Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6445

 1                           Wednesday, 17 February 2010 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 5           THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case number

 6     IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

 8             Good afternoon to all.  May we begin in the usual manner by

 9     taking the appearances for the day, please.

10             MS. KORNER:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Joanna Korner,

11     assisted by Crispian Smith, for the Prosecution.

12             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

13     Slobodan Cvijetic, and Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for Stanisic Defence.

14     Thank you.

15             MR. PANTELIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  For Zupljanin

16     Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  I assume the usher has gone to escort

18     the witness back to the stand.  Thank you.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             JUDGE HALL:  Good afternoon to you, Mr. Vlaski.  Before I invite

21     Mr. Krgovic to continue I remind you you're still on your oath.

22             Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

23             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour.

24                           WITNESS:  NEDJO VLASKI [Resumed]

25                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 6446

 1                           Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic: [Continued]

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Vlaski.

 3        A.   Good afternoon.

 4        Q.   We will resume where we left off yesterday late afternoon.

 5             Both I and Mr. Zecevic asked you about the press release.

 6             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] And can the witness, please, be

 7     shown Exhibit 1D116, please.

 8        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, we unfortunately don't have the binder you had

 9     yesterday, so perhaps you can use the transcript you have in front of

10     you.  Or perhaps we have it.  This will make it easier for you, since the

11     print is rather small.  Or, rather, bigger on the hard copy.

12             [Microphone not activated]

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for Mr. Krgovic.

14             MR. KRGOVIC:  Sorry.

15        Q.   [Interpretation] My apologies, I didn't switch my microphone on.

16             Can you please look at that third passage from the top.  I think

17     it's tab 12 in your binder.

18             Have you found it?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   It reads:

21             "By creating an anti-army atmosphere which can be deduced from

22     the written order of the MUP for the police to be involved in the

23     takeover of the military records from the JNA" --

24             I'm sorry that's behind tab 12.

25             Would you agree with me that this constituted a rather large

Page 6447

 1     problem because the Muslim leadership of the MUP, in fact, was pushing

 2     the MUP into a conflict with the JNA, was it not?

 3        A.   Yes.  But this is discussed in the context of the takeover of the

 4     records in order for military formations to be created that would be

 5     capable of confronting the JNA.

 6        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, within the MUP and state security hierarchy you were

 7     supposed to take up a rather senior post, practically that of the deputy,

 8     and correct me if I'm wrong, deputy under-secretary?

 9        A.   Yes, deputy under-secretary.  Nominally speaking, that's man

10     number two within security structure, such as that of the Security

11     Service.  In other words, the man who would be ranked first and would be

12     in charge of operative work.

13        Q.   So none of the operations -- none of the operative work could be

14     decided upon or launched without consulting you or without the proposal

15     coming from you.  Were you not the one to propose the operative plan and

16     the measures for its implementation?

17        A.   This was envisaged under the legislation in effect and the bylaws

18     governing the work of the service.  However, the practice was never, or

19     rather, the regulations were never put into practice because efforts were

20     made for no one to occupy that post.  It was a deliberate bypassing of a

21     chain and a deliberate attempt to avoid the implementations of the laws

22     on the part of those who wanted to act unlawfully.

23        Q.   Within the lines of duties of an incumbent on that post, there

24     were also measures of surveillance wire-tapping and observing the

25     activities of an individual.

Page 6448

 1        A.   Well, that's only one part of it.  No external or internal

 2     activity could have been planned without previous notification of the

 3     incumbent of that post.  There didn't exist an opportunity for such a

 4     post to be abolished, formally and legally speaking, or that anything

 5     should be done in practice without the knowledge of the incumbent.

 6        Q.   You would have been the one, in fact, if it was necessary to

 7     adopt -- to take any measures of wire-tapping for the request to that

 8     extent to be forwarded by you to the higher-ups in order for this to be

 9     approved and implemented?

10        A.   Yes, of course, but only for justified reasons which need be

11     presented by every person requesting any measure, including the measure

12     of surveillance.  In other words, any other measure which may encroach

13     upon human rights and constitutional powers.  Nobody could have embarked

14     on such an activity without consulting the hierarchy, and it had to go

15     from the lowest level up to the highest.  The decision-making process had

16     to start from the level at which a difficulty or a problem arose which

17     requires the application of such a measure.

18             So the first stage had to be first gone through where the problem

19     was identified, measures proposed, and then one would address the -- the

20     next immediate higher level and then what would follow would be the third

21     filter and that would be the senior staff of the service who would decide

22     whether the measures proposed were, in fact, commensurate with the threat

23     which was posed and then from then on, the procedure would ensue as per

24     regulations of the service.

25        Q.   The fact that the post was abolished and that the SDA leadership

Page 6449

 1     refused to agree to your appointment to that post, this particular chain

 2     was fully bypassed by then and an alternative channel was set up with the

 3     help of which they listened in to individuals they thought were

 4     interesting to them.

 5        A.   Well, this is a drastic example of unlawfulness which definitely

 6     required someone's consent or even a prior plan envisaging such activity.

 7             Even if the case had involved anybody else where the intention

 8     was to bypass laws, regulations, and certain levels, this would have been

 9     possible just as in any other service but, of course, there would have

10     been a greater threat for the person to be uncovered in his unlawful

11     conduct.

12             In the circumstances as they were, there was no such danger for

13     the person to be either uncovered or to be sanctioned for that conduct.

14        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, the Prosecutor asked you yesterday to confirm that

15     you had recognised the voices of certain individuals.

16             I'm interested in the specific case you discussed yesterday.

17     Before the Prosecutor, or the investigator, played the audiotape to you,

18     you were shown the transcript of the intercepted conversation; is that

19     right?

20        A.   I don't know which particular transcripts or intercepts you're

21     referring to, so I can't tell you, but I was given the opportunity to see

22     the transcripts, yes.

23             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up exhibit -- or

24     rather, 65 ter 1056 in e-court.

25        Q.   This is the alleged conversation between Stojan Zupljanin and

Page 6450

 1     Mico Stanisic.

 2             When the Prosecutor interviewed you, you were shown the

 3     transcript, and you commented on it.  For everybody's reference that's on

 4     page 17 of your interview.  There you commented on this transcript.  Do

 5     you recall that?

 6        A.   Yes, I do.  I commented on this and other transcripts.

 7        Q.   It follows from the transcript --

 8             MS. KORNER:  Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Krgovic.  Are you referring

 9     to page 17 of the old one or the one where there was a correction?

10             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, the old version.

11             MS. KORNER:  All right.  I'll have to look for that.

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   You were shown the portion where you saw that it was a

14     conversation between Zupljanin and then Gvozden and then you saw all the

15     various names involved in the intercept; is that right?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And then as you arrived here, you listened to the audio of the

18     intercept and the fact that you had previously seen the transcript helped

19     you identify the individuals in -- concerned; is that right?

20        A.   Well, not that much.  I -- I really could recognise the voices

21     and the individuals.

22        Q.   But at any rate, this fact did facilitate the recognition of the

23     individuals involved; is that right?

24        A.   Yes, it did.

25        Q.   The procedure whereby you were first shown the transcript stating

Page 6451

 1     the individuals involved and then played the tape is definitely not based

 2     on the police technique of identification as you applied it in your work;

 3     is that right?

 4        A.   Well, we used to have problems in our work where interlocutors

 5     would speak without introducing themselves, but we had -- now there are

 6     certain techniques and methods whereby you can uncover their identities,

 7     whereas, at the time, we used other techniques and methods for that.

 8        Q.   Before you were played the audio, you commented on the transcript

 9     with the Prosecutor in great detail; is that right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   In this particular transcript, the telephone number that was

12     wire-tape is missing; is that right?

13        A.   Well, it was missing in all the other transcripts I was shown

14     too.  I wasn't paying attention to the telephone numbers or to the way

15     the transcripts were labelled.

16        Q.   And this is indispensable in order for the telephone line that

17     was wire-tapped to be established, and this would have then been done by

18     the rules.

19        A.   Well, this should definitely have been mentioned in an Official

20     Note which would normally accompany such material.  As for the way we

21     worked, it was customary for us to know which particular line was

22     wire-tapped and on which date, as well as all the other elements

23     necessary for the identification of the individual, place, and time, as

24     well as other important elements for incrimination or for the substance

25     of the conversation.

Page 6452

 1        Q.   The -- the start time and end time of the tape or the

 2     wire-tapping was not mentioned here; is that right?  And that's

 3     important.

 4        A.   Yes.  Well, time is important because technology enables us to

 5     define precisely the time at which certain things were done.  And, for

 6     the purposes of any sort of police work, time is an essential element.

 7        Q.   Quite a few of the elements you've now mentioned and which should

 8     have been contained in such a document are missing from the transcript;

 9     is that right?

10        A.   Well, they are.  It says here telephone surveilled, but it

11     doesn't say which one.  Then the code number of the phone, well, there

12     could be several technological possibilities of surveillance.  The

13     conversation could have been intercepted in a certain venue and then it

14     is important also to know the device that was used and based on which the

15     information was obtained.

16        Q.   And there is no note explaining on the basis of what elements

17     Mico Stanisic was identified as one of the interlocutors because he was

18     not -- his name was not mentioned there?

19        A.   Well, it depends on the author of the analytical note.  Maybe it

20     is based on experience or his own knowledge of the voices.

21        Q.   And the author of the analytical note should also indicate from

22     what time the conversation was recorded?

23        A.   Yes, context is very important.  If you are reflecting a

24     conversation in its entirety then you have to include everything without

25     deletion or redaction.  If something is modified, that opens room for

Page 6453

 1     manipulation.

 2        Q.   And from your experience in that period, do you know that these

 3     wire-taps were brought to the MUP seat, various sources were there

 4     compiled and then submitted to your service?

 5        A.   Well, in this type of work, the person who wants to provide a

 6     certain report based on these technical sources, the report can combine

 7     all kinds of sources, can put forward one single telephone check or use a

 8     combination of various sources, but the report should show that.  And the

 9     person who receives that report cannot then use -- know exactly which

10     sources were -- were used.

11        Q.   Look at the second page of this document, please, where Zupljanin

12     allegedly says:  "Is there Vito, is Vito around?"

13             The only Vito you knew was Vito Zepinic, right?

14        A.   Yes, it was a normal way of reference and in conversation.

15     Nobody called him with his full name, Vitomir.  They always addressed him

16     as Vito, everybody in the MUP and even further afield knew that it was

17     Mr. Zepinic.

18        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, this type of work, wire-tapping of telephones without

19     including this important elements and indication of sources, was unlawful

20     and improper.

21        A.   Yes, it's unlawful in every respect.  It's unlawful for one

22     service to keep tabs on -- on their own colleagues from another service,

23     and it is even more inappropriate to keep tabs on a -- on the chief of

24     that other service.  It's beyond the pale to arrogate the right to keep

25     tabs on a colleague.  It is a huge responsibility to assume, to get

Page 6454

 1     involved in such serious violation of the regulations.  It only speaks

 2     about the people who were occupying such high positions at the time.

 3     And, also, it speaks to the absences of all checks and balances that

 4     should exist in a normal society.  There should be checks and balances by

 5     the civilian authorities but also by the parliament because this service

 6     is supposed to be in the service of citizens, not only the people who

 7     appointed these officers.

 8        Q.   And this transcript and what we see, the absence of these

 9     important elements, leaves a lot of room for manipulation, doesn't it?

10        A.   Well, from my many years in the Security Service, including this

11     type of work, that was always a possibility.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Vlaski.  I have no more questions for you.

13             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, before I re-examine, I do have an

14     application to make, which I'm afraid will require the witness to leave

15     Court.  He does actually understand English.

16             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Vlaski, the usher will escort you out of court

17     for a few minutes.

18                           [The witness stands down]

19             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours may not be surprised to hear me apply

20     regrettably for the second time in this trial to be allowed to

21     cross-examine this witness in re-examination and treat him as a hostile

22     witness.  Every part of the evidence he gave evidence yesterday could be

23     described virtually as adverse to the Prosecution case.  All -- some of

24     it actually volunteered, I can take Your Honours through the various

25     parts.  A lot came out as a result of leading questions but even more

Page 6455

 1     volunteered by him including the allegation - perhaps I better read it to

 2     Your Honours - that the total destruction of the state was intended by

 3     Mr. Izetbegovic and others.

 4             Your Honours, it's at -- of the transcript, page 638.  The

 5     questioning was about the intercepts and the legality thereof.  And he

 6     was asked by Mr. Zecevic about information being provided to the media,

 7     and then he talked about Sarajevo Oslobodjenje.

 8             "When you say involved, they were used for the purposes of a

 9     propaganda war, was it not?

10             "A.  Yes, it was part of the political, military, and media

11     preparations for the takeover of power in Bosnia by the HDZ, SDA

12     coalition and to the detriment of the Serb people.  The representatives

13     of this particular policy believed that they ought to be the masters in

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It seems that for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

15     relationship between the master and the servant was a historical category

16     and they believed that it was time for them to become the masters."

17             He then went on to talk about -- he was actually being shown the

18     various document with the complaints, and he then said that:

19             "Mr. Kvesic, the head of the State Security Service, privatised

20     the service.  When he no longer felt he needed to remain in Sarajevo, he

21     brought along with him documentation containing the service, if I may

22     add, it was precisely because of such actions that were taken that

23     certain individuals committed suicide."

24             Then he went on to say -- I don't know how much longer I need to

25     go on.

Page 6456

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your leave, from

 3     Ms. Korner's comments just now, I really see no grounds for considering

 4     the witness hostile at this moment.  I see no grounds for it in his

 5     answers to the Prosecution and to me -- to the Defence.  He is a

 6     Prosecution witness.  He was interviewed by the Prosecution and proofed

 7     here.  If the Prosecution has failed to ask all the questions that were

 8     necessary to elicit the witness's real views and opinions, then it's

 9     their omission.  I really see nothing hostile to the Prosecution in -- in

10     the witness's evidence.  He stated his views and his experience the way

11     he saw it.

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may add, I believe this

13     Prosecution application is -- comes too late.  The Prosecution could

14     have, if they were unhappy with the witness's answers in direct

15     examination, stopped their examination and asked to cross-examine the

16     witness as hostile.

17             Now, only after our successful cross-examination, are they coming

18     up with this request, which I believe is contrary to the jurisprudence of

19     this Tribunal.

20             JUDGE HALL:  [Previous translation continues] ... hear you on

21     Mr. Krgovic's last point.

22             MS. KORNER:  Yes, Your Honour, certainly.  There is no bar to

23     applying to treat a witness as hostile in re-examination.  Although he

24     said things and Your Honours may have seen that questions because I --

25     I'm sorry, I will start the sentence again.

Page 6457

 1             He was unforthcoming in examination-in-chief, which he was not in

 2     the course of the interview.  If you recall the question I asked him in

 3     respect of why the meeting of the 11th of February was held in

 4     Banja Luka, he volunteered the information in interview that it was

 5     because it was a Serb-controlled municipality.  I'll give Your Honours

 6     the page number.

 7             JUDGE HARHOFF:  We remember [Microphone not activated]

 8             MS. KORNER:  Yes, right.

 9             But, Your Honours I felt at that stage I didn't have sufficient

10     to say that although he said a great deal which was not contained in the

11     interview in which he was asked to give his account without leading

12     questions, he never, for example, said, over and over again, as he did in

13     this court, that the murder of the Serb wedding guest was a political

14     murder.  He gave an account which simply described it as a murder.  I

15     decided at that stage I would leave matters as they were.

16             However, as a result of the -- the cross-examination, any

17     lingering doubt that I may have had, that he was hostile, or adverse to

18     the Prosecution case, was dispelled.  He certainly never said in-chief

19     this business of the destruction.  I didn't read the further bit, but he

20     said -- if he could call it a state.  If Your Honours just forgive me,

21     it's -- and therefore, yes.  It is a caricature of a state, he called it.

22     And that's at page 6391, all of which was volunteered.

23             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my understanding of

24     the status of hostile witness the way I had an opportunity to see it

25     before this court, is that if the witness changes his evidence in a major

Page 6458

 1     way, either in -- compared to prior statements or to prior testimony,

 2     then he can be considered a hostile witness.

 3             Here, there is no major deviation either from evidence in direct

 4     or in -- in cross-examination.  There is no major shift that could

 5     justify his treatment as hostile witness at this point.

 6             And this is, on top of everything, a viva voce witness, and what

 7     he said in direct, he repeated in cross.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE HALL:  The application that the Office of the Prosecutor

10     has made to treat the witness called by them as an adverse witness and so

11     as to permit counsel to cross-examine that witness in the course of her

12     re-examination is an application which the Chamber grants, because it is

13     patent from the record that the tone and the -- sorry, not tone, but

14     the -- the overall effect of the witness's testimony was that, as the

15     Prosecution now advances, in essence, adverse.  And the appearance of

16     this, and I pause to select the right word, the appearance of this in the

17     course of examination-in-chief became obvious in the course of

18     cross-examination so that the practical footing on which the application

19     is made is from a perusal of the record obvious.

20             There are certain procedural issues which may arise, because it

21     is exceptionally an application being made while the Prosecution is about

22     to re-examine -- re-examine, and not as would ordinarily happen while the

23     witness was being examined in -- in-chief.

24             We expect that that may be cured by allowing the counsel for each

25     of the accused limited time to further cross-examination -- to further

Page 6459

 1     cross-examine after Ms. Korner would have completed her re-examination.

 2             The -- and, therefore, we would, upon the witness being invited

 3     to return to the stand, allow Ms. Korner to proceed in the manner that

 4     she has sought.

 5             MS. KORNER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 6             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before the witness

 7     comes in, I would appreciate a clarification.

 8             Does your decision mean that the Prosecution's cross-examination

 9     and the topics would be limited to our cross-examination?  Because that

10     would be fair, not to allow the Prosecution to go beyond the topics that

11     we discussed in cross.

12             MS. KORNER:  I agree.  I have no intention of going outside what

13     was raised in cross-examination.

14             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Ms. Korner.

15             JUDGE HARHOFF:  That solves the problem [Microphone not

16     activated]

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Vlaski, the Chamber has made a ruling that

19     although you would have been called at the instance of counsel for the

20     Prosecution, at this stage of their reexamination, counsel is being

21     permitted to cross-examine you.

22             Yes, Ms. Korner.

23                           Re-examination by Ms. Korner:

24        Q.   Mr. Vlaski before we deal with some of the matters of principle,

25     if I can put it that way, that you raised in your answers, can we just go

Page 6460

 1     back to a moment for the intercept that you listened to between Zupljanin

 2     and Stanisic.

 3             When you came to the Tribunal on Sunday, you listened to the

 4     intercepts, did you not, before you were shown any of the transcripts and

 5     the other documents?

 6        A.   I did listen to the intercepts.

 7        Q.   Yes.  You listened to them without the benefit of having any

 8     transcripts in front of you, didn't you?

 9        A.   At that time when I was listening, I didn't have the transcripts.

10        Q.   Okay.  And you have no doubt at all, as you've told Mr. Krgovic,

11     whether or not you saw the transcript eight months ago in Banja Luka that

12     the voices that you heard on that intercept are those of Stojan Zupljanin

13     and Mico Stanisic.  That's right, isn't it?

14        A.   That's right.  I didn't go into any analysis.  My aim was just to

15     identify the voices, and since I'm in full possession of my capacities, I

16     was able to do that.

17        Q.   Now, what you told this Court in one of your many lengthy

18     speeches yesterday was that what was happening was that there was a:

19             "... political, military, and media preparations for the takeover

20     of power in Bosnia by the HDZ/SDA coalition and to the detriment of the

21     Serb people.  The representatives of this particular policy believed that

22     they ought to be the masters in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It seems that for

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina the relationship between the master and the servant

24     was a historical category, and they believed that it was time for them to

25     become the masters."

Page 6461

 1             That's what you believe, is it, Mr. Vlaski?

 2        A.   Well, I gained that impression from my personal experience and

 3     from the general situation on the political scene, in the media, and in

 4     the security services.  It was my impression that there was a plan.

 5        Q.   So you're saying that from reading the newspapers, from the

 6     general situation on the political scene, and -- can you tell us what you

 7     mean by that?

 8             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry.  This is -- is a misinterpretation what

 9     the witness said.  He said three things:  The security situation; the

10     media; and the political scene.

11             MS. KORNER:  Yes, I know that.

12             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yeah.  But I think you're only asking him for two

13     things and he says based on all three things he had that impression.

14             MS. KORNER:  You know, I'm quite sure that the witness doesn't

15     need Mr. Zecevic's help.  Your Honour, I'm taking this in stages.  I'm

16     asking for an explanation of what he means by "the political scene."

17        Q.   Mr. Vlaski, please.

18        A.   Thank you very much, I will answer the question.

19             The political scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina was defined by the BH

20     constitution.  The constitute nature of the peoples is that they are the

21     three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and representatives of these three

22     peoples won the elections, and it was only natural and it so happened

23     that after the first multi-party elections they set about forming the

24     government.

25             However, following the elections, the HDZ/SDA coalition was

Page 6462

 1     formed, and it was symbolically represented through the binding of the

 2     two flags together.  So the representative of the Serb people found

 3     themselves confronted with a two-to-one ratio where two stood for the

 4     majority of the Bosniaks and Croats.  And everything was determined on

 5     that majority.  The political situation was such that the parliament

 6     where democratic decisions were to be taken and where the constituent

 7     nature of the peoples was to be respected, became the forum of outvoting

 8     to the detriment of the Serbian minority.  This manifested itself also

 9     through the decisions of the government, although the constitution

10     dictated that a consensus and an agreement among the three peoples should

11     take place.

12             I could hold a speech on this topic, but if this will suffice, I

13     can end it here.

14        Q.   I would really love to know what you call a speech.

15             I'm so sorry, you say that they were outvoted in the --

16     everything was determined by the majority.

17             Isn't that a democracy, Mr. Vlaski?

18        A.   Yes, a democracy, according to the western standards where a

19     mono-ethnic states are concerned, but in a multi-ethnic state such as

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina was where the constitution dictated a consensus and an

21     agreement among the constituent peoples, it is not governed by that

22     particular principle.  One element or one ethnic community had to be

23     content with the situation.  Lacking that, the democratic principle was

24     not met.

25             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, the transcript does not reflect what the

Page 6463

 1     witness said, and I feel it is important even for -- for Ms. Korner so I

 2     don't how to deal.  Shall we ask that the -- that -- that -- that the

 3     tape be listened again.  But it doesn't -- it wouldn't help Ms. Korner or

 4     maybe he should slowly repeat what he said word by word because the

 5     transcript says something which is -- which is definitely not what he

 6     said.  And I think it is an important issue about the constitutional

 7     specificity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 8             Thank you.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.

10             Mr. Vlaski, without counsel for the Prosecution having to repeat

11     her last question, could you give us your answer again and perhaps

12     sufficiently slowly so that it can be adequately interpreted?  Thank you.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             I don't think that my emotions can be easily controlled in

15     situations such as these so I tend to speak more quickly, but I will try

16     to do it more slowly.

17             The constitutional position of Bosnia-Herzegovina is defined as a

18     community of three constituent peoples where all three peoples take key

19     decisions by way of a consensus.  In other words, the constitution does

20     not provide for a possibility of outvoting on the part of a democratic

21     majority as in other democratic states in the west and elsewhere.  But

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina is a multi-ethnic state, and it rests on this

23     principle of multi-ethnicity and constituent nature of peoples.  This is

24     part and parcel of the constitutional provisions that outvoting shall not

25     take place.  In order for the interests of every single peoples to be

Page 6464

 1     respected, they have to have this mechanism enshrined in the constitution

 2     in order for them to protect their national ethnic interests.  We're not

 3     talking about a civic state, you're talking about a multi-ethnic state,

 4     so these are peoples who have the fortune or misfortune of living in the

 5     same country in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the community came into

 6     existence based on the willingness of the three peoples to live together.

 7             However, at some point, there arose a difficulty where the three

 8     peoples didn't want to live anymore together so that that's why the

 9     constitution envisaged the provision where for key decisions to be taken,

10     the agreement of even the smallest people had to be achieved and -- and

11     down to the last citizen of the country whose rights had to be

12     guaranteed.

13             In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the principle was violated

14     because a coalition was created between the party of democratic action

15     and the Croatian democratic union, and it manifested itself politically

16     through the binding together of their flags and in the parliament through

17     the outvoting and taking of decisions against the will of the Serb people

18     represented in these organs of power.

19             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

20             MS. KORNER:

21        Q.   The third element that you said led you to take this view was

22     the -- your personal experience, general -- sorry, in the media, the

23     security services.

24             Are you referring there to what you describe as the - I'm trying

25     to think of the right word for it - the seizing of the key positions by

Page 6465

 1     Muslims and Croats and not Serbs?

 2        A.   The principle of the separation of power implies a distribution

 3     of power on an equal footing according to the significance.  You can't

 4     allocate to someone a higher level post and to others to be street

 5     cleaners.  What was essential was to allocate down the hierarchy

 6     political posts and positions in the government.  In order for the power

 7     to be distributed according to the interparty agreement.  The

 8     interparty agreement was achieved, and it only needed to be implemented.

 9     This was not supposed to be the subject of bartering or trading off.  If

10     an agreement is achieved, it can either be implemented or not.  The Serbs

11     agreed to this interparty agreement even though it was to their detriment

12     because they did not have this historical experience of what was

13     important, which leaders of power were important to be held so that even

14     in this area they gave the advantage to the representatives of the

15     majority people including the Croat people who admittedly were not the

16     majority people.

17             It is important -- it isn't important who will be occupying which

18     post if the constitution and the laws are being respected.  If the

19     regulations are applicable to all then they will be duty-bound to

20     implement them.  However, the problem arises when individuals claim

21     right -- their right to decide which post is important and which is not

22     and when they enjoy political protection in doing so.

23             And they claim the right to decide which post should not be

24     occupied for certain individuals in order for them to realise their plan.

25     And that was the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that a deliberate

Page 6466

 1     obstruction was taking place in order for the Serb people to be tricked

 2     politically and otherwise in order for them to be bypassed and in order

 3     for time to be gained.  Once power is established, it is very difficult

 4     to change the structure.

 5             As for the security sector, they covered literally all the

 6     positions and did what they wanted.  They did not feel the need to ask or

 7     consult anyone on any matters let alone the representatives of the Serb

 8     people.

 9        Q.   Right.  I must express again.  [Microphone not activated]

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

11             MS. KORNER:

12        Q.   I'm sorry.  It is your view if I understand you correctly from

13     what you said before and what you say again that the Serbs were

14     inexperienced, didn't realise what was happening until too late; is that

15     what you're saying?

16        A.   I wasn't referring to the Serbs.  I was referring to the

17     political leadership of the SDS and their naivete.  I'm -- as for the

18     intentions, they may have had the best of the intentions when they took

19     up the positions of the minister of information, the minister of

20     agriculture, health care, or science.  These were the posts that they

21     fought for, the Speaker of the parliament.  Now as for the prime

22     minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of the interior, the

23     presiding of the Presidency, these were important posts which the Serbs

24     did not occupy.

25        Q.   Let's deal with the political leadership of the SDS, shall we?

Page 6467

 1             Were you aware that on the 14th of October, 1990 something called

 2     the Serbian National Council was established by the SDS?

 3             MR. KRGOVIC:  This appeared from the cross-examination.

 4             MS. KORNER:  The whole tenor of his answers, volunteered in

 5     answer to leading was that the Serbs were naive and had reacted too late.

 6     In addition, he was asked about -- in a document produced by the Defence,

 7     the SDA setting up a National Defence Council in June of 1991.  This

 8     arises directly out of those questions, not Mr. Krgovic's, I accept, but

 9     certainly Mr. Zecevic's.

10        Q.   Now, in connection with what you have been asserting, were you

11     aware of something called the Serbian National Council being established

12     in October, the 13th of October, to be precise, 1990?

13        A.   I'm not certain that it was in 1990.

14        Q.   Well, can I show you -- I'm sorry, Your Honour, because this all

15     came up today.  It says Oslobodjenje -- again, we haven't got it in

16     e-court, but we -- and nor indeed has it got an ERN number, but it -- can

17     I just finish then, it was referred to in a footnote in Dr. Nielsen's

18     report.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, we already cross, I think, the line

20     in some respect with -- leaving the Prosecution the right to -- to

21     cross-examine the witness during the re-direct and then ultimately giving

22     the opportunity to the Defence to re -- recross-examine.

23             Now, this is -- is -- as I -- I -- I have to accept that this is

24     the ruling of the Trial Chamber.  I have my opinion on that, but what I

25     think is, if Ms. Korner is allowed to use some additional documents,

Page 6468

 1     which have not been used, which have not been noted in -- in their -- in

 2     their exchanges that they are going to use with this witness, then we

 3     are -- we are -- we are going way out of bounds, in my modest opinion.

 4             Thank you very much.

 5             MS. KORNER:  I'm so sorry, but can I just be heard on this before

 6     you make a ruling?

 7             The document the Defence produced, as you appreciate, we have

 8     never seen before.  We have no idea even if they are genuine in

 9     connection with the SDA.  One in particular, a huge point was made about

10     the fact that in June of 1991 the SDA had set up what was called a

11     National Defence Council, and we don't have what it refers to because we

12     haven't been provided with the accompanying declaration.

13             In addition to that, this witness has said over and over again

14     the Serbs were at a complete disadvantage because they were naive and

15     only reacted too late.

16             I'm therefore entitled to put in re-examination, aspects,

17     particularly now I've been given leave to cross-examine, of evidence

18     which is available to the Defence because it is referred to, as I say in

19     a footnote of Dr. Nielsen's report that show what he has said is not

20     supported by available evidence.  And that's the submission I make.

21             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]  Your Honour, if you will allow me.

22             We notified the Trial Chamber and the Prosecution in accordance

23     with the Rules rendered by the Trial Chamber in this case of the

24     documents we would be using.  These were Defence documents, and documents

25     to be found in e-court.

Page 6469

 1             Now, the fact that Ms. Korner saw them for the first time, I'm

 2     really sorry about that, but that's her problem, really.  She had them

 3     for two days when the witness took an oath, and then we disclosed the

 4     documents.  She had a whole day to review the documents and to submit her

 5     opinion on them.  The fact that the document was disclosed by the Defence

 6     as a document on the basis of which the witness would be cross-examined

 7     has nothing to do with what I'm saying, and that's that the Prosecution

 8     cannot be now allowed to use documents that they have not announced, that

 9     were not used either in the examination-in-chief or in the

10     cross-examination.

11             And that is my position.  Thank you.

12             MS. KORNER:  The documents were only released to us when the

13     examination-in-chief began.  I did look at them.  Indeed, I sent

14     Mr. Zecevic an e-mail about my objections to them, and you heard us argue

15     them yesterday.

16             What I'm saying is that we've got no chance of checking these

17     documents at all when we only get them at the beginning of

18     examination-in-chief.  Which, if we're lucky, we get half a day to look

19     at.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE HALL:  The Chamber is of the view that Mr. -- that it would

22     essentially uphold Mr. Seselj's objection and allow the Prosecution to

23     put questions but without putting -- putting -- referring the witness to

24     a particular document, that simply would invite complications that we

25     needn't bring on ourselves.

Page 6470

 1             MS. KORNER:  I'm perfectly prepared to do that.

 2             MR. PANTELIC:  I do apologise, it's a minor mistake in typing.

 3     It's page 25, line 10.  I think instead of Mr. Seselj, it should be

 4     Mr. Zecevic maybe.

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

 6             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated]

 7        Q.   All right, Mr. Vlaski.  Can I put it to you, for your comments,

 8     you have obviously heard because you say you don't think it was in

 9     October of 1990 that the SDS did establish a Serbian National Council?

10        A.   Well, I wasn't a member of the SDS.  According to the working

11     practice within the police, we were not required to analyse the work of

12     the political structures.  Perhaps it was somebody's duty to analyse what

13     the SDS was doing, but we didn't have the official duty to do so because

14     nobody told us officially that we should be occupied with that.

15             So I wasn't aware of the fact that they had such a body, but I

16     did know there was a political council of the SDS which gathered

17     intellectuals who supported the party but were not members of it.  I know

18     of such individuals indirectly that they were involved in the work of

19     that council.

20             Now, as for this particular council, I'm not sure what its name

21     is.  Well, what I find important is the activity performed by a certain

22     body, its activity or even more importantly inactivity.  I don't know

23     what this body was doing, so I can't give a position on that.

24        Q.   Let me suggest to you that the founding of this council was

25     published in the newspapers, including Oslobodjenje.  Karadzic was its

Page 6471

 1     first president, and the text of the decision, let me suggest to you,

 2     said as follows:

 3             "The council will be made up not only of parts of the republican

 4     SDS leadership but also of representatives of other parties and even

 5     independent, distinguished persons.  The first decision of the council

 6     was adopted, by which the Serbian people make it known that it will not

 7     recognise any decisions on the change of the BiH state unless it is

 8     arrived at through a referendum of the Serbian people."

 9             Now, do you remember reading anything like that?

10        A.   I think that there was a great deal of such things and we were

11     practically swamped by them.

12             Now as for the text itself, I can't say that I am familiar with

13     it, but I am familiar with the context.  I was of the general political

14     position that the Serb people, as a constituent people, had the right to

15     speak their mind on this very important issue, such as the constitution

16     in form of a state.  Initially the -- initially Yugoslavia and later on

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina because of their constituent nature.

18             MS. KORNER:  You know, just for the purposes of the record, I

19     should add it was Oslobodjenje on the 14th of October in which this was

20     published.

21             JUDGE HARHOFF:  [Microphone not activated]

22             MS. KORNER:  Sorry?

23             JUDGE HARHOFF:  1991.  [Microphone not activated]

24             MS. KORNER:  1990.  Your Honour, that's the point I'm putting to

25     him.

Page 6472

 1        Q.   You see, Mr. Vlaski, if that's right, then the SDS, the

 2     leadership, was already making its position absolutely clear way back in

 3     1990.  Wasn't it?  It wasn't reacting to things.

 4        A.   Well, this is a position in relation to the future of the state

 5     because what was discussed at the -- at that point was Yugoslavia.  We

 6     were under the constitution of Yugoslavia, part of it.  You forget that

 7     there was the federal constitution which was binding on the republics

 8     forming the state, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that's quite clear.

 9     From this particular document, the article in the Oslobodjenje concerning

10     this position, well, there is nothing strange about it because all the

11     peoples are called upon to protect the constitution, to safe-guard the

12     constitution.  Is it a disgrace to try and safe-guard the constitution?

13        Q.   Sorry, I'll try one more time, Mr. Vlaski, and we'll move on.

14             The point that I'm seeking to see whether you will accept is that

15     contrary to what you assert that the SDS leadership didn't appreciate

16     what was happening and was only reacting to things too late.  Right from

17     an early stage, Mr. Karadzic was making it clear that the SDS would make

18     sure that the rights of the Serbian people were protected.

19        A.   This was a legitimate demand from a representative of the Serbian

20     people even if it was Mr. Karadzic.

21        Q.   We'll move on to the next topic.

22             You spent a little time explaining to Mr. Zecevic -- just let me

23     get the page number from yesterday.  It's at page 6421.  This is one of

24     your lengthy speeches.  It started at page 6420, and it was put to you by

25     Mr. Zecevic that one of the tactics which was pervasive, particularly

Page 6473

 1     prominent in the minister of the interior, was to postpone and drag the

 2     resolution of certain issues that were raised by the Serb side.

 3             And I think this was in the context of an intercept.

 4             And in the course of this long answer, you said this, you raised

 5     the Badinter Commission, and then you said:

 6             "If this was an option that we were going to be given," the role

 7     of a national minority, that is, "... it is clear that Izetbegovic

 8     received political and international support to organise a referendum in

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina" which, by the way, you added was never verified by

10     any of the institutions.  This particular act, which was organised in

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina without the participation of the Serb people, and

12     this was counter-constitutional, had never been verified by the BH

13     organs.

14             In -- on the 4th and 5th of November of 1991, was a plebescite

15     organised by the SDS?

16        A.   Not a referendum, a plebescite.

17        Q.   Yes.  You want to draw the distinction, do you?

18        A.   There is a terminological difference and a difference in

19     substance.

20        Q.   Did you vote in that plebescite?

21        A.   I voted for the existing constitution of the Federal Republic of

22     Yugoslavia that envisaged equality for both republics and the peoples.

23     We had lived in such community until then, and there was nothing wrong

24     with that.

25        Q.   It's right, isn't it, that, if you were a Serb you received one

Page 6474

 1     colour of a polling card; if you were a non-Serb, you received a

 2     different colour?

 3        A.   I don't know.  I don't know about such details.  I just went to

 4     cast my vote.  I didn't particularly look at the polling card to see the

 5     colour or appearance.  I just came to express my will, and what kind of

 6     paper it was printed on, I didn't care.

 7        Q.   You didn't read anything from the SDA or any of the other

 8     national parties pointing out that there were different coloured ballots,

 9     whether you were a Serb or a non-Serb?

10        A.   How can a -- someone coming to the polling box be recognised by

11     ethnicity?  Who would make that sort of distinction and identification of

12     people by pushing one sort of paper or another into their hand?  It's

13     nonsense.

14        Q.   In Bosnia it's fairly easy, is it not, to distinguish -- I --

15        A.   It's extremely difficult, in fact.  Not anymore perhaps because

16     people change the way they dress and sometimes they're very easy to

17     identify nowadays.

18        Q.   If you had the -- never mind.  Let's not get into an argument

19     about this.

20             So you're saying you're unaware of this.

21             Were the results of this plebescite ever given any kind of -- let

22     me find the express you used -- any kind of verification by anybody?

23        A.   Well, it was not institutionally organised or prescribed by law

24     and constitution as a procedure.  It was an initiative by a political

25     party.  It did not go through the institutions, and there was no need for

Page 6475

 1     it to be officially verified.  It was not something organised by the

 2     authorities.  It was organised by a political party.

 3        Q.   But you know, don't you, that the results of this plebescite were

 4     used as the basis, the authority, for the founding of the Serbian state

 5     in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 6             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]  I'm sorry, Your Honours.  I think

 7     this is a complete -- completely untrue.  We all know how Republika

 8     Srpska came into existence.  This sort of misrepresentation of facts is

 9     inappropriate, I would say.  I would be grateful if Ms. Korner could

10     rephrase.

11             MS. KORNER:  In fact, Your Honour, maybe -- I'm going to find the

12     document -- [Microphone not activated]

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MS. KORNER:  Sorry.  If Your Honours would take the break now,

15     I'll get the document that I'm referring to.

16             JUDGE HALL:  We resume in 20 minutes.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18                           --- Recess taken at 3.40 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.

20             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I have asked for document 65 ter 1259

21     to be put up on the screen when the witness comes in.

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honour, I'm not objecting.  I'm just stating

23     for the record that this has not been notified to the any of the parties

24     that this document will be used.

25             Thank you.

Page 6476

 1             MS. KORNER:  I wasn't going to use -- I just told him -- I only

 2     brought this because Mr. Zecevic raised the objection to what I was

 3     putting to the witness and said I was misleading him.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zecevic, I -- I'm under the impression but

 5     perhaps I'm wrong and then I should adapt my system.  But I'm under the

 6     impression that you used in your cross-examination some documents as well

 7     that weren't on the list that you gave us before we came in court.

 8             You think I'm wrong?

 9             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm 100 percent positive, Your Honour, that you are

10     wrong.  I don't know how it happened but it might be --

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  For instance 1D-- 1D14.  I didn't see that on

12     your list.  It's an exhibit -- exhibited document, that I agree.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  But I didn't see it on your list.

15             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honour, all the documents were listed, plus we

16     added a few documents during the -- the direct examination and we

17     notified the parties on that.  On all the documents.  I will -- I will --

18     I will check out the -- the -- the mail and I will inform you.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Perhaps I missed an e-mail.  That's a

20     possibility.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22             MS. KORNER:  I'm going to ask that document 65 ter 1259 is put up

23     on the screen.

24        Q.   I assume while we're waiting, Mr. Vlaski, you remember the

25     declaration on proclaiming the republic of the Serbian people of Bosnia

Page 6477

 1     and Herzegovina on the 9th of January; do you remember that?

 2        A.   I do.

 3        Q.   Well, let's look at the preamble to this.

 4             "In order to contribute to the peaceful and agreeable resolving

 5     of issues related to the territorial boundary determination and other

 6     rights and duties related to achieving the right on self-determination of

 7     the Muslim and Croatian people in the former Socialist Republic of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina as lawful representatives elected in a free and democratic

10     way and protector of its rights and interests, implementing its will

11     expressed by plebescite and its decision based on the plebescite to

12     establish the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..."

13             Now, you complained - and this is the only reason I'm putting

14     this to you, Mr. Vlaski - that the referendum held in March was not

15     valid, not ratified; but the same is true, is it not, of the plebescite

16     which had, may I suggest to you, even less validity than the referendum?

17        A.   No, it doesn't have less validity.

18             A plebescite was just the expression of the will of one people

19     organised by one political party.  A referendum, on the contrary, is an

20     act by the authorities, by the state, that has to meet the requirements

21     of both form and substance to make a decision that will include the

22     consent of the Serbian people, and without that consent there could be no

23     referendum and that was the key point in this case.

24             A referendum could not be held without the consent of the Serbian

25     people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In some other states perhaps it would have

Page 6478

 1     been possible.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, it wasn't.  And it was an

 2     anti-constitutional step.

 3        Q.   You don't consider, do I take it, Mr. Vlaski, that setting up

 4     the -- the Serbian -- the republic of the Serbian people within Bosnia in

 5     January was in any way an unlawful or anti-constitutional step?

 6        A.   This is just a declaration, an expression of volition.  It's

 7     nothing official.

 8             Here in the preamble it says that every attempt will be made to

 9     achieve a peaceful agreement-based solution.  You know well that the

10     international community was by this time was involved in the solution in

11     attempts to solve this problem.  All the peoples in Yugoslavia enjoyed

12     this right to self-determination.  If everybody enjoyed it, why not the

13     Serbs?  And the same goes for Bosnia-Herzegovina because in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs are also one of the constituent peoples.  Why

15     should they be treated any different from other peoples?  Why shouldn't

16     they have that right?  I think they have that right and they must enjoy

17     it and they must be able to exercise it if they live in a well-ordered

18     state ruled by the law.  We had no other law.

19        Q.   Would you accept that this action by the SDS in declaring the

20     state and everything that followed thereafter, if nothing else,

21     contributed to the outbreak of violence in April?

22        A.   No, no.  That was not the reason.  The SDS, apart from this

23     political aspect of its activity, had no other element to it that would

24     point to its involvement or organisation in preparations for any

25     conflict.  Because the Cutileiro Agreement was precisely along the lines

Page 6479

 1     of the decision of this decision by the Assembly of the Serbian people,

 2     that the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina should agree about their

 3     rights and obligations, and also about the territories and try to find a

 4     model which would be a solution.  And that agreement was agreed upon,

 5     although there were no guarantees by the international community that it

 6     would be implemented, and it was very naive of the Serbian people not to

 7     have required any guarantees from the international sponsors.  And

 8     precisely because there were no guarantees, this agreement was violated

 9     eventually precisely by those who reckoned they had enough power to make

10     decisions without taking into account the Serbs, and that's why we ended

11     up forming these regions that were known later as SAO Krajina or

12     whatever.

13        Q.   I will repeat the question again.

14             Would you accept that this action by the Serbs, the SDS, in 1992,

15     the founding of the Serb republic, contributed - and I emphasise

16     contributed - to the outbreak of hostilities in April?

17        A.   I answered the question.  It did not contribute to it.  This was

18     a political action.  It was all legitimate and all these declarations.

19     There was nothing final about it, it was just an expression of a

20     political attitude, a political decision that had to be harmonised yet

21     and agreed upon with other peoples.  If you decide something, it doesn't

22     mean that it is carved in stone that it will bear no further

23     modification, but it was something for the future.  There was room for

24     negotiation yet and for agreement.

25        Q.   I'll move on.

Page 6480

 1             You were asked about -- by both counsel for the Defence, again,

 2     about the 11th of February meeting.

 3             And it was put to you in terms by Mr. Zecevic - just let me find

 4     the right place - that no one could suggest -- I better just get the

 5     right words.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, Your Honour, I thought I had marked up the

 7     place but ...

 8        Q.   Well, I'm sure that Mr. Zecevic, if I get it wrong -- he put it

 9     to you in terms that this was not a secret meeting and you agreed

10     wholeheartedly that the meeting in Banja Luka -- yes, I've got it.  It is

11     page 6423.  And he put to you:

12             "That was not a secret meeting, was it?"

13             And you said:

14             "No, it was in no way a secret meeting.  I can absolutely claim

15     that it was not a secret meeting of any type."

16             If it was not a secret meeting, why was it held in the hotel

17     Bosna and not in the CSB in Banja Luka?

18        A.   Well, precisely because it was not a secret meeting.  You can go

19     into the CSB building, you can go into the CSB building only if you're

20     authorised, but hotel Bosna is a public place, a public venue.  Anyone

21     can walk in.  And it's not secret also because the conclusions from this

22     meeting were sent to Delimustafic, the minister.  Why would that be done

23     if the deliberations were secret?  It's absurd to claim there was any

24     conspiracy to it.

25             These transcripts were not meant for Serbian leaders and Serbian

Page 6481

 1     policemen, they were offered to the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a

 2     proposal for -- for a way to resolve the many problems that had

 3     accumulated.

 4        Q.   Well, should we have look at what you told us in interview about

 5     this?

 6             MS. KORNER:  Could we have up on the screen, please, page 30, and

 7     this is the revised version, whether the names and the like were

 8     corrected.  So, sorry, 65 ter 9020.  Is there a B/C/S version?  I'm

 9     afraid, Your Honours, there's only an English version, but the

10     interpreters can see it then.

11             It's page -- it says 30 of 73 at the bottom, yes, thank you.

12        Q.   You have been asked on the previous page to look at the minutes

13     of the meeting, and you were asked as I asked you whether they were

14     accurate and you said, for the most part, yes.

15             And then you were asked:

16             "Did you take" - top of the page - "any contemporaneous notes

17     like an agenda?

18             "No, by that time, I had already given up on writing any notes.

19     I don't have any notes from that meeting.  We were all -- we actually

20     arrived unprepared to the meeting.  The chiefs of the CSBs, the centres,

21     they had the real power especially here in Banja Luka where the Serbs

22     were in the majority and they actually had the power.  In Sarajevo, we

23     were illegals."

24             And then do you remember who asked you to the meeting, and you

25     said, "Dragan Devedlaka ... I don't know who informed whom, but it is

Page 6482

 1     logical to me that Dragan Devedlaka would have hierarchically have been

 2     informed by whoever, Mandic or Stanisic.

 3             "And these minutes, were they distributed to the participants

 4     after the meeting?

 5             "I don't think I got it."

 6             And the investigator said:

 7             "Okay.  Because you looked at it less than a minute and you knew

 8     all about this meeting.  I just wondered had you ever seen this document

 9     before today?

10             "Later on, I did see it.  I don't know if it was Radovic or

11     Zugic.  I think it was Goran Radovic who gave it to me."

12             So the minutes were not distributed immediately after the

13     meeting, is that right, Mr. Vlaski?

14        A.   Well, since the records were there, the people who prepared the

15     meetings and organised it and prepared the records had all these

16     technical things under control, and we who travelled to Banja Luka had to

17     return to wherever we came from, so I'm not so familiar with these

18     transcripts.  I was not in such a position as to deserve a transcript.  I

19     could, for instance, receive one from Mr. Zedlak.

20             MR. ZECEVIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... what the

21     witness actually said.

22             MS. KORNER:  I -- if you can help Mr. Zecevic.

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  He said that somebody who organised and prepared

24     the meeting had the records and had to deal with them in a technical way.

25     I assume he meant that has to be retyped or something like that.

Page 6483

 1             But the -- the -- the -- the transcript says all these technical

 2     things under control which is -- which means nothing, and that is

 3     precisely the answer to your question.

 4             MS. KORNER:  Okay.  Perhaps if I can put it -- so what you're

 5     saying, and tell me if is this right, please, Mr. Vlaski - I don't want

 6     to put words in your mouth - is that you had nothing to do with how the

 7     minutes were produced.  Is that what you're telling us?

 8        A.   Well, of course, the recording secretary takes the record in this

 9     case, this is Mr. Belasevic, and he is the person who was responsible for

10     what is in the transcript, in the minutes.  And I said, I believe it

11     reflects the atmosphere and the topics of the meeting, although you can't

12     see from this that there was any secret or a meeting organised in advance

13     because there were no invitations or an agenda notified in advance

14     because the first prerequisite for a properly organised meeting is to

15     inform everyone of what the agenda would be.  We did not need an agenda,

16     to be fair, because we had only one topic to discuss, the issue of

17     survival.  And the records were done later, because we had no laptops and

18     we had no typewriters.  I don't know where they did it physically, where

19     they prepared it.  I was not familiar with the technical aspects of this

20     job and who formulated these minutes and these conclusions.  Perhaps they

21     could be arranged better, in a different order, and perhaps they could be

22     even formulated better, but that's a different issue.

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... line 6, it

24     says -- Ms. Korner said "the minutes" and it says in the transcript "the

25     manipulates" were produced.

Page 6484

 1             MS. KORNER:

 2        Q.   All right, Mr. Vlaski, I don't want to get too bogged down in

 3     that, but I would like to move now to what you then dealt with.  You

 4     say -- you were asked by the investigator:

 5             "Can you recall these conclusions" -- can we push the page up a

 6     bit?  Thanks.  "Can you recall these conclusions?"

 7             And you say:

 8             "No, I believe they were compiled later.

 9             "How long did the meeting last?

10             "Can't tell you.

11             "Why held in Banja Luka?"

12             And can we go to the next page, please.

13             "I don't know who insisted on being in Banja Luka, I don't know

14     who organised it all."

15             "Would you call it a closed meeting," said the investigator?

16             "Mr. Zupljanin provided security.  We didn't feel insecure where

17     personal security was concerned.  I believe this meeting could have been

18     held anywhere.  I don't know who organised it and why Banja Luka was

19     picked.

20             "Q.  But this was a meeting only open to Serb police officers not

21     to Croat or Muslim."

22             Your response:

23             "Yes, and that was his intention."

24             Now do you still say this wasn't a secret meeting?

25        A.   It absolutely was not secret.  I don't see why it should have

Page 6485

 1     been secret.

 2        Q.   But if it wasn't meant to be a secret meeting and you wanted to

 3     make your feelings known to the Muslims and Croats that you said were

 4     taking all the positions, why didn't you invite them to this meeting?

 5     Why didn't you have Mr. Delimustafic to this meeting with Mr. Mandic and

 6     Mr. Stanisic and express your grievances?

 7        A.   Well, really, I have to -- you make me laugh.  They -- they

 8     should have come to our meeting.  Well, they didn't call us to the

 9     meetings where they should have called us because we were part and parcel

10     of the authorities.  Were their partners in the everyday work that was

11     supposed to be performed.  They didn't call us to these meetings we were

12     supposed to attend, and it would have been ridiculous for us to think

13     that they would come to one meeting that we organised, and it wasn't

14     really logical for them to be invited.

15        Q.   And you absolutely reject any suggestion that this was a meeting

16     that was to be kept quiet from the other nationalities in the MUP.

17        A.   This was the first meeting, and I've already said that.  It was

18     on this occasion that I met many of the people for the first time and got

19     to know them.  We hadn't had any previous communication unlike the

20     representatives of the Bosniak and Croat peoples who had everything at

21     their disposal from the various vehicles to communication devices and

22     premises.  They didn't invite us to their meetings, and this became only

23     too apparent from everything that happened later.  So this entire process

24     had lasted by that time for a year.  Had we acted responsibly towards

25     ourselves, then we should have by the 11th of February, been very

Page 6486

 1     familiar with one another and communicated our positions to one another.

 2     But the fact that on the 11th of February we only met many of the people

 3     amongst ourselves, only goes to show that we were at the very beginning

 4     of any activities.

 5        Q.   By the time of this meeting, perhaps you'd like to go to the

 6     minutes and could we have them up on the screen again.  It's 1D -- have

 7     you got them in your -- 1D135.

 8             By the time of this meeting, the Assembly of the Serbian Republic

 9     had already made a decision on -- that there was to be a Serbian MUP

10     established, hadn't it?  That's what Mr. Radovic says.

11        A.   That's right.  The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that's

12     what it should state because that's what the declaration was as well as

13     the political position that the MUP of the Serbian Republic of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina should be established.

15        Q.   Right.  And Mr. Stanisic, in his speech that we see on that page,

16     talked about the Council of Ministers of that Assembly, didn't he?  First

17     line:

18             "The position of the Council of Ministers at the last session was

19     that the territories in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which

20     are under Serbian control, that control must be felt ..."

21             So he was talking, wasn't he, about the Council of Ministers of

22     that Assembly, of which you may or may not have known he was a member?

23        A.   He was an advisor.  He had the role of a political representative

24     of sorts of the MUP within the Ministry of the Interior of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and his political role was to co-ordinate the work of

Page 6487

 1     MUP representatives in -- or rather, to co-ordinate the work of the MUP

 2     with the representatives of the MUP of Bosniak and Croat ethnicities and

 3     to co-ordinate the work with the Council of Ministers which was set up at

 4     the Assembly and the SDS.

 5             From his presentation it is clear that the MUP of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina is being divided by the Muslims and not by the Serbs.

 7     To us, this was common knowledge.  Their statements to the public at

 8     large and all the other activities they undertook were aimed at laying

 9     all the blame at the Serbs, so the result was the formation of the Serb

10     MUP from the municipal level to the regional level to the ministry

11     itself, but this was only a -- a -- a project at its inception at the

12     time.

13        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... can I ask my original

14     question again.

15             Were you aware, and it seems that you were, that Mr. Stanisic was

16     a member of the Council of Ministers of the Serbian Assembly?

17        A.   I was aware of it.

18             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honour, I didn't want to object because there

19     has been so many objections already.

20             I just don't see how this comes out of the cross-examination, and

21     I will beg Ms. Korner to pay attention to the limitation that has to be

22     imposed.

23             MS. KORNER:  He was asked both by -- by both counsel about the

24     content of these minutes, and his assertion is that at all times the

25     minutes were -- it was intended and that the minutes were sent to

Page 6488

 1     Mr. Izetbegovic, and I'm just dealing with that aspect.

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, I -- I beg your attention just --

 3             He was asked on direct about the minutes of the 11th of

 4     February meeting.  He was re -- cross-examined, examined exactly on that

 5     basis because he was asked on -- this document was produced to him during

 6     the direct.  He was cross-examined during the cross-examination on the

 7     same document.

 8             I don't see how, out of our cross-examination, anything of the

 9     sort that -- that refers to the Council of Ministers or anything comes

10     out.  I'm 100 percent sure that I never asked this question nor has

11     Defence of Zupljanin, or anything remotely connected to that.

12             Thank you.

13             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I'm going to go on asking unless you

14     tell me -- I've got just one point to make, and I would like to make it,

15     if you allow me.  If you don't, then I won't.  There has been

16     cross-examination on this document.  I appreciate I opened up in

17     examination-in-chief, but I want to explore some of those replies in

18     re-examination, in particular the assertion that these minutes went to

19     Mr. Izetbegovic, which is not something I think that was said in-chief.

20             JUDGE HALL:  Please proceed.

21             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Right.  Were you also aware - before I move onto the next point -

23     that Mr. Stanisic was --

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm so sorry.  In particular the certification that

25     these went to Mr. Izetbegovic which was not something that was said

Page 6489

 1     in-chief.  I heard Ms. Korner saying Izetbegovic.  This is a

 2     misinterpretation.  He said the minutes -- he said in direct in the

 3     cross-examination that the minutes are going to Delimustafic, the

 4     minister.

 5             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, I meant Mr. Delimustafic.  I said

 6     Izetbegovic, but I meant Mr. Delimustafic, which I apologise, you're

 7     quite right.

 8        Q.   Now maybe we can finish this topic fairly quickly.

 9             Were you aware that not only was he a member of the Council of

10     Ministers but a member of the SDS, a founding member it appears?

11        A.   I don't know, really, because I was not in charge of the

12     personnel policy of the SDS nor was I interested in the work of that

13     party in that sense as to who was a member or who was not.

14             As for the work of the Council of Ministers I was interested in

15     that because that was a process that had been launched, and I knew that

16     he was involved in the work of the Council of Ministers.

17        Q.   And Mr. Stanisic says:

18             "A list of minimal outstanding demands should be assembled at

19     this meeting and submitted to Minister Alija Delimustafic."

20             Correct?  Do you see that?  It's Mr. Stanisic 's speech.  It may

21     be on the next page in B/C/S.

22             You are asserting, do I understand this, not that a list of

23     demands was sent to Mr. Delimustafic but these minutes of this meeting in

24     Banja Luka; is that what you're saying?  I just want to understand that.

25        A.   I think that the form itself was not that important.  The

Page 6490

 1     intentions were important.  The format could have been that the message

 2     could have been conveyed verbally or in writing.  What mattered was the

 3     intention to acquaint Mr. Delimustafic who was nominally the minister and

 4     who was the individual who dealt with these matters was informed of this.

 5     We believed in the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the MUP of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We only thought that the conduct had to change, and

 7     that's why it mattered that the document be sent to Mr. Delimustafic.

 8        Q.   Yes, look, Mr. Vlaski, you have shown us over and over again

 9     you're not a stupid man.  You know the difference between a list of

10     demands being send and the minutes of a meeting such as this.  I want to

11     know, the Trial Chamber may want to know what are you saying?  Are you

12     saying that these minutes, these typed-up minutes were sent to

13     Mr. Delimustafic?

14        A.   I cannot claim either way because I don't know who was supposed

15     to formulate and convey the demands.  This is not stated in the minutes,

16     and I was not informed of it subsequently.

17        Q.   Because the only person, the only people who are said to be

18     informed of the conclusions, if you go to number 18, if we can go to the

19     fifth page in English and probably about the same in B/C/S.  Yes.

20             Are -- it says:

21             "Inform the Council of Ministers of the ..."

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, it has nothing to do with the objection.

23     It is the translation problem.  And ministerial council.  It says in the

24     original [B/C/S spoken] of the mentioned conclusions the Council of

25     Ministers is to be informed too.

Page 6491

 1             MS. KORNER:  And it's difference is?

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, I believe the difference is obvious.

 3             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, I --

 4             MR. ZECEVIC:  The English should say:  "Of the above conclusions,

 5     the Council of Ministers should also be informed," or something along

 6     these lines.

 7             MS. KORNER:  All right.  I'm sure you're right, Mr. Zecevic.

 8        Q.   That's all I want to ask you about these minutes.  And finally,

 9     can we turn one last time to the question of intercepts about which you

10     have had so much to say.

11             As I understand your complaint, it is that the intercepts which

12     were made, in particular of Mr. Karadzic, were illegal and particularly

13     illegal -- and other people, other Serbs, because the operatives used

14     were not, at the time, members of the MUP.

15             Have I understood that correctly?

16        A.   I provided an analysis of the procedure.  The request for the

17     application of any measures has to be based on some sort of information.

18             In this case, orders for the application of measures and the

19     entire procedure starts from the top and runs along illegal channels that

20     were outside of the institutions.

21             JUDGE HALL:  [Previous translation continues] ... if I may have a

22     moment.  Ms. Korner, I know that Mr. Krgovic spent quite a bit of time on

23     this, but the -- need you go down this road?  Because the question of the

24     legality of this trial -- this trial -- is this really something that the

25     Chamber at the end of the day is going to have to consider?

Page 6492

 1             MS. KORNER:  No, well, I mean -- but, Your Honour, I don't know

 2     is the answer because I know that you have ruled on this, as it were, but

 3     it wasn't really Mr. Krgovic.  It was more Mr. Zecevic who spent a very

 4     long time and put various names to him, as to the operatives.

 5             So I'm dealing with that as much as I can.  But if Your Honours,

 6     as we will be submitting that -- the -- the legality or otherwise is not

 7     something that -- that will make these intercepts admissible or

 8     non-admissible then I'm perfectly happy to leave it.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Well, of course I'm not going to anticipate what

10     eventual conclusion the Chamber might reach.  I only say that in the

11     context of the clear ruling -- rulings, I think there are more than one,

12     that the Chamber has given that I'm surprised that counsel on either side

13     felt the need to go down this road.

14             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, that's -- may I say, Your Honours

15     didn't stop Mr. Zecevic or Mr. Krgovic, so I can't read Your Honours'

16     minds, can I?  I feel I ought to deal with this slightly in

17     re-examination.

18             JUDGE HALL:  I think that over the months sometimes the -- I

19     think counsel on both side would have appreciated that the, speaking for

20     myself, perhaps my fellow Judges as well, but rather that intervening

21     in -- when counsel is on a particular plank, the preferable course is to

22     say nothing in the hope that it would -- that he would come.

23             JUDGE HARHOFF:  It goes away [Microphone not activated]

24             JUDGE HALL:  Yeah.

25             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours I'm perfectly happy to leave it, I

Page 6493

 1     mean, being given that indication.  I hope I won't, if it later comes to

 2     argument, be put at a disadvantage because I do have certain matters I

 3     can put to him about it.  But I'll -- I will take Your Honours' guidance

 4     on this, if I may.

 5        Q.   I just want to then deal with one aspect of this -- from your

 6     listening.  The intercepts which you have listened to, which you listened

 7     to here, they reflected, did they, particularly the ones where you were

 8     referred to, the situation at the time?

 9             Did you get the interpretation?

10        A.   I have too much noise in my earphones.  It's a problem.  Perhaps

11     we're being listened in.

12             JUDGE HALL:  [Microphone not activated]

13             MS. KORNER:

14        Q.   Right.  Did you hear the question?

15        A.   I didn't.  I didn't hear the question because there's too much

16     noise in my earphones.

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... the usher can give you

18     another set and see if that's any better.

19             The question I asked, Mr. Vlaski, was this:  You listened to a

20     number of intercepts that particularly dealt with your situation but also

21     referred to other matters.  Did those conversations, and forget whether

22     they were legal or illegally taped, represent a reflection on events that

23     you knew about?

24        A.   From what I could hear and read, I believe that they did reflect.

25     There were many more things, of course. You don’t have insight into

Page 6494

 1     all the intercepts, only the ones that were presented to you.

 2        Q.   I accept that entirely.  All right.

 3             Sorry, one last matter.  You were asked by Mr. Zecevic yesterday,

 4     and you had never said anything about the meeting but he put to you, at

 5     page 6406:

 6             "It was because of the nature of the your work that you were

 7     informed of the secret meeting of the SDA in the police hall which was

 8     held on 26th of May, 1991; is that right?"

 9             Now you have never mentioned the meeting of the 26th of May in

10     interview, in Banja Luka, nor when you gave evidence when I was asking

11     you questions, but you knew exactly what Mr. Zecevic was talking about.

12     Did he discuss this with you when you met?

13        A.   No, not this topic.  But it was only logical that this issue of

14     organising would crop up, because the context of my testimony had to do

15     with the response to various actions by the Party of Democratic Action.

16        Q.   What I want to know, Mr. Vlaski, is you didn't appear surprised

17     by the question at all.  And so that's why I'm asking you whether you

18     discussed this with Mr. Zecevic when you met him.

19        A.   I wasn't surprised by a single question put to me during my

20     testimony here.  I am not surprised.

21        Q.   Yes.  All right.  You see, you then -- your answer to this was:

22             "Yes, because at the time I was the chief of the administration

23     for the security of individual and those individuals included

24     Mr. Izetbegovic, who participated in the meeting."

25             Do we understand that you -- because were responsible for the

Page 6495

 1     security, particularly of the President, you accompanied Mr. Izetbegovic

 2     to this secret meeting?

 3        A.   I wasn't Mr. Izetbegovic's body-guard.  I was the chief of the

 4     administration.  The practice at the time when I headed the

 5     administration was such that many attempts were made at trying to prevent

 6     me from obtaining relevant information as to when Mr. Izetbegovic was

 7     taking the trip, where, when he was going to come back, and who he was

 8     going to stay when and who with.  And as for this particular meeting, I

 9     received the relevant information perhaps 15 minutes ahead of its

10     commencement.

11        Q.   All right.  Because, obviously, whoever was his body-guard, who

12     was under your command had to say where he was going and with whom?

13        A.   He had body-guards who were not under our control.  They were

14     party people.  Some of them were held criminally liable later on, and

15     some even earlier on.

16        Q.   Anyway, the upshot is, whether it was 15 minutes before or at

17     another stage, you were aware that Mr. Izetbegovic was going to a hall to

18     attend the meeting of the SDA; is that right?

19        A.   That's right.  Because the meeting was somewhat broader.  It

20     included the representatives from Sandzak, Croatia, Serbia, and all over

21     Bosnia, probably also from abroad.

22        Q.   Yes.

23             MS. KORNER:  I have no further questions.

24             JUDGE HALL:  When the Chamber gave leave to the Prosecution to

25     cross-examine this witness in -- in the course of re-examination, it was

Page 6496

 1     alerted to the possibility that this may have -- this unusual course, may

 2     have resulted in leave being given to the counsel for the Defence to

 3     further cross-examine.  But inasmuch as Ms. Korner has confined herself

 4     to matters that arose out of counsel's cross-examination, I -- do I

 5     correctly conclude that the question of further cross-examination does

 6     not really arise?

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  You're correct, Your Honours.  We don't have any

 8     questions for this witness anymore.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

10             MR. KRGOVIC:  I have no further questions for this witness, Your

11     Honour.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Vlaski, yesterday you told us, and it was

14     repeated today, that it seems that for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

15     relationship between the master and the servant was a historical category

16     and they believed that it was time for them to become masters.

17             So I presume that, before that, they were the servants?

18        A.   Well, it doesn't only have to do with servants.  You've gone to

19     one extremism.  We had equality, we had equality in the Socialist

20     Republic -- Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.  That was the principle in

21     which the country was based and servants and masters were a historical

22     occurrence during the Ottoman Empire.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Vlaski, we thank you for your assistance to the

25     Tribunal in coming to give evidence.  Your testimony is now at an end,

Page 6497

 1     and you're now released as a witness.

 2             The Chamber will now rise, and we will resume at 2.15 tomorrow

 3     afternoon.

 4                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.56 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 18th day of

 6                           February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.