120301IT

Page 26857

1 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. So the parties -- thank you. So the --

2 this revised translation will now be substituted for the translation

3 that's now a part of the record.

4 And the parties will have been notified by e-mail yesterday

5 afternoon that it is -- arrangements have made been to have one extended

6 sitting today from 3.00 to 4.30. And notwithstanding the earlier

7 expectation of the parties, we fully expect that we would be finished

8 with this witness well before the scheduled time for adjournment at 1.45

9 tomorrow afternoon. Thank you.

10 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

11 [The witness entered court]

12 JUDGE HALL: Before you take your seat, sir, would you be so kind

13 as to read the solemn declaration.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

15 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16 WITNESS: SLAVKO LISICA

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Examination by the Court:

19 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. You may be seated.

20 And could you, first of all, please confirm for me that you are

21 hearing me in a language that you understand.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you.

23 JUDGE HALL: Well, I would, first of all, point out that the

24 solemn declaration that you have just made imposes upon you an obligation

25 to speak the truth under the pain of the penalties for perjury which this

Page 26858

1 Tribunal is empowered by its Statute to impose should you give false or

2 misleading testimony.

3 That having been said, I, first of all, thank you for agreeing to

4 come and testifying before the Tribunal and to assist us in our work.

5 And I would ask you to, first of all, state your name, your place of

6 birth, and your ethnicity.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Slavko Lisica, born at

8 Bosanska Gradiska in the village of Laminci in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that

9 is, Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the

10 18th of February, 1944.

11 JUDGE HALL: And what is your ethnicity?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a Serb.

13 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] Have you testified

14 previously either before this Tribunal or before any of the courts in the

15 countries that comprise the former Yugoslavia?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for His Honour.

17 JUDGE HALL: Sorry.

18 Have you testified previously before either this Tribunal or

19 before any of the courts in the countries that make up the former

20 Yugoslavia.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I haven't. I gave testimony to

22 your investigators in Banja Luka, or, rather, they interviewed me.

23 JUDGE HALL: Yes, we are aware of that and we have seen the

24 transcript of that interview.

25 Now, as would have been explained in the communications of the

Page 26859

1 Tribunal officers of the Tribunal would have had with you and would have

2 been confirmed in my former letter to you, you have been called as what

3 we refer to as a Chamber's witness. In other words, whereas these

4 proceedings are adversarial, that is, one side presents its evidence and

5 then the other, there is provision for the Tribunal itself to call

6 witnesses in order to clarify issues which may not have been clear from

7 the testimony proffered by either side. And it is in that context that

8 we invited you - and we are grateful, as I said, for your acceptance of

9 the invitation - to so attend to clarify these matters. And as would

10 have been indicated to you, the two items with which we -- on which we

11 require your assistance are the resubordination of police forces to the

12 army and the responsibility for an investigation and prosecution of

13 serious crimes allegedly committed by resubordinated forces during such

14 time of resubordination. And then secondly, your interaction with local

15 authorities in the relevant area, including Andrija Bjelosevic and

16 Milan Ninkovic.

17 Now, especially since you have not testified previously, I should

18 point out to you, and you may be generally aware of this as a matter of

19 your own basic education and experience, that trials are -- evidence is

20 led during a trial on a question-and-answer basis, and the necessity for

21 this is so as to efficiently manage the presentation of relevant evidence

22 with which the Tribunal is concerned.

23 We are keenly aware that everyone has a story to tell. And

24 especially persons who have not testified previously in the former

25 setting of a court may wish to expand the answers to questions beyond

Page 26860

1 what the questioner would -- is trying to find out, but I would remind

2 you that in each case you should listen carefully to the question and

3 only answer the question that is asked.

4 Now, because you have been called as a witness by the Chamber, we

5 will begin by asking you questions and, indeed, in your case, I will be

6 asking the questions of you on behalf of the Chamber, but my brother

7 Judges may themselves pitch in and themselves ask questions in terms of

8 matters which I may have missed. And after I would have completed, then

9 I would invite counsel for the Prosecution, who sits at your right, to

10 ask their questions, such questions as they have arising out of the

11 questions that the Chamber would have put. Following that, then the

12 counsel for each of the two accused, and they're persons who are jointly

13 charged in this matter, would each have their turns to ask questions of

14 you. And at the end of it all, the Bench may have further questions

15 arising out of what counsel would have put.

16 In terms of time: The schedule, and again this would have been

17 communicated to you earlier, is such that we fully expect that your

18 testimony would be completed by midday tomorrow so that you may return to

19 your home.

20 The sittings for today are expected to continue until 4.30 this

21 afternoon, which is exceptional in terms of the usual work of the

22 Chamber. But -- and it is -- but it is not a continuous sitting. It is

23 broken up into sessions of no longer than an hour and a half for two

24 reasons: One is the technical necessity to change the tapes by which

25 these proceedings are memorialised; and secondly, the breaks allow for

Page 26861

1 the convenience of everyone concerned, yourself included. But

2 notwithstanding those breaks, which are usually of 20 minutes' duration -

3 except for the break between the first session and the last session,

4 which would be from 1.45 until 3.00 this afternoon - the -- if at any

5 time you yourself need to take a break for whatever reason, if you would

6 indicate that to us, we would of course accommodate you.

7 Now, before I go further, are there any questions that you have

8 on which I might assist?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have any questions.

10 Everything you said is very clear.

11 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Would you -- perhaps you could begin by

12 briefly telling us about your professional career. And it would be

13 useful, as we proceed, if you would indicate to us how you prefer to be

14 styled, whether as "Mr." or by the military rank that you last held.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I graduated from Military Academy

16 in Belgrade and I also finished Command Staff Academy in Belgrade. That

17 is, in -- I was trained in Yugoslavia, and I made a vow to defend the

18 country or the state of Yugoslavia.

19 It so happened that Yugoslavia was destroyed by NATO and it did

20 not exist as a legal entity. The former republics of Yugoslavia became

21 independent countries. During the war in the 1990s, I happened to be in

22 Knin in the Republic of Croatia as chief of armoured units of the

23 Knin Corps. That was my position.

24 The civil war in Croatia began then, or even wider than Croatia.

25 In Yugoslavia.

Page 26862

1 As an officer of the Yugoslav People's Army, I defended the state

2 the Yugoslavia rather than the Republic of Croatia. In Croatia there

3 were about a million Serbs, and in Knin there was a Serbian majority.

4 Now in Croatia there are no Serbs anymore. There are only Croats left,

5 because the Serbs were expelled and they went to Bosnia-Herzegovina. And

6 so on. The war continued. I defended Yugoslavia as an officer of the

7 Yugoslav People's Army, and I held the rank of general, and I lost the

8 war.

9 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] Thank you. The --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

11 JUDGE HALL: Thanks.

12 The -- returning to the specific concerns that we have in respect

13 of which, as I said, we expect you would be able to assist.

14 Could you begin by telling us what your experience is of the

15 practice in the context of the theory governing the resubordination of

16 police forces to the military in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in

17 1982 [sic], but even in the former Yugoslavia in general.

18 Do you understand my question?

19 A. Yes, I understand.

20 We are trained officers. Once you become commander of a -- any

21 formation, and I was commander of Tactical Group 3. That's what it was

22 called. It was a temporary formation. It was also known by the name of

23 temporary group Doboj --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Tactical Group

25 Doboj.

Page 26863

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Each formation has its area of

2 responsibility. In that area of responsibility, the number one man is

3 the commander, and I was commander. All units, the entire population,

4 that is, the economic, political, and military potentials, are under the

5 authority of the military commander of that area. All police forces were

6 subordinated to the commander of the zone of responsibility that I had as

7 commander of Tactical Group 3 or commander of Operative Group Doboj. The

8 entire population, including kindergartens, schools, economic operators,

9 everything was under the responsibility of the command of that zone of

10 responsibility. And that included the police forces. They were also

11 under my command.

12 According to the Strategy of Armed Combat of Yugoslavia, where I

13 graduated from military academy and where I completed Command Staff

14 Academy, everything in the zone of responsibility from retired people

15 down to children in kindergartens, medical facilities, economic

16 operators, everything is under the command of that one man, namely the

17 commander of the zone of responsibility.

18 I don't know if I was clear enough. I can elaborate.

19 JUDGE HALL: Well, in terms of -- when this resubordination --

20 when this subordination occurred, would it be for a particular purpose,

21 or would it be, at least in the first instance, general subordination to

22 the commander of the zone?

23 I have a follow-up question on that after you would have answered

24 that part.

25 A. That's understood. How should I put it? According to the

Page 26864

1 Strategy of Armed Combat of SFRY, all forces are automatically

2 subordinated to the commander. Because we're talking about war time, not

3 about peace. In peace, everybody goes about their own business. But

4 since at war we all the same objectives, that is to defend the state,

5 the -- defend the people, but this war was a civil war, and we in the

6 Yugoslav People's Army were not trained for civil war. We were trained

7 according to the scenario when, say, NATO were to attack Yugoslavia and

8 how we could defend ourselves. Or if the Warsaw Pact were to attack

9 Yugoslavia at the time. These were the kinds of scenarios that we

10 studied.

11 In 1968 I remember the situation in Czechoslovakia. I was second

12 lieutenant and stationed near the Bulgarian border and we were ready to

13 defend Yugoslavia if the Soviet Union were to attack us. I was a member

14 of the Yugoslav People's Army then. But we never trained according to a

15 scenario of civil war, which involves ethnic conflict, because at the

16 time there was brotherhood and unity. That was the slogan at the time.

17 We were all friends - Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Slovenians,

18 Macedonians - all the peoples that lived in Yugoslavia. I was not

19 trained to wage civil war.

20 I applied my theoretical and practical knowledge from the

21 Military Academy and the Command Staff Academy to act the way I would

22 have acted towards an enemy. My former friends became my enemies, and I

23 mean the Croats and Muslims. And I saw them as enemies. It didn't

24 matter to me whether they were Germans, Croats, Muslims - to me, they

25 were simply enemies who were attacking my people. And they thought that

Page 26865

1 I was attacking them. And I was never able to understand that the

2 Yugoslav People's Army became an aggressor army in their own country.

3 Much like the US army to turn into an aggressor in California, or the

4 German army in Styria or whichever German province. Or if the Dutch army

5 were to attack their own country. That's what I don't understand. But

6 that was the propaganda that was originated from the West, and those who

7 were destroying Yugoslavia turned the Yugoslav People's Army into an

8 aggressor in its own country.

9 First I defended Yugoslavia. I was unable to do so. And then I

10 started defending my own people, and that's the Serbian people. This was

11 it in a nutshell. What I'm trying to say, that all of it was a tragedy

12 and a misunderstanding in the Balkans. I mean, it was a civil war where

13 you have no rule of law. Yugoslavia as a legal entity had been

14 destroyed. Then have you no laws. You don't have a professional army.

15 When we say "army," we didn't really have one. We had an armed people on

16 the one hand, and an armed people on the other hand. Everybody was

17 armed. They started fighting in kindergartens and they continued

18 fighting all the way up to universities. It was very difficult to

19 control that. I don't know if you understand what I'm saying.

20 But in principle --

21 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... if I might

22 interrupt you to return to this matter subordination. And you may have

23 already answered this, what I indicated was my follow-up question.

24 When this occurred, would it have been -- when persons were

25 subordinated to the commander of the zone, would it have been a

Page 26866

1 subordination to individual military units or individually actually? Or

2 was it once subordination occurred, then it was entirely up to the zone

3 commander as to how to deploy these individuals?

4 A. Well, this last thing you said, talking about myself, I can say

5 that the police forces that were subordinated to me reported to me, and I

6 used them in combat where I had to.

7 We are not numerous. We're not a great people. There were few

8 of us. And the front line was long. So that every man counts. And the

9 goals are the same - the goals of the police, the army, the educational

10 system, politics. The goal was always to defend the people and save it

11 from destruction by the other people. Unfortunately, that's how it went.

12 So that police forces were directly subordinated to me.

13 Those that were in my zone of responsibility, and I issued such

14 orders, don't understand that -- understand this mechanically. Let's

15 say -- let's take Bjelosevic. He's in my zone of responsibility and he

16 comes to me and we talk like men how we can take of a -- of a situation,

17 but my -- I have the last word in that discussion. Of course, there's no

18 conflict there. Clearly he didn't want his police to go to the front

19 line. But since I didn't have enough soldiers, I had to send some police

20 officers to the front too, to at least keep certain positions in order to

21 secure the area, to protect the population, save it from destruction, or

22 prevent great losses. Those were talks. And it wasn't like I was the

23 commander and I told everybody what to do. We had the same goal. We

24 always discussed how we could solve a certain situation. But, clearly, I

25 had the last word in my zone of responsibility. The commander is

Page 26867

1 responsible in his own area of responsibility. He bears the entire

2 responsibility for the use of the police and other institutions, such as

3 the judiciary and, of course, including the army.

4 But let me add so it becomes clearer to you: According to the

5 Strategy of Armed Combat from a -- from an autonomous battalion - I don't

6 know how much you know about military things - and up, there must be a

7 military court. A military court takes care of all problems in the army

8 and in the territory. Military courts. But since Yugoslavia was broken

9 up and so was the legal system, we didn't have military courts who

10 specialised in trying military and police forces in the zone of

11 responsibility of any given commander. Civilian courts were not trained

12 to try a soldier who goes AWOL, for example, or if an observer wasn't

13 where he was supposed to be to observe and then, consequently, there are

14 detrimental consequences; people get killed and injured.

15 These such cases were supposed to be tried by military courts,

16 but we didn't have any. So there was no rule of law. It was a conflict

17 between peoples, and these people who were involved in the conflict were

18 not trained. What you call the Army of Republika Srpska or the

19 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were, in fact, armed people. They were not

20 professional armies. So we're talking about a war between one people and

21 another.

22 So if you have other questions, go ahead, but certainly

23 everything in my zone of responsibility was -- was -- were things over

24 which I had authority. Bjelosevic couldn't take decisions without

25 consulting me, or do anything without my approval.

Page 26868

1 JUDGE HALL: Thank you for that very illuminating answer, sir.

2 If we may take one step back. Up to this point we have been

3 speaking about subordination in the grammatically passive sense. Could

4 you --

5 A. We went back.

6 JUDGE HALL: The -- could I ask this question: Who initiated

7 subordination? In each case. Or did it change from case to case?

8 A. Well, I don't know how to put it. Waging a war or conducting an

9 operation is like a live organism. You are with the same people on a

10 daily basis, either in your office or under a tree or on the positions on

11 some hills. You discuss your common goals. So these are requirements,

12 the requirements of a specific moment. And at that specific moment I

13 appeared as a responsible commander, and that applied to other commanders

14 as well.

15 So I would come and tell Bjelosevic, who said that the Ustasha

16 and the Green Berets were going to attack along this and this axis. I

17 asked him how many policemen you have. But I have to control that

18 territory. I have this and this number of reserve police officers so let

19 us agree amicably, and you can give me 500 policemen, I will deploy them

20 on a certain positions, whereas, at the same time, I'm going to attack

21 along another axis whilst you guard the already reached territory.

22 So it's a live organism and live relationship. We were together

23 on a daily basis, not on different planets. We belonged to the same

24 people, we were faced with same -- the same problems. We had to reach

25 agreements which eventually ended in me issuing an order that had to be

Page 26869

1 complied with.

2 I hope I was clear.

3 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you.

4 Now, if during the time that a police unit was subordinated to

5 your command and a resubordinated policeman committed a crime during that

6 period of resubordination, what would be the process of, (a), reporting

7 that crime; and, (b), the -- the investigation; and, (c), how would it --

8 how would it finally be dealt with?

9 A. I understood your question, though I'm not sure whether you're

10 going to understand my answer.

11 Since we didn't have military courts but instead we have civilian

12 courts, in inverted commas, that was all contrary to the waging of war.

13 When there is war, from the independent brigade, over division, up to the

14 corps level, military courts have to be established. Had that been done,

15 then the military courts would prosecute every crime that happened in a

16 particular area of responsibility of each unit, i.e., a battalion,

17 brigade, division, and corps. Military courts should have existed at all

18 these levels. However, since the legal system of Yugoslavia was

19 destroyed and there was no rule of law, there were attempts to deal with

20 this on the part of the civilian courts, albeit they were not qualified

21 to deal with the problems within the military, on the front, et cetera,

22 especially in view of war crimes, because they didn't understand what a

23 war crime was.

24 So this was more in the hands of the commander to initiate, to

25 place in custody, anyone who attempted to commit a war crime, although

Page 26870

1 that was in contravention of the constitution of the former Yugoslavia. But

2 since we were in a lawless system, it is the commander who is responsible

3 for legal system, for prosecuting war crimes and punishing war crimes. The

4 commander who is in command in an area of responsibility. Unfortunately, that

5 was the situation. Had we had the proper rule of law, that would have been

6 within the jurisdiction of military courts. I had to be the military judge

7 and everything else. And I'm saying this not because I understood this

8 properly, but I have to point out that we didn't have any of these

9 institutions. Without a legal system you have nothing – the state

10 collapses. We didn't even have a system of moral values.

11 Some time ago, we had customary law and legal law - I don't know if

12 it is called that exactly - but we were in a kind of vacuum of lawlessness

13 and everything depended on individual consciousness of every commander.

14 I'm not defending anyone, I'm just describing the situation to you.

15 The commander is responsible for the prisoners, war crimes, and everything

16 else in his area of responsibility, because he assumed the responsibility

17 for that, as I did in my area of responsibility. I hope I was clear.

18 JUDGE HALL: Well, you did warn me that I may have difficulty

19 understanding your answer.

20 In terms of what you have just attempted to explain, though, in

21 practice, was the result that the military, or would it have been the

22 civilian prosecutor, who would have, despite the difficulties that

23 existed at the time and the inadequacies - that's my word not yours - of

24 the systems in place, would it be -- was the competence in dealing with

25 these matters that of the military or the civilian prosecutor?

Page 26871

1 A. It would be the military prosecutor to deal with such situations.

2 There's no place for a civilian prosecutor because he doesn't understand

3 the issues.

4 We had some kind of military prosecutors at the level of the

5 corps, but that was to such a limited extent compared to the atrocities

6 that were taking place. You need to understand that we didn't have a

7 clash between two professional armies, but, rather, a conflict between

8 two peoples. One mob against another. So it was very difficult for JNA

9 officers to try and stream-line that or -- or steer it in the right

10 direction in order to prevent losses as much as possible. Likewise, the

11 police forces tried to make people see reason in order to avoid casualties,

12 but it is impossible to control all the lunatics in your territory.

13 You know this case in Norway where Mr. Breivik killed some

14 80 young people or so. Was that possible for the minister to control

15 this lunatic who just went out there and killed all these kids on an

16 island in this particular part of Europe? Likewise, we were not able to

17 put all the lunatics under our control who put on uniforms. Some of them

18 came from Europe and other countries simply for the purpose of looting.

19 On the Muslim side, you had Mujahedins, Muslim Brothers, and God knows

20 what other groups. All this was a horrible situation in the eyes of the

21 law, and it was almost impossible for the police to prevent that. I am

22 not trying to avoid responsibility. I did what I could, and every

23 policeman did what they could.

24 Now, if we're talking about reserve police, this is not a

25 professional army either. These were armed civilians. Only 5 per cent

Page 26872

1 of them were professionals. 95 per cent of them were ordinary civilians,

2 labourers, farmers who put on uniforms. They didn't have any military

3 training. All they had was the desire for all the birds of the feather

4 to flock together and to defend themselves. Unfortunately, that is what

5 happened.

6 So can you please tell me if I was more clear this time? And I'm

7 ready to answer any further questions you might have.

8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. As we move on, do you recall a man by

9 the name of Milan Ninkovic?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember all the men from my

11 zone. Of course, yes. I forgot some of them after 20 years, but I

12 clearly remember a Ninkovic.

13 As I understood from some papers, it seems that we were on bad

14 terms. He was a politician; I was a soldier. I assume that every

15 politician, not only in the Balkans but elsewhere in Europe, tries to

16 ingratiate himself with his own people in order to win as many votes as

17 possible, whereas I dealt with the situation in a military way. It was a

18 sort of conflict because basically we had different opinions. I thought

19 that since we had a socialist system which implied social ownership, I

20 believed that whilst the war is in progress there could be no

21 privatisation because that would equate robbery. We have to wait for the

22 war to end and then start building a state.

23 You are trying here a state, Republika Srpska, which is

24 non-existing, actually, because it hasn't been recognised. The

25 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas I come from the country which

Page 26873

1 is not recognised. If we start looking at all the crimes at Sijekovac

2 and other places where the Croatian forces killed entire villagers,

3 starting from the elderly to infants, there were no other forces and due

4 to that we had to establish the Army of the Republika Srpska because that

5 was the people's army, not a professional army. The JNA ceased to exist.

6 There were some professional soldiers that happened to remain in the

7 territory, but they didn't exceed 5 per cent. The rest, the 95 per cent,

8 were simple people who just instinctively accepted the role of defenders

9 of their territory.

10 Had we had a strong and professional army, the war wouldn't have

11 lasted for four years. That was the war of exhaustion. And once the

12 western parties had enough of it, they started bombing the Serb army, and

13 this is what brought the war to the end, and it was eventually followed

14 by the Dayton Agreements. And this is what you did - in effect, you

15 destroyed Yugoslavia.

16 Don't think that I'm an embittered person, but I am trying to

17 tell you that there is no intellect, no power that can control hatred.

18 You can control people, but you cannot control hatred. Each commander

19 had his own zone of responsibility. For example, in Srebrenica, you had

20 international forces in control, and in spite of that, 3.000 Serbs were

21 killed in that area. And I don't believe that anyone from Belgium or any

22 other country who gave their contingent was tried. You simply couldn't

23 control hatred. And that is why the Serbs were so eager to attack

24 Srebrenica.

25 The same applied to my area of responsibility. You can control

Page 26874

1 people, but you cannot control their sentiment of hatred. And each war

2 that happened just fueled this hate. And we hate each other now more

3 than we did in 1990. And if another war happens, this hatred will become

4 even worse, and I think that is going to lead to self-destruction.

5 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, sir.

6 You have earlier alluded to your relationship with

7 Mr. Bjelosevic. Is there anything that you would wish to add in terms of

8 the issues with which we are concerned today that you haven't already

9 told us about your relationship with Mr. Bjelosevic in 1992?

10 A. We co-operated as ordinary people. One cannot speak about any

11 friendship in that sense. We had a professional relationship. He was in

12 charge of the internal affairs, and I was in charge of the army.

13 We had common goals and problems, and we jointly solved them

14 because I am that kind of person. I had the last say and each and every

15 of my decisions had to be carried out. Bjelosevic couldn't confront me,

16 since he had his own chain of command through the Ministry of Interior,

17 but what does this is kind of ministry mean in a non-existent state?

18 What does an assembly mean in a non-existent state? What does a judge

19 mean where there are no courts? All I'm trying to say, that all the

20 segments of society were demolished. Bjelosevic carried out my orders,

21 but I also listened to what his requests were, and along the way we tried

22 to find the best possible solution in order to save the people and to

23 save the remaining political and economic institutions.

24 So everything was based on agreement. There was no subordination

25 relationship between the two of us. We were two men who were solving

Page 26875

1 problems in a specific territory. But I did feel that I was in charge,

2 because according to the strategy of combat, I was the responsible person

3 because there was war. Had it been in peacetime, we would have been

4 friends who would meet in a pub for a drink.

5 Was I clear enough?

6 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. That's very helpful.

7 I don't know if the usher has yet handed to you a small folder

8 that we have prepared for your -- to facilitate the next set of questions

9 that I have.

10 A. You're welcome.

11 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.

12 A. Everything in the interest of justice and the people.

13 JUDGE HALL: Could you look at tab 1 in that folder.

14 And I would ask the Registrar to bring up Exhibit P1789, please.

15 Have you -- have you seen the document at tab 1 in your folder?

16 A. Yes, yes, yes. I had an opportunity to see it.

17 Being a commander, I had an opportunity to see much more

18 documents of this kind. This was a standard way of correspondence

19 between the various commands and the police, and it implied joint

20 responsibility.

21 So please go ahead with your questions.

22 JUDGE HALL: Well, if you could just expand on what you have just

23 summarised -- on what you have just said in terms of aiding our

24 understanding of how we should interpret this order from General Talic.

25 A. You have to read it as it says here. And it reads that the

Page 26876

1 police can use only exceptionally when it is necessary to hold and

2 strengthen the front, and that is what we did. Regardless of the order

3 from Mr. Talic, I issued the identical orders in my zone of

4 responsibility. The objective was not to use the police as assault

5 units, but, rather, as units that would be holding certain lines and

6 creating conditions for the military to take over this obligation from

7 the police. And this is what I did, irrespective of the fact whether I

8 had orders of the same nature from Talic or anyone else. I took my own

9 decisions and I provided my own solutions in my area of responsibility.

10 And I think that was a fair way of operating in a single territory,

11 because, as I said, we had a common goal, which was to defend or people.

12 I hope I was clear.

13 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Well, in that vein, could you look at tab 5 in

14 your folder.

15 And I would ask the Registrar to bring up 1D543.

16 A. Very well.

17 JUDGE HALL: First of all, I would ask you to please confirm

18 whether you signed this order.

19 A. Yes, yes, I did. This is my signature.

20 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... and although you

21 would have already - if I understood your answer in respect of the

22 previous document - partially answered these questions, to whom was this

23 order addressed; and how would the police have been informed of this

24 order?

25 A. Are you referring to the formation of each detachment for the

Page 26877

1 defence of Derventa town? Are you referring to that order?

2 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... yes.

3 A. Or are you referring to General Talic's order?

4 JUDGE HALL: No, your order. The one that you have --

5 A. The defence of Derventa town, supplementary order.

6 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... yes, the one

7 that's at tab 5 in your folder.

8 A. Yes. Yes, yes, I understand. And it's been signed by me. Well,

9 this is an order that I issued, and I think it's self-explanatory.

10 If necessary, I can read it out for you. But this order was sent to all

11 subordinate units and to the MUP as well, the MUP of Doboj. Or, rather, the

12 police station. But I don't remember whether it was Derventa or any other.

13 Anyway, all the police stations received this order, either

14 by courier or via fax. One way or another, they received it because they

15 would come to me to get information ... because that was a small territory.

16 It's not as big as Australia. They were 10 or 20 or 30 kilometres

17 apart, and we could quickly get together and exchange information. So

18 all those concerned received these orders of mine one way or another.

19 I used the word "gendarmerie" here because the reserve police

20 force was not diligent enough in carrying out their duties, and I

21 preferred to have had professional police or gendarmerie, as it is called

22 in our people. But that's only the name. They're also made up of people

23 and people are always the same.

24 You know, once you liberate the territory, as it was referred to

25 previously - but I prefer to call it when we occupied Derventa because it

Page 26878

1 had been occupied by the Ustasha first - so when my units occupied this

2 municipality, I established the post of the town commander. His duty was

3 to restore normal operation during the interim period before professional

4 organs took over, because there were no official authorities in this

5 town. There was only Ustasha authority. And once you enter a town, you

6 know that the first thing you do, you establish military authorities,

7 whilst conditions are not created for establishing proper civilian

8 authorities. I think you all know how it's being done, and it's the case

9 in each and every army around the world, and our army, which was in fact

10 an armed people, did the same.

11 JUDGE HALL: Could you go over to your tab 6.

12 And I ask the Registrar to bring up 1D764, which is a document

13 dated two days later, also over your signature.

14 And having regard to your comprehensive answer in relation to the

15 previous document, is there anything that you would wish to add in

16 respect of this document that's, as I said, is at your tab 6?

17 A. Not in essence. I functioned in the area which was my

18 responsibility as commander, and that was the area of Tactical Group 3.

19 To clarify this better: A tactical group was the equivalent to a

20 division to western standards.

21 Since this was in my area of responsibility, I made efforts to

22 have the population return as soon as possible. Because in Derventa

23 there was not a single Serb left. What -- whoever was unable to escape

24 from the Ustasha forces was either killed or put into camps. Nobody ever

25 made an investigation into the plight of the Serbian people in Posavina,

Page 26879

1 because that's what this area is called. The Ustasha forces set up

2 camps, and many people lost their lives there. Many families were

3 expelled or destroyed, and they still suffer serious consequences from

4 the traumas inflicted on them during the war. Nobody ever investigated

5 the sufferings of the Serbian people. Probably somebody made a decision

6 in advance that we, Serbs, are bad. And I did watch TV during the war.

7 It was depicted that we were raping people, strangling, and so on and so

8 forth. But when we came there, there was not a soul. I don't know who

9 we could have raped because there wasn't anybody.

10 First there was the Croatia army, that is, the Ustasha army.

11 Then the Muslim forces; they were called the Green Berets. And there was

12 the Serbian army. There were no civilians. Nothing. And what kind of

13 propaganda this was in Europe that the Serbs are devils who rape and kill

14 and do this and that; this was a very bad propaganda for my people and

15 for democracy and for the truth, if you are fighting for the truth.

16 Because if that's what you're doing, why did [as interpreted] you go

17 there and investigate into the massacres of the people in Zadar and

18 Zagreb and Pakracka, Dolina, and Bjelovar, where the entire staff of the

19 JNA was killed? Colonel Kovacic was killed at his workplace. Nobody

20 investigated into that. All the investigations went against the Serbs as

21 the main wrong-doers.

22 But, okay, let's leave it at that.

23 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] The -- could you look

24 at --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

Page 26880

1 JUDGE HALL: Thanks.

2 I would next invite you to look at your tab 7.

3 And, Mr. -- if the Registrar could bring up 1D765.

4 Are you familiar with this document? Well, first of all, do you

5 recognise it as being what it purports to be; namely, an order from

6 General Talic?

7 A. Yes, yes. I'm familiar with it.

8 I don't remember this specific document because each command got

9 a written document daily. I believe that there was some two tonnes of

10 documents in all.

11 This was found in my bag. That's where it happened to be. And

12 the entire documentation is with the corps. From my command, since there

13 was daily reporting, so on 360 days, there were 360 reports. And

14 360 times four years, you can imagine how that adds up. There was a

15 report to the corps commander and a report to General Mladic. I knew him

16 personally from Knin. We know each other as people and as officers. He

17 demanded that I send an identical copy as the one that I was sending to

18 the corps to him also. I don't know where he was. In Han Pijesak, I

19 think, his command post was.

20 So there is about a thousand documents. And your investigators

21 weren't able to find it. Actually, they didn't feel like going through

22 the heaps of documents, and this one happened to stay behind in my bag,

23 and I gave it to them. But they should have dug deeper in the

24 documentation of the corps, and they would have found a couple of

25 thousand signed by Colonel Lisica. That's me. There must be

Page 26881

1 5.000 documents at the corps command. And then you would be clear about

2 who did what to whom during that unfortunate war.

3 However, arbitrary stories, second-hand, you know, but this

4 document doesn't mean anything to me. I drafted such documents as the

5 responsible person to my subordinate units and the police units in my

6 responsibility. And that includes Bjelosevic. And we had a good

7 relationship; only, I had the last word. That's how it was during the

8 war. And no one of my subordinates can be held responsible. Only me,

9 because I issued the orders.

10 If a corporal commits a criminal offence, he can't be held

11 responsibility without me being held responsible, because it's my

12 responsibility. And that's how people knew me in my area of

13 responsibility. I don't shirk my responsibility. I only acted in

14 accordance with human laws and God's laws, and, of course, military

15 regulations, and those were the regulations of the Yugoslav People's

16 Army, where I was trained too. I wasn't trained in the American army.

17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. I would next invite you to look at

18 tabs 2, 3, and 4. And I'm not sure, having regard to the technical

19 limitations of us only being able electronically to bring up one document

20 at a time, but it would be 1D263, 1D264, and 1D265. And my question

21 would relate to all of those documents.

22 So perhaps the Registry should bring them up sequentially.

23 A. Yes, I see. It's okay.

24 Withdrawal of the police from combat operations. Bjelosevic

25 requested that.

Page 26882

1 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... if you would

2 just --

3 A. Many of my commanders --

4 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... if would you

5 just give me a moment, sir, while the electronic version is being loaded,

6 and then I will phrase my question.

7 A. Sure, go ahead. I understand.

8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

9 JUDGE HALL: If we could deal with them -- with your reading of

10 the documents one at a time. When you are through with tab -- your

11 tab 2, which is Exhibit 263 for our purposes, if would you please let me

12 know.

13 And then I'd ask the Registrar to move on to the next document,

14 and so on.

15 A. I've read it. I'm familiar with the contents of this request.

16 It's about withdrawal of the police from combat.

17 You can ask your question.

18 JUDGE HALL: Yes.

19 Could we then move on to the next document, which is Exhibit 264.

20 Your tab 3.

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 JUDGE HALL: And when you --

23 A. Yes, I know this document.

24 JUDGE HALL: And then Exhibit 1D265, which is your -- sorry,

25 1D265, which is your tab 4.

Page 26883

1 A. Yes.

2 JUDGE HALL: So what we have here, and correct me if I'm wrong,

3 is an exchange between yourself and Mr. Bjelosevic. And the --

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 JUDGE HALL: My first question is whether you were still --

6 whether you were still commander of Tactical Group 3 at this time?

7 A. I was. I was commander of Tactical Group 3.

8 Well, let me tell you like a man. This is a small part of the

9 puzzle. When you put it on paper, then you get the impression that it

10 carries more weight because it stays behind in archives and then later

11 you can be held responsible.

12 We had such meetings daily. And this is just a very small part

13 of my dealings with Bjelosevic and the commanders of the civilian or

14 military police, the commanders of brigades and battalions in my zone of

15 responsibility. He requested officially, not merely orally, because

16 later on nobody will admit to it. Probably his subordinates exerted

17 pressure on him because they wanted to get out of combat.

18 Let's take military units from Bosanska Gradiska. The president

19 of the municipality and the presidents of the parties came to me daily

20 asking me to let their people go so they wouldn't have to fight anymore.

21 In a civil war, fear is incredibly great. Everybody is afraid of war and

22 afraid of death, and everybody wants to stay as far as away from the

23 front as possible. Some of them fled, and we didn't have military courts

24 to sanction them. Some of them fled to Belgrade, others to Vienna. Some

25 maybe came here and may still be here, actually. Only to flee from the

Page 26884

1 war. And now we are being held responsible for crimes that we committed.

2 But tell me where and who committed them. But we were unable to control

3 the armed people and we were unable to control their hatred. We could

4 not control the criminals. We tried to, but we couldn't. Just like you,

5 here, weren't able to control that guy who killed 80 people on that

6 beach. And, yeah -- and we had such people armed in great numbers.

7 But let me tell you something else. According to the Strategy of

8 Armed Combat of Yugoslavia, where I was trained, if I were to order

9 soldiers to enter this room and kill you all, just for -- to give an

10 example, they were not obliged to carry out my order, because if they

11 did, they would commit a crime. And they could be held responsible for

12 executing that order. So everybody has the right to refuse an order, the

13 consequence of which would be a crime. You cannot order anybody to

14 execute prisoners of war.

15 Of course, I can go crazy and issue such an order, but the one

16 who is supposed to execute them must know that he has the right to refuse

17 such an order. I'm talking about professional soldiers, of course. But

18 these reserve forces, the armed people, they know no laws and

19 regulations. This applies to Muslim forces, Serbian forces, or Croatian

20 forces.

21 I had some prisoners, members of Croatian forces, and they told

22 me the very same thing as the Serbs who were taken prisoner and then

23 exchanged. If you are taken prisoner by an active duty officer or an

24 NCO, Serb, Croat, or Muslim, doesn't matter, then you stand a chance of

25 surviving. But if you get caught by a reservist - we call them

Page 26885

1 reservists because whoever was, I don't know, a waiter in civilian life

2 and now has the rank of captain - if you are taken prisoner by such a

3 one, you don't stand a chance. You'll get killed. If you are taken

4 prisoner by an active-duty police officer, it's all right, but if it's a

5 reserve police officer, you don't stand a chance. That's how it was.

6 But if you think it was otherwise, then prove it to me. Go ahead.

7 I'm talking -- I'm saying to you what was happening on the ground.

8 And I'm sorry it was that way. And all my energy, not just mine,

9 but that of the active-duty police, professional police, and

10 all the professional soldiers, officers, and NCOs, they were more

11 worried about preventing crimes than executing some combat assignment.

12 JUDGE HARHOFF: General, can I just follow up on what you have

13 just told us. In the letter which you have in front of you signed by

14 Mr. Bjelosevic, it appears that what he is saying is that it was because

15 his policemen had been assigned to your front line that there was now

16 extensive looting and disorder in Doboj.

17 Do you agree in his assessment here? In other words, if the

18 policemen had not been reassigned to the front line but would have stayed

19 home in Doboj, would the looting and disorder not have taken place?

20 A. Well, I can agree with his assessment, that probably there would

21 be less of that. Especially if we're talking about active-duty police

22 officers. But if only reserve police officers stayed back in Doboj, then

23 he was unable to do anything with him. And that was the same with

24 reserve police -- military police. I was able to impose law and order

25 only with active-duty military police.

Page 26886

1 But it's important for all of us to know that once a state falls

2 apart and there are no more laws, then everybody takes the law into their

3 own hands. And then we're talking about pillage, plunder, and no more

4 than that. There is no responsibility. I went into a village and asked

5 the people, But why are you plundering? And they would answer, But what

6 are you talking about? There's no state any more. But there's me, I

7 said. And who are you? I'm a JNA officer. And they would reply, But

8 there's no more JNA.

9 And I don't wish anyone to go through the same that my people

10 went through. Educated people in Europe cannot understand the calvary we

11 went through when we lost our state and the rule of law. I'm a man who

12 honours the law, and I would like to die in this country when there is

13 the rule of law. I live in Bosnia-Herzegovina now, but there is no

14 rule of law there. Some perpetrators of atrocious crimes during the war

15 are not standing trials in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There's your judge over

16 there, I mean, an international judge, who says that a column of the JNA,

17 that is, I'm -- we're talking about youths of 19 years of age, are a

18 legitimate target for thugs to be killed by them. And so this column --

19 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Previous translation continues] ... General --

20 A. -- was a legal target for the Green Berets. Not even now we have

21 a legal system. 20 years after the war.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: General, please keep your answers short.

23 The reason I'm asking this to you is that there seems to be a

24 slight contradiction in what you are saying. Namely, on the one hand

25 you're saying that there were a lot of thugs who were looting and acting

Page 26887

1 on their own and you couldn't control them. On the other hand, you're

2 saying that, well, these people could be - at least to some extent -

3 controlled if there had been sufficient police forces to secure law and

4 order.

5 So my question is, to you, to give us a picture of what the

6 situation really was. Are you saying that looting and disorder took

7 place everywhere and that, really, nobody could prevent that, not even if

8 there was police available? Or are you saying that looting and disorder

9 could, in fact, be controlled and prevented, to some extent, if only

10 there had been enough qualified manpower in the police forces available

11 in the area?

12 Now, which is it?

13 A. If we had had enough professional police, and I'm talking about

14 the professionals from peacetime, then we would have been able to prevent

15 looting. Professional police means not reserve police. Not armed

16 people. Then it would have been possible to prevent looting to a great

17 extent. Where there were professional officers and NCOs, looting was

18 prevented. But there's no contradiction here. I'm saying that the

19 situation was favourable for disorder and injustice, because the

20 institutions had been destroyed. They couldn't function because the

21 state was no longer there.

22 During the war, we were trying to set up a state, and that's the

23 Republika Srpska, which it, as yet, unrecognised. It's an entity within

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Based on the experience of the former Yugoslavia, we tried to set

Page 26888

1 up a system. But the setting up of a legal system is slow. And even

2 today Bosnia-Herzegovina is an internationally recognised country -

3 although it had never been a country before - it is not a state with a

4 rule of law. And if you have international judges, that's one thing.

5 But nobody does anything with regard to the law. Even nowadays there's

6 looting.

7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, General.

8 JUDGE HALL: We've reached the point where we must take our first

9 break.

10 We will rise, and return in 20 minutes.

11 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

12 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

13 JUDGE HALL: Before I invite counsel for the Prosecution to

14 cross-examine, I don't know if either of my brother Judges have any

15 further questions of the witness.

16 Yes.

17 Yes, Ms. Korner.

18 Cross-examination by Ms. Korner:

19 Q. General, you were interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor

20 almost exactly a year ago. That's right, isn't it?

21 A. More or less, yes.

22 Q. And when you arrived here, you were given a copy of that

23 interview which had been typed up in your own language. That's right,

24 isn't it?

25 A. Correct.

Page 26889

1 Q. And you were then spoken to by one of the legal officers in this

2 case, Mr. Cengic, who asked you if you'd had an opportunity to read that

3 interview; is that right?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. And you told him that you had read it.

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 Q. And you were asked if there was anything that you wanted to add

8 or alter, and you said no. Is that right?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. So you stand by the answers you gave to the Office of the

11 Prosecutor in Banja Luka last year.

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you this: You live in Banja Luka and

14 have done for many years; do you know a gentleman called Mirko Bojinovic,

15 who used be with the -- the SNB in 1992?

16 A. No. Maybe we know each other, but his name is not so much in my

17 memory as the names of Bjelosevic and others. I cannot remember if I

18 really do know him or not.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. Probably he knows me.

21 Q. I want to know whether between February of last year and coming

22 here earlier this week you've had any conversation with him.

23 Mr. Bojinovic, this is. I'll come on to Mr. Bjelosevic in a minute.

24 A. No. I didn't have any conversation. I don't know what we would

25 have talked about anyway. Nobody asked me to do that. I felt no need to

Page 26890

1 that because I'm not that kind of person. I always speak my mind, and

2 what I said in Banja Luka and what I'm going to tell you here today, I

3 believe that I spoke the truth. Maybe I omitted some of the things due to

4 the lack of time, what I wished to say, but I stand by what I did say.

5 Q. All right. Mr. Bjelosevic; have you seen or spoken to him

6 between February of last year and coming here this week?

7 A. I think we talked once. But he lives in Doboj, and whenever he

8 comes to Banja Luka, he rings me up and we have coffee together as

9 friends. We discuss family issues. Sometimes we tackle the issue of

10 The Hague because he had been to The Hague, but I wasn't very much

11 interested in hearing that. And I'm telling you the truth.

12 So since this interview with this investigator and now, we did

13 meet once. I think it was three or four months ago. But the truth is

14 that whenever he comes to Banja Luka, he contacts me and we discuss

15 ordinary things. I asked him about the situation in Doboj, economically,

16 and in other aspects.

17 Q. Did you -- you told us that sometimes you tackle the issue of

18 The Hague. Did he tell you about his experience of giving evidence at

19 this court?

20 A. No, he didn't speak about it. Although he did try to talk about

21 this to me, but I refused because, in my view, The Hague Tribunal is

22 biased. It is trying only the Serbs and not members of other peoples

23 from the Balkans. This is my opinion. Whether it is an objective one or

24 a subjective one, we can debate that. But I don't think that -- rather

25 than achieving reconciliation among the peoples of the Balkans, it has

Page 26891

1 worsened the situation. Because when you watch TV sometimes -- all

2 right.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I'm sorry, General, but we

4 need to stick to --

5 A. All right.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... we need to stick to the

7 topics. Right.

8 Now, the last question on this: Since you were informed by the

9 Trial Chamber that you were being asked to come to court to testify, have

10 you had any discussion with Mr. Bjelosevic about the nature of your

11 evidence?

12 A. No. I think that last I saw him was three, four, or five months

13 ago, but, as I told you, this is a common practice whenever he comes to

14 Banja Luka.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... no, I didn't -- yeah. I --

16 no, stop. I didn't ask whether you'd seen him. I asked you whether you

17 had had any discussion with him, and that includes the telephone.

18 A. No, no. We did not discuss it.

19 Q. All right. Can we then very briefly just flesh out your career

20 for a moment, about which you were asked about earlier this morning.

21 Between 1988 and 1992 you were chief of the Armoured Mechanised

22 Unit in Knin; is that right?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. You then transferred in 1992 to what was still, before the

25 declaration of the VRS, the 5th Krajina Corps, was it not? The

Page 26892

1 Banja Luka Corps.

2 A. Yes, yes. After the Kupres operation. I was conducting Kupres

3 operation, and after that I was transferred to the Banja Luka Corps.

4 Q. Right. And for a short period of time, is that right, you were

5 at the Manjaca training ground, as it then was, helping to train or set

6 up the 2nd Armoured Brigade?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And then, as you told the Court, you were appointed as the

9 commander of Tactical Group 3 in the Doboj area. And that was in June,

10 was it not, of 1992?

11 A. Yes. On the 24th of June.

12 Q. And you remained there until you replaced Colonel Simic, as he

13 then was, as commander of the operations group in Doboj; and that was in

14 1993.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. All right. Now, is this right: The size of Tactical Group 3 was

17 somewhere between 10- and 15.000 troops?

18 A. That's right. Depends on how many of them are present. You

19 always have a third of them absent for various reasons. Because, as I

20 said, those were ordinary people bearing arms, as they had to leave to

21 tend to their cattle, or toil the land, or whatever. Because they were

22 not professional army.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... all right. And just, again,

24 roughly, could you tell us, how large was Operation Group Doboj?

25 Roughly.

Page 26893

1 A. Roughly speaking, around 30.000.

2 Q. So all together in that area there were not less than 40.000

3 armed military persons in -- in that area, during 1992?

4 A. Well, it's very difficult to say precisely, but I think this is

5 an approximate number. And if you add active and reserve police

6 officers, the total number of uniformed personnel was around 40.000.

7 When I say "uniformed," I mean those who were not professionals but were

8 issued uniforms. As I said, an armed people.

9 Q. I just want to ask you to look, please, at one document in

10 relation to your transfer into the Banja Luka Corps.

11 MS. KORNER: Could we please have up on the screen 65 ter 20409.

12 And it's document number 4 in the Prosecution bundle.

13 Q. This document is from the 1st Krajina Corps, as it become, dated

14 the 11th of June, to the Main Staff, and it's giving a list of those who

15 have transferred from the JNA into the VRS in that corps.

16 Could we look, please, at, in English, page 7 -- sorry. Page 8,

17 I beg your pardon. And in the -- I think it's the same in B/C/S. No,

18 it's page -- it says page 15 at the top, and I think that's probably

19 right. Yes. Thank you very much.

20 And is that your name that we can see there, if you look at the

21 left-hand side, at number 8?

22 A. Number 8, Lisica. Yes, yes. Colonel, OMJ, SSNO.

23 Q. Now can we please go back, please, to the first page.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. The officers that we see there, beginning with Talic, then a

Page 26894

1 Lieutenant Ratko Jovic, Bosko Kelecevic, Dragan Marcetic, Gajic, Babic,

2 and so on, did you know these officers?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. Are these all experienced officers, some of whom had been

5 certainly with you in Knin or in Western Slavonia, during the Croatian

6 conflict?

7 A. When the Croats attacked the Yugoslav People's Army? Is that

8 what you mean?

9 Q. Yes, I'll -- for the moment, I'll let you say that. Exactly.

10 When you say the Croats attacked the JNA.

11 Were these officers all officers who had experience of the -- of

12 the conflict in Croatia?

13 A. Well, I'm not as sure about all of them, all these names that I'm

14 looking at. I think that Talic was in Stara Gradiska. Jovicic [as

15 interpreted], I don't know. Kelecevic was serving in Zagreb, and he

16 barely managed to escape. Marcetic was at the training centre, and so on

17 and so forth.

18 But if you're referring to any war experience, I don't think that

19 none of us had any. And I'm referring to experience in a civil war,

20 because we were trained differently.

21 Q. I quite understand -- I -- I understand entirely that the

22 training of the JNA --

23 A. [No interpretation]

24 Q. Just pause, please, sir. I understand entirely that the training

25 of the JNA envisioned an outside enemy and not a, what you call, a civil

Page 26895

1 war.

2 All I'm asking is: Were these officers whom you knew experienced

3 JNA officers?

4 A. Generally speaking, yes.

5 Q. Well, if we look, please, at the next page. Did you know

6 Colonel Vukelic?

7 A. Yes. The late Colonel.

8 Q. Yes. What about Lieutenant-Colonels Radman and Jakupovic?

9 A. No.

10 Q. What about Colonel Stevilovic, at number 42?

11 A. I never made his acquaintance, but I heard at the beginning of

12 the war that he was killed.

13 Q. Were these -- those who you did know, and it's a long list, were

14 you -- would you describe these as trained and experienced officers?

15 A. Yes, I would say that they were trained and experienced officers.

16 Q. All right. Yes. Thank you.

17 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may this document please be admitted

18 and marked.

19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, one question only.

20 In principle, given the contents of this document, I have no

21 objection. I would just like to make one remark. We received this

22 document from the OTP recently. And according to Rule 68, it should have

23 been disclosed to us earlier in order to address it with

24 Colonel Kovacevic, because it expressly deals with the number of

25 officers.

Page 26896

1 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, this was -- it was on the list for one

2 of the earlier witnesses, and I can't remember which, so it has been

3 disclosed sometime before.

4 But as there's no objection, Your Honours, may this be admitted

5 and marked, please.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

8 MS. KORNER: Thank you, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE HALL: Exhibit P2455, Your Honours.

10 MS. KORNER:

11 Q. Right. Now, before you went to Doboj as head of

12 Tactical Group 3, did you attend a meeting in early June to do with

13 Operation Corridor?

14 A. I think I did.

15 Q. And was this the first occasion that you met Mr. Bjelosevic?

16 A. I don't remember meeting him at that particular occasion. I

17 didn't know the man. We may have met following my arrival from Knin, or,

18 rather, from Banja Luka to Doboj, but this was a large meeting in which

19 as many as 100 people may have participated. But since we were neither

20 interested in each other, I don't think that we met until the time when I

21 became commander of TG 3, and that is when he came and we met.

22 Q. Right. Well, I remind you of what you said in interview about

23 this. This is page 81 in English and page 70 in the B/C/S version.

24 MS. KORNER: Sorry, I forgot to give the number. I was waiting

25 for it to come up.

Page 26897

1 Please, could we have up, please, 65 ter 30012.

2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could we have a tab number, please?

3 MS. KORNER: Tab 1.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

5 MS. KORNER: And I think that it's in the Defence's as well,

6 normally.

7 Q. All right. You'll see there the question, after Mr. Bjelosevic,

8 you were explaining, Mr. Bjelosevic had more dealings with the corps.

9 A. [No interpretation]

10 Q. Yep. When did you actually first meet him?

11 So you then say:

12 "So he came to meet me.

13 "Q. How long after you arrived in Foca would that -- would that

14 have been?"

15 And you said:

16 "Two to five days. I think he was also present or it might have

17 been the occasion that we first met where we sat down to decide how will

18 we go about to pierce of corridor. If you recall, when we had the

19 meeting at the agricultural co-operative, I'm assuming, because Martic

20 was also there from the Republika Srpska Krajina, so I'm assuming that

21 the Doboj head of CSB must have been there.

22 "Q. This also involved to a certain extent the Banja Luka CSB.

23 Would Stojan Zupljanin have been at this meeting?"

24 Your answer, over the page, please.

25 MR. KORNER: I think it's in -- in B/C/S ...

Page 26898

1 MR. ZECEVIC: It's the same page in B/C/S.

2 MS. KORNER: Oh, thank you.

3 Q. "It's possible, but I'm not certain ..."

4 "Q. But you think Bjelosevic was also there?"

5 And you say:

6 "I think he was. He was not taking notes ... there were a

7 multitude of people ..."

8 Now, is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's what it says. I really wasn't interested to know who

10 was present there. There were my school friends there, people with whom

11 I attended academy. We got together and chatted. But I didn't know any

12 of those people. He was probably there, given that he held the post that

13 he did.

14 Q. Yes, because this meeting was actually held, wasn't it, in Doboj?

15 As you put it, these were the hosts. Doboj was the host.

16 A. Yes. The president of Doboj municipality. That how it works [as

17 interpreted].

18 Q. And was somebody called Mr. Ljubicic there as well?

19 A. Well, Ljubicic was the municipality president, and he had the

20 rank of a reserve major.

21 Q. And what about Nikola Perisic, president of the Teslic

22 municipality?

23 A. I met him later. He may have been there as well. And all these

24 people that were there were invited by the corps commander. I only

25 exchanged greetings with the people I knew from my past, from my school

Page 26899

1 days. But as for the others, I can't tell you either way whether they

2 were there or not. I don't see the point.

3 Q. Okay. Let's sum this up. This was a meeting of the military,

4 the political, and the police to plan Operation Corridor, wasn't it?

5 A. Well, that was more in a theoretical sense.

6 I didn't even know what my role was going to be. A decision was

7 made at that meeting to resolve the problem. Since the corridor was cut

8 off, the corridor leading to Belgrade and Bijeljina --

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yes --

10 A. -- the instruction came from the Main Staff. But I explained all

11 this to you, and I think it's clear to everybody present here.

12 So a decision was taken on how to free these communications to

13 gain uninterrupted access to Bijeljina and further on towards Belgrade

14 and Serbia, because we belonged to the same people and we were fighting

15 for the state of Yugoslavia at the time. Both the politicians and

16 myself.

17 Q. General, can I just remind you, as the Judges reminded you:

18 Please keep your answers short and just answer the question.

19 The answer to my question is: This was a meeting to plan or to

20 make arrangements for Operation Corridor. Wasn't it?

21 A. You're right.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, I want to deal with something that, as we will

23 see, caused you some aggravation.

24 During the whole of 1992 and indeed 1993 there was never a

25 declaration, was there, of a state of war in the Serbian republic [sic]?

Page 26900

1 A. The Republika Srpska was not a state.

2 Q. I said in the -- I don't know how it was translated, but I said

3 in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A state of war was

4 not declared, was it? Simply an imminent threat.

5 A. Well, what I'm saying is that since the Republika Srpska, even

6 today, is not recognised as a state, I don't know how it could have

7 declared the state of war. We probably should have declared the state of

8 war in what we were calling the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 Why this wasn't done is a question to put to the supreme commander,

10 Karadzic.

11 Q. No. But, sir, it was something that concerned you a great deal,

12 wasn't it? because it limited your powers, the powers that you have so

13 graphically described to the Judges this morning.

14 A. Well, clearly, once the state of war is declared, or the state of

15 imminent threat of war, and so on, then there's a legal basis for you to

16 use all the resources of a given territory for armed combat. In other

17 words, for war. The way it was, you had no legal basis to use what you

18 think you should use. So I insisted that the state of war be declared,

19 although we were not a state. In the municipalities where I was, I told

20 every president of those municipalities that I consider the actual

21 situation to be the state of war and that, to my mind, we were at war.

22 Of course, that was not official. But the municipalities where I really

23 was, they were -- in reality they were at war.

24 Q. Yeah. All right. But the fact remains, and this is -- you

25 mention this on a number of occasions in the interview, and I'll remind

Page 26901

1 you of one of them, that no state of war had been declared. So what you

2 described to the Judges as every -- everything from the kindergarten --

3 down to the kindergarten being under your command was not in fact the

4 case, if it ever was, but certainly not in the 1992, was it? Much --

5 well, perhaps can you answer that question.

6 A. It was as if there had been a state of war, in practice.

7 Theoretically, or legally speaking, it was not that way because it wasn't

8 declared. But in practice, to my mind there was a state of war because

9 everybody had to carry out my orders, without any contradiction.

10 Q. Yes, well that's what you would have liked, but it's not actually

11 what happened, was it?

12 A. It was like that. I'm sorry, were you there? You would have

13 done what I told you too.

14 Q. Yes, well, I'm going to come on to your personal characteristics

15 in a moment, General.

16 But, you see, what you said at one point, when you were asked

17 this - and this is at page 49 of the interview in English and page 41 in

18 B/C/S - you were asked -- you talk about the war.

19 "You were aware, were you, there was no state of war that had

20 been formally declared."

21 And your rely was:

22 "I am aware of that, which was very strange on the part of the

23 leadership, both military and civilian. I was one of those who insisted

24 that it be declared. I had no support, which is why I had to retire, not

25 only because of that."

Page 26902

1 Is that right?

2 A. Yes. So what? What about it? That's exactly how it was.

3 Q. Right. Now, let's have a look at another time you made -- this

4 is December of 1992. Could you have a look, please, at part of Mladic's

5 notebook, which is, please, P1764. At tab 35. And this is him recording

6 for the 5th of December.

7 So what page is that in ... it's page 228.

8 Now, this is a briefing -- oh, wait a minute, we'll just wait --

9 yeah, it's coming up. Sorry.

10 A. Can you -- yes, in Serbian, yes.

11 Q. It's coming up in Serbian. But slowly.

12 Well, there should be a --

13 A. Oh, I can't read this handwriting.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... all right. Well, there

15 should be a typed copy.

16 A. Well, if you can show me that one. Yeah, I can see it says

17 Lisica.

18 Q. Are you family with General Mladic's writing?

19 A. Yes. But I was never able to read it.

20 Q. All right.

21 A. I had a courier and always asked to him, Do read out to me what

22 Mladic says. Because I write in Latin script and he uses Cyrillic

23 script.

24 Q. All right. Do you recognise his writing, though?

25 A. I think it is his hand.

Page 26903

1 Q. All right. Well, I'll read you what we've got and then we'll

2 try -- there is a typed copy in your language, but ...

3 It's you speaking on the 5th of December. And you say:

4 "The military and political authorities in Teslic have united.

5 "A state of war should be proclaimed and order should be

6 established behind the front."

7 Do you remember saying that? Do you remember this meeting where

8 you had a go at just about everybody?

9 A. I was saying that every day, day in, day out. That's nothing

10 new. That was my position.

11 Q. Yep. And you had a go, if you understand that, if it can be

12 translated, against somebody called Mr. Popovic, Mico Stanisic,

13 Goran Bubic, and General Talic, didn't you?

14 A. Where do you read that from?

15 Q. Do you see --

16 MR. ZECEVIC: Perhaps we can give, in all fairness to the

17 witness, the -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

18 MS. KORNER: Yeah. Yes, the typed copy. Well, actually not --

19 [Overlapping speakers] ...

20 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, not the typed copy, or maybe this copy --

21 [Overlapping speakers] ...

22 MS. KORNER: I've got a typed copy in.

23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Where am I having a go at these

Page 26904

1 people?

2 MS. KORNER:

3 Q. Do you see, your name is underlined and this is you speaking,

4 isn't it? General Mladic is making a note of what you say.

5 A. I don't know this Mico Stanisic. I didn't know him then. I

6 couldn't speak about a man whom I didn't know. I don't know him even today.

7 Is he about? I knew Bjelosevic, Goran Bubic. I don't remember that one. He

8 may have been president of the SDS. But general -- I spoke generally that

9 I disagreed with the SDS policy, if I said that. But I probably did. But

10 these are not my words. Maybe that’s what he thought, maybe I spoke and

11 since he knew those names, he wrote down the names, whereas I was speaking

12 generally that the SDS at Teslic did this or didn't do that or whatever.

13 Whereas I never knew this Mr. Stanisic.

14 Q. Well, you say that. But one of your obsessions, wasn't it,

15 during this period --

16 A. [No interpretation]

17 Q. Just a moment. Just a moment.

18 A. [No interpretation]

19 Q. All right. What do you want to say about Bubic? Very quickly.

20 A. I don't remember Bubic. I don't know him. Goran Bubic. I may

21 have met him casually, but ... I did know Talic. I knew Jovo Popovic.

22 He was a self-styled lieutenant-colonel.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... all right.

24 A. I don't know all of these people.

25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... but your obsession, or one

Page 26905

1 of your obsessions during this period, 1992, was what you considered to

2 be the -- the looting that was taking place for personal gain without

3 anybody doing anything about it. That was your -- your -- one of your

4 obsessions, wasn't it?

5 Or one of your -- leave out the word "obsessions." One of your

6 great criticisms.

7 A. Yes, it was.

8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and what you're --

9 A. You know something? I can clarify, if you let me.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... no. Well, clarify what?

11 A. Explain why I had held this opinion.

12 During the war, a self-proclaimed government - and that's what it

13 was to me - you don't have a state and you have an assembly. And then

14 the assembly adopts a law that there should be privatisation during the

15 war. Those were state-owned enterprises that were supposed to turn

16 private. To my mind, that was theft. During the war, there can be no

17 transfer of property, and I considered that theft generally. Whoever was

18 in power, when I was angry, I called these people thieves. That they

19 were stealing. Whoever implements privatisation during the war is

20 stealing. And you're right if you call it an obsession. Because once

21 the war ends, then we can go about normal things. But during the war,

22 that's nonsense.

23 Am I right?

24 Q. All right. I want to return, however, to the question. As I

25 say, on a number of occasions during the interview you talked about this.

Page 26906

1 The difference between an imminent threat of war and a state of war.

2 You did not --

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mrs. -- Mrs. Korner, before you move to that

4 point, I would like to ask the witness --

5 Does the witness have a -- a printed copy now in Serbian?

6 MS. KORNER: He has both, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Could the witness read the last part that

8 starts with: "Talic." The last entry on -- on this -- this page in

9 English.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I read it.

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can you read it aloud so that it can be

12 translated, please.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Okay.

14 It is said about Lisica that he is the greatest profiteer. These

15 are Talic's words. That he looted Derventa Brod, that he stole the

16 cattle and drove it to Levita, that he stole the monuments and sold

17 either it or some other things to -- to farmers.

18 But this is a total lie. If you want me to explain?

19 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Previous translation continues] ... no, no,

20 thanks, General. It's -- it's just because -- because I wanted to check

21 something.

22 Mrs. Korner, did I understand you well that it is your position

23 that all these entries are the General's ideas or words?

24 MS. KORNER: Yes. All of the -- it's rather oddly phrased in

25 English, but it is actually -- our understanding is it's Colonel Lisica

Page 26907

1 talking about all these people, and General Mladic making a note. And

2 this is also -- this is Colonel Lisica, as he was then, saying Talic is

3 saying about me, he's talking about himself in the third person.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Look at -- look at the reading by the witness

5 just a moment ago is exactly the opposite.

6 MS. KORNER: No.

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes.

8 MS. KORNER: Yes, I don't think it is. I hope this is not coming

9 off my time --

10 JUDGE DELVOIE: And that's how I read the English as well.

11 MS. KORNER: No. I -- Your Honour, I hope this is not coming off

12 my time. But, anyhow ...

13 Q. Colonel, this is you, isn't it, complaining that Talic has said

14 these things about you?

15 A. I can only say that Talic was an SDS member, to my knowledge, and

16 that we had political differences, because I didn't belong to any one

17 party. I had been a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

18 Q. Don't worry about that, Colonel. But it's because of the

19 phrasing in this notebook. It's -- General Talic wasn't speaking there,

20 was he? It was you complaining that Talic was defaming you.

21 A. Yes. My authority was great. Well, relatively, given the

22 circumstances. And then probably - but you should ask him to make sure -

23 he was afraid of my authority and my prestige and he blackmouthed me and

24 said that I was --

25 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Previous translation continues] ... please,

Page 26908

1 General, General --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- doing dishonourable things.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Previous translation continues] ... General,

4 please, it's just about -- well, it's so that we can get clear about what

5 is said here.

6 So you answered by the affirmative. You said, Yes, this is me

7 complaining about Talic telling lies about me. Is that right? That's

8 the only thing we need to know here.

9 Is this note about you?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is probably correct.

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, correct, correct.

13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, [indiscernible] -- I will do it

14 because I asked the same question when I looked at the entry, so I got

15 somebody who is a B/C/S speaker to tell me.

16 Now, can we go back to the state of war and imminent threat of

17 war.

18 Your only reason for complaining right up until December 1992 and

19 onwards that no state of war had been declared was because you didn't

20 leave -- you weren't legally able to exercise the powers that you

21 described to the Court because there was no state of war, that is,

22 control of everything and everybody. That's the reason for it, isn't it?

23 A. In practice, I had control over everything and everybody. But I

24 didn't have a legal basis.

25 Q. Right. Now, this is what I'm coming to. Because of your

Page 26909

1 personality, General, which, as you yourself said, you were a strict

2 officer and a good commander, you ran or tried to run your area as though

3 there had been a state of war declared. That's right, isn't it?

4 A. Yes, that is exactly right.

5 Q. Right. But unfortunately it didn't quite work like that, and I'm

6 going to come on in a moment to the question -- the whole question you

7 were asked this morning about resubordination. But I want to start with

8 some other matter.

9 You told the Court this morning that during 1992 the military

10 courts weren't operating. Now, were you aware that the military court in

11 Banja Luka was operating from the 19th of July of 1992?

12 A. I knew that there was a military court in Banja Luka with a very

13 small capacity. According to the rules of armed combat - I explained

14 that to you - from an independent battalion up, there should be a

15 military court. Since I'm a military person and use military language, I

16 don't know if these judges are able to understand the state of war, or,

17 rather, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If these judges are civilian

18 judges, they probably understand it at a theoretical level but not the

19 practical duties of a soldier, an officer, and so on.

20 Q. Yes. Don't worry about that. All, at the moment, that I'm

21 asking you is whether you were aware that there was a military court

22 operating on the 19th of July, and you said yes.

23 Were you familiar at all with any of the criteria for military

24 prosecutors that had been issued? Had you ever -- did you ever see them?

25 A. No, I have never seen them.

Page 26910

1 Q. Right. And it -- would it would be right to say - and this is

2 not a criticism at all, General - that you don't actually have anything

3 to do with the operation of military courts?

4 A. Nothing whatsoever.

5 Q. All right. Now, you were asked this morning about the question

6 of town commands. You were shown two documents about it, in Derventa.

7 Can I just read you what you said in interview and see if that

8 is, as you told us, still your position about the question of town

9 commands.

10 MS. KORNER: This is at page 35 in English and 30 in B/C/S.

11 Sorry, 30012, please; 65 ter.

12 Q. Now, you were asked about -- in fact, the original question was

13 about joint operations where the police were not resubordinated to the

14 military. And you said:

15 [As read] "in principle, if we are talking about a populated

16 area, you would appoint a commander, like I appointed one in Derventa.

17 Which in no way affects the tasks the civilian police is supposed to

18 conduct to preserve peace and order, just as I appointed the town

19 commander for Brod. The police would conduct their own affairs of

20 prevention of robberies, murder, et cetera, but regardless of that, you

21 would appoint a town commander, and the town commander is supposed to

22 co-ordinate the tasks and supposed to work together. The police is

23 supposed to maintain public law and order while the town commander

24 specifically is supposed to co-ordinate and organise, first of all,

25 battle-field clean-up, general removal of effects of combat operations

Page 26911

1 upon the town itself. And then, if possible, he is supposed to also

2 organise the work of utilities, et cetera.

3 "Q. So, in fact, a town commander would take over the civilian

4 part of the municipality until this is installed again?

5 "A. 100 percent correct. Until everybody who is supposed to do

6 their own jobs returns and starts doing them."

7 And then further down the page, you were asked:

8 "A town command is completely separate from a garrison command.

9 "Correct. A town command is a temporary body that exists until

10 civilian life returns to normal."

11 Those are the answers you gave last year. Do you still stand by

12 them?

13 A. Yes, I do stand by them fully.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... thank you.

15 A. I agree with myself.

16 Q. Right. Can we then look, please, at one short matter about, as

17 it were, police/military co-operation. The question of prisoners. And

18 this is the next page, please, in English, and in B/C/S also.

19 At the bottom of the page in English you were asked: If you took

20 prisoners, what would you do with them?

21 And then you said:

22 "According to all military regulations, we're talking about a

23 group of enemy combatants, soldiers that you captured, a report has to be

24 made to the commander."

25 MS. KORNER: We need to go to the next page in English, please.

Page 26912

1 But it's still the same page in B/C/S.

2 Q. "The commander orders prisoners to be removed to the rear post --

3 rear command post. From the rear command post, they would be taken

4 to ... free territory, the free territory that we consider to be Serb

5 free territory, and turned over to the civilian authorities. From that

6 [sic] moment on, they would be in charge of the civilian legal bodies."

7 And then further down the page, you were asked:

8 "You are talking about what sort of prisoners? Those who were in

9 uniform on those who were apparently not in uniform in civilian clothes?"

10 And your answer:

11 "The soldiers that would have been captured during combat

12 operations would still be turned over to the civilian prisons. That's

13 how it functioned in my area of operations. I can only be responsible,

14 and I can only talk about what passed, transpired in my zone of

15 responsibility."

16 And then you explain how you didn't have the resources to feed

17 the prisoners.

18 You were later asked --

19 MS. KORNER: Perhaps we ought to go to the next page in English

20 and also in B/C/S, please, to page 32.

21 Q. You said -- you were asked about the -- you were mentioning the

22 Geneva Convention. And you said that:

23 [As read] "prisoners should be turned over to certain authorities

24 that exist in the liberated or free territory. Because in the area of

25 responsibility ... you only have military authorities. Everything

Page 26913

1 outside an area of responsibility is controlled by the civilian

2 authorities, and my zone of responsibility -- my area of responsibility

3 was so small that I wouldn't have had the needs to detail with a small

4 number of captured military of the enemy ..."

5 And then you were asked --

6 MS. KORNER: Next page, please, in English.

7 Q. -- about this question:

8 "You mentioned the free territories, which territories do you

9 mean?"

10 And you said:

11 "The free territory was all the territory that was under the

12 control of the Army of Republika Srpska."

13 And then you said:

14 "... specifically in my case, we are talking about Doboj. They

15 had a prison. There wasn't one in Derventa or Prnjavor. Doboj was the

16 only place with a prison facility."

17 Are you therefore describing Doboj town, as opposed to the whole

18 of the municipality, as part of the free territories?

19 A. Is that the question?

20 Q. Yes, that's the question, yes.

21 A. Well, as I told I, the military judiciary was inoperable. And

22 this was -- unavoidable solution. Because wherever there were military

23 courts, the prisoners were brought before a military judge, usually at

24 the rear command posts. They would be interrogated there, members of the

25 enemy forces, and then the judge would decide the next course of action.

Page 26914

1 Since we had only a security officer either at the rear command post or

2 at my command post, it was he who interrogated those who were of interest

3 and then proceeded them to civilian authorities. But civilian

4 authorities were not competent and they didn't have adequate skill to try

5 the prisoners. But I didn't know what to do with them.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... just answer the --

7 A. They were a burden. I had to send them away. And there was a

8 prison in Doboj as well.

9 Q. General, truthfully you must just answer the question I ask,

10 because I really don't have very much time today.

11 All I was asking you: Whether you considered Doboj town to be

12 part of what you call the free territory.

13 A. Yes. Yes, yes, yes.

14 Q. Right. And one last thing - and I think then it will be time for

15 the break - on this question of co-operation and prisoners.

16 You were asked whether --

17 MS. KORNER: And this is at the next page in English.

18 Q. And it's page 33 in your language.

19 "Would civilians also be interviewed when they -- when you know

20 they are civilians?"

21 And you said:

22 [As read] "Of course. But you have to understand: civilians are

23 not captured. Where would I find a civilian in the middle of combat?

24 There is not a possibility that I would capture a civilian. If you are

25 talking about combat operations, there is no civilians in combat

Page 26915

1 operations ..."

2 Do you remember saying that?

3 A. Yes, I do. And that is correct. However, this propaganda about

4 us committing rapes, there was no one to be raped. There were only

5 military and police on the ground. But the western propaganda persisted

6 and insisted on us raping and strangling people, et cetera.

7 Please go ahead. I'm happy with my answer.

8 Q. Yes, you mentioned this in your interview, the question of rape.

9 What you're describing, therefore, finally on this topic, as combat

10 operations is two opposing forces fighting each other; is that right?

11 A. That's right. Two armed crowds, I would call them.

12 Unprofessional nations or armed people. Two armed peoples. The Serbian

13 army was not a professional one except in name only, and that applied to

14 the Muslims and Croats equally. And this kind of unprofessional army was

15 not subject to any regulations. It was a matter of survival. However,

16 you prosecuted only the crimes committed by us, and you didn't try any

17 Croats or Muslims, and this only exacerbates the hatred between these

18 three peoples.

19 Q. Sir, you've made your feelings clear, and it's been pointed out

20 to you before that you're mistaken in this. But we'll take it as read:

21 You regard this Tribunal as biased.

22 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that's probably an appropriate moment.

23 JUDGE HALL: So we reconvene in 20 minutes.

24 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 12.25 p.m.

Page 26916

1 MS. KORNER:

2 Q. General, I've been asked to confirm, and I do so: When you

3 describe "free territory," you meant territory that was actually

4 controlled by the VRS; that's right, isn't it? Can you just answer "yes"

5 or "no"?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. I want to move, please, to Mr. Ninkovic that the Trial Chamber

8 asked you about before.

9 You and he, to put it at its lowest, did not get on very well,

10 did you?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And let's just have a look, please, at the exchange, part of the

13 exchange of letters that you had.

14 MS. KORNER: Could we have a look, please, at document which is

15 30028. It's tab 7A.

16 Q. And it's actually extracted from one of the books you wrote,

17 General.

18 While we're waiting for it to come up - I think it's all right -

19 you wrote two books about 1992 or your experiences during the war.

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Now, this is -- comes from your book and is your, if you like,

22 summary of the letter which is to come.

23 You recognise that; correct?

24 A. Yes, I recognise it.

25 MS. KORNER: And let's go, please, to the next page in B/C/S and

Page 26917

1 English.

2 Q. And you put in a photocopy of your letter.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And it's dated the 4th of July. And it's to the Doboj Crisis

5 Staff. And let's summarise it because it's quite a long letter.

6 You talked about accusations that he was making.

7 MS. KORNER: And if we go to the next page in both English and

8 B/C/S, yes.

9 Q. Paragraph 4:

10 [As read] "If the gentlemen think that I and my army will take

11 over territories for them, while you, People's Deputy, Doboj Crisis Staff

12 member, and those in Derventa, Brod, and Prnjavor, will become what you

13 think you are and that you are irreplaceable. Where are you taking the

14 Serbian people. The people will not allow it - my deputy."

15 And then you talk about a legal state, not a political one. And

16 People's Deputy should know that there's no such thing as honest

17 authorities, and so on and so forth.

18 In summary, you were complaining, weren't you, that Mr. Ninkovic

19 and the SDS were taking credit for, as it were, the creation of the

20 Serbian state, which you believed was due to the army?

21 A. Well, roughly speaking, that's correct. I may go into details

22 and try to explain to you, but I see that you understand. Because

23 basically you know there's always a distinction between politicians and

24 soldier, everywhere, in the west and elsewhere. They try to win people

25 with the demagogy, whereas one has to do practical things in real life.

Page 26918

1 So this was more a theoretical conflict rather than a quarrel. There

2 was nothing for us to quarrel about. He was subordinated to me at the

3 time in my territory. I had mobilised him for a certain period of

4 times, but then an intervention came from above that he, as a people's

5 deputy, shouldn't be mobilised and that he had more important business

6 to do, though I never understood what that business was.

7 Q. Can we then look, please, at his response to you, which is 20044,

8 and it's at tab 8.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So one --

11 A. I was against Crisis Staffs. What is a Crisis Staff? The whole

12 country was in crisis. If you have a command and you have a municipality,

13 why do you need a Crisis Staff? But these were theoretical disagreements.

14 Q. General, again, can we just stick to the question I'm going to

15 ask you about this.

16 He -- he writes back to you on the 8th of July. He talks in this

17 first paragraph of there being four letters from you. In fact, you've

18 only got one in your book, and I don't think we've got the others.

19 And then in the second paragraph - do you see? - he says:

20 "With it you probably wanted to again establish how the civilian

21 government in Doboj is corrupted, how it is absolutely not working, so it

22 would be best to replace it with a military administration." Was that

23 your view, General, that, really, everything should have been run by the

24 military? That the country would have been better off if that were right?

25 A. No, that was not my general position.

Page 26919

1 There're bad leaders and good leaders everywhere. Just like you

2 have good officers and bad officers, army officers. But during the war,

3 I thought that this gentleman didn't address substantial issues, which is

4 to have the town functioning at all levels properly.

5 There was some government, but it can always be better, and my

6 intention is to improve it. If you ask them how many civilians were in

7 captivity, taken by the Muslims or Croats to the camps, they couldn't

8 produce a list. They didn't have any such information.

9 I hope you are satisfied with my answer. I am.

10 Q. And then he complains that you had absolutely no right or reason

11 to bring his name in connection with looting or other illegal action.

12 MS. KORNER: And then if we go, please, to the next page in

13 English, and it's still the same page in -- if we move it up slightly so

14 that the General can see. Thank you.

15 Q. He says he wants to inform you of the following:

16 "The Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality of Doboj did not come

17 into existence during or after but before the start of the combat for the

18 liberation of the territories of the Serb municipality ..."

19 And then at number 3.

20 MS. KORNER: So we need the next page, please, in B/C/S.

21 Q. "The Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality of Doboj was not

22 brought to power but, rather, with the help of the army and the police of

23 the Serb people of the Doboj municipality, it helped to organise and

24 liberate all the Serb territories in the municipality."

25 Now, you were not in Doboj at the time of the liberation, if you

Page 26920

1 like, but were you aware that there had been a combined political,

2 military, and police action to take over the town?

3 A. I don't understand your question. Doboj was liberated back in

4 1945. That's when it was liberated.

5 Q. Yes. All right. Well, the next paragraph, it -- it deals with

6 it:

7 "Even though ... one-third of the residents of Doboj municipality

8 were of Serb nationality ..."

9 Were you aware that in May, beginning of May of 1992, there was a

10 combined military, police, and political action to place the Serbs in

11 power in Doboj town?

12 A. I'm not aware of that. But no action or operation was needed

13 anyway. Because in a civil war, as I said, birds of a feather flock

14 together. You can't speak about ethnic cleansing because people

15 instinctively flee to the area where they are in majority. Nobody was

16 ordering anyone. If you shell Sarajevo and you kill one Serb, then you

17 can hang me here for that crime. But you cannot even do that, because

18 there are no Serbs in Sarajevo any longer. 99.something per cent are

19 Muslim and there are a few Croats. And the same situation prevails in

20 Central Bosnia. So this is all propaganda, this notion of ethnic

21 cleansing. What it means was people were fleeing from one group to

22 another without anyone ordering them to do so.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yes --

24 A. Please. I gave you an answer.

25 Q. No, you didn't give me an answer. Because it was a simple

Page 26921

1 question: Did you know that -- that power had -- right.

2 A. I didn't know about this.

3 Q. And, in fact, to cut this short, because you probably -- you

4 remember Mr. Ninkovic's letter, he complained that your allegations were

5 not true, and he asked you at the end of letter, please --

6 MS. KORNER: If we go to the last page in English, and it's the

7 last page in B/C/S.

8 Q. He wants you to come and meet him so you can see the results of

9 the work and wants you to withdraw the claims.

10 First question: Did you go and see him after he sent you this

11 letter?

12 A. No, I didn't.

13 Q. Did you withdraw the claims you'd made in the letter of the

14 2nd of July? Which unfortunately we don't have.

15 A. No, I didn't. He came to see me and he apologised.

16 Q. All right. So he came to see you and he apologised to you.

17 A. Yes, yes. They all apologised. That's how things were. I

18 wasn't prepared to tolerate anything. Why would I apologise to anyone?

19 It wasn't me who started the war. I never wanted it. I just happened to

20 be at the head of an armed people, and I defended this people. So these

21 were political and demagogical disputes. But at the time I was not in

22 the mood to have this kind of debates with him.

23 Q. All right. Would it be fair to say that because of your

24 personality and because you were head of the army in that area,

25 Mr. Ninkovic and Mr. Bjelosevic were, to a certain extent, frightened of

Page 26922

1 you?

2 A. Yes, they were.

3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may these letters please be exhibited

4 and marked.

5 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, we do object. I don't see particular

6 relevance of these documents at all for the -- for the issues in this

7 case. And I believe the witness said: "So these were political and

8 demagogical disputes," and I didn't have time for that at that moment. I

9 don't know -- I don't understand why is Ms. Korner trying to offer this

10 document.

11 Thank you.

12 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, could I ask -- would Your Honours be

13 kind enough to ask the General to take his earphones off for a moment?

14 JUDGE HALL: Yes.

15 Could you please remove your headphones.

16 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, what our case is with General Lisica

17 is very much to the extent that, as he's more or less said now, some of

18 the letters one sees and some of the actions are, in fact, the result of

19 the General's personality. And these letters reflect, we say, very much

20 his personality. And, in addition, they are, of course, relevant to

21 the -- the -- the general evidence in respect of the take-over of Doboj.

22 JUDGE HALL: Isn't his answer to your question as you summarise

23 this series dealing with the questions sufficient? Isn't that the point

24 of -- to which you were leading up to which he -- he readily embraced

25 your suggestion?

Page 26923

1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, yes. But nonetheless, they're still

2 relevant. I mean that -- nobody's said they're not relevant. And they

3 also deal with the issue of what happened in Doboj. Now, Your Honours,

4 at the time that we were putting in evidence about Doboj, we didn't put

5 these in because we had other documents, but they've now become relevant

6 and, we say, admissible. And if you look at the contents, it's clearly

7 relevant.

8 [Microphone not activated] And, Your Honours, can I point out

9 also that Your Honours put down this topic - thank you very much - as the

10 relationship with Ninkovic as part of the reason why this witness was

11 here.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

14 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. But I do agree that Your Honours put that as

15 an issue. And, again, as Your Honours correctly put it, the -- what we

16 have on the transcript is -- the witness confirmed that. And I don't --

17 I still don't understand how this document is relevant at all.

18 This is a letter which Ninkovic is sending to General over some

19 quarrel that they have between them, and this cannot -- this cannot serve

20 as any -- any exhibit that would -- that would help or assist the

21 Trial Chamber in finding the issues that Ms. Korner was mentioning.

22 Moreover, it was up to the Prosecutor to introduce this document

23 in -- as a part of their case, or during the cross-examination of

24 witnesses. Because we went through Doboj, we had Andrija Bjelosevic

25 here, we had rebuttal witness, and now only after all that we are faced

Page 26924

1 now with the additional documents that -- that the Prosecution is now

2 seeking to tender.

3 We do object.

4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, with respect, I couldn't have put this

5 to any of the witnesses from Doboj because Mr. Ninkovic has never been a

6 witness. Mr. Bjelosevic wasn't -- no one's to believe Mr. Bjelosevic was

7 aware of this correspondence. You have here the witness.

8 Your Honours, we're entitled to explore, within Your Honours'

9 limited, as it were, overview of what the witness may deal with, issues

10 which go directly to this case. And one of the issues is, indeed, not

11 just Mr. -- General Lisica's relationship with Ninkovic, but also the --

12 what happened in Doboj. And this is a relevant and admissible document.

13 It doesn't have to go to General Lisica's, if you like, credit, or

14 outlook. It can also be evidence, and it's there, if you look at what's

15 said by Mr. Ninkovic, which advances the evidence in the case about

16 Doboj, which is one of the municipalities in the indictment. And the

17 fact that we didn't put it in as part of our case is because we had a

18 limitation. As I say, we had no witness we could put this to. And now

19 we do.

20 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry to stand up again. But, clearly,

21 Your Honours, the -- this letter was written by a third person. General

22 here says: I didn't accept that and I didn't apologise to him. He came

23 to apologise to me.

24 Now, quite the opposite from -- from that what we have on the

25 record, Ms. Korner offers this -- this document for -- for the truth of

Page 26925

1 its contents.

2 I mean, the -- actually, the -- the testimony that we have on the

3 record opposes this document's credibility or the contents of it as

4 credible. I don't really see the basis for that.

5 Thank you.

6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm sorry, it does not. He says he

7 doesn't know about the take-over. This is a declaration against

8 Mr. Ninkovic's interest, if you like, where he says the Crisis Staff came

9 to an existence before the start of the combat. This is page -- the

10 second page of the letter in English, if we can go back to it.

11 And Your Honours specifically said to General Lisica he was being

12 called to deal with matters that might highlight the evidence that they

13 had heard in the case.

14 Now, here is Mr. Ninkovic saying to General Lisica, who received

15 this letter. He did say he didn't apologise. General says he doesn't

16 know about this aspect of it. The Crisis Staff was not brought to power

17 [indiscernible] but with the help of the army and the police, even though

18 only a third of the residents of Doboj municipality.

19 That's all relevant evidence in this case. And the fact that it

20 comes in at this stage, we say, is neither here nor there.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mrs. Korner, what -- which -- which documents are

23 we talking about precisely? It's -- it's 7A and 8?

24 MS. KORNER: Yes.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 26926

1 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, if we were to admit the letter that's

2 presently up, I think your application also embraces an excerpt from the

3 book. Why should that be added?

4 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] You mean the letter from

5 the General to --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MS. KORNER: You mean the first one? They're

8 both -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

9 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... tab 8. We're talking

10 about tab 8, Ms. Korner.

11 MS. KORNER: No, it's tab 8 I specifically want in.

12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes?

13 MS. KORNER: Yes.

14 JUDGE DELVOIE: So the question is, suppose that we admit it.

15 MS. KORNER: Oh, do I want 7A as well?

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah.

17 MS. KORNER: No. I can live without 7A. Thank you.

18 JUDGE HALL: So the letter is admitted and marked.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2456 [Realtime transcript read in

20 error "P2466], Your Honours.

21 MS. KORNER:

22 Q. General, next, briefly: Mr. Bjelosevic; you've already described

23 your relationship with him. What you said to us in interview about him

24 was that you -- the two of you had a good relationship.

25 That would be right, would it?

Page 26927

1 A. That's right. I was on good terms with everyone.

2 Q. You said at page 95 - and I'm not going to ask for it to be

3 brought up.

4 "We would always find a mutually agreeable solution of what is

5 best in the cause of the defence of territory and the people."

6 A. That is right. We shared the same goal and task but as part of

7 different hierarchies or structures. There was no reason not to agree on

8 something. We were on the same side and not on the opposing sides. We

9 had a common enemy. If there is a difference of opinion, then people

10 engage in discussions that need not necessarily amount to arguments.

11 Even this issue with Ninkovic is something I don't see as an argument or

12 a conflict, because otherwise someone may have ended up in prison. We

13 simply had different points of view.

14 Since I was in a more senior position, I simply had the last say.

15 I told him to keep quiet and that things would be the way I decided, be

16 it for Ninkovic or Bjelosevic.

17 Q. Yes, quite. I think you've explained that.

18 You said at page 85 that you had informal meetings with him and

19 that sometimes this would be when he was touring, as it were, inspecting

20 the police who were on the front lines; is that right?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. And as you said on -- said on a number of occasions, effectively,

23 all of you, the political, the police, and the army, shared the same

24 goals.

25 And the ultimate goal was this, wasn't it: To establish and

Page 26928

1 control the territories declared to be part of the Republika Srpska, as

2 it became?

3 A. Correct. Correct. Well, we did think it would still be

4 Yugoslavia, but in the end it was Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina

5 which had never been a state, a country of its own. But NATO became

6 involved and they had the might and dictated the terms. There's no

7 mention of any democracy there. It's just power.

8 Q. All right. Now let's turn to the general question that you were

9 asked earlier today by the Judges about resubordination of the police.

10 And look at what I said in interview -- what you said in interview was --

11 what you said in interview was correct.

12 First, is at page 28. Well, in fact, it started --

13 MS. KORNER: Sorry, can we have the interview up again, please.

14 It's 30012, and it's page 27 -- well, no. Let's start at page 28. 28 in

15 English; and 24 in B/C/S.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Serbian.

17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yep. "Srpsko" is coming up.

18 A. As the language called "B/C/S" is non-existent. I only heard of

19 it here. There is Serbian, though.

20 Q. Yes. Don't sidetrack.

21 A. Well, you can't keep taking away things from me all the time.

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... all right. In fact, the

23 question started the previous page, and I'm not going to trouble you with

24 that, because you were asked to tell us about resubordination by the

25 police to the army.

Page 26929

1 And then you said, as you told us today:

2 "The general principle was all the resources available to a

3 military commander in his area of responsibility are subordinated to the

4 commander. That means the presidents of municipal assemblies, Derventa,"

5 blah, blah, blah, "including the police in such a territory, civilian

6 police."

7 And you were asked then:

8 "Was it war-time or peacetime?"

9 And you said:

10 "Only in the cases of an existence of the state of war."

11 And then at the bottom of that page you explained about the one

12 single task is the defence of the territory and the defence of the

13 people.

14 Now, you then went on to explain, at page 30 in English and 26 in

15 Serbian.

16 A. I agree with everything that's written there. I agree with

17 myself. Everything that's on the paper is true. I said the truth.

18 Q. Okay. Well, then you explain that if you have a large front line

19 and you're lacking manpower, it's in the interest of the police and the

20 interest of the people that the police are acting on behalf to defend the

21 territory.

22 And you said that the police commanders that you commanded over,

23 they tried to explain to you the police were not a combat force, that the

24 police were going to be used for the control of the territory, which in

25 fact they were supposed to do, but you explained to them about the enemy

Page 26930

1 took over the territory, there would be no territory to control.

2 Now, I want to come to how the actual resubordination came about.

3 Could we go, please, to what you said at page 32 in English and

4 27 in Serbian.

5 You were asked:

6 "Did you ever consider in your mind during this period that you

7 had to make a request which had to be passed up the chain of command in

8 order to use the police in combat operations?"

9 And you said:

10 [As read] "No. I just ordered in my area of operations. If we

11 are talking about civilian police ... I think that the police requested

12 approval up their [sic] chain of command. Let's take for an example, we

13 have a police chief in Derventa. I put in a request. He forwards his

14 request to his superior and then his superior forwards the request to, I

15 don't know where, but let me tell you, in the end, they have to execute

16 what I ordered.

17 "Q. So you were aware that even if you gave the order, the

18 police had to go up its own chain of command because you actually phrased

19 this order as a request?

20 "Yes, that's how I did it. It makes sense. It's a logical flow

21 of sequence of events, but you have to consider that the chain of the

22 command of the military and the chain up to Mladic and whoever and the

23 chain of command of the police, they run in parallel to each other.

24 Ultimately, they end up with the same goal, which is why we had to

25 clashes, and everybody was aware ... probably there was lateral

Page 26931

1 communication. They probably spoke to each other."

2 So, just summarising what you were saying there, General: There

3 are two chains of command - the police and the military. You had to

4 phrase what you in your own mind considered to be an order as a request,

5 didn't you, because that's what had to do be done in any time when no

6 state of war had been declared?

7 A. In my area, we behaved if -- as if there was a state of war. In

8 other words, I would call Milosevic [as interpreted] or another

9 station -- police station commander and ordered him something, to do

10 something. He could not oppose that. Such a procedure did not exist.

11 But he was duty-bound probably to report to Bjelosevic and to the person

12 who was in the seat of the minister of the interior in that non-existent

13 state. And they probably would say, Do as you were told by the colonel.

14 Otherwise, someone would have to go. Either myself or them. And that

15 was impossible.

16 I was indisputable in my own territory. It's not as if I'm

17 saying one thing and was doing another. I did what I said. When I

18 called a municipal president to report to my office, he was always there

19 in five minutes. I don't even know how. When I asked Ninkovic or

20 Bjelosevic to come to my office, they did. There was no choice. It

21 wasn't as if they could say, I've got other things to do. When I said

22 so, it was their only thing to do.

23 Q. General, I absolutely accept you terrified the life out of these

24 people, and we'll see why in a minute.

25 But the reality was - the way things properly should have been -

Page 26932

1 that's what I'm putting to you - is that this had to be phrased as a

2 request, and each request had to go up the chain of command, didn't it?

3 A. That's probably true. I don't recall writing requests. I had no

4 time. Maybe one of my desk officers did. When I said that I needed

5 100 policemen along a front line or a police patrol, then my assistant

6 for security probably drew up this request, as you termed it, to forward

7 it to Milosevic [as interpreted]. In any case, my order had to be seen

8 through. For the most part. Such things were dealt with by my security

9 assistant, because he also attended the meetings. It was all dealt with

10 at the various meetings. If I needed the police, I requested that the

11 commanders of brigades and independent battalions be in attendance as

12 well as Bjelosevic or any other policeman.

13 Q. Let's just move through as quickly as we can, because I want to

14 show you some documents in a moment, what you said in interview.

15 The top of the next page in English but the same page in B/C/S --

16 in Serbian language.

17 A. Serbian. Serbian.

18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I changed it.

19 A. Thank you.

20 Q. The question was:

21 [As read] "When you used the police, when you ordered, as you

22 say, the police to take part in combat operations, was there a

23 time-limitation put upon it?"

24 Your answer:

25 [As read] "I took it upon myself to see that the use of police

Page 26933

1 for combat means was as short as possible. It never depended upon me how

2 long it would be. It depended on the complete situation at the front

3 line. I was completely aware that the police had its own share of tasks

4 to conduct according to the law that regulated their work and that the

5 phenomenon where they'd found themselves under me was a temporary one."

6 MS. KORNER: And then if we go down the page in English. It's

7 the next page in B/C/S -- in Serbian.

8 Q. "Would the police be mixed amongst the army or would they be

9 together in a unit?

10 "As a unit.

11 "Who would be their commander?

12 "Their own police station commander. In total they would be

13 subordinated, let's say, they were deployed within the area of

14 responsibility of the brigade to the brigade commander."

15 And that's right, is it?

16 A. Precisely. I agree with myself and what I said.

17 Q. Right. And you -- you dealt with this a little later.

18 MS. KORNER: Please, at, again, 69, please, in English; 58 in

19 Serbian.

20 Q. You were dealing with the term "co-ordination" which appeared in

21 one of the documents, and you said:

22 [As read] "the civilian authorities had their own task.

23 Co-ordination, is -- if you are going to use police, just means that the

24 police are going to be attacking in a co-ordinated fashion with our

25 military formations. If they are being put to combat use, not in a

Page 26934

1 police task -- not in police use. This only refers to combat tasks.

2 Then it's normal they should know I'm going attack towards this tree

3 whilst you are going to attack towards that house."

4 So the police were resubordinated to the military in your area

5 for the purposes of combat, is that right, fighting? Fighting the other

6 side.

7 A. Correct. Everyone had their own axis of attack or area of

8 defence or a line of defence so as not to be exposed to friendly fire.

9 One needed to know where the rest are and when the artillery or aviation

10 were to come into play, as well as all other branches. It wasn't only

11 the police or the army. There were tanks and assets, and it was my role

12 as the commander to co-ordinate it all together so as to enable it to

13 work smoothly as a Swiss watch.

14 Q. Now, you were also asked --

15 MS. KORNER: Can we go, please, to page 97 in English and 82 in

16 Serbian.

17 Q. -- what would happen if this mutual agreement, particularly

18 between you and Mr. Bjelosevic, didn't work?

19 A. It was impossible to happen. Well, what would have happened?

20 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

21 A. We can presume. What would happen if there were an earthquake

22 here?

23 Q. All right. Accepting it didn't happen with Mr. Bjelosevic except

24 over that exchange of letters. But this is -- I want you to look at,

25 please, what you actually said about this.

Page 26935

1 At page 97, you were asked:

2 "For once your good relationship with Mr. Bjelosevic failed. And

3 he said, My superiors in the ministry of the interior are supporting my

4 position that the police should be withdrawn. What would have happened

5 then?"

6 And your answer, as you say again:

7 "It never came to that. They knew me quite well and I knew them.

8 And considering that we had mutual goals to achieve, I don't think it

9 would ever have come to that."

10 And so the question went on that:

11 [As read] "Supposing Mr. Bjelosevic had said my superiors, the

12 minister of the interior, has ordered my troops come back to ordinary

13 duties, what would have happened then?

14 "Then such an issue would need be resolved by the Main Staff and

15 the Supreme Command. The minister -- the Ministry of the Interior, the

16 Ministry of Defence, that is the chain of events that would be produced."

17 And is that right?

18 A. That is correct. But when you discuss the good relationship

19 between Bjelosevic and Lisica, I wasn't Lisica per se, and neither was he

20 Bjelosevic as an individual. We were institutions and the common point

21 was our good relationship. But we were the people representing different

22 institutions. We were heads of commands, heads of units. And that is

23 where things need to run smoothly.

24 As for personal co-operation or personal position, that is

25 unimportant in times of war. The situation demanded that the two

Page 26936

1 institutions functioned well.

2 You say, If that would have happened. First of all, it was

3 impossible for it to happen. Even if it did, someone would have been

4 made to go, either me or Bjelosevic. But that would be resolved by the

5 Supreme Command and the Main Staff. But there could simply be no

6 situation in which he would not execute my order.

7 Q. Right. Well, I'm going to show you, as I say, in a moment, some

8 documents which you may think support what you say about the chain of

9 command.

10 And I want to ask you one last thing about the interview.

11 On disciplinary or criminal proceedings, you were asked the

12 questions the Judges asked you this morning in -- or in interview last

13 year.

14 MS. KORNER: Can we look, please, at page 44 in English; 36 in

15 Serbian.

16 Q. You were asked:

17 "If the civilian police unit is subordinated to the military,

18 will this have an impact on the police disciplinary system?"

19 And then the answers got slightly off track.

20 MS. KORNER: So can we go, please, to page 45 in English and 37

21 in Serbian.

22 Q. I better read the whole part.

23 [As read] "If during the course," you were asked, "of a period

24 when you were using a police force for -- a police unit for combat

25 operations a member of that police unit committed a crime or disciplinary

Page 26937

1 offence, who would be responsible for dealing with it - the military or

2 the police chain of command?"

3 And your answer:

4 "The police itself. But this is the way you should take it.

5 Whilst being engaged in combat activity, a policeman does not have a lot

6 of opportunity to commit a criminal act."

7 You were given an example: A policeman took a civilian prisoner

8 during combat operations and beat him up or killed him. Would you

9 consider that a crime?

10 You then say you gave an order. "If I find anybody who's killed

11 a civilian, he better shoot himself or I will kill him."

12 And then you -- the question: But supposing somebody was stupid

13 enough to ignore your threat and do that?

14 And you said he would be arrested and sent to prison. There is

15 no mercy for such things.

16 By whom would he be dealt with - the military or the police?

17 And you said: The first one that manages to capture such a

18 person.

19 And then, it was asked -- a less dramatic scenario was put to

20 you:

21 "A policeman refuses to obey the order given to him by his unit

22 commander," who you said would be the police commander, "who would deal

23 with him - the military authority?

24 "The police."

25 Now, that's right, isn't it? That policemen, when resubordinated

Page 26938

1 to the army, still remained policemen?

2 A. He was a policeman. But under a different hat.

3 Q. All right.

4 A. Instead of patrolling the streets, he was in the trenches. But,

5 nonetheless, a policeman. As I told you, our legal system had caved in.

6 It was broken into pieces. In normal situations all this would have been

7 handled by the military judiciary, starting with the level of battalion

8 and up. Since that was non-existent, we had a military court in

9 Banja Luka in the corps. There were many breaches of discipline that

10 were under the jurisdiction of the military judiciary, but such things

11 did not function, and I usually ended up in the position of a military

12 judge. Well, not me personally, but my command.

13 Q. But the point is this, isn't it: There are certain crimes which

14 could only be dealt with by the military courts in normal circumstances;

15 that's right, isn't it?

16 A. In war-time conditions, it is the military courts --

17 Q. But if a policeman committed a crime that was not a crime that

18 came under the military court's jurisdiction whilst he was resubordinated

19 to the army, he would be dealt with by the police chain of command

20 themselves, would he not?

21 A. I don't understand the question. Why is it so important?

22 Q. Never mind why it's important, General.

23 You've got a unit of police, say, 200 of the Doboj special police

24 that you acquired at some stage. And during the course of the time when

25 they are resubordinated to your command or one of your officers, one of

Page 26939

1 them commits a disciplinary offence. Would you, the army, take

2 disciplinary action against him; or would it be left to the police?

3 A. The procedure: I would launch the procedure against a police

4 officer who committed an offence during combat activity. Whatever is

5 subordinated to me -- or, rather, not me, to the command of the brigade

6 or the army, is dealt with by the army until it is taken out of its

7 jurisdiction, until the man returns to his regular tasks. As a police

8 member on the front line, he is subordinated to the commander, and the

9 commander must deal with all his offences until the resubordination is in

10 place. While he is subordinated to me, I deal with it; when he is

11 subordinated to the police, the police does.

12 That's logical. How else?

13 Q. Yes, but hang on a minute. Sorry. Have a look at your

14 interview, what you said there.

15 You were asked: "Who would deal with the man who,

16 resubordinated, refuses to obey an order?"

17 And you said there: "The police."

18 Now --

19 A. Military police.

20 Q. You meant to say the military police; is that what you're saying?

21 A. Military police, yes. That's what I meant. During combat

22 activity, then the military police deals with it. When he is patrolling

23 a village, then the civilian police deals with it; whereas, during combat

24 activity, it's the military police. If you're talking about mistakes,

25 but there couldn't be any mistakes. What kind of mistakes would those

Page 26940

1 be?

2 Q. What powers did you as a military commander have to discipline a

3 resubordinated police officer? Could you demote him?

4 A. He doesn't have a rank. How can I demote him? But these are

5 theoretical questions. And that applies to peacetime. In war, it's very

6 different. I don't care about his status, if he's a corporal,

7 lieutenant, or whatever. For me, he is a fighter on the front line.

8 While he's subordinated to him [as interpreted], he reports to me. When

9 he is no longer there, then have them do to him whatever they want. But

10 while he's under my authority, then I punish him for his offences, or I

11 make proposals. But when I make a proposal, it must be done, that the

12 police officer be demobilised or something like that. But then such

13 things didn't happen. Then Milosevic [as interpreted] or whoever was the

14 commander in charge, had to act upon that.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... all right --

16 A. There can be no opposing opinions here.

17 Q. Okay. So what you're saying, as I understand it, is the police

18 officer who, in your view, has committed an offence, you then tell

19 Bjelosevic that he has got to demobilise him or do something to this

20 officer; is that right?

21 A. Well, there is -- there are those who are in a position to draft

22 such an order to implement what I ordered. But it had to be implemented.

23 Whether it would be Bjelosevic or my assistant for security, that's a

24 technical matter which I cannot comment. But when you say

25 Commander Lisica, that actually means the command, and the command is an

Page 26941

1 institution. And there are all elements there - security, intelligence,

2 logistics, communications, and so on.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yes. No, this is what --

4 A. Somebody from my command would deal with it. And who would be

5 the one to dictate the letter or type it out, I don't know. But the

6 order would certainly be executed.

7 Q. All right. So I think the point you're making, General, is this:

8 You said earlier he didn't have a rank so couldn't demote him. He still,

9 as you said, remained a police officer, but serving as part or serving as

10 a resubordinated person to the military.

11 That's right, isn't it?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And so if any action were to be taken against him, short of

14 you're throwing him into prison or having him stood up at the wall and

15 shot, it would have to be taken, it would have to be taken by the police,

16 wouldn't it?

17 A. A court must pass a judgement to shoot somebody. It wasn't a

18 private war. That would enable me to take a pistol and kill anybody.

19 But since we didn't have courts, then it was up to the civilian

20 courts to deal with that, because there is no execution without a court.

21 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Well, can we just have a

22 look, please, at --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

24 MS. KORNER: Could we just have a look at a couple of -- well,

25 more than a couple -- some of the documents on this issue of the police

Page 26942

1 and resubordination.

2 First of all, can we look at document which is 30016.

3 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] Tab?

4 MS. KORNER: Oh, tab 16.

5 Q. This is an order from the Krajina Corps dated the

6 5th of September -- sorry, to the command of the Krajina Corps from

7 General Mladic, dated 5th of September. Saying:

8 "Pursuant to the order issued by the Presidency of the

9 Serbian Republic ..."

10 And then it orders a battalion to be formed from the MUP in

11 Prijedor.

12 This is right, isn't it, General, whether you liked it or not,

13 and I think you didn't much, that the Presidency or the president of the

14 republic had the power to order both the Main Staff and the police,

15 didn't he?

16 A. Yes, he did. So what's unclear here? Of course they had that

17 power. We called that the Supreme Command. I'm merely saying that in a

18 non-existent state, from a legal point of view, there can be no

19 Supreme Command either. But we had a Supreme Command anyway, in a

20 non-existent state.

21 Q. Then can we look, please, at document number --

22 A. Other commanders also had areas of responsibility, but those

23 areas were not investigated before this court, which is a sad fact for

24 the people there.

25 Q. Right.

Page 26943

1 MS. KORNER: Can we look next, please, at -- actually, it's on

2 the same point, the Presidency. Document, please, 30014. Tab 12.

3 JUDGE HALL: While that document is coming up, Ms. Korner, I

4 alert you that when we rise at 1.45 your time would have been exhausted.

5 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, I was hoping for five minutes

6 more because of the time we went through on General Mladic's diary, which

7 I think took about five minutes.

8 JUDGE HALL: I'm assuming that that would have been taken account

9 of.

10 MS. KORNER: All right. Well, see how we go.

11 Q. Could you look, please -- yes, we've got that document. Now,

12 look, this is Zvornik, 25th of August, 1992. And it deals with the -- a

13 company from the Zvornik public security station. And do you see that it

14 says:

15 [As read] "Based on the need to counter the offensive of the

16 Green Berets, with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior of the

17 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..."

18 So, do you agree, it appeared that, as you agreed, although not

19 in your area, approval had to be given by the minister for the use of

20 police troops?

21 MR. ZECEVIC: Perhaps the witness can read the document, because

22 I don't think that the translation is -- is proper. There is no approval

23 here mentioned in the -- in the actual document.

24 MS. KORNER:

25 Q. Could you read the first -- under "order," could you read out,

Page 26944

1 please, sir -- General.

2 Could you read it out, please, aloud. Sorry, could you just read

3 it out.

4 A. You want me to read it?

5 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yes, please, because we need

6 a translation.

7 A. "Based on the needs expressed for the prevention of the offences

8 of the Green Berets, and with the approval of the Ministry of the

9 Interior of the Serbian Republic of BH, along the axis of Donja Kamenica

10 village and Srpsko Snagovo I hereby order an intervention company of the

11 Zvornik public security station is to be used as part of the

12 Zvornik Brigade to close the axis Jasikovci village-Grujici village, with

13 the task," et cetera.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... that's all right. Stop,

15 stop, stop. Stop, stop, stop. That's enough. I didn't need you to read

16 any further. Thank you.

17 So, General, so do you see, as far as the Zvornik Brigade is

18 concerned, the approval of the Ministry of Interior was obtained?

19 A. Well, that -- but here, too, approval was always given in Doboj.

20 You make a phone call and they say, Okay, we approve. And then the

21 correspondence follows.

22 Q. Yes, sorry, General, I understand that. And it may seem that I'm

23 asking silly questions, but if you wouldn't mind just answering them.

24 Can you have a look, please, at a further document, which is,

25 please, at 30005. Tab 34.

Page 26945

1 This is a report to the Drina Corps from

2 Lieutenant-Colonel Andric. Did you know him?

3 A. I did not.

4 Q. Who is saying, page 2 in English, paragraph 5:

5 [As read] "Please resolve the issue of commanding (use) of the

6 SJB unit (police) since they cite the decision of the Ministry of the

7 Interior regarding their deployment (they are under their command and

8 only the ministry can deploy them)."

9 So it would appear that in areas outside ones that you

10 controlled, General, the -- the system of getting approval from the

11 minister, or the Ministry of the Interior, was followed; would you accept

12 that?

13 MR. ZECEVIC: Just if Ms. Korner can specify the time.

14 MS. KORNER: Yes.

15 Q. December of 1992.

16 A. I think that it may seem that way on paper. Everything was done

17 in agreement. The war and all the ministers of the police and the

18 military commanders met daily. It was a living organism. They always

19 talked. Of course, everybody tried to avoid being sent to combat. These

20 people also complained when I wanted to do so. And they said, But our

21 minister didn't give approval. And I would reply, I'm your minister now.

22 The soldiers from other municipalities were requesting to be sent

23 home and so on. Nobody likes war. They all wanted to be as far away

24 from the front as possible. It was business as usual. I believe you

25 English people understand that very well. You have war-time experience.

Page 26946

1 Q. Now, I want to put as a series of sentences to you and see if you

2 agree with them.

3 Throughout the war the civilian police participated in battles

4 through the area of the Republika Srpska. Do you agree?

5 A. I do, in principle.

6 Q. With the exception of a brief period in 1992, when it was

7 resubordinated to army commands in its place of operation, it was mainly

8 autonomous in action and under its own command.

9 A. I don't know of any police actions. Autonomous police actions,

10 what kind of actions would that be? Maybe actions against some

11 infiltrated sabotage group or criminals.

12 Q. If operations in the field were planned by the VRS Main Staff, it

13 would send a request to the Supreme Commander for the engagement of

14 police; and if the planning was being done by a corps, then its commander

15 would address the MUP organ in the area in question for the engagement of

16 their units.

17 Do you agree with that statement.

18 A. Well, these are probably procedures that were followed. It

19 always originates from the commander of the combat action. And then he

20 involves people in the procedure, and these would be the commands of the

21 military and the police. This was done to have everything covered

22 legally, but that didn't halt the execution of the order.

23 Q. All right. Okay. You were involved in both the Bosanski Brod

24 operation and the corridor operation. That's right, isn't it?

25 A. Yes, it is.

Page 26947

1 Q. Do you agree with this statement: For both the Bosanski Brod

2 operation and the corridor, in the case of planning, the Main Staff

3 applied the Supreme Commander, Karadzic, who approved the use of MUP

4 members? Were you aware of that? Or do you agree with that, rather?

5 A. I am not familiar with that.

6 Q. And now one final document, please. Could you have a look,

7 please - the two final documents, I hope - at 30020. At tab 25.

8 This is a report from Mr. Bjelosevic. He talks about the death

9 of Mr. Bijelic. And then says the same day you turned up to the

10 Derventa SJB, and this is October 1992, threw out the employees out of

11 the SJB building, stopped the traffic, ordered the commander to report to

12 you, and explained that the reason for these actions was to show the

13 Derventa politician how they should work. And whilst hurling countless

14 insults at them, you criticised their work.

15 Is -- do you remember that incident? And is that a rough

16 description of what happened?

17 A. No. I don't know. Well, it may be -- it may be correct. But I

18 think I would remember if somebody had been killed. This says that

19 somebody was killed, doesn't it?

20 Q. Does it sound like something you might have done?

21 A. Bijelic. No. What did I stop? What does it say? "Three

22 escorts, throw employees out of the SJB building ..."

23 Q. Don't worry about that. Can you look, please, finally at a

24 document 00494. Tab 11.

25 This is a report in July of 1992 from Colonel Vukelic. As you

Page 26948

1 put it, the late Colonel Vukelic. And I want you to just look at

2 something he said under paragraph 5, which is the next page in both

3 English and B/C/S.

4 Do you see he's saying:

5 "Morale in the units is high, with the exception of

6 Tactical Group 3, where erosion of morale has occurred because of the

7 arrogant attitude of ..." you, Colonel Lisica, as you were then towards

8 your subordinates, "... as well as his unprincipled treatment of some of

9 the officers. He is arresting people one day and demanding their release

10 the next day."

11 I take it you wouldn't agree with that. But it's right, isn't

12 it, that you did actually arrest -- or agree with the description of you

13 as unprincipled, but you were ordering a number of people on a number of

14 occasions to be arrested, weren't you?

15 A. I agree with what Vukelic says. I was arrogant.

16 Q. And then the last question that I have is this:

17 You told the Court earlier on today that your powers and your

18 opinion were derived from the ... the Strategy of Armed Combat; is that

19 right?

20 A. I didn't understand the question.

21 Q. Sorry. You told the Court earlier today, when you were

22 explaining to the Court, rather expansively, that in a time of war

23 everything in your zone of responsibility came under your command. You

24 said that came from the Strategy of Armed Combat.

25 Is that right? Your powers.

Page 26949

1 A. That is right.

2 Q. Are you able to recall whereabouts, in what is a lengthy

3 document, you say you derived those powers? Where it says that.

4 A. I derive it from a book that's called Strategy of Armed Combat.

5 It was issued by the Supreme Command Staff of the SFRY and published by

6 the SSNO.

7 It was an official document, a public document.

8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I absolutely -- no, I'm

9 merely asking --

10 A. But if you want an exact reference to article, paragraph, item,

11 I'm unable to do that. We were taught at the Command Staff Academy in

12 Belgrade and I had to read it, but where it is exactly to be found, on

13 what page of the book, I don't know.

14 Q. All right. Thank you. That's all I ask.

15 JUDGE HALL: So we take the luncheon break, and when we

16 reconvene -- sorry.

17 JUDGE DELVOIE: I have one small issue with exhibit numbers.

18 Madam Registrar, at page 39, line 16, we are at P2455. And at

19 page 67, line 18, we jumped to 2466.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, I think that the number should be

21 P2456. Thank you.

22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.

23 JUDGE HALL: So we resume at 3.00, when cross-examination by the

24 Defence would begin.

25 [The witness stands down]

Page 26954

1 JUDGE HALL: So while the witness is on his way in, I would give

2 the usual reminder to Defence counsel that the two hours that you have

3 between you, it is up to you as to how you divide that time.

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 JUDGE HALL: I don't know who is going to begin. Mr. Cvijetic?

6 Yes, please proceed.

7 Cross-examination by Mr. Cvijetic:

8 Q. [Interpretation] I'll have to cross-examine this witness because

9 the last time the division of time was at my expense, so I'm going to do

10 it this time.

11 Good afternoon. And before I address you, I'm going to remind

12 you of the question posed by the Presiding Judge as to how would you like

13 to be addressed.

14 A. Slavko Lisica.

15 Q. How about General Lisica?

16 A. All right.

17 Q. Thank you. Now, General Lisica, before I put the questions that

18 I planned to ask you, I'm going to return a document shown to you by the

19 Prosecution because I would like you to look at it again.

20 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] For the record, this is

21 Exhibit P01764; page 228.

22 JUDGE HALL: While the usher is doing that, I would point out to

23 the witness that when the witness and counsel both speak the same

24 language, it is necessary for there to be a pause to allow the

25 interpreters to catch up so there's no overlap. So after counsel would

Page 26955

1 have completed his question, General, before you attempt to answer, just

2 allow a few seconds for the interpretation. Thank you.

3 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, you remember this?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I see that the Trial Chamber does

7 not have the document on their screens yet, so I'd like to call up

8 P01764.

9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Tab number, please?

10 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] It's tab 35 from the OTP's binder.

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

12 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Now we have it.

13 Q. General, since you wrote books, I am seeking a linguistic

14 interpretation from you.

15 If you look at the bottom of the page, where it says "Talic," and

16 then after "Talic," we have a colon; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In our language, could this mean that these were Talic's words

19 and then his words are being quoted? Now I'm just talking about a

20 linguistic interpretation.

21 A. Yes. That is how it should be. It should be the words of Talic,

22 and not Mladic, as it's written here.

23 Q. Now, if you look at the original copy, can you see that there

24 were some markings added in colour red?

25 A. Yes, yes, there are some additions.

Page 26956

1 Q. So, General, bearing in mind what you said about

2 Mr. Mico Stanisic, you firmly can confirm that you never said that?

3 A. I couldn't have said that because I don't know the man.

4 Q. Do you allow for the possibility, then, that somebody has reduced

5 and abridged all the discussion so that, as the final product, it is

6 impossible to determine who said what?

7 A. Yes, I do allow for that possibility.

8 Q. Thank you. Now, I'm going to move to the questions that I

9 intended to ask you. And I would kindly ask the usher to give you a

10 rather voluminous binder with documents which is intended for you.

11 Now, please, the most practical course would be for you to

12 extract document number 3, because I don't think you can handle the whole

13 binder. If you look on the right-hand side, you will find the page

14 number. And kindly take out document number 3.

15 Take it out completely.

16 A. I was never good at office work.

17 Q. Separate it from the binder because you'll have to read it.

18 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I have to say for the

19 record that this is exhibit from our library, 00051, from tab 3 of our

20 Defence team.

21 I think that we still have to wait for the document to appear on

22 the screens.

23 L00051. Or if it's easier: L51.

24 Q. Now we have the document. And if it's no problem, can you please

25 go straight to Article 173 of the Law on the Army, because this is that

Page 26957

1 particular law; is that correct?

2 A. Yes. This is the Law on the Army.

3 Q. So could you please go to Article 173.

4 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] And for the benefit of the

5 Trial Chamber, we need page 24 in the English and page 17 in the Serbian.

6 Q. Article 173.

7 It's entitled: Command.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Have you found it?

10 A. Yes, I have.

11 Q. Now, General, this is a short article, so please read it first

12 and then I'll ask you something.

13 You don't have to read it out loud. Read it to yourself and then

14 I'll put a question to you.

15 Have you read it?

16 A. Yes, I have.

17 Q. You will agree with me, won't you, that these are three basic

18 principles of command in the army, although there are others, I know that

19 there are others, but these three are fundamental ones; is that correct?

20 A. Yes, you're right.

21 Q. The principle of unity of command with respect of the use of

22 forces and resources means ... something that I hope that you are going

23 to explain to us as briefly as possible, and I appreciate your assistance

24 in doing so.

25 A. An officer, or a commander of a certain unit, as far as this

Page 26958

1 principle is concerned, means that his orders must be obeyed.

2 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, we need to see Article

3 173 in English, so we have to move the right-hand part of the screen to

4 the right, or scroll it up, because we need to see Article 173, and it's

5 not there.

6 Okay. But we have to move to another column because that's where

7 it continues.

8 Q. So, in the army or in the combat zone or in the area of

9 responsibility of a unit there is only one commander.

10 A. Yes. And he is the commander.

11 Q. There is no army in the world and there is no military commander

12 anywhere in the world will allow to -- anyone to exert parallel command

13 in his area.

14 A. If he were to allow that, he would be a bad commander.

15 Q. If in an area of responsibility of the unit commanded by this

16 commander, let's say yourself, there are appeared an individual or a

17 group that is participating in combat operations but refuses to listen to

18 your command and are carrying out these operations according to their own

19 principles of command, you are authorised either to put them under your

20 command, to disarm them, and eventually arrest them if they committed

21 some offences in the process.

22 A. You are absolutely right. I can only repeat what you said.

23 Q. There's no need for that.

24 Let me move to the next principle. If you are in command, you

25 can carry out your commands only if this third principle is in place.

Page 26959

1 That is to say, that you can force all your subordinates to carry out

2 your orders; is that correct?

3 A. Precisely so.

4 Q. If you don't have that, then there is no command, there is no

5 army, and the whole concept, the whole pyramid of military organisation

6 will collapse; is that correct?

7 A. Yes. Now let me explain to you --

8 Q. Go ahead.

9 A. When I became commander of TG 3, which is an equivalent of a

10 division, I was fortunate enough to have trained officers at my disposal

11 because combat operations were being carried out along the corridor axis,

12 and, therefore, I was able to appoint trained officers as brigade

13 commanders, so I didn't have any problems with reporting.

14 In other corps, however, they had many problems with the reserve

15 forces but at the level of brigade.

16 Q. I'm going to ask you about all this. Just a little patience,

17 please.

18 Now we are coming to which mechanism you can employ in order to

19 force your subordinates to carry out your orders.

20 If your subordinates refuse to carry out your order, in doing so

21 they commit a criminal offence by refusing to obey the order of the

22 commander in charge, and you are authorised through your security organ,

23 or military police, or military prosecutor's office to hand over such

24 principles to the judiciary for further prosecution. Now I'm just

25 speaking about the principle. Don't tell me how it was in practice.

Page 26960

1 A. Yes. That is how it should be done.

2 Q. If your assessment is that a subordinate individual committed an

3 offence which does not constitute a criminal offence, which means that he

4 committed a minor offence or misdemeanour, you have the power, as well as

5 the military disciplinary organ of the unit, to impose a disciplinary

6 punishment upon him; is that correct?

7 A. Yes, it is.

8 Q. These disciplinary measures vary. One of those is the military

9 remand prison or transfer. For those who hold ranks, suspension of

10 further promotions, et cetera, et cetera. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes, it is. And they can also be dismissed from their post.

12 Q. The last measure that you mentioned, you can send someone from

13 the rear to the forward front line so that can he experience how it is to

14 be on the front line. Is that an option as well?

15 A. Yes, it is an option.

16 Q. Now, General, we come to the next document that I would like to

17 show you. Would you please take out document number 2 from the binder in

18 front of you. And please don't put back the previous one, because we're

19 going to deal with it a little bit after we have looked at number 2.

20 So just open it and don't take it out.

21 A. I see it.

22 Q. Now go back to the first document, under tab 3, which we saw

23 first, and I will provide the reference number for the other document

24 once we get to it. But for the time being we'll remain with tab 3.

25 Please go back to the first page of the Law on the Army, where

Page 26961

1 the title of the law is.

2 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] So we are still with L51. We need

3 the first page.

4 Q. General, please read for yourself Articles 2, 3, and 4.

5 A. Under number 2?

6 Q. Number 3, the Law on the Army.

7 A. Which articles?

8 Q. Two, 3, and 4.

9 Have you read it?

10 A. I have.

11 Q. You will agree with me that we have a description of the complex

12 military structure; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In Article 4, we also have the hierarchy. In other words, who is

15 responsible to whom. Basically, there's a general term for military

16 personnel that is used, and we have the subcategories of the people who

17 fall within that single category; correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That category includes reservists or military conscripts from the

20 reserve while on duty. Is that something you can see in Article 3?

21 A. Yes, I can see that.

22 Q. Go now to Article 9, please.

23 There, we see that military units in certain cases are to be

24 manned by people from the reserve force as well; correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 26962

1 Q. Now turn the next page, please.

2 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Let me see if the Judges have that

3 on their screens as well. Yes, Article 9.

4 Q. Which foresees that in the state of war or an imminent threat of

5 war military units may be replenished with volunteers. Do you see that?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. I can say that I have read all your books, documents, and

8 interviews, and I recall your testimony. I know that you have a very

9 poor opinion of volunteers as a category of people, especially those who

10 took part in this war, but here we are merely discussing the legal

11 concept of "volunteer."

12 Such volunteers, by their being placed under military command,

13 become military conscripts; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, could we -- could I ask Mr. Cvijetic to

16 read out the definition from the law of what a volunteer is.

17 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] No problem. These are people who

18 do not have their military assignment and were included in army ranks

19 upon their own request.

20 Q. Is that what it says?

21 A. Yes.

22 MS. KORNER: [Previous translation continues] ... just read -- it

23 doesn't talk about military rank.

24 MR. CVIJETIC: [No interpretation]

25 MS. KORNER: "War-time assignment" is what the translation is.

Page 26963

1 "Volunteers are persons joining the army at their own request

2 without a war-time assignment."

3 Not a military assignment.

4 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Did I say anything to the

5 contrary? Subparagraph 3 of Article 9. I believe we are talking about

6 the same thing.

7 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, I'm sorry, but it may be

8 important, as Your Honours know from discussions we've had. The English

9 translation in the document is: "A volunteer has -- does not have a

10 war-time assignment."

11 The translation that came out over the earphones, when

12 Mr. Cvijetic summarised it, was "military assignment."

13 The two are not the same. The word is not the same.

14 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I don't know where the mistake

15 lies, but the law does mention war-time assignment and I believe I read

16 it out as such.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It can be verified against

18 audio recording.

19 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General Lisica, it is stipulated here that such persons are

21 placed under military command, whereby they have the same rights and

22 duties as military conscripts; correct?

23 A. Yes. Yes, it includes both rights and duties.

24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, is there a difference between being a

25 military conscript, on the one hand, and having the same - what was the

Page 26964

1 word you used? - the same powers or the same functions as a military

2 conscript? Duties. Sorry.

3 What I'm hinting at is that being a military conscript is not

4 necessarily the same as having similar duties.

5 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I have to confess that I do not

6 understand your intervention. We can repeat the legal definition of

7 these categories. The definition states that active military personnel

8 and the reserve, while on military duty, enjoy the status of military

9 personnel. That category includes military conscripts from the reserve

10 force when executing their military duties.

11 Is that clear now?

12 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, what are you reading, please,

13 Mr. Cvijetic? It's not clear.

14 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Article 3, paragraph 2.

15 So, reservists are considered military personnel while

16 implementing their military duties. I believe that is sufficiently

17 clear.

18 We can use an example to try and clear it up for the general.

19 Q. General.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. People from the reserve force can do all sorts of things as

22 civilians. They can be judges, attorneys-at-law, assembly deputies,

23 ministers, et cetera?

24 A. Yes. But such people usually do not make the reserve. At least

25 not the categories you mention. But we had many waiters though. But in

Page 26965

1 any case, in principle, it is possible.

2 Q. Yes, I simply meant to say civilian professions.

3 However, once there is a general mobilisation as an imminent

4 threat of war had been declared first, all persons falling within the age

5 band of 18 to 65, that is to say, all people from the reserve, including

6 those who do not have a military assignment, are duty-bound to report to

7 their respective military units; correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 JUDGE HARHOFF: But, counsel, the -- to be -- to be labelled as

10 belonging to the military reserve, would that not follow from the

11 military assignment?

12 So you, if we take you as an example: You're a counsel, you're a

13 lawyer, an advocate, and in your military assignment it would say that

14 you belong to the military reserve in case of a -- of a call-up; is that

15 correct?

16 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is precisely the

17 topic I wanted to discuss with the witness, but gradually. And we'll get

18 to this particular issue. I was working my way up to a general call-up.

19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, make sure that you elicit from the witness

20 the position of people in whose military assignments there is no mention

21 of belonging to the reserve.

22 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I will, Your Honour. That was the

23 thrust of my questions. I was aiming to get there.

24 Q. So, General --

25 A. Yes.

Page 26966

1 Q. -- when all these people respond to a mobilisation, their

2 civilian capacity ceases. And for you, as the commander, they are no

3 longer attorneys-at-law, judges, or anything else. To you, they are

4 military conscripts. In other words, soldiers. Correct?

5 A. In times of peace, units are formed where a military conscript is

6 supposed to report to a particular command belonging to the unit where

7 his military assignment is. In other words, every military conscript in

8 peacetime knows what unit he belongs to, and is he to report to that unit

9 or to that command where he had been informed to report to. That's in

10 the briefest possible terms.

11 Q. So, all able-bodied men who reached the age of 18 were supposed

12 to serve their military service.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Just wait. I have another question for you.

15 Once they have served their military term, they are issued an

16 important document called a military booklet; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In the booklet, they have the beginning and end date of their

19 military service.

20 A. Yes. As well as their military specialty.

21 Q. Please do be patient.

22 They also have the military evidentiary speciality, or VES; in

23 other words, what they were trained during -- what they were trained in

24 during their military service, their specialty.

25 A. Precisely.

Page 26967

1 Q. Any ranks are also mentioned, provided the person in question

2 attended a school for reserve officers.

3 A. Yes. Or the rank of squad leader if they were exceptional

4 soldiers.

5 Q. In other words, the rank of a commissioned or non-commissioned

6 officer is mentioned if one such rank applies.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Once the military service is over, such a person is under an

9 obligation to report to a competent municipal organ when they are entered

10 in the military register of the reserve force or reserve force military

11 conscripts; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. His military booklet also mentions the war-time assignment you

14 mentioned. In other words, the unit such a person is supposed to report

15 to is mentioned in case of an imminent threat of war or state of war,

16 including the assembly point where he is to report to; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now I'm interested in the following. When one of them decides to

19 attend training for a civilian policeman, they either attend an

20 abbreviated policing course or enrol in a police school, whereupon they

21 are -- become civilian policemen. Once they are civilian policemen,

22 their status of a reserve military conscript is put on hold, and for as

23 long as that person is performing police duties and tasks, such a person

24 is not considered a military reserve conscript?

25 A. That is correct. And they probably attend military exercises --

Page 26968

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: police exercises.

2 [Defence counsel confer]

3 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. However, when the status of imminent threat of war is declared,

5 or the state of war, the situation changes, General Lisica. Then all

6 from that age bracket, including civilian police officers and the

7 minister of the interior, are duty-bound to respond to the call-up;

8 correct?

9 A. Correct. Yes, that's how it goes.

10 Q. So that in the Ministry of the Interior from the minister down to

11 the lowest-ranking employee everybody is a military conscript; correct?

12 A. Yes. Under the law, that's how it is.

13 Q. Throughout their tenure at the police, they still have a military

14 booklet, don't they?

15 A. Yes, they do. If they served in the army. Although some police

16 officers did not serve.

17 Q. General, if it is assessed that the situation is such as to

18 require their participation in combat operations, they will have to get

19 uniforms and weapons and will have to go to war; correct?

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. If it is assessed that the situation does not require the

22 participation of all of them in the war, they can discharge their regular

23 duties, but the people's defence body in charge issues them a decision of

24 labour or work obligation; is that correct?

25 A. Yes, it is.

Page 26969

1 Q. That work obligation is their war-time assignment. It is no

2 longer their former civilian occupation, but becomes their war-time

3 assignment given to them by the people's defence organ; correct?

4 A. The work obligation usually coincides with the peacetime

5 occupation so people can continue doing what they did before the war. My

6 wife is an economist, and her work obligation involved continuing to work

7 as an economist in the bank where she worked before.

8 Q. General, I'm reading to you the definition of work obligation.

9 But we do agree that this is then their war-time assignment?

10 A. Yes, it is their war-time assignment.

11 Q. There's a reference to this in our legal library --

12 A. And under that war-time assignment, they can be obliged to work

13 longer hours. Instead of eight hours, say, ten hours or 15, whatever.

14 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] For the benefit of the

15 Trial Chamber, this is L58 in our legal library, Article 2, and it's a

16 decree on the organisation and discharge of work obligation for defence

17 requirements.

18 Q. General Lisica, work obligation was no guarantee for any MUP

19 staff that, as soon as the following day, they wouldn't be sent to combat

20 wearing a uniform and carrying weapons; is that right?

21 A. In principle, yes.

22 Q. However, the following situation is also possible: That, in a

23 limited area, in the area of responsibility of one unit, the need arises

24 to draft a certain number of police officers for a certain time. Can

25 that happen?

Page 26970

1 A. Yes. Anything can happen in a war.

2 Q. General Lisica, the law provides for the possibility in such

3 situations that the commanding officer in that area to carry out that

4 mobilisation following the principle of resubordination. In other words,

5 you can issue the order to resubordinate a number of police officers who

6 will then have to join your soldiers in combat activities; right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Once they join their -- join your unit to take part in combat

9 operations, their civilian authority stops and they participate in combat

10 operations with all rights and duties as everybody else; correct?

11 A. Yes, that is precisely right.

12 Q. Before we move on, go to document number 2 in your binder,

13 please. L1 is the document. It's the Law on All People's Defence.

14 Have you found it?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I'm interested in Article 104. It's on page 67 in English; and

17 in Serbian, on page 18.

18 A. I found it, 104.

19 Q. Let's go to page 67 in English and on page 18 in Serbian.

20 I suppose you've read it.

21 A. Yes, I have.

22 Q. I won't repeat so as not to waste time.

23 In other words, during the time they're resubordinated to you,

24 they are military conscripts belonging to the category of reserve

25 military conscripts. They are duty-bound to follow your orders and

Page 26971

1 comply with the military laws and regulations.

2 A. Yes, that is correct. That's exactly what the law says.

3 Q. Do read Article 104. It is very important that we see that this

4 applies both to the state of war and to the imminent threat of war; is

5 that correct?

6 A. Should I read it out?

7 Q. No. Just confirm whether that's what the law says or not.

8 A. Yes. That's what the law says in Article 104.

9 Q. General Lisica, if they, as military conscripts, breach the

10 principle that we have just discussed and commit some offence or

11 disciplinary infraction while they have the status of military

12 conscripts, they come under the jurisdiction of military, judiciary, and

13 disciplinary bodies; right?

14 A. Yes. Exactly. Just like any other military conscript.

15 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I've just been told

16 that we should finish at 4.00. If that is correct, I can stop here; if

17 not, I can continue.

18 JUDGE HALL: 4.30.

19 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Excellent. Then I'll continue.

20 Q. Let us now return to document number 7 in your binder. It is

21 Exhibit P1284.07.

22 A. Item 7?

23 Q. No. Just you go to Article 9.

24 Let us just check if this is the right document.

25 You already know which -- which law it is. It's the Law on

Page 26972

1 Military Courts. Do go to the first page and I'll -- is that correct?

2 A. Law ... yes, yes, yes.

3 Q. Go to Article 9, please.

4 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] And for the benefit of the

5 Trial Chamber, we are on page 2 of both linguistic versions.

6 Q. Please read Article 9.

7 Have you read it?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Article 9 outlines the jurisdiction of military courts who is

10 tried by military courts for criminal offences, and Article 9 enumerates

11 these persons.

12 A. Yes. They are enumerated here.

13 Q. But then you are mentioned here too. I hope you don't mind my

14 saying that. It says an officer, because that follows from your status.

15 These courts functioned both in peacetime and in war-time. Do you agree?

16 A. Yes, I agree. Nobody is above the law.

17 Q. A police officer, while he discharges the duties of a military

18 conscript and while he is under your command, is tried by a military

19 court for any criminal offence if committed during the discharge of his

20 duties; is that correct?

21 A. Yes, that is exactly how it is.

22 Q. So, from -- from ordinary theft to the worst war crime; correct?

23 A. Correct.

24 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, for the benefit of

25 the transcript, I will now state the references that corroborate what has

Page 26973

1 just been said. Exhibits 1D -- I may choose to show some to the witness,

2 but I'll just give the references first.

3 MS. KORNER: No, no, no, no. It is the "may corroborate."

4 Mr. Cvijetic can show the documents to the witness and then we'll see

5 where we get to.

6 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] All right. I will pick one. Just

7 give me a minute.

8 [Microphone not activated]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.

10 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Let's take tab 22; Exhibit 2D0017.

11 Q. General, you have found the document?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. It has only two pages. Have you found it?

14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I dealt with this when I was asking

15 the General questions. He said, in terms, he had no dealings with nor

16 saw documents relating to the operation of the military courts, and

17 therefore all he can do is comment on this. So I don't see where we're

18 going to be taken.

19 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] He can comment.

20 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry --

21 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] You wanted me to show it. I just

22 want to read out the references, but you wanted me to show a document.

23 Why are you now backing out?

24 MS. KORNER: No, no, Your Honours, I'm sorry. The General can

25 deal with documents of which he has personal knowledge or understanding.

Page 26974

1 He has, in terms, said he did not see any documents dealing with the

2 running of the military prosecutor's office nor was he aware of the

3 detail of the military courts.

4 So he really cannot -- unless he says he's seen this document or

5 knows about its contents, he cannot be asked about it.

6 JUDGE HALL: Put another way, Mr. Cvijetic: Why would you be

7 spending time dealing with a document such as this if you know from the

8 answer that he has already given earlier that it -- he really can't speak

9 to it?

10 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is not a

11 problem. I don't want to embark on a polemic with Ms. Korner. But she

12 insisted that I show a document from which it follows that military

13 prosecutor's offices prosecuted all persons mentioned in Article 9 for

14 any criminal offences from theft to war crime, and that is corroborated

15 not only by this document but by all documents I wanted to list. But I

16 will content myself with the witness's answer and continue.

17 Q. General Lisica, while they are subordinated to --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Resubordinated to

19 your command --

20 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. -- police officers, as military conscripts, as you said, are a

22 legitimate military target for the opponent; correct?

23 A. Yes. The same way that I am.

24 Q. All right. They also have certain rights and duties, just like

25 you and other military conscripts. I will just mention some, and you say

Page 26975

1 if you agree or disagree.

2 Military laws and regulations are applied to their participation

3 as well as international conventions dealing with military conscripts and

4 soldiers; correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Should they be wounded, they accord the status of military

7 war-time invalid; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. If they get killed, their family gets the status of the family of

10 a killed military conscript, or soldier; correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. While they are resubordinated, they must follow military rules

13 and regulations, execute the orders of the military commander, and they

14 have all other rights and duties that stem from their status as military

15 conscripts; correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And you have already answered this question. If they fail to

18 abide by military laws and regulations, they can be held responsible;

19 correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. I'm going to mention another right, and I would like you to

22 confirm it for me.

23 While they are conscripts under your command and they have a

24 reserve-force rank, if they show valour during combat, the responsible

25 command can promote them to a higher rank; is that correct?

Page 26976

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And, lastly, a practical issue. If you, as a commander, think

3 that they committed a disciplinary infraction, you can impose a

4 disciplinary measure of a military remand prison, transfer, dismissal,

5 and so on and so forth, to any police officer resubordinated to you; is

6 that possible?

7 A. Yes, it is.

8 Q. General, I'm now going to move to some practical matters relating

9 to resubordination. I'm not going to show you any regulations. I'm just

10 going to check first whether you are familiar with that in principle.

11 In order to use the police force for military purposes and during

12 combat, is something to be generally decided by the Commander-in-Chief of

13 the armed forces? Are you familiar with that provision?

14 A. Yes, I am.

15 Q. The Commander-in-Chief, who, as we all know, is normally a

16 civilian, not a military person, has the right to issue orders, including

17 an order to engage the police, and he can delegate this right to the

18 commander of the Main Staff or the commander of a corps, a brigade

19 commander, and I think that this right to use the police ends at the

20 brigade level; am I right?

21 A. Yes, you are.

22 Q. I'm going to show you a document. It's tab 6 in your binder --

23 sorry, 62. 62. It's 1D00406.

24 It seems you haven't found it yet.

25 A. Yes, I have.

Page 26977

1 Q. Just browse through it. I'm going to give you two or three

2 minutes for that. And then we are going to discuss it.

3 Will you quickly move to the next page, because we only have here

4 the disposition of areas of responsibility.

5 A. Yes, it's all right.

6 Q. So, General Talic is making use of the legally provided

7 authorisation on resubordination, and in this order where he designates

8 the areas of responsibility of various units, and then towards the end of

9 this order he states this in very specific terms, that in the course of

10 carrying out combat operations all police forces shall be placed under

11 the command of the zone commander and he is the one who decides on their

12 use.

13 A. Yes, yes, that's right.

14 Q. So, General Lisica, for each and every --

15 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. It seems that we have

16 to move to the next page in English. Yes, that's it. Towards the bottom

17 of the page.

18 Q. So, General, for each and every instance of resubordination that

19 you carried out in the area of your unit, you had the basis in this

20 order. And to all intents and purposes, you could have implemented this

21 order simply by ordering the chief of the police station or the chief of

22 the CSB to give a required number of policemen to you; is that correct?

23 A. Yes. But we dealt with this in -- during the course of oral

24 reporting.

25 Q. Just be patient. We're coming to that.

Page 26978

1 So, you personally could have issued such an order even in the

2 absence of the order issued by General Talic; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. If your assessment was that the situation on the ground is such

5 that the territory within your area of responsibility could come under

6 the enemy control, then you are entitled to recruit and draft the entire

7 staff of a police station or even the entire personnel of a Security

8 Services Centre; is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Andrija Bjelosevic, while you were in communication with him, was

11 in resubordination by virtue of this order; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In response to a Prosecutor question, you gave us an extensive

14 reply about the co-operation that you had with the police force. You

15 would not issue any further orders to a police chief if he had previously

16 already placed all his --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between

18 questions and answers. Thank you.

19 [Defence counsel confer]

20 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. So you cannot issue an order to an SJB chief if he already has no

22 police at his -- force at his disposal.

23 A. Of course I cannot. But it never happened that they were left

24 completely without their staff.

25 Q. I'm talking about this issue in principle.

Page 26979

1 A. In principle, yes.

2 Q. So, if you assess that the situation requires that, you can even

3 engage only one police officer, if he hasn't got more.

4 A. In theory, but not in practice.

5 Q. Now my next question concerns your communication with

6 Andrija Bjelosevic and other SJB chiefs.

7 Whatever the communication is, you have the last say. You -- you

8 cut through the cord's knot and it's up to you to decide eventually.

9 A. Yes. That is the situation provided both in the law and in

10 practice.

11 Q. So being a military commander, all your decisions have to be

12 translated into orders; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And pursuant to such orders, all those to whom these orders

15 pertain must obey them regardless of any other agenda that they might

16 have.

17 A. They must obey.

18 Q. There's an old military saying, which says: Carry out an order

19 and then complain.

20 A. I used to repeat that during the war. If anybody didn't like any

21 of my orders, I have to tell them, Carry it out first and then complain

22 about it.

23 Q. Sorry. This was exactly my question, because that applies to

24 life in general.

25 It is possible that a police chief has serious problems if he is

Page 26980

1 left with a large -- without a large number of his police force, but he

2 nevertheless has to carry out your order, and then, subsequently, he

3 might put forward some comments to the command in charge for it to take

4 into consideration the reality; is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 [Defence counsel confer]

7 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General Lisica, I'm going to finish with two documents shown to

9 you by Ms. Korner. They are from the Prosecutor's tab 12 and 35.

10 Let me just remind you that this has to do with those cases in

11 Zvornik. 3014 and 3005.

12 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I suppose that this is an exhibit

13 number. Because there's no indication that this is the case, maybe

14 Ms. Korner can be of assistance.

15 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] 65 ter.

16 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. That's 65 ter 3005 and

17 3014; tabs 12 and 34.

18 Q. Let me just briefly remind you, General: In the transcript,

19 first, we have the wrong number then we have the correct numbers of tabs,

20 which should be 12 and 34.

21 Now, these examples that relate to Zvornik where there were some

22 problems with resubordination was something that was caused, according to

23 your words, by people refusing to go to the front line, et cetera.

24 However, being lawyers, we have to deal with principles here.

25 Now, this dispute that was described here could have resolved only in one

Page 26981

1 way, and that is by the commander in charge issuing an appropriate order;

2 is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. General Lisica, I have concluded my cross-examination, and my

5 learned friend, Mr. Aleksic, is probably going to continue tomorrow.

6 Thank you for answering my questions.

7 A. You're welcome.

8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... it's almost

9 time for break, so should I start now or tomorrow?

10 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I just wanted -- Your Honours, I

11 forgot, and indeed at the time I didn't think it was relevant, but the

12 Defence having addressed it, I would like these two documents exhibited.

13 It goes clearly now to the issue, that is, the one that Mr. Cvijetic has

14 just referred to, which is given the number 30014, and the second

15 document.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: If I correctly remember, over the last document we

17 were talking, and Ms. Korner was complaining that the witness had nothing

18 to do with that document, he was not aware of it, and there is no basis

19 to introduce that document through this witness. And how is this a

20 different situation at all? Because the witness doesn't know, doesn't

21 know the facts behind it. We were talking about the principle, and I

22 think the principle has been established.

23 Thank you very much.

24 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, first of all, the witness can

25 talk to this of his own knowledge because this is to do directly with the