could discuss this particular document for days and corroborate

 2     what is stated there with various statements and documents because there

 3     is no better proof than this one to show how far Mr. Kvesic, who was at

 4     the head of the State Security Service, privatised the service.  When he

 5     no longer felt that he needed to remain in Sarajevo, he brought along

 6     with him documentation concerning the service, and this was an

 7     illustration of his unlawful and unprofessional conduct.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9        A.   If I may add, it was precisely because of such actions that were

10     taken that certain individuals committed suicide, because of what had

11     been published about them in the book.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Vlaski, do you know that the Party of

13     Democratic Action, in the course of 1991, sent young men to be trained in

14     the Croatian MUP?

15        A.   Yes, of course.  And I personally saw documents dispatching these

16     men to the training centre in Zagreb.

17        Q.   I will show you 1D123.  This is a document issued by the SDA.

18             The document is dated 11 July 1991.  It is instructions for

19     candidates, and it is addressed to the Ministry of the Interior of the

20     Republic of Croatia.

21             Let me put one question to you before we start discussing the

22     documents.

23             You will see that on the right-hand side, in the heading, it says

24     SDA - Party for Democratic Action - Sarajevo, Marsala Tita Street, 7A.

25     Do you remember if this was, indeed, the correct address of the head

Page 6391

 1     office of the SDA in Sarajevo?

 2        A.   Yes, that was precisely their address.

 3        Q.   The document shows that the SDA recommended that certain

 4     candidates be admitted to the centre in the Republic of Croatia.

 5     Reference is made to some sort of a mutual agreement.  What is crucial,

 6     however, is that the Party of Democratic Action, as a political party,

 7     should be sending their members to such a training course for reserve

 8     policemen; whilst, at the same time, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there existed

 9     a school where policeman could undergo training.  Is that right?

10        A.   That's right.  This is the best illustration of such unlawful

11     conduct.  Any state, if it wants to state that it's ruled by law, then it

12     cannot have this sort of cooperation with a neighbouring state, in this

13     case, the Republic of Croatia, whilst bypassing the regular procedure.

14     It is out of the ordinary and unlawful that one should organise training

15     in this way.  But this reflects the situation in which we had to operate.

16     And it sounds somehow comical that I should even call it a state.  It's a

17     caricature of a state.

18        Q.   Do you know that these candidates who were sent to attend

19     training in the Republic of Croatia also took part in the armed

20     activities of the Croatian MUP and the ZNG against the JNA and Serbs in

21     Croatia?  Were you familiar with that?

22        A.   Well, quite clearly, in order for such agreement to exist as is

23     referred to herein, there would first would have to exist an agreement

24     between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25     Again, in this instances, as well as in other situations, the Serbs were

Page 6392

 1     bypassed.  They should have, at the very least, been informed about it,

 2     and, of course, under the existing rules and regulations, they should

 3     have been consulted.  What was happening here was the cooperation between

 4     the political leadership in Croatia and the leaderships of the HDZ and

 5     SDA in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6             This goes to show that the SDA party was using this channel to

 7     create an armed force of its own.  This was a way for it to create its

 8     own army, through the Ministry of the Interior, which later proved to be

 9     true.

10             Suffice it to say, that the very way in which they obtained the

11     candidates is telling.  They used the records in the possession of the

12     Ministry of Defence where qualities of these candidates were listed for

13     specific military disciplines.  Sefer Halilovic prepared a military

14     concept for the creation of an armed force, and it was following that

15     particular concept that these candidates were sent to the

16     Republic of Croatia for training.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Let me now show you another document by the SDA --

18             MS. KORNER:  I don't believe there was an answer to the question

19     that was asked by Defence counsel.  Namely, whether the candidates who

20     were sent to attend the training in the Republic of Croatia also took

21     part in the armed activities of the Croatian MUP and the ZNG against the

22     JNA and Serbs.

23             There was no answer to that question, at all.

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much, Ms. Korner.

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Would you kindly answer this question?  Yes,

Page 6393

 1     Ms. Korner is right.  Your response was quite long so I even missed it.

 2        A.   Well, I think this is something that was happening in a different

 3     state.  I don't know for what sort of purposes they used them over there.

 4     It was a bit difficult for us to know, so I'm unable to answer that

 5     question correctly.

 6        Q.   All right.  Very well.  Thank you.

 7             I would now like to show you document 1D00-4681.  This is a

 8     document by the SDA of the 8th of July, 1991, and it bears the heading:

 9     The List of Candidates for the Training of Special Forces in the MUP of

10     the Republic of Croatia.

11             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I have the information, but I'm not

12     sure whether this is P424 in this case file, MFI.

13             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I didn't say this last time, but I'm

14     going say it this time.  Before we go any further with these documents,

15     two things:  Firstly, has the witness ever seen it before?  Second,

16     please may I be told where exactly these documents come from.

17             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, first of all, I have

18     to show the document to the witness in order to be able to put questions

19     to him.  Secondly, on the 2nd of February of this year, in relation to a

20     piece of correspondence by Ms. Korner, I informed Ms. Korner in writing

21     about the sources of all the documents of Mr. Stanisic's Defence.  I

22     listed six sources from where all the documents that we have and that we

23     are presenting in the proceedings are from.  I can list those documents

24     again.  And this specific document came from the MUP of Republika Srpska,

25     from the team for the investigation of war crimes from Banja Luka.  I

Page 6394

 1     don't know if this is sufficient.

 2             I was hoping that this document and my letter of the

 3     2nd of February would be sufficient so that we would have no more need to

 4     go into the sources of the documents and discuss that particular matter.

 5             MS. KORNER:  Can I explain?

 6             It is absolutely right.  Your Honour will recall I raised this

 7     before in respect of some of these documents.

 8             One of the documents in particular, which was presented by

 9     Mr. Cvijetic, apparently came from a web site maintained by an accused in

10     this Tribunal, namely -- I've forgotten what his name is now.

11             MR. ZECEVIC:  General Praljak.

12             MS. KORNER:  Thank you very much.

13             Without any attribution whatsoever as to where these documents

14     actually come from.  That's my concern.  It's no good, as I say, simply

15     saying, Our documents come from these six sources.

16             There will be an objection to any document which comes off a web

17     site for which there is no attribution to where these documents come

18     from, and particularly a web site maintained by an accused in this

19     Tribunal.

20             Secondly, my concern is this:  Not the general sources, but where

21     each individual document about which we raise a query comes from.  And

22     I've now had a response in relation to this one.  I have nothing further

23     to say.

24             Do I take it the previous document that you showed this witness

25     is also from the MUP?

Page 6395

 1             MR. ZECEVIC:  That is correct.  And it has already been exhibited

 2     in this case.

 3             MS. KORNER:  No.

 4             MR. ZECEVIC:  Without the objection from you.  Yes, the previous

 5     document is 1D123, and it has been exhibited already.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Well, I'm --

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  Without any objection from the Office of the

 8     Prosecutor.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  Well, I think we may be taking some -- more

10     interest into where these documents emanate from.  However, the point

11     still is, is has this witness - and I appreciate until he has seen it, he

12     can't give the answer - but has he actually seen this document before?

13     He wasn't asked in the previous case whether he had seen that document

14     before.  In the previous -- the previous document.

15             JUDGE HALL:  So in answer to both of the issues that you raise

16     Ms. Korner, each item will be dealt with it as it arises on an

17     item-by-item basis.

18             MS. KORNER:  Yes, I agree.  And, Your Honour, at the moment, I'm

19     still waiting to hear whether the witness saw the previous document he

20     was shown -- had seen before, I'm sorry.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm not exhibiting this -- this particular -- this

22     previous document I'm not exhibiting with this witness because it's

23     already exhibited by another witness.  Therefore, I don't see any reason

24     why should I ask the witness if he has seen the particular document?

25             The witness knows about the fact that the SDA was sending

Page 6396

 1     candidates to -- to -- to -- MUP of Croatia for -- for the training.

 2     That is all that I wanted to elicit from the witness on that particular

 3     document.

 4             MS. KORNER:  Well, in that case, what is the point of showing him

 5     a document without asking him whether he has seen it?  You're inviting

 6     him to comment.  You could have asked the question, with the greatest of

 7     respect, without showing a document whether -- which he, may I say, I

 8     should be very surprised if he has seen before.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Let's move on.

10             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, you have a document in front of you.  It's a list of

12     the candidates for training as special forces in the Republic of the

13     Croatia MUP of the 8th of July, 1991.

14             You've looked at the document.  First, can you please tell me

15     whether you had the opportunity to see this document before?

16        A.   This one specifically, no.  But I did see a similar document on

17     the same topic, which we even published in a piece of information

18     material, in English, which we drafted in 1992, in Belgrade, with the

19     Jugo Istok, South East agency.  There is a copy done on the -- or an

20     issue done on the topic of media manipulation; I gave that to the

21     representatives of the OTP.  Unfortunately, I didn't have copies of that

22     publication with the documents that were included in that.  The

23     publication is called "The Chronicles of Anticipated Death," and they

24     were sent to -- this issue was sent to many addresses in the course of

25     1992.

Page 6397

 1        Q.   When you say you gave that publication to the OTP, can you tell

 2     me, when did you give it to them?

 3        A.   I didn't give them that one.  We did three different publication

 4     in that period on different topics.  One was on military, political, and

 5     media preparation, and, in that context, the first publication published

 6     a document on this same topic.  The second publication, which I did give

 7     to the Prosecution, had to do with the media manipulation coming from the

 8     west, and it documents exactly the facts which were deliberately

 9     manipulated for purposes of media manipulation, in that publication.

10        Q.   When you say it's a similar document, do you think that it's a

11     similar document by format, or does it also refer to the same topic or

12     that it is a list of candidates for training in special forces in special

13     forces in the Republic of Croatia of the MUP, that document?

14        A.   Yes, that document which we put in that publication does also

15     deal with the same topic of sending special forces for training to

16     Croatia.

17        Q.   Can you look at the last page of this document, please.

18             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] That is page 14, I think, in the

19     e-court.  Actually, it's 14 in the Serbian and perhaps already page 2 in

20     the English.  Because it's just a question of names.  Yes, exactly.

21        Q.   You can see that this document which lists a total of 463 persons

22     of Muslim ethnicity is signed by Rasim Muharemovic from the SDA Sarajevo.

23     There is a signature and a stamp.  Do you know who Rasim Muharemovic was?

24        A.   That was a person who was in charge of security issues in the SDA

25     party.

Page 6398

 1        Q.   So this gentleman, Muharemovic, was, let's say, the chief of

 2     security of the Party of Democratic Action?

 3        A.   Not security in the sense that he is doing protection work, but

 4     he is organising security within the party.

 5        Q.   Since you had the opportunity now to look at this document, can

 6     you please tell me whether, by its contents, it's similar to the document

 7     which you included in that publication or not?

 8        A.   Yes, it's a similar document.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

11     document as an MFI document.

12             MS. KORNER:  It already is ... [Microphone not activated]

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  But, Your Honours, I'm -- I was just -- it's P424.

14     So then the Prosecution actually tendered this document?

15             MS. KORNER:  No, no, you did.  [Microphone not activated]

16             MR. ZECEVIC:  But it's P424.

17             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated]

18             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, I'm really confused.  It's P424 then it

19     was tendered by the Prosecution and now Ms. Korner is -- is objecting for

20     me using this document.  I'm not -- I'm really -- I'm really confused.

21             JUDGE HALL:  I thought her objection was of a general nature, not

22     to this specific document.

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  Can we have it then, if there is no objection, can

24     we have it exhibited without the MFI?

25             MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... been a mistake.  It

Page 6399

 1     was put to --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 3             MS. KORNER:  I -- there seems -- I think there has been a mistake

 4     in the tendering -- I -- because I recall Mr. Draganovic was asked by the

 5     Defence about this.  They asked for it to be -- it's not on our document

 6     list.  You can tell.  It's a Defence document.  It couldn't have been put

 7     in by us.  So there must be a mistake in the numbering.

 8             MR. ZECEVIC:  Okay.  I accept, and I will not lose any more time.

 9             MS. KORNER:  And, indeed, I think it was marked for

10     identification because we raised the self-same objection to it at the

11     time it was sought to put it in, through Mr. Draganovic.

12             MR. ZECEVIC:  P424, MFI.

13                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

14             JUDGE HALL:  It appears that the document was, in fact, tendered

15     by Mr. Zecevic.  And it has somehow been incorrectly indicated as a

16     Prosecution document.

17             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes.  I'm -- I'm -- I was reminded, just for the

18     sake of -- of clarity on this, I was reminded by my colleague

19     Mr. Cvijetic that the document was MFI'd not because there was an

20     objection by the Prosecution when the document was offered to be

21     tendered, but because the witness said that it -- it -- it is a forgery

22     because the address of the SDA was not -- was not correct.

23             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated]

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yeah, okay.  Okay.

25             Well, now that the address, I believe is -- is -- is resolved,

Page 6400

 1     maybe we can re-address the issue again.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE HALL:  So the document being tendered is now admitted and

 4     marked as an exhibit.

 5             MS. KORNER:  No.  I'm so sorry -- [Microphone not activated]

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

 7             MS. KORNER:  I maintain the objection.  [Microphone not

 8     activated]

 9             This witness has never seen the document before.  He says he has

10     seen similar documents.  I'm maintaining the objection.  And particularly

11     in the light of the evidence of Mr. -- I'm asking that a witness be

12     called to give the provenance of this document.

13             JUDGE HALL:  Actually, Ms. Korner, I confess.  I had forgotten

14     the answer this witness gave earlier that he had not seen this particular

15     document --

16             MS. KORNER:  Yes.

17             JUDGE HALL: -- he had seen similar documents.  I was acting on

18     the correct -- on the acceptance of the address, which is just one --

19             MS. KORNER:  Yes.

20             JUDGE HALL: -- which is a different -- related by different -- a

21     different issue.

22             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, I'm -- I'm saying that I'm going to

23     object to the admission of these documents until I hear from a witness

24     about where these documents come from.

25                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

Page 6401

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE HALL:  The Chamber recalls its earlier order -- order --

 3     that this may be exhibited, and it must remain as an MFI document marked

 4     for identification for the time being.  Because, as Ms. Korner has

 5     correctly reminded us, this witness, although he accepts the correctness

 6     of the address, has never seen the document.

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  I understand, Your Honours.  I was just -- just

 8     notified by -- by my assistants that it was actually Mr. Di Fazio, who

 9     asked the document to be MFI'd.

10             JUDGE HALL:  We were reminded of that as well.

11             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

12             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  Let's not get this

13     confused.  It was a mistake to list it as Defence [sic] document.  We

14     weren't asking for it to be admitted; we were asking for it to be marked

15     so if we wanted to go back to it, we knew what it was.  It's still a --

16     it's still a Defence document.  It's should have never been marked an as

17     a Prosecution document.  And that's where the confusion has arisen.

18             JUDGE HALL:  It remains marked for identification at this time.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  I understand, Your Honours.  I would just -- I

20     would just like to clarify one thing.  Maybe it's not the proper time

21     now, but we will have to readdress that, because my understanding of

22     Ms. Korner is that she will object to all the documents, admission of the

23     documents by the Defence until she hears from the witness about where

24     these documents come from.

25             If there is -- if that is the standard, Your Honour, then the

Page 6402

 1     Defence will do the same.  And I don't think it will bring us to anything

 2     reasonable, considering the -- the due process of law and the -- and the

 3     normal -- normal procedure in this courtroom.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  But, Mr. Zecevic, the -- the so stated, in terms of

 5     the -- Ms. Korner's position, that isn't remarkable, is it?  We always

 6     have to be satisfied as to the provenance of exhibits so that the --

 7     there's no way -- there is no general anticipatory order that that --

 8     that can be made, even with the understanding of counsel.  We have to

 9     deal with these on an item-by-item basis, as I said earlier.

10             So we'll see.

11             MR. ZECEVIC:  I agree, Your Honours, but I was just -- just

12     surprised by the comment.

13             MS. KORNER:  I wanted to -- I want to make my position absolutely

14     clear.

15             MR. ZECEVIC:  May I continue, please.

16             MS. KORNER:  All right.  I just want to make this very clear.

17     There are certain classes of documents such as those that are taken off a

18     web site from an accused that will be an automatic objection.  Other

19     documents, as Your Honours say, we will deal with -- on a case-by-case

20     basis.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  But I have stated that this is not the document --

22     these are not the documents which come from the web site.

23             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated]

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  And even if they come from the web site, this is a

25     public domain.  The Internet is a public domain, Ms. Korner, and

Page 6403

 1     therefore --

 2             JUDGE HALL:  It doesn't necessarily follow, with respect,

 3     Mr. Zecevic, that because the internet is in a public domain that a

 4     document would migrate into the court, if that's the only source.

 5             But let's see what happens as we go.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours, I understand.

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Vlaski, I apologise for the fact that we are

 8     losing time.  Can we look at 1D124.  It's a document of the Ministry of

 9     Interior of the Republic of Croatia training centre, the

10     31st of July, 1991 is the date.  Subject:  Attendees of the training

11     course and instructions for those who have left the training course.

12             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D124.

13        Q.   Have you ever seen the document before or such a document before?

14        A.   No.  I haven't had the opportunity of seeing this sort of

15     document.

16        Q.   Very well.

17             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can the document be -- can the

18     witness be shown 1D00-4704, which is the document dated the

19     8th of August, 1991.

20        Q.   It was also issued about the MUP of Croatia and lists the

21     attendees of the sixth course for individuals training to be policemen.

22     Page 1 is related to the 1st Battalion, which -- the members of which are

23     listed in the alphabetical order.

24             Do you -- can you see the document?

25        A.   Yes, I can.

Page 6404

 1        Q.   Have you ever seen this document before?

 2        A.   No, not this particular one.  But, as I said earlier, I did see

 3     the lists that were sent to Croatia, whereas this particular document was

 4     issued in Croatia, and we can't see who it was sent to, but I haven't

 5     seen it before.

 6        Q.   Very well.  Tell me, Mr. Vlaski, these young Muslims who

 7     attended -- or who went to the MUP of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 8     you do know that on their return to the BH they largely joined the

 9     reserve force of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10        A.   Yes.  It's correct that the SDA leadership, through the MUP

11     reserve force, built up its own armed force which was supposed to acquire

12     legitimacy by virtue of the fact that it was part of an institution

13     which, by its very definition, was an armed forces.  And this was a

14     method, the simplest way of creating a powerful armed force through the

15     police reserve force.

16        Q.   You must be aware of the fact that the Ministry of the Interior

17     of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was illegally arming the

18     Party of Democratic Action?

19        A.   We had information to that effect, and this was more or less

20     known to the public at large, which channels were used for arming.

21        Q.   I have a certain number of receipts here, reflecting the

22     hand-over of weapons and equipment.  This is 1D00-6944.  The receipts are

23     mostly -- refer to the months of February and March 1992, and they

24     reflect the hand-over of weapons and equipment.

25             Have you ever seen these documents before?

Page 6405

 1        A.   Since we had Serb individuals as members of the MUP who worked in

 2     certain organisational units which had to do with financial records of

 3     the MUP, we received a great deal of information from these individuals,

 4     both about the hand-over of weapons and the invoices that were paid in

 5     Croatia, Slovenia, and in other countries through certain banks.  And

 6     behind all of it was Minister Delimustafic, Bruno Stoic, who was the

 7     assistant minister and head of finances in MUP.  Based on the information

 8     thus obtained, we launched information to the media - some of the

 9     information was published in the Belgrade media which was not that widely

10     read in Bosnia-Herzegovina - but they were known to the public at large.

11             Now, as for these receipts, specifically, we had a fair amount of

12     information about them because our colleagues who were employed on these

13     posts, in warehouses, and in certain departments were aware of these

14     activities.  They even knew of the vehicles used to transport the goods,

15     though I can't tell you exactly where the documentation based on which we

16     were aware of these activities ended up, what became of it.

17        Q.   Thank you very much.

18             MS. KORNER:  Yes, well, he still hasn't answered the question.

19     Can we have an answer, please.

20             Has he ever seen the receipts before was your question.  We then

21     got this speech which doesn't answer the question.

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  It was my understanding that he hasn't seen them,

23     and that is why I didn't offer it for --

24             But I can ask the question.

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Did you see the receipts that I've just shown

Page 6406

 1     you ever before?  Have you ever seen them before?

 2        A.   I can't recall specific documents.  It would really be too much

 3     of an expectation to expect me to remember receipt numbers so-and-so.  I

 4     was aware of some of them; I did see some of them.  But receipt

 5     number 115, well, almost 20 years later, I can hardly be expected to

 6     remember this.

 7        Q.   Well, that was my understanding of your answer, but since my

 8     learned friend insisted that I repeat the question --

 9        A.   Had I worked in a warehouse where such receipts were issued, I

10     would probably recall them.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Vlaski.

12             It was because of the nature of your work that you were informed

13     of the secret meeting of the SDA in the police hall which was held on the

14     26th of May, 1991.  Is that right?

15        A.   Yes.  Because, at the time, I was the chief of the administration

16     for the security of individuals, and these individuals included

17     Mr. Izetbegovic, who participated in the meeting.

18        Q.   At the meeting, a decision was taken, among others, on the

19     setting up of the National Defence Council of the party.  Is that right?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   At the meeting held on 26th May, 1991, a decision was taken on

22     the establishment of the Green Berets and the Patriotic League, as

23     paramilitary formations, and on their arming.  Is that right?

24        A.   It was not taken in that particular format, but a political

25     decision was made to take that general course.  These organisations or

Page 6407

 1     formations were not publicly announced at such meetings, not to everyone.

 2        Q.   The Council for National Defence of the SDA - and we saw, a

 3     moment ago, the name Muharemovic, who was the chief of security of the

 4     SDA and who authored certain documents - was in fact part of the plan for

 5     an armed conflict with a view to separating Bosnia-Herzegovina from

 6     Yugoslavia?

 7        A.   The SDA political leadership did not accept the constitution of

 8     the BH in the way in which it was laid down.  For any decision of this

 9     sort, whereby certain formations which were not provided for by the

10     constitution were set up, since, under the BH constitution, only the JNA

11     was envisaged and the MUP was envisaged as an armed force as well,

12     however, it was under the wing of the party that certain preparations

13     were made for one such activity to be legitimised, whilst taking control

14     of all the leverages of power.

15        Q.   Under the existing rules and regulations, this was an illegal

16     armed rebellion to all intents and purposes?

17        A.   I would not call it an illegal rebellion; I would call it illegal

18     preparations.  Mr. Izetbegovic was a lawfully elected state official

19     because he was the elected member of the Presidency as a representative

20     of the Bosnian people.  So as -- having such a role, he, however, acted

21     as an illegal structure in the Presidency because he was involved in

22     unlawful activities aimed at setting up illegal paramilitary formations.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can I show you 1D00-4743 now, which is a SDA

24     document, signed by Mr. Hasan Cengic.  It bears the date of the

25     13th June 1991.

Page 6408

 1             The document says that -- or notifies the fact that the Council

 2     for National Defence was set up.  Now officially established as you

 3     confirmed to us.  This was discussed on the 26th of May.

 4        A.   Yes, it was on that date that a political decision was taken to

 5     set up that formation.  It was on that -- at that SDA meeting that a

 6     political decision was taken as to what needed to be done.  Because the

 7     meeting was attended by representatives of the SDA not only of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina but also of Sandzak, Kosovo, Croatia, Vienna; there

 9     were also some foreign emissaries there whose identity we were unable to

10     uncover.  It was too difficult a task.

11        Q.   In other words, a political decision to set up the Council for

12     National Defence was taken on the 26th of May.  And as we can see from

13     this document, on the 11th of June, the decision was -- the political

14     decision, that is, was implemented.  Is that right?

15        A.   This is the logical sequence from a political decision to the

16     operational implementation of the decision.  At that time, in the month

17     of June, no elements existed for such an activity to be undertaken.  In

18     other words, there was a plan behind all of this.  And what the goal of

19     the plan was became clear afterwards.

20             If I may add another thing:  In order to implement this decision

21     already in the month of June, illegal organisations such as

22     "Slobodna Bosna" was set up, which was led by Zjakic from Stari Grad

23     municipality, and Patriotic League which was coordinated by

24     Sefer Halilovic, as an active JNA officer.

25        Q.   Tell me, sir, have you ever seen the document before?

Page 6409

 1        A.   Not this one, no.  But it was a -- a matter that was of common

 2     knowledge at the time.  It was a public matter in the public domain.  It

 3     had already been published by the newspapers at the time.

 4             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can this document please be

 5     exhibited, unless there are objections from the Prosecution.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Yes, there are.  Can I firstly be told where this

 7     comes from.  Secondly it says:

 8             "On that occasion, a declaration was adopted.  And we attach it

 9     herewith."

10             Can we have the declaration, please.

11             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] The document comes from the same

12     source as the previous one, namely, the MUP of the Republika Srpska, team

13     for investigations into war crimes of Banja Luka.  We don't have that

14     declaration which is one of the documents that were appended to this

15     document.

16             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, I -- again, it is not a document he has

17     seen.  It's a part document.  We haven't got the other part.  The

18     relevance is obviously what the declaration is.  I'm afraid we object.

19             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, to me, the fact that

20     this document confirms that on Monday, 11th of June, the Council for

21     National Defence of the SDA was set up illustrates its relevance, nothing

22     else.  A declaration about this is ...

23             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, the suggestion which is being made and

24     accepted with alacrity put by the witness is that this was part and

25     parcel of some kind of plan to do something.  I'm not quite clear what.

Page 6410

 1     But, therefore, it seems to me that it's important that we see the whole

 2     document for what it is.  In any event, as I have already said, this

 3     document is not admissible through this witness because he has never seen

 4     it before.

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Which seems to be the sort answer to your

 6     application, Mr. Zecevic.  The -- I suppose it could be marked for

 7     identification at this stage, but I will not accept it through this

 8     witness.

 9             MR. ZECEVIC:  I appreciate that, Your Honours.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1D180 marked for identification, Your

11     Honours.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13                           [Defence counsel confer]

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  May I continue, Your Honours?

15             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, please.

16             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

17        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Vlaski, you are aware that those who were

18     defending in the war or those whose wartime service was recognised as of

19     the 18th of September, 1991; are you aware of that?

20        A.   Yes.  This was published in the "Official Gazette" of the

21     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I don't know the exact date.  And I

22     don't recall.  But, anyway, the authorities at that time issued this

23     information on the -- in the "Official Gazette."

24        Q.   I'm now going to show you that document.  This is 1D03-1032.

25             We still don't have a translation of this document.  These are

Page 6411

 1     just two articles that are relevant.

 2             So I suggest that we just comment on them with the witness,

 3     because I assume that he referred to or meant that that was this

 4     document, when he said that it was published in the "Official Gazette."

 5             This is the law of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 6     government for 2004, with the subheading the Law on the Rights of

 7     Defenders and members of their families.

 8             In Article 1, regulates the conditions, the manner, and the

 9     procedure in order to achieve the rights for war.  Disabled veterans,

10     members of their families, the members of Sehid [phoen] families, members

11     of the families of those killed, who died, or are missing.  The families

12     of those killed, died, the missing defenders and demobilised defenders,

13     persons that are responsible and awarded merits for their work in the

14     defenders and liberation war, as well as other questions from the

15     protection of defenders and wounded war veterans.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  The counsel is asked to repeat a part of his

17     question.

18             MR. ZECEVIC: [No interpretation]

19        Q.   [Interpretation] My question was as follows:  Did you have this

20     regulation in mind that I just read to you when you said that you read,

21     in the "Official Gazette," this information that the term served in the

22     war is being recognised as of the 18th of September, 1991?

23        A.   Yes, that was published.  That date was published in the

24     "Official Gazette" that I saw, and I see the same date in this law.

25             I really didn't have any need to monitor the legislature of

Page 6412

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 because the facts that relate to this period

 2     are familiar from "Official Gazettes" published before, precisely for

 3     reasons that included in that law were also persons who represented the

 4     organisation of the Green Berets which was mostly formed from criminals,

 5     from Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   You can see here, in Article 2, that defenders are considered to

 7     be members of the army, the Croatian Defence Council, and the police or

 8     the authorised organs of internal affairs who participated in the defence

 9     of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the 18th of December [as interpreted], 1991.

10     And then, at the end of that paragraph, it says, As well as persons who

11     participated in the preparation for defence and in the defence of Bosnia

12     and Herzegovina in the period before the 18th of September, 1991, and who

13     were engaged by the authorised organs.

14             When it says here that that also refers to persons who were

15     engaged in the period before the 18th of September, does that actually

16     refer to the categories of persons that you mentioned before?

17             Can you please also wait before you begin answering.

18        A.   Yes, that particular "Official Gazette" that I mentioned,

19     provided for the possibility of these categories of persons be covered

20     and have that status before the 18th of September.  These are these

21     categories of illegal formations which were formed as of June or

22     practically May and which already did go through preparations and

23     internal organisation and which already had their names and weaponry.

24     And they were the ones who implemented these actions, which were planned

25     at the political level and carried out at the operational level by these

Page 6413

 1     particular formations.  This was probably a consequence of some ... one

 2     of the consequences of that was the killing of the wedding guest in

 3     Bascarsija.

 4             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, if there are no objections, I

 5     would like to tender this document to be admitted and marked for

 6     identification.

 7             JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Zecevic?

 8             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, it wasn't anticipated before, but definitely,

 9     if our friends from the Prosecution side will -- will accept that, we

10     will -- we will have it as a part of the law library, yes.

11             MS. KORNER:  All very sudden.  We got it today without a

12     translation.  We have never seen it before.  I don't know -- that's

13     clearly not the Gazette either.  So where is the Gazette?

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, we downloaded this from the web site

15     of the -- of the -- of the Government of Federation of

16     Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is why it is not in a proper form as a

17     Gazette.  But this is it the law.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Inasmuch as it is accepted that this is the law -

19     and I don't know that there's going to be any dispute as to its

20     authenticity - it is simply a mechanical matter of getting it translated,

21     which would happen eventually, I suppose.

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.  So can it be marked for

23     identification then?

24             JUDGE HALL:  We don't have to mark it either, do we?  Hadn't we

25     agreed that the library is a work in progress, and, at the end of

Page 6414

 1     exercise, counsel would jointly hand over -- lay over to the Chamber

 2     what -- what is in this basket that we call the law library?

 3             MR. ZECEVIC:  That is correct, Your Honours.  But this is

 4     something which just popped up like two days ago, and it wasn't -- it

 5     wasn't -- it wasn't a part of our understanding with -- with our friends

 6     from the -- from the -- from the -- from the Prosecution side.  And that

 7     is why I'm just raising this issue.  We are perfectly willing to add it

 8     to the law library, of course.

 9             MS. KORNER:  I'm not prepared to give an undertaking at this

10     stage without seeing further as to whether we are going to agree or not.

11             MR. ZECEVIC:  Okay, I will move on then.  Thank you very much.

12        Q.   [Interpretation], Mr. Vlaski --

13             JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  Oh, okay.  Thank you very much, Your Honours.

15                           [The witness stands down]

16                           --- Recess taken at 5.20 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.

18             JUDGE HALL:  While the witness is on his way in, Mr. Zecevic, it

19     has been brought to my attention during the break that inasmuch as this

20     last document, the Prosecution has reserved its position on that it may

21     or may not eventually make its way into the law library.  The safer

22     course would be to have it marked for identification so it doesn't

23     get -- it doesn't stray out there.

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you.  I appreciate it.

25             JUDGE HALL:  So it should be so marked.

Page 6415

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1D181, marked for identification,

 2     Your Honours.

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4             MR. ZECEVIC:  May I continue, Your Honour?

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, please, Mr. Zecevic.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] A moment ago we were looking at that piece of,

 8     legislation, and one of the crucial dates was the

 9     18th of September, 1991.

10             If you recall, can you tell me this:  Was this not the very same

11     date on which the police reserve force was mobilised, pursuant to an

12     order by Mr. Delimustafic back in 1991?

13        A.   Yes.  It has to do with this, as well as with what I said

14     earlier, that these paramilitary formations were granted the status of

15     legitimacy under these provisions, and this is by far more important to

16     me than what Delimustafic wrote.

17        Q.   But you will agree with me, won't you, that it was on or around

18     that date that the mobilisation of the reserve force of the police was

19     declared in BH, pursuant to an order by the then-minister of the interior

20     of the BH, Mr. Delimustafic?

21        A.   Yes, but this is a coincidence.

22        Q.   Right.  Let us sum up.  On 26th of May, 1991, a meeting was held

23     where a political decision was taken that the Council for National

24     Defence was to be set up.  Approximately, at the same time, the

25     Green Berets and the Patriotic League were established.  In the course of

Page 6416

 1     the summer, Muslim youths were sent for training to the MUP of the

 2     Republic of Croatia.  As they came back from training, they joined the

 3     reserve -- police force of the police, and that same force was mobilised

 4     sometime in mid-September 1991.

 5             Is the time-line more or less correct?

 6        A.   Yes.  But let me only add this:  That alongside this process, the

 7     arming process took place as well.  What were the financial sources?

 8     Well, some of it was from the budget and some of it was from the side --

 9     sidelines.

10        Q.   If my understanding of what you're saying is correct, in this

11     way, a respectable armed force was created, was it not?

12        A.   The indicators point to that precisely.  Because the option which

13     existed under the constitution that they should be part of the

14     Territorial Defence and the JNA was not utilised.  Rather, the third

15     option of creating a paramilitary force was chosen, and this had to be

16     legitimised through a political action and through the adoption of

17     relevant regulations by the authorities.

18        Q.   Throughout that time, you, in the Ministry of the Interior, were

19     confronted with numerous problems, such as the ones you related yesterday

20     and earlier today.

21             If I recall correctly, on the 9th of September, 1991, you came

22     out, or, rather, the leading staff of the Serb ethnicity came out with a

23     press release.  Do you recall that?

24        A.   Yes.  Because our struggle against the windmills was pointless.

25     We invested efforts in favour of professionalism and lawfulness and

Page 6417

 1     realised that it all came to nothing.  Our attempt, through the political

 2     structures - and who else could we have turned to but to the Serb people

 3     whom we were part of?  We could not seek international protection.  We

 4     could not expect any sort of fair or at least civilised approach by the

 5     Bosniak Muslim leadership of the MUP.  Thus, we were compelled, in a way,

 6     to let the public know about this.  We could only inform them about this,

 7     because we could not get any protection from them just as we couldn't get

 8     any protection from the SDS leadership.

 9             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please show you 1D116.  This

10     is the press release of the managerial staff of the MUP of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12        Q.   You can see the document now.  Is this the press release you

13     talked about a moment ago and confirmed its existence?

14        A.   Yes.  It's a press release issued by the managerial staff of Serb

15     ethnicity of the MUP of BH.

16        Q.   And in this press release you pin-pointed some of the most

17     typical cases, including yours, where you were not appointed to the post

18     which you should have been given or which the SDS should have given based

19     on the inter-party agreement.  Is that right?

20        A.   Yes, my case was among the cases that prompted the issuing of

21     this press release.  And there were some others which were even more

22     drastic.

23        Q.   When you say "more drastic," what exactly are you referring to?

24        A.   I'm referring to unlawful conduct, which became the standard

25     practice of a state institution and instead should have been punished.

Page 6418

 1     No control could be enforced, because the key positions of control were

 2     usurped by the very same individuals who took over the legislative,

 3     executive, and judicial functions all at once.  I mentioned the case of

 4     Mr. Zijo Kadic, who was the chief of a centre, member of the parliament,

 5     and a presiding -- or the chief of the State Security Service of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  How can a member of the Serb people expect such an

 7     individual to take any measure or initiative against the practices that

 8     became very prominent?  It was quite clear that there was no political

 9     will to do that.  Not only that, but there was another ulterior motive

10     which dictated precisely what -- that what was done should be done in the

11     way it was done.

12        Q.   P902 was shown to you yesterday.  This is an intercept involving

13     Mr. Zepinic and Mr. Karadzic, and I think it bears the date of the

14     16th of September.  They're having a conversation about the problem which

15     arose concerning your appointment.  Do you recall that?  That's P902.

16        A.   Yes, I do recall that.

17        Q.   Yesterday, when my learned friend was showing you --

18             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 4 of P902.

19     And that's page 4 both in the Serbian and English versions.  Page 4 in

20     e-court.

21        Q.   Can you see the document?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   At the bottom of the page, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic says - and in

24     English, it's in the middle of the page.  He says:

25             "If Avdo Hebib and Hilmo would remain here, I will not.  To be

Page 6419

 1     clear, I will not go there.  I will form a separate ministry."

 2             If my understanding is correct, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic tells

 3     Mr. Karadzic that because it is impossible to honour the agreement, he

 4     would, as the last resort, form a separate ministry.  Is that right?

 5        A.   Yes.  The date is the 16th of September, and these events

 6     happened in that very period.

 7             Throughout the year, the nine months were characterised by the

 8     very policies that I explained.  It was a time-limit within which all the

 9     vital functions should have been made operational and not just for

10     national security but for these institutions to become operational.  But

11     this deliberate obstruction, which completely bypassed the political

12     rules, colleagues, and institutions, led us to a situation where

13     Mr. Vitomir Zepinic, a top notch intellectual, who, to his misfortune,

14     did not have extensive experience with the police or with criminals - he

15     wasn't really skillful at discussing matters with criminals - well, this

16     proved to be his disadvantage, not an advantage.

17             It was a misfortune for us that we had to endure such relations.

18     Whatever the case, those who are in power, once they realise they have

19     power, they do what they will.  Those of us who did not have power, had

20     to do the little we could; and we could do basically nothing.  This

21     helplessness and desperation that led Vito into a situation where he said

22     that he would create a separate institution, such an intellectual who

23     advocated lawfulness in the face of individuals who only knew the tool of

24     force and -- and the language of force, had to resort to this.  I suppose

25     I would be able to tell you enough about these relations to fill a book

Page 6420

 1     of memoirs.  But the statement he made here best illustrates the edge to

 2     which we were pushed.

 3             On the other side, the political leadership did not have a

 4     political response to the situation.  They had been fighting for

 5     something for nine months and realised that they could not win the game.

 6     They realised that their coalition partners with whom they believed they

 7     had come to terms -- with -- about something, these three peoples could

 8     only co-exist on the principle, on principle of an agreement among the

 9     three peoples.  And the agreement was possible only through the mediation

10     of the international community, because there was no goodwill on the part

11     of these two peoples - and I'm referring basically to the political

12     leadership, not to the individuals themselves - they did not have a voice

13     that could be heard.  Unfortunately, individuals with a criminal past

14     took up certain positions thanks to certain conditions which prevailed in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They got a chance to do something.  And what they

16     did was the very worst.

17        Q.   I hope you will agree with me that one of the tactics which was

18     pervasive and particularly prominent in the Ministry of Interior was to

19     postpone and drag the resolution of certain issues that were raised by

20     the Serb side?

21        A.   Well, that was a part of the plan.  It was not -- it didn't

22     amount to postponing anything.  Mr. Izetbegovic, as he came out of

23     prison, already had an idea of how he was going set up a party and take

24     over power.  Clearly, the policy was to break up the existing state for

25     the preservation of which, unfortunately, representatives of the Serb

Page 6421

 1     people fought.  And this was confirmed by the plebescite which was aimed

 2     at preserving Yugoslavia, which was - and this is admitted by many

 3     now - tailored to fit everyone.  We were supposed to catch up with the

 4     progressive world.  And God knows when we will do it now, because we're

 5     still dealing with the same issues we were dealing with back in 1991 and

 6     1992.  And, for that reason, it was impossible to expect someone who

 7     already had a plan prepared -- well, the Serbs didn't have a plan.  They

 8     clearly made their political view loud and clear and that was that they

 9     wanted to preserve Yugoslavia.

10             Now, we were supposed to be given a role of a national minority,

11     and this is something that clearly transpires from one of the conclusions

12     of the Badinter Commission.  If this was an option that we were going to

13     be given, and if it was clear that Izetbegovic received political and

14     international support to organise a referendum in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina - which, by the way, was never verified by any of the

16     institutions - this particular act - which was organised in Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina without the participation of the Serb people, and this was

18     counter-constitutional - had never been verified by the BH organs.  And

19     by the letter of the law, it was counter-constitutional because the

20     legislation of the BH clearly envisaged a procedure for the verification

21     of the results.  Just as the results of the 1991 census in

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina had never been verified.

23             In other words, everything was a travesty in that state because

24     somebody wanted it to be that way.

25        Q.   When you say "plan," I assume that if we place the -- the events

Page 6422

 1     from September and the whole of 1991 into context, then a part of that

 2     would be the declaration on the independence of October, which was

 3     adopted by the Assembly in violation of the constitution, the rules of

 4     procedure, and other regulations.

 5        A.   This is just now the speeding up of the political process to buy

 6     some time so that things could be completed faster.  Along with the

 7     political aspect, all the other preparations were continuing to give us

 8     some kind of role that we could not accept.  Now, I'm talking about the

 9     people from my ethnic group because this is where my origin is.

10        Q.   You are aware that the European Union, in late 1991 and

11     early 1992, joined the plan to seek a peaceful solution for the situation

12     in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This plan was called the Cutileiro Plan and

13     envisaged a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities with

14     separate organs, which, at the time, was believed to be the only

15     reasonable and rational solution in order to resolve the situation in

16     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Do you recall that?

17        A.   I remember that very well.  Every event has left a thick mark on

18     my memory.  And such an event is something that I do remember very well.

19     Also because we saw it as a chance.  Finally someone did see that there

20     was a problem there that had to be resolved adequately and in a timely

21     fashion.

22             However, the plan and the assistance that came from the outside

23     was something that somebody did not need.  And after all of this, we can

24     see who did not need this.  The Serbs were willing to accept such a

25     solution.  The manner and the way in which this agreement would be

Page 6423

 1     reached was just a question of good will, how to implement that, but, of

 2     course -- I apologise.

 3        Q.   Is it not true that Mr. Izetbegovic also agreed to the plan after

 4     which he withdrew his signature or his agreement from the document?

 5        A.   This is a matter that is known.  Mr. Izetbegovic was never

 6     consistent in his policies.  His tactics was to be unpredictable and

 7     inconsistent, and it cost the other political structures a lot,

 8     particularly the Serb political structures.  If you believe the man, then

 9     that would, at the same time, be your punishment.

10        Q.   Perhaps he was consistent with his plan, as you said?

11        A.   Well, that he probably was.  But the way in which you need to

12     achieve a plan, you need to have different tactical manoeuvres and an

13     approach.  In order to implement this plan, he used all kinds of methods.

14        Q.   All right.  Yesterday you talked about my -- talked with my

15     learned friend about the meeting of the 11th of February, 1992, in

16     Banja Luka.  That was not a secret meeting, was it?

17        A.   No, it was in no way a secret meeting.  I can absolutely claim

18     that, that it was not a secret meeting of any type.

19        Q.   It's a fact that several of those who addressed the meeting

20     talked about the need to submit the conclusions to the then-minister,

21     Mr. Delimustafic, and to give deadlines in order to surmount certain

22     problems.  Isn't that right?

23        A.   Well, that was our approach; let's reach an agreement.  And we

24     did offer the possibility for an agreement.  However, trouble forced us

25     to assemble at this meeting.  Had there been any kind of plan, we would

Page 6424

 1     have managed to meet in this composition during a year or so that had

 2     gone by.  We would probably have sat down somewhere, organised ourselves,

 3     prepared ourselves.  We would have done something on some kind of

 4     political platform or would have had some other tasks to implement.

 5     Trouble forced us to meet on the 11th of February, 1991, for the first

 6     time.

 7             What does this mean, for the first time?  This means that we did

 8     not have -- other than these few colleagues on this list whom I knew

 9     personally, these were all the other people that I met for the first

10     time.  And this indicates the scale of our trouble, that we didn't even

11     have time to meet each other personally.  Whose fault is that?  It's the

12     fought of our leadership.  I, as the chief of the 5th Administration, was

13     prevented from moving around as an authorised official.  In order to

14     prevent me from moving around, Minister Delimustafic, actually the deputy

15     for -- or assistant for finances Bruno Stoic wrote an order stating that

16     no one can go more than 5 kilometres away in any official vehicle without

17     the permission of the minister.

18             So I was humiliated; I had to wait at the secretary of the

19     minister's office for her to write some kind of authorisation so that I

20     could go on a business trip.  While my colleagues, Muslims and Croats,

21     could travel distances of 300 or 500 kilometres and didn't have to

22     account for that to anyone.  And this is why we met for the first time.

23     And I regret that we met only then for the first time.  Had we been

24     meeting more or before, our response would probably have been more

25     effective, and we would have had probably the possibility of having some

Page 6425

 1     sort of influence on any situation.  But this is what -- how it all

 2     worked out.

 3             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] can we please show the witness

 4     1D135.

 5        Q.   My learned friend put questions to you yesterday about this

 6     meeting, and you did give your comments on that, so I don't want to go

 7     into that again.  But one of the things that was stated was the matter of

 8     the arming of the police reserve forces of Serb ethnicity.

 9             Isn't it a fact that, in 1991, the police reserves were mostly

10     replenished by Muslims.  They were mostly summoned into the reserves?

11        A.   Yes, correct.  Correct.  We, at the Ministry of the Interior,

12     had, as far as I know, about 10.000 members, uniformed policemen.  And

13     those who were just employees were not police officers.  And we also had

14     a certain number of reserve forces.  According to the list, which is

15     taken as the relevant criteria in 1991 - the ratio along the ethnic lines

16     in Bosnia-Herzegovina is known to everyone - so that structure was

17     supposed to correspond to the ethnic structure of those employed in all

18     the institutions.  So that structure was supposed to reflect the

19     constitution and the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in institutions

20     and some public enterprises as well.  It -- the situation with the

21     employees there was supposed to reflect the overall situation in

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23             For example, in western Herzegovina, the Bosniak -- the Croats

24     were in a -- in a majority.  Then, in some other places, had you Muslims,

25     Bosniaks, who were in a majority.  So that, perhaps -- situation was not

Page 6426

 1     reflected right there.  But precisely for that reason, at the level of

 2     the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs did constitute a majority.  And the

 3     prevalent opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina was that they were also a

 4     majority in that segment in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Nobody

 5     ever provided specific data about the ethnic structure of the cadres

 6     employed there.  That organisational unit was under the control of

 7     Mr. Hilmo Selimovic, who was mentioned as few times before, who came to

 8     the ministry from a post as the director of the brewery.

 9             So they were these authentic -- authentic people who were

10     interpreting these lists.  And you can imagine the objectivity that they

11     had when they provided their views on the protection of the

12     constitutional order and the actual state of affairs in the government.

13     That didn't even occur to them.  They could adjust the data the they

14     wanted to and put the stamps on that, and they were not obliged to report

15     about that to anyone.  They didn't have to report to anybody or be

16     responsible to any kind of political structure.

17             So, of course, this is all in the sphere of legend.  They

18     couldn't just sack people from the MUP for some frivolous reasons; I

19     mean, it was also a social question, not just a political question.  So

20     then they refrained from that sort of revenge, but they used all sorts of

21     more subtle methods of replenishing the staff.  And this is why they

22     thought up of this principle of the reserve composition through which

23     they were supposed to create an armed force, a legal armed force which

24     would be part of the ministry forces, which, if needed, could turn into a

25     military force, because those persons who were recruited were of

Page 6427

 1     specialties by establishment as drawn up by Sefer Halilovic, representing

 2     the Patriotic League, because he had military training.  And this is what

 3     they coordinated.  They had all had coordination at the SDA level, and

 4     the National Defence Council, together with cooperation from the HDZ,

 5     because they did need an alliance in relation to Serbia.  They needed an

 6     alliance with Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they were also settling

 7     their accounts through Bosnia and Herzegovina to the detriment of

 8     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9        Q.   I would like to ask you to be more concise because I think we

10     have lost track of the question here.

11             Was it not a fact that -- to a greet degree, Muslims were mostly

12     called to join the reserve forces of the MUP?

13        A.   Yes, that is correct.

14        Q.   Isn't it true that in those areas of the public security station

15     where the reserve forces had a Muslim minority -- majority, the MUP would

16     provide for material and equipment to precisely those places; is that

17     correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Isn't it true that in the same way, in the territories of the

20     public security stations, where the Serbs were in a majority in the

21     reserve forces, actually no weapons or materiel or equipment was sent by

22     the MUP?

23        A.   It's true that nothing was supplied, but there is another fact

24     which is even worse.

25        Q.   Go ahead.

Page 6428

 1        A.   There's another fact I am aware of.  Certain assets were

 2     deliberately taken out of the centres where the Serbs had at least some

 3     form of influence or clout.  This is particularly typical for state

 4     security, and this is the sector I'm most familiar with.

 5             When all the operative technology, which was by the order of

 6     Dautbasic, withdrawn from all the centres and stored in -- at one

 7     location in Sarajevo.  This made it impossible for all the people out in

 8     the field to work.  The official justification was that they wanted to

 9     prevent the equipment from being misused.  They stored all the technology

10     and the equipment in the head office and used it for their own purposes

11     as they saw fit, and we discussed that.

12        Q.   Yes, you discussed this yesterday.

13             Let me sum up.  On the one hand, the public security stations

14     where Serbs were in the majority, materiel and technical equipment,

15     including uniforms, were not supplied; whereas, on the other hand, what

16     little they did have was taken away from them and taken to the Sarajevo

17     head office.  Is that right?

18        A.   Yes.  From the available receipt documentation, you can see that

19     the equipment was taken, through unlawful means and methods, away; and

20     the individuals who were in charge of these facilities didn't have an

21     opportunity of using them anymore.

22        Q.   So some of the matters discussed at the meeting by

23     Mr. Andrija Bilosevic, among others, who complained about the fact that

24     did he not have any more weapons.  Then there was another individual who

25     said that they didn't have uniforms in sufficient numbers, et cetera,

Page 6429

 1     these were, indeed, matters which bothered the heads of public security

 2     stations and others who were represented at the meeting, and they did

 3     have an actual basis.

 4        A.   Yes, of course.  All these claims had a basis because they were

 5     based on the situations that prevailed in the various stations.  And

 6     there was a need to protect the population.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Let us, therefore, conclude.  The requests put forth

 8     at this meeting were not aimed at additional arming of policemen of Serb

 9     ethnicity.  This was merely a request for all the policemen, regardless

10     of their ethnicity, to be fully equipped, all those who worked within the

11     Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Is

12     that right?

13        A.   Absolutely.  The only logical explanation, and this is a fact, is

14     that this was the sole objective of these requests.

15        Q.   It is a fact as well that in the February of 1992, not only did

16     you, as members of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Serb ethnicity, see

17     no other way out of the situation then the formation of the

18     Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska.  You also enjoyed the

19     support of the European Union which had a plan of division of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina on the principle of the three entities.  Is that not

21     right?

22        A.   We merely followed a line of thinking, a policy, which wanted to

23     solve the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because neglecting or ignoring

24     the interests of one people would lead to an enormous difficulty for

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  You cannot run a concern policy whilst completely

Page 6430

 1     ignoring the interests of one people.  The international negotiations

 2     which took place and as far as the Lisbon Plan the Cutileiro Plan were

 3     concerned, they were headed in that same direction.  Later on, this plan

 4     was, in a modified version of it, brokered by the international community

 5     and these were the Dayton Accords.  That was the only possible political

 6     settlement.

 7             Now let me answer your question.  The MUP leadership consisting

 8     of individuals of Serb ethnicity didn't have any other choice because the

 9     political tendency was for certain regions of municipalities to be set up

10     through which authority would be established on a regional principle.

11     These were the well-known SAO Krajinas.  This was an option which was

12     offered, and this was offered in the discussions concerning the

13     constitutional amendments and the arrangement of the three peoples.

14     Neither the Bosniaks nor the Croats accepted this option because it did

15     not run in -- in their favour.

16        Q.   Very well.  Now, the last topic that I would like to discuss with

17     you, and this was also the last topic covered with you by Ms. Korner in

18     her direct examination, was the issue of the barricades as of the

19     1st of March, 1992.

20             You repeatedly stated that in your view this was a political

21     assassination.

22             Now, was not one of the reasons on which you base this position

23     of yours is the way in which the crime was committed?  The wedding guest

24     who was killed was killed in the yard of a church in Sarajevo in front of

25     the very eyes of the wedding party.

Page 6431

 1        A.   Well, that's the gravity of it all.  And that's the message it

 2     sent.  Had the circumstances not been such, the event would not have led

 3     to the subsequent events, if the incident itself didn't have such

 4     hallmarks.

 5             The murder of that wedding party guest was not committed because

 6     of the identity of the wedding guest -- party guest, but, rather, because

 7     of the Serb insignia, of the Serb flag.  And the message was that they

 8     shouldn't be there.  And then, by the same token, they shouldn't

 9     anywhere.  They were not desirable in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all.

10             Now, where would this lead us, the Serbs, as a collective and let

11     alone the individuals themselves?  So should an individual merely fall

12     flaunting a flag constitute a target for that very same reason?  Should

13     such a gesture have such drastic consequences?  Is this what should

14     befall a person who strikes a song or -- was this supposed to be the fate

15     of the Serb people?

16        Q.   And particularly the fact that the murder was committed at the

17     threshold of a church; is that right?

18        A.   Well, yes.  It has a wider dimension if we analyse it from the

19     political point of view.  The wedding could take place in a registrar's

20     office without any problems, but, in a church, Serbs, at Bascarsija,

21     should they really be there?  Well, the message that was sent was, You

22     came there this once, but that was your last time you were there.

23        Q.   Tell me, you confirmed that the perpetrator was identified and

24     arrested and subsequently released.  One of the eye-witnesses told us

25     that according to the information he had, the order came directly from --

Page 6432

 1             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, from where are you quoting? [Microphone not

 2     activated]

 3             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, I think the position of the Trial Chamber is

 4     that we are not allowed to -- to give the name of the witness.  We can

 5     cite the words of the witness without disclosing the name of the witness.

 6             MS. KORNER:  No, I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't agree with that.

 7             The rule is you cannot -- you can put propositions to this

 8     witness; they should not be preceded by the words "Somebody has told us

 9     this."

10             JUDGE HALL:  Rephrase the question, Mr. Zecevic.

11             MS. KORNER:  [Overlapping speakers] ... the proposition itself.

12             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do you have information that from interviewing the person

14     arrested, according to that, the information came directly from the

15     office of Mr. Izetbegovic?

16        A.   I don't have that particular knowledge, but all the facts, i.e.,

17     actions of the MUP officers involved, indicate that it was not done in a

18     professional manner.

19             The response of the persons authorised was not either

20     professional or in accordance with the law.  The individual should have

21     been firstly arrested, and, secondly, detained.

22             However, the person was hidden away.  Evidently he had the

23     protection of the police.  And the evidence from the crime site

24     disappeared.  Only 15 years later did the BH judiciary start -- initiate

25     a procedure against the suspect for the murder, but the trial was not

Page 6433

 1     completed because the various opposing factions were at logger heads

 2     surrounding this issue, and they liquidated the individual.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zecevic, I didn't hear the witness say that a

 4     perpetrator was arrested and subsequently released, and I didn't -- I

 5     can't see that in the answer he gave after you put that to him.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, it must -- it must be -- my mind is

 7     tricking me.  I feel I heard that he said that he was identified,

 8     arrested, and then released.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Can you -- can you ask him to clarify.

10             MR. ZECEVIC:  I understand, Your Honour.

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Tell me, sir, can you resolve this

12     misunderstanding?

13        A.   Yes, I am more familiar with this issue than you are.

14             This was the result of unprofessional conduct.  The role of the

15     authorised official is such that they first have to identify the

16     perpetrator.  And there was a policeman at the crime scene, and he was

17     supposed to arrest the individual.

18             However, the individual was hidden away and enjoyed protection.

19     So I'm not talking about any sort of arrest taking place.  The person who

20     was the participant in the event was protected.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  Was that enough explanation, or should I pursue?

22             JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated]

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Yesterday, during the direct examination, you

25     listed a number of individuals who were present in the Holiday Inn on the

Page 6434

 1     day you were there, including Mr. Stanisic.

 2             Mr. Stanisic claims that he was away in Mostar on official

 3     business on that day and that he returned to Sarajevo only late that

 4     evening.  Do you allow for the possibility that you may be mistaken, your

 5     memory might be playing tricks with you that he was in Sarajevo on that

 6     day?

 7        A.   Well, nobody asked me which period of time that was, or period of

 8     day.  I was there in the evening hours myself, and that was when we met.

 9        Q.   So that was late in the night?

10        A.   Yes, I was there late in the night.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.

13             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

14             Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

15             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, may I just mention that there's just

16     one small matter I want to raise just before we rise today.  It's purely

17     administrative, and it shouldn't take more than a minute.

18             JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] ... it is now 6.36.  If

19     you could --

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Sorry.  It's 6.36 now, according to the clock and

22     LiveNote.  If you could break at about 6.55 to allow Ms. Korner to deal

23     with that matter.

24             MR. KRGOVIC:  I will do that, Your Honour.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:

Page 6435

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Vlaski, good day.  I am Mr. Krgovic, and I'm

 2     representing Mr. Zupljanin.  I'm going to put several questions to you

 3     that have to do with your testimony today and yesterday.

 4             In response to my colleague, Mr. Zecevic's question, you

 5     mentioned certain operative techniques from certain centres where a

 6     certain influence was excerpted by Serbs at the centre in Sarajevo.  It's

 7     well known that the equipment used for wire-tapping was relocated from

 8     Banja Luka and transferred to the Sarajevo centre.

 9        A.   Not only from Banja Luka.  It was a decision to pull that out of

10     all the centres.  That was it.  It was not something that was done

11     selectively.  It was a general decision on the relocation of all the

12     equipment to the centre, where control would be taken over by the line

13     along the vertical subordination structure, under the control of these

14     structures, from the ranks of the Muslim and Croatian people.

15        Q.   And this meeting on the 11th of February in Banja Luka, the

16     opening by the host, Mr. Stojan Zupljanin, when he spoke about the

17     security and the materiel and financial situation, he also referred to

18     this about these matters, which in the circumstances, making the work of

19     the SUP more difficult.  Is that correct?

20        A.   Well, this was a problem -- it was a general problem where some

21     people were more affected by it and some less.  It just varied in the

22     details.  It depended on the size, the security requirements, the

23     security threat assessment.  So these problems were in some places more

24     pronounced and some places less pronounced.

25             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D135, please.

Page 6436

 1        Q.   This is the document of the minutes that you already had.  So can

 2     you please look at page 4 in the Serbian version, and that is the place

 3     where Mr. Vlado Tutus from the Banja Luka centre --

 4             Did you know Mr. Tutus?

 5        A.   Yes, did.

 6        Q.   And he says there that, precisely for the reasons that you are

 7     talking about, says that the people from Bosanska Krajina have lost their

 8     trust in the MUP; the CSB in Banja Luka does not have a single

 9     all-terrain vehicle.  And that problem did exist because people in the

10     municipal and regional centres felt abandoned and believed that the

11     Serbian cadres in the MUP had to do much more than they were objectively

12     able to.  Is that correct?

13        A.   Yes.  It was an assembly of the desperate, not MUP leadership.

14     Our cry was away of reacting.  Mr. Tutus, probably as a policeman of many

15     years standing in a town such as Banja Luka, had enough information about

16     the mood of the people.  And it was normal that those people would convey

17     their dissatisfaction.  And it was also normal that he, as an authorised

18     person in charge of the security in a town, if he had nothing to defend

19     it with and to carry out his regular duties -- I mean, we can see that he

20     didn't have the adequate vehicles.

21             Well, how can we talk about any kind of work?  Were we supposed

22     to get horses like we did in World War II to be able to go from one place

23     to another?

24        Q.   And the security problem was particularly pronounced in the

25     Banja Luka area because of proximity of the war in Croatia and the events

Page 6437

 1     which were spilling over from Croatia; right?

 2        A.   At that time, the refugees from Croatia were the first refugees

 3     that arrived to Bosnia and Herzegovina from Croatia, from Daruvar.  They

 4     came to the Krajina area, they came to Banja Luka.  And that pressure

 5     from Croatia was felt by the people, by the political leadership, and by

 6     the police because they were the ones who had resolve the numerous

 7     problems.  And they were most affected by those problems, and they were

 8     the ones called upon to deal with them.

 9        Q.   On the other hand, they were not equipped and didn't have enough

10     people, and they asked for reinforcements in personnel; they asked for

11     professional staff, which would help out.  They asked for people from

12     Croatia who had been left without work.

13        A.   They had been thrown out of their jobs in Croatia.  They didn't

14     just lose their jobs.  So what can a professional do?  He is not going to

15     go into some kind of trade that he never did in his life before.  He was

16     a policeman, and he was looking for a position in the police.

17             On the other hand, we had the process of the employment of

18     completely incompetent people to the police, even though we had perfectly

19     capable policemen that were available.

20        Q.   And that was precisely the problem discussed by Mr. Zupljanin at

21     this meeting.  On the one hand, criminals were being employed in the

22     police; and, on the other hand, we had professional who would be able to

23     do the job properly, who were not being taken into service.

24        A.   That was the plan.  Employing criminals, misusing, deliberately,

25     their abilities in order to implement objectives.  That was part of the

Page 6438

 1     plan.  Serbs could not employ the professionals that were offering

 2     themselves from Croatia.  There was no room for Serbs in the reserve

 3     forces of the police either.  They were not being trained; they were not

 4     being provided equipment or weapons.  And so now we have some question

 5     being put here about the arming of these structures.  Again, these are

 6     legitimate structures that were including the active police.  This was a

 7     pronounced problem.  What kind of a Serbian MUP or a Serbian conspiracy

 8     or a Serbian organisation can we be talking about?  That is a joke even

 9     to mention it in this context.  We were powerless there, and we were just

10     speaking rhetorically in this way without any kind of concrete action.

11        Q.   If you look at the second page of this document, one of the

12     speakers is Cedo Kljajic and he's referring to the Motorolas which were

13     obtained by MUP funds but were never placed in the MUP warehouses.  Was

14     that also part of this plan?

15        A.   I am very familiar with this kind of dealing about the obtaining

16     of this equipment because we did inform the public to a considerable

17     degree about that, as for these Motorolas.  And not only Motorolas; there

18     were vehicles arriving, all kinds of things coming in.  All of that was

19     being directed at these structures.  The Motorolas were taken by

20     Mahmutovic whose superior I was for a certain period of time.  And this

21     went along that line, the SDA.  I think that this, for us, at that time,

22     was not really any kind of strange thing, but we didn't have the

23     mechanisms to react.  We didn't have any mechanisms; we didn't have any

24     power.

25        Q.   And what Cedo Kljajic is saying, We Serbs are the only ones who

Page 6439

 1     are acting lawfully, as opposed to the SDA and the HDZ.  This assertion

 2     of his is correct?

 3        A.   Well, that was our problem because we naively believed that we

 4     could do something if acted legally.  Until the last day, until the

 5     division in the MUP occurred, until this whole process began of the

 6     falling apart of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we naively believed that you

 7     could preserve.  And this Assembly, this meeting of ours, and from the

 8     conclusions, it was evident that we were still trying to offer to

 9     Alija Delimustafic, as the minister, something.  But that was just an

10     illusion.  We were trying to give him an opportunity for us to form a

11     kind of Serbian MUP within the MUP so that we could at least be able to

12     collect -- to assemble in a restaurant without having to hide -- to say,

13     Well, we are Serbs; we could listen to each other; we could comfort each

14     other; and then, if we have the opportunity, we could tell each -- you

15     something; and then perhaps we could reach some sort of agreement or tell

16     you at least something.

17             However, the role of the police is not to reach agreements.

18     Their job is to implement the laws.  And the principle here, as they

19     imposed on us, was, Well, let's agree whether we're going to follow the

20     law or not.  And, of course, they didn't need the laws.  They had the

21     political support and that was the way they operated.

22        Q.   And when the reserve forces were formed, when members of the

23     Muslim ethnic group were recruited, then they went and they took records

24     from the Defence Ministry, knowing whose specialities were of recruits

25     who was -- were then mobilised.  They were recruiting those had had

Page 6440

 1     certain specialised military knowledge.  Is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  That was already the plan drawn up by Sefer Halilovic on

 3     the military organisation of the SDA Party.  And I am a witness who can

 4     affirm that Mr. Sefer Halilovic came to the Presidency to see

 5     Alija Izetbegovic, because, at that time, the Presidency was under the

 6     authority of my administration, at whose head I was, so we did know who

 7     was coming to the Presidency because it was our duty to provide

 8     counter-intelligence protection.

 9             However you couldn't do this in an institutional way.  This was

10     sort of privately-gained information, because this institutionalised work

11     required work along the specific professional line.  And the work had to

12     are verified somewhere in order to enter into procedure.  And so that

13     pursuant to any kind of information on illegal actions, somebody would

14     then need to take adequate measures because state security was supposed

15     to work on the combatting of organised and illegal activities.

16             As for legal activities, such as the legal activity of a

17     political party, that was not part of the work of a security service,

18     except in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where this was acceptable.

19        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, just a correction to the transcript, page 57.  You

20     said, I am personally a witness that he came.  Isn't that correct?

21        A.   Perhaps I misspoke.  I was informed about the fact that Mr. Sefer

22     Halilovic came to the Presidency to see Alija Izetbegovic.

23             MR. KRGOVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... to break up my

24     cross-examination.

25             JUDGE HALL:  This is a convenient point, Mr. Krgovic.

Page 6441

 1             Mr. Vlaski, the -- we are about to take the adjournment for the

 2     day.  Your cross-examination is still not complete, and before the Usher

 3     escorts you from the courtroom because the Court is not going to rise

 4     immediately, I would remind you of what I said yesterday about not

 5     discussing the matter with other persons.  Thank you.

 6             So we would resume at 2.15 tomorrow in this courtroom.  Thank

 7     you.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, the first thing can I say, we can do

11     in open session; and the second matter, I would like to go into private

12     session for.  But it's a question of tomorrow.

13             The next witness is only arriving late tonight.  We had a request

14     last week from Mr. Zecevic to be able to interview that witness before he

15     testifies.  We suddenly, today, had a request also from Mr. Krgovic who

16     would also like to see this witness, which is not a request we've had

17     before.

18             This witness, it would seem, is going to finish pretty quickly

19     tomorrow afternoon as I understand from Mr. Krgovic.  So we will not be

20     able to go, as a result of these requests and apart from the fact that he

21     has also got to look through documents, we won't be able to call that

22     witness tomorrow.  So there will be, I am afraid, a break at the

23     conclusion of this witness.

24             JUDGE HALL:  Actually, the office -- your office had alerted us

25     to the that in the note that was sent to Ms. Featherstone, when was this,

Page 6442

 1     on the 10th?  On the 10th.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Right.  I hadn't -- I've obviously missed that one

 3     or forgot about it.

 4             So just so Your Honours are aware of that.

 5             We're now getting requests to see just about every other -- every

 6     witness we're calling between now and Easter from both counsel.  So can I

 7     make it clear:  We'll do our best do accommodate them, but, obviously,

 8     VWS aren't happy about witnesses being here for a very long time.  And

 9     really it is incumbent upon the Defence, if they want to interview these

10     witnesses, to make their own arrangements, rather than us having to

11     factor in that when we bring them up here.  So I'm just, as it were,

12     putting down a marker, as somebody in my chambers would say.

13             Your Honours, for the second matter, can I just briefly go into

14     private session.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  We go into private session.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 6443











11 Page 6443 redacted. Private session.















Page 6444

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

18                           February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.