1 Friday, 29 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
6 everybody in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone.
11 May we have the appearances, please.
12 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. I'm Tom Hannis along
13 with Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
15 Slobodan Cvijetic, and Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for Stanisic Defence
16 this morning. Thank you.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic,
18 Igor Pantelic, Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
19 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
20 And if there is nothing to delay us, may the usher please escort
21 the witness back to the stand.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Planojevic, good morning to you, sir. Before
24 Mr. Zecevic resumes his --
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
1 JUDGE HALL: Before Mr. Zecevic resumes his cross-examination, I
2 remind you, you're still on your oath.
3 Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 WITNESS: DOBRISLAV PLANOJEVIC [Resumed]
6 [Witness answered through interpreter]
7 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
8 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Planojevic.
9 A. Good morning.
10 Q. Mr. Planojevic, yesterday we discussed the sending of certain
11 inspectors in the field. We mentioned Danilo Vukovic. That was the
12 question where we left it off. We discussed the decision by virtue of
13 which he was dispatched in the field. In addition to him, there was also
14 Dragan Andan, another inspector who was sent. Is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I'll show you 1D00-0617.
17 The document is dated 23 July 1992. It is an authorisation
18 issued to Dragan Andan to tour the security services centres, public
19 security stations, and police stations on the territory of the
20 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He will inspect them,
21 monitor them their work, offer expert assistance, and suggest measures
22 for the improvement of shortcomings observed. Signed: For
23 Mico Stanisic.
24 Can you recognise the signature?
25 A. Vlastimir Kusmuk, I believe.
1 Q. Were you aware of such an authorisation issued to Dragan Andan in
2 July 1992?
3 A. I think Dragan Andan left in early July on same business. I
4 don't know whether he had received that authorisation by that time.
5 Actually, I think it was already in June when he went out in the field
6 for the first time, and I think Danilo and he worked as a team. I was
7 wasn't competent for any uniformed police issues, but I do know that the
8 two of them left together. I don't know whether they had any written
9 authorisation before there date, but I know they were dispatched earlier
10 than the date referred to here.
11 Q. I'll wait for the transcript.
12 A. Dragan stayed in Sarajevo for a while and then he was banned from
13 entering the republican SUP building of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And
14 during that time, he had no assignments. And we made use of him to carry
15 out such visits, when necessary.
16 Q. I would just like to ask you to speak slowly, because we are
17 missing a part of your answer because of that reason.
18 When you say that Danilo left, you have in mind Danilo Vukovic;
19 is that correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. It is the inspector whom we discussed yesterday towards the end
22 of the session; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And you said that in your opinion this authorisation we are
25 looking at is actually the second visit by Dragan Andan or the second
1 inspection of the CSBs and public security stations in 1992; correct?
2 A. Yes. I am positive that he did the same in June. Therefore, I
3 believe this was his second inspection.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I seek
5 to tender this document into evidence.
6 MR. HANNIS: No objection.
7 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D392, Your Honours.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me.
10 Q. Mr. Planojevic, the inspectors Radenko Vujicic and
11 Petar Kovacevic, were they part of your administration or some other?
12 A. They were not in my administration, in the police administration.
13 Q. Very well. During examination last Friday, my learned friend
14 showed you a document which is 1D84. It is your letter, signed by you,
15 dated the 5th of June, 1992, sent to all CSBs in the territory.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D84. Or P568; the documents are
18 Q. Do you recall this document?
19 A. I do.
20 Q. Therein, you state that you have observed an increase in crime,
21 especially property crime, as well as war crimes.
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. And you provide instructions to use strong measures, as well as
24 to take people into custody if they were perpetrators of all types of
25 crime. That information was issued to all employees, whereby you also
1 invited them to cooperate with the judiciary and the military police; is
2 that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What I'm interested in the most is the suggestion you make in the
5 penultimate sentence, which reads:
6 "In wartime, you will encounter numerous obstacles in combatting
7 crime and will, on occasion, be unable to take on adequate measures; in
8 such cases, record all information in Official Notes for subsequent
9 measures, i.e., criminal prosecution ..."
10 Can you see that?
11 A. Yes, I can.
12 Q. Sir, you are sitting here as the author of the document. At the
13 time, having in mind the situation in the field and the events taking
14 place in wartime circumstances, you could foresee that the members of the
15 police will face serious obstacles in conducting investigations of
16 certain types of crime; is that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Irrespective of their obligations, based on legal regulation, as
19 well as other laws and regulations regulating the work of the organs of
20 the interior according to which they have to undertake certain, as you
21 call them here, adequate measures, still, there was a possibility, with a
22 view to the situation in the field, that such measures would not be
23 implemented; they wouldn't be able to do so. You could see that much at
24 that stage?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. In such cases, your instruction, or the instruction of the
2 ministry, rather, was that they gather all information and include them
3 in Official Notes, or by any other means, so as to enable when the
4 conditions became more favourable to conduct or put in place adequate
5 measures and prosecute the perpetrators; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, absolutely.
7 Q. Therefore, your instructions had absolutely nothing to do with
8 any covering up or implementing inadequate measures. You actually
9 directed your men to apply the only measures that they could, given the
11 A. Well, there was no other way to go about it, other than to
12 approach it this way.
13 Q. Yesterday, when you discussed certain flexibility on the part of
14 the Ministry of the Interior, you had in mind this type of flexibility;
15 is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Flexibility in the sense of applying measures which may not be
18 absolutely adequate but are the only ones possible, given the
19 circumstances at the time.
20 A. Yes. Perhaps I can clarify.
21 For example, there's a crime that had been committed but you
22 cannot investigate it because you cannot go about putting questions and
23 investigating because it is a war. Once the conditions are better, then
24 can you carry out your operational measures.
25 In times of combat, you could not even approach the front lines,
1 and the entire Sarajevo area was one large front line. There was combat
2 all over, throughout the war, especially in Ilidza and Vogosca. There
3 wouldn't go -- there wouldn't be a week that would go by without combat;
4 this includes Hadzici as well. The only part that was partially spared
5 was Pale. There were two corps there - the Sarajevo and
6 Zenica Corps - facing the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. The manning strength
7 was about 100.000 versus the 18.000 of the soldiers of the
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. If there was a single company out of combat,
9 it's already a problem. And it's particularly difficult to document
10 anything in such conditions. We have scene-of-crime measures which we
11 could not apply in combat -- in the combat environment.
12 Having in mind such a complex situation, on one hand the shortage
13 of soldiers -- because everyone went to the front lines, even those who
14 missed a limb. Everyone was in the trenches, because people were
15 fighting for their bare lives. That is why this dispatch was fashioned
16 in this way. But the purposes of it was not to instruct people to
17 oversee or forget something.
18 I hope that you can at least partially understand what my
19 intention was, since I authored this dispatch.
20 Q. I thank you for this comprehensive explanation.
21 Sir, when you were examined on Friday, you were shown another
22 document, or, rather, another version of this document. There were
23 questions put to you about the signature. Do you recall that part of
24 your testimony?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I won't go through it all again; I believe that was cleared up.
2 But what was key was that both versions we have in the file - and you
3 have explained why they are different - have the same content.
4 A. Yes, absolutely. Except the word "for." It was simply copied
6 Q. When you say "for," you mean in the signature block?
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
9 1D85, which is the same document.
10 Q. It was sent by the CSB in Banja Luka to its regional stations.
11 You viewed this document on Friday as well, I believe.
12 It conveys the entirety of your dispatch, of your instructions,
13 does it not?
14 A. Yes. And here it's in quotation marks. We have it all here.
15 Q. And towards the end, the chief of the centre added another
16 instruction of his own, saying that all authorised officials should be
17 acquainted with this dispatch and that they should abide by the
18 instructions provided.
19 Can you see that?
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can go to the bottom of
21 the page.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see it now.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Is that correct then?
25 A. Yes, it is.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 Sir, this document was drafted in early June 1992. In mid-July,
3 the first collegium meeting was held on the 11th of July, 1992, in
4 Belgrade, to be more precise.
5 A. I only know of that first one.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P160.
7 Q. Do you recall having seen this document? It is of the
8 11th of July, and you were in attendance at this collegium session;
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
12 page 16, I believe, in e-court. It is -- it is 0324-1863; that's the
13 ERN number. I am afraid I omitted to check what the English page is.
14 That is why I read out the ERN number. I apologise.
15 Thank you. This is exactly what I need.
16 Q. This is Mr. Mico Stanisic's presentation. I'll just read out two
17 or three things to you to check if you remember.
18 In the centre - I believe it's the fourth paragraph - it says:
19 "The Ministry of the Interior is a professional organisation,
20 that is, a professional police without political influence," and so on.
21 Do you remember that was the position of the ministry?
22 A. In general terms, yes. I'm sure I cannot reproduce the exact
23 words that he said, but I remember that he advocated such a professional
24 attitude all the time, and even before.
25 Q. Very well.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let's turn to page 20 of the
2 Serbian text.
3 Q. Which is your discussion at this collegium meeting. You asked a
4 few questions and made some suggestions; they are listed here, as you
5 see. And what matters most to me here is that you mention documenting
6 war crimes, medical records, and so on, as a priority. And you say that
7 lists of war criminals must be made distributed to the centres.
8 Mr. Planojevic, I believe that when you gave the interview in
9 2004 - and I think that you repeated as much on Friday - you said that
10 this document doesn't mention your words, and that's a point you insisted
11 on. Namely, that the priority is documenting war crimes. And you added
12 that this applied to everybody, irrespective of the ethnicity or the
13 religious affiliation of the perpetrators or the victims. Is that
15 A. Yes, it is.
16 Q. I'll read out some more conclusions to you.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] And that's on page 23 of the
18 Serbian text.
19 Q. You see conclusion number 1 refers to -- or, rather, explains the
20 complexity of the situation the MUP of the RS was in, the personnel
21 strength, and the fact that the police was resubordinated to the military
22 in the conduct of combat operations, or, in other words, it's involved in
23 combat. But even so, it is insisted that all members of the MUP take
24 measures from their remit to ensure the establishment and the functioning
25 of the authorities, as well as to secure the personal safety and the
1 security of property of the citizens.
2 Do you remember that this, in rough terms, was the position of
3 the MUP in 1992?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
6 page 26, and these are conclusions 6 and 7.
7 Q. You see that one of the conclusions of that meeting, that is, the
8 collegium held on the 11th of July, stems from your suggestion, which is
9 the preventation [as interpreted] and the documenting of war crimes with
10 these of -- all legally prescribed means and methods, as well as filing
11 criminal complaints and so on.
12 And then item 7 reads: The prevention and detection of other
13 criminal offences, irrespective of the identity of the perpetrators.
14 Can you see it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see P427.8.
18 Q. After this meeting on the 11th of July, a notification was sent
19 out about some aspects of the activities taken so far and future tasks.
20 The date is 11 July 1992, and it was --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: 17 July.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. -- and it was sent to the president and the prime minister.
24 Can you see it?
25 A. I do now.
1 Q. Such notifications or reports were mostly a task of the analysis
2 department of the minister.
3 A. Yes. That analysis department did all such work, especially for
4 the cabinet and the Presidency.
5 Q. All right. Then it's not surprising that you're not familiar
6 with this document.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. After this meeting, there was your dispatch of 5 June, regarding
9 war crimes. Then there is your suggestion, the discussion, and the
10 conclusions reached at the collegium to prosecute the perpetrators of war
11 crimes and any other crimes, irrespective of who the perpetrators or the
12 victims were.
13 Then on 19 July a form was submitted, which I'm about to show
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
17 Q. Do you remember drafting a form for the identification of war
19 A. Well, if I may clarify. We established a group of operatives
20 whose only task was to be of the prevention and detection of war crimes.
21 I sat down with them, and we made a rough outline of that future
22 questionnaire and what it should contain. There was Milomir Orasanin,
23 Nenad Skipina, and, I believe, Petko Pekic. It wasn't ready for the
24 meeting though, but two of these people soon were transferred to other
25 jobs after my resignation. But their only task was coordinating such
1 activities. But, as I said, Pekic went to the police, Orasanin went to
2 the border, and Pekic went elsewhere, so nobody was left from that
3 original group.
4 Q. Let us just clarify. If I understood you well, this group which
5 was established was part of your administration.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And when you said that it dealt with war crimes, generally
8 speaking, I must ask you once more: We are talking about war crimes, no
9 matter who the victims or the perpetrators were; correct?
10 A. Absolutely.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the beginning
12 of his answer. We didn't understand.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. Kindly
14 speak slowly. The interpreters did not understand your answer.
15 Could you please repeat slowly. You answered "absolutely," and
16 then ...
17 A. When I say we didn't care who the victim was, it was only
18 important that it was a war crime. I can mention an example: The only
19 two cases, detention cases, that is, persons who were taken in, were
20 documented for murdering non-Serbs. So this goes to show that this
21 wasn't just hollow talk. And this was -- this happened in the areas
22 where we could go at the time, Vrace and others.
23 Q. You said Grbavica and Vrace. So that's a part of Sarajevo;
25 A. Yes. Those were areas where we could function normally, where we
1 could physically go. And when I say "normal," I mean that we were,
2 indeed, present there.
3 Q. I'll show you page 3 of this document, the form itself, and I
4 would like a brief comment.
5 We were saying that war crimes were prosecuted no matter who the
6 victims were, that is, irrespective of their ethnicity or religious
7 affiliations. We see items 5 and 6 of this form for victims of war
8 crimes. Item 5 reads: ethnicity; and 6, religion. Correct?
9 A. Yes. It can be seen plainly here.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Planojevic, counsel for Mr. Stanisic has put
12 to you a whole string of documents which all seem to bare proof of the
13 intention by the MUP to have all crimes properly registered, irrespective
14 of the perpetrator or the victim, and including war crimes; and the
15 document that we have on the screen before us now certainly confirms
17 But it is also, as you may know, a common experience in real life
18 that one thing is the written word, quite a different thing is,
19 sometimes, the reality. So my question to you is if can you tell us
20 whether the intention that we have seen documented here were carried out
21 in practical life?
22 Is it your impression that, indeed, all war crimes, or at least
23 most of the war crimes, were, in fact, registered and investigated and
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?
1 I cannot state anything with certainty, because we saw what it
2 was like in Vogosca yesterday when the chief said what he said. The
3 general commitment and the intention of at least the people who were on
4 the collegium was what can be seen from the documents.
5 I didn't speak about other things. I don't know if I should
6 mention this. One highly esteemed attorney was here often. He was not a
7 Serb, and he lived in the area of Grbavica, and we protected his property
8 in the same way and filed criminal complaints.
9 I didn't want to mention everything. Unfortunately, he did
10 suffer some adverse consequences later. But often people became victims,
11 but given the circumstances, I think that we did more than many others
12 would have.
13 I don't know if you're satisfied or if I should clarify further.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. I guess this is as close as we can
15 get to this matter.
16 Back to you, Mr. Zecevic.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
18 Q. [Interpretation] I would like to follow up on this.
19 If I understand correctly, it is your position that the MUP
20 headquarters, or the MUP leadership, did absolutely everything they
21 could, given the circumstances at the time; right?
22 A. Yes, I can state that with regard to the period in question here.
23 Q. And you have direct knowledge about it because you worked at MUP
24 headquarters at the time; correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Furthermore -- or, let me rephrase it. Do you have reason to
2 believe that elsewhere in the territory MUP members worked differently?
3 A. Well, it seems they did, once -- or now that I know how the
4 situation developed. There must have been people who did not adhere to
5 these principles. I didn't know that at the time though.
6 Q. It's a fact, isn't it, that the official position was not that
7 negative incidents should be covered up; on the contrary, that they must
8 be registered, in order to take adequate measures once the conditions
9 allow it. Did I understand correctly?
10 A. Yes. And for all serious crimes, we had to conduct an on-site
11 investigation. And if you did that, and if there is no investigating
12 judge at the site, then it is forwarded - I mean, the criminal
13 complaint - and it cannot be closed until the perpetrator is found.
14 That's why we conducted on-site investigations, because we wanted to
15 reach the judicial bodies.
16 Q. Very well. Let us move on to a set of other topics which you
17 discussed with my learned friend on Friday.
18 You'll recall having discussed -- or, rather, my learned friend
19 put you a question to which you answered about the competences of the
20 police, should the police come across a perpetrator who is a member of
21 the military. You confirmed that in peacetime conditions, as should have
22 been the case in the time of the war, if the police come across a
23 perpetrator of a crime who is a member of the military, they were
24 supposed to hold him until the arrival of the military organs who would
25 then take him over and prosecute further.
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. However, this has a practical consequence or implication. What
3 we are discussing, what we were discussing so far, were the theoretical
4 presumptions. However, in reality, if a member of the military committed
5 a crime, they were usually accompanied by others. Seldom did it happen
6 that a single member of the military committed a crime.
7 A. Yes. And it also frequently took place at night when people were
8 not moving about and you simply couldn't know who the perpetrator was.
9 It was quite customary to have a curfew introduced in such periods of
10 war. Only uniformed personnel moving to the lines went around at that
11 particular time of day, and this further makes the discovering of
12 perpetrators more difficult. And, of course, they were usually not
13 alone. They moved in groups.
14 I'll cite two examples, for you to understand this more easily.
15 Q. Yes. But do it slowly, please.
16 A. In Rudo, a soldier left the line and killed the brigade
17 commander, his own soldier killed him. There were simply psychopaths
18 around. They were able to do anything, let alone kill their commander.
19 And there were a number of such examples. Just imagine a policeman
20 bringing in a person like that. That was life.
21 Q. You foresaw my next question, actually. It is a fact that
22 members of the army in wartime conditions, by nature of things, are
23 armed; correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If the police went by their operational rules, when there was an
1 arrest of a person who is suspected of carrying arms and was ready to use
2 them, then such actions were planned with care, involving a number of
3 personnel; is that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. The crux of the matter is that the Ministry of the Interior was
6 obliged to protect its members. Every life lost in line of duty is an
7 irreparable loss for the organisation; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Sir, my learned friend also asked you about the way members of
10 the Ministry of the Interior were disciplined. You know that the Law on
11 the Interior was issued in March 1992; we discussed that yesterday?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And that law came into force on the 30th of March, 1992; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The 31st of March.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. We said yesterday that it was almost identical to the Law on the
18 Interior of the SFRY. Or, actually, of the Socialist Republic of
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. The law foresaw the existence of certain disciplinary instances
22 such as disciplinary commissions and disciplinary prosecutors; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. At a certain point in his examination, my learned friend
25 Mr. Hannis asked you about certain disciplinary procedures and the
1 removal of certain heads of SJBs. You said that you were not aware of
2 such a removal of any of the chiefs being replaced during that time. Do
3 you recall that answer of yours?
4 A. I do.
5 Q. Sir, did you know that in 1992 the chief of the Bijeljina CSB,
6 Mr. Jesoric, was removed?
7 A. I learned of that later.
8 Q. Did you know that at least three SJB chiefs in Bijeljina were
9 removed: Mr. Pantic, Mr. Devedlaka, and even Andan for a while, who was
10 in that position?
11 A. I remember that Mr. Devedlaka went there to establish -- to
12 introduce some order, and I believe it was in May. I remember him
13 appearing at a collegium meeting in Belgrade, and he said that he
14 wouldn't go back to Bijeljina at any cost because that was the level of
15 threat issued against him. I think he was, at the time, the chief of the
16 station, and I believe he simply appeared at that meeting. I know,
17 however, that the station chiefs were then changed, because it was
18 discussed in Belgrade.
19 Q. Did you know that Andan was appointed to that position later?
20 A. I know and I believe that he was the chief of the station. I
21 only know that he was in Bijeljina, but I'm not sure anymore whether he
22 was a chief of the CSB or the station there.
23 Q. Did you know that in Teslic the SJB chief was also removed;
24 another person assumed that position?
25 A. I think I mentioned that when discussing it with Mr. -- with the
1 Prosecutor. I believe I learned that from Zivkovic or some other
2 work-mates of mine. But that was as late as 1993 or 1994.
3 Q. That was when you learned about that, in 1993 or 1994?
4 A. Yes, precisely.
5 Q. However, the removal took place in 1992, and you -- they were --
6 they confirmed it to you later on?
7 A. Yes. Zivkovic told me that when he came to the administration,
8 when we discussed certain events at the beginning of the war.
9 Q. Did you know that the chief of the Zvornik SJB was removed after
10 the operation carried out to bring in the Yellow Wasps; another person
11 was brought in instead?
12 A. I know that because I know the first chief. Later on, we became
13 friends. His name is Dragan Spasojevic. He told me. I think he was the
14 initial chief who was then removed. I even think that someone from
15 Loznica came there and declared themselves commander or chief of their
16 own will, and I believe such a situation continued for about two months.
17 I think that person was a boxer or something.
18 In any case, all that information is something I learned in
19 discussions with other people who were, for the most part, participants
20 in those events.
21 Q. Hence, your question [as interpreted] that this was not happening
22 could be simply interpreted as you not being familiar with it at the
23 time. But now you know that in 1992 some SJB chiefs and CSB chiefs were
24 actually removed. Correct?
25 A. At the time, I wasn't aware of any of that. I learned of those
1 things later on, through conversations with people I mentioned.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Page 20, line 5, I believe I said
3 "your answer," whereas in the transcript it reads "your question."
4 Q. So, it was your answer given to the Prosecutor on Friday.
5 Let me ask you this: We mentioned Boro Maksimovic, and we saw
6 some reports of your employees about how he looked down upon the MUP and
7 the CSB, not allowing anyone to interfere with his personnel policy, and
8 so on and so forth.
9 Did you know that he received a decision, disciplinary decision,
10 to be suspended from work on the 15th of the October, 1992? And then the
11 CSB chief, on the 30th of November, even filed a criminal complaint, a
12 criminal report against him. Did you know that?
13 A. I didn't.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
16 Q. This is the document. And since you weren't aware of that event,
17 I simply wanted to indicate to you -- excuse me? Yes. In the file, we
18 have both the disciplinary decision and the criminal report. I just
19 wanted to show you the first page.
20 The same goes for Vlado Kelovic, who was station commander in
21 Vogosca. He also had a disciplinary decision issued in his case on
22 suspension on the 15th of October, and a criminal report against him was
23 submitted in November 1992. I suppose you weren't aware of that either.
24 A. I was not.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] It is 1D187, for ease of reference.
1 Both documents are in tabs 124 and 125.
2 Q. Let me ask you this: Since we discussed Dragan Andan, did you
3 know that he, too, was suspended at a certain point in time, in
4 September 1992?
5 A. Dragan, himself, told me that upon his arrival. I believe it was
6 late 1992, when he came to Bijeljina. He said that the minister removed
7 him, and he complained that it wasn't done properly. I don't know more
8 than that. But he told me.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] It is P1269, tab 126, for
11 Q. While on the topic of Dragan Andan and Bijeljina, tell me if you
12 heard of the military camp at Batkovic.
13 A. I know of its existence, but I don't know under whose competence
14 it was. I think it existed throughout the war. I don't know whether it
15 was a prison or a camp, but I think it was in operation throughout the
16 war. If it's a camp, it's a camp. But I don't know what its proper name
18 Q. Well, it was called a military camp for POWs.
19 A. I didn't know that. But I did know of its existence and that it
21 Q. Very well.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Cvijetic [sic], is there a particular reason
23 why you added this document to your list as -- under tab 126? Obviously
24 it is already under tab 10.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just a mistake?
2 MR. ZECEVIC: It's a --
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... okay. It's no problem.
4 No problem.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... mistake. It's a
6 mistake. I wasn't aware that it was under tab 10.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thank you.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: I added it this morning. Thank you, Your Honours.
9 Q. [Interpretation] You remember that on Friday you discussed the
10 road through Caparde with my learned friend. Do you remember?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. In your evidence, you confirmed, then, that the road was not
13 safe, that you couldn't drive down that road safely; correct?
14 A. It was unsafe throughout the war.
15 Q. It's a fact that the MUP, in July or August, lost two of its
16 members on that road, Trobok and Spajic; correct?
17 A. Yes. They were telecom experts. They were members of the state
18 security, but they were helping out the public security. They wanted to
19 keep communications lines running but they both got killed. One them of
20 had a doctoral degree. He was a professor. I believe he even spent some
21 time in America and got his doctorate there.
22 Q. In the summer of 1992, in July or August, they were ambushed and
23 got killed; right?
24 A. Their vehicle was hit from a hand-held rocket-launcher and they
25 burnt in their car on that road.
1 Q. It was because of such ambushes traffic on that road was
2 organised in convoys, at the head of which there was an armed military
3 vehicle, and that's how people drove down that road?
4 A. Yes, that's correct. But that wasn't safe either.
5 Q. You remember that the name of Dusko Malovic was mentioned in your
6 evidence on Friday. You confirmed that that unit from Sokolac was on the
7 front line in Grbavica in Sarajevo.
8 A. Yes. And they were holding the line by the school, which isn't
9 even a hundred metres away from the building we were in. That was the
10 part of the line that they held. And occasionally they would take part
11 in combat operations, when there was more intensive fighting. Of course,
12 you don't stay at the line all the time. You're -- you're relieved from
13 time to time.
14 I mentioned an incident in Dobrinja by some garages. One man was
15 killed, and one was wounded. And upon returning to the school, they
16 talked about it.
17 Q. Do you know that they were ordered by the minister on
18 15 June 1992 - that unit, namely - to mobilize recruits in the
19 municipality of Novo Sarajevo?
20 A. I don't know about that.
21 Q. I'll show you document P1422.
22 You see that the order is signed -- well, the signature looks
23 like that of Cedo Kljajic to me, but maybe you can say who it is. It
24 says: "For the minister."
25 A. I can't make it out. The first letter is K, but I can't see the
2 Q. Very well. Here the unit is ordered to act upon the decision of
3 the Presidency on general and public mobilization of 20 May 1992. And on
4 the 15th of June, they are ordered to mobilize conscripts in the
5 municipality of Novo Sarajevo.
6 A. That's what it says here, and it also says that the mobilization
7 shall start on 16 June.
8 Q. While you were at Vrace, you saw that unit daily -- or, rather,
9 they were in front of the school at Vrace; that's where they held the
11 A. Yes. We would mostly meet them in the cafeteria during our
13 Q. You know that until June they had their positions there, since
14 that member of theirs got killed in Dobrinja in June; do you remember?
15 A. Yes, I remember. You know how it is when you lose a comrade. It
16 gets very emotional. It may have been in July even. But it's well known
17 when there was fighting. He was hit by sniper by the garages. It may
18 have been around the 25th of June.
19 Q. You remembered the incident involving Ivan Curak, a Croat, a --
20 who was a citizen of Sarajevo. He had a sniper rifle. And you saw
21 Dusko Malovic beating or mistreating him. Do you remember?
22 A. Yes. He hit him, and that's what I said. It was near the gate
23 at -- in the duty officers' room. So it can easily be observed when you
24 walk past.
25 Q. This may jog your memory, if I told you that on that day one
1 police officer guarding the school at Vrace was killed by sniper, and the
2 assumption was that the shot had come from the building where this Curak
3 lived and that's why the unit went there and took in a person who had a
4 rifle with a sniper sight.
5 Do you -- wouldn't you then remember the context of the event?
6 A. The search was, indeed, carried out, because a person got killed.
7 I believe the neighbourhood was called Shopping, and they were high-rise
8 residential buildings. And it's on Leninova Street. One man was
9 injured. His name was Ned; I don't remember his last name. Another was
10 killed. They were by the gate at the entrance. And a sniping rifle and
11 a Colt were found during the search. But as I knew the person, I said
12 that it was impossible that he could have done so. The reason was that
13 they thought this man was the perpetrator because he had such a rifle.
14 Q. Well, that is a founded suspicion, isn't it, two persons were hit
15 by a sniper and that man was in possession of a sniping rifle?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. I only have two more questions, sir, and I believe then we can
19 Irrespective of the -- the clash that you were involved in in
20 1992 and your resignation from your position, when Mico Stanisic returned
21 to be minister again in 1994 - for a very brief period though - he
22 invited you to return to public security. He explicitly asked you to
23 finish the work that you started in 1992 about all crimes.
24 A. Yes. But if I may explain.
25 I was informed that he was looking for me, and I believe that we
1 again met at the Bistrica hotel. What a coincidence. At the time, I was
2 very unaware of some other things that had happened. It was a "import of
3 oil." Some 5 or 6 million German marks were transferred to Bulgaria for
4 the importation of oil, I believe. That was what happened. But neither
5 the oil nor the money ever arrived. And then there was aluminum from
6 Nevesinje; the sum involved was some 14 million, I believe.
7 So the question was: Are you willing to continue where you left
8 off, because the conditions are much more favourable now. You can do it.
9 But then he told me about these other things. As you know, I refused,
10 and I never again got the idea to go back. And I know that these were
11 high-scale cases and difficult to deal with even in a well-organised and
12 functioning state.
13 I mentioned that there was an attempt to establish an
14 administration to combat the undermining of the economic foundation of
15 the state, and it was owing to me that it was not established. So he
16 told me that I would be free in my selection of personnel, and I had
17 carte blanche; but it was my conviction that there would be no changes,
18 and I told him my opinion frankly.
19 Q. If I understood correctly, apart from these large-scale
20 embezzlement and other cases, he told you that you could finish doing
21 what you started in 1992 concerning all crimes, but it wasn't recorded.
22 A. Yes, correct. We spoke very long. I believe that it was past
23 midnight when we finished. We discussed many things.
24 Q. I put it to you, sir, that in 1994, during his second term in
25 office, Mr. Stanisic was provided security by the unit of Dusko Malovic.
1 A. Is that a question to me?
2 Well, probably, but I'm not sure. I saw, then, that they
3 escorted him in a combat lineup. When we went to that collegium in
4 Belgrade; that's when it happened. Then there was a misunderstanding,
5 because some people may have -- may have thought that I was lying.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Planojevic. I have no more questions.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I have no further questions for this witness.
8 Thank you.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
10 Mr. Krgovic, do you stand by your position that you decline to
12 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
14 Mr. Hannis, it's a few minutes before the break, so we would take
15 the break at this point and you would re-examine when we return.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. That would be convenient for me. I
17 appreciate it.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I'm sorry, with your permission - I
22 spoke to my friend, Mr. Hannis. I noticed that a part of yesterday's
23 transcript which I recall witness gave the answer was not recorded. And
24 I spoke to Mr. Hannis, if he would be so kind to let me clarify this with
25 the witness before he starts his re-direct.
1 JUDGE HALL: Certainly, Mr. Zecevic.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: And I will, if you allow, have a -- first a
4 follow-up question on something you mentioned just before the break.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, just before the break, Mr. Zecevic
7 asked you this:
8 "If I understood correctly, apart from these large-scale
9 embezzlement and case he told you could" - and "he" is
10 Mr. Stanisic - "told you that you could finish doing what you started in
11 1992 concerning all crimes ..."
12 And you answered: "Yes, correct."
13 Do I understand correctly that Mr. Stanisic told you that you
14 could do your work on all crimes except on these large-scale, that they
15 were excluded from your work, if you would have accepted?
16 Is that how I should understand your answer?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It referred to everything that
18 was happening then.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: So even those special cases?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. He especially stressed these.
21 I didn't even know about that. And he informed me what had happened in
22 the meantime, these large-scale cases. I didn't even know about them.
23 And he explained to me how it all happened.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Planojevic, yesterday's transcript, on page 6, doesn't show
2 part of your answer. I would like you to repeat your answer.
3 You remember that Mr. Hannis asked you about the meeting you
4 attended in February 2009, I believe, in Nedzarici in Sarajevo, the
5 meetings with the representatives of the OTP; remember?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You then informed the OTP that in the meantime you had had a
8 contact a few months earlier with Mr. Stanisic. And Mr. Stanisic then
9 told you that he is familiar with the contents of your statement given to
10 the OTP in 2004. You remember saying that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You then said that Mr. Stanisic, at that meeting, asked you if
13 you were willing to be a Defence witness regarding the events -- the
14 events in Sarajevo before the war; do you remember?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And it is correct that Mr. Stanisic asked you that in
17 December 2008?
18 A. I think it was earlier than that, but I'm not sure. Let me try
19 and focus. But it doesn't matter. But he asked me, if necessary was I
20 willing, especially with regard to this aspect, because I was involved in
21 many events; and I said, If necessary, no problem.
22 Q. Thank you very much. That's all.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Re-examination by Mr. Hannis:
2 Q. Good afternoon -- good morning, Mr. Planojevic. I'd like to --
3 A. Good morning.
4 Q. -- start off first with questions you were asked today. And I
5 want to begin with just a follow-up on what Judge Delvoie asked you when
6 we came back in.
7 If I understand correctly, Mr. Stanisic was offering you a job
8 and giving you carte blanche to investigate all crimes, it sounds like;
10 A. You are fully correct.
11 Q. Okay. Can you tell us why you declined? Because it sounds like
12 a great job.
13 And if there's something about the answer that causes you
14 concerns, we could ask the Judges to go in private session if you're
15 concerned about mentioning a name or something. But, otherwise, if you
16 feel free to speak about it in open session, please tell us.
17 A. Because of my previous experience with the media, I will try to
18 steer clear of mentioning any names. But I'll try to explain why I
19 declined the offer.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Planojevic, we would rather not concern
21 ourselves with what the media might think or might not think. It's more
22 important that you tell the full truth. So if you feel more comfortable
23 by going into private session to give this reply to the Prosecution's
24 question, I suggest we do so.
25 MR. HANNIS:
1 Q. And so you understand, in private session that won't be broadcast
2 and picked up by the media.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 A. I think even without me mentioning any specific names my
5 clarification will suffice for you to understand.
6 I'd rather not put my faith in the hands of a private session
7 either. Or perhaps if I received some assurance that what I say here
8 will not leave this room.
9 But, in any case, once I explain, I believe you will realize that
10 there's no need for me to mention names.
11 May I go on?
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes, please.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The operational staff was decimated
14 at the time. Such personnel was always in small numbers, but when the
15 body of such personnel split between the three ethnicities, you simply
16 found yourself in a situation where you had a serious shortage of men.
17 Secondly, as I said, almost half of all men left abroad within a
19 Thirdly, a lot of those working in the crime department had
20 already left for the uniformed police because they realized that it was
21 far easier to act as a chief in the border police than stay in the crime
23 There was another thing, which was the war. Small, ordinary men
24 could not influence great changes. Those who had material, economic
25 influence were involved. I even know the name of the people who took the
1 money for Bulgaria. I think there was a certain lady, Detricka [phoen],
2 on their side, and I won't mention any names on our side. But when you
3 come across such a situation even in a most organised state, it's
4 difficult to deal with it. And we didn't even have the most primitive
5 technical equipment we could employ.
6 Then there was the war, which didn't last a couple of months, but
7 a few years by that point in time. I realized that there were new people
8 coming on board who were better placed to assist. For example, Pale is a
9 small location with perhaps a population of 10.000. After the war, I
10 think it had about ten or a dozen murders out of only two -- of which
11 only two were actually -- had their perpetrators prosecuted, irrespective
12 of the ethnicity of the victims. So I realized on time what was looming
13 ahead. I was simply brought up and educated in a different fashion, and
14 I received professional training.
15 When we say "social self-protection," it's an old concept as part
16 of which the citizens were willing to report things to the policemen. If
17 you recall the murder and attempted murder of the Turkish ambassador, it
18 were the citizens who were chasing the perpetrators. They didn't mind
19 that the person was armed; whereas today you can't even get a piece of
20 information out of anyone.
21 Between 1994 and now, it's only been 16 years, but people no
22 longer have any trust in the police. And it was for those reasons, being
23 aware of what time was to come, that I deadlined. After the war, I
24 received a number of similar offers from ministers and deputy ministers.
25 I always deadlined because with my mental framework I always believed
1 there was far more to lose for me than to gain.
2 I hope this explains my position a bit.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: I have a couple of interventions in the transcript,
4 just for the clarity. I mean, if you want me ...
5 32, 1, the witness -- it's recorded: "Small, ordinary men could
6 not influence great changes." I believe the -- the witness said the
7 small ordinary man were not capable of conducting such crimes. That was
8 my understanding. Maybe can you clarify that with the witness.
9 32, 7 --
10 MR. HANNIS: [Overlapping speakers] [Microphone not activated] ...
11 I see he's nodding his --
12 JUDGE HALL: [Overlapping speakers] ... could we deal with them
13 one at a time, Mr. Zecevic.
14 MR. HANNIS: [Overlapping speakers] ... I see he's nodding his
15 head in affirmative. So I'll take that as a yes from the witness, that
16 what you've said is correct.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may -- may I deal with -- with -- with the
18 witness on this? Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
19 [Interpretation] Sir, a few corrections for the transcript.
20 At page 32, line 1, you said small ordinary people were not the
21 ones who commit those crimes. Is that what you meant?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because they couldn't even
23 find themselves in a position to do that. Only those who were
24 financially powerful could.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just go slowly so that the
1 interpreters could catch up.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you want me to repeat?
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] No, this is fine.
4 Page 32, line 7.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: No, please. Go on. My question to the witness
6 would be: What crimes are we really talking about here? But that's
7 another -- that's -- that's a different issue as the one you're raising.
8 So please proceed. And I apologise for intervening.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I can deal with that also, Your Honours, if
10 you want me to do. But I would like first to clarify the transcript, if
12 [Interpretation] Page 32, line 7. You said -- well, what's
13 recorded is -- just a moment. I think you said that such investigations
14 of such serious crimes would last a few months or years. Is that what
15 you meant?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's not what I wanted to
17 say. Not only a few months but a few years, meaning that it couldn't be
18 concluded within months, a few months. That's what I meant.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, there seems to be something
20 on the record about the war, whereas I don't think you said that.
21 When you discussed Pale, you said after the war -- first you
22 discussed the population of 10.000, and then you said that after the war
23 there were ten to 12 murders. After the war - you probably meant after
24 1995; correct?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] And then you said that that was not
2 a matter of ethnicity, because all victims were Serbs; correct?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And, still, nothing was done
4 on resolving those crimes -- or, rather, something was done, but it
5 wasn't followed through.
6 Sorry. There was the chief and deputy chief of the centre
7 involved, the most responsible persons in question dealing with that;
8 whereas, the chief was actually liquidated in Sarajevo in 1999, I think.
9 And before that, the deputy chief of the centre was also killed.
10 So no matter what the effort that you invest, even to date it
11 didn't develop. It didn't go anywhere. And that is, I think, why I
12 didn't want to discuss it openly. It was my assessment that, actually,
13 things would develop the way they did.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Again, you're speeding up, because
15 there's another clarification. Line 35 -- line 6, page 35: You said
16 that is why I declined, meaning the offer made to you in 1994 as well as
17 a number of other offers you received from ministers or deputy ministers.
18 Is that correct? That's what you had in mind?
19 A. Precisely.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... thank you,
21 Your Honours. I clarified this part of the transcript.
22 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
23 MR. HANNIS:
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Planojevic, for your explanation. And if you have
25 any long answers to any of my coming questions, when you give those long
1 answers please try to remember to speak slowly. Thank you.
2 First thing today at page 3, Mr. Zecevic was asking about
3 Dragan Andan. And your answer was recorded as:
4 "Dragan stayed in Sarajevo for a while and then he was banned
5 from entering the republican SUP building ..."
6 Can you tell me when that was? What year, what time-period?
7 A. 1992. I returned from Belgrade on the 27th of May, I believe. I
8 found Dragan at the headquarters in Vrace. He told me -- I don't know
9 whether Jusuf Pusina was the minister at the time, but apparently he
10 prohibited him from the entering -- from entering the building of the
11 republican ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then he came to Vrace.
12 Q. Okay. So this was the -- not the Serb MUP; this was the
13 Bosnian MUP building?
14 A. You're correct.
15 Q. And Mr. Andan had not joined the Serbian MUP before the
16 27th of May; is that what you're saying?
17 A. When I returned, he was already there. But I think he came out
18 on the 9th of May, or left, because on that day about a dozen people from
19 the federal ministry in Sarajevo arrived in Vrace, five or six of which
20 were from the crime department.
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. I understand.
22 Next, at page 4 and going on to page 5, you were asked about your
23 5 June dispatch that you sent out to all the CSBs - that's P568 and
24 1D84 - about start fighting crime now and send in your dispatches and
25 make Official Notes.
1 The Official Notes that you mention in there being written to
2 record information about crimes, if -- if nothing more could be done
3 because of the circumstances, where would or should such Official Notes
4 have been sent? Would those go to your administration or somewhere else?
5 A. Such notes are not sent anywhere. They are part and parcel of
6 case files, of particular case files, so as to enable anyone to have a
7 full insight into the case at any point in time.
8 Perhaps another explanation.
9 Information need not only be recorded by way of notes. For the
10 most part, verbal statements can be put into notes. But this also
11 includes other evidence. I did mention notes specifically because most
12 of it could be obtained by speaking with people.
13 Q. What I'm trying to get at is to find out whether you, in your
14 administration, would have received any of that kind of information about
15 war crimes committed by Serbs against non-Serbs.
16 Would you have received any Official Notes or reports in your
17 administration; or was that information that would have remained at the
18 CSB or the SJB, where the investigation was done?
19 A. Under normal circumstances, daily bulletins would be used in
20 order to inform those higher up. There was no need, save for
21 exceptionally difficult situations, to communicate directly, because then
22 only that would be done, given the small number of personnel.
23 If more difficult cases are concerned, then assistance was
24 needed. I explained the role of the administration. One of the tasks
25 was also to professionally assist through direct contact with the
2 Q. Thank you. At page 10, Mr. Zecevic was asking you about the
3 document that is the record of the 11 July meeting in Belgrade.
4 Do you recall that?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And he said that in your interview in 2004 you had pointed out
7 that that document doesn't have all your words that you said at the
8 meeting about emphasizing documenting war crimes as a priority.
9 Do you recall that?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. Did you -- did you see that document in 1992, the record of the
12 meeting? I assumed that you did not.
13 A. No, I didn't.
14 Q. Do you know why your words "emphasizing reporting war crimes"
15 were left out?
16 A. If one looks at that document - we can put it up on the screen,
17 if you so wish - one can see that it says "summary" of the meeting,
18 meaning that it summarized the comments made. So that part didn't find
19 its way in.
20 I saw the document for the first time in 2004.
21 Q. Thank you. At page 18 today, you were asked some questions about
22 whether you were aware of certain MUP officials being removed, SJB
23 chiefs. And, in particular, at this page you were asked about
24 Predrag Jesoric being removed at the Bijeljina CSB.
25 My question is: Did -- do you know what position he went to after
1 he was head of CSB in 1992? Did you know he was head of the department
2 for foreigners, travel documents, and border crossing?
3 A. I could see that for myself in 1994 or 1995, because I had to get
4 in touch with Jesoric for some reason. Perhaps in a conversation then he
5 told me how it came about, but I can't recall any details.
6 I know that he worked on those jobs, but I don't know whether it
7 was 1994 or 1995 when we got in touch.
8 Q. Well, I could pull that up, but I think you'll see in the
9 July 11th meeting, 1992, he's referred to by that position at that time.
10 Would you disagree?
11 A. I can't say anything. I know he was removed, although I don't
12 know when. I also know that Pantic was at the meeting, although I don't
13 know in what capacity.
14 Q. Would you have an opinion as to whether a move from the CSB chief
15 position in Bijeljina to being head of this department would be
16 considered a lateral move, a promotion, a demotion? Do you have an
18 A. I'm not even certain whether that department existed at the time.
19 In any case, the level of department within an administration is
20 significantly lower than the level of a CSB chief.
21 If we were to put it in terms of hierarchy, perhaps the head of
22 centre and the head of administration would be at an approximately same
23 level. Or maybe the administration chief would be a bit higher up, but
24 only within his specific remit.
25 Q. You were asked about the SJB chief in Teslic being removed. Do
1 you know who that person was by name that you were talking about?
2 A. I don't know his name. I think I mentioned that in the context
3 of the Green Berets, and then I said that Zivkovic told me about certain
4 problems he and the chief of the centre had. It could be around the time
5 or in the context of the removal of the station chief. I know there were
6 some removals there.
7 Q. You said you mentioned that in the context of Green Berets. Was
8 that Green Berets or Red Berets?
9 A. Red Berets.
10 Q. Thank you. If I mention the name Kezunovic. Does that name ring
11 a bell as the chief of Teslic who was removed?
12 A. I know of Dragan Kezunovic, but that's not the person.
13 Q. Are you aware that the chief that was removed was later
14 reinstated in 1992, in Teslic?
15 A. I wasn't aware of that. But I do know that in Teslic, because of
16 the significant problems there, perhaps in 1993, a governmental
17 commission was established, and I was a member of it. It all had to do
18 with illegal trafficking on large scale, and there were clashes between
19 the then-Municipal Assembly speaker and the chief of the station.
20 After those meetings took place, I think there were certain
21 changes, in terms of personnel, but I don't recall any specific names.
22 Q. You were asked about the presence of members of Dusko Malovic's
23 unit at Vrace on -- on the front line when you were there in Vrace.
24 My question is: Do you know how many members of the unit were
25 engaged in that activity at that time?
1 A. While they were in Vrace, the whole unit was engaged in combat.
2 I told you already that some individuals from that list, as far as I
3 know, were never officially ... specifically, I have Bartola in mind, and
4 I don't know whether there was anyone else.
5 Officially, they were on the list. I know Bartola from Sarajevo.
6 I think he used to box. But I never saw him in that unit. That is why
7 it's difficult to mention any figures, but it's probably around 20.
8 Q. Okay. You saw 20 different members of that unit present in Vrace
9 at the time?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. But not Bartola?
12 A. I know the man, but I never saw him up there. However, he seemed
13 to be on the list of the unit.
14 Q. Thank you. You mentioned -- oh, you were -- I'll go back now to
15 questions from yesterday, and this is at page 16 from yesterday's
17 Mr. Zecevic was asking you about the meeting with representatives
18 of my office, the OTP, in May of this year, with an investigator named
19 Paul Grady, with Belinda Pidwell and an investigator, and how you had
20 been given your transcript only at 8.00 the night before.
21 It's my understanding, though, that the next morning you did
22 report that you had read your transcript and made some corrections. Is
23 that right?
24 A. It is correct that I said to them that I was able to read it
25 through very fast, and I made notes of some things.
1 Q. You were asked, then, at page 18, about whether somebody had sent
2 you a message concerning that meeting, somebody had sent you a message to
3 the effect that you had to be cooperative or else you would be fired.
4 Do you remember Mr. Zecevic asking about that?
5 A. But it's not connected to that. That has to do with the
6 interview in 2004, as far as I remember. But nobody sent me any messages
8 Q. You're correct. It was concerning the interview in 2004 when you
9 were going to be interviewed as a suspect. And you told him it wasn't
10 anybody from the OTP who gave you that message, but it was -- at page 19,
11 line 4, your answer was:
12 "This was given to me indirectly, and it could have been conveyed
13 by the lawyer Trivun."
14 Is that Trivun Jovicic?
15 A. I thought he was lawyer, an attorney.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Trivun Jovicic is a lawyer.
17 He's a Liaison Officer for Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal. Is that
18 the person you're talking about who gave you that message?
19 A. I said that I received it indirectly; that is, the document went
20 from the Government Secretariat for Cooperation with the ICTY, through
21 the chiefs of services, and they forwarded it to me.
22 Q. But where does Mr. Jovicic come in? You mentioned him
23 specifically. Did he speak to you?
24 A. Jovicic only briefly spoke to me earlier, before the interview I
25 gave the OTP.
1 Q. And -- and did he indicate to you that you might be fired if you
2 didn't cooperate with The Hague?
3 A. No, I didn't say that. I thought that maybe he had spoken to
4 people from the government. But I don't know where that message
5 originated from.
6 Q. Well, as I understood your answer yesterday, you had that
7 impression; that's part of the reason you were worried, because you had
8 the impression that you might be fired if you were seen to be
10 And my question now is: From whom did you get that impression?
11 And if you feel like this is something we should go into private
12 session for, we can.
13 A. I have very bad experience from the previous period, maybe from
14 2001, because of "non-cooperation" with the international factor, and
15 that referred directly to me when I was appointed director of the
16 service. Then there were interventions to nullify the appointment. The
17 prime minister could do so. And I got the message perfectly then. And
18 then I resigned after 45 days in office. That's -- that -- that
19 suffices, I believe.
20 Q. I'm sorry, I have to -- I have to press on this. You still
21 haven't answered my question.
22 When you were talking about this with Mr. Zecevic yesterday, he
23 asked you:
24 "So this warning, if I may call it that, was conveyed to you by
25 another person" - other than someone from the OTP - "right?"
1 And your answer was: "Yes."
2 My question is: Who was that person?
3 A. A man from the service. But I'll keep the name to myself. From
4 my own service, the State Security Service.
5 Q. Thank you. You were asked at page 21 and 22 about what happened
6 to you in 1991 when you were removed from your position and -- and put in
7 the position as commander in Marin Dvor, and Mr. Zecevic asked you if you
8 were -- if it was true that you weren't the only professional police
9 officer who had that kind of experience after the national parties came
10 to power. And you said there were many like you that had that happen to
12 My question is: Isn't it true that happened to professional
13 policemen of -- of all three ethnicities, Serb, Croats, and Muslims?
14 Professional policemen lost their jobs because political appointees were
15 put in their place.
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. And then Mr. Zecevic discussed with you the problems that you saw
18 in your area in 1991 with distribution of weapons to these additional
19 reserve police of Muslim ethnicity and the related problem of
20 non-qualified persons being put in jobs like chief of the SJB, et cetera.
21 And he, at page 28, said:
22 "And this was particularly widespread among the Muslim
23 community ..."
24 And my question is: Are you saying it was a bigger problem in
25 the Muslim community than the other two communities? Didn't they all
1 have the same problems?
2 A. What you say may be right, but this concerned me personally, and
3 what I was able to observed -- observe - and I not only observed it, but
4 I only -- also made notes and documented it - I took lists from drawers
5 and had a look at the names on those lists. And that's why I stand by my
6 statement as correct.
7 Q. But you don't disagree that in other parts of Bosnia and some
8 places, Croatians had the problem that Muslims and/or Serbs were getting
9 weapons and higher number of reserve police and having appointees placed
10 in jobs that had previously been held by people of their ethnicity?
11 A. That is probably right. But the individual peoples were in
12 different positions. It was said that the military was Serb, although it
13 wasn't, so that there was no need for additional ... if the army had
14 remained Yugoslav, there would have been no need for any changes. But
15 you know what happened to the army at a certain point in time; it started
16 breaking up along ethnic lines. And then we know what followed.
17 Q. I understand. The situation I'm talking about now, though, was
18 widespread and well-known, and that was part of the reason the federal
19 inspectors, Mico Davidovic and I can't remember the name of the other
20 man, came to Bosnia to investigate the situation; right?
21 A. I didn't understand that their arrival -- or I didn't understand
22 that the reason for their arrival was to conduct an investigation. As
23 far as I know, there was agreement between Minister Delimustafic and the
24 federal minister to have them come and act as a calming factor. They
25 weren't all Serbs. There were also Bosniaks among them, such as
1 Sead Rekic; the man had come from the federal SUP. Because the federal
2 SUP was manned from all republics, and they had their term in office for
3 a while. So they were supposed to -- to assess the situation and come up
4 with solutions to resolve it.
5 Q. I understand. But I understood that to address the situation
6 they had to first find out what it was and that involved doing some
7 investigation about the situation where a local politically-appointed SJB
8 chief in many places was expanding the reserve police force by adding on
9 dozens or hundreds of people of his own ethnicity, whether they were
10 qualified or not, whether they were criminals or not, and giving them
11 weapons. And that was part of what this federal inspection team was
12 trying to find out about; right?
13 A. Yes, among other things.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 At page 41, Mr. Zecevic was asking you about your -- your
16 whereabouts in 1992 from the time that you joined the RS MUP. And could
17 you clarify for me again when you first joined the RS MUP. I think you
18 went to Pale on the 13th or 14th of April and met with Cedo Kljajic; is
19 that correct?
20 A. That is correct. It was certainly like that. I explained. I
21 had some private business of my own at Pionirska Dolina, and I did some
22 things on the way and returned from Pionirska. But I came to Vrace in my
23 capacity of assistant on the 20th. I was corrected yesterday by
24 Mr. Zecevic. And it was basically then that I assumed my post.
25 Q. And then from the 20th of April until early June you were in
1 Vrace, and then you went to Pale and Kalovita Brda?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. Where were you that week between the 13th and 20th of April, if
4 you recall?
5 A. I went back to my family, my parents, because my wife and our
6 child had returned. They were staying at a village some 60 kilometres
7 from Pale.
8 MR. HANNIS: If we could show the witness 1D46.
9 Q. Coming up on your screen in a minute is a document you were shown
10 yesterday by Mr. Zecevic. It's the 15 May 1992 order regarding forming
11 war units in the MUP.
12 And I wanted to confirm that you did not see or receive a copy of
13 this in 1992; is that correct?
14 A. I said that I think I didn't read it, and I think that
15 Cedo Kljajic informed me of it. I may have read it subsequently, but I
16 don't remember.
17 I know, however, that Cedo told me that I was on some sort of war
19 Q. And we have seen in document P160 that the record of the
20 11 July meeting in Belgrade, that the minister made a specific reference
21 to this order by date and number.
22 Do you remember him talking about it at the 11 July meeting in
24 A. I don't. It was long ago. I don't really remember.
25 MR. HANNIS: Just for reference, that's at page 15 of the English
1 and the B/C/S of that exhibit.
2 Q. You were asked by Mr. Zecevic at page 47, line 20 -- he said:
3 "Tell me, Mr. Planojevic, the role of the ministry and the
4 ministry administrations is first and foremost of instructive nature;
6 And your answer was:
7 "Yes. They instruct and coordinate. That is their role."
8 I'd like to have you take a look at something in Exhibit P530.
9 We'll put that up on the screen. I'll tell you this is the
10 Law on Internal Affairs for -- for the RS.
11 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to page 6 of the English and
12 page 4 of the B/C/S.
13 Q. I'd like you to take a look at Article 33. And my English
14 translation reads:
15 "The seat of the ministry shall" -- the first item is: "Directly
16 execute activities pertaining to national security."
17 And the second one says:
18 "Monitor, direct, and coordinate the work of the centre of public
19 security services and public security services."
20 So, in addition to instructing and coordinating, the ministry is
21 to monitor and direct the work of the CSBs and the SJBs; correct? It's
22 not just instruct.
23 A. Well ... you expect an answer from me?
24 Q. I'd like one, if I could, please.
25 A. Well, that's what it says. I don't think that's in dispute.
1 Q. All right. Well, I'll ask a kind of question that Judge Harhoff
2 often asks. I know that's what it says, and we take that to mean that's
3 the way it was supposed to work. Is that how it actually worked in real
5 A. If we go back to the explanations of the conditions or
6 circumstances - I don't think I need to repeat them - and what the
7 conditions dictated, I think that what was done was the utmost possible,
8 in terms of coordination and monitoring.
9 But it -- please do not forget how we lived at those times and
10 what was going on.
11 Q. Thank you. While I have the Law on Internal Affairs up, I'll ask
12 you this question. At page 50, line 14, you were asked about the
13 incident when you and Cedo Kljajic asked the minister to have
14 Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic removed. Do you recall that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you agreed with Mr. Zecevic's proposal that there was a
17 procedure for appointing the minister and deputy minister, and that was
18 something that was a decision at higher level.
19 I've looked at this Law on Internal Affairs. I see no reference
20 to the position of a deputy minister or the appointment or removal of
21 such a person. Can you tell me where in the law that is, or was, in
22 1992? Is it in some other law; or do you know?
23 A. I know that the selection procedure for any minister, not only
24 the minister of the interior, is the same, as well as that for selecting
25 the deputy.
1 There was something about that in the law, and I was also in a
2 municipal administration body, which is basically a municipal level
3 government, so I knew the provisions of the Law on Public Administration.
4 I believe that you can find the relevant provisions in that law.
5 Q. So can --
6 A. Actually, at the time, I think the Law on Associated Labour was
7 still in force. I'm not sure what exactly the law was called. But there
8 was a law that regulated the relations and public administration.
9 Q. So at the time that you made this suggestion, what was your
10 personal understanding about who had the authority to remove the deputy
11 minister, Mr. Mandic? Who did you think could do that?
12 A. As far as I know, in every country, the prime minister is
13 appointed by the -- did parliament, and parliament later on also confirms
14 the cabinet. Here, I believe that it was upon the proposal of the prime
15 minister. It was possible to remove him, given the wartime conditions.
16 But I think that it must have been the prime minister to do that.
17 Because if the -- if parliament cannot meet, cannot convene, then until
18 the first session of parliament, the prime minister has the relevant
19 powers. So --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his last
22 MR. HANNIS: The interpreters are asking if you could please
23 repeat the last sentence. The last thing we have is that "until the
24 first session of parliament the prime minister has the relevant powers."
25 And then you started another sentence, and they didn't catch that.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The state president has the powers
2 of parliament, if parliament cannot convene, cannot meet. And I said
3 that Momo Mandic couldn't be removed without the prime minister.
4 MR. HANNIS:
5 Q. And as I understood your testimony, you knew and were friendly
6 with the prime minister, Mr. Djeric. Did you ask him if he could do
7 something about Momo Mandic?
8 A. I said that I took the opportunity when the minister was present
9 at Vrace, and I considered it logical, because this was about his deputy,
10 to request him to do that. At the time, I couldn't take forest-paths in
11 my car -- with my car. There was an opportunity, I took it, and that's
12 how it was.
13 Q. Okay. I take it -- you say you spoke to Minister Stanisic
14 because he was there at Vrace, but you didn't speak to Mr. Djeric because
15 you weren't able to drive to Pale and talk to him about Mr. Mandic; is
16 that what you're saying?
17 A. I saw no point in my going to see the prime minister because the
18 minister had promised that he would tackle the issue with the most
19 responsible people of the country.
20 And then I don't even know if Momcilo Mandic had a decision
21 appointing him to his position. Or if he only functioned by inertia.
22 Q. Okay. One thing I was confused about yesterday, your -- your
23 accidental meeting of Mr. Stanisic when he was walking with the
24 German Shepherd dog. Can you tell me where that took place and when that
25 took place? Because I'm not clear if it -- that happened in June near
1 Bistrica, or if it happened in October, or when you were in Rogatica.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Hannis, is this relevant and important?
3 MR. HANNIS: It is, Your Honour. It relates to who he saw when,
4 in terms of security personnel. That's the only reason I'm asking. And
5 I had understood him to say one thing before, and I just want to be sure
6 I have my dates and meetings correct.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The encounter most probably took
8 place in June, in front of the Bistrica hotel in October, in the forest
9 close to the village where Mr. Stanisic's parents lived ... that's what I
10 said yesterday.
11 MR. HANNIS:
12 Q. Okay. And in October, did you see any security personnel with
13 Mr. Stanisic? In the forest.
14 A. As I said, Jasarevic was there as a driver, and Abazovic.
15 Q. And you saw those two with him in front of the Bistrica hotel in
16 June as well?
17 A. He came out of the hotel alone then.
18 Q. Okay. Thank you.
19 At page 63 from yesterday's transcript, you were talking about
20 sending Mr. Borovcanin and Mr. Orasanin to Vogosca and Ilijas. And at
21 line 12, you said: Yes, they'd gone there -- you had a correction - you
23 "They were sent by Cedo."
24 And then you went on to say:
25 "Mico phoned [sic] me on the phone the following day. He asked
1 me about some instruction, what he should do."
2 Who is the Mico you're referring to there? I assume that's not
3 Mico Stanisic.
4 A. It's Milomir Orasanin.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 You were -- yesterday at page 67, you were shown the document of
7 the two inspectors about their attempts to investigate the situation at
8 Vogosca in connection with the stolen cars. And Mr. Zecevic asked you
9 about the opinion expressed at the meeting by the SJB chief,
10 Mr. Maksimovic. And you said there were many such examples of this kind
11 of behaviour at the local levels.
12 Can you give us a couple of other examples besides this one with
13 Mr. Maksimovic?
14 A. We touched upon Teslic a minute ago. Then we also discussed
15 Bijeljina and how many centre chiefs and station chiefs were removed in a
16 short period of time. There was something in Foca, I believe, as well,
17 because a commission was sent there.
18 Members of the police station had been beaten up and kicked out
19 of the premises. They forbade them to come back. It took a long time to
20 set up the police station, to have it functioning properly. And the
21 centre, too. I could go on.
22 In any case, the entire police station personnel was beaten up
23 and kicked out.
24 Q. By whom?
25 A. Some so-called intervention unit.
1 Q. Okay. I was looking for examples of where the SJB chiefs
2 exercised that kind of attitude toward the higher levels of the MUP. Do
3 you have any other examples of that, other than Mr. Maksimovic?
4 A. I just enumerated the stations at which the removals occurred for
5 that very reason, I believe. Of course, I'm no Einstein, to be able to
6 cram it all into such a small head of mine. I'm not trying to be
7 cynical. But even when I discuss things of yesterday, I start mixing
8 them up.
9 Q. That happens to me too.
10 You -- were you aware of a police chief in Bosanski Samac named
11 Stevo Todorovic?
12 A. We discussed that topic. I told you that I met the man during a
13 session of the RS Assembly, which I think took place in Jahorina in 1993.
14 I was able to link the events and developments with that man later on,
15 whom I had met.
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I have about 20 more minutes, so
17 perhaps this is a good time to break.
18 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.
22 JUDGE HALL: For the record, we reconvene for this final session
23 today under Rule 15 bis, Judge Delvoie being absent.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 MR. HANNIS:
1 Q. Witness, I'd like to begin by showing you an exhibit in evidence,
2 P406. And we've been talking about Stevo Todorovic.
3 What you'll see on the screen in a moment --
4 JUDGE HALL: That is a confidential document, I'm reminded,
5 Mr. Hannis.
6 MR. HANNIS: All right. Then, Your Honour, can we not broadcast
7 it but make it available for the witness. And thanks for reminding me.
8 Q. You'll see this is a report by a couple of inspectors. You'll
9 see their names in a minute on the last page.
10 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to the last page.
11 Q. This is report based on their work done in connection with the
12 Bosanski Samac Police Station. And I think you can see above their names
13 and signatures the recommendations or proposed measures. And the first
14 one is:
15 "We recommend the removal of the chief of the Samac SJB because
16 the Samac SJB has not functioned properly in any aspect of its work."
17 And I'll inform you that the chief they're talking about was
18 Stevo Todorovic.
19 Were you aware of this recommendation from these inspectors? Did
20 you ever hear about it?
21 A. I wasn't aware of this. I think I said yesterday, since I see
22 the first name here in the signature block, I don't think that person was
23 in service when I was in the administration at all; therefore, I presume
24 that this was drafted later on.
25 Q. Yes. I think this document is from -- from November of 1992,
1 after you were no longer in the administration.
2 How about the second inspector; did you know him? The second one
3 named there.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And did you know him to be a professional and good at his job?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. And as far as you know, Stevo Todorovic was never removed from
8 his position; correct?
9 A. I can't answer that. I only said that I saw him, I believe, in
10 January of 1993. There was snow on the ground; that's why I say January.
11 It was when the assembly met, and that's when I saw him at Jahorina.
12 Q. Okay. Let me show you another exhibit.
13 MR. HANNIS: P732.
14 Q. We've looked at this one before. It's a list of various MUP
15 personnel and units that were nominated for various awards. And you
16 remember we saw your name on this list as someone who was nominated for
17 an award for the medal for service to the country.
18 MR. HANNIS: If we could now look at page 12 in the English and
19 page 8 in the B/C/S.
20 Q. Do you see number 91 on the list is Stevo Todorovic, chief of the
21 Samac SJB. So not only was he not removed, he was given an award;
23 A. I can see that. Pardon me.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 Now, you mentioned earlier in your testimony that you had spoken
1 to Mico Stanisic about being able to request assistance from the special
2 unit if you needed it. And as I understood it, he -- he had approved
3 that; is that right?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. When you became aware of some of the circumstances in the
6 Vogosca SJB, as we saw mentioned in that report from the two inspectors
7 in mid-July, did you -- did you consider the possibility of asking the
8 special unit to arrest anyone in connection with that? For example,
9 Boro Radic. Was that something you considered?
10 A. It was not. And I need to explain why.
11 I said that as of the 11th of July I no longer had my position.
12 Q. Okay. Let me ask you about something that Mr. Zecevic raised at
13 page 73, line 15. Yesterday he was asking you if there was any kind of
14 attitude within the RS MUP, any attitude of discrimination versus
15 non-Serbs in the RS MUP while you were there.
16 And you said: "Absolutely not."
17 Can you tell me, do you know or do you remember how many
18 non-Serbs were employed by the RS in 1992?
19 A. That depends on the area in question. Perhaps you'd like me to
20 be more specific? As far as I recall --
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... do you have a total number?
22 A. I don't. Very few. But I wanted to clarify something.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. I don't recall anything about the area of Sarajevo, but I arrived
25 in Banja Luka in 1993, I believe.
1 Q. Well --
2 A. I don't recall what the name was, but there was a Bosniak who was
3 in the class junior to mine and I came across him in the centre there. I
4 didn't have access there, but I did run into him in down-town Banja Luka.
5 I think it's Nijaz Selimovic; I think he's the chief of the police
6 administration now. Where there was no serious combat, people stayed,
7 throughout the war. And it is a small number of people though.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. I only enumerated those I saw personally, and I cannot go beyond
11 MR. ZECEVIC: For the sake of transcript, I believe the witness
12 gave the name of this Bosniak that he met is in the centre of -- security
13 centre, CSB Banja Luka. And it said down-town Banja Luka.
14 And this other, Nijaz Selimovic is from Gradiska. That's what
15 the witness said.
16 So, can this be clarified, please.
17 MR. HANNIS:
18 Q. Do you agree with that, Mr. Planojevic?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 What was the highest position held by any non-Serb in the RS MUP
22 in 1992, to your knowledge?
23 A. I don't know of a single one in a senior position.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 Lastly, at page 75 yesterday, Mr. Zecevic was asking you about
1 the fact that there were numerous repeated instructions issued from the
2 ministry to the field, stressing the need to obey the law for -- and for
3 police to act in accordance with the laws and regulations. And his
4 question was:
5 "Isn't it true that due to the objective situation and the war,
6 the Ministry of Interior, to make sure that it's get through to the
7 lowest level - the SJBs - repeatedly sent out orders with basically the
8 same contents?"
9 Your answer was:
10 "Yes, that's -- that's true. But you had to be flexible. And
11 when I say 'flexible,' I mean that you had to balance things. Whether it
12 was justified to, say, sacrifice a village, or not insist on things, and
13 I've also explained the conditions which we worked."
14 My question, my first question, is: Is one of the ones that
15 these instructions were repeated frequently over time is because the
16 minister and the ministry had information that they weren't being
17 followed by some members of the MUP?
18 A. For objective reasons, which I won't repeat now, but as you could
19 see, yourself, if an entire police station personnel is kicked out of --
20 off the premises, what possibility do have you left? Would you engage
21 the whole special unit, which did happen in the case of Zvornik; would
22 you take the whole unit to deal with such a problem? And I told you what
23 the numerical strength and ratio was, especially in the area of Sarajevo.
24 Or would you rather choose to try to keep the strategic positions. If
25 you abandon a single position, you lose an entire area.
1 It was, among others, for that reason why it was repeated. When
2 we discussed things, then things come to mind. But I can't recall
3 everything, and I can't now recall off the cuff all sorts of situations
4 taking place. But it was mostly for those reasons that it was observed
5 that the situation was not improving, and then it was insisted again.
6 In Bijeljina, after I don't know how many removals of chiefs, in
7 late 1992, finally there was some sort of situation in which Bosniaks
8 could normally live in the town. But there were areas that were not
9 close to areas of combat.
10 Another problem was mass casualties. When I say "mass casualties," if
11 you lost, say, a dozen men from the unit, you simply could not reign in
12 all those relatives. They would not do it in full sight… retaliate. Or
13 whether they would kick somebody from the apartment or not. I heard
14 people speaking about Smoluca, a few thousand people being surrounded.
15 Who could prevent people in Bijeljina from kicking some Bosniaks out? The
16 only thing these people could do was fight each other. Say, a column of
17 5 or 6,000 people comes to Bijeljina, and there were such cases. I do not
18 deny that that is a war crime, when a person who is a member of… However,
19 try and put yourself in our shoes to try and tackle such a problem.
20 I cannot recall everything, as I said, and it very much depends
21 on what decision you will make at that moment, whether you shoot because
22 there were armed people. There was convoy leaving Gorazde and 50 people
23 are killed in ambush. You simply couldn't stop the hoards spraying
24 bullets over all buildings because they believed they were left to their
25 own devices, that they were betrayed. The opposite side, the enemy, no
1 longer matters. They simply turned their rage against anyone. Then I
2 tried to think what to say and then I might not say it. Maybe I'm not
3 saying everything I wanted to say even now.
4 Q. Related to what you're just saying --
5 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise, it's previous page, it's line 14:
6 "... 5- or 6.000 people moved somewhere in Bijeljina. And it is
7 a sort of war crime."
8 It is not what witness said with that regard, so could you clarify that with
9 witness. Because otherwise it's really unclear, this sentence. Thank you.
10 MR. HANNIS:
11 Q. Mr. Planojevic, you heard what Mr. Pantelic just said. Do you
12 want to help us with that?
13 A. I wanted to say that it too was a war crime. But those, the new
14 arrivals, were kicking out Bosniaks. There were such instances. So I
15 place both sides in that context which was not viable. If someone asked
16 me, Go ahead and deal with the situation, I'd run because I wouldn't be
17 able to deal with it. There were many killed. There were hundreds of
18 people who came into new areas with their children. We can, of course,
19 view things from our perspective here today. But at the time, it was
21 I have to go on. I'm sorry.
22 There was a clash between Bosniaks and Croats in Vares, and there
23 was 6- or 7.000 people leaving the area who came at the plateau at
24 Nisici. And then you find yourself in a position where your work-mate
25 comes to, say, Visegrad, but you advise him to go because I don't know
1 whether I can guarantee his safety overnight. Whether I decided
2 correctly ... then he came to Visegrad from Vares, someone gives me a
3 call asking me to guarantee their safety, then the police call him, he
4 says, As far as we are concerned, we'll do everything to protect you, but
5 we advise you to move on to Belgrade, and he did.
6 I'd lie if I were to say that we could -- that Croat. But we --
7 I believe that it was wiser to tell him to move on. You can judge me,
8 but I'm simply -- sometimes you deal with the situation because you
9 believe it to be the more favourable, and then we can discuss why this
10 Croat had no freedom in Vares, or in Visegrad.
11 I'm going back to some things that may be unrelated, but I'm
12 trying to picture the situation.
13 Q. I understand. I want to try and ask you two very specific
14 questions here, and then I'll be finished.
15 As part of the objective situation at the time - and I think that
16 includes everything you've just been telling us about the war, about the
17 combat, about the shortage of manpower on the Serb side - was part of the
18 objective situation that there was a more lenient attitude towards some
19 of these paramilitary groups because, to the extent that they were
20 willing and able to engage in combat, they were needed, and, therefore,
21 they might have been treated more leniently than they would have been in
23 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, if I might interpose that question. A more
24 lenient attitude on whose part?
25 MR. HANNIS:
1 Q. On the part of the authorities in terms of overlooking any crimes
2 they might have committed.
3 A. That's what I've been explaining all the time, when I said
5 I'll give you another example. What Grbavica meant, or Vrace, in
6 my statement that I gave in 2004, I said, roughly, that there was a
7 situation where I was assistant minister at headquarters, and a hundred
8 metre across the road that passes along the school compound there were
9 the lines of the enemy. But no -- not one man was wounded or killed in
10 our compound. And that's why people were weighing or were -- were trying
11 to make up their mind. Was it actually war or wasn't it? It was May and
12 there wasn't really any heavy fighting, only occasional shots.
13 People didn't want to leave their apartments. Few people in
14 Sarajevo wanted to leave everything they had acquired in their lives
15 behind, including the Serbs, until they went -- until they had gone
16 through their ordeal. And when you get hold of someone who can carry a
17 rifle, then you keep them. People are brought in from the surrounding
18 areas. And, I repeat, I was only a hundred metres away from the rifles
19 of the enemy. And in such a situation, who would dare go about and
20 arrest people? And you know what kind of people you get. Some are more
21 than ready to -- to kill you, to kill their commanders. I gave you an
22 example. So who would dare stand up to them?
23 So I -- I hope that this was at least an attempt to explain how
24 things were.
25 Q. I think you have explained it, and that leads to my last
1 question. And I think you've answered it, in part.
2 Did this situation in this circumstance where it sounds like
3 you're saying you needed all the able-bodied, armed men you had to fight,
4 did that lead, in part, to an attitude by many Serbs, including Serbs in
5 the police, of: Serbs shouldn't arrest Serbs, especially Serbs who
6 committed crimes against non-Serbs, because you needed Serbs to fight?
7 Would you agree that that was the attitude of many at that time?
8 A. If you go back to my dispatch - and I explained what it means
9 to -- to secure evidence - I was very much aware that much time would
10 elapse until we can -- although things have been documented, although you
11 have proved something, much time will elapse until we could start
13 And that's why, to come back to your question, were there such
14 individuals? Yes, of course, there were. And we know that any way.
15 What can I add to that?
16 But the majority, especially talking about professional police
17 officers, acted responsibly and did much more than is obvious. And when
18 you meet a Croat or Bosniak in Sarajevo nowadays, they are likely to
19 remember things.
20 So that's why I'm saying that much more was done than is obvious
21 at first glance. Because even today I walk the streets of that town
22 without any problems.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Planojevic. I don't have any more questions for
25 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Planojevic, we thank you for your assistance to
1 the Tribunal. Your testimony is now at an end, and you're released as a
3 We wish you a safe journey back to your home.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
5 [The witness withdrew]
6 JUDGE HALL: I believe, according to the schedule I've seen,
7 we're all mornings next week in Courtroom III.
8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 And I was going to indicate I have no more witnesses to call
10 today, so I'd ask that we stop for the week.
11 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you.
12 So we adjourn to Monday morning. I wish everyone a safe weekend.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.58 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Monday, the 1st day
15 of November, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.