1 Tuesday, 29 May 2012
2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
7 everyone in and around the courtroom.
8 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
9 Stojan Zupljanin.
10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 As would be observed, we're getting used to the new technology.
12 May we have the appearances, please.
13 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. The OTP this morning,
14 Joanna Korner; starting the most important person in the case,
15 Sebastiaan van Hooydonk, the Case Manager; then Alex Demirdjian;
16 Matthew Olmsted; and I think a new face to Your Honours, but a member of
17 the team for sometime now, Rafael La Cruz; and an intern, Lucy Eastwood
18 sitting in the back.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
20 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic and
21 Andreja Zecevic, appearing for Stanisic Defence this morning. Thank you.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic,
23 Aleksandar Aleksic, Michelle Butler, Miroslav Cuskic, David Martini,
24 Milena Dzudovic, and Ms. Joyce Boekestijn, appearing for Zupljanin
25 Defence team today.
1 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
2 So, of course, according to the Scheduling Order, we're here
3 today to begin the closing submissions, and we would invite the OTP to
5 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, before I do that, I sent an e-mail
6 yesterday to the Senior Legal Officer that -- I gather he's not here, but
7 copied to other legal officers in respect of the question of matters of
8 law contained within the Defence final briefs with which we took issue
9 and whether it would be possible to deal with those matters because
10 they're not really the purpose of a final address in writing.
11 Were Your Honours given notification of this application?
12 Your Honour, Mr. Zecevic objects - and I assuming the objection
13 is also maintained on behalf of the Zupljanin team - effectively on the
14 basis that once the final [microphone not activated] ... it has gone off,
15 has it? Oh, yes, I'm told the new microphones are actually less
16 sensitive than the old ones.
17 So, Your Honours, our application this morning is simply this.
18 There are not many but there are some matters of law which we say the
19 Defence have made an error about, and we would simply ask that we can
20 deal with that in writing, and no doubt if Your Honours agree to that
21 OLAD would clearly fund a response from the Defence.
22 JUDGE HALL: I'm not sure -- I hear what you have said about the
23 funding issue, but do I understand correctly, and perhaps Mr. Zecevic
24 could confirm this, that the objection is only based on the funding issue
25 and not on any issue of procedural principle? Because the -- as far as
1 the -- the initial view of the Trial Chamber is that this is a matter
2 that is -- can be disposed of in terms of the ordinary principles of how
3 these -- how -- how closings are conducted without venturing into this
4 matter of funding which ordinarily isn't the concern of the
5 Trial Chamber.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, thank you.
7 My -- my objection has nothing to do with the funding. Perhaps
8 that's a misunderstanding by Ms. Korner. My objection was -- was the
9 following: We believed that the Trial Chamber has given ample time for
10 the parties to address all the matters in fact and in law during the
11 closing arguments, and we believe we should do that in the oral
13 Furthermore, I added that once the closing is done, the Defence
14 team, according to the OLAD policy, does not exist anymore. Therefore,
15 it would be a certain problem for us to -- to -- to deal with the -- with
16 the -- with the written -- written submissions after the closing
17 [microphone not activated] ... of the case.
18 Of course, I assume that this problem can be overcome, but then
19 it will require additional -- additional time for us to discuss that with
20 OLAD and how to do it. And, by the way, a member of Defence teams have
21 been put on notice that after the 1st of June, that they will be no
22 longer needed and people have made some -- some plans to come home -- go
23 home and so on and so forth.
24 But we are in the hands of Your Honours. I mean, it's -- it's
25 not the problem that we cannot overcome. We just believe that it
1 would -- it -- we have enough time, both parties to address these issues
2 during the oral arguments.
3 Thank you very much.
4 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, you adopt what Mr. Zecevic has said.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes, Your Honour. It was joint submission by both
6 Defence teams.
7 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, could I hear you further on the
8 procedural aspect. Put aside the funding business.
9 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, there is -- there are a number of
10 possibilities in respect of final briefs, and one of those possibilities
11 is that there's a response to the final briefs, a written response.
12 Your Honours decided not to -- to afford us the opportunity,
13 which we accept. There are, as Your Honours will hear, we say, many
14 defects in what's asserted in some of the final briefs, but it's the --
15 the only matter that I'm concerned about is the fact of the law.
16 This is the final oral address. There's an opportunity for both
17 sides to deal with the factual matters that they wish Your Honours to
18 take away with them and also the -- any chance the public gets to hear
19 them. It doesn't seem to us that it's helped by an aery discussion of
20 whether or not [microphone not activated] ... the laws that been probably
21 formulated on certain aspects.
22 I don't think the new and replacement microphones are very
24 So that's the situation, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE HALL: Well, we have heard the parties, and we would give
1 this consideration and return with a ruling, probably oral, in the course
2 of today or certainly by tomorrow, first thing tomorrow.
3 Thank you.
4 Yes, Ms. Korner, are you ready to begin?
5 MS. KORNER: Thank you, Your Honours. Yes, it is on.
6 Your Honours, can we start by saying that, as I more or less just
7 said, that the purpose of our closing address today is to highlight some
8 of the matters that we have dealt with at far greater length in the final
9 [microphone not activated] ... trial brief and obviously to deal with
10 some of the matters that have been raised by both accused in their final
11 trial briefs.
12 Can I explain that as has happened through the trial, there will
13 be a division of labour for the purposes of this oral address. Once I
14 have dealt with some preliminary matters, Mr. Demirdjian will deal with
15 the municipalities that Your Honours have heard about in this case. I
16 will then deal with some of the background and the question of
17 resubordination. From there, we move to the liability of
18 Stojan Zupljanin. We are, as it were, building this address in the same
19 way that we built the final trial brief.
20 Mr. Hannis, who is not here at the moment but will be appearing
21 later, will deal with communications, which obviously an important aspect
22 highlighted by both Defence in their briefs, the liability of
23 Mico Stanisic. And Mr. Olmsted will then deal, as he has dealt through
24 most of the trial, with the failure to investigate and to prosecute,
25 which we say applies to both these accused.
1 And, finally, Your Honours, to round off, as it were, all the
2 themes together in one short topic, the -- we will deal with the killings
3 that took place at Koricanske Stijene.
4 Your Honours, can I just say a few general words about the
5 Defence final briefs. In our submission to Your Honours, they invite
6 very careful reading. There are, we would suggest, a number of lacunae
7 in these briefs. For example, propositions with made without any
8 citation. There are assertions of fact about which Your Honours have
9 heard no evidence at all. And, Your Honours, can I take one very simple
10 and straightforward and immediate example of that. It may not be the
11 most important, but it's, we say, unfortunately symptomatic.
12 Your Honours, in the Zupljanin final brief, at paragraph 1, so
13 the very first paragraph. It may not be vital but it's important. It is
14 asserted that Stojan Zupljanin was born on the 22nd of September, 1951,
15 as an only child to a poor, rural family. Well, Your Honours, we checked
16 very carefully and we find no evidence at all that he was an only child
17 to a poor, rural family. As I say, it begins, Your Honour, as it carries
19 Your Honour, in paragraph 201, where the brief is dealing with
20 the special police, which I will obviously be returning when I come to
21 deal with Mr. Zupljanin's authority over them, it states:
22 "While they suggested contacting Zupljanin," this is to do with
23 complaints about the behaviour, to address these problems, this was
24 simply because he was known as the head of the CSB, and "he was the most
25 convenient point of contact in the area and the undefined nature of the
1 unit also made it difficult for the Kotor Varos Crisis Staff to know whom
2 to address their complaints."
3 Well, Your Honours, there's not one iota of evidence to that
5 And, Your Honour, finally, if one looks at the Stanisic final
6 brief, at paragraph 53, Your Honours, this goes to the no cites and
7 assertion of facts we say not in evidence:
8 "Some 2.000 MUP employs were dismissed to recruit and employ
9 Muslim policemen on the pretext that it was necessary to achieve ethnic
10 balance between the service."
11 There is absolutely no cite for that proposition. The next part
12 for which there is a cite is to Mr. Andan, and that doesn't in any way
13 deal with that assertion there at the beginning of paragraph 53.
14 Your Honours, further, we say that there are really misleading
15 assertions, regrettably, in the brief.
16 Your Honours, sticking with the Stanisic brief for the moment,
17 paragraph 99, Your Honour, this comes under the section which is headed
18 the previous page: No plan to split the MUP. And they say at the end of
19 the paragraph, having -- the document that they're dealing with is, in
20 fact, 1D116. And it says:
21 "The document highlights the major problem created by the SDA
22 leadership by pushing the MUP into a conflict with the JNA. This was
23 done, in part, by the take-over of military records for the creating of
24 an armed force to confront the army."
25 Your Honours, I'm going to ask that we put up 1D116, please. Or
1 part of it. This was a public announcement.
2 If Your Honours look, this was the -- the BiH MUP making a public
3 announcement about the statement made by Dr. Karadzic. And at the end,
4 they list their complaints, we see -- it's the penultimate paragraph with
5 a dash:
6 "- creating an anti-army atmosphere, which is apparent in the MUP
7 written order to engage the police in preventing the JNA ... from taking
8 over military records... "
9 So what was happening there was they were preventing the JNA, not
10 taking over the military reports [microphone not activated] ... so,
11 Your Honours, the reason we're giving a few examples at this stage is
12 simply so that when reading these briefs, Your Honours do check the
13 various cites.
14 Can I take one example of this from the Zupljanin final brief;
15 paragraph 235.
16 This, Your Honour, is a part of the -- I can only call it a
17 diatribe, I'll come back to that, that -- that the Zupljanin final brief
18 engages in against Mr. Brown, the military expert. And they say there
20 "Prosecution expert, Brown, was forced to concede that an order
21 issued by General Talic provided that police in exceptional circumstances
22 may be used in a variety of different ways to support the army and that
23 importantly they may be used for combat activities without forming MUP
24 organs or obtaining their approval."
25 And the cite there is for Mr. Brown's evidence.
1 And pursuant to Talic's order discretion to resubordinate police
2 in such circumstances was vested in the army. Such exceptional
3 circumstances, i.e., war, were in fact the norm through the indictment
5 Now, the suggestion that is made is that what is what Mr. Brown
6 said. In fact, that was not what Mr. Brown said. Mr. Brown gave an
7 example of exceptional circumstances. I just -- for a moment -- the
8 passage. Sorry about that. Which is not cited. It's -- it begins at
9 the bottom of T18916. And he said about the exceptional circumstances:
10 "I would read this as bearing in mind the context of the time and
11 this comes in the middle of the corridor operation but this is relating
12 to the front line. I have maybe mentioned this in direct. Front line
13 combat tasks, for example, that were occurring in the corps in that time
14 in the corridor," and that in exceptional circumstances, presumably he
15 means here, if there is a weakness in the front line or there is a
16 counter-attack by the enemy formation that "in exceptional circumstances,
17 police can be used but there are limitations and that they are to hold
18 and strengthen the front prior to the arrival of military units."
19 So in essence, it is to plug a front line if there's a problem.
20 And he goes on to say at page 18949:
21 "So I read this document in the context of what was happening in
22 the corridor."
23 He did not say that exceptional circumstances were war. And, of
24 course, the Defence use that to show that war means that all stages, the
25 army could resubordinate the police. And, Your Honour, I will, as I say,
1 come back to that.
2 Your Honours, there are sentences taken out of context.
3 Judge Harhoff was quoted with approval at paragraph 420. May wish to
4 read what he said before and after the page that is quoted.
5 And, finally, Your Honours, what we would call false syllogisms.
6 Your Honours, it is particularly noted in paragraph 282 of the Zupljanin
7 brief. And I'm sure Your Honours are aware of what a syllogism is. I'm
8 having difficulty in saying it myself.
9 Your Honours, at paragraph 282, and we're still dealing with
10 resubordination, the Defence assert that -- this is following on from the
11 Law on Internal Affairs, the Geneva Conventions, that:
12 "Any involvement by civilian police in arresting, detaining,
13 interrogating suspects during an armed conflict occurred outside the
14 legal parameters of normal police duties. These are military tasks. It
15 follows that the only situation in which the police could be ordered to
16 engage in such tasks would be if they were resubordinated to the army."
17 Once this happened, military rules and laws applied to the
18 individual police officers involved.
19 In other words, and what we say is the false syllogism is, the
20 police are not allowed to guard prisoners by law, the military are, ergo,
21 if the police were guarding therefore they must be resubordinated. And
22 there's -- I'm sure Your Honours can see there's a definite missing link
23 there because the obvious answer is, well, by law they may not have been
24 allowed to do it. This doesn't mean they didn't. It does not
25 automatically follow that they were resubordinated.
1 Your Honours, two other matters before I invite Mr. Demirdjian to
2 tell Your Honours about what we say about municipalities.
3 The Defence, not surprisingly, rely very heavily on the witnesses
4 who were former senior members of the MUP and who came to testify
5 largely for the Prosecution. As we said in our final brief, it's for
6 Your Honours, of course, to assess the weight and the truthfulness of
7 that evidence. But, of course, most of them, if not all, had been
8 interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor as suspects. Many of them
9 were clearly a party to what we say was the joint criminal enterprise,
10 and all of them had their own interests to serve. And it's for
11 Your Honours to assess, as we say, how much weight you give their
13 The second matter is this: In one sense, the Defence have had
14 the advantage of being able to blame dead men; in particular, Mr. Drljaca
15 and Todorovic, and the advantage that in the dock, in the -- with both
16 these accused has been nobody who represented either the military or the
17 political side.
18 And the third thing, Your Honours, is this: In the Defence
19 pre-trial briefs, both the original and the supplementary ones which were
20 ordered, there is not a hint, Your Honour, of one of the major Defences
21 that has been run in this case. The fact that both accused who are going
22 to be saying as a major plank of their case that neither of them had
23 authority over the members of the RS MUP who committed crimes as anything
24 between 80 and 100 per cent, and I'll come to those calculations later,
25 were resubordinated at the time of the crimes being committed, whether
1 they were in take-overs or guarding camps. The nearest that one comes in
2 any of the pre-trial briefs was paragraph 17 of the Zupljanin final --
3 pre-trial brief where he stated that the role of the police was minor in
4 comparison with the role of the army and that his -- Zupljanin's de jure
5 position did not correspond with his de facto power.
6 And Your Honours are entitled to ask why such a major plank of
7 the Defence was never mentioned in either pre-trial brief.
8 Your Honours, finally, can I turn to the municipalities.
9 Your Honours, we are going to address in the beginning the events
10 there for the following reasons:
11 The crimes for which the accused, we say, are criminally liable
12 happened there; the evidence shows a pattern which leads to the
13 irresistible inference that these crimes happened by design, or these
14 events happened by design, not chance, but they are both widespread and
16 And because the only mention of the victims, really, in this case
17 has come through the Defence attempts to challenge the evidence that
18 named victims either died as a result of the crimes, or challenging their
19 civilian status by saying, by seeking to say, that at some time or other
20 those victims had been members of the opposing forces. And Your Honours
21 know, we say without any proper justification for so saying.
22 The victims for these crimes were the reason for the
23 establishment of this Court. As one sees on the poster coming into the
24 lobby of this building, "Bringing war criminals to justice and justice to
1 The nature of trials of high-level accused means that unlike the
2 earlier trials at this court, their voices, the voices of the victims,
3 have not been heard. And the most that, really, Your Honours heard from
4 victims of these crimes was from those who came to deal with disputed or
5 disallowed adjudicated facts, and regrettably because of the time
6 limitations and those limitations, in fact, were quite often not able to
7 explain to the Court, when they tried to, about what personally happened
8 to them.
9 And so we start, we hope, properly by reminding the Court of the
11 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Good morning, Your Honours.
12 As announced by Ms. Korner, I will be dealing with the pattern of
13 the evidence that emerged out of the municipalities in this case.
14 Before I deal with the specifics, it is useful to remind
15 ourselves of some of the context in which the pattern developed.
16 Now, Your Honours, as Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its
17 independence and with the likelihood of international recognition, the
18 Bosnian Serb leadership opposed an independent Bosnia and decided to
19 create a separate Serb state on large parts of Bosnia's territory.
20 To achieve this, the Serb leadership created a parallel
21 government and forcibly removed hundreds of thousands of Muslims and
22 Croats in what turned out to be a well-developed deliberate plan.
23 The crimes that came about as a result of this plan follow a
24 clear pattern showing that the crimes charged in the indictment were not
25 committed in isolation but, rather, were guided by a common theme.
1 Looking at the pattern inevitably means looking at the evidence
2 of victims who came to The Hague to recount what must have been the worst
3 experiences of their lives. We will look at what they said in court and
4 what contemporaneous documents tell us about the emergence of this
6 The first aspect I would like to deal with is the arming of Serbs
7 prior to the beginning of the conflict.
8 Your Honours, there is no dispute that Muslims and Croats sought
9 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Bosnian Serbs opposed it.
10 However, the accused have alleged in their Defence that all sides were
11 arming themselves as ethnic groups became suspicious of one another.
12 They have also alleged that the Bosnian Serb leadership's actions were
13 merely reactive or defensive. They claim they did not share the intent
14 of forcibly removing Muslims and Croats and that what occurred in 1992
15 was a by-product of the conflict.
16 As Your Honours will have seen from our final brief, the evidence
17 tells a different story. The Prosecution does not claim that Muslims and
18 Croats were not arming themselves. However, it is submitted that the
19 Bosnian Serbs prepared themselves, not to the defend against Muslim or
20 Croat physical aggression, but rather to implement their objectives by
21 forced after the loss of their political battle in blocking the
22 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state.
23 Several speeches made during Serb Assembly sessions prior to the
24 conflict make it clear that the Bosnian Serb leadership had in mind to
25 concur by force large portions of Bosnia's territory. Momcilo Krajisnik
1 said very clearly during the 8th session when he stated the following:
2 "Gentlemen, we want to remain in a single state together with
3 Serbia, Montenegro, the Independent Autonomous Region of Krajina, now the
4 Krajina state, and the rest. We just need to agree on the method to
5 achieve this. If we don't want this to be by certain methods, let us put
6 a stop to it. You know what our profession has always been - to wage
8 It is against this background that the Bosnian Serb armed
9 themselves. During the pre-conflict period, the Bosnia Serb leadership
10 requested the assistance of the JNA. Indeed, during the session of the
11 December 11th, 1991, Krajisnik highlighted the necessity to address a
12 demand to the JNA stressing its obligation to protect the territories,
13 and I quote, "We have proclaimed an integral part of the federal state."
14 By this time, Your Honour, the republics were virtually left
15 without any weapons as military weapons and equipment from the TO
16 warehouses had already been removed by the JNA by the end of 1990.
17 What followed was a systematic distribution of weapons throughout
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina by the JNA. Weapons were distributed to local SDS
19 committees in Bosnian Serb claimed territories. This was a well
20 orchestrated operation and involved the use of trucks and helicopters.
21 For example, in Prijedor, many members of the 5th Kozarac Brigade
22 returned from the Croatia battle-front and kept their weapons at home.
23 Shipments of weapons were delivered by trucks and helicopters during
24 spring of 1992 and the Serb villages of Balte, Petrov Gaj, and
25 Cirkin Polje.
1 The Serb staff members of the SJB used the premises of the social
2 centre in Cirkin Polje to store weapons. In his end-of-year report,
3 Simo Drljaca reported that:
4 "The focus of the work was on the covert organisation and
5 formation of shadow police stations and the arming and equipping of the
6 personnel. In this manner, 13 police stations were established with a
7 total of about 1500. Weapons, ammunition and other materiel were
8 acquired from various sources - the army was the primary source - and
9 secretly, mostly at night, collected, transported, stored, and
10 distributed to personnel for home keeping and use."
11 This is in Exhibit P689.
12 In Doboj, JNA barracks were located at the outskirts of town with
13 a military presence of the 6th Motorised Brigade manned by about a
14 thousand soldiers by the beginning of conflict and several other units
15 including a JNA artillery unit.
16 Starting in October 1991, five or six volunteer detachments had
17 been created by the JNA each being manned 3- to 400 persons. They
18 received their weapons from the JNA, and Your Honours have seen the
19 receipts for such distribution at Exhibit P2446.
20 Finally, in Zvornik, the SJB reported in its end-of-year report
22 "Working on various check-points during the months of January and
23 February, police personnel of Serb nationality enabled the transport of
24 weapons, ammunition and other materiel and technical equipment necessary
25 for the arming of the Serb people in the territory of this municipality."
1 These are but a few examples, Your Honours, of how the
2 Bosnian Serb leadership systematically organised the arming of the Serbs
3 in towns and villages and municipalities claimed to be an integral part
4 of Serb territory.
5 I will now move on to the take-overs.
6 By the end of 1991, Your Honour, the Serb leadership had already
7 created an assembly. They had indicated which municipalities fell under
8 the territory they claim to be Serb. If you will remember after the
9 plebescite, they issued a decision confirming the territory of each SAO.
10 They proclaim on the 9th of the January, 1992, the republic of the
11 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the following weeks they
12 adopted a constitute and the laws necessary to govern the republic.
13 All they needed was a green light to assume power over the
14 claimed territories.
15 That green light came on the 24th of March, the same day that
16 Mr. Stanisic was appointed minister of the interior. During the
17 12th Assembly, Radovan Karadzic convinced the Assembly that they did not
18 need a national guard like the one that was created in Croatia. Indeed,
19 Karadzic was happy with having the JNA on his side, and he added that a
20 national guard was not necessary as "numbers in the police are quite
21 sufficient." He followed by uttering these prophetic words. First he
23 "We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs.
24 "We also have the insignia.
25 "At a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we can form
1 whatever we want.
2 "This could happen in two of three days."
4 "At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the old
5 ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume control on
6 the entire territory of the municipality concerned."
7 Karadzic continues by stating that in Zvornik control would be
8 assumed over everything that constitutes the Serbian municipality of
10 He continued by saying this:
11 "Then, at a given moment, in the next three or four days, there
12 will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the
13 municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as
14 well as how to do them. How to separate the police ... take the
15 resources that belong to the Serbian people, and take command."
16 Your Honours, it is no coincidence that Zvornik was forcibly
17 taken over within weeks of this speech and it was one of the first
18 municipalities to be taken over.
19 Now take-overs seem to have followed a similar pattern depending
20 on the level of control exerted by the Bosnian Serbs in each
21 municipality. For example, in Pale and Bileca which were Serb majority
22 municipalities, Bosnian Serbs assumed power over municipal organs such as
23 the police, the Assembly and their institutions several weeks before
24 attacks took place on surrounding villages; whereas in other
25 municipalities, such as Sanski Most, Doboj or Bosanski Samac the
1 take-over was marked by an attack, an armed attack, against vital
3 The take-overs were conducted simultaneously over the course of
4 three months.
5 Now, this animated slide will show you how these municipalities
6 were taken over. The municipalities in the indictment on this map will
7 be coloured in red in a moment. Those that are not in the indictment
8 will be coloured in grey. The municipalities that are not in the
9 indictment for which we do have a take-over date will also be part of the
10 chronology, whereas the rest will be highlighted at the end.
11 Now, in the first animation you can see that by the end of the
12 March, Pale, Ilijas and Bijeljina had already been taken over.
13 By the end of the first week of April, you could see that
14 Banja Luka and Teslic have been taken over.
15 By the end of the second week in April, Zvornik and Visegrad were
16 taken over.
17 By the end the third week of April, Donji Vakuf, Bosanski Samac,
18 and Vlasenica were also taken over.
19 By the end of the fourth week in April, Prijedor and Sanski Most
20 fell as well.
21 Hence by the end of April 1992, 12 of the 19 charged
22 municipalities were under Serb control.
23 Now, by the end the first week of May, Brcko, Doboj, Skender
24 Vakuf and Kljuc were taken over.
25 Following this, by the end of May, pretty much every municipality
1 in the ARK had been taken over, except for Kotor Varos.
2 In the first week of June, Gacko was taken over.
3 And this was followed by Bileca and Kotor Varos which were both
4 taken over by the middle of June.
5 By the end of June, Modrica was taken over and this marked the
6 opening of the Posavina corridor.
7 During the first week of July, Derventa is taken over, enlarging
8 the corridor.
9 And we will see that in October, Bosanski Brod was also taken
11 By the end the year, all of the municipalities highlighted on
12 this map were effectively under Serb control.
13 Your Honours, may have already found that the take-overs have not
14 been mentioned once in the Stanisic Defence final brief, while Zupljanin
15 claims in his brief that the take-overs were conducted by the army and
16 that the involvement of the police, if any, was in a resubordinated
17 capacity. The evidence shows, Your Honours that in some cases, yes, the
18 army did -- took part and led forcible take-overs, whereas in other cases
19 the army played no role whatsoever and is seen later taking part in joint
21 We will start with Bijeljina which was, as you have seen already,
22 taken over on the 31st of March, and was the result of a combined attack
23 involving the Serb TO, Mauzer's national guard, Arkan's volunteer guard
24 with the support of the JNA. That day, the police had the role of
25 protect the vital facilities in town.
1 Following the take-over the SJB chief reported the following:
2 "I have managed to procure some of the equipment, berets and
3 badges with the tricolour from the Serbian MUP and our police officers
4 have worn them since the [sic] first day when they went out on the
5 streets on the 4th of April, 1992."
6 Stories of civilians being arrested and mistreated in Bijeljina
7 quickly circulated at the time and spread throughout the country. In the
8 first days of the attack, 48 bodies had been picked up prior to
9 Biljana Plavsic's visit on the 4th of April.
10 In Zvornik, Your Honours, the take-over took place on the
11 8th of April, and by this time the police had already split and the Serb
12 police force had established its headquarters in the Alhos factory where
13 the Crisis Staff and Arkan's Men were also stationed. Following an
14 ultimatum issued by the Serb forces, the police, the TO, the JNA, and
15 Arkan's men launched their attack on Zvornik town. The attack on Zvornik
16 was of great violence as is best summarised by the UN envoy in the
17 following clip.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 "That day an UN official was driving from Serbia to Bosnia. He
20 was stopped just outside Zvornik.
21 "[No interpretation] Everybody is crazy."
22 "A paramilitary commander proud of his work let in a news crew.
23 Here, the regime of terror is being established as military police try to
24 identify the Muslims."
25 "[No interpretation]"
1 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Your Honour, about a week after Zvornik,
2 Bosanski Samac fell. The town was taken over with the careful planning
3 both by the police, the JNA and the TO. All Serb police officers
4 deserted the police station and left one Bosnian Croat policeman on duty,
5 Luka Gregurevic. On the night of the 16th of April, Samac was a deserted
6 town. The restaurants were empty and one could feel that something was
7 about to happen.
8 On 17th April around 2.00 in the morning gun-shots a loud
9 explosion were heard in town. Bosanski Samac was taken over by the Serb
10 police and the Serb TO by securing government institutions, as this was
11 reported in a report of the 17th Corps headquarters as you can see on the
12 screen at this moment. The police station was attacked and taken over
13 and the new chief, Stevan Todorovic, assumed his position that day.
14 Three weeks later, Luka Gregurevic, who was on duty, would be
15 executed in Crkvine. On the same day, the 17th of April, the police
16 station in Sanski Most was split among ethnic lines, and the police
17 chief, Dragan Majkic, distributed the new RS berets and had his staff
18 sign the loyalty oath.
19 Two days later, the SDS president, Nedeljko Rasula, issued an
20 ultimatum to the SDA to vacate the municipal building otherwise the
21 building would come under attack. The building was indeed vacated
22 however a few non-Serb policemen remained inside.
23 At 10.00 in the morning, on the 19th of April, the Serb Defence
24 forces, the SOS attacked the municipal building and took it over. The
25 next day, CSB Banja Luka and the Serbian news agency --
1 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, Mr. Demirdjian, I don't know if you have see
2 the court reporter's note.
3 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, I will slow down, Your Honours. Thank
5 The next day on the 20th of April, CSB Banja Luka and the Serbian
6 news agency in Sarajevo were informed of this take-over by letter.
7 On 19th of April, Vlasenica's Serb Crisis Staff issued an
8 unambiguous order entitled: "Decision to take power." On that day, all
9 non-Serb policemen were disarmed.
10 And the next day on the 20th of April, units of the JNA's
11 Novi Sad corps and the Serbian Guard unit from Sekovici took control of
12 all municipal institutions in Vlasenica.
13 In Prijedor, the accused Zupljanin claims that the army and the
14 Crisis Staff led the take-over. In fact, take-over was organised by the
15 Serb police and the military.
16 Once again, the SJB chief was very candid in his end-of-year
17 report. Looking back of the achievements of his station in 1992, he
18 wrote the following:
19 "As a result in the night between 29 and 30 April ... following
20 very detailed preparations and pursuant to the relevant decisions of the
21 executive committee of the Serbian municipality of Prijedor, an organised
22 take-over of power was embarked upon. About 400 policemen assembled in
23 the social centre at Cirkin Polje, and at 4.00 in the morning they took
24 control of all important sites in town, which immediately made possible
25 the take-over of all leading functions in the municipality, the municipal
1 organs and the important companies."
2 During the month of May, Brcko was the first municipality to be
3 taken over, on the 1st to be exact. It was followed by Doboj which was
4 taken over during the night of the 2nd to the 3rd of May. The attack on
5 Doboj was orchestrated by the JNA and involved volunteer detachments led
6 by Major Stankovic, units of the 6th Motorised Brigade, Red Berets from
7 Serbia led by Radojica Bozovic, and the civilian police. CSB Doboj
8 officials had been meeting with Serb army officials for weeks prior to
9 the take-over. The CSB chief himself was on Mount Ozren the night of the
10 take-over at the moment when the take-over operation began. Your Honours
11 have heard allegations that the take-over was ordered by
12 Mr. Cazim Hadzic, the 6th Motorised Brigade's commander. However, you
13 have heard evidence that he was arrested the night of the take-over and
14 was in fact sidelined for months prior to the take-over. This allegation
15 is not credible.
16 In relation to the CSB building, Your Honour, the scenario was
17 similar to the one in Bosanski Samac. Virtually all Serb police officers
18 had deserted the police building and a non-Serb policeman was left in
19 charge of the duty service. A little after midnight, armed men entered
20 this police building and arrested non-Serb employees and beat them up.
21 The police entered the station the next morning and the Serb forces
22 helped taking over a number of other buildings in town.
23 As of that day, Your Honours, all non-Serb police officers were
24 dismissed and at least one Muslim inspector was directly informed of his
25 dismissal by the CSB chief, Bjelosevic.
1 The last take-over which is charged in the indictment was in
2 Kotor Varos, Zupljanin's birth place, and it was raided by the special
3 police detachment on the 11th of June, 1992, at dawn.
4 This Trial Chamber has had the rare opportunity to view a video
5 of this take-over and we will now look at some excerpts.
6 Now the first excerpt we will see in the morning hours of the
7 11th of June - and we can play it now - is a special unit entering the
8 SJB building.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: You can see the entrance of the police station
11 right there.
12 And you will see in a moment a number of members of the special
13 police detachment.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Now in the second excerpt, we see the special
16 police leaving the SJB building and you will notice here Ljuban Bajic
17 [sic] wearing a red beret. He is one of the leaders of the special unit.
18 Bajic. Ljuban Ecim, my apologies.
19 We now see one of the blue tanks used by the CSB Banja Luka.
20 Similar tanks were seen on the 12th of May parade. And in a moment we
21 will also see the first non-Serbs arrested that morning. Here a member
22 of the special unit orders a man to stand against the wall and show a
23 three-finger sign.
24 The third excerpt we will see is a special police forcing a
25 civilian to open the trunk of his car with some brutality.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: In the fourth excerpt, we see the special police
3 asking a civilian peacefully walking in the street to lay down, and he
4 kicks him.
5 [Video-clip played]
6 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: In the fifth excerpt we now see the special
7 police surrounding a house. As Your Honours will see in a moment, the
8 special police were allegedly searching for dangerous Muslim and Croat
9 extremists. Those are extremists that the Bosnian Serb leadership was
10 concerned about. In bright daylight, under no attacks, the special
11 police easily arrested Muslim and Croat civilians.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: These are the dangerous extremists,
14 Your Honours.
15 And the last excerpt we will see, on that day, the Serb flag was
16 hoisted on the municipal police station, the SJB.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Now, Your Honours, some municipalities were
19 taken over by relatively non-violent means, as the Serb civilian and
20 military leadership were already in a position to control the
21 municipality. We can see the next map, Your Honours will remember
22 hearing evidence that in municipalities of Kljuc, Pale, Bileca and
23 Teslic, non-Serb policemen were convened to meetings by their respective
24 SJB leaders and were simply told they could no longer work in the police.
25 Attacks on Muslim and Croats villages followed many weeks later at a time
1 where Serb control had already been imposed on the municipality.
2 This pattern equally applied to municipalities not charged in the
3 indictment. For example, you have heard evidence that in Bratunac, all
4 Muslims were fired from their work in mid-April 1992 and all the key
5 positions and the local government were taken over by the Serb
7 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down, thank you.
8 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: What emerges from the evidence, Your Honours, is
9 a pattern of forcible take-overs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina with a
10 varying degree of violence depending on level of control exerted by Serb
11 authorities prior to the take-over.
12 I will now move on to the issue of persecutory measures imposed
13 following the take-over.
14 The take-over of municipalities marked, Your Honours, the
15 beginning of a period of excessive measures applied against Muslims and
16 Croats, including large-scale arrested, unlawful detention, torture and
17 cruel treatment during periods of detention, killings, and other
18 persecutory acts such as limitation of movement and the forcible transfer
19 and deportation of civilians.
20 Your Honour, may remember the evidence of Sulejman Tihic,
21 president of the SDA in Bosanski Samac. A lawyer by profession, like
22 most of us in this room, he had his law office in Bosanski Samac.
23 However, a few days after the take-over he was arrested and suffered some
24 of the most depraved forms of mistreatment. To add to the injury he was
25 publicly humiliated by being forced to sweep the streets outside the
1 police station of the municipal building while being watched by all
3 In most municipalities, Your Honours, prominent Muslims and
4 Croats were dismissed from their managerial positions and this includes
5 judges, police station commanders, company managers, et cetera. Setting
6 aside managers, even employees were told they could not come to work. In
7 Banja Luka, already in late 1991, non-Serb directors and managers as well
8 as factory employers were dismissed. And in schools teaches were already
9 forced to use the Cyrillic script. Much later on the 18th of June, 1992,
10 all non-Serb employees from the hospital were dismissed.
11 We can move to the next slide. You have heard similar dismissals
12 in Sanski Most where Judge Adil Draganovic refused to sign a loyalty oath
13 to the new authorities, and he was fired from his position as a judge.
14 He also lost all his property and his house which were torched while he
15 was in detention.
16 In Doboj, you heard Edin Hadzovic who told you that he worked for
17 the association of physical education organisations. He was a cashier.
18 Hadzovic was told by Jovo Popovic, a manager of this enterprise, that he
19 and other non-Serb employees had to leave as Popovic was told to dismiss
20 all non-Serbs. This was shortly prior to the take-over.
21 In the next slides, you will see Sulejman Crncalo. You have
22 heard his evidence. You've -- he's told you how he was dismissed. On
23 the 15th of May he arrived at work at the Famos factory where he had
24 worked since 1978 and where he held the position of chief of the
25 development department. That day, he was told by the guard at the gate
1 that he could not enter. Some employees were allowed in but no Muslims
2 were allowed.
3 Now Your Honours have already heard examples of curfews in
4 various municipalities. I will simply mention that in the municipalities
5 of Kljuc, in Doboj, in Teslic, in Gacko, in Kotor Varos, and even in
6 Zvornik you have evidence of this curfew being announced and imposed
7 unequally and solely against non-Serbs.
8 I'll now move on to the large-scale arrests that occurred
9 following the take-overs. Your Honours, from one municipality to the
10 other, Muslims and Croats were arrested and taken to local police
11 stations where they were detained for varying periods of time. Usually
12 arrests started in town and focussed on prominent Muslims and Croats.
13 The aim was clear: By neutralising the leadership of the non-Serb
14 communities, the non-Serb population was paralysed and posed no threat to
15 Serb ambitions.
16 In Pale, again you heard from Mr. Crncalo that a number of
17 Muslims were arrested randomly in the streets by the civilian police and
18 were taken to the SJB building and were held there.
19 In Banja Luka, you have heard of policemen in blue camouflage
20 uniform driving around in a red van, which was also called the "red
21 kombi," arresting non-Serbs in the streets and beating them in the van.
22 The doors were always left open to this van so other residents could hear
23 the beatings and the screams. This method was used to intimidate other
24 Muslims and Croats in the neighbourhood. These were members of public
25 and state security in Banja Luka considered to be heros by
1 Stojan Zupljanin.
2 In Zvornik, you heard how on the 1st of June, hundreds of Muslim
3 civilians from the villages of Setici and Klisa were chased out of their
4 village by the army who had surrounded it with tanks. The villagers were
5 forced to walk to the village of Djulici where 750 men were separated
6 from the convoy by police officers and were taken to a Karakaj technical
8 In Brcko, non-Serbs were arrested throughout town and taken to
9 various camps. For example, on the 4th of May, Jasmin Fazlovic, who
10 worked in the fire station, was arrested with four other non-Serbs by
11 Captain Dragan and Mirko Blagojevic. They were taken to the SJB. There,
12 they were received by the SJB chief, Dragan Veselic, who accused them of
13 being Green Berets and sent them to the Luka camp where he said, You will
14 be killed.
15 You also heard from Isak Gasi, a former athlete who was quite
16 well-known in Yugoslavia. He was arrested by two preliminary,
17 Dragan Pantelic and Stevo Knezevic who took him without being told the
18 reasons for his arrest and were -- and he was taken to the SJB building.
19 After being detained there for an hour, he was taken to the Luka camp
20 which was situated 3- to 400 metres away from the police station.
21 It is worth noting that the Stanisic Defence brief claims that
22 the Luka camp was near Brcko. However, the evidence is clear, that the
23 camp was in Brcko. When Gasi arrived there, about 200 non-Serbs were
24 held there.
25 You also heard evidence of a similar pattern in Vogosca where
1 about 470 men, women and children were arrested following the take-over
2 of the villages of Svrake and Semizovac in early 1992.
3 If we can look at the next slide, in Bosanski Samac, mass
4 arrested started immediately with the take-over and were carried out
5 throughout spring and summer of 1992. On the 15th of May, the Serb
6 municipality issued the following unequivocal decision:
7 "All people of Croatian nationality on the territory of the
8 Serbian municipality of Bosanski Samac shall be isolated and deployed to
9 vital facilities in the town and in villages."
10 The SJB chief, Todorovic, gave evidence that Croats were actually
11 detained in such vital facilities as they knew that these were likely to
12 be targeted by the Croatian army.
13 Your Honour, one of the pervasive aspects of the pattern that we
14 observed in this case was the establishment of detention facilities where
15 civilians were held in inhumane conditions and where brutality varied
16 only in degree. The existence of such facility in every municipality
17 charged in the indictment is sufficient by itself to demonstrate a
18 pattern too uniform to be ad hoc; instead, one that must be a product of
19 a guiding hand above the municipality level.
20 That inescapable conclusion is only bolstered by fact that camps
21 were set up and run by the army, the police, the Crisis Staffs, all with
22 their chain of command up to the Presidency, the government, and, more
23 particularly to Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin. The detention of
24 civilians was systemic. Officials at all levels knew about the camps and
25 the republican exchange commission was established from the earlier stage
1 to monitor and control the possible release of civilians.
2 Now, as described at paragraph 650 and 651 in our final brief,
3 non-Serbs were detained in makeshift detention facilities from the
4 outbreak of the conflict, and both Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin
5 were aware of the existence of such facilities.
6 In Pale where Stanisic had his headquarters at the beginning of
7 the conflict, Muslims and Croats were detained in an old culture centre
8 next to the police station. Other detention centres included the movie
9 theatre and military barracks in Hrenovica.
10 Kemal Hujdur described how, following the attack on Hrenovica in
11 mid-May, around 25 Muslims were taken to the SJB and were beaten in front
12 of the station. The detainees were then brought to the old cultural
13 centre where about 20 non-Serbs were already imprisoned. Beating
14 continues there.
15 Looking at this next map, Your Honours, you will find the 52
16 detention centres charged in the indictment. Of course, more camps
17 existed in other municipalities not charged in the indictment, such as in
18 Rogatica, Ilidza, Sokolac and Ugljevik. They will not appear on this
20 Your Honours can see that detention centres were established in
21 every one of the five regions within the RS. Of the 52, there are 48
22 which were established by the RS MUP. Only two were under the
23 jurisdiction of the minister -- Ministry of Justice; that is, the Doboj
24 Central Prison and Planjo's house which is an annex to the Kula prison.
25 Two other detention camps were established by the army; namely, Manjaca
1 and Batkovic. All other camps charged in the indictment were operated
2 and manned by members of the civilian police under Mico Stanisic and
3 Stojan Zupljanin.
4 Before I get to the conditions in these camps, is this an
5 appropriate time to take a break?
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes. It appears so, Mr. Demirdjian.
7 So we would return in 20 minutes.
8 --- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.
10 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Demirdjian, before you continue, I would remind
11 you to pace yourself so that -- because it is a natural tendency that we
12 all have to speed up particularly when we deal with written --
13 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: I have been reminded by the interpreters as
14 well. Thank you, Your Honours.
15 Before the break, Your Honours, we were reaching the stage where
16 we were discussing the conditions in the detention camps.
17 Now we have heard repeatedly from victims detained in these
18 facilities that the conditions were simply appalling. Conditions for
19 proper hygiene did not exist. You heard from ST-08 from Teslic who was
20 held in the SJB cells. He recognised several prominent members of the
21 Muslim community in Teslic, and there were up to 50 Muslims and Croats
22 held in the cells at one point, clearly inadequate for the number of
23 detainees held there.
24 What he said was this:
25 "At some point we couldn't sit. We had to stand up. People used
1 to stand up even in the toilet. You could smell the ammonia from the
2 urine, so it was quite unbearable. The tears used to come out of our
3 eyes because of the smell of the ammonia. We used to shout, Give us some
4 air or kill us, because we needed some air."
5 Beatings were commonplace at the SJB building in -- several times
6 non-Serbs would be beaten at the entrance of the SJB and detainees in the
7 cells could hear and watch the beating.
8 At least on one occasion the police chief, Dusan Kuzmanovic, and
9 the police commander, Predrag Markocevic, watched the beatings from the
10 entrance of the station, standing there laughing. Such beatings in the
11 SJB building and later at the TO warehouse would lead to the death of
12 several non-Serb civilians.
13 In Donji Vakuf, the police was involved with the army in
14 attacking villages inhabited by Muslims. Following such attacks, the
15 police reported that there was a need to establish an collection centre
16 for Croatians and Muslim men. And the SJB dealt with everything and the
17 police were in charge of providing security. This was reported by the
18 SJB chief himself. The SJB reported that during the month of June it was
19 holding 123 Muslims and Croats and that it had transferred 28 detainees
20 to Manjaca camp.
21 But it is in Prijedor, it is the camps in Prijedor, which became
22 the epitome of dreadful conditions in detention facilities. The camps of
23 Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje captured the attention of the
24 international media in July of 1992 and clearly sent a signal to the Serb
25 authorities that what was happening in these places were clearly
1 unacceptable. Lack of access to proper hygiene, lack of food, and daily
2 beatings were part of the diet imposed on the prisoners held in Prijedor
4 The authorities in Prijedor did not label Omarska or Trnopolje as
5 camps, as you will see in the following video. During the visit of the
6 international media, the prisoners were too scared to describe the
7 conditions at these camps. The video begins at the Omarska camp.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 "Here, we were shown only several hundred of the two and a half
10 thousand prisoners or Muslim men at Omarska we were told to be
11 interrogated. Those fund guilty of fighting Serbs were then sent to
12 prisoner of war camps, the innocents to refugee camps
13 "This is all we saw of the prisoners and of Omarska itself.
14 "They never spoke.
15 "The only voice those of the guards ordering them to eat faster
16 and leave.
17 "How are you treated? What are the conditions, I asked.
18 "I don't want to tell lies. I can't speak the truth. Thank you
19 for coming.
20 "We were told that the army does not control Omarska. These
21 prisoners are the responsibility of the civil authorities and local
22 malitia. We sought an explanation from the camp commandant."
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: We can pause here. You can see here at the left
24 the SJB chief, Simo Drljaca, and to the right Nada Balaban, the
25 administrator of the Omarska camp.
1 Can you continue.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 "[Indiscernible] This is a prison camp, a transit camp or a
4 refugee camp.
5 "No, this is not the camp, this is the centre, the transit
6 centre. Omarska and Trnopolje, both the centres, not camps.
7 "And then the men left, back to wherever they'd come from, away
8 from our cameras and questions, hidden from United Nations and the Red
9 Cross who have been denied access to Omarska, hidden until now from the
10 world. We were not allowed to follow them to the living accommodation
11 what appeared to be the larger of the two buildings, to see the other
12 2.000 detainees and how they lived.
13 "What's your reason?
14 "[Indiscernible] to do my best here.
15 "Show us where they live
16 "Why are you not fulfilling Dr. Karadzic's promise to us?
17 "He promised us something else and said you can do this and this
18 and that and not that.
19 "We see nothing. We see one dining hall and 80 persons.
20 "So we left. Our host fulfilling their promise to show us the
21 second camp, Trnopolje, where 2.000 refugees are living. We were not
22 prepared for what we saw and heard there."
23 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: The visit of the international media left the
24 world with an unforgettable image of a terrified doctor, Idriz Merdzanic,
25 as he is being asked by the journalist about the conditions in Trnopolje
2 [Video-clip played]
3 "We, ourselves, saw no evidence of beatings on any refugee here
4 and we only heard the allegations, allegations even the camp doctor
5 seemed unable to substantiate in front of our Serb hosts.
6 "[Indiscernible] cases here of people who have been beaten from
7 the other camps?
8 "[No interpretation] yes.
10 "[No interpretation]
11 "Would you be happy speaking in another language?
13 "I was able, however, to smuggle out a role of film and the man
14 who took these pictures and gave it to me said he would be called if
15 caught. He begged me to check that in three days he was still alive."
16 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: This is the detention facility which was
17 labelled as a transit centre, Your Honours.
18 With the limited time we have, it would be impossible to expose
19 the details of every single detention facility, suffice it to say that in
20 most of these facilities one can observe striking similarities:
21 In all cases, detainees are Muslim or Croat civilians.
22 Detainees are never informed of the reasons behind their arrest.
23 The detainees are underfed and lose a considerable amount of
25 The detainees are repeatedly beaten and mistreated by guards,
1 soldiers, policemen, and members of paramilitary units. Several
2 detainees die of their injuries.
3 In some facilities, such as the sawmill in Kotor Varos, detained
4 women are raped repeatedly by guards and soldiers or policemen who
5 entered the facility. Some women became pregnant as a result. In some
6 cases, detainees are executed in large numbers while being detained.
7 The following incidents spring to mind:
8 Massacre of about 180 Muslim and Croat civilians in room 3 at
9 Keraterm camp.
10 The murder of 80 Muslim and Croat men in the Crkvina warehouse in
11 Bosanski Samac.
12 The murder of dozens of non-Serbs held at Luka camp, Brcko.
13 Murder of about 175 men at Gero's slaughter-house and the killing
14 of about 20 non-Serbs at the Celopek Dom Kultur at Zvornik, as well as
15 the killing non-Serb civilians held at the Susica camp in Vlasenica in
16 the summer of 1992.
17 Your Honours, another mean to -- another means to ensure the
18 spread of terror with the aim of forcing the non-Serb population to leave
19 Serb-held territory came through the acts of murder whereby dozens of
20 Muslims and Croat civilians were coldly executed. You have heard
21 evidence of killings at Velagici in the municipality of Kljuc where 77
22 Muslim men were killed after being detained shortly in the school. They
23 were collected from surrounding villages from their homes.
24 In Brcko, town of Brcko, became a large killing site during 1992.
25 Non-Serbs who were detained in the camp in the SJB in the Partizan hall,
1 the Laser bus company were routinely subjected to tortures and killings.
2 You heard from Isak Gasi that he witnessed the killing of
3 civilians in one of the streets leading to the market place on the 6th or
4 the 7th of May. Mr. Gasi was in a building in the old part of town when
5 he saw at a distance of about 30 to 40 metres a policeman dressed in a
6 typical civilian police uniform. The policeman shot and killed three
7 civilians right there in the street.
8 About 50 metres away he saw men in camouflage uniforms killing
9 about 12 more civilians.
10 In a now famous series of photographs captured in Brcko at the
11 time, Gasi was able to identify the same street where these killings
12 occurred. You will see on the first slide a policeman, on the second
13 slide a policeman aiming at a civilian, and the third picture a civilian
14 lying down.
15 Bodies were picked up by a refrigerator truck which was
16 frequently seen coming and going in the streets of Brcko. This picture
17 shows how these bodies were discarded in a mass grave in Brcko.
18 In Visegrad on the 14th of June a group of non-Serb civilians
19 from the village of Koritnik, mainly women, children, and the elderly
20 were forced to flee their village. Arriving in Visegrad on foot, the
21 group was placed in houses on Pionirska Street in the Muslim
22 neighbourhood of Mahala which is located 400 metres away from the police
24 Soon thereafter, Milan and Sredoje Lukic, along with other armed
25 Serbs arrived at the house. They first robbed the villagers of their
1 valuables, before leaving, taking one woman with them whom they would
2 later rape.
3 Later that night the Lukic brothers [sic] and other armed Serbs
4 moved this group to a house next door. They locked them up in a single
5 room. The house was set on fire. Those detained who tried to escape
6 through the windows were shot. Approximately 60 people were burned alive
7 in this house fire.
8 This next map, Your Honours, will illustrate the killings charged
9 in the indictment. And I will summarise. For the month of May in the
10 first wave - we'll go to the first animation - we can see killings in
11 various locations, such as the prison in Vlasenica; the killing of
12 22 non-Serbs at Nova Kasaba taken from the Vlasenica prison; the Drinjaca
13 school in Zvornik; the killing of over 800 non-Serb civilians during the
14 attack and shelling of the village of Kozarac, in Prijedor; and many
16 Moving onto the month of June. Many killings included the
17 notorious events such as the aforementioned killing of 77 Muslim men in
18 Velagici; the killing of over 20 non-Serbs in front of the medical centre
19 in Kotor Varos on the 25th of May; the killing of over 170 men at Gero's
20 slaughtered house; the killing of about 20 men by members of the
21 Yellow Wasps in the Celopek Dom Kultur; and many more.
22 In July, you have heard evidence of the killing of 144 men in the
23 Biljani school in Kljuc on the 10th of July; the killing of 180 non-Serbs
24 in room 3 at Keraterm; and the killings of about 24 to 25 non-Serb men
25 during transfer from Sanski Most to the Manjaca camp on 7th of July.
1 I apologise. The hospital centre in Kotor Varos was in the month
2 of June.
3 In August, we have heard about the killing of about 200 non-Serbs
4 transported from Trnopolje camp on the Vlasic mountain cliffs, also known
5 as Koricanske Stijene as Koricanske Stijene; and we've heard of killings
6 of Muslims and Croats at the Manjaca camp; and we have already heard of
7 killings of non-Serbs on the Kotlina bridge in Gacko.
8 In October, we have one last killing, this time at the building
9 behind the SJB in Bileca.
10 Your Honour, the fact speak volume about the determination of the
11 Bosnian Serb leadership to remove Muslim and Croat civilians from
12 Serb-held territories. Killings such as those we just glanced over serve
13 two purposes: Physically destroying parts of the population which was
14 intended to be removed and create an atmosphere of terror which would
15 prompt the rest of the population to leave the area.
16 Your Honours have already heard various accounts of attacks,
17 armed attacks on non-Serbs -- non-Serb parts of town and villages. A
18 cursory review of the evidence allows one to observe yet another pattern
19 which would force Muslims and Croats to leave their homes.
20 For example, on the 27th of May, the village of Pudin Han in
21 Kljuc was heavily shelled killing a number of inhabitants as a
23 Following the take-over the Doboj, the Muslim neighbourhood of
24 Carsija was shelled on the 3rd of May damaging the main mosque.
25 In Zvornik, you heard in the earlier video how the UN envoy
1 reported the anti-aircraft cannons shelling from the Serbian side of the
2 river into Muslim villages in Zvornik.
3 In Visegrad, you heard how journalist Ian Traynor qualified the
4 attack on the 13th of April in one of his articles. Referring to the arm
5 he stated:
6 "There is little doubt that they and the Serbian irregulars are
7 moving in for the kill."
8 He added in Court, still referring to the army and Serb
9 paramilitary troops:
10 "As we moved towards Visegrad, they were together. I was
11 standing beside them as they were firing rockets into Visegrad both from
12 artillery pieces."
13 In Kotor Varos, we have had the chance to view a video showing
14 the attack on Muslim parts of town by aeroplane showing the superiority
15 of the equipment from the Serb forces.
16 If we could see this video, please.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: Yes, for the record this is Exhibit P2014.
19 Your Honours, as a result of persecutory measures, large numbers
20 of Muslims and Croats left the Serb controlled area, and when they didn't
21 leave on their own, the Serb leadership made sure to facilitate their
22 departure by organising convoys of buses thereby expelling thousands of
23 non-Serb civilians.
24 In Sanski Most, between 3500 and 5.000 non-Serbs left as a result
25 of the take-over in April 1992. In Kotor Varos out of 10.640 Croats,
1 only a thousand remained following the take-over. And from 11.000
2 Muslims, only 4500 remained.
3 Against Sulejman Crncalo explained to Your Honour that people
4 were rounded up by the RS MUP to be placed on buses that left Pale in
5 convoys. RS MUP policemen escorted the convoys. In late June, the
6 number of Muslims from Pale were also transferred by buses.
7 In Zvornik, quotes are attributed to a Serbian mayor,
8 Brano Grujic, which provided chilling insight into the changing nature of
9 that municipality from 1992. In 1993, he stated that:
10 "The demographics are now different. Zvornik once had a
11 population of almost 70.000 with more than 60 per cent being Muslims.
12 Today, the mosque has been blown up and the city is more than 90 per cent
13 Serb, maybe even 99 per cent."
14 The next video will illustrate what forcible transfer and
15 deportation means.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 "Some 2.000 people were unaccounted for. Nobody knows how many
18 of them were executed on the spot or how many were sent to concentration
19 camps where the murder continued. The rest were expelled. Forty-nine
20 thousand Muslims lived in Zvornik. None remain. Five centuries of
21 Islamic life and culture there were erased. This is ethnic cleansing.
22 It became routine as the Serbs took control of three-quarters of Bosnia's
23 territory. In time, they learned to keep the cameras out but ethnic
24 cleansing continued."
25 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: This was Exhibit P908, Your Honours.
1 In Bijeljina, you have heard evidence from Milorad Davidovic that
2 one of the architects of this expulsion was the CSB chief,
3 Predrag Jesuric, another one -- another one of these architects was
4 Vojkan Jerkovic.
5 Can play the next video-clip, please.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 "My guide was Vojkan Jerkovic, who was of Bijeljina's most
8 prominent citizens. He was one of the 60 fighters who seized the town of
9 the Serbs at the beginning of the war. Vojkan was especially proud of
10 his expensive Italian sunglasses. Men like him are doing very well these
11 days in the Bosnian Serb republic. At his office Vojkan had assembled
12 some of the last Muslims left in Bijeljina. He said they're his friends.
13 Vojkan is president of the regional commission for the free movement of
14 the civilian population. That means is he in charge of ethnic cleansing.
15 A report prepared for the UN said he has led groups of armed men had been
16 terrorising the Muslim community. Vojkan cheerfully denies it all.
17 "[No interpretation]
18 "He has turned ethnic cleansing into an official procedure and
19 turned Bijeljina into such an ethnically Serb town that these Muslims are
20 desperate to get out.
21 "[No interpretation]"
22 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: This is Exhibit P140, Your Honours. And another
23 excerpt of this video Djurkovic claims that he should be receiving the
24 Noble peace prize because he estimated that he had saved thousands of
25 lives. Speaking of the Muslims he had just thrown out, he would go on to
1 add these words:
2 "They were tourists. We took a stroll from Bijeljina to Tuzla or
3 to Berlin or somewhere else. Let them come back."
4 Djurkovic was seen at Luka camp as was told to you by Isak Gasi.
5 Banja Luka, Your Honours, resettlement agencies were also
6 settled. And you have heard from Witness S225 [sic] the following:
7 "Unfortunately those are the most tragic moments in the lives of
8 us. Your friends, brothers, fathers, neighbours are leaving. Maybe the
9 most difficult the citizens of Banja Luka went through during that
10 period. And it went on and on, convoy after convoy, bus after bus. Very
11 difficult good-byes from the assembly points where the citizens of
12 Banja Luka went to get on the busses, and for those who stayed behind
13 there was uncertainty, huge uncertainty as to what would become of them.
14 If were to single out some moments from the overall tragedy in the area
15 then I would choose this. These are very earth-shattering experiences."
16 As adequately reported in a 1 KK report on the 1st of June, 1992,
17 a portion of the Muslim and Croat population is moving out. Those
18 departing will not be allowed to return. It's Exhibit P411.29.
19 Your Honours have already heard throughout the trial that the
20 homes and property of non-Serbs were systematically torched and
21 destroyed. The limited time we have, Your Honours, here is a video of
22 the result of attacks on the villages of Kozarac -- on the village of
24 [Video-clip played]
25 "We visited the ethnically cleansed Kozarac in northern Bosnia
1 last week. We were closely supervised by the local Serb militia
2 restricted to just a few blocks of the town, once home to about 15.000
3 Muslim men, women, and children. Today there are no Muslims there; none.
4 And none of their X-marked homes is in intact. Other homes in Kozarac
5 have been marked to survive. This one with the colours of the Serbian
6 flag. This one says, This is Serbia. They stand undamaged like the
7 remaining Serb residents of Kozarac surrounded in silence, deadly
9 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: This is Exhibit P1718. It was filmed in October
11 It was highlighted by one witness, Your Honours, not a single
12 Serb house had been attacked in Kozarac.
13 Your Honours let's me conclude with these words. The
14 Trial Chamber has received a great deal of evidence: Killings of Muslims
15 and Croat civilians and inflexion of bodily harm in 1992 on a massive
16 scale, and also received considerable evidence on atrocious conditions in
17 detention facilities. We asked the Trial Chamber to keep in mind the
18 considerable evidence about the forcible displacement and systematic
19 transfer of the territory claimed by the Serbs. The Trial Chamber must
20 assess the evidence in conjunction with the statements of the
21 Bosnian Serb leadership anticipating the take-over of large parts of
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the creation of ethnically pure areas. The
23 intent of the Bosnian Serb leadership can be inferred from several
24 aspects of the evidence, including the scale and the pattern of the
25 attacks, their intensity, the substantial number of Muslims killed, the
1 detention of Muslims and Croats, their brutal treatment in those
2 detention facilities, destruction of their property.
3 These are all factors that must be considered by the
4 Trial Chamber.
5 This concludes our presentation on the evidence of pattern. I
6 will now leave the floor to Ms. Korner who will deal with the background
7 of the creation of the RS MUP.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Before you do so, Mr. Demirdjian, could you just
9 clarify one thing.
10 The video you showed with the aircrafts bombing some targets on
11 land, when was that taken?
12 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: July 1992.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: And you referred to Exhibit P2014.
14 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: 2014, that is correct.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: But that appears to be an interview with
16 Stojan Zupljanin, Brdjanin and Momir Talic.
17 MR. DEMIRDJIAN: It's a -- it's a video. It's a compellation of
18 a video showing interviews. And interspersed in those videos, there are
19 clippings that show the attacks. There are various attacks in that
20 video. You also see soldiers carrying shells that are being fired
21 towards mosques and inhabited areas.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may I, as I explained earlier this
24 morning, say a little bit about the background to the creation of the MUP
25 because the Stanisic final brief devotes a number of pages to the
1 testimony of the Serb members of the RS MUP and who had been formerly
2 members of the BiH MUP and who gave their reasons to Your Honours for
3 what could be said to be their disenchantment with the state of the BiH
4 MUP between the beginning of 1991 and April of 1992.
5 We would submit that obviously it's a one-sided view. For
6 obvious reasons, Your Honours didn't hear from, really, any of the Muslim
7 members of the BiH MUP except very briefly those who were victims. It is
8 said in paragraph 44 of the brief that the recitation of the background
9 of the events provides the context and reasons for the split in the MUP
10 which took place at the beginning of April 1992.
11 Well, Your Honours, can we make one thing absolutely clear.
12 There is no dispute in this case that after the 1990 elections the HDZ,
13 the SDA, and the SDS entered into an agreement on the divisions of posts
14 that was to take place amongst their separate nominees, governmental
15 posts and MUP posts. In the MUP, the minister, of course, was
16 Delimustafic, who was SDA or Muslim; the deputy minister, Mr. Zepinic;
17 and the under-secretary for the SDB was a Croat named Kvesic. And it is
18 equal not disputed at all that this so-called agreement led to, in fact,
19 a number of disagreements and much arguing about personnel and positions
20 and who had what.
21 The complaints which were rehearsed, as a result of questions
22 from the Defence by nearly all the witnesses which are repeated in the
23 final trial brief, was that the Serb police were being marginalised, that
24 this was the fault of the SDA, that unqualified Muslims from Sandzak were
25 being recruited, the inequities of persons such as Mr. Hebib and
1 Mr. Alibabic, all of those complaints, in fact, were being made in
2 June 1991 by a Serb ex-employee of the MUP named Goran Zecevic. It's
4 And Your Honours can see some excerpts from that document. It's
5 addressed to the council of the SDS, and talks about -- what aggrieves my
6 colleagues is that the SDS lost the secretariat of the interior positions
7 that should have been following to them. Key positions in the MUP have
8 been occupied by the SDA and the HDZ and the leading figure in the MUP is
9 the minister. And it goes on, and I don't think I need bother to go
10 through the other parts of the documents, though we have it up to, as I
11 say, rehearse the complaints which were then rehearsed by all of these
13 What is not referred to at all in the final trial brief is the
14 report on the ethnic structure of the ministry which was prepared, and
15 Your Honours we haven't put that up, but it's P829. And testimony that
16 was actually given by Mr. Mandic in the Krajisnik case, and Your Honours
17 can I just remind you of this. It was, although Mr. Mandic resiled from
18 some of his testimony, either voluntarily before he testified but after
19 he had seen the Defence or later, as a result from questions of the
20 Defence, he did not resile from this, and this is page 8650 of his
21 previous testimony which is P1318.2.
22 And he was asked:
23 "Mr. Mandic, did some of the steps towards the preparation for
24 separation of the joint MUP or unified MUP include arming of Serbian
25 police stations or police officials and at least the beginnings of the
1 terminations of non-Serbs from police forces?
2 Mandic relied this:
3 "Well, I think it was the other way round then. Up until the
4 beginning of the war, in the police of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were
5 about 11.000 members of the MUP. From among them, there were 75 per cent
6 Serbs. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was mainly Serbs who were in the army
7 and police which did not correspond to the ethnic pattern of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So conclusions were reached by the senior staff of
9 the MUP to dismiss Serb personnel who were trained and educated to work
10 on this kind of job and that Bosniaks and Croats should be recruited from
11 elsewhere, including the reserve force, and the Territorial Defence, so
12 that the pattern would correspond with the ethnic pattern in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That means, at that time, there were more Serbs on
14 the force than there were in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself and that is one of
15 the problems that was faced by the joint MUP."
16 That evidence does not get a mention in the final trial brief.
17 Your Honours, equally, if we look, please, at P905, this was a
18 letter that was sent protesting about Mr. Mandic and his work to all and
19 sundry -- when I say "all and sundry," I mean Mr. Izetbegovic,
20 Mr. Delimustafic, Mr. Zepinic, Mr. Hebib. And if we look, please, at the
21 next part of the slide, we are writing this letter in respect of the work
22 and behaviour of the assistant minister, Mr. Mandic, who has put him in
23 charge of personnel policy an oddly enough his speciality is being the
24 selection and bringing on board of Muslim employees without anybody's --
25 concerned. So the complaints that are made by the Serb that you heard
1 from about Muslims being brought on were apparently also being brought on
2 by Mr. Mandic. And it goes on to say:
3 "On the other hand, when it comes to the Serbian personnel the
4 wishes and orders of the SDS and Mr. Karadzic are fully respected with no
5 questions asked."
6 And finally this kind of work is explained by Mr. Mandic's good
7 relationship with the minister of the interior, Mr. Delimustafic, which
8 originates from their joint business ventures:
9 "We demand that Mr. Mandic be urgently prevented in his actions
10 and intentions and that all remaining vacancies in the BH MUP that belong
11 to the SDA cadre as per the inter-party agreement be filled but without
12 Mr. Mandic's interference."
13 So, Your Honours, the -- these complaints about who was doing
14 what, who was interfering with what, were common to all parties and all
15 sides, and it was not the one-sided issue, if one likes to put it that
16 way, that the many of the witnesses and, indeed, the brief would have you
18 Additionally, not mentioned, is the October 1991 paper, the
19 possibilities of organising a Serbian MUP Ministry for Internal Affairs,
20 again, not going to trouble to put it up, but, Your Honours, it's P521.
21 Moreover, it's the reaction by Karadzic, the leader of the SDS,
22 to these arguments over personnel in 1991 was unequivocal. We just look
23 for a moment at part of an intercept which is P897, a conversation in
24 July of 1991, all arising out of arguments over who had what ministry.
25 Karadzic, in terms, saying to Zepinic:
1 "Let the collegium meet every morning. I was with Izetbegovic
2 last night and Zulfikarpasic and I told him right into his face, We'll
3 establish a parallel government, parallel police, we'll withdraw our
4 people and they'll have to be paid by the government. We withdraw all
5 our people under arms. We'll establish an entire parallel state if you
6 keep on screwing us." Et cetera.
7 And again, at P903, another intercept. Karadzic and Simovic in
9 "Tell Zepinic that as of tomorrow we are withdrawing all our
10 ministers and all our officials in the MUP. We are discontinuing the
11 complete partnership and going in opposition. Vlaski," whom Your Honours
12 heard from, "was removed from his office and it's over. Tonight at 8.00
13 I'm going to break up with Izetbegovic. I'm withdrawing everything.
14 Serbian Democratic Party into opposition. We're going to break apart and
15 then we are going to establish our own SUP separately, and with other men
16 and we'll make the government separately. We'll make everything
18 Your Honours, it may well be that nobody took Karadzic's threats
19 that seriously in that part of 1991. In fact, it was their mistake, we
20 submit, and they should have taken those threats seriously.
21 Your Honours, moreover, we do not quite follow, if that's the
22 right word, the Defence's train of thought on this. Because the Defence
23 case is that there simply never was any plan to split the BiH MUP. The
24 only time that it became under -- that it came under active consideration
25 was at the result of the Cutileiro agreement that Your Honours have heard
1 so much about. In the Stanisic final brief, between paragraphs 98 and
2 119, that is the position that they adopt, in which case it is not easy
3 to see why this background has any relevance to the split which took
4 place, except as, we say, for what was being said by Karadzic at a very
5 early stage.
6 In fact, with respect to the Cutileiro Plan, Your Honours, the
7 evidence shows that even before the declaration of the Serbian state in
8 BiH in January of 1992 and long before the Cutileiro talks got started in
9 February, the split in the MUP was being planned and planned secretly.
10 On the 19th of December, one has what's been called the Variant A
11 and B instructions. And, Your Honours, those were referred to by
12 Karadzic in his speech at the 50th Assembly meeting in 1995. And
13 Your Honours will see an extract from that speech on the screen where,
14 "And we really start. We mobilise then, we did not have a war." Ten
15 lines down:
16 "At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were
17 in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
18 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
19 up secret government, municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents.
20 You will remember, the A and B variants. In the B variant where we were
21 in the minority, we had set up a government and a brigade," and so on and
22 so forth.
23 And then he deals with the involvement of the JNA. The war began
24 and the JNA helped as much as it could here and there. It had helped
25 before. He adds he hopes he isn't going out on television this.
1 General Subotic helped just before the war began by sending the tanks,
2 took the risk, signed for them to go to servicing while, in fact, he sent
3 them to Banja. Banja, yeah. And then it was -- he talks about the fall
4 of one of the other municipalities done with the help of Subotic who was
5 a colonel here. Distribution of weapons was carried out, thanks to the
6 JNA, and so on and so forth.
7 And then, at the bottom:
8 "It was the SDS which organised the people and created the army.
9 It was an army. Together with the police, those were the armed forces of
10 the Serbian Republic and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They created the space,
11 they [sic] liberated and created the space."
12 And, Your Honours, of course, that is the Prosecution case in a
13 nutshell, that the police were the armed force, and together, once the
14 VRS was created, did just that: Liberated, if that's the word, the
16 Your Honours going back to why we say the split in the MUP was
17 already being planned well before the Cutileiro talks. On the
18 21st of December, 1991, the council of ministers, as part of this
19 parallel shadow government, was created. And at that state Zepinic was
20 named as minister of the interior. And that's P180.
21 Then we come to the 11th of February meeting in Banja Luka. Can
22 we just have that up for a moment. Now, Your Honours, it is asserted by
23 all the witnesses who Your Honours heard from who attended the meeting,
24 including Mr. Mandic, in particular, that there's no way this was a
25 secret meeting. Mr. Mandic asserted that he even spoke to
1 Mr. Delimustafic about it. History in the form of Mr. Mandic, does not
2 relate what Mr. Delimustafic's response to this invitation was. We
3 suggest that in that respect, Mr. Mandic was not telling the truth at
5 None of the other witnesses appear to be able to explain how they
6 had ever got an invitation to this meeting in the first place, or nobody
7 could remember, and if this was an open meeting, open to anyone, there
8 wasn't a single non-Serb person there. The meeting was not held in the
9 CSB Banja Luka despite the fact that Your Honours saw the CSB Banja Luka
10 had ample rooms to hold the meeting. Your Honours saw the photographs
11 through one of the witnesses.
12 Having said that, Your Honour, it's a matter for Your Honours to
13 decide whether this was, firstly, a meeting that was being kept quiet;
14 and, secondly, whether it was a pivotal meeting in the split of the MUP.
15 But, clearly, Stanisic's speech said, Work has to be done by the
16 organisation of the Serbian MUP, starting from the municipal and regional
17 levels, up to the Serbian ministry. The Serbian personnel in the MUP
18 must provide the means to strengthen and supply the Serbian MUP, ensuring
19 that resources will be distributed equally.
20 And if one looks very briefly at what each of the -- some of the
21 participants say in turn:
22 "Bjelosevic: I support the decision to establish the Serbian
24 "Zugic: The Serbian MUP has to start work as soon as possible.
25 "Jesuric: I only trust my own people and weapons that I have
1 acquired and hidden, the Serbian MUP should be established as soon as
3 Two further quotes:
4 "Mr. Vlaski: The only -- who also denied that this was a meeting
5 concerned with splitting the MUP. The only way would be to organise the
6 Serbian MUP and implement all decisions without question.
7 "Mr. Draskovic: This is the first time that we are telling each
8 other the truth without the people who have been holding us back."
9 And finally, Your Honours, in the conclusions suggested that
10 Mr. Delimustafic was going to be sent, the conclusions of the meeting,
11 that's not in fact what happened because if you look at the conclusions:
12 "The Serbian collegium of the MUP is hereby instructed to carry
13 out all preparations necessary for the functioning of the Serbian MUP,
14 after the promulgation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia constitution."
15 And no mention in any of the conclusions of sending
16 Mr. Delimustafic -- the conclusions.
17 Your Honour, the next important meeting that took place was that
18 of the SDS in Holiday Inn on the 14th of February, and there Karadzic
19 explained not only that whilst the Serbs and the Croats wanted the
20 cantons, he was discussing the talks that had gone on, and the Muslims
21 want a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also that under no circumstances
22 were any Serbs to participate in any referendum. The second level of the
23 Variant A and B instructions were to be implemented, and he added:
24 "As for the army and the defence of the Serbian Krajina, we will
25 anticipate everything: The police we will make a plan of defence and
1 security operations."
2 An and that's P1841.
3 Your Honours, we say that from the moment the SDS had made its
4 decision that there was to be a separate Serbian state in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the formation of its own security forces, both army
6 and police, was a foregone conclusion. And it was one, we say, that was
7 evident to all of the senior MUP officials who attended the
8 February meeting in Banja Luka.
9 Your Honours, can I move, then, very shortly to mention one other
10 aspect of -- of the -- which has come out through the Defence
11 cross-examination. Your Honours, throughout the trial, the Defence have
12 attempted and sometimes succeeded in introducing evidence of events which
13 are outside the scope of the indictment, outside the period, in the
14 interests of what they've called context. So that, for example,
15 Your Honours have heard about the alleged secret training in Croatia of
16 Muslim and Croat police officers. Your Honours that's covered in the
17 Stanisic final brief between paragraph 62 and 69. Can I just sort of,
18 out of interest, put -- ask for one document to be put up from this
19 series that related to the training. That's 1D787.
20 Now, Your Honours, this was put -- oh, it's gone. For some
21 reason, it's gone blank on my screen. Anyhow. Yes, thank you.
22 Your Honours, this -- this is a document that was put in by the
23 Defence as part of this series of documents showing training going on in
24 Croatia. This is June of 1991. But Your Honours it does show and indeed
25 Mr. Nilsson dealt with this to a certain extent in his report that these
1 were rumours that's -- that was supposed to be secret training - but in
2 actual fact was ordinary training conducted, and don't forget at this
3 stage Yugoslavia as such still existed - containing a number of different
4 ethnic groups. And if one looks at the list of people here and the
5 commanders it would appear that they were indeed mixed, Your Honours,
6 between certainly, apparently, Serbs and, in this particular instant,
7 Croats. So we suggest that the so-called secret training should again be
8 looked at with a degree of skepticism.
9 Your Honours also heard about events in Bosanski Brod, in
10 Derventa, about Muslim attempts to procure arms, about Crisis Staffs
11 being formed by the SDA and the HDZ, and about crimes being committed by
12 Muslims or Croats against Serbs. Many of the insider witnesses, the Serb
13 witnesses, were very insistent in having their say about what they said
14 were the crimes committed against the Serbs. Your Honours, the -- as --
15 some of which was adduced by Defence counsel. Witnesses ST-19 was asked
16 the following series of questions by Mr. Pantelic. It's at page -- it's
18 "Q. Witness, which forces killed hundreds upon hundreds of
19 Serbs in Kotor Varos municipality? Do you know?
20 "A. No, I don't know.
21 "Q. Who roasted living Serbs in Kotor Varos municipality? Do
22 you know that?
23 "A. No.
24 "Q. Who burned and levelled the Serb villages in the territory
25 of Kotor Varos municipality. Do you know?
1 "A. I don't.
2 "Q. No further questions for this witness."
3 Your Honour, that's an extreme example, but, nonetheless, it is
4 something that was adduced through the Defence.
5 Your Honours, because of -- this trial involves these two accused
6 and because the evidence that has been led is that which relates to their
7 involvement, Your Honours have no real opportunity to examine the type of
8 evidence that was adduced in its proper context. And the Defence that at
9 one stage it seemed was being mounted, namely that all the actions taken
10 by the Serbs were nothing more than self-defence is not, in fact, sought
11 to be advanced, nor, on the evidence could it have been in the context of
12 the events of 1992. And it may not need saying, but out of an abundance
13 of caution we say it: It is not a Defence to say that the other side
14 committed crimes and so we were justified in committing the crimes that
15 we did. Revenge attacks, which is something that's being mentioned
16 often, are still crimes.
17 Your Honours, finally before I turn to the question of
18 resubordination, can I just talk very briefly about joint criminal
19 enterprise, Mr. Pantelic's favour topic. Neither accused, in fact, seek
20 to argue in their final trial briefs that the crimes alleged did not take
21 place. In fact, in paragraph 219 of the Zupljanin brief, it's said in
22 terms, nor, with a few exceptions, namely, the special police actions in
23 Kotor Varos, do they seek to argue that the police did not take part in
24 crimes. The evidence is overwhelming on that matter.
25 Neither accused further seeks to argue in their final brief that
1 a joint criminal enterprise did not exist. We say that is because the
2 evidence of such an enterprise is overwhelming, not only from what was
3 said at the time and subsequently by members of the Serb political,
4 military, and police leadership, but also by the pattern so clearly
5 demonstrated in the address given to you by Mr. Demirdjian of the events
6 in the indictment.
7 Your Honours, that the enterprise had, as its object, the
8 forcible removal of the non-Serbs from the territory of the Serbian
9 state, we say, is absolutely clear. And if there were no other evidence
10 but that of the six strategic goals, that would set it out. And,
11 Your Honours, can we look at the version not that given on the 12th of
12 May by Karadzic in the Assembly but by the note made by General Mladic on
13 the 7th of May, so five days before the Assembly, of his discussions with
14 Krajisnik, where the strategic goals are set out. And goal number 1 is:
15 To separate from the Croats and Muslims forever.
16 And then the further goals of the corridor from the Krajina; the
17 Drina, Neretva -- I'll redo that one. Neretva with -- Nere -- anyways, I
18 give that one up. Even after all this time. A natural border with the
19 Croats. And then a part of Sarajevo is to be ours. The Muslims can have
20 their part of the city and a link with their territory. Then the passage
21 to the sea. And links with the Republika of Serb Krajina.
22 Your Honour, the issue in this case is really were the two
23 accused members of the JCE. Both of them deny it. They deny any
24 knowledge of the crimes committed. They say, as a result of the lack of
25 communication from their subordinates and/or the faulty communications
1 equipment, and Mr. Hannis will deal with that as a separate topic a
2 little later, and, to a certain extent they blame interference from
3 municipal authorities, in particular the Crisis Staffs.
4 Not surprisingly, Zupljanin is running an alternative Defence and
5 sets it out as an alternative in a number of different place, that if he
6 did know of the crimes, they fell outwith his responsibility as, at the
7 time, the perpetrators, if they were members of the MUP, were all
8 resubordinated to the VRS.
9 Of course, Your Honours, the essence of the joint criminal
10 enterprise is that all involved had a role to play and notwithstanding
11 that the course of the relationships between the political, the army and
12 the police did not always run smoothly, in the end, as a number of
13 witnesses said, they did share the same goal. The MUP at all times was
14 and had to be an integral component of any plant to take over and retain
15 territory. In every municipality that Your Honours saw this morning, one
16 of the first actions was the take-over of the SJB. Before the creation
17 of the VRS on the 12th of May, the only armed force on which the
18 Bosnian Serbs could positively rely was the MUP because at that stage
19 they did not know even if the JNA was secretly arming, secretly prepared
20 to help, they could not know whether or not the JNA would come down on
21 their side in any conflict, would, as they did, provide manpower and
22 materiel to carry on the -- the plan. And so the only armed force at the
23 beginning, until May, and Your Honours saw how many of the take-overs
24 happened before May, was the MUP.
25 We say it is inconceivable that the head of the MUP, who, in this
1 case, was, we say, was a member of the SDS, although it is denied, had
2 been a part of the shadow government from no later than December 1991,
3 together with the head of the police in the largest targeted area for the
4 Serbian state should have been no more than the innocent tools, which is
5 what it comes down to, of a Machiavellian Bosnian Serb political
6 leadership. The removal of Zepinic, who was, after all, chosen to be the
7 first minister of the interior in the shadow government, shows the
8 importance, we submit, that was attached to having a head of the MUP who
9 was prepared to carry out the enterprise.
10 And, Your Honours, as we have shown, we submit, through the
11 evidence, as set out in our final trial brief, both of the accused,
12 Stanisic and Zupljanin, played their parts in the implementation of the
13 criminal enterprise.
14 Your Honours, can I now, very briefly, before I move to
15 Zupljanin, turn to the vexed question of resubordination.
16 The accused - and in particular Zupljanin because he was closer
17 to the perpetrators of the crime in his position as chief of CSB - rely
18 on what is described by them as the principle of resubordination.
19 Namely, that of all relevant times when crimes were committed by members
20 of the MUP as we have shown they were, they were under the command and
21 control of the army, the VRS. And they say that in order to assert that
22 this deprived them of effective control of their subordinates.
23 Your Honours, the focus at this stage is not going to be on the
24 power to prevent or punish being removed from the accused - Mr. Olmsted
25 will deal with that tomorrow - but on the evidence as to whether or not
1 this resubordination actually took place. Your Honours, for one last
2 time, or maybe more, if the Defence are going to let us have a look,
3 please, at Article 10 far -- 104 of the Law of All People's Defence,
4 which is in L1.
5 Your Honours, the word "resubordination" does not appear in the
6 Article. It says:
7 "In war, in times of an immediate threat of war and ... other
8 emergencies, the police may," emphasising the word "may," "... be used
9 for carrying out combat activities for the armed forces in accordance
10 with the law."
11 We submit the word "may" makes it clear that this is intended to
12 be the exception and not the rule.
13 And then:
14 "During its engagement for combat activities in the armed forces
15 the police shall be under the command of the authorised officer in charge
16 of combat activity."
17 I'm not sure -- we put it onto the slide, but, Your Honour, it
18 goes on to say:
19 "The reserve forces of the police shall be reinforced by military
21 Now, Your Honours, we submit that because, as Your Honours know,
22 that the great theory of Defence expert Kovacevic is that -- that -- that
23 everybody is a military conscript in a time of immediate threat of war.
24 Your Honours, it's clear here that there is a distinction made between a
25 military conscript and the police.
1 Now, it is the evidence from one of the military witnesses who
2 had actual experience of the conflict during 1992 was that to use the
3 police for combat operations which, according to one witness, meant being
4 on the front line, and we suggest that is the obvious common sense
5 meaning of combat in the context of Article 104. A formal process had to
6 be gone through which involved seeking approval from a senior officer who
7 in turn would have to request the use of MUP units from the appropriate
8 MUP level.
9 And by Stanisic's order of the 14th of May, that would be the CSB
11 Moreover, it was a procedure of limited duration, geography, and
13 Now, there is no doubt the evidence shows there were police units
14 who were actually resubordinated. The police brigade which was set up by
15 Zupljanin in 1992, November of 1992, was clearly a police units that had
16 been resubordinated to the military for the purposes of action.
17 But, as expressed in at least one report, such resubordination
18 was, as it's put, occasional. This is P163, the meeting of the Trebinje
19 working group in August, where the chief of the Doboj CSB mentioned the
20 possibility of a conflict between the army and the MUP, regarding, in the
21 view of the army members, the privileged war-time position of MUP
22 employees in relation to them. And, Your Honours, that one has a classic
23 example of the relationship not always running smoothly.
24 He therefore suggested that the reserve police force and the
25 soldiers on the front line alternate tours of duties or that the reserve
1 police force is occasionally subordinated to the army.
2 Now, Your Honours, there were obviously instances where strict
3 procedures weren't followed and this particularly, we would suggest
4 depended on the relationship between the local police, MUP commander, and
5 the VRS officer. If it was a good relationship, or the VRS officer had a
6 particularly overbearing nature, then, it was clear that the proper
7 procedures were sometimes by-passed and it's worth -- again, I hope one
8 last time, looking at the Lisica/Bjelosevic correspondence. Can we have
9 a look at 1D263, please, or part thereof.
10 This was Mr. Bjelosevic writing to, as he then was,
11 Colonel Lisica, and saying that -- he is complaining. It's not on the
12 screen but he is complaining about the robberies, and so on and so forth,
13 and he says:
14 "In order to prevent these occurrences, we are forced to withdraw
15 the police from combat operations on the fronts in Bosanski Brod and
16 Gradacac. We will carry out the withdrawal of the police from these
17 fronts ..."
18 Now, Your Honours, the plain meaning of this is: This is what
19 I'm going to do. This is not a request. This is what I'm going to do.
20 And then we hope that you will understand the reasons why we are forced
21 to withdraw the police from the battle-field. Expect your positive
22 reply. So we get the next -- letter back the following -- that's the 2nd
23 of October, the 3rd of October, from Colonel Lisica who, as Your Honours,
24 know takes the view that in time of war, whether declared or undeclared,
25 he's the boss. And whether or not the regulations agree -- that. I do
1 not authorise the withdraw of the police forces, because if I do so, the
2 front will soon reach Doboj and you will not have any territory under
3 your control. If you'll correctly understand the reasons why the police
4 forces cannot be withdrawn. We welcome all forms of co-operation and
5 assistance between the military police and the police force.
6 In fact, he's probably making -- Your Honours, making a fairly
7 sensible point, that if there is fighting going on there the police are
8 better off staying with him.
9 And then on the 6th of October, Bjelosevic replies and says:
10 "I was rather surprised by the content of the order, all the more
11 since I believe that co-operation between the TG 3 and the Doboj CSB has
12 been excellent."
13 And, Your Honours, we say that is the operative word,
14 "co-operation." And then if we go further on, we skipped about official
15 vehicles being put in his disposal:
16 "While I was issuing approval for the engagement of the police in
17 combat ... outside my authorisation and the order of the minister of the
18 interior, there was looting and disorder on a massive scale."
19 Your Honours, we suggest that, again, we have the CSB chief
20 giving approval and he, himself, says because of his relationship with
21 presumably Colonel Lisica, he had by-passed the chain of command which
22 ought to have taken place. And, as we say, we accept the evidence is
23 plain that sometimes the proper procedures were not gone through but all
24 were aware of those procedures and resubordination was not, as
25 Zupljanin Defence [indiscernible] would have you believe an automatic
1 thing as they say. The army was there, then the police were
2 resubordinated. It was a highly technical matter.
3 Your Honours, in order to overcome the plain fact that not one of
4 the crimes charged in which members of the MUP were involved, is there
5 any evidence at all to suggest that the police who were involved were
6 part of a resubordinated unit. The Defence are, in fact, forced to try
7 and extend what we say was a formal short-lived action to encompass all
8 police action taken in an area which contained a military unit under the
9 principle that you have heard over and over again of singleness or unity
10 of command, which is a military term, and certainly applies if there are
11 resubordinated units properly resubordinated. But it does not, we
12 suggest, on the evidence, encompass every single action in which the
13 police or the military co-ordinated or co-operated.
14 Your Honours, all of the undisputed actions by the police, the
15 crimes that were committed, the looting, the destruction, the killings
16 that took place after events such as the shelling of Kozarac, or Mahala,
17 the suffocation of the prisoners on the truck who had been brought by the
18 police to Manjaca as is evidenced in the report from one of the persons
19 at Manjaca, the guarding of prisoners in camps which have no military
20 presence whatsoever, as demonstrated to you by Mr. Demirdjian, all of
21 that, it is asserted, took place whilst the police officers involved were
22 resubordinated. And it's asserted that the words "co-operation" and
23 "co-ordination" all imply that a relationship of resubordination existed.
24 Well, Your Honours, if we look for a moment at P60.3, this was
25 the order given to -- I believe it's Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic, that he
1 was to move his troops and, as it is put:
2 "Establish full co-operation with the organs of the government in
3 Sanski Most municipality and collaboration with the To and police units."
4 Now this was shown to the Defence expert who said that means --
5 although it's difficult because I don't know the background, but in my
6 view that means resubordination.
7 Your Honours can I just go to private session for one moment.
8 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
9 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE HALL: And we now take the break and resume in 20 minutes.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can I finish fairly swiftly, I keep
24 saying because of the time constraints, the question of resubordination.
25 Your Honour, no doubt, many of the insider witnesses from the MUP
1 supported the population that resubordination virtually occurred anywhere
2 where there is army and police. They, of course, would say so, as we
3 submit, out of self-interest. It deflects any attention from their
4 activities at the time and, of course, the Defence expert, Kovacevic,
5 about whom Your Honours know we have already made lengthy submissions.
6 In fact, the OTP rely on the documents that came into existence
7 at the time and on the evidence of what happened. Mr. Brown, as I've
8 already mentioned, receives a barrage of criticism, much of it being
9 through selective misquoting, particularly in the Zupljanin final brief,
10 and we say that paragraph 250 requires careful reading, but the OTP do
11 not rely heavily on him for this aspect of the case; because, as he
12 pointed out, it was not the focus of his report and the research which he
13 carried out which was on the activities of the VRS in the Krajina area
14 during 1992 and not the nature of the relationship between the police and
15 the military.
16 He was, of course, asked about it because by the stage at which
17 he testified, the issue had become clear, which, as we say, was
18 definitely not made clear before the start of this trial.
19 Your Honour, we say those documents show and we have set them out
20 far fuller in our final brief. First, that the VRS accepted that there
21 needed to be a request before they could have the police resubordinated.
22 We rely on, for example, document 1D641. Then if Your Honours also look
23 at P1789 and footnote 3076. The RS MUP themselves refused or restricted
24 requests; for example, P376. The VRS themselves distinguished between
25 co-ordinated action and resubordination. It's set out -- the documents
1 are set out in the footnote to our brief 3066. And the RS MUP in its
2 annual report referred specifically to combat activities at the front
3 line. If Your Honours note, is P625 at page 8, also 1D406. And we
4 invite Your Honours to look at paragraph 237 of the Zupljanin final
6 Your Honour, in no document produced at the time is there any
7 suggestion that in every activity connected with the take-overs or their
8 aftermath in which the members of the RS MUP were engaged that at all
9 times and in all places they were not under the authority of their
10 superiors in the MUP, but, rather, resubordinated units who were under
11 the authority of the army. That suggestion is not made. And, in fact,
12 it couldn't have been, because, as Your Honours have heard this morning,
13 at the time of take-overs, for example, in Bijeljina and in Zvornik,
14 there was no VRS. There was no Serb army. There was only the JNA,
15 which, of course, did engage in those take-overs.
16 Your Honour, some time is spent in both briefs on the question of
17 town commands. Your Honours will also have seen our submission on that.
18 We say they have almost no bearing at all on the events in this
19 indictment. Indeed, in Kotor Varos, where apparently some kind of a town
20 command was supposed to be established, and was established, the
21 Crisis Staff was operating throughout the period until November 1992 when
22 the last stronghold of Muslim resistance, Vecici, fell to the Serbs.
23 Your Honour, the last topic on that that I want to deal with
24 are -- is this percentages which the Defence have raised.
25 Your Honours, the accused at various times, have suggested that
1 80 per cent of the RS MUP was resubordinated at any one time and at one
2 stage, Mr. Stanisic was suggesting to the government that there was
3 100 per cent of the MUP engaged in Herzegovina which is the Trebinje CSB
4 and in Doboj. Your Honours, we don't have figures from Doboj but we have
5 figures from the other reports. And, Your Honours, we've put them up on
6 the screen, we hope, in an attempt to assist.
7 Your Honours, the MUP -- sorry. The Banja Luka year-end report,
8 P624, and this is the document on which the percentages is put by
9 Mr. Krgovic, I believe, to Mr. Macar were taken from. And there they say
10 it should be mentioned that 5034 employees were engaged in combat
11 operations for 114.529 days, and that's the basis of the 80 per cent
12 calculation. This works out to an average of 23 days of combat per
13 police employee for that nine-month period. It doesn't indicate -- it
14 just says engaged in combat and it doesn't indicate whether the police
15 were resubordinated during these operations. We say it's made clear in
16 other documents that resubordination and police involvement in combat are
17 not synonymous.
18 In addition to participating independently in combat operations -
19 and there you have it, Your Honours - the police also made 1.593 reserve
20 on a 39 activity duty police employees available to the Army of Republika
21 Srpska, and we say there's a clear distinction being made there, being
22 made available, being resubordination independently not being
24 Your Honour, what we say is that it shows that only 1.632 police
25 officers, both active and reserve, from the CSB Banja Luka area of
1 responsibility were resubordinated during the -- to the VRS during combat
2 operations between April and December and the rest them were
3 participating, whatever that may be, independently but certainly not
5 Mr. Krgovic used the CSB's December figures for active and
6 reserve police within the CSB Banja Luka and we say that those figures
7 are set out there, 1203 active and 5065 reserve; 31.5 per cent of the
8 reserve police force and 3.2 of the activity police force during this
9 period were resubordinated.
10 And if we go to the next slide which deals with Trebinje, which
11 is where Stanisic was apparently saying there were 100 resubordinated,
12 that document which is P169, shows that the participation of active and
13 reserve police within the CSB Trebinje in combat operations varied from
14 month to month. That's on page 2. 482 officers participated in May.
15 Between 176 and 181 participated in July and August.
16 So based on the October figures for the reserve, which are shown
17 as 530, and active, 192, within CSB Trebinje, that shows 67 per cent in
18 May, 25 in July, and 46 per cent in October. The report doesn't indicate
19 how they were participating, whether as resubordinated or independently.
20 Your Honours, that's all that we wish to say about
21 resubordination at this stage.
22 Mr. Olmsted is going to say a little about it when he addresses
23 you on the failures tomorrow.
24 Your Honours, may I turn now to the role of Zupljanin.
25 Again, because of the time constraints we are not going to go
1 through everything that we have said in the brief about him, nor would it
2 be of assistance, we feel, to Your Honour, who can, as I've always been
3 told, read documents the way that I can. We say that the evidence that
4 Zupljanin knowingly and with intent played a key role in the
5 implementation of the joint criminal enterprise is overwhelming. He and
6 the other CSB chiefs were the intermediate level of authority between the
7 SJB chiefs and their police who were the actual perpetrators of the
8 crimes and the RS MUP top echelon.
9 Now, on his behalf, Your Honours, and this is what we're going to
10 concentrate on, really three aspects of Zupljanin, that is raised by him
11 in the final brief. It is contended, first, he was never a member of the
12 SDS. He never attended any of their meetings. He did not conform to the
13 party line and at one stage was apparently threatened. Those submissions
14 appear in paragraphs 50, 55, and 104.
15 Second, he was only a member of the ARK Crisis Staff (ex
16 officio) - and I'll come back to that in a minute - for a matter of weeks
17 during May. And that's paragraph 53. He never discriminated against
18 non-Serbs; paragraph 15.
19 He had nothing to do with the formation of the special police
20 from the CSB Banja Luka or the absorption into the special police of
21 members of the SOS.
22 He had no authority or control over the actions of the special
23 police. That's in paragraphs 15 and 171 to 216 inclusive. He did not
24 order forces to participate in joint operations with the VRS. All police
25 taking part in joint operations were subordinated.
1 He knew nothing about the existence of any camps, particularly
2 those in Prijedor until he was informed by Radulovic a short time before
3 he attended the 11th of July meeting.
4 And, finally, if he found out about crimes, he took prompt
5 action, if he was able to, but, for the most part, he was unaware of
6 those crimes.
7 In other words, Your Honours, if one were to accept that
8 throughout this whole period when Zupljanin was sitting in the CSB
9 Banja Luka or out and about, as we know that he was, visiting the various
10 areas within his area of responsibility, he was effectively cocooned in a
11 ivory tower because that is what Defence submissions amount to.
12 Can I just then please concentrate on three aspects of what they
13 say. The first is his relationship with the SDS. There is no direct
14 evidence, unlike, as we say, in respect of Stanisic, that he was ever a
15 member of the SDS. But we say it is clear that he shared their ideals
16 and in the multi-party jostling for positions in 1991 he was supported by
17 local SDS leaders; for example, Brdjanin, in his capacity as president of
18 the Celinac SDS. And that's P1098.12.
19 Witness ST-174 believed that he was a member of the SDS. At
20 paragraph 58 of the Zupljanin final brief, quotes what he says at
21 transcript page 8135, but entirely omits the previous lines of his
22 testimony and indeed, the statement he made in which he asserted that it
23 was his belief if not his knowledge that Zupljanin was a member of the
24 SDS, and his statement is Exhibit P1098.6.
25 He was undoubtedly in contact with both Karadzic and Plavsic in
1 1991. He is described as "our man," and that's in P1178. And contrary
2 to what is suggested, Your Honours, that he never attended any meetings
3 of the SDS, there is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that he
4 both attended the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 26th of January with the
5 declaration of their state, and the Holiday Inn meeting on the
6 14th of February. He definitely attended the Bosnian Serb Assembly in
7 October of 1992 in Prijedor because he is on video there and that will be
8 shown to Your Honours later when Mr. Hannis addresses you about Stanisic.
9 But can I just deal with his attendance at the Bosnian Serb
11 Can we look first, please, at part of P1190. This is an
12 intercept of a conversation -- in fact, I think it is wrongly titled.
13 Zupljanin doesn't, himself, appear on the conversation. It's between
14 Cizmovic, described as an unknown male, and Karadzic. It's on the
15 25th of January and there you will see that Cizmovic and Karadzic the day
16 before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.
17 "Karadzic: Will we see each other at the theatre?
18 "Cizmovic: We will but Stojan is asking if he should say.
19 "Karadzic: Pardon?
20 "Cizmovic: Stojan Zupljanin is asking if he should stay. Should
21 he stay on a for tomorrow?"
22 And Karadzic says:
23 "That would be good."
24 And that would seem to suggest, as we say, that he was there for
25 the 26th of January meeting.
1 We turn next to the 14th of February. We say there is no doubt
2 he was there.
3 On the 13th of February, Cizmovic again -- can I just remind
4 Your Honours, Cizmovic was the so-called co-ordinator of the -- if the
5 regions appointed back in December of 1991 and was actually a Banja Luka
6 lawyer. Is, actually, a Banja Luka lawyer. Cizmovic saying to Karadzic
7 on the 13th of February:
8 "Can we meet earlier tomorrow, and Stojan would like to come with
10 "Karadzic: I hope so.
11 "Cizmovic: Where should we look for you? At the headquarters
12 or --
13 "Karadzic: We'll be there. We'll have breaks so we'll have an
14 opportunity to get together."
15 This is the meeting which I reminded Your Honours of earlier this
16 morning where Karadzic is describing the negotiations to assemble members
17 of the SDS and the implementation of level two of the Variant A and B
19 Can we look now, please, at P1353.17. Those who came from
20 outside the Sarajevo area apparently stayed at the Holiday Inn -- a
21 number of people. This is one of the receipts, and we say that receipt
22 is that for Mr. Zupljanin. So we say it is untrue to assert that he
23 never attended any of their meetings.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Is there a date?
25 MS. KORNER: Is there a?
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: A date indicated on the bill.
2 MS. KORNER: Yes. Do you see to the right-hand side,
3 Your Honour, says arrival 14.2 and departure 15.2.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: And we also have wrong translation as well. It
5 says Supljanin, not Zupljanin.
6 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: We also have wrong translation. It said he is
8 Supljanin, not Zupljanin.
9 MS. KORNER: Yes, well, Your Honours, so that's the -- thank you.
10 We then come to the 2nd of March and the barricades incident in Sarajevo.
11 Could we have look, please, at P981. This is a conversation
12 between Zupljanin and then Stanisic. And if we go -- whose called by
13 apparently appears to be his nickname, Stole, and Zupljanin tells him:
14 "We're listens to how things are going over there. We are
15 waiting for further instructions."
16 Stanisic says:
17 "You are in contact with this policy of yours, aren't you?
18 "All right, now be ready.
19 "For the most part everything is ready on our side.
21 Zupljanin: We are waiting for the sign. If a total blockade is
22 needed or the rest, it will be done.
24 Now, Your Honours, we say this shows that even if not a formal
25 member of the SDS, he was certainly by March a party to the planning that
1 was going on, and, indeed, from February at least for the meeting.
2 Now, the -- his membership of the ARK Crisis Staff. Now,
3 Your Honours, even before the announcement of the ARK Crisis Staff, as
4 Zupljanin was, in fact, attending and reporting to the ARK Assembly. And
5 that's P2061. He is listed as a member of the ARK Crisis Staff on the
6 document P556, and, indeed, in the gazette that was published of all the
7 ARK decisions up to June.
8 Now, the Defence position on his membership of the ARK
9 Crisis Staff, I think the fairest way of putting this is to say it has
10 vacillated somewhat. In the pre-trial brief, at paragraphs 18 -- I'm
11 just going to find it.
12 This is the supplementary pre-trial brief that was filed on the
13 31st of July, 2009. And they say at paragraph 18:
14 "Mr. Zupljanin also takes issue with the allegation that he was
15 an active member of the ARK Crisis Staff and instrumental in the
16 implementation of the alleged plan. In reality, his role was minor, and
17 he did not have any influence upon the ARK Crisis Staff which was
18 directed and controlled by Radoslav Brdjanin."
19 At paragraphs 25, it is said:
20 "The Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and War Presidents," I
21 think they mean war staff, "were interchangable nomenclatures for the
22 same institution."
23 Well interestingly enough, Your Honours, that is not what was
24 being put to Ms. Hanson who testified about this. What was there being
25 put was that they were completely different institutions. Indeed, I
1 think at that stage when this was being dealt with, I actually got up and
2 asked - it's fair to say it was Mr. Pantelic - whether the suggestion was
3 by the Defence that there was a totally separate body called a war staff
4 from the ARK Crisis Staff which was simply Mr. Brdjanin alone without any
5 participation by Mr. Zupljanin. Is that the suggestion and the answer
6 was, Yes, that is my suggestion.
7 And that is at T4647.
8 The paragraph 25 of the pre-trial brief, goes on to say:
9 "Mr. Zupljanin takes issue with the contention that the ARK
10 Crisis Staff issued decisions which were sent to municipal Crisis Staffs
11 and put into effect. The municipal Crisis Staffs were neither charged to
12 do so nor did they do so, in fact. "
13 Well, as Your Honours will see in the brief now there is a
14 change, because it said not originally but later on the ARK Crisis Staff
15 did have power over the municipal Crisis Staff.
16 And, finally, at paragraph 33 they repeat the suggestion that
17 Mr. Zupljanin's role in that organ was negligible and his acts and
18 conduct did not have any impact on the creation of either orders and
19 discussions or the outcome alleged."
20 Well, Your Honour it is now said that in fact he was only a
21 member of the ARK Crisis Staff for the period of May. Your Honours,
22 there is -- that's what's asserted. There is absolutely no evidence at
23 all that that is in fact the situation. The ARK Crisis Staff went from
24 May until the 17th of July, and there's nothing to suggest that Zupljanin
25 as various witnesses have attested did attend those meetings of the
1 Crisis Staff as a member.
2 Your Honour, the words ex officio are used in both of the
3 accused's briefs. My understanding or our understanding of ex officio is
4 that by virtue of the characteristics inherent in the holding of a
5 particular office you hold an appointment without need of specific
6 authorisation or specific appointment.
7 In the case of the SJB chiefs, and Zupljanin, they were on the
8 Crisis Staffs by direction of the government. Can we look brief, please,
9 at P70, this is Djeric's order. The Crisis Staff consists of members,
10 each of whom has his own responsibilities: The president, et cetera
11 et cetera, head of the MUP.
12 It is not clear either, Your Honours may think, why -- whether it
13 was by order or ex officio, it makes the slightest difference. These SJB
14 chiefs, these MUP chiefs were participating in the Crisis Staff for the
15 reason that the Bosnian Serb leadership saw the Crisis Staffs as the best
16 means of achieving their ends by their co-ordinating factor between the
17 military, political which had the goals, the police and the military who
18 carried them out.
19 Your Honour, the ARK Crisis Staff, as we say, operated between
20 6th of May and the 17th July. That was the vital period for the actions
21 that took place within the Autonomous Region of Krajina. Contrary to
22 what is asserted in paragraph 114 of the Zupljanin brief, the Assembly of
23 the autonomous region did not meet between April and July of 1992. It
24 met on the 17th of July, when it verified most, if not all, of the ARK
25 Crisis Staff decisions, and that's P1827.
1 Moreover, whether called the Crisis Staff, or the war staff or
2 the War Presidency, the composition remained the same, and everybody
3 called it the Crisis Staff including the people on it. Your Honours saw
4 briefly a part of the clip of the video P204. Can we just look at the
5 earlier part where we see the interviews, please, of three of the major
6 players in the Kotor Varos action.
7 [Video-clip played]
8 MS. KORNER: Could we pause for a moment. Sorry.
9 Your Honours, can I just pause there to note that certainly
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic, who is being interviewed there, is
11 distinguishing between the units of the MUP and the units of the army.
12 Yes. Next clip, please.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honours, there we see the three
15 components together: The army, the political, and the police in the
16 Autonomous Region of Krajina acting together, on the ground, to take over
17 Kotor Varos and rid themselves of those who did not wish to accept Serb
19 Your Honours, the importance of Zupljanin's presence on the ARK
20 Crisis Staff can be seen from some of the matters that were discussed in
21 the meetings.
22 Could we have up, please, P441.
23 First of all, we see the decision on the formation of the
24 Crisis Staff. The war staff as printed -- the -- shall be and we see
25 Zupljanin. The other members were, of course, Talic, Stevandic, and
1 other persons whom Your Honours have heard about.
2 Then can we go, please, to the next decision. This is the --
3 of -- we haven't got the date up, have we. I think it's April of...
4 just a moment. No, it must be the beginning of May. I'm sorry,
5 Your Honours, we should have put the date onto this.
6 I've got it here. It's -- the first document was the 5th of May,
7 and this one is -- yes, it's the 11th of May, Your Honour, I'm sorry.
8 The deadline of the surrender of weapons who will be dealing with
9 the -- what happens after the deadline. The weapons will be confiscated
10 by employees of the Security Services Centre.
11 Obviously important that the chief of the
12 Security Services Centre was there to discuss with the other members of
13 the Crisis Staff whether that was possible and whether they should be
14 doing it.
15 Then, next, Your Honour, can we look at the 13th of May. On the
16 16th of the May a delegation consisting of Kupresanin; Erceg; Brdjanin;
17 Radic; Sajic, who was the national defence secretariat; Zupljanin; and
18 others to hold talks in Knin with representatives of the RSK in
19 establishing links in information and the economy.
20 And then:
21 "The security services in Banja Luka is to fully implement the
22 decisions of the Crisis Staff on the disarming ..."
23 Can we look, please, at the next clip. This is the 18th of May.
24 A delegation. Again, Kupresanin, Erceg, Sajic, and Zupljanin to go to
25 Pale and hold talks on defining the territory towards Semberija.
1 I think that's all that I need. Thank you.
2 Your Honours, Zupljanin himself was fully aware of the importance
3 of the ARK Crisis Staff as the co-ordinating body for the establishment
4 of the Serb state.
5 Can we have a brief look, please, at P367.
6 And, Your Honours, this is the meeting that took place on the 6th
7 of May. In fact, it wasn't -- the report or the document recording it
8 not produced until the 20th of May. And it contains a number of themes
9 which we say are important when you consider Zupljanin's authority.
10 "All my orders conveyed orally, as well those I may forward by
11 dispatch, must be carried out. They are your law."
12 And then goes on about the chain of command.
13 "In all our activities, we are obliged to observe all measures
14 and apply all procedures ordered by the Crisis Staff of the autonomous
16 And then disarmament: "We ... take no action until the Crisis
17 Staff makes the relevant decisions. It is ... important that we solve
18 the problem comprehensively."
19 Your Honour, again, we see over and over again in the documents
20 produced at the time that, as far as was possible, there was to be a
21 comprehensive and collaborative solution to the problems.
22 And finally this, Your Honour, which goes onto deal with the next
23 topic that I want to cover: "The chief of the CSB informed the members
24 of the ... council that he ..." not the army, "he had established a
25 special counter-sabotage and counter-terrorist police unit of about
1 150 ... The unit is made up of both active and reserve police and persons
2 who fought on ... Slavonia battle-fronts. The unit is equipped with the
3 most up-to-date combat equipment. Its founding will be celebrated in
4 Banja Luka at a special ceremony marking security forces day on Tuesday,
5 12 May."
6 Your Honour, for some reason, this has become of some importance
7 in respect of Mr. Stanisic because, to be fair, there's been some
8 confusion about it, largely because of the Glas article on the parade,
9 which was dated the 14th, seemed to refer back to the 13th. But every
10 other document in this case, including the video of the parade, shows
11 that it took place on the 12th in the late afternoon after the Serb
12 Assembly this concluded. Stanisic in his final brief asserts that it
13 took place on the 13th and that he drove there and back again.
14 Your Honours, however, there we have, in one short document, all
15 these themes, as it were.
16 And, Your Honours, we say, and we've set it out again in our
17 brief, that the decisions made by the ARK Crisis Staff, in particular
18 those relating to disarmament and dismissals, were forwarded by Zupljanin
19 for action to his subordinate SJBs.
20 Your Honours, may I then move to the special police and/or the
22 Your Honours, the evidence of Zupljanin's participation in the
23 formation of forces used to implement the common plan, his command and
24 his control of those forces, the crimes committed by those forces, is
25 fully set out in our final brief. We say it is the strongest possible
1 evidence, and the Defence attempts to negate it through the final brief -
2 this is the Zupljanin final brief - through selective, we say, quotation,
3 and omission demonstrates just how powerful it is.
4 At paragraph 172 of the Zupljanin final brief starts in its
5 recital of facts on the special police with the ARK decision of the 27th
6 of April. It utterly omits Zupljanin's announcement of the formation of
7 the special police on the 15th of April. That was an announcement made
8 to Glas newspaper, and it's P542.
9 It is asserted in the brief that the SOS was brought into to the
10 special police against Zupljanin's wishes and completely as a result of
11 negotiations between the army and the SOS.
12 Could we have up for a moment, please, P552.
13 This, again, is an article of an interview -- an article in Glas
14 containing an interview with Zupljanin, and he states:
15 "As to ... SOS, which were placed upped the jurisdiction of the
16 Security Services Centre by the ... Assembly decision, Zupljanin said ...
17 a large number of these units' members, being reliable and experienced
18 fighters, would be tested for engagement in the special detachment, while
19 others would be assigned to the reserve police and the Krajina TO. The
20 SOS would thus virtually cease to exist."
21 And P560, please.
22 This is Glas interviewing Zupljanin on the 12th of May and
23 actually asking him a question about the special detachment. And what he
24 has said -- sorry. What he says is this, that: This will be an elite
25 unit," middle of the -- "... equipped with combat vehicles, helicopters
1 and other contemporary equipment and weaponry."
2 And so on and so forth.
3 "If it is necessary for the detachment to fight together with the
4 army, it will be made available."
5 Now, it virtually beggars belief how it can be asserted in the
6 light of all the evidence that this was an army unit that had no
7 connection with or was under the control of Zupljanin and, indeed, that
8 was resubordinated. Then he talks again about the parade on Tuesday.
9 Or --and then he said: "This is the first time that Security --"
10 Can we have the -- I think it's the -- that's it. Oh, well.
11 Your Honours can see the whole article, in any event; P560.
12 Now, Your Honours, the crimes -- actually, just a couple of the
13 intercepts. Yes, sorry.
14 I'm skipping something. Sorry.
15 Your Honours, the identification, the IDs of the special police,
16 were signed by Zupljanin. That's in 2D72 at page 9. Your Honours, at
17 paragraph 174 of the final brief for the -- for Zupljanin, it is said
18 that -- and for most of what is said, they rely on the evidence of
19 Witness SZ-02. I can't remember whether he was in closed session or not
20 so I'll just stick to it. That although they may have formally appeared
21 to be police officers because they were issued IDs by CSB Banja Luka, in
22 essence, they were a military unit.
23 Again, Your Honour, at the time, Your Honours may have thought,
24 the -- the -- the logic behind this is not apparent, why the IDs should
25 have been signed for by Zupljanin for a unit that had nothing whatsoever
1 to do with him.
2 In paragraph 79, when dealing with why Zupljanin made the request
3 for the military to provide the arms that he talks about and the
4 equipment, it is said this was merely for logical -- sorry.
5 "... logistical expedience as the structures were in place at the CSB as
6 a regional centre to facilitate the delivery of such equipment."
7 Now, leaving aside that there is not one iota of evidence that
8 was why the request was made, how was it logistically more expedient for
9 the army to take its equipment from its own headquarters in Banja Luka
10 and transport them over to the CSB for a unit that was going to be a
11 military unit? As I say, it defeats all logical thought.
12 Your Honours, the 12th of May parade. Your Honours, we say, it's
13 absolutely clear from the evidence you've already seen that it took place
14 on the 12th of May. And, Your Honours, there's one other piece of
15 evidence which deals with that which we'd like Your Honours to this time
16 listen to. It's an intercept. It's P1124. And it is dealt with in the
17 brief for Zupljanin as follows. We say this intercept again goes to a
18 number of different themes.
19 The -- paragraph 61 says: "The Prosecution's probable reliance
20 on Zupljanin's intercepted conversation with Cedo Kljajic on the 7th of
21 May to try and depict Zupljanin's character as anti-Muslim is far from
22 the mark."
23 This is when they're asserting that some of his best friends were
25 "It is clear from the conversation that they ..." that is,
1 Kljajic and Zupljanin "... enjoyed a personal friendship, and this is
2 reflected in the jovial and sarcastic comments recorded. The jokes in
3 that conversation were, no doubt, in poor taste, but they were made in
4 jest and were undoubtedly a response to the unique strains both
5 individuals were labouring under at the time."
6 Leaving aside there's no evidence of what strain, if any, either
7 of these two men were labouring under, we think that Your Honours might
8 like to hear some of the conversation as they spoke it.
9 It's fair to say the microphone was obviously in Kljajic's office
10 and Zupljanin is fainter.
11 And that, may I say, Your Honours, on -- what you see on the
12 screen is a still from the parade which we'll look at it. Zupljanin in
13 front; Kljuc behind.
14 [Intercept played]
15 MS. KORNER: Next.
16 [Intercept played]
17 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, looking at the conversation, you may
18 think that the humour of what they were discussing is not apparent.
19 Would Your Honours forgive me just one moment.
20 [Prosecution counsel confer]
21 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, we invite Your Honours to read through
22 the whole transcript because there we see, we've only -- because it takes
23 a little longer to play it, there is conversation about what should be
24 done in Sarajevo, with Zupljanin indicating what he thinks ought to be
25 done, and that's at pages 4 and 5 of the intercept. And, at the end,
1 there's a conversation about the Banja Luka parade. This is the 7th of
2 May. Cedo Kljajic is invited by Zupljanin and the minister, and the
3 question is whether the minister can fly, and there's a discussion about
5 And there's also a long discussion with Serbian members of the
6 MUP, of the new MUP, who are not doing what they ought to be doing.
7 Can we now look, please, at the -- some of the video from the
8 parade, which is P1393.
9 Your Honours will see on the screen it's clearly the 12th of May,
10 and the part of the speeches that were made.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 MS. KORNER: You may have missed that. There's the date that
13 comes up on the screen.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 MS. KORNER: Pause. We will see identification later. We
16 haven't -- we have identified some of the other participants, but that is
17 behind Zupljanin, Cedo Kljajic appearing and disappearing, with the
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MS. KORNER: We do see the 12th there.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 MS. KORNER: This is the end of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. We
23 see Zupljanin saying this speech. While we're waiting for that.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, there is going to be identification of
1 the various people in a minute.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, well, I say that. The version I saw
4 stopped the film at various points, and you saw the various participants
5 identified. Maybe it's this part.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MS. KORNER: All right. I think -- can we just ... we'll have to
8 re-play this clip.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 MS. KORNER: Can we go back to -- I'm sorry I'm taking the time,
11 but I think we need to do this.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 MS. KORNER: Well, there had to be one moment when techniques
14 went wrong.
15 Your Honours, can I -- we'll come back to that once
16 Mr. van Hooydonk has found the right bit.
17 Your Honours, as far as the special police are concerned, we say
18 that the crimes committed by the special police were well documented,
19 particularly in Kotor Varos.
20 Your Honours, in paragraphs 193 to 5, the Defence - the Zupljanin
21 final brief - as I say, heavily criticise Mr. Brown for what Your Honours
22 may recall was a misunderstanding between a document that was issued by
23 the 1st Krajina Corps at the beginning of July, which Mr. Brown,
24 admittedly helped along unfortunately by me, assumed related back to the
25 killings outside the health centre in June. And he is heavily
1 criticised. It's described somewhat slangily in paragraph 193 as
2 scuppered by the -- by the Prosecution expert Brown. And, Your Honours,
3 it is suggested that Brown agreed that there had not been a killing
4 outside the health centre. That -- if Your Honours read the relevant
5 evidence of Mr. Brown, you will see that is -- couldn't be further from
6 the case. He accepted that he had misread the 1st Krajina Corps
7 document, which related, apparently, as it says, to the killings of some
8 special police, which took place later, quite clearly. But the killings
9 outside the health centre, contrary to the Defence assertion - I'm not
10 altogether clear whether they actually mean it - did take place and,
11 indeed, the witness who survived the killings, who saw them, was never
12 cross-examined on the basis that those killings did not take place.
13 Your Honours, as far as the remainder of the evidence is
14 concerned which shows Zupljanin's control over the special police, he
15 ordered their release from custody. All that's said in the pre-trial
16 brief is he didn't order that they weren't to be prosecuted. Well,
17 Your Honours can deal with that one, I'm sure. He did all that he could
18 in August to prevent them being disbanded. And, Your Honours, finally,
19 we say, the Defence undermines its whole argument on this whole matter,
20 because in paragraphs 200 and 201, they say this. And this is the first
22 "The Defence maintains that when Zupljanin was made aware of
23 accusations against the special police he (notwithstanding his lack of
24 authority over the unit) refused to allow such allegations to go
1 In other words, he went -- says the Defence, this wasn't a unit
2 over which he had any control. It was a military unit, but given,
3 however arduous his task, were controlling those who were under his
4 commend, he went out of his way to try and address their crimes. And we
5 say that, in itself, undermines everything.
6 Now I don't know if we are in a position to play -- yes,
7 Your Honours, we are. If we could just look ...
8 [Video-clip played]
9 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, I think -- although there was
10 more, I think that will suffice.
11 Your Honours, we say there was the classic bringing together
12 again of all the components to the joint criminal enterprise.
13 Your Honour, the reality, we say, is this. One uses the modern
14 word, "a reality check." Zupljanin, the evidence shows, conformed and
15 controlled the special police, the CSB Banja Luka special police. It was
16 his own personal contribution, additional to the RS MUP members he
17 already controlled through his position to the forces which implemented
18 the take-overs. Your Honours, that the police took part in the
19 take-overs, as you've heard, is clear, from the witness testimony and
20 from the reports prepared by the MUP themselves.
21 Your Honour, finally, can I deal with the question of detention
22 facilities and Zupljanin, because we cover this aspect very fully in the
23 final brief. But the assertions are made in the Zupljanin final brief
24 that all detention facilities were the responsibility of the army as the
25 MUP was not allowed to guard them. I've already dealt with the missing
1 logical progression in that.
2 That Zupljanin was unaware of their existence until shortly
3 before July the 11th meeting. That's paragraph 299. And that he took an
4 initiative to form a commission and accordingly was instrumental in the
5 closure of Omarska and Keraterm. That is paragraphs 286 and 312.
6 Your Honours, in the light of that, it's necessary, very shortly,
7 to rehearse some of the evidence. We say that that evidence shows that
8 the incarceration of the non-Serbs in these camps and the subsequent
9 removal from the area was a primary method of achieving the objective of
10 the Bosnian Serb plan. Of the 22 detention facilities, as Mr. Demirdjian
11 has already shown you, that were listed -- are listed in the indictment,
12 only one of them was under the jurisdiction of the VRS, but it was the
13 police, as Your Honours know, who brought the majority of the prisoners
14 to Manjaca, Kljuc, and Sanski Most in particular. They took part in the
15 interrogations and the classifications in Manjaca. So they or -- and
16 guarded some of the facilities. So although it was a military camp run
17 by Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, the police, too, had an input into that.
18 Your Honour, when Omarska was established in May, Drljaca sent a
19 copy of his order about Omarska to the CSB in Banja Luka. That is P1560.
20 So it is really not possible for Zupljanin to say that he was unaware of
21 the establishment of these camps. On 13th of June, Drljaca wrote to
22 Zupljanin complaining about the treatment being meted out by the special
23 police. Your Honours, that's P659.
24 Your Honour, it is very interesting that Drljaca, who is supposed
25 to be this rogue, this person over Zupljanin, had no control, virtually
1 is one of the more assiduous reporters of matters to Zupljanin of any of
2 the SJB chiefs.
3 By June, Radulovic was warning his superiors in the SNB that the
4 International Committee of the Red Cross was really exhibiting increasing
5 interest in visiting the collection centres. That's P1391. So, again,
6 that's before he actually spoke to Zupljanin about it.
7 And in June, the same month, Muslim representatives held a
8 meeting with General Talic about what was going on in Banja Luka. The
9 persecutions and the delegation facilities. That's P459.19. And there
10 they complain to General Talic. And General Talic, at the end of that
11 meeting, if we can perhaps go to the next slide -- no, sorry. I thought
12 it was on there. But, in fact, he tells them he will write to Zupljanin
13 about the other collection centres over which the army has no control.
14 Your Honours, at the July 11 meeting, it is said in the -- in
15 the -- in the brief, that, "as a result of his submissions at that
16 meeting, conditions improved and Prijedor was eventually closed down."
17 If one looks, please, very briefly at page 7 his actual intent is
18 that the army and Crisis Staffs or War Presidencies are requesting that
19 as many Muslims as possible are gathered, and they are leaving these
20 undefined camps up to the internal affairs organs.
21 And he goes on to say -- at no stage does he say, This is all the
22 army, and we should insist that these camps are closed down.
23 Your Honour, from the moment, in fact, that the camps became
24 known to the international community, the MUP tried to shift
25 responsibility to the army, and you will see that in P1818.
1 Now, Your Honours, not once in the final brief is there any
2 mention that, in fact, as everybody knows, the reason that these camps
3 were closed down was the visit by international reporters, and to assert,
4 as Zupljanin asserts, that it was his action at the 11th of July which
5 was responsible and, indeed, his subsequent commission, Your Honours, is,
6 again, we say, without any foundation at all. Indeed, by the time the
7 internationals got there on the 6th of August, Keraterm had already been
8 closed, and most of the Omarska prisoners, as we saw in that clip, had
9 been moved to Trnopolje. Before that happened, Zupljanin had visited
10 Omarska had no less than two occasions.
11 And, Your Honour, the report, the commission report which covers
12 only three out of the municipalities [sic] under his control, which, on
13 his order, had to be completed in three days, Your Honours may think was
14 nothing more than a whitewash. That report being P602.
15 Your Honours, obviously, we've had to allocate the time, and I've
16 reached the end of what we say about Zupljanin.
17 The Defence rely -- when I say what we say about Zupljanin,
18 obviously we have had a great deal more to say in what we wrote.
19 The Defence rely very heavily on the document that he sent on the
20 30th of July where he was apparently saying that the police should not be
21 taking orders from Crisis Staffs and the like. Your Honours will look at
22 the document. It's 2D25. And you may think that if the reason for
23 sending it is possibly quite clear, that there were a lot of complaints
24 coming about -- from the Serbs themselves about the behaviour of the
25 police, and it was a document, we suggest when you read the whole thing,
1 is no more than, as it were, shifting responsibility. There's no clear
2 instruction given. There's no resume of what it is in -- in detail that
3 they are complaining about.
4 And the one document perhaps that we should look at is one that
5 he sent on the 20th of July to the MUP headquarters, which, needless to
6 say, I don't think I have made a note of. But, Your Honours, it's -- no,
7 I haven't -- I'll have to come back to that and I'll mention that
9 Your Honours, finally on the question of intent, the Defence say
10 that Zupljanin was never heard to say anything discriminatory against
11 non-Serbs. In fact, the theme that comes out very strongly from a number
12 of witnesses who spoke to Zupljanin and complained to him about what was
13 happening was effectively there was nothing he could do. Well,
14 Your Honours, he wasn't a Brdjanin, he wasn't a Vukic, he wasn't a
15 Kalinic. He didn't use words in the way that they did to drive out those
16 who were terrified. But we say if you look at his actions, they have no
17 other explanation but of his whole-hearted endorsement of, and mixing
18 with, involvement in, the Bosnian Serb plan.
19 Your Honours, we've got five minutes, but whether it is worth
20 Mr. Hannis starting, I don't know.
21 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] ...
22 Before we take the adjournment for the day, with regard to the
23 Prosecution's request seeking leave to file a written motion to address
24 what it argues are errors of law in the Defence trial briefs, the Trial
25 Chamber notes that the Prosecution has had an opportunity to make its
1 submissions on the law in its final trial brief. Moreover, the Chamber
2 has granted the parties an additional hour for their closing arguments,
3 in order to give the parties more time to attend to what was raised in
4 the final trial briefs.
5 For these reasons, the Chamber denies the Prosecution's request.
6 So we take the adjournment until 9.00 tomorrow morning.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of May,
9 2012, at 9.00 a.m.