Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6667

 1                           Tuesday, 23 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 6             Good morning everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case

 7     number IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and

 8     Stojan Zupljanin.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             Good morning to all.  May we begin in the usual manner by having

11     the appearances, please.

12             MS. KORNER:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Joanna Korner assisted

13     by Jasmina Bosnjakovic.

14             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

15     Appearing for Mr. Stanisic, Slobodan Cvijetic and Case Manager

16     Tatjana Savic.

17             MR. PANTELIC:  Good morning, Your Honour.  For Zupljanin Defence

18     this morning, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE HALL:  If there are no preliminary matters that need delay

20     us, would the usher please escort the witness back to the stand.

21             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, this isn't going to delay you so the

22     usher can bring the witness in.  We applied for protective measures for

23     Witness 213, who is coming next week.  I understand from speaking to

24     Mr. Krgovic there's no objection.  I don't know whether anybody else has

25     got any objection.  So if we could have a decision on that, that would be

Page 6668

 1     very helpful.

 2             MR. KRGOVIC:  We don't have an objection, Your Honours.

 3             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] No, me neither.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6                           WITNESS:  DRAGO BOROVCANIN [Resumed]

 7                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 8             JUDGE HALL:  Good morning, sir.  Before I invite Ms. Korner to

 9     continue, I would remind you that you're still on your oath.

10             Yes, Ms. Korner.

11             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

12                           Examination by Ms. Korner:  [Continued]

13        Q.   Mr. Borovcanin, can I, this morning, before we continue with the

14     documents in this case, just deal with two slightly separate matters.

15     Firstly, we've seen that Mr. Cvijetic was chief of the CSB during the

16     relevant period.  Is he still alive?

17        A.   No.  He was killed in 1993, in January.

18        Q.   All right.  And secondly, I just want to deal with the topic of

19     intercepts very briefly.  You were asked to listen to a number of

20     intercepts, and can I just deal with them in this way:

21             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, this was listed on the proofing note

22     which was supplied to the Trial Chamber.

23        Q.   Were you able to recognise the voice of Mico Stanisic - and don't

24     worry about the -- the numbers I'm about to read - on intercepts which

25     had the numbers 2695 -- 65 ter numbers 2695-1088, and 1090, on which

Page 6669

 1     intercept 1090 you were also able to recognise the voice of someone

 2     called Miljenko Borovcanin, and also on 1054 you recognised

 3     Mico Stanisic's voice?

 4             Can I just ask you, who is Milenko Borovcanin?  Is he a relation

 5     of yours or just somebody who has the same name?

 6        A.   Milenko is no relation of mine.  I don't know how you understood

 7     it, but in the Orthodox faith, if your patron saint is not the same -- we

 8     are not related.  We just share the same last name.

 9        Q.   Do you know who he was, what position he held in 1992?

10        A.   Just before the war, he was in the police station of Novi Grad,

11     and during the war I believe he was assistant commander of a police

12     station in the process of being established in Rajlovac.

13        Q.   And I think you also heard, recognised the voice of Karisik, the

14     head of the Special Police on intercepts which were numbered 1091 and

15     1095.  Is that right?

16        A.   I can't recall precisely whom he was talking to, but I recognised

17     his voice.

18        Q.   Yes.  Yes.  Thank you, sir.  That's all that I want to ask you

19     about those matters.  I'm sorry, I should have asked you one further

20     matter.

21             Were you aware of the -- called the Serb autonomous areas, in

22     particular the SAO Romanija-Birac?

23        A.   I didn't know that until later when it was reported in the media,

24     when I understood that it was an area that the centre was covering, if I

25     understood that correctly.

Page 6670

 1        Q.   All right.  So you never heard about anybody who was president of

 2     that Serb autonomous region or any kind of Assembly that was ever held?

 3        A.   Certainly not.

 4        Q.   All right.  Can we return, then, please to some of the documents

 5     you looked at.  Not all, you'll be happy to hear.  We dealt with,

 6     although I said we were going to go back to it, I think we've done

 7     everything we need to with that, the 11th of July meeting in Belgrade.

 8             Could you have a look now, please, at 6 -- I'm sorry,

 9     Exhibit P610, which will come up on the screen again, but quite slowly,

10     I'm afraid.

11             This is a report on the implementation of the conclusions from

12     the meeting of senior personnel in the MUP held on the 11th of July, and

13     these minutes are headed "Sarajevo, August 1992."

14             Did you see this document at the time?

15        A.   Well, as far as I remember, we went through this document

16     yesterday.  I attended that meeting, and that implies I've seen the

17     document.

18        Q.   Right.  Can I ask you to look, please, at the -- in English it's

19     the second page, and I think it's the same in the B/C/S version.

20             Now, it appears that the ministry had sent out a telegram on the

21     17th of August, asking for responses to certain questions, and this is a

22     document issued by your CSB replying to the questions.  Under item

23     number 6, I think the question was - unfortunately we don't have the

24     document here - about the investigation of war crimes, and here it's

25     stated:

Page 6671

 1              "They have started with video cassettes on processed war

 2     crimes."

 3             War crimes against whom were being investigated?

 4        A.   Well, you see, by that time, war crimes were really being

 5     committed in an area called Birca, in the area of the police station

 6     Bratunac, and some in the area of the police station Milici.  And if I

 7     remember well, a scenes of crimes officer team went out onto the scene to

 8     document these war crimes, and there are photographs.  They tried to do

 9     their best to conduct a professional on-site investigation with the

10     personnel and the inspectors that were available, so I know that for a

11     fact those were war crimes against the Serbian population in the area of

12     Podrinje, mainly in the municipality of Bratunac, including the village

13     of Kravica and some other places I've forgotten.

14             And I have to add, I'm sorry, if there had been any crimes

15     committed by Serbs and we had known about them, I believe they would have

16     been treated in the same way as these crimes.

17        Q.   Yes.  Well, you've anticipated my next question.  As far as you

18     know, was any investigation carried out into war crimes committed against

19     non-Serbs?

20        A.   I just said that.  On-site investigations were carried out.  Oh,

21     you mean against non-Serbs?  At that time, you have to believe me, I was

22     engaged in other work.  It would not be good for me to answer that

23     question without proper information and statistics.  People from the

24     crime department should be asked that question.  They did their job day

25     to day, and they had all the documents.  I was engaged in operations work

Page 6672

 1     with uniformed police, and I spent a lot of my time in the field doing

 2     specific jobs.  Without proper information, it would not be a good idea

 3     for me to give you an answer.

 4        Q.   Yes, but you were able to give me detail -- or give us details of

 5     the investigations in crimes into Serbs, what was alleged to be war

 6     crimes against Serbs.  Are you saying that you don't know of any

 7     investigations against Muslims?  Of war crimes that had taken place as

 8     against non-Serbs, sorry.

 9        A.   I her later that there had been a few such investigations, and I

10     believe it's documented somewhere, but I cannot speak in a substantiated

11     way about these things because I was not involved in those

12     investigations.

13        Q.   As far as you were concerned, during that period of 1992, were

14     there any investigations into any of the events that had taken place, for

15     example, in Hrasnica, Susica camp, for example?

16        A.   I think I partly answered that question yesterday when I said

17     that when we heard about Susica, a lot of water had passed under the

18     bridge, and I learned more about it from the media than we had official

19     reports, because there were many incidents going on; I was in the field a

20     lot; it was difficult to keep up with these things.  I can't say I knew

21     about it at the time.

22        Q.   All right.  That's all that I want to ask you, thank you, about

23     that document.

24             Can we move next, please, to --

25             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Witness, could I just ask a question for

Page 6673

 1     clarification of this, because I'm not sure I fully understood your

 2     testimony in respect of your involvement in the investigation of war

 3     crimes.

 4             You said that you were aware of the fact that the war crimes

 5     prevention service had gone out to investigate crimes in three different

 6     police stations where allegedly crimes -- war crimes had been committed

 7     against Serbs, and you told us that videos were taken and some

 8     preliminary investigations were made, and then when Ms. Korner asked you

 9     about similar war crimes committed against non-Serbs, you said that you

10     were not involved or had no information about this.

11             So my question is why is there a difference between your

12     involvement in crimes against Serbs compared to crimes against non-Serbs?

13     Or have I misunderstood your testimony?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] there's probably a

15     misunderstanding.  I said that employees of the crime department led by

16     inspectors conducted on-site investigations into crimes against the Serb

17     population.  And that has been documented, as I said.  I added later that

18     I was sure that if there had been reports about crimes against non-Serbs,

19     knowing my colleagues, I believe they would have treated these reports in

20     the same way, gone out and investigated.  Also, I did not participate

21     directly in these on-site investigations, but I looked at some of the

22     photographs, for instance, when there were massive crimes involving

23     hundreds of victims, and I also participated myself in the investigation

24     in a village.  I believe it was called Pantici near Zvornik.  I just

25     happened to be in the field with that team.

Page 6674

 1             As for other reports and on-site investigations into crimes

 2     against non-Serbs, I can't say I was directly involved.  But I have to

 3     say, again, I believe my colleagues were professionals and they would

 4     have dealt with it.

 5             JUDGE HARHOFF:  So, just to be sure, when, later on, you learned

 6     that crimes, in fact, had also been committed against non-Serbs, you

 7     heard of no investigation being made to investigate those crimes.  Is

 8     that your testimony?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In one unofficial informal

10     conversation, and I believe there's even a document about it, it says

11     that investigations had been carried out into crimes against non-Serbs.

12             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.

13             Back to you, Ms. Korner.

14             MS. KORNER:

15        Q.   Can I just continue for one moment on this theme.  One of your

16     duties was to -- to send inspectors to the various SJBs you've told us

17     yesterday; is that right?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And one of their jobs, looking at that checklist of what they had

20     to do, was to look at the books to see what crimes had been record and

21     what investigations had been carry out; is that right?

22        A.   Certainly.  Every crime had to be recorded in the books that were

23     prescribed by the regulations.

24        Q.   And their reports should have contained references, particularly

25     to, for example, major killings, shouldn't they, and what was happening

Page 6675

 1     about the investigation?

 2        A.   Certainly.  Every serious crime, especially murder, had priority

 3     in our work above all other crimes such as theft and robbery and

 4     suchlike.  I don't really understand what you're asking me.  Everything

 5     was documented.  Everything was processed.

 6        Q.   But from what you say, you don't recall any reference in any

 7     reports to any war crimes committed in particular places against

 8     non-Serbs.

 9        A.   Let's try to distinguish between two things.  If a police

10     inspector came to carry out an inspection at a police station, he was to

11     inspect the internal organisation, the keeping of records, operative

12     work, security plans, the engagement of policemen.  He was to inspect

13     solely the work of uniformed policemen.

14             My colleagues in the crime department were much more involved in

15     this other area of work that you're asking me about now.  And I think

16     people who were involved in that work know much more about it.

17        Q.   And just but finally then, Vlasenica did come under the CSB that

18     you were employed in; is that right?

19        A.   Organisationally speaking, yes.

20        Q.   Well, do you want to -- to add a caveat to that?  In other words,

21     you say, "Organisationally speaking, yes."  Are you trying to say that

22     practically it didn't?

23        A.   Well, you see, if you look at the organisational scheme of the

24     CSB, the security services centre, we looked at it yesterday, you see the

25     head of the centre and the police stations below, that's what I mean.

Page 6676

 1     Organisationally, they fell under us.  There's no dilemma there, that

 2     that's implied.  They were under our jurisdiction.

 3        Q.   I don't want to pursue this any further.

 4             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, can I just mention, and we should

 5     perhaps have put it in for completeness sake, the document that's

 6     referred to, the 17th of the 8th, 1992, was the request.  It is actually

 7     on our 65 ter list just so it links up.  So it's numbered 217, and I wish

 8     to put it in for completeness sake but just so it links.  Thank you.

 9             Right.  Can we move now, please, to document, continuing in the

10     chronological fashion, 2879, please.

11        Q.   Now, this is a document from the CSB crime prevention department

12     to the SJBs, and we see "Vlasenica" in the second line.  And it's

13     addressed to the chief, and it's signed by somebody called

14     Simo Tus -- Tusevljak.

15             Sorry.  There are occasions when I have serious problems.

16             Did you know him?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And this was a request to forward information about the period

19     from the 1st of April to the 30th of July about crimes, and did you know

20     about this -- this document at the time?

21        A.   Of course.  As in the CSB, we held regular working collegium

22     meetings, and each department chief would brief the head about the

23     priority tasks that lay ahead.  My colleague Mr. Tusevljak, in accordance

24     with the request and the dispatch from the meeting, did this because the

25     minister gave outstanding orders that this information should be provided

Page 6677

 1     to the information listed in this document.  This was a professional

 2     approach to the job in those times of chaos.

 3        Q.   Well, thank you very much, sir.  That's all I want to ask you

 4     about the document.

 5             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,

 6     please.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P991, Your Honours.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Could we now have, please, up P730.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  I do apologise.  It's Exhibit P992.

11             MS. KORNER:  Right.  Thank you.  Can we have P730 up, please.

12        Q.   Now, this is a report to the ministry, dated the 3rd of August --

13     in fact, it's actually addressed to the minister himself - on the

14     realisation of an order dated the 27th of July, 1992, and the document

15     itself appears to be unsigned.  I think that's because, in fact, part of

16     the document is missing.  But if we look at the first paragraph, it says:

17              "Acting in accordance with your order and the working agreement

18     with ... the CSB, I visited the majority of the public security stations

19     in that area except for Skelani and Bratunac, which were visited, as

20     agreed, by the chief of the police department in the CSB,

21     Drago Borovcanin."

22             So are you able to say, when you look at this document, who it is

23     likely to have been written by?

24        A.   When going through the document with the investigator, I had a

25     dilemma.  I see that it is quite well written with quite a lot of

Page 6678

 1     information from the ground, and if my name wasn't mentioned here where

 2     it said I visited only Bratunac and Skelani, I might have thought I had

 3     written it myself.  A colleague of mine did this very well.  But I'm not

 4     sure; I don't know who did this.  I can only assume it was someone from

 5     the MUP, from the police administration.

 6        Q.   All right.  Can we just look at a couple of parts of the

 7     document, and we'll come on to the report you did next.

 8             MS. KORNER:  Firstly, it's in paragraph -- second page in

 9     English, and it's still the first page, I think, in B/C/S.

10        Q.   Where it says:

11             "The majority of the public security stations in the territory of

12     this centre established good co-operation with the units of the army of

13     the Serbian Republic, especially in the plan of integral defence, where

14     members of the police are filling up the crisis areas at the defence

15     line, joint work with the military police, and so on."

16             Now, can we pause there for a moment because I just want to ask

17     you something about this co-operation between the military and the

18     police.

19             To your knowledge, did the -- were police units sent to assist

20     the military?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And who would be in command of the police unit that assisted the

23     military?

24        A.   In practice, it was like this in those days:  If we received a

25     request from a military command that we should provide assistance in

Page 6679

 1     manning one of the demarcation lines, then with the approval of the

 2     ministry and the chief of the centre a dispatch would be prepared which

 3     would contain the following information:  For example, we need a company

 4     of a hundred men.  And then we would write to all the SJBs asking them to

 5     provide a few policemen depending on their manpower levels so that they

 6     would not be depleted too much, and the unit that would be formed in this

 7     way would be commanded by a local company leader, someone with

 8     experience, who would take that unit to the demarcation line.  When this

 9     was done, he had to report to the military command in the combat zone in

10     question.  And after that, they would be resubordinate to the

11     Army of Republika Srpska, and they would carry out their tasks jointly

12     with the military while their shift lasted.

13             Let me just add why it was we who appointed the company leader.

14     We wanted to remain in contact with them, and it was their responsibility

15     to draw up a report on what was happening, to check on the discipline of

16     the officers on the front line, to report on any casualties, and so on.

17     That was their task, but they were resubordinated to the

18     Army of Republika Srpska in compliance with the law then in force.

19        Q.   The -- you've told us who -- that the -- it would be commanded by

20     a local company leader.  In practice, what sort of rank would that

21     company leader hold?

22        A.   Well, you see, the minister gave that a lot of thought, and in

23     both situations we were duty bound to have a military sort of structure

24     so that we would know who could be a company leader, and they were people

25     who had experience.  We also looked at their military specialties that

Page 6680

 1     they had had in the JNA.  If they had any kind of military speciality, we

 2     would take that into account.  If someone had been a reserve officer, for

 3     example, in Bileca, which was a barracks that was held in high esteem

 4     where people were well trained, and we had then confidence in people who

 5     had been trained there.  If they happened to be in the police, we would

 6     appoint such men to be company leaders.

 7        Q.   But they were still -- they were still police officers; they

 8     weren't military -- they weren't in the VRS.  They were still part of the

 9     MUP?

10        A.   Of course they were, yes, but while they were at the demarcation

11     line, we didn't have contact with them.  If anything dishonourable

12     happened there, it would be military security that would deal with that.

13     If there was something like a crime, God forbid, something really

14     atrocious, we would suspend them even before they returned to the base.

15     And, of course, disciplinary proceedings would be instituted.  And as for

16     criminal prosecution, that would be in the purview of the court.  The two

17     processes would run in parallel.  That's how it was.

18        Q.   So that's the situation if there had been a request for police

19     assistance, as you put it, on the demarcation line.  Where the situation

20     was that in a particular area the army were operating but also obviously

21     police were carrying out their duties, would the police there, if there

22     were just ordinary work going on, be resubordinated to the army, or would

23     they be responsible to their own MUP chain of command?

24        A.   I'll try to illustrate this with an example.  Imagine a

25     demarcation line cutting through the territories of one or more SJBs.

Page 6681

 1     This was the case around the city of Sarajevo where there was not a

 2     single station that was not in a combat area.  If the military was active

 3     on the territory of an SJB, we had nothing to do with that.  They did

 4     their work, and we did our regular work, unless they expressly asked for

 5     a squad or a company to assist them and then we would provide that.

 6        Q.   Thank you, sir.  That's fairly clear.

 7             All right.  Can we just go back to the document for a moment.  In

 8     this document at --

 9             MS. KORNER:  It's paragraph 3 on that -- the English page, being

10     a special problem.  In the B/C/S we need to go to the next page, please.

11        Q.   Here your inspector is dealing with the paramilitary formation

12     problem.  He says:

13              "True as I was informed, they were responding and helping the

14     units of the Serbian Army and police, but obviously they have some

15     special motives for war, and they don't want to put themselves under the

16     army command," et cetera.

17              "In some areas, for example, in Ilidza and Pale, they are

18     staying in separate buildings and are often on the move and in different

19     areas.  On the route Sarajevo-Zvornik and in the course of leaving the

20     field, also when leaving as a group, they make problems for the local

21     public security stations, ignoring them or even threatening to attack the

22     policemen at the check points.  And this was recently the case with the

23     so-called 'Carlijevci' in Vlasenica."

24             Now, can I just ask you first of all about were you aware of the

25     problems of paramilitaries before you -- you even saw this report?

Page 6682

 1        A.   Of course.  I wish they hadn't helped us.  As soon as the war

 2     broke out, quite a lot of these groups arrived.  They were

 3     self-organised.  And there were all sorts of groups.  And for you to

 4     understand this completely, in the very beginning there were groups who

 5     very well equipped with the new uniforms and they were tidy and neat so

 6     one thought they might have been trained, but very soon we came to

 7     understand that their motivation was not to help and to be active on the

 8     lines.  They were a mixture of criminals, people prone to looting, and

 9     all sorts of people.  So they did a lot of damage to us, and I wish they

10     hadn't arrive.  They were everywhere, especially in the Podrinje area,

11     because Serbia was nearby and they saw it as a sort of gold mine.  And

12     they visited that area daily.  I can expand on that if you like.

13        Q.   No, don't worry.  We might -- I just want to ask you one further

14     question about that.  Are you aware of any request being made by your

15     chief to the minister that there should be some kind of assistance from

16     the Special Police or -- or anybody else or the army to get rid of these

17     paramilitaries?

18        A.   At that time, we didn't know whether they were in the composition

19     of the military commands.  There were quite a few of these renegade

20     commands who would simply declare themselves to be some sort of unit, but

21     in the very beginning we didn't really understand what was going on.  We

22     thought they were part of the army.  And to tell you the truth, at the

23     very beginning we were happy when helped -- when help arrived.  But when

24     we saw what their real motivation was and what their contribution was,

25     very few of them were killed and those that were not killed in combat but

Page 6683

 1     during looting.

 2             I moved around in areas such as Bratunac, Skelani, Ilidza, and

 3     Sarajevo, and you asked me whether we had information and passed it on.

 4     At the collegium meetings, we continually discuss these topics.  We knew

 5     these groups existed, and it was very dangerous to take any sort of

 6     thoughtless action against them.  These people numbered more than a

 7     hundred in some cases.  And as an experienced policeman, I thought we

 8     should talk to these people to avoid bloodshed, because I was responsible

 9     for the policemen under my command.  Those were very difficult times, you

10     know.  And the way they took the bridges in the Podrinje area, for

11     example, where they had policemen to act as a front, they were reserve

12     policemen whom they used to conceal their smuggling activities, and it

13     was very difficult, very difficult to get these people out of our area.

14        Q.   You see, this report says they were responding and helping the

15     units of the army and police.  Was that a view, as you've told us, that

16     early on was held, that they could help the police in carrying out their

17     duties?

18        A.   Well, I'll illustrate this with an example to help you

19     understand.  For example, Carli's men were mentioned here.  They were in

20     Sarajevo and Grbavica and Lukavica before.  And in April - it was still

21     early on - we were expecting an attack according to some security

22     information we had, intelligence we had.  And there was a leader - I've

23     forgotten his name - they all had some sort of nicknames.  And I, "Well,

24     you're experienced.  Let's act together on this line, separating the part

25     of Sarajevo in question from Lukavica," and in the morning they called me

Page 6684

 1     up on a Motorola and said there was an attack, a policeman was killed.  I

 2     went up there and I saw that the policeman had been hit by a piece of

 3     shrapnel from a mine, from a shell, and the police wanted to attack me.

 4     They said, "You should be ashamed of yourself.  You brought these men

 5     here, but they weren't on the front line.  They went to a house nearby

 6     where they gambled and spent the time there, and I saw this with my own

 7     eyes."

 8        Q.   You've told us there was these -- this problems was discussed at

 9     various collegiums, was Mico Stanisic present when these problems were

10     discussed in collegiums at any stage?

11        A.   Well, of course, all the initiative came from the minister.  He

12     wanted to create a professional MUP.  He was facing a situation of chaos.

13     I wondered how we were able to survive at all.  He kept insisting that

14     the law be respected, but you know how it was in early 1992.  I'm just a

15     small pebble in the entire mosaic, but there were Crisis Staffs, the

16     civilian authorities, military security, and you didn't know who was

17     doing what.  And in that sort of situation, it was very difficult to

18     enforce the law.  And this was a long and difficult process.

19        Q.   All right.  These paramilitaries, the crimes that they were

20     committing, were they against all nationalities, whether Serbs or

21     non-Serbs, or were they limited to non-Serbs?

22        A.   I'm sorry, I didn't hear the beginning of your question.

23        Q.   These paramilitaries who you've told us were criminals, were the

24     crimes that they committed against all nationalities or simply against

25     those who were non-Serbs?

Page 6685

 1        A.   I'm sure they committed crimes against all nationalities.  I have

 2     to illustrate with another example.  When I was in Skelani -- when I was

 3     in Skelani, the man in whose house I spent the night told me I shouldn't

 4     go out at night because I would be killed by someone.  There was a

 5     paramilitary group active in the area.

 6             A man went out to create order.  He was a politician, and he was

 7     very naive.  He tried to remove this renegade check-point at the bridge

 8     in Skelani, and they beat the living daylights out of him.

 9             Whoever stood in their way would get killed.  That's how it was.

10        Q.   All right.  Thank you very much.  Can we just look at a couple of

11     other things in this report.

12             MS. KORNER:  Next page in English, and I think it's still the

13     same -- yes, same page in B/C/S.  Yeah, sorry, it's the next page in

14     B/C/S as well.  Sorry.

15        Q.   The paragraph at the top of the page in B/C/S, but the second

16     paragraph in English:

17              "The chief and commander in CSB Pale informed me that about

18     20 Arkan's men were staying in their area ... in the 'Panorama' Hotel,

19     and they would discuss with them leaving the area of Pale, and they were

20     convinced there shouldn't be any problems about it."

21             Were you aware of Arkan's men staying in the Panorama?

22        A.   Not at that time.  I do know, however, and this is something

23     characteristic of that paramilitary unit, they were all neat and tidy and

24     disciplined.  Some of them may have represented themselves as Arkan's men

25     because Arkan was a name that inspired awe at that time.  I don't know

Page 6686

 1     whether they were actually Arkan's men or not, the people in Panorama,

 2     but I know in other areas units would represent themselves as Arkan's

 3     men.  And they all had false names.  They acted in secrecy.

 4        Q.   And then finally, please, on this report, could we go to the

 5     fourth page in English, and in B/C/S it's the next page, dealing with

 6     Vlasenica again.

 7             In Vlasenica it says:

 8             "There are 16 active and 70 reserve policemen.  There's a special

 9     unit with 25 members for which it is already agreed they will be put

10     under the command of the Army of the Serbian Republic."

11             This is a special unit of the police, is it, they're talking

12     about, the inspector's talking about?

13        A.   Well, it's like the situation we discussed yesterday.  For

14     example, the Ilijas special unit.  But what it says here about the

15     Vlasenica area shows only the continuous attempts to introduce order,

16     because, you see, bringing the reserve force up to manpower level, well,

17     we would know how many policemen and reserve policemen a certain area had

18     to have in proportion to the population.  But during the war, the numbers

19     burgeoned.  People would come and report to the police stations, and some

20     sort of order had to be introduced.  The regulations had to be respected.

21     I don't know what the standards were exactly, the norms, but per thousand

22     inhabitants there would have to be a certain number of police officers,

23     and we tried to act in accordance with those regulations.

24        Q.   I'm sorry, Mr. Borovcanin, my simple question was are we talking

25     about a special unit of the police, because it just says "special unit"?

Page 6687

 1        A.   Well, I said yes.

 2        Q.   Right.  Now, it goes on to say, however:

 3             "Finally, taking into account the specificity of the area, I

 4     suggest that an intervention group should be formed within the SJBs duty

 5     service or the police station."

 6             Now, isn't an intervention group effectively the same as a

 7     Special Police Unit?

 8        A.   Well, the lines were very fuzzy.  You know who a Special was.  He

 9     was a man who had to have training for all sorts of situations, from rock

10     climbing to diving and so on.  Someone can declare themselves to be a

11     Special, a member of a Special Police Unit, but it was far from reality,

12     especially in police stations where there was combat on a daily basis,

13     where the situation was very volatile.  All sorts of units would spring

14     up.  Some would call themselves a guard.  There were lots of

15     paramilitaries in the area.  And in May and April, there was general

16     chaos.  We couldn't know who was establishing what sort of unit, what the

17     quality of the men was, whether they were qualified to be members of the

18     MUP.  That's what the situation was like.  These units did exist, there's

19     no doubt about that, but we attempted to introduce some sort of order

20     into all that.

21        Q.   All right.  So the -- sorry, but this report's dated August, but

22     this special unit, which it's agreed they'll put under the command of the

23     Army of the Serbian Republic, is this right, from what you're saying, was

24     not an authorised special unit, which is why the author was suggesting

25     there should be an intervention platoon?

Page 6688

 1        A.   What do you mean authorised?  Authorised officers were only

 2     professional policemen who were employed full time.  They were authorised

 3     officers.  A reserve officer did not have an official ID, did not have --

 4     he could not be an authorised officer.

 5        Q.   You're quite right.  I'd forgotten about the specific meaning of

 6     "authorised."

 7             This special unit had not been set up with the authority of the

 8     minister or anyone else, had it, because that's why they're being sent to

 9     the Army of the Serbian Republic?

10        A.   Correct.

11        Q.   Thank you.  All right.  That's all I want to ask you about that

12     document.

13             MS. KORNER:  Can we look next, please, at document 2398.  Oh, no,

14     sorry.  It's not 2398, is it?  Yes, it is.

15        Q.   The last report mentioned that you would be doing the report on

16     Bratunac and Skelani, and if we go to the last page in both, we can see

17     that this is your report.

18        A.   Correct.

19        Q.   Right.  Now, as we can see, if we go back, please, to the first

20     page in each, you carried out the inspection from the 1st to the

21     3rd of August.  And in paragraph beginning "The police officers are

22     mainly engaged on the front lines ..." which we can see halfway down the

23     page, and it's -- it's the penultimate paragraph there.

24              "Lately, a great deal of police officers are engaged in cleaning

25     the ground from Muslim extremists."

Page 6689

 1             What are you describing as "Muslim extremists"?  Who do you mean

 2     by that?

 3        A.   Well, at that time, combat activities were very frequent there in

 4     that part of the Bratunac municipality, and policemen had no choice but

 5     to be actively involved in protecting the citizens in rural areas, in

 6     villages, to prevent crimes, because great crimes had been committed in

 7     the past there, precisely where you see the reference to the police

 8     station in Kravica.  There were many other villages and hamlets that were

 9     targeted throughout the war.  Sometimes those were incursions by sabotage

10     groups and suchlike.  So the police had no choice but to get involved in

11     that kind of work to protect the citizens and their property.

12        Q.   I simply want to know, sorry, sir, who do you mean by

13     "Muslim extremists"?  Do you mean the army?  Do you mean paramilitary

14     forces?  Do you mean ordinary Muslim citizens protecting their homes?

15     Who do you mean?

16        A.   Well, imagine a group of people which bursts in, killings

17     11 policemen, and douses them in petrol.  Is that a normal soldier?  What

18     would you call him?  A criminal, war criminal, what?  We were afraid of

19     them.  And these investigations are still going on, and one day the truth

20     will emerge.

21        Q.   Yes.  So by "Muslim extremists ," you mean criminals, murderers

22     of Muslim nationality?  Is that what you mean?

23        A.   Well, I don't know about the precise composition of those groups

24     and what profiles these people were.  I don't want to make any claims.

25        Q.   No, but you -- the suggestion in this report is that there are a

Page 6690

 1     number of these groups, aren't there, because you say "a great deal of

 2     police officers are engaged in cleaning the ground from Muslim

 3     extremists"?  So you're not talking about one isolated incident there,

 4     are you?

 5        A.   Well, imagine a police station with 20 active-duty and

 6     20 reserve policemen and their rural area is forbidding, villages and

 7     hamlets scattered all about, difficult to defend.  That's how you should

 8     understand it.

 9        Q.   All right.  Well -- and then the remainder of this report deals

10     really with the problem, does it not, of the paramilitary formations that

11     were in both of these municipalities?  That's right, isn't it?  Both of

12     these police stations.

13        A.   Yes.

14             MS. KORNER:  Yes, Your Honour.  That's all I want to ask him.

15             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Can I just put an additional question in relation

16     to this report, sir, because I was wondering whether the police officers

17     to whom you refer in the part that has been read out to you by

18     Ms. Korner, whether these police officers were under the command of the

19     police chief at the SJBs involved, or whether these police officers had

20     been resubordinated to the army.  Do you understand my question?  You say

21     in the report that:

22             "Lately, a great deal of police officers are engaged in cleaning

23     the ground from Muslim extremists."

24             Now, Ms. Korner has clarified what you meant by the expression

25     "Muslim extremists," but my question goes to whether these police

Page 6691

 1     officers, during those cleaning operations, had been resubordinated to

 2     the army or whether they were acting under the command of the police.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I believe that they did, in

 4     part, act together with the army but sometimes also independently.  Why?

 5     Sometimes an attack would happen, and there's no -- not much time to

 6     report it, to send a dispatch.  And by the time you get a feedback, many

 7     ugly things could happen in between.  So there were no -- there was not

 8     time for -- for the usual steps, reporting, approval, et cetera.  The

 9     command would say, "This is critical line here.  You have to send me

10     10, 15 men, whatever you can spare."  And that's -- that's an actual

11     situation.  Sometimes, out of necessities, you couldn't go through all

12     the formalities of seeking approvals, et cetera.  That is the real take

13     on the situation at the time.

14             JUDGE HARHOFF:  I understand, sir, and I realise that the

15     situation must have been extremely difficult for all parties involved,

16     but from -- you may see -- you may, perhaps, think that this is an overly

17     legalistic question, but I'm interested in clarifying whether the police

18     officers during those cleaning operations were acting under the command

19     of an army officer who was present in the area and governing the

20     activities of the VRS or whether the police officers were acting under

21     the command of the local chief of the SJB.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let's try to clear that up

23     too.  I'm sure, since the military command at in that area was at brigade

24     level, they were much more numerous, they were on the defence line all

25     the time.  There was combat nonstop.  And whenever police was asked to

Page 6692

 1     join them, they were -- they were certainly under military command.  You

 2     couldn't go solo there.  How would the policeman know the situation on

 3     the ground unless they reported to the military command to find out and

 4     to be assigned somewhere.  So that was clear co-operation with the

 5     Army of Republika Srpska.

 6             JUDGE HARHOFF:  I understand that this is a way in which things

 7     should be done, but as we all know, this was not always the way that life

 8     played out in practice.  So my question is whether police units would

 9     occasionally would engage -- would engage themselves in a cleaning

10     operation under their own command.  Maybe they would report to the local

11     army officer that they now intended to clean this area, but -- but they

12     were acting during such a cleaning operation under the command of the

13     local SJB chief or somebody else representing the MUP.  Did that ever

14     occur?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the general answer to that

16     question is no.  Definitely they would always be in co-ordinated action

17     with the army.  Whether someone ever took it upon themselves to go solo

18     and play Rambo, I don't know.  The best way to act was to be in

19     co-operation with the army, because then they would have communications,

20     medical services, logistics, et cetera.  And plus what could you do with

21     a small group of men, unless they had happened upon a crime in a hamlet

22     and reacted immediately, impromptu.  That I cannot say, but normally not.

23             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you, sir.

24             MS. KORNER:

25        Q.   Sorry, can I just, again, continue on -- on the theme raised by

Page 6693

 1     Judge Harhoff.

 2             Co-operation with the army is different, isn't it, from the

 3     resubordination you've described which comes as a result of a request and

 4     then an order?

 5        A.   What do you mean different?  Maybe you can expand.

 6        Q.   Yes.  Where you talked about the operation, and we'll see in the

 7     next document I want you to have a look at, it's not the same, is it, as

 8     where the army takes over a unit at its request of police, an order is

 9     issued, and then the police officers are, as it were, for these purposes,

10     part of the Serbian Army.  What you're talking about and what your report

11     is talking about is the police co-operating in the sense of helping, as

12     you put it, get rid of Muslim extremists.  "Mopping up," I think, is

13     another term.

14        A.   I understand the question.  "Co-operation" is a broader term than

15     "co-ordinated action."  Co-operation can be an everyday exchange of

16     information, meeting, et cetera, whereas co-ordinated action is something

17     different.  For instance, one police unit is engaged within the area of

18     one military command on the ground.  Maybe this term "cleaning" or

19     "mopping up" is an unfortunate choice, but even that would fall under the

20     narrow definition of co-ordinated action.  That term cropped up in the

21     war.  When you are capturing a part of the territory, you have to take

22     all of it.  It can't be a leopard skin.  It's the doctrine shared by

23     every army in the world.  The demarcation lines moved all the time.

24        Q.   But if the army, for example, had been carrying out an action

25     somewhere within your territory and had got -- moved on and the police

Page 6694

 1     came in, and when I say "mopped up," I use it in it's ordinary sense of

 2     arresting people, tightening the -- establishing the security in the

 3     area, that would still leave, would it, the police under its own chain of

 4     command as opposed to the army chain of command?

 5        A.   Not really.  You -- you're talking about arrests.  Who would you

 6     arrest during a military operation unless you are taking -- capturing a

 7     part of the territory and then there are some prisoners taken?

 8     Otherwise, there's no logic to making arrests.

 9             Let's go back to this "mopping up," this unfortunate term.  It's

10     just a small part of co-ordinated action in a certain territory, because,

11     in practice, the situation on the ground was such that we had no time

12     to -- to establish proper communication with the command.  But once

13     communication is established, then we exchange reports, which territory

14     has been captured, how many people were killed, how many were captured.

15     Those who haven't -- people who haven't lived through that find it

16     difficult to understand.  But I had many opportunities to -- to see these

17     ugly scenes.

18        Q.   Sir, all I'm trying to establish is whether -- if the police

19     officers as you say in your report were carrying out cleansing operations

20     of Muslim extremists, and the incident you described seemed to talked

21     about an ordinary crime where people burst into the police -- burst in,

22     killing 11 people and doused them in petrol.  Now, that's what you

23     described as something these officers were doing.  That had nothing to do

24     with army operations, had it?

25        A.   I don't know if you understood me properly.  I mentioned an

Page 6695

 1     indent in a different context when 11 of our policemen were ambushed and

 2     killed.  They were doused in petrol and set on fire.  I gave you an

 3     example for you to understand what kind of people we were fighting.  Of

 4     course, normal servicemen would not do something like that.  These

 5     people, the assailants, must have been sick.  And I was the one who

 6     collected the victims.  I saw that with my own eyes.  We had to identify

 7     the bodies by their teeth.  I couldn't eat for three days after that.

 8     I'm talking about that as an inhumane act, something I'm trying to

 9     forget.

10             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a correction for the

11     transcript.  He said "These people, they are extremists, these

12     assailants."  "They are extremists."  And that part is missing from the

13     transcript.

14             MS. KORNER:

15        Q.   All right.  Well, one last try at this.  When you wrote this

16     report and you said - and I better go back to it because I'd moved on

17     already.  There it is.

18              "... a great deal of police officers are engaged in cleaning the

19     ground from Muslim extremists."

20             Just tell us, one more time, what did you mean they were doing?

21        A.   I think we've discuss the matter.  Mopping up or cleaning the

22     ground means securing one locality from further incursions by such

23     groups.

24             Let me try to make it clear to you from the military point of

25     view.  There is a skirmish, for instance.  Somewhere around there is a

Page 6696

 1     group that had not had time to withdraw in time, and the skirmish is

 2     still going on.  Who will attack who first?  Now, if the policeman from

 3     the next shift comes to the line, he has to be secure.  He has to know

 4     that his back is safe, that he won't be ambushed again, that that part of

 5     the territory is now safe.  That's what cleaning the terrain meant, from

 6     these pockets, these groups that were still shooting here and there.

 7     That's how I understand it.

 8        Q.   I'm sorry, sir, you're not talking about the police in this --

 9     being resubordinated to the military.  You're talking about police

10     officers acting as police officers.  That's what the report says.

11     Because you actually, in the next line, distinguish between the

12     engagement of the police on the front lines and in cleaning the grounds.

13     So there's a difference, isn't there?

14        A.   Well, then that's my omission if I didn't stress it.  You know,

15     you can't be focused all the time, especially at that time to -- it was

16     difficult to put it all on paper and include everything.  I know that you

17     are looking at the legal side, but my side was closer to life.

18        Q.   No, I'm not looking at the legal side at all, sir.  All right.

19     Just one other question, please.  This incident you described of the

20     police officers who were ambushed and set on fire, can you tell us when

21     that happened, as you remember it so vividly?

22        A.   Well, you don't forget a thing like that, and time does nothing

23     for it.  At that time, the police were supposed to go into --

24        Q.   No, no, sorry, sir.  I just want to know the date, the month and

25     the year and the place where this happened.

Page 6697

 1        A.   It happened in Skelani municipality.  That is in Podrinje.  I

 2     forgot the place.  Oh, it's Kragivode.  It's a village road that goes

 3     through the woods.  And these 11 policemen were ambushed.  They were shot

 4     at at the same time from two areas.  It was a very clever ambush.  None

 5     of them had time to react.  And then they were doused in petrol and set

 6     on fire.  It was in Skelani --

 7        Q.   You told us.  You told us.  I just want the date, please.

 8        A.   April.  I can't tell you the exact date.  April 1993.

 9        Q.   1993.  I see.  Yes.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Ms. Korner --

11             MS. KORNER:  Oh, certainly.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  -- if I may.

13             Witness, sir, still about cleaning the grounds from Muslim

14     extremists, in the beginning when you were telling us about this you said

15     that this was done to protect rural citizens.  Could you clarify that for

16     me?  What rural citizens?  Let's -- would that be Serbian hamlets or

17     Muslim hamlets, or would it make no difference?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those were villages and hamlets

19     populated mainly by Serbs.  I can't tell you the exact statistics.  Maybe

20     there were some mixed villages.  But when the war broke out, everyone who

21     was smart enough left the area of their own will.  And even if there had

22     been any Muslims, they might have left before the war, too, but I'm not

23     sure.  Some of these villages were ethnically purely Serb.  But if police

24     had information that a village was in danger, whether they had received

25     the report from the military commander or some other source, they would

Page 6698

 1     have come out to prevent crimes that had already happened before in that

 2     area oftentimes, and, of course, there is appropriate documentation.

 3     There's no question about it.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And when you said that it's normal in any war

 5     that when you take a territory you take it all, am I to understand that

 6     when you say "cleaning the grounds from Muslim extremists" means removing

 7     all Muslims from a territory you take?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation]  Well, that's not the way I see it,

 9     and that's not the way I explained it.  When I say "mopping up," I mean

10     in the course of a military operation.  Small pockets of enemy forces

11     were still active, were still firing.  It's in that sense that we tried

12     to reinforce the line and protect our own forces, remove those pockets.

13     It was a purely military confrontation.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

15             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  That's all I ask on that document.

16             JUDGE HALL:  Well, it's time for the break.  We will resume in --

17     sorry.

18             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Exhibits?

19             MS. KORNER:  Is this document an exhibit?  No it's not.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

21             JUDGE HALL:  [Microphone not activated] marked.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P993, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE HALL:  So we would resume in 20 minutes.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

25                           [The witness stands down]

Page 6699

 1                           --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I've been given the depressing news by

 3     the Court Officer that I've only got five minutes left of my original

 4     three hours.  So could I ask for the extra hour I asked for yesterday?

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Ms. Korner.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Thank you very much.

 7             MR. PANTELIC:  And in the meantime, Your Honours, if we are going

 8     to be depressed the same way as Ms. Korner, we could also rely, on, I

 9     believe, your gratitude sometimes.

10             JUDGE HALL:  We will consider your application at the appropriate

11     time.

12             MR. PANTELIC:  Much obliged, Your Honour.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             MS. KORNER:

15        Q.   Mr. Borovcanin, I thought we'd left the document, but I'm afraid

16     over the break I've had an opportunity to think a bit more.  Firstly,

17     when I asked you to describe what you were talking about in respect of

18     the term "Muslim extremists," the incident you described happened in

19     1993, but this report is August 1992.  What incidents come to mind, if

20     any, in August of -- up until August of 1992?

21        A.   I'm referring to events that had already taken place against the

22     civilian population, war crimes, slaughtered bodies, and so on.  I don't

23     know what normal person could do that, slaughter someone so as to make

24     the corpse unrecognisable.  Only extremists can do that.  I illustrated

25     this with an example from 1993, but those were the kinds of things that

Page 6700

 1     happen.

 2        Q.   Yes, but can you think of any particular incident that led you to

 3     talk in your report about Muslim extremists in 1992?

 4             MS. KORNER:  And, Your Honour, can I just say my screen's gone

 5     blank in front of me.  I don't know if somebody can get a technician.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's a very long time ago.

 7     If you're thinking of an isolated incident, a specific incident, I can't

 8     recall any such thing at the moment.  But such crimes did happen, and

 9     that is the explanation of the term I used, "extremists."

10        Q.   All right.  Next thing, you told us that you personally went to

11     inspect this scene.  You told us earlier that it wasn't your job to

12     inspect the scene; that was for the crime police.  Why were you going

13     down in 1993 to inspect the scene?

14        A.   In 1993, I happened to be on the ground.  I was a commanding

15     officer at the time, and I spent some 20 or so days in the area, and

16     while I was there, the incident happened, the ambush I mentioned

17     occurred.  I happened to be in the vicinity, and I carried out the

18     on-site investigation with a representative of the crime prevention

19     department, and this man was unfortunately killed a year later in an

20     ambush.  So we did the inspection together, and we had to inform the

21     families and so on, because there were all sorts of rumours going round

22     that they had been tortured and so on.  So we went to document this on

23     the spot, on site, and you can find the records.

24        Q.   On that topic of the crime police, in fact, where there was a

25     crime scene, the area was secured by the uniformed police, wasn't it, as

Page 6701

 1     in everybody else's jurisdiction?

 2        A.   Well, you see, to go back to this incident, it happen in the

 3     depth of the territory -- sorry.

 4        Q.   No, no.  Not the incident.  Generally speaking.  If a crime was

 5     being committed and was being investigated, was it the uniformed police

 6     who secured the area?

 7        A.   Of course.  The crime prevention department collected traces and

 8     clues, photographed the scene, and did everything else that belongs to

 9     the investigation, whereas the uniformed police secured the site.  This

10     would be a broader area covering one, two, or three villages, and the

11     police would secure the area while the inspection was going on.

12        Q.   And it was the uniformed police that came within your

13     jurisdiction; is that right?  Because that's what you told us yesterday.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And finally this on this particular aspect:  This report that you

16     wrote or your inspectors wrote, was that given to the chief of the CSB,

17     Mr. Cvijetic?

18        A.   Yes, that's understood.  We were always duty-bound to report to

19     our superior officers in the MUP and in the centre.  We had instructions

20     on urgent ongoing and interim reporting which regulated all this.

21             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I'm sorry.  I'm going to pause while

22     they check to see why my screen's not working.

23        Q.   And would your reports be included in the monthly reports that

24     the CSB was obliged to send to the -- the minister?

25        A.   Yes.  I just mentioned the instructions we had on urgent

Page 6702

 1     reporting, if there was a murder or something, ongoing or regular

 2     reporting, and interim reporting when an analysis was being carried out.

 3     And all this is prescribed in detail in the instructions.  And, of

 4     course, we followed those instructions.

 5        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  That's all I do ask on that particular aspect.

 6     Now could you have a look, very quickly, please, at the document which is

 7     number -- sorry.  Yes.  318, 65 ter 318.

 8             This is a response from Vlasenica SJB, dated the 6th of August,

 9     to the request that we looked at earlier for information.  I don't know

10     what the number is, but it was the document forwarded by the CSB chief of

11     the 25th of July that we looked at, and I think this is a document whose

12     contents you are aware of, is that right, and you know Mane Djuric, the

13     chief of the SJB who signed it?

14        A.   Yes, I know him.

15        Q.   Right.

16             MS. KORNER:  Could we look, please, at the bottom of the first

17     page in English, and it's the second paragraph in B/C/S.

18        Q.   "Combat activities of paramilitaries units were not registered in

19     the area of this station, whilst there were several cases of crimes

20     committed by members of the 'Red Berets,' i.e., the unauthorised transit

21     of stolen cars throughout this area."

22             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, we need to go to the next page in English.

23     Second page in English, please.  No, not in B/C/S, in English.  All

24     right.  Anyhow, that's what it says.

25             In the light of --

Page 6703

 1             MS. KORNER:  Could you go back to the first page in B/C/S because

 2     that's what he's looking at.

 3        Q.   In the light of everything that we've seen in your reports and

 4     that of your inspectors, when you saw this report back in 1992, was it

 5     any surprise to you that apparently the only crime that was being

 6     reported by the paramilitary group was the theft of cars -- or, sorry,

 7     the unauthorised transit of stolen cars?

 8        A.   Of course that wasn't the only sort of crime that occurred, but

 9     if you look at the heading, it says:

10             "Joint action between the MUP and the army information," and the

11     date is August 1992.

12             So this is a request for information relating exclusively to

13     joint action carried out by the army and the MUP.  So what it says here,

14     Red Berets, theft of cars, and so on, the focus was on police activity

15     jointly with the military.

16             Of course other crimes occurred, but they were mentioned in other

17     reports that you have available.

18        Q.   I see.  All right.

19             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, may that be marked and admitted,

20     please.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P994, Your Honours.

23             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, I just want to check whether [indiscernible]

24     I want the next document in.

25        Q.   Yes.  Could you now look, please, at document 3 -- 65 ter 394.

Page 6704

 1     Now, this is Pale police station's response to the request again that we

 2     looked at earlier today for information about paramilitaries from the

 3     CSB, and this has been sent to your centre.  It says, re: your document:

 4             "In connection with your document number above, we hereby inform

 5     you of the following:

 6             "a) there were no paramilitary formations on the territory of

 7     this SJBs nor are there any now."

 8             Now, this is on the 7th of August.  On the 3rd of August, we look

 9     at the report that says Arkan's men were stationed in the Panorama Hotel

10     in Pale.  Now, can you understand how Pale SJB could have put in this

11     response?

12        A.   It's illogical.  It was probably an omission by the local

13     commander.  Pale were a place through which everybody passed, so I'm

14     really surprised that the local chief didn't mention that here.  Maybe

15     they were no longer there at the point in time.  This was already in

16     August.  But this is certainly an omission, an error by the person who

17     wrote the report.

18        Q.   Well, this is something like four days after the inspector's

19     report, and this report is denying that there had ever been any

20     paramilitary formations in Pale, if you look at (a).  It says:

21              "There were no paramilitary formations ... nor are there any

22     now."

23        A.   That's what it says here in this document.  I agree with you.

24     Okay.  But my comment on this is that most probably the chief omitted to

25     include the fact that they had been there previously.  You can establish

Page 6705

 1     that by looking at a number of other documents or other testimonies.  I

 2     don't wish to speculate whether he simply omitted to mention this.  Most

 3     probably yes, but I have reservations in this respect.

 4        Q.   But it's not an omission, is it?  It's an outright lie.  Did you

 5     point this out to either your chief or to Mr. Stanisic at any of the

 6     collegiums?

 7        A.   Well, I didn't mention this particular incident, but this was

 8     being continuously discussed.  I am surprised by this statement here.

 9             Well, let's look at it from a different angle.  Why would he have

10     a reason to say these people weren't there if they were causing problems?

11     I know that this chief was a very active person, and he wouldn't allow

12     just anyone to wander around his area stealing and looting.  I'm really

13     surprised by this.  I have no other comment to make.

14        Q.   Of course, Pale was where the government was stationed, wasn't

15     it?  Mr. Karadzic and all that lot.

16        A.   Yes.  The seat of the government was there in the Panorama for a

17     while and then in some improvised sheds where the ministry sat.  All the

18     more reason to remove such negative individuals.  That's why I'm

19     surprised by this statement that there were no paramilitary formations

20     there.

21        Q.   All right.

22             MS. KORNER:  Can we look at number (d), please, and then we need

23     to go to the second page in English only.  In English only, not in B/C/S.

24     Thank you.


Page 6706

 1        Q.   "We had no prisoners brought in by the army, but we had prisoners

 2     brought in and guarded by the police.  We have no prisoners at the

 3     moment, and we have not had any for any while."

 4             Now, here there's no question about it.  The prisoners are being

 5     brought in by the police, not the army.

 6             Did you -- yesterday I asked you about the Dom -- the

 7     Kulture Dom, Dom Kulture, and you said that you were aware, you had heard

 8     that there were prisoners there or there were people being kept there.

 9     Were you surprised by item (d)?

10        A.   I repeat that I heard about it, but I didn't see those people

11     myself in the period when they were in the Dom Kulture.  And this other

12     statement here -- just a moment.  I want to be precise.

13              "We had no prisoners brought in by the army, but we did have

14     prisoners brought in and guarded by the police."

15             It's hard for me to comment on what he meant by that, but I can

16     guess that people from the surrounding villages, Bosniaks or Muslims as

17     they were called at the time, would turn up from the combat area and

18     expected police protection, and the police guarded them for a while.

19     That's how I understand this, although I wasn't there when this was going

20     on.  And they -- then they would transport them to the demarcation line.

21     That's how I understand your question.

22        Q.   I'm sorry.  You understand the word "prisoners" to mean refugees

23     looking for protection?  Is that really what you're telling the Court?

24        A.   Well, look here, prisoners in the military sense.  I don't know

25     what the local chief meant when he used the word "prisoner" in this

Page 6707

 1     document, but all those who were being escorted or guarded by the police

 2     were in some manner, in one way or another, were deprived of their

 3     freedom, because imagine if someone had let those people wander around

 4     and they might run into some sort of renegade paramilitary group and a

 5     crime might occur and then that would be a stain on the police.  There

 6     may have been military prisoners, but I'm not aware of that.

 7        Q.   Yes, well, I don't know if you've her the expression,

 8     "Pigs may fly," Mr. Borovcanin.  Anyhow, that's all I ask on that

 9     document.

10             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, may that marked -- admitted and

11     marked, please.

12             JUDGE HALL:  I suppose there's a technical -- there could be

13     technical reason why it shouldn't be through this witness, but I see the

14     logic of it, so it's admitted and marked.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 995, Your Honours.

16             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, the police chief who signed, that is

17     not a witness.

18        Q.   Right.  Could I ask you now, please, to look briefly at

19     document 1573, please.

20             MS. KORNER:  Can we pull it down.  No, sorry.  No, no.  Yes.

21        Q.   Okay.  This is a -- the -- a report from the

22     Sarajevo Romanija Corps command, and I accept entirely you wouldn't have

23     seen it before.  I want to ask there about one aspect of what's reported

24     under 4, "Morale."  The last three sentences of that paragraph:

25              "Paramilitary formations that are still not disarmed are causing

Page 6708

 1     big problems, they behave more violently and are arrogant.  Disarming

 2     these formations will not be possible without armed clashes with them,

 3     especially as they are supported and established by certain organs in the

 4     local authorities and the police."

 5             Now, were you aware from your inspections of the area within this

 6     military command of the police supporting and establishing

 7     paramilitaries?

 8        A.   What it says here, I'll quote two sentences:

 9              "All the more so as they're supported by some organs of the

10     local authorities and the police."

11             This is absolutely not true what it says here, "and the police."

12     I'm sure of that because we never authorised them to act in any way, and

13     I don't know how the military could write something like this.

14             As for the local authorities, I would be speculating if I were to

15     claim that they were the people under whose auspices they were there.

16     People did say that.  There were some rumours to that effect going round,

17     but I can't assert that.  However, this simply doesn't hold water, no

18     way.

19        Q.   Yes, but you see, we looked earlier at a report relating to --

20     I've forgotten which SJB it is now, where there was a -- I'm going to say

21     unauthorised, but not officially approved unit of the Special Police who

22     had been taken into the army.  Weren't they paramilitaries?  Because they

23     were neither police nor army.

24        A.   No, they weren't paramilitaries.  They were citizens of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina a hundred per cent.  Most of the paramilitaries were

Page 6709

 1     citizens or nationals of another state, which at that time was the

 2     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

 3        Q.   Well, not all -- well, sorry, you're saying paramilitaries were

 4     those who were not citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 5        A.   Of course I'm not saying that local paramilitary units could not

 6     be established on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Criminals who

 7     were under nobody's command, they would also be paramilitaries.  But what

 8     I'm talking about now is those groups in the area.  Ninety-five per cent

 9     of them arrived from Serbia, and that should be seen in that context.

10             As for Vlasenica and the other areas you mention, those were

11     local people, reservists.  But we've already discussed that.

12        Q.   All right.  And we can see at the bottom of the document -- in

13     the English it's over the page, but it's dated the 18th of August.

14             MS. KORNER:  If you can just pull down, please, the bottom of

15     the -- yes.  That's fine.

16             Your Honours, obviously I can't have it admitted, but could I

17     have it marked for identification, and we'll ask for it --

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             MS. KORNER:  Oh, is it?  I wasn't going to do ones that have been

20     exhibited.  Sorry about that.  Can I just check, Your Honour.  The next

21     one is exhibited as well, the one I was going to do, but I just want to

22     see if there's anything I needed to ask him.

23             Yes.  Very briefly.  Could we have a look at a document that has

24     been exhibited, which is another one of the reports, P632.

25        Q.   This is another inspection on the 10th of August.  In fact, an

Page 6710

 1     inspection of the CSB and also the SJB in Ilidza and Vogosca SJB.  We can

 2     see that in the third paragraph, and it's -- you were involved in it.

 3     Yes.

 4             It's signed by a Mr. Rade Radovic, chief of the police duties and

 5     tasks department.  Did you know him?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   All right.  Now, can we just look at one aspect again of this.

 8     At Ilidza, there was a discussion about paramilitaries, the bottom of the

 9     first page in English --

10             MS. KORNER:  And then can we go to the second -- the second page

11     in English and also the secretary page in B/C/S.

12        Q.   In the second paragraph on both pages:

13             "The problem of Special Units in Ilidza will be resolved through

14     an Act of Systemisation, which has been drafted and harmonised at the

15     CSB."

16             What was the problem with the special units in Ilidza?

17        A.   The problem was similar to the one you mentioned in Vlasenica,

18     but, again, it was specific because the area was surrounded on all sides.

19     Those special units were necessarily established while combat was going

20     on at the police station, at the collegium meetings, when we decided that

21     order should be introduce.  As regards these units, we had only a special

22     squad.  These were men who had done such work in the former MUP, and we

23     wanted to introduce order into this situation, to have them under only

24     one command and so on.  It's a long story, but you can put specific

25     questions to me and I'll do my best to answer them.

Page 6711

 1        Q.   All right.  I've just got one specific question, Mr. Borovcanin,

 2     and that's this:  Were these Special Police Units out of control and

 3     committing crimes?

 4        A.   They were under the control of the local SJB, if we're talking

 5     about police reservists who were attached to them in terms of

 6     organisation.  But let me remind you, in the former plans that were drawn

 7     up regarding the former All People's Defence for some sort of war where

 8     we would be attacked from outside, it was envisaged that such units would

 9     be established in areas such as Rakovica.  That's on the territory of

10     Ilidza and so on.  And there were quite a few of reservists who attached

11     themselves to the police station because that was their military

12     deployment there.  So that professionals, active-duty policemen, were

13     mixed with them.  And they called themselves a Special Police Unit.  And

14     they were active in the very beginning, in May when there was fighting

15     going on at Ilidza every day and so on.  At that time, we didn't have any

16     sort of communication, not even phone lines.  So we were unable to

17     prevent this situation or introduce order there in a timely manner.

18     That's what the situation was like then.

19        Q.   We're talking about August -- I'll come on to communications.

20     I'm talking about August of 1992.  You dealt with this in your interview.

21     You had proper communication by August of 1992, didn't you?

22        A.   Yes, certainly.  I'm aware that we were talking about August, but

23     I was trying to explain how it happened that those units were

24     established.  And later on in some 20 or 25 SJBs, we had to go there,

25     inspect the station, see what was going on, and then deal with it.  So

Page 6712

 1     this was an ongoing process.

 2        Q.   Yeah, I just -- you didn't actually answer the original question

 3     I asked.  Were you aware that these so-called special units were actually

 4     committing crimes, and that's what was meant by the problem?

 5        A.   No.  I never heard about that.

 6        Q.   All right.  And who was the police chief in Ilidza in

 7     August 1992?

 8        A.   I'm not sure.  I know it was Tomislav Kovac in the beginning, but

 9     in August was it Budisa Petko?  I'm not sure.  I've forgotten.  I know

10     Tomo Kovac later went on to other posts in the MUP.

11        Q.   Yes.  He later became, didn't he, the minister of the interior?

12        A.   That was at a later stage, but it went gradually.  I think he was

13     first assistant.

14        Q.   One other thing on this report.

15             MS. KORNER:  Can we go, please, to the third page in English, and

16     I believe it's also -- no.  It's still the second page in B/C/S.

17        Q.   This is the -- this report is the 10th of August.  The report

18     from Pale police station was the 7th of August, and we discussed what was

19     said.  And in this report, three days later:

20             "It was stated while inspecting the Pale Public Security Station

21     that a group of Arkan's men are still present at the Panorama Hotel.

22     Chief Koroman presents that as a solved problem because he's expecting

23     their commander in a couple of days with whom he would solve it without a

24     problem."

25             So it does appear, doesn't it, that Mr. Koroman, for whatever

Page 6713

 1     reason, was telling lies in his report of the 3rd of -- 7th of August.

 2        A.   Is that what you're asking me?

 3        Q.   Yes.

 4        A.   I can't say he was lying.  Maybe he just failed to include that

 5     they had been captured.  I really dare not speculate.

 6        Q.   All right.  As you touched on it, can we just deal with

 7     communications generally.  Can you look, please, at document 1859,

 8     65 ter.

 9             This is the CSB quarterly report, is it not, to the ministry,

10     dealing with the period July to September of 1992.

11        A.   Correct.

12             MS. KORNER:  And if we go in English, please, to page 5, and in

13     B/C/S to the fourth page -- no, fifth page as well, although it says 4 at

14     the top.  Yes.  No.  Fifth page, I'm sorry.  I want the 4 at the top.

15        Q.   And I don't want to read through it, but we can see in the second

16     paragraph in -- in the English, and I think it's down there somewhere in

17     B/C/S there's a long part about how the communications had been

18     established, shortwave telephone, telefax established in each SJB,

19     teleprinter, and so on and so forth.  I don't want to go through it.

20             Do you agree that's an accurate description?

21        A.   Well, I think so, because there were numerous problems,

22     especially at the outset, until things settled in a bit,

23     things [as interpreted] who were directly involved in this work knew more

24     about it.  But I know that at the beginning we had great problems.

25        Q.   Well, you were -- all right.  Let's deal with it in -- there were

Page 6714

 1     no problems, were there, in delivering these reports, weekly, monthly,

 2     quarterly reports?

 3        A.   Well, there were problems.  It didn't always run smoothly.  There

 4     were many hitches.  As far as I remember, my attempts to communicate with

 5     people, sometimes the fax machine wouldn't work, sometimes there would be

 6     a breakdown in communications, but we made do.

 7        Q.   All right.  As you say, in fact, although I accept -- I think

 8     nobody would seek to dispute that there were occasional breakdowns, there

 9     was never any time, was there, where you were wholly unable to

10     communicate with any of the SJBs within your area of responsibility?

11        A.   Well, you said it yourself.  We had every intention to

12     communicate properly and report properly.  Sometimes we even used

13     couriers.  So there's nothing disputable about that.  We had the best

14     intention to inform and communicate, and we did.  I don't see the

15     problem.

16        Q.   Thank you very much.  That's all I wanted to ask you about

17     communications.  Can we just go through a few more documents and then we

18     will be finished.

19             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, Your Honours.  Can I -- I'm just -- I'm just

20     trying to cut out as many as I can.

21        Q.   Yes.  Could you have a look, please, again fairly briefly, at

22     12 -- oh, it's all right an exhibit.

23             MS. KORNER:  No.  Your Honours, forget that.  I see these

24     documents are already exhibits.

25        Q.   Yes.  Could you have a look, please, at document 2882.  Document

Page 6715

 1     dated the 24th of August, 1992, from the CSB, referring to a document of

 2     the same date from the Ministry of the Interior, requests that the

 3     following information be gathered for the needs of the

 4     Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare.

 5             MR. KRGOVIC:  No translation.

 6             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Sorry?

 7             MS. KORNER:  No interpretation.

 8             MR. KRGOVIC:  There's no interpretation.

 9             MS. KORNER:

10        Q.   Can you understand me now, Mr. Borovcanin?  Are you getting

11     interpretation?

12        A.   Yes, I've heard you all this time.

13        Q.   Right.  This is asking for the names of camps, prison collection

14     centres, who ordered the establishment, who ordered individuals, et

15     cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

16             You were aware, were you, of this document of the

17     24th of August, 1992, signed by Mr. Cvijetic?

18        A.   Yes.  In fact, this document just paraphrases the dispatch

19     received from the MUP that Mr. Cvijetic refers to of August 1992.  What

20     the minister requires from us, regardless of jurisdiction, because the

21     original request came from the institute for social security of

22     Republika Srpska, to collect this data because it was considered

23     important.

24        Q.   Had you become aware of the international outcry over the

25     so-called collection centres, in particular those in Prijedor?

Page 6716

 1        A.   Well, you know, when those images were broadcast on TV, of course

 2     everyone was able to see it, and the institutions that were in charge of

 3     those camps had to do their best to protect those people from

 4     mistreatment, et cetera.  It was, of course, in the jurisdiction of

 5     Republika Srpska, all these camps.  And we were just collecting data,

 6     because police stations cover the entire territory, and they are able to

 7     gain insight into the entire area controlled at the time by the army.  So

 8     this information is collected and collated.  That's how I understand this

 9     dispatch from the minister and this other dispatch later from our centre.

10        Q.   When you saw the footage on television, how did you react to it?

11        A.   It was harrowing, horrible to see.  I can't think of a normal

12     person who would approve of that.

13        Q.   Did you know Simo Drljaca?

14        A.   Maybe only superficially before the war.  I'm trying to think

15     back, because I had gone on field trips, inspection trips, before the

16     war, and each station would be visited at least once a year, and you have

17     to multiply that by 100 which is the number of stations, and I believe I

18     met him before the war, in Prijedor, but I don't know when that was.  But

19     during the war, I did not meet up with him.

20        Q.   Yes, thank you.

21             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,

22     please.

23             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P996, Your Honours.

25             MS. KORNER:

Page 6717

 1        Q.   All right.  Can I then ask you to look now, please, at the

 2     document which is 319.

 3             This appears to be a report about a visit to Vlasenica again,

 4     signed by a gentleman called Sasa Blagojevic.

 5             MS. KORNER:  If we look at the second page.  Third page in

 6     English, second page in B/C/S.

 7        Q.   Did you know this gentleman?

 8        A.   Briefly and superficially.  He was an inspector in the crime

 9     department.  I believe that sometime in 1992 he just vanish.  He went to

10     Serbia.  I've never heard of him since then.

11        Q.   All right.  Was this a sort of inspection, this report?

12             MS. KORNER:  If we go back to the -- please, can we go back to

13     the first page in English and -- the first page in B/C/S and the first

14     page in English as well.

15        Q.   Was this a kind of inspection?

16        A.   Yes.  There was an inspection report, very terse, but I can

17     conclude that this Blagojevic was inspecting the crime department.  I can

18     deduce that from the references to Sargic, Milenko, chief of the crime

19     department, but if you ask me, it's a very scant report.

20        Q.   All right.  I just want to ask you about one other aspect of this

21     report.

22             MS. KORNER:  Page 2 in English.  It's the first page in -- no.

23     Second page in English, and second page in B/C/S as well.

24        Q.   At the bottom of the page in English, yes:

25              "They are also striving to deepen the existing operative

Page 6718

 1     information about Serbs who sold weapons to Muslims in the Vlasenica

 2     area."

 3             Was this a problem that you'd come across before, that apparently

 4     Serbs had sold weapons to Muslims?

 5        A.   I don't know.  I find it hard to believe now that I'm reading it.

 6     It must have happened at the time, but I can't claim anything one way or

 7     another.  People are sometimes prepared to sell their souls for money.

 8     Everything is possible.

 9        Q.   Yes.  All right.

10             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, that's all I ask on that document.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

12             MS. KORNER:  Oh, sorry.  Could it be admitted and marked, please.

13             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, admitted and marked.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P997, Your Honours.

15             MS. KORNER:

16        Q.   Next could you have a look -- no, that's not -- yes, at

17     document 373.

18             Now, earlier we saw the document forward by the CSB to the SJBs

19     about what prisons, what collection centres, et cetera, existed in these

20     municipalities.  This document from Mico Stanisic, although I think it's

21     signed on his behalf, isn't it?  It's a "za," is it not?

22        A.   Someone else signed this.

23        Q.   Addressed to the CSB:

24             "We've been informed by the Presidency of the Serb republic that

25     a delegation of the commission for European security and co-operation is

Page 6719

 1     coming on Sunday.  They would like to visit the prisons in Pale,

 2     Bijeljina, Trebinje, and Bileca, and Foca.

 3             "The delegation is arriving in Lukavica ..."

 4             So that's where you were based, wasn't it?

 5        A.   Yes, we were in Lukavica.

 6        Q.   And then it -- and so on about it organising police escort and

 7     security.

 8             Now, were you aware of this visit by the OSCE people?

 9        A.   I can't remember that.  The thing is I was very often absent from

10     the centre because a large number of police stations had to be visited.

11     This could have arrived when I was somewhere in the field, but I can't be

12     sure one way or another.  But knowing what I did at the time, I would be

13     asked to secure the road because there were some critical sections

14     targeted by snipers and a byroad would be used to be safe and make safe

15     these people who were coming.  But the real answer to your question is I

16     can't remember.

17        Q.   But whether you can remember whether you did the security,

18     although you would have been asked to, but Mr. Cvijetic make you aware,

19     because of your position, of this impending visit?  Whether you were

20     there or not at the time.

21        A.   In my absence, the inspectors at the police station were trained

22     to develop a mini plan for escorting the delegation, because there was

23     one road, the one I mentioned, and another back-up road via Trebevic.  I

24     don't know how they moved, but I'm sure that one of the inspectors made a

25     plan of security.

Page 6720

 1        Q.   All I'm asking is whether -- not whether you made the plan or one

 2     of your inspectors, but whether Mr. Cvijetic let you know that this

 3     dispatch had come from Mr. Stanisic.

 4        A.   I believe he did, because after I would return from a field trip,

 5     we would sit down and have coffee and brief each other.  And that

 6     happened all the time, regularly.  It's just that I can't remember this

 7     particular time.  After a while your memories fade.

 8             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, this document has, in fact, already

 9     been MFI'd.  Can I ask now that it be admitted fully.  It's P164.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE HALL:  How does this witness's testimony advance the

12     quality or character of the document as an exhibit?

13             MS. KORNER:  Because, Your Honour, he says, although he

14     personally now can't remember whether he was told about this or not, he

15     would have had to or one of his subordinates set up the security, as he's

16     put it, for the snipers and whatever.  And, Your Honours, there's no

17     argument this visit took place.  You're going to hear a visit -- but this

18     is the only, really, the only witness who can deal with any part of it

19     and he's dealt with it.

20             JUDGE HALL:  You would recall my reservation about an earlier

21     document, but, again, I see the logic of your application.  And inasmuch

22     as I suppose there's no other witness who can do it, it's admitted and

23     marked.

24             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

25        Q.   And just before we move on to the next --

Page 6721

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             MS. KORNER:

 3        Q.   How often would you and Mr. Cvijetic have, sort of, coffee and

 4     talk about what was happening in the -- in the area?  Was that a regular

 5     thing?

 6        A.   I just said a moment ago there were days when I would be gone for

 7     a month if I was to inspect several police stations and stay away for

 8     days and nights, and then I would come back to a back-log of mail and

 9     documents to peruse, and we would meet up whenever we were there both.

10     There also were times when I was there but he wasn't.  The circulation

11     was very high, but we did try to maintain normal communications.  We did

12     sit down whenever possible.

13        Q.   All right.  Can I ask you now quickly, please, to look at 1931.

14     Again, it's something [indiscernible] dealt with.

15             This is a report dated the 8th of September, 1992, to the CSB,

16     from Bratunac, and it's apparently in accordance with an order by

17     Mr. Cvijetic and yourself.  Do you remember why you asked for this

18     particular report?

19        A.   Well, that fell within the purview of the inspectors, the

20     department, to tour police stations from time to time.  I can't remember

21     this particular time, but it was a regular activity for inspectors.  And

22     Logo must have gone to the Bratunac police station for the same purpose.

23        Q.   All right.  Just two or three aspects of this report.  On the

24     first page, in the second paragraph, it was stated that:

25             "As for the combat activities, it can be concluded that great

Page 6722

 1     successes were achieved considering the Muslim population was in a

 2     majority in the territory of the Bratunac municipality."

 3             And that's right, wasn't it?  The Serbs -- this was not a Serb

 4     majority municipality, Bratunac?

 5        A.   Well, you know, for you to understand this and have a picture,

 6     every police station had its files which the leaders of the patrol

 7     sectors were in charge with, and if it was in an urban area, it would be

 8     the leader of the beat area.  All villages would be covered, and we

 9     always knew what percentage of Muslims were there, what percentage of

10     Serbs, what percentage of others, and there was no doubt about that.  So

11     I can believe that in Bratunac there was a majority Muslim population,

12     and I seem to remember that.  But I couldn't tell you the exact

13     percentage.

14        Q.   All right.

15             MS. KORNER:  Then could we look, please, at paragraphs 8 and 10

16     of the document.  That's the second -- sorry, one, two, three -- fourth

17     page in English.  Third page in B/C/S.

18        Q.   Your inspector concluded that:

19             "The police station submits all the information, responds to

20     documents to the CSB in an orderly manner."

21             That's paragraph 8.  And paragraph 10:

22             "As for the documenting of war crimes against the Serbian people

23     committed by the Muslim extremists, 46 cases were documented."

24             Again, in relation to Bratunac, there were no cases reported to

25     you, were they, where the police in Bratunac were investigating

Page 6723

 1     allegations of war crimes against non-Serbs?

 2        A.   Well, I can only confirm that this is indeed the case, because I

 3     don't have any other information available.  Fourty-six cases are

 4     mentioned here.  As I tell you, there was a lot of that in Bratunac, and

 5     this report refers to a particular period of time.  Whether in that

 6     period of time there were any crimes committed against non-Serbs, I'm not

 7     aware.  But knowing the people there, that would have been dealt with if

 8     that occurred.  And that's all I can say about it.

 9             MS. KORNER:  All right.  Your Honours, may that be admitted and

10     marked, please.

11             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P998, Your Honours.

13             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I'm aware that I've come to the end of

14     my extra time.  I just want to see if I can squeeze in one more document,

15     and I don't think I can.  Your Honour, just one -- may I just check.

16     Yes.  I'm sorry.  Just one more, Your Honour.

17             Can I ask that 10276 be put up on the screen.  Your Honours, I

18     say straightaway that this was not -- it's one of the ones that was not

19     on our 65 ter list.  So all I can do is ask if you're happy with it to be

20     MFI'd.

21        Q.   It's the 9th of August.  We've gone back a bit in time, but this

22     again is the CSB to the public security stations, referring to a

23     memorandum from the Ministry of the Interior saying that a report shall

24     be prepared on the Serbian authorities' treatment of and conduct towards

25     prisoners of war.

Page 6724

 1             MS. KORNER:  And if we go over to the second page in B/C/S -- in

 2     English, sorry, not in B/C/S.

 3        Q.   "All senior CSB officers are ordered to release civilian-category

 4     persons immediately, which implicitly entails all persons, irrespective

 5     of age, who have not been members of enemy formations, i.e., to allow

 6     them free movement."

 7             Now, first of all were you aware of this order coming from the

 8     ministry and then Mr. Cvijetic sending it out?

 9        A.   If you had asked me without showing me this document, I don't

10     know whether I'd have been able to recall that.  But I see that prompt

11     was action taken.  And as soon as the dispatch arrived from the MUP,

12     steps were taken to respond.

13        Q.   Now, it says:

14             "... ordered to release civilian-category prisoner immediately,

15     which implicitly entails all persons, irrespective of age, who have not

16     been members of enemy formations, to allow them free movement."

17             Now, you've said on a couple of occasions that these persons who

18     were being -- being described as prisoners or being kept in

19     Pale Dom Kulture were people who had come in from surrounding areas and

20     were being kept there for their own safety.  Does this paragraph refer to

21     these people?

22        A.   I think so, yes, because these are displaced persons gathering

23     there from the territory of Pale which had been a multi-ethnic community

24     before the war.  There were quite a few Muslims and Serbs there and some

25     Croats.  I think the people mentioned here are those people.  And they

Page 6725

 1     had to be escorted, according to their wishes, for their own security to

 2     the demarcation line.  Most of them wanted to go to Sarajevo.

 3        Q.   Well, it doesn't say that they should be escorted to the

 4     demarcation line.  It says that they should be allowed free movement, if

 5     the English translation is right.  Doesn't it?

 6        A.   That's what it says here, but it's understood they had to be

 7     escorted.  Certainly that's how it was done.  Buses probably had to be

 8     provided.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, may that just be marked for

10     identification, and then we'll apply formally to add it to our 65 ter.

11             JUDGE HALL:  Any objection being marked for identification?

12             MR. KRGOVIC:  No.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P999, marked for

14     identification, Your Honours.

15             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

16        Q.   And then the final question, Mr. Borovcanin, is this:  In 1993, I

17     think it's right, isn't it, that you were recommended for an order?

18             MS. KORNER:  This is already an exhibit, but perhaps we should

19     have it up.  P732, please.

20        Q.   We can see that this refers to -- it doesn't have a date at all

21     or anywhere, but it refers to a -- the "Official Gazette" number 4 of

22     1993, and indeed because Mico Stanisic is described as former minister of

23     the Republika Srpska.

24             In your case --

25             MS. KORNER:  Can we go, please, in the English first of all to

Page 6726

 1     page one, two, three -- four, and in the B/C/S to page 3, just to show

 2     the order.

 3        Q.   This is the Milos Obilic commendation?

 4             MS. KORNER:  And we need to move on in the B/C/S to the next

 5     page, fifth page, and in the English also to the next page.  Sorry, in

 6     the English we need to go one further page.  Number 87.  Yes.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Mr. Borovcanin, is that you, number 87?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Did you get your award?

10        A.   You might laugh at this, but halfway I was proposed for an award,

11     nominated, and perhaps I'm one of the few who said that we were acting

12     too fast with these decorations.  They were decorations from those

13     unfortunate former wars that the Serbs had waged, and I felt that they

14     were being devaluated in this way, and I at first refused to accept the

15     decoration I was nominated for.  Then I was invited again, and to avoid

16     being seen as apolitical, I responded.  And all I received was a piece of

17     paper, a certificate.  But there was no medal; it had got lost somewhere.

18     So I never actually received it.

19        Q.   I'm sorry to hear that, Mr. Borovcanin.  Thank you very much,

20     that's all I ask.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Ms. Korner, in regard to the previous document

23     that was not on your 65 list, that was a five-digit number, and I --

24     that's what indicates that it's not on your 65 list?

25             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  If you see a 10.000 something number that's

Page 6727

 1     not --

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes.  Additionally, your list used to have them

 3     in red digits, and I see that on the last two ones they are in black.

 4     And it's very helpful if they are in red, so if you can --

 5             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, I think that Mr. Smith had to leave

 6     suddenly.  What happened was we had a whole lot of marking, so I simply

 7     said to Ms. Bosnjakovic, and I take full responsibility, remove all the

 8     red markings.  Because they weren't just the numbers; there were other

 9     things.  But, Your Honours, I hope Your Honours will accept that we would

10     always tell Your Honours that it was not on our 65 ter list.  And

11     anything that's, as you say, 10.000, is not.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

13             JUDGE HALL:  We are 10 minutes past the ordinary time for the

14     break, so we rise now and resume in 20 minutes.

15                           [The witness stands down]

16                           --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 12.37 p.m.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Cvijetic, you may begin your

20     cross-examination.

21             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Cvijetic:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Borovcanin.  My name is

24     Slobodan Cvijetic.  I am a counsel in the Defence team of Mico Stanisic,

25     as co-counsel.

Page 6728

 1        A.   Good afternoon.

 2        Q.   Before I move on to the topic of your testimony before this

 3     Chamber, unfortunately I have to say something about procedural matters.

 4     There was some suspicions voiced yesterday about our contacts in the

 5     course of the week -- or, rather, on Sunday, so before I deal with that,

 6     I'll put a direct question to you.

 7             Before last Sunday here in The Hague, had the two of us ever met

 8     or had I ever communicated with you in any way concerning your testimony

 9     here in The Hague?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I never called you up on the phone; is that right?

12        A.   Yes, that's right.

13        Q.   Tell me, when someone in the Defence team, and this is the fourth

14     Defence team that Mr. Stanisic has had because he was not fortunate

15     enough to have one and the same team all the time, so when someone from

16     the Defence called you up and asked you to testify, you said you would

17     think about it and that you hadn't reach a decision yet.  Is that

18     correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   My question to you is the following:  At that point in time, did

21     you know that you would be a witness here before this court?

22        A.   At that time, I didn't know it.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And one more question about this.  I looked at the

24     transcript of your interview with the investigators, and at the end when

25     asked by the investigator as to whether you wanted to testify before this

Page 6729

 1     court, you said, quite decidedly, "If I don't have to, I don't want to

 2     testify."  Is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes.  That, too, is correct.

 4        Q.   So I would like to know why you changed your decision and why you

 5     decided to come and testify after all?

 6        A.   At that time I didn't know about the rules of the court, the

 7     rules of procedure.  I'm not familiar with them today, but in a

 8     conversation with one of the investigators a few months ago - I can't

 9     recall the name - I was asked whether I wish to testify for the

10     Prosecution.  I said I would be happy if I didn't have to testify for

11     either the Prosecution or the Defence, and then he said to me, Yes, but

12     we have a legal means to make you come.  We can have a court order

13     issued.  So when he said that, I said, All right, I'll come and testify.

14             They asked me if I want to be a protected witness, and I said no.

15     I said I wanted to see the other people in the courtroom and that I would

16     do my best to say what I know truthfully.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And, very briefly, about our meeting on Sunday, my

18     colleague Mr. Krgovic and I talked to you from 9.00 a.m. to 11.00 a.m.

19     Can you just confirm that this conversation was held in the presence of a

20     representative of the Victims and Witnesses Unit?  There was a lady there

21     whose name I don't recall.  She said she would sit there and wait because

22     she had to take you to your interview with the OTP after that?

23        A.   Yes, that's correct.  While we were talking, she was sitting

24     there at the side.  I don't recall her name either.

25        Q.   Yes.  She did introduce herself, but I've forgotten her name.  It

Page 6730

 1     doesn't matter.

 2             Furthermore, we agreed we would meet after the OTP had finished

 3     interviewing you, and I did not set a specific time.  I hadn't completed

 4     my interview with you because there was still lots of documents to go

 5     through, and I said that I would continue only after you had finished

 6     your proofing with the OTP.  Is that correct?

 7        A.   You may have said at 1700 hours.  You may have assumed we would

 8     be finished earlier.  But it took quite a long time; it took longer here,

 9     so we met later.  I may be a layperson, but I was quite surprised that I

10     could see both the Defence and the Prosecution.  I understood this to be

11     a very transparent process, and in that context we talked, yes.

12        Q.   Very well.  And this second meeting of ours was supervised by

13     another lady from the Victims and Witnesses Unit.  She was there at the

14     beginning of our conversation.  And all this took place in the lobby of

15     your hotel; is that correct?

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Cvijetic, I'm not sure why we're spending so

19     much time on this.  The nature of Ms. Korner's observation, I wouldn't

20     even use the word complaint, in respect of this witness was, as I recall,

21     merely the issue of the amount of the witness's limited time between his

22     arrival in The Hague and his -- the commencement of his testimony that

23     was spent in the course of these pre-trial interviews, for want of a

24     better expression.  But the -- that complaint, I'll use that word now, is

25     not something which could be resolved by these questions that you're

Page 6731

 1     putting to the witness in open court.

 2             You may recall that what the Chamber said yesterday is that it

 3     had heard what the Prosecution's observation was and the response, I

 4     think it was particularly from Mr. Pantelic, but it was not something

 5     that the Chamber -- on which the Chamber was prepared to say anything

 6     more definitive at that time.  So I don't know how -- how this trial is

 7     being progressed by your going into this with the witness.

 8             MS. KORNER:  I was going to say, there was no suggestion in

 9     relation to this witness and Mr. Cvijetic of any impropriety.  As

10     Your Honour rightly says, it was simply the length of time.  If I can

11     make that absolutely clear.

12             JUDGE HALL:  So would you like to begin your cross-examination

13     now?

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE HALL:  Just a moment, please.  Mr. Borovcanin, it appears

16     that inadvertently you, in response to a question put by counsel, you

17     would have in your answer given the name of a member of staff on the

18     record, and that is the order that I have just made redacting that from

19     the transcript.  So in the future, that is something that should be

20     avoided.

21             Thank you, Mr. Cvijetic.

22             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, these introductory

23     questions were leading up to the last question in this area, and that's

24     precisely what Your Honour mentioned.  Ms. Korner mentioned yesterday

25     that she had information to the effect that the witness, after the

Page 6732

 1     interview with me, was under stress and was fatigued.  Well, I to

 2     interview the witness.

 3        Q.   Mr. Borovcanin, did my interview with you cause you to be

 4     stressed and exhausted?  Was I responsible for your fatigue?  Did you

 5     find it unpleasant to talk to me?

 6             MS. KORNER:  No, sorry.  Just a moment.  Your Honour --

 7     Mr. Borovcanin, don't worry.

 8             Your Honour, it was the combined effect of the two interviews

 9     with Mr. Cvijetic and the OTP, and I don't really think that Mr. Cvijetic

10     need worry.  There is no suggestion that he behaved improperly.

11             JUDGE HALL:  And I may add that when the witness was released

12     earlier than the usual time yesterday, I was careful to choose language

13     which didn't convey the impression that any physical difficulty he had

14     was the cause of the early adjournment.

15             Please begin your cross-examination proper, Mr. Cvijetic.

16             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Honours.  And I

17     did this -- in future I will be more cautious, and we will co-operate

18     better with the OTP and the Victims and Witnesses Unit.

19        Q.   Mr. Borovcanin, yesterday during the examination-in-chief,

20     Ms. Korner made a small digression and tried, so to speak, to throw light

21     on a fact concerning my possible relatedness to Mr. Cvijetic, and, yes,

22     he was my brother, but he was a mechanical engineer, and he is

23     fortunately still alive.  His name is still the same as this --

24     Mr. Zoran Cvijetic who was killed, but we have no relationship.  So I do

25     have a brother called Zoran Cvijetic, but he is alive and well, and he is

Page 6733

 1     a mechanical engineer and has nothing to do with these events.  That's

 2     the explanation.

 3             Very well, Mr. Borovcanin, I will proceed in the same way that

 4     you proceeded with Ms. Korner.  So let's discuss your departure from

 5     Sarajevo.

 6             You said at one point that as you were a police officer, your

 7     neighbours asked you what was going on, and you said that you couldn't

 8     see the forest for the trees.  Could you please explain to the

 9     Trial Chamber what it is that you couldn't see?

10        A.   I didn't have information about what was in the offing.  I was on

11     the sidelines.  So when my neighbours, who viewed me with suspicion

12     thinking I was concealing something from them, questioned me -- I was

13     taken aback by the events that occurred.  I decided it was for me to

14     leave Sarajevo.  I illustrated this with some examples.  Shots were fired

15     at my windows.  My wife realised it was too dangerous for her to continue

16     to go to work at Ilidza, and this event was a message to her as well that

17     we should finally agree to leave town.  We had a house in a village where

18     my late parents had lived.  We wanted to take our children to safety.

19        Q.   Very well.  I'll ask you directly.  Did you observe the arming of

20     the Muslim population and Muslim paramilitary units near the place where

21     you lived?  Were you able to see this with your own eyes?

22        A.   Well, I already mentioned this in the interview.  Across the road

23     from my flat in the Mojmilo neighbourhood, there was a kindergarten.  One

24     day, I think it may have been the 7th of April or maybe the 6th, but it

25     was around that time, a black Golf drove up.  I peeked out behind the

Page 6734

 1     curtain, and I saw automatic weapons being taken from the boot of the car

 2     and handed over to some young men who carried it into the building of the

 3     kindergarten.

 4             Prazina, Jusuf Prazina, whom I knew from before the war - he was

 5     a criminal with a fat file in the police service - got out of the car,

 6     and this told me that nothing good was going to happen.  I was worried

 7     about my own security, as I was a police officer in the MUP with certain

 8     responsibilities.

 9        Q.   When you observed the adherence of the Patriotic League, which is

10     a Muslim paramilitary formation --

11        A.   Yes, I was working in the night-shift.

12        Q.   You don't have to go into details.  Let's just establish that the

13     members of the Patriotic League were members of a paramilitary formation.

14        A.   Yes.  We didn't know about those insignia at the time.  We had

15     our own insignia.

16             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Gentlemen, you are overlapping, so make sure that

17     you wait with your answer to Counsel Cvijetic's question so as to allow

18     the interpreters to catch up.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation]  All right.  Thank you.

20             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Later on, did you learn from your colleagues in the police that

22     three members of the Patriotic League got identity cards from the police

23     service of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24        A.   I wasn't aware of that at the time, but most probably they were

25     given police IDs to provide them with credibility.  So they were acting

Page 6735

 1     under the auspices of the service.

 2        Q.   So common criminals were provide a credibility by means of an

 3     official document, official identification?

 4        A.   Yes.  I'm telling you that as regards the Ministry of

 5     the Interior, the system was falling apart, both at a local level and

 6     higher levels, and my colleagues from the federal MUP can confirm that it

 7     was the criminal underground that had taken over the town practically.

 8        Q.   When you mentioned this sidelining of the real police, did you

 9     notice that Serb officers were sidelined in the MUP?

10        A.   Of course.  I still can't understand why, after so many years of

11     service, from commander of the largest unit in the republic, I was

12     demoted to the night-shift.  I still can't understand who humiliated me

13     in that way, because I was the man with the greatest experience and the

14     longest service.

15        Q.   Sredoje Novic was one of those nominated for the post of -- for a

16     post in the federal MUP, and he didn't get it.  He was demoted in the

17     same way as you.

18        A.   Yes.  He was secretary of the SUP, in today's terminology,

19     assistant minister, and he was in charge of the crime department.  And,

20     of course, I was astonished when I heard that he been transferred in a

21     small -- to a small police station in Novi Grad.  That's a demotion by

22     two steps on the ladder.

23        Q.   In that period while you were in Sarajevo, did this violent

24     takeover of some police stations occur by paramilitary units when one

25     Serb policeman was killed?

Page 6736

 1        A.   Yes.  It was just before the war broke out.  I know of that

 2     incident.  It was at the police station of Novo Sarajevo.  One of our

 3     colleagues, late Petar Petrovic, was killed while on duty at the police

 4     station, and he was leader of the duty service at the time.  It was an

 5     incident that instilled fear in all of us Serbs.  It was bad a writing on

 6     the wall.

 7        Q.   And you got another similar message, the killing of a member of a

 8     Serbian wedding party in the churchyard.

 9        A.   Well, that happened outside one of the oldest places of worship

10     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the killing of an innocent man.  It was not only a

11     warning, it was -- this shooting took place against the background -- how

12     shall I put it?  It was a shot fire at all Serbs.  Anyone who was Serb

13     had great reason for concern.

14        Q.   So there are some of the most important reasons why you decided

15     to walk out.  At that time, you were probably not even thinking of

16     getting involved in the establishment of the Serbian MUP.  I believe you

17     said you weren't even aware that one was being established.  Am I right?

18        A.   The last time I talked with Mr. Bakir Alispahic at one meeting

19     where I didn't even bother to sit down, when I said I was no longer going

20     to go to work and I didn't want to be a clay pigeon, he said, Where are

21     you going now, Drago?  And I said I was a cosmopolitan.  I did not want

22     to get involved in anything.  For security reasons also, because as I was

23     going back to Mojmilo, it may sound strange but I took a completely

24     different route.  Those who know Sarajevo will understand if I say I took

25     road by the tobacco factory.  Because everything was ruled by criminals,

Page 6737

 1     and I fear for my safety, and when I finally reached my apartment, I told

 2     my wife that we should leave town immediately.

 3        Q.   We'll leave this topic there.  Your departure from Sarajevo was,

 4     in fact, flight.  You were fleeing to save your life?

 5        A.   Well, we were rather naive.  We were totally unprepared.  I

 6     forgot to take all my important documentation, jewellery, some things of

 7     sentimental value.  I don't know what I was thinking.  I was thinking we

 8     are coming back seven or ten days later.  But -- and only when we were

 9     gone did we realise that things were very serious.  There was a war going

10     on.  And fortunately I had some very honest neighbours who returned all

11     my documentation to be when I came back eventually.

12             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] May I ask the usher to hand this

13     to the witness.

14        Q.   Wait, Mr. Borovcanin.

15             Mr. Borovcanin, I'll begin with a meeting held in Belgrade on the

16     11th of July, 1992.  It's P160.  In your binder it's tab 6.

17        A.   All right.

18             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Can we put on the screen the

19     17th page in B/C/S and page 19 in English.

20        Q.   You were at this meeting, and you will agree with me that it was

21     the first real meeting or collegium of senior officers of the MUP held

22     from the moment the war began?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   You will agree with me that the venue was the only one possible

25     and the best, Belgrade.  Because, from the point of view of geography, it

Page 6738

 1     was easily accessible -- equally accessible to those from Trebinje and

 2     from everywhere else.

 3        A.   Well, I personally wondered why Belgrade, and then it was explain

 4     that it was at an equidistance from Banja Luka and Trebinje more or less,

 5     although it was farthest from Trebinje because Trebinje is at the south

 6     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7        Q.   On this occasion, the minister of the interior saw some of his

 8     underlings for the first time, but it was also an opportunity for him to

 9     hear for the first time about the problems that police stations and CSB

10     encounter on the ground every day.

11        A.   Yes.  He not only met some people for the first time, but also

12     some of us met each other from the -- for the first time, because in the

13     meantime there had been some appointments of -- some new appointments.

14        Q.   And after this meeting, after having received his first

15     information about certain problems, the minister could begin to respond

16     and react to these problems to ensure that the law on the Ministry of

17     the Interior be properly enforced.

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   You will agree with me that it was not easy at that time and that

20     creating a Ministry of the Interior is a process that cannot be completed

21     within five months.

22        A.   Of course.  I've said several times in my interview it's a very

23     arduous process.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel and witness please make pauses

25     between question and answer.

Page 6739

 1             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I think the witness is being asked

 2     to repeat his answer.  Okay.

 3        Q.   Sir, we were talking about a process, and year 1992 was not quite

 4     a normal year, was it?

 5        A.   Certainly not.  War time cannot be normal.

 6        Q.   Now, I'll invoke some of the contributions of those who attended,

 7     and in this way I'll try to show, to highlight certain areas that we will

 8     later look at through documents to try to see how Mr. Stanisic reacted to

 9     some of this information.

10             The Prosecution already showed to you the contribution by

11     Mr. Zupljanin.  I have so far selected just one passage, and that's by

12     Mr. Planojevic.

13             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] It's actually page 17 -- no.  It's

14     actually page 20 in B/C/S.  In the witness's copy it's 17.  But it's

15     page 20 in e-court in B/C/S, and in English it's 19.

16        Q.   So Mr. Planojevic speaks.  This is the right page.  Have you

17     found it?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Mr. Planojevic says:

20             "The priority is to document war crimes with complete

21     documentation (on-site investigations, photographs, expertise, medical

22     reports) and it's necessary to draw up lists of war criminals to be

23     exchanged among centres."

24             Of course, we should not this -- understand this as exchange of

25     war crimes, but exchange of lists.

Page 6740

 1        A.   Right.

 2        Q.   Another person speaks on the same topic, and that's why I chose

 3     him, and he is from your area.  Mr. Simo Tusevljak.

 4             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] The English page is 20, and

 5     B/C/S is 21.  It's paragraph 3, begins with the words "So far" or,

 6     "Thus far."  Have you found it?  He says:

 7             "Thus far, the job of documenting war crimes and filing criminal

 8     reports has been a priority.  War crimes are documented also if committed

 9     by Serbs."

10             Is that correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   We will later show documents that confirm what is said here.  But

13     I would like to clear up one point before that.  You police officers,

14     when you come across a crime and you find the victim of a killing, you

15     are not able to say at first glance what the motive for the murder was?

16        A.   Of course not, because the on-site investigation reveals

17     step-by-step every aspect, whether the person was killed for gain or

18     profit or some other reason.  Until you complete the entire investigation

19     procedure, you cannot know.

20        Q.   You sometimes simply have to opt for the qualification of murder

21     that implies, among other things, the death sentence, but the final legal

22     qualification is selected by the prosecutor?

23        A.   That's how things should be.  We prepare our documentation and

24     submit it to the prosecutor's office, and the prosecutor then does his

25     job.

Page 6741

 1        Q.   So if we find in one of the reports that in the area of a certain

 2     police station ten murders had taken place, it may happen that two or

 3     three resulted from war crimes, but that can only be established in the

 4     course of prosecution and trial.

 5        A.   Of course.  Nobody can claim anything before all the facts are

 6     established.

 7        Q.   Now, in practice, you will agree with me that most of individual

 8     murders that we see in the reports, regardless of the identity of the

 9     victim, in murders outside combat zones we mostly find that these were

10     traditional murders and the motive was profit.

11             MR. PANTELIC:  I think it should be corrected on page 73, line 1.

12     Instead of question, it should be answer.  And then next line, in front

13     of word "now," should be question.  Just for the sake of accuracy of the

14     transcript.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

16             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Let me start again.  I was asking you about the percentage of

18     individual crimes and motives regardless of the identity of victims.  Is

19     it the case that most crimes fall into the category of general crime?

20        A.   Yes, most of them do.  Motivation such as profit, et cetera.

21        Q.   Any suspicion of a war crime arises mainly when there is a large

22     number of victims.

23        A.   Yes, if we're talking about civilians.

24        Q.   All right.  I'll come back to this when I get to the documents,

25     but I'll stay with this meeting for a while.

Page 6742

 1             Apart from this issue raised by Mr. Zupljanin and followed up by

 2     Mr. Planojevic and Mr. Tusevljak, many other problems were raised and it

 3     was said that they had to be dealt with in the following period.  Most of

 4     the speakers also mentioned the engagement of the police in combat

 5     operations.  It was emphasised as a problem, because with the reduced

 6     manpower, the police were unable to do their regular police work.

 7        A.   Yes, or they were able to but with great difficulty.

 8        Q.   They also emphasised the problems they experienced with

 9     paramilitary units?

10        A.   Yes.  That was one of the most important problems stressed at

11     that meeting.

12        Q.   And I'll mention only one, although there were many more:

13     Organisational personnel and financial problems?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   You will agree with me that if the minister of the interior were

16     to grapple seriously with these problems, you had first to complete the

17     creation of the ministry and enable it and equip it properly to come to

18     grips with these problems?

19        A.   Yes.  It's a very arduous process, as I said.  And we started

20     from scratch as far as the Sarajevo centre is concerned, because we were

21     literally tenets in the former offices of Energoinvest.  Can you imagine

22     a very large centre starting from scratch?  It was truly hard work.

23        Q.   The minister had the same problem, because his headquarters was

24     in Vraca, then he moved to Pale, then to Hotel Bistrica at Mount Jahorina

25     and then in the second half of the year to Bijeljina.

Page 6743

 1             How correct is my information which I heard from other witnesses

 2     that the MUP in all its lines of work started functioning properly only

 3     after the headquarters was moved to Bijeljina?  Is this correct?

 4        A.   Yes.  The headquarters were now in one place, and we knew where

 5     to send dispatches, reports, and exchange information.

 6        Q.   Very well.  You will agree with me that the minister had to

 7     ensure that internal mechanisms were in place for him to be able to have

 8     all his orders and decisions implemented.  He had to create an internal

 9     organisation and discipline in order for him to make decisions with

10     authority.  Is that correct?

11        A.   Well, the ministry would not be able to function without such an

12     approach.  Staffing, respect for regulations, order, all that is

13     necessary for it to become a proper institution.

14        Q.   But you will agree with me that he inherited a ministry in which

15     there were those who had been appointed by the local authorities, and

16     later on, as it turned out, those who had broken the law, and that he

17     also had problems because of this and had to clean up the ministry.

18        A.   Yes.  That is also correct.  On more than one occasion in the

19     early days, May, June, I would see a person I had never seen before, and

20     I thought I knew all the -- all the people who were in positions of

21     authority in the ministry because I'd been there for quite some time, and

22     I would see a new person.  There was chaos.  The River Drina was nearby,

23     and this was something that criminals found very convenient, because it

24     was very easy for them to cross the bridge into Serbia.  So they had an

25     excellent opportunity to get rich quick.

Page 6744

 1        Q.   What municipality were you referring to?  It's not on the record.

 2     Were you referring to Zvornik municipality?

 3        A.   Yes.  I mentioned Zvornik as the most glaring example of this.

 4        Q.   And you will agree with me that in solving these huge problems,

 5     Mr. Stanisic had to have support, both political and every other kind of

 6     support from Republika Srpska, in order for him to succeed.  He could not

 7     succeed on his own; is that correct?

 8        A.   Of course it's correct.  I'd like to see what individual could

 9     deal with all that on his own without any sort of support.  But very

10     often he didn't get support from the local authorities because they were

11     states within a state, so to speak.  The local structures would be

12     consulted about everything while the MUP was marginalised in these

13     places.  They probably had their reasons for behaving in this way.

14        Q.   Very well.  I'll put a general question about each area, followed

15     by some documents so that we can see whether the documents confirm what

16     we say.

17             So as you were a police officer on the ground, you received

18     orders from the chief of the CSB, attended collegium meetings, and I

19     assume you also had opportunities to see orders emanating from

20     Mr. Stanisic, so I'll ask you the following:  In the area of attempts to

21     pull the police out of combat operations so that it could devote itself

22     is to police work, did you notice that there was continuity and

23     persistence in the minister's efforts to achieve this goal?  I'm speaking

24     about practical moves, not in general terms.

25        A.   Well, of course I was able to notice that through administrative

Page 6745

 1     dispatches and also directly on the ground.  His overall efforts were

 2     aimed at creating a professional MUP as soon as possible composed of

 3     professional experienced police officers, but this was a drawn-out

 4     process.  It was very difficult.  There were many problems with the local

 5     authorities.  We can talk about that later, but I know that it was a

 6     powder keg in many places.

 7        Q.   All right.  Let's move on to another area, the fight against

 8     paramilitary formations.

 9             Did you observe that there was continuity and persistence on the

10     part of the MUP and the minister, Mico Stanisic, in attempting to

11     eradicate such paramilitary formations?

12        A.   Certainly, yes.  I said that in my interview two or three times.

13     That was a standing task, in police terminology.

14        Q.   Very well.  In the attempts to clean up the police, to get rid of

15     persons who had criminal records or who had committed crimes in the

16     course of their duties, did you observe in this area that Mr. Stanisic

17     was making efforts to remove them from the police force?

18        A.   Yes, certainly.  There's more than one dispatch showing this.  I

19     hope the accused will not misunderstand it when I say that it was already

20     a pain in the neck, because a dispatch would arrive and two or three days

21     later it would be followed by another one repeating the same things.  He

22     was really and truly trying to create a professional MUP amidst that

23     full-time chaos.

24        Q.   Very well.  Let's move on to the problem of war crimes.  Did you

25     receive any instructions and documents from the ministry on the ground as

Page 6746

 1     to how war crimes should be documented, and was there any discrimination

 2     according to who the victim was?

 3        A.   We did receive instructions.  Of course my colleagues from the

 4     crime prevention department will be able to say more about that, because

 5     it was they who had to fill in certain forms, but of course there had to

 6     be no discrimination, because every human being had to be treated in the

 7     same way and given the same protection.  There was no dilemma in that

 8     respect.

 9        Q.   I'll ask you the following, as you were on the ground:  Do you

10     know of a single instance of a crime that you learned of which was not

11     documented and dealt with whether the perpetrator was known or unknown?

12        A.   I'm not aware of any such instance.  I don't know if it would be

13     possible for anyone to overlook a serious crime without documenting it

14     and dealing with it.

15        Q.   Very well.  And now we come to the problem of camps, collection

16     centres, reception centres, and so on.

17             The Ministry of the Interior had only one competency when it

18     comes to facilities where persons are deprived of their liberty, and

19     these are places where persons are remanded in custody and can be kept

20     for no longer than three days.

21             You will agree with me that all other similar facilities were not

22     under the jurisdiction of the police.  Is that correct?

23        A.   Yes.  Let me just explain.  You mentioned detention units.  Every

24     police unit had one, two, or three, depending on its area, cells where

25     persons could be kept for no longer than three days.  They would all be

Page 6747

 1     given a decision on custody, and there would be records of the condition

 2     in which the persons arrived, whether they had injuries, what their

 3     psychological state was, and so on.  As for collection centres and camps,

 4     they came within the purview of the military of Republika Srpska.

 5        Q.   Very well.  We'll come to that.  Sometimes it was civilian

 6     municipal organs that set up these collection centres, but when we look

 7     at the documents, we will deal with that.

 8             And one more topic remains, the organisational staffing,

 9     financial, and other aspect of the MUP.  Did you observe continuity in

10     Mr. Stanisic's work in attempting to deal with the enormous problems in

11     this area?

12        A.   Well, of course.  First of all, we had huge problems with

13     staffing.  I'm referring to professional police officers who could

14     shoulder the responsibility of holding certain posts in those difficult

15     times in leadership positions in the CSB and the SJBs.  We tried to find

16     qualified, well-trained personnel to carry out this work, because in

17     those times there were people who did not answer that description and who

18     didn't really understand what was going on.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

20             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Borovcanin, I don't want to make a mistake, but I think that

22     on the 11th of July at this meeting, Mr. Zupljanin raised an issue, the

23     issue of financing the work of the organs of the MUP, because at the

24     beginning this was not properly regulated.  Do you know anything about

25     this?

Page 6748

 1        A.   I know that there was no unified system.  I think that in the

 2     Ilijas police station there were some people going solo, so to speak, and

 3     whether he was the president of the municipality or the

 4     Executive Council, I can't remember, but he would say, I'm providing the

 5     funds; I want to issue the orders.  That was a fundamental problem,

 6     because he said, I'm providing uniforms for the police, equipment.  So

 7     this was a terrible problem in the beginning, and Mr. Stanisic wanted

 8     this problem to be overcome.  He wanted the financing, equipping, and so

 9     on of the MUP to be carried out from a single centre, and that was the

10     truth of it.  So he was continuously attempting to create a professional

11     MUP.

12        Q.   Very well.  You anticipated my next question, which had to do

13     with these problems of funding, and now only one area remains to be

14     covered in this introductory part and that is the problem of the attitude

15     of the local authorities, Serb autonomous provinces, Crisis Staffs, and

16     municipalities and their influence on the work of the local police

17     stations.

18             Did you come across this problem in your practical work on the

19     ground?

20        A.   Well, of course I did.  Imagine the situation in

21     1992 in May/June.  Check-points would be set up, and we had no idea who

22     had set them up.  Some were set up by Crisis Staffs, others by military

23     security, some by paramilitaries.  I can give you examples of how they

24     did this.  And, of course, the priority was to establish who had the

25     authority to do this and who was in charge of these check-points.

Page 6749

 1             We were on the margins.  We couldn't believe this was going on.

 2     So more than once I would say at meetings, Okay, people.  Let's draw up

 3     an instruction about check-points, who can man check-points, what powers

 4     they can have.  For example, when checking goods, because there was a lot

 5     of theft.  So there were attempts to set up a system, and to have order

 6     introduced.  But the MUP was pushed to the sidelines because we were

 7     encountering great difficulties in trying to establish our organisation.

 8        Q.   Very well.  And can you tell us now something about the problem

 9     of communications, the physical accessibility of some parts of

10     Republika Srpska, the problem of lack of information due to poor

11     communications?  Did you run into these problems as well?

12        A.   Yes, of course I did.  I'll give you an example which I'm not

13     sure you'll fully understand.  There was a police station called

14     Nedzarici.  It was actually a reserve police station attached to the

15     Ilidza SJB.  So imagine coming to that station which I visited only once,

16     by night because I had to pass through that road, and then you would go

17     through walls which had been broken through in a building.  You had to

18     pass through several holes in the wall in order to reach that station

19     which was in the very heart of the combat area.  In western Sarajevo when

20     going towards Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, there were screens set up in many

21     places to protect from sniper activity, mortar fire, and you would be

22     risking your life every time you set out to go there.  And if electronic

23     communications, telephones, and so on were not working, you can imagine

24     the kind of problems we faced in 1992 in the beginning.

25        Q.   And I think we're coming to the end of today's session, so I'll

Page 6750

 1     just put a general question and later we'll see specific documents.  Did

 2     you observe whether Mr. Stanisic had the absolute support of other organs

 3     in the government, politicians, and so on?

 4        A.   Well, I can only give you my opinion.  Imagine people trying to

 5     get rich quick, all those who were engaged in criminal activities.  Of

 6     course establishing a professional MUP was hindering their activities.

 7     So of course they were not all enthusiastic about setting this up,

 8     especially those who wanted to appropriate property that didn't belong to

 9     them.  So this was a huge problem.

10        Q.   Tell me, which post did you occupy in 1994?

11        A.   In 1994, I fell ill in the combat area, and then I underwent

12     treatment for six or seven months until sometime in 1995.  And when I got

13     better, I returned to the SUP inspection -- to the SUP inspectorate as an

14     inspector.  I believe that's where I spent a few years.

15        Q.   Do you remember that in 1994 Mr. Stanisic became minister of the

16     interior again for a short while before he resigned?  Just tell me if you

17     remember.

18        A.   Yes, I do.

19             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have finished with

20     this introductory part.  My next segment will be a long display of

21     documents.  Shall I start now, or shall we leave it for tomorrow?  For me

22     it's a completely new area, so maybe it would be better to start

23     tomorrow.

24             JUDGE HALL:  I agree, Mr. Cvijetic.  It's just about two minutes

25     before the time for the adjournment.  So we would take the adjournment

Page 6751

 1     now and.  Mr. Borovcanin, I would remind you of what I said yesterday at

 2     the adjournment, not to discuss the case with anybody outside the court

 3     and to have no communication with counsel from other side.

 4             So we resume in this courtroom tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 5                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day

 7                           of February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.