1 Tuesday, 11 January 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 12.36 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon to
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good afternoon to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
11 MR. OLMSTED: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Matthew Olmsted,
12 Tom Hannis, and Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
13 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. For
14 the Stanisic Defence, Slobodan Cvijetic and Eugene O'Sullivan.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
16 Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
18 Are there any matters which should be addressed before we revert
19 to closed session to continue the witness who is presently on the stand?
20 So we revert to closed session.
21 [Closed session]
11 Pages 18599-18607 redacted. Closed session.
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE HALL: So if there is nothing that need detain us, we take
4 the adjournment to resume at -- just a moment, please.
5 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
6 JUDGE HALL: Yesterday, it would be recalled that counsel for the
7 Prosecution in the person of Ms. Korner had made an oral application
8 supplementing the written application for the addition of certain
9 documents in respect of the witness who is scheduled to begin this
10 afternoon, and the counsel for Defence had been invited to -- well, we
11 inquired as to whether he was in a position to reply at that stage, and
12 Mr. Zecevic, speaking for the Defence as a whole, indicated they would
14 What is the position now, please?
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, about this issue, I
16 was in contact with Mr. Zecevic, and we opposed the Prosecution's -- the
17 Prosecution demand to add these documents to the 65 ter list. We give
18 the reasoning in our reply to the Prosecutor's motion of the
19 14th of December.
20 We consider that the Prosecution has not shown a valid reason to
21 explain why they didn't put those documents earlier on the 65 ter list.
22 Also there were no valid reasons to explain why they didn't show those
23 documents to the expert. So there are no reasons to put it on the
24 65 ter lists.
25 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. So we have your response, and that would
1 be incorporated into such a decision as we make, obviously at some point
2 before the witness is called to testify.
3 So we take the adjournment, to resume at 2.15.
4 --- Recess taken at 1.06 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 2.35 p.m.
6 JUDGE HALL: Again, we apologise for the late start. We were
7 trying to finalize a ruling which we have to give relative to the witness
8 who is about to take the stand.
9 MS. KORNER: Sorry, are Your Honours going to give the ruling
10 or ... because I do have a further application in respect of documents,
11 which I notified the Defence of by e-mail and Ms. Featherstone at half
12 past 1.00.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Ms. Korner. We think it might be useful to
16 hear you before we give our ruling.
17 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honours, it would. It's along the same
18 lines, although, in fact, there's, rather, more of a background to this
19 particular document.
20 Your Honour, the document has become known as Directive 4.
21 Your Honour, it's one of a series of directives issued by the Main Staff
22 of the VRS, which are all referenced in Mr. Brown's report. Directives 1
23 and 2 are on our 65 ter list and have remained on our 65 ter list.
24 Directive 4 was on our 65 ter list as number 1609 but was withdrawn as
25 part of the huge cull of documents which took place in - if I can just
1 get the date again - 2008, I believe. Sorry. Let me get the date here.
2 21st of May, 2008.
3 Your Honours, we did apply, in fact last year, to reinstate that
4 document on our 65 ter list. We gave the reason for it. The motion is
5 dated the 18th of March of last year; namely, that we wished to ask an
6 upcoming witness about it and that it was relevant to the forcible
7 transfer of the Muslim population. And Your Honours refused our
8 application on the 24th of March. In fact, some six days later. And in
9 a very short motion there were other documents in our motion simply
10 saying that we hadn't shown good cause for the request and must satisfy
11 the Trial Chamber that the proposed documents are prima facie relevant.
12 Now, what we should have added, except we were concentrating then
13 on Witness 187, is that it is clearly exceedingly relevant and is
14 referred to by Mr. Brown on no less -- in no less than three footnotes to
15 his report, namely, numbers 80, 723, and 823, as illustrative of a number
16 of themes with which he deals. Moreover, and I'm afraid that it was only
17 yesterday and this morning when I was re-checking the contents of the
18 documents, which is why I asked for the time until 2.15, that I noted
19 that it was also referred to in a document, again footnoted by Mr. Brown,
20 which I propose to show him during the course of his testimony, which is
21 document 65 ter 1611. And I'm going to ask that it be put up on the
22 screen. It's at tab 58.
23 Your Honour, this is a document dated the 24th of November, 1992,
24 to the Drina Corps command. It's in fact, therefore, out of the specific
25 1st Krajina Corps, which Mr. Brown's report largely deals with, but it's
1 clearly relevant to our case because it deals with Zvornik. And you will
2 see that it says:
3 "Pursuant to the directive of the Main Staff of the
4 Army of Republika Srpska, Strictly Confidential Number 02/3 of the
5 19th of November, 1992 ..."
6 And I'm going to ask that the directive be put up, please, just
7 so that can you see that that's what it refers to. It's actually in
8 e-court with the number 1609.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner --
10 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... Your Honours will see
11 there --
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, you are referring to tab 51 of your
13 list, on the one hand.
14 MS. KORNER: The first document --
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes.
16 MS. KORNER: -- that I asked to be put up was tab 58.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: 58.
18 MS. KORNER: Yeah. 1611. That's the first --
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: 1611, yes. Okay.
20 MS. KORNER: And that's always -- that has been, always, and
21 remains on our 65 ter list. And you will see from the convergence of
22 numbers that clearly this was all part of the same theme.
23 But there is Directive 4 of the 19th of November.
24 Now, Your Honours, further to his footnotes for the -- to his
25 report, Mr. Brown, in the further statement that he made when he was
1 looking at documents which had materialised since he had written the
2 report, and which we have in at tab E now, if you look at -- the
3 statement dated July 2009, at page 8. If we may have that up on the
5 No, I'm sorry, I suppose -- let's have a -- 65 ter. I'm so
6 sorry. It's been given a ... it's 10638. Yep.
7 If you look at paragraph two --
8 [French on English Channel]
9 MS. KORNER: -- the second line, you'll see the number 0429-2352
10 to 2354. That's the -- that's 1611. 65 ter 1611.
11 [French on English Channel]
12 MS. KORNER: And as Mr. Brown says: "In my report, I
13 indicated" -- oh we've got French on the English channel apparently.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Could you please repeat the numbers --
15 [Overlapping speakers] ...
16 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour. It's second line, the third
17 number along, 0429-2352 to 0429-2354. That is the number this -- the
18 ERN number of 65 ter 1611.
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
20 MS. KORNER: You will see it indicated in the spreadsheet for the
22 And Mr. Brown says - leaving aside the other documents; we
23 haven't put in all of them because, in fact, of all of them, that was the
24 only one on our 65 ter list - "In my report, I indicated at
25 paragraph 1.53 that the strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs were
1 promulgated to lower levels within the VRS. These nine documents, all
2 except Operation Directive 4, are new to me. Seem to indicate to me a
3 process by which strategic level objectives were disseminated." And
4 explains why that is. And he says:
5 "The seminar took place at the Drina Corps four days after" --
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, sorry, Ms. Korner, but we don't -- we are
7 not getting the LiveNote at all.
8 MS. KORNER: Oh, sorry.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: There is no transcript since -- since the moment
10 when you said: "And Mr. Brown says ..."
11 MS. KORNER: Oh, right.
12 Sorry. Going back to the page of the statement that I was
14 "The seminar took place at the Drina Corps four days after
15 Operational Directive 4 was issued. Furthermore, the documents culminate
16 in the issuance of a Drina Corps order on the 24th of November,
17 specifically referencing Operational Directive 4."
18 And, Your Honours, that's -- we're going back to the 1611.
19 "Taken as a whole, this group of documents is important in
20 demonstrating senior and political military direction, a functioning
21 chain of command, and what was written by the VRS Main Staff analysis of
22 the combat readiness," which is another document that I'm going to deal
23 with, with Mr. Brown.
24 So, Your Honours, with many apologies for the fact that is --
25 this is late, but it's not as though we haven't applied before, but we
1 perhaps didn't give the detail of this aspect of the case because at the
2 time, as I say, we were considering Witness 187. We do reiterate our
3 request for Directive 4 to be added to the 65 ter list. The -- the
4 direction that -- okay.
5 [Technical difficulty]
6 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
7 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, what I was about to -- to say was that
8 this goes, we would submit, to the very clear issue in this case and
9 that's in the indictment of whether or not there was a joint criminal
10 enterprise; whether the direction came from the top leadership - which
11 is, we say, includes the Accused Mico Stanisic - but was transmitted to,
12 as it were, the lower level of those who were involved; and, indeed, that
13 the plans and directions which were conceived of were put into effect by
14 those who received the instructions. And in the light of all that, we
15 say all the directives, but, in particular, directive 4, is a relevant
16 document. And although for the reasons that Your Honours know about, it
17 was removed from the list. It was done in advance of a trial before the
18 issues became clarified. And although I know that Your Honours do not
19 want to have documents in that are not specifically relevant, we say this
20 is clearly relevant and a document that Your Honours, and, indeed,
21 anybody else looking at a transcript of this trial, should be made
22 available to them. And although it's -- it's no more than persuasive, it
23 is a document that has been exhibited in other cases, including, of
24 course, the Karadzic case.
25 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, before I call on the Defence for any
1 reply that they have, although you didn't use the word "reconsideration,"
2 is it a fair summary of your application that for the reasons that you
3 have expanded on in some detail that you are requesting the Chamber to
4 reconsider its decision of - was it March or May of last year?
5 MS. KORNER: 24th of March.
6 JUDGE HALL: -- 24th of March of last year, thank you - in respect
7 of this one document, directive 4 --
8 MS. KORNER: Yes.
9 JUDGE HALL: -- because the -- it is a document in respect of
10 which the -- in its application at the time, the Prosecution would have
11 been in the position to point out its relevance and its necessary
12 connection to the other relevant documents and, therefore, the Chamber
13 should reconsider its decision?
14 MS. KORNER: Yes.
15 JUDGE HALL: Is -- that's a fair summary?
16 MS. KORNER: It is. Your Honour, what I hope I made clear is
17 that regrettably no human being, nor even part of a team, can carry all
18 the evidence in their head at one time. And the concentration then, in
19 March of last year, as I say, was on the upcoming witness. And at that
20 stage I'm afraid Mr. Brown was so far over the radar. I see
21 Judge Delvoie shaking his head slightly at this, but -- but we really had
22 something like a hundred witnesses in between that witness and this one
23 and nobody had combed his report to see how relevant it was.
24 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I respectfully disagree with
1 everything which my learned friend Ms. Korner said.
2 This document is clearly irrelevant for this case. Let me say
3 why. This document is the directive of late November 1992 and it's
4 talking about the further actions of the Army of Republika Srpska which
5 took place in 1993, which is clearly outside of the scope of the
6 indictment in relation to the dates.
7 Furthermore, Your Honours, there is not a single incident charged
8 in the indictment which happened in December or late November in -- in
9 this case.
10 The third. The document Ms. Korner and -- and Mr. Brown are
11 referring to goes -- is directed into the -- the -- as I understood
12 Ms. Korner's speech right now, goes to the -- to the actions of the
13 Drina Corps, as well as the document 58 -- tab 58, which is 65 ter 1611.
14 Now, this document, if you -- if you read the document, which we
15 did in a couple of minutes ago, refers to four municipalities where --
16 where attempt -- where the actions are to take place in the future, and
17 that is Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde. None of this, none of
18 these municipalities, is in our indictment as well.
19 The talk -- the talking about Zvornik refers to the order to keep
20 the communication between Zvornik and some other places open. That is
21 the only reference to any of the municipality which is in our indictment.
22 For the purposes of what -- what Ms. Korner wants to establish,
23 we have already three directives in the -- in the -- in the case as -- as
24 exhibits. I don't -- if -- if that is -- if the intention of the
25 Office of the Prosecutor is to show that the directives were sent to
1 the -- to the Chief of Staffs and then the Chief of Staffs issued the
2 directives to the lower level military -- military structure, the -- it
3 is -- it is quite sufficient that we have three of the directives to
4 establish that.
5 Therefore, I -- I really don't see any reason or any basis to
6 claim that this document is relevant at all for this case.
7 Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: This document is not relevant for our client
10 because it is related to the eastern part of Bosnia. So we just want to
11 say that we support the submission of Mr. Zecevic.
12 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, 1611 is already on our list. I think
13 we'd better have a look, in the light of what Mr. Zecevic asserts, at
14 some of what the directive says. Because it does refer to municipalities
15 which are within the indictment. And, secondly, it is, as we say, a
16 continuing demonstration of one of the themes of this case, namely, the
17 conception by not only the military but also the political leadership.
18 Your Honours, can we go back, please, to Directive 4. It's 1609.
19 And we need to go -- it's a very lengthy document, but we need to go,
20 please, in English, to the fifth. Maybe it is - one, two, three - yeah,
21 the fifth page. And in the B/C/S it's item (d).
22 Your Honour, I'm sorry. If I'd realised I was going to have do
23 this, I would have gone in -- I would have had it marked up.
24 I think it may be, in the B/C/S, the fourth -- actually, no, may
25 be the same page, the fifth page. Oh, maybe -- yes, I think that's
1 right. Yes, it is this page.
2 Under (d):
3 "The Drina Corps, from its present position, its main forces
4 shall persistently defend Visegrad," in our indictment, "the dam,
5 Zvornik," in our indictment, "and the corridor, while the rest of its
6 forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the
7 heaviest possible losses on him, and force him to leave the Birac, Zepa,
8 and Gorazde areas, together with the Muslim population."
9 And, Your Honour, that, of course, is a theme which is the
10 enforced expulsion of the non-Serb population.
11 And if we could go back for a moment, please, to the fourth page
12 in English, and I think probably the same in B/C/S.
13 The order actually begins on the previous page. At the top:
14 "Preserve the free territories on all fronts, set up a border
15 service, stabilise the existing corridors," and part of what Mr. Brown
16 deals with is the corridor operation, "and open new ones to ensure
17 unimpeded communication in Republika Srpska, launch offensive operations
18 to crush the HVO and Muslim in the territory of the Republika Srpska,
19 force them into unconditionally surrendering their weapons or destroy
21 So, Your Honour, we say it's a late directive, but it reflects
22 the themes that are -- or issues that are present in this case and
23 specifically refers to at least two of the municipalities that are part
24 of this indictment.
25 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE HALL: The Chamber is satisfied that the circumstances
3 having changed since the Ruling of March of 2011 [sic] -- 2010, I'm
4 sorry, in respect of which this document Directive 4 was excluded as a
5 part of that Ruling. And the explanation that is now given by the
6 Prosecution for its inclusion, we are satisfied, in the interests of
7 justice, it should be -- it may be added to the 65 ter list, and we so
9 Now for the other Ruling which we would wish to deliver before
10 the witness takes the stand.
11 On the 14th of March, 2010, the Prosecution filed a motion
12 seeking to add seven documents to its Rule 65 ter exhibit list. Five of
13 the documents pertaining to Ewan Brown were cited in his report and, if
14 added, would be tendered through him. The Prosecution seeks to admit
15 into evidence the other two documents from the bar table.
16 On the 6th and 10th of January, the Prosecution requested to add
17 to its exhibit list one map and a further five documents respectively
18 also to be tendered through Ewan Brown. The Defence responded jointly on
19 29th of December acceding to the addition of the five documents cited in
20 the report of Ewan Brown but opposing the motion in respect of the two
21 motions requested to be admitted from the bar table.
22 On the 11th of January, the Defence jointly opposed the
23 document -- the documents sought to be added through the supplemental
24 motion of the 6th January and the oral addendum of the 10th of January.
25 The five documents cited in Ewan Brown's report, Rule 65 ter numbers
1 3703, 3704, 3705, 3706, and 3707, are prima facie relevant and probative
2 to issues in this case. In view of the lack of objection, the Chamber
3 grants the motion in respect of the five documents.
4 The two documents which the Prosecution seeks to admit into
5 evidence from the bar table, Rule 65 ter numbers 3708 and 3709, originate
6 from the CSB Banja Luka. One is the payroll from May 1992 and the other
7 is an order of May 1993 by Stojan Zupljanin on forming the CSB Banja Luka
8 staff. Both list the names of one Dragan Skrbic, who -- Idriz Mend --
9 MS. KORNER: Merdzanic, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you -- Merdzanic, testified as one of the
11 three RS MUP officers who arrested him. The documents are being tendered
12 to corroborate the evidence of this witness and to bolster his
13 credibility. The Defence opposes the addition on the grounds that the
14 Prosecution ought to have exercised due diligence in disclosing them
15 prior to the testimony as opposed to disclosing them on the day after his
16 testimony had concluded. This, it is agreed, would have allowed the
17 Defence the opportunity to investigate the identity of the persons
18 mentioned in the documents.
19 Idriz Merdzanic testified about the identity of the officers who
20 arrested him. The payroll from May 1992 is consequently relevant and
21 probative and corroborates the witness's evidence. The Prosecution
22 should have exercised due diligence by applying to add this document
23 prior to Idriz Merdzanic's testimony; however, the document concerns a
24 matter which is not new and which the Defence cross-examined upon. The
25 Chamber therefore considers that it is in the interests of justice to
1 grant the motion with respect to Rule 65 ter number 3708.
2 The document, Rule 65 ter 3709, on the other hand, is from
3 outside the indictment period, and the Chamber finds that a list of
4 persons employed in CSB Banja Luka in May 1993 is irrelevant to the
5 evidence of Idriz --
6 MS. KORNER: Merdzanic.
7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Taken as pronounced.
8 The motion is consequently denied in this respect.
9 The one map with Rule 65 ter number 3710, sought to be added
10 through the supplement file on the 6th of January, depicts the operations
11 conducted to open a corridor directly from the ARK to Serbia. The
12 Chamber finds the map is relevant and probative to the issues in this
13 case and grants the supplemental motion of the 6th of January.
14 Four of the five documents, Rule 65 ter numbers 10505, 10636,
15 10640 and 10641, sought to be added by the oral addendum of the
16 10th of January, date from 1992 and are military documents that originate
17 from the ARK. Rule 65 ter numbers -- number 10639 is an undated map
18 showing the area of operation of the 1st Krajina Corps. All five
19 documents are cited in the report by Ewan Brown. The Chamber finds them
20 to be relevant and probative to matters in this case, and the oral
21 addendum to the motion is, therefore, granted.
22 So could the witness be escorted to the stand, please -- yes,
23 Ms. Korner.
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I have just one more -- not
25 application, it's more a direction.
1 There's been a number of different ways of -- and times at which
2 the expert's reports have been tendered in this case. I'm merely seeking
3 Your Honours' guidance as to whether I am permitted to submit Mr. Brown's
4 report and his extra Mladic report on -- on the -- on the notebooks - not
5 the statement in which he just looked at various documents - at the
6 beginning of his testimony, or whether I have to wait until the end?
7 Can I say, straight away, the report is a lengthy one. The
8 documents cited to are numerous. And I can't, and nor would Your Honours
9 want me to, go through every single part of the report. But, therefore,
10 it's, I think, in everybody's interests to know whether the report is
11 admitted as whole at the beginning of his testimony. I don't -- other
12 than the complaint that he used to work for the Office of the Prosecutor,
13 I don't think anybody's sought to suggest that he's not a military
15 JUDGE HALL: The practice that we have adopted, and if your
16 recollection is different from mine, Ms. Korner, you would correct me,
17 that as with documents admitted under Rule 65 ter, the document having
18 been identified at the beginning of the witness's testimony, the formal
19 decision as to admission, is only made after the conclusion of his
20 testimony. Isn't that the practice that we have followed?
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, 92 ter. Thank you. The same practice we
23 would have followed -- the comparable practice that we would have
24 followed in respect of 92 ter packages?
25 MS. KORNER: Well, interestingly enough, Your Honours, I --
1 whilst we were waiting, I asked Mr. Smith to check that, and Mr. Donja's
2 report went in right at the beginning. Mr. Nielsen's went in at the end.
3 But all the documents which are in his footnotes on our 65 ter list were
4 admitted at the beginning. And then I think with Ms. Hanson, that was
5 at -- after the conclusion of her testimony.
6 As I say, there hasn't been a standard practice, which is why I
8 But, Your Honours, I'm content with that, subject to this: We do
9 rely on all the -- the whole report. As I say, I can't -- I'm going to
10 try and highlight various themes from it with Mr. Brown, but -- but,
11 clearly, if there was any suggestion that any part of the report was not
12 going to be admitted, then I'd want to be able to deal with before that
13 decision was made, if you see what I mean. Do you see, that's the
14 problem I have? That I don't know whether it's going to be suggested by
15 the Defence that any part of the report is not relevant, or whatever, in
16 my examination-in-chief.
17 And, as I say, it's not a case where the Defence are suggesting,
18 as I understand it, that Mr. Brown is anything other but -- than an
19 expert, but ARK did complain about a bias because he used to work for the
20 Office of the Prosecutor.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, I'm sure you will appreciate that the
22 Chamber is and will be unable to determine in advance whether the entire
23 report can be admitted into evidence or only parts it because that
24 decision is taken only when the Defence has had its chance to
25 cross-examine. And if the Defence is successful in showing to the
1 Chamber that huge parts of Mr. Brown's report, I mean, just as an
2 example, are unreliable, then, of course, we will have to include that in
3 our decision in the end.
4 So at this point, we decline from your invitation to take any
5 position on the admission into evidence.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, yes. Unreliability, that, of course,
7 is, you know, if Your Honours were to find that as a result of
8 cross-examination he un -- I'm not sure how, but anyhow, but my concern
9 is only whether it's going to be at any stage suggested that any parts of
10 his report are not relevant. Because clearly I would want to show and
11 would be selecting those parts to show why they're relevant if the
12 suggestion is going to be that they're not relevant. And I think I'm
13 entitled to know that. I think it's something I've raised before, with
14 Defence matters. We're entitled to know that now, at this stage, whether
15 or not any suggestion is going to be made that any parts of the report
16 are not relevant.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
19 JUDGE HALL: I would only add, Ms. Korner, to what Judge Harhoff
20 has already indicated, that there is nothing in the Brown report where
21 the Chamber itself has determined that there are parts of which are
22 clearly not admissible for the usual reasons.
23 So as Judge Harhoff says, the final decision would depend on such
24 objections as the Defence may have and our ruling on it.
25 MS. KORNER: Yes. Well, thank you very much, Your Honours.
1 That's -- as I say, we rely on the whole report. And, obviously, because
2 of the time element, I'm only going to be selecting certain parts and
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Good afternoon, sir.
7 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: And welcome to the Tribunal. And thank you for
9 coming to give your testimony.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: We would like to ask you to begin by making the
12 solemn declaration which the Court Usher will show you.
13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
14 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, sir. You may sit down.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sir, would you begin by stating your name and
19 your date of birth.
20 THE WITNESS: My name is Ewan Brown. My date of birth is the
21 15th of May, 1964.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much. What's your current
24 THE WITNESS: I'm currently a consultant, sir.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Where?
1 THE WITNESS: Sorry. In the United Kingdom.
2 JUDGE HALL: And what sort of consultancy do you do?
3 THE WITNESS: I do training work in relation to intelligence
4 analysis and also my previously work at the ICTY and ICC. So in relation
5 to Rule of law, Geneva Convention issues, and others.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. Dr. Brown, you have been called by
7 the Prosecution as an expert on the military background in -- in 1992 in
8 the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the Chamber has accepted your
9 qualification as an expert. And if you're not aware of it, the
10 difference between an expert and an ordinary witness is that experts are
11 allowed to make inferences which normal witnesses would ordinarily not be
12 allowed to do. So you're being called in order to assist the
13 Trial Chamber in understanding some of the military aspects that are
14 pertinent in the trial here against Stojan Zupljanin and Mico Stanisic,
15 who you see to your left.
16 You told us just a while ago what your current occupation is, but
17 could you, in a minute, just briefly outline your professional
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Prior to working at the ICTY in 1998, I was a military officer in
21 the British Army. I served from 1986 to 1996, having been commissioned
22 from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. I spent the majority of my
23 career as a military officer in the intelligence and security field
24 and --
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Which rank did you hold?
1 THE WITNESS: I finished my service as a senior captain, sir.
2 I served in a variety of --
3 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Your Honours, I'm sorry to
4 interrupt, but could we go into private session, if Your Honours want the
5 detail of his background? It's set out in his CV. There are reasons why
6 part of that CV, part of his background, should not be given in open
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: I understand. But, Ms. Korner, my intention was
9 not to take him through his CV but merely to line out the points which
10 are indicated in the resume --
11 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... yes.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Merely to say that Mr. Brown was once a
13 British Army officer, then he moved on to the ICTY and to the ICC, and
14 now he is somewhere else.
15 MS. KORNER: Yes.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: And that's all. As a means of just lining out
17 the main features of his professional background.
18 MS. KORNER: Yes, I understand -- I understand what Your
19 Honours -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Overlapping speakers] ... will go no further than
22 MS. KORNER: Yes, thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I finished my military
24 service in 1996. I then resumed academic study and gained a
25 master's degree in criminology before working here at the ICTY in 1998.
1 I worked within the Office of the Prosecutor from 1998 to 2004 and I then
2 moved to work at the International Criminal Court, which I did for four
3 years and finished working there in late 2008, where I returned back home
4 to the United Kingdom and where I currently am working as a consultant,
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, sir. Now, Mr. Brown, have you ever
7 testified before this Tribunal?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Which cases?
10 THE WITNESS: I've testified three times, sir. The Stakic case,
11 the Brdjanin case, and the Krajisnik case.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. So you are already well familiar with
13 the procedure here, and I'll therefore just limit myself at this point to
14 informing you that the Prosecution has asked to spend four hours in its
15 examination-in-chief of you, and the floor will thereafter be given to
16 the teams of the Defence. The Stanisic Defence team has asked for five
17 hours to conduct its cross-examination; and the Zupljanin Defence team
18 has asked for two and a half hours.
19 After the completion of the cross-examination, the Prosecution
20 will then have a chance to re-direct examination. And in and between or
21 after the questions put to you by counsel on either side, the Judges may
22 also have questions to you.
23 That is as much as I need to inform you at this moment. You are
24 also recalling that we will have sessions every 90 minutes in order to
25 have the tapes changed, and, therefore, there will be regular breaks.
1 But it looks as if your testimony will go well into tomorrow and probably
2 into next week as well, because we will start late tomorrow. I think
3 we're resuming at 3.00 tomorrow afternoon, if I'm ... 3.00 or 3.15
4 tomorrow afternoon. And then Thursday and Friday, are days in which the
5 Chamber will not be sitting due to the Orthodox New Year's celebration.
6 And we will then resume on Monday with your testimony. So that's the
7 plan as it looks at this moment.
8 Before I turn over the floor to Ms. Korner, I need to remind you
9 that you have to tell the truth and that also there is a severe penalty
10 for providing false or incomplete information to the Chamber.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you have any questions to put before we begin?
13 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, sir, thank you.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well then. Let's get on with it. I give
15 the floor to Ms. Korner.
16 MS. KORNER: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 Examination by Ms. Korner:
18 Q. Mr. Brown, can we, first of all, deal with your rather more
19 extended resume, to this extent. Did you produce an updated resume or CV
20 for the purposes of this case?
21 A. Yes, I did, Ms. Korner.
22 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can I ask that that be exhibited and
23 marked under seal. Sorry, it's got the number 10635.
24 JUDGE HALL: So admitted and marked.
25 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, just -- sorry.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 1776, under seal,
3 Your Honours.
4 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
5 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, just to put the documents that we're going to be
6 dealing with in context, first of all, you produced the main report
7 headed "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina 1992" in
8 July of 2002, is that right, originally for the purposes of the Brdjanin
10 A. Yes, that is correct, Ms. Korner.
11 Q. And, indeed, at that stage I'm not sure whether General Talic was
12 still alive or not but I believe he was, just.
13 Subsequently, did you make a statement in July of 2009 when you
14 were asked to look at documents that you hadn't seen before, some of
15 which were relevant to the themes which you had dealt with in your
16 original report?
17 A. That is correct, yes, I did.
18 Q. And, finally, were you asked to look at the material that had
19 been recovered from General Mladic, either his home or elsewhere, and, in
20 particular, what's become known as the Mladic diaries, or more properly,
21 work books?
22 A. Yes, that is correct also.
23 Q. And did you produce a short statement detailing those entries in
24 those work books which, in your view, were relevant to the matters you've
25 discussed in your report?
1 A. Yes, I did.
2 Q. Now, what I want to do, please, in the time that we have, is go
3 through some of the areas of this report and have a look at some of the
4 themes and some of the documents which are relevant.
5 You've divided the report, first of all, after your summary, into
6 the political/military developments in respect of the 5th Corps of the
7 JNA, which then became the 1st Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army;
8 then the military operations; and, finally, the roles, responsibilities,
9 and authorities of the commander of the 5th Corps, or 1st Krajina Corps.
10 Can I just ask you this: In preparing your report and coming to
11 the conclusions that you did, what was the -- the documentation that you
12 looked at? In a general term; not, obviously, specifically each and
13 every one.
14 A. When I first arrived at the ICTY for the Office of the Prosecutor
15 in 1998, I was made aware that a series of documents had been seized or
16 recovered that related to -- were a component of the archive of the
17 1st Krajina Corps, the VRS 1st Krajina Corps. That material was already
18 in the possession of the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor when I arrived.
19 My then-line manager, analytical team boss, asked me to look at
20 this material which up until then had not been fully analysed. And I
21 started to do that over a protracted period of time. I had other tasks,
22 but that was one of the tasks I was set. In fact, it became my key task.
23 And so the material I predominantly used for the production of this
24 report was material from that collection. It became known as the
25 1st Krajina Corps, or 1 KK collection, in the Office of the Prosecutor.
1 It wasn't the only documents that I used in the report, though, but it
2 provided the bulk of the materials.
3 I did use a number of additional documents, some police documents
4 which related, I believe, related to areas that I was looking at and
5 reflected similar issues that were relevant in the 1 Krajina Corps
6 collection. Used a small number of political documents and, I believe, a
7 very small number of open source or video-related material. But the
8 overwhelming bulk of the material came from this collection, from the
9 archive of the 1st Krajina Corps.
10 Q. In general terms, the documents that came from the headquarters
11 of the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka, did that show reports to the
12 Main Staff or orders by General Talic, or whoever preceded him, to his
13 subordinate officers, or was it a mixture?
14 A. It was a mixture of documents. Although, I would add, I believe
15 that many of the documents were reports up the chain. So in the case of
16 the JNA documents, the 2nd Military District; and when the 5th Corps
17 became the 1st Krajina Corps, to the Main Staff of the VRS. There were a
18 lot of daily combat reports. The VRS, in particular, often reported
19 twice a day, very rare -- occasionally three times a day. So there was a
20 significant number of documents that were reports from the corps to the
21 Main Staff. However, there were also documents relating to the internal
22 workings of the corps, documents to subordinate units, logistic reports,
23 and occasionally some documents that went externally from the corps.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sorry.
2 MS. KORNER: Yes.
3 Q. Yes, thank you. All right. Can we turn directly, please, to
4 your report, and I think you've a got a copy with you. And can we look,
5 please, just at the first section that -- on political and military
6 developments at page 12.
7 MS. KORNER: Oh, yes, well I -- yeah. For the moment, I don't
8 need it.
9 Q. You set out there, first of all - and I don't propose to go
10 through anything in particular there - the -- the general developments
11 between January and April of 1992 and then --
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, could we have the relevant part on the ...
13 MS. KORNER: Do you want it on the screen?
14 MR. ZECEVIC: For the benefit of our clients, I think.
15 MS. KORNER: Yes, I'm sorry, I'm -- Your Honours, I'm
16 summarizing. And when I come -- perhaps I can put it this way: When I
17 come to a specific matter that I want to ask about, we'll have it up on
18 the screen. But otherwise it's just going to be a question of the screen
19 trying to catch up with what I'm doing.
20 Q. At page 15 you dealt with the 5th Corps. And, now, can I just
21 ask you something about the 5th Corps and as it became the
22 1st Krajina ...
23 Within the JNA, how big was the 5th Corps in comparison with the
24 other corps?
25 A. I would -- I would have to be a bit hesitant to answer that
2 Q. Right.
3 A. I can tell you what subsequently happened with the VRS. The
4 problem in relation to the 5th Corps was -- especially into 1992, was
5 that a number of corpses of the JNA began to fragment.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
7 We were just concerned about whether the two accused would have a
8 paper copy of the -- of your report so as to enable them to follow.
9 Is the Defence able to clarify?
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I believe they have, but -- I mean, the problem is
11 Ms. Korner is summarizing, so I guess they would not -- because I can't
12 find the relevant part that she's referring to. And then if -- if
13 Ms. Korner intends to do that in the future, then perhaps she can give
14 also the indication of the number in Serbian for the benefit of the
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: That it true. But as Ms. Korner explained - hold
17 on a minute. As Ms. Korner explained, at this point where she is just
18 rapidly going through the main features of the report, it would -- it
19 would take considerable time to have it brought up on the screen each and
20 every time. So when we come to the point where we have to digest the
21 report in detail, at that point I think it's -- it's required to have the
22 text put up in the screen both in B/C/S and in English. But if the
23 accused would have a paper copy so that they could follow as Ms. Korner
24 is quickly running through it, it might be helpful to them. And that was
25 what we were concerned about.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours. I didn't -- I didn't
2 object to Ms. Korner's explanation, and I -- I appreciate the way that
3 she intends to deal with the -- with the matter, and I wasn't complaining
4 about that at all. And as for the clients, we will provide them with a
5 copy if they don't have that at the moment.
6 Thank you.
7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
8 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, and, no, I can't give page numbers in
9 B/C/S, I'm afraid. The one thing I certainly didn't do was mark-up the
10 B/C/S copy, so I'm afraid that the English-speaking counsel will have to
11 indicate if -- what page it is in B/C/S.
12 JUDGE HALL: Anyway, it's the time for the first break, so we
13 would -- if this is a convenient point, with the interruption.
14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... certainly,
15 Your Honours.
16 JUDGE HALL: And we would resume in 20 minutes.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, just while the witness is coming back
21 into court, can I just ask that the document that you admitted from our
22 motion, 3708, be assigned an exhibit number, which is what was the
23 request in our motion. So document from the motion, the Skrbic document.
24 And you said you granted our motion with respect to Rule 65 ter number
25 3708, so could it be assigned an exhibit number, please.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
3 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you. So admitted and marked.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1777, Your Honours.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I understood
7 correctly then, the Prosecutor's application was to have a bar table
8 motion --
9 MS. KORNER: [Previous translation continues]
10 [Overlapping speakers] ... the application at the end of the motion - I'm
11 sorry, Mr. Krgovic - was admitted into evidence proposed 65 ter
12 Exhibit 3708 through the bar table, in other words, not as the part of
13 the bar table motion, and order the Registry to assign a trial -- an
14 exhibit number. And that motion was granted. It's not on our bar table
15 motion that we filed, the big one.
16 I hope that explains it to Mr. Krgovic's satisfaction.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 JUDGE HALL: And Mr. Krgovic may take comfort from the fact that
19 I was similarly confused. So thank you.
20 MS. KORNER:
21 Q. Yes, Mr. Brown, I'm sorry about that.
22 All right. I want to deal with, effectively, that part of your
23 report that we can see which begins at paragraph 1.15 - I think the
24 paragraph numbers are the same in the translation - where you talk about
25 the 5th Corps between January and April of 1992. And you refer to a
1 document in respect of your sentence at the end of that paragraph, which
2 is on page 16 in English, which was the withdrawal from Western Slavonia
3 in the Croatian conflict, and you state that:
4 "Some units were tasked with securing full control of the
5 territory, preventing inter-ethnic conflicts, and establishing links with
6 the municipal authorities, TO staff, et cetera."
7 And can we look, please -- this is a document that's already been
8 exhibited - it's referred to in your footnote 14 - at document
9 number 2 -- sorry. It's tab 2 of our list; it's P60.3.
10 This is an order dated the 1st of April, 1992, to the
11 10th Partisan Division. The order is to pull out that brigade, or
12 division, from combat in the Draskenic village.
13 And was that in Croatia?
14 A. Yes, Ms. Korner. This unit had been operating in
15 Western Slavonia as part of the 5th Corps in Western Slavonia, and it was
16 ordered back to Bosnia.
17 Q. Then it says it's ordered back to Bosnia to go to Sanski Most.
18 "To deploy the unit in the Sanski Most Kamengrad village with the
19 following tasks: achieving full control of the territory, preventing
20 inter-ethnic conflict, setting up roadblocks, and securing features of
21 special importance, establish full cooperation with the organs of
22 government in Sanski Most municipality, and collaboration with the TO,
23 Territorial Defence, and police units."
24 Now, this is an early document. How does that fit in with your
25 assessment of -- of the cooperation of -- that existed between the army
1 and other aspects of, I suppose, defence?
2 A. I -- in reviewing the documents, I saw a number of references
3 that cooperation with municipal authorities, legal authorities on the
4 ground, police, it was a component in -- in a lot of documents in the
5 1 Krajina Corps. And it was also a feature in Western Slavonia, I have
6 to say. So I don't think it was necessarily something new. When the
7 5th Corps was in Western Slavonia, it clearly cooperated with TO units
8 and government organisations there, and this is -- although it's an early
9 document, I saw this type of language reflected in a large number of
10 documents or a number of documents in the Krajina Corps throughout the
11 spring and summer of 1992.
12 Q. All right. Now, your report, in fact, devoted a whole section to
13 Western Slavonia. It begins at paragraph 1.19. And you deal with, in
14 paragraph 1.20, how it deployed the 5th Corps in the Autumn of 1991 to
15 Western Slavonia. And then at 1.23 you cover what you have
16 just - 1.23 - dealt with, which is on page 18, the cooperation with and
17 the utilisation of the Serb TO.
18 Now, the question of that cooperation, did that also cover
19 provision of arms? Because you deal with that at the top of page 19.
20 A. In relation to Western Slavonia, there were a small number of
21 documents that the 5th Corps was providing weapons to the
22 Territorial Defence in Western Slavonia, including, I think, one
23 document, or at least one reference, that weapons were being provided
24 after the UN agreement in Croatia, which -- I'd have to read the UN
25 agreement in detail, but I believe indicated that the area was to be, in
1 essence, demilitarised, and only police with side-arms were allowed to be
3 So I did some small number of documents that the provision of
4 weapons by the 5th Corps to the TO in Slavonia occurred.
5 Q. Right. Now, was that to all TOs?
6 A. No. I believe it was only to the Western Slavonia TO. It wasn't
7 TOs -- Croatian TOs or others, it was to Serbian TOs in Western Slavonia.
8 Q. All right. Now, did it also, in fact, in Western Slavonia, did
9 the 5th Corps deal with what were called volunteers or paramilitaries?
10 And if you look at your paragraph 1.25.
11 A. Yes. There were references in a small number of documents to the
12 integration or use of volunteers, and in particular highlight
13 Veljko Milankovic, paramilitary commander, in Western Slavonia. They
14 were integrated into the corps and used in operations there. Some of the
15 volunteers, I believe, came from Serbia.
16 Q. All right. And just jumping ahead for a moment because you will
17 see later how you cover the question of paramilitaries. Was the use
18 of -- of Milankovic in Western Slavonia echoed later on in their dealings
19 with the paramilitary formations in Bosnia?
20 A. Are you talking specifically about Milankovic or more generally
21 about paramilitary?
22 Q. More generally.
23 A. I think when the VRS was established it became acutely aware of a
24 problem relating to paramilitaries. I do deal with that in the report.
25 And I believe that General Talic issued some instructions relating to
1 paramilitary groups. I don't think he was particularly happy with the
2 fact that paramilitary groups were operating outside his command. He
3 instructed units of his command appropriately to, in essence, bring these
4 paramilitary groups under the command of the army or disband them. And I
5 do know, at least the Milankovic case, he was integrated into the VRS,
6 given a rank. At one stage, and I believe later, in 1992 - I would have
7 to go through the document again - was instructed by Talic to go and
8 conduct operations, and I believe he was later killed in 1992 in combat
10 There were clearly problems with paramilitaries, recognised by
11 the VRS. And they instructed that these groups were to be integrated and
12 put under unified command.
13 Q. All right. Then, moving through, you then dealt with, from
14 page 21, paragraph 1.29, the 5th Corps, between April and May. And can
15 we come, please, straight away, to the 16th Session of the Assembly of
16 the Serbian People on the 12th of May dealt with in your report at
17 page 24, paragraph 1.38.
18 MS. KORNER: And can we have up, please, the document itself,
19 which is P754. Oh, and it's at tab - sorry, I should have said - 6.
20 Your Honours, I'm really sorry, I -- oh, no, of course, yeah.
21 Sorry, I thought I had lost it. I have to find it again. I've just got
22 it in the wrong place.
23 Yes. Now, Mr. Brown, can we first of all deal with this
24 generally. How important, in your view, from the point of view of the
25 development of the Bosnian Serb army, the VRS, and the -- their, if you
1 like, cooperation with political and other civilian authorities, was this
3 A. I believe in the report itself I argue that this is quite an
4 important meeting, and, in fact, a particularly important meeting. I
5 would indicate that this is not, by any way, a stand-alone meeting. But
6 in relation to the 16th Assembly, it establishes the VRS. Its decisions
7 are passed in relation to the establishment of the army, the position of
8 Mladic as its commander. And, I believe, in the discussions about the
9 strategic goals, it gives a political back-drop to what the VRS are
10 expected to be achieving in the coming weeks and months as a military.
11 It outlines six strategic goals. Karadzic outlines those goals.
12 And if we go through those goals individually: Placing the separation
13 from the other two national communities in Bosnia as the most important
14 strategic goal --
15 Q. Yes, just pause for a moment, if would you, Mr. Brown. Perhaps
16 we better just turn up that part.
17 MS. KORNER: Can we look, please, at -- in the English, page 13,
18 possibly -- actually, I suppose it could be 14. And in the B/C/S, at
19 page 7.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: What are you referring to, Ms. Korner? Page
21 numbers or paragraph numbers or ...
22 MS. KORNER: Sorry?
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: To what exactly are you referring -- [Overlapping
24 speakers] ...
25 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... I'm referring to the
1 12th of May Assembly. And the page numbers I've given are the page
2 numbers at the bottom, in each case.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.
4 MS. KORNER: So it's page 7 in -- sorry. It's page 13 in
5 English; and I believe it begins at the bottom of page 7 in the B/C/S.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Of which document?
7 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... no, it doesn't.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Of which document?
10 MS. KORNER: 12th of May Assembly, Your Honour.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
14 MS. KORNER: Actually, no, that's not the right page. Oh, yes,
15 it is, yep. If I'm right, it's the beginning. Right.
16 Q. The strategic goals. The first such goal: Separation from the
17 other two national communities, separation of states. Separation from
18 those who are enemies and have used every opportunity, especially in this
19 century, to attack us.
20 Right. Second is the establishment of the corridor between
21 Semberija and Krajina.
22 MS. KORNER: And we need to go to the next page, please, in B/C/S
23 for this.
24 Q. Third strategic goal: The corridor in the Drina value -- Drina
1 Fourth strategic goal: The establishment of the border on the
2 Una -- Una, sorry, and Neretva rivers.
3 Fifth strategic goal: Division of the city of Sarajevo.
4 And sixth - for which we need go over the page in English - is
5 access of the Serbian republic to the sea.
6 Now how did those goals, as set out, link up with the military
7 operations, Mr. Brown? I think you effectively deal with that in
8 paragraph 1.41.
9 A. Well, I would argue that those strategic goals were reflected in
10 military documents. They were reflected in a number of military
11 directives that were sent by the Main Staff not long after this Assembly
12 session. They were reflected, in terms of commentary, down the line
13 through Talic's instructions and reports; and, in particular, for
14 example, second strategic goal, which is a corridor link through
15 Semberija, basically linking the Krajina with Semberija, General Talic,
16 within weeks of this Assembly session, launched a very large military
17 operation to achieve that strategic goal, which his corps did do through
18 the summer of 1992.
19 There are -- some of the goals were not achieved. For example,
20 access to the sea was one. And there was some problems in the
21 Neretva river. But through a number of VRS Main Staff directives I would
22 argue that it's clear that these were not just political hot air or
23 rhetoric that had no great meaning; actually they were seen and reflected
24 in the operations that were conducted by the military through the year.
25 I would also add that I don't believe that the 16th Assembly and
1 the goals announced there were the start point. I believe there are --
2 were references through other Assembly sessions prior to that, indicating
3 that the objectives of the Serbs, for example, were to separate Sarajevo,
4 divide Sarajevo into a Muslim and Serb part, or to divide Sarajevo, or to
5 have a corridor link. And in some of the previous Assembly sessions in
6 1992, late 1991, I think you can see echos of those goals.
7 But the 16th Assembly Session for me is one that crystalises
8 that. So it states what the objectives are. But also the decisions that
9 are passed at that Assembly establish the army. Establish the command;
10 place Mladic as the head of the army; discuss issues of integrating the
11 TO into the army to form a unified command, and one army rather than a
12 separate TO and a VRS; and that there is to be a functioning chain of
14 So I believe this Assembly session is very important. And, if
15 you like, crystalising the next stage in what the Serbs, the Bosnian
16 Serbs, were going to be doing through May, June, into the summer, and
17 later into 1992.
18 Q. Now, you make the comment that the language used was in many
19 senses inflammatory, combative, and derogatory. This is at
20 paragraph 1.44.
21 If we just look at a couple of examples of what some of the other
22 delegates said.
23 MS. KORNER: First of all, at page 32, Mr. Kozic, and -- that's
24 in English. And in B/C/S, that is at -- I've got it all marked up. I've
25 just got to search where the markings are.
1 Yes, I think that's at page 14 in the B/C/S. Actually, no ...
2 sorry, not page 14. Page 23. My fault. Yep.
3 Q. Mr. Kozic, who is talking about it, says:
4 "I have asked for the floor because of the following suggestion:
5 The enemy, Ustashas and Mujahedin, must be defeated by whatever means are
6 necessary, and only after that can we negotiate."
7 Was that one of the comments that you had in mind?
8 A. Yes. And there are -- I think when you read the Assembly session
9 in its entirety there are a number of references. The tone of the
10 Assembly session doesn't seem to be one that's somewhat calm. Even
11 Mladic, for example, indicates that; he talks about heads of
12 fundamentalism and Muslim and Croat hoards. And language like that is --
13 is -- is present in this Assembly session.
14 Q. Yes. We'll look at Mladic in a moment. But can we now look,
15 please, at a speech that comes shortly after that by a
16 Professor Milojevic, which is at page 33, English, and 24 in B/C/S.
17 Now, he says, in the second paragraph of that statement:
18 "I would like to suggest there will be no doubt that will be the
19 first option of war ..." and so on and so forth.
20 And then in the fourth sentence in English:
21 Which applies that -- "Which implies that we would have to have a
22 map of our own, a border agreed between the political and military
23 leadership of our republic, one thoroughly assessed and, I might add,
24 kept a secret. Divulge it to no one. But each and every general must
25 know this border. And the political leadership should keep this map as a
1 political potential," sorry, "negotiating chip."
2 And then further down, the sentence beginning:
3 "If it is a state border, it intrinsically implies moving a
4 contingent of population. Within the present option, we do not have
5 the [sic] solution."
6 Now, was that a speech of significance, in your view, Mr. Brown?
7 A. Yes. I think it's a comment that -- there are other references
8 in the document, but I think it's a comment worthy of note, that in
9 essence the strategic goals appear to me to be saying, Here's the
10 territory that we want to control, and that will be ours.
11 And there are references in -- from various delegates and
12 speech -- delegates and representatives, saying this will involve the
13 resettlement of people. And sometimes in these documents it's what's not
14 there that may also speak volumes, because I don't really see many people
15 rebutting that and saying, We must not do that, except with the
16 possibility, somewhat oddly enough, of Mladic who seems to raise a note
17 of caution about what is being discussed or prepared.
18 Q. Yeah. And let's just look briefly, then, look at what Mladic had
19 to say during this speech. His speech begins at page 35, and it's a
20 very, very lengthy speech.
21 MS. KORNER: If we look at, first of all, page 36 in English, and
22 it's, I believe, page 27 in the B/C/S.
23 Q. In the middle of second paragraph, he says:
24 "As for defining the goal, it would be very useful to determine
25 and to define the territory of the Serbian republic of Bosnia and
2 And then further down that same paragraph:
3 "If we have taken something in this war that was not ours, we
4 need to keep hold of it so that in political negotiations we can get
5 those things that were ours and we cannot get it in any other way."
6 What do you understand him to be saying at that stage?
7 A. Well, I think it's -- my reading of this is that the
8 16th Assembly Session is outlining the areas that they want - this
9 Bosnian Serb leadership, that is - want to control. And when he says
10 "not ours," I assume what he means here is possibly territory or
11 municipalities that are not necessarily Serb but that they should concur
12 them or take control of them so that they can somehow trade later, maybe
13 in a political solution or some other agreement, that territory away.
14 And later, in the summer of 1992, the Krajina Corps's zone, for
15 example, they took control of Jajce. And Jajce is not, I believe, a
16 predominantly Serb municipality. It had other values because of -- it
17 had a hydro-electric plant and other areas. But some of the corridor
18 municipalities, for example, were predominantly Croat. But I think what
19 he's saying here is that we must be prepared to take the territories,
20 even though they're not ours in terms of ethnicity or traditionally Serb,
21 so that we can organise and deal with the trade of territory later.
22 Q. All right.
23 MS. KORNER: And then if we go to the next page in English, but
24 it's still the same page in B/C/S, we see, at the top, he is saying:
25 "People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in one's
1 pocket that can be shifted from here to there."
2 Is it a quote like that that you had in mind when you were saying
3 he's sounding a note of caution about things?
4 A. Yes. I think there are one or two references in this speech from
5 Mladic that -- and I think I've referenced them in my report. That's one
6 of them. And there are two other ones which seem to indicate that he has
7 an idea of what this is -- this is discussing. This is discussing the
8 movement of people or the forcible removal of people and this might not
9 be an easy thing to do.
10 I would also draw your attention to a quote that he says later
11 on, when he says: What we are discussing here should be kept as our
12 guarded secret. And I think from my reading of this, this Assembly
13 session, he has an understanding of what is going to happen or what is
14 likely to happen, and he warns, in a way, that people are going to be
15 expelled and that -- and moved. I think it's -- it's -- it sits in stark
16 contrast to some of the comments from the delegates who are actually
17 talking about resettlement.
18 Q. Yep. Well, yeah, in fact, that was the next part of the speech I
19 was going to look at.
20 MS. KORNER: If we go to the -- please, the next page. 38 in
21 English, and it's 27 in B/C/S -- 28 in B/C/S as well.
22 Q. If we look at the middle. And, as I say, this is an exceedingly
23 lengthy, apparently unbroken speech by General Mladic. In the middle of
24 the page:
25 "Please let us not only put our minds into what we are doing" -
1 it's about ten lines down - "but let us also think thoroughly about it
2 and let us be cautious about when to keep mum. The thing we are doing
3 needs to be guarded as our deepest secret. And what our representatives
4 appearing in the media at political talks and negotiations are going to
5 say, and they do need to present our goals in a way that will sound
6 appealing to the ears of those we want to win over to our side, without
7 being detrimental to our Serbian people. Our people must know how to
8 read between the lines."
9 And, I mean, in fact, that echos, does it not, Mr. Brown, what
10 Mr. Kozic said a few minutes ago about keeping things a secret?
11 A. Yes, it does, Ms. Korner.
12 Q. Yeah. All right. And just, as I suppose as a contrast, if we
13 look, finally, on General Mladic's speech, at the next page in English,
14 page 39. And it's page 29 in B/C/S.
15 At the top, he refers to a Colonel Hasotic. And he said:
16 "I've explained to you just now, but I will have to do it here
17 before the Assembly. I brought Colonel Vukelic with me this morning, who
18 is from these parts ... shared the same school bench ever since high
19 school. However, it is better to have, here, this Hasotic, who was here
20 amongst us, than to have him take the place of the [indiscernible] Karic
21 or to have him in the trenches fighting against us."
22 Now, first of all, do you know who Hasotic was, Colonel Hasotic?
23 A. Yes, I do, Ms. Korner. He was a JNA officer. Prior to taking
24 his position in the VRS, as head of the VRS, Mladic was commander of the
25 9th Corps in Knin. And Hasotic was one of his staff officers and he was
1 a Muslim officer.
2 Q. Did -- jumping ahead for a moment, did Muslim officers like
3 Colonel Hasotic and Colonel Selak remain in the corps once it was
4 reconstituted as the 1st Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army?
5 A. No. There may have one or two at lower levels. There may have
6 been some in some of the units. But certainly in the staff there were
7 the removals of non-Serb officers, I believe sometime in June 1992. Most
8 of them were sent on leave or sent to have their status resolved in
9 Belgrade, and I believe Hasotic was one of them.
10 Q. All right.
11 A. I also just like to add, I think: What Mladic may be saying here
12 is that there might be other good reasons not to have non-Serbs -- I
13 think he's looking at it from a military perspective. He's saying, If we
14 get rid of all these people - in particular his staff officers - these
15 are the very people who are going to be potentially fighting us. So he
16 might be throwing that in as another reason, not necessarily because he
17 has obvious sympathies there, but I think it's from a military
18 perspective he's saying, We need to be weary.
19 Q. And he goes on shortly, within a few lines further on:
20 "Therefore we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so
21 that only Serbs would stay or that the Serbs would fall through and the
22 rest leave. Well, that is -- that will not -- I do not know how
23 Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to the world. People,
24 that would be genocide."
25 So was that, in your view, a continuation of this theme about
1 what to do about the non-Serbs?
2 A. It would appear to be, yes.
3 Q. All right. And then further down the paragraph, he seems to
4 switch slightly, because the language he uses, as I think you pointed
5 out, becomes a bit more descriptive. He says -- he's talking about the
6 Muslims living peacefully above Kalinovik, and then the military hospital
7 under blockade, so the Muslims are under blockade, there is nowhere they
8 can go. One of the reasons is because of the head of the Dragan
9 fundamentalist lies beneath our hammer.
10 And, again, is that the language you were thinking about?
11 A. Yes, I think that's quite derogatory language.
12 MS. KORNER: And then, finally, and this is the final part of the
13 speech, could we go to page 45 in English. And in B/C/S it is page 33.
14 Q. He says, at the top there:
15 "The enemy has attacked us with all its might from all
16 directions" - it's about five lines down - "and it's a common enemy
17 regardless whether it is the Muslim hordes or Croatian hordes. It is our
18 common enemy. What is important now is either to throw both of them out,
19 employing political and other moves, or to organisation ourselves and to
20 throw out one by force of arms and we will be able to deal somehow with
21 the other."
22 And how does that particular utterance by Mladic fit in to what
23 subsequently happened, Mr. Brown, as far as you're concerned?
24 A. Well, there clearly was a significant use of the VRS in
25 operations immediately -- actually, prior to this Assembly session.
1 There was already operations going on. But certainly in the weeks and
2 days and months after that, there was significant operations.
3 So --
4 Q. Right. All right. That's all I want to ask you about the
5 session itself.
6 Now, going back to your report, you make the point, at
7 paragraph 1.53, that these strategic goals were not simply rarified
8 statements. And is that exemplified by one of the documents that you
9 looked at?
10 MS. KORNER: Sorry. Can I, just for a moment -- yes, can we look
11 at, I think it's 58.
12 I just want to check, sorry, Your Honours, one document.
13 Q. Yeah, you make the point that these goals were disseminated, in
14 fact, to the lower levels.
15 MS. KORNER: And can we look now, please, at the mobilization
16 order, 21st of May, tab 11, which is document number 10505.
17 Q. Now, this is the general mobilisation order issued by
18 General Talic, although I think if we look at the last page we'll see it
19 was signed on his behalf by somebody else.
20 And if we look at the terms of this general mobilisation order,
21 first of all, it's page -- second page in English but still on this front
22 page of the B/C/S:
23 "Immediately establish direct contact with municipal, military,
24 and territorial organs on the ground, offering expert and materiel
25 support for the mobilisation process."
1 That's item 1.
2 Item 5 -- well, before I actually move on to this slightly
3 different topic, how does that fit in with the general themes that you
4 observed through your analysis of these documents?
5 A. Well, I think this is an important document. It comes not long
6 after the Assembly session and the establishment of the army. It calls
7 for mobilisation. There had actually been calls prior to this for
8 mobilisation, and there had been mobilisation of the Serbian TO in
9 April and calls for mobilisation in early May. But this is a
10 mobilisation instruction based on the Presidency. So the Presidency have
11 called for this, Talic has passed it down the chain, and it's of note
12 that his first instruction is to establish direct contact with municipal
13 and military organs on the ground. It's -- he places it as his first
14 task for those who have been mobilised.
15 He also makes note, in paragraph 6, that those who are mobilised
16 are to have the goals of our struggle briefed to them. So it doesn't
17 specifically reference the six strategic goals, but it does indicate that
18 those who are being mobilised are to be made of why they are being
19 mobilised and what the struggle is about.
20 Q. All right. Which goes on from the point you're making in your
22 The -- before you move on to the next page in English, but
23 item 5:
24 "When conscripts are enlisted into the units, perform security
25 checks on each individual, taking care that provocateurs and fifth
1 columnists are not admitted."
2 I think fifth columnists, it may be fairly obvious what's meant
3 by that. But what about provocateurs? Are you able to assess what he
4 was referring to there?
5 A. I don't think I'd like to make a guess on what he means by that.
6 He could be talking about, say, Muslims or Croats who might come in and
7 become problematic. He could be talking about Serbian paramilitaries.
8 But I'm not sure I'd like to make a comment on what that is.
9 Q. All right. Okay. Moving then, please, to paragraph 8.
10 MS. KORNER: Next page in English, and it's the second page in
12 Q. "Until the units receive combat tasks, engage them in the
13 following tasks."
14 And item -- the 4th task:
15 "Establish the closest possible cooperation with the people and
16 legal authorities within their zones of responsibility."
17 So is that developing, effectively, from his first instruction?
18 A. Yes. I think it reinforces what he said in paragraph 1.
19 Q. All right.
20 A. And I would argue that in a number of cases from the
21 documentation that's exactly what happened.
22 I'd also like, maybe, to draw your attention to paragraph 11,
23 which relates to paramilitaries. It says:
24 "Do not allow the presence of paramilitary formations or other
25 special organisations within the zone of responsibility. Disperse
1 individuals [sic] among various units as volunteers, and if they refuse,
2 break them up. Or, if necessary, destroy them."
3 Maybe there'll be an issue that will come up later, but I -- this
4 is, for me, one of Talic's -- a constant thread or a regular thread that
5 comes through his documents, that he -- he's unhappy with paramilitaries
6 working outside his chain of command and that -- yet that he's happy to
7 have them in, in his units.
8 Q. All right. And why do you think it is that he's unhappy about
9 them working outside of his chain of command?
10 A. Well, I can't say for sure, because, you know, it was not
11 necessarily documentation that shows his thoughts on the matter, but he
12 was a professional military man. And I think senior officers want to be
13 in command. And I think having organisations outside his military
14 command, either conducting operations separately to what he was doing or
15 doing other things, may not have sat well with him. And he wanted to
16 have them inside. It may also be a reflection on what was articulated at
17 the 16th Assembly Session, which -- where they've have the units -- what
18 they called a unity of command. The VRS was to have, like any army, was
19 to have a proper chain of command. So I think he, as a military man,
20 wanted to have them in his formations rather than outside.
21 Q. All right. And then one further small point on this document.
22 MS. KORNER: If we go to the next page in English, please, and
23 it's the last page -- it's page 3 in B/C/S and page 4 in English.
24 Q. We see there -- well, there we can see the stamp, and it's got
25 the word "Zar." So someone signed, apparently, on General Talic's
1 behalf. But underneath that is the distribution list.
2 Now, was that common on military documents, that there'd be a
3 list of the people to whom this was going?
4 A. Yes, that's right, Ms. Korner. In many of them, not all of them,
5 but many of the documents had a distribution list.
6 Q. All right. I know it's difficult, and if you can't answer that
7 question, say so. But did -- have you ever seen a document which shows
8 one of these orders or directions from General Talic going to the police?
9 A. I have seen one or two documents which were specifically directed
10 to the police, i.e., it was a letter or a report to them. I can't
11 remember if I've seen any document, if you like, a more routine document
12 that has a distribution of the police at the bottom.
13 There were one or two which were related to police issues or
14 cooperation issues or the provision of equipment to the police which
15 clearly went in the address block to the police, but in terms of the more
16 routine military instructions, I don't remember. If there are there,
17 they are probably very small number.
18 Q. All right. Although, of course, as we can see from that,
19 obviously the military police was a different matter. They came under
20 [indiscernible] command.
21 All right. Can we a look -- now there's one example of, as you
22 say, the goals or the directions which emerged from the
23 12th of May Assembly being disseminated. Can we look at much, much later
24 document, please, which you looked at more recently, and that's at
25 tab 58 --
1 MS. KORNER: Oh, Your Honours, in fact, this one hasn't yet been
2 made an exhibit. So could that be, please, admitted and marked.
3 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1778, Your Honours.
5 MS. KORNER: Now can we have up on the screen, please,
6 65 ter 1611, please; tab 58.
7 Q. Now, this document is much, much later in time, obviously.
8 24th of November, 1992. And it's addressed to the Zvornik Light Infantry
9 Brigade command. And it says:
10 "Pursuant to the directive of the Main Staff ... strictly
11 confidential number ... and assessment of the situation, I have
12 decided ..."
13 How does that fit in with your observations and conclusions on
14 the dissemination of instructions?
15 A. Well, I think it's - I hope - quite self-evident, that the
16 Drina Corps is passing to a subordinate brigade an instruction that it's
17 received from the Main Staff and would seem to show a functioning chain
18 of command. And the directive in question, I believe, has similar
19 language in paragraph 1. And maybe more generally, although this is an
20 area, I do hasten to add, Your Honours, that I'm not necessarily as
21 detailed with in terms of knowledge of documents from the Krajina area;
22 this all relates to operations in the Drina valley. And, of course, the
23 Drina valley was one of the strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs. To get
24 control of the Drina valley and to eliminate the border between the FRY,
25 or Serbia, and the SRBiH. That was a stated strategic goal. And this
1 appears to be related to attempting to secure control of that area
2 through the use of directives from the Main Staff down to the corps and
3 then down onto a brigade of a lower level. And obviously in paragraph 1
4 it makes reference to forcing the Muslim local population to abandon
5 areas within that area.
6 Q. Right. We'll have a look at the directive in a moment. But if
7 we continue to say with this document, as you say, it was the Drina
8 valley. If we go over -- well, first of all, we can see it deals with
9 Visegrad and -- under paragraph 1. And then tasks for the units, the
10 task to the Zvornik Light Brigade in 2.1.
11 MS. KORNER: And over the page, please, in English and also in
13 Q. To Bratunac. And then further down he talks about the
14 intelligence support and engineers support. And then (c), morale and
15 psychological preparations.
16 "Before initiating any kind of operation, inform the unit members
17 about the important aim of that operation and underline that the outcome
18 of minor actions and of the whole operations of crucial importance ..."
19 MS. KORNER: And can we go to the next page, please, in English.
20 And I hope I'm on the right page in B/C/S. Yes, I am.
21 "... importance for the realisation of the aim of the
22 Serbian People, namely the creation and establishment of a Serbian state
23 in these areas."
24 And how does that fit in with the earlier documents that we saw
25 about mobilization?
1 A. Well, I think it's quite similar to some of the other directives
2 or areas, that even at the lower level the military are informing their
3 subordinates of the importance of the territory that they are to gain
4 control of. And, again, I say that this is an area that links to a
5 strategic goal of a -- getting control of the Drina valley. And it would
6 seem that they are placing an importance on informing, at the lower
7 level, the importance of that particular area and the importance of that
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. It's not a rarified statement that's held at a political level
11 that doesn't have any clear meaning. It would appear that the commander
12 of the Drina Corps is making sure that the soldiers who are going to
13 execute this particular operation know why it has a higher meaning or a
14 higher strategical importance.
15 Q. All right. And then if we look --
16 MS. KORNER: Oh, yes, I'm sorry. Yes, Your Honours. May that
17 now be admitted and marked, please.
18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1779, Your Honours.
20 MS. KORNER:
21 Q. And then if we look very quickly at Directive 4 which you in fact
22 deal with in a number of places in your report, which has got the 65 ter
23 number 1609.
24 It's not in -- it's going to come up on the screen, Mr. Brown.
25 Sorry it's not in the bundle, because it was a late addition.
1 You reference it, in fact, at your footnote number 80 in this
2 particular section dealing with it. It sets out what has happened.
3 If we can look at the second page in English, and it's also, I
4 believe, the second page in B/C/S. Yeah.
5 "Most of the tasks have been carried out in full. And among the
6 most significant, we would stress the following. The 1st Krajina Corps
7 has preserved and expanded the borders of the Republika Srpska; smashed
8 enemy groups in Central Bosnia, Bosanska Posavina; liberated
9 Bosanski Brod, Jajce, and other settlements in its area of
10 responsibility; protected the Serbian people; and preserved the corridor
11 through Posavina."
12 And then if we look at the following tasks which he's decided
13 should take place. At page 3 in English and also, I think, page 3 in the
15 "I have decided the following. The main forces of VRS army of
16 the Republika Srpska are to stabilise the Defence on the lines reached,
17 cleanse the free territory of Republika Srpska of the remaining enemy and
18 paramilitary formations, drive the regular Croatian army force out of our
19 territory, while the auxiliary forces are to crush the Muslim forces in
20 the Drina valley."
21 So, again, that's referring back to one of the strategic goals.
22 And then the aims of the operations are as follows.
23 MS. KORNER: And if we go to the next page in English, please.
24 THE WITNESS: And maybe just also on that particular page --
25 MS. KORNER: Yeah.
1 THE WITNESS: -- not related to the Drina valley, but it makes
2 mention that they haven't managed to achieve their goal in the Neretva
3 river, and that was a goal. And they also ask or say that they need to
4 expand the Posavina corridor so that even though they've secured the
5 corridor, they want to expand on it.
6 MS. KORNER: Yes, sorry. Can we just go back.
7 Q. You're quite right. I should have drawn your attention to that,
8 to the previous page. Yep.
9 The following tasks from Directive 3 have not been carried out.
10 And there we see, as you say, the Herzegovina corps has filed to reach
11 the left bank of the Neretva river security access to the sea.
12 And then, finally, on this document, two other matters.
13 MS. KORNER: So can we go, please, to page 4 in English. These
14 are the aims of the operation.
15 Q. "Launch offensive operations to crush the HVO and the Muslims in
16 the territory of Republika Srpska, force them into unconditionally
17 surrendering their weapons or destroy them?"
18 MS. KORNER: And then over the page, again, to (d), what the
19 Drina Corps is supposed to be doing. And I think, I'm sorry, we need to
20 go, probably, to the next page in B/C/S. Yes, it needs to be -- sorry,
21 yes, it's page -- in the B/C/S, it is 0087-6282 at the top. Yes, thank
23 Q. "(d) The Drina Corps, from its present position, its main forces
24 shall persistently defend Visegrad, the dam, Zvornik, and the corridor,
25 while the rest of its forces, in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust
1 the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, force him to
2 leave Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas, together with the Muslim
4 Again, how does that fit into the overall themes, Mr. Brown?
5 A. Well, I think it's as I said earlier on. This is the directive,
6 and then that the corps - the document that we saw before - that the
7 corps extracts its -- the Drina Corps extracts its component and passes
8 it down to the Zvornik Brigade in relation to operations in the Drina
9 valley, to control that territory and to move Muslims, as it's annotated
10 on that document.
11 Q. All right. Yes, thank you. That's all I ask about that
13 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may that be admitted and marked,
15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1780, Your Honours.
17 MS. KORNER:
18 Q. All right. Going back to your report again, Mr. Brown. From
19 paragraph -- and we've looked at some of the examples that you specified
20 in paragraph 1.53. You say that by -- in paragraph 1.54:
21 "By the summer of 1992, it was clear that the objectives of
22 creating a Serb state were not just political rhetoric but were a driving
23 factor behind the actions of the military."
24 And that's effectively what you've been describing to us now; is
25 that right?
1 A. Yes. I think there are some other documents as well that are
2 referenced. But I would argue that that is the case.
3 Q. Right. There are, in fact, a number of other references to other
4 documents, but because of the time, I'm going to move on. Right.
5 Yes, sorry, I'm doing -- because it's both of us speaking
6 English, I gather what has been happening with the B/C/S witnesses, not
7 leaving a pause.
8 Now, the strategic goals, and finally on this part before we move
9 to the next part of your ... were set out, were they not, very clearly in
10 a report which deals with a number of themes. And we may as well look at
11 that now. The analysis of the combat readiness of the army, which was
12 produced in 1993.
13 MS. KORNER: And it's document 1305, and it's at tab 62.
14 If we look, after the table of contents, effectively, at the
15 beginning of that, it's page 7 in English, control and command. And in
16 B/C/S it's on the -- it's page 8, I think. Yeah. Yes.
17 Q. It talks about what's happened in the VRS and says:
18 "The objective of our operations, battles, and engagement [sic]
19 in the recent period has been to defend the Serbian People against
20 genocide by the Muslim-Ustasha forces ... protect the property and
21 cultural heritage of the Serbian People, and to liberate ... territories
22 which are ours," and so on and so forth.
23 MS. KORNER: In fact, if we then look, please, at the third --
24 sorry, page 10 in English. And in B/C/S, at page 11, I think.
25 Q. Now, it says here:
1 "The control and command function in the framework of the
2 establishment of the Army of Republika Srpska developed in two stages.
3 The first from April -- 1st of April to 15th of June. And the second
4 from that date until today?"
5 Now, the -- the establishment of the VRS took place, did it not,
6 on the 12th of May, the 12th of May Assembly?
7 A. Yes, it did.
8 Q. Right. So when it talks about developed in two stages, what's it
9 referring to there?
10 A. I believe maybe what they're talking about is that once the army
11 was announced at the 16th Assembly Session there was a period where, if
12 you like, the formal structure of exactly what the corps were going to
13 consist of, the units that were going to be subordinated, the
14 Light Infantry Brigades that were going to be created into the TO, took a
15 few weeks or a period to be established. And that probably meant work at
16 the Main Staff level, maybe at the Presidency level. But once that had
17 been agreed and accepted, there -- I think, at least according to this
18 document, there was a formal establishment instruction which was passed
19 out around the 15th of June.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. That doesn't mean to say that I think when this army was
22 established on 12th of May that they were not -- the Main Staff was
23 somehow in a vacuum, because there are -- for example, the mobilisation
24 instruction was passed on the 20th of May by the Presidency, passed down
25 through the Main Staff to General Talic. He instructed that. There are
1 reports going up from General Talic prior to the 15th of May and
2 after the -- 15th of June and after the 12th of May, reports going up to
3 the Main Staff, daily combat reports two or three times a day. There are
4 instructions coming down to the Main Staff.
5 So I think it's a little bit ambiguous, this date. But I think
6 maybe what it meant was that around the middle of June all the pieces
7 were in place in terms of the formal establishment structure of what each
8 corps in the VRS was going to be. But it -- from my perspective, it
9 didn't mean that the VRS was not functioning between it's establishment
10 on the 12th of May and the middle of June. Far from it, actually.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Who exactly made this analysis?
12 THE WITNESS: This type of analysis was not unusual in the JNA.
13 And, in fact, I suspect what happened was that the VRS, because there
14 were many of them, were all former JNA officers, that they simply
15 utilised this process. And it was an established process within the JNA
16 to conduct, in essence, a retrospective analysis of how formations had
17 been in a particular period. And I think staff officers at the
18 Main Staff would have contributed components to this. The Main Staff
19 officers would have been heavily involved. And I know that there were
20 reports that went -- for example, the corps were expected to provide an
21 analysis of combat readiness, which, in turn, would assist the staff
22 officers at the Main Staff in compiling this analysis.
23 So, for example, there are logistic issues, issues on tanks,
24 communications, and I would suspect that each staff officer under whose
25 remit that function fell would probably be the person that would provide
1 the material for that analysis. And it would be fused together -- I
2 don't know for a fact, but possibly by someone like the chief of
3 operations, senior staff officer at the Main Staff, or maybe another
4 important senior staff officer.
5 So the information is provided by the subordinate formations, the
6 staff officers in the particular departments within the Main Staff would
7 most likely have provided the material that is relevant to their remits,
8 and it would probably be pulled together by maybe the operations and
9 training department to provide the full report.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you know if such reports were made regularly?
11 And were they made for purely internal purposes within the army, or were
12 they drawn up for external purposes so as to be presented to the
13 political leadership or others outside the military structure?
14 THE WITNESS: I think this is a type of document, bearing in mind
15 its size, that was once a year or relatively -- a relatively expanded
16 piece. But there is -- in the beginning of this document, it clearly
17 went with a briefing. It didn't just go as an interesting thick document
18 that went in the archive. Because at the beginning of the document it --
19 it's -- it gives an analysis briefing that clearly occurred. And when
20 you look at that, it's not just military figures that are attending this
21 briefing. It includes the political leadership. There are -- all the
22 various departments of the army, I think, are talking about their
23 individual component. And I believe even the minister of interior
24 attended this briefing.
25 So I think in this particular case -- this document was written
1 in 1993, so it is a retrospective document. I think it's April 1993; I
2 have to check the date, but I think it's April 1993. But it's reflecting
3 back on what had happened in 1992, and that was the normal format of this
4 type of report. In the JNA days it would be quite similar. But clearly
5 this one had been accompanied - I'm assuming occurred - because there is
6 a timetable of who is to brief --
7 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... yes, and if we go back --
8 if Your Honours -- yes, can we go back, please, to the page 4 in the
9 English after the contents table, and we'll see that. And in B/C/S it
10 will be at page -- it's at page 3. 5. Sorry. Page 5.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: But I think -- the important point of my question
12 was to shed some light over the recipients of this information.
13 THE WITNESS: I don't know who -- who were on the distribution.
14 I'd have to check. There is a distribution at the back, potentially.
15 But I don't know. But certainly, bearing in mind this was found in the
16 Krajina Corps archive, it's clearly gone down the military chain. And
17 you'd expect that. It reflects many of the issues that the army is to
18 address. I mean, the purpose of the report is not just to look back and
19 say, This is what happened; it's to address what they need to do in the
20 forthcoming period.
21 So clearly it's gone down. And clearly there's obviously a
22 briefing that involves other people outside the military. But I can't
23 tell you whether this document more widely was disseminated outside the
24 military structure.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Because the important thing is to know also
1 whether it was pushed upwards, more particularly to the government.
2 MS. KORNER: It's signed -- yes, sorry, Your Honour, that we can
3 do. It's signed. It's actually signed by Karadzic.
4 If we go, please, to page 157 in English. I believe it's page
5 137 in the B/C/S. When I say "signed," it appears under his signature as
6 supreme commander. It's not actually signed I don't think. It's just
8 English, please, at page 157.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I have some more questions on this
11 document, but I'm told it's time for the break.
12 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
13 So we would resume in 20 minutes.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I have had put up on the screen the
19 part that Mr. Brown was referring to about who was present at this
20 briefing on the report.
21 Q. All right, Mr. Brown, I've had put up on the screen the part of
22 that document that you were referring to, which is the briefing session,
23 it would appear. And we can see that at 1330 to 1400 there were speeches
24 by the guest participants in the analysis, the RS prime minister,
25 RS defence minister, and the minister of the interior, who I hasten to
1 add, in April 1993 was not, of course, Mico Stanisic.
2 Ten minutes per speech. I would be very surprised if that was
3 adhered to.
4 MS. KORNER: And then over the page, please, very quickly.
5 Q. In fact it appears there were representatives from other armies
6 there as well.
7 And then finally, at 1610, contribution of the supreme commander
8 of the armed forces of Republika Srpska to the analysis of the combat
10 And that was, in fact, was it not, Mr. Karadzic, as we saw?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. Yep. Right. Can we then go back to the part that was dealing
13 with. I think we've dealt with the dates that were shown about the
14 starting. And as you deal with in your report, in fact, we can see from
15 other documents that you reference that there were -- the Main Staff was
16 issuing instructions and orders before its formal date of the
17 15th of June.
18 MS. KORNER: The next -- oh, sorry. Page 11. Back to page 11 in
19 English. And page 11 also in B/C/S.
20 Q. In the second paragraph, it says how big the army was by
21 April of 1993. "The Army of Republika Srpska currently numbers 222.727
23 Are you able to comment at all on that, Mr. Brown?
24 A. No. I mean, I think it's at face value. That the size of the
25 military. And the 1st Krajina Corps, I think, was around about 70.000 at
1 that time. So it was one of the biggest, in fact, it was not -- it was
2 the biggest by some significant way, by that time.
3 Q. Right.
4 MS. KORNER: Then if we go next, please, to page 13 in English,
5 and where they're talking about infantry units. And it's page 13 also in
7 Q. Now, you deal -- in fact, you reference this part of the report
8 later on when you're dealing with other matters. Really the cooperation
9 with the Territorial Defence units. But we may as well deal with this as
10 one whole.
11 "The infantry units which through some self-organisation grew on
12 a massive scale out of the Territorial Defence and other units were used
13 only at the beginning of the war according to the decisions of
14 Crisis Staffs and similar authorative bodies. Amongst the infantry
15 units, there were also units which represented various political
16 structures, which were sometimes in opposition to the overall objectives
17 of our war. Some of them developed into paramilitary formations. These
18 units mainly executed missions in the territories of their own
19 municipalities or even smaller areas. Initially the units elected their
20 own commanders. And the targets of actions were chosen collectively.
21 And individuals or groups sometimes abandoned the set goals."
22 Now, again, really, what themes do we see, in this part, that you
23 consider to be important?
24 A. Well, I think looking at other documentation it would seem that
25 that first component about the use of Crisis Staffs, the referencing
1 Territorial Defence units that ended up being incorporated into the VRS
2 as light brigade, that would seem to be what happened. There were
3 municipal operations in which localised TO, or former TO, light brigades
4 were used, as well as regular VRS, I have to say. But it would seem to
5 be -- and then what happened is these units were integrated into the VRS.
6 And as the municipalities were brought under control, the operations
7 tended to change, at least in the 1st Krajina Corps, into larger, more
8 set, peace combat operations.
9 For example, the operations in the corridor. Operations in Jajce
10 was one, another one. So I think it would seem to be reasonably
11 reflective of what did happen in the early -- late spring, early summer,
12 municipality attacks with the use of Crisis Staffs at a localised level.
13 And then what happened later in summer were the more set piece, either
14 consolidation of the territory that they had, or larger-set peace combat
15 operations, like occurred in Jajce.
16 Q. All right. And there they refer also to the -- the units which
17 developed into paramilitary formations. Again, is that a theme that we
18 see echoed throughout the documentation that you've looked at, this
19 question of these so-called paramilitary organisations?
20 A. Yes. There were -- I -- I go back. I make no bones that there
21 were references in the documents, the military documents, that there were
22 what they called paramilitary groups outside the VRS that they wanted to
23 bring in under control. I would argue that it would seem, certainly in
24 the municipalities where the documentation is stronger, such as Prijedor,
25 such as Sanski Most, such as Kljuc, that the units from a military
1 perspective, although they were often operating or at least the documents
2 say they were operating with the police and -- you know, with
3 Crisis Staffs, the documents for me show that the units, the military
4 units that were involved in these municipalities were not paramilitary
5 ones. For example, the 43rd Motorised Brigade was not a paramilitary
6 group or unit. It was a formed unit of the 5th Corps that had operated
7 in Sanski -- in Croatia. It was sent back by Talic into Prijedor and
8 then it [indiscernible].
9 The 6th brigade that we saw earlier on that was deployed back
10 from Western Slavonia into Sanski Most was not a paramilitary group. The
11 1st Partisan Brigade operated in parts of Kljuc was not a paramilitary
13 So, yes, there are references to paramilitaries and the problem
14 of paramilitaries, but I wouldn't necessarily overplay them that they
15 somehow were the units that were involved in all or many or even most, I
16 have to say, of the actual takeover of municipalities or combat
17 operations that were taken in controlling the territory in that first
18 stage that they talk about.
19 Q. Right.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Brown, speaking as a military expert, would
21 you consider any military advantage for an army leadership to have such
22 paramilitary groups operating more or less on their own? Perhaps as
23 autonomous units that would be or could be controlled or guided on a very
24 superior level so as to say that such groups could be asked to assist in
25 this or that operation but other than that, these groups would be
1 operating on their own, basically.
2 Is there, from a military point of view, any advantage to having
3 such groups; or are they merely a nuisance to the military leadership and
4 the military structures?
5 THE WITNESS: I'm a little bit unclear. Your Honour, are you
6 talking about from my own experience or are you talking about from what I
7 see maybe from the documents relating to the VRS?
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sorry for being unclear. I'm talking about your
9 evaluation of the use that these paramilitary groups in Bosnia in 1992
10 could have offered to the army, if any.
11 THE WITNESS: I think, depending on who they are and what their
12 skills are and what they've done before, there could have been a value.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Such as?
14 THE WITNESS: Well, for example, if you look at
15 Veljko Milankovic, who clearly had some following in his municipality,
16 who clearly had a desire to fight - I'm assuming because he sent his
17 organisation and himself to Croatia - who continued to fight through 1992
18 until he was killed later in the war, of course they would have had --
19 and it may well have been they gained some experience or knowledge of
20 particular areas. It may well have had some significant previous
21 training. So from a strictly military perspective, there could have been
22 significant value in having them within the military.
23 But I think one of the issues potentially for Talic is that he is
24 a former JNA man. He has been instructed that the Serbian army is to
25 have a unified command and that -- that that should mean that anybody who
1 is in the army or -- or an armed unit, I mean, outside maybe the
2 Ministry of Interior, which also, you know, has an armed component,
3 should be placed under a command.
4 And I think I argue in the report is that, yes, he makes
5 references to, We must disband these groups or break them up, but it
6 strikes me that it's as much an issue of command and control as it is
7 about the unhappiness of what these organisations -- organisations have
8 actually done. He brings Veljko Milankovic into his corps and he gives
9 him a task with the knowledge that this mans has created problems in the
10 past. And I think it's almost -- but -- it is a complicated issue, I
11 have to say, and it is -- it strikes me is that the greater goal of
12 having a unified Serb position and a unified army counts more than the
13 fact that these people are looting, committing crimes, are sometimes
14 disreputable characters, and challenging what they see as the legal
15 authority, i.e., their authority. That seems to be the problem for them.
16 More than the really obvious one, is that, Is this the type of
17 organisation you want to bring into a military organisation?
18 Because I know from my own military perspective there would have
19 been, talking about the British Army here, there is no way that I could
20 see any commander that I have known in my military service come anywhere
21 close to some of these groups that are outlined in some of these reports,
22 let alone, you know, integrate them into their command.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you for this answer. Could I just put a
24 supplementary question: Namely, if you are in possession of any evidence
25 to show that these paramilitary groups were assigned particular tasks by
1 the military, such as mopping-up operations or cleaning up after the
2 takeover, do you have any evidence to support this? Or is that
3 [Overlapping speakers] ...
4 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers] ... I would like to refresh
5 my report and some of the footnotes and maybe get back to you, if I
6 could, tomorrow on that. There are references to paramilitaries
7 operating. I said Milinkovic was one that was integrated into the corps
8 and send off for operations. Whether it was specifically to do cleaning
9 up operations, I would have to look again at the documents, if that's
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
12 Back to you again, Ms. Korner.
13 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honours, this -- the references - it may
14 assist Mr. Brown; we may as well deal with it, if we can, now - at
15 page 20 of the report in English, paragraph 1.26, 1.25, really, because
16 it's Western Slavonia that ...
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. I think we should let the witness
18 come back to this point, if he wishes to expand on his answer --
19 MS. KORNER: Certainly.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- tomorrow.
21 MS. KORNER:
22 Q. Well, Mr. Brown, if, tomorrow morning, after you've had a chance
23 to look through it, you come up with anything, then you can let the Court
25 MS. KORNER: Can we go back, please, then, to the -- this combat
1 readiness report. The next paragraph says:
2 "When the army of the Republika Srpska was formed, the units were
3 incorporated into it."
4 If we go over the page, please, in English, and also in B/C/S, to
5 page 14, we see there, in paragraph -- second paragraph on that page:
6 "The [sic] infantry units formed are equipped with weapons
7 received from the former JNA which were distributed by officers, members
8 of the SDS, or other representatives of the Serbian People."
9 Q. Now, again, this theme of the arming, coming from the JNA, from
10 the SDS, and Serbs, is that a theme that had been prevalent -- sorry,
11 prevalent, had been seen in Western Slavonia?
12 A. Yes. I said earlier I think there were some admittedly small
13 number of reference in the documents to the arming of the Serbian TO in
14 Western Slavonia. There were a small number of other JNA documents in
15 the period prior to the establishment of the VRS which would indicate
16 that the JNA were supplying weapons to TOs prior to the -- if you like,
17 the breakup of Bosnia.
18 Q. All right. It then deals with what the arms were. And then
20 "Since the Muslims did not have enough weapons or support
21 equipment, no significant support of infantry units in action was
22 necessary, especially not by longer-range or higher range [sic] calibre
23 ordnance. The need for it grew steadily as the war progressed."
24 Again, from your examination and analysis of the documents, is
25 that an accurate description, that the Muslims simply didn't have weapons
1 or support in the way that the VRS did?
2 A. Well, my report didn't go into details on the issues of the
3 Muslim capability. That's not what the report was asked to do. And it
4 was looking specifically at the Krajina Corps documents that gave an
5 indication. However, I would have to say that, in essence, although
6 there was some pull-out of JNA units, to all intents and purposes, the
7 JNA, at least in March -- February, March, April, that was present in
8 Bosnia, became the VRS. Yes, there were individuals who left,
9 non-Bosnian ethnicity. There was the pull-out of some equipment from the
10 JNA. But to all intents and purposes, the JNA became the VRS. And the
11 JNA was a military organisation that had had combat operations in Croatia
12 over a protracted period of time. And I would, as I say, although I
13 haven't looked at, in detail, the issue of the ABiH, I don't think --
14 well, I know they were not -- I believe they were not armed in anything
15 like the way that the VRS was. I don't see the heavy artillery, I don't
16 see tanks, I don't see communications systems, all the things that the
17 JNA had had which used in Croatia. I don't see that with the ABiH at
19 Q. And just while we're on this page - and it's purely in case
20 anybody raises any inquiries - they describe the features of an attack at
21 the bottom of it, and they say at number 7, or dot 7:
22 "An attack is usually carried out by special units, so-called
23 intervention, special or assault formations."
24 Do you know what they mean here by "special units"?
25 A. Some -- it's not completely unusual; they may call them different
1 names, but some infantry battalions, in the way that they would have what
2 are called rifle companies or infantry companies, occasionally have a
3 specialist platoon or a specialist reconnaissance platoon. Often it's
4 called "intervention platoon" in the JNA. And these may well be people
5 who are more highly trained, highly trained in reconnaissance issues,
6 maybe certain special weapons skills. And it may be that it's relating
7 to that.
8 Q. And then one more question on a particular item. Two, further
9 on, they talk about the fortification of lines during an attack is not
10 carried out, is that ... and interdictions, very seldom.
11 What does that mean in military parlance?
12 A. Interdiction normally means, if you like, the severance of a line
13 of communication or an ambush on a particular route. It's to -- or to --
14 an attack or maybe even the mining of an area to stop the enemy utilising
15 that route. I don't necessarily think there's anything unusual in that
17 Q. All right. Yep. Can we move on then, please, just to look at a
18 couple of other matters in this report.
19 MS. KORNER: If we go to the assessment of morale at page 45 in
20 English, and I think it's the same in, yes, B/C/S. Or maybe it's not,
21 actually. Just a moment. Sorry, I'm not sure it is. I think I've got
22 the wrong ... that's a later one.
23 Sorry, it's page 40 in B/C/S.
24 Q. "Factors which influenced the morale of units in the army" - and
25 we'll look at some morale reports later - but "the attitude of the
1 international community to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and war,
2 and we see the Serbian People, midway through the paragraph, was
3 subjected to inconceivable demonisation. The unscrupulous information,
4 propaganda war, in almost all of the powerful states of the world, in
5 particular the orchestrated planting of lies about alleged massacres of
6 civilians, bombardment of civilian facilities, POW camps, ethnic
7 cleansing, the raping of women, and other media fabrications serve to
8 project a distorted picture of the national interests of the Serbian
9 people ..."
10 Now, Mr. Brown, from your reading of the documents, was this a
11 position that the JNA was taking throughout, that what was being said
12 about what was happening was propaganda and lies?
13 A. I'm not necessarily saying the JNA, but the VRS.
14 Q. Sorry, the VRS. Yeah.
15 A. The VRS did make such comments that, in essence, there was some
16 external -- there was -- the external actors were misrepresenting and
17 mis-portraying their position. And I think this -- I mean, I guess I
18 read it like most, that what they're trying to say here is that these
19 allegations of massacres or camps were somehow an external propaganda and
20 that, I guess, the inferences is that they're not true.
21 Q. All right.
22 MS. KORNER: And then over the page, please, to the current
23 situation in Republika Srpska, and it's in the next page in B/C/S as
25 Q. The first paragraph again talks about the Serbs' problem. But
1 it's the second paragraph I want to look at part of. In the middle of
2 that paragraph, a series of military and political consultations that was
3 held to consider the situation and course of combat operations, the
4 functioning of the political authorities, and problems of cooperation
5 between the civil authorities and the army, the numerous meetings held
6 between unit commands, local authorities, and so on and so forth.
7 Again, when you looked at the documents, is that
8 paragraph reflected in those documents, namely, the meetings and the
9 cooperation that's described here?
10 A. Yes, I think that seems to be the case. And obviously this is a
11 relatively general comment in one line, but do see -- if you ask me do I
12 see examples of municipal meetings with military and civil and police, I
13 do see that. Have I seen requests for cooperation in court? Yes, I do.
14 Have I seen it at the senior level? Well, there are references in, for
15 example, Mladic's diary where he is attending meetings with senior level
16 figures but he's also touring the ground with local and municipal
17 leaders. So if you ask me if I've seen examples that would seem to
18 corroborate that, I would say yes.
19 Q. All right.
20 MS. KORNER: I want to move, please, to where we see the size of
21 the Krajina Corps as a whole. Just find that. Just a moment. Thought I
22 had it marked.
23 Yes, if we come, please, to page -- well, let's start page 69 in
24 English, and it's page 62 in the B/C/S. Then we see -- we've really
25 dealt with this, the organisation of the Army of Republika Srpska and
1 then the forming of the Main Staff. But let's go over the page then,
2 please, two pages. Page 71 in English and 64 in B/C/S.
3 Q. And there we see, do we, that the total size of the
4 1st Krajina Corps on page 71 involves -- was some 72.000 men?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And as you say, rightly, if we look at the size of the other
7 corps, and this is in 1993, it really is virtually three times as large
8 as the next largest, isn't it, which was the ...
9 A. I think the Drina Corps and the Sarajevo corps were quite
10 reasonable in size, but they are still not anything like the size of the
11 1 KK.
12 Q. Just while we're on that, because we've heard a lot of references
13 to various units or the ... can we just briefly deal with, please, what
14 the rough size, obviously it may vary, of the various components that
15 made up the 1st Krajina Corps or generally more than that.
16 First of all, how many men would there be in a brigade, roughly?
17 A. Well, it would vary, depending on what the brigade was. If it
18 was an armoured brigade or an artillery brigade or a light infantry
19 brigade or an infantry brigade, so it did vary. But you could be talking
20 thousands. Maybe 3.000.
21 Q. All right. I don't think the VRS had regiments, did it?
22 A. It did. But they were -- for example, they would have an
23 engineering regiment, so they did use the phrase regiment.
24 Q. Okay. And what sort of the size would they [Overlapping
25 speakers] ...
1 A. Probably around the same size. Maybe slightly smaller than a
3 Q. All right. A battalion?
4 A. Well, a battalion normally can be about 600 people. And that's
5 kind of similar to what it would be in the British Army. But usually a
6 battalion is maybe around 600.
7 Q. A company.
8 A. I don't know for sure for the VRS, but a company normally is
9 about 100 to 120 men. Maybe a few more but not many more.
10 Q. And then a platoon?
11 A. Those ones are usually about 30 men.
12 Q. And, finally, a squad?
13 A. A squad, I know from the British Army were always impoverished,
14 so we have fewer men than the Americans, but the -- it's usually about
15 eight to 12 men.
16 Q. All right. And then if we just look at, in April 1993, we can
17 see the total number of the VRS at page 73, in English. And --
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Could I just ask, before leaving the diagram on
19 the screen.
20 Under officers and non-commissioned officers, there are two
21 figures above a line and under a line; what's the difference between the
22 two? Do you know?
23 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure, sir. Whether one relates to active
24 military personnel and one reservists; that could be one of the issues,
25 that the one below the line or, if you like, regular people and the
1 others are reservists. But I'm a little bit unclear myself, sir.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
3 MS. KORNER: And if we move, please, to page 73 in English; 65 in
5 Q. We see there the total figure for the VRS in April of 1993 was
6 214.000 men altogether.
7 Yep. Although you do actually reference -- well, actually, while
8 were on the subject, just one other thing, while were on the subject of
9 the ethnicity personnel.
10 MS. KORNER: Can we go to page 80 in English, sorry, and I'm not
11 sure which page it is, actually. It will be page -- yes. It's page 72
12 in B/C/S.
13 Q. Where they refer to the national structure of active officers
14 serving in the VRS: 37 Macedonians, 204 Yugoslavs, and then 33 Muslims,
15 62 Croats, 33 Muslims, and 200.165 Serbs. So it would appear that some
16 Muslims and some Croats did remain with the VRS?
17 A. Yes, outside of military officers. And I think, getting back to
18 your other point, Your Honour, I think the line does mean, I think, if
19 you look at the figures, it says the 1 KK of the 4.054 officers
20 established 2.373, or 59 per cent are filled with officers, of whom 398
21 or 17 per cent are active military officers. So I think that reflects in
22 the figure, the lower figures, active military personnel, i.e.,
23 professional officers. Other ones are reservist, people who've had
24 military service but have been recalled.
25 But, yes, the figure in relation to the ethnicities relates to
1 active personnel, but it would still seem to be relatively small.
2 MS. KORNER: And then, finally, can we look at this report at
3 page 90 in English, and it's page 80 in B/C/S.
4 Q. Paragraph 9:
5 "The intensity and pace of combat operations of the army ...
6 necessary to accommodate increasing numbers of POWs. In the past period
7 we processed about 8.500 prisoners of war, filed criminal reports for
8 various criminal offences against about 1.000 of them. And during the
9 processing of prisoners of war, we pursued a policy of massive
10 persuasion, whose effects will be apparent after a few years."
11 In this context, did you understand what's meant by "massive
13 A. This is under the intelligence and security section so I suspect
14 that what they're trying to do is turn them or use them as informants.
15 And that's what they mean. In the later years, the information they may
16 get may be of valuable to them. Some of them, not eight and a half
17 thousand of them, but I think, bearing in mind this is under the
18 intelligence and security section, it may -- may mean that they're trying
19 to persuade released POWs or POWs to somehow continue to provide
20 information in the coming period.
21 Q. All right. And then under paragraph 10, in the middle of that
22 para they're talking about cooperation, and again this is under
23 intelligence and security.
24 "Our cooperation with the MUP of Republika Srpska and especially
25 with the MUP of the Republic of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia we consider to be unsatisfactory, that the main cause being,
2 in our opinion, the passivity of the organ mentioned and their reluctance
3 to expand cooperation ..."
4 And it goes on to say at the end of the paragraph that they're
5 going to call for meetings with the intelligence and security affairs.
6 All right. And I think that's really all -- although, as I say,
7 you refer to other parts. That's all that want to ask about that
9 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked.
10 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1781, Your Honours.
12 MS. KORNER:
13 Q. Sorry, going back to your report then, Mr. Brown, you -- we
14 stopped at paragraph 1.69, but I think I want to deal with the next part
15 fairly quickly. Formation of the 1st Krajina Corps, effectively you
16 cover that and give the documentation which is relevant.
17 Then you deal, at paragraph 1.77, with mobilisation. And you set
18 out there the background to the mobilisation order that we looked at. Is
19 that correct?
20 A. Yes, that's correct, Ms. Korner.
21 Q. Can we look now, please, if we move through, as I say, you set
22 this up all very clearly in your report, to the area of responsibility of
23 the 1st Krajina Corps, which is paragraph 1.83 at page 39.
24 Now, you set out very clearly the -- where -- which area it
25 covered. The more complicated of the municipalities was Kljuc, if we can
1 summarize that. Is that right?
2 A. Yes. I -- I think in the early part of June there was clearly
3 some discussion between the neighbouring corps, the 2nd Krajina Corps and
4 the 1st Krajina Corps, as to who and how Kljuc should be included and
5 whose area of responsibility it should be in. And I think it was then
6 subsequently passed on to the 2nd Krajina Corps, although there was a
7 period, I think maybe late May and the first few days of June, where
8 Kljuc, the units in Kljuc that were conducting operations in Kljuc, were
9 part of the 1st Krajina Corps. But there was an anomaly as to exactly
10 whose area of responsibility Kljuc fell.
11 Q. I think that's pretty clearly documented and referred to in your
13 MS. KORNER: If we can just, so that we can see a pictorial
14 representation of it, the map. Could we have a look, please, at 10639,
15 tab 64.
16 Now, the copy in the bundle is pretty small, so hopefully we can
17 blow up bits of it so it's clear what we're looking at.
18 It has not been translated but I think you'll -- does it -- well,
19 I suppose, actually, we ought to properly get a translation from the
20 interpreters, if we could just -- well, if you could -- no, well,
21 actually, it's quite complicated to get ...
22 Q. Mr. Brown, what does the heading say? That's the simplest.
23 A. I believe it says "Area of Responsibility of the 1st Krajina
25 Q. Right.
1 And if there's any doubt about it, what it says ...
2 Then can we see, what do the markings that we can see across
4 A. The one that I'm a little bit unclear on is the yellow one in the
5 middle, the smallest one. But the -- going from top left: Ops
6 Group Prijedor; Tactical Group 6 is the red one next to it; Tactical
7 Group 3; Tactical Group 1; 5; 4; Ops Group Doboj; I believe this is
8 OG Vlasic, the green one at the bottom; and then I think this is
9 30th Infantry Division. But the one in the middle, I'm a little bit
10 unclear as to what that says.
11 Q. All right. I hope it doesn't matter too much.
12 MS. KORNER: If we can just -- I don't know whether we can zoom
13 in slightly --
14 Q. Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Brown, there's one other ... where does this
15 map actually come from? And can you -- it's not dated, but are you able
16 to say, from your knowledge, roughly when it was produced?
17 A. This was a map that was within the 1st Krajina Corps collection.
18 It's rather a large laminated map, I believe, if I remember rightly. So
19 it was within the collection.
20 I believe it is a map that most likely was made in late 1992.
21 And I say that because the area of responsibility would seem to match, if
22 you like, the furthest extent that the corps got after it secured the
23 whole of the corridor area, which is the area to the top right, and also
24 operations in Jajce which were in the Autumn or late summer/Autumn of
1 So it must be at least after those operations. And my assessment
2 is it's most likely to be in late 1992 or maybe even to early 1993. And
3 it would seem to show where the corps had achieved its objectives or
4 achieved its area of responsibility by that period. Although, I have to
5 say I do caveat that with that it is not dated, and, you know, it could
6 be a little bit later than that period.
7 Q. All right. And, I mean, the municipalities it covers --
8 actually, I think one of the documents does have a list, but it's all
9 those going up to -- does that go up to the border with Croatia?
10 A. Yes. Yes, that -- in essence, the river is the top boundary of
11 the corps.
12 Q. Yeah. Yes. Yes, thank you.
13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,
15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1782, Your Honours.
17 MS. KORNER:
18 Q. Now in respect of Kljuc, I think you note at -- in paragraph 1.95
19 that military operations and attacks that had occurred there IN late May/
20 early June were carried out by units under Major Talic's command --
21 General Major Talic's command. There was then a meeting, and units were
22 resubordinated to the command of the 2nd Krajina Corps.
23 But I want to look at one document that you reference there,
24 please, in that paragraph.
25 MS. KORNER: Could we have a look, please, at ... it's -- sorry.
1 Where has it gone to? Yes. Document 65 ter 805, at tab 15.
2 Q. Now, this is a document of the 31st of May, 1992. And if one
3 goes to the third page in English and the third page, also, in B/C/S,
4 it's signed by Colonel Galic, then-Colonel Galic. Is that the same Galic
5 who then went on to deal with the siege of Sarajevo?
6 A. Yes, that's correct. He was the 30th Infantry Division or
7 Partisan Division, as it was called in the JNA days, in Mrkonjic Grad
8 area, under Talic, and then a little bit later than that he went to
9 become the corps commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
10 Q. All right. And was this the 30th Partisan Division one of the
11 divisions that came under General Talic's command?
12 A. That's correct, yes.
13 Q. All right.
14 MS. KORNER: Can we go back to the first page, please.
15 Q. This is an order. He says:
16 "Because of the recent situation in the municipality of Kljuc and
17 resumption of the blood-thirsty activities of the Green Berets," and so
18 on and so forth, "I hereby order the Kljuc Defence command shall be
19 mounted in the zone of the municipality of Kljuc."
20 And then he sets out who it should consist of, and it includes in
21 that list the chief of the Kljuc public security station, the president
22 of the municipality of Kljuc with two or three members of the current
23 Crisis Staff, then operatives and clerks. The primary task assigned to
24 the Kljuc defence command shall be the protection of the Serbian People
25 in the grater area of the municipality.
1 Now, first of all, the term "defence command," is that one that
2 crops up regularly in documents.
3 A. No. I have to say I think this is the only time I have seen it
4 in that phrase.
5 Q. All right. And do you -- from your looking at it, these
6 documents, what was the purpose of -- of this, as far as you understand
7 it, in May of 1992?
8 A. I think I put it in line with similar kind of activities that
9 were going on in other municipalities, whereby there was a coordinated
10 effort by municipal actors in order to conduct operations, or take
11 control of territory, or defend territories as it sometimes may be
12 stated, often utilizing members of the civilian authorities or involving
13 members of the civilian authority, the police and the military. If you
14 like, a sort of coordinated effort in that area. And there's a --
15 similar to occurred -- would seem to have occurred in Prijedor, for
16 example, or in Sanski Most, where you had Crisis Staffs with a similar
17 kind of makeup. I would put it along that. Although, I have to say,
18 that the phrasing of "defence command" is one, as I said, that I hadn't
19 necessarily seen before.
20 Q. All right. In most of the documents that we've looked at so far
21 and which we'll look at later, there's cooperation with the other
22 authorities, the civil authorities, the police. Here it appears to be an
24 A. Yes, it would seem to be, which, I have to say, is the only one I
25 have seen like that and is somewhat unusual, I suspect. But I haven't
1 seen a similar instruction in the corps documents.
2 Q. All right.
3 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, could that be -- I don't think
4 that has been admitted so far, has it? No. Your Honours, could that be
5 admitted and marked.
6 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1783, Your Honours.
8 MS. KORNER:
9 Q. In that context, I think it is also worth looking at a document,
10 that comes from the civil side. Can we look, please, at document -- just
11 a moment. The description of our list seems to be a bit odd. 37.
12 Should be -- it should be a report on the work of the Crisis Staff. Can
13 we just -- sorry. Sorry, the description is completely out of kilter of
14 what the document is. But it's 2783, 65 ter number.
15 All right. This is a report on the work of the Crisis Staff
16 (War Presidency) of the Municipal Assembly Kljuc in the period from 15
17 May till today. And it's July of 1992.
18 If we go to the second -- the next page in English and also in
19 the B/C/S, we see there at the penultimate paragraph on that page in
20 English but I think it is actually the next page in the B/C/S. Sorry, we
21 need to go to the next page in the B/C/S. Top paragraph there?
22 "Representatives (Commanders) of the VRS who led and conducted
23 war operations defended the territory against Muslim extremists
24 participated regularly at the meetings of the Crisis Staff and War
25 Presidency at the time of the war conflict and had very good cooperation
1 with the Crisis Staff. All important military and police issues were
2 solved, including Crisis Staff of Municipal Assembly. The period can be
3 characterised as a period of very successful cooperation between the
4 Crisis Staff and military organs and the breaking the Muslim extremists's
5 armed resistance, and the Crisis Staff especially emphasised and
6 recognised the efforts and good job of the 30th Division," so on and so
8 And it goes on to say that: "... after the VRS regular and
9 reserve police forces was the whole Serb population ... broke down Muslim
10 extremists's armed resistance, and the Crisis Staff tried as much as was
11 possible in the war conditions to establish civil authority."
12 Taking those two documents together, Mr. Brown, what do you
13 deduce from that?
14 A. Well, I think, at face value, the documents would appear to
15 indicate that there was a coordinated effort to take control of that
16 municipality involving the military, clearly, but also involving the
17 police and the -- the civil authorities. And that there was coordination
18 or cooperation with the Crisis Staff and the military, and it didn't
19 seem -- at least that's what the documents would seem at face value.
20 Q. And it doesn't appear that in this document there is any
21 reference at all to this -- this one document there, where it talks about
22 "defence commands"?
23 A. No, there's not.
24 Q. Yeah. Yes.
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that document then, please, be
1 admitted and marked.
2 JUDGE HALL: Yes, admitted and marked.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1784, Your Honours.
4 MS. KORNER:
5 Q. Yes, you then go on to deal, in your report, please, back to your
6 report, at paragraph 1.101, "Cooperation with Civilian Bodies." And you
7 set out there at paragraph 1.105, and it's a document we have looked at
8 on a number of occasions - so I'm not -- although it is on our list, I'm
9 not going to trouble the Court with that - the Djeric instructions. And
10 you looked at the Prijedor decision of the 20th of May, which referred to
11 those instructions. But, again -- I just want to check that one,
12 actually. I think that's already been exhibited, so ...
13 Oh, yes, that's the one where we've got -- there's two versions
14 of it.
15 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour, one -- yes, it's the document at
16 tab 9. I just want to check that. Yes, it is an exhibit.
17 Your Honour, that version of the document doesn't have a date, as
18 I say, but the gazette version, which is 466, does, which is at tab 10,
19 and, Your Honours, I think, simply, for those purposes, we'd better ask
20 to admit the gazette version as well, so we know exactly what the date
21 is. But, Your Honours, I don't want to go through it again because we --
22 but it has already been gone through and it is an exhibit.
23 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, when you say as well --
24 MS. KORNER: It's tab 10, it's 65 ter 466.
25 The previous document has already been admitted, the version of
1 this document, but it doesn't contain a date. The gazette version does.
2 And so I think just for those purposes, we'd better have the gazette
3 version admitted as well.
4 JUDGE HALL: Yes, so admitted and marked.
5 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, one suggestion, Your Honours. Before we
7 do that - make we can check - I think it's a part of the law library.
8 But I cannot --
9 MS. KORNER: Oh, is it?
10 MR. ZECEVIC: But I cannot be 100 percent sure, and my assistant
11 is not in the court right now.
12 JUDGE HALL: Thanks for that reminder, Mr. Zecevic.
13 MS. KORNER: Well, then, Your Honour, I'm perfectly happy to wait
14 until then.
15 I withdraw that application. It's part -- Mr. Zecevic is quite
16 right; it's part of the law library.
17 Q. And, as I say, I think, Mr. Brown, you deal with a number of
18 other documents that show that in -- in your report. And, again, I don't
19 think we need trouble that -- until we get, please, to paragraph 1.113.
20 This may be the last matter that we deal with this afternoon. Where you
21 reference that, in fact, it was General Mladic who ordered that contacts
22 be established with the president of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and
23 that General Talic was a member of the ARK Crisis Staff.
24 And you reference the document, which I think already has been
25 admitted, which is the telephone numbers - yes, it has - it's P557. Can
1 we just have that up very briefly. We see there the telephone numbers of
2 the Krajina Autonomous Region, what is called the War Staff here.
3 Interestingly enough, though, it has everybody's telephone number
4 but General Talic. Are you able to read anything into that at all?
5 A. I -- I couldn't really comment why it's not there or why it
6 should be there but isn't. I'm not sure I could really speculate.
7 Q. All right. Thank you. In that case, I don't think I need
8 trouble that one. Yes.
9 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I see the time and that's probably a
10 suitable time to break off.
11 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Brown, whereas you know this quite well, I'm,
12 nevertheless, for the record, obliged to remind you that, having been
13 sworn in as a witness, you cannot have any communications with counsel
14 from either side, and in such conversations that you may have outside of
15 the courtroom, you cannot discuss your testimony.
16 So we take the adjournment, to reconvene tomorrow at 3.15 in the
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
21 January, 2011, at 3.15 p.m.