Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27669

 1                           Wednesday, 27 March 2013

 2                           [Judgement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 3.30 p.m.

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

 7             New technology.  Good afternoon to everyone.  May we have the

 8     appearances, please.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

10             Joanna Korner, Tom Hannis, Matthew Olmsted, Alex Demirdjian,

11     Rafael La Cruz, and Case Manager Sebastiaan van Hooydonk for the

12     Prosecution.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

14     Slobodan Cvijetic, Ms. Alex Laskowski, and Mr. Dominic Kennedy, appearing

15     for Stanisic Defence this afternoon.  Thank you.

16             MR. KRGOVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Dragan Krgovic,

17     Aleksandar Aleksic, Michelle Butler, David Martini, and Lennart Poulsen,

18     appearing for Zupljanin Defence.

19             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  And now I will do what I ought to have

20     started with, namely, to ask the Registrar to call the case.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case

22     number IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and

23     Stojan Zupljanin.

24             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

25             Before I continue, I just wish to confirm that the accused can

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 1     both hear me in a language that they understand.

 2             THE ACCUSED STANISIC: [Interpretation] I can hear you perfectly

 3     well and I greet you.

 4             THE ACCUSED ZUPLJANIN: [Interpretation] I also perfectly hear you

 5     and I greet you.

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  The Trial Chamber is sitting today to

 7     deliver its judgement in the case of the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic

 8     and Stojan Zupljanin.  I now read a summary of the Chamber's findings.

 9     The full written judgement will be made available at the end of today's

10     hearing.

11             At the outset, the Chamber wishes to express its gratitude to

12     counsel for the Prosecution and the Defence, the Registry staff, the

13     Chamber's own staff, and all others who have contributed to the conduct

14     of this trial.

15             The judgement is a lengthy document, reflecting the size and

16     complexity of this case.  The trial commenced on 14th of September, 2009,

17     and concluded on the 1st of June, 2012.  The Trial Chamber sat for

18     354 days, during which it admitted the evidence of 199 witnesses, entered

19     4.377 exhibits into evidence, and took judicial notice of

20     1.042 adjudicated facts.

21             The concept of a greater Serbia has a long history.  One of its

22     aspects was the extension of Serbia into those portions of Croatia and

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina containing substantial Serb populations.  This was

24     strongly pursued in the late 1980s and on into the 1990s.  Through public

25     speeches and the media, Serbian political leaders emphasised a glorious

Page 27671

 1     past and informed the audiences that if Serbs did not join together, they

 2     would again be attacked by Ustashas, a term used to instill fear in

 3     Serbs.  The danger of a fundamentalist Muslim community was also

 4     presented as a threat.  After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia

 5     began, the theme of the Serb-dominated media was that, if Serbs became a

 6     minority, their existence would be endangered.  The media presented the

 7     Serbs with a choice between waging war or being subjected to non-Serb

 8     rule.

 9             The present case pertains to the role and responsibility of

10     Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin in events that occurred in Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina following the creation of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina.

13             Mico Stanisic was the minister of the interior of

14     Republika Srpska.  The Ministry of the Interior will be referred to as

15     MUP in this summary.

16             Stojan Zupljanin, during the indictment period, was the chief of

17     the Regional Security Service Centre of Banja Luka.  From May to

18     July 1992, he was also a member of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous

19     Region of Krajina, hereinafter referred to as the ARK.

20             Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin are charged with ten counts of

21     crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.

22     One of the modes of this criminal responsibility is their participation

23     in a joint criminal enterprise, or JCE.  The objective of the alleged JCE

24     was to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and other

25     non-Serbs from the territory of the planned Serbian state.  The JCE

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 1     allegedly came into existence no later than the establishment of the

 2     Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia on the 24th of October, 1991,

 3     and continued until the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.

 4             The objective of the alleged JCE is said to have been achieved by

 5     means which allegedly included the commission of the crimes enumerated in

 6     Counts 1 to 10.

 7             Mico Stanisic is charged with criminal responsibility for crimes

 8     committed in 20 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He allegedly

 9     participated in the creation of Bosnian Serb entities and forces that

10     implemented forcible takeovers of municipalities, and in the development

11     of Bosnian Serb policy at the leadership level in order to secure these

12     takeovers and the forcible removal of the non-Serb population.  He also

13     is said to have commanded, directed, and assisted in the co-ordination of

14     MUP forces, when acting jointly or in co-ordination with Crisis Staffs,

15     the Army of Republika Srpska, referred to as the VRS, and other Serb

16     forces, in order to implement the objectives of the JCE.

17             Stanisic allegedly facilitated the establishment and operation of

18     camps and detention facilities in which Serb forces beat, sexually

19     assaulted and killed non-Serb detainees.  It is therefore alleged that,

20     while being under a duty to protect, as the minister of the interior, he

21     failed to take adequate steps to protect Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats,

22     and other non-Serbs.

23             Furthermore, Stanisic allegedly encouraged and facilitated the

24     commission of crimes by Serb forces by not taking adequate measures to

25     investigate, arrest, or punish the perpetrators of such crimes, and, as

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 1     such, contributed to the maintenance of a culture of impunity by

 2     participating in sham inquiries into these crimes.

 3             Stojan Zupljanin is charged with criminal responsibility for

 4     crimes committed in eight municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

 5     ARK municipalities.  Zupljanin allegedly participated in the formation of

 6     Bosnian Serb entities and the forces that implemented the forcible

 7     takeovers of municipalities.  In order to implement the objectives of the

 8     JCE, he allegedly commanded, ordered and directed members and agents of

 9     the MUP, when co-operating or acting jointly with Crisis Staffs, the VRS,

10     and other Serb forces, and participated in the formation, financing,

11     supplying, and supporting of special units.  He allegedly facilitated,

12     established or operated camps and detention facilities in which Serb

13     forces beat, sexually assaulted and killed non-Serb detainees.

14             Therefore, Zupljanin allegedly failed, while being under a duty

15     to protect, to take adequate steps to ensure the protection of the

16     civilian population in the Autonomous Region of Krajina.  It is alleged

17     that he instead encouraged and facilitated the commission of crimes by

18     Serb forces against Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs.

19     Furthermore, he allegedly failed to take the necessary steps to

20     investigate, arrest, or punish the perpetrators of these crimes, thereby

21     contributing to the maintenance of a culture of impunity including by

22     participating in sham inquiries concerning these crimes.

23             The Trial Chamber will now briefly summarise its findings on the

24     crimes alleged to have been committed in 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25             In the early hours of the 3rd of April, 1992, a paramilitary

Page 27674

 1     group known as the Serbian Defence Forces, or SOS, set up check-points

 2     and blockaded the town of Banja Luka.  The blockade was orchestrated by

 3     high-ranking members of the Serbian Democratic Party, hereafter referred

 4     to as the SDS, and was backed by Serb municipal authorities, the police,

 5     and the Territorial Defence, hereafter referred to as the TO.  Many

 6     non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, including those in leading

 7     positions.  Members of the police, including members of the Banja Luka

 8     CSB Special Police Detachment, began rounding up Muslims and Croats,

 9     searching their apartments, beating them, looting their property, and

10     taking them to the Banja Luka CSB where police and state security

11     inspectors interrogated them and frequently beat them.

12             The municipality of Banja Luka also hosted the largest detention

13     camp of the ARK, known as Manjaca.  Starting in mid-May 1992, Serb

14     civilian police were Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc and other ARK

15     municipalities transported thousands of detainees to Manjaca.  About

16     98 per cent of the detainees were of Muslim and Croatian ethnicity.  In

17     Manjaca, prisoners were held in unsanitary conditions, were not provided

18     with sufficient food or medical care, and were beaten on a regular basis.

19     Several Muslims and Croats died as a consequence of the beatings.  Others

20     died of asphyxiation while being transported in locked refrigerator

21     trucks from Prijedor to Manjaca.  As a consequence of the campaign of

22     violence, by September of 1992, thousands of Muslims and Croats had left

23     the municipality.  Before they could leave, however, Serb authorities

24     forced them to surrender and leave most of their property behind.

25             Between May and September of 1992, the 19th Infantry Brigade of

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 1     the VRS and Serb police, fighting together, took control of Donji Vakuf.

 2     There were at least seven clashes in Donji Vakuf between the Serb police

 3     and Muslims, with the Serb police sometimes being supported by VRS units.

 4     Between mid-June and mid-September of 1992, Muslim and Croat male

 5     civilians were arrested by Bosnian Serbs soldiers, military police, and

 6     police officers.  They were detained in the public security station, or

 7     SJB.  They were also confined at the TO warehouse, the Vrbas Promet

 8     factory, and a detention facility known as "the House."  In these

 9     locations, the detainees were regularly beaten.  Naim Sutkovic, an

10     elderly detainee, died as a result of a severe beating at the warehouse,

11     and two detainees were killed at the factory.  In the course of 1992,

12     12.970 Muslims and 480 Croats left Donji Vakuf due to harassment and

13     threats by Serbs.

14             On the 7th of May, 1992, JNA forces entered the town of Kljuc,

15     imposed a curfew, and set up check-points at important locations

16     throughout the municipality.  From then onwards, arbitrary arrests of

17     Muslims and Croats were carried out by Bosnian Serb police.  As a result,

18     Bosnian Muslims from surrounding villages were arrested and taken to

19     detention facilities at a school and the SJB building in Kljuc.  From

20     mid-1992 onwards, villages in the municipality that were predominantly

21     inhabited by Muslims and Croats were shelled by Serb forces.  This was

22     accompanied by the looting of their valuables.

23             On the 1st of June, 1992, approximately 76 detainees were killed

24     in Velagici by VRS soldiers.  On the 10th of July, 1992, at least 144 men

25     were killed by Serb police and VRS soldiers during mopping up operations

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 1     in Biljani.  Significant numbers of persons living in the municipality of

 2     Kljuc were forced from their homes between May 1992 and January 1993.

 3             On the 11th of June, 1992, Serb forces commenced the takeover of

 4     the town of Kotor Varos and the surrounding villages, all of which were

 5     inhabited by Muslims or Croats.  A total of 14 Muslim and Catholic

 6     monuments in Kotor Varos were heavily damaged or completely destroyed in

 7     1992, most of them in July and August, by fire, explosives or shelling.

 8     The Banja Luka CSB Special Police Detachment and police from Kotor Varos

 9     arrested and detained Muslim and Croat individuals at the Kotor Varos

10     SJB, the Kotor Varos prison, and the sawmill.  Detainees at the SJB were

11     brutally beaten and held in inhumane conditions with insufficient food,

12     water, and sanitation facilities.  At the Kotor Varos prison, detainees

13     were physically mistreated by soldiers and some were beaten to death or

14     were executed after being beaten.

15             Over 300 Muslim and Croat women, children, and elderly men were

16     held at the sawmill.  Female detainees were taken out of the main hall of

17     the sawmill during the night and raped by members of the Serb forces.  On

18     the 25th of June, 1992, Serb forces killed approximately 26 men on the

19     way to and in front of the medical centre.  Thousands of Muslim and Croat

20     residents were transported out of Kotor Varos or fled as a consequence of

21     the mistreatment, intimidations, looting, and destruction of property and

22     religious buildings.

23             Erb forces took over the municipality of Prijedor on the

24     30th of April, 1992.  The perpetrators in Prijedor comprised members of

25     the local Crisis Staff, active and reserve police, the TO, the JNA, and

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 1     the VRS.  Blockades and check-points were established around the towns

 2     and villages, and the movement of Muslims and Croats was curtailed.  They

 3     were dismissed from their places of employment.  Muslim members of the

 4     police were relieved of duty and replaced by persons of Serb ethnicity.

 5     Radio announcements made pejorative references to Muslims and threatened

 6     to deploy everything that belonged to them, including mosques and

 7     historic monuments, which were reduced to ruins.  Muslims and Croats were

 8     required to identify their homes with white flags on the windows.  Most

 9     of these homes were looted and then razed to the ground.  Over

10     1.000 people were killed during the takeover of Prijedor.

11             Inhabitants of towns and villages in and around Prijedor were

12     escorted to improvised detention camps in Trnopolje, Omarska and

13     Keraterm.  Their belongings were taken from them during the course of

14     transit and at arrival in these camps.  The conditions in these camps as

15     well as at the Prijedor SJB and the Ljubija football stadium were

16     deplorably inhumane.  Detainees, including women, children, the old and

17     the infirm, were beaten, sexually assaulted, and deprived of basic civic

18     amenities such as appropriate food, water, shelter, sanitation, and

19     medical help.  The Chamber has found that several persons died in these

20     detention facilities as a result of the ill-treatment and torture.  Over

21     100 persons were executed in Room 3 at Keraterm camp in one night around

22     the 25th of July by Serb guards.  At Omarska camp, where the red and

23     white houses came to acquire particular infamy among the approximately

24     3.000 inmates, mass executions were conducted from late July onwards.  At

25     Trnopolje, the detainees were primarily women and children, and the women

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 1     were routinely subjected to rape.

 2             Eventually detainees were expelled in convoys to Muslim-held

 3     territory.  Over 33.000 residents of Prijedor and its neighbouring towns

 4     and villages left the area in the course of the conflict in 1992.  On the

 5     21st of August, 1992, one such convoy of four buses from Trnopolje, which

 6     was escorted by Prijedor policemen and members of the intervention

 7     platoon, stopped along its route at the cliffs called Koricanske Stijene

 8     in Skender Vakuf.  Between 150 and 200 men were ordered off the buses,

 9     made to kneel at the edge of the gorge, and then executed.  One witness

10     testified that he turned to his father and said, "Father, throw

11     yourself."  The father then pushed him off the cliff.  Grenades were

12     thrown into the gorge to make sure that no one survived.  This witness

13     was one of only a few survivors.  None of the policemen involved in the

14     incident were held accountable for their involvement.

15             On the 25th of March, 1992, the president of the Sanski Most

16     branch of the SDS announced that all Serb territories in the municipality

17     were declared to be part of Republika Srpska.  In April, the 6th Krajina

18     Brigade of the JNA set up check-points in the town of Sanski Most.  Serb

19     authorities formed a Crisis Staff which was controlled by the SDS.  The

20     Crisis Staff, with the help of paramilitaries, began dismissing Muslims

21     and Croats from their jobs.  Serb paramilitaries blew up businesses

22     belonging to Muslims and Croats.  In May, upon orders of the Crisis

23     Staff, the JNA and the TO carried out an operation to confiscate illegal

24     weapons.  This operation only targeted citizens of Muslim and Croat

25     ethnicity.  After conducting military operations against non-Serb

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 1     villages and settlements, members of the 6th Krajina Brigade, including

 2     its military police, looted property, destroyed houses and mosques, and

 3     arrested about 1600 Muslims and Croats.  These men were kept in harsh

 4     conditions in detention facilities in Sanski Most where policemen and

 5     members of the TO beat them.  Women and children were also temporarily

 6     detained before Serb civilian authorities organised convoys to expel them

 7     to Muslim-controlled territory.  By the end of 1992, almost all of the

 8     Muslims of Sanski Most had fled as a consequence of the campaign of

 9     violence carried out against them by Serb forces.

10             In early 1992, Teslic, a Serb-majority municipality, was declared

11     a constituent part of Republika Srpska.  Non-Serbs were arrested,

12     detained, and questioned by Bosnian Serb police.  Non-Serb police

13     officers who did not sign a declaration of loyalty to the Serb MUP were

14     dismissed.  In June 1992, Serb forces searched and looted houses

15     belonging to Muslims and Croats in Teslic.  The army indiscriminately

16     shelled the Bosnian Muslim villages of Stenjak and Teslic, following the

17     expiration of the deadline issued to the inhabitants to surrender their

18     weapons.  Thousands of Muslims and Croats fled Teslic.  Hundreds of

19     Bosnian Muslims and Croat men were arbitrarily detained at the SJB

20     building and the TO warehouse.  While in detention, detainees were

21     subjected to beatings and deplorable living conditions, including serious

22     overcrowding and lack of sanitation facilities.  At least three men were

23     killed while in detention at the TO warehouse as a result of beatings

24     they received.

25             Bijeljina was brought under Serb control after four days of

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 1     fighting which began on the 31st of March, 1992, with the arrival of a

 2     group of feared paramilitaries known as Arkan's Men.  By the

 3     3rd of April, dozens of non-Serbs, including women and children, had been

 4     killed, some of them shot at close range.  In the ensuing months, Muslim

 5     residents were increasingly terrorised through a campaign of intimidation

 6     and violence, culminating in the murder of two prominent Muslim families.

 7     While the attacks were orchestrated by the SDS Crisis Staff, the

 8     killings, looting, searches and seizure of property were carried out by a

 9     special police unit and various paramilitary formations.

10             Wealthier Muslims could obtain passports for exorbitant fees and

11     leave.  Others, however, were simply bussed to the demarcation line or

12     detained at the Batkovic camp.  This camp held more than 1200 detainees,

13     most of whom had been transferred there from detention camps in other

14     municipalities.  The camp's sanitary and sleeping conditions were poor,

15     and detainees were beaten on a regular basis, some of them so severely

16     that they died.

17             On the morning of the 10th of June, 1992, Serb paramilitaries

18     entered Bileca.  Together with the Serb police they arrested about

19     140 Muslims and unlawfully detained them for months.  The prisoners were

20     held in appalling conditions and were systematically beaten by members of

21     the police and paramilitaries.  Two detainees died as a consequence of

22     the beatings.  After the arrests began, Serb forces imposed restrictions

23     on the movements of the Muslim population, looted their property, and

24     razed their houses and mosques.  As a consequence of this campaign of

25     violence, the Muslim population fled Bileca.

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 1             On the morning of the 17th of April, 1992, the town of

 2     Bosanski Samac was forcibly taken over by Serb forces, which included JNA

 3     soldiers.  Over the next two days, the non-Serb population was forced to

 4     surrender their weapons to the JNA.  Immediately after the takeover,

 5     large-scale arrests and looting by Serb forces started.  In April 1992,

 6     businesses and private buildings belonging to Muslims and Croats were

 7     targeted, damaged, and destroyed by the JNA and other Serb forces.  On

 8     the 7th of May, 1992, 16 Muslim and Croat detainees who were being held

 9     at Crkvina warehouse in Bosanski Samac were shot and killed by a member

10     of the a Serb paramilitary unit.  On the 26th of April, 1992,

11     47 detainees were forcibly transferred from Bosanski Samac to Brcko by

12     JNA personnel, and on the 4th of July, 1992, between 70 and 180 non-Serb

13     detainees were transferred to a village in Croatia.

14             On the 30th of April, 1992, Serb forces blew up two bridges

15     linking the town of Brcko to Croatia.  The explosion killed between

16     70 and 100 civilians.  The following day, 1.000 members of Serb forces,

17     including JNA paramilitary and TO battalions, launched an attack on

18     Brcko.  Muslim neighbourhoods were shelled and looted, their houses

19     destroyed and left to burn.  Paramilitaries and a special unit called the

20     Red Berets flocked to Brcko to loot and plunder.  Muslim and monuments

21     units were attacked, with three mosques destroyed within minutes on one

22     afternoon.  Large numbers of Muslims and Croats fled the municipalities.

23     From May to August 1992, Muslim and Croat civilians were arrested and

24     detained in at least 14 locations.  Non-Serbs detained at Luka camp were

25     held in a crowded hangar.  Their valuables were confiscated and they were

Page 27682

 1     forced to perform manual labour.  Women were raped and detainees were

 2     beaten with particular cruelty.

 3             Each night for at least five nights, camp commander Goran Jelisic

 4     came to the door of the hangar and yelled for volunteers to come out.

 5     The detainees who emerged were lined up against a wall where soldiers

 6     beat and cursed them.  One detainee was then pulled from the line and

 7     forced to lie on the asphalt with his head over a grate.  This detainee

 8     was shot in the back of the head.  Detainees who were lined up at the

 9     wall were forced to remove the body, and the killing was then repeated

10     with at least one more detainee from a wall.  Detainees who remained in

11     the hangar heard the same thing every time a group was taken, a voice

12     saying, "Lie down.  Lean your head against the grate."  And then a shot.

13     Approximately 50 men were killed each night in this manner.

14             On the 3rd of May, 1992, Serb paramilitaries, the police and the

15     JNA took over the town of Doboj and the Serb Crisis Staff took control of

16     the municipality.  Members of the Banja Luka Special Police Detachment

17     and paramilitaries, including the Red Berets, Predo's Wolves, and

18     Martic's Men, terrorised the town, raping, looting, and murdering the

19     Muslim and Croat population.  The Red Berets and other paramilitary

20     groups took the possessions of Muslims and Croats, arrested them, beat

21     them at the CSB, and delivered them to the Doboj central prison which was

22     run by member of the Republika Srpska Ministry of Justice under the

23     instruction of the Serb Crisis Staff in Doboj.  They were detained in

24     unsanitary conditions and beaten by paramilitary soldiers in the

25     evenings.  During the working day, detainees were taken to the CSB and

Page 27683

 1     beaten there.  In the same period, Serb forces destroyed Muslim and

 2     Catholic monuments.  As a result of the intimidating atmosphere,

 3     thousands of Muslim and Croat residents fled Doboj in 1992.

 4             By April 1992, the town of Gacko was under the control of the

 5     JNA.  The village was looted and burned, and at least 137 Muslims were

 6     killed.  Thereafter, 270 Muslims and Croats were kept at six detention

 7     facilities.  Detainees at the Power Station Hotel were kept under

 8     appalling conditions, threatened, abused, and sexually assaulted.  Some

 9     were beaten and some killed.  Those taken to the Gacko SJB building had

10     their belongings confiscated and were given insufficient food and water

11     in cramped unsanitary conditions.  Many were repeatedly beaten.

12     Detainees saw others executed and were forced to clean up the blood

13     afterwards.  One man was forced to watch a close relative being raped by

14     members of the Red Berets.  He was then kicked in the face, breaking his

15     nose and cheek-bone.  Some of the detainees were taken to a bridge near

16     Kotlina, shot by police officers, and thrown off the bridge.  In May and

17     June, 800 Muslim women and children were transported out of the city.

18     When the JNA and police attacked Fazlagic Kula on the 17th of June,

19     hundreds more fled.

20             In March 1992, in Ilijas, the SJB split along ethnic lines and

21     the Serb Crisis Staff took over the military and civilian institutions in

22     the municipality.  On the 27th of May, members of the Ilijas SJB attacked

23     the village of Gornja Bioca.  They torched Muslim houses, killed two

24     people, and wounded a little girl.  A group of men from the village were

25     taken into custody and imprisoned in several detention facilities in

Page 27684

 1     succession.  On the 4th of June, Serb soldiers and police attacked the

 2     majority Muslim village of Ljesevo, killing 20 Muslim villagers and

 3     displacing the others to Podlugovi where they were detained along with

 4     persons from other villages in Ilijas.  The Croat and Muslim detainees

 5     were beaten and forced to sing Serb nationalist songs.  Around the

 6     17th of August, detainees were transferred by Serb military police and

 7     personnel of the Ilijas SJB to a detention centre in Vogosca known as

 8     Planjo's House.

 9             In late March or April 1992, the police in Vogosca were divided

10     along ethnic lines.  A large part of the municipality was brought under

11     Serb control by army units and the police between the 4th and

12     17th of April, 1992.  Subsequent to the refusal to surrender, the

13     predominantly Muslim village of Svrake was bombed by military aircraft

14     and taken over on or about the 3rd of May, 1992.  Up to 1.000 Muslims

15     were then detained at the Semizovac barracks.  All were released after

16     two to three days, except 100 prisoners who were transferred to a

17     detention facility called "the Bunker."  There, they were beaten by

18     members of the Serb police at Vogosca, held in poor conditions, and used

19     for dangerous labour and as human shields.  On the 8th of July, the Serb

20     municipality of Vogosca created another detention facility in Vogosca at

21     Planjo's House.  At this prison, more than 100, mostly Muslim, detainees,

22     were held, beaten, and used as human shields.

23             From March 1992 onwards, members of the Pale police and reserve

24     police arrested Muslims and Croats and detained them at the Pale

25     gymnasium and the SJB building.  These detainees were abused by soldiers,

Page 27685

 1     by members of the special police under Rajko Kusic, and sometimes by

 2     civilians.  The police did nothing to stop this, and some detainees died

 3     from the beatings.  At the Pale gymnasium, detainees were starved and

 4     kept in such unsanitary conditions that they were eventually covered in

 5     lice.  Despite this, they were forced to work.  On the 22nd of May, 1992,

 6     Serb forces launched attacks on Renovica and Donja Vinca.  They burned

 7     homes belonging to Muslims, and the villagers were arrested and

 8     transported from Pale to Muslim-held territory.  In the entire

 9     municipality of Pale, constant pressure was put on the Muslim citizens to

10     leave.  By early July 1992, the Pale SJB, by order of the Pale Crisis

11     Staff and Municipal Assembly, facilitated the transfer of over a thousand

12     non-Serbs out of the municipality in a series of convoys.  After they

13     left, members of the Pale police claimed the Muslims' property.

14             On the 14th of April, 1992, the Uzice Corps of the JNA entered

15     Visegrad.  Convoys were organised, emptying many villages of their

16     non-Serb population.  The JNA withdrew from Visegrad on the 19th of May,

17     1992, leaving behind Serb paramilitary units, including one led by a

18     member of the reserve police, Milan Lukic.  These units carried out

19     widespread operations of mistreatment and humiliation such as rapes,

20     theft, destruction of property, and arbitrary killings.  On the

21     7th of June, 1992, Milan Lukic abducted and executed five Muslim men on

22     the bank of the Drina river.  On the 14th of June, 1992, Milan Lukic,

23     Sredoje Lukic - who was a member of the Visegrad regular police - and

24     other armed Serbs, locked a group of Muslim civilians, predominantly

25     women, children and elderly persons, in a house on Pionirska Street.  The

Page 27686

 1     house was set on fire, and persons who tried to escape were shot.

 2     Approximately 66 persons were killed in this incident.  Hundreds of

 3     non-Serb civilians were found to have been killed and at least 11.000

 4     Muslims fled from the municipality of Visegrad.

 5             In April 1992, the municipality of Vlasenica was divided along

 6     ethnic lines, and on the 19th of April, the Serb Crisis Staff took over

 7     power of the municipality.  Muslims were subjected to discriminatory

 8     measures:  They were forced to surrender their weapons, dismissed from

 9     their jobs, and assigned work obligations.  Their homes and shops were

10     broken into and painted with anti-Muslim signs, their property stolen,

11     and the town mosque destroyed.  Muslim residents fled Vlasenica as a

12     consequence of this treatment.  The TO, JNA, and Vlasenica special police

13     units conducted operations in predominantly Muslim villages, such as

14     Zaklopaca and Drum, during which they detained or killed the Muslim men,

15     removed the women and children to Muslim-controlled territory, and

16     destroyed their homes.  Muslims were detained at Vlasenica municipal

17     prison, the SJB building, the Susica camp.  Detainees were subjected to

18     interrogations, beatings, rape, killings, and other inhumane conditions.

19     On the 21st of May, 1992, at least 28 Muslim males from the municipality

20     of Bratunac who were being detained in Vlasenica were shot and killed at

21     a location outside Nova Kasaba.

22             On the 8th of April, 1992, Serb policemen and paramilitaries,

23     together with TO and JNA units, shelled and took over the town of

24     Zvornik.  Military operations continued throughout April, May and June,

25     and Serb forces took over several Muslim villages in the municipality.

Page 27687

 1     After the attacks on Muslim villages, Serb policemen, paramilitaries and

 2     members of the JNA and TO expelled the Muslim population, destroyed their

 3     houses and mosques, and stole their property.  Serb forces also arrested

 4     hundreds of Muslim men and detained them in facilities in and around the

 5     town of Zvornik.  Serb policemen and members of the TO beat and

 6     mistreated the detainees.  At the Dom Kulture in Celopek, the

 7     Yellow Wasps and other paramilitaries, with the knowledge of the police,

 8     severely beat and wounded Muslim prisoners.  They also humiliated,

 9     sexually abused and mutilated them.  Dusan Repic, one of the Wasps's

10     leaders, forced two pairs of fathers and sons to perform sexual acts on

11     each other, including intercourse and penetration with a broom handle.

12     Other members of the Wasps cut off detainees' penises and ears and forced

13     other prisoners to ingest them.  If a prisoner did not do so, he was

14     killed.  Between the end of May and the beginning of June 1992, members

15     of the TO and the paramilitaries, including the Yellow Wasps and

16     White Eagles, executed at least 497 detained Muslim prisoners.  Starting

17     from April 1992, thousands of Muslims were either expelled from the

18     municipality by Serb forces or fled as a consequence of the campaign of

19     violence.

20             In an annex to the Judgement, the Trial Chamber has set forth its

21     analysis of the forensic evidence and its findings in relation to each of

22     the 17.735 individually named murder victims in the indictment.

23             The Trial Chamber will now summarise its findings on the

24     Prosecution's allegation that a joint criminal enterprise came into

25     existence no later than the 24th of October, 1991, and continued

Page 27688

 1     throughout the period of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the

 2     signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.  The Prosecution alleges that the

 3     objective of the JCE was to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian

 4     Croats, and other non-Serbs from the territory of the planned Serbian

 5     state by means which included the commission of the crimes alleged in

 6     Counts 1 through 10.

 7             In its written judgement the Trial Chamber has found that

 8     following the declaration of independence in the Bosnian Assembly by the

 9     delegates of the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic

10     Union on the 15th of October, 1991, the SDS and the Bosnian Serb

11     leadership began to create separate and parallel Bosnian Serb

12     institutions and to establish Serb municipalities within

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party

14     issued the Variant A and B instructions.  The main purpose of these

15     instructions was to prepare the local Serb communities and their leaders

16     to take over power in municipalities across Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17             What followed, as just described, were the violent takeovers of

18     those municipalities and the ensuing widespread and systematic campaign

19     of terror and violence which resulted in the removal of large numbers of

20     non-Serbs from those municipalities by way of commission of the crimes

21     that the Chamber has found were committed.  Throughout the indictment

22     period, the Bosnian Serb leadership was in charge of the events taking

23     place in the municipalities through its control over political and

24     military structures.  On the basis of the numerous statements of the

25     Bosnian Serb leadership at the time, the Chamber finds that the goal of

Page 27689

 1     these actions was the establishment of a Serb state, as ethnically pure

 2     as possible, through the removal of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian

 3     Croats.

 4             The Chamber therefore is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt,

 5     that a common plan came into existence no later than the 24th of October,

 6     1991, and remained in existence throughout the indictment period.  The

 7     objective of the common plan was to remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian

 8     Croats from the territory of the planned Serbian state through the

 9     commission of the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer, as crimes

10     against humanity.

11             The Trial Chamber now turns to the question of whether the

12     accused in this case were members of this joint criminal enterprise.

13             Stojan Zupljanin was born on the 22nd of September, 1951, in the

14     village of Maslovare, in the municipality of Kotor Varos.  In 1975, after

15     graduating from law school, he started a career in the police.  During

16     the indictment period, he was chief of the Banja Luka Security Service

17     Centre of the Ministry of Interior of the Serbian republic, otherwise

18     known as the Banja Luka CSB.  By the 6th of May, 1992, the CSB had in its

19     areas of responsibility the SJBs of all of the municipalities that were

20     part of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, that is, the ARK.  While there

21     ask no evidence that Zupljanin was a member of the Serbian Democratic

22     Party, he undoubtedly had strong ties to it.  As the highest police

23     authority in the ARK, Zupljanin had the legal duty to protect the entire

24     civilian population regardless of religion, ethnicity, race or political

25     beliefs.  On the 5th of May, 1992, Zupljanin became a member of the

Page 27690

 1     Crisis Staff of the ARK.  From April until the end of July 1992,

 2     Zupljanin issued several orders to his policemen to follow the

 3     instructions of this regional body.  These orders included the

 4     disarmament of Muslims and Croats and restrictions on the amount of

 5     currency and valuables that could be brought out of the ARK.

 6             Stojan Zupljanin, in concert with the Banja Luka TO and members

 7     of the Serbian Democratic Party and the ARK, was one of the key actors

 8     behind the organisation of the blockade of Banja Luka on the

 9     3rd of April, 1992.  When the non-Serb community in Banja Luka demanded

10     police protection, Zupljanin either provided false assurances or openly

11     refused it.  In addition, Zupljanin dispatched his policemen, including

12     the Banja Luka CSB Special Police Detachment, to disarm the Muslim and

13     Croat population and to participate with other Serb forces in the

14     takeover of municipalities in the ARK.  While engaged in these

15     operations, Zupljanin's special police detachment which he had created

16     and staffed with Serb nationalists, some of whom with prior criminal

17     records, committed heinous crimes against Muslims and Croats, including

18     rape, torture, and murder.  Zupljanin, despite being repeatedly informed

19     of the crimes of this special unit, continued engaging it in operations

20     in close contact with Muslim and Croat civilians, whom the detachment

21     continued to abuse.  Zupljanin was also aware of the unlawful arrest and

22     detention of thousands of Muslims and Croats in the ARK, of the harsh

23     conditions in which they were interned, and of the abuses and other

24     crimes that were cruelly inflicted upon them.  In spite of this

25     knowledge, Zupljanin continued engaging his policemen in guarding the

Page 27691

 1     unlawfully detained prisoners and ordering the transfer and

 2     transportation of detainees from police-controlled facilities to the

 3     Manjaca camp.  Zupljanin did issue a number of orders exhorting ARK

 4     policemen to respect the law, but these orders were ineffective and, as

 5     found by the Trial Chamber, not genuinely meant to be effectuated.

 6     Notably, on the 20th of July, 1992, Zupljanin proposed to Stanisic to

 7     treat unlawfully detained non-Serbs as hostages and to exchange them for

 8     Serb prisoners.

 9             In spite of his extensive knowledge of the commission of crimes

10     against non-Serbs, including by his subordinates, Zupljanin failed to

11     investigate these crimes or to discipline the perpetrators.  In relation

12     to at least two incidents where large numbers of Muslims were killed by

13     members of the police, Zupljanin misled the judicial authorities in an

14     effort to shield the perpetrators from criminal prosecution.

15             The Trial Chamber finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that through

16     these acts and omissions, Stojan Zupljanin both intended and

17     significantly contributed to the plan to remove Bosnian Muslims and

18     Bosnian Croats from the territory of the planned Serbian state.

19     Moreover, the crimes that the Trial Chamber has found fall outside the

20     plan, such as murder, extermination, unlawful detention, and torture,

21     were foreseeable to Zupljanin.  The Chamber has examined the evidence

22     linking the physical perpetrators to members of the JCE and finds that

23     the crimes committed in the ARK municipalities were imputable to at least

24     one member of the JCE and thereby to Stojan Zupljanin.

25             Mico Stanisic was born on the 30th of June, 1955, in the village

Page 27692

 1     of Ponor, in the municipality of Pale.  In 1973, he commenced work with

 2     the SUP in Sarajevo and became an inspector after graduating from law

 3     school in 1982.  Stanisic attended the first meeting of the Council of

 4     Ministers of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.  At this meeting, the demarcation

 5     of the boundaries of ethnic territory for the Serbs was the priority, as

 6     well as the establishment of governmental organs in that territory.

 7     Stanisic was involved in the establishment of the SDS and worked to

 8     promote and implement its policies.  During the indictment period, he was

 9     the minister of interior of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska.  As the

10     highest authority in Republika Srpska on matters of interior affairs,

11     Stanisic had the legal duty to protect the entire civilian population,

12     regardless of religion, ethnicity, race or political beliefs.  Stanisic

13     shared a close relationship with Radovan Karadzic and other leading

14     members of the JCE, and he was a key member of the decision-making

15     authorities from early 1992 onwards.

16             Stanisic had overall authority over the police forces of

17     Republika Srpska and employed the internal affairs organs in accordance

18     with the policies and decisions adopted by the Presidency, the National

19     Security Council, and the Bosnian Serb Assembly, or the BSA.  His

20     conduct, presence at key meetings, attendance at sessions of the BSA, and

21     acceptance of the position of minister of interior, all indicate his

22     voluntary participation in the creation of a separate Serb entity within

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina by the ethnic division of the territory.  To this

24     end, Stanisic made active police forces reinforced with unqualified

25     reserve policemen available for co-ordinated action with the armed forces

Page 27693

 1     in order to effect ethnic divisions on the ground.

 2             Despite being aware of the commission of crimes by these joint

 3     forces, Stanisic consistently approved the deployment of his police

 4     forces in this manner.  He also permitted the continued use of reserve

 5     forces by the army, primarily for the purpose of guarding prisons and

 6     detention camps.  Stanisic only sought to withdraw regular policemen from

 7     combat activities towards the end of 1992, when most of the territory of

 8     Republika Srpska had been consolidated.

 9             The Trial Chamber received evidence that Mico Stanisic issued

10     orders in the course of 1992, particularly between the months of July and

11     August, for the protection of the civilian population.  However, Stanisic

12     failed to use the powers available to him under the law to ensure the

13     implementation of these orders, despite being aware of the limited action

14     taken subsequent to his orders.  Moreover, the orders in relation to

15     detention camps were prompted by the scrutiny of the international

16     community and were mostly concerned with the image of Republika Srpska in

17     the eyes of the world.  By failing to remove errant personnel from the

18     police forces, Stanisic violated his professional obligation to protect

19     and safe-guard the civilian population in the territories under his

20     control.  The fact that Mico Stanisic had the ability to do more is borne

21     out by the decisive manner in which he pursued the theft of Golf vehicles

22     from the RS MUP and the harassment of local Serb leaders by paramilitary

23     groups after the outbreak of hostilities.

24             The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that, through

25     these acts and omissions, Mico Stanisic both intended and significantly

Page 27694

 1     contributed to the plan to remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from

 2     the territory of the planned Serbian state.  Moreover, the crimes that

 3     the Trial Chamber has found fall outside the plan, such as murder,

 4     unlawful detention, and torture, were foreseeable to Stanisic, except for

 5     the crime of extermination which will be dealt with in a moment.  The

 6     Chamber has examined the evidence linking the physical perpetrators to

 7     the members of the JCE and finds that the crimes committed in the

 8     municipalities, save for the appropriation or plunder of property and

 9     wanton destruction in Bileca, were imputable to at least one member of

10     the JCE and, therefore, to Mico Stanisic.

11             With respect to the crime of extermination, the Chamber reviewed

12     the evidence on Stanisic's responsibility for this crime pursuant to the

13     remaining modes of liability charged in the indictment.  With regard to

14     the incidents of extermination in the municipalities of Kljuc,

15     Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Brcko, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Zvornik, and

16     Banja Luka, the Trial Chamber finds that Stanisic is not criminally

17     responsible for instigating the crime of extermination, nor is he

18     responsible for aiding and abetting this crime.  The Trial Chamber

19     further analysed Stanisic's liability for extermination under the

20     doctrine of command responsibility and finds that he either did not know

21     or did not have reason to know that extermination was about to be, was

22     being, or had been committed.  In the case of Koricanske Stijene,

23     although Stanisic did come to know of the extermination of over 150

24     Muslim men within days of the crime, the Trial Chamber finds that he does

25     not bear criminal responsibility for these crimes because the Prosecution

Page 27695

 1     failed to prove that Stanisic failed to take necessary and reasonable

 2     measures to punish the perpetrators in relation to this incident.

 3             This completes the summary of the findings of the Trial Chamber.

 4             I will now read out the disposition of the Trial Chamber, as

 5     contained in the written Judgement:

 6             Will the accused Mico Stanisic please rise.

 7             For all the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to Articles 23, 24,

 8     and 27 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and Rules 98 ter, 101, 102, and

 9     103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal, the

10     Trial Chamber hereby decides as follows.  The Trial Chamber finds you,

11     Mico Stanisic, to be guilty, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, of

12     the following counts:

13             Count 1, persecution, as a crime against humanity, through the

14     following underlying acts:  Killings; torture, cruel treatment, and

15     inhumane acts; unlawful detention; establishment and perpetration of

16     inhumane living conditions; forcible transfer and deportation; plunder of

17     property; wanton destruction of towns and villages, including destruction

18     or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion and other

19     cultural buildings; imposition and maintenance of restrictive and

20     discriminatory measures;

21             Count 4, murder, as a violation of the laws or customs of war;

22             Count 6, torture, as a violation of the laws or customs of war.

23             In relation to the following counts, on the basis of the

24     principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does not

25     enter convictions for:

Page 27696

 1             Count 3, murder, as a crime against humanity;

 2             Count 5, torture, as a crime against humanity;

 3             Count 7, cruel treatment, as a violation of the laws or customs

 4     of war;

 5             Count 8, inhumane acts, as a crime against humanity;

 6             Count 9, deportation, as a crime against humanity;

 7             Count 10, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), as a crime against

 8     humanity.

 9             The Trial Chamber finds Mico Stanisic to be not guilty, pursuant

10     to Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the following count.  That is count 2,

11     extermination, as a crime against humanity.

12             The Trial Chamber hereby sentences Mico Stanisic to a single

13     sentence of 22 years of imprisonment.  Mico Stanisic has been in custody

14     since the 11th of March, 2005, and, pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the Rules,

15     he is entitled to credit for the time spent in detention thus far.

16     Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, Mico Stanisic shall remain in the

17     custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for his

18     transfer to the state where he shall serve his sentence.

19             Mico Stanisic, you may now be seated.

20             Will the accused Stojan Zupljanin please rise.

21             The Trial Chamber finds you, Stojan Zupljanin, to be guilty,

22     pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, of the following counts:

23             Count 1, persecution, as a crime against humanity, through the

24     following underlying acts:  Killings; torture, cruel treatment, and

25     inhumane acts; unlawful detention; establishment and perpetuation of

Page 27697

 1     inhumane living conditions; forcible transfer and deportation; plunder of

 2     property; wanton destruction of towns and villages, including destruction

 3     or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion and other cultural

 4     buildings; imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory

 5     measures;

 6             Count 2, extermination, as a crime against humanity;

 7             Count 4, murder, as a violation of the laws or customs of war;

 8             Count 6, torture, as a violation of the laws or customs of war.

 9             In relation to the following counts, on the basis of the

10     principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does not

11     enter convictions for:

12             Count 3, murder, as a crime against humanity;

13             Count 5, torture, as a crime against humanity;

14             Count 7, cruel treatment, as a violation of the laws or customs

15     of war;

16             Count 8, inhumane acts, as a crime against humanity;

17             Count 9, deportation, as a crime against humanity;

18             Count 10, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), as a crime against

19     humanity.

20             The Trial Chamber hereby sentences Stojan Zupljanin to a single

21     sentence of 22 years of imprisonment.  Stojan Zupljanin has been in

22     custody since the 11th of June, 2008, and, pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the

23     Rules, he is entitled to credit for time spent in detention thus far.

24     Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, Stojan Zupljanin shall remain in

25     the custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for

Page 27698

 1     his transfer to the state where he shall serve his sentence.

 2             You may now be seated.

 3             After the Court rises, the Registry will distribute copies of the

 4     Judgement.

 5             The trial is now completed.

 6             And this hearing stands adjourned.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.47 p.m.