1 Thursday, 6 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused Stanisic entered court]
4 [The accused Zupljanin not present]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
7 everybody in and around the courtroom. This is case IT-08-91-T, the
8 Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 Good morning to everyone. May we begin as usual by taking
11 today's appearances, please.
12 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. Joanna Korner; and this
13 morning, a new face, Charlotte Frew, who's temporarily attached to our
14 team, is with me, and I don't think Your Honour can see, but she is
15 behind me; together, as always, with Crispian Smith, case manager.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
17 Eugene O'Sullivan, and Ms. Tatjana Savic, appearing for Stanisic Defence
18 this morning. Thank you.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
20 Miroslav Cukic for the Zupljanin Defence. Mr. Zupljanin is not present;
21 he already signed a waiver. Thank you.
22 Mr. Zupljanin is not present. He already signed a waiver.
23 JUDGE HALL
24 Yes, could the -- I assume the usher has gone to escort the
25 witness back to the stand.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 on your oath.
5 Yes, Mr. Zecevic. Please continue.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
7 WITNESS: MOMCILO MANDIC [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Mandic.
11 A. Good morning, Mr. Zecevic.
12 Q. Mr. Mandic, during the night I looked at the transcript, and
13 there are a couple of things that I need to address. Something needs to
14 be changed in the transcript.
15 Now, since you and I overlapped when speaking, it is no surprise
16 that the transcript needs to be corrected here and there and that there
17 might have been some slips by the interpreters.
18 On page 9627, for instance, line 6, when you were talking about
19 Mr. Hasan Cengic. It says here that he wanted to introduce a
20 pro-Iranian, pro-Shiite elements in the work of his party, aspects in the
21 work of his party, and I think you said that he wanted to do that in the
22 state rather than the party. Is that right?
23 A. Yes, in the state.
24 Q. After that, I asked you about Bosnia and Herzegovina and what it
25 was like, what kind of state it was like before the 1992 events, compared
1 to its secular character, if you recall, and I don't think that part of
2 your answer was recorded. I believe you said or, rather, confirmed when
3 I asked you that it was a secular state, and that since that you were
4 born in Herzegovina
5 Turks, because -- let me put it this way, because of the 500-year
6 presence of the Turkish Ottoman empire in that area. And since Turkey
7 a secular state, that is to say, the state is separate from the church
8 and religion or, rather, religion, you used that example to show what
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina was like. Is that right?
10 A. Yes. And I said how nice it was to live there, to live in
12 Q. Now the crux of the matter is that the situation started to
13 change with the arrival of, let me say, the radical Islamists to power.
14 A. Yes, with the arrival of the radical Islamists in the leadership
15 of the Party of Democratic Action in fact. And through them, it was
16 these pro-Iranian, pro-Shiite people that came into power who tried to
17 introduce religious laws into state institutions and organs, and that was
18 where the problem lay. And that, of course, started in the police force
19 with the arrival of Mirsad Srebrenkovic. And he was a religious teacher
20 in the great mosque in Zagreb
21 where he is working to this day.
22 Q. Thank you. Now for the transcript, Mr. Slobodan Cvijetic has
23 joined the Defence team for Mico Stanisic today.
24 Now on page 9634 of the transcript, line 1, the first line, when
25 you were speaking about -- well, my question to you was about the fact
1 that we had information telling us that some people who had criminal
2 files were employed in the police force, and you confirmed that. And
3 then you gave us an example with respect to the fact that the former
5 access criminal files from other republics.
6 A. Yes, there was a centre.
7 Q. Your full answer was not recorded in the transcript, because if I
8 remember correctly, what you said was, That's how we entered and accessed
9 the information centre and established the fact that such and such person
10 had a criminal report in Sandzak in Serbia, and that they were
11 nonetheless employed in the MUP of the Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's right,
12 isn't it?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And that was absolutely against all the rules, to employ someone
15 with a criminal police file; right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And especially people from other states in the police.
18 A. Well, it was one state, a single state. Bosnia-Herzegovina was,
19 at the time, a component part of Yugoslavia
20 However, in the meantime of course, Slovenia
21 proclaimed independence, and they were already foreign citizens, while
22 the citizens of Serbia
23 a single state, and the political leadership of those republics, in 1991
24 at least, recognised it as being one state which was, of course,
1 Q. Thank you. Now, the next intervention I'd like to make to the
2 transcript is 9642, page 9642, line 21. I'm sure you'll remember the
3 document we were looking at of the Serbian Democratic Party which
4 referred to a Presidency meeting of the 2nd of March, and you said that
5 it was most probably a mistake in the typing, a typo. And then you said:
6 "I can remember the sequence of events."
7 And in the transcript what was record was that you could not
8 remember the sequence of events. So your answer was, I can remember in
9 the affirmative?
10 A. Yes. And I explained how that came about.
11 Q. Thank you. And now my last intervention to the transcript is on
12 page 9643, line 11, and I'm sure you'll recall that same document, and we
13 were discussing the very end of the document, where it refers to
14 Munir Alibabic, and you explained to us about Munir Alibabic. However,
15 on that same page, 9643, line 11, as I've already quoted, it was not
16 recorded the way you put it, to the best of my recollections.
17 What you said was this, you said that Mr. Munir Alibabic mixed up
18 different conversations or, rather, edited them and transferred them from
19 cassettes to tapes.
20 A. Yes, that's what we were told by one of his operatives in one of
21 the cases before the court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I said that at the
22 proposal of the Prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal, Carla Del Ponte,
23 proceedings were taken against him, and the High Commissioner for
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina forbade him to deal in police affairs.
25 Q. When you say that one of his operatives explained to the Court of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, explained this, do you mean he explained the way in
2 which Munir Alibabic transferred the intercepts, telephone-intercepted
3 conversations, and made a collage of them and made them into one whole?
4 A. Yes, he explained the ways and means of doing this and how people
5 dealt with these intercepts, the way in which one could go about that and
6 did go about that. So the operative explained how you could mix and join
7 them together.
8 Q. Right.
9 Very well. Let's continue where we left off yesterday then.
10 Now, in addition to the situation that we explained, and we've
11 reached February 1992, I believe, there were a series of other
12 contentious issues which cropped up on a daily basis in the Ministry of
13 the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Let me remind you, for instance, that there was one particular
16 problem between the public security station at Pale, where the chief was
17 Mr. Malko Koroman, and the public security station Stari Grad, in
19 these two public security stations bordered on each other. They were
20 neighbouring stations on the territory of Sarajevo
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Well, I'll ask the questions, thank you; just the answers,
24 If I remember rightly, you said that you were in charge of
25 dealing with the problem that occurred between these two public security
1 stations, and the problem was as follows: This man, Ismet Dahic, the
2 chief of the Stari Grad police station, let go all the ethnic Serbs from
3 the public security station. He dismissed them and did not want, despite
4 an order received from the Ministry of the Interior, and the minister
5 himself, to appoint a commander, a komandir, who was a Serb in the public
6 security station. And you, I believe, if I remember correctly, were
7 given the assignment of implementing that.
8 Do you remember that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Now as retribution that conduct on the part of Ismet Dahic --
11 Malko Koroman for his part from the Pale public security station also
12 refused to follow the order from the MUP and the minister to appoint a
13 commander, junior commander, komandir, who was a Muslim; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And you tried or -- rather, you were given the assignment to
16 resolve the problem, and as far as I remember, you were not successful;
18 A. Well, the Pale municipality and Stari Grad municipality in
20 Stari Grad has a Muslim majority.
21 Now, the top people in the police force belonged to the ethnicity
22 that was in the majority, so Pale had a Serb; Stari Grad had a Muslim;
23 and vice versa.
24 Now the number two man, in ethnic terms, were the ethnicity of
25 the number two majority. Now Dahic, who was a cadet together with me at
1 the Military Academy
2 Milosevic, somebody who had been working in the police force for many
3 years, and he didn't let him perform his functions. And at the time he
4 raised 6.000 reserve policemen, I believe. 600 reserve policemen.
5 Now, the -- it boomeranged, and there was a physical settling of
6 cuffs between myself and Malko Koroman, who didn't understand the
7 importance of the order and had to do that. And as a Serb cadre myself,
8 I tried to explain the situation to him and told him that he couldn't be
9 stubborn on that point and couldn't base his actions on what people were
10 doing in another municipality because then it would be a chain reaction
11 all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. And who know what the consequences of that
12 would have been.
13 But I wasn't able to persuade him, Dahic or the other man. And
14 so the commanders were never -- at Pale was never a Muslim, or in
15 Stari Grad was there a Serb. And it's the place where the wedding party
16 with -- displaying the Serbian flag and the man from the wedding party
17 was killed, that is the same Stari Grad municipality.
18 Q. I think you misspoke. You said Ismet Dahic, that he was your --
19 I think you made a slip of the tongue. That he was at the
20 Military Academy
21 A. I beg your pardon. I meant to say the police academy. We were
22 in the same year.
23 Q. Mr. Mandic, I'm sure you'll agree with me that that situation
24 reflected the fact that the authority of the Ministry of the Interior,
25 even in Sarajevo
1 strong to impose its orders on the chiefs of the public security
3 A. Yes, we're talking about the autumn 1991 and the arrival of
4 Denkovic [phoen]. Now the authority of this ministry as a homogenous
5 entity began to be disrupted, and this had a ripple effect. When this
6 man from Croatia
7 individual environments, which accepted or did not accept the way in
8 which he worked.
9 So that's the example of Stari Grad municipality and Pale
11 Q. Very well. Thank you.
12 So we agree that the crux of the problem was that the Ministry of
13 Interior's authority in the autumn of 1991 compared to its territorial
14 branches, and I mean the Security Services Centres, the public security
15 stations, was significantly disrupted; right?
16 A. Yes. And we have a saying by which we say that the fish stinks
17 from the head, not the tail.
18 Q. Now let's summarise the situation. From the autumn of 1991, the
19 situation in the Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as you have told us, drastically deteriorated, the
21 crisis became deeper.
22 A. Yes. And there was general mistrust amongst us.
23 Q. Now you, and when I say "you," I mean the collegium, the leaders,
24 especially the Serb leaders - tried to resolve the problem within the
25 Ministry of the Interior. And yesterday you confirmed and said that you
1 attended a number of meetings with the minister but that the minister
2 told that you that he himself was incapable and -- of resolving the
4 A. Well, as far as I and my close associates are concerned, both
5 Muslim, Serbs, and Croats, we tried to solve the situation in our own
6 house first. And we held a number of meetings in that regard. And after
7 that, we organised meetings of Serb cadres both in Sarajevo, and I think
8 in Banja Luka too, to discuss those problems, and then we would report
9 back to the Minister Delimustafic.
10 Q. Yes, we'll come to that in due course.
11 Now we're going to speak about the second half of 1991. So after
12 you held the meetings and tried to resolve that within your own house
13 first, after that, you wrote a letter to the Presidency and the
14 government and the Presidential Commission for the Protection of the
15 Constitutional Order, that is to say, all the relevant institutions, you
16 wrote to all of them and pointed out the irregularities and unlawfulness
17 of the work of the MUP.
18 A. Yes that was my duty. All I was doing was doing my job.
19 Q. And, finally, due to the fact that your letters did not bear
20 fruit, letters to the top state institutions did not bring about any
21 results, you, as we saw, addressed the public in September and then again
22 in February and so on and so forth. And in your addresses to the public,
23 you were joined by the Serbian Democratic Party, or, Dr. Karadzic; is
24 that right?
25 A. Yes. Dr. Karadzic liked to meddle in these cadre problems. He
1 always wanted to have a finger in the pie.
2 Q. Now, you'll agree that addressing the public and presenting the
3 problems publicly and indicating the seriousness of those problems had,
4 as its goal -- well, that was your last chance, to resolve the problem
5 under pressure from the public.
6 A. Well, when we couldn't solve the problem in our own home and
7 couldn't resolve the problem by appealing to the Serb cadres and holding
8 meetings, then all that was left to us to do was to inform the public, so
9 that the public should be informed about what was going on.
10 Q. However, none of that resulted in anything concrete.
11 A. No.
12 Q. And parallel to what was going on in the Ministry of Interior of
13 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
14 political process under way at the time. That is to say, in the autumn
15 of 1991. And then in October, completely unconstitutionally, in the
16 Assembly, a declaration was proclaimed on the independence of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that?
18 A. Well, I think with the deterioration of the political situation
19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- well, that was helped by the war in Croatia
20 think, because the Bosnian Croats did all they could to make life
21 difficult for Serbs in BH as a consequence of the war in Croatia. And
22 that part of the Muslim leadership wanted to have its own state. This is
23 to say, they wanted to have Islamic and religious laws introduced into
24 state organisations. So in that general Bosnian pot, cauldron, there
25 were problems, disagreements, and then we saw the spring and the war
2 Q. After that unconstitutional or, rather, less violent act against
3 the constitution when this declaration of independence was adopted
4 unconstitutionally, after that, in December, the Presidency and the
5 cabinet decided, again without participation of the Serb representatives
6 in those bodies, to request the recognition of the -- of the independent
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember?
8 A. Yes, Ms. Plavsic and Dr. Koljevic withdrew from their positions
9 in the Presidency, so what was left was a so-called truncated Presidency
10 which consisted of the representatives of the Muslim people and
11 Mr. Ejub Ganic who declared himself to be a Yugoslav. But he is now
12 standing trial in the United Kingdom because he plays a role in the
13 attack on the column withdrawing from Sarajevo where many people came to
14 harm, including children.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, this is a public broadcast, and I do
16 think that it is only right, particularly as these are ongoing
17 proceedings, I think it should be made absolutely clear that Mr. Ganic is
18 not standing trial for anything in the United Kingdom. Serbia
19 request for his extradition. He is awaiting extradition. The United
20 Kingdom is not trying him for anything.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: That is exactly, Ms. Korner, what the witness said;
22 it was only recorded wrongly in the transcript. I wanted to clarify
24 Q. [Interpretation] You said, sir, that Ejub Ganic was in London
25 that Serbia
1 the killing of the children in the Dobrovojacka Street?
2 A. Yes, that's what I said. I didn't say that he was being tried in
4 Q. Thank you. So as a result of this declaration of independence --
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. ZECEVIC: May I proceed, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE HALL
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
9 Q. [Interpretation] As a result of this declaration which was
10 adopted in an unconstitutional manner in the parliament of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs established the Assembly of the Serbian
12 People in Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
13 A. Yes. They walked out from the joint parliament and established
14 the Assembly of the Serb people. So the same members of parliament who
15 had been elected at the first multi-party elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 and who belonged to the Serb people walked out and established the
17 Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
18 Q. That establishment of the Assembly of the Serb people in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is the separation of Serb members of parliament,
20 is a direct result of this constitutional violence in October 1991 and
21 the unconstitutional adoption of the declaration of independence.
22 A. That was actually a -- a down-voting or majoritisation of the
23 Serb members of parliament.
24 Q. So your question -- answer to my question is affirmative.
25 A. Yes. I tend to add things to explain them better. But I can be
2 Q. After that, as we saw in December, that incomplete Presidency
3 without Serb representatives and a cabinet requested the recognition of
4 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the international community.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. The result of that move of the Muslim and Croat peoples, or,
7 rather, their representatives, is the creation of the RS in January 1992;
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. After the creation of the RS, and all the events that we know
11 about, the international community and the European Union, especially the
12 latter, started a process that is known under the popular name of the
13 Cutileiro Plan. Do you know that?
14 A. Jose Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomate, represented the
15 European Community or the internation community and he had some
16 suggestions as to the structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the future as
17 an independent state. That plan was adopted by Croats, Muslims, and
18 Serbs at a certain moment, and the Sarajevo Agreement was signed in early
20 Q. Sir, very briefly, if we can see 1D133. And let us very briefly
21 comment on the Cutileiro Plan.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I said 1D133. 133.
23 Q. Mr. Mandic, this is a document with a heading: Statement on the
24 principles of new constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 This is the document that you were talking about and to which all ethnic
1 communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed. It was drafted by the
2 European Union, and it is popularly called the Cutileiro Plan.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. In item 1 it says that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be an independent
5 state composed of three constituent units. Can you see it?
6 A. Yes, I know this plan almost by heart.
7 Q. I'm sure that you know that the plan foresees that each
8 constituent unit have its own police; right?
9 A. Yes. And it was to reflect the ethnic structure of that unit.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let us show the witness 1D01-0936.
12 [In English] 35.
13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mandic, this document is basically a
14 document with which the Croatian democratic Union agrees to the
15 Cutileiro Plan, and it was published in the Zagreb daily "Vjesnik" on
16 26 February 1992
17 under paragraph B it says that the HDZ accepted this proposal without
18 objections. Do you see that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Does this correspond to your recollection that the Croats
21 accepted the Cutileiro Plan as something acceptable to the HDZ?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Unless there are objections, I seek to tender this
24 document into evidence.
25 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sure you were.
2 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
3 First, Your Honour, we really cannot have a two-fold thing.
4 Either newspaper articles go in without objection from other side subject
5 to relevance, or the same rules apply.
6 The second matter is this. I don't know what this is. There is
7 only a partial page of it. And I see it's -- is that "Kozarski Vjesnik"?
8 Which one is it?
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] In the footnote we can see that the
10 source is "Vjesnik." At the time, it was the number one daily in
12 know whether it is still published.
13 MS. KORNER: Yes. But there is a publication called
14 "Kozarski Vjesnik" as well. Is that different?
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Definitely.
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, the fact remains, I would like to see
17 the full article. I have no objection, subject to the -- and a full
18 translation, obviously. Otherwise, but as I say, there's got to be one
19 rule for both sides.
20 JUDGE HALL
21 this a newspaper comment on the Cutileiro Plan, or is it the
22 Cutileiro Plan as published by the newspaper in question?
23 MR. ZECEVIC: It is my understanding, Your Honours, that this is
24 the -- the proclamation of the Croatian Democratic Union, the party of
25 the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is referring to their
1 position on the Cutileiro Plan, which was published by this "Vjesnik"
2 from Zagreb
3 JUDGE HALL
4 wouldn't exist some more authoritative source than having to rely on a
5 newspaper -- newspaper account, as it were.
6 But, Ms. Korner, you were about to say something on this issue.
7 MS. KORNER: At the moment, Your Honour, all I'm asking for is
8 the full article, please, and not just one page from it.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you know our position
10 with regard to newspaper articles. I'm not sure now, but I think that
11 this document -- and you may remember four to five months ago
12 Mr. Tom Hannis disclosed to us a certain number of documents that have to
13 do with the Cutileiro Plan.
14 At this moment, I really cannot say whether this document is part
15 of that. Therefore, my submission would be to mark this document for
16 identification, so as not to waste time now so I might proceed. This
17 could be the best solution. And in the meantime we can try to find the
18 original documents to support our case.
19 JUDGE HALL
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I don't think it even meets the
21 threshold as set out for marking for identification. It is a partial
22 part of a newspaper report.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Since Ms. Korner opposes, I will
25 withdraw my submission and continue.
1 JUDGE HALL
2 some point, but, yes.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Certainly, Your Honours. Thank
5 Q. It is a fact, Mr. Mandic, isn't it, that the Serbian side very
6 firmly backed up the Cutileiro Plan and supported it as an absolutely
7 acceptable solution for a peaceful transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into
8 a new situation which would be an independent state with three entities;
10 A. As far as I know, all three ruling parties supported the
11 Cutileiro Plan, at least initially, and signed it. And when it should
12 have been ratified in the parliament, Alija Izetbegovic gave up the plan,
13 and then when he was asked about it, he uttered that famous sentence. He
14 was asked, Why do you give up -- why did you give up the plan,
15 Mr. President? He answered, I have one opinion in the morning and
16 another in the afternoon.
17 The Croats didn't give up, only -- or didn't back out. Only the
18 representatives of the Muslim people did.
19 Q. His refusal of the plan was in late March 1992; right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. In the meantime, that is to say, in late January and all through
22 February while the parties were fine-tuning the Cutileiro Plan and they
23 all stated their acceptance, that is the end of January, all of February,
24 and a major part of March; right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. At that time, on the 11th of February, a meeting was held in
2 Banja Luka, which is 1D135.
3 You spoke about it a short while ago, saying that the Serb
4 personnel got together to speak about the problems in the MUP of the
5 socialist republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina because they had became
7 A. Yes. I believe that this was the second meeting of Serb staff
8 about these problems. The first one took place in Sarajevo and the
9 second in Banja Luka. The one in Banja Luka was held at the Bosna hotel,
10 I think.
11 Q. Mr. Mandic, the meeting in Banja Luka wasn't a secret meeting by
12 any means, was it?
13 A. I personally informed Mr. Delimustafic of that meeting. I
14 believe that even a copy of the minutes was -- was sent to the minister.
15 We wanted to acquaint him with our conclusions. There was no reason for
16 it to be secret. I believe that I informed him by phone and maybe even
17 in a dispatch about the time and place of the meeting. There was no
18 reason for it to be secret.
19 We were desperately -- we were making a desperate appeal to
20 regulate things to put them into order.
21 Q. I can show you page 2 of these minutes.
22 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
23 MR. ZECEVIC: 27.
24 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please. In the Serbian.
1 The English page is correct.
2 Page 2, please.
3 Madam, page 2 in the Serbian, not in the English. The English
4 version had the right page.
5 Q. Mr. Mandic, we have Mico Stanisic address those in attendance.
6 He said that the minimum requests pending need to be assembled and sent
7 to the minister, Mr. Delimustafic, with a set deadline. This is
8 precisely what you were saying when you said that you forwarded it to
9 Mr. Delimustafic.
10 A. Yes. We asked that policemen not be fired because they were
11 Serbs and that no personnel be employed on the Muslim side without
12 previous checks and that there should be a balance and that the Law on
13 Internal Affairs and the rules of service should be observed. It was
14 nothing out of the ordinary.
15 Q. One of the conclusions in item 19 is something I wanted to read
16 out to you, and perhaps can you confirm to me whether you recall it.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please repeat the quote.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I will have to repeat -- well,
19 there's no need.
20 Q. You confirmed that your wish was to have your positions made
21 public from the meeting concerning the irregularities which were taking
22 place at the time; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Sir, there's an opinion expressed here that that meeting was
25 intentionally held in the Bosna hotel in Banja Luka so as to hold it
1 covertly. What is your position on that?
2 A. Had we wanted to do it in secret, we would have used a police
3 building or a state building without the presence of the public. We had
4 waiters waiting on us in the same meeting room, and there were another
5 100 or 150 other guests there of different ethnic communities. The door
6 was wide open. We wanted the public to know. We would not have used a
7 public location such as the Hotel Bosna. There was a restaurant there
8 where there were guests. There were waiters there, serving drinks, and
9 they were from all ethnic communities. They were doing their job and
10 waiting on other guests as well.
11 What secrets? Please.
12 Q. Mr. Mandic --
13 A. I apologise. We wanted Alija Delimustafic at that meeting. We
14 requested his presence. I did so personally, so that people could tell
15 him what they think. They were unable to directly communicate with him.
16 The chiefs in the field, that is. I wanted him there so that people
17 could speak to him face to face. Of course, he did not come, but there
18 is no reason for it to be -- to see it as something secretive. I think
19 he is in Sarajevo
20 Q. I think what you said, and that is not recorded, that he received
21 the minutes and that he held it in his hands and that you can guarantee
22 that he is in Sarajevo
23 Is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P527.
2 Q. Sir, apparently you sent this document. It is your dispatch sent
3 from the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
4 13th February 1992
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Can you see that? Is it your dispatch?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. Sir, was this a secret dispatch in any way, or did you follow the
9 usual channels through the MUP communications centre of the Socialist
10 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
11 A. We used the regular channels. The communications system as it
12 existed. People of all ethnicities worked there. This was no secret.
13 This is just a regular dispatch. There are no specific designations as
14 to its secrecy in the right-hand corner at the top.
15 I apologise, this dispatch was sent as all other dispatches were.
16 This was a regular way to communicate within the police.
17 Q. And it was a public and open dispatch, was it not?
18 A. Yes. It was received by those on duty in the respective police
19 stations and centres. Of course, it wasn't Stojan Zupljanin who sat
20 there awaiting it, but those in charge the communications. Whether that
21 person was Muslim, Croat, or Serb, we could not know.
22 Q. In any case, any dispatch sent from the communications centre of
23 the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was always
24 processed in such a way that a copy would remain in the MUP archives;
1 A. Yes. And I believe this is an archive copy of the Federation
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mandic.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show 1D139 to the
5 witness. It is tab 38.
6 Q. Sir, this is a decision of the interior ministry in Sarajevo
7 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ministry, that is. The date is
8 14 February 1992
9 Alija Delimustafic.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. By virtue of this decision, Mico Stanisic is being appointed to
12 the duties and tasks of advisor in the minister of the interior cabinet.
13 Do you recall that?
14 A. I do.
15 Q. If, as you say, Mr. Delimustafic had this -- had the minutes of
16 the meeting of the Serb personnel in Banja Luka, and he was informed of
17 it by you, and he was asked to come there by you. All this, in any case,
18 preceded this decision of his to appoint Mico Stanisic as his advisor?
19 A. I don't know why any insistence is placed upon the secrecy or
20 alleged secrecy of that meeting. Mr. Delimustafic was well aware of it,
21 and I sent a dispatch to all of the addressees you could see a minute
22 ago, asking that all officials be informed of within the respective areas
23 of their police stations and centres.
24 I don't understand. There was nothing illegal or secretive about
25 it. As for Mico Stanisic, there was a vacancy, and according to the
1 distribution of personnel, this was supposed to be a Serb position, and
2 he appointed Mico Stanisic as an associate to his office. There was
3 nothing secretive or illegal about the whole thing.
4 Why insist on this?
5 Q. Thank you. Sir, the Assembly of the Serb People in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the 23rd of March, 1992, passed its Law on the
7 Interior of the Serb Republic
8 the time.
9 Do you recall that?
10 A. I don't know whether that was the date or whether it was
11 published in the "Official Gazette" on the 23rd of March. That I am
12 positive of. They must have -- may have voted on it before that, perhaps
13 a day or two before.
14 First it had to be adopted by the Assembly, and then it could be
15 published in the "Official Gazette", so as to come into force some eight
16 days later. One could find it in the "Official Gazette" of the Serb
17 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was called at the time.
18 Q. To illustrate the situation even further with the MUP of the
19 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would kindly ask that you be
20 shown 1D118.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Tab 31.
22 Q. Sir, this document contains information on abuse, illegalities,
23 and manipulation by SDA and HDZ officials in the service of the B and H
24 MUP State Security Service, dated March 1992.
25 I won't go through the document itself, because, more or less, it
1 reflects what we have commented upon, especially the abuse by
2 Mr. Munir Alibabic as well as some other facts, including the fact that
3 the assistant chief of the State Security Service, which, under the
4 agreement, was supposed to be a Serb, such a person was never appointed.
5 Do you recall that?
6 A. I do. Yes, there was a problem with personnel. Man number 1 in
7 the state security sector was a Croat Branko Kvesic. Person number two
8 was supposed to be a Serb who would act as his deputy. He was supposed
9 to be the operational chief of the State Security Service. A Serb was
10 never appointed to that position. I think they even changed the
11 structure or the job classifications by abolishing that post. Had a Serb
12 been appointed as was part of the inter-party agreement, it would be that
13 Serb in charge of all operations, in effect, being in charge of the State
14 Security Service. The powers that be would not have that, and a person
15 was never appointed to that position. I think Vlasko Nedjo [as
16 interpreted], a career policeman, was supposed to be appointed. But once
17 this became a problem among the parties in power, they simply abolished
18 that post. He was simply never appointed, although he was supposed to
19 have been. I think his name was Vlaski Nedjo, but please don't hold it
20 against me if I'm wrong.
21 Q. In any case, it was obvious that the SDA and HDZ did not honour
22 even the inter-party agreement they signed alongside the SDS. That is
23 obvious, is it not?
24 A. It is obvious that the parties came to realise that the police
25 ministry was to play an important role in the creation of the future
1 state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At some point in time the inter-party
2 agreements as well as the laws regulating the work of the police were
4 Q. Mr. Mandic, this problem was pointed out during sessions of the
5 Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order of the Presidency of
6 the Socialist Republic
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] It is 1D120.
8 Page 2, please. So that we can see who was in attendance.
9 Q. Did you know that the members of the council for the protection
10 of the constitutional order of the Socialist Republic
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina were Stepjan Kljuc; Dr. Miodrag Simovic; your
12 minister, Alija Delimustafic; and Izet Muhamedagic?
13 A. And Biljana Plavsic.
14 Q. She was the president of the council.
15 A. Yes, she was the president, and she was the official chief of the
16 council. She was in charge of controlling the legality of its work. I
17 believe in her absence, it was Ejub Ganic who acted as her deputy. It
18 was because on a number of occasions she froze her membership in the
19 council, due to the visits of Princess Elizabeth accompanying her on her
20 tour of certain monasteries, that is Princess Elizabeth Karadjordjevic.
21 Q. We see that the deputy minister of the interior was also in
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Do you know that the meeting was held, the session was held.
25 A. Well, I wasn't present, but Vitomir informed me. Yes, we did
1 know about the session because the problems were acute relating to the
2 work related to the work of the state security, and they reached a peak
3 at that time. And so Vito as a representative of the ministry, or,
4 rather, the Serbian people in the police force, attended the session, as
5 well as Dr. - what was his name - Simovic, who was the vice-premier in
6 charge of internal policy, and later on he was chief of police and chief
7 of justice.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, sir -- Mr. Mandic, the day before yesterday
9 Ms. Korner showed you a document. It is P532. It's your interview, a
10 public interview that you granted on the 28th of March, 1992.
11 Do you remember that you commented on that?
12 A. Yes, I remember seeing that, seeing the interview.
13 Q. And you confirmed when Ms. Korner asked you that you granted the
14 interview, and you confirmed its contents, and that's why I'm using it
15 here and now.
16 Now, in that interview, on the 28th of March, 1992, you talked
17 about everything that you and I discussed yesterday and today concerning
18 the problems that existed in the MUP of the Socialist Republic
20 A. Yes, that's the truth of it. Everything else is manipulation.
21 All that is true.
22 Q. And on page 1, you say:
23 "In the MUP of Bosnia
24 or three months, during the last two or three months, the national police
25 force of Muslim people has legally been established. After
1 Hilmo Selimovic had resigned from the position of assistant in personnel
2 section and the arrival of Mirsad Srebrenkovic from Zagreb some strange
3 things ban happening, et cetera.
4 A. Well, you see, this person was a religious teacher from the
5 Mesihat. He didn't work in the mosque but in the Muslim Islamic school,
6 the Mesihat, and you have a man like that coming to head a multi-national
7 community in a multi-national state where officials were mostly the
8 socialist officials and cadres who didn't know a lot about God and didn't
9 believe in God much of any confession. And it was a shock for us, and I
10 have to repeat that. It was a real shock. The meeting was interrupted
11 for the man to go and pray. That was unprecedented as far as we were
12 concerned. And that's why I referred to these secular Turkish state
13 where you couldn't do that kind of thing, you can't do that now. And
15 the crux of the problem within the police force. And I, as a socialist
16 official, never went to church. I didn't go to church at all, except
17 maybe three times for a funeral or christening. And here have you this
18 man coming in, interrupting the meeting at noon, and going off to pray.
19 I can't describe to you in words how shocked I was, and what the
20 situation was like. And our leading Muslim, Hilmo Selimovic, who lives
21 and works in Sarajevo
22 dismissed without any explanation or anything.
23 So if somebody can explain to me why that was the case, then I
24 might be able to accept it, but I just can't understand. And this
25 happening in Europe
1 place in Europe
2 ethnicities. My wife's a Catholic, and so on and so forth. And that was
3 the general rule in Sarajevo
4 before the Olympic Games as well. And we were in Europe, and had none of
5 this happened with the nationalist parties being victorious, pressing
6 their national positions, and so on, none of this would have happened.
7 Q. Thank you. If I understood you correctly, you didn't mind, you
8 weren't bothered by the fact that this man was of the Islamic faith.
9 What did bother you was that he would do so in working hours, if I can --
10 during the working day?
11 A. Yes, of course. I have many friends who are Muslims in Sarajevo
12 I always have had and still do and will do. So that wasn't a problem.
13 But it -- it was introducing these religious rights into a secular state.
14 That was the problem. Otherwise you were free to follow your own faith.
15 And those who had been to the police academy and were in the structures
16 of power and authority within the polices force, what was happening was
17 something that we just didn't understand. We just saw it on films when
18 this man Khomeini returned to Iran
19 shock for me.
20 Q. Now in this document, sir, Mr. Mandic, you say, on page 1, when
21 asked by the journalist, Does all this mean that there's no united MUP
23 And you said:
24 "That's right. There is no united MUP. That's a thing of the
25 past. There hasn't been a united MUP since the days of -- well, since
1 the time that 1400 people were employed working for the SDA and when
2 30 Serbs fled from Stari Grad," and so on and so forth.
3 And you stand by that, still? Do you still maintain that that
4 was the historical circumstance, that the MUP of the Socialist Republic
5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina could no longer operate in the way it had been
6 operating before that?
7 A. Yes. That was reality at the time.
8 Q. Now, Mr. Mandic, in this document, in this interview, you state
9 that it was your wish as a professional to have a united MUP persevere,
10 but that it wasn't possible given the situation. And I'm going to show
11 you your -- well, if we turn to page 2. It is rather a poor copy. It's
12 been copied many times, but let me read it out:
13 "If, as you say, a single or united MUP is the past, how, then,
14 do you see the organisation of this institution in the future? Let
15 politics decide. What the parties decide will be followed. If the
16 Serb Assembly decides to form a Serbian MUP, then I agree with that."
17 A. We were the people who carried out the decisions taken by the
18 politicians, the parliaments, and the Assembly of the Serb people. And
19 that was logical; it couldn't be otherwise. At least that is what I was
20 taught when I studied at the faculty of law in Sarajevo.
21 Q. The fact remains, Mr. Mandic, and I think you said this yesterday
22 during your conversation, or maybe two days ago, when Ms. Korner was
23 questioning you, that it was your position within the frameworks of the
24 MUP collegium of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, you
25 professionals, the professional staff, that you should do your work
1 professionally and leave it to politics and politicians to decide and
2 that you would behave in line with their decisions.
3 Is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Very well. Now, on the 23rd of March, 1992, in the
6 "Official Gazette," the Law on The Ministry of Interior was published of
7 the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And you confirmed that, did
8 you not?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Now, towards the end of that law, it's -- it is stipulated that
11 the law comes into force eight days after having been published in the
12 "Official Gazette".
13 A. Yes, that's right. That was the rule.
14 Q. And that was customary, was it? That was the usual -- the usual
15 practice and -- well, that was the deadline for a law to come into force,
16 right, eight days after publication?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, in conformity with that, on the 31st of March -- and that is
19 P353. Tab 17. P353 is the document number. You sent this dispatch, the
20 one you have before you. Do you remember that?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. I don't want to repeat what it says here. We have looked at it
23 several times, but this dispatch was sent to everybody within the
24 Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And this dispatch in the preamble, if can I call it that, says
3 that it is pursuant to a Sarajevo Agreement on the Cutileiro Plan and the
4 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities.
5 A. I'm sorry that we don't have the original of Cutileiro's Plan
6 here, but this dispatch reflects Cutileiro's Plan with respect to the
7 partition of the police, and it says that the local police force should
8 be based on the ethnic composition of the population in the area. So
9 this dispatch in fact reflects certain portions of the Cutileiro Plan or,
10 rather, the Sarajevo Agreement which was signed. And ultimately there
11 was war and many crimes were committed, and people were killed, many
12 people were killed, but the international mediators returned, and the
13 parties returned -- or, rather, they went back to the Cutileiro Plan.
14 And now we have the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the police as
15 it is set out in this dispatch which was reasserted by the
17 So if we had stayed with the Cutileiro Plan and the agreement
18 reached by the internationals and so on, there would have been no war.
19 And you would have had the situation as it is today in BH in 1992.
20 Now, Bosnia-Herzegovina would -- and Bosnia-Herzegovina would
21 have become part of the international community even before the other
22 countries. Look at the Dayton Accords, look at the Cutileiro Plan and
23 this dispatch, as far as the police is concerned it is an exact copy.
24 And what did we have in the mean time, a bloody war for four years. And
25 who is responsible [realtime transcript read in error "espionage"] for
1 that, I ask you?
2 Just take a look at the facts. Dayton sanctioned this dispatch,
3 and I'm referring to the police, of course, when I say that, and the
4 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb police force still
5 exists in Republika Srpska with these five districts where the district
6 courts are in authority, where the prisons were set up, the district
7 courts were set up, the misdemeanours court were set up, municipal courts
8 were set up, and so on.
9 I didn't think all this up. That's what the mediators thought
10 up, and that is how it was. And the Serbian People's Assembly adopted a
11 Law on Internal Affairs speaking about that and the -- or the Assembly
12 passed that on the basis of the Cutileiro Plan and the
13 Sarajevo Agreement, signed by the representatives of all three ethnic
14 groups. And there should have never been a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I see the time.
16 JUDGE HALL
17 MS. KORNER: I want to correct the -- Your Honours, can I -- it
18 says at the moment -- the transcript reads at page 31, line 16, "a bloody
19 war who is espionage for that I ask." I rather think that the word was
21 JUDGE HALL
22 MS. KORNER: Yes.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, before we move too far away from the
2 February 11th meeting, I inquired of Mr. Zecevic, whether he proposed to
3 put to Mr. Mandic what his client asserted in interview to the OTP
4 investigators way back whenever it was, 2004, I think, 5.
5 Namely, that it was Mr. Mandic who scheduled the meeting that
6 took place on the 11th of February and actually organised it.
7 I don't know -- Mr. Zecevic thought that he had said that, but
8 I've checked and I can't any see reference to it. Of course, we go back
9 to the same problem. There is no obligation on the Defence to put a
10 case, subject to what Your Honours may or may not rule in respect of our
11 motion about this. But it seems to me that Mr. Mandic is here. He has
12 been asked a lot about the 11th of February meeting. If that is still
13 the Defence case, then that is a matter that Your Honours may feel that
14 Mr. Mandic should be asked about.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, the witness said himself that he
16 invited Minister Delimustafic to the meeting. He personally invited
17 Minister Delimustafic to the meeting. And it is our understanding that
18 he is doing that because he's organising the meeting. That is our
19 understanding. But I'm perfectly willing to ask the witness, again, to
20 confirm that.
21 MS. KORNER: There is a slight difference. Saying that I asked
22 Mr. Delimustafic to the meeting; it is not the same thing as, I
23 personally organised the meeting and scheduled it in Banja Luka. That
24 begs the question entirely. Because, I mean, he may have asked
25 Mr. Delimustafic on the basis somebody said, Here, Momo, we're having a
1 meeting of all the Serbs in the MUP. Do you want to come along? Which
2 is not quite the same thing.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Notwithstanding the significance that it may have
4 to clarify who exactly organised the meeting, whether it was Mr. Mandic
5 or somebody else, my simple question would be to Mr. Zecevic if would you
6 mind actually clarifying this matter with the witness when he comes back.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Of course, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Because if it is a point of contention, then we
9 might as well clear it up while he is here. So if you would be so good
10 as to clear this up.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated] I understand, Your
12 Honours, and I appreciate -- and of course, I will ask that. I didn't
13 thought that that was an issue.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 MR. ZECEVIC:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mandic, I hope that your dispatch dated
17 31 March is still before you.
18 You explained to us all the background. And at the very
19 beginning you told Ms. Korner and later on you told me how that dispatch
20 came about, that it was drafted by your assistants and you.
21 I would just like to -- to read out to you the last paragraph of
22 your dispatch where you say that: "All staff who were" -- who had jobs
23 with the MUP on that date would be taken over by the MUP of the Serb
24 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And you go on to say that these staff,
25 before becoming officially employed, must make a solemn declaration.
1 It's a fact, isn't it, Mr. Mandic, that Article 41 of the law
2 states the words of the solemn declaration required to be given by every
3 MUP staff?
4 A. Yes. That was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina and all of
6 Q. Mr. Mandic, tell me, it was certainly not in your interest to
7 cleanse the MUP of non-Serbs, was it?
8 A. Exactly. That's what I stated in the dispatch. And I say that
9 in the dispatch. There was no reason to do so.
10 Q. In the last paragraph you insist that all MUP staff of the
11 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be acquainted with the
12 contents of the dispatch so that they may be objectively informed in a
13 timely fashion so that unwanted situations be avoided; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. We will see later on that that this was also the position of the
16 collegium. But I'm asking you as the author of this dispatch, its
17 essence was that the MUP should be divided without problems peacefully
18 and in a civilised manner?
19 A. That's what we did, Mr. Zecevic. I think it was on a Tuesday or
20 a Wednesday in early April, when at the professional collegium, we agreed
21 - and I believe that everybody was present, only except for
22 Mr. Delimustafic, he attend as cabinet meeting - we agreed that the MUP
23 be divided in accordance with this dispatch and that, pursuant to the
24 Cutileiro Plan, such a structure of the police be established as
25 corresponds to the ethnic makeup of the then-regions in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was agreed upon.
2 We discussed that. We made -- that's what we stated, and we
3 reached that conclusion. I believe that two or three days later, a
4 meeting was held of all the professional staff of the joint MUP, our
5 objective being that everything be done peacefully and democratically.
6 Q. Mr. Mandic, it is the Prosecution case in this trial that all
7 these problems we have discussed so far from mid-1991 on in the MUP of
8 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all the irregularities, all
9 illegal acts that may have been committed, were merely a pretext for the
10 Serb leadership to do what they had intended to do from the very
11 beginning anyway; namely, to tear up Bosnia-Herzegovina and can carry out
12 a joint criminal enterprise and ethnically cleanse Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 from non -- or of non-Serbs.
14 A. That is not correct.
15 Q. Mr. Mandic, as you were one of the highest-ranking executives of
16 the MUP, you were a long-standing police professional, after which you
17 became a judge, and you're a lawyer by training. Tell me, please,
18 whether the problems we have discussed were so great and so complex and
19 so important, as you said in the interview you gave on the 28th of March,
20 that, due to all that, a partition of the MUP was inevitable?
21 A. Yes. Due to that peaceful partition of the MUP, there has never
22 been a confrontation of police forces of the individual ethnic groups,
23 except at Vrace, where the Serb special police was ambushed. Pursuant to
24 the orders given by Minister Delimustafic, the Serb special forces were
25 relocated to Vrace and the Croatian special forces to Bjelovar. And it
1 was due to that fact that there were no major armed clashes between
2 members of the police who belonged to different ethnicities, nowhere, in
3 no area.
4 We only carried out orders, and politics was up to the
6 Q. Tell me, now that we're talking about this, isn't your impression
7 the same as mine; namely, that, the Serbs or the SDS, did not want war in
9 A. Of course, they didn't. And I don't think the Muslim people or
10 the Croat people wanted it either. The people didn't want war in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We only wanted to live in our own state, to agree on
12 things, and go toward Europe
13 could have wanted war?
14 Q. Tell me, when I asked you about the inevitable partition of the
15 MUP and the allegation of the Prosecutor, namely, that there was a plan
16 in existence according to which the partition of the MUP was the trigger
17 of all subsequent events. You were asked a similar question in the
18 Krajisnik case and you answered in the negative. But could you now
19 please elaborate a little. Do you still say that this is absolutely
21 A. I will repeat once more. The minister's collegium in its first
22 composition cooperated well. And we were kind of a buffer for the -- for
23 the tall aspirations of the highest leadership. Nobody of us wanted the
24 MUP to be divided. We were professionals. Politics played no role in
25 that. And it isn't correct that my dispatch or the partition of the
1 police triggered the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other things
2 triggered it, but they were outside of the police.
3 From Minister Delimustafic to the police officer on the beat,
4 nobody could have affected that or taken part in that.
5 Q. Mr. Mandic --
6 A. Mr. Zecevic, if I may, just a moment.
7 We tried to prevent the creation of a militant Islamic malitia,
8 not police, a militia in the framework of the police and under the cover,
9 as it were, of the MUP. Hundreds of people came in, and they received
10 badges and weapons. So we saw that a militia was being created, not a
11 police. And within our police force -- Bosnia-Herzegovina is small. We
12 got that information. And we, I mean the Serb [indiscernible] staff,
13 tried to prevent that. If that was the cause of the war, well -- but I
14 don't think it was. The cause of the war were other things that had
15 nothing to do with the police or police work.
16 Q. When you saw militia, you basically mean this party militia, one
17 single ethnic militia?
18 A. Yes, that's what I mean, what a -- militia -- what a militia --
19 when I say militia. We know what a militia is.
20 Q. All right, Mr. Mandic. Immediately after you had sent out this
21 dispatch to everybody in the MUP of the Socialist Republic
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the then-minister, Mr. Alija Delimustafic, sent
23 out a dispatch, I believe, one minute after your fax was sent, the fax
24 with his dispatch went out. Do you know that?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Let us take a look at the dispatch.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D136.
3 Q. Mr. Delimustafic -- I am sorry, Mr. Mandic; I apologise. In this
4 dispatch, Mr. Delimustafic, about halfway down, says that he cannot
5 elaborate on the regulations pointed out in your dispatch.
6 THE INTERPRETER: We cannot see where counsel is reading from.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Can you see this section?
9 A. Yes. I know this dispatch by heart.
10 Q. If I understood you correctly --
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we scroll down in the English
13 Q. I'll have to repeat. It's is halfway through the document in the
14 Serbian language. The sentence starts about the contents of the dispatch
15 in question, Taking into consideration all dilemmas, pointed out the
16 dispatch, I cannot -- I'm unable to dwell more closely on -- et cetera,
17 because they are unknown to any of the professional services in the MUP,
18 nor were they presented to me by anyone, not even by the workers in
19 charge whose names are mentioned in the dispatch?
20 You say you saw that?
21 I'm waiting for the transcript.
22 You confirmed, sir, that you saw it, and that you're familiar
23 with this dispatch.
24 Mr. Mandic, it follows from this dispatch, let me put it this
25 way, that the minister, Alija Delimustafic, was caught by surprise when
1 he saw your dispatch and that this partition of the MUP and all that was
2 a surprise to him, if I understood your testimony correctly these past
3 two days.
4 First of all, the Assistant Minister, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic --
5 A. Deputy minister.
6 Q. All right. Mr. Vitomir Zepinic, deputy minister, was appointed
7 minister of the MUP of the Republic of Serbian
8 was published in the "Official Gazette" in January. Mr. Delimustafic
9 must have known about that.
10 A. Of course he knew, and we did all this in agreement.
11 Q. He was, of course, familiar with the text in the "Official
12 Gazette" which published the Law on Internal Affairs of the Serbian
13 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was also familiar, because you said
14 you provided him with the minutes of your meeting of the 11th of
15 February, he was familiar with it as well. Following which, he appointed
16 Mico Stanisic as his advisor. Hence, Mr. Delimustafic was completely
17 familiar with it all, and you said a moment ago that you did this in
18 cooperation with him.
19 A. We discussed this daily. We had offices one to the next in the
20 same building, and the minister could always -- was always familiar with
21 what I was discussing. He had all the information. He was probably the
22 most and best informed person in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He knew everything
23 that was going on inside the ministry and outside.
24 Q. How do you explain this dispatch of his, of the 31st of
25 March then?
1 A. Well, he had to follow the orders of his party. He had to honour
2 their position, and he frequently said so. He couldn't prevent
3 Srebrenkovic being appointed, although he was the chief of police. No
4 one asked him. Otherwise he would have been removed too.
5 Q. If I understood you well, this dispatch he sent was actually the
6 results of the pressure exerted upon him by the SDA. For some reason,
7 the SDA wanted to do this.
8 A. Yes. Under the pretext that there should be a single police.
9 Mr. Cengic who was in charge of that as well as Avdo Hebib, who was his
10 advisor, I believe.
11 Q. I think you said that it was done because the SDA wanted to form
12 a single-party militia under the clout of the MUP as a whole; is that
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Mr. Mandic, I think, in answer to Madam Korner's
16 questions on day one of your testimony, that after this dispatch of the
17 31st of March, you sent out another in which you provided further
18 explanation of the functioning of the joint MUP, which was supposed to
19 take over some of the prerogatives belonging to the joint MUP. And in
20 keeping with the Cutileiro Plan, the three entities should have their
21 respective police forces in keeping with your dispatch. Correct?
22 A. We provided further explanation in that dispatch. We said that
23 the police staff would be trained and educated in joint schools, and that
24 certain services, such as logistics and those aiding operational -- the
25 operational aspects should remain the same. This was simply a model we
1 put forth on how to organise the police across the territory of
3 Q. Mr. Mandic, I'll show you a dispatch of 1 April. It is 1D78.
4 This is a dispatch sent to all, to the minister, the federal SUP,
5 all CSBs, all SJBs, much like your previous dispatch of 31 March. This
6 is a -- the report or the minutes of the MUP collegium of the Socialist
7 Republic of B
8 meeting a moment ago.
9 A. Yes. That was the agreement. There was certainly no trigger.
10 Everything was arranged at this meeting.
11 Q. Sir, you can see here that reference is made of the
12 Sarajevo Agreement in paragraph 1.
13 It also states that the general provisions were confirmed
14 yesterday during a meeting in Brussels
15 functions and that the reorganisation of the MUP is already under way
16 across the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Do you see that?
18 A. I do.
19 Q. You said a moment ago that it seemed to you that
20 Mr. Alija Delimustafic did not attend that collegium meeting. However,
21 in addition to deputy minister, Mr. Zepinic, there was also
22 Mr. Branko Kvesic, HDZ representative; Mr. Jusuf Pusina; then Mr. Sabic;
23 Avdo Hebib; and some others who were there on behalf of the SDA.
25 A. The collegium meet in its full composition together with the
1 deputy minister from the minister's office. This was the full collegium.
2 Q. And the document says what you have discussed a moment ago, i.e.,
3 what were to be the joint services, et cetera.
4 On page 2, towards the middle, the collegium calls upon all to
5 deal with the situation without excesses in a peaceful fashion so as to
6 transform the existing MUP in its seat as well as in the field.
7 It also says that there should be no one-sided firing of staff
8 based on their ethnic background and that the employees should
9 voluntarily decide on their further engagement and status.
10 Do you recall that?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. And that was, indeed, the collegium's position.
13 A. Well, the same principle was followed when the Yugoslav republics
14 went their own ways. People could choose where to live and work, and so
15 here could choose which police force they were to join. The collegium
16 insisted upon this. Everyone was there, save for the minister. All
17 those community's representatives agreed upon that. This was our joint
19 Q. Sir, this dispatch, in the signature block states: Collegium of
20 the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is this by chance, or was it intentional that the entire
23 collegium is mentioned?
24 A. Was no chance. This was our joint position. The conclusions
25 were such. All members of the collegium were present, save for
1 Mr. Delimustafic. Mr. Zepinic stood in for him, as well as his two
2 deputies, Hebib and Stanisic.
3 Q. If I understood you well, it was intentional that the dispatch
4 was signed by the collective MUP collegium of the Socialist Republic
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina so as to indicate its joint position.
6 A. Yes. The position that had been agreed upon.
7 Q. Thank you very much.
8 Mr. Mandic, following this, the first subsequent thing done in
9 keeping with the agreement was the division of the special unit of the
10 Socialist Republic of B and H MUP; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Let's put it in a context. It is a fact, is it not, that during
13 the fall and towards the end of 1991 and in early 1992, there were
14 certain problems with the use and engagement of the special unit of the
15 MUP of the Socialist Republic
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Namely, that unit was used for searches of areas, for
18 mistreatment of certain people, especially Serbs in the environs of
20 A. It was an anti-terrorist unit. The name speaks for itself. This
21 is what it was supposed to be used for, against terrorists, sabotage, et
23 In late 1991, however, it was used to search houses and
24 apartments in the municipalities of Foca; in Bileca [phoen], in the
25 settlement of Pofalici; in Sarajevo
1 searches mainly concerned Serb houses. People in the field and deputies
2 reacted to it, asking that the anti-terrorist unit not be used for things
3 that would otherwise be done by the regular police. It was our agreement
4 following these objections to meet at Krtelji in the seat of the special
5 unit. We met with the commander and his assistants, whereby we agreed
6 that the special unit could not be used without the approval of the
7 tripartite leadership, that is to say, one member of each ethnic
8 community. That was the decision that was reached.
9 Q. I read somewhere, or maybe you said it, that you were at the very
10 meeting at Krtelji when this tripartite key was agreed upon?
11 A. Yes, there are minutes from that meeting.
12 Q. Very well. Mr. Mandic, isn't it true that Vitomir Zepinic, as
13 deputy minister, received a task from Mr. Delimustafic, the minister,
14 with the approval and support, so to say, of the collegium of the senior
15 staff of the MUP of the Socialist Republic of B and H, to carry out the
16 partition of the special forces along ethnic lines in early April.
17 A. Yes, I think the Krtelji meeting was attended by Zepinic, as well
18 as Jusuf Pusina and Bruno Stojic. They agreed then the Serb part of the
19 special unit, that is to say members of Serb ethnicity, of whom there
20 were 35, were to go to Vrace, to the former building of the special unit.
21 The building was called TEF
22 there pending further political solutions and that the rest of unit
23 should go to the police hall the Bjelovar settlement.
24 Delimustafic confirmed as much in Sarajevo, that this had indeed
25 taken place. Delimustafic issued an order to that effect, and the order
1 was followed through. This was a peaceful dissolution or division into
2 two different facilities, pending the political resolution on MUP
4 Q. Mr. Mandic, you mentioned Mr. Delimustafic. It is a fact, is it
5 not, that Mr. Delimustafic, as you have just said, testified in a
6 criminal proceedings against you before the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 in 2007; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. It is a fact that Mr. Delimustafic in that case appeared as your
10 Defence witness.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And, as you have just said, Mr. Delimustafic confirmed all the
13 facts about the MUP partition at your trial; is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Of course, we have the record of that trial.
16 A. Yes. And I believe his words were quoted in the judgement
18 Q. Thank you. Mr. Mandic, following the meeting at which, as you
19 say, there were representatives of all three sides, that is to say,
20 Mr. Zepinic, who was a Serb; Mr. Jusuf Pusina, a Muslim; and
21 Mr. Bruno Stojic, a Croat. The decision on the partition was made --
22 A. Yes. The division or partition, so as to avoid any further
23 conflict. These were special forces, trained people who had been
24 stationed there for a while. And the Muslim personnel actually refused
25 to go to Bosanski Brod. They refused to carry out any further searches
1 of Serb houses. And then Mr. Delimustafic said that they did not want
2 any armed conflicts within the police. Do send one part of the special
3 force to the school of the interior and the other to the police hall at
4 Bjelovar, which is close to the MUP seat. This was arranged, and it was
5 done the same way, as requested.
6 Q. Mr. Mandic, let me take you back for a moment to the beginning of
7 April or, rather, that was the 1st of April. Now let's go back to the
8 1st of March 1992 when the killing took place at the wedding ceremony,
9 the killing of the Serb member of the wedding party at Bascarsija.
10 Now we heard claims saying that that was a political killing. Do
11 you agree with that?
12 A. Well, I'm a policeman, so let me tell you. And I will describe
13 it to you and tell you what happened.
14 Within the nucleus of the old part of Sarajevo there is 12th,
15 13th century church, a Serbian Orthodox church dating back to the 12th or
16 13th century, and that part of Sarajevo
17 Muslims, 99 per cent of the population are Muslims, in actual fact. And
18 it is an Orthodox custom to go to church without any weapons. The father
19 of the bride was carrying a Serb flag with the emblem of the
20 double-headed eagle. And Delalic, a man who had a criminal file with a
21 friend of his, whether he was irritated when he saw a Serbian flag flying
22 through Muslim-inhabited area, killed him. And this caused a major
24 I was head of the crime department, and we learned who the
25 perpetrator was very quickly and where the perpetrator was hiding. But
1 we weren't able to go and arrest him and act according to the law, which
2 we were duty-bound to do, because he was guarded by the reserve police of
3 the Stari Grad police station led by Dahic. Sixty armed people with long
4 rifles stood guard over him.
5 Now the man's son, the man who was killed, his son came to see me
6 and so did the clergyman, the Orthodox priest. And he asked me, he said,
7 Mr. Mandic, among other things, how much money did you get, and what is
8 it that the Muslims gave you to protect the killer, my father's killer?
9 So this was an escalation of various misunderstandings. The Serbs took
10 to the streets and blocked the whole of Sarajevo for 48 hours. And we
11 didn't know what to do. We knew who the killer was; we knew where the
12 killer was. We knew what we were supposed to do, and we just couldn't do
13 it; we couldn't act.
14 So anybody who wasn't in a situation like that doesn't know what
15 it means, and I can't explain it to you. But we were completely
16 impotent, helpless. We couldn't act according to our rules of service.
17 If they had allowed us to arrest the man and keep him in prison if he was
18 irritated by the flying of the Serb flag and if he was handed over to the
19 investigating judge, the escalation would never have come about and
21 highly tense and a very difficult situation.
22 Q. Mr. Mandic, it's a fact, isn't it, that when the barricades were
23 erected after that killing in Sarajevo
24 which was the joint MUP of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 to a collegium decision, they want to the barricades to try and calm the
1 people down and to try and solve the problem? Isn't that right?
2 A. The people had weapons in Sarajevo, all three ethnic groups. And
3 they were at the barricades, all three ethnic groups. And for the space
4 of 48 hours, nobody was wounded, nobody was killed, nobody was injured,
5 and that was thanks to our operational work, mutual understanding, and
6 the fact that we went to the barricades to try and calm the people down
7 and prevent them from doing something stupid. And in the meantime the
8 politicians sat down to negotiate, and the situation was resolved two
9 hours [as interpreted] later. And I think today that it was thanks to
10 the police, who, in a way, went to the places, toured the places, and
11 patrolled the places where the people had gone out to the barricades,
12 because, you see, you had you a Serb barricade on one side and Muslim on
13 another and Croatian on another. Everybody was afraid of everybody else.
14 And so we went to talk to the people; went up to the barricades; and
15 nothing happened. No excessive incident happened within those 48 hours
16 or two days. And in my opinion, that was an example of police success,
17 that they were able to prevent anything bad from happening.
18 Q. It says here that the politicians resolved that in two hours, you
19 meant two days, did you not?
20 A. Yes, 48 hours later.
21 Q. Now, the substance of my question, Mr. Mandic, was this. What I
22 was getting at was this: You on the other senior officials of the MUP of
23 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina went to those barricades on
24 assignment, on police assignment, that was your duty; is that right?
25 A. Yes, from -- on orders from Delimustafic, the minister, and on
1 basis of an agreement reached.
2 Q. If I remember correctly, Mr. Delimustafic confirmed that during
3 the trial that took place in Sarajevo
4 go to the barricades.
5 A. Of course. He even asked to us work 24 hours round the clock to
6 prevent any outbreaks. The important thing was to calm the people down
7 because they were so angry because the father-in-law of the bride had
8 been killed in the wedding ceremony. So you can't explain to people that
9 it wasn't just an extremist act and that this extremist act was a one off
10 and didn't represent the entire Muslim people who, out of hatred and
11 their propensity towards crime, carried that act out. Because one thing
12 leads to another, you know. And it is difficult to explain something
13 like that to the population. It was only us, we, who were able to go
14 there and explain this to the people. And Muhamed Cengic, the prime
15 minister, not the one now but the other one, Dukic, and Simovic, I think
16 they went to the blockades, too, to talk to the people, to prevail upon
17 the people. And they held meetings too. And we were able to resolve the
18 situation quite quickly because the party heads were somewhere else, at
19 some other meeting. They weren't in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all at the
20 time. They were, I think, in Brussels
22 Q. Now, it is the Prosecution case that the barricades were not
23 erected spontaneously as the result of that killing, but that they were
24 intentionally by the Serbian Democratic Party.
25 A. That is incorrect. It is 100 percent wrong.
1 Q. Thank you. Now let's go back to April 1992.
2 Mr. Mandic, you told us about Mr. Vitomir Zepinic and the
3 reserves -- or, rather, the reservations that existed vis-a-vis his - how
4 shall I put this? - well, his honour and decency bearing in mind the
5 facts that were established that you told us about. You said that there
6 were certain irregularities in his work and in his conduct.
7 Now, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic on 4th of April, 1992, submitted his
8 resignation. Do you remember that?
9 A. Yes. In the Assembly of the Socialist Republic
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he tendered his resignation, the deputy minister of
11 the police force, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic.
12 Q. I'm going to show you a document - it is P912 - now.
13 That's the letter of resignation which Mr. Zepinic tendered on
14 the 4th of April, 1992
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. He sent this letter of resignation and signed it in the office of
17 the President of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik; isn't that right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, you were present when he did that, and what came before and
21 after; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Tell me now, please, Mr. Mandic, was there any - how shall I put
24 this? - any conflict between Mr. Mico Stanisic and Mr. Vitomir Zepinic;
25 and is it true and correct that Mr. Mico Stanisic pulled out a rifle and
1 pointed it at Mr. Zepinic at -- in the office of Mr. Krajisnik?
2 THE INTERPRETER: A pistol, interpreter's correction. A pistol,
3 not rifle.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you couldn't get into
5 Mr. Krajisnik's office armed. Yes, there was a verbal dual and probably
6 voices were raised, but he didn't attack him physically at all.
7 As to this business about the pistol, there is no question of
8 that. Nobody had any weapons on them; it was on the second floor of the
9 Assembly, and the security service on the ground floor would keep your
10 weapons. You couldn't enter with any weapons. They would search you.
11 So nobody had weapons in Mr. Krajisnik's cabinet or offices. But that
12 there was verbal dual, yes, there was.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now, what was the verbal dual about?
15 A. Well, precisely the conduct of Mr. Zepinic and everything that
16 happened around him.
17 He was an intellectual, a highly capable man, but he involved
18 himself in matters that did not concern him. And it was a difficult
19 situation for all of us.
20 Q. It says here -- on page 50, line 17, that my question was that
21 Mr. Stanisic took out a rifle and cocked it at Mr. Zepinic, but we
22 were -- we talked about a pistol?
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Was a pistol.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. I didn't notice
25 that correction by the interpreter.
1 Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Mandic, that in addition to this whole
2 situation and the fact that Mr. Vitomir Zepinic tendered his resignation
3 that there was talk -- well, that there were discussions with
4 Mr. Krajisnik that he offered Mr. Zepinic a post, a place, in the MUP of
5 the Socialist or rather the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
7 A. Yes. I think they were very close, Mr. Krajisnik and
8 Dr. Vitomir Zepinic. Well, it was a bit of an ugly situation, actually,
9 because, after all, he was the number one man representing the Serbian
10 people in the police force. And then when you're in a situation like
11 that and there's some ugly things and undignified going on, on the one
12 hand, and other hand, you have a staff and someone who is very
13 intelligent and had many years in the police force, that is a very tricky
14 situation, difficult.
15 Q. When you say ugly, ugly situation, are you thinking of the fact
16 that Mr. Vitomir Zepinic was the top man in the MUP of the Socialist
17 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was established that he behaved
18 wrongly, in a undignified manner. Is that what you meant?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Sir, the following day, on the 5th of April, as we said, in
21 keeping with an agreement reached and an order from the minister,
22 Alija Delimustafic, part of the special units, the Serb members of the
23 units, 35 of them, in keeping with the agreement, set out to the TEF
24 facility at Vrace?
25 A. Let me explain. On that day, the 4th of April, the special unit
1 was divided. The Serb portion -- it was partitioned. The Serb portion
2 went to a facility in Rakovica, and that's a settlement by the special's
3 headquarters, because the facility they were supposed to go to was rather
4 run down, nobody had used it for several years. And so we agreed or,
5 rather, Mr. Zepinic and the minister agreed to clean the facility up, to
6 carry out some construction work, prepare the facility so that part of
7 the specials who were Serbs could take -- could go to the facility;
8 whereas the other part of the specials unit made up of the Croatian and
9 Muslim people went to the police Dom or centre, and that was in use.
10 They had somewhere to go. It didn't need any refurbishment. So the Serb
11 part sent the night in this catering establishment in Rakovica. And once
12 the facility TEF
13 the police academy, they were able to take up residence there. And I
14 think that Dr. Zepinic, might I add, whether he came to the Assembly from
15 that meeting or went home in the meantime to have something to eat
16 freshen up and then go to the Assembly, I don't know, but it was the day
17 that the specials units were split in two, partitioned.
18 Q. Now, the letter of resignation by Mr. Zepinic that we just looked
19 at, it had nothing to do with that division or partition or the partition
20 of MUP. His resignation followed on as a consequence of the lack of
21 dignity he had demonstrated in performing his functions. Is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Mr. Mandic, when the members of the special unit arrived at the
24 Vrace facility they were ambushed. And if I remember well, two were
25 killed on the occasion.
1 A. Three were injured, and two were shot in the back of the head.
2 There are documents in the case file against me in Sarajevo.
3 So two were hit in the back of the head. They had set out for
4 the third gate with their personal weapons. They had passed by the
5 accommodation building for the students, and they arrived at the third
6 building where the forensic facility was, and the accommodation facility
7 where they were supposed to stay. And they were both hit in the -- or,
8 rather, shot in the back of the head. One of them was Lizdek, and the
9 other's name was Kupic. They had both completed a course and in -- at
10 that centre at Vrace, there were 170 in all. I believe there are also
11 medical documents to corroborate what I have just said.
12 Q. All right. At any rate, that confrontation ended and that part
13 of the special unit that consisted of Serbs found accommodation in the
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Mr. Mandic, at the time you were assistant minister, and it was a
17 Sunday; right?
18 A. Yes, it was Sunday, and the second day of Bajram; I remember
20 Q. On Monday and Tuesday, you went to work to the MUP of the
21 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to your workplace; right?
22 A. The agreement was that those of us who had worked in the joint
23 MUP should keep our workplaces until the new structure really started
24 functioning. The new MUPs established under the Cutileiro Plan. And
25 that we should assist in the establishment of these new MUPs.
1 But Munir Alibabic devastated my office, and I came there two
2 days -- on two days, but then I no longer went there because I understood
3 that even my life was in jeopardy. Jusuf Pusina also recommended me not
4 to come there any longer, and I didn't. Soon enough I was dismissed on
5 the 8th of April by the joint cabinet when Jure Pelivan was
6 prime minister.
7 Q. So to sum up, the agreement was -- or the agreement that was
8 reached, I suppose that happened in advance, but it was only verified by
9 the collegium. And under that agreement, there certainly must have been
10 a time-period for the transformation of the single MUP of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina into entity MUPs pursuant to the Cutileiro Plan.
12 A. Yes. And we were waiting for the politicians to find agreement
13 so that we could -- we could implement that and start working.
14 Q. And after that collegium session, the special police force was
15 split, and there was a confrontation, a clash, but that was completed.
16 But you still continued going to work, to assist in the further partition
17 of the MUP.
18 A. Yes. I tried to do so.
19 Let me just add that at Vrace, in that clash, two Serb special
20 police forces were killed and two or three wounded, but none of those who
21 ambushed them was either killed or injured. So the only victims were
23 Q. Then, on Wednesday, the 8th of April, you were dismissed from
24 your position at the cabinet session; correct?
25 A. Yes. Unfortunately, Delimustafic, if you have the document,
1 actually dated my dismissal the 5th of April, although there was no
2 cabinet session on that day. What's more, it was a Sunday and Bajram.
3 Q. I'll show you the document.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D00-0488. Tab 12.
5 Q. Mr. Mandic, let's just wait for the English translation.
6 Is this the dispatch about your dismissal?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. It is dated 8 April, but as you said, the 5th of April figures in
9 the text.
10 A. Yes. An earlier date is stated there. I kept going to work on
11 the 6th and 7th. On the 8th, I was dismissed and no longer went there.
12 Q. So that the date when you were dismissed certainly is the 8th of
14 A. Well, you see that it was an urgent dispatch and which was sent
15 out immediately after the decision of my dismissal.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Unless there's opposition, I tend
17 to -- I seek to tender this document into evidence.
18 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
19 JUDGE HALL
20 THE REGISTRAR: As exhibit 1D256, Your Honours.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I think that Ms. Korner
22 was assessing whether she would object.
23 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]... Can I [indiscernible]
24 where this document comes from? I just want to ask. That's fine. No
1 MR. ZECEVIC: It comes from disclosure; it has the ERN number.
2 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] That's fine. No
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
5 [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would now like to pass on to
6 another topic, so this may be a convenient moment for a break.
7 JUDGE HALL
8 [The witness stands down]
9 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.28 p.m.
11 [The witness takes the stand]
12 MR. ZECEVIC: May I, Your Honours?
13 JUDGE HALL
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Mandic, before we continue with my cross -- with my
16 examination-in-chief [as interpreted], let me ask you this.
17 We just spoke about the 11th February meeting in Banja Luka. You
18 confirmed that it was a public meeting and that you personally invited
19 the minister, Mr. Delimustafic, to attend the meeting. It is my
20 conclusion that you invited the Serb staff to join the meeting as well?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So you --
23 A. I organised the meeting, if that's what you mean.
24 Q. Yes, thank you.
25 Mr. Mandic --
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Would the Trial Chamber want me to pursue this
2 matter anymore, or you're satisfied?
3 JUDGE HALL
4 satisfied. If you are the -- I don't know that we need to -- from my
5 point of view, I don't think we need to explore the matter further. But
6 at the end of the day, it is a matter for counsel, I would have thought.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, and I appreciate. I would just -- I
8 was just trying to be of assistance. Thank you very much, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 MR. ZECEVIC:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mandic, I will show you a document, which is
12 1D174. These are the conclusions of the Presidency of the Socialist
13 Republic of B
14 the 4th and 8th of the month specified.
15 Do you know there was such a Presidency meeting?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please. I think we don't
18 have the right page in the English -- yes, this is the right page now.
19 And we need page 2 in the Serbian.
20 Q. Item 3 of this decision, signed by the President of the
21 Presidency of the Socialist Republic
22 date is the 4th of April, states:
23 "A mobilisation should be carried out of the entire reserve force
24 of the Socialist Republic of B and H police in keeping with the earlier
25 decisions of the Presidency and government ..."
1 In item 4 it says:
2 "That in keeping with their own assessments, a mobilisation be
3 carried out of civil protection units in the city of Sarajevo
4 municipalities in the republic."
5 Do you see that?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Do you recall this situation?
8 A. I do. This was the rump Presidency and the rump government,
9 without any Serb representatives.
10 Q. Mr. Mandic, I'll show you another document.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] P440.
12 Q. Which is a communique of the Assembly of the Serbian people in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and its national security council. The date is the
14 4th of April, 1992, signed by Dr. Radovan Karadzic.
15 In that very document, which is actually a public announcement
16 marked urgent, he states that the rump Presidency of the
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina operating without any representatives of the Serb
18 people has issued highly irresponsible and illegal instructions regarding
19 the raising of Territorial Defence and people's self-organisation and the
20 raising the civilian protection and reserve police.
21 Do you recall this announcement signed by Karadzic?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. In paragraph 4 it says:
24 "By inviting the people to self-organise, the rump Presidency has
25 acknowledged the collapse of the constitutional and legal order as well
1 as that of legal authorities and has thus instigated chaos, violence, and
2 civil war."
3 Do you agree with this assertion?
4 A. I do.
5 Q. The next paragraph:
6 "The Serb national security council invites the citizens to
7 disregard the I ill-advised invitation of the rump B and H Presidency and
8 do everything in its power to avoid civil war and the suffering of the
10 Mr. Mandic, was this indeed the position of the SDS and
11 Mr. Karadzic?
12 A. I think so.
13 Q. In the last paragraph Mr. Karadzic says should any
14 Territorial Defence, civil protection, or reserve police units in any
15 area respond to the invitation of the Presidency, Crisis Staffs in those
16 areas should [sic] be activated," et cetera, et cetera.
17 Do you see that?
18 A. I do. It was tit for tat.
19 Q. Tit for tat? You mean this was a reaction to the previous
20 discussion of the rump Presidency?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You will agree with me that this public announcement was yet
23 another invitation, a call upon all to avoid a civil war?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And that is in keeping with what we have discussed a moment ago
1 when you said that the Serbs truly did not want a war in
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Mr. Mandic --
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D175 shown to
6 you. It is a document marked for identification. It is a dispatch of
7 the minister of Defence, Mr. Jerko Doko, dated 5 April 1992. Among
8 others, it was sent to the CSB
9 document is dated 5 April.
10 Q. First of all, Mr. Mandic, are you familiar with this dispatch by
11 Mr. Jerko Doko, whereby he conveys the conclusions of the government on
12 the call-up of the reserve force and TO units?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. On page 2, in both versions, you can see that he conveys -- it is
15 towards the middle of the page. The sentence begins, "It is tasked
16 with ..."
17 It says:
18 "The interior ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina is tasked with
19 securing appropriate weapons and equipment to TO units necessary to
20 secure public law and order and protection of vital facilities and to
21 instruct and coordinate the activities of TO bodies."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. I do.
24 Q. I think you pointed it out back in September in your documents.
25 That is, September of 1991. Six or eight months before this, and we now
1 see it being put into practice.
2 A. Yes. And this actually happened. We tried to prevent any arming
3 of any people, of -- of the police arming the TO. And who were they
4 supposed to protect from whom?
5 Q. On the next page of this document signed by Minister
6 Jerko Doko --
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 3. At
8 the top of the page.
9 Q. The first sentence you see, I think it's on the following page in
10 the English version, it is stated in this order by the minister of
11 Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- sorry, by that
12 time it was Bosnia-Herzegovina. No, it was still the Socialist Republic
13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 5th of April.
14 It is stated:
15 "TO units which will be mobilised to carry out the aforementioned
16 tasks and under the provisions of the law aforementioned are subordinated
17 to the police stations in the respective municipalities and should follow
18 orders of the officials of the Ministry of the Interior of
20 Mr. Mandic, it is not in dispute that you and the Serb personnel
21 in the MUP countless times in 1991 and 1992 warned of this that the
22 police was being turned into an armed force, or rather that a party
23 militia was being constituted. And indeed, on 5th of April, this was put
24 into practice by virtue of this order of the minister of defence. Your
25 fears were justified as early as 1991. Correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, given
3 that the witness recognised and is familiar with this document and he
4 confirms its contents, I propose that we remove the MFI designation.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE HALL
7 Prosecution, so the -- so ordered.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
9 [Interpretation] Next, could we please have 1D00 ...
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 JUDGE HALL
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Just for the record, this document now is 1D175.
13 Thank you.
14 [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D00-4780.
15 Q. Mr. Mandic, this is an urgent dispatch sent to the entire MUP of
16 the Socialist Republic
17 It says:
18 "Immediately implement all three degrees, (I, II, and III) of the
19 order on alert measures." Signed by the interior minister,
20 Alija Delimustafic?
21 Do you see that?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. I'm looking at the number at the top, 08-8. It would seem that
24 this number was used by one of the deputies of the minister, because the
25 minister's number was 01.
1 A. Yes, it was. He was 01, and this was sent by someone from his
3 Q. Do you recall this dispatch? Do you recall the alert measures
4 being raised?
5 A. No, I wasn't familiar with that.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D00-2282.
7 Q. You can see that this is a dispatch by which the Doboj CSB chief,
8 Andrija Bjelosevic responds to the MUP of the Socialist Republic
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, the joint MUP, on the same date, the
10 6th of April, 1992, referring to the order we just saw, the dispatch that
11 is, the number of which is 08-8 of 6 April 1992.
12 In this dispatch, the centre chief points out to the ministry
13 that the alert measures of the first and second degree are to be taken
14 after the declaration of a state of emergency, and of the third degree
15 once the declaration of a state of war took place which is in the
16 jurisdiction of the SFRY Presidency, according to valid regulations.
17 Next he says:
18 "In addition, according to your document from November 1990, the
19 MUP receives and transmits the ordered readiness measures but cannot
20 order them."
21 Are you familiar with this dispatch and position put forth by
22 Mr. Bjelosevic?
23 A. I have never seen this dispatch, but I am familiar with this
24 position, and I know that the first dispatch was illegal. I don't think
25 Alija sent it at all. In any case, I don't know of this one.
1 Q. But, Mr. Mandic, do you agree that Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic in his
2 dispatch is conveying what is stipulated by law?
3 A. Yes. The Ministry of the Interior can't proclaim states, states
4 of anything, and that's what the Presidency does. The ministry
5 implements it, and Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic explains here who does what
6 very correctly.
7 Q. Very well. Thank you.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I don't know if there are any
9 objections from Ms. Korner. I can see there are. Then I won't even
10 attempt to tender this document. Thank you. May Mr. Mandic be shown
11 1D00-4778 [realtime transcript read in error "1D00-4776"] next, please,
12 in tab 13. It is another dispatch sent to the entire MUP of the
13 Socialist Republic
14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 There's a mistake in the transcript. I said 1D00-4778. The last
17 digit was 6 there. So it's 8. Maybe I misspoke, and if I did so, I
19 Q. You see, Mr. Mandic, here we have the dispatch dated the 8th of
20 April, 1992. And it refers to the dispatch from the Ministry of Defence
21 which we looked at a moment ago, signed by Minister Jerko Doko. And this
22 is an elaboration of that. It follows on from that order, an elaboration
23 by the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it says,
24 in paragraph 2:
25 "Inform us of your progress in completing the resubordination of
1 appropriate TO, Territorial Defence units to the competent organisational
2 units of the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
3 including problems and lack of clarity in the completion of this
5 Now, paragraph 3, it goes on to say strict categories -- strict
6 records must kept according to categories. Active police force is the
7 first point. The second bullet point is active personnel out of uniform.
8 Then reserve police force. Then under, 4, reserve personnel out of
9 uniform. And then 5, TO members, Territorial Defence members, that is.
10 And 6, volunteers or other men liable for military service placed under
11 the command of the SJB.
12 Do you see that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So this document actually covers everybody. All those who are in
15 a position and capable of bearing arms, right, it refers to all of them?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Are you familiar with this dispatch?
18 A. No.
19 Q. It is signed by an O. Jasarevic.
20 A. Osman Jasarevic. He was chief of a police administration within
21 the MUP headquarters and a colleague of mine. We were in the same class
22 or year.
23 Q. And he worked in the -- yes, ministry of the Socialist Republic
24 of BH.
25 A. He was a head of a police department. Osman Jasarevic, that is.
1 Q. Now these facts, as set out here, once again confirm what we were
2 saying earlier on and everything that you pointed out to us in 1991 and
3 1992. It was proved in practice in 1992 that all your fears and caution
4 was justified. Isn't that right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I see that Ms. Korner isn't looking
8 at me, which means she has an objection. Is that right?
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
10 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] I didn't know that there
11 was an application to admit this.
12 Sorry, are you asking for this to be admitted as an exhibit?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, to round everything off, and
14 the witness's statement and testimony, since the witness did not
15 recognise the document, I would like it to be at least MFI'd. I don't
16 want to tender it because I don't think we can do so, because the witness
17 didn't actually recognise it.
18 I don't know how the Prosecution feels about this, but perhaps
20 MS. KORNER: Yes, I'd like again if I could be told from where
21 the document comes. I am afraid.
22 Anyhow, for the moment, I certainly would object to it being
23 admitted as an exhibit.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I will give you an explanation
25 for this document. But certainly it's from the sources that I enumerated
1 in my letter to you a few months ago.
2 MS. KORNER: Yes. I mean, I know that. But I need to know,
3 there are sources and sources, and I have rooted -- or a root-and-branch
4 objection to anything that comes from General Prlic's web site. So if is
5 one of those, then I'm going to object to it even being marked for
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let me assure that it is not a
8 document from General Prlic's web site, or any other web site for that
9 matter. It's just that I can't give you a specific explanation for this
10 document, but I will do so in due course.
11 But if I understood, Ms. Korner, I don't think she objects to
12 having this document MFI
13 JUDGE HALL
14 identification at this point.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D257, marked for identification,
16 Your Honours.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. Mr. Mandic, I'd like to show you document 1D152 next, please.
19 Which is the transcript of a Presidency session, BH Presidency session.
20 And I would like to us have page 2 displayed, please.
21 It relates to -- page 2, please. It relates to Mr. Avdo Hebib,
22 whom we talked about. And you remember, I'm sure --
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 of the Serbian, please.
24 Yes, and page 2 of the English as well. Thank you. Both the page 2s.
25 Q. You'll remember, I am sure, sir, that we commented your -- about
1 your letter and the written caution that you sent with respect to
2 Mr. Avdo Hebib, where you said that he dealt in arming and armaments and
3 that nobody in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of BH knew what he was
4 engaged in, and that he caused problems, inter-ethnic problems, and that
5 he was leading up -- helping to lead up to a civil war. I think that is
6 what you said in respect of Avdo Hebib; right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, in this transcript, of the Presidency meeting at which
9 Minister Delimustafic was present, he says:
10 "Both we and his ministry made mistakes. Like what Bakir or Avdo
11 Hebib did," and in bracket it says, "(Assistant Minister for police) when
12 he ordered the war to start, people to open fire, occupy the barracks.
13 He sent the order to all centres without my knowledge. He declared war.
14 I told him to issue a statement to observe the proper form. He never
15 came to see me again; he does not speak to me."
16 And then Izetbegovic says: "Who did that?"
17 And Delimustafic's answer is: "Avdo Hebib."
18 And Izetbegovic says: "What did he do?"
19 And Delimustafic says: "He declared war on the army, four
20 points, sign the dispatch."
21 Izetbegovic: "In what capacity?"
22 And Kljuc intervenes there and says: "We have finished
23 recording. Don't record this."
24 Now, do you know that Mr. Avdo Hebib in fact started the war, as
25 Alija Delimustafic claims here?
1 A. I don't know who started the war. But certainly contributed to
2 the war in the initial stages in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 Q. With this kind of conduct?
4 A. Yes, of course.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 Well, we've finished with that.
7 Now, Mr. Mandic, on the 8th of April, after you were relieved of
8 your duties, you explained that, for a time, you assisted, if I can use
9 the word, at the request of Mico Stanisic, assisted people in the
10 Ministry of Interior during the month of April. And then, sometime at
11 the end of April, you learnt that you would be appointed to the post of
12 minister for justice and administration, and that happened sometime in
13 mid-May 1992. Isn't that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, it's not contentious that you, as a judge, your recognition
16 as a judge, that wasn't contrary to your desires to be minister of
18 A. That's quite right, I was a lawyer. So it wasn't alien to me, if
19 Nikolic didn't come to work.
20 Q. At the time, the prime minister, Mr. Djeric, proposed you for the
21 post of minister of justice; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It's a fact, isn't it, that very soon you and Mr. Stanisic - how
24 shall I put this? - I won't say clashed, but that you didn't see eye to
25 eye with Djeric. Is that right?
1 A. Well, as far as our personal relations went, there were no
2 conflicts. But there was a divergence in the way that different
3 ministries functioned, and, of course, that shouldn't mean a personal
4 conflict. There was, first of all, a misunderstanding or a divergence of
5 views between Stanisic and Djeric. And soon after that, well, already in
6 the autumn, in actual fact, just prior to the Zvornik Assembly, Stanisic
7 and me were on one side, and Mr. Djeric and Biljana Plavsic on the other.
8 But only when it came to work and the way in which the state was supposed
9 to function, or the Republika Srpska entity.
10 Q. It's also a fact, is it not, that Mr. Djeric, as prime minister,
11 sat throughout 1992 in what was called an expanded Presidency, which, in
12 addition to three Presidency members, Karadzic, Plavsic, and Koljevic,
13 there were Prime Minister Djeric and Assembly President Krajisnik.
14 Isn't that right?
15 A. Yes, that was the Supreme Command to be. And as the
16 prime minister, he was part of that body, ex officio, and he was the
17 number three man in the armed forces -- in the Supreme Command, rather.
18 Dr. Radovan Karadzic was -- then Ratko Mladic. And the third man was
19 Professor Dr. Djeric, Branko.
20 Q. And I hope which agree that, as member of the expanded
21 Presidency, where Dr. Djeric was at the source of all information, all
22 available information; right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Very well. Now, sometime in May, Mr. Trbojevic was appointed
25 vice-premier; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Mr. Trbojevic as vice-premier was in charge of the Ministry of
3 the Interior departments and the Ministry of Justice departments.
4 A. He was vice-president for internal policy, or, rather, he was the
5 immediate -- my immediate superior. Mine and Stanisic's.
6 Q. However, even though he was your immediate superior, and
7 Stanisic's too, at one point in time he sort of grew closer to the
8 positions advocated by Prime Minister Djeric in this divergence of views
9 and the clashes between Mr. Djeric and you and Mico Stanisic; right?
10 A. Probably, yes. Well, Mr. Trbojevic didn't like to be too
11 prominent in any of these discussions.
12 Q. It's a fact, Mr. Mandic, is it not, that the only two ministries
13 which were really very serious about -- or worked seriously during 1992
14 and succeeded in achieving something, however limited, was the Ministry
15 of Justice that you headed, and the Ministry of Interior, led by
16 Mr. Mico Stanisic; right?
17 A. Yes. And in an official report of the work of the government in
18 October at the Assembly in Banja Luka, Mr. Djeric, Branko Djeric, put the
19 Ministry of Justice first when he boasted about the ministry and said
20 that it had scored the best results by organising the justice system and
21 regular courts, prosecutor's offices, and correction facilities, and my
22 endeavours to unite the justice system, civilian and military. And
23 there's a written report about that.
24 In second place was the police, which tried to establish public
25 law and order and under combat under the command of the army.
1 And in combat -- of the army.
2 So Mr. Djeric spoke about that and wrote it all down in his
3 written report. And there's written trace of that because it is a
4 written report.
5 Q. You said -- when you say the police, you meant the Ministry of
6 the Interior; right?
7 A. Yes. The ministry of the police, the Ministry of Interior,
8 that's right.
9 Q. And you said in combat action when they were under the command of
10 the army; right?
11 A. Yes. When there was an immediate threat of war, or -- and if
12 there was fighting, then pursuant to the commander, the police had to be
13 resubordinated to the army. That was under the constitution and the Law
14 on Ministries.
15 Q. Mr. Mandic, I'll show you 1D96, which is the operational
16 programme of the government called operational programme of measures to
17 prevent disturbances to the functioning of the society under conditions
18 of war. The date is the 18th of June, 1992.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 17th of June.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. This programme was put into effect by the government of the
22 Serbian Republic
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 2 in both
25 Could we scroll down so that the witness could see the whole
2 Q. I'm quite certain you're familiar with this document.
3 A. I am.
4 Q. I won't go through the whole of it, since it's already an
5 exhibit. Let me ask you this: It is not in dispute, is it, Mr. Mandic,
6 that everything contained in this operative programme of the government
7 that was under the remit of the Ministry of Justice is something you
9 A. We were the only ministry which implemented all of the measures
10 under the plan.
11 Q. The same goes for the Ministry of the Interior, more or less,
12 does it not?
13 A. Yes. As Mr. Djeric specified in his report, the first one.
14 Q. All of the other ministries, due to objective or subjective
15 reasons, or because of the situation, did not carry out even the basic of
16 measures envisaged by this programme; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Sir, you - and when I say "you," I mean the justice ministry -
19 managed, under wartime circumstances, to create a functioning ministry,
20 establish courts, prosecutor's offices, prisons, detention facilities,
21 from grass-root level; correct?
22 A. When I was appointed justice minister, I had nothing, not even an
23 office or a driver or a secretary. No paper, no pencils. Nothing. I
24 worked 16 hours per day to establish the judicial system in
25 Republika Srpska.
1 Q. By the end of 1992, which is something I don't think is in
2 dispute, the judicial system, following the October elections, began
3 working, so to say.
4 A. Yes. And it still works on the same principles.
5 Q. Mr. Mandic, you mentioned on a number of occasions that it was
6 your position, as well as that of the ministry and of the senior
7 leadership, was to respect the ethnic makeup on the ground, applied to
8 those employed in the ministry.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. If I am interpreting it well, it means that a certain number of
11 non-Serbs - that is to say, Muslims, Croats, and others living in that
12 area - were appointed as prosecutors and judges and to various positions
13 within the Ministry of Justice.
14 A. Yes. Although there was must resistance in certain Assembly
15 sessions by deputies. Despite of that, we managed to secure ethnic
16 representation at all levels of the ministry.
17 Q. Do you know by heart how many persons of Muslim ethnicity did you
18 appoint to the positions of judges and prosecutors during your tenure in
19 the ministry of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
20 A. I think there were 27 in the first wave, and we continued working
21 on it. I think that was the figure, although I'm not 100 per cent
23 In any case, all those names can be found in the "Official
24 Gazette". You can check it against that, who was appointed and when.
25 Q. I'll show you a document shown to you previously by Madam Korner,
1 which is P1333, which is tab 202.
2 I think it was on the second day of your examination-in-chief
3 that this document was admitted.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] This is definitely not it.
5 This is the document.
6 Q. It came from your ministry. It is an overview of courts and
7 prosecutor's offices number of elected judges and appointed public
8 prosecutors in Republika Srpska.
9 As it says, this is annex 1. I suppose it was an annex to your
10 annual report of the Ministry of Justice. Correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. At page two, we see that there was a total of 276 judges who were
13 elected in 1992, in Republika Srpska?
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please. I see that in the
15 English translation the figure is missing. It says total of judges on
16 the Supreme Court and then number 6. And just below that, it should be
17 total, 276.
18 In the English version for some reason it was omitted.
19 Q. Can you see that?
20 A. I do, I can.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] The next page, page 3.
22 Q. It is stated there that the total number of prosecutors appointed
23 was 80.
24 Do you see that?
25 A. I do.
1 Q. Does this tally with what you can recall? Do you have any reason
2 not to trust these documents?
3 A. I don't. This is my report.
4 Q. On the next page, page 4, which is Annex 2 to your annual report,
5 I presume, we see an overview of normative activity of Ministry of
6 Justice and administration.
7 We can see that your ministry worked on amendment proposals,
8 laws, decrees, decisions, totalling 25 acts such as laws, decisions,
9 decrees, and amendments. In that process, it also prepared another five
10 pieces of legislation which were put up for discussion by the parliament.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. When we look at all this, Mr. Mandic, it is difficult
13 to understand why Mr. Djeric, as far back as May, and then in August, and
14 then in the fall of 1992, insisted on the reconstruction of the
15 government, specifically pointing you and Mr. Stanisic out.
16 Do you agree with me that this was illogical, especially having
17 in mind the report he submitted?
18 A. I don't know where he specifically mentioned me and Stanisic in
19 May and that fall. Is there such a document? Up to now, I had no
20 knowledge of this.
21 As for November and the Assembly in Zvornik, I have an
22 explanation for that.
23 Q. Mr. Mandic, I'll show you P190, which is a letter by
24 Mico Stanisic sent to the Prime Minister, Branko Djeric. The date is the
25 18th of July, 1992.
1 In it, puts forth a critique at the expense of Mr. Djeric. He
3 "Although I'm a member of the government, I requested a number of
4 times at governmental sessions that a draft law be created in keeping
5 with international law and the laws of war, so as to direct the
6 activities of the army, groups, and individuals," et cetera, et cetera.
7 "You did nothing up to date, although I believe this was supposed
8 to have been discussed on the first government session."
9 Did you know that Mr. Stanisic sent this letter to Mr. Djeric?
10 A. Well, I don't think there was a clash between the two of them,
11 but it was the position which I supported that the paramilitary
12 formations which came to the Bosnia-Herzegovina theatre were not to be
13 allowed to enter the territory of Republika Srpska. He mentioned that a
14 few times at government sessions, as you can see in the minutes. He
15 insisted this area in particular be regulated by governmental decisions
16 and laws.
17 But this was not a clash. It was simply the position of a police
18 minister who wouldn't have any paramilitary formations. I must tell that
19 you they did a lot of -- they caused a lot of trouble. They robbed,
20 first, non-Serb families. And when they ran out of those, they started
21 robbing Serb families. And this is what the minister of the interior
22 pointed out. I supported him in that.
23 Mr. Djeric followed instructions of Madam Plavsic. She said at
24 the Assembly meeting in Zvornik -- and there is a recording of it, as
25 well as the minutes shown to me by Ms. Korner. On that occasion she
1 clearly said:
2 "I invited Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, and his Tigers. I invited
3 the White Eagles. I invited some other animals and beasts, I can't
4 recall who. And it is our minister, Stanisic, detaining them, preventing
5 our brothers from abroad to help the Serb cause. He seems to enjoy
6 Momcilo Mandic's position, and they are against other Serbs assisting
8 My Defence counsel Milan Vujin used that footage.
9 When Ms. Korner asked me about Mr. Stanisic, I said that we -- I
10 said that he said to Ms. Plavsic that we allowed criminals to come in.
11 She felt in need to respond, and she did so in Zvornik on 24th November.
12 Mr. Djeric supported Ms. Plavsic on that.
13 I remember well -- bare with me. I think there were some
14 "Zuta Osa" or Yellow Wasps in Zvornik whom the police detained. And then
15 Biljana Plavsic ordered their release. And of course there was a clash
16 in the functioning of the authorities and the state. These were vein
17 people, university professors. And it was my personal opinion, although
18 I do not wish to insult anyone, they did not realise what it means that
19 for some people who went unchecked to go into villages, robbing, and
20 killing people and children. It seemed important to them to pose -- to
21 have photographs taken with them, but as for the rest of what was
22 happening, we disagreed strongly. Ms. Plavsic took this personally, and
23 this is the cause of that rift or argument. Djeric, however, was on
24 Ms. Plavsic's side. Please do show us the minutes of that session where
25 she says, I invited them. She was a member of the Presidency and the
1 Supreme Command. And there you have a minister who said, Well, you can't
2 do that. She was insulted by that. And there was me, the minister of
3 justice, seconding what my colleague said.
4 Mico Stanisic, as the chief of police, said this a number of
5 times to Djeric, President, we cannot control groups coming from all over
6 into Republika Srpska. They kill children, they torch, rob, kill, and go
7 back. They are these so-called weekend warriors, and they are officially
8 supported by Biljana Plavsic. She appears on TV saying our brethren are
9 coming to help us. They kill children, creating problems for everyone.
10 Robbing people. And then we said, President, this cannot go on any
11 longer. You are in charge of the state and of the police as well. And
12 then Djeric resigned.
13 He singled out me and Stanisic, and he said I had ties with
14 Karadzic, and yet I wouldn't exchange a word with Karadzic for half a
15 year because he allowed Plavsic and others to do this. I had my
16 position. I spent my whole career in state bodies; I know how things
17 work. They simply would not leave us room to do this. We wanted the
18 judiciary; we wanted to people for certain crimes; and we wanted to
19 prevent the entry of those paramilitary groups. They would arrive on a
20 Friday; do all sorts of harm; and go back on a Monday. And then they
21 say, Yes, this is how it should be done. And we said, President, this
22 cannot go on. This is a shame for the Serb people.
23 I was present when information came in of those people robbing
24 Serbs and their property because there were no Muslims left any longer.
25 It was me and Stanisic. We all knew about that. If this is exactly the
1 -- the argument you have in mind. Branko Djeric was a member of the
2 Supreme Command. He attended sessions of the Security Council, I think,
3 comprised of professors, Plavsic, Djeric, et cetera. They thought we
4 were their teaching assistants or students who were there to serve
5 coffee. If you don't something they want you to do, there's trouble.
6 And once you point out to them, Well, we're not to do this because Europe
7 will never forgive us, then they think you're -- you've turned against
9 Q. Yes, thank you.
10 Now let's take a look at page 2 of this same document, the same
11 letter from Mr. Stanisic to Mr. Djeric.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.
13 It's page 3 in the English.
14 Q. You see the sentence that is underlined there. It says --
15 Mr. Mico Stanisic says, and he is informing the prime minister:
16 "We are working on collecting information and documentation of
17 war crimes, i.e., genocide, regardless of who the perpetrators are and
18 what their ethnicity is."
19 And then he ends by saying:
20 "Due to the potential responsibility that may emerge as a result
21 of your insufficient involvement of this issue, I shall send this letter
22 to you personally; to the Presidency of the Serbian republic of BH
23 well as to the federal republic of Yugoslav SUP
24 interior, where a committee with one of our members is working on these
25 very issues."
1 And underneath there we have Mico Stanisic's signature.
2 Do you see that?
3 A. Yes, that is his signature. I am aware of this document. I am
4 familiar with it.
5 Q. Do you know that that was the position taken by
6 Mr. Mico Stanisic?
7 A. Yes, we kept repeating that again and again and held debates on
8 the issue.
9 Q. Mr. Mandic, this position taken by Mr. Stanisic, to the best of
10 your knowledge, was implemented from the very beginning. And I'd like to
11 show 1D61 to show you that, to see if you're familiar with the document.
12 The date is the 15th of April, 1992.
13 Do you see the document? It's an order signed by Mico Stanisic.
14 And at the time, you were still helping out, if I can put it that way, in
15 the MUP of Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 A. I already took over the Ministry of Justice, and I sent a similar
17 dispatch before there, a fortnight before, the police station. And I
18 think we discussed that document yesterday.
19 Q. I think the date here is the 15th of April, 1992.
20 A. Oh, yes, I apologise, I was thinking of May. You're quite right.
21 I was in the police then.
22 Q. I agree that it is very similar to the order we looked at a few
23 days ago signed by you, the contents of which are almost the same. And
24 that's what I want to ask you. So that was the position taken by the
25 Ministry of Interior from the very outset; right?
1 A. Yes, we were both policemen. We protected law and order, and
2 life and property. We are just doing our jobs. So it is nothing
3 unusual; it was quite normal.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Now, could the witness be shown
5 65 ter document -- no I apologise, P427; and .8, item 8 of that.
6 Q. Sir, this is information from the -- or a report from the
7 Ministry of the Interior. It says report on certain aspects of the work
8 done to date and the tasks ahead, dated the 17th of July, 1992. Sent to
9 the President of the Presidency, Mr. Karadzic, and the prime minister.
10 Do you see this report?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Have you seen it before?
13 A. No, I don't think so. I can't remember. I don't think so.
14 Q. Well, I'll try and refresh your memory. Perhaps you know about
15 some of the things contained in the report.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] May we turn to page 4, please.
17 [In English] It's tab 50.
18 Q. [Interpretation] On the 17th of July, 1992, Mr. Stanisic is
19 informing the president, President Karadzic, and the prime minister of
20 some phenomena on the ground that he was informed of at the collegium
21 held on the 11th of July, the MUP collegium of Republika Srpska held in
23 "The army and the Crisis Staffs" -- or, rather, War Presidencies
24 are asking that the army collect or capture as many Muslims as possible
25 and such undefined camps be left to the Ministry of Interior. The
1 conditions there are bad, individuals not respecting international norms
2 of conduct, and so on.
3 Now, this report, is it not in keeping with what your knowledge
4 was of the situation in July 1992, when you received information of this
5 kind; and is it not in keeping with the instructions that we -- set of
6 instructions that we looked at about captured persons and the authority
7 that the army had over these individuals; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Now, may we show page 7 to the
10 witness, please.
11 Or, rather, page 8. May we turn to page 8, please.
12 Q. It reads, the first paragraph on that page:
13 "The minister underlined the resolve that in order to achieve
14 full legality constitutionality as well as the implementation of bylaws
15 to do everything possible to prevent crimes from taking place, not only
16 on the part of citizens but on the part of soldiers and army officers,
17 the active and reserve policemen, members of the interior -- Ministry of
18 Interior, and their officers for which it is established that they had
19 committed crimes of any kind."
20 Now it is true, that what is says there absolutely coincides with
21 what you said earlier on, that, from the very beginning, that was the
22 policy pursued by the ministry because you and Mr. Stanisic, as
23 professional members of the Ministry of the Interior, could not act
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now on the next page, page number 10, it says the following.
2 On page 10, one of the tasks mentioned is to prevent and document
3 information about crimes --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel give a specific reference,
5 please. Thank you.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Can you see that? About war crimes.
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Now the next page. I think it's
10 page 12, mentioning --
11 Q. It says -- it discusses the problems and states that one of the
12 problems is the investigative centres, prisons, and collection centres
13 that are in existence, and, in that regard, the responsibility of the
14 organs, the MUP, so that the MUP in keeping with the law on
15 Criminal Procedure and the Law on the Interior, on Internal Affairs, in
16 order to carry out duties should act, vis-a-vis people, up to their trial
17 and hand them over to the law enforcement organs; and specific discussion
18 should be how to deal with the relocation of certain citizens, villages,
19 et cetera, because this does not fall within the competence of the MUP,
20 although efforts are being made to link it to the MUP.
21 Now, do you know that Mr. Stanisic complained of problems of this
22 kind and occurrences of this kind?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Now, Your Honours, I have five or
1 six more documents to go through, and that will take me between
2 20 minutes and half an hour at the most. But as it is another area, I
3 suggest that we adjourn for the day and continue tomorrow.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 10.00 -- 9.00 tomorrow morning.
6 MS. KORNER: Can I just say one thing about the form of
7 cross-examination. I haven't objected all morning, but I do think that
8 cross-examination does require a question and not a comment such as, Now
9 it is true that what is says there absolutely coincides with what you
10 said earlier, that from the very beginning that was the policy pursued by
11 the ministry, because you and Mr. Stanisic as professional members of the
12 Ministry of Interior could not act otherwise.
13 There isn't even the beginnings of a question there,
14 Your Honours. I think questions should be questions, and not comments.
15 And as I said, I haven't objected all morning, but just for the
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I didn't want to -- because the
18 witness already gave his answer to the previous question where he
19 basically answered my question in anticipation what would be my question.
20 That -- that is why I tried to summarise, just to save the time. But I'm
21 perfectly willing to ask the witness, any time, Your Honour, his opinion.
22 JUDGE HALL
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
25 to be reconvened on Friday, the 7th day of May,
1 2010, at 9.00 a.m.