1 Monday, 11 April 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [Stanisic Defence Opening Statement]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
7 everyone in and around the courtroom.
8 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
9 Stojan Zupljanin.
10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 Good morning to everybody. May we have the appearances, please.
12 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. Joanna Korner,
13 Tom Hannis, and Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
15 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic, and
16 Ms. Deirdre Montgomery appearing for the Stanisic Defence this morning.
17 Thank you.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
19 Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
20 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
21 Before we invite counsel for the first accused to open, I
22 understand -- well, the Chamber has one or two housekeeping matters, but
23 before we turn to that, we have been alerted that the OTP has a matter to
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, we do and we thought it right to raise
1 it before the official start of the Defence case.
2 It relates back to the evidence of Witness ST-210, who was the
3 witness, the summary witness, who dealt with the police log-books, the
4 KU log-books.
5 Your Honour, during the course of his cross-examination, he was
6 shown some documents which were subsequently exhibited on the basis that
7 these -- that the documents which were criminal reports did not appear in
8 the log-books, and ergo, the log-books were defective.
9 Your Honours may recall, there was some discussion about this.
10 Mr. Olmsted who was dealing with the witness said that regrettably it had
11 been discovered just before the witness came to give evidence that one
12 page from the log-books, the Doboj log-book was missing. It was
13 subsequently retrieved. It has been translated and it's already added to
14 e-court. The Defence and the Trial Chamber were notified on the
15 17th of February of this year, so after we closed our case, and it was
16 uploaded into e-court under 65 ter number 10493A, and indeed,
17 Your Honours granted leave for the corrected crime register to be
19 Now what that showed was this, Your Honour, that four of the
20 documents which Mr. Zecevic put to him, which are 1D355, 1D356, 1D357,
21 and 1D362 all appear on that missing page. And so the suggestion made by
22 Mr. Zecevic that they were not there is, in fact, as it transpires,
24 There were two further criminal reports which were Exhibit 1D360,
25 and 1D361, which, again, the suggestion was that these had been -- these
1 did not appear in the crime register. In fact, when a check was made, as
2 we were reviewing the evidence after the close of our case, it was seen
3 that they did, in fact, appear on the second page. What had happened was
4 that those two crime reports had simply omitted the KU number.
5 Your Honours, we have sent this -- we sent a letter to
6 Mr. Zecevic and Mr. Krgovic about this matter on the 15th of March and
7 asked if they would be prepared to stipulate to this. Your Honours, it
8 is important because obviously we rely for a number of reasons on these
9 KU registers. And Your Honours, in fact, dealt with it, if I can just
10 refer Your Honours to -- or mentioned it. Judge Hall started this by
11 saying effectively was it correct that these entries, therefore, that the
12 log-books were defective in this sense because these crime reports did
13 not appear. And Judge Harhoff, at page 13769, stated:
14 "But the Presiding Judge's remark a while ago still stands,
15 namely, that evidence has been provided to show that the KU log-book in
16 itself is incomplete, to understand the full picture."
17 And I think this is accepted by the Chamber.
18 Well, Your Honours it is now clear that's not right. Certainly
19 not as far as those documents are concerned.
20 We invited the Defence -- we've not had a response from
21 Mr. Krgovic, but we invited Mr. Zecevic to simply make an admission or
22 stipulation, as the Americans call it, that that was the case. He
23 declines to do so.
24 So, Your Honours, there are three options. The first is that we
25 can apply to re-call Witness ST-210, simply to deal with this, which
1 seems to us to be a complete waste of time. Second, we can take a
2 statement from him under 92 bis and simply seek to put that in. Or,
3 third, Your Honours can simply take note of the fact although it's -- in
4 a sense it's me giving evidence, but I'm showing Your Honours where it
5 can be seen in the books.
6 So those are the options in the absence -- of course, we can't
7 force either Defence team to agree to this, but we would suggest that
8 this is something that clearly needs to be dealt with in some form or
9 another before the Defence case starts, if at all possible.
10 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, did I understand your third option to mean
11 that a proper examination of the record would -- without the need for
12 anything else, solve the -- indicate that what appeared to be a problem
13 is not a problem.
14 MS. KORNER: Yes. Absolutely. The trouble is, of course, if
15 one -- whoever -- if somebody for the purposes of the judgement would
16 just happen to be reading the actual transcript, they would be misled.
17 And provided all are satisfied with my explanation about this, so that
18 it -- and -- and obviously this record is here now, and it can be seen by
19 simply checking the documents, well, Your Honours, that seems to us to be
20 sufficient. It would be preferable, and I understand Mr. Zecevic accepts
21 that, if we could get agreement from the Defence and the -- on both
22 sides. But failing that, it seems to me that --
23 JUDGE HALL: I'd certainly hear what Mr. Zecevic has to say on
24 this point. But if I understand you correctly, it may that be it would
25 be sufficient for the -- this matter to abide such submissions as the
1 Prosecution makes at the close of the case.
2 MS. KORNER: Yes. What we don't want -- can I put it this way,
3 we'd rather not have to waste time in our final brief or -- not so much
4 time, but page numbers, because we will have a limit on how long the
5 brief can be, on something which we would hope was agreed.
6 JUDGE HALL: Well, let me hear whether Mr. Zecevic has had a
7 change of mind since his last communication with you.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 I share the view of Your Honours that the -- this is more
10 appropriate for the closing submissions of the Office of the Prosecutor
11 than at this point in time.
12 Now, I'm not sure what -- what the Office of the Prosecution is
13 proposing. If they are proposing to re-open their case, there is a
14 jurisprudence about that, and -- and they should apply for the -- for the
15 re-opening of their case. If that is the -- if my understanding is
16 correct of the position of the Office of the Prosecutor.
17 However, Your Honours, the position of Defence doesn't change.
18 We still maintain our position that the KU log-books are -- for obvious
19 reasons and for a number of reasons are not sufficient for establishing
20 these facts.
21 The second problem is not only the KU books but this witness was
22 asked to prepare an annex to his statement where he was on the
23 instruction of the Office of the Prosecutor putting some numbers on the
24 number of criminal reports filed against -- where the victims are
25 non-Serbs and the perpetrators are Serbs. And we say that this -- that
1 that annex is flawed. Therefore, there is no way that the Defence will
2 stipulate to anything of the sort and we -- we maintain our position.
3 And we will maintain it until the end of the case. And you will hear our
4 evidence about that matter.
5 MS. KORNER: Your Honours --
6 JUDGE HALL: Sorry.
7 MS. KORNER: Yes.
8 JUDGE HALL: Do I understand you to essentially agree that,
9 notwithstanding the -- what you have just articulated as to the effect of
10 the evidence that is at present before us, it is, at the end of the day,
11 a matter of what is made of that evidence and, therefore, it is probably
12 not necessary to re-call the witness but that the whole thing can be left
13 for, despite the reservations Ms. Korner may have about the -- how this
14 would add to the bulk of material that we would have to consider, that at
15 the end of the day it is still a question of argument between counsel for
16 Defence on one side and counsel for Prosecution on the other.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Definitely, Your Honours. That is what I said at
18 the very beginning. I just wanted to clarify my position why I say that.
19 Thank you, Your Honours.
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honours --
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, could I just ask, then, concretely
22 in respect of these, was it five documents, six documents, would it be a
23 problem for the Defence to accept that those were, in fact, in the
24 KU log-books, while you can still maintain that the general picture of
25 the KU log-books is still, in your view, that these books are
1 insufficient? With or without those six documents.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: With all due respect, Your Honours, I tried to
3 explain. It is the not problem with the KU log-books by itself. It is
4 the problem that the witness -- what -- looking at these KU log-books,
5 not for this municipality but other municipalities, was preparing an
6 annex and we say the annex is flawed. And the Office of the Prosecutor
7 relies on his findings as a summary witness reviewing the KU log-books.
8 Your Honours, it is a very simple situation. We are having as
9 our witness the chief of the CSB Doboj, as you know. And it's our first
10 witness and he will deal with this matter, I can guarantee that.
11 Thank you.
12 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, I'm sorry, Mr. Zecevic is -- and
13 I'm afraid, in our view, deliberately not answering the question.
14 It is a very simple question. Whatever submissions we make about
15 the efficiency of these books or otherwise, does the Defence, having had
16 a chance to examine the documents which are exhibits, agree that those
17 six crime reports exhibited with the numbers that I have given are
18 actually in the KU book?
19 Everything else, I agree, is for submissions. But that is a very
20 simple, straightforward question which I would invite Your Honours to ask
21 Mr. Zecevic and, of course, Mr. Krgovic.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, as I stated very clearly, I'm not
23 ready to stipulate. And you will understand why I'm not ready to
24 stipulate once you hear the evidence that we are going to present,
25 Your Honours.
1 And it is -- and after -- at the end of the day, this is a matter
2 for the final submissions, definitely.
3 Thank you, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, I suppose you'll say otherwise.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... joint submission.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE HALL: Could counsel assist on a matter which, we confess,
8 we -- you probably said it and we just didn't get it. Are these six
9 documents already part of the evidence or not?
10 MS. KORNER: Yes, they are. They were all exhibited,
11 Your Honour. They're 1D355 through to -- sorry, 355, 356, 357, 360, 361,
12 and 362.
13 They were all made exhibits on the basis, and it's very clear in
14 the transcript, I haven't bothered you with the references, on the basis
15 that these were not in the KU register.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: So if I'm to understand this correctly, the only
17 issue that now remains is to whether these six documents were or were
18 not --
19 MS. KORNER: Correct.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- in some of the log-books.
21 MS. KORNER: They're shown -- four of them were in the first
22 page, which regrettably we had to go back and get because it hadn't been
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: From which log-book?
25 MS. KORNER: It's the -- does Your Honour want the exhibit
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: No --
3 MS. KORNER: It's the Doboj crime register.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Which is the KU log-book.
5 MS. KORNER: The KU -- I'm sorry, yea. The KU log-book. I'm so
6 sorry. Two of them were in fact already and could have been seen but the
7 witness, I imagine rather taken by surprise -- in fact he does say at
8 some stage, "I would like to a chance to review this." And indeed they
9 are mentioned in his report, and that's 1D360 and 1D361. But obviously
10 giving evidence, it was rather [indiscernible].
11 As I say, all I'm asking for is that the Defence who have had the
12 opportunity -- we sent the letter on the 15th of March, appreciating that
13 Mr. Zecevic has had a lot to do recently, but we did ask for an answer.
14 My understanding was it isn't disputed. It can be seen. It is clear,
15 but he is not prepared to stipulate.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, the KU log-book is also Exhibit 1D,
17 1D Exhibit, 358. So, therefore, we offered also the KU log-book as our
18 exhibit. And I don't really understand if all these exhibits are inside
19 the -- the material in this case, everybody can -- can, at the end of the
20 day, take its own conclusions after we finish presenting evidence.
21 Your Honours, if we start -- if we start stipulating on the
22 issues in this case, we can -- we can adjourn and meet after four months
23 from now, because I will have a number of issues that I would ask the
24 Office of the Prosecutor to stipulate at this point.
25 I don't really understand -- I don't understand the -- the
1 reasoning behind ...
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, the reasoning is that the transcript,
3 if read, would be misleading. That's why.
4 And as it is misleading, we think the correction should be
5 agreed. It is not agreement or a stipulation to our case which -- as to
6 what the log-books show. Its relevance to the issues. It's a simple
7 stipulation to a factual matter.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, now I think I begin to understand
9 Mr. Zecevic's point. Because, are you saying that, if these
10 six documents were accepted as actually having been properly inscribed in
11 that particular KU log-book, then the log-book would be completely
12 reliable and exhaustive.
13 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... I'm saying that that
14 is a matter of argument which we may or may not make at the end of the
16 I'm simply saying that at the present time, you admitted these
17 particular documents or these particular documents were admitted on the
18 basis that they were not shown in the Prosecution log-book. All I'm
19 saying is that they were admitted under -- and I'm not saying that --
20 that -- that it's done deliberately. We didn't have the first page and
21 to that extent it was our fault. But now that we do, now it's been
22 admitted into evidence, all I'm pointing out is that certainly four of
23 the documents -- in fact all six were admitted on a false basis; namely,
24 that they were not reflected in the log-book. And all I'm asking for is
25 for a clear, simple, straightforward admission that if you look at the
1 log-book, those criminal reports are recorded, which will save everybody
2 an awful lot of time.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE HALL: We -- we are grateful to counsel for seeking to
5 enlighten us on this matter. And it appears to us that -- what
6 Ms. Korner has indicated as option 3 is the practical way forward.
7 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, yes, I'm just sorry that -- that
8 the Defence don't feel able to assist everybody in this court in this
10 Your Honour, there is one other -- or two other matters.
11 First is this. Recently we provided to the Defence some
12 information relating to Dr. Nielsen, which came to the attention
13 Mr. Hannis and myself relatively recently. We have been asking
14 Mr. Zecevic whether he wishes to deal with this matter at all, and, at
15 the moment, I understand he does not, but may file something later this
16 week. I'm sorry again that it's not possible to deal with this orally,
17 if at all.
18 Your Honour, the difficulty raises is this. They have now given
19 us their expert's report. We would obviously wish to seek Dr. Nielsen's
20 take on it. It's a very lengthy report. We've, so far, not done that
21 because, obviously in case Mr. Zecevic wanted to raise anything, we felt
22 we ought to wait. But because -- and we've been asking Mr. Zecevic for
23 some time now, because he hasn't, can I just say this. We are going to
24 send him -- I'm not asking Your Honours to do. This is simply so the
25 Court's informed. We are going to send him Professor Bajagic's report to
1 seek his comments on it. We can't wait any longer because, subject to
2 Your Honours' ruling on Mr. Zecevic's application for reconsideration, we
3 haven't got that much time left.
4 Your Honours, finally, we were given on Friday night -- four --
5 well, no, I mean a total -- some more documents, some of which are not on
6 the 65 ter list, to be used with Mr. Bjelosevic. Four of them don't have
7 translations. And, Your Honours, I'm really sorry, but we have to know
8 in advance what it is the Defence are going to use. And it may well be
9 that if this goes on, we will be saying, again, we will not be in a
10 position to cross-examine and the witness will have to go away and come
11 back again. We've been given already a 150-odd documents for this
12 witness, so I'm -- we simply must have translations. I shouldn't -- as I
13 say, some of these documents are not on the 65 ter list.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may respond, Your Honours.
15 On the first matter, we intend to file a written submission
16 concerning this situation with Dr. Nielsen. And I hope you will
17 appreciate that we were rather busy preparing the opening statement and
18 the first witness and, therefore, we couldn't -- we couldn't file that
20 So this is -- this will be filed within next 24 to 48 hours. And
21 we needed to check some of the information which the Office of the
22 Prosecution provided to us.
23 The second matter, Your Honours, we came in the possession of
24 these documents the day when we disclosed it to the -- to the Office of
25 the Prosecutor. They're not on our 65 ter list. We just disclosed it as
1 a matter of courtesy that these documents have been received and we
2 immediately disclosed to them the documents. We sent the documents for
3 translation. Whether we are going to use those documents and if we are
4 going to -- to ask leave to add them to 65 ter list remains to be seen.
5 If we do, then -- then this -- then this opposition by Office of the
6 Prosecutor would be -- would be justified. At this point, I don't
7 think -- maybe we are not going to use the documents. We just disclosed
8 them to the Office of the Prosecutor as a matter of courtesy.
9 Thank you.
10 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, except that the e-mail that came
11 with them said, "These are documents we propose to use." That's why I
12 raised it. If they were simply disclosed to us, I wouldn't have
14 JUDGE HALL: So they over-spoke in the e-mail.
15 MS. KORNER: Sorry?
16 JUDGE HALL: They over-spoke in the e-mail.
17 MS. KORNER: Yes.
18 JUDGE HALL: Your apprehension is --
19 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, I can only go on what I'm told.
20 I'm afraid I rather feel that it's an excuse rather than anything else,
21 but let's see where we go.
22 But, Your Honours, I'm just giving notice that if this goes on
23 like this, we will be seeking an adjournment before cross.
24 JUDGE HALL: So we will see when we arrive at that point. Thank
1 There are one or two housekeeping matters which the Chamber would
2 wish to raise.
3 The first relates to the witness Bajagic who is scheduled to
4 testify on the 2nd of May, and the Chamber's preference is that he begins
5 testifying on the indicated date. And the -- as of Friday - I don't know
6 whether things have changed after to this morning - there still remain
7 two documents that remain to be disclosed, and we would ask the
8 Prosecution if it accepts to have this witness begin on the 2nd of
9 May even though it would be less than 30 days' from the last disclosure
10 of the complete material. As for the decision on the expertise of
11 Mr. Bajagic, the Chamber notes Ms. Korner's statements at the Pre-Defence
12 Conference that the Prosecution does not dispute his expertise regarding
13 the MUP. The Prosecution has, however, raised objections regarding
14 certain parts of his report which it submits lies outside of his
15 expertise, and it is noted the Prosecution would file its observations in
16 advance of the 2nd of May.
17 Accordingly, the matter of whether, and if so which, parts of the
18 report will be admitted into evidence will, as has been the practice up
19 to this point, be decided at the conclusion of the witness's testimony.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may be of assistance, just an update on the
21 matter of translations. The draft translations have been provided to the
22 Office of the Prosecutor.
23 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
24 The second matter relates to the OTP request on the 270 new death
25 certificates and we give an oral ruling as follows.
1 At the Pre-Defence Conference on the 4th of April, the
2 Prosecution stated that it had obtained 270 death certificates in B/C/S
3 which it would seek to add to the consolidated hyperlinked spreadsheet or
4 proof of death database which the Chamber admitted into evidence by its
5 decision of the 1st of February. In order to be able to assess properly
6 this matter, the Chamber directs the Prosecution to file a written motion
7 which is to include: One, English translations of all the materials the
8 Prosecution requests the Chamber to consider; and two, an updated
9 spreadsheet which includes the new material.
10 With reference to the Stanisic Defence submission on the
11 4th of April, that there remains pending an oral application by the
12 Defence to reconsider the Chamber's decision of the 1st of February, the
13 Chamber finds no record that such a request was ever made and therefore
14 need not further consider this submission.
15 The final matter -- sorry, you wanted to --
16 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... something about the
17 translations. What we've done, all the death certificates are on the
18 same form. So we're having one translated in full, and then for the
19 rest, all that will be translated are the details, the name, date of
20 birth, and so on and so forth. Because to translate 270 documents
21 identical documents in full would, we hope, be somewhat otiose.
22 JUDGE HALL: If I may say so, Ms. Korner, it appears eminently
24 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
25 JUDGE HALL: The -- of course, the -- each of these items would
1 have to be linked to the spreadsheet. That's the practical [Overlapping
2 speakers] ...
3 MS. KORNER: Absolutely, yes. Thank you.
4 JUDGE HALL: The Chamber is in receipt of the batting order for
5 the first two months with estimates for the examination-in-chief and it
6 would be useful for us to receive cross-examination estimates, especially
7 for the witness who is scheduled to begin tomorrow. And the -- that
8 matter -- there's a usual segue into a related issue of which counsel may
9 have been -- to which counsel may have been alerted, and it is this. Up
10 to this point, we have been operating on the assumption that once the
11 Defence opens, that this trial will continue at the pace of five
12 hearings, five days a week. Come the middle of June or thereabouts, it
13 probably wouldn't arise before that, two members of this Bench having
14 been assigned to another matter, it would mean that the hearing five days
15 a week in this once case would not be possible. So it remains to be
16 seen, and the e-mail -- there is, I believe, an e-mail in circulation
17 inviting counsel in both cases with which we are concerned, their input
18 into how to stagger the presentation of the cases to accommodate the fact
19 that -- that Judges have overlapping duties. But, as I said, we seem to
20 be clear for the first -- for the time being. But this would arise come
21 sometime in June.
22 So unless there are any further matters, I would -- yes.
23 MS. KORNER: Well, no, Your Honour, I was only going to say that
24 if it is in circulation, it hasn't circulated to us yet. But, as regards
25 the estimate for the first witness, certainly the 20 hours proposed by
1 Mr. Zecevic for his examination-in-chief and particularly in the light of
2 the recent discussions about the Doboj log-books which I note, by the
3 way, is not on the list of documents that the Defence propose to use, so
4 I was interested to hear that Mr. Bjelosevic was supposed to be dealing
5 with this.
6 Your Honours, it will be exactly the same amount from the
7 Prosecution. I understand that Mr. Krgovic says that he is going to be
8 an hour and a half with the witness.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
10 So we invite counsel for Mr. Stanisic to open.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours. In order to be very
12 precise, I will speak in Serbian. Thank you very much.
13 [Interpretation] Your Honours, I shall start my opening statement
14 in this case by firstly speaking about the context surrounding the events
15 which are the subject of these proceedings.
16 In order to properly understand the causes and consequences as
17 well as the developments that took place in the territory of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina during the period relevant to the indictment, the situation
19 must be put in a proper context. The Prosecution spoke about the context
20 of the events in the indictment, firstly in the opening statement and
21 then during the entire Prosecution case. The Defence believes that the
22 Prosecution described the context in overly simplified terms or, rather,
23 that their description of the context, whether deliberate or not, was
24 by -- based on the secondary phenomena and consequences of less important
25 processes that took place. In that sense, the context was used to
1 justify the conclusions and the theory of the Prosecution case.
2 During the Defence case, the Defence intends to lead evidence
3 which will paint an objective picture of the context based on the
4 fundamental processes that took place in society, and by that I mean the
5 former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, because we believe
6 that this aspect of the case is the important background which will allow
7 us all to better understand the events that ensued and that have since
8 become the object of this indictment.
9 I will take this opportunity to briefly outline some of the
10 significant social processes which, in the Defence's view, created a
11 context relevant for the understanding of this case. As a federal union
12 of six republics and two autonomous provinces, both in the Republic of
13 Serbia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created during
14 the World War II or the National Liberation War as it was known in the
15 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 Its social and political constitution was reflected in the name
17 of the state as socialist, in that the ideology was undoubtedly
18 Communist. The social and political constitution was further
19 characterised by a mono-party system dominated by a party which was
20 initially known as the Communist party of Yugoslavia and thereafter as
21 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The state consisted of several
22 nations which is why the aspects of nation and nationality were given a
23 lot of attention. One of the underlying causes of that attention were
24 the historical events and conflicts between members of different ethnic
25 groups in the area, especially during the Second World War whose
1 consequences were still fresh in everybody's member. In a desire to
2 overcome possible major problems, including the problem of time which
3 would have been required to establish the guilt of individuals and groups
4 for the events that had taken place during the Second World War as well
5 as to eliminate the causes of such events, the Communist leadership of
6 the state decided to make the leap of faith and establish a society based
7 on the concepts such as were -- the brotherhood and unity of all the
8 nations and nationalities that resided in the territory of the SFRY and
9 similar equally empty phrases.
10 Besides offering practical benefits to the then-government, that
11 decision was in keeping with the Communist ideology which was based,
12 first and foremost, on class struggle and attachment to a class rather
13 than to an ethnic group or tradition. Communist ideology disparages
14 national traditions and ethnic affiliations; i.e., it doesn't recognise
15 any of those because it advocates Communist internationalism. In some
16 cases and in some parts of the state, that way of dealing with this issue
17 as adopted by the government and the party certainly required harsh
18 repressive measures during the first 10- or 15-year period after the end
19 of the Second World War. After that period, any public display of
20 national ideology was subject to uncompromising criminal prosecution.
21 As a result, the problem of previous ethnic conflicts among the
22 peoples of the SFRY seemed to have been solved, and save for a small
23 number of dissents who continued to pursue the matter, the problem was
24 largely ignored by the official authorities. However, the problem
25 continued to persist, and the memories of the events that had taken place
1 during the Second World War were passed on among family members or in
2 smaller local circles. As is often the case, since the memories of those
3 events were suppressed by force, i.e., by the state enforcement agencies,
4 they became mystified in the collective memory of individuals and
5 national groups.
6 The entire political and legal system of the Socialist Federal
7 Republic of Yugoslavia was based, as I've already said it, on a
8 mono-party system in which the party played a regulatory role of sorts.
9 I dare even say that it had a controlling role over any social, political
10 or economic processes that were taking place in society.
11 Let me explain this. Through its local bodies and branches, the
12 League of Communists exerted its influence in all spheres of life. In
13 that way, the party exerted a significant influence on the choice of
14 cadres for all positions. I dare say in the local bodies of government,
15 municipalities and cities, all the way up to the Federation. It also
16 influenced the choice of cadres in the economy, judiciary, state
17 administration, education, health system, military, and so on.
18 The situation changed in 1990, with the onset of democratisation
19 and the introduction of a multi-party system. A large number of
20 political parties were created overnight. They sprung up like mushrooms
21 after the rain, which is only understandable because the same kind of
22 processes were taking place across Europe during the period of
23 post-Communist transition.
24 However, the situation changed only on the face of it but
25 essentially it remained the same. As illustrated and confirmed by
1 numerous examples in recent past, by that I mean Iraq and Afghanistan,
2 the introduction of a multi-party system and the democratisation of a
3 society is a process and not a simple declaration of the fact. Such a
4 process, necessarily means that the population must be educated about the
5 functioning and democratic principles. It especially implies the
6 creation of bodies and putting in place a structure compatible with such
7 a democratic system. None of that existed in the former Socialist
8 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
9 In some more developed parts where some sort of democratic
10 traditions were in place, like, for example, the Republic of Slovenia or
11 larger economic centres, the system started to undergo the process of
12 transformation, but if anything, the transformation was only skin deep
13 and purely cosmetic. The structure of the political and legal system had
14 not changed nor was that objectively possible within such a short period
15 of time. As a result, the HDZ and the SDS parties in Croatia and Serbia
16 respectively were given to play an identical role as the defeated League
17 of Communists before that. All the other parties mostly served as
19 I believe that it is a widely known fact that both Franjo
20 Tudjman, the HDZ leader in Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, the SDS
21 leader in Serbia, were proven Communists. Tudjman as a JNA general and
22 Milosevic as a high-ranking party leader. Since the two of them were
23 undoubtedly very close to the Communist ideology and they were also
24 rather familiar with the functioning of the League of Communists, the
25 respective parties that they headed were modelled after the League of
1 Communists in terms of their organisation, structure, and functioning.
2 Only a relatively low number of intellectuals at the time saw
3 democratisation in the proper sense of the term, i.e., as a possibility
4 to create institutions based on the rule of democracy, law, and free from
5 party control in all segments of life and work. Unfortunately, their
6 numbers were low in the entire territory of the former Socialist
7 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and they were marginalised in every
8 sense which made it impossible for them to fight against the populous
9 parties and movements that ended up imposing themselves on the large
10 popular masses.
11 The emergence of democracy and the break up with Communism led to
12 the abolishment of all taboo topics, so the national issue which was
13 previously strictly controlled and carefully concealed, unfortunately
14 came to the fore. All the leading parties in the republics displayed
15 very pronounced national self-awareness. The surge of that national
16 awareness, which to a certain extent could be seen as a consequence and
17 product of the fact that the issue had been largely ignored as
18 non-existent by the Communist authorities for a number of years, did not
19 move things in a positive direction. Unfortunately, quite the contrary
20 was true. That national self-awareness assumed the characteristics of
21 national exclusivity and chauvinism. One of the plausible underlying
22 reasons for that was the desire of all those parties to make themselves
23 popular, which was a reaction to Communism, and to give prominence to
24 those issues which had been either ignored or prohibited during the
25 Communist rule. Since all the parties based their programmes on the same
1 identical issues, their positions gradually became more radical in an
2 attempt to attract the highest possible number of voters.
3 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been a known as a small
4 Yugoslavia due to its specific characteristics, those tendencies resulted
5 in even more pronounced consequences as citizens sided with their own
6 national parties. The reason for that probably lies in the relative
7 underdevelopment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even the backwardness of some
8 of its parts, in the structure of the population, the history and the
9 ostensible absence of any democratic traditions in the area.
10 It is already in evidence that the breakdown of the Ottoman
11 Empire after the Berlin Congress that took place in 1878 left Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina a rather underdeveloped state in the region. It remained
13 underdeveloped as a short-lived protectorate of the Habsburg Monarchy
14 towards the end of the 19th century. In 1907, it was annexed by the
15 Habsburg Monarchy which meant that the area was again occupied, although
16 under rather different principles in respect of the Ottoman occupation.
17 It can be said that only then, at the beginning of the 20th century, the
18 Habsburg occupation planted the seeds of democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 However, that was again very short lived. During the World War I, the
20 Habsburg Monarchy collapsed and after the end of the war, the territory
21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
22 Slovenians first and then Yugoslavia, and finally, after the Second World
23 War, Communists took power.
24 Since the national structure of the population of Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina was not homogenous, the only option to stand up against the
1 League of Communists was to create a coalition of ethnic parties because
2 without such a coalition, it was impossible to win a majority of votes in
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina and beat the League of Communists at elections.
4 Unfortunately, this type of coalition with victory over Communism being a
5 common denominator of all the coalition parties was doomed from the very
6 outset. Namely, all those ethnic parties, just like the HDZ in Croatia,
7 and the SBS in Serbia, were essentially anti-democratic, and as I've
8 already stated, they mirrored the League of Communists and modelled
9 themselves after it. This was especially true of the HDZ of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina which was undoubtedly part of the HDZ of Croatia, and
11 as such, it implemented the policies of the mother republic and its
12 leading party and it was directly subordinated to the party leader and
13 president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman.
14 One of the instantly recognisable characteristics of all ethnic
15 parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the fact that they copied the work of
16 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the sense that each of them
17 wanted to grab as many resources for themselves and to take as much
18 control as possible over the institutions of power. As I've stated
19 already, there were no democratic or structural mechanisms in place to
20 prevent them from doing so, because the system that existed and that was
21 inherited was based exclusively on a mono-party system.
22 A special problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the fact that
23 ethnic parties, or at least their original leaderships, or those that
24 were the first to join them, were mostly people with little or no
25 experience in the matters of politics or state administration. In that
1 sense, unlike the HDZ in Croatia, or the SBS in Serbia, where most of the
2 members had joined from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the lack
3 of competency was particularly pronounced among the ethnic parties of
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 Your Honours, I believe that during the Prosecution case you saw
6 ample evidence testifying to that lack of competency among the people in
7 leading positions. Poorly educated people were appointed to responsible
8 positions in the state apparatus, in political bodies and the state
9 administration in general. Even if there were any with higher education,
10 as a rule their educational background had nothing to do with the
11 positions to which they were appointed and the roles they played. People
12 with no experience or knowledge were appointed to positions in political
13 institutions, municipalities, and the state administration.
14 During the Prosecution case, we were given as an example a
15 municipality where the president of the Executive Council, the chief of
16 the SJB and the chief of the Secretariat of National Defence were all
17 engineers. I believe that they had degrees in either physics or
18 chemistry and they didn't have any prior work experience. As you know,
19 the MUP -- the Ministry of Interior at the state level was not much
20 different in terms of its leadership. A large majority of the Assembly
21 members, as you may be able to conclude from the evidence in this case,
22 in the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, for example, were novices to the
23 job. Their discussions were often offensive, inappropriate and not very
24 productive either.
25 A very specific characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of which
1 you will hear more in the future, although there has been much evidence
2 to that effect already in this case, is the fact that the three ethnic
3 political parties deliberately or by chance polarised the population
4 along the ethnic rather than political lines. From the moment they were
5 created, they considered themselves the only legitimate representatives
6 of the ethnic group they represented and that is how they conducted their
7 business. The ultimate result of that is -- is that even now, before at
8 this Tribunal, somebody's ethnic affiliation is often considered the same
9 as their party affiliations. If you're a Serb, then you're also the SDS.
10 A Croat is also the HDZ, and a Muslim is the SDA although it doesn't
11 necessarily have to be true. Nor should this be indeed be the case
12 because an individual's political affiliations should depend on the
13 party's programme and the individual's preference and interests.
14 You have also heard that all smaller parties ceased to exist or
15 became marginalised as a result of that. Whereas the SDA, HDZ and SDS
16 coalition which initially favoured party members as their candidates for
17 various positions given to them based on the -- the inter-party agreement
18 but later on, faced with a shortage of party members to fill those
19 positions, they started appointed individuals based on their ethnic
20 rather than party affiliations. Primarily for these reasons, the legal
21 system and structures of power simply collapsed in the entire territory
22 of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and particularly in
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, as you will see. As a result, laws were being
24 broken every step of the way and at all levels, from the Federation and
25 Republics to the municipalities.
1 In Bosnia and Herzegovina this may be illustrated by various
2 examples starting with the establishment of the SDA as an ethnic party
3 and then other ethnic parties, although that was strictly forbidden under
4 the laws then prevailing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The process culminated
5 in October 1992, when, contrary to the valid constitution and the legal
6 regulations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a declaration of independence of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina was passed by the SDA and HDZ members of the
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly in the absence of the representatives of
9 the Serbian people. In one of his statements, Lord Carrington said that
10 that act, undoubtedly initiated by Alija Izetbegovic, was illegal.
11 Can we now play the video please.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 "... have been in the majority. And then the Muslims, who had a
14 very much higher birthrate than the Serbs became the predominant -- the
15 majority of the population. And this, of course, was something very hard
16 for the Serbs to swallow, and they made it abundantly plain very early on
17 that they were not prepared to accept the situation in which there was an
18 independent Bosnia under the constitution which then prevailed, and
19 indeed under the institution that then prevailed, it was not -- it was
20 illegal for Izetbegovic to declare independence because any
21 constitutional change of that magnitude had to be agreed by all three
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 During the Defence case, you will see how far-reaching the state
25 of lawlessness in Bosnia and Herzegovina was and how slowly but surely it
1 led to legal and political chaos. You will see that the impotence of the
2 central powers in Sarajevo resulted in the regional associations of
3 municipalities which had almost nothing to do with the central republican
4 powers. Some associated themselves with their mother states, like, for
5 example, the community of Herceg-Bosnia, which was in the western part of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaned on Croatia. Some leaned on the Socialist
7 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e., the Federation, like, for
8 example, the Autonomous Region of Krajina in north-western Bosnia,
9 whereas some existed on their own.
10 The impotence of the state apparatus and its structures top down
11 to the local level was partly due to the lack of competence of its
12 leaders who even if they had wanted to stop those processes, probably
13 simply didn't know how to do it. This fact, which I consider extremely
14 important for the sequence of events that ensued, has already been
15 corroborated by ample evidence led during the Prosecution case. The
16 Defence will lead other evidence to that effect. When armed conflicts
17 started to take place in the atmosphere that I have just described, the
18 situation became absolutely unbearable and impossible for the functioning
19 of the state and its united powers, as you will see from the documents
20 and evidence we intend to exhibit.
21 And now led me say something about Mr. Mico Stanisic. The
22 evidence that was led during the Prosecution case shows the following.
23 Mico Stanisic was born to an impoverished patriarchal family that
24 lived off agriculture and cattle breeding in Ponor village in Pale
25 municipality, some 50 kilometres south-east of Sarajevo on the slopes of
1 Mount Romanija.
2 MS. KORNER: I'm very sorry to interrupt, Mr. Zecevic, but that's
3 not evidence we led, and as I understand it, Mr. Zecevic is not calling
4 Mr. Stanisic. Is he saying that's evidence that's going to be given by
5 somebody else?
6 MR. ZECEVIC: No. As I said, Ms. Korner, this is the evidence
7 which you -- that you led in this case. It's P2300, P23 [Microphone not
8 activated] those are the exhibits in this case.
9 MS. KORNER: Well, I hear what Mr. Zecevic says, Your Honour.
10 We'll check that.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Stanisic's family had
12 three children. The only way for a poor family to give their children
13 education was to send them to military or police schools. After having
14 enrolled in the police school in Sarajevo, Stanisic himself was a
15 hard-working student. His hard work paid off and in the school year
16 1972/1973, he was proclaimed the best final-year student in all of Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina, based on his achievements. He was also an active
18 athlete. He trained judo, which made him popular and well-known in the
19 city of Sarajevo. You will hear that he graduated from the secondary
20 police school as the best student in his generation. After graduation he
21 signed an employment contract with the Ministry of Interior of the
22 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and enrolled at the law
23 school in Sarajevo. While studying, he also held a permanent job and the
24 cost of his education was borne by the Ministry of the Interior of the
25 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1 The Defence will lead evidence to show that the colleagues always
2 perceived Mico Stanisic as serious and hard-working. Somebody who always
3 carried school-books around and took any opportunity to revise. You will
4 also hear that he was a dedicated athlete and student, that he never
5 drank and that he was never argumentative. You will also hear that from
6 the very start of his career, he was always seen as a man of strong
7 principles and a professional who always did everything by the book and
8 insisted on respect for the laws and regulations. Also that he was
9 sociable and that he socialised with members of all ethnicities, that
10 from the age of 15 he shared a room in the dormitory of the police school
11 with a Muslim and a Croat, his fellow students.
12 Nobody ever saw or heard him display any nationalist feelings nor
13 did he ever spoke offensively about members of any other ethnicity. On
14 the contrary, he was considered a role model as the best member of the
15 youth organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1973, he had the honour
16 of being the first to carry the relay race baton which was traditionally
17 given to President Tito every year on his birthday, which was also a
18 national holiday known as the day of youth, a holiday which symbolised
19 the fraternity and unity of the peoples and the youth of Yugoslavia in
20 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
21 After a while, Mico Stanisic left the police and joined the
22 business community as a successful manager of the Gradske Trznice
23 Trading Company which supplied the city of Sarajevo with food. After the
24 victory of ethnic parties at the 1990 elections, despite the support he
25 enjoyed from the SDA, he left his position as company director because
1 the support was conditional upon the shake-up of the staff. He was not
2 willing to be involved in that because he believed that the company was
3 not a state property and that the only parameters of the company's
4 success were its performance and profit. From that moment on, he was in
5 private business and together with his wife he opened several consumer
6 goods shops.
7 Towards the end of 1990, he joined the steering committee to
8 establish the democratic party of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a true
9 democratic party, where he worked together with the democratic parties of
10 Serb Yugoslavia. That party was not an ethnic party nor did it have such
11 aspirations. At the time, Professor Nenad Kecmanovic, a well-known
12 intellectual and dissident during the Communist rule, was earmarked as
13 the future party president. However, Kecmanovic joined the party of
14 reformists led by the then prime minister Ante Markovic, while ethnic
15 parties started being registers and the picture changed. Members of
16 different ethnicities, almost to the last, started joining their own
17 ethnic parties. When the Prosveta association, the club of Serbian
18 intellectuals, which included Radovan Karadzic as its member, proposed to
19 establish a Serbian ethnic party, a large number of small parties with
20 majority Serbian memberships disappeared and their members joined the new
21 SDS party. The party whose steering committee member was Mico Stanisic
22 experienced the same fate.
23 In July 1990, very soon after the establishment of the SDS,
24 Mico Stanisic clashed with SDS members, and in early Autumn 1990,
25 Mico Stanisic quit the political life and the party.
1 In March 1991, at Vitomir Zepinic's proposal, Mico Stanisic
2 returned to the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
3 joined as the secretary of the Sarajevo SUP. Although no other than
4 Momcilo Krajisnik's brother Mirko was his counter-candidate for the
5 position, Croat and Muslim support was the decisive factor in
6 Mico Stanisic's appointment.
7 You will hear that on his return to the MUP of the Socialist
8 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mico Stanisic continued to uphold his
9 principles and insisted on the strict enforcement of the law, and that
10 because of such position, he clashed with certain structures within the
11 MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the illegal issuance of
12 identity cards and passports to individuals who were not BH citizens, and
13 he was eventually removed from the position as the chief of the Sarajevo
15 After that, on 14th of February, Mico Stanisic was appointed as
16 an advisor to Minister Delimustafic. During the Defence case you will
17 hear that the prime candidate for the post of the interior minister of
18 the Republika Srpska after the promulgation of the constitution and the
19 passing of the laws on internal affairs and on ministers and government
20 was Vitomir Zepinic. However, his candidacy was withdrawn because of
21 suspicions that he had been involved in illegal dealings together with
22 Alija Delimustafic. After that, Prime Minister Djeric appointed
23 Mico Stanisic as minister.
24 You already heard during the Prosecution case that he accepted
25 the appointment halfheartedly. And let me quote Prime Minister Djeric
1 who said at the meeting of the Assembly at which he explained his
2 proposals for the ministers of the interior and foreign affairs, this is
3 Exhibit P198, page 4, Prime Minister Djeric said that Assembly meeting:
4 "I would like to stress that both candidates certainly appreciate
5 the current position of the Serbian people. I'm not saying that they
6 have accepted the positions halfheartedly, but they have not refused
7 them. So much about that."
8 Those were Djeric's words uttered at that Assembly meeting.
9 Speaking about the events of the 1st of March and barricades in
10 Sarajevo, the evidence we will adduce will show that no MUP inspectors or
11 operatives ever implicated Mico Stanisic in the events, nor was anybody
12 in the MUP privy to information that Mico Stanisic had any role to play
13 in those events, contrary to the Prosecutor's allegations.
14 You will also hear that after his appointment as minister of the
15 interior of the Republika Srpska, Mico Stanisic continued to insist on
16 the consistent and strict implementation of the laws and regulations. He
17 continued to be considered a man of principles when it came to enforcing
18 the laws and insisting on the professional work of the police. He
19 applied these principles indiscriminately to his own work as well as to
20 the work of his associates.
21 Your Honours, I have noted the time. It would be a good moment
22 for me to make a break here.
23 JUDGE HALL: So we will resume in 20 minutes. Thank you.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: We will -- may I continue, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please, Mr. Zecevic.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much. We will have the video
4 played, if we can have the transcripts given to the Trial Chamber and the
5 Office of the Prosecutor.
6 Madam Registrar? It's our second video.
7 [Interpretation] Your Honours, before the break, I said that you
8 would hear during the Defence case that even after the appointment as
9 minister of the interior of Republika Srpska, Mico Stanisic, he continued
10 to be considered a man of principles when it came to enforcing the law
11 and insisting on the professional work of the police and that he applied
12 his principles indiscriminately to his own work as well as to the work of
13 his associates.
14 To illustrate this, I will show you an authentic contemporary
15 video-clip depicting the parade of the Sokolac police on the
16 30th of March, 1992, under Mico Stanisic's supervision. On that
17 occasion, he held a speech. The video from Sokolac is 1D1 -- or, rather,
18 that is the transcript, whereas, the videos are 2D1. And now we're going
19 to play the video.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] The text of the solemn declaration
22 will be read by the minister of the interior of the Serbian Autonomous
23 Region of Romanija, Zoran Cvijetic.
24 "I declare that I will perform the duty of an authorised official
25 continuously and responsibility [as interpreted], that I will abide by
1 the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
2 Yugoslavia and the law, and that will I protect the constitutionality of
3 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, the
4 rights, freedoms and security, and that I will carry out those and other
5 tasks and assignments of an authorised official, even in cases when
6 carrying out these tasks and assignments would bring my life into
8 "The minister of the interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
9 and Herzegovina, Mico Stanisic, will address the members of the police
10 units of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Romanija.
11 "As of today, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has its
12 own police force. The legality of our existence is provided by the
13 constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
14 Law on Internal Affairs which was recently adopted by the Assembly at its
15 session. Moreover, the legality of our existence is based on the results
16 of negotiations of the three ethnic communities under the auspices of the
17 European community. As of today, we will act as the police of the
18 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will carry out its
19 tasks and assignments professionally and not politically, as the MUP of
20 the old Bosnia and Herzegovina has done so far, in order to protect
21 property, life, body, and other securities of all citizens in the Serbian
22 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina equally.
23 "Members of the police, we are not involved in politics. We must
24 carry out our tasks professionally. For those reasons, long speeches do
25 not belong to us as of today. Good luck. Get to work in the interests
1 of all who live in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thank
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 As you could see, Your Honours, during his first official
5 appearance as interior minister, Mr. Mico Stanisic insisted that the
6 police had a duty to protect the lives and property of all - I stress the
7 word "all" because that word was stressed by Mr. Stanisic in his speech -
8 "of all citizens of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
9 This is a rare example from that period, where the equality and
10 protection of all citizens is stressed. As you all know already, that
11 period was characterised by incendiary nationalistic speeches by state
12 officials representing all the three national communities in Bosnia and
14 From the evidence adduced so far, you know that Mico Stanisic
15 attended the meeting of the collegium of the minister of Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina on the 1st of April, 1992, where the practical issues of the
17 division of the Ministry of the Interior were discussed. The other
18 participants were representatives of all of three sides,
19 Alija Delimustafic's assistants.
20 Mico Stanisic participated in his capacity as minister,
21 Delimustafic's advisor, and minister of the interior of the Serbian
22 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 During the Prosecution case it was shown that Mico Stanisic had
24 met with Jusuf Pusina, chief of public security of the MUP of Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina, a member of the SDA, on the 3rd of April, 1992, to discuss
1 possible options for a building that would house the MUP of Republika
2 Srpska headquarters in the territory of the city of Sarajevo. The next
3 meeting was scheduled for the 5th of April, 1992, at Holiday Inn hotel in
4 Sarajevo at 1330 hours, and in the meantime, Mr. Pusina was supposed to
5 consult with President Izetbegovic about the headquarters of the MUP.
6 On that day, when Mico Stanisic was waiting for the meeting to
7 start, Pusina first informed him that he would not be able to attend
8 because he was involved in an investigation into the murder of a Serbian
9 policeman in the Novi Grad police station that had happened the night
10 before, and then an another piece of news arrived about a conflict in
11 Vrace and the killing of two Serbian policemen.
12 During the Prosecution case, you heard and saw a number of
13 exhibits and ample evidence that demonstrated Stanisic's dedication to
14 the establishment and functioning of the MUP in strict compliance with
15 the law when the MUP of Republika Srpska was being established
16 practically from scratch during an extremely difficult period. You also
17 heard about his persistent work aimed at stabilising the situation in the
18 Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska. During the Defence
19 case, the Defence will present ample additional evidence to corroborate
20 this statement.
21 You will hear, furthermore, that in 1994, when he returned to
22 that position, he removed some leading individuals from the police and
23 that he -- that -- and that he tried to establish responsibility for all
24 crimes that had been committed, particularly war crimes, and that he
25 insisted on arresting perpetrators of war crimes. You will hear about
1 his fight against crime in general, which is why he clashed with the
2 political leadership and that's why he was removed from his position for
3 the second time. Most particularly, you will hear the testimony about
4 the moment when this Tribunal's indictment was served on Mico Stanisic in
5 2005 and his reaction and attitude towards the indictment.
6 During the Defence case, you will hear additional evidence about
7 Mico Stanisic's work and efforts invested by himself and his closest
8 associates to introduce the rule of law in the territory of the
9 Republika Srpska. His positions, actions and conduct are typical of a
10 man who does not wish to inflict harm upon anybody, or embarrassment. On
11 the contrary, they show him as a serious and responsible civil servant
12 and state official who did everything in his power, at the expense of his
13 own personal safety and the safety of his associates, to protect public
14 order and security and offer protection to all citizens of the Republika
15 Srpska irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, which was his duty under
16 the law.
17 During its case, the Defence intends to demonstrate that there is
18 no evidence to corroborate the Prosecution allegations from the
19 indictment or a shred of evidence for any of the crimes the Prosecution
20 charges the accused, Mico Stanisic, with. When I say that, I mean
21 Counts 4 through 11, and 17 through 23 of the indictment.
22 We intend to show that there is no evidence in this case that
23 Stanisic is individually criminally responsible, under Article 7(1) of
24 the ICTY Statute, for the crimes under Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute
25 with which he is charged in this indictment, and which he allegedly
1 committed not directly but as a co-perpetrator, and which he aided and
2 abetted and assisted in their planning, preparation or commission.
3 Let me be quite open, Your Honours. It is Mr. Stanisic's
4 position that there was no joint criminal enterprise as described in the
5 indictment or in any other way which he would have been a member of or
6 whose common purpose he would have shared. It is his position that the
7 evidence adduced to date and that which is yet to be presented during the
8 Defence case demonstrate that Mico Stanisic was not involved in any
9 criminal activity, individually or in concert with others, or any sort of
10 conspiracy or criminal enterprise. He fulfilled his obligations under
11 the laws in force at the time responsibly and as far as it was possible
12 for him to do so. Furthermore, as minister of the interior, he did not
13 do anything impermissible or criminal, either through action or inaction.
14 Quite the contrary, in fact.
15 The joint criminal enterprise, as pleaded in the indictment,
16 which ties it in with the 24th of October, 1991, as the date when the
17 Assembly of the Serbian People in the -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
18 established, did not exist. Or if such a joint criminal enterprise or
19 something similar did exist, Mico Stanisic was most certainly not a
20 member of that joint criminal enterprise.
21 Furthermore, in our submission, Mico Stanisic did not use
22 physical perpetrators for the commission of any crimes. We will
23 particularly and specifically demonstrate that there is no evidence to
24 support the OTP contentions that, in the municipalities listed in the
25 indictment, and through his action, and inaction, Mico Stanisic did as
2 Under A, participating in the formation of the Bosnian Serb
3 bodies and forces that implemented the forcible takeovers of the
4 municipalities and participated in the crimes listed in this indictment.
5 Under B, participating in the development of Bosnian Serb policy
6 at the leadership level in order to secure the takeovers of the
7 municipalities in the targeted territory and the forcible removal of the
8 non-Serb population.
9 Under C, communicating and coordinating with Bosnian Serb
10 political figures at the republican level, particularly Karadzic and
11 Krajisnik, as well as political, military, and police figures at the
12 regional and municipal levels, in order to facilitate the implementation
13 of the objective of the joint criminal enterprise.
14 Under D, commanding over members and agents of the RS MUP in
15 implementing the objective of the joint criminal enterprise.
16 Under E, assisting in the co-ordination of joint operations of
17 the Army of Republika Srpska and the MUP of Republika Srpska in support
18 of the implementation of the objective of the joint criminal enterprise.
19 Under F, facilitating the establishment and operation of camps
20 and detention facilities in which Serb forces beat, killed and sexually
21 assaulted non-Serb detainees.
22 Under G, failing, while under a duty under the laws and
23 regulations applicable to the Ministry of Interior, to protect the entire
24 civilian population within the areas under the control of Bosnian Serb
25 authorities, to take adequate steps to ensure that MUP -- that the RS MUP
1 forces would act to protect the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and other
2 non-Serb populations residing in those areas.
3 Under H, encouraging and facilitating the commission of crimes by
4 Serb forces against Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs
5 by not taking adequate steps to investigate, arrest, and/or punish the
6 perpetrators of such crimes and thereby contributing to the maintenance
7 of a culture of impunity in respect of such crimes, including by
8 participating in sham inquiries concerning these crimes.
9 Therefore we contest all these allegations from the indictment as
10 indicated above.
11 Furthermore, we intend to demonstrate the following: That did he
12 not have the intent for the commission of any of the crimes listed in the
13 indictment, nor could he have considered them as foreseeable
14 consequences, that he did not have the criminal intent for any of the
15 crimes charged against him. You will hear that, contrary to Prosecution
16 allegations, a certain number of victims listed in the indictment were
17 members of armed forces and not civilians.
18 And, of course, we also contest Mr. Stanisic's responsibility
19 under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.
20 In our submission, the allegations in the indictment are
21 unfounded and incorrect, and the Defence will contest them during its
22 presentation of evidence, just as it did during the Prosecution case.
23 After all, it was for this reason that our client pleaded not guilty, and
24 our pre-trial brief details the underlying reasons. During its case the
25 Defence intends to demonstrate that the Prosecution's allegations and the
1 opinions provided by their experts, Prosecution experts, are erroneous
2 and based on a lack of knowledge of the legal system in force in the
3 Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Republic of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on a
5 complete and utter misinterpretation of relevant legal provisions. We
6 intend to demonstrate that such allegations are not based on knowledge of
7 relevant issues but, rather, on a one-sided and therefore biased and
8 erroneous interpretation of specific facts which were, for the most part,
9 construed out of the relevant context and legal regulations. We intend
10 to show that there is a significant difference between having knowledge
11 and expertise of a certain field and being merely informed of it through
12 quotations and analyses of selected documents.
13 To give you an illustration of it, let me quote what my learned
14 friend Mr. O'Sullivan had to say about it at some point during this
16 "If I went and designed a bridge after reading all the available
17 material about how to build bridges and without having the requisite
18 knowledge about bridge construction, I would not recommend that you cross
19 that bridge."
20 Your Honours, looking back, I'm sure that, generally speaking,
21 the Trial Chamber has a very clear impression and knowledge of the
22 Defence's position in this case, given that our position has been very
23 transparent and, most importantly, consistent from the start of trial.
24 What we have been maintaining from day one is what we will continue to
25 maintain throughout the Defence case. As I said, the Defence position
1 has not and will not change. In our submission, Mico Stanisic did,
2 indeed, do everything within his powers, obligations, and duties as
3 minister of the interior to combat every type of crime. You have ample
4 evidence to that effect in the record and more will follow.
5 But that is not all. The Defence submits that not only did
6 Mico Stanisic do what was required and necessary, but he did even more
7 than that when the situation was such that it does not bear describing.
8 You have seen and will see that, from day one, not only did he insist in
9 his dispatches on the strict application of the laws and regulations and
10 professional conduct of MUP members, but that he kept repeating it
11 throughout his time as minister and took measures to have his orders and
12 dispatches implemented.
13 We will demonstrate specifically that did not amount to mere
14 correspondence, but that the MUP inspectors present in the headquarters
15 risked their lives at times to oversee the implementation of instructions
16 on the order of the minister and his assistants by going out into the
17 field and touring the same CSBs or SJBs, not once, but several times, to
18 make sure that they were implemented. You will see that all his efforts
19 and persistence resulted in the situation taking a significant turn for
20 the better in the second half of 1992, and that these efforts taken by
21 the entire Ministry of Interior headed by him can by no means be
22 connected in the slightest with any alleged joint criminal enterprise or
23 the commission of any crime from this indictment. Quite the contrary.
24 In this case, through a twist of circumstances, not only do we have
25 testimonies of witnesses from the Prosecution case and more to come in
1 the Defence case, but we also have a large amount of contemporaneous
2 documents, even originals, from the ministry of Republika Srpska, as well
3 as copies of the same documents forwarded by CSBs to the territorial
4 public security stations and follow-up letters checking if the
5 instructions were being complied with.
6 We submit that in such a situation nobody could have done more
7 than had been done.
8 Your Honours, the crimes are many. The victims are many. And
9 all of us, including my client, feel it keenly. However, on the other
10 hand, never lose sight of the fact that the situation in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina in 1992 was everything but regular in every sense of the
12 word. There was chaos and whirlpool of civil war, where former
13 neighbours, friends and kin killed each other in cold blood,
14 unfortunately. Not even the best qualified and best organised police
15 forces in the world would be able to handle such situations in the
16 circumstances that are incomparably less extreme despite having fully
17 functional states that keep situations under control. I will not be
18 citing examples here because you know them full well. The important
19 thing here is to understand that at that point in time, in 1992, a
20 functional state simply did not exist. The state was only in the making,
21 as was the state administration, including the Ministry of Interior.
22 As one of the Prosecution witnesses graphically put it, the
23 RS MUP had to be established and I quote, "by starting from the green
24 grass." Meaning from scratch.
25 You will recall that on the issue of communications, the
1 Prosecution put in everything they had to prove that there was normal
2 communication with occasional interruptions until one of their witnesses
3 explained the relations quite plastically in terms of figures.
4 Specifically, that in normal times, the entire MUP traffic of dispatches
5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina amounted to over 300.000 dispatches a year, and
6 that in 1992, the RS MUP, at a time when armed clashes raged, had only
7 8.570 of them all together. The fact of the matter is that three CSBs of
8 the RS MUP did not even exist before April 1992, that they were yet to be
9 established and to be made to work at a basic level, that -- I -- I will
10 remind you that active policemen were by far a minority compared to
11 reservists, who were picked out and placed on the police reserve force by
12 Crisis Staffs or other organs wholly unrelated to the MUP.
13 In our submission, when all these issues are taken into account,
14 one can hardly point a finger and say that this ministry, or this
15 minister, did not do this and that in 1992 and had the ability to do so.
16 Surely the Trial Chamber will recall that on several occasions during the
17 Prosecution case, I underscored the fact that, from the very start, the
18 Defence left no room for doubt as to which witnesses would be called
19 during the Defence case, and that, aside from Defence experts, most of
20 them would be witnesses whom the Prosecution had placed on their
21 65 ter lists but did not call to testify. I use lists in plural here
22 because these lists were amended on several occasions at trial, as we all
23 know, with new witnesses being added, others dropped, only to
24 subsequently reappear. And the Prosecution did not call these witnesses
25 to testify. Hence, the case will proceed just as I announced it.
1 During the Defence case, the Chamber will hear two experts, that
2 is, an expert on police matters who is a professor at a police academy.
3 Therefore, a fully competent witness who will provide detailed
4 explanations and clarifications of the legal provisions governing
5 internal affairs in the relevant period, specifically the establishment
6 of the MUP of Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the way the MUP of
7 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina worked in 1990 to 1992; the
8 duties, rights and obligations of MUP members and the ministry as a
9 whole; the system of management within the RS MUP; the duties, rights and
10 obligations of the minister and other senior officials under the law in
11 force; the disciplinary and criminal responsibility of MUP members as
12 provided for in the regulations in force at the time, in terms of powers
13 to request, initiate, conduct, render decisions, and the appeals
14 procedure. I mean the appeal in the disciplinary proceedings.
15 In particular, the expert sets out in his report a comparison
16 between the de jure and de facto situations in respect of all the
17 specific issues I mentioned above and addresses some of the conclusions
18 drawn by Prosecution experts.
19 In the supplement to his report, the expert addresses the only
20 two topics that are, in our view, material and relevant for this case and
21 which have to do with the report of the Prosecution's military expert.
22 The second expert of the Defence is also a university professor,
23 a demographer whose main area of study is precisely demography in
24 theoretical terms and, more specifically, the demography of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, a fully competent witness too. What I mean to
1 say is that the expert addresses in his report the history, mechanisms,
2 reasons, and courses of migrations in Bosnia-Herzegovina over time and
3 specifically during the period relevant to the indictment.
4 Crucially, the expert gives a comprehensive view of the issue and
5 provides explanations from the perspective of the entire population of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina and not just individual groups, because, as we noted
7 previously, and repeatedly, we believe that the type of report which
8 relates to individual groups, which is the sort of report presented by
9 the Prosecution, inevitably implies bias and means that the subject of
10 study is examined out of context. Consequently, such a report runs
11 contrary to the basic principles of scientific methodology.
12 The Defence intends to call fact witnesses relevant to this
13 indictment. They may roughly be divided into three groups, depending on
14 the issues they will testify to. Two witnesses will testify about the
15 situation in the security services centres. One of the witnesses was a
16 CSB chief and the other a chief of the CSB crime service.
17 In selecting witnesses, the Defence has primarily focussed on
18 members of the crime prevention administration and specifically the crime
19 service, because it is precisely this administration that is believed to
20 be in the best position to provide relevant information about the crimes
21 listed in the indictment.
22 The Trial Chamber will surely recall that under the Law on
23 Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska, the MUP of Republika Srpska of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was organised into five Security Services Centres;
25 namely, Trebinje, Sarajevo, Bijeljina, Banja Luka, and Doboj.
1 You will also recall that, previously, the MUP of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina had had nine Security Services Centres. In other
3 words, of the CSBs that had existed before the conflicts in April and
4 May of 1992, only the CSBs in Banja Luka and Doboj remained in the
5 territory of Republika Srpska.
6 Given that in terms of hierarchy the CSBs come directly under the
7 MUP headquarters, the Defence intends to have the most competent witness
8 possible, a CSB chief, present to the Chamber the way the centre worked
9 before and after the split in the MUP and before and after the armed
10 clashes in the territory of that centre. Since our choice was
11 significantly reduced due to the fact that, as I said, of the five CSBs
12 in the Republika Srpska, only two had existed before the split in the
13 MUP, and in view of the fact that Mr. Zupljanin is a co-accused in this
14 case, we were left only with the chief of CSB Doboj, who meets both these
15 criteria. Therefore, our first witness will Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic,
16 chief of the state security centre during the time relevant to this case.
17 The area covered by CSB Doboj includes, among others, three
18 municipalities from the indictment; namely, Doboj, Teslic, and
19 Bosanski Samac. Through his testimony and the documents we will present
20 during his evidence, the witness will explain in detail the situation in
21 the CSB area before the split in the MUP, the failure to operate as well
22 as the unlawful activity of the MUP of the Socialist Republic of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He will also explain the processes unfolding at the
24 time and state his reasons for attending the meeting in Banja Luka on the
25 11th of February, 1992. He will give first-hand testimony of the
1 relations between the Crisis Staffs and CSB chiefs. He will testify
2 about the actual state of affairs in CSB Doboj and his engagement in the
3 army under the command of Colonel Lisica, as well as about the relations
4 or the attitude of the army toward the civilian authorities. The witness
5 will also discuss the problems he confronted in his work during the armed
6 clashes in 1992 and CSB's lack of control over the territory in the first
7 several months.
8 He will testify about his presence at the first RS MUP collegium
9 meeting in Belgrade on the 11th of July and about all the other collegium
10 meeting he attended during the period relevant to the indictment,
11 including the issues and problems discussed at these meetings.
12 Furthermore, the witness will testify about the measures he took
13 to functionally unify CSB Doboj, about when the centre started to operate
14 properly, when it created a network with local SJBs on the ground along
15 the various lines of work, and about the measures of control and
16 supervisory inspection that were implemented in these SJBs. He will also
17 discuss the resistance he met from local authorities on the issue of
18 appointments and removals of individuals in leadership positions in the
19 territory. The witness will also testify about the supervisory
20 inspection and tours of CSBs by inspectors from the MUP headquarters on
21 several occasions in the autumn of 1992.
22 Finally, the witness will speak about the measures taken by the
23 CSB to file criminal reports for crimes committed against non-Serbs, to
24 impose disciplinary measures against certain members of the centre, and
25 reasons why such measures were not taken against other members of CSB and
1 the subordinated SJBs. This witness was interviewed by the Prosecution
2 on more than one occasion.
3 Witness Simo Tusevljak is also a professional policeman. He had
4 been working in the crime service of the city of Sarajevo SUP since the
5 1st of September, 1990. During that time, he was coordinator for general
6 crime for the town of Sarajevo. The witness will testify how, during
7 this period, there was, at the same time, an upward trend in the number
8 of crimes and a decline in the number of uncovered cases of crime and
9 will give the reasons behind this state of matters. He will further
10 testify about the makeup of the police personnel who were employed during
11 this period, and I mean with the MUP of the Socialist Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You will also hear detailed information about
13 illegal arming and arms trafficking in the town of Sarajevo, and about
14 the deliberate coverup of these crimes by some of the MUP members. He
15 will give evidence about the existence of a separate parallel system of
16 communications that the Muslim members of the MUP had together with the
17 paramilitary organisation the Green Berets, and about the situation in
18 Sarajevo on the 1st of March, 1992.
19 He will also testify about the events in Sarajevo in early
20 April 1992. He will testify about his knowledge of the split in the MUP
21 and what sort of instructions existed in that regard. From June 1992
22 onwards, the witness was chief of the crime service of the CSB Sarajevo
23 of MUP of Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina. He will further testify
24 about the situation in the field, the number of employees and stations,
25 police participation in combat operations, and measures taken to set up a
1 crime service. The witness will give evidence about the situation in the
2 field and whether the CSB was able to control the stations in the field
3 and, in particular, about the meetings with SJB chiefs and instructions
4 given on these occasions. In particular, the witness will speak about
5 the situation in the stations across CSB territory and about the problems
6 they confronted in their work. The witness will give evidence about the
7 work of the judiciary at this time and in that territory, and about the
8 relations with the army.
9 The witness will particularly speak about the criminal reports
10 filed against perpetrators of crimes, reports against MUP members, and
11 about the way in which KU registers were kept.
12 The next group of witnesses that the Defence will call are from
13 the MUP headquarters and they include the chief of the crime prevention
14 administration, Mr. Goran Macar who took up the position following the
15 month of July 1992, after Prosecution Witness ST-220 was removed.
16 As an experienced policeman, the witness will give evidence about
17 his work in the MUP of Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of
18 1977, about his acquaintance with Mico Stanisic, and about what his
19 opinion was of Mico Stanisic back then. He will further testify about
20 his work in Sarajevo as chief for general crime as of 1990, that being
21 the position he held at the time of the events in early April 1992, and
22 about the way the Serbian Democratic Party treated him. The witness will
23 give evidence about his joining the RS MUP and the positions he held. In
24 particular, the witness will testify about the first review of the RS MUP
25 personnel in Sokolac on the 30th of March, 1992, a glimpse of which you
1 saw in the video footage which he attended. He will also speak about the
2 early days of the crime sector administration and the number of
3 inspectors he used to have in the administration back at the HQ. The
4 witness will give evidence about the establishment of this administration
5 in Bijeljina and its initial relatively normal work in the autumn of
6 1992, when inspectors were being dispatched into the field for
7 supervisory inspection and in order to learn about the situation on the
8 ground. The witness will speak, in particular, about the tour of CSB
9 Banja Luka in mid-November 1992 and about the visit of a group of
10 inspectors to SJB Prijedor which he headed, and I mean he headed the
11 group of inspectors.
12 The witness will further testify about the objective problems MUP
13 was confronted with due to the absence of records of MUP members, the
14 migration of the population in 1992, and the background to several orders
15 issued by the minister to remove those MUP members who did not deserve to
16 be on the MUP force, to downsize the reserve force and to place these MUP
17 members at the disposal of the VRS.
18 The witness will also give evidence about the first time that the
19 MUP HQ toured the CSB in Banja Luka in March 1993, and his conclusion
20 about the state of crime in that CSB at the time with reference to the
21 crime at Koricanske Stijene. The witness will testify about the
22 initiative taken by the MUP to prosecute war crimes at a time when
23 Mico Stanisic was minister for the second time around. The witness was
24 interviewed by the Prosecution and was on the Prosecution 65 ter witness
25 list as ST-118.
1 Witness Dragan Andan was a police inspector of the RS MUP.
2 Before the outbreak of armed clashes, he occupied a very senior position
3 in the BH MUP as a senior inspector first-class of the police
4 administration charged with public law and order. His line of duty was
5 to control the work of SJBs in East Herzegovina. The witness will give
6 evidence about the situation in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the ministry's collapse after the multi-party
8 elections. He will describe the examples of a number of SJBs across the
9 territory of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He will
10 testify how Muslim leaders of the MUP, Avdo Hebib above all, placed
11 ethnicity before profession, and how the split along the ethnic lines
12 within the BH MUP began as early as during the time of Minister
13 Muhamed Besic, who held this position before Alija Delimustafic.
14 He will testify about the barricades in Sarajevo on 1st of March,
15 1992, and the information available to the MUP of the Socialist Republic
16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time about the organisers of barracks. He
17 will give evidence about his knowledge of Mico Stanisic in relation to
18 this event, and what sort of man Mico Stanisic was reputed to be, as well
19 as about the reasons for Mico Stanisic's removal from the position of the
20 chief of the city of Sarajevo SUP.
21 The witness was in favour of keeping a united MUP and opposed the
22 split. He will also testify about the dilemmas he faced in that regard.
23 How his dilemmas were dispelled and why he decided to flee Sarajevo and
25 When he crossed over to the MUP of Republika Srpska of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was posted to Bijeljina as an inspector. He was
2 dispatched from Bijeljina to try to sort the situation out in the
3 SJB Brcko. He will testify about the situation he found there and
4 measures he took, as well as about conflicts with certain groups in
5 Brcko. He will also speak about his knowledge of the Luka prison and
6 under whose authority it was.
7 Following his time in Brcko, he was sent back to Bijeljina to
8 sort the matters there, together with a team of the federal SUP led by
9 Mico Davidovic, Prosecution Witness ST-142. He will testify about the
10 situation in Bijeljina and the role played by Dusko Malovic's group. He
11 spent sometime there as acting chief of the public security station, or
12 of the CSB, and has knowledge about the powers over the Batkovici camp
13 near Bijeljina; it's a military camp.
14 He will give evidence about the original way in which he set
15 about implementing the minister's order to downsize the police reserve
16 force. He will further testify about how he prepared, organised and
17 reconnoitred the Zvornik area for the operation against the Yellow Wasps,
18 which was a success. He personally arrested Zuco. He will testify about
19 the praise he received from the minister for that and for preparing a
20 similar operation in Foca. He will also testify about the reasons about
21 why it was aborted.
22 He will testify about the encounter with ST-171 and the subject
23 of discussions at the time in 1992. He will testify about how a
24 disciplinary procedure was initiated against him and how he stopped
25 working in the MUP of Republika Srpska. The witness will also give
1 evidence about Mico Stanisic calling him in 1994 and asking that he
2 rejoin the MUP to lead a team for combatting all manner of crime,
3 including war crimes and arresting perpetrators of war crimes.
4 The witness will testify that he was appointed police director of
5 Republika Srpska in 2004, and that during the two years he performed this
6 duty, 11 individuals were brought before this Tribunal, including
7 Mico Stanisic. The witness himself served Mico Stanisic with the
8 indictment and he will testify to this event. He was interviewed by the
9 Prosecution and IPTF on several occasions. He was proposed as
10 Witness ST-122.
11 Witness Milomir Orasanin is a 92 ter witness. He is a
12 professional policeman. He was an inspector in the MUP of RS of UZSK,
13 which is the administration for crime prevention. He was one of the
14 inspectors from the administration headed by Goran Macar until
15 November 1992, when he transferred to the border police administration.
16 He will testify about knowing Mico Stanisic from the school days. He
17 will testify about the sidelining of Serbian members of the MUP and
18 arming of the Green Berets in Novo Sarajevo, where he was chief of the
19 crime prevention department.
20 The arming escalated with the attack by the Green Berets on SJB
21 on the 4th of April, 1992.
22 He will give evidence about the situation in the RS MUP as he
23 found it in May 1992, when he joined the RS MUP, and about the problems
24 they faced. The witness was present at a meeting in mid-1992 between
25 Mico Stanisic and some members of the crime prevention administration and
1 will testify about what was discussed at the time and what it was that
2 Minister Stanisic insisted on. He participated in drafting the
3 instructions on the deposit and war crimes.
4 He will give evidence about his visit for supervisory inspection
5 to Ilijas and Vogosca in May and about the situation he found there. In
6 June he went on a supervisory inspection visit to Skelani, Zvornik and
7 Brcko. He will testify about the situation he found there and about the
8 supervisory inspection in the area of CSB Doboj in August. He will also
9 speak about the visits to SJBs in Foca, Rudo and Visegrad. The witness
10 was interviewed by the Prosecution.
11 Nikola Milanovic is a 92 ter witness as well. He is also one of
12 the crime prevention administration inspectors, Orasanin's colleague. He
13 will testify about his acquaintance with Mico Stanisic and about his work
14 together in the SUP Sarajevo for the whole of 15 years.
15 He will testify about Mico Stanisic's attitude toward members of
16 other ethnicities. He will speak about how he was pensioned off for
17 being a Communist and member of the Serbian People on two occasions, in
18 1991 and 1992, how he complained to the SDS president Karadzic about the
19 treatment he was accorded by the MUP of the Socialist Republic of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina and what sort of measures Karadzic took in response to
22 The witness wrote what was probably the first criminal report by
23 RS MUP, and against a Serb at that, for the crime of murder committed
24 against a Muslim in the Lukavica area. He will testify about supervisory
25 inspection carried out in 1992 and the situation as he found it on the
1 ground. He was interviewed by the Prosecution on several occasions and
2 was on their 65 ter list as ST-120. Because of his impaired health, it
3 was submitted that he should testify via videolink.
4 The third group of witnesses are individuals who can provide
5 information about specific events or issues which came to the fore during
6 the Prosecution case and which remain a matter of contention between the
8 Witness Branko Vlaco retired from the MUP of the Socialist
9 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina back in 1989. He subsequently lived in
10 Vogosca where he kept a catering establishment at the time. As the
11 conflict broke out he was in France on a temporary job, but since his
12 family resided in Vogosca, he returned right away. The witness became a
13 member of the Vogosca Crisis Staff. The Crisis Staff, or more
14 specifically, Zdravko Luketa appointed him warden of the reception centre
15 called Naka's Garage. The reception centre was subsequently moved to the
16 location called Bunker, and to Sonja's cafe, called Kontiki. The witness
17 will say under whose control these reception centres were. After the KPD
18 Butmir department was set up at the location called Planja's house, he
19 was appointed warden of the department in Vogosca by virtue of a decision
20 issued by the Ministry of Justice on the 21st of July, 1992.
21 The witness will testify about how there was another individual
22 with a similar first name and identical last name who was a member of the
23 MUP. The witness will also give evidence about how he joined the RS MUP
24 only on the 1st of October, 1992. The witness does not have a passport
25 and there is a procedure pending against him before the High Court in
1 Belgrade as well as a possible investigation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For
2 these reasons he cannot appear before the Chamber and it was submitted
3 that he should testify via videolink.
4 The Defence intends to include two 92 quater witnesses, both of
5 whom are from Bosanski Samac. In the relevant period witness
6 Stevan Todorovic was appointed chief of SJB Samac by the Crisis Staff.
7 His testimony was partially admitted during the Prosecution case, and the
8 portion of his testimony that the Defence intends to rely on is tendered
9 under Rule 92 quater. Todorovic's testimony is relevant to the role the
10 Crisis Staff played in his appointment, activity, reporting, and
11 responsibility. The testimony is also relevant to the events alleged in
12 this indictment.
13 Witness Stoko Sekulic, also from Bosanski Samac, was a member of
14 the MUP before the armed clashes in March/April 1992. He testifies about
15 the situation in the SJB after Stevan Todorovic took up his position as
16 the chief and about Stevan Todorovic's conduct during that time. He was
17 appointed to the post of SJB commander in the summer of 1992 under a
18 certain degree of pressure from Todorovic. He introduced a degree of
19 order into the work of the station whose functioning up to that point
20 left much to be desired. The witness gives evidence about supervisory
21 inspection conducted by inspectors from CSB Doboj and the RS MUP. He
22 also testifies about the army arresting Stevan Todorovic in November 1992
23 and the appointment of a new SJB chief thereafter.
24 Moreover, as you know, the Defence intends to adduce
25 895 documents from our 65 ter list to corroborate the statements that
1 will be made or have already been made by witnesses or experts.
2 Finally, Your Honours, we submit that Mico Stanisic is not a man
3 who is capable of committing the crimes the Prosecution has charged him
4 with. At no point during his life has he exhibited any manner of
5 intolerance, extremism, hatred, inclination to violence or indeed
6 violence itself. This transpires quite clearly from his conduct during
7 the whole of 56 years of his life, from what he did and how did he it,
8 and from what he said. The facts thereof are either before you already
9 or will be presented during the Defence case. He is a man who has always
10 insisted on the consistent application of law and professionalism. Crime
11 is the last thing Mico Stanisic would justify, regardless of who
12 committed it and what the motives were. As he, himself, has said on
13 several occasions, his conscience is clear. He has been saying from the
14 moment he was indicted that the Prosecution allegations and charges are
15 unfounded. He asserts that these allegations and charges are without
16 foundation and utterly erroneous.
17 Mico Stanisic believes that the evidence that has been adduced so
18 far and that which has yet to be presented to the Chamber will give a
19 clear picture and completely answer all the charges against him, and that
20 at the end of this trial you will acquit him of these charges.
21 Thank you, Your Honours. These were my opening statements.
22 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much, Mr. Zecevic, for your
1 opening remarks. The Chamber has taken good notice of the evidence that
2 you have accounted for and that will come to us in the next couple of
4 There is one matter that I wanted to raise before we hear the
5 Defence witnesses. And as you will recall, it is a matter that we also
6 addressed when the Prosecution was leading its witnesses; namely, the
7 issue of whether the parties would be willing to offer to the Chamber
8 copies of the witness statements to the extent, of course, that such
9 statements exist. You drew our attention to the fact that you will be
10 leading several witnesses who were originally scheduled as Prosecution
11 witnesses, and I suppose that for those witnesses, very likely,
12 statements do exist, taken by the Prosecution originally. And maybe
13 there are, for those and for other witnesses, additional statements that
14 have been taken by you.
15 It is of assistance to the Chamber to see these statements before
16 we hear the witnesses so as to give the Judges a better idea of the
17 testimony that these witnesses will bring. And we ask for this, not to
18 have those pieces exhibited and admitted into evidence, but, rather, as a
19 supplement and as a support to the accounts that you have made in your
20 Rule 65 ter submissions.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, the situation is as follows.
22 Concerning two 92 ter witnesses which we proposed, the -- none of them
23 gave a statement. They have their -- their interviews given to the
24 Office of the Prosecutor. We want to rely on that, and we offer that as
25 a part of the package.
1 One of the witnesses gave an additional statement, and it's also
2 a part of the package and it's already disclosed to Your Honours. As all
3 other witnesses, none of them gave any statements, although they were on
4 the -- a majority of them were on the -- on the list of the Office of the
5 Prosecutor, they never gave a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor,
6 and, as far as I can remember, they were offered as viva voce witnesses.
7 However, their interviews given to the Office of the Prosecutor
8 do exist, and we don't see any -- any particular problem in disclosing
9 these -- these interviews given to the Office of the Prosecutor to -- to
10 the Trial Chamber, except if maybe Office of the Prosecutor has something
11 in opposition to it.
12 MR. HANNIS: Well, I have a concern and a question, I guess.
13 The interviews that were given to the Prosecution that did not
14 result in any statements being created were generally tape-recorded
15 conversations. And you've seen or heard some of these transcripts of
17 I guess I'm wondering out loud is the Defence saying that they
18 took no statements from any of their witnesses? There are no witness
19 statements other than, I think, the one that has been disclosed?
20 If they have investigator notes or tape-recorded interviews of
21 their witnesses and they're willing to disclose those to the
22 Trial Chamber, then that would affect our position as to what we want to
24 So no notes ...
25 MR. ZECEVIC: We don't have any notes, nor recorded interviews.
1 We relied on their interviews given to the Office of the Prosecutor and
2 based on that, we spoke to -- to the witnesses.
3 MR. HANNIS: And took no notes or tape-recorded none of those
5 MR. ZECEVIC: No, none.
6 MR. HANNIS: Oh.
7 Your Honour, we're in your hands.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE HALL: So in that case -- thank you very much, Mr. Hannis.
10 In that case, we would be much obliged if the Defence would make these
11 transcripts available to the Judges before the witnesses appear.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE HALL: So we take the break now and you will be ready with
14 your witness when we resume.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, yes, the witness is scheduled to come
17 tomorrow morning at 9.00, yes.
18 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
19 JUDGE HALL: So we take the adjournment to 9.00 tomorrow morning.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.02 p.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of April,
22 2011, at 9.00 a.m.