Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9029

 1                           Wednesday, 18 December 2013

 2                           [Rule 98 bis Hearing]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 7     courtroom.

 8             Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

10     IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

12             May we have the appearances, please, starting with the

13     Prosecution.

14             MR. STRINGER:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  For

15     the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer; Sarah Clanton; Starroula Papadopoulos;

16     case manager, Thomas Laugel; and legal intern, Ana Humljak.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

18             Mr. Zivanovic, for the Defence.

19             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good morning, for the Defence of Goran Hadzic,

20     Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

22             Mr. Stringer, you have the floor.

23             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.  Good

24     morning again, also to counsel.

25             In our submissions today, I will be addressing legal issues first

Page 9030

 1     that arise out of the Defence submissions made on Monday.  I will then

 2     address aspects of the joint criminal enterprise and how it relates to

 3     the Defence submissions from Monday.  I'll also be addressing two of the

 4     four specific incidents that counsel identified as part of their

 5     challenge, those being Ovcara and the Velepromet.

 6             After I've completed my submissions, Mr. President, then my

 7     colleague, Sarah Clanton, will take the floor.  She will address the

 8     other two incidents related to Opatovac and Lovas.  She is also going to

 9     address other incidents, other aspects of the case, in which in our view

10     the Court could find that there is sufficient evidence on all counts that

11     the Defence has challenged.  And she will also just -- she will also

12     briefly address a couple of the other issues raised as part of the

13     Defence submissions.

14             Mr. President, Your Honours, at the hearing on Monday, the

15     Defence clearly limited its 98 bis challenge to Counts 2 through 9 to the

16     extent that they're based on four specific incidents or events and not

17     counts, specifically the incidents at Velepromet, Ovcara, Lovas,

18     Opatovac.  The Defence also challenged Counts 5 through 9, but only to

19     the extent that they are based on crimes committed in the camps that were

20     located in Serbia.  That's transcript 8988 and -89 from Monday's

21     proceedings.

22             Your Honours, the Chamber should reject the Defence invitation to

23     engage in the piecemeal and incident-based application of Rule 98 bis

24     that focuses only on parts of Counts 2 through 9 based on these four

25     incidents.  The Chamber should also decline to enter a judgement of

Page 9031

 1     acquittal regarding only those parts of Counts 5 through 9 that relate to

 2     the detention facilities in Serbia.

 3             The Defence's proposed application of Rule 98 bis is not only

 4     contrary to the plain language and intended of the Rule itself, it is

 5     also contrary to the consistent manner in which Trial Chambers have

 6     interpreted and applied Rule 98 bis since it was amended in 2004.

 7             As amended in 2004, the rule provides that the Chamber shall

 8     enter a judgement of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence

 9     capable of supporting a conviction.  The specific use of the word "count"

10     is significant, it's not accidental.  The word "count" was introduced in

11     2004 to replace the word "charge" which had appeared in the previous

12     formulation of the Rule.

13             On Monday, after citing Rule 98 bis as reformulated to focus on

14     counts, my learned friend proceeded by referring to charges nonetheless,

15     and it is indeed only a few specific charges that form the basis of the

16     Rule 98 bis application.  What was clear from my learned friend's

17     presentation is that the Defence is not pleased with or does not suit

18     them to apply Rule 98 bis as it ought to be applied and how it exists in

19     its current version.  Counsel indicated or claimed that counts and

20     charges ought to be equivalent or that they are equivalent for purposes

21     of 98 bis.  That's page 8986.

22             In support of this view, counsel claimed that Judge Robinson, in

23     the Milosevic case, also considered charges and counts as equivalent;

24     that's 8984.  However, this is misleading, because Judge Robinson's views

25     in the Milosevic case, of course, were expressed prior to the amendment

Page 9032

 1     of Rule 98 bis.  What my learned friend omitted to mention is that

 2     Judge Robinson's views on Rule 98 bis after its amendment, for example,

 3     in Lukic and Lukic.  We have a slide up for Your Honours and for counsel.

 4     This is page 3582 of the Lukic and Lukic case, where Judge Robinson

 5     states:

 6             "The rule, as amended in December 2004, focuses on counts rather

 7     than charges.  If a count is comprised of several parts and there is no

 8     evidence on one part of the count but there is evidence capable of

 9     supporting a conviction on the other parts, the motion will fail."

10             This was a unanimous decision, no dissent or separate opinion.

11     This same approach and application is found in numerous other Rule 98 bis

12     decisions entered by Chambers after the 2004 Rule change.

13             Just for the Chamber's benefit, we're citing Mrksic decision from

14     28th June, 2006; Martic, 3 July 2006; Milutinovic, 18 May 2007; Prlic,

15     20 February 2008; Popovic, 3 March 2008; Lukic and Lukic,

16     13 November 2008; Gotovina, 3 April 2009; Seselj, 4th of May, 2011;

17     Karadzic, 11 June 2012.  These are all cases which have applied Rule

18     98 bis in the way it ought to be applied, by a counts approach, rather

19     than entertaining specific incidents and purporting to strike or enter a

20     judgement of acquittal as to a specific incident forming a part of a

21     count.

22             The Defence referred to Judge Antonetti's dissent in the Seselj

23     case.  What they did not mention is Judge Antonetti's statement in the

24     Prlic case, which we've just cited here, which was unanimous.  There

25     Judge Antonetti said:

Page 9033

 1             "Since the 8th of December, 2004, when Rule 98 bis was last

 2     amended, a Trial Chamber is only expected to determine whether the

 3     Prosecution has adduced enough evidence for each count taken as a whole,

 4     as opposed to all the various charges making up that particular count.

 5     As a consequence, the Trial Chamber may only enter a judgement of

 6     acquittal with respect to an entire count of the indictment."

 7             Now, when they referred to the Lukic and Lukic indictment, as

 8     well as the Haradinaj indictment on Monday, counsel essentially argued

 9     that 98 bis should apply to counts only when the count is based upon a

10     single charge or a single incident, as was the case in those indictments.

11     This approach would, in our view, Mr. President and Your Honours,

12     effectively render 2004's amendment of 98 bis to be meaningless.  The

13     distinction between charges and counts with regard to the rule was noted

14     by the Chamber in Karadzic, after it advised the parties that the

15     Rule 98 bis submissions should be concerned with counts and not specific

16     charges.  And that's on the slide for Your Honours at this point.  That's

17     the Karadzic decision on accused's motion for order to withdraw unproven

18     allegation, 23 May 2012, paragraph 3.

19             I should say that it's in this decision, Mr. President, the

20     Chamber did suggest that the Prosecution should go back and look at

21     specific incidents.  Of course there are many, many incidents in the

22     Karadzic case, and invited the Prosecution to go back and to see whether

23     there are any specific incidents which, in fairness or for whatever

24     reason, ought to be dropped out of the case at that stage.  And the

25     Prosecution agreed to undertake that.  In this case, it's our submission

Page 9034

 1     that there are no incidents in which there has been a failure of proof,

 2     none.  So that again the counts-based approach is what's required under

 3     the law, and proceeding on that basis certainly isn't going to result in

 4     any inefficiency because of the possibility that an individual incident

 5     here or there might have actually been left unproved.

 6             In advocating a return to the charge or incident-based approach

 7     to Rule 98 bis, the Defence has also referred to the structure of the

 8     Hadzic indictment.  However, our indictment is entirely consistent with

 9     the approach taken in other leadership cases.  The indictments in Martic,

10     Karadzic, Seselj, all have counts also which are comprised of different,

11     separate incidents.  During the Rule 98 bis proceedings in those cases,

12     the Chambers determined whether for each count there was sufficient

13     evidence capable of supporting a conviction for at least one of the

14     criminal incidents and the accused's responsibility for it.

15             We say that's the correct approach and the approach taken by the

16     Defence here asking the Court to focus on specific incidents as opposed

17     to the counts as a whole is not a correct application of the Rule.

18             My learned friend also indicated that it's more efficient,

19     perhaps more fair, to consider specific locations or incidents.  In our

20     view, Mr. President, the amendment to Rule 98 bis was intended to make

21     the proceedings more efficient by eliminating the requirement that each

22     charge has to be considered individually.  The fact that a count is made

23     up of several incidents was acknowledged by Judge Robinson himself.  In

24     the Dragomir Milosevic Rule 98 bis decision, this is what he said, this

25     is from Dragomir Milosevic, 3 May 2007, transcript in that case, 5641

Page 9035

 1     and -42:

 2             "Thus, a count could have as many as 100 or more separate

 3     allegations.  It could cover 40 municipalities, be alleged completed by

 4     15 different mean, details of which could be set out in 50 or more

 5     items ..."

 6             He goes on:

 7             "As presently formulated and applied, a submission leading to the

 8     acquittal of the accused or of an accused at the end of the Prosecution

 9     case is only likely to succeed in the very rare case when the Prosecution

10     case, as a whole, has broken down, so that there is no evidence of either

11     the actus reus or the mens rea of the crime."

12             And, Mr. President, we say that there is no aspect of the case in

13     which there has been a failure of proof remotely close to that level of

14     collapse.

15             It's our submission, Mr. President, Your Honours, that the

16     Chamber can deny the Defence Rule 98 bis application on this ground.  The

17     Defence has not even attempted to demonstrate that there was a failure of

18     proof on any count in the indictment.  They have only focused on four

19     specific incidents out of the many that are found in the case.

20             The Defence also argued that this is a circumstantial case and

21     that, therefore, inferential findings, inferences, can only be entered at

22     the Rule 98 bis stage when they are the only reasonable inference or

23     conclusion that can be drawn, that's at transcript 8975, 8991.  That is

24     factually and legally incorrect.  Factually, we do not accept that this

25     is a circumstantial case.  This is a case with abundant direct evidence

Page 9036

 1     of Goran Hadzic's criminal intent, direct evidence of his significant

 2     contribution to the joint criminal enterprise, direct evidence of his

 3     participation in the events, and indeed in some of the crimes themselves

 4     that occurred.  There's nothing circumstantial about that.

 5             Legally it is also incorrect to say that this is a circumstantial

 6     case or that, as a result, the Chamber has to draw all inferences or has

 7     to rule out all inferences apart from guilt basically in order to

 8     proceed.

 9             There is clear case law on this.  At the Rule 98 bis stage,

10     inferences do not have to be the only inferences reasonably available on

11     the evidence.  The Chamber in Popovic squarely addressed the issue and

12     stated that:

13             "At the ... 98 bis stage, the inference of an agreement to commit

14     genocide need not be the only reasonable inference that could be drawn

15     from the evidence."

16             This is Popovic, 3rd of March, 2008, their transcript

17     number 21464.

18             Indeed, for the Chamber to accept the Defence application to

19     apply this strict inferential standard at this stage would run contrary

20     to the practice and the rule that the Chamber accepts the Prosecution

21     evidence at its highest.

22             Applying Rule 98 bis to the evidence at hand, to counts, and

23     accepting the Prosecution evidence at its highest, we submit the Defence

24     has failed to meet its high burden of showing that there is any count for

25     which a judgement of acquittal should be entered.

Page 9037

 1             With regard to the detention facilities located in Serbia, the

 2     Defence raises a legal question whether international humanitarian law

 3     applies in Serbia.  This argument begins on page 9023 of Monday's

 4     transcript.  The Defence question whether there was an armed conflict or

 5     a spillover of an armed conflict into Serbia, and therefore whether IHL

 6     applies there, is the question that was raised by counsel on Monday.

 7             Our first response to that is that, as is the case with the other

 8     four substantive incidents which the Defence raised linking those to

 9     OG South, this assertion that with respect only to the detention

10     facilities in Serbia this is yet again a piecemeal, incident-based

11     argument that's inappropriate for consideration under the applicable

12     Rule 98 bis standard.  There is by no means a complete failure of proof

13     on the detention-related crimes charged in Counts 5 to 9 and there is

14     indeed no challenge raised to the detention crimes alleged to have

15     occurred in places, for example, such as Erdut and Dalj.

16             Again, it's a specific incident-based approach that's

17     inappropriate under Rule 98 bis.

18             Secondly, this is a novel legal question, raised for the first

19     time in this case on Monday in the form of an oral submission.  Counsel

20     refers to no legal authority or precedent supporting his view that the

21     prisoners in Serbia did not merit the protection of international

22     humanitarian law simply because they had been transported into Serbia.

23     And yet the Defence asked the Chamber to remove parts of Counts 5 to 9

24     regarding the charged detention facilities in Serbia and the crimes such

25     as mistreatment and the sexual violence that occurred in those facilities

Page 9038

 1     on the basis of a legal argument raised for the first time on Monday.

 2             Although Chambers are not precluded from making determinations of

 3     legal issues at the 98 bis stage, the Tribunal case law after the 2004

 4     amendment indicates that generally they refrain from doing so.  The

 5     Trial Chamber should refrain from doing so here.  Here are some examples

 6     of issues that were not considered appropriate for determination at the

 7     98 bis phase.  We have the slide up.  These come from the Popovic case,

 8     3 March 2008, transcript 21462-63, 21465-66, 68; Milutinovic decision

 9     14 June 2007, paragraph 18; Kvocka, decision on motions for acquittal,

10     15 December 2000, paragraph 41.  Legal issues raised which the Chambers

11     declined to consider at the 98 bis stage, including such issues as

12     whether victims of deportation as a crime against humanity must be

13     civilians, whether the Prosecution had alleged two conspiracies based on

14     the same conduct, definition of forcible transfer, et cetera.

15             So in our view, Mr. President, that's another reason why the

16     Chamber should not take up the issue of the Serbian detention facilities,

17     which, as raised on Monday, is a purely legal question whether

18     international law applies to the victims, the prisoners, who were held

19     there.

20             If the Chamber were minded to consider the merits of the Defence

21     submission on the applicability of international humanitarian law, the

22     Prosecution offers these brief submissions, although we believe that such

23     a question is indeed best left until the end of the proceedings, if ever,

24     and only then on written submissions in which both parties have been

25     afforded sufficient time to research and develop their positions.  In

Page 9039

 1     fairness, we should get more time to address this purely legal issue.

 2             Having said that, we offer these brief and possibly incomplete

 3     submissions, based upon what we've been able to develop as a response in

 4     the limited time that we've been given.

 5             Before arriving at the Serbian detention facilities, many of

 6     those prisoners who testified in this case first had to endure the siege

 7     and the destruction of Vukovar.  When the town fell on the

 8     18th of November, they emerged from their destroyed homes, cellars,

 9     shelters.  They were rounded up by the JNA and they were transported to

10     Serbia.  (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16             Therefore, the rounding up and the detention of these prisoners

17     undoubtedly occurred in the context of the armed conflict in Vukovar and

18     the surrounding area.  The crimes inflicted on these prisoners in the

19     Serbian camps occurred in the context of the armed conflict and are

20     clearly connected to the conflict, even though the detention crimes

21     occurred in Serbia.  How can it be that after being bombed out of their

22     homes, rounded up, and transported to detention camps by the JNA, these

23     victims lost the protection of international humanitarian law simply

24     because they had been removed to Serbia?

25             In the Seselj case, the Appeals Chamber held that for purposes of

Page 9040

 1     Article 5, crimes against humanity:

 2             "The Prosecution need only establish that an armed conflict is

 3     sufficiently related to the crimes with which the accused is charged."

 4             The Chamber has that on the screen, Seselj decision on the

 5     interlocutory appeal concerning jurisdiction, 31 August 2004,

 6     paragraphs 12 to 14.

 7             To this end:

 8             "It is sufficient to show a connection between the Article 5

 9     crime itself and the armed conflict."

10             For Article 3 crimes, the Prosecution must show a nexus to the

11     armed conflict.  In Stakic, the Appeals Chamber stated at paragraph 342:

12             "For Article 3 to apply, the crime charged must be committed in a

13     time of armed conflict and an accused's acts must be closely related to

14     the conflict.  The latter requirement is known as the 'nexus'

15     requirement.  The nexus need but not be a causal link, 'but the existence

16     of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part

17     in the perpetrator's ability to commit the crime, his decision to commit

18     it, the manner in which it was committed, or the purpose for which it was

19     committed.'"  And here the Chamber cites the Kunarac appeal judgement at

20     paragraph 58.  This is Stakic, 22 March 2006, paragraph 342.

21             Your Honours, we submit that the nexus between the crimes at the

22     Serbian crimes and the armed conflict is self-evident.  The facts and

23     circumstances of their detention and mistreatment demonstrate a clear

24     link between the victims in the Serbian camps, the crimes committed

25     against them there, and the armed conflict from which they came before

Page 9041

 1     finding themselves in the Serbian camps.  In particular, even if the

 2     detainees were only entitled to the protections available in

 3     non-international armed conflicts, that is, Common Article 3, they would

 4     be protected from the inhumane treatment which they suffered.  It would

 5     be nonsensical if these protections could be circumvented by simply

 6     moving detainees a certain distance or even across a border.

 7             The Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3, in particular, are

 8     part of customary international law, applicable to both international and

 9     non-international armed conflicts.  Regardless of how one characterises

10     the conflict or the fact that the victims had been transported from

11     Vukovar to camps in Serbia, these people cannot be stripped of the

12     protections to which they're entitled under Common Article 3.  And that

13     is because of the close, virtually seamless, nexus that exists between

14     these prisoners, the crimes visited upon them in the Serbian camps, and

15     the armed conflict from which they emerged in Vukovar.

16             We consider the Defence's challenge to crimes occurring in Serbia

17     at the detention facilities to be a wholly legal challenge, the one that

18     I've just addressed.  There is no claim that the crimes did not occur,

19     nor is there a claim that Hadzic is not responsible for them under one of

20     the alleged modes of liability.  The claim is that IHL does not apply.

21     Having addressed that point here, we do not intend to make further

22     factual submissions related to the Serbia detention facilities.

23             Finally some remarks on the legal side with regard to counsel's

24     characterisation of aspects of the law of joint criminal enterprise.  On

25     Monday counsel repeatedly asserted that the accused must intend or know

Page 9042

 1     the details of a specific incident falling within a common criminal

 2     purpose in order to be held responsible.  For example, in relation to the

 3     killings at Lovas minefield, counsel argued that a "precondition" for

 4     Hadzic's liability would be a pre-existing or contemporaneous knowledge

 5     of the incident.  That's page 9014 of the transcript.  This argument is

 6     based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law of this Tribunal.

 7             The Defence supported their argument by referring to Brdjanin,

 8     the appeal judgement, paragraph 430.  This paragraph concerns JCE

 9     liability and indeed JCE is a mode of liability that the Prosecution

10     alleges in this case.  However, Brdjanin does not stand for the

11     proposition that the Defence claims.  In Brdjanin the Appeals Chamber

12     held that for JCE liability it must be shown that the JCE member shares

13     the intent for the crimes within the JCE.  By "crimes," this means crimes

14     set out in the Statute of the Tribunal, such as murder as a war crime or

15     crime against humanity, forcible transfer, torture, et cetera.  This does

16     not mean that the accused has to intend or be aware of all the details of

17     the specific criminal incidents occurring on the ground.

18             The Appeals Chamber has confirmed this in numerous cases; for

19     example, in Krajisnik the Appeals Chamber held at paragraph 200:

20             "The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly

21     identified the required mens rea for the first form of JCE, explaining

22     that it must be shown that 'the JCE participants, including the accused,

23     had a common state of mind, namely the state of mind that the statutory

24     crimes forming part of the objective should be carried out ...'"

25             Here the Appeals Chamber referred to the statutory crimes.  It

Page 9043

 1     did not require the Chamber to look at the accused's specific state of

 2     mind and conduct in relation to every underlying incident.

 3             Mr. President, I believe that a redaction may be needed at

 4     page 11, line 4, I've just been passed a note.  I may have mentioned a

 5     name that I shouldn't have.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  We'll check that, Mr. Stringer.

 7             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 8             The Appeals Chamber jurisprudence establishes -- excuse me, I

 9     need to back up.  The Defence also erroneously claims that the accused

10     must specifically or directly contribute to each underlying incident,

11     again such as the murders at Lovas minefield.  See, for example,

12     transcript 9014.  Here counsel stated, "Now, even assuming..."  These are

13     the words of counsel, my learned friend, on Monday:

14             "Even assuming that there is some potential association between

15     Mr. Hadzic and Mr. Bogic, there is no indication that Mr. Bogic shared

16     any information about the incident, much less that Bogic was the conduit

17     for conveying any instructions that would have contributed to this

18     crime."

19             We say that's not necessary or required as a contribution under

20     JCE.  The Appeals Chamber jurisprudence establishes that the accused's

21     significant contribution should go to the common criminal purpose.  As

22     the Appeals Chamber in Kvocka held, paragraph 263:

23             "Contrary to Kvocka's claim, to find an accused guilty of the

24     crime of murder it is not necessary to establish his participation in

25     each murder.  For crimes committed as part of a joint criminal

Page 9044

 1     enterprise, it is sufficient to prove not the participation of the

 2     accused in the commission of the specific crime but the responsibility of

 3     the accused in furthering the common criminal purpose.  The

 4     Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in finding

 5     Kvocka guilty of the crime of murder without establishing his specific

 6     responsibility for each murder committed."

 7             By contributing to the common criminal purpose, the accused

 8     contributes to the crimes falling within the JCE.  This is why the

 9     appeals jurisprudence does not require direct participation in each

10     specific crime charged.

11             Mr. President, that completes our legal submissions.  With those

12     arguments, it's our submission that applying correctly the law and the

13     practice of Rule 98 bis, the Defence arguments concerning the state of

14     jurisprudence on personal responsibility at this Tribunal correctly.

15     This is a basis on which the Chamber can deny the motion or motions for

16     judgement of acquittal, to the extent that they are directed at pieces of

17     the case, specific incidents forming a relatively small number of the

18     total number of incidents on which the counts are based.

19             If the Chamber applies 98 bis correctly, there are no counts to

20     dismiss because the Defence has not identified any count for which there

21     has been a failure of proof.  This alone is sufficient for the Chamber to

22     deny now, at this time, the Defence motion without any further input or

23     response from the Prosecution.  The Chamber should not entertain the

24     incident-based challenges advanced by the Defence.

25             I'm not getting the signal that the Chamber's prepared to accept

Page 9045

 1     our suggestion on that point, and so I will continue with my submissions.

 2             The Prosecution is, Mr. President, prepared to proceed with

 3     additional submissions in order to show that even the relatively small

 4     number of incidents which the Defence now seeks to challenge falls

 5     squarely within the scope of the joint criminal enterprise charged in the

 6     indictment and are incidents for which Goran Hadzic bears individual

 7     criminal responsibility.  In what remains of my submissions, I will refer

 8     the Chamber to evidence showing that Hadzic intended these crimes, these

 9     statutory crimes, and that he contributed to the JCE in which they were

10     committed.  I will address the Defence's challenge to the Ovcara and

11     Velepromet incidents.  My colleague, Ms. Clanton, then, as indicated,

12     will refer the Chamber to more specific evidence related to the other two

13     incidents, Opatovac and Lovas, and to other incidents charged in Counts 2

14     through 9 which make it clear that there is ample evidence to support

15     each of those counts for purposes of this hearing.

16             Goran Hadzic bears individual criminal responsibility for what we

17     call the four incidents because he shared the intent that the crimes

18     charged in Counts 2 through 9 would be committed against non-Serbs as

19     part of the common purpose of the JCE.  He knew and intended that

20     murders, beatings, unlawful imprisonment, and torture would be committed

21     in furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise, even if he was not

22     personally present when every incident occurred.  The physical

23     perpetrators of crimes charged in the four incidents were members of this

24     joint criminal enterprise with Hadzic or else were tools used by JCE

25     members.  Hadzic, as the most senior and powerful Serb political figure

Page 9046

 1     in the SBWS, significantly contributed to this enterprise.

 2             And so if we are to engage in an incident-based analysis of the

 3     evidence for purposes of this hearing, the Chamber would, in our

 4     respectful submission, benefit from a look-back at some of the evidence

 5     it has heard and seen that tells us about Hadzic's criminal intent and

 6     contribution to the JCE generally.  Before this, however, I do have a

 7     couple of preliminary remarks.

 8             First, the Defence raises no challenge with respect to any counts

 9     or crimes that were committed in the SAO Krajina region and no challenge

10     to crimes that occurred during 1992 and 1993.  We will, therefore, not

11     address those crimes.  We will, however, refer to some pieces of evidence

12     from that period that shed light on Hadzic's intent during 1991.

13             Secondly, as mentioned already, the fact that Hadzic was not

14     personally present when every crime was committed does not make this a

15     circumstantial case.  On a few occasions Monday my learned friend

16     asserted just that, transcript 8975 and -76.  As said, our case is a

17     direct case, direct evidence of Hadzic's intent, direct evidence of his

18     contribution to the common criminal purpose.

19             As president of the SBWS, Goran Hadzic -- sorry, as president of

20     the SBWS government, Goran Hadzic made clear his government's policy and

21     his own personal view that there was no place for non-Serbs in the

22     Serb-controlled territories in Croatia.  Hadzic repeatedly and publicly

23     advocated ethnic separation of Serbs and non-Serbs.  His tactic of

24     demonising Croats in his public statements made clear that they were a

25     fair target for crimes such as those charged in Counts 2 through 9,

Page 9047

 1     whether in Erdut, Beli Manastir, Lovas, or Ilok.

 2             His views manifested themselves on the ground in the crimes that

 3     we have, in our view, proven in this case.  For example, in a press

 4     conference in September of 1991, after claiming that Vukovar would be the

 5     capital of the SAO SBWS, Hadzic distinguished between "indigenous Croats"

 6     as opposed to Croats who arrived after World War II.  He claimed that

 7     some of the Croat population carried a hatred of Serbs in their genes.

 8     The non-indigenous Croats who in previous generations had settled in

 9     these areas from western Herzegovina would be given return tickets.

10     Hadzic further stated that "we" do not have problems with colonised Serbs

11     who are extremists.  That's P39 and P2955.2913.

12             The Chamber will recall the evidence of Witness Veljko Dzakula, a

13     prominent Serbian politician in Croatia.  He reviewed this report that

14     I've just described and confirmed that such statements provoked hatred,

15     distrust and fear among Serbs and Croats alike, having come from a member

16     of the Croatian Serb leadership.  He confirmed that Hadzic advocated

17     population movements:  Serbs in, Croats out, prevention of Croat returns,

18     transcript 394-395.

19             By March of 1992, Hadzic, with the assistance of Serb forces such

20     as Arkan's volunteer guard and the JNA units deployed throughout SBWS,

21     had substantially achieved the goal of cleansing non-Serbs from the

22     territory.  As implementation of the Vance Plan approached, Hadzic

23     advocated for population movements in the opposite direction.  At the

24     SFRY Presidency meeting in Belgrade on the 2nd of March, 1992, Hadzic and

25     Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had an exchange on the issue of

Page 9048

 1     population movements and exchanges.  Karadzic observed that the idea of

 2     organised population exchange was nebulous and would be seen as abhorrent

 3     by the rest of the world.  Hadzic disagreed saying:

 4             "There is nothing nebulous in it.  The Serbs from Zagreb should

 5     resettle, as well as those from Belgrade, and it is out of the question

 6     now."

 7             That's P37, page 68; transcript 384-385.

 8             Hadzic and Arkan intimidated and threatened even Serbs who did

 9     not support their vision of an ethnically pure SBWS.  The Chamber will

10     recall the testimony again of Mr. Dzakula, who in late March or April of

11     1992 met with Hadzic in Hadzic's office in Erdut.  Arkan was also

12     present.  Hadzic asked Veljko Dzakula:

13             "Is it true that you advocate co-existence with the Croats?"

14             Dzakula denied that he advocated co-existence because he was

15     afraid of the consequences of admitting it in the presence of Arkan.  As

16     Dzakula said, Arkan was "quite ruthless to people who did not express

17     Serbdom as he thought was fit."  That's transcript 379-380, 413, 570-572.

18             And indeed, the Chamber will recall subsequently that in the

19     spring of 1993 Mr. Dzakula was stripped of his membership in the

20     RSK Assembly and jailed for having signed the Daruvar Agreement, which

21     was an agreement he made with Croatian authorities that was intended to

22     create preconditions for the return of refugees to Western Slavonia.

23     Goran Hadzic signed a decree disbanding the Western Slavonia regional

24     council through which Hadzic had entered into the Daruvar Agreement, P44,

25     P45, P46, transcript 403-405, 413-417.

Page 9049

 1             In a July 1992 meeting with UNPROFOR Commander Nambiar, Hadzic

 2     claimed he was willing to accept the return of non-Serbs, that it must be

 3     realised that "even if all non-Serbs were to return, the Serbs would

 4     still remain in the majority."  That's P41, paragraph 10.  Hadzic was

 5     clearly in favour of taking advantage of ethnic cleansing committed under

 6     his regime to maintain the Serb majority where there had not even been

 7     one prior to the conflict.  On the 4th of September, 1992, when

 8     confronted by UN Under-Secretary-General Marek Goulding with the ethnic

 9     cleansing of non-Serbs that was continuing in Sector East in the SBWS

10     region, Hadzic defended the practice saying that they should act "eye for

11     eye and tooth for tooth" because of the expulsion of Serbs from areas of

12     Western Slavonia, P2432.2398.

13             In our submissions on the JCE, I will refer the Chamber to

14     evidence of Hadzic's broad powers as SBWS prime minister and his

15     relations with several of the various Serb forces that were on the ground

16     in the SBWS contributing to the common criminal purpose.  The Chamber

17     should consider all of this evidence to come in light of the personal

18     views expressed by Goran Hadzic throughout the period covered by this

19     case, his views on ethnic separation, ethnic engineering, demographic

20     engineering, if you will, and consider that evidence now in light of how

21     he's acting with other JCE members, Serb forces, during 1991.

22             We know from Theunens that the mission of the JNA changed.  After

23     first, of course, having been the army of all of Yugoslavia and then

24     initially acting as a buffer between conflicting parties in Croatia, the

25     JNA eventually became a Serb armed force for the Serb people in Croatia.

Page 9050

 1     This is clearly visible from early operations in July and August 1991

 2     during the take-over of Dalj and Erdut.  That's Theunens,

 3     transcript 4150-4153; P1753, pages 141-142; P2930.

 4             We also know that the JNA accepted for operational purposes

 5     Serbian volunteers linked to political parties and/or otherwise known for

 6     undisciplined and violent behaviour, such as the Leva Supoderica, party

 7     linked to the Serbian Radical Party of Mr. Seselj; the Dusan Silni, which

 8     was active in Lovas; and of course the Serbian Volunteer Guard, Arkan and

 9     his men.  Exhibit 2937, transcript 4128, 4649; Exhibit 1753,

10     pages 124-125; D17; and P1865.

11             The JNA's having accepted volunteers for operational purposes is

12     important because it shows the interrelation between the various Serb

13     forces in the SBWS:  The JNA, Arkan, volunteers, and the local TO, the

14     SBWS Territorial Defence.  The Defence attempt on Monday to try to

15     describe OG South as some separate organisational structure bearing no

16     link to Hadzic or other members of the JCE, does not reflect the

17     evidence.  I'm referring to counsel's remarks on Monday at page 8991.

18     This issue of OG South/OG North is a red herring.  Whether or not there

19     is some sort of organisational structure connecting Hadzic to crimes in

20     OG South is irrelevant.  What matters is whether the crimes committed

21     there are linked to Hadzic or one of his fellow JCE members.

22             In his submissions on Monday, Defence sought to create this

23     distinction between OG North and OG South, even suggesting that there

24     might be two JCEs in this case:  One in the north, one in the south.

25     Transcript 9012.  The 98 bis challenge that they raise relates to the

Page 9051

 1     four incidents which they say took place in OG South.

 2             Your Honours, there are not two JCEs in this case.  There is a

 3     single JCE, a single joint criminal enterprise, for purposes of this

 4     hearing which encompass the entire territory of the SBWS, that is, the

 5     entire territory for which Goran Hadzic acted as prime minister during

 6     1991.  The JCE members operating on the territory of the SBWS included:

 7     Hadzic, as the prime minister; Arkan and his Serbian Volunteer Guard; the

 8     SBWS TO; Serb volunteers such as Leva Supoderica; Stevo Bogic and the

 9     Serbian National Security unit, which was based just metres away from

10     Mr. Hadzic's office in Erdut; and of course the JNA.

11             JNA forces in the SBWS were all under the command of the JNA

12     1st Military District and its commander, Zivota Panic, P2931, P2933,

13     P2940, P1986.1981.

14             Your Honours see a slide.  This is from the expert report of

15     Mr. Theunens, Exhibit P1753.  This is at page 197.  And in describing the

16     respective areas of responsibility within the territory of the SBWS, he

17     refers here to the north.

18             "OG North is based on the 12th Novi Sad Corps, commanded by

19     Major-General Andrija Biorcevic ..."

20             Biorcevic's predecessor, I should add, was General Bratic.

21             The Trial Chamber will recall the video footage of the dinner

22     celebration in which Biorcevic described how his units, his JNA units, of

23     OG North worked in close co-ordination with Hadzic.  The video is

24     P211.140.  He celebrated Arkan and worked jointly with him in his

25     operations in OG North.  We say that Biorcevic, the JNA, and Arkan were

Page 9052

 1     all acting jointly in the north to further the common criminal purpose.

 2             The next slide relates to the Vukovar area.  In the middle of the

 3     SBWS, corresponding to the eastern Slavonia/Vukovar area, Colonel Mrksic

 4     was in command.  His area of responsibility was Vukovar, extending south

 5     to Ovcara and Grabovo.  Here again we're relying on the Theunens report,

 6     1753, pages 197 and 198.  We say that the JNA's complete and utter

 7     destruction of Vukovar was intended to advance the common criminal

 8     purpose by installing Vukovar as the capital of the SBWS with Hadzic as

 9     its president, and in the process to drive out the non-Serb civilian

10     population there.  Vukovar was better defended and it took longer to

11     conquer than the other places in the SBWS.  However, the purpose of the

12     attack on Vukovar, the intent to achieve Serb domination over the town,

13     is qualitatively no different from the JNA attacks to the north or to the

14     south in Western Srem.  This also was a part of the common criminal plan.

15     After the town fell, the JNA removed the inhabitants of Vukovar, in many

16     cases transporting them to the JNA camps in Serbia where now it's claimed

17     they no longer had any protection under international humanitarian law.

18             In the south, again from the Theunens report page 198 of

19     Exhibit P1753, the area of Western Srem, including Lovas, Tovarnik,

20     Bapska, Sarengrad, Ilok, these comprised the area of responsibility of

21     Major-General Arandjelovic.  I'll speak in a few minutes about how the

22     JNA in Western Srem conducted its activities in a way that was consistent

23     with the JNA forces to the north.

24             But first, in Monday's submissions the Defence claimed that

25     Hadzic was not responsible for the Lovas and Opatovac incidents because

Page 9053

 1     they fall inside the JNA's Operative Group South.  That's not correct.

 2     The Chamber has visited these places on the site visit.  You will recall

 3     that all of these places are in Western Srem.  And as we see here on the

 4     slide, Lovas is specifically in the area of responsibility of

 5     Arandjelovic, not the Operative Group South, which is under Mrksic's

 6     command farther to the north and which is restricted primarily to the

 7     Vukovar town.  Opatovac is down here as well.  The Chamber may recall

 8     Lovas, Tovarnik, Bapska.  It's on the road between those various towns in

 9     Western Srem, all outside of the OG South, in the area of responsibility

10     of Arandjelovic.

11             Whatever might be the Defence theory as to why Hadzic is not

12     responsible for crimes committed in OG South, that theory does not apply

13     to Lovas and Opatovac.

14             Regarding Western Srem, as Arkan and Biorcevic were working

15     together in the northern third of the SBWS where Hadzic was based, doing

16     their part to further the criminal common purpose by attacking and

17     expelling non-Serbs there, Arandjelovic and his JNA forces were busily

18     ridding the SBWS territory of the non-Serbs who lived in Western Srem,

19     places whose name we see, Lovas, Tovarnik, Bapska, Sarengrad, Ilok, for

20     example.

21             Arandjelovic, his JNA forces in the south contributing to the

22     same common purpose as the pounding, the destruction of Vukovar, which is

23     intended to achieve the same result also being sought by Biorcevic,

24     Arkan, and Hadzic's own backyard in the north, it's all the same, top to

25     bottom, north to south.  The OG South/OG North distinction bears no

Page 9054

 1     relevance to the Chamber's consideration of the evidence in this case or

 2     the joint criminal enterprise.

 3             On the 27th of September 1991, a Bora Tomic delivered an

 4     ultimatum to the inhabitants of Bapska.  It was signed by JNA

 5     Major Slobodan Barjaktarevic, who was under the command of

 6     Major-General Arandjelovic.  The Chamber has the ultimatum.  I'm not

 7     going to bring it up or read it, but it made clear that if the people of

 8     Bapska did not surrender the village would be erased from the map.  The

 9     ultimatum was read out on Croatian TV, P324, paragraphs 13 to 16; P316,

10     page 1.

11             Arandjelovic was involved in the expulsion of the non-Serbs

12     inhabitants of Ilok.  During the negotiations leading up to the

13     expulsion - this is October 1991 - Arandjelovic threatened the Croat

14     representatives from Ilok if they did not surrender their weapons:

15             "I am going to use tanks and howitzers and aircraft and I'm going

16     to level Ilok to the ground."

17             That's the statement attributed to Arandjelovic by

18     Witness Brletic, P1418, transcript 1338.

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 9055

 1   (redacted)

 2             Mr. President, Your Honours, we submit that the purported

 3     distinction, as I've said, between North and South is not only incorrect,

 4     it is artificial.  The JNA forces deployed throughout the entire SBWS

 5     territory were there to make their contribution to the joint criminal

 6     enterprise, each with their respective areas of responsibility, making

 7     their own contribution.

 8             Hadzic, as president of the government of the SBWS, was fully

 9     informed about and enthusiastically supported the JNA's ethnic cleansing

10     activities throughout his territory.

11             I'd like to show one video, Mr. President, with your permission,

12     P322.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Presenter:  Let's move on to the

15     area of Slavonia and Western Srem.

16             "Reporter:  After the press conference that was held in Erdut

17     earlier today, we asked Mr. Hadzic, the prime minister of Slavonia,

18     Baranja, and Western Srem, to respond to several questions for the

19     benefit of the viewers of TV Belgrade.  Mr. Hadzic, to what extent are

20     fierce battles being fought at the moment on the battle-field ?  What are

21     the prospects in this war?

22             "Goran Hadzic:  There is fierce fighting going on.  This first

23     operation, the first part of the liberation of Western Srem is in its

24     final stages, the battles for Vukovar, as I say, are being fought.  It

25     could be said that our units control almost 50 per cent of the town.  We

Page 9056

 1     have secured positions and advances are made slowly house by house.  Over

 2     the past two days the operation to cleanse the Ustasha villages has been

 3     completed.  After the mopping up of the Sid-Vinkovci route, a couple of

 4     Ustasha villages were also cleansed on this route in this central section

 5     of the area, this was three days ago, and that's to say Bogdanovci and

 6     the villages down there.  Some of the villages surrendered.

 7     Specifically, in Ilok we have an offer of surrender from a group, while

 8     another extremist group will not allow it.  Incidentally, I will be

 9     attending talks today to take care of this issue so that they surrender

10     their weapons and that the culprits be brought to justice and those who

11     did not do anything wrong can stay and live together with us.

12             "Reporter:  Will the Territorial Defence men" --

13             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you.

14             Mr. President, I brought up this video, it's obviously -- well,

15     in our view it's relevant for quite a number of different things.  First

16     of all, (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)  We know that the timing of this video, it's prior to the fall of

23     Vukovar.  He says they control almost 50 per cent of the town.  So this

24     is quite likely in November or October of 1991.

25             He's demonstrating knowledge and support of the entire operations

Page 9057

 1     of the JNA that are taking place at the time.  At this stage of the case

 2     it's our submission that the Chamber has heard plenty of evidence about

 3     the crimes that are being committed against non-Serbs in all of these

 4     areas.  Of course we hear his repeated references to Ustasha villages as

 5     a justification for the cleansing of entire villages which, in our view,

 6     the Chamber knows, has heard evidence, was indeed taking place.

 7             If we can just continue with the video.

 8             Sorry, just before we start, Mr. President, could I ask to redact

 9     from page 26, lines 10 to 16.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes, Mr. Stringer.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Reporter:  Will the

13     Territorial Defence men, village defenders, and the Yugoslav People's

14     Army mount a fierce offensive of some sort because as of late, as you

15     know, a number of objections have been raised in respect of the ferocity

16     of the operations especially those conducted by the

17     Yugoslav People's Army?

18             "Goran Hadzic:  Well, yes, there have been objections.  They are,

19     I would say, relatively warranted, given its stance and the possibilities

20     open to it.  Our primary objective is not to kill Croatian people in

21     large numbers, but to punish the criminals among them.  This means that

22     we have tried everything, including these democratic approaches and other

23     non-military approaches, to prevent it.  However, even after we signed

24     truces and agreements and after negotiations, the Ustasha continued to

25     act in disregard of the signatures.  This means that everyone with all

Page 9058

 1     this - I do not trust them at all - it is clear to me that there is no

 2     more negotiating with them and that the situation must be tackled

 3     militarily.  After this press release of the Supreme Command -- and this

 4     press release of the Supreme Command speaks in the same vein, but we must

 5     be aware that the army cannot do that without its people.  In other

 6     words, there must be a co-ordinated action of some sort, a true

 7     co-ordinated action of the people together with the army."

 8             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you.

 9             Now, just a couple of remarks here, Mr. President, starting with

10     possibly the most important which is the final point Hadzic makes here,

11     which is the importance of co-ordination between the people and the army.

12     Hadzic is the people, the JNA is the army, and they are indeed

13     co-ordinating and working in their own respective spheres toward

14     achieving the common criminal purpose.

15             Hadzic makes a few references in here to bringing culprits to

16     justice.  People, the culprits, will be dealt with -- they will be

17     brought to justice and those who did not do anything wrong can stay and

18     live with us.  This is an important point because, in our view, it

19     relates to this issue of the Croatian fighters from the Vukovar hospital

20     who, in theory, were also to be brought to justice.  This is a common

21     thread throughout Hadzic's statements.  It's false, in our view.  It's a

22     lie.  He has no intention of bringing any of these people to justice in

23     the true sense of the word.  It's our submission that, as will be the

24     case on the Ovcara submissions, it's his intention that they be brought

25     to justice through retribution and violence.  This is just for public

Page 9059

 1     consumption; that's our assertion.

 2             That brings me to Ovcara.  He moves for a judgement of acquittal

 3     as to the Ovcara massacre on the 20th of November, 1991.  We know,

 4     Your Honours, that on that day the 260 prisoners executed there on the

 5     night of the 20th began their day as prisoners of the JNA.  They were

 6     rounded up at the Vukovar hospital and taken to the JNA barracks, where

 7     they spent some period of time.  This is -- I'm referring now to

 8     transcript 8658-8660, Witness GH-063, Mr. Karlovic.

 9             We also know that a group of prisoners, Croatian fighters from

10     the Mitnica unit, had already been removed by the JNA previously and

11     taken to the JNA prison at Sremska Mitrovica, transcript 8686.

12             The reason why the second group of prisoners was never taken down

13     to Sremska Mitrovica is because Goran Hadzic played a decisive role in

14     pressuring the JNA to turn the prisoners over to him and his local

15     authorities, including ultimately the TO commander Vujovic, who was in

16     charge of the killing operation.  I'm referring of course to the pivotal

17     meeting between Hadzic, other members of his government, and

18     representatives of the JNA, which was held at the Velepromet complex

19     earlier in the day on the 20th.

20             On 20 November 1991, a session of the government of the SAO SBWS

21     took place at Velepromet.  Hadzic presided and the chief topic of the

22     agenda was war prisoners.  GH-028, transcript 6303, 6304, 6307, 6311.

23             Hadzic had arrived at the Velepromet facility with Arkan; that's

24     agreed fact 60.  The Trial Chamber will recall Arkan's statement that he

25     doesn't take prisoners, P102.  The meeting with the JNA was tense.  At

Page 9060

 1     one point Arkan took his pistol off his chest and put it on the desk,

 2     GH-028, transcript 6314.

 3             The Chamber will recall my description earlier of the incident in

 4     which Hadzic had Mr. Arkan present in order to intimidate and bully

 5     Veljka Dzakula on the issue of whether he supported or agreed to

 6     co-existence with Croats.  Here again we see Hadzic with Arkan in this

 7     pivotal meeting, again not hesitating to bring his attack dog, who

 8     doesn't hesitate to threaten and intimidate even other Serbs who don't

 9     share the prevailing view of Serbdom that exists in the Hadzic

10     government.  The Chamber's going to hear about another incident of Arkan

11     being used to intimidate and threaten a person who expressed disagreement

12     with the Hadzic policy in Ms. Clanton's submissions later.

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 9061

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Goran Hadzic:  This is the first

 3     meeting of the government held in the future capital of our Serb district

 4     of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.  Now to the conclusions, apart

 5     from the ones intended to bring life and the situation in general back to

 6     normal, there is one main conclusion that the Ustasha prisoners who have

 7     blood on their hands must not leave the territory of the Serb district of

 8     Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and they cannot be taken to Serbia

 9     because Serbia is not a country at war.  Also, the army that assisted in

10     the capture, well those who were taken prisoner were not soldiers, they

11     were paramilitaries.  They can only be put on trial by the people here,

12     that is to say the people of our Serb district which has been recognised,

13     which has its court.  We even have a second-instance court.  The third

14     instance could possibly be on the federal level, the Yugoslav level, but

15     we have our district court and our municipal court.  Consequently we have

16     agreed with the authorities that the Ustasha remain in some of our camps

17     around Vukovar.  Since one group was already taken to Sremska Mitrovica,

18     I will make sure that these people, if they can be called people at all,

19     are brought back and put on trial here, those who are culpable and those

20     who are not will naturally be released so they can join us in rebuilding

21     our town.

22             "Journalist:  In your estimate, how many" --

23             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you.

24             Mr. President, apart from yet another demonisation of the Croat

25     prisoners, if we can call them people at all, as he says, Hadzic makes

Page 9062

 1     clear that he has now reached an agreement with the military authorities

 2     that the prisoners would stay in the SBWS.  He tells the world this.  He

 3     refers to the earlier group that had already been taken down to

 4     Sremska Mitrovica, and he's now going to try to bring those back, those

 5     people back, and we know that he did.  Again, the evidence of his having

 6     gone to Sremska Mitrovica with judges and other people, I refer, for

 7     example, to the testimony of Mr. Pribudic.

 8             In essence, in this video Hadzic tells the world that he has

 9     taken responsibility for the lives of these prisoners and he cannot wash

10     his hands of his responsibility, given his direct involvement, the

11     pressure he's brought to bear, in procuring their transfer from the JNA

12     forces to his local authorities.  By the time Hadzic was giving this

13     interview, the buses of prisoners, some 260 of them which had been

14     waiting at the barracks, had in all likelihood arrived at Ovcara.  Many

15     prisoners were beaten in the hangar, a few were executed.  The Chamber

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19     prisoners, Vujovic answered:

20             "That's no longer your concern, it is our business."

21             Transcript 4927.  The prisoners were in Vujovic's hands because

22     Hadzic made it happen.

23             That night, as the Chamber knows, the prisoners were summarily

24     executed in groups of 20 to 30.  The beatings and executions were carried

25     out by members of the JNA, volunteers of the Leva Supoderica unit, and

Page 9063

 1     the local TO.  Adjudicated facts 125-126; GH-129, transcript 4925,

 2     4931-4932.

 3             Your Honour, it's the Prosecution position that Goran Hadzic was

 4     lying when he said that he wanted the prisoners to stay so that they

 5     could stand trial.  Based upon not only the evidence that I've described

 6     today but all the evidence in the case, his own views, his repeated

 7     expressions demonising Croats, association with Arkan, and Arkan's role

 8     in keeping these prisoners in the territory - Arkan is someone who

 9     doesn't take prisoners - it's our submission that he did this in order to

10     keep the prisoners in the SBWS so that they could be killed.  He played a

11     direct role in bringing about the deaths of these prisoners.  The

12     perpetrators were all linked to Hadzic's co-JCE members or to Hadzic

13     himself through his SBWS TO.  The crime itself is not disputed.  The

14     Prosecution submits that on these facts, a reasonable Chamber could, for

15     purposes of this 98 bis hearing, find that Hadzic is responsible for this

16     crime under any of the modes of liability that are charged in the

17     indictment.

18             Your Honour, perhaps this would be the time to -- I could, with

19     Your Honour's permission, start on the Velepromet piece.  I might not be

20     able to finish it, but maybe I'll just continue.  I was going to say we

21     could break and I could come back for the Velepromet part.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  I think that's a good idea, Mr. Stringer.  Let's

23     take the break now and come back at 11.00.  Court adjourned.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

Page 9064

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zivanovic, we heard that you want to address

 2     the Court.

 3             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Yes, I'd just like to inform the Chamber that we

 4     noted some discrepancies between Exhibit P322, the transcript of this

 5     exhibit and the content of the transcript here on the -- it is page 27

 6     through 33.  There are more than one or two discrepancies, and I wouldn't

 7     inform about it in details.  But just to let you know, and we shall see

 8     with the translation service how it appears.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

10             Mr. Stringer.

11             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12             Just to follow-up, the transcript of the video was printed from

13     e-court and was given to the interpreters in the booths to assist them.

14     The extent I think to which they read versus listen and interpret is

15     obviously for them.  So if there's a discrepancy, that may be part of

16     what's happening.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The quality of the

18     translation received is rather poor so the interpretation differed

19     because of that.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Is this the quality of the interpretation or the

21     quality of the copy you got?

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The quality of the written translation of the

23     videos that were played.  The translation into English was problematic in

24     our view.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  So it's about content.  Okay.  Thank you.

Page 9065

 1             MR. STRINGER:  I'm being told that what's in e-court actually

 2     bears a Defence document ID, so I think it's obviously for the Chamber to

 3     consider as it sees fit.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Stringer.

 5             MR. STRINGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Also just to -- I failed

 6     to mention the -- give a citation on the Kvocka, this -- on the legal

 7     submissions on contribution referred to the Kvocka appeals judgement

 8     decision or the appeals judgement, I should say, and just for the record

 9     that's the 25th of February, 2005, paragraph 263.  I didn't give that

10     citation on page 15, lines 14 to 15, today which would have been the

11     place to do it.

12             Shall I -- could I also indicate for the record, Mr. President,

13     that we're now joined in the courtroom by our intern, Mr. Kat Tai Tam,

14     who's joining us for the remainder of today's proceedings.

15             One last loose end -- one last loose end, Mr. President.  On the

16     issue of the Vukovar, we would like to direct the Chamber to the

17     testimony of Mr. Theunens at 4296-4297, also P1694.  And this relates to

18     a ceremony or recognition of the 1st Military District of the JNA which

19     was given to the efforts of the volunteers for their contribution to the

20     Vukovar operation and this was held at the SSNO, that's the secretariat

21     for the people's defence in Belgrade, at a reception on the

22     21st of November, 1991.  And to congratulate JNA officers involved in --

23     who were in charge of the operation at Vukovar, Mile Mrksic,

24     Andrija Biorcevic, Zivota Panic, who was the commander of the

25     1st military district.  Noting also that Vukovar TO member

Page 9066

 1     Miroljub Vujovic was also present with Kadijevic who was the secretary

 2     for All People's Defence at the reception in his office.  And so we see

 3     that as a broader, more JNA-membership-based piece of evidence that

 4     relates to the Vukovar operation as well as Ovcara.

 5             With regard to Velepromet, Your Honours, the Prosecution position

 6     is that Hadzic bears responsibility for the crimes committed at

 7     Velepromet as charged in Counts 2 through 9 because the perpetrators of

 8     the crimes were linked to members of the JCE of which Hadzic was a

 9     member.  This applies whether the perpetrators were JNA, local TO, or

10     volunteers.

11             The evidence shows that the perpetrators of the crimes committed

12     at Velepromet were both members of the JNA, Vukovar TO, and volunteers.

13     As counsel indicated in his submissions on Monday, the JNA acquiesced in

14     the crimes committed against prisoners by others such as volunteers who

15     were permitted to enter the Velepromet compound; that's transcript 9016.

16     Even if TO members or Chetniks committing crimes were subordinated to the

17     JNA at the time or had been subordinated to the JNA for operational

18     purposes as counsel asserts at page 9016 of the transcript, this still

19     does not sever or break the link between the crimes, the perpetrators and

20     Hadzic in the JCE.  Of course, as set out in our earlier submissions, the

21     TO SBWS members were subordinates of Goran Hadzic.  And I'm going to

22     direct the Chamber to additional evidence on that issue shortly.

23             This does not change even if they had been temporarily

24     subordinated to the JNA.  Those perpetrators at Velepromet were clearly

25     carrying out crimes that form a part of the JCE, crimes that Hadzic

Page 9067

 1     intended and accepted.

 2             Furthermore, both the JNA and TO units were closely co-operating

 3     with members of the SBWS government and the other Serb forces, such as

 4     Chetnik volunteers used by the JCE members during the implementation of

 5     the JCE.  For example, counsel claims that Velepromet was a JNA

 6     headquarters under the control of the JNA; that's Monday's transcript at

 7     9016.  However, as we know, the Velepromet facility was indeed used by

 8     Hadzic and his government as the site of the important government meeting

 9     held there on the 20th during which the fate of the Ovcara prisoners was

10     decided.  This is yet another example of the collaboration between the

11     various JCE actors, Serb forces, and Hadzic's government.

12             We note some ambiguity in the Defence position in respect of

13     Velepromet, and I do wish also to highlight briefly errors in counsel's

14     characterisation of what must be proved in relation to Hadzic's knowledge

15     and intent regarding crimes at Velepromet.

16             In his submissions counsel initially referred to challenging the

17     Velepromet crimes that occurred on 19 November 1991; that's page 8988 of

18     Monday's transcript.  However, in the course of the submissions on

19     Velepromet, the Defence referred to the evidence of GH-063.  63 was not

20     present at Velepromet until the 21st of November, after he had been

21     returned from Ovcara on the night of the 20th, spent the night at a place

22     called Modateka and then brought to Velepromet on the 21st where he spent

23     time with others in the room of death and the carpentry workshop, the

24     Stolarija; that's transcript of GH-063, 8670 and -71.  So there is

25     somewhat of a disconnect in terms of the time-frame, 19, 20, 21,

Page 9068

 1     involving the crimes at Velepromet and precisely what the Defence is

 2     challenging.

 3             Counsel's also mis-characterised the law, in our view, again in

 4     terms of what is required to prove Hadzic's knowledge and involvement and

 5     responsibility for crimes at Velepromet.  At page 9016 and 9017 of

 6     Monday's hearing, my learned friend says, I'm quoting:

 7             "There has to be evidence that he knows, starting with knowledge,

 8     there has to be knowledge that these crimes are taking place or will take

 9     place.  He," referring to Hadzic, "has to have at least an awareness that

10     that's going to occur; and if he doesn't, then there cannot be liability

11     for those crimes."

12             We would just simply refer the Chamber to our earlier submissions

13     on the knowledge requirement in respect of Hadzic's liability for these

14     crimes as a member of the joint criminal enterprise, particularly the

15     Krajisnik Appeals Chamber judgement at paragraph 200 in which the

16     Appeals Chamber stated the Trial Chamber had correctly identified the

17     required mens rea for the first form of JCE, explaining that it must be

18     shown that the JCE participants, including the accused, had a common

19     state of mind; namely, the state of mind that the statutory crimes

20     forming part of the JCE objective should be carried out.

21             So we do not have to prove Hadzic's knowledge of the specific

22     incidents, as was asserted by my learned friend on Monday, for every

23     beating, every murder, every incident that occurred at Velepromet during

24     the 19th, the 20th, or the 21st.

25             In our submissions we will address the composition of the Serb

Page 9069

 1     forces that were at the Velepromet facility during the three-day period

 2     of 19 to 21 November, which is the period that corresponds to

 3     paragraph 31 of the indictment, as set out in annex 1.

 4             There is no dispute that Hadzic was present at Velepromet on the

 5     20th.  However, Mr. President, Your Honours, it's the Prosecution

 6     position that because the crimes committed at Velepromet were all linked

 7     to co-JCE members of Hadzic, his presence or not at Velepromet at the

 8     moment that any given crime was committed is not decisive in respect of

 9     his criminal liability.

10             Your Honours have heard evidence that non-Serbs were detained at

11     Velepromet from early November 1991 under the control of the JNA,

12     Exhibit P2285.2284, which is a report drafted by the Guards Motorised

13     Brigade security organ.

14             Your Honours have also heard from victims and survivors that

15     non-Serbs were detained at Velepromet following the fall of Vukovar on

16     the 18th of November, 1991.  They testified before the Chamber that the

17     guards at Velepromet were members of the Vukovar TO.  Referring here to

18     P2506, transcript 4008-4013, 4035-36.  That on the 19th of November there

19     were paramilitaries wearing all sorts of clothing.  Also Covic, P067.1,

20     transcript 3441.3443, referring to a member of the Territorial Defence

21     and members of the Territorial Defence at Velepromet being in charge.

22             GH-054 stated that he was taken to Velepromet on the

23     21st of November and was searched by a soldier and reservist.  He noted

24     that three prisoners were taken away by paramilitaries and never

25     returned.  That's P02032, paragraphs 44-45.

Page 9070

 1             In the submissions on Monday, counsel referred to the evidence of

 2     GH-063, Mr. Karlovic.  He was quoted -- Karlovic was quoted by the

 3     Defence at page 9016 of Monday's hearing, stating that "the JNA military

 4     police was in charge of guarding us," that statement being attributed to

 5     Karlovic.  That's referring to page 8674 of Karlovic's trial testimony.

 6     However, the Defence failed to provide Your Honours with the remainder of

 7     Karlovic's evidence on that point.  He said, and it's on the same

 8     page, 8674:

 9             "There is no procedure.  The JNA military police was in charge of

10     guarding us.  However, the Chetniks had no problem entering the two rooms

11     we were in and taking people out.  Quite simply, the JNA military police,

12     in co-operation with the Chetniks, had organised for those people to be

13     taken out and killed."

14             So it's our position, Mr. President, the evidence supports that

15     both components, volunteers as well as JNA, were working together or

16     certainly facilitating the activities of each other at Velepromet.

17             Members of the Guards Brigade Motorised Brigade security organ,

18     the Guards Motorised Brigade military police, and members of the

19     Territorial Defence were present at Velepromet on the 19th of November;

20     that is, P02284, paragraphs 51, 56; also transcript 6390.

21             In front of the hangars where the detainees were held, there were

22     two sets of guards, JNA military police, and Chetniks.  This is P02284,

23     paragraph 58-59.

24             During a visit by the international diplomat and negotiator

25     Herbert Okun, who was part of the delegation of Cyrus Vance, a visit to

Page 9071

 1     Vukovar on the 19th of November, 1991, more specifically at the reception

 2     centre there, it was noted that the centre was full of JNA and other

 3     rough customers, armed irregulars, and others.  According to Okun there

 4     was an air of brooding and imminent menace conveyed by Chetnik-types.

 5     The JNA and irregular forces were intermingled and smoking cigarettes

 6     together.

 7             P1332.1325, page 33; P1325, transcript 16917 and 16919, that's

 8     Okun's 92 quater statement I'm referring to.

 9             GH-054 testified that a JNA captain came on the 21st of November,

10     took him to the room of death.  The captain said that they were all in

11     danger of getting killed that night.  This is 2032, paragraph 46.

12             The room of death that the Chamber's heard a lot of evidence

13     about P02056.1, transcript 5923-5924.

14             Witness 54 gave evidence, I'm going to refer to at transcript

15     5498 and also P2038, regarding the identities of various victims who were

16     in the room of death, among whom was Tihomir Perkovic, who was killed;

17     that's at GH-063's evidence at trial transcript 8675.

18             8676, GH-063, Karlovic, tells his own story about when the

19     Chetniks came into the room and took the 14-year-old boy, had him remove

20     his clothes before taking him out and killing him.

21             The JNA leadership in Vukovar, including Mrksic and Sljivancanin,

22     were aware of the beatings and killings occurring at Velepromet on the

23     night of the 19th of November, 1991.  That's agreed fact or possibly

24     adjudicated fact, I should say, adjudicated fact 157.  Also P2284,

25     paragraph 81-83.

Page 9072

 1             That night, Sljivancanin told members of the security

 2     administration:

 3             "Don't be surprised if Chetniks are slaughtering Ustashas there."

 4             That's 2284, paragraph 49-50; trial transcript 6353.

 5             So on the basis of all this, Mr. President, it's our position

 6     then that the JNA, being in charge of the Velepromet, the evidence

 7     indicating that JNA personnel were guarding prisoners and yet at the same

 8     time making the prisoners available to Chetniks for purposes of beatings

 9     and murders, these are linked through to JCE membership, the JCE

10     membership on the one hand and the Chetnik volunteers through to Seselj's

11     Serbian Radical Party on the other, committing crimes which are within

12     the intended scope of the JCE of which Hadzic is a member.

13             I'd like to just spend my last few minutes directing the

14     Chamber's attention to some pieces of evidence which relate to Hadzic's

15     authorities and his role, contribution, in respect of some of the other

16     JCE actors whose crimes were taking place throughout the SBWS region.

17             As we said in our legal submissions, it's not necessary to prove

18     that Hadzic contributed in some direct way to each criminal incident.

19     What is required is his proof of a significant contribution to the common

20     criminal purpose.  Hadzic used his powers and authorities as

21     prime minister of the SBWS government and the support he received from

22     the Serbian leadership in Belgrade to contribute to the common criminal

23     purpose, which encompassed the crimes in this case including the specific

24     incidents alleged challenged by counsel in their 98 bis submissions.

25             As prime minister, according to GH-016, Hadzic possessed the

Page 9073

 1     powers typical exercised by prime ministers from around the world, but

 2     the powers were augmented due to the state of immediate threat of war in

 3     SBWS.  That's transcript 1106-1108, and 1236.

 4             Witnesses universally testified that Hadzic was in command of the

 5     Serbian National Security unit, SNB, that was led by Stevo Bogic.  For

 6     example, P1040, paragraphs 37-39 and 41; transcript 2825-2826; P140,

 7     paragraphs 94-95; P111, paragraphs 79 and 80; P246, which is a 92 ter

 8     statement, the transcript reference there 15201; and P201.140.

 9             Hadzic selected members of his SBWS government, that's GH-016,

10     P140, paragraph 20.  He proposed presidents of the municipal councils who

11     were approved by his government, P197.140, including the -- Mr. -- the

12     appointment of Mr. Borislav Zivanovic to be president of the

13     Beli Manastir Executive Council.  The Chamber may recall that it was

14     Zivanovic and the Beli Manastir authorities which had passed a number of

15     highly discriminatory pieces of legislation against non-Serbs residing in

16     the Beli Manastir region during the latter part of 1991, referring here

17     to P2157, 2158, 2160.

18             The effects of the discriminatory legislation were described at

19     transcript 5827-37.

20             We know that Hadzic used his position and support to obtain

21     needed equipment, manpower, and materials for the Serb forces that were

22     conducting the crimes on the ground in the SBWS.  Witness Djordjevic gave

23     evidence of the trip that Hadzic and Arkan made to Belgrade in

24     November of 1991, in which they met at the Serbian Ministry of Defence

25     with Djordjevic who was acting on the co-ordination group of the

Page 9074

 1     Ministry of Defence.  Hadzic requested 30- or 40.000 grenades.  He was

 2     provided a smaller quantity of grenades for a different weapon.  That's

 3     P2300, paragraph 71.

 4             Hadzic ordered that the Erdut training centre expenses be covered

 5     out of the funds of the DP Dalj agricultural enterprise, the place where

 6     Arkan was based.  Pursuant to Hadzic's order, Arkan's training centre was

 7     financed by DP Dalj.  P215.140 and P214.140.

 8             Hadzic had command over the SAO SBWS police and he exercised his

 9     authority to appoint and dismiss members of the police, P111,

10     paragraphs 29-34; transcript 881, 884, 972 and 975.

11             My colleague, Ms. Clanton, will address further issues regarding

12     the SBWS police and Mr. Hadzic's relationship with it.  As prime

13     minister, Hadzic was Commander-in-Chief of the SBWS TO, T 1218, T 8283,

14     8292-93, 8378-8380; P1327, transcript of which is 17119-120; and P2913.1,

15     paragraphs 98-99.  That's the authority supporting that Hadzic was the

16     Commander-in-Chief of the SBWS TO.  Hadzic appointed Radovan Stojicic,

17     Badza, as commander of the SBWS TO, P140, paragraph 48; transcript

18     page 2645-2649.

19             Witness Djordjevic of the Serbian Ministry of Defence gave

20     evidence that as Croatia withdrew from the SFRY, presidents of the SAOs

21     in Croatia filled the void that would have been otherwise filled by the

22     president of the republic in respect of the TOs.  He says at P2300,

23     paragraph 8:

24             "Presidents of the SAOs with their assemblies and structures

25     became responsible under the law for organising and equipping the TOs in

Page 9075

 1     their territories."

 2             This means that for the SAO SBWS, it was Hadzic who was

 3     responsible for organising and equipping the SBWS Territorial Defence.

 4             We know that Badza, Stojicic, whom Hadzic appointed, was a

 5     high-level government of the MUP, Ministry of the Interior, of Serbia;

 6     and that once he arrived in the SBWS Stojicic attended meetings of

 7     Hadzic's SBWS government.  P2913, paragraph 100; see also L38, page 3;

 8     and P197.140.

 9             One witness said that Hadzic and Stojicic regularly attended

10     meetings together approximately every few days, P246, transcript 15186.

11             GH-027 testified that Hadzic resisted taking on active-duty JNA

12     officers as commanders of the SBWS TO.  And as a result, no senior

13     active-duty JNA officers were appointed as commanders of TO staffs in the

14     SBWS.  Instead, the SBWS TO officers were local taxi-drivers and

15     labourers, and this was one of the ways in which Hadzic maintained

16     control over what he referred to as "their" TO.  That's P2913.1,

17     paragraphs 98-99; transcript 8161-62; P2959.2913.

18             That evidence is consistent with the evidence of GH-068 -- excuse

19     me, GH-168, a witness who counsel spent quite a bit of time attempting to

20     discredit in his submissions on Monday.  On this point, GH-168's

21     testimony is completely consistent with the testimony not only that I've

22     just cited, but also to the testimony of Djordjevic of the Serbian

23     Ministry of Defence.

24             168 testified that the SBWS leadership headed by Hadzic set up TO

25     staffs to assist with the implementation of the plan to create

Page 9076

 1     Greater Serbia.  He said that Hadzic's government selected staff members

 2     and subordinate units on that basis of the membership and loyalty to the

 3     SDS and their willingness to carry out any task.  That's transcript

 4     8282-8284; 8292-93; 8375, 8378-80.

 5             Djordjevic, who's co-ordination group was tasked to provide

 6     support to the TOs in Croatia, gave evidence that as opposed to the

 7     SAO Krajina, in 1991 the SBWS TO had limited dealings with the Serbian

 8     Ministry of Defence, again consistent with what's being said by 168 and

 9     also GH-027.

10             Djordjevic said that he believed the SBWS TO dealt more closely

11     with the JNA and possibly the Serbian MUP because Stojicic, Badza, was

12     also himself a member of the Serbian MUP.  P2300, paragraph 21.

13             Brief few words on the volunteer unit Leva Supoderica and Arkan.

14     P194.140, Hadzic, as SBWS prime minister, exercised his authority in

15     appointing Arkan as commander of the Erdut training centre.  P140,

16     paragraphs 98, 100-101; also transcript 1218, 2650-2651.

17             More generally, Witness GH-010 testified that volunteer units

18     arriving in the SBWS placed themselves under the SBWS TO; that's

19     transcript 4813-14; P1739; P1740.

20             Exhibit 1727 indicates -- identifies Leva Supoderica as being one

21     of these units comprised of volunteers from the Serbian Radical Party.

22     They were dispatched from Belgrade.  Its commander was Milan Lancuzanin,

23     also known as Kameni.  This document, 1727 bears the stamp of the

24     Vukovar TO staff.  2576, dated the 9th of November, 1991, to Kameni was

25     commanding Leva Supoderica personnel as part of the Vukovar operation,

Page 9077

 1     receives this letter indicating additional volunteers are being

 2     dispatched to be placed "under the protection of the Vukovar TO."

 3             P151, on the 21st of January, 1992, Hadzic issued a decision

 4     disbanding the Leva Supoderica at the proposal of an assistant commander

 5     of the Novi Sad Corps.  Hadzic issued the call welcoming volunteers from

 6     Serbia to come into the SBWS and to join the Serb forces already engaged

 7     there.  He enthusiastically thanked them for their support and

 8     contribution, P58, transcript 610-612.

 9             My last remarks are about the Serbian National Security unit, the

10     SNB, an elite unit that was formed for purposes of providing security to

11     Hadzic.  They were based in the Erdut training centre in the government

12     offices.  They were led by Stevo Bogic.  P1040, paragraphs 54-61, 79;

13     transcript 2895-2896.

14             Bogic reported directly to Hadzic, 1040, paragraph 37, 38.

15             There is a close connection between Bogic and the SNB, their

16     personnel, and members of Arkan's Tigers, some of Arkan's Tigers received

17     the SNB identification cards which enabled them to move throughout the

18     area more freely even beyond the curfew time.  P1040, paragraph 58.

19     Members of the SNB acting jointly with some of Arkan's Tigers committed

20     some of the most brutal and cold-blooded murders charged in this case.

21     They also participated in brutal interrogations and torture, taking place

22     with Arkan and Milorad Stricevic in the training centre.  Members of

23     Hadzic's SNB arrested and murdered Juliana Pap, Franjo Pap and

24     Natalia Rakin, whose deaths are charged in paragraph 28 and whose bodies

25     were dumped into the well outside Borovo Selo, that the Chamber visited a

Page 9078

 1     few months ago.

 2             Could I briefly go into closed session or private session,

 3     Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session, please.

 5                           [Private session]

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13                           [Open session]

14             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

16             MR. STRINGER:  Mr. President, unless the Chamber has any

17     questions, that completes my submissions at this point.  I propose to

18     give the floor to my colleague, Ms. Clanton, who will continue with our

19     response.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Stringer.

21             Ms. Clanton.

22             MS. CLANTON:  Good morning, Your Honours, Mr. President.

23             As Mr. Stringer has explained, at the Rule 98 bis stage the

24     question for Your Honours is whether the Prosecution has adduced enough

25     evidence for each count taken as a whole, as opposed to an examination of

Page 9079

 1     all of the various charges making up the particular count.  The

 2     Prosecution submits that it has presented evidence establishing each of

 3     the incidents charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.

 4     However, since it is unnecessary to establish the sufficiency of the

 5     evidence for every incident at this stage, our next submissions will

 6     focus on particular crimes and events that illustrate that the

 7     Prosecution's evidence is indeed capable of sustaining a conviction for

 8     every count of the indictment.

 9             I would like to begin with the detention and murders that took

10     place in the Dalj police buildings.  These crimes fall under Counts 1

11     through 9 of the indictment.

12             The Chamber has heard evidence about the murders of at least 39

13     people in Dalj over the course of a two-week period in September and

14     October of 1991.  These crimes shocked the community and further

15     intimidated the remaining non-Serb population of Dalj and the surrounding

16     villages.  As shocking as they were, these killings were not random or

17     isolated incidents.  The evidence shows that these crimes were part of

18     the pattern of crimes committed against non-Serbs to force them from the

19     territory and ensure that they would not return.

20             Beginning with paragraph 24, the murder of 11 persons on

21     September 21st, 1991.  By the time of this crime, Dalj had already fallen

22     into the hands of Serb forces and was serving as the seat of Hadzic's

23     government.  The forceful take-over of Dalj on the 1st of August, 1991,

24     was part of what Hadzic described on the radio as the "decisive attack"

25     on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, which had been planned in

Page 9080

 1     July of 1991.  T 8291-8292; P2987; transcript page 1284-1285.

 2             In September 1991, non-Serb civilians who had been arrested in

 3     Baranja were transferred by the SBWS and Serbian police through Serbia to

 4     Borovo Selo.  They joined other non-Serb civilians who had been arrested

 5     from Dalj, Erdut, Aljmas, and the respective hill areas or "planina" of

 6     each of those villages.  All of the arrests were arbitrary, no criminal

 7     reports, detention orders, or other paperwork were provided for the

 8     detainees.  As the Chamber heard, this transfer of non-Serb detainees

 9     from Banja and other parts of the SBWS to Dalj was done pursuant to

10     Hadzic's orders.  This included his own assertion when confronted about

11     the status of these people that he was the prime minister and could order

12     that anything be done.  That's P111, paragraphs 49-54; transcript

13     5821-5822.

14             Some prisoners from Baranja were then taken to Dalj, where they

15     were first detained at the cultural centre and then to the local

16     co-operative or Zadruga building that was serving as the Dalj police

17     area.  While in these Dalj police buildings, the detainees were

18     frequently interrogated and savagely beaten almost every night.  In

19     particular, they were beaten and interrogated by Milorad Stricevic and

20     his so-called space police, who were notorious for taking people away,

21     interrogating them, physically mistreating them and liquidating them,

22     P278, paragraphs 9-10; P111, paragraphs 47 and 65.  A few days into their

23     imprisonment, Arkan arrived at the facility and swore at the detainees,

24     calling them Ustashas.  He was together with Marko Loncarevic, a former

25     policeman who co-ordinated the work of the TO staffs of the SBWS, as well

Page 9081

 1     as several men in camouflage uniform, Arkan's men.  After introducing

 2     himself to the detainees, Arkan, that is, his men beat them severely with

 3     iron chairs until the chairs fell apart, P2132, page 7; P2110, page 5.

 4             During the night of the 21st to the 22nd of September, Hadzic and

 5     Arkan arrived at the police building along with approximately 20 of

 6     Arkan's men.  After introducing himself to the detainees, Hadzic ordered

 7     that two of the men be released to him and left the remaining

 8     11 prisoners to Arkan and his men, P250.245; P2132, pages 8-9.

 9             The Trial Chamber will recall that Hadzic had earlier attended a

10     meeting with Arkan and journalist Aernout van Lynden in Belgrade, during

11     which Arkan openly stated that he took no prisoners and told van Lynden

12     that he would not be able to film if he killed prisoners.  This is a

13     statement that Arkan publicly repeated throughout the international

14     media, transcript page 7029; P102.  It therefore could not have come as a

15     surprise to Hadzic or to anyone else that the 11 detainees were executed

16     by Arkan and his men after they were removed from the Dalj police

17     station.  Hadzic's responsibility for this incident did not cease at the

18     time that the non-Serbs whom he brought to Dalj were killed.  He is

19     further responsible for covering up this crime and preventing an

20     investigation.

21             Mr. President, if we could go into private session, please.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session, please.

23                           [Private session]

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 9082











11  Page 9082 redacted.  Private session.















Page 9083

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4                           [Open session]

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 7             MS. CLANTON:  Approximately two weeks after the murder of 11

 8     persons, at least 28 prisoners detained in the Dalj police station were

 9     killed by Milorad Stricevic, Arkan, and their men.  This incident appears

10     at paragraph 25 of the indictment.  As with the previous 11 victims, many

11     of the 28 victims had been brought from Baranja, P111, paragraph 62.

12             There is evidence before this Chamber that during the first week

13     of October 1991, Hadzic knew that the non-Serb prisoners were being held

14     in the Dalj police buildings.  Indeed, Hadzic and Arkan were seen talking

15     in front of the detention facility in the days immediately before the

16     killing of the prisoners, P278, paragraph 11.

17             On the evening of the 4th of October, 1991, Arkan, Stricevic, and

18     20 of Arkan's men arrived at the station.  For several hours in the early

19     morning, the prisoners were beaten and then most were killed.  A few

20     prisoners were kept alive in order to load the bodies onto a truck which

21     drove them to the river's edge.  There the remaining prisoners were

22     executed and all of the bodies were dumped in the river.  Upon learning

23     of this crime the next day, the Dalj police leadership conducted a

24     preliminary inquiry and reported the incident of the SBWS police chain of

25     command.  This is P112.111; P111, paragraphs 65-72; P1140.1, page 4;

Page 9084

 1     P1141.1, transcript page 4166.

 2             These killings were known throughout Dalj within a day or so

 3     after they took place.  Civilian medical staff were asked to retrieve

 4     four or five bodies that were stuck in the rocks as the water-level had

 5     dropped.  Blood was visible on these rocks.  Bodies were seen floating in

 6     the river, P104; P253, paragraph 82.

 7             The townspeople of Dalj kept reporting this information to the

 8     police.  Around the 10th of October, 1991, Arkan made a speech in the

 9     Dalj market square in front of hundreds of persons, including

10     representatives of the JNA, the SBWS government, and SBWS TO and police

11     officials, acknowledging that he had killed the prisoners and stating

12     that no one could do anything to him.  He announced that his philosophy

13     was "a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye."  This was widely known

14     in the community.  T 1543, 1546-1549; P111, paragraphs 68, 75-76.

15             This all occurred while Hadzic maintained his government offices

16     less than a kilometre from the crime scene and a couple hundred metres

17     from the Dalj market square, transcript page 769-787.  Despite the uproar

18     in Dalj and the actions taken by the police in this instance, no actions

19     were taken to punish the perpetrators.

20             The same Serb forces who murdered the detainees in late September

21     and early October participated in forcing the remaining non-Serbs of Dalj

22     from their homes and they plundered their property.  This pertains to

23     Counts 10 through 14 of the indictment.  I have just one example.  In

24     October 1991, the same month as the killing of the 28 prisoners,

25     remaining Croats in Dalj were gathered in busses and expelled.  GH-169

Page 9085

 1     explained that the expulsions of the Croats from Dalj were organised and

 2     were similar to the expulsions that took place in other towns such as

 3     Vukovar, transcript 8793-8797.  He also testified that this happened

 4     again and again.

 5             Buildings of religious significance to the Croat community, such

 6     as the Catholic church in Dalj, were mined and destroyed by Arkan's men,

 7     transcript 8735-8736.

 8             The mistreatment I've described, that is, the mistreatment of the

 9     non-Serb civilian inhabitants of Dalj and surrounding areas, is

10     consistent with the widespread expulsions, deportation, imprisonments,

11     torture, wanton destruction, plunder, and persecution inflicted on the

12     non-Serb residents of many towns in the SBWS and throughout what would

13     later become the RSK in 1991 and 1993.  This mistreatment featured

14     prominently as well in the nearby town of Erdut where Arkan established

15     his training centre.

16             Mr. Stringer has already spoken today about the contributions of

17     the accused to the JCE, including his role in assigning the Erdut

18     training centre to Arkan, who became its commander.  Now I will briefly

19     speak about the violent crimes and the environment of fear that

20     characterised Arkan and his training centre and the concordance between

21     the functions of the training centre and the counts in the indictment --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The counsel is kindly asked to slow down for

23     the purposes of interpretation.  Thank you.

24             MS. CLANTON:  I apologise.  The Concordance between the functions

25     of the training centre and the counts in the indictment, including but

Page 9086

 1     not limited to Counts 3-9.

 2             The Erdut training centre was the epicentre of the activities of

 3     Arkan and his men.  They lived there, they ate there, and they trained

 4     there.  The facility was also next to that used by Hadzic, for the

 5     government and for Hadzic's personal security service, the SNB.  When not

 6     travelling to Serbia, Hadzic would spend the night at the training

 7     centre, transcript page 2705-2706.

 8             The installation by Hadzic of Arkan and his men at the training

 9     centre served several purposes.  First and foremost, this facility was

10     used to further the campaign of removing non-Serbs from Slavonia and

11     surrounding areas.  The men who were trained at the centre, like Arkan

12     himself, were known criminal and they lived up to their reputation.  I

13     refer the Chamber to P2916.  At the training centre, they imprisoned,

14     mistreated, tortured, and murdered non-Serbs.  The non-Serbs were

15     detained in poor conditions, including what had been the public

16     restrooms.  Their space by 4 by 4 metres, and was damp, dark, and cold.

17     They were provided no bedding and were unable to sleep.  They were

18     repeatedly taken to Milorad Stricevic for interrogation and many came

19     back badly beaten.  They were removed in the middle of the night from

20     their cell, lined up against a wall, and then subjected to a mock

21     execution.  During the nights, members of Arkan's men took prisoners from

22     the room.  Shortly thereafter, the prisoners remaining heard gun-shots

23     and the people who were taken were never seen again.  This continued

24     until a room holding 28 men contained only two.  Transcript page 2686,

25     2701-2703; 2207-2214, 2227.

Page 9087

 1             Arkan's men targeted the remaining Croat male population of Erdut

 2     and surrounding villages.  Many of these men had been forced to labour,

 3     that is, as forced labourers in the months before they were taken from

 4     their homes and ultimately brought to the training centre and killed.

 5     But they did not target only men.  The Chamber has heard evidence that

 6     non-Serb women were also detained and mistreated at the centre.  The

 7     prisoners included a woman of 65 years who was kept in a robe and

 8     slippers, P2039; transcript 2702.

 9             Arkan's men, working with Milorad Stricevic and Erdut local

10     police, including Bozo Bolic, decimated the ethnic Hungarian population

11     of the Planina region of Dalj, Erdut, and Aljmas.  All the men of several

12     families were taken and killed.  The wives of the victims were told by

13     Bolic that their husbands and their fathers were in Arkan's hands and

14     that they should not try to go see them.  Ominously, they were told that

15     their husbands and fathers would not be requiring medication or warm

16     coats anymore.  The training centre employees testified that the

17     Hungarians were kept in detention at the training centre where they were

18     forced to sing the Serb national anthem.  The Hungarians were taken away.

19     Transcript 2174-2176, 2193, 2701.

20             By November 1991, it was public knowledge in the eastern Slavonia

21     region that prisoners taken to the Erdut training centre never returned,

22     transcript page 2208.

23             The Erdut training centre served to support the widespread

24     commission of crimes against civilians with the purpose of creating a

25     state without non-Serbs.  It is important to emphasise that the training

Page 9088

 1     centre itself and the forces located there facilitated the removal of the

 2     non-Serb population in another way:  Through sheer intimidation.  Even

 3     those who were not detained at the centre feared for their lives and knew

 4     that anyone could be taken at any time.  The behaviour and reputation of

 5     Arkan's men was such that their daily activities spread fear.  The

 6     Chamber has seen video of his men singing songs with lyrics such as:  We

 7     will crush the Ustasha, we will kill them all.  The Chamber has heard

 8     evidence that Arkan was relied on by other JCE members to operate in the

 9     field, engaging in retribution and intimidation, which was designed to

10     rid the area of non-Serbs, P129; P331, paragraphs 11-12; transcript page

11     8282-8283, and 8295-8297.

12             Your Honours, the crimes I've just described that were committed

13     in Dalj and Erdut, part of eastern Slavonia, they did not take place in

14     isolation.  The crimes in Slavonia in 1991 were part of the plan that was

15     executed in the entire territory of the SBWS.  The Prosecution has shown

16     that the crimes that were committed and charged in the indictment all

17     took place in the context of the execution of the common criminal plan to

18     expel non-Serbs.  As we have stated several times, consideration of

19     individual incidents is inappropriate for Rule 98 bis.  However, the sake

20     of assisting Your Honours, I will now discuss the mistakes in counsel's

21     submissions about -- submissions on Monday concerning the testimony of

22     GH-012; then I will discuss the evidence showing the single JCE and the

23     links between bodies in Western Srem and the government; finally, I'll

24     turn to the remaining crime bases identified by Defence counsel, Opatovac

25     and Lovas.

Page 9089

 1             On Monday, counsel suggested, page 8971, that the accused is not

 2     responsible for certain crimes committed in the area of what was

 3     described as OG South.  In particular, counsel suggested that the

 4     testimony of GH-012, Dusan Jaksic, proves that there were no links

 5     between the SBWS government and the TO units and TO staffs located in

 6     Vukovar and in Western Srem.  Jaksic's testimony does not support this

 7     claim.  Further, the recitation of his evidence of counsel was selective

 8     and ignores the totality of the evidence of the relationship between the

 9     accused and events that occurred south of the Vuka river.

10             Counsel's interpretation of Jaksic's evidence is highly strained.

11     Counsel conflated the concepts of TO units and TO staffs.  While TO units

12     could and were resubordinated to OG South and Colonel Mrksic during

13     combat, the TO staffs themselves were not.  Transcript page 7063-7064,

14     7109-7110.  This is part of Jaksic's testimony and I refer the Chamber to

15     that in particular related to his description of the political functions

16     and the position of commanders of the TO staff.  In this context,

17     Your Honours, Jaksic's testimony that the TO staffs were civilian

18     political institutions that reported to the Ministry of Defence is

19     entirely consistent with his evidence that the Petrova Gora TO unit was

20     resubordinated to OG South.  In fact, Jaksic testified that he was

21     appointed TO Staff Commander for the OG South area, not by the JNA, but

22     rather at a meeting of village TO staff commanders held in Oriolik.

23     Transcript page 7063-7064, 7109.

24             Other witness evidence presented in this trial also supports that

25     the various local TO staffs within the SAO SBWS remained under civilian

Page 9090

 1     control, even when their TO units were temporarily resubordinated to the

 2     JNA for combat operations.  Transcript page 8283-8293; P140,

 3     paragraphs 40-41.

 4             The Chamber has also received into evidence documents that

 5     establish that the TO staffs in Vukovar and Western Srem were operating

 6     under the SBWS government, in co-operation with the JNA.  The following

 7     are exhibits that show these links:  P1727, is dated

 8     18th of October, 1991, a document of the SBWS TO, issued by Dusan

 9     Filipovic in Sid that legalised the Leva Supoderica detachment as part of

10     the Vukovar TO.

11             D6, D6 is the minutes of a 30th of October, 1991, meeting in

12     Lovas that was attended by TO staff and village representatives of, among

13     other villages, Lovas, Opatovac, Sotin, and Tovarnik.  The minutes show

14     that the meeting was also attended by several members of the SBWS

15     government, including Mladen Hadzic, Ilija Petrovic, Stevo Bogic,

16     Borislav Bogunovic, and Vojin Susa.  Radovan Stojicic, Badza, is listed

17     as attending as the SBWS TO commander.  Mladen Hadzic chaired this

18     meeting and during the meeting he explained how the SBWS government "is

19     constantly working in this field" and that they had launched many

20     "drives, actions, and tasks."  Stevo Bogic insisted that it was the duty

21     of the village representatives to inform the government of events.

22     Ljuban Devetak of Lovas asked the SBWS government to recommend "the

23     organisation of power in local communes ... the government must issue

24     decrees about how we should get organised."  The minutes of this meeting

25     show the ability of the government to operate in the Western Srem area

Page 9091

 1     prior to the fall of Vukovar.

 2             P2979, this exhibit is the minutes of a 3rd of November, 1991,

 3     meeting also held in Lovas attended by TO staff and village

 4     representatives of the towns or villages of Opatovac, Mahovo, Lovas,

 5     Tovarnik, Sotin, and Vukovar.  On this occasion, the meeting was led by

 6     Slobodan Grahovac, who was listed in the minutes as the deputy minister

 7     of the Serbian district of the SBWS.  It was attended as well by Dusan

 8     Filipovic, a member of the SBWS TO staff.  This evidence about the

 9     positions that were held by Grahovac and Filipovic is consistent with the

10     testimony of witnesses before this Chamber, including Goran Stoparic, who

11     stated that Grahovac was linked to the government and was described as a

12     minister and the testimony of Borivoje Savic who said that Filipovic was

13     the commander of the TO staff.  I would refer the Chamber to P50,

14     paragraph 205, and transcript page 4714, 4773-4774.  The agenda of the

15     meeting was the current problems of the Territorial Defence staffs in the

16     liberated places.  At the end of the meeting, the participants

17     unanimously arrived at the following conclusions, and there are three

18     that I want to share:

19             First, to establish units and TO staffs in the liberated places

20     "in accordance with the instructions and tables which the competent

21     organs of the government worked out and sent out."

22             Second, based on the organisation worked out per the previous

23     item, to step up co-operation and co-ordination with the JNA.

24             And third, that "existing and obvious problems have to be

25     continuously resolved in co-operation with the government of this

Page 9092

 1     district and the relevant military command, such as the mop-up of the

 2     village and surrounding areas, freedom of movement, et cetera."

 3             General Vasiljevic testified about these minutes.  He stated that

 4     the use of the term "co-operation" between the TO staffs and the JNA

 5     shows that:

 6             " These are activities of two sides that have an approximately

 7     equal status.  So this is not a relationship between a subordinate and a

 8     superior.  So that is co-operation in something that is in their common

 9     interest, two structures that co-ordinate their activities."

10             Transcript page 8179-8184.

11             For all of the reasons noted above, Your Honours, there is ample

12     evidence in the record showing the links between Hadzic, his government,

13     and the TO forces in the areas referred to on Monday as OG South.  And

14     I'm mindful of the time, perhaps we should ...

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Ms. Clanton.

16             Court adjourned.  We will be back at 12.45.

17                           --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Ms. Clanton.

20             MS. CLANTON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21             Your Honours, I am now going to discuss why the Defence arguments

22     concerning Opatovac and Lovas also must fail.  These towns are in

23     Western Srem and Your Honours have heard evidence that they were taken by

24     Serb forces in October 1991.  For the village of Opatovac, the Defence

25     has challenged the charges of imprisonment, torture, inhumane acts, and

Page 9093

 1     cruel treatment in Counts 5 through 9.  For Lovas, the Defence has also

 2     challenged the charges of murder and extermination, Counts 1 through 4.

 3             For the village of Opatovac, the Defence pointed to the testimony

 4     of two witnesses at transcript page 9021 and 9022 of Monday's transcript.

 5             Based on the submissions of counsel, the Prosecution understood

 6     that the accused is not challenging the crimes themselves, but rather his

 7     responsibility for them.  I should add that for now I am intentionally

 8     setting aside the quotation used from expert Reynaud Theunens that was

 9     provided to Your Honours on the submissions of Lovas and Opatovac.  I

10     will return to that issue when we speak about Lovas.

11             With regard to Opatovac at page 9021, counsel listed certain of

12     the evidence about who the perpetrators were and what they did.  Then he

13     suggested that there is no evidence that the accused intended these

14     crimes or that the crimes were encompassed through a joint criminal

15     enterprise of which he was a member.  This is at page 9022.

16             My colleague, Mr. Stringer, has already discussed the existence

17     of the JCE in which the accused was a member.  He has also clarified for

18     Your Honours the correct legal framework, including that the accused need

19     not be aware of all the details of the specific criminal incidents as a

20     JCE member in order to be found responsible.

21             Now, turning to the facts that were presented by counsel, the

22     witness evidence concerning some of the perpetrators in Opatovac is

23     indeed Prosecution evidence of the commission of crimes by members of the

24     JCE and the forces that utilised them.  The evidence you heard on Monday

25     shows that units of the JNA and the local Territorial Defence, aided by

Page 9094

 1     local Serbs, participated in the crimes in Opatovac.  In addition, the

 2     Chamber heard evidence during this trial that soldiers from Kragujevac

 3     were present in Opatovac, as were paramilitary or Chetnik groups who

 4     threatened the population.  Transcript page 8626 and 8642.

 5             The evidence before Your Honours of the crimes committed in

 6     Opatovac mirrors the broader pattern of crimes in Western Srem.  I would

 7     like to briefly remind you of the evidence that you have heard about the

 8     pattern of crimes committed by JCE members or persons utilised by them in

 9     Western Srem.  For this I will mention the evidence of four witnesses as

10     an illustration.

11             First, the former commander of the police force in Ilok testified

12     that the pattern was as follows:  First, the JNA issued tough ultimatums;

13     then it indiscriminately shelled; then its forces entered the towns,

14     followed by reservists and local Serbs.  This method caused the

15     inhabitants of the town to flee.  When the reservists and local Serbs

16     entered towns, they would abuse villagers physically and psychologically

17     and they would kill some of them.  That's at page 3487-3488, P1418 at

18     transcript page 1313.

19             Next, the Chamber also heard evidence that the crimes did not

20     stop at killings and physical and psychological abuse.

21     Witness Tomislav Rukavina, a resident of Bapska, verified that the

22     non-Serbs remaining in Western Srem in early 1992 were then forced to

23     leave.  When they left, they confirmed what had happened in their

24     village.  After the Serb army subdued the village, the village was left

25     to paramilitaries.  These paramilitaries would break into their homes,

Page 9095

 1     threaten their lives, force them to sign documents which stated that they

 2     were willingly moving to Croatia, strip them of their personal

 3     possessions and valuables, and then force them to leave.  Transcript

 4     page 2130; P327 and P328.

 5             Third, Your Honours heard the evidence of James Lubin, a civilian

 6     affairs co-ordinator for UNPROFOR in Sector East.  He testified that

 7     prior to his arrival non-Serbs were mistreated in the manner I've just

 8     described consistent with P328.  He added to that that the description is

 9     incomplete because in some cases the expulsions were happening on a daily

10     and even hourly basis.  Mr. Lubin testified that some people were

11     physically beaten and were in a very bad state when they were expelled.

12     He said that they were crying and shaking with fear, obviously terrified

13     for their lives.  Transcript page 3196.

14             Finally, Your Honours heard evidence that some non-Serbs from

15     Opatovac and other villages were unable to reach safety when they were

16     expelled from their villages.  They were sent to the Sid military prison,

17     to Begejci camp, to Stajicevo farm and the Zrenjanin barracks, P2993,

18     page 6; P2992, page 9.  Dr. Mladen Loncar testified that the older women,

19     those who were not of child-bearing age, in the Begejci detention camp

20     were from the towns of Western Srem, including Tovarnik, Ilok, Lovas,

21     Berak, Sarengrad, and Bapska.  This is at transcript page 8231.

22             Your Honours, these witnesses, Mr. Rukavina, Mr. Brletic, and

23     Mr. Lubin, all confirmed that persons from Opatovac, non-Serb persons

24     from Opatovac were victimised in this way.  This is at transcript

25     page 2130, 3488, and 3196 respectively.

Page 9096

 1             The underlying criminal incidents in Opatovac fall squarely

 2     within the JCE.

 3             Next, Your Honours, I would like to move on to Lovas and address

 4     the shortcomings of the Rule 98 bis challenge to the crimes that were

 5     committed in Lovas.  The argument made by counsel about the Lovas

 6     minefield crime which is paragraph 26 of the indictment contains errors

 7     that are similar to those in his submissions on Opatovac.  In addition,

 8     the Defence has challenged the relationship between named members of the

 9     Serb authorities in Lovas, such as Ljuban Devetak and the government.

10     The Defence has also challenged whether the accused could be liable for

11     crimes that took place when he was not physically present at the scene of

12     the crime.  This is transcript page 9010-9013 of Monday's hearing.

13             As Mr. Stringer has already discussed the errors in legal

14     submissions and has emphasised for Your Honours that there is no

15     requirement for the accused to have knowledge of every incident, that is,

16     every murder that takes place, I will focus my submissions on some of the

17     key evidence which shows the responsibility of the accused for crimes

18     committed in Lovas, also including evidence before Your Honours about the

19     relationship between the authorities in Lovas and JCE members.  This

20     forms part of Counts 2 through 9.

21             Inhabitants of Lovas were not the only persons who were present

22     during the attack that began on the 10th of October.  Some of the people

23     in Lovas on that day had come to Lovas after fleeing neighbouring towns

24     that had already been attacked, such as Tovarnik, Ilaca, and Berak,

25     transcript page 1653 to 1654.  The pattern of crimes that I have just

Page 9097

 1     discussed and the submissions on Opatovac feature prominently in the

 2     attack on Lovas.  Your Honours have heard evidence of negotiations that

 3     did not succeed, an ultimatum, then shelling, including of religious

 4     buildings, followed by an attack, including killings, before the ultimate

 5     take-over of the town.  The take-over occasioned forced labour, unlawful

 6     detention, and additional crimes such as the murder and torture of

 7     non-Serbs.  Witness Zeljko Cirba testified that after the village was

 8     taken over, all villagers of Croatian nationality and non-Serbs had to

 9     report for interrogations and they were sometimes detained for days at a

10     time.  Croats and non-Serbs were obliged to wear a white ribbon on their

11     sleeve marking their ethnic origin and constantly taken for interrogation

12     and mistreatment.  They were also subject to the work detail.  This is at

13     P288, paragraph 27.

14             The killing in the minefield was perpetrated by members of the

15     Valjevo TO detachment from Serbia and the Dusan Silni.  The Dusan Silni,

16     a unit led by Devetak, was active in the Western Srem area and consisted

17     of men from the Stara Pazova area who supported Mirko Jovic's

18     Serbian National Renewal Party.  They operated in Lovas alongside the TO

19     and the JNA and with the civilian authorities led by Devetak.  This is

20     P2913.1, paragraph 80; transcript page 7951; transcript page 1822-1824;

21     P1865.

22             The evidence shows that Serb civilian authorities took over Lovas

23     very soon after the attack.  Various witnesses have given evidence about

24     these authorities in Lovas.  Witness Ivan Mujic described these people,

25     these authorities, in plain language.  He said Devetak was the number one

Page 9098

 1     person in the village and that Milan Radojcic was his right-hand man.

 2     Transcript page 1703-1704.  Radojcic was the commander of the Lovas TO,

 3     P2979, P300, paragraph 46.  General Vasiljevic confirmed that the JNA had

 4     no part in the appointment of Ljuban Devetak, transcript page 8180.

 5             P2979, which I've already referred to, again this exhibit is the

 6     minutes of the meeting on the 3rd of November in Lovas.  The attendees

 7     were the local civilian leaders, TO commanders, Dusan Filipovic of the

 8     SBWS TO staff, and representatives of the government, police, and JNA.

 9     During this meeting - this is on page 6 of the English and 6 of the B/C/S

10     of P2979 - Devetak listed the problems in Lovas and stated that:

11             "Our government should urgently get in touch with the JNA and

12     solve all these problems."

13             Now, the positions held by Ljuban Devetak and Milan Radojcic are

14     further explained in a JNA report to the 1st Military District which is

15     dated the 28th of February, 1992.  This is Exhibit D51.  In this

16     document, on page 4 of the English and of the B/C/S, the JNA reports that

17     Serb refugees from Western Slavonia are moving into the municipalities of

18     Mirkovci and Vukovar.  Colonel Novica Gusic, the assistant commander for

19     civilian affairs, stated the following and this is a quote:

20             "Because of distrust and what is happening to the Serbs who

21     remained in Western Slavonia and their property, and with the tacit

22     consent of the government of the SAO Slavonia and the assistance of the

23     prominent members of the government, the so-called co-ordinators and

24     ministers, they are placing a certain pressure on the local inhabitants

25     to make them move out voluntarily.  In doing so, they resorted to

Page 9099

 1     unlawful means, threats, and even killed some individuals.

 2     Characteristic examples of such conduct can be found in the villages of

 3     Bapska, Lovas, Sarengrad, and Mahovo, organised by Radojcic from Lovas

 4     village, the commander of the Lovas Territorial Defence Staff and

 5     co-ordinator for the TO 5th Zone who has behind him a certain

 6     Ljuban Devetak, who is very influential in the government of the

 7     SAO Slavonia."

 8             Your Honours, these excerpts of documents are meant to provide

 9     examples of the links between the government, other members of the JCE,

10     and the crimes that were committed in Lovas.  This is not an exhaustive

11     list.  Witness and documentary evidence show that the crimes in Lovas,

12     including the murders in the minefield, were part of the plan to remove

13     non-Serbs.  After the minefield incident, those who survived who were

14     able to leave, had to sign a document turning over their property to the

15     government, that's at transcript page 1822-1826 and 1828.  Some of those

16     persons who were put through the minefield were expelled in

17     December of 1991, P1083, paragraphs 58 and 59.  Witness Ivan Mujic

18     testified that at least one person who was wounded in the minefield was

19     tortured in a cellar in Lovas in December of 1991 before being forcibly

20     expelled, this is P296, transcript page 1706-1707, and P292.287.

21             Your Honours, turning now to the argument put forth by counsel

22     for Opatovac and Lovas concerning the role of town commands and the

23     testimony of expert Reynaud Theunens.  This is at transcript page 9011

24     and 9022 from Monday's hearing.

25             Mr. Theunens' evidence on town commands, as well as that of town

Page 9100

 1     commander Colonel Milorad Vojnovic and General Aleksandar Vasiljevic,

 2     makes clear that the JNA was not in charge of civilian affairs in the

 3     areas mentioned by counsel.  Instead, the civil affairs organs of the JNA

 4     were co-operating with the civilian authorities in the area, that is, the

 5     government and its representatives.  I would refer Your Honours to P2943;

 6     transcript pages T 5106-5109; P1981, paragraphs 24 and 25; transcript

 7     pages 7956 to 7961 and 8169-8170.

 8             During this hearing, the Prosecution will not address every

 9     single factual misrepresentation or inaccuracy from the presentation we

10     heard on Monday.  One in particular, however, relates to the

11     mis-characterisation of Mr. Theunens' evidence.  Counsel parsed a

12     20-plus-page exchange that took place during Mr. Theunens' testimony and

13     claimed that Mr. Theunens testified that the civilian authorities did not

14     have authority over civilian affairs.  This discussion starts on

15     transcript page 4572.  In fact, Mr. Theunens testified that there were

16     consultations and co-ordination between the town command and the SAO SBWS

17     authorities.  This is at transcript page 4575.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please continue, Ms. Clanton.

19             MS. CLANTON:  Thank you.

20             Further, Your Honours, using the specific examples that were put

21     forward by counsel during his cross-examination of Mr. Theunens,

22     Mr. Theunens stated --

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  I hope that this one will be the last one,

24     Ms. Clanton.  Please continue.

25             MS. CLANTON:  Thank you.

Page 9101

 1             I think I should go back a sentence.  What I was saying,

 2     Your Honours, is that during his cross-examination Mr. Theunens, using

 3     the specific examples that Defence counsel put to Mr. Theunens, Theunens

 4     stated that the documents indicate that the civilian authorities, that

 5     is, the government, had responsibility for most civilian matters.  And

 6     this is at transcript page 4583-4585.

 7             And, Your Honours, this concludes our response to the submissions

 8     made by counsel on Monday.  For all of the reasons put forward by the

 9     Prosecution today, the Chamber should deny the Rule 98 bis motion seeking

10     a judgement of acquittal.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Ms. Clanton.

12             This is the end of the Rule 98 bis hearings.  Court is adjourned

13     until further notice.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.09 p.m.