1 Wednesday, 13 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
6 number IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
7 Stojan Zupljanin.
8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
9 Good afternoon to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
10 MR. HANNIS: Good afternoon, all. I'm Tom Hannis along with
11 Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
13 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic, and we are
14 joined with two interns, Ms. Louise Beck and Paul Derohannesian,
15 appearing for Stanisic Defence this afternoon. Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
17 Aleksandar Aleksic, appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
19 Before we begin, there's a small housekeeping matter and this
20 relates to the, quote/unquote, informal request that we received,
21 Mr. Hannis, and what we've decided is that the -- we would take a
22 30-minute break from 5.30 so that would result in the third session being
23 abridged by 15 minutes. Of course, all this is subject to the -- any
24 problems that the witness himself may have. So we go from 2.15 to 3.15,
25 3.30 to 4.30, 4.45 to 5.30, and then the final session is from 6.00 to
1 7.00. Thank you.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I announce that there is a small matter which I was
3 requested by the Trial Chamber to address yesterday.
4 JUDGE HALL: Do we have to go into private session?
5 MR. ZECEVIC: I think so, Your Honours, because --
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
7 [Private session]
11 Pages 23213-23215 redacted. Private session.
7 [Open session]
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session. Thank
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE HALL: Good afternoon to you, Mr. Macar. I give you the
12 usual reminder about your solemn declaration before I invite Mr. Hannis
13 to continue.
14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 WITNESS: GORAN MACAR [Resumed]
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]
18 Q. Mr. Macar, when we left off yesterday, I think we'd been talking
19 about briefings and collegiums of the MUP that you attended in 1992. And
20 in that connection, you had told Mr. Zecevic last week on 6th of
21 July that at these meetings you all reached some conclusions that the
22 influence of local bodies of government, the Crisis Staffs and the
23 War Presidencies, was "overbearingly influential" is the translation I
24 have of your term. And I wondered, did you have knowledge of or can you
25 tell us any specific examples of a local police chief or an SJB receiving
1 from a Crisis Staff and carrying out an order to do something illegal.
2 Did you have any evidence that that was happening between the
3 local Crisis Staffs and the local SJB and SJB chief?
4 A. I do not have information that SJB chiefs received orders to
5 commit crimes. I do have information, though, that SJBs were tasked to
6 do something from the remit of municipal authorities.
7 Q. You said -- you also said in your answer that later on in the
8 year when you were doing some of your inspections or your tours out in
9 the field that -- that you were being told that some Crisis Staffs were
10 making decisions that police officers were to be sent to the front line.
11 Is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you have any document to show us where a Crisis Staff ordered
14 policemen to go to the front line?
15 A. I don't have documents that show such orders. But I remember an
16 example. When we had a meeting with the representatives of the crime
17 enforcement services of the Sarajevo centre, I forgot which event
18 triggered it, but, anyway I asked the chief of the crime enforcement
19 service at Sokolac to explain, to give me some instructions, and he
20 looked at me with confusion, and he said to me, "Boss," that's they
21 called me, "Boss, I came from the front line yesterday." And I asked
22 him, "What do you mean?" I know that the crime enforcement service still
23 isn't fully manned. And I -- I wanted to learn about the way things
25 The Sokolac municipality was affected by combat activity in the
1 direction of Olovo and the front line was pierced repeatedly. The Crisis
2 Staffs that -- which, at the time, took care of security issues demanded
3 that the police be engaged at the front line. And it's important for the
4 Trial Chamber to know what the problem was with these engagements. The
5 VRS had 15 days of leave after 15 days on the front line; whereas, police
6 officers, after one day of rest or even without any rest, after coming
7 back from the front line had to go about their policing duties. Based on
8 this information and the way they were engaged - and I'm now referring
9 only to crime enforcement - I told the minister that something must be
10 done about the way the police were sent to the front line, because if a
11 police officer is at the front line 15 days and goes about policing
12 duties in the following 15 days, it's very difficult to do his work
13 efficiently because he has no information about what went on in the
14 meantime, where he worked. Because the crime situation in any given area
15 had to be monitored.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Hannis.
17 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Can I just inquire with the witness something
19 that he said a while ago, when you asked him whether he had examples of
20 either the SJB or the local police chief being asked or ordered by the
21 Crisis Staff to carry out something illegal.
22 Mr. Macar, you answered that you had no information that SJB
23 chiefs were being so asked but that you did have information that some
24 SJBs were tasked to do something from the remit of municipal authorities.
25 That's what you said.
1 What -- what were those things that the Crisis Staffs will asked
2 the SJBs to do? Can you be more specific?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me first comment that I said in
4 my statement that I didn't have information that SJB chiefs received
5 orders to commit any crimes. But what is outside the remit of an SJB,
6 such as municipal services, providing security, or acting as couriers or
7 running errands, receiving refugees and assisting in these segments;
8 certainly, if a thousand people turn up somewhere, that's a problem.
9 Although there was the Red Cross and other organisations.
10 So there were many administrative duties, much administrative
11 work, that had to be done by other structures, municipal bodies.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: There seems to be some misunderstanding here.
13 Because I thought that Mr. Hannis was asking you if you had any
14 information that SJBs, one way or another, would be engaged in illegal
15 activities because of orders or instructions or demands being made by the
16 Crisis Staffs.
17 So I just want to clarify a bit what sort of activities are we
18 talking about here? Illegal activities, that is.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Illegal activities or activities
20 contrary to the minister's orders are something that I can explain on the
21 example of Samac.
22 Our inspectors found out that, pursuant to the orders of the
23 Crisis Staff, some police were engaged to provide physical security for
24 the collection centre at Samac. That was in contravention of all orders,
25 but it was ordered by the Samac Crisis Staff, and the police took part in
1 that. They were involved.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Just how was that illegal?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The army had the duty to provide
4 security to such facilities, and the MUP had no need to do this kind of
5 work. Additionally, there were the minister's orders saying that police
6 cannot be engaged to do something from the remit of the army, unless some
7 police are resubordinated to the army in accordance with the procedures
8 that were in place. In other words, if those units were to join army
9 units and then do this kind of work.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you have other examples of illegal activities
11 done by the SJB at the instigation of Crisis Staffs?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Towards the end of the year, I was
13 informed that it was similar in Prijedor. Pursuant to the orders of the
14 Crisis Staff in a similar way, police forces were engaged, although they
15 had instructions or, rather, orders as to how they should conduct
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, Mr. Macar. I think this is as far as
18 I can get with this.
19 Back to you, Mr. Hannis.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Mr. Macar, let me ask, first, a couple of specifics about the
22 example you gave concerning Sokolac and the inspector who had been at the
23 front line.
24 When was that; do you recall what month in 1992?
25 A. I think it was July.
1 Q. And who was the inspector?
2 A. If my memory serves me well, it was Mr. Borovcanin.
3 Q. Do you recall his first name? We've got another Borovcanin who's
4 an inspector.
5 A. I don't remember his first name, but I'm certain about his family
7 Q. Was there not some military command of the VRS that was working
8 in the area of Sokolac at that time; and, if, so do you know which unit
9 it was?
10 A. Certainly there was a military unit in every municipality and it
11 had its command. I don't know anything about their organisation or their
12 formation or structure or anything like that because that was outside my
14 Q. The reason I ask is, wouldn't it have been the VRS that was
15 resubordinating a policeman who was going to the front line rather than
16 the Crisis Staff?
17 A. When the front line is pierced in a war or when the enemy is
18 launching offensive operations, then the army reacts with all available
19 capacities. They may or may not have enough reserves at that time.
20 The Crisis Staffs, being informed of the problems at the front
21 line, demanded that the police forces be engaged to the highest possible
23 Q. All right. Thank you. I would like to show you the Law on
24 Internal Affairs and ask you about a provision in there relating to the
25 Crisis Staffs and the local police authorities.
1 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at Exhibit P530. This was tab 3 of
2 the Prosecution's list. And if we could go to page 4, both the English
3 and the B/C/S.
4 Q. Mr. Macar, I want to direct your attention on the screen --
5 A. I apologise, but --
6 Q. We'll blow it up --
7 A. -- this is poorly legible, and my eyesight isn't so good.
8 Q. We'll blow it up and hopefully you can see it. I want to look at
9 Article 27 in both English and B/C/S.
10 How's that? Can you read it now?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. My translation reads:
13 "In addition to the activities and tasks set out in the Rules on
14 the internal organisation of the ministry, a public security station
15 shall implement regulations passed by the municipal assembly and relating
16 to law and order ..."
17 So let me ask you: Does that mean -- and, first, let me ask you
18 this question.
19 This talks about municipal assemblies. But would you agree with
20 me that in times of imminent threat of war, or war, or a state of
21 emergency, that the Crisis Staffs stand in the place of municipal
22 assemblies. Do you agree with that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And so for purposes of this Article when it says "municipal
25 assembly" I'm talking about Crisis Staffs.
1 The way I read that, it sounds as if the Crisis Staff passes a
2 municipal ordnance or a regulation relating to law and order, then the
3 public station shall implement that. So if a Crisis Staff decides
4 because of the war time situation that they need to have a curfew or they
5 need someone to provide security at the hospital because you may have an
6 enemy prisoner in the hospital being treated and you're afraid that
7 locals may come in and cause a disturbance, that's something that shall
8 be implemented by the police; right?
9 A. If I may be allowed to read this Article out loud ...
10 Q. Well, I don't need you to. I don't know if the Judges need to
11 you to. We have got it on the screen. We can all read it.
12 JUDGE HALL: I am wondering whether the witness wants to do it
13 for his own comprehension. If he's --
14 MR. HANNIS: If that's the case, then I have no objection.
15 JUDGE HALL: If it's convenient for him.
16 Then you may proceed, Mr. Macar.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will read just this part after
18 the coma after the word "ministry."
19 "... a public security station shall implement regulations
20 passed by the municipal assembly ... relating to law and order ..."
21 Could you please bring it back.
22 "... and road safety," as part of the assessment of the situation
23 in the sphere of law and order, the municipal assembly or the Crisis
24 Staff may issue a decision prohibiting the opening or, rather, the
25 operation of various catering facilities or restricting their working
1 hours, and the police - because this is a decision that pertains to law
2 and order - has to act. They have to act if a catering facility operates
3 in contravention of this decision. The same goes for road safety. If a
4 decision is issued that a -- trucks should not use a specific road, then
5 traffic police must act. Municipal decisions of this sort can be taken
6 by the assembly, and other tasks that have nothing to do with law and
7 order and road safety could not be assigned.
8 MR. HANNIS:
9 Q. Well, then, isn't it a matter of interpretation of -- about
10 whether or not in the circumstances existing at the time a particular
11 measure has to do with law and order?
12 A. Could you please clarify your question?
13 Q. Well, would you agree that establishing a curfew could relate to
14 the law and order during the context of an imminent threat of war?
15 A. I agree, based on the assessments of the public security
16 stations, about any disturbances of law and order, especially if it can
17 cause danger to general public or some other kind of danger, then a
18 curfew could be established, and the police was supposed to implement
19 this decision by stopping citizens who happened to be outside during the
20 curfew and to check what their reasons are, and file criminal -- or,
21 rather --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Misdemeanour
23 reports, if necessary.
24 MR. HANNIS:
25 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, could you look at the phrase for me and
1 tell me what you understand that to mean. Because it says:
2 "... regulations passed by the municipal assembly and relating to
3 law and order and road safety ..."
4 And then it says: "... as well as other regulations in the
5 domain of internal affairs ..."
6 What does that mean? Can you give me an example of a regulation
7 that would be in the domain of internal affairs that doesn't relate to
8 law and order and road safety?
9 A. Well, I can't really recall, and I don't want to speculate. But
10 I actually read this in another way, that the municipal assembly cannot
11 issue decisions that are not in line with the Law on Internal Affairs.
12 Well, the municipal assembly can issue a -- decisions to discuss on a
13 monthly basis or every three months, every five months, or annually, the
14 security situation in its territory and that the public security stations
15 should report to it covering the period determined by the municipal
16 assembly. It can be one month, three months, five months, and so on. It
17 is up to the assembly to decide.
18 Q. Let me follow on in this discussion about Crisis Staffs and the
19 local police.
20 You said one of the conclusions that you all at the ministry
21 collegiums reached was -- and this is at transcript page 22899, line 23:
22 "The heads of public security stations should, as a matter of
23 priority, inform the Crisis Staffs of their work."
24 Is that what you said?
25 A. No, the -- that's not what I said, that this was a priority for
1 them to report. But in line with the decisions because, I noted a little
2 while ago, it is only natural for the Crisis Staff to discuss security in
3 the area, in the territory of its municipality and it is quite natural
4 for the chief of the SJB to report about the work of the station itself
5 and to take measures to improve the security situation.
6 Q. Well -- I wondered about that at the time when I read that answer
7 on the transcript. Did you mean to say that you, at the collegium, had
8 concluded that the heads of public security stations should, as a matter
9 of priority, inform the CSBs about their work instead of Crisis Staffs?
10 A. I think that the translation is wrong and never a decision was
11 made at the collegium that these heads of the SJBs should inform anyone
12 about anything, report about anything. That was not a topic at any of
13 the collegia. When I spoke about that, I said that at the collegium we
14 would talk about the impact of the Crisis Staffs on the functioning of
15 the public security stations. And now I would like to add that in some
16 municipalities, there were some problems that some people advocated at
17 the time because they did not understand the whole system. Well, some
18 people in the municipal authorities wanted to impose military rule, to
19 suspend civil rule. And in many municipalities there were problems of
20 this sort, and this definitely had an impact on the functioning of the
21 ministry. They may have acted more as if they were part of a military
22 rule. They brought together civilian and military aspects of power
23 together, and that is why the police was involved to such an excessive
24 extent in combat operations.
25 Q. Okay. Try and be patient with me here because I'm trying to
1 clarify what you said last week, and all I have to go by is what is in
2 the transcript in front of me. And I'm still not sure, then, what you
3 meant to say when you said:
4 "One of our conclusions was this: The heads of the public
5 security station should, as a matter of priority, inform the Crisis Staff
6 of their work."
7 Now I understand you're saying, no, no, that was never said. But
8 you went on to say:
9 "And for the most part, they weren't informing the Security
10 Services Centre or the ministry of the interior in situations where that
11 was required."
12 And then you say:
13 "There are two aspects to this. One was a technical aspect. It
14 was physically impossible to communicate with the centre, or the
15 minister, the HQ. That is part of the reason why they had to communicate
16 with the Crisis Staffs."
17 Do you remember giving that answer to Mr. Zecevic last week, on
18 the 6th of July? And if that's not correct, can you tell us what you
19 meant to say there?
20 A. Well, I would like to hear an audio-recording of what I actually
21 said. It seems to me that we were talking about the problems that the
22 Ministry of the Interior faced in its work, especially the SJBs and the
24 And I do think that I said, at the time, that the problems of
25 keeping the ministry headquarters and the minister informed and keeping
1 the CSB informed by the SJBs were caused, for the most part, by technical
2 problems that we had. And that with some of the public security stations
3 we would have a situation that the chiefs mainly kept the Crisis Staff
4 informed rather than the relevant centre from which the reports would go
5 onto the ministry or to report directly to the ministry.
6 I think this is the gist of my evidence.
7 Q. Okay. That makes sense to me. And you know that in most places
8 that I am aware of, the SJB chief, the local SJB chief, was a member or a
9 participant in the local Crisis Staff. Didn't you find that to be the
10 case in 1992 in the RS?
11 A. I was not directly a member of anything, but the reports that we
12 received and the reports that we received from the collegium made it
13 clear to me that in conditions where the Crisis Staff assumes the role of
14 the municipal assembly, the chiefs report on the security situation in
15 the area covered by their SJB to the Crisis Staff.
16 Now, whether there were any SJB chiefs who were involved in the
17 Crisis Staffs, well, I can't really tell you that.
18 Q. Well, do you personally know of any Crisis Staff in the
19 Republika Srpska in 1992 where the local SJB chief was not a member or
20 not a regular attendee of Crisis Staff meetings?
21 Can you tell me one municipality where that was the case?
22 A. Well, I've just told you that I can't tell you whether there were
23 any, and if there were any, how many of them were involved in the Crisis
24 Staffs. And according to the normal procedure, it would be normal for
25 the SJB chief to report to the Crisis Staff about any security problems
1 because the Crisis Staffs assumed the role of the municipal assembly, and
2 that would be fully in line with the provisions of the Law on Internal
3 Affairs, because that's the security-related issues.
4 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. That reminds me I meant to ask you
5 about one other provision of the Law on Internal Affairs.
6 MR. HANNIS: Again, if we could look at this document that's on
7 the screen. But if we could go to Article 31 which is, I think, on the
8 same page.
9 Q. And Mr. Macar, I will ask you if this is it what you had in mind.
10 My English translation says:
11 "If so requested by the municipal assembly and its executive
12 committee, a Security Services Centre and a public security station shall
13 submit reports, information, and other data relating to the situation and
14 problems in the area ..."
15 Is that what you had in mind?
16 A. Inter alia, yes.
17 Q. Okay. Thank you. Were you aware that, apart from the
18 communications system that the MUP was using, that the -- the Presidency
19 and the government had access to a communications network that was
20 primarily based in Pale and it was sometimes called the republic
21 communications centre.
22 Did you know about that?
23 A. No.
24 Q. All right. Thank you. Related to the problem with local Crisis
25 Staffs having too much influence over the local police, at page 22900,
1 you said:
2 "Most of the people in leading positions, the chiefs and heads of
3 public security stations were never appointed by the minister but,
4 rather, by the local Crisis Staffs. And that was probably one of the
5 most important reasons why the Security Services Centres were unable to
6 have a consistent subordination system, in terms of the way they
8 Can you give me an approximate total number of how many SJB
9 chiefs there were in the Republika Srpska in 1992? Was it 50, 100; do
10 you know?
11 A. Well, let me remind you of the list for September that I did.
12 There were 73 public security stations, which means that there were 73
13 public security station chiefs, commanders, chiefs of crime enforcement
14 sections and so on, and all the other elements that were necessary.
15 Q. Okay. Do you have any idea of that number of 73, how many of
16 those had not been appointed by the minister or were not subsequently
17 approved by the ministry? Was it 10, 20; do you know?
18 A. This would be a question for the chief of the legal affairs and
19 personnel service, because I did not have statistical data in my service.
20 But I do know that there were quite a few chiefs who had not been
21 appointed in accordance with the procedure of the Ministry of the
22 Interior, which required that the centres recommended them for the
23 appointment and then the ministry approved it, and that is why in 1992
24 attempts were made to re-establish procedure in line with the law and the
25 appropriate order of the minister in this sphere.
1 Q. Of the -- of the CSB chiefs, of which we understand there were
2 five - Trebinje, Doboj, Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Bijeljina - do you know
3 how many of them had appointments from the minister in 1992?
4 A. He probably appointed all of those chiefs. And their files show
5 us whether he signed the appropriate decision or not.
6 Q. Thank you. With regard to your answer where you said that
7 security centres were unable to have consistent -- a consistent
8 subordination system, for purposes of this question, don't -- don't
9 include Teslic SJB and don't include Prijedor.
10 Apart from those two, can you give me any specific examples of a
11 SJB chief refusing to subordinate to his CSB and follow orders and
12 provide requested information, demand -- disband the special unit when
13 required to do so.
14 Can you tell me any other example?
15 A. I have some examples where the leaders of the autonomous regions
16 disbanded the special units, if you're talking about the disbanding of
17 the special units and not -- and other issues. But I'm not aware of any
18 other examples -- or, rather, I cannot recall any of them. I probably
19 did get reports about that at our meetings, but I don't want to
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. If we're talking about special units.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, if we're still on the one-hour
25 schedule, I guess it's time for our first break.
1 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we resume in 15 minutes.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Recess taken at 3.16 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 3.42 p.m.
5 JUDGE HALL: While the witness is on his way in, there is a
6 matter which both as an issue of courtesy and efficiency, I should have
7 brought to the attention of counsel today. Counsel may have picked this
8 up from other sources, but in terms of the resumption of the present
9 trial after the break, it is now projected that the other trial in which
10 this is running in parallel would run for three weeks and, therefore,
11 the -- counsel would recall that we had previously projected a two
12 week/two week alternate sittings. What is now expected to happen is that
13 the other matter will run for three weeks, then we will resume this case
14 on the 5th of September for three weeks, and, thereafter, the two
15 week/two week plan would -- we would revert to the two week/two week
16 originally planned. And any alarm that counsel may feel would be
17 relieved then on reflection, you would realise, we probably are at the
18 end of the day in a better position than we would have been with the two
19 week/two week arrangement.
20 So, therefore, any rumours you have heard to effect that, I have
21 now confirmed.
22 Thank you.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 MR. HANNIS: Thank you for that, Your Honour.
25 Q. Mr. Macar, the next topic that Mr. Zecevic took you to was asking
1 you about the fact that we'd had in this trial a number of documents
2 suggesting that war crimes committed against Serbs were singled out
3 for -- for priority on investigations, et cetera.
4 And he showed you, and I think I talked with you earlier about
5 that document from the federal Ministry of the Interior in -- from the
6 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1992, where they were requesting
7 from your newly created MUP information about war crimes and
8 international law crimes where Serbs and other ethnicities were the
10 Do you recall that document and that discussion?
11 A. Yes, and I would like to see it.
12 Q. Okay. Well, I can -- I can show it to you in a minute. If I
13 recall what number it was, but I don't recall off the top of my head.
14 While we try to find that, let me ask you a related question. In
15 your answer, you said:
16 "In 1992 there was much propaganda. The Serbs were represented
17 in various ways, very bad ways, which you probably know. The Ministry of
18 Foreign Affairs wanted to present the situation on the ground as
19 realistically as possible."
20 Do you recall that answer?
21 A. Yes, there was propaganda of the other side. That propaganda,
22 for a great part, was not founded on facts. Anything not on any
23 information that we had.
24 But what exactly is your question you want me to answer?
25 Q. I wanted to show you another document that I think is related to
1 the one that we looked at before. Let me show you that now while I'm
2 still trying to found the old one. And this one is P173. This is
3 tab 111.
4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, this is one that the Prosecution just
5 e-mailed this morning, one of two additional documents we wanted to add
6 for use.
7 Q. And, Mr. Macar, this is a document dated the 16th of May, 1992 to
8 the various Security Services Centres. It has Mr. Stanisic's name and a
9 signature on it.
10 And you'll see the number of this, Witness, is a strictly
11 confidential document. This is the 01-2/92. And in the first
12 paragraph he makes reference to a task resulting from the order by the
13 minister, strictly confidential number 01-1, dated the 15th of May.
14 I will remind that you 01-1/92 strictly confidential was the one
15 where Mr. Stanisic is talking about creating war units in the ministry.
16 You remember us looking at that one?
17 A. I remember when we were explaining this strictly confidential
19 Q. Okay. I want to look at page 2 of the B/C/S, and it's page 3 of
20 the English. It's Roman numeral IV, war crimes. It says:
21 "Measures and activities conducted to document war crimes. These
22 activities must involve collection of information and documents on war
23 crimes against the Serbs. This implies conducting an on-site
24 investigation with the entire team in all cases of crimes against the
1 And at the end of paragraph you will see it says:
2 "In order to send copies to the federal SUP and the Federal
3 Secretariat of the interior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
4 This to me seemed to be related to that other document that we
5 had seen from the Federal Secretariat.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm -- I'm sorry, I -- I note that there might be a
7 mistake in the translation. Perhaps the witness can -- can read the very
8 first sentence that you -- the very first two sentences that you wrote --
9 that you -- that you read from -- from the translation, so we can have
10 the accurate translation of what is said in the document. Thank you.
11 MR. HANNIS:
12 Q. Yes, Mr. Macar, maybe you can help me out. I have read what I
13 have in English in front of me. But it is a suggestion that that's in
15 So could you please read the first few lines of paragraph Roman
16 numeral IV?
17 A. Paragraph IV, war crimes:
18 "Take measures and activities to document war crimes. These
19 activities must involve collection and -- of information and documents on
20 war crimes against Serbs."
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness did not read
22 out the first sentence as it is printed in the document.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do I -- need I continue?
24 MR. ZECEVIC: The interpreters interpreted exactly as it is
25 stated in the translation. However, I insist that they interpret what
1 they hear and not look at the translation what is written. It is similar
2 but it's very different you see, Your Honours, because there is no word
3 "must" ever mentioned anywhere.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, we just got word from the
5 interpreters that apparently what the witness read out was not similar to
6 what is in the B/C/S text. So maybe we should try once again.
7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I'm a bit puzzled by this. I heard
8 the interpreters over the headphones say that the witness did not read
9 out what is printed on the page.
10 THE INTERPRETER: It's the first word of the first sentence.
11 MR. HANNIS:
12 Q. Mr. Macar, could you repeat for us that exercise and start from
13 the first -- first word under war crimes.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Take measures and activities to
15 document war crimes. These activities need to involve information and
16 documents about war crimes against Serbs."
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness again did not
18 read out the first sentence as printed in the document. The first word.
19 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honours, I think even at that, the gist
20 is generally the same. However, I would request that we submit this to
21 CLSS for a revised translation, since this one is a draft translation.
22 Q. But, Mr. Macar, the point I want to make is, this is a direction
23 to document war crimes against Serbs; correct?
24 A. My understanding of this document is that measures are being
25 taken and activities were under way to document war crimes, as stated in
1 the first sentence. Without making a distinction between war crimes
2 against Serbs, Croats, Muslims, or anybody else.
3 Q. Well, how can you --
4 A. And in the next --
5 Q. Wait. Wait. How can you say that, sir? Because it says "war
6 crimes against Serbs." It doesn't say "all war crimes," or "war crimes
7 generally," or "war crimes against all ethnicities." It says "war crimes
8 against Serbs"; right?
9 A. No. If I may finish.
10 Q. No, no, please. Show me where it says "against anyone besides
11 Serbs." It says "against Serbs," doesn't it? It doesn't talk about war
12 crimes against any other group; right? Can you answer that "yes" or
14 A. No. If I may, Your Honours, I'll be glad to finish my answer.
15 Q. Your Honours, I would request that you ask him to answer my
16 question which calls for a yes or no answer.
17 JUDGE HALL: But, Mr. Hannis, your question, your original
18 question was whether this is direction so-and-so correct. And he began
19 by saying his understanding is, and he went on.
20 So having posed the question the way that you did, you mightn't
21 be satisfied with his explanation but can he only answer according to his
22 understanding. So he should be permitted to complete the question as he
23 understands it.
24 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, my first question was:
25 "Is this a direction to document war crimes against Serbs;
2 And then he said his understanding was it was to document war
3 crimes without making distinction. And then my question was:
4 "How can you say that, sir? It doesn't say 'all war crimes.'"
5 So my question is now what does the document say on its face.
6 JUDGE HALL: And the witness is about to explain his
7 understanding. Now you may come back to this if you aren't satisfied
8 with his answer.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I, Your Honours?
10 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please continue.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the first sentence, it is
12 clearly stated "take measures and activities to document war crimes."
13 The second sentence follows, and it reads: "These activities
14 must -- need to involve the collection of information and documents about
15 war crimes against Serbs."
16 The first sentence means that war crimes must be documented. And
17 I believe it's clear enough. And the second sentence says that, as part
18 of this work on documenting war crime, information and documents must be
19 collected that have to do with war crimes committed against Serbs.
20 MR. HANNIS:
21 Q. Okay. Can you read the next sentence for us, please, so I'm sure
22 I'm working from a correct translation.
23 A. The sentence saying that information and documents must be
24 collected about war crimes against Serbs, and it is continued like this:
25 "This implies conducting an on-site investigation with the entire team in
1 all cases of crimes against Serbs ..."
2 Q. Thank you. You can stop there.
3 Is it your understanding of that phrase that it does not require
4 an on-site investigation with the entire team when the war crime was not
5 against Serbs.
6 Isn't that the logical inference?
7 A. No, it is like this. According to the Law on Internal Affairs
8 and the Law on Criminal Procedure, it is clear how the organs of the
9 interior proceed.
10 In the second part, which mentions crimes against Serbs, does not
11 mean that the same procedure should not be applied in case of crimes
12 against other ethnicities.
13 Q. Well, then, why is it being specifically pointed out that in all
14 cases of crimes against the Serbs, there should be an on-site
15 investigation with the entire team, if an on-site investigation with the
16 entire team is standard procedure for all cases? Why is it needed to be
17 said that this applies to cases of crimes against the Serbs, unless
18 there's some reason to make a special emphasis?
19 A. I absolutely do not understand this document as something that
20 states that a different procedure should be applied in case of crimes
21 against members of other ethnicities.
22 I don't know who wrote this document on behalf of the ministry,
23 but I can say that in May 1992, there was a rampant campaign against the
24 Serbs in the media and somebody from the ministry may have requested some
25 material to present the situation on the ground as different.
1 Q. I understand that, and I think you've said that before, that --
2 and because of the perceived campaign to portray Serbs in a bad light,
3 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency and the FRY were
4 interested in trying to counteract that perception. But in doing so, I
5 suggest to you, Mr. Macar, that the emphasis was more on public relations
6 than actually solving crimes against non-Serbs.
7 Isn't that what happened?
8 A. I disagree with your statement.
9 Q. I understand. We do disagree.
10 Let me show you --
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Hannis, before you go to another document,
12 Mr. Macar, could I ask you to read, ones again, the two first phrases of
13 this document under -- under the title "War Crime." I want -- I want to
14 listen to the French translation.
15 Would do you that for me?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Take measures and activities to
17 document war crimes." End of sentence. "These activities must need to
18 involve the collection of information and documents about war crimes
19 against Serbs."
20 And if I may?
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
22 MR. HANNIS:
23 Q. Mr. Macar, I'd like you to look at --
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated] If -- if Mr. Macar
25 wants to add something, please do, Mr. Macar.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I understand in the Serbian
2 language is the following: There are two activities in this request.
3 One is to take measures and activities to document war crimes; and,
4 secondly, as part of these activities, war crimes against Serbs should be
5 documented, and documentation is sought to complete it all. That's how I
6 understand it in Serbian. And that's how I originally understood this
7 document and not as a distinction or discrimination to deal only with one
8 group of crimes, or one type of crimes.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 MR. HANNIS:
12 Q. Now, Mr. Macar, I'd like to show you --
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one moment, Mr. Hannis.
14 MR. HANNIS: Sorry, Your Honour.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Macar, there's a question which Mr. Hannis put
18 to you and to which I believe I understood your answer, but I'm going to
19 phrase this slightly differently. And it is this: Appreciating, as you
20 have explained, that this directive about taking measures would have been
21 of general application, why was it necessary, in this paragraph and the
22 portions that Mr. Hannis has cited, to specify any particular ethnic
23 group; in this case, Serbs?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that two or three times
25 during the examination by the Defence I was explaining that there was
1 constant pressure or there were constant requests made to the ministry to
2 submit, among others, information about the suffering of the Serbian
3 people in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in the RS. Not only dry
4 information was sought to be presented to international representatives
5 and so on, and then what followed, there was additional elaboration that,
6 among all the crimes, there were also crimes against Serbs and as
7 evidence there are medical documents, photographs, or other documents,
8 such as witness statements, and so on, to serve as an illustration to
9 counteract that propaganda, and vividly show that crimes had been
10 committed against the Serbian people in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, sir.
12 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
13 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Q. Before we leave this document, then, let me point you to two
16 The end of that paragraph says, in my English translation:
17 "... in order to send copies to the Federal Secretariat of the
18 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, among other things?"
19 So this information, one of the purposes of gathering it is to
20 send it to the Federal Secretariat of the Interior in Belgrade; correct?
21 A. It says here:
22 "Among other things, in order to submit copies to the federal
24 And, as far as I know, at least as far as the crime enforcement
25 administration is concerned, I don't remember that such information was
1 sent to that secretariat in 1992. Whether or not it was done by another
2 service, I don't know. But the crime enforcement administration
3 certainly did not compile such material for this purpose.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MR. HANNIS: And to put it all into context, could we go back to
6 page 1 in both English and B/C/S.
7 Q. In that first paragraph, halfway through, my English translation
9 "And in order to collect documentation on the crimes against the
10 Serbian population (for prosecution and to accurately inform the local
11 and international public), fax reports must be submitted daily to the
12 ministry ..."
13 Doesn't that also indicate that the emphasis here is on crimes
14 committed against Serbs? Wasn't that the priority?
15 A. Well, I wouldn't understand this as setting a priority. It's an
16 explanation why -- it was explained later, in fact, and it says quite
17 clearly here: "In order to inform" -- just a moment, "... the domestic
18 and international public."
19 So this is the reason why the other part was explained. It would
20 be much more logical. It would appear to be much more logical if we had
21 seen this first, because it's an explanation of the other segment.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Macar. And now, you had asked to see the document
23 that I think this relates to. And that is 1D635, Defence tab 14.
24 I'll show that to you and just to make sure that's what we were
25 trying to talk about.
1 And while it's coming up, I will tell you it's dated 22nd of
2 April, 1992, from the federal Ministry of the Interior. Or that Federal
3 Secretariat of the Interior; I'm sorry.
4 Do you remember seeing that one the other day? Because I had a
5 discussion with you then about why there was a distinction about crimes
6 committed against Serbs and other ethnicities.
7 Do you recall this document now?
8 A. I recall the document, yes.
9 Q. Would you agree with me that the last one we just looked at from
10 the RS MUP, Mr. Mico Stanisic, appears to be a response partly to this
11 request for information about war crimes and other genocide and
12 international law crimes committed against Serbs? Don't those two seem
13 to be related, this document and that one?
14 A. Well, I would not agree with this part, that only Serbs were the
16 Q. My question is: As of 22 April 1992, the newly created Republika
17 Srpska, or I guess at that time, it was called the Serbian -- the
18 Republic of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm sorry, I can't keep
19 track of all the names. But your newly created republic was not a part
20 of the FRY, was it?
21 A. Well, you can see that the decision that was made at the session
22 of the federal council of the 18th of March, the decision was made on the
23 establishment, scope, and composition of the state commission for
24 collection of data for the verification of war crimes, crimes of
25 genocide, and so on and so forth.
1 Q. I understand that the commission was created before the conflict
2 began in Bosnia. But as of the 22nd of April, isn't it fair to say you
3 had no legal obligation to provide this information to the FRY; right?
4 A. Well, as for whether we had a legal obligation, I am a crime
5 policeman. I wouldn't like to go into that. I think it's something for
6 a -- law scholars to answer. And as I've already told you, I don't know
7 whether in 1992 - I'm now talking about the crime police - crime
8 enforcement administration, that we submitted any reports. Now whether
9 anyone submitted such reports on behalf of the ministry, I can't tell you
10 that, I don't know.
11 Q. You would agree with me, though, wouldn't you, that in April of
12 1992 you guys had plenty of problems more serious than sending a report
13 to a country that you didn't have a legal obligation to send anything to.
14 You were in a war fighting for your very existence; right?
15 A. In April, I did have problems much greater than the ones
16 described in this document. Where to find accommodation for my family,
17 how to make ends meet for my family, and, as far as I can remember, this
18 was the beginning of the war, and I can tell you that I myself and 90
19 per cent of my colleagues were convinced that something would happen to
20 prevent the situation that existed in the field and that the combat
21 operations, the fighting, would not continue. Because I, my family, and
22 most of my colleagues, and I think the Serb people as a whole, did not
23 want the war. We don't -- didn't want the fighting to continue. That's
24 what I can say about this --
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. -- topic.
2 Q. Let me show you Exhibit P625.
3 MR. HANNIS: This is tab 63 from the Prosecution's list.
4 Q. And just looking at the first page, this is dated January 1993
5 and appears to be to the annual report on the work of the RS MUP for the
6 period April to December 1992.
7 Have you ever seen this report before?
8 A. This report was discussed at a collegium meeting in 1993. I
9 would like to have a copy in the Serbian language too, a hard copy,
10 because it's very difficult for me to read because of the position.
11 Q. I see Mr. Zecevic helpfully has one available. If the usher
12 could hand it to you. Thank you.
13 And I want to go to page 14 of the English, and in e-court, the
14 B/C/S is e-court page 20. I think for you, Mr. Macar, in the hard copy,
15 the page number you need to be looking for at the bottom is page 17.
16 And, actually, if you look back to page 16 on the previous page,
17 you'll see a portion underlined. My English translation says:
18 "The work of the service for crime prevention and detection ..."
19 MR. HANNIS: I think we need to go back one page in e-court.
20 No, we're on the right page; I'm sorry.
21 Q. Do you see that?
22 A. The footnote?
23 Q. No, I'm sorry, on the left-hand page. It says page -- 16 at the
25 A. 16.
1 Q. Yeah. And you see the underline heading: "The Work of the
2 Service for Crime Prevention and Detection."
3 That's your administration; right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, at this time, in December 1992, I think when information for
6 this report would have been collected, you were at least, de facto,
7 acting head of that administration; correct?
8 A. Yes, you could put it that way.
9 Q. And do you recall, were you involved in any way in providing the
10 information that went into this report?
11 A. The report was drafted on the basis of the information that we
12 received from the ground.
13 Q. I understand.
14 A. From our remit.
15 Q. And I -- I think I've heard testimony that this report was
16 actually prepared by people in the -- in the 10th Administration, the
17 analysis people; is that correct? That Mr. Vujic's [sic] administration.
18 A. Vujicic.
19 Q. Is that right? Were they the ones who would have put this
21 A. Well, yes. Based on the information that came in from the
22 centres and the SJBs, this was all put together into this report.
23 Q. And how did it work in terms of creating the final product?
24 Because you were the acting head of that administration, did you get to
25 see the draft of what was being said about the work being done by the
1 crime police and make any changes or additions? Did you have a chance to
2 do that?
3 A. Based on the information that was submitted by the CSB and what
4 the administration had been doing in 1992, an overview of the whole
5 situation, this was all submitted to the analysis section where the
6 report was drafted. At least that's how it was done at the time.
7 Q. And if, after the report is written, you read the part that
8 pertains to your administration and you see something that's not correct,
9 do you have an opportunity to make a change or have a supplement filed so
10 that there's an accurate picture of your section's work, your
11 administration's work?
12 A. If this report was drafted in late January for the collegium, as
13 it existed at the time, well, I did not have an opportunity to review it
14 because in February 1993 I spent 90 per cent of my time in Belgrade
15 because my wife was there for her first surgery. My late wife. So I
16 can't really tell you.
17 I see that this is January, and that this is a draft version, so
18 it may have been completed in February.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I note that it's time for our next
22 JUDGE HALL: 15 minutes.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 [The witness stands down]
25 --- Recess taken at 4.30 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 4.47 p.m.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 MR. HANNIS: If we could return to the MUP annual report.
4 Q. And, Mr. Macar, I'll going to read a couple of sections and ask
5 if -- if they're accurate or if you would agree. On that page where we
6 have the heading for the work of the crime prevention, paragraph says:
7 "In the first stage, at the beginning of April, the main activity
8 was the evacuation of crime prevention officers from the MUP of the
9 former Bosnia and Herzegovina to Vrace and the setting up the operational
10 groups and crime departments in public security stations in the area of
11 Republika Srpska."
12 And would you agree with that? Is that accurate?
13 A. Well, had I drafted this document myself or reviewed it, I would
14 not have described this stage in April in those terms. And I can be more
16 Q. Well, let me ask you a question first.
17 I understand you say you wouldn't agree with it, but is it
18 inaccurate? I understand you may have written it differently. But as
19 it's phrased, is that not true and correct?
20 A. No. First of all, the headquarters of the Ministry of the
21 Interior, as we have already stated so many times, in the Buducnost
22 building what you asked me about Kalovita Brda. And in April, the
23 ministry, now whether it was on the 20th or sometime in April, moved to
24 the building in Vrace, in mid-April, or after the 20th of April, it was
25 in the building in Vrace. And I would like to correct this: The
1 evacuation of the crime prevention officers from the MUP of the former
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would disagree with this.
3 Q. Well, remind us again: Where were you between the 3rd of
4 April and the 19th or 20th of April? Where were you personally located?
5 A. Well, as I have already stated, in Sokolac until my late wife and
6 my children, my family, left for Belgrade.
7 Q. So you weren't at Vrace in the first couple of the weeks of the
8 war, so you don't know who was there, do you?
9 A. Since I know most of the members of the crime enforcement service
10 from the Sarajevo area, I had an opportunity to learn how and when they
11 left their places of residence, not the MUP, because from Sunday or
12 Monday, 90 per cent of those employees could not do it because of the
13 fighting and because of their concern for their families. They could not
14 go to work, because this is what the situation in the town was like. For
15 most of them, in particular the operatives who lived in the suburbs of
16 Sarajevo, there were quite a few of them, it was impossible for them to
17 go to work, physically impossible, to MUP. That's why I disagree with
18 this phrase, "evacuation from the MUP." If it said gathering the
19 employees who had fled the parts of Sarajevo held by the other side,
20 well, then, I would agree with that, and that's how I would phrase it,
21 because that is a fact.
22 And if I could ask you, since I see that this is a draft version,
23 I would like to ask whether we have the final version, because I can see
24 that this is the draft version. That's what it says on the front page.
25 Because a final version would bear an appropriate number. Here where it
1 says strictly confidential, copy number, you would have the number.
2 Q. Mr. Macar, this is the version we have. I don't have another
3 version to show you.
4 But I want to ask you, I'm not sure I understand your
5 disagreement. This document says: "... evacuation of crime prevention
6 officers from the MUP of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina."
7 I take that to mean that Serb -- Serb policemen who had been
8 working in the joint MUP before the conflict started were evacuated to
10 You disagree with that? You don't know that Mr. Planojevic went
11 to Vrace briefly in early April?
12 A. I don't know when Mr. Planojevic was in Vrace. But I wanted to
13 know where he was when he left for Vrace and that was definitely not --
14 he was definitely not in the office where he worked, and I don't believe
15 that on the 6th of April he was in his office and that he was able to go
16 to Vrace. The terminology used here "evacuation of crime prevention
17 officers from MUP" at the time when the two warring factions already had
18 taken their positions and when it was basically impossible to pass
19 through, I failed to see how anyone could evacuate them.
20 Now, the Serb side organised the evacuation. Well, in that
21 period, it was only possible to use your connections, your friends, among
22 the Croats in Stup to cross from the area where Serbs were in the
23 majority, and those were isolated cases. I'm talking about citizens in
24 general who wanted to cross.
25 Q. Okay. I understand your disagreement. Let me move to the next
1 paragraph and read you a sentence there.
2 "The second stage was characterised by the relocation of the MUP
3 of Republika Srpska to Pale municipality."
4 Would you agree with that?
5 A. If I had written this, I would have said the MUP in the
6 headquarters, not of the entire MUP, but the MUP that existed in the
7 headquarters that was located in Vrace. So it was not the entire MUP
8 that was moved to Pale. The minister, with the rump administrations, if
9 I can call them that, moved from Vrace to Pale.
10 Q. And skipping the next sentence, to the third sentence in that
11 paragraph said:
12 "This period of the UZSK," that's the crime prevention and
13 detection administration, as I understand it, "was not characterised by
14 organised criminal operative work."
15 You would agree with that, wouldn't you? You weren't able to
16 carrying on your general organised operative work in this early second
18 A. Here, where it says that this period of the UZSK was not
19 characterised by organised criminal operative work, this means that the
20 crime enforcement administration was supposed to be set up with the
21 appropriate personnel and equipment, and, as we have already said,
22 because of the shortage of personnel and equipment, the administration
23 was not set up and it was unable to perform its function.
24 Q. Next paragraph says:
25 "The third stage began with the relocation of the MUP
1 headquarters to Bijeljina."
2 That's accurate, isn't it? That was the next stage for MUP
3 headquarters, was the move from Pale to Bijeljina?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And then it says:
6 "Only then was the criminal police administration, with organised
7 and planned work on the tasks of crime prevention and detection, actually
8 set up and posts filled."
9 And then there's a footnote with some more information about
11 Is that accurate?
12 A. My explanation for this part, had I been involved in the drafting
13 of the report, it -- I would say it was only then that the activities
14 commenced to set up the crime enforcement administration, and it started
15 taking shape. And from this, it would appear that, once the headquarters
16 moved to Bijeljina, everything was done, and this was not a process that
17 could be completed on the day of the move or within five days of the
18 move, definitely. And that is why I fear that this is just a draft
19 version that was amended at a later stage.
20 Q. By whom? Do you remember making any changes to this draft
21 report? Who would have amended this?
22 A. I see that this is January. That's when this draft version was
23 produced, and it was probably finalized in February. And as I have
24 already said, in February, I was absent. I only came to Bijeljina very
25 seldom, in order to obtain medicines for my wife.
1 Q. So if this section of the report dealing with your administration
2 was amended sometime after this was written and it wasn't done by you,
3 who would it have been? Did you have a deputy or somebody immediately
4 covering for you when you were gone?
5 A. I said I didn't know. At the beginning of the question, I said I
6 didn't know if it had been changed. This was a draft. Whether or not
7 anybody changed it, I don't know. That would be speculation.
8 The Trial Chamber had the opportunity to see yesterday, based on
9 a document that was presented, that we were able to look into the
10 archives of the crime police. I wanted to prepare and make sure that I
11 can give adequate answers based on documents, and I would have found
12 documents there that pertain to the crime enforcement administration.
13 Unfortunately, I must inform the Trial Chamber that the request
14 was never acted upon because I only found out almost half a year after my
15 inquiry that the top officials of the MUP were afraid that somebody would
16 be accused of aiding and abetting war criminals. It would have been
17 helpful to me, though, and good for both the Defence and the Prosecution,
18 because I would have been able to find my way through the documents
19 better than anybody else, and I would have been able to observe whether
20 there was anything missing and check the continuity.
21 Q. Okay. I share your despair about not having a complete set of
23 Let me ask you about the next paragraph. It says:
24 "In this period, the criminal inspectors visited all the CSBs and
25 SJBs and had meetings where they gave instructions for carrying out
1 concrete operative activities."
2 Is that right? I know you were trying to visit all the CSBs and
3 SJBs with the available personnel during the last part of 1992.
4 A. I disagree with the part that says that the focus of the
5 operative work in CSBs and SJBs was" --
6 Q. Mr. Macar, Mr. Macar, you're reading ahead. I wasn't asking you
7 about that sentence yet. You're awfully anxious to get to that part
8 about the Serbs, but my question was the first sentence about your
9 inspectors visiting all the CSBs and SJBs. Is that part accurate? We'll
10 get to the next one in a minute.
11 A. It's absolutely inaccurate.
12 Q. Well, you told us previously that your inspectors went out and
13 visited many CSBs and SJBs in the latter half of 1992; right?
14 A. I said that they visited some centres and some stations. Not
15 many stations. The reports clearly show which ones we did not visit,
16 especially the 24 stations from the area covered by the Banja Luka
17 centre. Some of the stations belonging to the Sarajevo and Trebinje
18 centres also remained unvisited.
19 Q. Now we'll get not next sentence which says:
20 "The focus of the operative work in CSBs and SJBs was on
21 detection, documenting, and reporting members of the enemy army who had
22 committed acts of genocide against the Serbian people, torched or
23 destroyed immovable property, cultural and religious monuments, and other
25 That's correct, isn't it? A focus of the work, the operative
1 work in the CSBs and SJBs, was about crimes against the Serbian people.
2 A. Among others. I would never say the focus of operative work.
3 Yes, one of the tasks was to submit reports about members of the enemy
4 army that had committed crimes against the Serbian people, and this
5 applies to combat zones.
6 The focus of the operative work of CSBs and SJBs certainly wasn't
7 only on this, on such matters.
8 Q. If we could go over one page in both the English and the B/C/S.
9 Actually, I think it may be on your page number 18, Mr. Macar. Yes. You
10 see there's a paragraph is that said:
11 "The administration" -- sorry. "The administration has, in
12 particular, provided expert assistance and direct operative engagement to
13 take measures and activities in investigating criminal activities in the
14 work organisation TAS in Vogosca since the beginning of war operations."
15 That investigation about the stolen cars and the stolen Golf
16 vehicles from Vogosca took a big part deal of your administration's time
17 in 1992, didn't it?
18 A. No. I can elaborate.
19 Q. Let me ask you this question first and then you can elaborate.
20 Can you name me three other investigations that your
21 administration did in 1992 that took more time, more men, more resources
22 than the TAS investigation?
23 A. First of all, the work of crime enforcement isn't measured by the
24 amount of time spent on something. The TAS case went on throughout the
25 war and continued after its end. All centres had their own remit and
1 conducted checks in their area. At the beginning, when the Sarajevo
2 centre initiated these activities and took them over and took part in all
3 meetings about how they should proceed, everybody was checking operative
4 information in their respective areas, and it is the task of crime
5 enforcement, since, towards the end of the year, we were able to reach
6 agreement with the Serbian MUP, the MUP of Serbia, to forward information
7 to them about vehicles that were supposed to be stolen from the TAS
8 factory. That doesn't mean that all the operatives worked 24 hours a day
9 on that case. There were operative workers who checked some information
10 and that information was obtained during four years of the war and even
11 after the war, I think.
12 Q. I don't think you answered my question, though. Could you tell
13 me three other investigations that your administration did that took more
14 time and more resources than the TAS investigation.
15 Can you name one?
16 A. I will answer briefly.
17 First of all, this was not an investigation of the
18 administration. The administration assisted the Sarajevo CSB in the
19 operative implementation of the TAS case. And when an operation is
20 conducted, especially about stolen cars, the information is forwarded to
21 other centres and stations where there was possibly information that they
22 were registered based on forged documents. That is, all stations through
23 their administrative and legal departments checked whether vehicles with
24 certain engine numbers and VINs were registered in their area.
25 Q. Okay, Mr. Macar. We'll move onto something else.
1 You were asked --
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, but perhaps it's a misunderstanding,
3 because I'm listening and I see that the witness is not answering your --
4 your question at all, and he keeps -- he keeps giving explanation about
5 the TAS, and that was not the question, and ... I wonder, because I don't
6 have my earphones, I don't know what -- what -- what was the translation
7 that he got. Maybe he is confused about the contents of your question,
8 Mr. Hannis.
9 MR. HANNIS: I don't think it's a very confusing question.
10 Q. Mr. Macar, did you not understand? I was asking you if you could
11 name -- well, first, I asked if you could name three other cases
12 investigated in 1992 that took more time and more resources than the TAS
13 case; and when you seemed to have difficulty answering that, I asked you
14 if you could name one case that took more time and resources?
15 Do you understand that question; and can you answer it?
16 A. Security Services Centres and public security stations were
17 working on solving all sorts of crimes observed in their area. How can
18 you measure how much time was invested into solving, I don't know, the
19 Yellow Wasps case, or case A, or case B? We assessed these things based
20 on how difficult it was to apply the relevant methods to collect
21 information and evidence and not based on the time used to obtain them.
22 I believe that this may be clearer.
23 And this is mentioned in the context of economic crime, because
24 an economic operator was harmed.
25 Q. I don't want to spend any more time on this, Mr. Macar. But the
1 Yellow Wasps, you could have some measure of how much time was spent on
2 that case but counting up, what, 14 operatives did 59 interviews over a
3 period of seven days and come up with a rough estimate of how much time
4 was spent on the case; right?
5 I see you shaking your head no. I'll take that as a no and move
7 You were asked about what happens when -- when the police file a
8 criminal report, send a case to the prosecutor's office. And you pointed
9 out that the characterisation of a crime depended on the evidence and
10 that the prosecutor could change the classification of a crime if he or
11 she thought that was appropriate.
12 Do you personally know of any case where the MUP submitted it as
13 a war crime and the prosecutor changed the designation to something else
14 that was not a war crime?
15 Did that ever happen in 1992?
16 A. We didn't have insight in the subsequent activities of the
17 prosecutor's office; that is, we don't know whether the prosecutors
18 changed the classification of a crime. So I have no relevant information
19 because their work was not open for inspection by us.
20 Q. You've mentioned a lot about the problems with Crisis Staffs and
21 their independence from the higher level of government. You were aware
22 that there was a transition beginning in June 1992. The Crisis Staffs
23 were disbanded and replaced by, first, War Presidencies, for a day or
24 two, was what was in the -- in the legislation, but then it was changed
25 to War Commissions.
1 You knew about that change in June of 1992?
2 A. There were amendments to the laws, but I cannot specify how the
3 dynamics of that process went.
4 Q. And did you know that one of the changes from Crisis Staffs to
5 War Commissions was that the War Commission established in a municipality
6 included some representative from the republic level government? For
7 example, in Zvornik, when they created a War Commission at the end of
8 June, beginning of July, Dragan Djekanovic, a republic minister, was a
9 member of the War Commission.
10 Did you know about that facet of War Commissions?
11 A. No, I didn't. I took no interest in that.
12 Q. Could you see how that was one way in which the central
13 government, the republic government, was trying to get better control
14 over those local municipal authorities, to make sure that what was being
15 done at the local level was consistent with what they wanted to do from
16 the republic level. Seems a logical way to go about it; would you agree?
17 A. I could speculate about it. But since I didn't attend government
18 sessions, nor did I follow the implementation of their decisions, I'd
19 rather not.
20 Q. Now, regarding Crisis Staffs and -- and local situations, at page
21 22912, you mentioned that there was an incident which took place in
22 Prijedor sometime in November that caused me to look into the situation
23 and the conduct of senior staff members.
24 When you say an incident in November, are you talking about the
25 occurrence when you went to Prijedor and had that brief meeting with
1 Mr. Drljaca when he basically sent you and your colleagues away? Is that
2 the incident you were talking about there?
3 A. Yes. That's the only time in 1992 when I was in Prijedor.
4 Q. Okay. I assumed it was. I just wanted to be sure there wasn't
5 some second incident.
6 And you were shown, in connection with this, Exhibit -- well,
7 65 ter number 619D1. That's Defence tab 57. And it was a list of
8 conclusions and decisions by the Crisis Staff and the Prijedor Executive
9 Committee relating to the SJB.
10 I can give you -- oh, do you have the tab there? I think it's
11 tab 57 in your binder.
12 A. Just let me take a look at the number.
13 Q. You recall looking at that one before?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, for example, number 4 on the first page talks about a
16 conclusion of 30 June. And the second paragraph under number 4 talks
17 about company directors are supposed to be responsible for implementing
18 this conclusion relating to the ownership of socially owned flats that
19 had been vacated.
20 And then it says:
21 "The chief of the SJB and the regional command shall be obliged
22 to take the most rigorous measures against any members of the police or
23 military who have broken into flats."
24 Now, there is nothing wrong with the Crisis Staff or the
25 municipal assembly asking the chief of police to take measures against
1 policemen who have broken into flats; right? That's not interfering with
2 the work of the police, is it, to ask them to basically do the job of the
4 A. The public security station, under the Law on Internal Affairs
5 and the Law on Criminal Procedure, is duty-bound, because, under these
6 two laws, it must act. And if they have information that a member of
7 that station has broken into an apartment, they must take measures to
8 file a criminal complaint and initiate the procedure to suspend these
9 members. But that isn't done pursuant to such a conclusion. That's
10 regular procedure. I believe that if the municipality had information
11 that somebody had done something like that, they could submit according
12 information, but a public security station works pursuant to the
13 provisions of the Law on Internal Affairs.
14 Q. Well, I guess I would say, at best this measure by the municipal
15 assembly or by the Crisis Staff is unnecessary, but it's not really an
16 inference with the work of the police, is it? It's just asking them to
17 do what they're supposed to do under their own law.
18 Is it your position that this is meddling and interfering with
19 the work of the police?
20 A. It's interesting that the municipality is giving orders to the
21 SJB through this conclusion, ordering it to act under the Law on Internal
23 If they had an information, then there's a procedure in place how
24 that information is -- is submitted, or forwarded. I've already
25 explained how a public security station is supposed to act.
1 Q. Okay. Thank you.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I note it's time for our next break.
3 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Macar, because -- in order to accommodate
4 certain commitments that counsel have, this is a slightly shorter
5 session. We have a longer break, so we would resume in a half-hour.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would suit me. Thank you.
7 --- Recess taken at 5.29 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 6.02 p.m.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 MR. HANNIS:
11 Q. I just want to ask you one more question about this Defence
12 tab 57, 65 ter 619D1. It seems we have something different on the screen
13 at the moment.
14 I think it's -- it's at the bottom of page 1 in the English, and
15 for you, Mr. Macar, it's item number 1 under the heading: "A Summary of
16 Conclusions, Orders and Decisions from 29 May to 24 July."
17 The first one order number such and such of 5 June forbidding the
18 unauthorised firing of fire-arms on municipal territory, and it says the
19 competent organs of the military police and SJB organs are tasked with
20 implementing this order.
21 Now we looked earlier at Article 27 and the Law on Internal
22 Affairs, which says that SJBs are -- shall implement regulations passed
23 by municipal assemblies or Crisis Staffs related to law and order.
24 Would you agree with me that forbidding the unauthorised firing
25 of fire-arms on the municipal territory is something related to law and
2 A. Yes. But it had nothing to do with the Crisis Staff, the
3 executive function of the authorities in the municipality. This is a
4 typical example. If you discharge a -- fire-arms, this causes public
5 danger, and this is sanctioned in the Law on Criminal Procedure and the
6 Criminal Code, where organs of the interior routinely intervene because
7 this is within their purview, within their jurisdiction.
8 Or it's the military police that has -- intervene if it is within
9 their jurisdiction. And as all the other items listed here, this is yet
10 another example of assuming this -- the functions on the part of the
11 executive branch, the Crisis Staff, or the Executive Board, and you could
12 see that in the previous examples where they issued orders to the
13 military and demanded reports from them, and routinely reports are
14 received from the public security station and reports are filed, listing
15 all the -- all such cases, and --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last part
17 of his answer.
18 MR. HANNIS:
19 Q. I held my hand up because the interpreters requested that you
20 repeat the last part of your answer. I'm afraid that you've gotten away
21 from them again.
22 A. I don't know how far they got.
23 Q. Neither do I. But let me ask you this: I'm not sure if you
24 disagree with me or not. It seems to me that this kind of ordnance or
25 regulation passed by the Crisis Staff is something that is related to law
1 and order. And under Article 27, the public security station shall
2 implement it, according to the Law on Internal Affairs.
3 Do you -- do you have some quarrel with that? How is this
4 interfering with the work of the public security station?
5 A. I don't have a problem with that. The Crisis Staff had a problem
6 with that. Things that are regulated by the Law on Public Law and Order,
7 the Law on Criminal Procedure is not under the jurisdiction of the Crisis
8 Staff. Or, rather, it cannot make decisions about those elements that
9 have already been regulated by a law.
10 Q. Can you point to me some law that says that the Crisis Staff or
11 the municipal assembly can't pass a local municipal ordinance that may
12 already be regulated by law? Where does it say that?
13 A. The Law on Public Law and Order, the Law on Misdemeanours, the
14 Law on Criminal Procedure, regulated crimes and misdemeanours which are
15 dealt with by the organs of the interior.
16 And now imagine a situation where somebody gets mixed up as
17 regards their role, and they say, No crimes shall be committed in the
18 territory of my municipality. Yet you have such a provision in the
19 relevant law already. And in this sense, this is in line with the way in
20 which administrative organs function. It is ridiculous for a Crisis
21 Staff to issue an order prohibiting the discharging of fire-arms when
22 there is such a provision already in the law. The law already prohibits
24 Q. Well, I'm not sure. Let me give you an example and ask you to
25 compare it to your experience. In my jurisdiction where I grew up, there
1 would be a federal law against the sale of marijuana, and that would
2 cover the whole United States. And there would be a state law in the
3 state of Arizona that prohibited the sale of marijuana, and there might
4 be a city ordnance in Phoenix Arizona prohibiting the sale of marijuana.
5 Now why is it a problem for the municipality to pass a regulation
6 even though there may already be something in the RS Criminal Code or the
7 federal Yugoslavia Criminal Code? Where is there a provision that says
8 the municipality cannot pass a local ordnance banning the same kind of
9 conduct? Can you give me a specific statutory or constitutional
10 provision that says that's not permitted?
11 A. First of all, the Crisis Staff issues an order, and in its order
12 it charges the organs of the SJB and the military police with performing
13 tasks that are within their purview under the law. The municipal
14 assembly itself cannot task -- cannot issue decisions that are already
15 regulated by a number of laws, such as the Law on Criminal Procedure,
16 Criminal Code, Law on Misdemeanour. They cannot issue orders that are
17 covered by those laws, and it -- apparently we have totally different
18 legal systems.
19 Q. Well, you keep telling me that they cannot but you haven't been
20 able to tell me the place where I can find that law. Is it in the
21 constitution of the Republika Srpska? Is it in the Criminal Code? Can
22 you give me -- cite me an article, a law, a number, where I can go look
23 it up?
24 A. Try and find the Law on State Administration which regulates the
25 actions of all the relevant organs from the state all the way down to the
1 municipality, and you can read there what the government is in charge of,
2 what the Executive Board in the municipality is in charge of, and you
3 will see that they are not authorised to issue this kind of order.
4 This tells us more about the way in which the executive board
5 actually operated because they assumed all the legislative power. They
6 controlled the army and the police. They assumed power over them in
7 contravention of the regular procedure because in the chain of command,
8 the chain of reporting in the MUP, that's how the reports were supposed
9 to go. They were not supposed to report to the Crisis Staff.
10 Q. Okay. One final question on this and then I'll move to another
12 You saw Article 27 which said that public security stations shall
13 implement regulations passed by the municipal assembly relating to law
14 and order, traffic safety, and other matters falling within the purview
15 of internal affairs. Are you saying that Article means the municipal
16 assembly, or the Crisis Staff, can only pass regulations that cover
17 matters that aren't covered by some other already-existing law? Is that
18 is that how you read Article 27 of the Law on Internal Affairs?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Now, you talked about the problem related to the
23 non-existence of judicial bodies, prosecutors in particular, in the early
24 months of the war in 1992 and some of the consequences of that. Would
25 you agree with me that one of the consequences of this lack of
1 prosecutors and judges was that -- both civilian and military prosecutors
2 and judges was that hundreds, indeed, thousands of non-Serbs, were being
3 held in detention for months in inhumane conditions and oftentimes
4 guarded by police personnel. That was one of the problems from having no
5 judges and prosecutors; right?
6 A. If you're looking for a causal link that because there were no
7 prosecutors and judges, what was it again you said? Which number did you
8 mention, of persons?
9 Q. Hundreds or even thousands.
10 A. The collection centres, or whichever way they may be defined,
11 were within the remit of the military bodies. Whatever happened there is
12 because somebody came to those collection centres or because they were
13 kept in a certain area. I wouldn't link the problem of prosecutors'
14 offices to this matter, or vice versa.
15 Q. Well, isn't one of the reasons that those people stayed in
16 detention was because there was no judge or no prosecutor to prosecute
17 the case and the authorities, military, civilian, and police authorities
18 of the RS, were unwilling to release those people. That's what was
19 happening across the Republika Srpska in the early months of the war in
20 1992. Wasn't it?
21 A. Well, talking about the detention, that was the phrase you used,
22 if there were people suspected of committing crimes they couldn't be
23 processed for objective reasons. If that was the reason for their
24 detention, well, we, from the Ministry of the Interior, because there --
25 unfortunately, there were no prosecutor's offices, released those persons
1 after three days, even though suspected of murder or burglary and robbery
2 and so on which caused great dissatisfaction, especially in those places
3 or neighbourhoods where those people were from, and all that negative
4 energy was directed at the Ministry of the Interior.
5 Q. I think I've run in a problem sometime in using the term
6 "detention" or "detained," because I understand with the -- with you and
7 other police witnesses, that has a very specific meaning for you.
8 What I'm talking about here are the civilians, non-Serb
9 civilians, who are put in some sort of facility, whether it's a
10 collection centre or a detention facility or a camp, and they're not free
11 to leave and, yet, they're not being charged with any crime, and they're
12 kept for more than three days. And I'm saying part of that problem was
13 because the authorities didn't know what to do with them but they didn't
14 want to release them.
15 That did happen in the early months of 1992 in the RS, didn't it?
16 A. I wasn't aware of that during the early months. I didn't know
17 the reasons for their detention, nor did I know where they were detained.
18 At least my administration didn't have any pertinent information.
19 We can only speculate about the reasons being for some persons
20 suspected of committing crimes that -- and supposed that they were kept
21 longer than three days which is contrary to the laws and regulations. I
22 didn't have information about the reasons for detention. Only in late
23 1992, I heard of the existence of some centres such as Prijedor or there
24 were reports from -- from Samac about a facility where a certain number
25 of persons was detained.
1 But those matters basically weren't within the remit of the
2 police so I couldn't say more about them.
3 Q. Well, I suggest to you that perhaps you didn't know in July of
4 1992, but others in the MUP higher ups did know. And to support that, I
5 want to show you Exhibit P160. This is tab 20. And this is about the
6 meeting in Belgrade on the 11th of July, 1992.
7 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Mr. Zecevic did you want to --
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, there were two things. One thing is on page
9 55, line 11, there should be a witness's answer was recorded as part of
10 your question. So that is one thing.
11 And the second thing is I would like to propose that the previous
12 document, which -- which the -- which the witness commented upon be
13 admitted into evidence because I see there is no -- there is no
14 opposition from the -- from the Office of the Prosecutor, and I showed
15 the document to the -- to the witness and, therefore, I think, because
16 the witness commented on the document, that we should have the document
18 It is number 619D1.
19 MR. HANNIS: That's correct, Your Honour. I have no objection.
20 Mr. Zecevic showed it but didn't offer, but now I have directed the
21 witness to a couple specific provisions. I have no objection to it being
23 JUDGE HALL: So it's admitted and marked.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As 1D661, Your Honours.
25 MR. HANNIS:
1 Q. Mr. Macar, you will see on the screen the cover page for this
2 document about the meeting in Belgrade. And I understand you did not
3 attend that meeting. I believe Mr. Planojevic was still the head of the
4 administration, and that was the last one of these meetings he attended.
5 A. As I have already stated, I was not present.
6 Q. During -- during your proofing or previous interviews, were you
7 ever shown this document; do you recall?
8 A. I wasn't. At least I don't recall.
9 Q. Okay. I just want to show you one particular paragraph. It's at
10 page 7 of the English in e-court and page 8 of the B/C/S. And the
11 paragraph I want to ask you about Mr. Zupljanin is addressing the group,
12 and I think it's the --
13 A. I apologise, could I get a hard copy?
14 Q. Yes. I think I can hand you the page anyway.
15 Mr. Zupljanin speaking saying:
16 "The army and Crisis Staffs or War Presidencies are requesting
17 that as many Muslims as possible are gathered and they are leaving these
18 undefined camps up to the internal affairs organs. Conditions in these
19 camps are bad. There is no food. Some individuals do not observe
20 international norms because, among other things, such collection centres
21 are not adequate or there are other reasons ..."
22 So it appears that the RS MUP leadership was aware of this
23 situation as of at least July 11th, and the problem with these undefined
25 Mr. Planojevic didn't tell you about this after the July 11th
2 A. I don't remember that I had the opportunity to see this report.
3 Because I cannot see the whole document, probably Mr. Zupljanin relates
4 in it that he had information that the army and the Crisis Staffs or
5 War Presidencies are demanding that as many Muslims as possible be
6 collected and taken to some camps. Whether that was, indeed, done or
7 not, I cannot say.
8 Q. Do you know that one of the reasons that was being done was that
9 civilian prisoners or detainees or hostages like that could be exchanged
10 for Serbs who were being held by the Muslims or the Croats on the other
11 side of the conflict?
12 Were you aware of that?
13 A. No, I wasn't, not in 1992. I didn't know that there were such
15 Talking about the Sarajevo area where I stayed, I knew that,
16 through certain structures and if you had money, you could organise for
17 somebody to leave a certain area. But I am not aware of such exchanges
18 as this taking place.
19 Q. And did you never hear about the republic commission for the
20 exchange of war prisoners and killed soldiers and others? Were you aware
21 of the existence of that exchange commission in 1992?
22 A. I know that there was a commission for the exchange of prisoners
23 of war and the bodies of killed persons.
24 Q. Did you know a MUP employee named Slobodan Markovic who worked on
25 that commission?
1 A. Slightly.
2 Q. Okay. But you didn't realise that the commission was exchanging
3 not only dead soldiers and prisoners of war but civilians as well?
4 A. I was not familiar with the organisation or the powers of the
5 commission apart from the fact that there was a commission called this or
6 that, and I didn't have the opportunity to cooperate with them or to know
7 anything about their activities.
8 Q. Okay. I don't have any more questions about that document for
9 you at the moment.
10 Do you recall a -- a big international furor in the media in the
11 first week of August 1992, when certain information and pictures were
12 circulated about non-Serbs detained in places like Omarska and Manjaca?
13 Do you remember that?
14 A. No. But I must explain how come.
15 Unfortunately, after leaving Sarajevo and moving to Bijeljina, I
16 got a new apartment, unfurnished, and I had to buy stuff. And only after
17 1998 [as interpreted] was I in the position to buy a regular TV set and a
18 small radio. And there were no printed media available, especially not
19 international media from which I could get such an information. This is
20 meant more as an illustration.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues] ...
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 MR. HANNIS:
24 Q. Yes, I see you're confirming Mr. Zecevic's remark that it was
25 only after 1993 that you were able to buy a regular TV set and radio; is
1 that right.
2 A. I had the opportunity to buy a TV set only in 1993, and I did so
3 in a nearby place.
4 Q. Are you telling me in August 1992 you didn't know anything about
5 those detainees in Manjaca and Omarska and all the international press
6 furor about those camps in Prijedor? You must have heard about it.
7 A. As you know, in August 1992 up until 3 September, I was in
8 Bijeljina carrying out a specified task, and I was active in respect of
9 the Yellow Wasps so that I didn't have the chance to learn that,
10 especially not from the international media. I couldn't follow those
11 media. Some of us, because simply the shortage of electricity, or for
12 the lack of basic technical means.
13 Q. Well, were you not aware of Prime Minister Djeric's announcement
14 or reaction on the 7th of August, 1992 responding to a CNN report about
15 Omarska and Manjaca? You didn't hear about that through your police
16 friends or official reports or local media?
17 A. That's what I'm saying. I was dedicated to that aspect and on
18 the storey, or the two storeys where we worked, I don't think there was a
19 single radio set, but certainly not in the office where I spent time with
20 my colleagues. So I couldn't hear anything from the local media, and I'm
21 utterly unfamiliar with the document that Mr. Djeric published or sent to
23 Q. Do you recall when Mr. Tomo Kovac got his position in the
24 ministry as an assistant for police administration for the uniformed
25 police? Do you recall what month that was?
1 A. No, I cannot say with certainty.
2 Q. And do you recall when he first came to Bijeljina?
3 A. I believe that it was September, maybe early October. But I
4 think it was September. That's more likely. Mid-September possibly.
5 But I'm not fully certain.
6 Q. Okay. And you attended the MUP collegium or the extended meeting
7 in Trebinje on the 20th of August, 1992; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And you attended a similar meeting on the 9th of September, on
10 Mount Jahorina?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And the one on October 3rd in Bijeljina?
13 A. I think so. But I'd have to see the document so as not to
14 conjecture. But I think I was there.
15 Q. And was there no discussion of this situation about the camps and
16 the civilian detainees at any of those collegiums?
17 A. I cannot be sure that it was in September. But I found out that
18 a commission had been established of the Banja Luka centre, and it
19 conducted some checks with regard to the existence of these collection
21 Q. So was that the first time you think you heard about the
22 situation that had existed in Prijedor and Omarska and Manjaca?
23 A. As I've already said, up until that time - and I think it was
24 September when I first heard of the existence of collection centres - and
25 that a commission had been set up to check some information but not
1 before that.
2 Q. Okay. Now, I think you told us before that you sometimes
3 attended sessions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in 1992; is that right?
4 A. I did go to assembly sessions. In 1992, I may have attended one,
5 but from early 1993 until the end, I attended most every session. But if
6 you're referring to a specific session, do remind me by stating the place
7 where it was held, because only thus can I be certain.
8 Q. I understand. Let me ask you about six or eight sessions in
10 I think you already said you did not attend the May 12th session
11 in Banja Luka?
12 A. No, I did not.
13 Q. Okay. How about the 17th Session which was held 24 through 26
14 July at the Hotel Bistrica in Jahorina?
15 A. I cannot be sure if I was there in July. But I did attend one
16 towards the end of the year.
17 Perhaps I can help you some more. Being present at an assembly
18 session does not mean being there for three days or sitting in because my
19 role was limited to those items on the agenda that had to do with crime
20 enforcement. Perhaps there was -- there was a question of a member of
21 the assembly and then a reply had to be given or perhaps information had
22 to be presented or something like that.
23 Q. I understand that. That makes sense to me. I'm just trying to
24 find out which ones you might have attended to focus on those, if I have
25 a question. But it appears that in most of the assembly sessions, there
1 was at least some discussion of police-related security matters.
2 How about 11 August 1992 in Pale? Did you attend that one?
3 A. No, I did not. As you know, I was in Bijeljina.
4 Q. All right. Well, there was one the next day in Banja Luka, so I
5 assume you didn't attend that one either.
6 How about the 14th and 15th of the September in Bijeljina?
7 A. No.
8 Q. I -- are you uncomfortable?
9 A. I can go on. I'm just making myself more comfortable.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. In early September, I think it was around the 3rd, we went to
12 Pale upon the orders of the minister. I don't remember whether we went
13 to Bijeljina and back. But with regard to the Yellow Wasps, there was an
14 order which I remember, pursuant to which we went to Pale in early
15 September. It may have happened that I went there to carry out a
16 specific task, but I don't remember that. And I'm -- really don't
17 believe it was the case.
18 Q. Okay. How about the end of October, 30/31 October, 1 November,
19 in Prijedor?
20 A. I didn't attend the session in Prijedor.
21 Q. How about the one in Zvornik? 23 and 24 November.
22 A. I think that either you or Mr. Zecevic have asked me about that
23 before, and I answered in the negative.
24 Q. And one last one in 1992. 17 December, Jahorina mountain.
25 A. It's possible that I was present. Possibly the agenda could jog
1 my memory, if there was an item on it that had to do with the ministry.
2 Q. I'll have to come back to that later to check for specific items
3 related to the ministry.
4 Now, you talked about a document, Exhibit 1D98. It's tab 20.
5 Defence tab 20. I think it's in your binder, yes. It's a document from
6 the prime minister. I think we have evidence that it was actually signed
7 by the deputy prime minister, Mr. Trbojevic for Mr. Djeric. It's dated
8 25th of May, 1992, and addressed personally to Mr. Kljajic, asking for a
9 report from the ministry about the situation at TAS, the car factory in
11 A. Could you just tell me under what number is it?
12 Q. Tab 20, I believe. 2-0. If I wrote the note down correctly.
13 That looks like it.
14 I think that you commented that it was unusual that it was
15 directed to Mr. Kljajic, the under-secretary for public security instead
16 of to Mr. Stanisic, the minister; is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you think that one of the reasons that Mr. Djeric,
19 Mr. Trbojevic, did that was because at that time there was some suspicion
20 that Mr. Stanisic may have been involved in that matter?
21 A. As a man and as a policeman with long experience behind me, based
22 on what I know, I cannot believe that Mr. Djeric and least of all
23 Mr. Trbojevic could think that Mr. Stanisic, who has a reputation as a
24 fair and honest police officer, could be involved in something like that.
25 So I can't see how this may have occurred to them.
1 I know that their relations were bad, but the rule was in the
2 pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the ministry -- when one ministry
3 addresses another ministry or if the government addresses a ministry,
4 then the correspondence is addressed to the minister and not to some of
5 the lower-ranked personnel. That was the general rule. And if there is
6 any suspicion that one of the ministers, the commission was established,
7 the government could establish a commission to investigate any suspicions
8 about the minister. That is why I find it quite strange or perhaps this
9 is just a remark on your part.
10 Q. No, I thought you agreed with me that it was strange that it was
11 directed to Mr. Kljajic instead of to the minister and I was asking if
12 that might not be a reason.
13 Do you have some other explanation? Was Mr. Kljajic a personally
14 very close friend of Mr. Djeric? Do you have some other explanation why
15 this was directed in what we agree is an unusual way?
16 A. The reason why it was sent to Mr. Kljajic, well, I can't say that
17 with 100 per cent certainty. I know that there were some problems
18 between Mr. Djeric and Mr. Stanisic. And it seems to me that in my
19 answer to Mr. Zecevic I gave an explanation to support my opinion.
20 Q. But you haven't answered my question: Do you know of any close
21 personal relationship -- oh, would you like to take a break?
22 A. Not a break. I wanted to answer you.
23 Q. Oh, okay. Okay. I guess -- and one of my questions was --
24 and were Kljajic and Djeric close personal friends, and that's why he
25 might have sent it to Kljajic instead of Mico Stanisic. Do you know?
1 A. I did not know that they were close friends. And to my mind,
2 this is a typical example of an attempt to subvert the chain of command
3 by bypassing the minister of the interior and by sending a document, a
4 letter, especially of this kind, to the minister's subordinate.
5 Q. Let me ask you about your testimony at page 22923. You talked
6 about how in May 1992 you and Mr. Planojevic were sent to Kula by the
8 Do you remember that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Okay. And apparently somebody in the government or maybe the
11 Red Cross had received information about persons being detained there,
12 some civilians, and you were to go check it out.
13 Why -- why you and Planojevic? You're fairly high up in the
14 system. Do you know why you were chosen for this what seems like routine
16 A. I cannot recall, but I think it was Mr. Planojevic who spoke to
17 the minister, and since at that time in Vrace we had some fuel in a
18 vehicle; I think it was my car. Now, I don't know if it was
19 Mr. Planojevic who made this suggestion or whether it was I. It was
20 maybe 15 or 20 minutes drive, given the conditions. We decided to go
21 there. It was nothing special, really. In my car, I think we had fuel
22 because there were problems with the cars and with fuel and so on, and we
23 simply decided to go. We could have appointed one of our associates,
24 tasked them to go, and the fact that the minister demanded urgent
25 corroboration or confirmation of this information that he received from
1 somebody in the government, that there were civilians in Dobrinja who
2 were moving, withdrawing together with the Territorial Defence from those
3 lines after the fighting ended.
4 Q. And it turns out these were non-Serb civilians who had been
5 brought in, I think, by TO, Serb TO forces, after some of the combat in
6 the area of Dobrinja; right?
7 A. Of mixed ethnic background, or, rather, there were people from
8 various ethnic groups. They were not all non-Serbs. And in this general
9 chaos the information that we received that after the fighting, while the
10 fighting went on, and as the units were retreating, the people were
11 following. They were retreating together with them. That was the
12 information that we got. And they brought them there because they didn't
13 know where else to bring them. They couldn't have brought them back
14 because the fighting was still going on in the broader area of Doboj,
15 Butmir, whatever those neighbourhoods are called.
16 Q. While they were there, who was guarding them; do you know?
17 A. Well, I can't really say whether they were guarded or not. As we
18 were approaching the duty station, most of them were outside. I don't
19 know if they were smoking or whatever it is they were doing while we were
20 approaching the duty officer to ask him about this information.
21 Q. Why wasn't this a matter for somebody from the military or the
22 Ministry of Justice, rather than you in the police?
23 A. Well, it was probably a quicker response from a session attended
24 by the minister. He received information, and I don't know if anyone
25 asked him to do anything. I can't speculate. And since at the time we
1 were in Vrace and sessions of the government were held in Pale, he simply
2 called for urgent information by way of confirmation whether this was
3 actually the fact. Now, I really don't know why nobody thought to notify
4 the army to do that.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours I'm ready to move onto another topic.
7 This might be an appropriate pause for today.
8 JUDGE HALL: So we take the adjournment, to reconvene tomorrow --
9 Yes, Mr. O'Sullivan.
10 MR. O'SULLIVAN: The witness can be accused, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Mr. Macar, we have a procedural matter before
12 we rise, so the usher will escort you out ahead of us.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honours. There's just one very
15 important matter. I refer you to transcript 12791, that was the 13th of
16 July, 2010, and we will all recall on that day, a year ago, that we
17 couldn't believe that Mr. Hannis was turning 39. Today we are equally
18 amazed that he is only turning 40, but we wish him all the best on this
19 special day.
20 JUDGE HALL: And the Chamber joins in that sentiment.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 14th day of July,
24 2011, at 2.15 p.m.