1 Tuesday, 2 April 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Would the witness make the
7 solemn declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. Good morning,
9 Mr. President. Good morning, Your Honours, especially the
10 Presiding Judge. Good morning to the Defence and the Prosecution.
11 I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,
12 and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Komad. Please be seated and make
14 yourself comfortable.
15 WITNESS: TRIFKO KOMAD
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Komad, before you commence your evidence, I must
18 let you know a certain Rule that we have here at the International
19 Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
20 Under this Rule, you may object to answering any question from
21 Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe
22 that your answer might incriminate you. In this context, "incriminate"
23 means saying something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a
24 criminal offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you
25 might have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that
1 an answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer
2 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
3 compel you to answer the question, but in that situation, the Tribunal
4 would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would
5 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence
6 save and except the offence of giving false testimony.
7 Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Komad?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Komad.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning. Good morning your
13 Excellencies. Good morning to everyone.
14 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Komad.
16 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
17 Q. I have to ask you to pause between our interventions, that is to
18 say to speak slowly so as to have everything in the record. Can you tell
19 us tell us whether you provided a statement to the Defence team?
20 A. Yes, Mr. President.
21 Q. Thank you. Can we please have in e-court 1D7981.
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm afraid the e-court is still not working or
24 properly functioning, so shall we put the statement on the ELMO? But if
25 it is the case of statement, given that we all have the statement, it
1 would be sufficient to provide the witness with his statement in hard
3 Mr. Komad, do you have your statement with you now?
4 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
6 MR. TIEGER: I was just noting if e-court is a problem, then
7 we're just deferring the need to attend to it. We'll obviously need to
8 have a functioning e-court before we get to cross-examination, perhaps
9 even before the remainder of examination-in-chief. I just don't know the
10 extent of the problem.
11 JUDGE KWON: I will inquire of the registrar whether it is a
12 problem of Courtroom III.
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 JUDGE KWON: What I just heard from the registrar is that the old
15 documents that is already in e-court have no problem, but the problem is
16 with the new document that is to be uploaded on the e-court. So let's
17 see how we can manage with this system.
18 Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This again raises the issue of my
20 ability to upload documents, much like the Prosecution can. That will
21 significantly reduce the problems, but nevertheless, we'll work this way.
22 Can we then have the English version on the ELMO, and I will ask
23 Mr. Komad, with the approval of the Chamber, to have a look at the hard
24 copy of his statement that's before him.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Komad, can you see the English version on the screen of the
2 statement you provided?
3 A. Yes, I can.
4 Q. Thank you. Have you read this statement and signed it?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Does this statement accurately reflect everything you
7 told the Defence team?
8 A. Yes, Mr. President.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. I'd like to correct something in the text, though, in item 2
11 where it is stated the teachers of Muslim ethnicity and professors
12 working at civilian universities should be the professors working at
13 civilian schools rather than religious schools. So secular schools.
14 Q. That's accepted. Is there anything else?
15 A. Well, perhaps only a few technical matters. On the next page,
16 item 5, it says number 4. That's where your apartment was, but it was at
17 Sutjeska number 2. And in item 21, it says they wanted Banja Luka to be
18 the centre of the Serb people instead of Pale. It should be Sarajevo,
19 because that was -- instead of Banja Luka it should be Sarajevo.
20 Q. Save for the corrections, is everything else recorded accurately?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly
23 be asked to pause.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat.
25 THE ACCUSED: It shouldn't be -- instead of Pale it should be --
1 instead of Banja Luka, it should be -- instead of Sarajevo. Banja Luka
2 to be instead of Sarajevo. Because Pale were a part of Sarajevo, Serbian
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Is that clear? The word "Pale" should be replaced with
7 A. That's what I had in mind, Mr. Karadzic.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Komad, having in mind the corrections you have just kindly
12 mentioned, does the rest truthfully reflect your words?
13 A. Yes, it does.
14 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you in the
15 courtroom today would your answers be basically the same?
16 A. Yes. The gist of it would be the same.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Excellencies, I
18 seek to tender this statement as part of the 92 ter package.
19 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Tieger?
20 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President. There's one small section that
21 arguably fell within the Court's previous guidance, but it was very brief
22 and so I don't have any objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll admit the statement as well as the
24 four associated exhibits.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the 92 ter statement 1D7981 will be
1 Exhibit D3198, and the remaining four associated exhibits will be
2 Exhibits D31992 to Exhibits 33201.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will read out a
4 summary of Mr. Trifko Komad's statement in the English language.
5 [In English] Mr. Trifko Komad worked from 1986 to the outbreak of
6 war in the republican conference of the Socialist Alliance of B and H, in
7 charge of issues related to religious communities. For some time he also
8 worked on issues of the People's Defence. After the founding of the SDS,
9 he became a member of the Main and Executive Boards. In late 1992, he
10 became a member of the office of the Republika Srpska in Belgrade from
11 where he retired.
12 Trifko Komad saw that the Islamic and Catholic religious
13 communities had enormous influence on social trends and politics in B and
14 H. The influence on both religions could be seen throughout BH.
15 However, the Orthodox religious group had a smaller standing.
16 Even before the establishment of the SDS, Islamic fundamentalists
17 were organising themselves and conducting monitoring exercises on cafes
18 and many Serbs were scared about the developing situation before the
19 establishment of the SDS. Due to his position, Trifko Komad was asked to
20 comment upon the issue regarding Serbian ethnicity in a number of
21 political circumstances.
22 Trifko Komad was present at meetings in which the difficult
23 position of the Serbs in BH, the protection of the Serbian people and
24 plans for the future were discussed. At first point the first clashes
25 between Croats and Serbs had already taken place and other parties had
1 been established. Despite the previous establishment of the SDA and HDZ,
2 there was a huge resistance in BH to the Serbian people organising
3 themselves and therefore this could not be done publicly. In addition,
4 Serbian people feared retribution in response to organising politically.
5 When the Serbs were established -- the SDS was established in
6 the -- it was for Yugoslavia and for the equal treatment of the Serbian
7 people in the BH and Yugoslavia. Trifko Komad considers that the party
8 was led by the Serbian people and their wishes which were considered by
9 the leadership of the SDS.
10 Following multi-party elections, when a coalition was formed it
11 was clear that the other parties were breaching the coalition agreement
12 regarding the appointments of the staff in the BH governmental bodies
13 which led to a loss of confidence in the truthfulness of the SDA's
14 claims. The SDS advocated constitutionality and legality in its
15 activity. However, other parties acted in illegal and unconstitutional
17 Muslim party leaders, presidents of municipalities and municipal
18 governments where Serbs were in power were invited to the SDS annual
19 party conference in July 1991 as guests to encourage co-existence and
20 joint action in BH. Many people were allowed to participate in meetings
21 and media employees were also invited. Unfortunately, there was a lack
22 of discipline in the local level of the party and the local leadership
23 were rather autonomous in their work, leading to inter-party clashes.
24 Trifko Komad was aware that the SDS wished to avoid bloodshed and
25 war in BH at all costs. Due to the escalation of the situation in
1 Sarajevo, he left in April 1992 with his son but only just managed to get
2 his wife out soon after. Both his parents were persecuted in Sarajevo,
3 which led them to deaths. His sister was also targeted in a hit and run
4 incident. Trifko Komad -- Trifko Komad considers that due to his
5 political affiliation.
6 Crisis Staffs were established in municipalities where there was
7 the greatest danger of the clashes breaking out. They were established
8 to prevent clashes and protect the population, not to persecute the
9 Muslims and Croat population. When hostilities broke out, the Crisis
10 Staffs were left to their own devices, and in the majority of the Serbian
11 authorities did not have any information about their work. Communication
12 was interrupted and local organs were operating autonomously, so wartime
13 commissions were introduced to link the republican government to the
14 local branches including Pale.
15 The SDS suspended its activity when fighting broke out to avoid
16 the possibility of the party using its power to influence the work of the
17 state organs. Following this, Mr. Trifko Komad escorted humanitarian aid
18 convoys through Serbian territory. There were instances when convoys
19 were stopped by armed Serbian forces and many members of the SDS fought
20 for humanitarian aid to be delivered unhindered to the Muslims and
21 Croats. The general position was that the Muslims and members of all
22 other ethnic groups must be guaranteed all civil and other rights.
23 Dr. Karadzic personally stopped the requesting -- and requested --
24 supported and requested that the Muslims do not move away from Janja and
25 other places in Republika Srpska and became integrated -- instead to be
1 integrated in population.
2 And that is the summary and at that moment I do not have
3 questions for Mr. Komad.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Komad, as you have noted, your evidence in
5 chief in this case has been admitted in writing, that is, through your
6 written statement in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you'll be
7 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.
8 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
11 Q. Good morning to the Bench. Good morning to all. Good morning,
12 Mr. Komad.
13 A. Good morning.
14 Q. Mr. Komad, at paragraph 9 of your statement, you state that after
15 the inaugural conference of the SDS, which I believe was in July of 1990,
16 you became a member of the Main Board and the Executive Board and the
17 political council. In that respect, I'd like to look at a few documents
18 or indicate to you that we have in evidence a few documents, including
19 the following: D1275 reflect the minutes of the Executive Board of the
20 SDS held on 6 September 1991. It lists at page 2 the members present,
21 including Mr. Dukic, the President of the Executive Board, Mr. Neskovic
22 and others, and then states in the subsequent paragraph that apart from
23 the members of the Executive Board, the following attended, and that
24 includes your name along with Jovan Turanjanin.
25 Similarly at P25 --
1 JUDGE KWON: Do you mean to show the document to the witness?
2 MR. TIEGER: It's in evidence, Mr. President, I'm not sure based
3 on the question it will be necessary.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Similarly at P2584, a meeting of the Executive Board that took
7 place ten days later on the 16th, it indicates before the agenda items
8 are discussed the members of the Executive Board who were present and
9 states further also in attendance were Trifko Komad and Jovan Turanjanin,
10 secretaries of the party services of the SDS BH.
11 Now, is it correct, therefore, Mr. Komad, that you were not a
12 member of the Executive Board but you were secretary of party services
13 serving the members of the Executive Board?
14 A. No. I was the secretary of the Executive Board, and you can find
15 that in certain documents. The secretary of the Executive Board is at
16 the same time a member of the Executive Board.
17 Q. And I take it then that you don't have an explanation for the
18 distinction that is made in the minutes of the Executive Board between
19 the members of the Executive Board and other persons such as yourself as
20 they are listed who are also in attendance and indicated as I said
21 earlier, secretary of the party services?
22 A. I can't comment on that, but I claim that I was the secretary of
23 the Executive Board.
24 Q. Similarly with respect to the -- your Main Board membership, I
25 wanted to look quickly at 65 ter 00698, which is a stenogram taken at the
1 12 July 1991 session of the SDS party, and although there is a good deal
2 of discussion, I wanted to turn directly to pages 87 through 93 of the
3 English, and pages 107 through 114 of the B/C/S that reflect the election
4 of the SDS BM Main Board for -- and goes through it in various reasons.
5 So if -- in various segments.
6 So if we look first at page 87, we see the election of persons
7 from the Herzegovina region including in Mr. Vucurevic, Mr. Kozic, and
8 Mr. Nadezdin. Similarly for Stara Herzegovina. As we turn the page we
9 see the election of people from Romanija including Mr. Kusic and
10 Mr. Zugic. Semberija, Birac, Tuzla, Central Bosnia. And please pay
11 attention to the names, many of whom the Court will be familiar with. On
12 to Western Bosnia, south-western Bosnia, Bosnian Krajina.
13 And then finally we see at pages 92 and 93 additional persons
14 elected including Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Najdanovic, Mr. Buha, Mr. Toholj,
15 Mr. Neskovic, and Mr. Saric. And then at the bottom of page 93, we see
16 that Mr. Karadzic has been nominated as President of the SDS. He is the
17 only candidate, and it appears to have been a unanimous vote. That -- by
18 the way, that segment in B/C/S is at page 114, but I noted that the pages
19 were inverted, so I think it goes in reverse order from 19 -- immediately
20 jumps from 113 to 118 or 119 and then back counting down to 114 which is
21 why you may not see it on that page.
22 None of these names, Mr. Komad, are yours from any of those
23 regions, so it appears that as indicated with the Executive Board that
24 you are not listed as someone who was a member of the Main Board.
25 A. Can I explain? Under the statute, in addition to the nominees
1 who are elected, the President of the party had a discretionary right to
2 co-opt, I can't remember exactly how many but I think it's seven or eight
3 people, and I was among those people co-opted into the Executive Board by
4 the president of the party, and if you're talking about the Assembly on
5 the 12th of July 1991, you can look it up in the statute. I -- it is I
6 who provide the explanation of the statute as well as the programme, the
7 platform of the party.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Komad.
9 MR. TIEGER: I tender 65 ter 00698. I realise, Mr. President,
10 there's a reference to those last pages, and the Court's previous
11 guidance might have us just admitting those. I'm just at the Court's
12 discretion. But given the nature of documents we've previously admitted,
13 I'm more than happy to have the entirety of the document admitted and
14 imagine that the Defence will probably feel the same way about this
15 particular document.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We would prefer the whole
17 document be admitted. It's of the kind of document such as Assembly
18 sessions that we've admitted in the past in their entirety, and so it
19 could be useful to have it all admitted.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. In the circumstances, we admit it in its
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6243, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: There's one thing you'd like to.
25 THE REGISTRAR: I just want to correct the record. The fourth
1 associated exhibit will be Exhibit D3202. Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just -- I don't think part of
4 the answer of Mr. Komad was not recorded, that he was co-opted also into
5 the Main Board, not only into the Executive Board.
6 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Komad?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just one thing. The secretary for
8 the Executive Board was an opening, and the description of the opening
9 made it clear that it would also be a member of the Main Board and that's
10 the opening I was running for, and I confirm what Mr. --
11 President Karadzic just said.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Mr. Komad, at paragraph 17 and 18 of your statement, you refer to
15 the plebiscite, and I just wanted to clarify one aspect of the
16 plebiscite. So it is correct that the plebiscite ballots consisted of
17 two different ballots with different colours, one for Serbs, one for
18 non-Serbs, and with two different texts, one for Serbs and non-Serbs.
19 And in that respect, if we could look quickly at 65 ter 17542. That's
20 the meeting of the Executive Board of the 25th of October, 1991, and if
21 we turn the page, we will see that it reveals that following the debate
22 it was concluded that whilst observing organisational and technical
23 requirements, two kinds of ballot papers should be printed out, blue ones
24 for the citizens of the Serbian nationality and yellow ones for other
25 nationalities. Can you confirm that that was the case, Mr. Komad, with
1 respect to the plebiscite ballot?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And similarly if we call up quickly 65 ter 06621 and 06622 --
4 A. Just one thing. Please, can I say something about the text? You
5 also asked about the text, about the wording, was it the same.
6 Q. I'm going to show you two documents with respect to the text
7 right now, Mr. Komad. So you'll see on the screen 65 ter 06621 and then
8 06622. And while it's being called up, I'll describe briefly the
9 difference. 06621 provides in Cyrillic:
10 "Do you agree with the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian
11 people," et cetera, "that the Serbian people remain in the common state
12 of Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia
13 Baranja," et cetera.
14 And 06622 for non-Serbs in Latin Scripps states:
15 "Do you vote for Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain as a republic with
16 equal rights in the common state of Yugoslavia?"
17 A. This second text was also an official text for voters, members of
18 all ethnicities.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. I tender those documents, Mr. President.
20 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
21 JUDGE KWON: Those documents being?
22 MR. TIEGER: 06621 and 22.
23 JUDGE KWON: Not the previous one?
24 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry, and also 65 ter 17542, yes. Thank
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit them all.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter 17542 will be
3 Exhibit P6244, 06621 will be Exhibit P6245, and 06622 will be
4 Exhibit P6246.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Now, at paragraph 30, Mr. Komad, you dispute an adjudicated fact
7 which stated that on 21 November 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly
8 proclaimed as part of the territory of federal Yugoslavia all those
9 municipalities, communes, and settlements where a majority of registered
10 citizens of Serb nationality voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia,
11 and you make the point about the basic socio-political community being
12 the local community.
13 With respect to your dispute of that adjudicated fact, can we
14 turn to 1D20085. That will be a decision taken at the November 21st 1991
15 session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which states in its first paragraph
16 the territories of municipalities, local communities, and populated
17 places in which -- in which more than 50 per cent of the Serbian
18 electorate voted for the same joint state, and then we see in the last
19 portion of that paragraph, "... shall be considered the territory of the
20 federal state of Yugoslavia."
21 Now, with insignificant differences, that decision reflects the
22 text of the adjudicated fact that you disputed, does it not?
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. I tender that, Mr. President.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, may I explain my own
1 position? According to earlier regulations and the constitution of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, a local commune was defined as the
3 basic socio-political entity. We had encountered cases where
4 municipalities were split in that period, and I quoted the example of
5 Neum which separated itself from Capljina, the example of Milici which
6 split from Vlasenica. Janja was --
7 Q. What --
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. -- you're explaining is exactly what you state in your statement
10 and which is already before the Court. My point was that you are -- you
11 disputed this fact, and that fact is reflected in precisely in this
12 decision. Now, you may have an explanation about what you consider to be
13 the basic socio-political unit and how this might otherwise have been
14 written, but you've accepted that this decision, in fact, was made, as we
15 can see in the text, and that was the point I wanted to bring to the
16 Court. So it's not necessary for you to repeat the text of the
17 information -- the text of your statement and the information you
18 provided there.
19 A. All right.
20 MR. TIEGER: So I tender 1D20085, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6247, Your Honours.
23 Q. Mr. Komad, at paragraph 23 of your statement, you briefly
24 describe your information about the Variant A and B document, which as
25 you indicate in paragraph 23 is extremely limited. Now, you also say at
1 paragraph 11 that you were often present at the sessions of the Bosnian
2 Serb Assembly. Do you recall whether you were present at the sixth
3 session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held on the 26th of January, 1992,
4 that's P1349, at which following discussions about the need for action in
5 the face of the apparent developments toward a sovereign and independent
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Cizmovic stated the following at page 13:
7 "To solve this problem I propose that we begin with an urgent
8 operationalisation and a declaration on the establishment and
9 promulgation of the Serbian Republic of BiH. Tasks set out in the
10 instructions of 19 December 1991 should be carried out."
11 So there in front of everybody at the Assembly Mr. Cizmovic made
12 an explicit reference to the 19 December document which reflected the
13 Variants A and B and the first and second level. So notwithstanding the
14 fact that everyone in the Assembly was reminded about it, is it still
15 your position that you, Mr. Komad, knew nothing about it other than what
16 you say in paragraph 23?
17 A. No, nothing else. I believe I probably did not attend that
18 Assembly session. If I had been there, I would have probably remembered
19 this. I said before it was not my obligation to be -- attend every
20 session. I attended from time to time. The only thing I would like to
21 say is that the document you talk about was not before the organs of the
22 party, and it was not endorsed by the organs of the party. If it had
23 been, it would have been in the protocol. It would have been entered in
24 the log-book. It would have had a stamp. It would have been
25 officialised. So I stand by the statement I have given.
1 Q. Mr. Komad, the president of the party would appear to be a fairly
2 important organ of the party. Were you not present at the session of the
3 deputies club on the 14th of February, 1992, when Mr. Karadzic spoke and
4 made four separate references to the Variant A and B document, including
5 asking the audience whether they remembered what he was discussing and
6 getting the response we know, and concluding at page 22 of P00012, "That
7 is why we called you today, to intensify, to introduce the second level
8 and to intensify the functioning of the government at any cost and on
9 every single millimetre of our territory."
10 And for the benefit of the Court and the party, those individual
11 references are found at pages 5, 7, 17, and 25 of the English and pages
12 4, 5, 12, and 18 of the B/C/S.
13 Do you claim, Mr. Komad, that despite the fact again that
14 everyone at that extended meeting of the -- everyone at that extended
15 meeting of the deputies club was aware of the Variant A and B document
16 but you were not aware of it?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Thank you. Nevertheless, Mr. Komad, you -- that document which,
19 among other things, called for the establishment of Crisis Staffs, and
20 you did acknowledge that the party did create Crisis Staffs at paragraph
21 26. You also state at paragraph 27 that the party suspended its work
22 following the outbreak of hostilities. In that connection, I wanted to
23 ask you how quickly you claim that the party suspended its work after the
24 outbreak of hostilities? And I take it, by the way, that you considered
25 the outbreak of hostilities to be at the beginning of April. If you
1 consider otherwise, let us know.
2 A. Yes, that's what I believe too, with the proviso that the party
3 was the initiator as far as the Crisis Staffs were concerned, but they
4 were established by municipal authorities, by municipal governments,
5 whereas the party was a political organisation and the initiator of that
6 activity, but it was not the party that carried it out in all
7 territories. That was done by municipal and local authorities. As for
8 when the work of the party was put on hold, I believe it was May 1992.
9 Q. Did you --
10 A. Or June perhaps. May or June. I cannot remember the exact time.
11 And that's what I said in the statement, that Mr. President called me and
12 informed me of the decision to put the work of the party on hold.
13 Q. Okay. But not before the party attempted to ensure the
14 transition from party Crisis Staffs into War Presidencies or
15 War Commissions as had been ordered by the republic level RS authorities;
17 A. Yes, because the war was already going on. The state of war was
18 imposed, so it's possible that the decision was not implemented in all
19 the territories at the same time.
20 Q. And that's reflected in P2608, a document that you sent on the
21 31st of May, 1992, as the secretary of the Executive Committee to various
22 parts of RS authorities, specifically the SAOs, Herzegovina, Romanija,
23 Birac, and Semberija, advising them that the decision of the republic
24 authorities had been made, that War Commissions will be set up.
25 Actually, in this document you refer both to War Commissions and War
1 Presidencies indistinguishably. Tell them to continue performing their
2 functions, and if they have any suggestions, remarks, or difficulties
3 regarding implementation to contact the Presidency. That is Mr. Karadzic
4 as president of the Presidency directly; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Now, at -- in part of your statement you refer to events in
7 Trebinje, that's paragraph 20 of your statement, and the involvement of
8 the SDS republic level with events there. The Trial Chamber, Mr. Komad,
9 has in fact received quite a bit of evidence about what happened in
10 Trebinje during that period of time, and I'd like to confirm the details
11 of what happened with you or challenge the full accuracy of your account
12 with the evidence the Court has received.
13 So first of all, Mr. -- let me march through that with you
14 step-by-step, Mr. Komad.
15 First of all, as we know from P6228, on the 2nd of September
16 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Vucurevic talked about a problem that Vucurevic was
17 having with, among others, Grubac and Borkin [phoen]. And Dr. Karadzic
18 told Mr. Vucurevic at page 3 of that document:
19 "Who is not following our politics can go to another party."
20 On the subsequent page Mr. Vucurevic begged him to come that same
21 week, and at page 9 of that document Mr. Karadzic told him:
22 "Don't you worry, we will finish it."
23 You don't have any reason to dispute that that happened. That's
24 an intercepted telephone conversation between Mr. Karadzic and
25 Mr. Vucurevic which the Court has received in evidence.
1 A. No.
2 Q. The next day, and that's found at P6229, Mr. Vucurevic continued
3 to express concerns. Mr. Karadzic again told him not to worry, he would
4 resolve it, saying:
5 "We won't have anyone eating shit under our banner."
6 That's at page 7. And assured Mr. Vucurevic that:
7 "Momo and I will come. We will bring it all to an end."
8 That's at page 8. And again you have no reason to dispute that
9 chronology I take it, Mr. Komad.
10 A. I don't know what they said to each other. I cannot confirm
11 whether it's correct or not, but I suppose if it's an intercept, then --
12 I can see here on the display that that's the subject of their
13 discussion, but I cannot confirm either yes or no. I suppose it's true,
14 because I cannot know what they talked about.
15 Q. Well, Mr. Komad, you're -- you were involved in this according to
16 your own statement, and you paint these events as somehow being a --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- failed effort by Mr. Karadzic but a triumph on your part
19 because somehow, as you painted, you had to intervene and therefore
20 succeeded where Mr. Karadzic could not. So I want to continue with this
22 On the 6th of September, according -- as we see from P2544,
23 Mr. Karadzic spoke to Mr. Milosevic.
24 MR. TIEGER: And although the English translation of this
25 document has the date sometime in December, we received evidence long ago
1 that clarified that date as being the 6th of September, Mr. President.
2 Q. Mr. Karadzic told Milosevic:
3 "I've just been to Trebinje and sacked some fools. They wanted
4 to replace my man Bozo Vucurevic. When I made that null and void last
5 night, I kicked them out, brought other people into the party and so on."
6 And he explains the municipal government collapsed. That's at
7 page 3 through 4 of 2544.
8 Now, similarly, we have the minutes of the Executive Board of the
9 same date. That's D1275. And those minutes reflect that on that date
10 Mr. Karadzic submitted a report on the situation which was endorsed, and
11 the decision to dissolve the Trebinje Municipal Board was adopted. A
12 working group with Mr. Vucurevic named first was to be formed to conduct
13 all affairs until new organs were constituted and that working group was
14 obliged to consult with the Executive Board and Mr. Karadzic.
15 Now, that's an accurate reflection of what happened with respect
16 to Mr. Karadzic's involvement in the difficulties Mr. Vucurevic was
17 having in Trebinje and his salvaging of the position of what he called my
18 man Bozo Vucurevic as the leading figure in Trebinje; correct?
19 A. I don't know whether he called him my man because he never called
20 him so before me, but as to the fact that there were conflicts or perhaps
21 better to say problems in the local organisation of Trebinje, that's
22 correct. But it didn't happen only in Trebinje. It happened in other
23 places, too. Many people saw themselves as leaders and party foremen,
24 and in this competition there were occasional clashes of all sorts.
25 However, as far as Trebinje specifically is concerned, it's true
1 that Karadzic went there and he informed us of the situation, and it's
2 also true that Mr. Rajko Dukic and I, he as president of the Executive
3 Board and I as the secretary, went to attend that session of the
4 Municipal Assembly in Trebinje where these problems were discussed, and
5 after that session the problem was forestalled. Consultations took
6 place, although not immediately, and the problem was solved not only in
7 Trebinje but in other places too. It existed in other places, too, but
8 Trebinje was the glaring example of problems and disunity in
9 self-organisation, which is small wonder. Those were the first party
10 elections and many people saw it as a chance to push their ambitions.
11 That is how --
12 Q. Okay. And I appreciate that you're about to go into a good deal
13 of detail about Trebinje. We have a good deal of information about that.
14 I want to focus on other aspects of this same issue.
15 As you point out, indeed this was not the only occasion that
16 triggered the intervention of the SDS republic level authorities, and
17 indeed it was not the first or last time that Mr. Karadzic ensured the
18 composition of the local authorities by intervening in a similar manner.
19 So, for example, in June of 1991, as we know from P2557,
20 Mr. Karadzic had a conversation with locals from Prijedor and was alerted
21 to problems that they were having, and that was a conversation with
22 Mr. Goran Babic from Prijedor. Mr. Karadzic told Babic:
23 "Tell those people who made problems that they cannot join the
24 party now. That is my order."
25 Page 3:
1 "Tell them that I will introduce new measures in Prijedor and
2 that I will tell them who the President will be there."
3 "Tell him," referring to Mr. Srdic in that case, "everything.
4 Tell him that I will dissolve board and I will place ten people to lead
5 the party. Tell him that I forbid any one of them to get closer to the
6 party. If you are not able to organise the real democratic elections
7 without those bastards, I will name 10 to 15 people to lead it as I did
8 last time."
9 So P2557, an intercepted telephone conversation in June of 1991,
10 reflects another occasion on which Mr. Karadzic monitored the situation
11 in the municipality and intervened to ensure that the composition
12 remained as the SDS republic level desired; correct?
13 A. I really can't say anything about your assertion. I didn't take
14 part in it. I did take part in the events in Trebinje, but as for
15 anything else, I can't say anything because it doesn't concern me, and
16 you don't find that in the statement either.
17 Q. Well, let me ask you another event reflected in D1289. That's a
18 conversation that took place a little earlier in June between
19 Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Brdjanin, and Mr. Cvetkovic. And again Mr. Karadzic is
20 complaining about any departures from the SDS republic level party line,
21 and he states:
22 "They are complete idiots. Insolent motherfuckers. As long as
23 they are in SDS it will be decided here. What is like that in a global
24 picture and what is not like that. Whoever will not accept this can fuck
25 themselves and then we are going tell the people what they are doing. I
1 will send them to hell. Those are idiots. This is the party policy and
2 whoever wants to eat shit, they will have to take off the SDS badge and
3 eat shit in their own name."
4 That's at page 6. And he goes on on the next page of that
5 intercepted telephone conversation to state:
6 "If you ruin this, we will have --"
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Neither we nor the witness see the
8 part of the intercept that Mr. Tieger is referring to. Could we have
9 that on the screen so that the conversation is read out in
10 interpretation, because it otherwise may have a changed meaning.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have that on the screen,
12 the part you were referring to, sir.
13 MR. TIEGER: I think the first question -- this is a document in
14 evidence that by the way was introduced by the Defence. The first
15 question is the extent to which the witness has any familiarity at all
16 with this event, and then the nuances of the translation, if any, may or
17 may not be relevant. But I --
18 JUDGE KWON: It will be fair enough if you are going to quote a
19 substantive part of the intercept.
20 MR. TIEGER: I'm now turning to page 7 of the English. That's --
21 where Mr. Karadzic stated:
22 "If you ruin this, we will have new municipal elections, and I
23 guarantee that none of you is going to be on the list. I will be making
24 the list. I will come to Banja Luka for a month and make SDS to this."
25 Mr. Komad, were you familiar with this and is this not a
1 reflection yet again of Mr. Karadzic overseeing, monitoring, overseeing,
2 and intervening to ensure that the SDS republic level party line was
3 adhered to?
4 A. Given the fact that I'm not included in this conversation, I
5 can't say anything about it. Knowing Mr. Karadzic as a man, I find it
6 difficult to believe that he would use such language and vulgarity
7 because I consider him to be a high-brow intellectual and a highly moral
8 person. I did not participate in the conversation, so I wonder why this
9 question is put to me. I couldn't have been present at every
11 Q. The question is put to you, Mr. Komad, because you make certain
12 assertions in your statement based ostensibly on your own experience. So
13 I am testing whether those assertions are contrary to your experience or
14 whether or not your experience is lacking in such a way that maybe the
15 assertions you make are contradicted by facts about which you did not
16 know or claim not to know. Do you understand?
17 A. I do understand, but you see I explained the situation in
18 Trebinje. I described it briefly. I haven't touched upon anything else.
19 I did say that there were problems, of course, and I still say that,
20 because it was the very beginning of multi-party organisation and the
21 beginning of the party as a political entity. Of course there were
22 problems, and they were being dealt on the go. As far as I know, it was
23 done on a democratic basis through constructive dialogue and raising
24 important issues. That was the policy of the party, to deal with matters
25 through dialogue, taking into account the general values that the party
1 had built into its platform. That was the basis for such conversations
2 and dialogue. And the same principle was supposed to be -- was supposed
3 to have been followed in the field when organising its work in the
4 municipalities and local communes.
5 Q. Well, I'm not going to dwell on this for long, but with respect
6 to your comment about constructive dialogue and general values, let me
7 ask you about some other evidence we've seen. P2556 is an intercepted
8 telephone conversation with Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Stevandic from January
9 of 1992, and among other things in that conversation Mr. Karadzic says:
10 "Well, I will not -- I will not -- well, let them go fuck
11 themselves. Whoever makes a mistake, I will suspend him and throw him
12 out of the party. I do not give a fuck. I will throw the shit heads out
13 by a single stroke of the pen. I cross him. He is not in this party.
14 As soon as he betrays the basic -- the basic flows of the party and the
15 principal policy of the party."
16 Those excerpts are found at pages 4 through 5.
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters do not have this text in the
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Was that a question, sir? I
20 confirm that I did not take part in such conversations and I do not
21 recognise Mr. Karadzic in this. I do not dispute that he was perhaps
22 upset and agitated when people say things, but his general demeanour as
23 party president did not boil down to what you are insisting on. Quite
24 the other way around. We were always in favour of democratic principles
25 and everything that was contained in the party programme and the
1 programme of the main and Executive Boards. We were in favour of the
2 party acting along the agreed principles, democratic principles. I can
3 cite an example in favour of it.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. You've had an opportunity to cite examples before. I just wanted
6 to -- I take it then that the positions reflected in this intercept were
7 not part of the constructive dialogue that you referred to in your
8 earlier answer; right?
9 A. Well, if that was -- I was discussing the party principles and
10 not a single conversation, which may have been imbued with emotion or
11 something else based on the reasons for it. I was discussing the
12 principles of the party and the principles followed by party organs. Its
13 president was also an organ of the party, so perhaps in affection he may
14 have said something, but it was not the policy or standing practice
15 applied by the party.
16 Q. Okay. Now, you've already mentioned and we've discussed to some
17 extent Mr. Vucurevic, who was the leading figure in Trebinje, the
18 president of the SAO Herzegovina and the leading figure there, and this
19 Chamber's already received evidence in D3170, that's a document tendered
20 by the Defence, where Mr. Karadzic said to him:
21 "Keep everything under your control, the entire Herzegovina."
22 Now, Mr. Vucurevic in fact was someone who was close to and
23 deferential to Mr. Karadzic, wasn't he?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And on the other side of Bosnia, that is in the north-west part
1 of Bosnia, was the Krajina, and Mr. Brdjanin is someone who regularly
2 checked in with Mr. Karadzic for guidance, direction, and approval;
4 A. It wasn't only Brdjanin. I think Vojo Kupresanin sought advice
5 much more than he did, as well as some others from Krajina. However,
6 Brdjanin was one of the group as I have stated in the statement. Now, if
7 you're asking me who came to see him the most, then it was the men I
8 mentioned, Vukic, Radic, Kupresanin.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We didn't hear the last
10 two names.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And this includes Brdjanin. I
12 really can't say who came to see him most frequently. If I try to think
13 back, it seems to me that they all came to see him rather frequently.
14 Brdjanin didn't come more often than the others, the others I mentioned.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Thank you. We have received evidence, that is this Trial Chamber
17 has received evidence of a particular telephone call that Mr. Brdjanin
18 had with Mr. Karadzic on the 31st of October, 1991. That's P2549.
19 Mr. Brdjanin calls concerning the problem with a dance that has been
20 scheduled that he thinks was inappropriately scheduled, and Dr. Karadzic
21 asks him:
22 "Can't you solve a single problem without Karadzic?"
23 "You have all the power in Krajina. Why don't you exercise this
25 And then he continues after Brdjanin tells him, well, someone --
1 pages 4 through 5 of the English.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask that the things
4 being referred to be shown to us and to the witness especially. This is
5 not the translation. It was simply Mr. Tieger's interpretation and we
6 lose the context.
7 MR. TIEGER: It is not my interpretation. I'm reading from the
8 English translation of a document that's in evidence. I don't -- since
9 it is in evidence, I don't consider that for the purposes of this
10 question it's necessary for the witness to follow. I'm happy if he can.
11 I can call it up. And it is up.
12 JUDGE KWON: But in order to elicit an informed answer, it would
13 be fair to show the document to the witness. Let's continue, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. And now moving on to page 5 of the English, as I said --
16 MR. TIEGER: And you can move the -- you can move it one more
17 page in the B/C/S.
18 Q. Dr. Karadzic tells him:
19 "Come on, man, do your job. Don't call me about every minor
20 problem. I am not your nanny. You have power in your hands, you have
21 presidents of municipalities through whom you can exercise as power until
22 we achieve autonomy. You should exercise power vigorously and to the
23 fullest. Not a single bird should be allowed to fly over Krajina and
24 there not be a shortage of men from Krajina for the army. You must
25 establish all that. I've seen what was written and sent. All of that
1 must be implemented. Take care of that. Call each and every
2 municipality president and keep checking if it has been implemented and
4 Now, Mr. Komad, do you recall what was happening at this time and
5 what Mr. Karadzic was referring to when he talked about the need to
6 implement all that was written and sent; that is, when he spoke to
7 Brdjanin about that on the 31st of October, 1991?
8 A. I can't say anything really with regard to your question. I
9 don't know.
10 Q. Let's take a look at P2548 then. This is a telex that's entitled
11 "The Sarajevo SDS Order," and it refers to the meeting held on the 26th
12 of October, 1991; that is, five days before the meeting we just looked
13 at. A meeting that was chaired by Dr. Karadzic. And it orders, among
14 other things, to form commands and institute permanent watch immediately,
15 to institute full mobility of the territorial army, to form field units
16 and name their substitutes, to take over power in public firms, post
17 office, account-keeping institutions," that means the SVK, I take it,
18 "administration of justice, and especially in mass communication media,"
19 and then it goes on to order other things.
20 Mr. Komad, that's what Mr. Karadzic was directing Mr. Brdjanin to
21 do in that October 31st conversation; correct? And that's what was going
22 on at the time.
23 A. What was the question for me?
24 Q. I asked you earlier if you knew what Mr. Karadzic was referring
25 to when he was adamantly instructing Mr. Brdjanin what to do on the 31st
1 of October. You said that you professed not to know. So I showed you
2 now the SDS order of the 26th of October, from five days before, and I
3 asked you if, in fact, that wasn't what was happening at the time and
4 that was what Mr. Karadzic was referring to when he was talking to, at
5 least in part, to Mr. Brdjanin on the 31st.
6 A. As far as I can see, this is a SAO Krajina document. Those were
7 the issues discussed at that level in that body if this is indeed so. I
8 had no possibility of being included in it all. As I've stated at the
9 beginning, I'm here to testify to the work and functioning of the party
10 organs and not the executive organs. The SAO Krajina was a type of the
11 executive organ at this particular point in time. I cannot state any
12 conclusions of mine regarding documents as this one and this type of
14 Q. So it's your testimony to this Chamber that you knew nothing
15 about these events and what was happening at that time with respect to
16 forming commands, taking over power in public firms and so on; is that
18 A. I was not included in it.
19 Q. Well, let's take a look at P958. P958 reflects a speech given by
20 Mr. Karadzic before -- just before the plebiscite in November of 1991,
21 and I'd like to look at certain aspects of that. At page 4 of the
22 English and page 2 -- well, it's hard to say how this is in e-court.
23 Page 2 of the text in B/C/S. It won't be e-court page 2 because we have
24 a cover page as well and some other pages, but it will be the second page
25 of the text.
1 Mr. Karadzic states:
2 "I'm kindly asking you, I've seen it not only in Krajina but also
3 in Pale, you should seize completely and energetically. It cannot happen
4 that a company manager is not loyal to the party where that party is in
5 power. We cannot have a radio chairman or a newspaper editor who is not
6 implementing the policy of the party in power."
7 And then he continues in the next paragraph:
8 "Be prepared soon to take over the SDK decisively, I mean to
9 appoint your own man in the SDK."
10 Now -- and the SDK is the account-keeping facility; correct,
11 Mr. Komad?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And then at page 10 of the English, and that's the third to last
14 page of the text in B/C/S, Mr. Karadzic states:
15 "You presidents of municipalities, you have to do this job. You
16 and especially if the army instructs you to do it, no one else, no
17 employee in charge. You and nobody else, because you are presidents of
18 the national defence councils, and you are commanders of your towns. And
19 also in Krajina, especially where the war is going on, everything that
20 Brdjanin has written for you."
21 Now, based on those two entries alone, Mr. Komad, this is a
22 reflection of Dr. Karadzic telling municipality presidents and others
23 gathered for the plebiscite speech about the need to implement the
24 Sarajevo SDS order of the 26th of October, 1991; correct?
25 A. First of all, I can say that I was not in attendance when this
1 speech was given. That's one thing. Another thing, when you read this
2 out, I see that reference is made to the policy that had already been
3 established at the national parties and ethnic divisions in the different
4 municipalities and companies. Of course, the goal was to have the
5 personnel chosen and to be clear on the ideology and platform chosen by
6 the party. It was a lead-up to the war, in fact, and the will of the
7 people was clear because people were fearful and there were conflicts in
8 the environs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, threatening it with war. So the part
9 that you quoted from Mr. Karadzic's speech, this is the first time I hear
10 of it, but that is what it is stated, the ideology of the party that was
11 supposed to be conveyed to where it was supposed to go, that is to say,
12 to the people.
13 As for the concept of this speech, I may have a separate opinion,
14 but this is the first time I see it.
15 Q. Well, maybe you can tell us then, Mr. Komad, who Mr. Karadzic is
16 referring to at page 5 of the English and page 4 of the B/C/S text. And
17 if we look at the first full paragraph in English which begins with
18 Mr. Karadzic talking about "We and the Croats waking up in a state with
19 the borders recognised by Europe," and then just before the italicised
20 portion in English Mr. Karadzic states:
21 "Trifko, can I have some water? Get that kid to bring it."
22 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly read slowly. Thank you.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. He's referring to you, isn't he, Mr. Komad?
25 A. That may be. There are other Trifkos, but it could be me. I
1 can't remember. And given the fact that I hear of this text for the
2 first time, I simply stated my view on the general position presented
3 therein, but I can't really read the original. It is so dense and
4 illegible that I can't make things out. I think I've provided you with
5 my position when I said that it was already the multi-party stage and the
6 functioning of the parties. He was basically addressing the deputies of
7 the SDS in the various municipalities and SDS personnel in different
8 companies where they represented the party.
9 I don't know whether this refers to me. It may well be.
10 MR. TIEGER: All right. Mr. President, I note the time. I don't
11 know if I've exhausted my time as allocated, but I don't think I have
12 much more than ten minutes in any event, but I think it's better -- I can
13 do it in a more efficient fashion I think if we take the break now.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll break, but before we do, about this
15 document, in particular translation. I note there are several emphasis
16 or italicisation. Who did that, while there's none in the original?
17 MR. TIEGER: I can check on that, Mr. President. This
18 translation, so far as I'm aware, has appeared in various cases, so it
19 wasn't done specifically for this case. It was inherited. But I'm happy
20 to check and see if it's more suitable to eliminate the italics and
21 replace it with normal font.
22 JUDGE KWON: If you could do so.
23 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. Mr. Komad, we're still discussing the plebiscite speech of
4 November 1991. That's P986. And I wanted to turn you to a different
5 excerpt, and that is found at page 6 of the English and page 7 of the
6 B/C/S. And there Mr. Karadzic says the following -- that paragraph
7 begins with a discussion about what Mr. Karadzic says he told Izetbegovic
8 concerning immigrants, Muslim immigrants from other areas to Bosnia, and
9 he says:
10 "But I am telling you whatever Bosnia we have one day, no Muslim
11 foundation shall ever be laid in Serb areas and Serb villages whether or
12 not you import Turks, because we will instruct Serbs not to sell land to
13 Muslims. The first foundations that are laid will be blown up and all
14 foundations that are laid will be blown up."
15 And then he continues some sentences later:
16 "They are implementing a demographic policy here, but we will be
17 implementing one, too, and the whole world will understand that. The
18 world will understand when we tell them that we will not allow the
19 demographic picture to change either naturally or artificially. No way.
20 Our territories are ours. We may be hungry, but we will be there."
21 And then he continues:
22 "You must not sell land to Muslims. You must not, because this
23 is a fight to the finish, a battle for living space."
24 Now, first of all, Mr. Komad, having heard these remarks, does
25 that refresh your recollection about your attendance at the plebiscite
1 speech in November of 1991?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Neither the interpreters nor the
3 witness nor I saw this passage on the screen. We did not see that
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: I have it at page 6 of the e-court at the bottom.
7 That would be the one, two -- the third full page of text and the last
8 paragraph of that page and continuing on to the top of page 7 of the
9 e-court. Or page 4 of the full text if the witness wants to look at it.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the reference for the
11 B/C/S and have it displayed on the screen, the Serbian page.
12 MR. TIEGER: It's P986. It's the one, two --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 MR. TIEGER: P986, the third page of text in B/C/S, the bottom
15 paragraph beginning [B/C/S Spoken], et cetera.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's -- the "et cetera" is
17 precisely what I want to see.
18 MR. TIEGER: I'm not disputing it. I'm just identifying where
19 the passage is found.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I certainly want the witness to
21 see that too.
22 JUDGE KWON: Are we on the correct page, Mr. Tieger?
23 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Mr. President? I don't know what else I
24 can do other than to call up the -- oh, I'm sorry. Okay. I see the
25 problem. It's P958. My apologies to the registrar. Otherwise,
1 everything applies. And as I say, the third -- I think it's page 6 of
2 the B/C/S, but it's in any event the third page of text. That's it.
3 There you go.
4 Q. See at that last paragraph, Mr. Komad? That's the portion that I
5 was quoting --
6 A. Very poorly.
7 Q. Well, just to recap quickly, it begins with a reference to the
8 Muslim gentlemen establishing a ministry. It continues on about no
9 Muslim foundations shall ever be laid in Serb areas. First foundations
10 will be blown up, and then several sentences later:
11 "They are implementing a demographic policy here. We will not
12 allow the demographic picture to change either naturally or
14 And then finally, I believe at the top of the next page, but I
15 won't move any faster than you want me to.
16 MR. TIEGER: And perhaps we can just show the next page in B/C/S
17 and get rid of the English for the moment. No. We're going to have both
18 pages at the same time, but that's fine.
19 Q. Finally it states:
20 "You must not sell land to Muslims, you must not, because this is
21 a fight to the finish, a battle for living space."
22 A. Yes, I see what you're driving at. The question is am I aware of
23 it or not. You keep asserting this and trying to portray Mr. Karadzic as
24 an absolutist, a man who ruled absolutely without the involvement of any
25 authorities, and I disagree about that. This is just a verbal expression
1 of anger, anger about the situation that was already what it was on the
2 ground. There was already mistreatment of Serbian people, displacements,
3 movements of population. If there is any expression of anger, it was
4 part of the dialogue and attempts to find solutions by pointing out to
5 the problems that was the meaning. The party advocated this and
6 Mr. Karadzic too.
7 Let's go back to Trebinje where you said that Karadzic was an
8 absolutist, and then I would like to ask how come he didn't deal with it?
9 Why did Rajko Dukic and I have to go there?
10 Q. Mr. Komad, I went through at that with you. I'm not going back
11 there. I showed you the documents that are in evidence, the
12 contemporaneous statements that were made at the time. So you had plenty
13 of opportunity to do that. If Mr. Karadzic wants to take you back there,
14 he's more than welcome to do so. Let's stick to what I'm talking about
15 right now which is Mr. Karadzic's remarks in November about the
16 demographic policy and the demographic picture and the battle for living
17 space. And in that connection, I want to take you to paragraph 24 of
18 your statement.
19 A. In November 1991, there were already movements of the Serbian
20 population, especially from Croatia. there were convoys of refugees from
22 Q. Sorry, sir. This is not a debate. What I'm trying to do is ask
23 questions to focus on certain areas, particularly certain areas that
24 you've covered in your statement. I'm about to move to one of those
25 paragraphs. So I'd appreciate it if you would listen to the questions
1 and answer the question asked rather than making a speech about what you
2 think the impact of your testimony so far has been or not been.
3 In paragraph 24 of your statement, you refer to a meeting between
4 Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Tudjman. And in connection with the demographic
5 picture, I wanted to ask you about some aspects of that meeting which are
6 not reflected in your statement.
7 MR. TIEGER: So if we could turn to P986, please, and this time
8 it is P986.
9 Q. These, in fact, are the minutes of the meeting in January of 1992
10 between Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Tudjman, and other members of -- and other
11 associates of Mr. Tudjman. At page 6 of the English and page -- well,
12 the page that has the ERN 9181 in B/C/S. You will find those ERNs at the
13 top of the page. Mr. Koljevic states:
14 "An independent Bosnia does not suit us at all because it brings
15 us and we think the Croatian people into a situation where we are
16 separated from our motherlands."
17 At page 13 of the English and at page 9189 of the -- in B/C/S,
18 Mr. Koljevic states that it is not so impossible to divide Bosnia with
19 the aim of homogeneity of certain areas. He says that everything is
20 possible but complains that that option is excluded on the basis of a
21 stand taken by the internationals in advance when they look at the
22 leopard skin aspect of Bosnian demographics.
23 And page 32 of the English and the page which is 9213 through
24 9214 of the B/C/S, Mr. Koljevic talks about delimiting territorial
25 boundaries and arranging for the transfer of property and population, and
1 he states the term "homogeneity" was, as you know, "vilified in
2 Yugoslavia. Why should it be something terrible for people to live with
3 people who are closest to them?"
4 And Tudjman responds that:
5 "Whenever national problems so conceived emerged as they did with
6 us, that was resolved," and he refers to World War I and World War II,
7 "that was brought to a conclusion by exchanges."
8 So, Mr. Komad, the meeting between Koljevic and Tudjman which you
9 referred to in paragraph 24 of your statement in fact reflected a further
10 aspect of Bosnian Serb concerns about the demographic picture and a
11 further reflection of their interest in ensuring that ethnic separation
12 took place in a manner such that the -- the final demographic picture was
13 suitable to the Bosnian Serbs. Isn't that right?
14 A. I was present when Mr. Koljevic left for Zagreb and when he
15 returned from Zagreb. I see this transcript for the first time, but I
16 know his reaction, and I reflected it in my statement. He went on that
17 trip to beg Tudjman and the leadership of Croatia to do everything within
18 their influence to stop the winds of war from spilling from Croatia into
19 Bosnia. That was the purpose of his visit. And to ask that all issues,
20 including borders, to be resolved by dialogue.
21 I remember well, and I know this well because I'm from
22 Herzegovina, Tudjman said -- sorry. He said, "Do you want Herzegovina to
23 be your border?" And Tudjman said, "Yes, on the condition that you move
24 Muslims to your yard." And that explains the later coalition between
25 Muslims and Croats.
1 I did not see this transcript before, but I'm just relaying my
2 impressions because I was present there, and that's what I said in my
4 As for the other remarks on which you insist, of course I was not
5 fully informed until the end, because transcript is one thing and my
6 general impression that I stated is another.
7 Q. Mr. Komad, I have two hopefully quick matters. The first is, and
8 it involves having you listen first to an intercept and then a brief
9 portion of a video-tape. So if we can call up 65 ter 30304, please.
10 Maybe we better start that again.
11 Mr. Komad, this is a conversation between you and
12 Mr. Milorad Bojovic on the 4th of October, 1991, and I just wanted to
13 give you a chance to listen to it briefly. I won't play the entirety of
14 it but you're welcome to look at the transcript of that conversation if
15 you wish, but let's play portion of it first so you can presumably
16 recognise yourself.
17 [Audiotape played]
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. That's enough for now. The conversation will continue,
20 Mr. Komad, and I can put up the two transcripts briefly for the benefit
21 of the Court. This is a conversation between -- well, first of all, let
22 me ask you quickly if you recognise your own voice and that of
23 Mr. Bojovic?
24 A. I recognise my voice.
25 Q. And as you heard from the tape, this is a conversation in which
1 you call because Professor Koljevic said that you should talk. You talk
2 about the Crisis Staff and the staff for regionalisation. Mr. Bojovic
3 says that he thought that they should not take any steps without an idea
4 of how it should be done and what your plan is up there. You talk about
5 the decisions of the government of SAO Herzegovina and SAO Krajina,
6 et cetera, and Mr. Bojovic talks about the need for synchronisation, and
7 the concluding part of the excerpt we heard thus today was Mr. Bojovic
8 says that they called so they wouldn't do anything stupid or rash, and
9 you say all preparations should be carried out. And he says, "Of course,
10 that's why I'm asking you because nothing can be done without your
11 approval." And you say, "Well, then, there you are." And he says he's
12 asking because you -- because these people have not been informed of
13 these matters, et cetera.
14 So was that the -- let me ask you, was that the type of
15 conversation you were having with municipality figures at that time in
16 respect of the implementation of regionalisation and the decisions of
18 A. Yes. If there were issues, yes. If there were such issues, yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. TIEGER: I tender 30304, Mr. President.
21 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will receive it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6248, Your Honours.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. And finally, Mr. Komad, there was a brief discussion earlier
1 about the language used by Mr. Karadzic, and I had the impression you
2 were indicating some surprise at that, so I wanted to briefly play
3 65 ter -- or at least a portion of 65 ter 40136B, which takes place
4 around the time we've been talking about; that is, around the time of the
5 plebiscite in 1991.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't hear the sound.
8 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover]
9 "Reporter: We no longer have any obligations towards the rest of
10 Yugoslavia. We have the right to self-determination and the right for
11 people to self-organise. When asked if it wouldn't be an act of
12 unconstitutional destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karadzic replied in a
13 not quite diplomatically.
14 "Karadzic: You cannot fuck up the entire Yugoslavia expecting
15 Bosnia to remain a virgin. No way! To point out at the end, three
16 million ballot papers have gone out to polling stations, two millions for
17 Serbs, the rest for the others. The balloting is reportedly also taking
18 place in Serbia, America, wherever people live.
19 "Many dilemmas have been raised by the colour of the ballot
20 papers. The blue ones are for the Serbs, the yellow ones for the others.
21 Many in Bosnia and Herzegovina noticed a similarity with the notorious
22 yellow armbands. The SDS response for this was solely caused by
23 technical difficulties."
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Now, Mr. Komad, as you can see, this deals with the subject
1 matter that we discussed during the course of your testimony to some
2 extent, but mainly I wanted to show it to you because of your reaction to
3 some of the language you heard from Dr. Karadzic. Here we see
4 Dr. Karadzic publicly saying: "You cannot fuck up the entire Yugoslavia
5 expecting Bosnia to remain a virgin. No way!" as a public broadcast.
6 Did you see it, sir?
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. I tender that Mr. President.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that it was a joke.
10 Obviously it was not appropriate, but the then journalists such as that
11 one were intent upon showing Karadzic and other Serbs as lacking in
12 culture, lacking in education, and so on and so forth. I believe that
13 this was why this was shown. This was not the way he normally
14 communicated. I already told you that there was a lot of anger, but this
15 is not a result of anger, but it was a joke which should not have been
16 aired publicly. If it was uttered in a small crowd of people, it should
17 have been appropriate. It would have been received as a joke.
18 As far as I know him, that's not the way he spoke publicly. He
19 must have been joking. As you can see from the context, it was more of a
20 joke than the real thing or his real expression of a real opinion.
21 MR. TIEGER: I tender this excerpt, Mr. President, and that
22 concludes my examination.
23 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6249, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Do you have re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency. Not much. I hope
3 I will finish very quickly.
4 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Komad, on page 41 of today's transcript
6 Mr. Tieger summarised on line 13 and he said that you said that the
7 Crisis Staff and the staff for regionalisation. Could you please make it
8 clear, which of the two staffs existed? Did the two -- or did both exist
9 in the autumn of 1991?
10 A. As far as I can remember, the staff for regionalisation existed,
11 i.e., it was either a board or a staff for regionalisation.
12 Q. Thank you. At that time did we have a Crisis Staff at the party
14 A. No, we did not.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. If you will allow me. In my conversation in the intercept, I use
17 the term the Crisis Staff for regionalisation, and I would like to
18 correct myself, and I did it on -- in the conversation as well, as you
19 could see.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you know who else accompanied Professor Koljevic
21 on behalf of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency to meet with President
23 A. Boras, a member of the Presidency. The Croatian member of the
24 Presidency. Franjo Boras I believe was his name.
25 Q. Thank you. When it comes to those parts and elements where the
1 import of population from Turkey is mentioned, do you know what that
2 refers to? Did you know at that time what was going on?
3 A. There was talk about the Mujahedin being on their way to Bosnia,
4 that they had set up their camps where they prepared themselves. We had
5 reports, but the information was not very specific. We did receive
6 information, but it was not complete, but such information already
7 reached us and circulated around Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 Q. Sokolovic Kolonija is also mentioned. It was built in Serbian
9 Ilidza. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what is meant when one says the
10 changing of an ethnic composition, what operations?
11 A. I wanted to say before this Trial Chamber that the spiritual
12 status of the Serbs when they were compared with the other two religious
13 communities that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to do with a
14 long-term initiative that the Serbian being or the Serbian culture or the
15 Serbian spiritual culture is being quashed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By way
16 of example, I can tell you that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the Second
17 World War until the year 1990, only one church was built in Krajpolje
18 where I was born, and there was a ban ongoing there.
19 In contrast, over 1.000 religious edifices were built in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina serving Catholics and Muslims. Likewise, not a single
21 letter, not for a single hour was Serbian Orthodox culture and thought in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1945 to 1990. In contrast, there was an Islamic
23 theological college which was in Bascarsija. It was set up in 1970 as
24 the only one in Europe. Also, there is a Franciscan theology, Jesuit
25 theology, and the secondary theological school in Visoko. During that
1 period of time not a single letter was thought about the Serbian Orthodox
2 culture. So there was a tendency to do away with the Serbian culture,
3 and this information testifies to that.
4 On the eve of the war I analysed the political postcards that
5 were published in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a priest. You could not see
6 any symbol of the Serbian spiritual or Orthodox culture in any of the
7 postcards. In addition to that, settlements like you have just mentioned
8 were built because various entities gathered around those places of
10 Q. I believe that you said "tourist leaflets" on line 10 and it says
12 A. Yes. Those were touristic leaflets, not political leaflets. I
13 must have misspoken.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at P2548.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
16 Q. Do you have an explanation for the fact that five days before the
17 conversation with Brdjanin that you were shown that Brdjanin had said
18 that there had been a meeting and that he was instructed to do the things
19 that he mentioned? Can you look at the document? Can you tell the
20 Trial Chamber what was applied in 1991, in October 1991? Did we set up
21 garrison commands?
22 A. No. I don't know anything about that. I don't know that any of
23 these things were implemented. I don't have any information to that
25 Take over power in public companies. We couldn't do that since
1 the -- the authorities had already been set up.
2 Q. Did we put a ban on issuing building permits?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did we put a ban on the employment of people who came from the
5 war-struck areas?
6 A. What do you mean?
7 Q. Paragraph 9.
8 A. Paragraph 9, okay. No.
9 Q. Thank you. What about 13? Did we impose higher tax rates in
10 October 1991?
11 A. No.
12 Q. The bullet point 3, did we form field units and name their
14 A. No.
15 Q. All in all, would you say that that document arose from the party
16 politics? Was it ever applied?
17 A. I've already told you when the Prosecutor was examining me that I
18 don't think so. Not only do I not thing so, I'm sure that it wasn't a
20 Q. Thank you. On page 23 you discussed an intercept featuring
21 myself and Mr. Bozo Vucurevic. A line was taken out of the context
22 there, and in that line there is reference to control.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to ask for the document
24 to be displayed. I believe that it is D3170.
25 Can we go to the following page in Serbian, and I believe that we
1 should be on the follow page in English as well. In English it's the
2 last line on the first page.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Please read the fourth line from the top.
5 A. "Whatever they have, whatever companies they have and can get
6 from you from the company, they all found it there from one company."
7 Q. Mr. Komad, is this about political control or is it about
8 procurement and the functioning of the companies?
9 A. It's about the functioning of the companies.
10 Q. Thank you. How were decisions made within the party?
11 A. I've already told you, but I repeat. The party tried to find the
12 best democratic solutions that existed in Europe and in the world. By
13 way of example, I would like to mention the political advisory body for
14 ethnical co-operation which consisted of the three members of academy,
15 the three top intellectuals from the Serbian culture. That council, that
16 advisory body, had a major input on the decision-making process. They
17 sought the most democratic solutions that could be applied at the time in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most commonly the party carried out activities in
19 the field, and it was the fieldwork that impacted the decision-making
20 process the most. It was not the leadership of the party but the
21 municipalities that did that. It was a democratic procedure which would
22 discuss issues like the statute, the programmes, some political positions
23 with regard to the plebiscite, and things like that. All that was first
24 checked in the field. We passed that by municipal bodies. We even
25 carried out some sort of research, opinion surveys to hear what the
1 people think, people in the field, at grassroot what they think, and
2 that's how decisions were made.
3 Everything that was decided was published by the party. We had
4 our own bulletins. We had our own newsletter. Where we could not
5 penetrate public media in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we issued our own
6 bulletins. We published them on behalf of the party. The general public
7 was present when it comes to all the pertinent issues that had to be
8 defined by the party and that had to be launched by the party.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you now tell the Trial Chamber who had the right
10 to distort a decision that was democratically made? Who was in charge of
11 the implementation of such decisions?
12 A. The Executive Board was in charge of the implementation of
13 decisions. I also participated in the Executive Board decisions of the
14 Assemblies, the highest body of the party. They launched those
15 decisions, and the Executive Board was tasked with the implementation of
16 such decisions to make sure that those decisions were implemented among
17 the people, among the basic cells of our party at the local level. That
18 was the kind of policy that was pursued by the party.
19 Q. Thank you. Did anybody had the right to apply the programme of
20 another party and pass it as the programme of the Serbian Democratic
22 A. No. There was such attempts, but the answer's no. There were
23 some elements from the old system, from the League of Communists, that
24 tried to assert themselves, but what was positive was applied, but what
25 the organs deemed not to be applicable could not be applied at all.
1 Q. On page 21, there was reference to the disbanding of the
2 Executive Board of the party in Trebinje. Is that something that was
3 contrary to the statute or was that envisaged by the statute?
4 A. The statute envisaged that, but the experience was still
5 practically non-existent. It was a period when we were making our first
6 step on the democratic path, and the -- an executive -- a Municipal Board
7 could be disbanded if there were quarrels and if there were activities
8 contrary to the basic principles, and in that sense one could reach a
9 decision on the disbanding of a Municipal Board and the Executive Board
10 of the party at the municipal level.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be instructed to slow
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor imputed to me that I
14 participated in the events in Trebinje --
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. [No interpretation]
17 A. I apologise.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes. Could you start again. Please
19 be slower.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. I'll try.
21 When it comes to the disbanding of Municipal Boards and the local
22 bodies of authority, that was based on the statute. There was a
23 provision in the statute to that effect, that such boards could be
24 disbanded due to local disagreements, activities contrary to the statute
25 and programme of the party. In that case the party could be disbanded.
1 When it comes to Trebinje more specifically, because it was said
2 to me that I can say what I think, if you, Mr. President, had absolute
3 power, I can ask you why didn't you do that when you were in Trebinje for
4 two days? It was the Executive Board that concluded that Rajko Dukic,
5 the President of the Executive Board, and I, as the secretary, should go
6 to Trebinje in order to resolve the situation there. That procedure is
7 certainly democratic because we sought the best solutions in order to
8 deal with the situation in Trebinje.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you. In the intercepts involving Kozic and Vucurevic,
11 Kominic [phoen] is mentioned as well as the SPO. Could you tell the
12 Trial Chamber who those people were? What were those bodies, and what
13 was the attitude of that party towards the SDS with regard to Trebinje?
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down
15 and not to start his answer before the question is finished.
16 JUDGE KWON: Please wait a bit or put a pause before you start
17 answering the question, and please speak very slowly. Could you repeat
18 your answer, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The SPO was a political
20 organisation based in Belgrade and led by Vuk Draskovic. At that period
21 of multi-party activity, the SPO had established its branch or its
22 organisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a focus on the Serb inhabited
23 areas. The SPO in a way competed with the SDS. They used many means to
24 push out the SDS from those parts of the country where we had already set
25 up municipal bodies. As for the names, can you remind me of the last
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Kominic?
4 A. He was the deputy, I believe. Anyway, he was from the top of
5 Vuk Draskovic's party in Belgrade. He was literally critic active in
6 Belgrade and who came to Trebinje with the purpose of expanding the
7 activity of his party in competition with the SDS.
8 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber what was the position,
9 especially vis-a-vis extremism of the SDS and the SPO?
10 A. The SPO was a more radical organisation in terms of their
11 position concerning the activities of Serbs through the political system
12 than was the case with the SDS. Generally speaking, the SDS had a
13 moderate or more moderate policy which could already be by the time
14 observed through the different documents and platform it published.
15 Q. Thank you. On page 20 and 21 there was discussion about
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 65 ter 30239.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. You were quoted from some documents from the beginning of the
20 crisis. Some documents from early September were quoted to you. This
21 one is the 17th of September. Please look at the third line from the
22 bottom. What does Mr. Dukic say?
23 A. Do you want me to read it out?
24 Q. Please just tell us what it's about. And the last part which
1 "Trifko is kept abreast..."
2 A. Yes, Dukic is conveying his impressions from Trebinje. And he
3 delegated that authority to inform me -- to inform you to tell us how we
4 participated at the Municipal Assembly session in Trebinje. That was the
5 purpose of this conversation as far as I can see. Of course we said that
6 we were hoping that things would settle down there after our visit, and
7 indeed it was so.
8 Q. Thank you. And there it is stated that you were in favour of
9 lifting the suspension from Grubac.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in both
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. So that both Vucurevic and Grubac stay there. That was your
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness start
17 JUDGE KWON: No, no. Just put a pause. The interpreters are not
18 able to follow up with your speed. Shall we start again, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, at the Assembly session at
20 Trebinje, I advocated or actually proposed that Vucurevic and Grubac
21 should sit down as the two opposing parties as well as their associates
22 in order to reach an agreement in those areas that were open to
23 discussion rather than to have Grubac suspended. There were some
24 proposals along that line. That was my proposal, which was accepted, at
25 least at the outset.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Thank you. When you said at the Assembly session, did you mean
3 the Municipal Assembly session or the meeting of the party?
4 A. The Municipal Assembly.
5 Q. Thank you. I'll read out what I say:
6 "I proposed it to them back then but they didn't accept it. They
7 did not accept it the first time round, and the Executive Board then
8 reached a decision to suspend -- or, rather, to dissolve the Municipal
10 Was it the Municipal Board who made that decision or was it me?
11 A. The municipal -- the Executive Board, Mr. President, as we can
12 see from the conversation, and I know it was so.
13 Q. Thank you. Two lines down I say again:
14 "Well, yes, this can be done democratically in public forums,"
15 and then Lukic says that you spoke to Vucurevic.
16 Now, help us out here. Dusko Kornjaca from Ljubina, is this a
18 A. Yes, it is, Mr. President. Dusko Kornjaca, as far as I know, is
19 from Cajnice, and Dusko Kozic is from Trebinje if that's the person in
20 question. But I don't know why Dusko figures in this transcript in the
21 first place.
22 Q. Thank you. Then we propose that Grubac remain.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. The third line from the top. My last sentence. Grubac's aims
1 may be noble and good, but the means he chose are violent. Do you know
2 what I advocated actually, what kind of instruments to be used in
3 political life?
4 A. Always I've said already, you were exclusively for dialogue, for
5 discussion to apply the best possible solutions that will suit the most.
6 Q. Thank you. The next large remark of mine, the means and ways he
7 applies are rough. One needs to take into account the model and method
8 of the SDS rather than certain Communist or SPO principles or God knows
9 what. We have our moderate democratic methods. And then further down we
10 say the democratic -- a democratic party does not make decisions only but
11 comes up with solutions. How does this tally with what you know about
12 the party you were a member of?
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness start again.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Komad, you were fast again. Could you start
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours. Pardon.
17 My entire testimony is to the effect that we were constantly
18 looking for the best and most democratic solutions. We consulted the
19 international community and scientists who could help us organise the
20 work of the party. Now, as for how successful we were, that's a
21 different matter. These were turbulent times with many difficulties of
22 things we had inherited and the problems that were brought about by the
23 looming conflict. This problem of things we inherited from the previous
24 system that we had lived in before as well as the looming problems made
25 things that much more difficult in applying the democratic principles of
1 the SDS.
2 If I were to make a summary of our activity, I would say that the
3 party did not have any militant or any kind of absolutist methods. It
4 was in constant search of the best methods. I've already mentioned what
5 kind of bodies and people helped us who were active in our area and
6 within our organisation. It was all done to create such methods.
7 I mentioned that I was a member of the political council
8 throughout its operation. It comprised the best intellectuals who had a
9 great impact on our programme and activities as a whole.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Thank you. You were shown part of the transcript between
12 Professor Koljevic and Franjo Boras with President Tudjman.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have P986.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
15 Q. Perhaps you can help us out. Let's see if the document contains
16 what you've mentioned was your impression?
17 JUDGE KWON: You're not tendering this intercept?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. I apologise.
19 JUDGE KWON: Then you should have confirmed with the witness
20 whether the witness really spoke with you. I think he appears up to this
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. In this document he does
23 appear. We can leaf through it. We can keep going through it. Dukic
24 mentions you on page 1.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. As someone who worked on it?
2 A. Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: Page 4 and 5, the witness spoke to you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have that shown to the
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. You actually scheduled some interviews on my behalf and I
8 accepted it. Do you agree?
9 A. Yes, I saw that. It was towards the bottom where it says:
10 "Trifko has something else to ask you." Rajko said that. And then I
11 asked you about that. That is correct.
12 Q. Are you the Trifko?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Tieger?
16 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3203, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. In this document, page
20 7 in the Serbian and 6 in the English, please. In this P986, which is on
21 the screen. Page 7 in the Serbian, page 6 in the English version. The
22 intercept transcript could be removed.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Now, perhaps we should look at the previous page so as to see
25 that it is Professor Koljevic who speaks. Look at the last long
1 paragraph. "We essentially proposed a tripartite community." Can you
2 look at it and tell us whether that is the gist of what was conveyed to
4 A. Please put it back, the paragraph, the one referred to by the
6 Q. This is Koljevic's intervention?
7 A. Yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Once again Mr. Karadzic is not being mindful of the
10 distinction between cross and examination-in-chief or redirect
11 examination, so he's lapsing into a leading mode. He'll need to find
12 out. And I think the witness has basically identified what he remembers
13 of the information he received from Mr. Koljevic, but in any event, this
14 would not be the way to proceed in redirect.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Komad, what Mr. Tieger presented as the topic and the gist of
18 that meeting and what you know about it, does it accurately reflect what
19 the meeting was about? What did you know about it?
20 A. As I've said already, I recall Mr. Koljevic going there and what
21 his intentions were when he went to talk to Franjo Tudjman. I also
22 paraphrased the words of the late Mr. Koljevic as to what he said upon
23 his return. He told us, of course, that he had discussions and that he
24 had conveyed -- he actually conveyed to us the thoughts of Mr. Tudjman as
25 to the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and some other parts. That's it.
1 Q. Look at the last paragraph, please, and tell us how does it tally
2 with what you learned from Professor Koljevic?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Again, I mean that's an insistence - as we've seen
5 before - a stubborn insistence by Dr. Karadzic on ignoring both the
6 objection and the ruling by the Court. If Dr. Karadzic wants to ask
7 generally about certain aspects in a non-leading way he can do so, but
8 instead he offers up a -- he elicits a generalised account and then he
9 goes right to the leading portions of the examination. So he --
10 JUDGE KWON: In your opinion, what the problem with the last
11 question is?
12 MR. TIEGER: He can certainly -- if he's moving on to a
13 particular subject matter generally, then he can ask whether the witness
14 was -- recalls any discussion about certain topics, but now he wants an
15 affirmation of what's in the transcript, and the witness -- by now the
16 witness has been reading from the transcript in any event as it stayed in
17 front of him during the course of these questions. But I think it's very
18 clear what Dr. Karadzic is trying to do here: He wants to pop this
19 document in front of the witness and get affirmations about specific
20 aspects of the document, and that is quite different than eliciting from
21 the witness in a non-leading way what the witness was aware was addressed
22 by Dr. Koljevic upon -- either before he went or upon his return.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
25 Yes, Mr. Robinson, if you could assist us.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. I think once Dr. Karadzic has shown that the
2 witness is familiar with the context he's entitled to put -- to draw
3 witness's attention to particular portions of the document and put a
4 non-leading question to the witness, like how does that tally with your
5 understanding. I don't think there's anything wrong with doing that or
6 anything leading, and I think the Prosecution did that continuously
7 during its case once it had established that a witness was familiar with
8 the topic. It directed their attention to particular portions of
9 documents or intercepts, and I don't think that this in any way is a
10 leading way of proceeding.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 That was my point of question for you, Mr. Tieger. Yes. You
13 have some --
14 MR. TIEGER: I won't argue it further so we can move forward in
15 any event, but let me just say as a general matter: It's -- it's one
16 thing to ask about a subject and then follow it up with a question. It's
17 another thing to take a generalised topic -- "Were you ever" -- for
18 example, "Were you ever in Sarajevo?" "Yes, you were." "Oh, you know
19 where it is." And then here's a document about something specific. And
20 that latter approach more closely resembles what we see Dr. Karadzic
21 doing repeatedly here than a follow-up to more specific inquiries. As I
22 say, I raise that as a general response to Mr. Robinson's point, but as
23 for this particular ruling, I leave it to the Court.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's proceed. We'll allow the
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Perhaps I can
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Did Mr. Koljevic go to see Tudjman in order to negotiate an
5 aggressive or a democratic way to resolve the crisis?
6 A. As I said already, the basic idea of Mr. Koljevic's trip to
7 Zagreb was not to have the war spill over into Bosnia-Herzegovina,
8 rather, to stop all war activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent
9 possible and also in Croatia, because the war had already started there.
10 So the specific goal of the trip to Zagreb was to invest an effort in
11 stopping the war which was already at the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. Thank you. Can we go to the next page. Would you look at this
13 and tell us -- the English page should remain the same.
14 Could you tell us how this fits in? What is Professor Koljevic
16 A. He's advocating any other alternative, including division,
17 absolutely anything, any solution that is not war. So he is in favour of
18 finding solutions for delimitation, agreements, negotiations. That was
19 the purpose and his intention behind going to Zagreb.
20 Q. Could we see English page 7 and Serbian page 9. In paragraph 3,
21 Professor Koljevic says:
22 "We had no wish to impose on the Muslim people any of our own
24 Is Professor Koljevic telling the truth here?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Could we see Serbian page 11, English 8. I will read out to you
2 the third paragraph by Koljevic:
3 "We tried to offer a surplus of sovereignty instead of denying
4 sovereignty. Let it be a Muslim sovereign, Serbian sovereign, and Croat
5 sovereign Bosnia. Let it be a sovereign state of sovereign peoples."
6 And then towards the bottom you see along the principles of
8 What did you know about this position of Professor Koljevic?
9 A. This position expressed by Professor Koljevic who was by the way
10 also chairman of the political council of the Serbian Democratic Party,
11 is a position that the Serbian Democratic Party and Professor Koljevic
12 advocated in talks and in dialogue, including here with Gojko Susak.
13 Those were the basic premises from which we proceeded in the party. We
14 fought for the sovereignty not only of the Serbian people but of all
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please,
17 both in English and in Serbian. Serbian 12, English 9.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
19 Q. This was partially quoted to you where Professor Koljevic says in
20 view of the intermingled nature of territories, there would be the
21 possibility of transfers and exchange in a civilised way, and then he
23 "And this is already happening spontaneously. The ethnic,
24 territorial, and demographic principles should be equally applied."
25 Did anyone from the Serbian Democratic Party or any of its
1 representatives in the government propose any violent, forced changes in
3 A. I understood you well, Mr. President. I do not know of any such
4 ideas, if they existed at all in anyone's head, but certainly in the
5 minds of the Serbian Democratic Party, members, and its representatives,
6 there was no such thing.
7 Q. Thank you. Did you together with me take part in my contacts
8 with the grassroot level, and were you aware of what I recommended to our
9 officials on the ground regarding co-existence with others, especially
10 Muslims, in terms of atmosphere and relations?
11 A. You advocated co-existence, living shoulder to shoulder wherever
12 possible. If that was not possible, if the relations had been disrupted
13 to that extent, you were in favour of division but on an equal footing.
14 You were in favour for equal rights for every individual but also peoples
15 as a whole. That was your principle and the principle of the party that
16 you represented.
17 I did not attend any meeting or any negotiations apart from some
18 minor excesses where you would officially proceed from the position of
19 hegemonism and lack of respect for other peoples. You put everyone on an
20 equal footing, the Serbian people and all the other peoples in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the policy and the strategy of the party
22 you represented.
23 Q. Thank you. I would now like to call 1D05745 in e-court, please.
24 28 September 1991, talks between Trifko Komad, Branko Simic, and
25 Radovan Karadzic. There is no other person with the same name and
1 surname as you, right, Trifko Komad?
2 A. No, there isn't.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see the next page in
4 both versions.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
6 Q. You see, you are introducing to go me Branko Simic from Mostar.
7 And further down below Simic speaks to me. I'm reading this in English:
8 [In English] "And there were disruptions in Opusici and Lokve,
9 but I -- there isn't any serious problem there and the people are going
10 back there and of course Muslims have all gone back."
11 [Interpretation] I say, "uh-huh, uh-huh."
12 Then Branko Simic:
13 [In English] "Over there in the village of Opusici, Muslims and
14 Serbs got together," [interpretation] I confirm [In English] "and are
15 roasting lambs on the spit together."
16 A. Lamb.
17 Q. [Interpretation] And then I say:
18 "Excellent. Let it be. Let them know that we have nothing
19 against them."
20 And then further below:
21 "One needs to keep repeating our forces, our weapons are against
22 Ustasha. Do not join the Ustasha and you have nothing to fear."
23 Do you recall this, and how does this position of mine fit in
24 with your recollection of our position towards the Muslims?
25 A. Precisely as you stated it, Mr. President. You always advocated
1 that wherever possible normal relations should be established and
2 fostered. You found examples for our common history of living together
3 and working together, and you always advocated for all the positive
4 vibrations and positive experience to be built into our relations, the
5 relations between Serbs and Muslims and Croats in our multi-ethnic
6 community in Bosnia.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Csn this document be
8 admitted, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3204, Your Honours.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. On page 18 you were asked the question in which it is not clear,
13 because negatives are used differently in our language and in English.
14 The question was:
15 "Do you claim, Mr. Komad, that despite the fact [In English] that
16 fact again one of that extended meeting -- at the extended meeting of the
17 deputies -- deputies club was aware of the variant A and B, and you were
18 not aware of it?"
19 [Interpretation] Then you answered: "No."
20 Did you mean that you didn't know or that you don't claim that?
21 It's a linguistic problem.
22 A. I meant to say that I was not aware of it.
23 Q. Then in English the proper answer would be, "Yes, I claim that."
24 A. Yes, I claim that I was not aware of that, that I did not attend
25 that meeting.
1 Q. Thank you. There was discussion on pages 13 and 14 about the
2 yellow ballot papers for the plebiscite of the Serbian people. Could you
3 first tell us who was that journalist who prompted me to make that
4 unsavory joke? Do you remember him?
5 A. He was very well known, Smiljko Sagolj, a journalist of Croatian
6 provenance who was notorious for many incidents and excesses as a
7 journalist and his tendentious reporting.
8 Q. Can you repeat the name?
9 A. Smiljko Sagolj.
10 Q. And he's regretting -- he's moaning about Bosnia, not Yugoslavia.
11 How did you understand his comment? Why did I make that joke?
12 A. The coalition was already there. The flags were already tied
13 together, the chequerboard flag and the lilies flag. They were tied
14 together in many public places and they were hoisted together as a sign
15 of their coalition. The Croats had already made a pact with the Muslim
16 side to make a coalition and to build an independent and sovereign
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the provocation he made and you reacted. I
18 understood what you said as a joke, because I repeat I did not know you
19 as that kind of person.
20 Q. Thank you. What can you tell us about these different colours of
21 ballot papers, especially the yellow ones, because you saw back there
22 that Sagolj says we claimed it was for technical reasons?
23 A. Yes, it was for technical reasons, because when counting we
24 wanted to know how many members of other ethnic communities accepted our
25 idea of living in a common state. If the Court allows me, I would like
1 to make a small digression.
2 If we were to analyse the programmes and the documents of the
3 Serbian Democratic Party, the HDZ, and the SDA, if we were to make a
4 sociological analysis, we would see that in our platforms all of us
5 advocated democratic principles and those programmes coincide a great
6 deal, especially in enactments. We differ mainly on one issue: In what
7 kind of state we are going to live in. That was where the disagreement
8 was. HDZ and the SDA wanted the principle of the majority to rule. They
9 wanted to out-vote others, to out-vote us and marginalise us. So through
10 these yellow ballot papers, we wanted to see how many members of other
11 ethnic communities agree with the idea of living together in a common
12 state. We were just testing the ground. That was our aim, not what
13 Sagolj and some others suggested.
14 Q. Thank you. Did that yellow colour of the ballot paper have a
15 special meaning or connotation? Why was it yellow and not something
17 A. No matter what colour it was, they would always find something to
18 object about. I know that yellow was chosen randomly so that we, the
19 technical services, could more easily analyse.
20 Q. Could we now see 65 ter 31994. And you, of course, know who
21 Miodrag Simovic is?
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. Who is Miodrag Simovic? Can you tell the Court?
24 A. Miodrag Simovic is a professor at the law school of the
25 university. He was deputy prime minister during the multi-party
1 government. He was the deputy prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a
2 candidate of the Serbian Democratic Party. He is now teaching at the
3 university in Sarajevo, and he's also a member of the academy.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before we upload this document, yes,
5 Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Thanks, Mr. President. Well, I'm having a hard time
7 seeing how this won't run afoul of the general principle that I
8 discussed. I mean, if Dr. Karadzic had said do you remember that I told
9 Mr. Simovic or Mr. Simovic told me, that would clearly be a leading
10 question. I don't know where we're heading here, but it seems to be
11 potentially the same problem, because I don't know exactly offhand what
12 the text of this intercept is about. It's difficult for me to speculate
13 about. It's a relationship to something that was just raised, but it
14 doesn't seem like this is going to work without being leading.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the topic was the colour of
16 the ballot papers, and it is clarified in this intercept, but I wanted
17 the Chamber to know who Miodrag Simovic was, what his importance and his
18 position was, but I didn't want to say it myself. I wanted to elicit it
19 from the witness.
20 JUDGE KWON: Well, let us see. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we get the next page,
22 Serbian 2, English 3.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. I'll read out towards the bottom. Karadzic says:
25 "Uh-huh. And tell me about some of our other neighbours. Some
1 of them are interested. Others are afraid of the plebiscite. Is that
2 your impression too?"
3 And Simovic says:
4 "I believe many more people of other ethnicities will turn out at
5 the referendum --"
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. "-- than we can guess at this moment."
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Serbian next page, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. And then he goes on:
12 "That's what I think from some of my impressions from my contacts
13 with him. That's my impression. You see, after all it's a great thing
14 when we say Yugoslavia, declaring oneself in favour of Yugoslavia. They
15 know it all."
16 And he goes on to say that 90 per cent of them know that without
17 Yugoslavia there is nothing.
18 And then on the next page he says:
19 "Although yesterday in 'Oslobodjenje' in some report he repeated
20 it, saying that the colour yellow denotes a second-rate people,
21 second-rate citizens, and I say he is a complete fool. I say he's a
22 complete fool. We wanted the colour to be white. The printing press
23 said they had no yellow paper and white was -- sorry, they had no white
24 paper and yellow was cheaper anyway. And then I say again, he's an utter
1 So were we trying to send a message using that colour? Did we
2 try to humiliate anyone?
3 A. No. No, we had no such intention.
4 Q. Thank you. Concerning the election of the secretary, it was
5 interpreted or translated that I was not nominated to become president of
6 the party. Is nomination and election the same thing or are they two
7 different things?
8 A. They are two different things. You can be nominated by somebody,
9 whereas election means that one is elected either by all citizens or by a
10 certain circle defined by a document. That's the difference.
11 Q. Thank you. Is there a difference between nomination and
12 appointment? The secretary of the Executive Board as a neutral body,
13 does he vote for one or the other faction or does he keep his neutrality?
14 A. As I've already told you, the election or appointment is a more
15 democratic form than nomination because it arises from the opinions and
16 the decisions of a majority, the majority that is eligible to vote,
17 whereas anybody can be nominated even by an individual. I already
18 explained that I as the secretary was appointed based on the advertised
19 opening and by virtue of my position I was a member of the Executive
20 Board. I was not nominated. I was elected. A nomination is less
21 democratic than appointment based on the advertised opening for a
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
24 MR. TIEGER: No.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3205, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Two more minutes, one document.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You were shown some sentences from which it stems that everybody
5 listened to me, that I was an autocrat, especially when it came to
6 Krajina. Can you tell the Trial Chamber?
7 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me. Excuse me, please. I'm quite certain
8 that I didn't use that term. This is commentary and leading at the same
9 time and needs to be avoided.
10 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely. The Chamber agrees with Mr. Tieger.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I apologise. I will
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. The picture that Mr. Tieger represented about me as a --
15 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Why doesn't Mr. Karadzic simply go to the specific
18 reference or to the subject matter without trying to characterise it or
19 comment on it in any way? It would seem to me to be much simpler.
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you need a break, Mr. Karadzic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will finish before the break.
22 It's very difficult, though, because Mr. Tieger made such a salad of his
23 questions, so he showed so many documents that portrayed me in quite a
24 different way, and now I would like to ask Mr. Komad what he knew about
25 my relationship with people in the field, especially with the leaders in
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I have already spoke about
3 your behaviour and conduct, about how you interacted with people as
4 president. I showed as much as I could that you used all the possible
5 democratic principles that could be applied in all of your activities,
6 including what you did in Krajina. So I can't say anything else. I
7 can't present any other of your traits than the ones that I did.
8 In my written statement it says that your tolerance sometimes
9 went beyond what could be expected resulting in a lack of consistency.
10 When I was talking about activities as a president, I said that the
11 meetings of the main boards were attended by people who had not been
12 invited to attend them, but you believe that everybody had the right to
13 have their say, that everybody had to be given the possibility to say
14 what they wanted to say. I would like to confirm that when it comes to
15 your attitude towards Krajina and the issues there, you sought democratic
16 solutions that would be applied across the board including Krajina.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. On line 23 you said "a lack of systematic nature" and it was
19 recorded as "inconsistency."
20 A. I would like this to be translated as the lack of systemic nature
21 because at meetings you would set -- you would refrain from setting up
22 the agenda. You left it to the others to do that. Sometimes you would
23 even didn't -- would not do that. It was not very practical.
24 Q. My last question: Did the Krajina leaders listen to me? What
25 was their attitude towards me? Did anybody listen to me, especially
1 those people from Krajina?
2 A. I believe that a majority respected you, that they showed
3 respect, and as a result of that they agreed with you.
4 Q. Did they obey me blindly?
5 A. No, no. There were dialogues. I don't want to say that there
6 were arguments. There were dialogues which were sometimes heated, I
7 would say.
8 Q. Did somebody have to pay the price for disobeying me or
9 contradicting me?
10 A. I don't know of any such examples.
11 Q. I am not going to call up a document which has already been
12 admitted, which is P2552.
13 Thank you, Mr. Komad. Thank you for the co-operation that I had
14 with you over the years, and thank you for coming to testify.
15 A. Thank you as well, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: Well, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Komad. On
17 behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The
18 Hague to give it. Now you're free to go.
19 But before we rise for a break, there are a couple of
20 housekeeping matters I'd like to deal with now. The first is scheduling.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 JUDGE KWON: Pursuant to the courtroom schedule on the intranet,
23 it is noted as we are sitting for three days in the week of 20th of May,
24 but given that Monday is a UN holiday, Whit Monday, we will be sitting on
25 Friday as well, that is 24th of May, unless it would cause a lot of
1 problems with the parties.
2 MR. TIEGER: Let me simply say, Mr. President, that when we
3 consume UN holidays or for -- and add them to the schedules, it's much
4 more difficult for the parties, I believe, because the services are quite
5 different. So apart from the fact that it prevents hard working
6 personnel - and everyone is working extremely hard - from getting what I
7 would think is a much deserved break, it also becomes much more difficult
8 to cope with preparation during that period because so much of the staff
9 is otherwise gone, and I suspect that is replicated on the Defence side
10 as well.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I see the point, but it has been our practice,
12 hasn't it, that while we are sitting four days a week when there's a
13 holiday, we still continue to sit four days a week even if there's a
15 MR. TIEGER: It has been our practice, which is why I was able to
16 make the comments I did on the basis of experience, and as I say, I
17 suspect it would be echoed by the other side.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, we would prefer -- we've
20 already scheduled all our witnesses for May, and we would have to now
21 round up two more, which we'll do it if you order us to, but it's -- the
22 information that we -- that coming from the Chamber, and the registry is
23 not always very clear to us. For example, we thought we weren't
24 signature on this Friday for a long time, and nobody notified us until a
25 calendar popped up and all of a sudden we were sitting on this Friday, so
1 we scrambled and we have enough witnesses for this week, but when we saw
2 the calendar for May there were two weeks in which we only had three-day
3 weeks, and so we scheduled the witnesses accordingly and it makes it
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We have three-day week in the week of 6th of
6 May, but there seems to have been a mistake as regards the week of 20th
7 May, but I will -- the Chamber will consider the issue, but you have
8 problem with sitting on Friday, 24th of May specifically.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Well, we don't have a problem with that other than
10 we would have to recruit some more witnesses for that period, and I don't
11 know -- I think there's enough time between now and then we can probably
12 do that. So we don't have a problem specifically with that date, but it
13 makes it difficult for us when we get conflicting information about the
14 calendar. So had we had the information originally when we filed -- when
15 we prepared for May, we would have had no problem with that.
16 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will come back to this issue in due
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From my point of view as a person
19 of a certain age, I was hoping for some more breaks. This rhythm is
20 killing us all. We are working very hard. Our witnesses follow in a
21 very rapid succession. I'm not complaining. I'm just trying to make
22 sure that the Trial Chamber has that in mind. We all have to stay
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
25 The final matter is related to the exhibit issue. The Chamber
1 recalls that on the 20th of March, 2013, it requested that CLSS provide a
2 revised translation for a specific excerpt of the video admitted into
3 evidence as Exhibit P2 -- I'm sorry, P6211.
4 The Chamber has now received a revised transcript in B/C/S as
5 well as the corresponding English translation of this excerpt, and
6 although there are only slight differences, the Chamber finds it
7 preferable to have the revised versions in e-court. Accordingly, the
8 Chamber instructs the Prosecution to upload the revised versions of the
9 B/C/S transcript and English translation as provided by CLSS to replace
10 those documents currently in e-court.
11 We will resume at 1.30.
12 --- Recess taken at 12.45 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.34 p.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: For the record, Judge Lattanzi cannot be with us for
15 this session due to her official function.
16 Yes. Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
18 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Bjelica. Please be seated and make
20 yourself comfortable.
21 WITNESS: MILOVAN BJELICA
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
24 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Bjelica.
1 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
2 Q. Like everyone who speaks Serbian, I have to ask you and to remind
3 myself to speak slowly and especially to make a pause between question
4 questions and answers. Have you given a statement to my Defence team?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. May I call up in e-court 1D7980. Please look at the
7 screen. Do you see your statement on the screen?
8 A. Yes, now I do.
9 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed this statement?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Could we see the last page so that the witness may
12 identify his signature.
13 A. Yes, this is my signature.
14 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have
15 said? Are there any errors? Are there any corrections needed?
16 A. Yes. It is a faithful reflection of what I said.
17 Q. Do you have your statement before you?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Well I shall ask for the leave of the Trial Chamber if you need
20 to use it.
21 If I were to ask you the same questions today as you were asked
22 when this statement was taken, would your answers be essentially the
24 A. Yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Excellency, I
1 tender this 92 ter package.
2 JUDGE KWON: I just note the revised statement has been filed,
3 but I haven't had the time to check what the differences are.
4 Mr. Robinson.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. There have been several
6 paragraphs added to the revised -- to the original statement which deal
7 with adjudicated facts and some additional documents which are referenced
8 in the statement.
9 JUDGE KWON: I just checked paragraph 23. In my version I
10 already have paras 60 to 82. But reference to 1D7305 has disappeared in
11 the new para-23.
12 MR. ROBINSON: That's actually in paragraph 59 now, and I think
13 it was --
14 JUDGE KWON: Fifty-nine, yes. It was my mistake. I thought it
15 was para 23. Yes, 59. It remains there.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, it was actually listed as an additional
17 exhibit because it wasn't listed at the time we submitted this list and
18 we have taken a position to put all untranslated documents as additional
19 exhibits pursuant to the Trial Chamber's instruction, but we have in the
20 meantime received a translation, so if the Chamber would be willing to
21 consider it as an associated exhibit, that would be helpful.
22 JUDGE KWON: I remember you rose before I asked the question.
23 MR. ROBINSON: I did rise just to tell you that there were 25
24 associated exhibits being offered and eight of them are not on our 65 ter
25 list and we would ask that those eight be added to our 65 ter list mostly
1 because they were received after the list was submitted.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Can I hear from you, Ms. Gustafson.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: Good afternoon, Your Honour. Thank you. Yes, as
4 we indicated in our e-mail yesterday evening, there have been 23 new
5 paragraphs added to the statement, paragraphs 60 through 82. They
6 reference a total of 17 new documents not mentioned anywhere else in the
7 statement. Clearly this goes beyond the minor corrections and
8 clarifications permitted at this stage under Rule 92 ter, so in our
9 submission these additional paragraphs should be led live.
10 I note Mr. Robinson's comments a moment ago that there is now a
11 translation for 65 ter 1D07305. As far as I'm aware, we have not yet
12 received that, so I had also objected to the admission of that document
13 and paragraph 59 which is essentially devoted to a discussion of that
14 document. If I can see the translation, I'd be happy to reconsider
15 whether that objection still stands or not, but until I can see the
16 English, that's difficult for me to do. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: I don't think there would be any problem for the
18 Defence to lead live about 1D7305. Do you have any observation to make
19 as regards the recently added paragraphs?
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We offered to the Prosecution
21 to postpone the cross-examination of this witness so that they can have
22 enough time to digest that material, and they've told us that they have
23 enough time to digest the material and go ahead with the
24 cross-examination now, but in line with the Chamber's practice they were
25 requesting it be led live. If I'm misquoting Ms. Gustafson, she can tell
1 me that, but that was my understanding of their position.
2 But our position is that this is Dr. Karadzic's contribution and
3 the only time he can make the contribution to his evidence, and we think
4 that any remedy ought to be to have the Prosecution have as much time as
5 they need for cross-examination. If you want to lead the evidence live
6 as long as it's not charged against our time, we have no problem and
7 we're not prejudiced by that, but we would be prejudiced if we would have
8 to spend against the 300 hours that we're given for our whole case to
9 lead evidence that can simply be postponed so that the Prosecution has
10 enough time, and that's we think a more valuable use of the Chamber's
11 time and a better remedy.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
13 MS. GUSTAFSON: If I can just comment on one remark Mr. Robinson
14 just made, which is that this is Dr. Karadzic's contribution and the only
15 time he can make the contribution. In this case, the bulk of these
16 additional paragraphs are the witness's comments on a number of documents
17 that were shown to him, and I see no reason why if Dr. Karadzic knows he
18 wants to do this he can't communicate sufficiently with his Defence team
19 to ensure that this is done well in advance so we are not faced with this
20 kind of -- this bulky new material at the last minute.
21 And just in terms of the practice, it has been the Chamber's
22 consistent practice when this kind of volume is added at the last minute
23 of new material that this is led live and I believe there's a good reason
24 for that. We are in this instance able to absorb this material into our
25 preparations and we don't need a delay, but if there is no
1 counter-balance in terms of some impact on the Defence's time, then in
2 our view there will be no limit as to the amount of additional
3 information that will appear in these 92 ter statements, and it will
4 become a significant problem in terms of our preparation. It is not a
5 simple matter to 24 hours prior to a cross-examination absorb and deal
6 with this amount of new material. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: And your argument is that the minor changes that is
8 to be covered by the so-called 48-hours rule is limited to really minor
9 things so that these cannot be said to be minor changes.
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Exactly, Your Honour. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Without repeating too much, I don't think we could
13 really live with that kind of rule given that this is Dr. Karadzic's only
14 opportunity to have input, and if he's relegated to a minor player in his
15 own trial, I don't think that that's fair.
16 Also, Mr. President, in terms of remedies for whatever let's say
17 violations there might be, the Prosecution had many disclosure violations
18 for which there were no remedies. So if you use the same logic that
19 Ms. Gustafson has used, there would have been remedies for those
20 violations to make sure that they didn't occur again, but also when you
21 did give us six or eight weeks to deal with late disclosure, you didn't
22 deduct that from the Prosecution's 300 hours. So it would be similar if
23 you were to give -- make us lead this evidence live. You shouldn't
24 deduct it from our 300 hours.
25 JUDGE KWON: One more question for clarification. You said that
1 the Prosecution said to you that it is -- it would be okay to go ahead
2 with cross-examination. Could you expand?
3 Or whether Ms. Gustafson could clarify that?
4 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honour. It's just that we don't need
5 any additional time to prepare for this new material, just our position
6 is it should be led live. And just in response to Mr. Robinson's remarks
7 about past disclosure violations, this is the practice the Chamber
8 applied to the Prosecution [Overlapping speakers] --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just one question. Even if the Chamber is to decide
10 to admit these paras, you are not asking for additional time for the
11 preparation of your cross.
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: No, I'm not.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: Given the circumstances, i.e., given that the added
16 material is not that much and that the Prosecution is ready to proceed
17 with her cross-examination, we'll admit the statement but not the
18 document whose 65 ter number is 1D7305. That paragraph should be led
19 live. We'll give the number for the statement.
20 THE REGISTRAR: That is Exhibit D3206, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: And just I forgot to raise this: Mr. Karadzic, the
22 Chamber had an opportunity to skim through the statement. Para 44, the
23 Chamber -- we will keep the first and last sentence, but the other part
24 should be redacted, as well as paragraph 45, 47, and paragraph 49 to 51.
25 They do contain too much detailed evidence, including names, ages of
1 victims on crimes against Bosnian Serbs that are not relevant or
3 With that caveat we admit this statement, and the other
4 associated exhibits will be admitted and will be given numbers in due
5 course by the registrar.
6 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: In light of Your Honour's ruling admitting these
8 23 additional paragraphs, unless there's been a recent change, there are
9 no translations for 65 ter 1D07974 referenced at paragraph 81 or
10 65 ter 05392 referenced at --
11 JUDGE KWON: Is it the document that is being tendered? I forgot
12 to mention that whether there's an English translation of 1D14014, which
13 is referred to in para 38. Where do you find that document,
14 Ms. Gustafson, 7974?
15 MS. GUSTAFSON: It's referenced at paragraph 81 and 65 ter 05392
16 referenced at paragraph 79.
17 JUDGE KWON: I think it was listed as additional document and as
18 such I take it, Mr. Karadzic, you're going to lead -- deal with it live.
19 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President, and also we do have
20 a translation of 1014 that I can see in e-court, so I don't know if
21 that's a problem with e-court.
22 JUDGE KWON: We didn't have the time to look at it. If
23 Mr. Karadzic could lead it live as well.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Okay.
25 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read out in
2 English the summary of Mr. Bjelica's statement, and then I will deal with
3 the documents that need to be led live.
4 [In English] Milovan Bjelica was born on 19th of October 1958 in
5 Rogatica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He now permanently resides in Sokolac
7 Milovan Bjelica was a member of the SDS in the Sokolac
8 municipality. He held several positions. First, in 1990, he was a
9 member of the Sokolac Assembly. Later, in May 1991, Mr. Bjelica was
10 elected as vice-president of the SDS Municipal Board. On 13th of
11 January, 1992, he became president of the SDS Municipal Board in Sokolac.
12 He was also a member of the SAO Romanija Assembly.
13 The SDS was formed during 1990 following the formation of the
14 SDS -- SDA and HDZ. In July that year, the founding assembly of the SDS
15 was held in Sarajevo. The party's key objectives were to preserve
16 Yugoslavia and the equality of the Serbian people in B and H. The most
17 important organ of the SDS was the Main Board, and the Assembly which
18 was -- among other things elected president of the party and implemented
19 decisions of the SDS Assembly.
20 Following the declaration of sovereignty of BH on 15th of
21 November -- October 1991, it resulted in the breakdown of co-operation
22 that had been established following the inter-party elections 1990. On
23 21st of November, 1991, the Serbs in BH adopted a decision to verify the
24 proclaimed Serbian autonomous regions and later that year the reserve
25 police force, Territorial Defence, and some reserve forces of the JNA
1 that were mobilised due to the mounting political tensions.
2 Muslim forces began to establish paramilitary groups, and by
3 January 1992, the Patriotic League was fully formed. There were sabotage
4 and terrorist attacks carried out by the Muslim units. There was also
5 information that Muslims were volunteering fight in Croatia against the
6 Serbs and bringing home weapons which alarmed the Serbian population. On
7 April the 4th, 1992, the Rump Presidency of BH, which did not include the
8 participation of the two Serbian representatives, declared a general
9 mobilisation of its police, military, and paramilitary units.
10 The Crisis Staff Sokolac municipality was formed in early April
11 1992. The Crisis Staff was independent in its work and received no
12 instructions from the Presidency and National Assembly of Republika
13 Srpska. There was no obligation to send documents of the Crisis Staff to
14 those organs of the Republika Srpska. The Crisis Staffs were -- that
15 were formed in municipalities and local communities were not a secret
16 system of command and control. The Crisis Staff in Sokolac functioned in
17 a democratic manner and helped with normal work and life in the
18 municipality. A meeting of the Crisis Staff was held on 23rd of April
19 that called for the maintenance of good ethnic relations and a return to
20 normal life. SDA members refused to attend the meeting. Although the
21 Crisis Staff called on the Muslim people for tolerance and co-existence,
22 they started leaving the Sokolac settlements and all settlements where
23 they were a minority population they left. There was no pressure of the
24 authorities for them to leave, and some remained at their homes nearly
25 until the end of the war. Those who remained lived in peace and were not
2 In the summer of 1992, as the member -- as the number of killed
3 and wounded of Serbian Army, police, and civilians increased, the VRS
4 called on civilians to hand over their weapons. Muslim units did not
5 respond to that call and sabotage and terror continued. The already
6 difficult situation in Sokolac increased when large numbers of Serbian
7 refugees started to arrive.
8 In summer of 1992 a number of incidents occurred in which Serbian
9 civilians were killed by Muslim extremists. The VRS 2nd Romanija Brigade
10 decided to demilitarise the area and Muslim units put up armed
11 resistance. Casualties were sustained on both sides.
12 There were no paramilitary or para-police units in Sokolac during
13 the war. There were some informal groups of young men who terrorised
14 both Muslims and Serbs, but with gradual establishment of authorities,
15 these groups disappeared and these persons were expelled or arrested.
16 There were no camps or prisons in Sokolac municipality, nor there were
17 any instructions from the state authorities to set them up.
18 Milovan Bjelica was aware of two incidents in June and September
19 1992 in which 50 and 44 civilians -- Muslim males had been killed.
20 Regarding the incident in June, Milovan Bjelica only knew details of the
21 incident after the exhumation of the bodies, because the incident was
22 kept secret from the public. Regarding the second, Milovan Bjelica heard
23 that it was committed by an informal group of Serbian youths, that the
24 perpetrators covered up the crime, and that representatives of the
25 Sokolac authorities were not informed about.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And now I would like to ask you to tell us something about your
3 relationship with the regional command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade, i.e.,
4 the relationship of the civilian authorities and that military command.
5 For example, in September or in the course of the summer of 1992.
6 A. May I? When it comes to the co-operation between the local
7 civilian authorities of Sokolac municipality during that period of time,
8 we had a Crisis Staff in the municipality of Sokolac. It was active
9 sometime up to the month of June or July. After that, the Executive
10 Board of Sokolac municipality was set up. The communication between the
11 command of the 2nd Motorised Romanija Brigade and the local authorities
12 in Sokolac municipality, i.e., the Executive Board and the president of
13 the municipality, was not satisfactory.
14 It was asked from the local authorities to provide additional
15 funds for the military, primarily for the food, fuel, cigarettes, the
16 food for the families of the combatants who were on the front line,
17 because at that time people did not receive salaries, which is why food
18 had to be supplied for the combatants as well as for their families.
19 The authorities in Sokolac municipality requested from the
20 brigade command to put a number of army members on standby to be given
21 work obligation in the companies that were still open. They did not have
22 enough trained and skilled workers for production, and that merely
23 applies to the forestry and timber industry known as Romanija. We did
24 not meet with the full understanding on the part of the command of the
25 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade which resulted in misunderstandings. The
1 command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade characterised this as interference
2 with the line of control and command in the units of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska, and it reported back to its superior command about
4 that. We are going to see that document later on in the courtroom.
5 The brigade commander reported back to his superior command with
6 this regard. That's why the relationship between one part of the command
7 on the one hand and the authorities of Sokolac municipality were not --
8 was not good.
9 Q. I would like to call up 1D07305. This is a document which is
10 mentioned in paragraph 59.
11 Please pay attention to this document. You have just mentioned
12 something that I would like you to talk about. What is this document?
13 A. This is document -- the document that I have just mentioned. You
14 can see that the command of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade addressed
15 its superior command, i.e., the Main Staff, and I can see from the
16 document that it also contacted the Supreme Commander, i.e., the
17 president of the Serbian Republic. It transpires from this document that
18 the command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade informs them that civilian
19 authorities should not interfere with the work of the military so that
20 the political structures of Sokolac municipality cannot do that. They
21 have their orders from the superior command that they were supposed to
22 carry out and that they report only to the military leadership and the
23 state leadership of Republika Srpska.
24 Here they're trying to portray this as political interference,
25 but it wasn't political interference. Things were just as I explained
1 them in my previous answer before I was shown this document.
2 Q. In English it is on the next page, and in Serbian it is the last
3 paragraph here. The brigade commander claims that the SDS in Sokolac is
4 also interfering and requesting that all of his activities should be
5 subjected to the interest of the SDS. How correct is that, or is it just
6 a matter of antagonism?
7 A. The SDS never interfered with the control and command of those
8 units, because that was not within the party purview. The party purview
9 was to encourage the local authorities to put in place conditions for a
10 normal life of our combatants and the local population in Sokolac
11 municipality. The situation was the same elsewhere. There was no
12 interference whatsoever, and during that period the work of the Serbian
13 Democratic Party was frozen. So we could not interfere on behalf of any
14 party organs because it was you on a certain date, I don't know when
15 exactly, sent us a directive. You sent it to the municipal structures of
16 the Serbian Democratic Party to put the activities, political activities,
17 of the party on hold, to suspend it for the time being.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: No objection.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll accept it.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3232, Your Honours.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Were you a member of the Crisis Staff? Did you know anything
24 about the decisions that were made by the staff?
25 A. Yes. I became a member of the Crisis Staff by virtue of my
1 position on the day when it was set up. As far as I can remember, there
2 were several persons who were members of the Crisis Staff by virtue of
3 their duty. President of the municipality; the president of the
4 Municipal Board of the SDS; the chief of the police station, the local
5 police station in Sokolac, that is; chief of the Defence Department in
6 the municipality; representatives of the industry, education, health
7 care. Some were members and some attended the meetings of the Crisis
8 Staff when needed. The members of the Crisis Staff were never from one
9 party alone. There were also representatives of the other political
10 parties in Sokolac that were a member of the Crisis Staff as well.
11 Q. How did the Crisis Staff deal with alcohol abuse and other risky
12 behaviours that might have led to the escalation of the crisis and
14 A. We had such situations that certain individuals who returned from
15 the front line arrived in settled areas with weapons. They would go to
16 local pubs where they had one drink too many, and then they would use
17 their firearms, i.e., they would open celebratory fire as we call it. In
18 order to prevent such unfortunate events, to prevent those things that
19 could lead to accidents, the Crisis Staff discussed the issue and issued
20 orders to the effect that there would be a ban on serving alcohol in pubs
21 and on carrying weapons in settled areas or on public premises. There
22 was a ban of bringing weapons to any place where there might be larger
23 groups of people present. So we did everything possible in order to
24 prevent any unfortunate events that may have tragic consequences.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D4383.
1 That document is mentioned in paragraph 79.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
3 Q. When you say celebratory shooting, where was fire most commonly
5 A. It could happen in a pub or around a pub, in places like that.
6 Q. And when fire was opened did they aim at anything?
7 A. No. It was opened in the air.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, could you look at the document and tell us
9 whether that document is familiar to you? You mentioned a number of
10 bans. What can you tell us about that?
11 A. This is exactly what I've just described. I'm familiar with the
12 document, Mr. President. This is a document that the Crisis Staff
13 issued -- or, rather, it adopted a decision and tasked the public
14 security station in Sokolac with the implementation of this decision.
15 Inspection services were tasked with the implementation of this document.
16 Q. Can you read for the benefit of the Trial Chamber paragraph 2.
17 Can you please read it allowed.
18 A. "All catering establishments in Sokolac must stop operating no
19 later than 24 June 1992 at 1800 hours."
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
21 JUDGE KWON: Where is this document referred to? You said para
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 79.
24 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Robinson?
25 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. In paragraph 79 I see that
1 it's document 5392. So we have to look a little bit further. I'm
2 advised it's the same document.
3 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Gustafson?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 65 ter number is different.
5 It's 5392, whereas 1D is 4383.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: I mean, I have no objection to it being MFI'd
8 pending translation.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3233, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber when you finally managed to
14 consolidate the municipal authorities during the first year of war, and
15 to what extent could it control the developments there?
16 A. The municipal authorities did everything in their power to
17 maintain public order in the territory of our municipality and to provide
18 for the security of citizens in Sokolac. However, it was a tall order.
19 There was a lot of weapons. People returned from the front line. They
20 were known to use weapons randomly from time to time. We tried to react.
21 We had some shake-ups in the personnel of the public security station in
22 Sokolac in order to improve the situation as best as we could. However,
23 things were not intolerable, but our goal was prevention in order to
24 avert any fatal consequences to the detriment of the security of the
1 Q. In September 1992, did the Crisis Staff still function? What was
2 the composition of the power in September 1992?
3 A. As far as I can remember, in September 1992 the Executive Council
4 of the municipality was already operational. As far as I can remember,
5 but I'm not sure.
6 Q. Thank you. And now I'd like to call up 1D7974. This document is
7 mentioned in paragraph 81.
8 I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 2 where it says:
9 "There was a unanimous conclusion to the effect that in the
10 territory of the municipality no legal regulations could be carried out
11 or implemented because the public security station Sokolac is not
12 functioning properly and because competent services cannot put a stop to
13 lawlessness which is constantly on the rise."
14 How do you interpret this, and how does this tally with what you
15 know about the power or the impotence of the authorities?
16 A. That was already the time of an imminent threat of war which was
17 declared. It was the area of responsibility of the
18 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, and the public security station in town
19 controlled and made sure that laws were applied. However, we were not
20 happy with the situation. There were a few incidents that involved a
21 group of police reservists who controlled traffic at certain locations,
22 and a number of citizens complained, which is why the Executive Council
23 sent a request -- or, rather, a letter to the Ministry of the Interior
24 which was headquartered in Pale, telling them that the situation had
25 deteriorated and that it would be desirable to carry out a shake-up in
1 the personnel in order to stop smuggling, thefts. We even had some armed
2 attacks against individuals. There were also attacks at the public
3 security station in Sokolac. Those attacks were carried out by certain
4 individuals who jeopardised the functioning of the authorities, the
5 implementation of the law, conclusions and orders by the Presidency of
6 Republika Srpska.
7 The lack of will power in the then public security station to
8 prevent such incidents jeopardised the security of the citizens of
9 Sokolac and threatened to lead to the state of anarchy. That's why we
10 asked the Ministry of the Interior to help the local authorities to
11 prevent this and to make sure that the citizens were safe in their town.
12 Q. Thank you. What conclusions and orders by the Presidency of the
13 republic are referred to that you had no power to implement them?
14 A. For example, guaranteeing safety to all citizens residing in the
15 territory of Sokolac municipality and protecting the functioning of the
16 legal institutions of Republika Srpska at the time.
17 Q. Thank you. Be it from the Presidency, the government, or the
18 ministry, were any orders or instructions received that would distinguish
19 between people based on their ethnic or religious background in Sokolac?
20 A. No, never. Not a single document made us conclude at the time
21 that there was any kind of discrimination aimed at anyone in particular
22 or an ethnic group or an individual. That was never the case.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted, and
25 paragraph 81 is the reference paragraph.
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3234, Your Honours.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You just said that there was no difference in the way people were
5 treated in the documents that were received in terms of distinguishing
6 between the population in terms of religion or ethnicity. You also
7 mentioned that people left some villages, some Muslims, whereas in other
8 villages they stayed. Can you tell us what is the difference? Can you
9 cite the villages in your municipality and neighbouring municipalities
10 that were inhabited by Muslims who remained there, and what was the
11 difference between those who left and those who stayed? To what extent
12 did it depend on the decisions and conduct of the authorities, and what
13 was their own behaviour?
14 A. The villages neighbouring Olovo that were part of the
15 municipalities of Knezina and Kaljina at the beginning of the crisis and
16 upon invitation of the then municipal president from Olovo
17 Mr. Dzevad Abazovic were emptied. People moved to the territory of
18 Olovo, and they took their cattle with them as well as whatever property
19 they could take in order to find shelter, because there were front lines
20 nearby, and so as to preserve their lives and property. That is why they
21 responded to Dzevad Abazovic's call who came there together with the
22 president of the Serb municipality of Olovo, Mr. Milovan Zugic. They
23 came to Knezina to a meeting with the leadership of Sokolac municipality.
24 On behalf of Sokolac municipality the meeting was attended by the
25 Municipal President Mr. Milan Tupajic, president of the Executive Board
1 of Sokolac municipality, the chief of prison station in Sokolac, and I
2 think at the time the chief of the CSB of the Sarajevo-Romanija region
3 Mr. Cvijetic. It was agreed that one part of the Muslim population move
4 to the territory of Olovo, whereas another part or a part of the Serb
5 residents move to the territory of Sokolac.
6 That is what took place in the two local communes. In the
7 villages of Novoseoci, Vrbarije, and Burati that were in the direction of
8 Rogatica, the population remained there, and some remained even after the
9 Dayton Accords were signed. Food was secured for them, and they had a
10 designated shop where they could supply themselves with basic necessities
11 which was as one enters Sokolac. It was agreed upon by the
12 representatives of those villages with a municipal president. They could
13 go there so as not to mingle with the rest of the population in town. We
14 were afraid that if there were more of them in the town itself that it
15 may result in casualties. We thought they would be safer at the entry
16 point in Sokolac, although there were people who came to town
17 individually buying what they needed.
18 I know there were problems with working the land and harvesting.
19 It was difficult to receive fuel, but Sokolac municipality did make it
20 possible for the residents of those villages to have fuel as well that
21 they could use for their agricultural machinery and whatever machinery
22 was necessary for them to go about working their land.
23 Q. Thank you. Line 15 on this page, let us try and clarify
24 something. You said that at an entry point to the town there was a shop
25 that was dedicated to their supply so as not to mix with the refugees,
1 whereas we seem to have victims in the town. Can you tell us what the
2 risk was? What would be the risk of mixing these two populations and how
3 many refugees were there in the town itself?
4 A. There were many refugees from Sarajevo and its municipalities
5 such as Centar, Novi Grad, Hadzici, Stari Grad, Olovo, Kladanj, and some
6 were from Zenica too. The risk was that they would mix with the families
7 which had by that time during the war lost their members due to combat
8 with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We -- it was an attempt to suppress
9 any kind of provocation or retaliation aimed at the Muslim population.
10 That was the reason for their personal safety, because by that time we
11 had had at least several dozen victims of Serbian ethnicity in the
12 territory of our municipality, and those who came from Sarajevo and
13 Olovo, some of them lost their nearest and dearest as well. In Sokolac
14 itself during the war, there were some 1.300 killed soldiers and
15 civilians who were buried during that time.
16 Q. Thank you. You mentioned Vrbarije. Until what time did the
17 residents, Muslim residents of Vrbarije remain living in their village
18 near Sokolac? When did people leave and how?
19 A. I cannot recall a specific date, but I know that they remained
20 for a few years at least in their village and that they co-operated well
21 with their neighbours. Once they decided to go when the crisis was --
22 well, the situation was very difficult by that time. It was difficult to
23 secure food and other necessities. Then a number of them decided to go
24 to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled territory. This was
25 arranged with international organisations. I think it was the ICRC that
1 was involved in it. As far as I know, it was reported on by TV crews.
2 It was recorded by the Serb radio and TV as well as by foreign crews. It
3 was broadcast in the media where people could see how they left and
4 bidding farewell with their Serb neighbours, and both sides were crying
5 and kissing, et cetera. Once the crisis was over they returned, and as
6 far as I know to date they live well with their neighbours, aiding each
8 Q. Thank you. As for the arranged move between Knezevo and Olovo,
9 was it on a permanent basis or was it temporary, and were there any
10 returns there?
11 A. It was on a temporary basis. I've said already that it was to
12 provide shelter for them for the time being in the municipalities of
13 Knezina, Olovo, and Kaljina. By that time there were incidents on the
14 borders of those municipalities. It was also for the sake of Serb
15 civilians for Olovo to find shelter in RS territory. It was initiated by
16 the Olovo municipal president, a Bosniak Muslim, Mr. Dzevad Abazovic.
17 That move looking from this position was a good one, because most of them
18 surprised. A number of Serbs returned to Olovo, and most of the Bosniaks
19 returned to their property and hearts. They had left both with the
20 cattle and whatever property they could take temporarily, and they
21 returned immediately following the Dayton Peace Accords. They still live
22 there and their children attend schools there, although there aren't too
23 many of their children theirs there. In any case, they are religiously
24 active and their co-operation with their neighbours is a good one.
25 Q. Thank you. Mr. Abazovic, what party did he belong to?
1 A. As far as I know, the did.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D7991. I think we
4 have the subtitles in English so that we can follow it.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. What party was he? You said he was the SDA?
7 A. Yes, the Party of Democratic Action.
8 Q. Abazovic was in the SDA.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we now see this footage.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 "This is the village of Vrbarije near Sokolac in Bosnia inhabited
13 mainly by Serbs and Muslims. After the imposed Dayton Peace Accords, the
14 villagers were aware of what this meant to them. And as the town became
15 part of the Serb entity, the Muslims decided to collectively leave to
16 their own entity
17 "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Both of you are in tears.
18 Neighbours, today you are parting ways.
19 "That we are.
20 "Well, is it hard?
21 "Yes, as you can see two neighbours saying goodbye in tears.
22 "From the depth of my hard and his. Definitely.
24 "You lived together for so many years.
25 "As many years as he's lived, together for 68 years without
1 fights or disagreements, always helping each other our entire lives and
2 now as well.
3 "And how is it now?
4 "It's hard.
5 "Was there any abuse by the other side? Was it bad for you here?
6 "Never. It couldn't have been better.
7 "Are you sad?
8 "Of course I'm sad. We're saying goodbye to our neighbours.
9 We've always liked them. We got along great.
10 "Did the Serb kids ever provoke you or cause any problems?
11 "No, never. Everything between us was good, just like before.
12 "No disagreements, no pressures, no fights?
13 "No, never, never here.
14 "You're alive and well?
15 "Alive and well. Never had the slightest problem. Lots of
16 people came, soldiers, different ethnic groups. Nobody even gave me a
17 dirty look. Our neighbours are here. We're all crying. We're saying
18 goodbye the way human beings should.
19 "I want things to be like before, for problems to get fixed so we
20 can live together again. I want Yugoslavia back like it was before."
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you. It is stated that these people left after the
23 agreement, after their village became part of the Serb entity. During
24 the war were any of these people killed or were any Serbs killed by these
1 A. None of them were killed. There were cases close to their
2 villages, perhaps not in the village itself, a mine was laid or mines,
3 and upon return following a funeral when Ilija Macar and his wife were
4 coming back, they came across those mines near the village and were both
5 killed. However, no one ever blamed the people who lived there for it,
6 because we realized that it was some kind of provocation. It was so
7 clarified to me, and that those people should not pay for that. They
8 continued being treated the same way. You can see that they are well fed
9 and clothed as they left. And they returned after a while, perhaps a few
10 years later after the Dayton Accords were signed. They still work on
11 their land today.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bjelica. I didn't say that, but I suppose that we
13 will find it in the statement. You are the mayor of Sokolac today;
15 A. Yes, I am.
16 Q. You were elected by direct ballot; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender the video-clip into
20 MS. GUSTAFSON: I've got a number of objections to the
21 video-clip. Firstly, the witness wasn't asked any questions about the
22 actual clip, so he wasn't asked to recognise anything or whether he'd
23 seen this before or what it depicted, so there's just a basic lack of
24 foundation for its admission. In addition, we were informed that this
25 clip comes from a movie called "The Weight of Chains" that from what we
1 can gather on the internet was created in 2010 that appears to take a
2 clip from a source that is not apparent on the video, so we don't know
3 where the original footage comes from.
4 I also note that in the first few seconds of the video the
5 commentator states that:
6 "After the imposed Dayton Peace Accords, the villagers were aware
7 of what this meant to them, and as the town became part of the Serb
8 entity, the Muslims decided to collectively leave to their own entity."
9 Now, that is directly contradictory to the accused's own case on
10 what happened to these villagers. He tendered with the previous witness
11 from Sokolac D3189, which is the document from the Sokolac SJB to the
12 Sarajevo CJB stating that the 61 civilians from Vrbarije were transferred
13 to Kula prison in October of 1994, which is well over a year before the
14 Dayton Peace Accords, and this witness has said in his statement, and
15 again he indicated in his testimony, that these people left in 1994 and
16 in his testimony just now he said they returned sometime after the Dayton
17 Peace Accords.
18 So there are some serious concerns about the reliability of this
19 video and for those reasons we object to its admission.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I clarify things with the
21 witness? First of all, the witness did mention Vrbarije on several
22 occasions. Second of all, he mentioned that some people left in 1994 and
23 that some left after Dayton.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
25 Q. Mr. Bjelica, do you know who actually recorded this footage at
1 the time?
2 A. Well, I can see Mr. Skiljevic who was a TV journalist. He was
3 affiliated with the radio television of Republika Srpska. I can also see
4 Ms. Suzanna Obradovic who was also a journalist. I can see
5 Milomir Vitomir, Nedzo Vitomir, Mr. Kadri, and some others whom I know.
6 I'm familiar with this. I was not there, I was not on the spot, but I'm
7 sure that this is an authentic document which aired on the media.
8 I commented upon this document in the Krajisnik case. The
9 document was original. I was a Defence witness for Mr. Krajisnik. It
10 was sometime in April 2006. And this video-clip was shown and tendered
11 into evidence in that case. Perhaps it was not the same version, 2010.
12 It was the authentic document which aired on radio television and there
13 was another international channel that aired that same programme. I
14 don't know which one. The journalists are Skiljevic, Obradovic, Vitomir,
15 Djokics, and the others whom you can see kissing their neighbours and
16 saying their good-byes to them.
17 I've already told you that some of the locals left before the
18 Dayton Accords, some left after the Dayton Accords, but they all
19 returned. Sixty or so people left on that day, but nobody ever killed in
20 either Vrbarije or Burate. Those are two villages bordering on Sokolac
21 and Rogatica or rather halfway between Sokolac and Rogatica.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, is this enough?
23 The video-clip was edited later, and in 2006 it was shown before this
24 Tribunal in a different case as the original footage that was shown on
1 JUDGE KWON: Do you agree that this is part of movie which is
2 called "Weight of Chains"?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was used subsequently as a
4 document in 2010, whereas in 2006 [Realtime transcript read in error
5 "1996"] Mr. Bjelica used this document in the courtroom when it was not
6 part of the whole show. I keep on repeating 2006 and it keeps on being
7 recorded as 1996. 2006.
8 JUDGE KWON: It's not clear from Mr. Bjelica's answer who filmed
9 this and when.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Serbian Radio Television. He
11 said that.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you help us, Mr. Bjelica? Which channel produced this clip?
14 And you already told us about the journalists.
15 A. The Serbian Radio Television and Radio Romanija produced this
17 Q. When was that?
18 A. On the day when they left. It was shot on the spot.
19 JUDGE KWON: When was it, Mr. Bjelica?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It may have been sometime in late
21 1995 or early 1996. After the Dayton Accords were signed in any case. I
22 can't give you the exact date, unfortunately.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
24 MS. GUSTAFSON: Just two remarks. Dr. Karadzic's answer wasn't
25 clear, but I assume the Defence will agree as they told me this this
1 morning that this video-clip we just saw came from a movie called "Weight
2 of Chains" which, as I said, from the internet appears to have been
3 created in 2010. Also, Dr. Karadzic has picked up on Mr. Bjelica's
4 assertion that this video was played in the Krajisnik. It certainly
5 wasn't played in court in the Krajisnik case because I have recently read
6 Mr. Bjelica's testimony in the Krajisnik case several times and there is
7 no video played. So I don't know where that comes from.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that I'm right and that I
9 understood Mr. Bjelica who said that he used the information from that
10 film. That film existed in 1995, and it became part of the documentary
11 in 2010. That's how documentaries are made. The existing materials are
12 used and compiled in order to make up a documentary.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the Chamber has sufficient a
15 foundational provenance of this film to be admitted at this stage. Until
16 that time, we'll mark it for identification.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3235, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: I think I have some -- you have some further
19 questions, but we'll do that tomorrow given the time, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, your Excellency. I am done
21 with my examination-in-chief. I believe that Mr. Peter Robinson will be
22 able to understand the concerns about these excerpts and we will be able
23 to obtain more information or maybe a better copy from the TV house that
24 produced it.
25 JUDGE KWON: Are you not tendering 1D14014?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes. Everything that we
2 have led live is being tendered into evidence. A total of three
3 documents and the video-clip that we've just seen.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We should lead that live
5 tomorrow morning.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 Mr. Bjelica, before we do, how do you spell your last name.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I spell it for you?
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. There's no i before j. That's what I
11 wanted to confirm with you.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there's no i.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will adjourn for today and continue
14 tomorrow. Can I advise you not to discuss with anybody else about your
15 testimony here.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
17 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.52 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day
20 of April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.