1 Wednesday, 12 June 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Please continue, Ms. Pack.
8 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 WITNESS: GORDAN MILINIC [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 Cross-examination by Ms. Pack: [Continued]
12 Q. Now, Mr. Milinic, yesterday we left off and we were talking about
13 Directive 7.
14 MS. PACK: And I'd ask for that to be put back in e-court. It's
15 P00838, please. Can I have page 10 of the English and page 15 of the
16 B/C/S. Thank you. And it's the last sentence that I wanted to examine
17 again at the end of the first paragraph related to the Drina Corps. We
18 talked about this yesterday and I just wanted to refer you to it again,
19 the sentence which begins:
20 "By planned and well thought out combat operations, create an
21 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
22 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
23 I want to go back to what you said in your statement about the
24 convictions expressed in this document. Now, do you agree that what is
25 stated here, the intentions expressed here, are odious and wrong in that
2 A. These are not President Karadzic's convictions. They come from
3 someone else's mind, and of course they're inappropriate and wrong.
4 First of all, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this
5 is not a valid document. I doubt that it has the signature of
6 President Karadzic. We have the stamp of the Main Staff --
7 Q. We spoke about this yesterday. Thank you.
8 A. We did not discuss the stamp --
9 Q. I'm not asking you about the stamp.
10 A. The seal.
11 Q. You can perhaps deal with it when you're questioned by the
12 accused, but I'm not asking about the stamp. I'm asking you about the
13 sentence. You said it's inappropriate. It's more than that, isn't it?
14 It's hateful.
15 A. What I'm saying is that the entire document is not valid. I
16 don't want to discuss something that is not valid. It is not a valid
17 document and these are not the words of President Karadzic. It is not a
18 valid document. There is no sign, stamp, or protocol number that would
19 be associated with the president of the republic. These are someone
20 else's words and not President Karadzic's, clear.
21 Q. You're not answering my question. I'm not asking about stamps.
22 I'm asking about what this says. What is imported by these words and I'm
23 asking if you agree with me that it's hateful?
24 A. You are talking about something abstract, about some words that
25 are not the words of this man here. They are not his words and I cannot
1 discuss them.
2 Q. Please, let's move on.
3 A. They're simply not relevant.
4 Q. I want to read to you what Radovan Karadzic said to the
5 RS Assembly in August 1995 regarding this directive.
6 MS. PACK: Mr. President, I wasn't going to ask for the document
7 to be called up as it's been referred to on numerous occasions. It's
8 P01412 and I'll just read it. It's the transcript from the 52nd Session
9 of the RS Assembly dated the 6th of August, 1995.
10 Q. I'm going to read it to you. I'm going to read what is stated at
11 page 111 to -12 of the English and of the B/C/S in e-court at page 95.
12 Here it is:
13 "The time had come and I signed Directive Number 7" --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Also for the benefit of the
15 interpreters, it's better for --
16 MS. PACK: Better to show it.
17 JUDGE KWON: -- for us to upload it. Yes, shall we --
18 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President. Well, just to repeat, the
19 relevant pages were English page 111 in e-court and B/C/S 95. Thank you.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Kindly read slowly. Thank
22 Interpreter's note: Could the Prosecutor please precisely
23 indicate the passage in B/C/S that she's going to read in English for the
24 purposes of translation.
25 MS. PACK: Yes, let me take you to e-court page 95. The passage
1 begins six lines down from the top of the page, where it begins: "The
2 time had come ...," so that's for the interpreters just to communicate
3 what I'm reading there from the B/C/S. And in the English version, as I
4 said, it's at page 112 -- sorry, 111 over to 112, starting at the bottom
5 of the page in English, "the time had come..." So let me just read it,
6 assuming that the interpreters have the relevant extract.
7 "The time had come and I signed directive number 7 to capture
8 Teocak, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. The directive was signed and we
9 embarked on it" --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Do we have that passage in front of
12 MS. PACK: Yes, it should be -- my apologies, I should have
13 located it for Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 MS. PACK: Bottom of page 111, bottom paragraph in the middle of
16 that paragraph.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Sorry, we cannot find the
18 relevant passage in B/C/S.
19 MS. PACK: Okay. It's at the top, it's six lines down from the
20 top of the B/C/S, and it's --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, we have found it. Thank you.
22 MS. PACK: And it's four lines up from the bottom of the English.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
24 MS. PACK: Thank you very much.
25 Q. Let me just read it again.
1 "The time had come and I signed directive number 7 to capture
2 Teocak, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. The directive was signed and we
3 embarked on it."
4 And I'm just not going to read out the following couple of
5 sentences. Turn over in the English, please, to 112, same page in the
6 B/C/S. I'll pick it up.
7 "I was in favour of all the decisions that we made and I support
8 them. All the decisions are recorded in the Supreme Command. I ordered
9 in verbal and written form to attack Zepa and Srebrenica. This is not
10 fair, and the state cannot survive if we work without co-ordination and
11 if rumours are spreading. None of these rumours are true in the essence.
12 We are not able to take Gorazde at that time and we are still unable to
13 conquer it because the threats are serious and we cannot afford to punch
14 them in the eye right now, but there will be the right time to take
15 Gorazde just as there was the right time to conquer Srebrenica. There
16 will be the right time to attack and destroy Gorazde ..."
17 Plain meaning of these words, Radovan Karadzic signed directive
18 7; do you agree?
19 A. I do not agree. You can see that he says that he signed
20 directive number 7 to take Teocak and Srebrenica and then he says it was
21 all signed although he doesn't say it was signed by him. Then in the
22 text he asked how come Tolimir shows such respect for the president of
23 the republic? So this indicates again the rift between the civilian and
24 military authorities, and then we have the words man, he wants you to
25 become involved so that you cannot say that you were against it. Again,
1 this clearly --
2 Q. Stop, please.
3 A. -- indicates the arguments between the military and political
4 leadership, it's a quarrel.
5 Q. You are deliberately distorting the plain meaning of this text.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Objection.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand Serbian well --
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, that's an argumentative statement
9 as opposed to a question.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: It could of course be a question, but I think
11 counsel can leave interpretation of words in these circumstances to the
13 MS. PACK: Of course, Your Honour.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just wanted to say that one needs
15 to understand the sense in the Serbian language. You understand English,
16 of course, but I can clearly see what it is in the Serbian language. It
17 is the quarrel between the Main Staff and the political leadership, and
18 the Main Staff was blaming the president because he was against it. I
19 read between the lines in the Serbian, although you get it in English. I
20 was in attendance during that session --
21 MS. PACK: [Overlapping speakers] --
22 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, can we see the previous page?
23 MS. PACK: Yes, the previous page which was --
24 JUDGE KWON: Let me go back to the previous page.
25 MS. PACK: Yes. That's 111 in the English. The B/C/S can stay
1 on the same page.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milinic, I don't follow what you just said.
3 Here Mr. -- this is what Mr. Karadzic has said. Here he said: "The time
4 had come and I signed directive number 7 ..."
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He didn't say "sign."
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He did not say "sign," he said
8 "signirati" which is one thing and to sign is a different thing. It was
9 a matter of the arguments between the Main Staff and the president. They
10 blamed him for halting combat activities.
11 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. Could you read out from "the time had
12 come ..." aloud.
13 MS. PACK: If I can assist the witness, it's the beginning of the
14 sixth line --
15 JUDGE KWON: Just read out --
16 MS. PACK: [Overlapping speakers] --
17 JUDGE KWON: -- the sentence aloud. "The time had come ..."
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The time had come. I --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: "Signirati" in the Serbian
20 means to assign numbers.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I did "signirati" to take Teocak
22 and Srebrenica.
23 THE INTERPRETER: And then the witness will need to repeat the
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
1 Could you repeat.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [As read] "As for directive number
3 7 and it all, I assigned numbers to take Teocak and Srebrenica and
4 Gorazde. It is all signed and we embarked on it. In the telegram you
5 yourself describe it for the first time and I was surprised how come
6 Tolimir showed such respect for the president of the republic" --
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I would request the CLSS to take a look
8 at the passage and produce a report to the Chamber about this passage, in
9 particular the -- with respect to "signirati."
10 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 MS. PACK: Perhaps I can move on to another RS Assembly Session,
13 P01415. This is the transcript from the 54th Session of the RS Assembly
14 dated 15/16 October 1995, and I'd ask to be shown up in e-court page 108
15 of the B/C/S and page 84 of the English.
16 Q. The passage in the English is at the bottom half of the third --
17 of the third full paragraph on the page, the paragraph that begins:
18 "We must look at army publications ..." and then going down. I'm
19 looking at the last sentence. And in the B/C/S it's the fifth paragraph
20 down the page and it's just the last sentence of that paragraph. It's
21 the penultimate paragraph on the page. And it's the last sentence of the
22 penultimate paragraph.
23 Have you found it, Mr. Milinic?
24 A. [In English] Yes.
25 Q. I am going to read out what I have as the English translation of
1 this quote from Dr. Karadzic.
2 "I have examined, approved, and signed seven directives. No one
3 submitted the eighth and ninth to me ..."
4 Have you found that in the B/C/S?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So you'd agree there that Dr. Karadzic is stating that he signed
7 seven directives; yes?
8 A. That's what it says; however, by the same token, it is clear that
9 he was being set up by the army, that they did not even show him some
10 things. They didn't show him what was to be signed. Now that I see it,
11 it says the two directives were not even submitted to me for reading, let
12 alone signing. Perhaps the seventh was treated the same way, maybe he
13 was set up. The procedure was when I drafted something, I came to the
14 president, and I would tell him what's in the document, and then he would
15 say, "Okay," and he signed it.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. But here is it true that this
17 transcript says Mr. Karadzic signed seven directives?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's true. That's what it
19 says. However, being familiar with the situation I can tell you that I
20 don't believe he signed it or perhaps he was set up and the seventh was
21 slipped in to be signed alongside other documents. For me it is not a
22 valid document because it does not contain certain elements that would
23 have to be there had the president signed it.
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you look at the other things,
1 you can see that there is always his signature and stamp.
2 JUDGE KWON: Can you explain what you meant by eight and ninth,
3 Mr. Karadzic was set up by those two directives? Could you repeat what
4 you said?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He said that no one submitted the
6 eighth and the ninth directive to him even for reading let alone signing.
7 It was because General Gvero and the others drafted it and they decided
8 who they wanted to listen to. He said that it was done without him, that
9 General Gvero wrote it alone. Many things were imputed to the president.
10 He was often given documents to sign without knowing what he was signing.
11 The eighth and the ninth directive were not even submitted to him, and
12 yet the army acted independently without the president of the republic in
13 implementing them. That's key. That is what I was trying to point out.
14 I was there day-in/day-out and I know what their relationship was. They
15 were simply looking down upon the president of the republic. He was
16 important -- unimportant to them, what he thought. If they wanted to set
17 him up and submit a paper to him for signing, they would, and then they
18 would say that it was a document by the president. There was a complete
19 lack of -- there was a complete lack of respect and the president said so
20 himself. They arranged for things to be signed --
21 MS. PACK:
22 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
23 A. -- and designed what they wanted to do. It was simply a group of
24 military officers doing whatever they wanted and they used the president
25 to sign what they wanted.
1 MS. PACK: Mr. President, are you happy for me to move on from
2 this section?
3 Q. I'd like just to turn to another section in these minutes,
4 please, and that's just finally at page 86 of the English and at page 111
5 of the B/C/S. And in the English it's the paragraph towards the bottom
6 that starts: "As the supreme commander, I stood behind ..."
7 And in the B/C/S we can see that paragraph, again about halfway
8 down -- it's the last paragraph actually in the B/C/S. So you can see
9 that, the last paragraph in the B/C/S. I'm going to read it.
10 A. I see it.
11 Q. "As the supreme commander, I stood behind the plan for Zepa and
12 Srebrenica, mainly for Srebrenica, Zepa was implied. Gentlemen, we would
13 lose the war if there were 90 thousand armed Muslims in Zepa, we would
14 lose the war. I personally supervised the plan without the knowledge of
15 the Main Staff not even hiding anything but I happened to run into
16 General Krstic and advised him to go straight into town" --
17 JUDGE KWON: Slow.
18 MS. PACK: Sorry, my apologies. I'm going too fast.
19 Q. "... but I happened to run into General Krstic and advised him to
20 go straight into town and to pronounce the fall of Srebrenica, and later
21 we will chase the Turks around the woods. I approved an /?immediate/
22 task and a radical task and I don't regret it."
23 Just confirm one thing for me, will you, this is October 1995.
24 Can you confirm this for me, by months earlier, by August 1995,
25 July/August 1995, the international press had reported allegations of
1 mass killings of Muslim men and forced removal of thousands of elderly
2 men, women, and children from Srebrenica? You can confirm that for me,
3 can you?
4 A. I cannot confirm that. There was no forced removal. People
5 asked to go to Tuzla, they wanted to go. What forcible removal? No one
6 ordered anyone go. They said we wanted to go to our own to Tuzla. This
7 is now Serb territory and we don't want to live here. They asked for the
8 buses themselves to leave. Their requests were of that nature. What
9 forcible removal? No one was forcibly removed. The people wanted to
10 leave. No one wanted to be in another's territory. I did not want to
11 live in Mostar because it was a Croat and Muslim town. I'm a refugee as
12 well. [In English] I'm a refugee, too. I don't want to live with
13 Muslims and Croats who are armed. Yes. [Interpretation] Who are armed.
14 Q. Mass killings, do you agree now that Muslim men were killed on a
15 mass scale after the fall of Srebrenica? Do you accept that now?
16 A. No way. No way. I am witness to it. I received from the state
17 security this many papers, 15.000 Muslims left the encirclement in
18 Srebrenica. They went through, through the Serb army. They reached
19 Zvornik and wanted to torch it. It was without the Serb army and
20 whatever little soldiers there were left opened fire on the Muslims. At
21 that moment through a loud-speaker Tursunovic, the Muslim leader, said,
22 "Dear Serbs, only let us go through Tuzla. Unless you do so, there are
23 15.000 of us who will torch Zvornik town, we'll destroy it unless you let
24 us through ..." and they were --
25 Q. Stop there, please.
1 A. -- let through by Zvornik, 15.000 people.
2 Q. Do you not accept now that thousands of Muslim men were killed
3 following the fall of Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces? Do you not
4 accept that?
5 A. I don't, I don't. That is incorrect. It was set up by the
6 Muslim media and by different world factors. That had not been done.
7 Perhaps I can acknowledge that there were cases of perhaps a few hundred,
8 but they were all killed in combat. They passed by Zvornik, the 15.000.
9 I personally talked to some people. We had our line towards Tuzla and
10 they attacked this line to break through to Tuzla. They attacked from
11 behind, and several thousand Muslims were killed in combat. I talked to
12 a man who said I had a machine-gun, I was firing and wave upon wave of
13 people were falling down. 40 Serbs were killed but they broke through,
14 whereas thousands of dead Muslims were left dead. Later on, it was said
15 that they were executed, but they were killed in combat. Perhaps a few,
16 a few hundred were executed, but most of them were killed in combat.
17 Q. You accept that at the time it's not just the Muslim media
18 so-called but the international press and international actors were
19 reporting allegations of the forced displacement of thousands of
20 individuals and the fear that thousands had been killed? This is in
22 A. That was Muslim propaganda. Alija Izetbegovic personally planned
23 an operation to blame the Serbs and to have NATO bomb the Serbs. He
24 wanted to use their own casualties. The Islamic jihad is such that they
25 will sacrifice thousands of their people for their goals without any
1 problems. At the time we didn't know what jihad is. Now you know what
2 jihad is. In Baghdad you plant a bomb, kill 50 people, and nothing
3 happens. It's water under the bridge. Alija Izetbegovic kills his own
4 people in order to blame the Serbs. He -- these 100 people don't mean
5 anything to him, but the Serbs will be seen as criminals by the
6 international community. Srebrenica is a huge set up. I tell you,
7 people were killed in combat. Maybe a few hundred were executed, there
8 may have been such cases. I learned of them subsequently, that there
9 were some groups of extreme Serbs who did something of that kind, but
10 those were a couple of hundred. But most of them were killed in the
11 break through. 15.000 men, you can't do --
12 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
13 A. -- anything to stop that. They keep assaulting, you mow them
14 down and they keep coming.
15 Q. I just want to turn to one document, please, 65 ter 13645. I
16 just want to quickly show you one document that was sent to Dr. Karadzic
17 on the 24th of July, 1995. It's only available in English. This is the
18 cover sheet indicating that a letter was transmitted to Dr. Karadzic, and
19 I would just ask, please, to go to the third page which is clearer than
20 the fax copy on the second page. There is the letter itself. There's a
21 letter from the Special Rapporteur of the Commission for Human Rights,
22 24th of July, 1995.
23 And just in the first paragraph there I'll read it so you can
24 have it translated.
25 "I would like to express my deepest concern regarding the recent
1 events in the Srebrenica area which resulted in the forced displacement
2 of some 40.000 individuals. It has been reported that as a result of
3 these events several thousand individuals are unaccounted for and there
4 is fear that many of these have either been killed or detained."
5 Now, presumably these were allegations coming from international
6 actors about which you were aware in July 1995?
7 A. And what is your question?
8 Q. I'm asking you if you were aware of these allegations coming from
9 international actors in July 1995?
10 A. I didn't follow the documents of international organisations. I
11 focused on the documents of our security services and I trusted these,
12 because international propaganda at the time was unanimously oriented
13 against the Serbs. It says here "forced displacement," but it wasn't
14 force. The people wanted to go; it was their free will. People wanted
15 to go from Bijeljina, a Serbian town where nobody exerted pressure on
16 them, nothing was happening to them, and the president who was concerned.
17 Why do the people want to move? And I was a member of the commission
18 to -- that spoke to those people to investigate that. Is anybody doing
19 anything to you? And they replied, "No, but we don't want to live in a
20 country where there is a war. We want to go to Australia, Canada, and
21 other countries. We'll be grateful if you let us go." And we did
22 receive letters of gratitude from those who did leave. And imagine
23 Srebrenica, a town where the Serbian army had just entered. They had
24 lived in fear of the Serbs for years and everybody wants to leave to go
25 to a safe territory. They were calling it the free territory where the
1 Muslims were, whereas the Serbs called the territory where the Serbs were
2 free territory. It was a war. Everybody wants to get away from war.
3 The people wanted to move of their own will and go to their territory. I
4 was a witness to that. I talked to people in such towns such as
6 Q. I didn't follow the documents of international organisations, you
7 didn't follow these documents, these sorts of allegations, did you,
8 because you knew about the killings already. It was no news to you, was
10 A. No, we didn't know. I had reports of state security and military
11 security saying that 15.000 Muslims had gone through our lines and that
12 intense fighting was going on because they were trying to break through
13 toward Tuzla. Those were the real reports and I monitored those reports.
14 I was an intelligence man. I read reports from the field and I wasn't
15 interested in the jabber of the international community because they were
16 against us anyway, you know.
17 THE ACCUSED: Transcript.
18 MS. PACK:
19 Q. Let's turn to the DB, shall we, the state security --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said -- what he said,
23 the president was concerned why -- [in English] president was concerned
24 why those people want to leave. [Interpretation] And then he said the
25 president established and sent a commission to talk to them and I was a
1 member of that commission.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct. There was a
3 commission with five members --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that spoke to those people.
6 JUDGE KWON: Do not overlap with the interpretation, please.
7 What page, what line, Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 15, page 15, line 9. Before "and I
9 was a member of that commission." Before that sentence he said the
10 president established a commission and sent it out to speak to those
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct --
13 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers]
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- there was a commission
15 comprising five people.
16 JUDGE KWON: We are dealing with the transcript.
17 Please continue, Ms. Pack.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I don't think that
19 Mr. Tieger has informed Ms. Pack that we're supposed to ask for time when
20 we run out, so the Prosecution has, as I understand it, used up the time
21 allotted for cross-examination --
22 JUDGE KWON: Would you leave it to the Chamber.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Okay, but --
24 JUDGE KWON: She's now about to conclude her cross-examination.
25 That's why I left her to continue.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Okay. But by doing that, you don't allow us to be
2 heard. So we would prefer if a system like we had with Dr. Karadzic when
3 he did his direct examinations -- when he did his cross-examinations,
4 that you were telling him how much time he had left and then he had to
5 comply with that and the Prosecution can be heard. So we would like the
6 opportunity to be heard rather than the time just expiring and not being
7 able to be heard.
8 JUDGE KWON: Well, the Chamber is following the situation, so you
9 may rest assured. And please leave it to the Chamber.
10 Yes, Ms. Pack.
11 MS. PACK: My apologies, Mr. President. I had thought I had
12 about 12 minutes more, allowing for time for objections and arguments
13 yesterday, but perhaps my estimation of the time is incorrect so that's
14 why I hadn't asked yet for more time. I was hoping to be able to
15 conclude in the next 15 minutes.
16 JUDGE KWON: And I will -- I wanted to leave it at that, but you
17 may go back to the Prosecution case and without asking leave the Chamber
18 granted Mr. Karadzic a lot of more time at the end of his
19 cross-examinations. I'm confident there were so many cases.
20 Let's continue. Let me see.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
23 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. You don't disagree, do you, that there were DB operatives active
25 on the ground in the Srebrenica area during the Srebrenica operations
1 including before and after the fall of Srebrenica; correct?
2 A. Srebrenica at that moment was a combat zone where the military
3 decides about everything. It decides who can go there and who cannot.
4 It was very difficult. We even had a problem there between state
5 security and the military leadership. I can tell you --
6 Q. I'd just like to ask you to answer my question, please. Do you
7 deny that there were DB operatives working and active in the Srebrenica
8 area both before and after its fall?
9 A. The state security had its collaborators even among the Muslims.
10 You know that operatives and collaborators can be found in the ranks of
11 the other side too, but then work was difficult, their access was
12 difficult because the military had control over any movement, and there
13 was a clash between security and the Main Staff. And I want to tell you
14 about it. An operative of state security informs General Mladic --
15 Q. I'm not --
16 A. -- why not? Why not? You asked me about operatives.
17 Q. You can deal with this in re-examination. I'm going to ask you a
18 further question, please.
19 MS. PACK: Can we have up, please, P04974.
20 Q. So is it your evidence that there were no DB operatives in
21 Potocari, working in Potocari, on the 12th of July --
22 A. There weren't any.
23 Q. On the 12th of July?
24 A. It was off limits. The military declared it off limits.
25 Operatives of state security are civilians. It was a restricted area.
1 You know what that is, combat zone.
2 Q. Can you look at the document, please, on the screen. This is a
3 document that is signed by Dragan Kijac, head of the RDB. You're
4 familiar with him, obviously; is that right? You know who Dragan Kijac
6 A. I knew everybody, not just him. I know everybody in the RS. Of
7 course I knew him. I knew everything. Now I know even you. When they
8 asked me to know -- do you know Milica? I would say yes. And I will
9 tell you why these people were rewarded and you interrupted me --
10 Q. Can you just -- let's just for the record, this is a
11 communication from Kijac, a proposal to the deputy minister of the
12 interior, that number of members thereafter identified of the RDB
13 Bijeljina CRDB, that's the state security department centre, are awarded
14 money for their extraordinary contribution and engagement during the
15 liberation of Zepa and Srebrenica. And it lists there a number of
16 members of the Zvornik DB, yes, and the Bijeljina CRDB. Do you agree
17 that those are the individuals who are listed there? They include
18 Sinisa Glogovac, Mile Renovica, who is the head of the Zvornik DB. Do
19 you agree that all those are members of the DB in Zvornik and Bijeljina,
21 A. That's what I wanted to tell you. These people were rewarded
22 because they discovered that 15.000 Muslims broke through the
23 encirclement of the Serbian army and they informed General Mladic,
24 saying, "General, here you are, 15 [as interpreted] people went through,
25 they will burn down Zvornik, they will make it to Tuzla." General Mladic
1 simply waved his hand and said, "Well, let them go. Go on, send 20
2 people to find those 15.000 of theirs." General Mladic didn't believe
3 that 15.000 fighters went through our lines, made it through our lines.
4 These seven people found that out. They are from Zvornik and they saw
5 that these 70 [as interpreted] thousand passed through. They said, "Send
6 out your troops because they will burn down Zvornik." Mile Renovica is
7 from Zvornik --
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, just a second. If you could bear
9 with us.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Well, shall we continue?
12 But, Mr. Robinson, the Chamber considered your observation again
13 and then -- and your observation, I have to say, was not a correct one.
14 As long as I remember, the Chamber has never limited Mr. Karadzic's
15 cross-examination when his line of cross-examination was relevant; in
16 particular, we considered in this witness's case the way the question and
17 answer was proceeding. So the Chamber finds that some extension was
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, actually, Mr. President, I completely agree,
20 and I wouldn't have objected to an extension in this particular case. My
21 point was a different one. My point was that during the Prosecution's
22 case when Dr. Karadzic had a time-limit, he was told that he had five
23 minutes left or two minutes left --
24 JUDGE KWON: When the line of his cross-examination goes beyond
25 the relevant -- the point, that -- the Chamber often asked him as a way
1 of warning, asked him how much longer he would need --
2 MR. ROBINSON: Right --
3 JUDGE KWON: -- but we didn't -- the Chamber didn't do that as
4 long as he remains on the relevant part. That's the policy I had taken.
5 Shall we leave it there?
6 MR. ROBINSON: Okay.
7 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Pack.
8 MS. PACK: Yes, Mr. President. I did think I had 56 minutes left
9 for this morning -- not now but when I started, so perhaps if I just wrap
10 up in the next few minutes. My apologies if I have gone over the time
11 but I had actually thought I'd kept within it.
12 Q. I'll ask you to look at one more document, please. Can we have
13 P04388 on the screen, please. Now I think you've testified -- you
14 certainly said it in your witness statement that you got all of the
15 communications from the VRS Main Staff sector for intelligence and
16 security; is that right? Can you confirm that?
17 A. I was getting compilations made by the intelligence service about
18 the situation in the field, where the Muslim forces were moving, what was
19 currently happening with the Croatian forces. So that was a compilation
20 or a daily digest that I received about what the spies or the
21 intelligence operatives of the RS were learning on the ground. I
22 informed the president about what he needed to know. I never mentioned
23 trifles to him.
24 Q. This is a communication, isn't it, from Popovic,
25 Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic. It's dated the 12th of July, he's
1 the Drina Corps security officer, to the Main Staff sector for OB. The
2 time recorded on it is 1730 hours.
3 MS. PACK: And I'm going to ask for the English, please, to be
4 shown on page 2 of the English, please, in e-court and it can remain on
5 page 1 in B/C/S.
6 Q. He's reporting on the course of the day. And at paragraph 3, I'd
7 like to read out what he says there. He says:
8 "A refugee group of about 30.000 - 35.000 women, children,
9 elderly, the infirm, and the sick is located after beyond the UNPROFOR
10 base towards Srebrenica ..." et cetera, it goes on.
11 And then I'll pick up, please, at the last two sentences:
12 "We are separating men from 17 - 60 years of age and we are not
13 transporting them. We have about 70 of them so far and the security
14 organs and the DB are working with them."
15 Do you see that?
16 A. Yes, I see that, but I haven't seen this letter before. This was
17 sent to the Supreme Command, that is, the president of the republic. We
18 never received this communication. We only received daily compilations.
19 This wasn't part of it. I have never seen this letter before. I don't
20 know. I cannot comment what this is about because I really don't know.
21 Q. Well, you can see now it is a report the DB are working with the
22 VRS security organs -- they're working together on the ground in Potocari
23 with the separated Muslim men --
24 A. No, they never worked together. I mean state security and the
25 security organs. There was always a clash between the two. There was
1 state security and military security. They were not on good terms.
2 There were also rivalries between brigade commanders and civilian
3 municipal authorities. I don't think that state security organs were
4 involved in this. It functioned very poorly. I told you already what it
5 was like when the state security informed General Mladic about events.
6 He didn't -- of which he didn't get information from the field. They --
7 he didn't believe them. He sent out 20 people to find 15.000. I don't
8 believe that this happened. We never received such reports from state
9 security, nor did we get any from the military security. They mostly
10 gave us information about the enemy, where enemy troops are concentrated,
11 what kind of combat activity can be expected, and so on. I doubt that
12 they worked together.
13 Q. It's just not true, is it. You --
14 MS. PACK: And I'm not going to refer to another document because
15 I know my time is up.
16 Q. But you have referred in your statement to a log-book, P02989, to
17 a log-book that records daily communications on the 11th, on the 12th, on
18 the 13th, on the 14th, on the 15th, daily communications from the RS
19 Main Staff OB to the president, to the RS MUP DB, and to the RS defence
20 ministry, timed at around the same time, early in the morning, every
21 day --
22 A. Yes, that's it. Yes. These are the daily compilations I
23 mentioned to you. The Main Staff, that is, the intelligence sector would
24 send us a daily compilation containing the positions of the enemy units,
25 what their intentions were, where an attack can be expected. I told you
1 that we received those all the time, but they never mentioned such
2 things. We never learned of such things, no, we didn't get this.
3 Q. We don't have these documents, do we, the documents referred to
4 in your log-book, because they're missing, is that right? They're
6 A. How should I know what you have? You had access to everything.
7 In 1995/1996, you were able to copy everything. I saw you walking up and
8 down the hallways of the facilities of the president of the republic. I
9 really can have no way of knowing what you did copy and what you didn't.
10 MS. PACK: Mr. President, I realise I'm at the end of my time.
11 No more questions.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Pack.
13 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency. I'll try to be as
15 brief as possible and I'll start with the latest.
16 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, you were asked just now about
18 documents, where these documents were, the ones that came from the
19 Main Staff. Does the Main Staff keep copies of the documents they send
21 A. Certainly, certainly, they have an obligation to do that.
22 Nothing can be sent without having a copy kept.
23 Q. Thank you. When we sent -- we are sending a document, do we
24 leave copies too? So does the sending and receiving party have a copy of
25 the document?
1 A. Certainly. That's an obligation too. That's why I was upset
2 because one document was not prescribed, it was not proper, rather.
3 Every document has to have a letter-head of the president and also this
4 number, strictly confidential, your signature, and a stamp and seal of
5 the president of the republic. That would be the right kind of document.
6 One copy remains in our hands and the other one is sent to the receiving
7 party, and that is why I complained about that directive because
8 allegedly that is your signature but you're not to the Main Staff, you're
9 the Supreme Command, you're the president of the republic. And this
10 document was not registered in the archives of the president of the
11 republic, and it is not in the military office of the president and it is
12 not registered as strictly confidential. I do not find such documents to
13 be valid. What is valid is what is properly registered. One copy is
14 sent to the receiving party and another copy is archived properly,
15 signed, stamped with the seal of the president of the republic. Those
16 are real, valid documents.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness is speaking at
18 a pace which is too fast for interpretation.
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
20 If you are speaking so fast, it will not be reflected in the --
21 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, please.
22 JUDGE KWON: -- transcript correctly.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. On page 108, Prosecution Exhibit P1415, this is a transcript of a
1 session of the National Assembly. It says there -- actually, it was read
2 out to you, it was shown to you. I'll read out the entire paragraph.
3 "Gentlemen, we need to look at our military lists and you will
4 see why" --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have a copy of
6 this text.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, for the benefit of the correct translation, we
8 need to upload it. Please wait.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the second paragraph. In
10 English it's page 84. It's the beginning of the second, or rather, third
11 paragraph in English, "We must look ..."
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. So this is what it says:
14 "We must look at army publications, our army journals, and you'll
15 see why, or that which went down in the trenches, and you'll see why, or
16 what General Gvero is writing in Novosti at the moment when we are losing
17 large pieces of the Krajina, what he found most urgent to say, that's not
18 for the Assembly, that's between me and him, but, gentlemen, I have
19 examined, approved, and signed seven directives. No one submitted the
20 eighth and ninth ones to me ..." and so on and so forth.
21 First of all, could you please explain the following to me. What
22 does it mean when you say "signirati" and what does it mean when you say
23 "potpisati," "sign"?
24 A. "Signirati" means send to someone, I mean forward to someone,
25 forward, that's what it actually means; whereas, to sign "potpisati," is
1 to sign [In English] "potpisati" is to sign. To sign is "potpisati."
2 [Interpretation] That is the difference between the Serbian and English
3 language, whereas "signirati" in Serbian means to forward or write
4 something, that's not signing at all. In Serbian that does not mean to
6 Q. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: What word is used here, "signirati" or "potpisati"
8 when he said he signed seven directives?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will get to that, but it says
10 "signiro" whereas in this paragraph it says "potpisati," but in that
11 paragraph that only has to do with number 7 it says "signirati," meaning
12 "forwarded," "marked." Page 95, this document, P1 --
13 JUDGE KWON: No, no, I remember that it -- in the 52nd Session
14 which is Exhibit P1412, that that passage used the so-called "signirati,"
15 but here what's the term used? Is it "signirati" or "potpisati,"
16 Mr. Milinic?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it says "potpisati," signed,
18 here, but this generally pertains to some seven directives --
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that was my question. You answered the
21 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 D232, directive number 1, could we please have that in e-court.
24 Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In terms of the register or the letter-head -- no, P232 -- no,
2 that shouldn't be it. It's D, not P, Defence. Yes. May I kindly ask
3 you to look at the top of the page and see who it was that wrote this?
4 A. It says here the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and
5 their numbers are there, strictly confidential number such and such. And
6 this was compiled by the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
7 Q. Thank you. Could we please take a look at the last page so that
8 we see who signed it.
9 A. The signatory is commander Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic. This
10 is a typical military document of the Main Staff of the Army of
11 Republika Srpska.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D593, could we now please take a
14 look at that.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
16 Q. The same question, please, could you take a look --
17 A. Likewise, up here it says the Main Staff of the Army of
18 Republika Srpska, their strictly confidential number, and this would have
19 to be a document of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
20 Q. It's 02, like the previous one; right?
21 A. Yes, 02.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the last page now please be
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Who signed this other directive?
2 A. Likewise, commander, Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic, that is to
3 say the commander of the Main Staff. This is a military document, a
4 typical military document.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D235, could we please have that,
7 Defence 235.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Please, again, could you identify where this was created, which
10 institution this is, and who signed it? We'll see that at the end.
11 A. Likewise, the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, their
12 strictly confidential number, and therefore this is a document of the
13 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have page 13 in
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Likewise, signed by the commander
18 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic. Likewise, this is a directive of the
19 Main Staff and the signatory is Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic. This is
20 a proper document, a proper military document of the Main Staff.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P976, that's a Prosecution
24 document, Prosecution, P, could we please take a look at that now.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Please, where was this document created?
2 A. Again, the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, their
3 strictly confidential number, so this is also a document of the
4 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, a directive.
5 Q. Which number?
6 A. Strictly confidential 02/5-216.
7 Q. Thank you. And the number of the directive?
8 A. The directive is number 4, that is directive number 4.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the last page,
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Signed by commander
13 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic, that is to say General Mladic signed
14 directives. You did not sign the seventh directive. It was Ratko Mladic
15 who signed it. I have seen several directives now and they were all
16 signed by Ratko Mladic. That is why I could not accept that you had
17 signed that document. All directives were signed by
18 General Ratko Mladic.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 1866, could we please take a
22 look at that now.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Can you tell us where this document was created and whose stamp
25 it bears?
1 A. This is a document of the Main Staff of the Army of
2 Republika Srpska, and it bears the stamp of the Main Staff of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska. Again, this is an excerpt from a directive.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the penultimate page
6 in Serbian.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Signed by the commander of the
8 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,
9 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic, directive properly signed, a proper
10 military document with the stamp of the Main Staff of the Army of
11 Republika Srpska. That's what I've been saying all the time.
12 General Mladic signed directives.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit D3688. And for the record,
18 Your Honours, 65 ter number 22049 which was on the 92 ter notification is
19 in fact Exhibit P3149. So to avoid duplication, this will be
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 P977, this is a Prosecution document.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. When was this document created and what is this document, which
2 A. This is also directive number 5, the Main Staff of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska, strictly confidential number 02/2-479. This is a
4 document of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, directive
5 number 5.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the penultimate page.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Signed by commander
9 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have Prosecution
13 number P3039.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
15 Q. What is this? Can you tell us? And can you tell us where this
16 was created?
17 A. Directive number 6, but this time -- well, it's also a document
18 of the Main Staff, but it says strictly confidential number 02/2-934, but
19 it no longer says the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, but
20 what they wrote was the Supreme Command of the armed forces of
21 Republika Srpska. But no, this is a document of the Main Staff of the
22 Army of Republika Srpska. That is as clear as day.
23 Q. So the -- all the signs there, everything you can see there, all
24 the designations, the register, all of that is from the Main Staff of the
25 Army of Republika Srpska?
1 A. [No interpretation]
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
3 witness's answer.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milinic, the interpreters were not able to hear
5 you. Could you repeat slowly.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So this is a document that was
7 created at the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. This was not
8 written in the Presidency of Republika Srpska, or rather, at the military
9 office at the Supreme Command. There is no number there, there is no
10 number of the register of the Supreme Command, or rather, the president
11 of the republic, 02/2 are the numbers according to the register. This is
12 the Main Staff, this is their number, and up here what is written is the
13 Supreme Command. To a degree this may be considered a forgery.
14 Supreme Command, that has to contain the letter-head of the president of
15 the republic. It has to be on his writing paper. And also, all the
16 designations have to be those of the president of the republic. I find
17 this to be a suspicious document.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness the last
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. We have established where it was created. Let us see where it
24 was signed.
25 A. Ah, yes, how come Radovan Karadzic's signature is here? How come
1 Radovan Karadzic's signature is here?
2 Q. Can you tell us whose stamp this is?
3 A. The stamp is that of the president of the republic, yes. The
4 stamp is that of the president of the republic. And that is what gives
5 it validity. When your signature is there and your stamp is there,
6 then -- yes, I could acknowledge this document because it has the seal of
7 the president of the republic and the signature of Radovan Karadzic. It
8 is not quite proper, but I can recognise it, acknowledge it, because of
9 the seal, the seal of the president of the republic has been affixed.
10 Q. Thank you. We've seen number 7, we've shown you directive number
11 7 -- oh, we don't have to call that up again. So, Mr. Ambassador, was I
12 precise when I know I said that I signed seven directives, and out of
13 these seven directives how many did I actually sign?
14 A. Out of all seven, I can only recognise this one as having been
15 signed by you because it has your signature and your seal, the seal of
16 the president of the republic. And also your signature,
17 Radovan Karadzic, president, your signature -- so this is the only
18 directive that you signed, not the rest. On the rest of them there is no
19 stamp of yours, no letter-head, no register number that belongs to you.
20 I would only recognise this one, although this one has certain
21 shortcomings because it has not been registered in our office. It does
22 have these shortcomings but I would recognise it because it has your seal
23 affixed to it.
24 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether you have assessed what led me
25 to say that I signed seven directives, although I had not signed them?
1 What kind of atmosphere was this?
2 A. There was much division between the Main Staff and the president
3 of the republic. You were always in favour of unity. You always strove
4 to say that you worked jointly so that the people would not be familiar
5 with the rift. Throughout the rift we tried to hide it. We -- you tried
6 to undertake measures and change the military leadership. We tried not
7 to cause any divisions among the people and that is why you said that the
8 directives have been accepted as a result of some kind of joint work in
9 order not to cause divisions among the people. Throughout the period you
10 worked actively on your attempts in order to try and change the military
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we next have P1412, page 95.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This has already been shown to you. I think it's page 111 in
16 English. Perhaps not. We'll see. It's 111. Was this session full of
17 arguments and quarrels? Perhaps you can remind yourself if you read it
19 A. Do kindly remind me of the date of this session.
20 Q. The 6th of August, 1995.
21 A. Ah, yes. It was in the situation where you dismissed the
22 commander of the Main Staff. On the 6th of August, 1995, the chief of
23 the -- the commander of the Main Staff, Ratko Mladic, had already been
24 dismissed, and this is the situation in which this discussion developed.
25 You had the support of the people's Assembly, whereas all of the generals
1 immediately launched a boycott. They said they would boycott you and the
2 red government you represented. There was a general -- an uprising of
4 Q. Thank you. On the 6th of August was there any knowledge of any
5 illegal killings that the deputies may have been aware of or that the
6 government may have been aware of, at least the people you talked to?
7 Was there any kind of information available save for much rumour in the
9 A. No one sent any kind of information of any killings. I only
10 received information about combat and the break through I discussed when
11 the 15.000 Muslims broke through Zvornik to Tuzla, and I discussed that
12 great clash. No military or state security report mentioned any kind of
13 killing. To date I still do not believe it took place. It is all part
14 of this massive Muslim propaganda. When I was at an out-of-country
15 voting centre in Vienna, I found 1.000 Srebrenica Muslims who registered
16 to vote, and yet back home they were on the burial list in Srebrenica. I
17 intervened and the 1.000 votes were then checked because people could not
18 vote if they were dead. I caused much discontent in the out-of-country
19 voting centre in Vienna. The Srebrenica graveyard is one big farce.
20 There -- it contains the bodies of people who died of natural causes in
21 1992, 1993, and yet all of them were buried as war victims. The Serbs
22 were set up with the whole thing. I will never acknowledge it.
23 Q. Thank you. What elections are you talking about, the ones in
25 A. 1996, 1997, and 1998. We kept having these rounds of elections
1 and I was constantly in Vienna for months at a time as a representative
2 of the RS government.
3 Q. Thank you. Let's go back to P1451, page 108 and 84 in English.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Could you maybe repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.
5 JUDGE KWON: Probably 1415.
6 THE ACCUSED: Yeah. [Interpretation] Page 84 in the English
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Please look at the part before "military publications." It says:
10 "Gentlemen, this is destroying the state ..."
11 And then the next sentence:
12 It suffices that I lost my confidence in several generals because
13 I felt it on my own skin and the skin of these people, and in their media
14 I could see that they were working against the state as of day one. And
15 if I need to explain why we thanked General Gvero, because that is the
16 formulation, we thank him because he has both merits and effect and he
17 worked hard ...
18 Do you recall that I objected to their work for three and a half
19 years? Since day one I resisted their concept of how they saw the state
20 and the army.
21 A. Yes, as I've already said, you say here that you lost confidence
22 in several generals and that you could feel it on your own skin and the
23 skin of the people. They did not listen to you at all. You were just a
24 figurehead, and yet you tried to change things all the time, you kept
25 working on their removal. But it was a sort of general junta and they
1 rallied together. If you touch one of them, it's touching all of them,
2 they are immediately against you, wanting to cause trouble, and they had
3 the force, they had the weapons. Yesterday I said that it was stated at
4 the Assembly session that General Novak in front of a line of soldiers
5 said that Radovan Karadzic is not our commander, the president of the
6 republic is not our commander. Their ambition was to gain civilian power
7 as well, to have it all for themselves. They kept asking for a state of
8 war to be proclaimed so that they could be the main in command. And the
9 heads of municipality could never agree with commanders of brigades
10 because the commanders wanted to have everything. In the West they are
11 controlled by civilians, but in a state of war -- actually, in the war
12 itself, they thought they were gods and that they could not be touched.
13 They basically decided on everything and yet you tried to have them
14 removed. In the trenches they distributed leaflets and brochures against
15 you. Throughout I could see that things were not functioning properly.
16 The civilian authorities had no control and attempts were made to regain
17 that control but it couldn't be. This misfortune of General Gvero was a
18 member of the JUL party, Mira Markovic's party, kept putting forth
19 different kinds of ideology.
20 Q. [No interpretation]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note, could Mr. Karadzic kindly
22 please repeat his question.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please repeat your question. You
24 overlapped with the interpretation of the answer. Could you start over,
25 all over again.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. The last question: Let's look at what the ambassador discussed
3 when he mentioned a senior officer who denied my confidence. It is P --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, the Chamber has to rise now. We'll
5 have a break for half an hour --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I can conclude.
7 JUDGE KWON: We have to rise, unfortunately.
8 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, you said that you did not see individual
14 documents of the military security service, but rather compilations of
15 material. Can you tell us who produced them and sent them to the
16 president's office?
17 A. Such compilations of documents were put together by the sector
18 for intelligence and security at the Main Staff of the VRS. It was
19 General Tolimir who was the head and there was General -- no, actually,
20 Colonel Salapura and Colonel Beara. They were the three people at the
21 helm and one of the three always signed the document which would then be
22 sent to me.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we next have P970, page 95. We
24 can see my contribution begin. In English that's page 95. P970.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. It has to do with what you said that at the Assembly session
2 there was discussion of a senior officer who said that I was not his
3 supreme commander and that I was unimportant. Can we have that?
4 A. Yes, I remember General Bozo Novak. Apparently he said that in
5 front of a line of around 1.000 soldiers and that is how it was
6 interpreted at the Assembly session.
7 Q. If we don't have it, I can read it out from hard copy page 102.
8 I'll read it out in English and then we'll have it interpreted.
9 [In English] Here --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
12 JUDGE KWON: It will be coming. For the sake of having correct
13 interpretation, we better have it. Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think this is not the right
15 number. I asked for P970, page 95. That's where I begin. Can we see
16 that in English. Yes, it's fine in English. Next can we go to page 102
17 in English, please. And then we should go to the Serb page where it
18 begins "the report clearly demonstrates ..."
19 The Serb version begins at page 98 and then six pages over -- oh,
20 no it's page 86 in e-court in the Serbian. Let me just find where it is.
21 "A senior officer ..."
22 It begins with "simply" or "simply put." Here in this place a
23 senior officer who was awarded his rank by me said that the supreme
24 commander of his is not Karadzic, Karadzic is unimportant. But the
25 office that Karadzic holds does matter and must be respected. And on the
1 morrow some other Karadzic will be there. You cannot expect one to say
2 this will be - if you'll pardon the expression - I don't know what kind
3 of state. This is a priestly, clerical, Chetnik, capitalist, this or
4 that kind of state. And then further below:
5 "The report clearly demonstrates a total disrespect of the
6 ministry," that's the next paragraph "and the minister. We can't have
8 And then further below:
9 "The army is not and cannot be a structure above the state, but
10 it is a state organ ..."
11 Mr. Ambassador, you were a military intelligence man before the
12 war. Can you tell us whether you were able to establish the basis for
13 these conceptual differences between civilian authorities and military
14 structures? Was it ideological? Was it some kind of foreign influence
15 or was it a struggle for power? What was it?
16 MS. PACK: I object.
17 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer the question, we lost the e-court
19 Yes, Ms. Pack.
20 MS. PACK: I object. This isn't something that was -- arises
21 from cross-examination.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think throughout there were
23 stories of differences between the armed forces and civilian structures,
24 and now I'm trying to discuss the basis of those disagreements. And this
25 witness is certainly in a position to know.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Can you tell us then as an officer and intelligence man what was
5 the basis, what factors or combination of factors, were the cause of this
6 permanent disagreement?
7 A. There was this permanent disagreement because the generals
8 believed in another ideology, they used to be JNA generals, mostly
9 communists who could not navigate the democratic changes and multi-party
10 elections. Many of them were members of the League of Communists. There
11 were also members of Mira Markovic's party, but there was another factor
12 which played a decisive role which was particularly pronounced when
13 Serbia imposed sanctions on the RS. Not a single civilian leader could
14 go to Serbia as of August 1994 when Serbia imposed the sanctions on the
15 RS. Any general could cross the border and military personnel regularly
16 went this way or that. The centre of power, the centre of
17 decision-making for the generals was not in Pale, it was somewhere else.
18 I have to tell you that many people from the field told me that
19 General Mladic keeps repeating that: My command is not in Pale. I
20 listen to no one in Pale. That is what people from the field kept
21 telling me. So there were different reasons, ideological, their
22 membership of other parties, their lack of knowledge about their own
23 people because the fighters in the trenches had completely different
24 views than theirs. And in this general elite there were other ideas in
25 circulation and probably other goals too. I suspect they wanted to seize
1 power all together, but they couldn't because they would be seen as a
2 general junta. They would not have been recognised as leadership, not as
3 long as there was the president of the republic and the Assembly because
4 they were democratically elected in 1990 during elections. They were
5 cautious of it and occasionally they would listen to a thing or two, but
6 mostly --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all background noise
8 be stopped.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that was the basis of our
10 misunderstandings. Those people simply could not navigate the
11 multi-party system and they belonged and believed in other goals and
12 ideas. Of course they also had desire to rule. They wanted to obtain
13 civilian power as well. I know General Mladic said several times that he
14 would like to be the president of the RS. I heard it several times --
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Shall we pause there. Yes.
16 Probably I was mistaken. Ms. Pack, did you deal with the
17 so-called rift between the political leaders and military leaders?
18 MS. PACK: No, no, that was the reason why I objected to this.
19 This isn't something that arose out of my cross-examination. It's
20 re-examination-in-chief. There was a long soliloquy about this topic at
21 the beginning of examination-in-chief, and this is it. This is a
22 second --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mladic's words are quoted here of
1 him giving up political ambitions. What do you mean this wasn't raised
2 in the cross-examination? It was challenged. I'm convinced that it was
3 raised but I can't find the page now.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Anyway, thank you, Ambassador. I have no further questions.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milinic, could you tell us again what your
9 incumbent job is?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm currently a professional
11 diplomat of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm a minister councillor with the
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sarajevo.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
14 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Milinic. I thank you for your
15 coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 JUDGE KWON: If you could call your next witness, Mr. Karadzic.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we're ready to have the testimony of
20 Nedjo Nikolic. He's here.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MS. PACK: And, Mr. President, may I just ask for a couple of
23 minutes for the Prosecution to change seats, for me to change seats with
24 my colleague.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE KWON: Could the witness make the solemn declaration,
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
4 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 WITNESS: NEDJO NIKOLIC
6 [Witness answered through interpreter]
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Nikolic. Please be seated and make
8 yourself comfortable.
9 Good morning, Mr. Nikolic. Before you commence your evidence, I
10 must draw your attention to a certain rule of procedure and evidence that
11 we have here at the international Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under
12 this rule, you may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic,
13 the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe that your answer
14 might incriminate you in a criminal offence. In this context,
15 "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an admission of
16 guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that might provide
17 evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence. However,
18 should you think that an answer might incriminate you and as a
19 consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that
20 the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question. But in
21 that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony compelled
22 in such circumstances would not be used in any case that might be laid
23 against you for any offence save and except the offence of giving false
25 Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
4 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Nikolic. I kindly ask you to
6 speak slowly and to pause between question and answer so as to enable the
7 interpreters to interpret everything that was said. Did you give a
8 statement to my Defence team, Mr. Nikolic?
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D09601.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Please take a look at the screen before you. Do you see that
14 statement of yours on the screen?
15 A. Yes, I see my statement on the screen.
16 Q. Thank you. Did you read and sign that statement?
17 A. I read and signed this statement.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness the last
20 page for him to identify his signature.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Is this your signature?
23 A. Yes, this is my signature.
24 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said
25 to the Defence team?
1 A. This statement faithfully reflects all that I said.
2 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask you the same questions again today,
3 would your answers be essentially the same as in the statement?
4 A. They would be essentially the same.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this statement
6 given under Rule 92 ter.
7 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?
8 MR. COSTI: No objections.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3690, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read out a
13 brief summary of Mr. Nedjo Nikolic's statement.
14 [In English] Mr. Nedjo Nikolic was the director of the Ciglane
15 brick factory in Bratunac during July 1995. Mr. Nikolic recalls that on
16 the morning of 14th of July, 1995, five or six men in uniform came to his
17 office and asked whether some Muslims from Srebrenica could be put up
18 temporarily on the grounds of the factory.
19 Mr. Nikolic showed the men around the factory grounds, and
20 particularly the open area of the factory. One of the men,
21 Colonel Beara, asked if Mr. Nikolic could provide drinking water for the
22 prisoners. Mr. Nikolic said that they could do that. However, after
23 receiving a telephone call, Colonel Beara and the men seemed
24 disinterested in using the brick factory and left. Mr. Nikolic never
25 heard from them again.
1 Mr. Nedjo Nikolic refutes Prosecution Witness Momir Nikolic's
2 testimony that Momir Nikolic did not come to the brick factory on the
3 morning of 14 July, 1995. Nedjo Nikolic is positive that Momir Nikolic
4 was one of the persons who came to the brick factory with Colonel Beara
5 on the morning of 14th of July. Nedjo Nikolic had known Momir Nikolic
6 for about 20 years at that time.
7 Mr. Nedjo Nikolic also refutes the testimony of Momir Nikolic
8 that there was a plan from 12th of July, 1995, to take the Muslim
9 prisoners from Srebrenica to the brick factory to be executed. No one
10 had come and asked about using the brickworks for prisoners prior to the
11 visit of the group on the morning of 14th of July, 1995. The brick
12 factory premises were unsuitable as a place to execute prisoners because
13 there were about 50 employees at the factory at that time and there were
14 people living nearby.
15 Nedjo Nikolic also refutes the testimony of Momir Nikolic that
16 the officers who came to the brick factory asked the director about this
17 place as a possible execution site. During the visit on 14th of July,
18 1995, no one made any reference to an execution site or to killings.
19 And that is the summary. I do not have questions for Mr. Nikolic
20 at that moment.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, as you have noted, your evidence in
22 chief in this case has been admitted in its entirety in writing, that is,
23 through your written witness statement. And now you'll be cross-examined
24 by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor. Do you understand
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Costi.
3 MR. COSTI: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning, everyone
4 in the courtroom.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Costi:
6 Q. Mr. Nikolic, good morning. Now, at paragraph 4 of your statement
7 you said that you were a member of the SDS since its founding. Now, you
8 were also a candidate for the SDS at the Bratunac Municipal Assembly
9 election in 1990; correct?
10 A. That is correct. I have been an SDS member since its foundation
11 and I was a candidate as well as a member of the Municipal Assembly of
12 Bratunac from 1990 till 1997.
13 Q. Very well. Now, you also said that you were a member of the SDS
14 Municipal Board, and if I'm not wrong you were a member of that board
15 from July 1991; correct?
16 A. No, not July 1991. From 1990, since the foundation of the Serb
17 Democratic Party, until 1998, that's when I was a member of the Municipal
19 Q. Thank you. Now, you were also a member - you may have mentioned
20 it already - of the Serbian Municipal Assembly when it first was
21 established in 1991, right, so not just the party but also the Serb
22 institution in Bratunac?
23 A. I was a member of the Municipal Assembly of Bratunac from 1990
24 when the first multi-party elections were held until the war. It was not
25 a Serbian municipality. It was the municipality of Bratunac where there
1 were also other ethnicities such as Muslims and Croats. The Municipal
2 Assembly did not operate from the beginning till the end of the war.
3 Q. All right. Let's move on. You are -- you know Jovan Nikolic,
4 he's your cousin, isn't he?
5 A. Yes, I know Jovan Nikolic, he is a relative of mine.
6 Q. And he was the manager of the Kravica warehouse?
7 A. Yes, he was the manager of the co-operative in Kravica. It was
8 called Zadruga. That's -- it -- the facilities, the buildings, belonged
9 to Zadruga.
10 Q. And in July 1995 you both lived in Bratunac in
11 Gavrila Principa Street, is it correct?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And you were living in the same building; correct?
14 A. The same building, the same storey, our apartments were next to
15 each other.
16 Q. Now, in your statement at paragraph 14 you explained that you
17 were mobilised between the 10th and the 13th of July, and that on the
18 13th of July you resumed your work; correct?
19 A. I came from the front line on the 13th and on the 14th I reported
20 at the company to continue working. So it was on the 14th, not the 13th.
21 Q. So what it says on paragraph 14 of the statement is inaccurate
22 because it says, and I read:
23 "On 13 July we were back at our enterprises and resumed our work.
24 In the evening of the same day, I came to Bratunac and went straight to
25 my flat, had a bath, and I went to sleep."
1 So you're talking about the 13th of July in your statement. Are
2 you now saying that it was the 14th?
3 A. Please, I came from the front line, that is, I was demobilised on
4 the 13th and went home to rest because I had been away for three or four
5 days. And on the following day, the 14th, I went to work. That's what I
6 said and that's what it says or it should.
7 Q. Well, that's not what the -- that's not what your statement says
8 because your statement says that on the 13th you were back at our
9 enterprise and resumed our work. So now you specified and you explained
10 that what you meant here to say was that on the 13th you went back home
11 and then the day after you went back to the brick factory. Is this your
12 testimony now?
13 JUDGE KWON: Let's --
14 MR. COSTI: [Overlapping speakers] --
15 JUDGE KWON: -- upload his statement. Exhibit 3690.
16 MR. COSTI: And it's page 4 of the English translation and page 2
17 of the B/C/S.
18 Q. So can you read your statement --
19 A. This is what I said. On the 13th of July, 1995, we were returned
20 to our companies to continue working, which means that we were released
21 from the front lines. I -- on the evening of that day, I came to
22 Bratunac, I went to my flat, had a bath, and went to bed because the
23 previous nights I did not sleep. That was on the 13th. On that day I
24 did not go to my company.
25 Q. Now, you also said at paragraph 19 that in these days, meaning 13
1 and 14 I understand, you didn't notice anything particular happening in
2 town, anything particular happening, because, and I quote, you were going
3 from your flat directly to work and back. Is it correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Now, on 21st February 2012 you testified before the BiH state
6 court as a defence witness in the case against Dragan Neskovic and
7 Zoran Ilic; right?
8 A. No.
9 Q. You didn't testify?
10 A. No, I did not. Zoran Neskovic, no, never.
11 MR. COSTI: Can we have 65 ter 25208.
12 Q. Now, if we look at the first and the second paragraph, it said
14 [As read] "Nedjo Nikolic, former members of the Army of
15 Republika Srpska Bratunac Brigade 3rd Battalion and defence witness
16 of ... Ilic said that on the 13th and 14th of July they saw Ilic in
18 And then further down there is a quotation from what appears to
19 be your testimony that said:
20 [As read] "'I went to the send-off party at the house of Jovan
21 Ilic, Zoran's father, on the 13th of July ...'"
22 So you're saying that this is not you, this is not your
24 A. No, I'm Nedjo Nikolic, son of Petar, from Kravica, and in the
25 Bratunac municipality there are five men by the name of Nedjo Nikolic. I
1 was never at that send-off party and I did not testify in the trial of
3 Q. Very well. So on the night of the 13th you were back at home you
5 MR. COSTI: Now can we have 65 ter 25223.
6 Q. Now, you will see this Chamber has been in Bratunac and is
7 familiar with those places, but this is an aerial picture of the city.
8 Now, if you look at this picture, Gavrila Principa is the street that
9 leads to Konjevic Polje, so is the one in this picture that starts from
10 the bottom and goes all the way up to the Hotel Fontana; correct?
11 A. Yes, that's correct. On this -- I still haven't found it on this
12 map, but Gavrila Principa Street runs to Fontana from the direction of
13 Kravica or stretches that way.
14 Q. Now, if you can find the street, it is -- you see on the bottom
15 it says "Konjevic Polje" with a red arrow and you see that just close by
16 that label you see a street and it goes all the way up and then you see
17 Hotel Fontana almost in the middle of the picture. Do you see that
18 street now?
19 Now, can you also locate your apartment building?
20 A. I've found it. Yes, I've found it.
21 Q. Is it that big apartment building block on the left side of the
22 street across to the road that leads to the Bratunac Brigade
23 headquarters; correct? If we can ...
24 A. It's on the left turn. It's always the opposite direction from
25 the building of the Bratunac Brigade and it's the third building on the
2 MR. COSTI: If we can zoom in a little bit around -- yeah. A
3 little bit more.
4 Q. So it's this big apartment building block that we can see on the
5 left side of the road; right?
6 A. It's a series of buildings on the left side of this street. They
7 are connected but autonomous. I'm in the third building on the left or
8 when you enter the street it's on your right.
9 MR. COSTI: If you could zoom in a little bit so for the benefit
10 of everyone and the Chamber, is this -- yeah, a little bit more.
11 Q. And it's the big block that we see on the top of the picture now?
12 A. Yes, I see it.
13 MR. COSTI: Now, if you can zoom out a second.
14 Q. Now, the brick factory is in the direction of Ljubovija; correct?
15 You can zoom all out.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. So basically it is the street that you can see in this picture at
18 the top of the image where there is an arrow that says "Ljubovija,
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Very well. So to go from the brick factory to your apartment and
22 vice versa, you drive across the town; correct?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Now, this Chamber has heard several testimony of the presence of
25 many buses detaining thousands of Muslims, kept in buses in these and --
1 in this street and other locations, and some of them were precisely on
2 your way home. So Zlatan Celanovic, for example, a member of the
3 Bratunac Brigade, testified that the buses filled up a large portion of
4 the street that connects the Vuk Karadzic school with the Gavrila
5 Principa Street.
6 MR. COSTI: If we can have P00257, please.
7 Q. Now, you will see the next picture is basically the same picture
8 where the witness Celanovic marked the buses that he saw. What he said
9 in his testimony, and it is page 27 of P0037, he said the vehicles were
10 parked with an interval of 2 or 3 metres in the street. So there was a
11 column of vehicles with 2 or 3 metres between them. They filled up the
12 street, so every 2 or 3 metres there would be a parked vehicles and then
13 again 2 or 3 metres and then again another parked vehicle, all the way up
14 to the end of the street in front of the school.
15 And if we can zoom in more or less at the centre of the picture
16 where we can see there's a green mark. I think the picture is -- we
17 should turn the picture exactly. Yeah, here we are. You will see that
18 the street that leads to Gavrila Principa is where the witness marked all
19 the buses. So are you saying that you never noticed anything on your way
20 home on the 13th of July?
21 A. When I arrived on the 13th of July, I didn't even go there. I
22 went to the left immediately, to the building where I lived. I didn't go
23 there and I didn't see anything.
24 Q. You didn't go there, but you passed through, right, you --
25 A. No, no, I did not.
1 Q. So you were -- you must have driven through Gavrila Principa
2 Street, didn't you?
3 A. Through Gavrila Principa Street to the apartment but not further
4 than that, and further on is this building where the buses were and the
5 street where the buses where.
6 Q. But you were coming, if we look at this picture, from the up side
7 of the road, from the Hotel Fontana directions because you were coming
8 from the brick factory. So you passed by that street, didn't you?
9 A. I went to Ciglane only on the 14th in the morning at 7.00. Also,
10 I did not want to take that street. I went straight to the intersection
11 where the traffic lights are now and then to left towards Ljubovija, or
12 rather --
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the name.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So I went apart from this street.
15 I did not have any contact with that street.
16 MR. COSTI:
17 Q. Very well. So when you got to your apartment, you must have seen
18 or heard -- I mean, seen buses parked close to the stadium and heard
19 shooting that night, didn't you?
20 A. I really did not hear anything. I arrived tired and I went to
21 bed straight away. My apartment is so good, it has such good isolation,
22 that I did not hear anything, buses, shooting, nothing.
23 Q. Nothing. So you were in Bratunac on the 13th evening, all this
24 was happening behind the corner, and you haven't heard or seen nothing;
25 this is your testimony?
1 A. It's not exactly round the corner. It's certainly about 400
3 Q. Which is not very far you might agree. Now --
4 A. All right. It's not far away but it's between that school that
5 you're speaking of and my building -- I mean, there are quite a few
6 buildings there, so if there were sound signals, I did not hear that.
7 Q. But there are no buildings between your apartment and the
8 stadium, as we can see from this picture? There is an empty field.
9 A. Yes, not between the stadium and the building, but I don't know
10 about the stadium, that anything was happening there. I haven't heard of
11 anything happening at the stadium.
12 Q. Well, if we look at this evidence, this picture, you see that the
13 witness marked three buses -- a series of buses also close to the
14 stadium, you see that other little three crosses, these are other buses
15 that could have been seen from the building.
16 A. Well, they could be seen, but I wasn't really watching anything
17 and I didn't see anything.
18 Q. So you didn't see anything, you didn't watch anything, you didn't
19 hear anything. Yet, at paragraph 21 of your statement you show no doubt
20 and you said that:
21 "What happened in Bratunac," and you're referring to
22 mistreatment, killings, and detention of Muslims, "has been spontaneous,
23 not planned."
24 Now, if you haven't heard, seen -- I mean, what is -- you don't
25 have any basis for this assertion, do you?
1 A. I cannot claim anything that I had not seen and I had not seen
3 Q. So what I'm saying is that you can't even claim that it was
4 spontaneous and not planned, the detention, transportation, killings of
5 Muslims in Bratunac on the 13th of July?
6 A. Well, was it spontaneous? I think it was spontaneous. It
7 happened. Now, whether some plan had been made earlier on, I don't know.
8 Q. Very well. So you don't know. So what is at paragraph 21 is not
10 Now, the transportation --
11 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to answer the question? Do you agree
12 with Prosecution's comment that your statement which said what happened
13 in Bratunac had been spontaneous, not planned, is not correct?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I claim yet again that all of that
15 which happened was spontaneous, that there had not been a plan that
16 planned for all of this to happen. Everything happened spontaneously and
17 that's it.
18 JUDGE KWON: The question was while you did not know anything,
19 how did you know that it was spontaneous?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are my assumptions.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it's -- then that answers the question.
22 Let's move on.
23 MR. COSTI: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Now, you know Ziv -- sorry, Srbislav Davidovic, the president of
25 Bratunac municipality Executive Board in July 1995?
1 A. Yes, I know the former president Srbislav Davidovic.
2 Q. Yeah, my pronunciation wasn't impeccable. Now, he testified
3 before this Chamber that on the 14th of July in the morning he met with
4 Beara and two other officers at the Bratunac SDS office. Now, these
5 other officers asked him to provide them with construction machineries.
6 Davidovic then testified that he agreed to their request and called you
7 to inform you that the military will come to take the loader at the brick
8 factory. And this is Davidovic testimony is P04100 at pages 53, 54, 92,
9 and 93.
10 So my question for you is: Davidovic called you that morning and
11 asked you, the morning of the 14th, and asked you to provide the military
12 with the loader that you had at the brick factory; right?
13 A. It is true that he called me and he said that the army would come
14 and that they would ask for an excavator. That's a special machine, not
15 a loader.
16 Q. Very well, an excavator. And you did provide that machine to the
17 army; right?
18 A. Later on, I don't know whether it was on that day or the
19 following day, men from the military police came and they asked for that
20 machine and I secured that.
21 Q. And that machine was actually used for the burial in mass graves
22 of those killed at the Kravica warehouse; right?
23 A. I assume so, correct.
24 Q. So you knew that you were giving your support to the burial
25 operation of those executed down there?
1 A. Well, before that they asked for machines too and they were
2 mainly used for sanitisation of the terrain. I knew that they were going
3 then, but that is natural in war time, to use machines, and I knew that
4 there were casualties and I knew that the machine would be used for that
6 Q. But what is not natural is that a thousand people -- around a
7 thousand people were killed and executed at the Kravica warehouse on the
8 13th of July, the day before, is it?
9 A. I did not know that a thousand people were killed in Kravica on
10 that day, and now whether 1.000 were killed at all, well that's ...
11 Q. So let me ask you here because in fact in your statement you said
12 something about Kravica and you said that you heard later that Muslims
13 were killed. When did you actually learn about the event in Kravica?
14 A. I heard perhaps on that day, the 14th in the afternoon, or the
15 following day. I'm not sure exactly. But you know what? This
16 information does not spread that quickly -- well, it's sort of hushed up
17 and it's not that this information was accessible, so I couldn't hear
18 about it very quickly.
19 Q. Well, that's not what other witnesses have testified in this
20 case, but you heard of it on the 13th -- on the 14th or the 15th, you
21 said. And you probably discussed it with your cousin when you were back
22 in the apartment; right?
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 Q. Because he was informed of the killing already on the 13th in the
25 evening. Did he tell you something that night when you went back?
1 A. These were difficult days. I did not see my relative at all.
2 His brother was killed on the following day, so we did not even talk. Up
3 until then I didn't see him at all, so I couldn't have heard about that.
4 Q. Now, you described in your statement the killing. You said:
5 "The Muslims who were being taken to the warehouse rebelled,
6 seized the rifle from one of the soldiers or policemen, and killed him,
7 and then started shooting at other guards."
8 And then you said, same paragraph, paragraph 20:
9 "The guards then panicked and in fear opened fire at the Muslims
10 and killed a number of them."
11 Now, I'm asking you today you know, don't you, that many Muslims
12 were executed that day and that they were systematically and deliberately
13 killed. It wasn't an action out of panic or fear; right?
14 A. Please, I said there what it was that I heard. I was not an
15 eye-witness and I cannot claim anything.
16 Q. I'm sorry, I'm not asking you what you heard at the time. I'm
17 asking you what you know now. What do you know now about Kravica? What
18 do you know that happened in Kravica now?
19 A. Well, I know that there were killings, that's evident, that there
20 had been killing.
21 Q. And you agree that they were not in fear or in panic but there
22 was a systematic and deliberate execution; right?
23 A. Well, I cannot claim that. How can I claim that, how that
24 happened? This is what people were saying and now you claim that it's
25 different. How can I tell? I'm not a court myself. I told you what I
2 Q. So if you were to tell the story to someone, you would still say
3 that what happened in Kravica is that the guards panicked and in fear
4 opened fire and killed a number of Muslims? This is the way you think
5 things went?
6 A. Well, I believe that both happened. It is true that there were
7 Muslim attacks, that a group grabbed a soldier's rifle and that there was
8 shooting, that is true, and also it is true that there were killings. So
9 I cannot claim either one or the other. I said what it was that I had
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that there were
14 casualties on the Serb side and that is not reflected in the transcript.
15 Line 16.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Shall we continue.
18 MR. COSTI: Yes.
19 Q. Now, so you said that at that time it was normal to provide the
20 excavator or the loader for sanitisation. Now my question for you is
21 about the reburial operation. Now, you know, don't you, that around
22 September or October 1995 the Bratunac civilian authorities together with
23 the Bratunac Brigade exhumed and moved thousand of bodies from primary to
24 secondary graves, including from Glogova, the one where your machinery
25 were used; right?
1 A. I heard that. There had been some movement. I don't know
2 whether my machines went then, maybe they did. I do not know, but I know
3 that there were removals --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot follow both the
5 witness and Mr. Karadzic at the same time.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, you interrupted the interpretation.
7 Could you repeat your answer, Mr. Nikolic. You heard that,
8 what --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree that there were movements,
10 that there were removals of graves in 1995, but whether my machines went
11 then I really don't know, I do not remember.
12 MR. COSTI:
13 Q. Well --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes? So we can continue, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I wanted to ask the
16 Prosecutor to tell us -- to give us a reference. How come it was the
17 civilian authorities of Bratunac that did that? It would be a good thing
18 if we knew about that if there are documents to that effect.
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue.
20 Let's continue.
21 MR. COSTI:
22 Q. Now, you don't know with whether your machinery were involved.
23 Well, let me refresh your memory and P140 who is a protected witness who
24 testified in the Blagojevic case, he was the man who was operating the
25 excavator or the loader during both the burial operation in Glogova and
1 the reburial operation from Glogova. And what he testified in the
2 Blagojevic case is that the same team was called back, meaning the same
3 team who dug the graves in Glogova, the same team with the lorries and
4 the machines, and this is transcript page 3435 and 3436 on the 23rd of
5 October in the Blagojevic case. And again, when he's asked the following
7 "Q. Can you describe the machine you were using to lift the
8 bodies out of the graves?
9 "A. Yes, I can. I can describe the machine. It's very much
10 like the one in your sketch except that this type is a 160-B or C which
11 doesn't make really any difference. It is a loader belonging to the
12 brick works."
13 Now, the same witness said that there was a yellow truck from the
14 brick factory used both -- during both operations. So machines from the
15 brick factory were, in fact, used also for the reburial operation in
16 September and October. Would you agree with that? Do you remember this
18 A. I've already said that I do not remember. However, if a man who
19 operated this machine made this statement, then it is correct. I've
20 forgotten, but I know that our machines were involved during that year,
22 Q. And you said you'd forgotten, but there are a few aspects that
23 strike me as to why you have forgotten. The first question is: Wasn't
24 it unusual to have a request of a loader and a truck month after the
25 military operation in the area were finished? Didn't it strike you as
2 A. I've already said a moment ago that the army often addressed us,
3 asking us for some help in terms of sanitisation of the ground for
4 burials and so on, and I did not find anything unusual in that. When I
5 heard about relocations -- but even if I knew that it was something
6 unusual, I couldn't do anything. When the army addresses us asking for a
7 machine to be given to them, we just had to do it.
8 Q. I'm not suggesting you could have prevented or you could have
9 said no, maybe you couldn't. But what I'm saying is that this is what
10 you did and you should remember what happened. And there is another
11 detail -- well, ...
12 A. Well, I'm saying even now, I mean, I cannot remember that detail,
13 but I claim that if the man gave a statement, that that's what he did,
14 then that is correct. But again, I cannot recall when that was done, I
15 don't know the date or anything. That's why I said it's possible, but I
16 don't remember. It is possible, I am saying that now. But now I'm
17 saying again if the man who operated that machine said that, then that is
19 Q. Now, the same witness also said that when they returned the
20 machine after the reburial operation, he said, and it's transcript page
21 3440 in the Blagojevic case:
22 "The machine had been washed from the smell of the dead bodies
23 because the stench had penetrated the cabin and all other parts of the
25 You don't recall that they brought back this machine after
1 digging up bodies, carrying it somewhere else, and they had to be cleaned
2 because they were stinking and you couldn't use them for the stench?
3 A. The machine was returned after the job was completed. Of course
4 I remember that it was brought back. I would have remembered if it
5 hadn't returned. But when a machine is returned after a few days, then
6 that is the usual process. I remember that the machine was returned, of
7 course I remember. As for the washing, I don't know about that. I did
8 not wash it and I was not there in the machine to have felt the stench --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the end of
10 the sentence.
11 MR. COSTI:
12 Q. Can you repeat the last sentence because the interpreters
13 couldn't follow you.
14 A. As for the washing, I did not know about the washing. I didn't
15 know that it was supposed to be washed because I'm not a machine
16 operator. It's the machine operator who assessed that it should be
17 washed and that's what he did. I, as director, did not know about that.
18 Q. So let me move to another topic. Now, in your statement at
19 paragraphs 15 and 18 you said that Beara, Branimir Tesic, Momir Nikolic,
20 and a group of officers came to the brick factory on the morning of the
21 14th. Now, you said that at one point a telephone rang and it was a call
22 for Mr. Beara; right?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. And you also said that Beara took the phone and when the
25 conversation finished he told the others that they were leaving. And
1 that nobody --
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. -- told --
4 A. He did not tell me anything. After the telephone conversation,
5 he got up two or three minutes later and set out. He did not tell me
6 anything, Beara.
7 Q. So -- and you said -- well, only Beara, so someone else told you
8 something about the telephone conversation?
9 A. When leaving my office in the hall, Momir Nikolic just sort of
10 discreetly whispered to me or told me softly that this combination was
11 off; however, I did not say that in my statement. He said that to me
12 discreetly, very softly, so that it could not be heard, and I thought
13 that that was unimportant and I didn't mention it in my statement.
14 Q. Well, that's exactly the point that I wanted to get because on
15 the 2nd of April, 2004, you gave a statement to the Blagojevic Defence;
16 right? Now, in that statement which is 65 ter 25220, you didn't mention
17 any call and you said:
18 "In the meantime, one of the military officers, I think it was
19 Momir Nikolic, arrived and said that this location had been given up and
20 that the Muslim prisoners would not be held there. This was a final
21 definitive order from above. I noticed that Beara became angry and when
22 he heard this -- when he heard this, but he obviously had to accept it.
23 After this announcement, they sat for a little longer and said good-bye
24 and left."
25 So now you changed a little bit what you said in your statement
1 which get closer to what you said in 2004. But you see the
2 inconsistency, don't you? Did you receive a telephone call for Beara or
3 you didn't?
4 A. In my statement from 2004, I did mention the telephone
5 conversation; however, these people who worked on the Defence team of
6 Major Blagojevic did not record that.
7 Q. But you signed it, you signed the statement where you said that
8 Momir Nikolic arrived and brought the news, to which Beara reacted. So
9 why did you sign it if it's a different story?
10 A. I signed that. I believed that the Defence team left that out on
11 purpose or that they wanted to leave it out, and I didn't want to oppose
12 this wording. Momir did not say that publicly --
13 Q. Should we just --
14 A. -- he whispered to me --
15 Q. So you believe that the Defence team left it out and you didn't
16 want -- and they didn't want this wording so you didn't say it publicly,
17 so it sounds like you said you signed it because the Defence wanted you
18 to sign it; right?
19 A. Please, this is what I claim. The telephone conversation did
20 take place --
21 Q. No, I'm sorry, Mr. Nikolic --
22 A. -- and I mentioned it. The Defence did not --
23 Q. -- I'm asking you something different now. I'm asking you
24 whether it is true what you just said, which is true, having you said it,
25 but that you left it out because you believed that the Defence team
1 wanted that passage to be out. So you basically changed your version
2 because you believed that the Defence in the Blagojevic case wanted you
3 to say something different; is this correct?
4 A. It is correct, but I thought that this telephone conversation
5 didn't really matter that much.
6 Q. And let me ask you this question: Is there anything in the
7 statement in this case that you provided to the Defence in the Karadzic
8 that you changed because you thought that it was irrelevant or you
9 changed because you thought that the Defence didn't want it to be there?
10 Like, for example, that on the 14th you were informed of the Kravica
11 warehouse massacres as you said a few minutes ago, whereas in the
12 statement you said much later, if I'm not wrong. Let me go back to the
13 statement, is there anything in the statement you have omitted because
14 you thought the Defence didn't want to hear it?
15 A. Please, I was not there on the 14th --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat. The
17 interpreter did not hear him.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nikolic, please repeat your answer. Could you
19 start over again?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I did not provide a
21 statement. I did not say that I was informed on the 14th of any massacre
22 in Kravica. I did not know that on the 14th. As for the statement I
23 signed where there is no mention of the telephone conversation, I signed
24 it because I believed the telephone conversation to be unimportant and
25 that it didn't change anything. Also, I believed that it did not have
1 any bearing on the essence, the gist, of the statement.
2 MR. COSTI:
3 Q. You said something completely different to the Blagojevic
4 Defence. You said that Momir came and informed you all about the new
5 plan and the order coming from above. Now, this is something different
6 and it's not just an irrelevant detail. Your story is different.
7 A. It is not correct that Momir informed us all of some other plan.
8 He only told me in the hallway that the plan was being scrapped. He was
9 accompanied by Colonel Beara. He didn't dare comment anything, and I
10 talked only to Beara. Momir was simply there close by in the hallway or
11 in a nearby office. He didn't tell everyone that the plan was to be
12 scrapped. He didn't dare nor could he say it.
13 Q. Did he also tell you that the plan has changed because there was
14 a final definitive order from above?
15 A. He told me, orders, there's a change to plan, that's all, and
16 that's how I understood it, that the order came from above.
17 Q. And Beara got upset?
18 A. Beara did not comment. It was my conclusion that he was upset.
19 He got up, said nothing, and left. So it was my conclusion that there
20 was a change to the plan and I concluded that he was upset. He no longer
21 addressed me, got up, and left.
22 Q. You didn't conclude there was a change of plan; you were told
23 there was a change of plan pursuant to an order from above. And then you
24 may have concluded by looking at Beara that he was upset; right?
25 A. Please, first, Beara got up and left, and on his way out Momir
1 told me there was a change to plan, that is to say, after the telephone
2 conversation. He told me that discreetly so that only I could hear. He
3 didn't dare say it out loud. Beara was the person in charge of the
4 process and of the talk with me. Momir could not answer any questions.
5 He couldn't say that there was a change to plan. He was a junior officer
6 there who couldn't comment.
7 Q. And Beara left without telling you anything? He stood up after
8 the call and left?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Now, in December 2012 you gave another statement to this Defence,
11 to the Karadzic Defence, a very short one which is 65 ter 1D05107. I'm
12 not sure we need it, but in this statement you said something again
13 slightly different. Instead of saying that you reached a conclusion that
14 you weren't told nothing and now that Momir said something. You said
16 "After the telephone conversation, Beara told me that he is
17 giving up on Ciglane ..."
18 So contrary to what you just said, Beara actually talked to you
19 after the telephone conversation and told you that they were not bringing
20 prisoners there anymore or whatever. What did he tell you after the
21 telephone conversation?
22 A. Again, I repeat that Beara told me nothing after the telephone
23 conversation. I never said he said anything to me.
24 Q. So what you said -- let me check. If what you said to this
25 Defence in December 2012 is then false because you said -- and I read it
1 to you and you can see it on your screen. You said:
2 "While we were sitting at the office someone called Beara by
3 phone. And after the telephone conversation, Beara told me that he is
4 giving up on 'Ciglane,' so no one of the Srebrenica Muslims was brought
5 to 'Ciglane' where I was a manager."
6 Can you see that? So that statement is also wrong?
7 A. Exactly. There is a mistake here. I don't know how it happened
8 but he really said nothing to me.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: In LiveNote page 71, line
10 2, it should be: I never said he ever said anything to me.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a mistake. There is a
12 mistake in this part. He didn't say to me that they were giving up on
13 Ciglane, it is incorrect.
14 MR. COSTI:
15 Q. So you gave two wrong statements, one to the Blagojevic Defence,
16 one to the Karadzic Defence in December of 2012, and in part you made a
17 few adjustments to the statement you gave now to the Defence. So you
18 can't quite keep the story straight, can you?
19 A. Well, you know, it's been a while and one cannot remember all of
20 the details; however, I did make a mistake here when I said that Beara
21 told me anything. He did not. It's a mistake. I don't know how it came
23 MR. COSTI: Your Honour, this ends my cross-examination. I would
24 ask the admission, if you think it's necessary, of these two statements.
25 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?
1 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: P140 was the number in Blagojevic case?
3 MR. COSTI: Correct. It was the number of the -- is the name of
4 the witness. He's a protected witness. Yeah, sorry.
5 JUDGE KWON: So could you give the reference of the page numbers.
6 MR. COSTI: Yeah.
7 JUDGE KWON: Is it -- I think it's a statement. What's the
8 65 ter number?
9 MR. COSTI: Yeah, the 65 ter number, unfortunately I made a
10 mistake not to print the list.
11 JUDGE KWON: I think we have it.
12 MR. COSTI: Yeah, yeah, we do. I prepared -- there is a
13 65 ter number with a summary -- with an excerpt of his testimony. Here,
14 is 25236. This are the relevant transcript of P140's testimony in the
15 Blagojevic case.
16 JUDGE KWON: No, what we have seen is the statement signed by
17 Mr. Karnavas and the witness.
18 MR. COSTI: That statement is --
19 JUDGE KWON: What you are -- what is it that you are tendering?
20 MR. COSTI: Well, I meant the two statements provided by the
21 witness to witness -- to the Defence --
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'm asking the 65 ter number of the statement.
23 MR. COSTI: I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I thought you were
24 talking -- so the statement -- so the statement to the Blagojevic Defence
25 is 65 ter 25220.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, thank you. We'll admit both statements.
2 MR. COSTI: Thank you.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P6400 and P6401 respectively,
4 Your Honours.
5 MR. COSTI: Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, very briefly.
9 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Nikolic, when you provided these different
11 statements, were they taped and then typed out?
12 A. They were taped.
13 Q. Which one?
14 A. I think the first one for the Blagojevic case.
15 Q. And the ones you provided to my Defence team?
16 A. I really don't remember. I don't think they were recorded.
17 Q. Thank you. Did you put it in writing or were you speaking and
18 someone was taking notes?
19 A. Others wrote things down and I spoke, so a few silly things did
21 Q. Thank you. Can you help us out. The word "excavator," it's the
22 English word for "rovokopac." It is a composite word containing the
23 words "rov," in English trench, and "kopac," digger?
24 A. Precisely.
25 Q. In line 23, the witness didn't say "few silly things," you said
2 A. You mean the digging of trenches?
3 Q. No, no, others wrote things down and?
4 A. Yes, I said there were mistakes or omissions in typing.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: That is what the witness
6 said. It can be verified against the recording.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Bench what the two words contained
9 in the compound word "rovokopac" mean?
10 A. It contains two words, "rov" is a depression in the ground, a
11 hole that was dug; and "kopac" is a machine that digs. Thus, we have the
12 compound of "rovokopac," meaning a digging machine.
13 Q. Where can such trenches or holes be found in times of war? What
14 are they used for?
15 A. There were trenches along defence lines on both sides, but we
16 used this piece of equipment to dig gravel.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lines 14 to 16, we have the word
18 "rov" in the Serbian, could it be interpreted as "trench." Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Nikolic, on page 58 you said it was your assumption that it
21 was all done in a rush --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Spontaneous.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you know or were you told of the existence of a plan to commit
25 murders in the co-operative building in Kravica?
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly
2 repeat? There was an overlap.
3 JUDGE KWON: What was your answer, Mr. Nikolic? Interpreters
4 didn't hear you.
5 MR. COSTI: Also, Your Honours, sorry, the discussion about
6 whether it was planned or not was about what was happening in Bratunac
7 not at the Kravica warehouse in any event.
8 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure it was limited to that area only in
9 your question. I think it's fair enough to allow that question to be
11 What was your answer, Mr. Nikolic?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My answer is that I didn't hear of
13 the existence of any kind of plan, either before or after it all, after
14 what happened.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. If I may respond, on
16 page 68, lines 11 and further, the question referred to the events in
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Nikolic, as regards the events in Kravica and in the town
20 itself, did you know at the time that there was a plan or did you learn
21 later of the existence of a plan to act illegally?
22 A. I didn't know at the time that there was a plan, and later on I
23 didn't hear of any plan. I did hear, though, that there were things
24 happening, but I never heard anything about a plan.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have P0037, and it will be
2 my last question. It's an aerial image, page 27 of the document.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Could you please repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.
4 Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: P0037. [Interpretation] Perhaps someone can assist
6 me. It is the aerial image of Bratunac. I think it is P0037.
7 JUDGE KWON: Or the 65 ter 25223 or Exhibit P257. We saw two
9 MR. COSTI: The aerial picture image without markings is
10 65 ter 25 --
11 JUDGE KWON: 25223.
12 MR. COSTI: Yeah, I'm sorry.
13 JUDGE KWON: This is a marked one.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We can use this one.
15 Could the witness be assisted with the electronic pen.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Nikolic, I would kindly ask you to mark your direction
18 en route from your apartment.
19 A. Do you mean from Ciglane to my apartment?
20 Q. On the 13th in the evening when you came back from the front
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. You came from Konjevic Polje, from that direction;
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Can we have the date and initials placed on the
2 photograph, Witness.
3 You, Mr. Nikolic, please use the same pen.
4 A. The lower right-hand side corner?
5 Q. Yes, that's good. The date and initials.
6 A. Is it the 16th?
7 Q. No, the 11th or the 12th perhaps.
8 A. [Marks]
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3691, Your Honours.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Nikolic.
15 A. You're welcome.
16 Questioned by the Court:
17 JUDGE KWON: During the course of cross-examination, Mr. Nikolic,
18 you said this in your answer - this is transcript page 69, line 13 and
19 onwards. I quote what you said.
20 "He," meaning Momir Nikolic, "he --" I quote:
21 "He only told me in the hallway that the plan was being scrapped.
22 He was accompanied by Colonel Beara. He didn't dare comment anything and
23 I talked only to Beara. Momir was simply there close by in the hallway
24 or in a nearby office. He didn't tell everyone that the plan was to be
25 scrapped. He didn't dare nor could he say it."
1 And then the Prosecutor asked this:
2 "Did he also tell you that the plan has changed because there was
3 a final definitive order from above?"
4 And this is your answer, I quote:
5 "He told me, orders, there's a change to plan, that's all, and
6 that's how I understood it, that the order came from above."
7 Do you remember that conversation, having said so?
8 A. Yes, that's how it developed.
9 JUDGE KWON: What did you mean then by "above"? Order from
10 "above"? How did you understand it?
11 A. The military top.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Unless there's a question for you from my colleagues, that
14 concludes were you evidence, Mr. Nikolic. On behalf of the Chamber, I
15 would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you
16 are free to go.
17 We'll rise all together. We'll have a break for 45 minutes and
18 resume at 1.25.
19 [The witness withdrew]
20 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.38 p.m.
21 [The witness entered court]
22 --- On resuming at 1.29 p.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
1 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
2 WITNESS: JOVAN IVANOVIC
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Ivanovic. Please be seated and make
5 yourself comfortable.
6 Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Ivanovic, I must draw your
7 attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here at the
8 Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under this rule you may object to
9 answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from
10 the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate you in a
11 criminal offence. In this context, "incriminate" means saying something
12 that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or
13 saying something that might provide evidence that you might have
14 committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an answer
15 might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer the
16 question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to compel
17 you to answer the question. But in that situation the Tribunal would
18 ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would not be
19 used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence save and
20 except the offence of giving false testimony.
21 Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Ivanovic?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
25 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Ivanovic.
2 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
3 Q. I must ask you to pause between question and answer and I remind
4 both myself and you to speak slowly for everything to be recorded.
5 A. All right.
6 Q. Did you give a statement to my Defence team?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please display 1D7327.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you see that statement before you on the screen now?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. If you're looking at the transcript, then you will be
14 able to tell when the interpretation has finished, that will be when the
15 cursor stops moving. Did you read and sign this statement?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Let us show the last page to the witness so he can
18 identify his signature.
19 Is this your signature?
20 A. Yes, this is my signature as I put it here in The Hague.
21 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you told
22 the Defence team?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. If I were to ask you the same questions today, would your answers
25 be essentially the same?
1 A. Yes, I think -- I mean maybe where there's some minor changes
2 that would not affect the essence, I have not rehearsed this, but yes.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this statement
5 under Rule 92 ter.
6 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. McKenna?
7 MS. McKENNA: No objection, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3692, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read out the
12 summary of Mr. Jovan Ivanovic's statement in English.
13 [In English] Jovan Ivanovic was chairman of the
14 Executive Committee of the Zvornik Municipal Assembly from 1990 to 1992,
15 and one of the initiators and founders of the SDS party in Zvornik. The
16 SDS was formed as a political response to the SDA already formed in
17 Zvornik. The SDA's political objectives were separatist and chauvinistic
18 activities by Muslims in BH, whereas the SDS aimed to establish political
19 equality and equilibrium among the citizens of BH. The main message of
20 the constituent Assembly of the SDA in Zvornik was that BH was a Muslim
21 state, that the time had come for Muslims to form a unitary state, that
22 brotherhood and unity was a communist trick, and that there was no place
23 in BH for those who did not agree with these messages. SDA policy
24 influenced the Muslims in Zvornik.
25 After the first multi-party elections, the SDA and SDS formed a
1 coalition government in Zvornik. After six months of functioning
2 normally, under the influence of the SDA Sarajevo, local Muslim officials
3 began to undermine the coalition in Zvornik. SDS requests were usually
4 ignored and were voted down by Muslim leaders in Zvornik. Jovan Ivanovic
5 could not carry out a realistic social and economic policy despite the
6 fact he was in charge of it. Muslim officials stated they were working
7 and acting in accordance with the instructions coming from the SDA
8 central office in Sarajevo. In Zvornik, the SDA showed its preferential
9 attitude during the selection of personnel in many businesses and social
11 In October 1991, the Muslim leaders in Sarajevo decided on the
12 sovereignty of BH, ignoring the will of the Serbs and withdrawing
13 representatives of BH from the organs of the SFRY and violating the
14 existing constitution. The Zvornik SDA simultaneously carried out its
15 own personnel policy in the police station, Territorial Defence, and
16 Municipal Assembly. Reserve police stations were established exclusively
17 in Muslim villages and only Muslims were mobilised for these stations.
18 Muslims in the reserve police stations spear-headed the organisation of
19 an armed struggle against the JNA and later VRS in Zvornik.
20 The Serbs formed a Serbian municipality of Zvornik in December
21 1991 in response to the Patriotic League. This was the only way to
22 protect their interests in Zvornik. Jovan Ivanovic was appointed SDS
23 co-ordinator for the negotiations with the SDA. In order to overcome
24 inter-ethnic problems, the SDS wanted to negotiate with the SDA leaders
25 in Zvornik. The other side rejected them and ignored calls for talks.
1 Provocations and mistreatment of the Serbs began in Zvornik. Privately
2 run establishments were mistreated and Serbs wearing national costumes
3 were physically attacked causing fear among the Serbs in Zvornik. The
4 Serbs in the SDS sincerely tried to find interlocutors with whom they
5 could resolve the newly arisen situation in a neighbourly and brotherly
6 manner to prevent any armed conflicts.
7 The act of terrorism in Sapna on 5th of April, 1992, triggered
8 the fighting in Zvornik. The Serbs set up barricades around their
9 villages, while the Muslims took control of the town itself and the
10 villages in which they were the majority. The next day, Zvornik was
11 under total blockade by armed Muslims. Serbs from the municipality
12 leadership and Serbian policemen went to the Alhos factory and set up
13 temporary municipal offices. JNA members were also targeted and killed
14 and communications and links were down, so the Crisis Staff was put into
15 operation. In the town, Muslims were searching Serbian houses and any
16 remaining Serbs were mistreated. JNA units offered little protection.
17 On 7th of April, 1992, Jovan Ivanovic met with Abdulah Pasic at
18 Jezero restaurant. Pasic was president of the municipality. They agreed
19 to do their utmost to ease tensions, that the Muslim leadership would
20 disarm Muslim civilians, and that a Joint Commission would go to
21 Kula Grad, the Muslim stronghold. After the lifting of the blockade,
22 they would go to the local radio station and send a message of peace to
23 Serbs and Muslims. Serb negotiators were sincere and hoped to resolve
24 problems and achieve peace in Zvornik by agreement; however, the meeting
25 was suddenly interrupted by Arkan and his men. Arkan called
1 Jovan Ivanovic and Jovo Mijatovic Serbian traitors and beat them. Nobody
2 beat the Muslim participants. Arkan talked to them to arrange the
3 surrender of the Muslim forces. Arkan and his men took over power in the
5 The Crisis Staff existed from 6 to 10th of April, 1992. Arkan
6 was personally in command of military operations for the liberation of
7 Zvornik. After 10th of April, 1992, total anarchy and lawlessness set in
8 and the local Serbian leadership had almost no contact with the
9 leadership at Pale. Serbs were afraid that the events of Second World
10 War would repeat. Arkan and other paramilitary groups came to Zvornik,
11 looted, and committed crimes, but the local authorities had no strength
12 to stop them. Everybody in Zvornik was afraid of the paramilitaries.
13 The chaos lasted until July 1992, when the leadership of the RS sent
14 special police forces reinforced with the special units of the VRS. They
15 disarmed and arrested over 100 paramilitaries who were tried before
16 competent courts in RS and Serbia. It was only after they were arrested
17 that many of the paramilitary crimes were discovered.
18 Radovan Karadzic did everything he could to preserve peace in BH.
19 He promoted talks and insisted on reaching an agreement and a peaceful
20 resolution of the interethnic disagreements between Serbs and Muslims in
21 Zvornik. Radovan Karadzic is a humanist and a good man, but he did not
22 have any sincere interlocutors from the Muslims in BH. If he had such
23 interlocutors, the crisis in BH would probably have been resolved
25 And that is a summary. At that moment I do not have questions
1 for Mr. Ivanovic.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 Mr. Ivanovic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this
4 case has been admitted in its entirety in writing, that is, your written
5 witness statement. Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of
6 the Office of the Prosecutor. Do you understand that?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. McKenna.
9 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:
11 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Ivanovic.
12 A. Good afternoon.
13 Q. Now, as you noted in your statement, you've spoken to
14 investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor on a number of occasions
15 and given them some statements, so I'd just like to run through these.
16 You were interviewed by the OTP on the 13th of October, 2000, and this
17 interview was tape recorded. Can you confirm that?
18 A. Yes. I don't remember the exact date when it happened, but I
19 gave statements on a number of occasions. I don't really know to who
20 either, but I suppose everything has to do with this international
22 Q. Well, we will likely come -- we will come to discuss each of
23 these statements individually, but can you confirm that you gave a signed
24 statement in March 2002 and a further signed statement in October 2002 to
25 the Office of the Prosecutor?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And you also gave public testimony before the war crimes chamber
3 of the Belgrade district court in the case against Branko Gruic on the
4 20th of September, 2006; is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And you told the truth in these prior statements and your
7 previous testimony; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, in your statement today you describe a series of events
10 which, according to paragraph 14 of your statement, led the Serbs in
11 Zvornik to form a Serbian municipality. Now I'd like to show you a
12 passage from your previous statement on the topic of the formation of the
13 Serbian municipality of Zvornik.
14 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have 65 ter 25117.
15 Q. And, Mr. Ivanovic, you will see that this is your statement from
16 the -- that you signed on the 27th of March, 2002. I'd like to turn to
17 page 4 of the English and page 5 of the B/C/S of this statement, and
18 focusing on the paragraph:
19 "Sometime in 1992, it must have been a couple of months before
20 the war, the Serbs from Zvornik established a parallel municipality
21 administration in Zvornik. Also polarisation happened in the police
22 force. We received instructions from the SDS leadership in Pale to
23 organise the Serb municipality.
24 "All municipalities all over Bosnia and Herzegovina got the same
25 instructions. It was enough if the municipality had one Serb village. I
1 never saw the written instructions from Pale because I was not a member
2 of the party leadership, but I was told that we had got instructions. I
3 did not see the document but I assumed it was signed by Karadzic as he
4 was the President of the SDS."
5 So can you confirm the accuracy of this statement?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And then three paragraphs down you state:
8 "Serb municipality did not start to function until a couple of
9 days before the war. However, everything had been organised. We had
10 appointed all the positions; the Mayor, Secretaries, Executive Board, and
11 everything was prepared for municipality to start functioning."
12 Again, can you confirm the accuracy of this?
13 A. It is accurate.
14 Q. So in your testimony in the Gruic case you described the
15 instructions you received as a platform of the SDS, and you stated that
16 it was the position of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik that when it came
17 to the point that co-existence or life together was no longer possible,
18 the Serbian community should separate itself from the Muslim community.
19 Again, can you confirm the accuracy of that testimony?
20 A. I don't know if I said "separate," but if co-existence is
21 impossible, then we have our municipality, we have our legal
22 administrative personnel, and we continue to live and protect the Serbian
23 people as a sovereign people of the then-Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 MS. McKENNA: Could we please see 65 ter 25093.
25 Q. And, Mr. Ivanovic, I'm just going to remind you of exactly what
1 you said in your testimony in the Gruic case on this issue.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will need an opportunity to
3 intervene in the transcript.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 24 the as a sovereign and
6 constituent people of the then-Bosnia-Herzegovina, "constituent" was not
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MS. McKENNA: And could we please see English page 30 and B/C/S
10 page 21. And actually, perhaps we could move to the previous page in the
11 English just so Mr. Ivanovic can see the context of this statement.
12 Q. So --
13 JUDGE KWON: First let's find out the full name of the witness.
14 I have Jovo Ivanovic, but is it Jovan Ivanovic, Mr. Ivanovic?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My real official name is Jovan, but
16 I'm often called Jovo.
17 MS. McKENNA:
18 Q. Thank you. So at the bottom of the English version and I believe
19 on the -- this page of the B/C/S version, you're being asked about the
20 instructions that were received and Variants A and B. And the Presiding
21 Judge says:
22 "You have mentioned some instructions to establish the Serbian
23 municipality of Zvornik about the attitude of the Sarajevo SDS before the
24 war ... what can you tell us about that, briefly?"
25 And you respond:
1 "Well, all right, that was a platform of the Serbian Democratic
3 And you're asked whether you saw the Variants A and B, whether
4 you had the plan in your hands.
5 MS. McKENNA: If we could turn to the next page in the English,
7 Q. And you say you can't remember precisely what it says. And then
8 you say:
9 "Well, those weren't criminal plans of any sort ... it was simply
10 a plan, from what I can remember ... I know that story of Momo Krajisnik
11 and Radovan Karadzic - when it had come to the point that co-existence or
12 a life together was no longer possible, that this should be split up ...
13 that it was known which flat was a Serb flat in every high-rise building.
14 I think that this was being said more figuratively but that it should be
15 separated ... and to tell you the truth, we had actually worked on that
16 programme for a while, ... but given that, as it was, we could not live
17 together ..."
18 So here it's clear -- or having reminded yourself of your
19 previous testimony, do you agree that it was the position of Mr. Karadzic
20 and Mr. Krajisnik that the communities be separated?
21 A. No. It was somewhat different. We did everything - and I'm
22 referring to the Serbs in Bosnia and Dr. Krajisnik -- Dr. Karadzic and
23 Momo Krajisnik as the leaders of the SDS made great efforts to preserve
24 Yugoslavia and Bosnia and continue living together as we had in the
25 previous 50 years. They did everything they could to preserve peaceful
1 co-existence because they were warning everybody that everything else
2 could result in trouble. Unfortunately, since Mr. Izetbegovic,
3 Haris Salajdzic, Ejup Ganic, Omer Behmen, and who have you, openly stated
4 that their goal was the jihad. That was their ideology as to everybody's
5 bewilderment --
6 Q. We're straying from the response to the question, and I'd like to
7 focus you on the questions that I ask and ask you to keep your answers as
8 concise and precise as possible.
9 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I'd like to tender those two pages,
10 but I may be tendering additional pages from the same transcript.
11 JUDGE KWON: Did you hear the answer to this passage from the
13 MS. McKENNA: The witness --
14 JUDGE KWON: So let him finish.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try to finish. In all these
16 statements I said I heard something I don't remember so well I suppose.
17 And, in a way, I've never held a piece of paper in my hands saying plan
18 A, plan B, and so on. But it kind of lingers in my memory that there
19 must have been some document, or rather, that's -- I have a faint memory
20 of it. But if there had been an official document of whatever kind, it
21 would have had to reach me because I was a direct representative of the
22 Serbian people in the Zvornik municipality. However, I can claim with
23 full responsibility here that this was merely a story by our leaders, by
24 all of us, and we all told the same story. Radovan Karadzic was saying
25 nothing other than we were saying in our municipalities. We were trying
1 to come up with a plan what we should do if Alija does not give up his
2 policy. And let me be concise, there hasn't been a plan A or a plan B or
3 anything of that kind, but what there was, there was our fully legitimate
4 intention to protect what is ours, what is Serbian, no matter where it
5 is. So if we're not a municipality with a Serbian majority, then we have
6 our own policy there. But if we're not, we will not fight, we will not
7 resort to violent means to threaten our Muslim neighbours; rather, we
8 will merely try to protect what is ours. And we wanted to say it more in
9 a figurative manner or in a literal manner, that we would protect even
10 one house in a town. And I talked to a lot of people and everybody
11 understood it that way. And if you mean that this was some sort of
12 ideology which mattered a lot to us, no, no, no. I never gave much
13 attention to that.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 Please continue -- but shall we admit those pages shown to the
16 witness as well as the first page. As we go by, we may add some pages
18 MS. McKENNA: And, Your Honour, on the basis of the witness's
19 additional answer just -- given just now, he had previously confirmed
20 what he had said in his March 2002 statement. Now he appears to be
21 resiling from that. So I now wish to tender the relevant page from his
22 March 2002 statement as well.
23 JUDGE KWON: Show it to him.
24 MS. McKENNA: Could we again please have page 4 of 65 ter number
25 25117. And page 5 of the B/C/S.
1 Q. Now, you've just said in your response before this Court that if
2 there had been some sort of instructions you would have heard about them,
3 but -- I'm -- but you disputed that there were instructions. However,
4 just previously you had confirmed your previous statement where you said:
5 "We received instructions from the SDS leadership in Pale to
6 organise the Serb municipality."
7 And you say:
8 "I never saw written instructions but I was told that we had got
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness did not say that had
13 these instructions existed I would have heard of them. He said had these
14 instructions existed, I would have known of them because I was head of
15 the government. So it's not about hearing. He confirmed that he had
16 heard about them, but he said that he had not received them, received
17 them. He did not have knowledge as prime minister.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
19 MS. McKENNA: Your Honour, to simplify matters, the witness
20 previously said that he was aware of instructions [overlapping
21 speakers] --
22 JUDGE KWON: I thought you were about -- you were going to show
23 another passage.
24 MS. McKENNA: No, it was simply the same passage that he had
25 confirmed. So as he has resiled from it now, I would like to tender both
1 this passage and the passage from his Gruic testimony.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive them both as well -- we'll
3 include the first pages as well.
4 MS. McKENNA: Thank you.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 25117 will be
6 Exhibit P6402 and 25093 will be Exhibit P6403.
7 MS. McKENNA:
8 Q. Now, in your current statement, Mr. Ivanovic, you paint a picture
9 of Muslims arming themselves while Serbs sought only to negotiate peace,
10 and I'll refer you to paragraphs 12 and 34 of your statement. But do you
11 agree that the Serbs armed and organised themselves for war prior to the
12 incident in Sapna which you say triggered the breakout of the war in
14 A. I agree that they were being armed but not in an organised way in
15 order to start a war; rather, they lived in great fear. Sometime from
16 mid-1991 when we saw this jihad policy of Alija Izetbegovic and his
17 followers. Unfortunately, followers in Zvornik as well because we did
18 not give any cause or pretext in Zvornik for this kind of behaviour or
19 policy. Then people in different ways, I assume. I did not have any
20 evidence, I did not see this. So this is similar to the thing a moment
21 ago, the question. I never saw that platform. There was talk about
22 that, but, no, no. I claim with full responsibility that there was no
23 written platform or any platform that was ordered. As for this arming, I
24 heard about that, and after all when the conflict started it turned out
25 that the Serb people had weapons just like the Muslim people had weapons.
1 Now I've forgotten, what was the beginning of the question? So
2 that would be it.
3 Q. Well, let me focus you. You say that there was arming. Do you
4 agree that those that organised the arming included the Crisis Staff, the
5 TO, and the JNA?
6 A. No.
7 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have 65 -- or, it's page 10 of the
8 same document -- so rather, page 10 of 65 ter 25117 and page 15 of the
10 Q. And again, Mr. Ivanovic, this is the previous statement that you
11 gave signed before the Office of the Prosecutor in March 2002. And I'm
12 looking at the paragraph in the lower middle of the page in the English
13 and it's the paragraph beginning, "Before the war ..."
14 And you state:
15 "Before the war we did not have any well-organised Crisis Staff
16 with a fixed number of members. Sometimes more than 100 persons could
17 participate in the Crisis Staff meetings and I'm not sure whether there
18 was a board or not. The distinction between the Crisis Staff and TO was
19 very unclear. Normally the Crisis Staff meetings consisted of Serbs from
20 all the villages in the municipality so it was a huge body. The only
21 real function the Crisis Staff had before the war was to arm the Serb
22 population ..."
23 Now, can you confirm the accuracy of this statement?
24 A. Yes, Crisis Staff. A moment ago you said to me JNA Crisis Staff,
25 et cetera, you interrupted me, but I wanted to say that it wasn't the JNA
1 that was arming us. The JNA was the army of our common state and that's
2 what we saw in them. The army of the state that was supposed to defend
3 our state. When we saw that the JNA is flaccid, no, everybody thought
4 that they were supporting the Serbs, but, no, they couldn't even stand
5 strong themselves. You saw that when young children got killed in
6 Sarajevo, Tuzla, elsewhere, Muslims killed them. I hope that we're going
7 to be talking about these other events too.
8 Then the Crisis Staff started - started, I mean - being in the
9 function of arming the Serb people. But you know what, this Crisis Staff
10 is not the Crisis Staff that was appointed by politicians, those five or
11 six persons; rather, this Crisis Staff there were 100 people from 100
12 villages of the Zvornik area -- well, I'm not saying this literally. So
13 there is a person from every Crisis Staff in that area and that's what
14 people were doing, trying to buy this and so on. I personally did not
15 take part in that, but that is roughly what Muslims did too. I agree
16 with you that it wasn't only Muslims who were being armed; it was Serbs
17 who were arming themselves too out of this great fear they -- there was
18 mutual fear.
19 Q. Well, let's talk about one meeting that you did participate in,
20 you and other Serb municipality leaders attended a meeting in Celopek in
21 early 1992 at which the defence -- the organisation of the defence for
22 the villages was discussed and military leaders were chosen for each
23 village; isn't that correct?
24 A. I'm not quite sure that I attended that meeting. Believe me, I
25 am trying to tell the truth here. I wish to say the truth here. I was
1 not involved in this work, again, let's say, let's call it arming. This
2 work that had to do with setting up some kind of plans of defence and so
3 on. So I find all of that to be rather foggy. However, I had heard of
4 some meeting in Celopek and actually that is where these people from
5 these villages met. Helping each other collect these rifles so that they
6 could defend their villages if they were attacked. As far as I could
7 hear, this was a football stadium and they were in a changing room of a
8 football team. That's where they met, 3 by 6, so there weren't any
9 benches there or chairs, there were no facilities there. I mean, it's a
10 rubbish place, if you will. But people just gathered there because they
11 had to defend their bare lives as they had to in 1941 because there was
12 this very, very bitter experience that they had with their Muslim
13 neighbours in that area.
14 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, I understand it was a long time ago, and just -- in
15 order to refresh your memory, could we please see 65 ter number 25118,
16 and that is your statement that you signed in October 2002.
17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
18 MS. McKENNA: And that's -- I'm interested in page 3 of the
19 English and page 5 of the B/C/S.
20 Q. And in the middle of this page you recall the same meeting in the
21 locker room in Celopek, but you state:
22 "I was present at this meeting with many other Serbian leaders in
23 the municipality."
24 Does that refresh your recollection?
25 A. Of what?
1 Q. Of the fact that you attended this meeting?
2 A. Well, I do not rule out that possibility. I think that there
3 were several gatherings taking place there. It wasn't a classical
4 meeting. There wasn't an agenda and so on and so forth, not to bore you
5 with all of that now. Then I allow for that possibility that I was
6 present at some point in time at some gathering. It was sort of a
7 meeting, and perhaps some of the other top people were there too as well.
8 But if you were to ask me who, when exactly, I really have no idea
10 Q. Well, Mr. Ivanovic, can we agree that in fact contrary to your
11 statement the Serb leadership in Zvornik were organising for war prior to
12 the incident in Sapna?
13 A. No, no. No, that is absolutely wrong. They were not organising
14 for war. They were organising to defend their very own lives and the
15 lives of their family members. In case this were to be repeated or
16 happen in Zvornik, what happened in Brod, Sijekovac, Kupres, what
17 happened down there in Konjic, Bradina, and many, many other areas in
18 Bosnia. I don't know all of them exactly, but you know that full well.
19 There were these --
20 Q. Thank you --
21 A. -- excessive situations in practically every Bosnian
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ivanovic.
24 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to tender that page. It would -- and
25 again, I may be adding to --
1 JUDGE KWON: We have not admitted this one?
2 MS. McKENNA: No, this is a separate -- this is the October 2002
3 interview, 65 ter 25118.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, any objection, Mr. Robinson?
5 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit the first page and this page.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6404, Your Honours.
8 MS. McKENNA:
9 Q. Now, Mr. Ivanovic, in your statement today you emphasised the
10 local Muslim officials' lack of co-operation with the SDS and their
11 turning a deaf ear to your cause for talks. Previously when you spoke
12 about the topic of pre-war relations between Muslims and Serbs, you
13 emphasised the co-operation between the national parties. Do you agree
14 that, as you previously told the Office of the Prosecutor, through 1991
15 and all the way before the break-out of the war that there was - leaving
16 aside the issue of infrastructure funding which you discuss in your
17 statement - that there was good co-operation between the national
19 A. This is what the truth is. We were colleagues from the factory
20 too and friends. I on the Executive Board and the president of the
21 municipality Mr. Abdulah Pasic, the representative of the Muslim people,
22 and some others too. And I did my utmost to ease this relationship so
23 that it would function, and I received quite a bit of praise from some of
24 the prominent Muslims in Zvornik who were not working at the municipality
25 but in other institutions. And that's how it was, as you were saying in
1 your question, up until -- well, I cannot give you the exact date, please
2 don't take my word for it, but up until those dates when
3 Alija Izetbegovic - how do I put this? - tricked the Muslim people,
4 that's what I'd say, so that they trust him and vote for this sovereign,
5 independent Muslim Bosnia -- I don't know what to call it but you know
6 what I'm trying to say. From that moment onwards, these people that I
7 and -- it wasn't only me, it was all my other colleagues too from the
8 Serb community, if I can call it that, it was fine until then; and then
9 from that moment onwards nothing went well anymore, as if some kind of
10 devil had cropped up.
11 I have given a great deal of thought to this. You know, we did
12 talk every day and some things were being said that perhaps should not
13 have been said. They admitted to me that that is not what they thought
14 in their heart of hearts, but that was the order from Sarajevo and it had
15 to be observed. That's what I tried to explain. It's not only
16 infrastructure and so on and so forth. You know how life was set up in
17 general, you know how a municipality works. Everything had to be changed
18 according to them, the representatives of the Muslims. You know,
19 everything was being counted. My goodness, they accounted for 60
20 per cent, we 40 per cent, and then everything had to be changed
21 accordingly. The names of streets, you know, they did not correspond
22 to -- well, you know, for example, Nobel Prize winners, the name of a
23 street had to be changed into the name of some beg that we had never
24 heard of from Turkish history and it was the name of a Nobel Prize winner
25 that was being changed. I'm just giving you this as an example of how
1 shocked we were of all these changes that were taking place.
2 And then, of course, all of us together in the present-day
3 Republika Srpska started thinking about what we should do, how to respond
4 further on to this kind of behaviour. So we were just supposed to melt
5 peacefully into this sovereign Bosnia of Alija's or we should organise
6 something of our own. Let me not go on so extensively any longer. From
7 October onwards, things did not function as they should have. You know,
8 people felt that. I would schedule a meeting of the Executive Board and
9 there were 30 items on the agenda that had to do with the economy. The
10 crisis was already on our door-step, and 60 Assemblymen go at midday to
11 pray at the mosque, to pray to God, and I cannot carry on. And before
12 that, they never went to pray when a meeting was scheduled, and there's
13 so many examples of that kind, but I don't know to what extent you're
14 interested in all of this.
15 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, I'd like to focus actually for the moment on the
16 statements that the Serb community was making during that time or at that
17 time. Now, you told the Office of the Prosecutor that you heard
18 Branko Gruic and other extremist Serbs in Zvornik make extreme Serbian
19 statements. And I'm going to read a passage of your previous statement
20 to you. You say, regarding Mr. Gruic:
21 "In an interview with Sky News he stated Muslims during history
22 had committed genocide of the Serbs and that the Serbs now responded with
23 a small genocide of the Muslims. I do not remember all of it. It was
24 some newspaper commenting about his interview with Sky News."
25 Do you recall this statement now?
1 A. Yes. But may I explain that?
2 Q. I'd like to -- perhaps Mr. Karadzic can allow you to explain it
3 in his cross-exam -- in his re-examination. I'm afraid I'm very short of
4 time, but I'd like to again give another example which you told the OTP
5 about --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But -- objection. Why is that not
7 being shown to the witness? How can I do this in re-examination? I
8 don't know what this is all about.
9 MS. McKENNA: My apologies. The reference is 65 ter 25117, the
10 witness's March 2002 statement, and it's on page 10 of the English and
11 page 14 of the B/C/S. But again he talks about it -- perhaps we can look
12 at page -- the witness's October 2002 statement which is 65 ter 25118
13 which discusses the same issue. And that's at page 3 of the English and
14 page 4 of the B/C/S.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But still, I cannot see this and
16 the witness cannot see it. We need to hear him on this.
17 JUDGE KWON: He said --
18 MS. McKENNA: The witness has --
19 JUDGE KWON: He confirmed having said so.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I object because when a
21 witness says, Yes, but may I explain that," and the party doesn't allow
22 them to explain, I would give no probative value to that answer of "yes"
23 because it obviously can be qualified by many things, but if you are
24 going to give probative value to it, then the witness in fairness ought
25 to be able to complete his answer by explaining.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Ivanovic.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said yes I have never read any of
4 that in the newspapers. I don't know how to read in English. I did not
5 hear Brano say that. Somebody was joking. I had a bit of a quarrel with
6 Brano Gruic, so we accepted that as some sort of joke, and then we wanted
7 to take a bit of revenge on him. You know, this is Serbian business, if
8 you will. Perhaps it's important to mention that, that it was our
9 misfortune in Zvornik, perhaps, that somebody a bit more intellectual was
10 not president of the Serb Democratic Party rather than Brano Gruic. He
11 was rather uneducated, but we were grateful to him for having accepted
12 that. The offer was made to me and to other intellectuals from Zvornik,
13 but I don't want to take up the Court's time now to explain why none of
14 us accepted that.
15 So Brano was a bit stupid so he used different words without
16 knowing what they meant, genocide, little genocide, and so on. So it was
17 sort of his style. This is what they did to us and this is what we're
18 going to do to them. I never read that, I never heard that. I mean, I
19 said to you yes, I did say that, so I do apologise in this way to
20 Branko Gruic that I wanted to take a bit of revenge on him. So those
21 were the reasons. It was not that this was some kind of truth that he
22 was presenting.
23 MS. McKENNA:
24 Q. Well, let's talk about what you thought yourself at the time and
25 the -- the policy of the Serb authorities at the time. I'd like you
1 to -- oh, we have page 3 of the English of -- yeah, this is the correct
2 page. And I'm going to read a passage from your previous statement to
3 you. You stated:
4 "In those days I thought that it was best that we finally draw
5 border-lines between our two nations. Today in retrospect looking back
6 on the awful events that took place, I feel that this was not right, but
7 at the time during the war the idea was that Muslims had to move out of
8 certain villages and that Serbs had to move into certain villages claimed
9 to be Serbian villages."
10 Can you confirm the accuracy of this statement?
11 A. It is certain that I never said that. However, when you talk to
12 investigators then for four or five hours and then when they offer this
13 to you to sign it, I never read this but I would sign it immediately. So
14 if you wish now with a clear head I can tell you what it was that I meant
15 when I stated that, I mean that which is reflected that way in the
17 Q. Before you do - and we'll come back to this page - but can we --
18 would perhaps assist if we looked at the signature page of this document
19 in the English which is the last page -- actually, it's the
20 second-to-last page. And here you confirm that the statement was read to
21 you in the Serbian language and is true to the best of your knowledge and
22 recollection. So I'd like to go back to another passage on the same
23 topic before you comment, and that would be again page 3 of the English
24 and page 5 of the B/C/S. And you continue:
25 "Once the war started there were attacks on civilians in Muslim
1 villages so that the Muslim civilians would move out and Serbs could move
2 in. Before the war that was not the political concept, but once the war
3 began those that waged the war had that purpose. A good example of this
4 is the attack on Djulici. There was an attack on the villages, the
5 Muslim population wished to leave, the Serb forces went in and moved the
6 people out, and within days Serbs moved into these villages. Serbs that
7 moved into these villages were the same Serbs who had been forced to
8 leave what is today Federation territory. Drinjaca, Divic, Liplje,
9 Gornji Sepak and Kozluk are all examples of this."
10 Can you --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Is that yes, you confirm the accuracy of this statement?
13 A. Again, there is part of it that is similar to the one a moment
14 ago; that is to say, what I meant in all of these statements is that
15 after all our efforts to prevent a war - and we did not succeed - once
16 the war did happen and when thousands of Serbs from the Federation came
17 to the municipality of Zvornik and when conflicts started and Muslims
18 asked to leave because they were totally unsafe, I would have asked to
19 leave too if I had been in their skin, and then I certainly said - and I
20 think that to this day - that it's better for people to live in peace
21 once and for all in some territory of their own, ethnic, if you will, but
22 just not to have a war happen again. That's what they're saying to this
23 day, what I'm saying to you just now. You know, some of these killings
24 and expulsions and all that, I don't know much about that. I mean, for
25 something being organised, no I cannot confirm that. I mean, I cannot
1 even read it that fast.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to tender this page.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add this page to the -- I'm sorry.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm told that this is already admitted --
7 MS. McKENNA: Oh, in fact, yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: It's the same page.
9 MS. McKENNA: The same page, excuse me, my mistake.
10 Q. Mr. Ivanovic, I'd like to move on to the situation at the
11 Hotel Jezero, and you deal with this meeting briefly in your statement.
12 I'd like to go into a little bit more detail on the meeting which you
13 previously provided to the Office of the Prosecutor. Again, I'd like to
14 ask you to focus on the questions I'm asking and by all means explain
15 your answers but keep them as short as possible.
16 Now, previously you stated - and this for the parties' reference
17 is at page 6 of the English and page 9 of the B/C/S of 65 ter 25117 which
18 is Mr. Ivanovic's March 2002 statement - that Abdulah Pasic complained
19 about the Arkan unit that had deployed themselves in the hills above
20 Zvornik. They were afraid of them because they had heard about
21 atrocities taking place in Bijeljina by Arkan 's men. TV Sarajevo and TV
22 Belgrade were also reporting about what was going on at that time.
23 Can you confirm that that's correct?
24 A. Yes, I can confirm that he said so at our meeting.
25 Q. And Arkan showed up to the meeting accompanied by Marko Pavlovic,
1 Peja, and two other men; is that correct?
2 A. That is what I said at the time because it was a great shock to
3 me when I saw him. Later on when I talked to some people who were there,
4 I didn't remember it quite well, but this Peja and Marko Pavlovic came in
5 a bit later, although I don't think it is important, the difference may
6 be two or three minutes. Arkan and some other men came in first and then
7 Marko Pavlovic and Peja perhaps three or four minutes later.
8 Q. Thank you. And Arkan, as you said in your statement, said that
9 you were traitors and he also said that he would cut off Muslim heads and
10 roll them down to Istanbul. Can you confirm that?
11 A. Yes. And he used some other vocabulary from the Belgrade
12 underworld, whatever a criminal from Belgrade could say. It's not
13 something you memorise easily, but it's a plethora of curses and insults
14 that he uttered. I can't recall them all.
15 Q. And do you recall that after beating you, he interrogated the
16 Muslim representatives, or rather, he -- his men interrogated the Muslim
18 A. He did not interrogate them. He only used the words I've
19 mentioned already. He -- they were interrogated by this Peja of his, but
20 it's the same thing. You can count it as if Arkan interrogated them. I
21 can't remember what Arkan asked him and what Peja asked him, but it's all
22 the same thing, whether it was he or his closest associate.
23 Q. Now I'd like to focus on why Arkan and his men came to Zvornik.
24 And perhaps it will assist you if I show you your previous statement on
25 this which is page 5 of the English of 25117 and page 7 of the B/C/S.
1 And you say - and this is towards the bottom of the -- the third from the
2 bottom paragraph in English:
3 "I cannot be sure that Arkan's men were not invited by local
4 leaders, but I assumed that some locals knew about it as well as some
5 military from Serbia knew about it. Officially local leaders did not
6 call them, but unofficially probably someone was involved during the
7 whole operation. Otherwise it would be impossible to move large groups
8 of armed people across the border."
9 Do you stand by this previous statement?
10 A. The only thing I would like to change is the last sentence,
11 "otherwise it would be impossible to move a large group." It was
12 possible. It was the same country and there was no border and it was
13 easy to sit in your car and go across the bridge. Otherwise, it may
14 appear that there were two states with a border. But no, it was one
15 state, no border, no police check-point, no customs, nothing, you sit in
16 your car and go over. That's the difference. And the rest was simply
17 expressing my thoughts. It wasn't so important what I thought, but I
18 thought along these lines. I guess they didn't come without anyone
19 having invited them. I didn't know then and I don't know now who invited
20 them. Whether they came uninvited, well I don't find it very likely even
22 Q. Thank you. Let's turn to the issue of who was in command in
23 Zvornik. Now again, you've said at paragraph 24 of your statement:
24 "Arkan was personally in command of military operations for the
25 liberation of Zvornik town and he organised absolute power in the
1 municipality at that time."
2 And then at paragraph 25 of your statement, you say that:
3 "After the 10th of April 1992, total anarchy and lawlessness set
4 in in Zvornik municipality, Arkan and other paramilitaries took over
5 power, and local enforcement organs were in total disarray."
6 Now, in your current statement, there is no mention whatsoever of
7 Marko Pavlovic, despite him featuring very prominently in your previous
8 statements. So I'd just like to clarify this. In your March 2002
9 statement you said:
10 "While Arkan's men were in Zvornik, Arkan himself commanded them.
11 After they left, I think Pavlovic was in charge."
12 Can you confirm that this was the case?
13 A. I confirm that in the beginning in the first few days after Arkan
14 occupied, so to speak, Zvornik -- well, there was no occupation. He
15 simply came in, started looting houses, money, jewellery, there was no
16 fighting. If someone was killed, it wasn't in fighting. They killed
17 only to sow fear, to create chaos, and then they left. And then, I think
18 I mentioned in my statement, is what I saw or experienced or heard
19 because I wasn't there in those few days. I'm not any relevant witness.
20 But later on Marko continued to be this sort of main commander of the
21 Territorial Defence. For a long time, I didn't know what it was he
22 commanded. We simply called him "commander." The people didn't care
23 what he commanded. There was a retreating army, the JNA, that is, and
24 the -- the -- disorganised people, police, fear, chaos, lawlessness,
25 crime, all of it, and in that context I mentioned that this Marko was
1 some sort of commander at first. And that by his appointment in a way
2 some degree of order was introduced. When everyone acted as commanders
3 in paramilitary and volunteer groups, then there was chaos.
4 Q. So can you confirm, as you did previously, that Marko Pavlovic as
5 the head of the TO was the co-ordinator of the paramilitary units
6 operating in the Zvornik area?
7 A. With the exception of the first few days but not more than let's
8 say ten days, but later on yes. I think so. Again, I have no piece of
9 paper, I wasn't there to see, but that's what I could hear and that was
10 my experience. I did live there and work there.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, I'd like to talk about the relationship between
12 Mr. Pavlovic and Mr. Gruic. Previously you stated:
13 "I believe that Gruic and Pavlovic had daily contact. Gruic was
14 the president of the Crisis Staff and he provided the logistics and
15 support for operations conducted by Pavlovic."
16 For the parties' reference, that's 65 ter 25118, page 2 of the
17 English and page 4 of the B/C/S.
18 Can you confirm the accuracy of that statement?
19 A. Yes, that's what I said. I said I thought so. That was my
20 impression, my opinion, nothing else. I don't think I went up there for
21 a month during the worst clashes, so I really don't know. But that's my
22 opinion, that's my impression. I don't know whether I'm right or not.
23 Q. And at paragraph 26 of your statement you say that you
24 realised -- you describe realising that Arkan and the paramilitary groups
25 were taking over power and the local leadership had no influence or
1 decision-making powers in Zvornik. Now, you've just made clear that you
2 weren't around for the first -- for a period of time following the
3 take-over. There is evidence before the Trial Chamber that members of
4 Arkan's unit, the Yellow Wasps, the White Eagles, and other paramilitary
5 groups in Zvornik, including those under the command of Zoran Aleksic,
6 Niski, and Pivarski, were all under the command of the local authorities
7 in Zvornik.
8 MS. McKENNA: And for the parties' reference, to name a few:
9 P158, P3157, P2870.
10 Q. Now, paying the paramilitaries suggests, at a minimum, a support
11 for their activities, doesn't it?
12 A. Probably, I don't know. If I may say something. For two years
13 I've been fighting actively in Zvornik, in Bosnia, to avoid any
14 conflict -- or actually, I had been fighting. I failed along side
15 Jovo Mijatovic who is another gentleman who invested a lot of effort to
16 set things right, but after we were beaten up, after we were kicked out
17 of politics, from then on I didn't participate and I shied away from the
18 municipality, army, paramilitaries, et cetera. So I cannot be a relevant
19 witness. Whatever I said may well be wrong. You know these
20 investigators, they bore you, they are persistent, and I'm inexperienced.
21 And then I share my impression, my opinion, which may be completely
22 incorrect. If you lead evidence, and that's proven, then there's nothing
23 for me to deny.
24 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I note the time. It's perhaps a good
25 time to break for the day.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 Before we adjourn, Mr. Tieger, could the Chamber receive the
3 Prosecution's response to the accused's motion for videolink testimony
4 for General Zivanovic by this week, i.e., the Friday 14th?
5 MR. TIEGER: I think we can do that, Mr. President. If there's
6 any problem, we'll certainly let you know.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 Mr. Ivanovic, we'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. Can I
9 advise you not to discuss with anybody else about your testimony.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Understood.
11 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.44 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 13th day of
14 June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.