101112ED

Page 17367

1 before the scheduled time, if you indicate that to us, we will certainly

2 accommodate you.

3 I would -- we are beginning, as you appreciate, your testimony in

4 the third and final session for today and the court does not reconvene,

5 both for reasons there being a United Nations holiday and concern other

6 administrative reasons, until Wednesday morning, so your testimony when

7 we take the adjournment at 1.45 today, which is in a little over an hour,

8 will be continued at 9.00 on Wednesday morning.

9 I would begin by asking you to state your name, your date of

10 birth, and your occupation, sir.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my name is

12 Mevludin Sejmenovic. I was born on the 15th of October, 1962. I have a

13 degree in mining. I am a mining engineer.

14 JUDGE HALL: And what is your ethnicity?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My ethnicity is Bosniak.

16 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, sir. I would invite Mr. Olmsted, who

17 appears for the Prosecution, to begin his examination-in-chief.

18 MR. OLMSTED: And, Your Honours, just to clarify, is my

19 understanding there was going to be some oral rulings at the end of the

20 day today? When should I finish?

21 JUDGE HALL: Five minutes before the scheduled time of

22 adjournment. Thank you, Mr. Olmsted.

23 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Examination by Mr. Olmsted:

25 Q. Good afternoon, sir.

Page 17368

1 A. Good afternoon.

2 Q. I first want to briefly go over some of your background. Prior

3 to the armed conflict in 1992, had you spent most of your life living in

4 Prijedor municipality?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And in 1992, what village were you living in?

7 A. I lived in the village of Trnopolje.

8 Q. Prior to the multi-party elections in 1990, did you become

9 involved in the political process in Prijedor?

10 A. I became engaged in the preparations for the upcoming elections

11 and I was involved in the process of establishing parties and all that

12 led to democratic changes.

13 Q. And, in fact, were you one of the founding members of the

14 Party of Democratic Action, the SDA in Prijedor?

15 A. Yes, I was one of the founding members. Later on when the party

16 was indeed established, I was one of its officials.

17 Q. And during the -- or, as a result of the 1990 elections, did you

18 win a seat in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

19 A. Yes. Yes.

20 Q. Can you tell us which chamber you were elected to?

21 A. I was elected to the chamber of municipalities in the republican

22 parliament. I was the representative of Prijedor municipality.

23 Q. So in this particular chamber, you were the only representative

24 for all of Prijedor; is that correct?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

Page 17369

1 Q. And did you hold this position when the armed conflict began in

2 Prijedor in 1992?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. And as the deputy for the RBiH Assembly, did you regularly attend

5 Prijedor Municipal Assembly and government meetings?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. How did you divide your time between Sarajevo and Prijedor? Was

8 it half your time or what fraction?

9 A. At that time it was probably half-half, I would say.

10 Q. Prior to the 1990 elections, was there a level of co-operation

11 between the three national parties, the SDA, the SDS, and the HDZ?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you tell us what happened to this co-operation after the

14 elections?

15 A. We had agreed certain principles of co-operation, but those were

16 abandoned by the SDS.

17 Q. Was one of these areas where the SDS abandoned co-operation with

18 regard it to the allocation of government positions among the three

19 parties?

20 A. Are we talking about the republican level or the municipal level?

21 Q. Well, let's first just talk very briefly about the republican

22 level then I want to ask you about at the municipal level.

23 A. At the republican level, the SDS was unhappy with the

24 distribution of power. Primarily because they did not manage to

25 implement some of their requests through official structures, and as a

Page 17370

1 result of that, they walked out of the state parliament.

2 Q. Let's now talk about at the municipal level. What happened in

3 Prijedor with regard to this issue of distributing positions amongst the

4 three ethnicities?

5 A. The Serbian community, or rather, its representatives, without

6 any problems and within a very short period of time, adopted the

7 allocation of leading positions and functions in the municipality of

8 Prijedor. But they started blocking the distribution of power and

9 division of power at other levels. Sometime later, they established

10 their parallel bodies or shadow government, shadow assembly.

11 Q. And we'll talk about those parallel institutions in a minute, but

12 can you tell us what particular positions was the SDS particularly

13 concerned about and did not want to negotiate with the other parties

14 about?

15 A. The position that the SDS ultimately requested was the position

16 of the chief of police, or rather, the chief of the Ministry of the

17 Interior. Then the position of the director of the payment transaction

18 institute, the so-called SDK. And some other positions on top of those.

19 Q. Did the SDA leadership in Prijedor attempt to negotiate a

20 compromise to resolve this problem with the SDS?

21 A. Throughout all that period, the SDA leadership did offer

22 compromise and the offers that we had went even beyond the mere

23 compromise. The SDA offered the SDS a just redistribution of the

24 remaining positions of power in half-half ratio and that half-half ratio

25 could be done by anybody, either the SDA or the SDS. If it was the SDA

Page 17371

1 who was in charge of the distribution, it was given to the SDS to choose

2 the positions that they wanted. And vice-versa, if the SDS was in charge

3 of making the division, the SDA would be given an opportunity to choose

4 which positions they wanted.

5 Q. And what was the SDS leadership's response to these efforts by

6 the SDA to negotiate a compromise on this issue?

7 A. The SDS found all sorts of excuses not to accept the proposal.

8 However, their public messages and interpretations were quite the

9 contrary. At the moment when the half-half offer by the SDA was publicly

10 announced in the media on television shows, the SDS could no longer

11 justify their attempts to block the development, and that was one of the

12 reasons why the interim session of the Municipal Assembly was called and

13 that was supposed to be one of the items on the agenda.

14 Q. And was that meeting held, and if so, did it resolve this

15 problem?

16 A. The meeting was held. However, the meeting did not resolve

17 anything. The SDS arrived at the meeting with a demand for the

18 Municipal Assembly to be dissolved and that new elections be organised.

19 At that moment, the SDS had a very significant share of power, however,

20 they insisted on interim elections or by-elections and the dissolution of

21 the existing Municipal Assembly.

22 Q. Can you tell us approximately when this municipal meeting

23 occurred?

24 A. That could have been sometime, as far as I can remember, in

25 February 1992.

Page 17372

1 Q. Despite this issue, this problem with the SDS compromising on

2 these positions, was the Prijedor Municipal Assembly and the government

3 still able to function?

4 A. Yes. Everything functioned normally. The government was in

5 session every day and the Assembly met in regular intervals, as was

6 customary.

7 Q. You've already mentioned that at some point the SDS in Prijedor

8 established its own government institutions. Can you tell us, were you

9 aware that the SDS had created a Serbian Municipal Assembly for Prijedor

10 in the beginning of 1992?

11 A. At that point in time, we did not have any indications, no

12 unverified information about anything happening to that effect. However,

13 there was an ad hoc development. The Serbian representatives in the

14 Municipal Assembly organised a rally in the national theatre and

15 proclaimed the establishment of the Serbian Assembly. We learned about

16 that event from the media.

17 Thereafter, they continued to attend the meetings of the regular

18 Municipal Assembly.

19 Q. Were you aware that the SDS joined the Autonomous Region of

20 Krajina in early 1992, that the SDS created this Serb municipality in

21 Prijedor and then joined the ARK?

22 A. We didn't know that. We knew that that was happening in the

23 neighbouring municipalities, we knew that that had happened in

24 Banja Luka, Gradiska and Dubica, in other words in those municipalities

25 where those things could be voted in favour of by municipal councils and

Page 17373

1 where those things could be decided by political means. In Prijedor, no

2 such thing was possible and it was not officially done. Whether they did

3 it illegally or in any other way, I don't know, and we didn't know about

4 that at the time.

5 Q. When did you learn that they had joined the ARK?

6 A. We learned after the military coup and the take-over of power.

7 That was a part of their official public announcement.

8 Q. And, finally, were you aware that the SDS created a Serb

9 Crisis Staff in Prijedor?

10 A. No, not at the time. There were speculations, but we were not

11 really aware of the fact.

12 Q. So when did you first hear about this SDS Crisis Staff?

13 A. At the same time we heard about their joining the ARK. In other

14 words, when they took over power in all the institutions after the

15 military coup.

16 Q. Prior to the take-over of Prijedor, did the SDS propose a

17 division of Prijedor municipality along ethnic lines?

18 A. The SDS did propose not only in Prijedor, but also in other parts

19 of the state, that some municipalities should be divided along ethnic

20 lines. In Prijedor, that could not be accepted either by the opposition

21 parties or the ruling parties, the SDA and the HDZ. Only the SDS party

22 in power advocated that proposal, but they could not implement that

23 through official institutions. They never even put that up in as a

24 proposal in the Municipal Assembly. They only mentioned such proposals

25 in informal ex-changes and what they would say was that it would be best

Page 17374

1 for everyone and that the best solution would be for Prijedor to be

2 divided along ethnic lines.

3 Q. Under the SDS's proposal, what percentage of Prijedor would have

4 fallen within the Serb community?

5 A. Those of us who resided down there knew that Prijedor could not

6 be divided along ethnic lines because a large part of the municipality

7 was of mixed ethnic composition. The SDS made their requests public in

8 "Kozarski Vjesnik" which was our municipal newspaper. They published a

9 map of a national property in Prijedor. And in that map the Serbian

10 territory was marked in red; as far as I can remember, the Croatian part

11 was blue; and the Bosniak, or Muslim, as it was known at the time, was

12 green.

13 What everybody noticed immediately, irrespective of the level of

14 education, was that almost the entire map was red. All state or common

15 property was red. For example, national parks, industrial complexes,

16 mines, industrial zones, parks. In other words, everything that was not

17 privately owned. As for the green and blue colours, they were used to

18 mark only those areas or territories which were privately owned by

19 non-Serbs in cadastral terms. It became clear very soon that such a

20 division spelled nothing but a huge hardships for everybody concerned.

21 We had already had the experience of such divisions in other

22 municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in municipalities in

23 Croatia.

24 Q. What was their proposal with regard to local communities that

25 were ethnically diverse, in other words, no one ethnicity had a complete

Page 17375

1 majority?

2 A. As far as I can remember, that also fell under the Serb

3 territories on that map. In practical terms, probably around 80 per cent

4 of the territory or the map was marked as the Serb-owned territory.

5 MR. OLMSTED: May we have on the screen 65 ter 10236.11.

6 Q. Now, this is a point map showing ethnic distribution within

7 Prijedor municipality as of 1991, and if we look -- if we can keep it

8 where it is right now, we see just above the map that there is -- there

9 are some figures showing that the Muslim population in Prijedor was

10 49.351; the Serb population, 47.581; and the Croat population, 6.316.

11 Are these figures accurate or roughly accurate, at least?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. It also indicates --

14 A. I believe that they are accurate.

15 Q. Thank you. It also indicates that 6.459 persons in Prijedor

16 classified themselves as Yugoslavs. At the time, was it more common for

17 Serbs or Muslims to classify themselves as Yugoslavs?

18 A. In practice, it was more common for Muslims to classify

19 themselves as Yugoslavs, but there was also a percentage of Serbs who did

20 that, as well as Croats and others.

21 MR. OLMSTED: Now, if we can scroll down to the map itself. And

22 this is fine right there.

23 Q. We see that on this map, the Muslim areas are shown in green, the

24 Serb areas in blue, and the Croat areas in red. Does this appear to be

25 an accurate depiction of the ethnic composition of Prijedor back in the

Page 17376

1 1991, 1992 time-period?

2 A. Yes, this would be more or less correct; however, I would like to

3 say that the map was even more colourful than this one. These are just

4 places where one ethnic group accounted for an absolute majority.

5 MR. OLMSTED: May this be tendered into evidence, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE HALL: Admitted soon marked.

7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P01714. Thank you, Your Honours.

8 MR. OLMSTED:

9 Q. You've touched on this before, but as you were working in both

10 the Republic Assembly as well as attending government meetings in

11 Prijedor, did you sense any link between the attitude of the SDS at the

12 republic level and that of the SDS at the Prijedor level regarding these

13 issues that we've talked about so far?

14 A. There were a lot of similarities. Actually, whatever happened in

15 Prijedor only reflected things that had already happened at the state

16 level.

17 Q. Was another area of disagreement between the SDA and the SDS the

18 issue of the JNA mobilisation to fight in the conflict in Croatia

19 sometime around the summer of 1991?

20 A. That is right. And that was not just a bone of contention

21 between the SDS and the SDA. The SDS was not in agreement on that with

22 any other party in Bosnia-Herzegovina either with civic parties, the HDZ,

23 the SDA. The SDS position was completely different from anybody else's;

24 for example, the reform party, the liberal party, the opposition party as

25 a whole. Only the SDS and the Serb Radical Party pursued the policy of

Page 17377

1 supporting mobilisation -- or, rather, a very strong presence of the JNA

2 in the Croatian theatres of war.

3 Q. And if you could just slow down and when you give your answers, I

4 can hear that the translator is struggling to keep up with you.

5 The SDS position was they were strongly in favour of

6 mobilisation; is that correct? Is that what you've specified for us?

7 A. Correct. Correct.

8 Q. And what was the position of the SDA with regard to mobilisation?

9 A. The SDA position was that the SDA was not in favour of

10 mobilisation, in general terms; however, it did not want prevent citizens

11 from responding to call-ups if they wanted to be drafted.

12 Q. And was there a JNA formation in Prijedor in 1991?

13 A. In 1991, there was a large military formation in Prijedor, the

14 5th Kozara Brigade. Even before that, there was a JNA garrison in

15 Prijedor.

16 Q. Did the mobilisation which began in the summer of 1991, and I

17 believe there was probably multiple mobilisations after that, did this

18 result in a change in the ethnic composition of this 5th Kozara Brigade?

19 A. Only in the first round of mobilisation, a certain number of

20 non-Serbs responded to the call-up. Later on, their numbers dwindled and

21 there came a time when people no longer responded to mobilisation calls,

22 and the reason was that people had gained certain experiences that they

23 shared with the rest of us after they returned from their units. They

24 were telling us that the army was being transformed into something else

25 and that they no longer felt like members of that new army.

Page 17378

1 Q. Can you explain that a little bit further. Did they feel like

2 they were being somehow mistreated once they were mobilised into the JNA

3 at this time-period?

4 A. I will explain, Your Honours. Men of age would traditionally

5 respond to mobilisation calls, or, rather, to call-ups for military

6 manoeuvres. I, myself, participated in several military manoeuvres

7 before the developments of the 1990s. At that time, the military was a

8 national military of a mixed composition. There were no elements of

9 provocation. We were all equal in the military. There was no different

10 attitudes with respect to different ethnic groups. However, in the

11 relevant time, all those things started happening.

12 The units started removing the insignia of the JNA from their

13 uniform, from their hats, and what reappeared were some old traditional

14 Serbian -- even the cockades, the Chetnik insignia pertaining to the

15 Second World War, denoting units that fought on the side of the Germans.

16 There came a time when they started nationalist songs, which either

17 insulted or intimidated members of other ethnic groups. Men tried to

18 desert those units, but, in any case, they no longer wanted to respond to

19 mobilisation calls.

20 Obviously, I don't know whether such things happened across the

21 board in all units, but I know that people deserted several different

22 units precisely for the reasons that I've just mentioned.

23 Q. By April 1992, what percentage of the 5th Kozara Brigade was

24 non-Serb?

25 A. Until early April 1992, the percentage was negligible.

Page 17379

1 Q. Was there also a Territorial Defence in Prijedor in 1991 and

2 1992?

3 A. Yes, there was a Territorial Defence as an official structure

4 with a long tradition.

5 Q. And prior to the take-over in Prijedor, who was in charge of the

6 TO?

7 A. The TO was in charge of Becir Medunjanin. He was Chief of Staff

8 of the Territorial Defence.

9 Q. Just to clarify, I think it is the other way around, that Becir

10 Medunjanin was in charge of the TO, is that what you said?

11 A. Yes, correct.

12 Q. I think this might help us a little bit, but if you could tell us

13 prior to the take-over, can you explain how the TO was organised at the

14 various governmental levels within Prijedor. So we have the municipal

15 level, but what about the local communes and how were they organised in

16 this pre-take-over period?

17 A. The centre of the TO was in the town of Prijedor itself. The

18 command of the TO was also there and the units of the TO could be found

19 all over the municipality of Prijedor at the level of local

20 self-administration, that is the local communes. Where the local

21 communes were large, there would also be even smaller organisational

22 elements of the TO, so-called sectors. And they had -- each of these

23 elements or units had their own commanders who were subordinate to the

24 commander of the TO in Prijedor.

25 Q. Let's take, for example, the Kozarac TO, what villages did that

Page 17380

1 TO unit cover?

2 A. The Kozarac TO encompassed Kozarac, which include the settlements

3 of Dera, Kalata, Brdjani. And some villages in the immediate surrounding

4 of Kozarac. That was TO Kozarac. There was also TO Trnopolje, then TO

5 Kamicani, or, rather, the sector of staffs. But the main command in the

6 area for the sectors that I mentioned was at Kozarac.

7 Q. And this was in accordance with existing laws at the time?

8 A. Of course, it was all in line with the structures as laid out by

9 the law, and the constitution because the TO was actually provided for by

10 the constitution.

11 Q. Did the TO have weapons in 1991?

12 A. The TO did have a certain quantity of weapons in 1991.

13 Q. Well, did something happen in 1989 that resulted in the removal

14 of a number of their weapons?

15 A. That's correct. Most of the weapons, or rather, all of the

16 weapons of the TO were taken over by the JNA and they put it in their

17 warehouses. That wasn't done in accordance with the procedure, nor was

18 that agreed upon by the leadership of the republic. Then the situation

19 was taken care of in such a way that there were negotiations to return

20 the weapons to where they belonged. The result being that a smaller

21 quantity of bad or unusable weapons was returned to the TO.

22 Q. When the JNA confiscated the TO weapons from the Prijedor TO

23 units, where did they store them in Prijedor?

24 A. In their own facilities. They took the weapons to the garrison

25 in Prijedor. Whether or not the warehouse was there or somewhere else, I

Page 17381

1 don't know, but certainly they were controlled by the army. That was the

2 interpretation that was offered to the public, namely that the weapons

3 were safe.

4 Q. You mentioned that the JNA eventually returned a small quantity

5 of weapons. What kind of weapons did the JNA return to the Kozarac TO?

6 A. Most of the weapons that were returned, and it was a small

7 quantity altogether, were old rifles from the Second World War, the

8 so-called M-48 rifles. Then there would occasionally be a half-automatic

9 rifle, a certain quantity of ammunition, possibly some rifle grenades and

10 a smaller number of automatic rifles. Whether there were small calibre

11 mortars which was a weapon that was also owned by the TO, I don't know.

12 The local commune of Trnopolje did not get back a single mortar.

13 Q. Prior to the take-over in Prijedor, I want to focus mainly in the

14 1992 period leading up to the end of April 1992, were Serb civilians

15 being armed?

16 A. Before April of 1992, we noticed that Serb civilians were being

17 armed. Some party members were even present to witness it. In two

18 villages they were able to observe the process. In one case, I also

19 watched a helicopter landing from a distance and unloading something that

20 I couldn't make out because of the distance.

21 There was a second instance when people saw crates being taken

22 out of a helicopter, and there was a third instance in a local commune,

23 in the outskirts of Prijedor, in plain daylight from a truck trailer,

24 weapons were being handed out to civilians. An SDA member happened to

25 pass by, I believe his name was Irfan Cepic and he looked on, and he

Page 17382

1 immediately came to inform us.

2 We requested information from the authorities but everybody

3 denied that anything like that was going on.

4 Q. And who was distributing these weapons to the Serb population?

5 A. The truck I mentioned was a JNA truck, a green truck, I'm not

6 sure whether it was a Tamic or a FAP, I wasn't there to see it. Anyway,

7 the tarpaulin was taken off and at a crossroads weapons were being

8 distributed. Cepic noticed that nobody had to sign any receipts and he

9 didn't see any lists either. He just saw people assembled there and some

10 people taking weapons out of the truck and distributing them and the

11 other group taking those weapons with them.

12 Q. This method of distributing weapons, was this in accordance with

13 the laws at the time?

14 A. No, it wasn't. No laws whatsoever.

15 Q. Can you tell us in which villages the arming of the Serb

16 population was most prevalent? Were there certain areas where they were

17 most focusing on as far as arming?

18 A. Cirkin Polje, which is a suburban settlement was the place where

19 weapons were distributed from the truck. It's in the outskirts of

20 Prijedor. There is a Serbian village nearby, and further on there were

21 non-Serb territories. We noticed a helicopter landing at the village of

22 Petrov Gaj, which is a Serb village, and boxes or crates were being

23 dropped off that helicopter and the inhabitants of a non-Serb village

24 nearby, another non -- which was nearby watched on.

25 I observed a situation at Salac [phoen], which is also close to

Page 17383

1 the boundaries -- or the boundary that existed between the Serb and

2 non-Serb inhabited areas.

3 Q. And I think you answered my question at the very end. Were these

4 areas that were being armed the border areas between Serb villages and

5 non-Serb villages?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. What about the non-Serb population --

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. What about the non-Serb population, were they attempting to

10 obtain weapons during this pre-take-over period?

11 A. An atmosphere of fear had been created and some people strove to

12 come by weapons to protect their personal safety, but this was done in an

13 uninstitutional manner. Nobody felt safe so people were striving to

14 provide some kind of safety to themselves. We tried to organise and

15 strengthen the Territorial Defence, enable it to carry out their duties

16 in order to relax the situation to the extent possible.

17 Q. Did the SDA play any role in arming the non-Serb population?

18 A. No. It was a task of the SDA to organise the people who had

19 obtained weapons in various ways as members of the TO, and that they were

20 offered to be -- to join the TO.

21 Q. Who were the leading JNA officers in Prijedor in early 1992?

22 A. Colonel Arsic was the commander. The garrison commander was

23 Major Zeljaja, and I had opportunity to meet the chief of military

24 security but I don't know his name. They were the three most important

25 personalities, or highest-ranking officers at the local level.

Page 17384

1 Q. Did Colonel Arsic attend Municipal Assembly meetings?

2 A. Yes, more than once and I remember his presence at one of the

3 Municipal Assembly meetings very well.

4 Q. And from what you could observe, what was the relationship like

5 between Colonel Arsic and the SDS leadership? I'm talking about prior to

6 the take-over.

7 A. Arsic appeared during those talks about mobilisation, those

8 discussions. Whatever the SDS said, Arsic said, and vice-versa. Their

9 positions were identical. Both Arsic and the SDS accused those unwilling

10 to respond to the call-up in the same way. These accusations were that

11 Prijedor would not be defended in Prijedor, that Prijedor must be

12 defended in Croatia. And whoever was unwilling to go to Croatia to

13 defend Prijedor was opposed to the defence of Prijedor.

14 Q. In the weeks leading up to the Serb take-over in Prijedor, what

15 was the atmosphere like in Prijedor?

16 A. It was horrible.

17 Q. Did the SDA make any proposals to the Serb community to try to

18 improve the situation?

19 A. All our activities in the SDA were aimed at humouring the SDS,

20 trying to calm the situation, trying to appease the population, try to

21 disperse their fears and that was the purpose of all our activity. We

22 asked the SDS to establish patrols comprising members of different

23 ethnicities in border areas and have them patrol at night which would

24 disperse fear. I must say that the Serb population in various places

25 accepted these offers with satisfaction. And even without a decision of

Page 17385

1 the SDS, such joint guards and patrols were established.

2 The Serb population, too, was of the view that they wouldn't

3 attack anybody, but that somebody may come in from outside and do so.

4 However, these joint guards didn't stand their ground long because the

5 SDS demanded everybody who took part in those joint guards and patrols to

6 withdraw.

7 The people took it hard where I was, in my village. We spoke to

8 the Serbs who were members of joint patrols. They couldn't explain why

9 they were withdrawing, they were just saying we have to withdraw. We

10 have been ordered to do so. Let everybody defend their own. And they

11 didn't return. The withdrawal of Serbs from the joint patrols, to us,

12 was a signal that something was underway.

13 Q. That leads to my next question: In the days leading up to the

14 take-over in Prijedor, did you or the other members of the SDA leadership

15 notice anything that, in retrospect, signalled to you the take-over was

16 about to occur?

17 A. We noticed that the population withdrew at night from some Serb

18 territories bordering on non-Serb territories. Around about midnight or

19 11.30, from some hamlets and there where I lived, women, children, and

20 elderly people were leaving. And then people were asking those who had

21 stayed behind, Why are the women leaving? And the reply was, No, that's

22 not true. And then the neighbourhood of Pecani or possibly Raskovac,

23 too, in Prijedor, a huge number of people with children left high-rise

24 apartment buildings at night and returned in the morning. This was

25 observed twice.

Page 17386

1 Q. Was there also a tank placed is somewhere?

2 A. The tank was brought in in late April and stayed until early May

3 at one of the entry points to Kozarac. And the barrel of its cannon

4 pointed at the nearest houses in Kozarac. When people noticed that,

5 general panic broke out, but then the people tried to contact the tank

6 crew, one man recognised a friend of his who was in the tank, and then

7 they said it wasn't their intention to shoot. And then the inhabitants

8 of Kozarac brought them food and drinks and that went on for a couple of

9 days. So they fed those soldiers because the military didn't bring them

10 any food. But the reaction to the positioning of that tank was immense

11 fear because it was expected that the tank could start firing any moment,

12 and when that tank arrived, strong forces were observed to arrive at

13 Trnopolje from the direction of Ribnjak and take positions just before

14 the houses in the periphery. That was the house of the Serb family

15 Baltic there and several dozen men took positions there.

16 All that contributed to an unbearable atmosphere spreading.

17 People started panicking.

18 Q. I want you to clarify your last answer, you said: Strong forces

19 were observed arriving at Trnopolje, were these JNA forces?

20 A. We don't know, they only came at night and they also withdrew at

21 night. In the morning, we weren't able to see them anymore, and they

22 didn't come into Trnopolje, but only to the outskirts. They would come

23 as close as 200 or 300 metres, roughly.

24 Q. Would you at least know whether they were Serb forces or non-Serb

25 forces?

Page 17387

1 A. Those were Serb forces. Occasionally they would fire at the

2 houses in Trnopolje, the houses closest to the railway line or to

3 Ribnjak.

4 Q. During this late April time-period, were there also announcements

5 made over the radio, the public radio, with regard to non-Serbs?

6 A. In late April, well, what kind of announcements are you referring

7 to, could you please explain?

8 Q. Well, for instance, were there any announcements that the

9 non-Serbs were going to attack Prijedor or something to that effect?

10 A. Well, not only announcements or propaganda, even in the

11 Official Gazette there was the information that the Muslims are getting

12 ready to destroy the Serbs in the area. Irrespective of the situation,

13 and although the Serbs were backed up by tanks and cannon and multiple

14 launchers, et cetera, this piece of information was published in the

15 Official Gazette, and that, of course, frightened the people.

16 Life was marked by fear and by attempts to organise a defence in

17 any manner available.

18 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Olmsted, obviously this is an area that isn't

19 going to be completed today, so the -- to allow time for the matters with

20 which we have to deal before we rise, if we could take the adjournment at

21 this point.

22 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour. This is an appropriate time for

23 me to stop anyways.

24 JUDGE HALL: Sir, as I indicated before, your testimony will

25 continue when we reconvene on Wednesday. Having been sworn as a witness,

Page 17388

1 you cannot have any communication with counsel from either side, and in

2 such conversations as you may have with persons outside of the court, you

3 cannot discuss your testimony. So you are now excused. The Court will

4 not rise immediately because it has some other matter with which it must

5 deal. The usher will escort you out and you will return on Wednesday

6 morning. We trust you have a safe weekend, sir.

7 [Witness stands down]

8 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, before you deal with your ruling, can

9 I just mention very quickly the question of next week's sitting.

10 Mr. Zecevic requested that Friday be free so we could discuss

11 exhumations. For various reasons, the technical information he wants is

12 not going to be given to him until Thursday. And, therefore, Friday is

13 not going to be a day that we can discuss the matter. Seems to us that

14 there's a real likelihood that we may need a Friday sitting to finish the

15 two witnesses who are now here for next week, if I could just put that on

16 the record.

17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.

18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. There is one more oral ruling.

19 Having now issued oral rulings today and yesterday on the various

20 Prosecution motions pursuant to Rule 92 bis and for the addition of one

21 further witness, the Trial Chamber turns to the question of the time

22 remaining for the presentation of the Prosecution's case.

23 The Trial Chamber has given meticulous consideration to this and

24 thanks the Prosecution for the various calculations it has presented

25 through the Chamber's Legal Officer. It is also grateful to the parties

Page 17389

1 for their joint submissions on stipulated facts and the resulted

2 withdrawal of witnesses, and directs the parties to file those two

3 documents as one joint submission with the Registry.

4 The Trial Chamber will address first its direction as to what it

5 has chosen to refer to as core witnesses, that is, those witnesses on the

6 reduced witness list filed on 10 September 2009, as amended during the

7 trial, but not including witnesses called to address the denied

8 adjudicated facts and those for whom motions to add are still pending.

9 The Trial Chamber confirms its written rulings of 8 June 2010 and

10 22 July 2010, which together allow a total time of 242 hours and 40

11 minutes to the Prosecution for the presentation of its case, pursuant to

12 Rule 73 bis(C) and (F). Without going into the minutae of the

13 calculations, the Trial Chamber advises the Prosecution that the other

14 rulings which led the Prosecution to believe that a total of 255 hours

15 had been allotted, had already been included in the calculations

16 reflected in those two decisions. Therefore, the total allotted -- the

17 total time allotted for the core witnesses is 242 hours and 40 minutes.

18 The Registry has confirmed that, as on Wednesday 10 November, the

19 Prosecution had utilised 243 hours and 52 minutes for the core witnesses.

20 The time allotted pursuant to Rule 73 bis is therefore exhausted and

21 there remain four core witnesses still to be called: ST-004, Ewan Brown,

22 Charles McLeod, and ST-219.

23 The Trial Chamber has also granted the Prosecution a total of

24 40 hours in which to present the evidence of witnesses called to address

25 the denied adjudicated facts. Again, the Registry has confirmed that, as

Page 17390

1 on 10 November, before Witness ST-225 started to testify, just over 27

2 hours of this time remained, after hearing ten witnesses from this

3 category. Again, without going into the minutae of the calculations, it

4 is noteworthy that, thanks to the efforts of the parties, the number of

5 witnesses to be called in this category has been reduced and, therefore,

6 the time actually needed in court may be also reduced accordingly.

7 The Chamber is mindful of the fact that only two sitting days are

8 available next week, eventually three if we take the Friday as well, and

9 that thereafter four weeks, 20 sitting days, remain before the court's

10 winter recess. Having considered the various time estimates provided by

11 the parties, the Trial Chamber is of the view that it is possible, with

12 the exceptions identified herein later, to complete the presentation of

13 evidence within that time. This will require counsel on both sides to

14 exercise control and focus over their examinations and cross-examination

15 of each witness.

16 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that it is in the interests of

17 justice to allow the Prosecution additional time pursuant to Rule 73 bis

18 in order to present the evidence of the four remaining core witnesses;

19 the one witness added yesterday; the four witnesses whose evidence was

20 not admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis; and the one witness added to the

21 list on 17 September 2010.

22 The Trial Chamber, therefore -- I've problem here. I'll have to

23 go over that again.

24 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can we take it -- obviously you are

25 going to issue, I take it, a written decision at some stage on this. We

Page 17391

1 are taking it you're giving us until Christmas to complete our case.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated] exception.

3 MS. KORNER: There is an exception is there? All right.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: I think we better go to the end of this. So I

5 repeat: The Trial Chamber is satisfied that it is in the interest of

6 justice to allow the Prosecution additional time pursuant to Rule 73 bis

7 in order to present the evidence of the four remaining core witnesses;

8 the one witness added yesterday; and the one witness added to the list of

9 17 September -- added to the list on 17 September 2010. The

10 Trial Chamber, therefore, increases the time available by 13 hours and

11 directs the Prosecution to complete the presentation of all witnesses,

12 other than exceptions identified herein later, by Friday 17 December,

13 that is by the winter recess.

14 The two non-sitting days indicated previously, Friday, 3 December

15 and Friday, 17 December, are revoked and the Chamber will sit both days

16 if necessary.

17 While calculating the use of court time until the winter recess,

18 the Trial Chamber took into account not only the above-mentioned

19 additions, but also the time needed to complete the hearing of all the

20 denied adjudicated facts, witnesses, including those witnesses added to

21 this category by oral ruling of today on the Prosecution's Rule 92 bis

22 motion, and the time eventually needed, if any, for the

23 examination-in-chief of ST-261, ST-262, ST-263, and ST-264 in the event

24 that the motions to add these witnesses would be granted and

25 notwithstanding an eventual exception as set out herein later.

Page 17392

1 Therefore, whether or not the addition of ST-261, ST-262, ST-263

2 and ST-264 will be granted, the testimony of all Prosecution witnesses

3 shall be concluded before the beginning of the winter recess, except for

4 the hearing of expert witness Ewan Brown and ST-181, if Mr. Krgovic's

5 application to recall this witness is granted.

6 Should the Chamber grant the Prosecution's motion for addition of

7 ST-263 and ST-264, a possible exception remains for either or both

8 witnesses who may be called in January 2011. Thank you.

9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. So we take the adjournment now to

10 Wednesday morning. And I trust that everyone has a safe weekend.

11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.

12 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

13 November, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.