1 Wednesday, 9 July 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

6 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Madam Registrar.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon. Case Number IT-02-60-T, The

8 Prosecutor versus Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic.

9 JUDGE LIU: Good afternoon, Witness. Did you have a good rest?

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

11 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to proceed?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi, you may proceed.

14 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 WITNESS: PIETER BOERING [Resumed]

16 [Witness answered through interpreter]

17 Examined by Mr. Waespi: [Continued]

18 Q. Major Boering, yesterday you had said that you had an initial

19 meeting in January 1995 with various people, including General Zivanovic

20 whom you had said that he was the command of the Drina Corps. Now, do you

21 recall whether he was present at the Hotel Fontana meeting, any of those,

22 on the 11th of July?

23 A. As far as I remember, he was not present. General Krstic was

24 present. And General Mladic introduced him as the commander of the Drina

25 Corps.

1 Q. And I think I asked you that yesterday. Do you recall which of

2 the two meetings on the 11th of July Mr. Krstic was present?

3 A. It was the second meeting.

4 Q. Now, turning to the issue we had left off last night, the third

5 meeting Hotel Fontana on the 12th of July, 1995. Now, I'd like you and

6 the others present in the courtroom to see a clip which again was already

7 shown.

8 MR. WAESPI: I'm not sure whether we see it on our screens.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see anything yet.

10 Yes.

11 MR. WAESPI: Yes, if we could start again from the beginning.

12 Thank you, Ms. Stewart.

13 [Videotape played]

14 MR. WAESPI: Perhaps if we could stop at this point.

15 Q. Now the people you have seen so far, can you tell us a little bit

16 who they were.

17 A. The three people stepping out of the Mercedes Benz in civilian

18 clothes, I was the driver. They were the three representatives of the

19 Muslim population. They were Mandzic, the other was Camila Osmanovic, and

20 I don't recall the name of the third man, but that was the father of an

21 interpreter. And I also noticed the interpreter Petar in civilian

22 clothes. At the entrance you can see Mladic's bodyguard.

23 [Videotape played]

24 MR. WAESPI: Now we have another clip, video, from that meeting,

25 if that could be shown.

1 Q. Do you recall this scene?

2 A. Yes, I remember them.

3 Q. And can you tell us who these people are as far as you can recall?

4 A. Yes, from left to right, in civilian clothes you see Mandzic, the

5 father of an interpreter, Camila, myself, and at the head of the table is

6 seated Colonel Jankovic. The next person is somebody I do not know, next

7 to him. Across is a man in civilian clothes, and he was designated for

8 screening operations, particularly for Muslim men ages 14 to 60 or 70.

9 And the man with the moustache in between them appears to be Colonel

10 Kosovic.

11 MR. WAESPI: If the next still could be shown.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There you see General Mladic as well

13 as somebody wearing a white shirt who was also involved in inspecting the

14 staff, screening.

15 MR. WAESPI:

16 Q. And by "screening," what do you mean?

17 A. General Mladic indicated that if men were found among the

18 population, that they needed to be inspected for their conduct in the

19 warfare, as to whether they had perpetrated war crimes. And this man in

20 the white shirt served this purpose.

21 Q. Now, did General Mladic indicate the age range of the people who

22 needed to be screened?

23 A. From 16 to 60 or 65 years of age.

24 Q. Do you recall other issues which were discussed at this meeting?

25 A. Especially with respect to removal of staff, the idea was that the

1 fuel would need to be supplied by DutchBat if it could not be supplied

2 through vehicles. And the sequence of removal of staff, Muslims, first

3 the injured, then the elderly, then the more healthy individuals. As well

4 as a certain security for the DutchBat vehicles, there was personnel to

5 secure them.

6 Q. Thank you, Major Boering. Now, over the weekend when you were in

7 the Office of the Prosecutor, you have been shown a transcript of about

8 six, seven pages of this video which carried the scenes of this third

9 Fontana meeting. Now, do you recall that you have read in this transcript

10 General Mladic's comment about screening war criminals?

11 A. General Mladic indicated there that it needed to happen and that

12 once it had happened, the staff would be returned to the enclave.

13 Q. And the comment you just made, were these comments contained in

14 that transcript you have read? Or you don't recall.

15 A. At this time, I do not recall.

16 Q. Now, you mentioned a few people who were present at this meeting,

17 and you have seen the people who had entered that Hotel Fontana, getting

18 out of the car. From DutchBat, who was present apart from you?

19 A. Colonel Karremans was also present at that meeting, or rather

20 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Boering. Now, what did you do after the meeting

22 finished? And perhaps you could start with telling us at what time you

23 recall the end of that meeting.

24 A. The meeting started around 11.00, and ended around noon -- excuse

25 me, around 12.00. We drove back to our compound at Potocari, spoke

1 briefly with Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans about commitments or the

2 contents of the discussion. At any rate, there was some misunderstanding

3 as to whether or not personnel would be evacuated as well as commitments

4 about fuel, commitments by Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, and that's why I

5 returned to check matters again. I drove back to Fontana and contacted

6 Nikolic and the Commander Kosovic again.

7 Q. And what were they doing when you met them?

8 A. They said they were having lunch, but they were clearly in the

9 midst of planning operations. They were irritated that I had returned and

10 made it very clear that they had made their commitments and that

11 transports had already been arranged. They urged me to depart quickly

12 because I had no business being there.

13 Q. Was somebody else with you at that time?

14 A. Only a driver.

15 Q. Did Mr. Kosovic and Nikolic indicate to you a time when the

16 transports would be initiated?

17 A. It might be in the course of the day, considerably later. But

18 upon the drive back toward the enclave, it was clear when we overtook a

19 convoy that the operations had already begun. And both Kosovic and

20 Nikolic were already in vehicles headed in that direction.

21 Q. How many vehicles were part of that convoy which you said you

22 overtook on your way from Bratunac to Potocari?

23 A. 30, 40.

24 Q. And what kind of vehicles would those be?

25 A. Some were buses for public transport; others were lorries with --

1 covered by cloths for normal transport.

2 Q. At what time did you arrive in Potocari?

3 A. I believe it was around 2.00 in the afternoon.

4 Q. And how was the situation as it appeared to you?

5 A. At the entrance to our compound, General Mladic was busily

6 convincing the personnel, the Muslims, that they would need to be

7 evacuated, and there were camera crews to record the scenes. It was not

8 as agreed, first the injured and the elderly. They were clearly trying to

9 get people into the vehicles quickly.

10 Q. Now, how many people did you see at Potocari? Can you give a

11 rough estimate?

12 A. Around the vehicles, it was thousands, two or three thousand.

13 Q. And these people, were these women, children, men?

14 A. It was a combination of people. Most were women and children, but

15 there were also some boys and occasionally there was a man among them.

16 Q. Now, what happened to the men?

17 A. The men were selected and gathered in a building across from the

18 compound. I watched that taking place. Then I went to the building to

19 check things out there. And the elite troops of the VRS were present

20 there. They had several dogs to guard or screen. I briefly entered the

21 building. I saw some passports and things and clothes on the ground

22 there. And then I was hastily removed from the building. There were dogs

23 and there were also machine-guns pointed at me.

24 Q. Did you actually see these men, the Muslim men? Did you look into

25 their faces?

1 A. Yes, I saw a few of them. I looked at them. But there was no

2 interpreter, so I couldn't really contact them through speaking. But I

3 could see clearly that they were very frightened.

4 Q. What was the age group of these men you just described?

5 A. About 12 to 80 or so. It's difficult to guess the ages when

6 people look like they're in such bad shape.

7 Q. Now, at that time, did you make a connection between the comment

8 you just made about General Mladic's words during the meeting?

9 A. Yes, I reported this to Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans as well. He

10 was still at his command post, and then he left his command post to check

11 the site.

12 Q. Just a clarification: You said that the General Mladic made a

13 comment about the screening of war criminals between 16 and 60. And you

14 told us that today. And now, a few hours later, you saw, in fact, men of

15 that age group. Now, at that time, did you make a connection that these

16 two events could be linked or not?

17 A. If there was any connection, it certainly wasn't a standard

18 interrogation since there were some elite troops standing ready outside

19 the building, a possible execution battalion, a possible execution squad

20 that were ready to march people off behind the building. And there was no

21 opportunity to walk past. There were obstacles. You couldn't pass

22 because there were dogs there and there were soldiers who wouldn't allow

23 you to pass. And we heard some shooting behind the building.

24 Q. Now, you said that you had reported that to your superior. Did

25 you do something else to ascertain what happened in that building?

1 A. To ask the UNMOs on site to stay at the building. At any rate, to

2 count how many people were entering. I stayed at the building up to that

3 point.

4 Q. Can you tell us what an UNMO is.

5 A. The military observers from the United Nations.

6 Q. How many UNMOs were in the enclave?

7 A. It varied. Usually four to six.

8 Q. And do you recall the name of this UNMO whom you had contacted at

9 that time?

10 A. Yes, I believe the name was Kingori. The other UNMO in the

11 neighbourhood was de Haan, who was Dutch.

12 Q. Now, you said these men were led to a house. In relation to the

13 entry of the Potocari UN Compound, how far away was that house?

14 A. It was visible, about three or four hundred metres away.

15 Q. Now, at what time were the buses leaving?

16 A. About 4.00 in the afternoon.

17 Q. And what did you do?

18 A. I rode along on one of the vehicles with a coworker of mine to see

19 what would happen. And Colonel Kosovic, who escorted the transport

20 authorised this.

21 Q. In what car did you accompany the convoy?

22 A. A Mercedes Benz belonging to our own battalion.

23 Q. And what was the purpose of you accompanying this convoy?

24 A. At any rate, to be a witness to what happened to this convoy and

25 to be able to report it in any way possible. It was unclear to me what

1 was going to happen. And it had not been communicated clearly by the

2 Serbs either.

3 Q. Was the issue of escorts of these convoys discussed before?

4 A. Yes, this had been discussed at the third meeting with General

5 Mladic because one man from our battalion would be present per vehicle.

6 It was not the case. I was the only vehicle for the entire convoy.

7 Q. Of how many vehicles did this convoy consist of?

8 A. 30, 40.

9 Q. Major Boering, if you could tell us on the map the route which you

10 took out of Potocari.

11 A. Yes, I'll be happy to do that for you.

12 Q. Perhaps if you could blow up the sort of section, come back

13 towards Kladanj to the left. The middle part of it to the left, yes.

14 That's perfect.

15 A. The route we took was from Potocari toward Bratunac. And then in

16 Bratunac, left to Glogova. And ultimately, at the next fork, we took to

17 left to Milici. And then we travelled west toward Vlasenica, and then we

18 headed toward Tisca. And about there, the convoy stopped.

19 Q. Now, Major Boering, on the way, what did you see, did you observe,

20 between Potocari and Tisca?

21 A. In Bratunac, we took a left and headed west. And along the way

22 after a few kilometres, the convoy was stopped. And the police escorting

23 us, they were very nervous. We had to go under cover because there were

24 outbreak attempts from the enclave. And there was indeed a type of prison

25 vehicle where people were busy loading something. It was difficult to

1 see. And at a certain point, that operation ended, and the vehicle headed

2 off toward Bratunac. And we were authorised to continue on.

3 Q. Now, you said that around Tisca, the convoy stopped. Why did you

4 stop there?

5 A. We stopped there. It was made clear we encountered Major Sarkic,

6 who I knew from the past. He explained to me that from that point onward,

7 we would need to walk about 6 or 7 kilometres through no-man's-land to

8 escort the population toward Luke Kladanj. And the route was not entirely

9 safe. It needed to be demined first. And after a brief wait, I was

10 invited to come along with the first population group because it was too

11 dangerous for the Serbs themselves to cross no-man's-land.

12 Q. Now, you said that you had met Major Sarkic before. Can you tell

13 us when that was and what his function was or is.

14 A. That was upon the transfer of DutchBat II to III in early January.

15 And at that point, he was presented -- introduced by General Zivanovic as

16 the contact from the Milici Brigade. So he was our contact if there were

17 any problems or operations.

18 Q. Now, did Major Sarkic tell you under which orders he was acting?

19 A. Yes, he mentioned that. He indicated that he took his orders

20 directly from the Drina Corps.

21 Q. Now, did the men who were part of your convoy join you to walk

22 towards the free territory?

23 A. Again, they performed a selection to see whether there were any

24 men left among them. They were removed and taken off to the forest.

25 Q. And they were taken off by whom?

1 A. By VRS troops. We couldn't see where they were going. There was

2 no way that they would have allowed us to do that. They would have

3 threatened us with armed force, would have told us we had no business

4 there.

5 Q. At what time in the day was that when you had met Major Sarkic?

6 A. I believe it was around 6.00.

7 Q. The same day you had left Potocari.

8 A. Yes, between 5.00 and 6.00.

9 Q. Now, on the way between Potocari and Tisca, did you see any people

10 wearing UN uniforms or parts of uniforms or helmets?

11 A. Certainly parts of DutchBat uniforms, and you could see those

12 between -- you could see those among the Serb troops, a few.

13 Q. So are you saying that these DutchBat uniforms at that time were

14 not worn by Dutch people or people under the authority of DutchBat, but by

15 somebody else?

16 A. Yes, they were worn by the VRS soldiers. You could tell by the

17 people in charge and their positions.

18 Q. Now, how come the VRS got hold of these uniforms?

19 A. Possibly through the hostagings of our soldiers.

20 Q. And do you know the reason why the VRS was wearing or members of

21 the VRS were wearing these uniforms?

22 A. It was possible to cultivate trust so that this would indicate to

23 the Muslim population fleeing that they were safe, and then they could

24 surrender.

25 Q. Now, to finish, I would like to show you a brief clip again.

1 [Videotape played]

2 MR. WAESPI:

3 Q. If you could comment on what you're seeing.

4 A. This is at the end of the route that we walked. On the right

5 is -- you see a BH soldier. They walked toward us.

6 Q. I'm sorry.

7 MR. WAESPI: Can you please go back.

8 Q. I think we shall freeze it at one point so you can identify the

9 people on it. But you can continue to explain, Major Boering.

10 A. The last section through the no-man's-land, and we were met there

11 by the BH soldiers. They disarmed us and took us off as virtual prisoners

12 of war for interrogation. In the centre, you see me and my colleague to

13 the right is Voorman, and to the left is a BH soldier.

14 Q. And is it fair to say that after you arrived in the Muslim

15 territory, you did not go back to Potocari?

16 A. No, that did not happen.

17 Q. Did you eventually return to Holland?

18 A. Next, I travelled back to Germany via Tuzla.

19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no more questions.

20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

21 Any cross-examination? Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Cross-examined by Mr. Karnavas:

24 Q. Good afternoon. Is it still Major?

25 A. [No Interpretation]

1 Q. Before I go into your background, I just wanted to get one thing

2 clear. This wasn't the first time that you had seen folks that were not

3 part of DutchBat in UN uniforms. Isn't that a fact?

4 A. Yes, but not really in a war area.

5 Q. Okay. Now, you testified in the previous trial, did you not,

6 during the Krstic trial?

7 A. I acted as a witness in the Krstic trial.

8 Q. And during that trial, you were read, and later on you were shown,

9 a document from the Dutch Institute whereby in that report, it notes, and

10 it's marked as Defence Exhibit 1 in that particular case, that "Soldiers

11 of the BH army fully dressed with blue helmets or blue caps have arrived

12 to the area within 15 metres of one of the observation posts acting as UN

13 personnel. They opened fire from this position into the direction of the

14 position of the VRS. Therefore, it seemed as if the United Nations had

15 opened fire. In this way, they attempted to provoke the fire of the VRS

16 on the observation post, and by doing so, embroil the Dutch Battalion into

17 combat activities."

18 Now, do you recall being shown and being read that report that was

19 prepared by the Dutch Institute?

20 A. I remember the previous trial, and also that your colleague Hansel

21 came up with this text, and that it was unclear at the time what the

22 status of this paper was. And I myself have no information about this.

23 Q. Okay. But you did indicate during that trial that there were

24 complaints by Major Nikolic.

25 A. There have been complaints from Major Nikolic, that's true. But

1 when you say about the specific case you're referring to, I cannot recall

2 that at all.

3 Q. Okay. But you're not challenging today that report from the Dutch

4 Institute, are you?

5 A. No, I'm witnessing about what I've seen.

6 Q. Exactly, all right. So you're not saying that it is, in fact,

7 false that, in fact, the Dutch Institute would present and prepare a false

8 document noting that Muslim soldiers where you were supposed to be in a

9 demilitarised area protected by DutchBat were, in fact, impersonating

10 themselves as DutchBat firing onto the VRS in order to provoke an incident

11 so that the UN forces, the DutchBat forces, would get involved?

12 A. No, I do not endorse this report.

13 Q. Okay. Now, as I listened to your background yesterday, you

14 indicated that you went to a military academy. So I take it the military

15 is your career.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. And back then, in 1995, you're a major, and today in 2003 you

18 still hold that rank as major. Is that correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And yesterday, there was an indication you were a G3. Not being a

21 military man, maybe you can explain that to us, what that means.

22 A. In my previous function, I was responsible for operations and

23 trainings in an artillery unit. And that is how I went to Kosovo. And

24 during the period six years before, that I was part of a brigade staff.

25 And on this brigade staff, I was in the G3 section, trainings and

1 exercise.

2 Q. Okay. So that's what that refers to.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. All right. And if I get -- if I have it right, you are an

5 artillery man. That's what your specialty is.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, you went to Srebrenica as part of the DutchBat unit, and I

8 understand that you arrived sometime in January 1995.

9 A. Yes, in January.

10 Q. And as I understand it, when you got there, there was sort of an

11 eight-hour welcoming, you know, welcoming you folks and sort of saying

12 good-bye to the folks that were leaving, and that was prepared by the VRS.

13 A. Yes, in Bratunac, the Drina Corps.

14 Q. I take it, it took place at the Hotel Fontana?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. And that's when you met for the first time General Zivanovic who

17 had introduced himself, and indeed, from reading your testimony, had even

18 made an impression on you as a soldier's soldier. He introduced himself

19 as the head of the Drina Corps.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And there was some other officers, including Major Nikolic.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And you would over the period of six months become quite

24 acquainted with Major Nikolic in your capacity as liaison between the

25 DutchBat and the VRS.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And in fact, if I have it right, you had weekly meetings -- at

3 least weekly meetings. I believe they were on Tuesdays. Mondays was

4 reserved for the Muslims; Tuesdays for the Serbs; Wednesday was for the

5 civilians in Srebrenica; and then Thursday, Friday for observation. I

6 take it Saturday, Sunday was for rest?

7 A. That was the schedule, but when times of tension arose, then quite

8 regularly, we had no contact with Major Nikolic for several weeks, even

9 though we wanted to have contact.

10 Q. Exactly. And there were sometimes, there were sometimes, at least

11 a couple that I can glean from the testimony, where there were some

12 surprise meetings would be invited, and all of a sudden Nikolic and maybe

13 a guest would arrive with Mr. Nikolic.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. All right. Now since we're on Mr. Nikolic, we'll stay on this

16 topic if that's okay with you, Major, and then we'll get back to your

17 mission. It was your understanding at the time, in your capacity as the

18 liaison officer, and might I say in that capacity you acted more or less

19 as the eyes and ears for the colonel or the lieutenant-colonel?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. It sounds to me from reading it, and again I'm not a military man,

22 it sounds to me you were acting more or less like a security intelligence

23 officer, in that capacity. I mean, you're liaisoning, but you're also

24 trying to get information at the same time. Right?

25 A. Of course one gathers information, but my duty, as for duties

1 regarding security and intelligence, that was certainly not the main

2 thing.

3 Q. Okay. I agree with you on that one. And as I understand it

4 correctly, you reported directly to the lieutenant-colonel. In other

5 words, you had almost like a, for lack of a better term, a separate chain

6 of command. That's who you worked for. Right? And you were charge for

7 the civic aspect, and as I understand it, there was an individual that was

8 responsible for the military aspect, and then you had the major sergeant

9 or sergeant-major, one of those two.

10 A. Sergeant-major.

11 Q. And the sergeant-major was sort of in between, kind of assisting

12 both of you. That was initially?

13 A. Yes, originally.

14 Q. And then at some point, due to attrition, you know, one of them

15 had left. That's what I mean by attrition. Basically you and the

16 sergeant-major, the sergeant-major took over both those aspects.

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. The civil and the -- okay.

19 A. Yes, within as well as outside the enclave.

20 Q. Right, right. And so -- all right, now, let's get back to

21 Major Nikolic. You had been there six months, up until the time of the

22 fall of Srebrenica. And as I read the statements that you gave after the

23 fall of Srebrenica and your testimony, perhaps you hold this opinion

24 today, throughout this period, you thought that Major Nikolic was the

25 assistant commander of the Bratunac Brigade. Is that correct?

1 A. The position of Major Nikolic was very unclear. And he didn't

2 want to indicate that. When we addressed him as deputy commander, he was

3 reasonably upset about that. And after that, for a brief while, we had no

4 contact with him.

5 Q. Okay. You mean he objected to being called that, that was your

6 impression?

7 A. He did not want it to be clear to us what his position was.

8 Q. Right. In fact, you had asked him a couple of times, and on one

9 occasion, he had indicated to you that you were not stupid and that you

10 knew what he was doing.

11 A. Yes, I recall that.

12 Q. Right. Could we say -- I mean I take it you have been around

13 military people. You can judge a character as well as I can, we're lay

14 people. Could we say that Mr. Nikolic had a particular aura about him?

15 You know, he demonstrated an aura of, say, lack of a better term,

16 arrogance?

17 A. He made it clear that he was the boss, and he had absolutely no

18 problem keeping us waiting for a couple of hours.

19 Q. And of course, at times, when you would meet with Major Nikolic,

20 you would have to meet another individual, and he was a colonel, I

21 believe. And that was Colonel Vukotic am I getting it right?

22 A. Yes, you're right. But I didn't deal with him very much.

23 Q. But in your dealings when they were both together, it was clear to

24 you, was it not, that Major Nikolic was sort of disparagingly addressing

25 and behaving towards Mr. Vukotic or Colonel Vukotic?

1 A. Yes, you might say so.

2 Q. You're saying it, not me.

3 A. Yeah, yeah.

4 Q. All right. But there was one individual that when Mr. Nikolic was

5 with, all the airs and the pretensions of being arrogant and being a

6 person of authority were more or less gone. Right? You know who I'm

7 talking about?

8 A. That was, for example, with Zivanovic.

9 Q. All right. That's a general now. Now, but can you think of

10 another -- do you recall meeting him with Colonel Beara?

11 A. Oh, yes, I remember that.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. That was during Serb Easter.

14 Q. Right. But as I indicate from reading your reports, when he was

15 in front of Colonel Beara, he was more like a, as they say in that part of

16 the world, wet chicken. Very subservient and very quiet.

17 A. Yes, but the situation was very unsafe at the time. And I was in

18 a no-man's-land.

19 Q. No, I'm not saying about your behaviour; I'm saying about

20 Nikolic's behaviour. Nikolic's behaviour in front of Beara. In your

21 reports, it was clear that he was subservient when he was with

22 Colonel Beara. That's what I glean from your testimony and statements.

23 A. You're absolutely right.

24 Q. In fact, on one occasion, you had been invited to a meeting, and

25 there was an ambush.

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. And Nikolic more or less kind of laughed about it.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. And of course when Beara shows up, Nikolic is like a little

5 schoolboy hiding behind the skirts of Colonel Beara. Would that be

6 correct?

7 A. That's the impression I got, yes.

8 Q. Now, let me stay with Mr. Nikolic just a little bit longer. I

9 want to fast forward a little bit. And I want to talk about the days on

10 the 11th, 12th, and so on. During the meeting, the first meeting, as I

11 recall, you indicated that Nikolic was there front and centre.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. One would think he never saw a camera he didn't like because he

14 seems to be in all the footage?

15 A. Yes, he was quite handy in handling those.

16 Q. Right. Now, as I understand your testimony from the previous case

17 and from your statements and from -- we touched upon a little bit today

18 here in your direct examination, during the evacuation process, I'll leave

19 it up to the Trial Chamber to determine whether it was a forcible transfer

20 or deportation, so we'll just call it evacuation, if that's okay with you.

21 During that period, you had some extensive dealings, or at least you

22 were able to observe Mr. Nikolic being somewhat -- quite involved in that

23 process along with another gentleman by -- I believe he was Kosovic?

24 A. Kosovic, yes.

25 Q. And you noticed that they were sort of together, almost glued

1 together, making arrangements with the buses. And in fact, if I

2 understand it correctly, it was quite visible at the time that Nikolic was

3 working side by side along with Kosovic during that process?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. During the meetings, and if I understand it correctly, you were at

6 all three meetings?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. It was quite visible to you also that Nikolic was sort of part of

9 that -- at least present during those meetings.

10 A. He was present at the meetings, perhaps there was one where he was

11 briefly absent.

12 Q. Right. And in fact, I believe you noted - I can't recall whether

13 it's in the statement or your testimony - that he left suddenly, and that

14 caught your eye. I take it you're a man of detail.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay. Now, let me -- let's move on to another topic, if that's

17 okay with you. And I want to talk a little bit about the DutchBat

18 mission. First, we're going to go to the general. I know you touched on

19 it a little bit more, if you can bear with me, and then we'll go from

20 there. Okay? Is that all right with you?

21 A. Yeah, yeah.

22 Q. Okay. Now, as I remember yesterday, you indicated that there

23 was -- there were three parts to the mission of DutchBat in Srebrenica

24 during that period.

25 A. You're right.

1 Q. Okay. And I had it written here someplace. Let me get it here.

2 One was to secure a safe area.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Another one was to demilitarise the enclave.

5 A. Mm-hmm.

6 Q. And the other one was humanitarian assistance. Is that right?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. Now when we say secure a safe area, I take it what you mean

9 by that was to secure the people that are inside the enclave. Right?

10 A. As I said yesterday, also for going outside, try to prevent it.

11 Q. That was my next question. See, now you're doing my job. You're

12 anticipating. That's okay.

13 So part of it was to secure inside because you want to protect the

14 people that are inside the enclave, but also secure the people that are

15 outside the enclave because they were being attacked by the military that

16 was within the enclave. Right? Is that a yes?

17 A. At any rate, there were complaints from Major Nikolic, so that's

18 what we were to take care of.

19 Q. I know that there were complaints. But certainly, you're not

20 trying to suggest that those complaints were unfounded; certainly you're

21 not saying that?

22 A. No, I didn't say that.

23 Q. Right, exactly. And I just want to make sure that I was clear.

24 Because at least in the Krstic judgement, on paragraph 30 of that

25 judgement, because of testimony taken in that case, they describe an

1 incident that took place about the time that you were there. I was

2 wondering whether you knew anything about that incident, whether it was

3 investigated, and it had to do -- it was a relatively small incident, they

4 burned down a few houses and killed just a few people - they were all

5 Serbs by the way - and this was, I believe, early in the morning of June

6 26, 1995.

7 A. Mm-hmm.

8 Q. Right. Were you aware of that incident?

9 A. At this point in time, I don't remember exactly. But there

10 happened several incidents that made it clear to us that we had this role

11 to play.

12 Q. Right. Okay. But I take it if we find it in that judgement, that

13 there was testimony with respect to an attack on June 26, which is only,

14 what, two weeks before the attack on Srebrenica, that that incident did,

15 in fact, occur?

16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

17 MR. WAESPI: I think the witness just said that he doesn't

18 remember exactly. And second, it's doubtful whether it makes sense to

19 refer to a judgement rather than specific witness statements or parts of

20 testimony.

21 JUDGE LIU: Well, I understand that the witness did not remember

22 the particular incidents, but he said that there are several incidents

23 that happened around that time. And I see no problem by the Defence

24 counsel using the judgement of another case.

25 You may proceed, Mr. Karnavas.

1 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. Now, the second aspect of your mission was the demilitarisation of

3 the enclave. Help me out here. Srebrenica was declared an enclave back

4 in, what was it, 1993?

5 A. Within the military structure that existed within the BH, there

6 was light armour present. And somewhat heavier armour had been collected

7 in a weapons collection point and was managed by DutchBat. And in

8 particular, the light armour still present should not have been there; and

9 therefore, we had the duty to try and trace it. And when we got a hold of

10 it, to store it at the weapon collection point.

11 Q. Okay. So getting back to what I was trying to suggest, here we

12 are in 1995 when you come in. Srebrenica is declared an enclave under the

13 protection of the UN, and one of the mandates or one of the requirements,

14 I should say, for it being an enclave was that it be demilitarised. So at

15 this point when you arrive and throughout the period that you were there,

16 the enclave was still not demilitarised. Isn't that a fact?

17 A. As regards the armour still present, if that is part of the

18 definition, then it was not demilitarised. And I do not mean armour, but

19 light arms.

20 Q. Okay. But light arms kill, do they not?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And soldiers carry light arms, do they not?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Okay. So from that aspect, soldiers in -- let me back up. Were

25 there soldiers in Srebrenica during that period of time? Yes or no.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. And those soldiers had arms. Right? Not heavy arms, but

3 they had arms; right?

4 A. When we saw them carrying arms, then we were supposed to

5 confiscate them.

6 Q. I didn't ask whether you saw and confiscated. I'm sure you were

7 doing your job. But you're surely not trying to suggest here today that

8 the soldiers that were in the enclave at the time did not have arms.

9 A. They had arms, yes.

10 Q. In fact, they had held you hostage for four days.

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And they held other Dutch soldiers hostages over there at that

13 period; right?

14 A. Yes, but whether these were soldiers or farmers...

15 Q. Well, come, come, Major, you were in a particular area, were you

16 not?

17 A. What are you referring to?

18 Q. Well, when -- well, I would like to talk about when you were

19 kidnapped or when you were held hostage, when you were a prisoner of war;

20 right? Or were you AWOL? Do you know what I mean by AWOL?

21 A. No, we were, one might say, hostaged.

22 Q. When -- one might say. Were you able to leave at your own free

23 will, or did Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans have to negotiate your release?

24 Yes or no.

25 A. It was not Karremans who had to negotiate; it was Ramic who had to

1 negotiate.

2 Q. Who's Ramic?

3 A. He was the chief of staff of the army.

4 Q. Which army?

5 A. He's the one who had to negotiate. Of the army of the soldiers of

6 BH. He was to negotiate with Zulfo.

7 Q. All right. Well, we're going to get to that. We're going to get

8 to that. But I'm a little confused here from your statement, okay. Now,

9 you gave a statement back on 6 May -- I'm sorry, 28 September, 1995. Do

10 you recall that, giving a statement?

11 A. Go ahead. I have made several statements.

12 Q. I'm just asking if you remember giving the statement. That's all.

13 A. I made the statement, but specifically on what date and what

14 statement it was...

15 Q. All right. Did you have a chance to review your statements when

16 you met with the Prosecutor - I don't know how long you were meeting with

17 him - to go over your testimony, but did they show you your statements?

18 A. I read a number of statements. That's correct.

19 Q. Okay. Did they actually let you have them so you could hold on to

20 them, read them at your leisure, or did they just show them and take them

21 back?

22 A. I read them properly.

23 Q. Does that mean -- did they physical let you have them? In other

24 words, do you have your statement with you today?

25 A. I have my statement with me from the previous trial.

1 Q. Your testimony.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay, but not your statement that you gave, I take it, back on 28

4 September 1995.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: If I could, I have enough copies, Your Honour, I

6 hope.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is a statement that I'm

8 aware of.

9 MR. KARNAVAS:

10 Q. Okay. And just to make sure, I take it you had an opportunity to

11 read it before. I don't have a signed statement with me. Can I assume or

12 can -- not me, but can the Trial Chamber assume that you read it carefully

13 after it was completed to make sure that it was true, accurate, and

14 complete?

15 A. I signed a Dutch version, I remember.

16 Q. Okay. But -- I take it you do read English.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So it wouldn't be a problem for you to look at a portion if I were

19 to direct you in the right direction. It would be page 3, and it would be

20 the second-to-last paragraph.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: And for the record, there's a number on that page,

22 and it's 00443269.

23 Q. Okay, he said: "I saw Ramic, Naser Oric, and a man I later

24 understood to be Zulfo standing there." We'll get to Zulfo later. "Zulfo

25 told us to stay and join the other Dutch troops." From that, I gather

1 there were other Dutch troops being held hostage, too.

2 A. I had to go there to negotiate for their liberation. And the

3 result was that I could join them.

4 Q. So the negotiator of the hostages became a hostage himself.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Okay. How many Dutch troops were being held hostage there?

7 A. About 10.

8 Q. About 10. And these were the folks that were there to make sure

9 that the place was demilitarised?

10 A. Yes, it was by order of the UN that we had to patrol that area in

11 particular, especially for demilitarisation and the freedom of movement.

12 Q. Right. And so as part of their duty, they went into this area.

13 Do you recall the name of that area?

14 A. The Bandera triangle.

15 Q. It was more like the other triangle where ships and planes

16 disappear.

17 A. No, but I'm still here.

18 Q. Okay. Well, then it says: "We were held there for four days."

19 And by that I take it you were not free to go. You were captive.

20 A. Yes, but I wasn't threatened with armed violence.

21 Q. I didn't say that you were threatened with armed violence, now did

22 I? You can be held hostage without being threatened with armed violence.

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. Okay. "Eventually Karremans went to talk to Naser Oric, and

25 others came from Tuzla to let us go."

1 A. Mm-hmm.

2 Q. So from this I understand it was Karremans, and that's why I said

3 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans had to come rescue you. By that I meant he

4 had to go and negotiate with an individual by the name of Naser Oric. And

5 then apparently he had his higher-ups in Tuzla, and then they had to

6 intervene in order for you to be released, you and your colleagues,

7 because you were in an area where the Muslim army within the enclave was

8 operating, and they did not want you or other DutchBats around seeing what

9 they were up to and how heavily militarily they were armed at that

10 location. Is that a fair characterisation?

11 A. It was an area we were not allowed to enter. And it was --

12 pertained to Zulfo, and whether that was because of the military or

13 smuggling operations, or whatever type of operations, I was never able to

14 ascertain.

15 Q. Right. But when you say, sir, that you were not allowed to enter,

16 that area was part of your mandate, wasn't it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And when you say you were not allowed --

19 A. We were allowed to -- we were allowed access to certain areas

20 along the roadside, but we weren't allowed to actually enter the area.

21 Q. Right. And I take it when they won't let you in, they don't want

22 you in those areas?

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. Is that a yes?

25 A. There were areas where we were not welcome, and Karremans

1 determined whether or not those areas needed to be patrolled. And I did

2 not always witness what happened in practice over there. Obviously there

3 were patrols in those areas.

4 Q. Okay. Now you say "we were not allowed" --

5 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas, it's time for a break.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE LIU: I think during the break, the witness can have a

8 chance to read his statement.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. And I can provide him with

10 other statements so that he can be up to speed.

11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please. We'll resume at 4.00.

12 --- Recess taken at 3.34 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.

14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. Major, I take it --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.

18 A. Yes, I read it again.

19 MR. KARNAVAS:

20 Q. So you -- now just one point of clarification, and it was an

21 oversight on my part. When you were held captive as a result of wandering

22 into the region called the Bandera triangle, what period are we talking

23 about, what months if you recall?

24 A. February.

25 Q. So you just arrived?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Were the soldiers that were there already that you went to

3 negotiate, had they arrived with you at the same time, in January?

4 A. Yes. They were part of our battalion, too.

5 Q. Okay. Now, as I understand part of your duty, as we talked about

6 earlier, was to have these meetings. Mondays you would meet with the

7 Muslim military of Srebrenica. Is that right?

8 A. Yes, there was a certain sequence, but that's perfectly possible.

9 Q. Right. I'm going by what you had testified earlier. But it

10 doesn't matter whether it was Monday or Tuesday; that's not the important

11 part. But what's important is I take it during that period, you would

12 meet with the commander of the military, and here you describe it as

13 "Operational Group 8." And I take it that was Naser Oric. Is that

14 correct?

15 A. Yes, it was Naser Oric.

16 Q. And that Group 8, do you know or are you aware of the fact that it

17 was later renamed the 28th Division?

18 A. Yes, my memory goes back that far.

19 Q. Okay. Now, in your report, in fact, you give a little outline of

20 all these individuals. You speak a little bit about Mr. Oric, his chief

21 of staff Ramic. Is that the same Ramic that was injured, by the way, when

22 they were trying to helicopter in, into the enclave?

23 A. Yes, it's the same person.

24 Q. Right. And just so everybody understands, during that period

25 while you were there, the BiH army was -- the Muslim army was

1 helicoptering in military hardware while at the same time you were trying

2 to keep the hardware out of the enclave. Isn't that correct?

3 A. At the end of our period in the enclave, there was more helicopter

4 activity.

5 Q. Right. But that helicopter activity wasn't sort of a mode of

6 transportation, like we would take the bus or the trolley here to go from

7 point A to point B. It was a means of transporting military hardware,

8 perhaps military individuals, soldiers or commanders.

9 A. It's perfectly possible. I didn't see it myself.

10 Q. Okay. But you were aware of it?

11 A. Yes, it was being watched.

12 Q. And in your capacity as the liaison officer, did you sort of bring

13 it up with Mr. Oric and say "What's happening, commander? You know you're

14 not supposed to have these flights. You know you're not supposed to have

15 all this equipment." Did you bring it up with him in your weekly Monday

16 morning meetings?

17 A. Specifically about the helicopter activity at the end of the

18 period, Oric was not in the enclave at that time, but we definitely made

19 clear that that would not be tolerated.

20 Q. But it was tolerated.

21 A. We tried to avoid doing so.

22 Q. But my -- I guess my statement is or my question, it was in fact

23 tolerated because DutchBat didn't do anything about the flights, they kept

24 coming in. And isn't it a fact -- and this is a compound question, so why

25 don't I just stop at that. You didn't stop the flights from coming in.

1 Right?

2 A. They kept continuing.

3 Q. They kept continuing, right. And would it be fair to say, in fact

4 you've already said it in your previous testimony, that Srebrenica was

5 becoming more militarised during this period than it had been when you

6 arrived?

7 A. In any case, around the last month, the last months.

8 Q. June, May, June; right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And we talked about the incident in June 26 when there was the

11 raid on the Serb village where they killed the Serb villagers there and

12 burned their houses. That was during your watch as a DutchBat in

13 Srebrenica when it was supposed to be demilitarised, and it was in fact

14 getting militarised. Right?

15 A. I don't remember that incident.

16 Q. Okay. Now, yesterday you were asked a specific question

17 dealing -- comparing actually the VRS with the Bosnian army, if we could

18 refer to it as an army, which is what you said yesterday. Those were your

19 terms, meaning the BH army. Now, you indicated yesterday that it was your

20 opinion that the Drina Corps was fairly well organised. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes, correct.

22 Q. And then you were asked about the Bratunac Brigade. Do you recall

23 that question?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And you had a particular opinion about the Bratunac Brigade

1 yesterday, did you not?

2 A. That they were organised.

3 Q. Well, okay. Let me go back to what you stated. I have

4 yesterday's transcript. Okay, and this is on page 67, for the record.

5 It's the unofficial version of the transcript, but I think it will help us

6 here. It says, on line 15, you answer: "The organisation was in fact an

7 organised Drina Corps with clear, rigid system of command. What I saw of

8 the Bratunac Brigade, it was a clear structure with sufficient staff and

9 arms in the sense of artillery and tanks." And then you were asked about

10 making an observation of the BH army, as it was described, and you did so.

11 You indicated that "It was lightly armed, primarily hand firearms and

12 machine-guns and limited other arms." And of course, earlier on the page

13 on line 9 you indicate, as I stated earlier, when asked about the BH army,

14 you stated "To the extent that we could refer to that as an army."

15 So my question to you, sir, is with respect to the Bratunac

16 Brigade. Obviously, you had some contacts with an individual,

17 Mr. Nikolic, Major Nikolic, over a period of six months during which

18 period, or even up until today, you weren't clear what exact function he

19 carried out, other than he was a point of contact with you as being the

20 representative of DutchBat and he being from the Bratunac Brigade. Is

21 that correct?

22 A. I was not aware of his exact function.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. He was more than a liaison officer and behaved like a chief of

25 staff or a deputy commander with sufficient mandate.

1 Q. Right. Now you never met, and you state this in your statement,

2 in fact. You never met the commander of the Bratunac Brigade?

3 A. No, I never met him.

4 Q. So during your period as a liaison officer, you would make

5 periodic trips to Bratunac?

6 A. Only to Fontana, the hotel there, with limited freedom of

7 movement. And I used that occasionally to turn off and try to recognise

8 some units.

9 Q. You mean do some spying while you're there? Observation.

10 A. Observation, yeah. Yes, observation.

11 Q. All right. Gathering of evidence. Collecting information.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. All right. Now, the Fontana Hotel is in Bratunac, is it

14 not?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay, while you were in Bratunac on those many occasions, and from

17 what I read, you visited quite often there, did you ever request to meet

18 with the commander of the Bratunac Brigade? Yes or no. If you can

19 recall.

20 A. I remember a request. Whether it was the Bratunac Brigade or the

21 Drina Corps, it was unclear. But after certain incidents, meetings were

22 requested. There was no affirmative response to those requests.

23 Q. You never made a request, sir. Isn't it a fact you and Colonel

24 Karremans have a meeting with the commander of the Bratunac Brigade?

25 Isn't that a fact?

1 A. I don't know.

2 Q. You never went to the Bratunac Brigade headquarters. Is that

3 correct?

4 A. We weren't allowed there.

5 Q. I didn't ask you whether you were allowed. I'm asking if you

6 went. I'm trying to be precise.

7 A. Yes, so am I.

8 Q. Now, did you make a request, and they said "You're not allowed"?

9 A. Major Nikolic indicated that we were not allowed in the vicinity.

10 Q. Okay. So to the extent that you had any contact with the

11 higher-ups of the Bratunac Brigade, it was through Mr. Nikolic,

12 Major Nikolic?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Right. And so you don't know today for a fact whether Mr. Nikolic

15 was communicating your wishes, your desires, your expectations, to his

16 commander whom you never met in the Bratunac Brigade?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. All right. And might I add you never met the commander of the

19 Bratunac Brigade?

20 A. No, I did not meet him.

21 Q. He was never at those crosspoint meetings that you had when

22 Nikolic would show up with Beara?

23 A. No, that's correct.

24 Q. Now, yesterday, and I need you to work with me on this one, help

25 me out here, please, you indicated that -- you know, you gave a

1 description as to the strength and operational capabilities of the

2 Bratunac Brigade. Today, you tell us you had limited access in Bratunac

3 once you got to Bratunac, though you kept a watchful eye.

4 May I ask, may I ask how many tanks did the Bratunac Brigade have?

5 A. All I know about that is that the enclave was under fire from

6 strong calibre -- high calibre weapons from the mountains, from Bratunac,

7 and that Major Nikolic occasionally stopped by there on patrol, according

8 to what he told me. And whether they were tanks or artillery or tanks

9 firing indirectly, I can't judge that.

10 Q. All right. Let me get this straight now. I'm a little confused.

11 You drew a conclusion yesterday that the Bratunac Brigade had tanks

12 because in your opinion, expert opinion, might I add, as somebody who is

13 an artillery man, indicated that there was firing coming from the Bratunac

14 area.

15 A. Mm-hmm.

16 Q. And from that, you concluded that it must have been or it is, in

17 fact, the case that the firing was done by the Bratunac Brigade, one; and

18 number two, that the Bratunac Brigade had the tanks. Am I correct in

19 making that assumption?

20 A. Yes, and also based on conversations I had at the observation

21 posts with soldiers from the Bratunac Brigade, I often came there and

22 talked extensively with the soldiers there or who had served there.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And you get more information that way.

25 Q. All right. So you weren't just relying on Nikolic; you were going

1 to the soldiers and seeing if you could pry some information out of them.

2 A. We were waiting for Major Nikolic. He didn't show up. And we

3 waited there, and if you spend an hour or two waiting there...

4 Q. You're trying to pry some information out. That's your job. And

5 I take it these soldiers were telling you that the Bratunac Brigade had

6 tanks. Is that your testimony here today?

7 A. They certainly spoke about artillery.

8 Q. Did that mean -- can you equate one with the other? I mean, help

9 me out here. I'm not a military man.

10 Are you posing a question to me? Do you want me to rephrase the

11 question?

12 A. Mm-hmm.

13 Q. Okay. Mm-hmm means yes, I take it.

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. All right. So when they were saying to you about artillery, you

16 took that to mean automatically, exclusively, axiomatically that that

17 meant tanks. Is that correct?

18 A. We can get into technical details about artillery and tanks.

19 Q. Well, I'm not trying to get into any technical details because you

20 are far more a superior expert than I am. But here today, or yesterday,

21 you made an observation to this Honourable Trial Chamber that the Bratunac

22 Brigade had tanks. Now today, I'm trying to figure out whether that was

23 just a misunderstanding on your part; in other words, you assumed that

24 since there may have been volleys from tanks coming from the Bratunac

25 area, that those were from the Bratunac Brigade, or whether in fact you

1 know, having seen, observed, or have documentation showing that the

2 Bratunac Brigade did, in fact, have tanks?

3 A. In the Bratunac Brigade area, when the enclave fell, we were on

4 our way to Fontana. In that neighbourhood, there were enough tanks there.

5 Also along the path before that, through information from UNHCR convoy

6 reported to me that tanks were indeed being delivered to the neighbourhood

7 of Bratunac.

8 Q. Okay, all right. I don't want to seem as if I'm trying to be

9 argumentative, but I'm trying to be specific here. Let's agree that tanks

10 were there, in the area in which you're describing. Can we assume today

11 that the assumption that you are making, because of the location of those

12 tanks, that automatically and exclusively those tanks were from the

13 Bratunac Brigade? Do you know that for a fact?

14 A. No, you don't know that as a fact.

15 Q. Okay. Do you know for a fact how many other units of the VRS were

16 operating in that vicinity? Do you know for a fact?

17 A. Only based on what was reported to me, but not through my personal

18 inspection.

19 Q. When you say reported to you, does that mean afterwards? You

20 know, weeks later, months later, or reported to you at that particular

21 period?

22 A. At that point in time, around that point in time, yes. I have a

23 lot of sources of information.

24 Q. And did those sources of information tell you, sir, that those

25 tanks belonged to the Bratunac Brigade? That's what I'm trying to get at.

1 A. I'm not a specialist in that field, so I cannot give you an

2 affirmative answer.

3 Q. Well, you said yesterday that the Bratunac Brigade, okay, it was a

4 clear structure with sufficient staff and arms in the sense of artillery

5 and tanks. I'm just trying to figure this one out.

6 A. In the area of the Bratunac Brigade, I'm assuming that according

7 to the structure, the Bratunac commander was in charge.

8 Q. So you're making an assumption now? Or yesterday, you made the

9 assumption?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Okay, all right. We're moving along, then. So if I can

12 understand you correctly, based on your observation of the Drina Corps,

13 you, then, deduced that obviously, if the Drina Corps is structured, the

14 Bratunac Brigade must be structured in a like manner, organised in a like

15 manner, staffed in a like manner, and have artillery and tanks in a like

16 manner, for a brigade; not for a corps but for a brigade. Is that

17 correct?

18 A. Yes, you might say that.

19 Q. Okay, so it's an assumption and not a fact that you can tell us

20 with any degree of certainty.

21 A. On my limited perceptions, I cannot judge that 100 per cent.

22 Q. Exactly, nor could you judge with your limited perceptions - and I

23 don't mean this in a despairingly manner - but whether the troops that

24 were firing in Srebrenica or were engaged in battle at that period were,

25 in fact, from the Bratunac Brigade and not from other units, from the main

1 staff or from the Drina Corps --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please not move away from his

3 microphone. Thank you.

4 THE WITNESS: Would you please. It's a little bit mixed up now

5 for me.

6 MR. KARNAVAS:

7 Q. Okay, all right.

8 A. Because I hear the interpreter.

9 Q. With your limited perceptions, could you tell which units belong

10 to -- which soldiers belong to which units at that period of time?

11 A. At the moment the enclave fell, I saw some of the soldiers from

12 the Bratunac Brigade at the observation post that I came to. I saw them

13 operating in the enclave.

14 Q. Okay. Did you see any of them on tanks?

15 A. I did not see them on tanks.

16 Q. All right. I'm going to move on from this section, and we'll go

17 to the BH army, if we could refer to it as an "army" as you've indicated.

18 Can you please give us a rough approximation of how many soldiers were in

19 this particular army in Srebrenica during that period?

20 A. That was not my expertise, in the first place. And secondly, that

21 estimate was often -- our battalion tried to make, and let us say that it

22 was a few hundred.

23 Q. Okay. So in your opinion, it was only a few hundred, which would

24 mean to me less than a thousand.

25 A. Let's say yes, a few hundred, yes.

1 Q. Okay. Now would it be less than 500 or more than 500?

2 A. Well, I never counted them. And let's say a thousand.

3 Q. Okay. But you were there six months, sir, were you not, and you

4 were having regular meetings with Naser Oric and some of his colleagues?

5 A. Mm-hmm.

6 Q. Did you ever ask them, "Tell us how many soldiers you have"?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. Was Zulfo, the individual you referred to in your report,

9 and the one that kept you hostage, was he a soldier or was he just one of

10 these renegades running around doing as he wished in these enclaves?

11 A. I think Zulfo can be characterised as one who was the boss, fully

12 the boss in a limited area.

13 Q. In that area, he would be over Naser Oric. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes. Certainly in the period when we were there.

15 Q. All right. Now, Naser Oric was the commander, was he not?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you had several meetings with him?

18 A. Not so often. Perhaps twice.

19 Q. Perhaps twice. In living in Srebrenica area, did you get an

20 opportunity to form an opinion based on information that you had been

21 gathering regarding the character of Naser Oric?

22 A. He's a commander.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And likes being a commander.

25 Q. All right. Okay. Was that -- that's the extent of the

1 information that you gathered?

2 A. Of course, there is more information about him.

3 Q. I'm asking you what information -- what did you receive about him,

4 how would you characterise him, what was he up to?

5 A. Someone who was difficult to fathom and it was unclear whether he

6 was concerned with military matters only, that money matters were also

7 involved.

8 Q. In the sense of black marketeering?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Siphoning off the humanitarian aid that was being provided to the

11 residents of Srebrenica so he could sell it on the black market for his

12 own gains?

13 A. I couldn't tell.

14 Q. I beg your pardon?

15 A. I cannot tell.

16 Q. Okay. During this period, Naser Oric wasn't there; right?

17 A. During a specific period at the end, he was no longer there.

18 That's right.

19 Q. And who were you dealing with with respect to the BH army?

20 A. Especially Ramic, and when he wasn't there, it was Ekrem.

21 Q. That's the security and intelligence captain. Right?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. Very well.

24 I have some documents here I'd like to share with you. And

25 perhaps you can help me out. We received these from the Office of the

1 Prosecution. If you can take a look at that, sir, for a second, I'd

2 appreciate it. And if you can look -- it's pretty short. Just give it a

3 quick look, and then I'll go section by section.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: For the record, the number on the top is R0050415.

5 Q. Have you ever seen this document before, sir?

6 A. No, I don't remember this document. But UNMO does make reports

7 that I have seen from time to time.

8 Q. Right. And you indicated that UNMO were the military observers?

9 A. They were actually present within the enclave, a number of them.

10 Q. And they were there to observe and gather intelligence or

11 information?

12 A. Yes, inside as well as outside the enclave. But outside, they

13 were not welcome.

14 Q. Right. Well, they weren't really welcomed inside either.

15 A. They could move around freely there.

16 Q. They can go to the Bandera area freely while DutchBat could not.

17 Is that what you're suggesting?

18 A. They had a little more freedom there.

19 Q. Okay. So I take it they were never taken hostage?

20 A. I don't remember.

21 Q. Okay. Now, under -- in the first page, at least -- it would be

22 the second page of this, it's dated, as you note, 7 July, 1995. And at

23 the last page, page 5, it's signed by a PHD Wright, MIO, SNE, whatever

24 that stands for. On number 2, it talks about the ABiH corps. Now, says

25 the 2nd Corps. 28th Division was part of the 2nd corps, was it not?

1 A. I don't know.

2 Q. Okay. Well, it does make a description here. It says: "It is

3 worthy of note that the ABiH within Srebrenica and Zepa, although poorly

4 armed and probably not that much less in number than the total number of

5 infantry in the Drina Corps." "Probably not much less in number."

6 Now, let me ask you, before I ask you whether you agree or

7 disagree with this, the UNMO, are they a reliable bunch? Can we trust

8 their observations?

9 A. Yes, and their reports, too.

10 Q. Okay. So they have a certain amount of credibility to be tested,

11 at least, in this trial.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. Now, would you agree or disagree with this statement:

14 "That the ABiH within Srebrenica and Zepa, although poorly armed are

15 probably not that much less in number than the total number of infantry in

16 the Drina Corps"?

17 A. I know nothing at all about Zepa. So without getting Zepa

18 involved, and this is a report to Tuzla with information also from outside

19 the enclave concerning other infantry units of the Drina Corps, so I can't

20 say anything at all about this.

21 Q. Okay. Well, let's go down to number 6. Maybe you can help us

22 there on that one. It says: "Naser Oric, commander of the 28th division,

23 was reported to be in Tuzla last week and being prevented from returning

24 to the enclave by ABiH" and it gives the following reasons. "A, Oric

25 treats Srebrenica as his personal fief, does not follow the orders of

1 either the government or the army if it conflicts with his personal

2 interests. He is reputed to have made a fortune through his control of

3 the economy and must -- and this must involve dealings with the BSA,

4 that's the VRS, the Serb army. It is, therefore, in the interests -- it

5 is therefore in his interest to keep the enclave quiet." "B, he's an

6 embarrassment of the BiH government, and he is suspected of being a war

7 criminal."

8 Having lived in Srebrenica for six months, having met with

9 Mr. Oric, having been part of that community, having been watchful and

10 observant and engaging in trying to gather information in your capacity as

11 a liaison officer, is this -- what do you think of this? Is this correct?

12 A. These are possibilities.

13 Q. Okay. Okay, now I want to take you back -- I'll go through just a

14 little bit more of this. It does talk about the purpose of the attack.

15 And there are two options. Right?

16 A. What paragraph are you referring to?

17 Q. I'm referring to paragraph 10. I apologise. Option 1, conquer

18 Srebrenica enclave; option 2, neutralise Srebrenica enclave. Okay.

19 A. Mm-hmm.

20 Q. And then it says that option 2 would be more logical choice in

21 military -- for political, military, and personal terms. Okay. Then I

22 want to go to the conclusion, paragraph 18. It says: "ABiH will be happy

23 for enclave to be shelled as it gives media coverage and

24 replaces `Sarajevo, the marred city'. To this end, the 28th Division can

25 expect to be ordered to carry out patrols and provoke the BSA; however,

1 Oric's whereabouts will continue to provide a clue to ABiH policy."

2 What is your opinion of that, sir?

3 A. To me, this is an unknown conclusion, and I cannot endorse it just

4 like that.

5 Q. All right. Well I'm not asking you to endorse it, but am I

6 correct to assume from your previous answer that the UNMO had more access

7 to information than you did, and from your own indication, I could rely or

8 we could rely, to some extent, on their reports? In other words, we just

9 cannot outright dismiss their reports.

10 A. Mm-hmm.

11 Q. Okay. Now, I want to show you another report. That was from --

12 this is from July 9th. The interpreters may want a copy.

13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Ms. Sinatra.

14 MS. SINATRA: Yes, Your Honour, I was just wondering whether

15 Mr. Karnavas has any copies in B/C/S of this evidence that has been in his

16 possession, I suppose, for a while, or if the Prosecution has B/C/S

17 copies.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, these documents were disclosed to me

19 as they were disclosed to Ms. Sinatra.

20 MS. SINATRA: I'm not arguing about that. I'm just asking if

21 there are any B/C/S copies available.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: The Prosecutor would know about that.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

24 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, it's very unlikely because we are not

25 required to translate these documents into B/C/S, and there are literally

1 tens of thousands of these UN situation reports. So we can certainly

2 check, but it's extremely unlikely that we have it in B/C/S.

3 JUDGE LIU: Well, all those documents were disclosed to the

4 Defence team. Right?

5 MS. SINATRA: Yes, Your Honour.

6 MR. KARNAVAS:

7 Q. If you could take a look at that, and I want to apologise to the

8 French booth. Apparently we did not make enough copies.

9 I want to focus your attention particularly to page 5 and page 6.

10 And for the record, the numbers of the document begin with R0037477 and

11 they end with R0037490.

12 Do you -- have you had a chance to look at it? Would you like

13 some more time?

14 A. I've found the page.

15 Q. Okay. If I could direct your attention to the page 5, the top of

16 it you'll see page 5 of 12.

17 A. Yes, I've found it.

18 Q. At the bottom it states, it has a number R0037483.

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. If you could look where it says "military assessment," just read

21 that very quickly, first, second, third, and fourth paragraphs, and then

22 we'll go to the next page. We'll go page by page. When you're ready, let

23 me know.

24 A. I read it quickly.

25 Q. Okay. Now, just for the record, do you know what this document

1 is? Or do you have an idea? Look at the front page; that might help you.

2 A. It is a Sitrep, only I don't know from whom. It's from General

3 Janvier.

4 Q. How did you characterise it again?

5 A. A situation report.

6 Q. Okay, all right. Okay. A situation report. Now -- and this has,

7 it says on top of it, UNPF. Do you know what that stands for, United

8 Nations Peacekeeping Force?

9 A. Mm-hmm.

10 Q. And it says HQ, that means headquarter?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. And Zagreb, that's where the headquarters were?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay, so this is a UN-generated document?

15 A. But the page you were referring to is a Sitrep, and at the top it

16 says "From UNPROFOR, internal distribution."

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. So I think it was meant for internal use only.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. For G2.

21 Q. Okay. And I see they used a G3. Is that similar to the G3 you

22 were talking about earlier?

23 A. It says G2 here, to that's reconnaissance, intelligence.

24 Q. Okay, intelligence. And in your opinion, this was generated by

25 UNPROFOR?

1 A. A Sitrep from UNPROFOR.

2 Q. And who are UNPROFOR, just so I'm clear on this?

3 A. That was the military boss, so to speak, in all of Bosnia.

4 Q. And that was -- and you were --

5 A. And Croatia. In Yugoslavia, let me put it that way.

6 Q. And I take it the DutchBat were subordinated to them?

7 A. Yes, we were, through a structure.

8 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, it says military assessment. And it

9 gives an assessment, and it says: "Reduce the size of the enclave in

10 order to be able to free assets for use in other conflict areas,

11 north-east Sarajevo, et cetera, this can be achieved by capturing key

12 terrain along the perimeter of the enclave." That's what it says. That's

13 what they believed at the time; right? And the date is 9 July 1995.

14 And further down, it says: "Eliminate the threat of BiH

15 harassment, patrols, ambushes, from the enclave and increase the control

16 over the enclave." Is that correct?

17 A. That's what it says.

18 Q. Now, if you flip the next page, that would be page 6, and I'm

19 referring to the third paragraph from the top, it says: "The Bosnian

20 Serbs could halt their advance pending a number of conditions, a complete

21 demilitarisation of the enclave will probably be their highest priority.

22 This would serve the primary goal of freeing troops from around the

23 enclave." All right, so I think here the UN acknowledges that the enclave

24 is not demilitarised, as you've indicated to us from your own

25 observations. And then it says: "The BiH will continue to try to block

1 DutchBat in their OPs," I take it that means operations, "or in positions

2 in front of the BiH. It would involve the use of force, they can colocate

3 within UN positions to use them as human shields. This might provoke a

4 reaction from the BSA with a risk for UN personnel to get caught in

5 crossfire between both factions. The BiH is likely to attempt to capture

6 weapons and vehicles from DutchBat to compensate for their lack of

7 armament." So that was an assessment that was made by your colleagues

8 within the intelligence community of the UN on the ground in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time. Is that correct?

10 A. As you say.

11 Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion with respect to that?

12 A. That last part didn't happen. They didn't capture weapons and

13 vehicles from us.

14 Q. Right. But nonetheless, that was a concern.

15 A. I just give you a fact that it didn't happen. I said it didn't

16 happen.

17 Q. I understand it didn't happen. And my retort was, but that was a

18 concern. Right? Something else happened, if I may, you know, move ahead

19 a little bit or jump ahead, and that was the killing of a Dutch soldier by

20 the Muslim army in Srebrenica. Right?

21 A. I remember that incident.

22 Q. Okay, well, we'll talk about that. But further down, it says, not

23 the next paragraph but the following one: "Similar to what happened in

24 Gorazde, spring 1994, BiH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR, including the RRF,

25 or NATO, into the conflict on BH side. Sudden abandoning of positions

1 along the confrontation line, the simulation of the collapse of the

2 enclave or alarming reports from the Bosnian side on the situation in the

3 enclave will be indicators for this. Stronger involvement of

4 international community could be interpreted by the BSA as an incentive to

5 step up operations and try to eliminate the enclave as well as retaliate

6 against UN forces."

7 Do you have an opinion about that, sir?

8 A. It is a possibility.

9 Q. Now, at some point, because of the rules of engagement, it was

10 necessary to ensure that the VRS was actually shooting at the DutchBat, or

11 in order to activate the airstrikes. Is that correct, or am I getting it

12 wrong a little bit? Close air protection, that's what I mean by that.

13 A. It was one of the possibilities of air support.

14 Q. Right. In order to get air support, or close air support, a

15 number of things had to happen. Right?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay. In fact, Colonel Karremans had promised the army that was

18 in Srebrenica that there would be close air support or airstrikes -- and

19 incidentally, they more or less look the same, don't they, when you're on

20 the ground? When you're on the receiving end?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. And so from the ground where you were, you had to indicate to your

23 higher-ups that that you're under fire, and therefore you could get the

24 close air support.

25 A. Yes, there was such a relationship.

1 Q. Right. And in fact, you testified in the previous trial that on

2 one occasion, in order to create a provocation or in order to get the air

3 support, you coordinated with members of the Muslim army to drive up to an

4 area where they would be shot at in order to give the pretext of placing

5 the call to get the airstrikes. Do you recall that?

6 A. What you're referring to is not quite correct.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. If it was really an attack within the enclave by Serbian troops,

9 these troops had to be recognised, and their intentions had to be

10 recognised as being aggressive.

11 Q. Right.

12 A. And therefore, another verification had to take place, and that's

13 an entirely different word than "provocation".

14 Q. Okay. Let me rephrase it, then, and correct me if I'm wrong.

15 There were some conditions necessary in order to get air support, right,

16 in order to get NATO, whoever it was, to come over and bomb the positions

17 of the Serbs. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes, there were.

19 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Waespi.

20 MR. WAESPI: Yes, Mr. President. If counsel is referring to the

21 transcript of his Krstic testimony, I think it would be fair to show it to

22 the witness, perhaps quote it word by word, since he already said that it

23 wasn't correct what he had put to him.

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I think that's a reasonable request.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. If I may have a moment.

1 Your Honour, I must apologise for not having an extra copy, but I would be

2 more than happy to share my copy through the usher. It's even underlined.

3 It's convenient for the witness to read, if he could look at it. You may

4 need to flip through the previous page to get the whole context.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've read it.

6 MR. KARNAVAS:

7 Q. Do you still need the transcript?

8 A. Do you have any additional questions about it?

9 Q. I do. But let me see if I can get a hold of... In fact, I can

10 get the page -- the relevant page for you. I have it right here.

11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Ms. Sinatra, you want to help?

12 MS. SINATRA: Yes, Your Honour, I have an extra copy he can use

13 until our next break if he would like.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: I have it right here, Your Honour. I'm trying to

15 catch my staff unprepared.

16 Q. Now, I'm referring to page 1.156. I don't know if our colleagues

17 from the Prosecution have it handy, but...

18 It says on line 4 that there was a question. It says -- this was

19 a question posed by the Prosecutor to you. I think it was by the

20 Prosecutor. Yes. It says: "So Colonel Karremans guaranteed to the

21 Muslims that there would be close air support. Was there any condition

22 placed on that air support being" --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel slow down when reading,

24 please.

25 MR. KARNAVAS:

1 Q. "Was there any condition placed on that air support actually

2 being provided to the enclave?" And the answer is: "Would you please

3 repeat the question." Question: "Did Colonel Karremans say that anything

4 had to happen before the air support would be given?" Answer: "Must be

5 clear at that moment that we were, we or the Muslim enclave, should be

6 attacked by Serbs, and there must be a kind of visible contact with them.

7 For that reason, we must first be on the spot." Question: "Did you or

8 any Dutch officer take action to ensure that an actual contact took place

9 between Bosnian Serb army and DutchBat, or Muslims within the enclave?"

10 Answer: "Yes, I did. I contacted military men, the Muslims, and he

11 himself drove, say, into the Serb position. He came back, and he was shot

12 at. His car was shot at. I remember." You were asked: "How did you

13 feel sending the man -- sending the Muslim male in a vehicle to be shot at

14 by the Bosnian Serb army?" And of course, your answer was: "Of course it

15 was not comfortable to do that." "Was he armed at all, this man?"

16 Answer: "When he drove in his car to that position, I didn't see him step

17 into his car and driving, so I don't know." Question: "Now, you say that

18 he was shot at. Did anything actually happen to him? Was he injured?"

19 Answer: "He himself was not injured."

20 So my question to you now that we've refreshed your memory with

21 what you stated under oath at the Krstic trial, you needed to have

22 contact. Right? And so -- and you needed to be on the spot.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. And we've already indicated that at least -- when we first started

25 I showed you or I read to you a report that came from the Dutch Institute

1 that Muslims dressed in UN uniforms would pose and shoot at -- would pose

2 as DutchBat and shoot at the VRS in order to provoke an attack. In this

3 instance, in essence, you're trying to do the same, are you not? Sending

4 someone to the front line to be shot at so you can look at it, observe it,

5 see that there's contact, so then you can call in to your bosses and say

6 "Send in the planes, strike the VRS forces on the ground." Is that a

7 correct characterisation?

8 A. No, that is not a correct account.

9 Q. Okay. Is there anything that you stated during the Krstic trial

10 that I read from inaccurate?

11 A. No, you did not do that.

12 Q. Okay. Well, I know -- well, I tried not to be inaccurate in

13 reading it --

14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

15 MR. WAESPI: I think the witness was just pausing to explain what

16 he --

17 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Witness, if you want to explain to us, please do

19 so.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: It's very difficult, Your Honour, from this angle.

21 I don't mean to be disrespectful to the witness.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I wanted to add was that Ramic

23 indicated on several occasions in this case as far as I can remember that

24 he said "Hey, we have been attacked," that the battalion indicated once

25 again there's got to be proof. And that this should be the ultimate proof

1 for air support was one of the reasons for demonstrating that there were

2 troops in the enclave.

3 MR. KARNAVAS:

4 Q. But in this instance, the conclusion that I draw from your own

5 words, that you placed yourself in a location and had the Muslim soldier

6 drive up to the line to be shot at. Because later on, you're asked a

7 question by none other than the Prosecution, who I assume briefed you in

8 advance and knew of the incident in order to ask you the question, and

9 they asked you "How did you feel?" Because obviously, as a human being

10 and as a professional soldier, it must have been a very difficult decision

11 for you to ask someone, albeit not a Dutch soldier, but to ask someone to

12 drive up to be shot at so later on you can contact the headquarters and

13 say "There has been contact, and let's get the close air support."

14 A. The last part, "let's get close air support" --

15 Q. That's the part you disagree?

16 A. Yes, that's one. And second, did I actually said it's not

17 indicated in the Krstic report because there was indeed one person who was

18 seriously injured and who was transported to the hospital. I do remember

19 that.

20 Q. Okay. All right. If we could move on to another area --

21 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas, it's time for a break.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE LIU: If you are moving to another area, we better take the

24 break right now. But before that, could you indicate how much time are

25 you going to need to finish your cross-examination. It's just with

1 arrangements of the next witness.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand, Your Honour. I can -- I'm going as

3 fast as I can.

4 JUDGE LIU: Of course.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: And in light of yesterday where I was caught a

6 little bit off guard and not being as diligent as I should have been, I'm

7 trying to be a little more thorough today. I can safely that the

8 gentleman should not check out of his hospital room tonight if he doesn't

9 live in The Hague because I think I'm going to need the rest of the

10 period. It may be a little bit tomorrow, Your Honour, because there were

11 some doors opened by the Prosecution. I'm trying to make it all relevant.

12 And of course, throughout the proceedings, you will see that all of this

13 will be tied in.

14 JUDGE LIU: I just hope you could make the best use of your time.

15 We'll resume at quarter to 6.00.

16 --- Recess taken at 5.16 p.m.

17 --- On resuming at 5.49 p.m.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas, please continue.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Major, I would now like to show you a letter that was provided

21 from Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan. And if you could take a quick look at it.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: For the record, it's numbered R0080307, and it ends

23 with R0080309. It's dated 12 July, 1995. It was provided to us by the

24 Office of the Prosecution.

25 Q. If you could take a look at that.

1 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President.

2 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

3 MR. WAESPI: Just for clarification purposes, is the Defence

4 proposing those as trial exhibits, Defence exhibits, and I think for ease

5 of reference it would be good to mark them so we can discuss it, perhaps

6 identify, mark them for identification.

7 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I think that's a good idea. If the Defence

8 counsel introduces a lot of documents, we better have a mark on them, and

9 then later on it's easy for us to consider whether it should be admitted

10 into evidence or not.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE LIU: And we also instructed both parties to provide a list

13 of the documents you might use during the direct examination and the

14 cross-examination. Of course, we understand it is a little bit difficult

15 for the Defence to provide us with a list of the documents used in their

16 cross-examination because you could not anticipate what kind of documents

17 you are going to use. But anyway, to facilitate the work, we are

18 expecting that a list of the documents you are going to use.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. I do apologise. Normally,

20 I wouldn't mark it for identification purposes. And again, I apologise.

21 It won't reoccur. The question is where do we go from here for the rest

22 of the day? Do I -- should I just go ahead and then at the end of the day

23 perhaps meet with Madam Registrar here?

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, it's a very good idea.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Again, I apologise to everyone, and I thank

1 the Prosecution for bringing it to my attention.

2 Q. If you could look, sir, to the first paragraph, paragraph number

3 1, again, this is dated July 12th. It says: "Under the circumstances,

4 you may wish to consider the merit of the Secretary-General addressing a

5 letter to the Council which would warn of the dangers of raising

6 unrealistic expectations and remind the Council of those serious issues

7 which he has drawn their attention in the past which events in Srebrenica

8 have again brought into focus."

9 If we flip to the following page, under paragraph number 3, in

10 particular, 3(b), and then 3(c), 3(b) states -- okay, well 3 starts with:

11 "In his report, the Secretary-General has drawn attention to the problems

12 of the safe area regime in the following areas: (b), use of the safe

13 areas by the Bosnian government for military purposes." By that I take

14 it, sir, Major, what they mean is that the Bosnian military, the BiH

15 military or the Muslim military - and I don't mean that in any derogatory

16 sense, but that military that was in Srebrenica - was using the enclave as

17 a staging ground or as a basis from which to launch military operations.

18 I think that's what they're referring to. Would that be a correct

19 assessment of what they mean by this?

20 A. A safe area, a place where they could be as military safe.

21 Q. Well, it says "Use the safe areas by the Bosnian government for,"

22 for, for, and I underscore "for military purposes."

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So you agree with my interpretation, they are using the enclave as

25 a basis as an area from which they can operate, which would mean outside,

1 you know, going outwards, not inwards?

2 A. It's a problem. Draw attention to, it's a problem.

3 Q. Okay. And then "(c), provocation and attacks from within the safe

4 areas." Okay, so in other words, if I understand this correct,

5 Mr. Akashi, and you do know who Mr. Akashi was at the time?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Who was he just for the record?

8 A. Akashi was in charge of UNPROFOR.

9 Q. He was the head -- he was the head of the UN mission basically

10 dealing with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 A. Mm-hmm.

12 Q. And he was out of Zagreb; right?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. And where it says "Annan," do you know who we're talking about,

15 which Annan?

16 A. He's in New York.

17 Q. Well, it says New York here. Do you know who he is?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Who might that be?

20 A. The Secretary-General.

21 Q. Okay. Of the United Nations?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. And so then if we go to number 4, it says: "As for the

24 demilitarisation of safe areas, the Secretary-General should remind the

25 Security Council that it took a year following events in Gorazde for the

1 consul to refer to `mutually agreed demilitarisation of the safe areas and

2 their surroundings' in SCR998." I suspect that means Security Council

3 Resolution 998. Right?

4 A. For me rather difficult English to read. It's difficult to

5 understand, and I don't ordinarily encounter such technical language. No

6 comment.

7 Q. Okay. Well, if I could then show you something that was generated

8 by UNMO headquarters on July 26th, 1995, maybe it's more in military terms

9 and more akin to what you're used to reading, albeit in English and not

10 Dutch. For the record, the first page has a number on it, R0050422, and

11 the entire package goes all the way through R0050433.

12 I want to direct your attention - I'll walk you through this -

13 first part is paragraph 6 on the first page. It says: "ABiH

14 leadership" --

15 A. Would you tell me the origins and status of this document.

16 Q. Well, this is a document given to me from the Office of the

17 Prosecution. And this is the manner in which I received it. And it says

18 up here: "UNMO headquarters, SNE." I don't know what that is?

19 A. Sector North-East maybe.

20 Q. Well, you would know more so than I would. But at page 6, sir, it

21 seems that our friend that we encountered earlier, PHD Wright, and I take

22 it he's a major, same rank as you, UNMO, MIO, SNE. Okay, so if you could

23 help me out a little bit.

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are having a little bit of

25 trouble following without documents.

1 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.

2 Q. Let me go through the first page. It talks about ABiH leadership.

3 And it says that Oric was a charismatic commander of Srebrenica, and he

4 was not allowed to return by either the BiH government or the 2nd Corps.

5 Then it says: "By reasoning in reference A that's above, it maybe false

6 and it was instead a deliberate attempt to weaken the 28th division.

7 Whatever the reasons, it certainly succeeded in doing so according to UN

8 reports which claim that the local commanders seemed incapable of taking

9 any decisive action."

10 From this, we could gather that Naser Oric was a major component

11 of the 28th Division, as its commander, and that 28th Division was, in

12 fact, operating from within the enclave during the period while you were

13 there. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes. Yes, you could read it that way.

15 Q. Could you read it that way, too? I know I'm reading it this way.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Okay. So you agree with me?

18 A. Mm-hmm.

19 Q. That means yes?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. All right. Now, if we could go -- if we could go to the second

22 page, I guess. Now we are at paragraph A, talks about the strength of the

23 BSA. In paragraph B, talks about the strength of the ABiH. And here,

24 their assessment is "Not known, however, the usual estimate of 10 per cent

25 of population would give a force of approximately 4.000. It was not clear

1 before the attack whether all were armed, but it was believed that at

2 least half had SA." What does SA mean? "As well as HMG, LTMOR, anti-tank

3 weapons including RPGs and more modern ones. (Certainly all capable of

4 destroying the tanks against them). There are reports that many of these

5 weapons were thrown away during the march of friendly lines because of the

6 weight." And then it has a comment: "This suggests a collapse of

7 discipline and little control not least because such weapons could have

8 been cached for future use by guerrilla parties." And then the comment

9 ends.

10 Now, would that be a correct assessment based on your six months

11 in Srebrenica, that they had a force of approximately, if the estimate was

12 10 per cent, 4.000?

13 A. Not so long ago, I said about 1.000. And if it reads 4.000 here,

14 then that's his estimate.

15 Q. Well, if I may, and I don't want to dispute with you here, but as

16 I recall, you said in the hundreds. And then wanting to make you a little

17 more precise, I said could it be, you know, less than 500, more than 500.

18 And as I recall --

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Waespi.

20 MR. WAESPI: I think the witness clearly answered and said

21 thousand. And he also answered the second question saying that the 4.000

22 number was the estimate of whoever wrote this report.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I don't think there's any dispute about that.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. I apologise.

25 Q. All right. If we could go to paragraph 11, paragraph 11 says:

1 "ABiH withdrawal." Okay, are you there?

2 A. I'm there.

3 Q. "Rumours of the ABiH fighting their way out began to be reported

4 by 11 July with the final meeting between Ramiz and UN the night before."

5 I take it you're the UN that they're talking about.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. And Ramiz is who, again?

8 A. At the time, he was the military leader.

9 Q. You mean he had replaced Naser Oric?

10 A. And when Naser was there, he was chief of staff.

11 Q. Okay. And then it says: "However the town of Srebrenica was only

12 entered that day. For a large body of men from all the over the enclave

13 to start such an operation, the planning and forming up must have started

14 sometime earlier." And then it gives two possibilities. Possibility 1:

15 "ABiH was planning to withdraw long before the situation necessitated it,

16 and it's supported by the seemingly poor resistance put up by the ABiH."

17 And then B, "The breakup was not planned, but rather carried out by small

18 groups resulting in fighting, ambushes in the west and northwest as troops

19 from the east side tried to get through."

20 And then it goes on, and this is something I'm kind of curious,

21 perhaps you can help us out here with: "An interesting footnote to this

22 withdrawal is a well-sourced report from Hakija, chief of police, Oric's

23 henchman, and possible war criminal, escaped with 56 of his men leaving

24 some who volunteered to stay and fight." So from this, can I conclude

25 that the chief of police --

1 JUDGE ARGIBAY: Sorry, Mr. Karnavas, may I interrupt you a minute.

2 In the paper you send us, it says "Is a well-sourced report that Hakija,"

3 not from Hakija.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise, Your Honour. "Is a well-sourced

5 report that..."

6 JUDGE ARGIBAY: It's different.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Because we're talking about Hakija himself.

8 Q. "That he escaped with 56 of his men, leaving some who volunteered

9 to stay and fight." And then it goes on: "This seems a large percentage

10 from an approximate total of 120 who, considering they were meant to be

11 keeping law and order." The question I'm asking is was the police in

12 Srebrenica also armed like a military? Or were they merely police

13 officers carrying their usual weapon, if you are aware?

14 A. I can't remember that. I believe they were allowed to have only

15 very limited arms, and they had to perform their duties as policemen.

16 Q. Okay. Did you ever have any contact with this gentleman Hakija?

17 A. Not directly.

18 Q. Does that mean that you had contact with him indirectly?

19 A. My colleague was there for the initial contacts. He was also a

20 liaison officer. He did meet with Hakija on a few occasions. And at a

21 certain point, the military police took over.

22 Q. Okay, but he was not military police; he was regular police?

23 A. The UN, the military police that supervised him.

24 Q. Right. And it says here "Oric's henchman." You know what a

25 henchman is?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. If you could give us your definition of a henchman, so we have at

3 least a standard by which to go by.

4 A. Somebody who does somebody else's dirty work.

5 Q. All right. And it says "war criminal." So from this could we at

6 least assume that the author of this was led to believe that Hakija,

7 Oric's henchman, was involved in war crimes?

8 A. It reads here "possible".

9 Q. Well, that's what I -- yeah. Finally, on paragraph 12, it has the

10 conclusion. And it says: "The advantages militarily seem to have been

11 with the defenders, they at least hold out for rather longer and have

12 inflicted greater losses on the BSA than believed. However, the ABiH

13 leadership seems to have actually acted against their own interests to

14 carry out a successful defence with little coordination, except possibly

15 in withdrawal and no attempt to seize any heavy weapons held by the UN

16 whilst more junior individuals have been allowed to make their own

17 decisions and run."

18 Now, it's this conclusion that I'm rather interested in. Having

19 been there on the ground, you will know perhaps --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Excuse me, please. Could I just finish

21 translating this for the witness.

22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.

23 MR. KARNAVAS:

24 Q. Okay. Now, in the conclusion, it says "The advantages militarily

25 seem to have been with the defenders..." I take it by "defenders" they

1 mean the ABiH army was in the enclave at the time it was supposed to be

2 demilitarised. Right?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. So it was a fairly large force that was inside?

5 A. It says "defenders" here. There's nothing about the size.

6 Q. Okay. They had the advantage militarily.

7 A. Yes, they had -- the advantage of the terrain when you're

8 defending.

9 Q. All right. So from that, you cannot conclude that the size, but

10 merely they had a geographical advantage?

11 A. Yes, the terrain is a very important element there.

12 Q. Of course. And from there, because they had the advantage of the

13 terrain, a smaller force could pin down a much larger force like the Drina

14 Corps. And with the UN protection, can raid Serb villages, burn down Serb

15 houses, kill Serb civilians in order to provoke; and then run back in

16 under the protection of the UN and also have this physical or geographical

17 advantage given the terrain. Do you understand my question?

18 A. I don't see that mentioned here under item 12.

19 Q. I didn't say it was in item 12.

20 A. I don't see what you're heading for.

21 Q. Okay. Let me help you out here, then. You've indicated that

22 based on this conclusion, what you can conclude from it that when they say

23 that they had the advantage, the defenders had the advantage, by that, you

24 understand it to mean because of the geographical position, the terrain, a

25 smaller force could, in fact, have an advantage over a larger force. Is

1 that correct?

2 A. Yeah, so far.

3 Q. Okay, so far. So far so good. Now, we add the element of the UN

4 protecting this enclave. And what I am suggesting is that another

5 conclusion could also be drawn, and that is that from this enclave where

6 you have UN protection, a smaller force could use it as a staging ground

7 of going out, committing war crimes, committing atrocities, committing

8 crimes against humanity, and then run in under the safety of the UN flag,

9 and also having the advantage of the physical terrain.

10 A. What do you mean by that?

11 Q. Okay. What do I mean by that? Well, what I'm suggesting, sir, is

12 that while you were there, there was a significant -- there was a

13 significant Muslim, Bosnian army presence in Srebrenica.

14 A. As I said before, about a thousand men.

15 Q. Well, that's your interpretation, and we have another one that

16 could be as high as 4.000 from here.

17 A. But you're asking for my interpretation.

18 Q. I understand. But as you indicated earlier, and correct me if I'm

19 wrong as you did earlier, this report was generated by the military

20 observers who had access to information and access to terrain that you did

21 not have. Right?

22 A. Yes, but they had not been into the enclave, those who made this

23 report.

24 Q. You know this gentleman in particular, so are you discrediting his

25 report entirely, the report that he sent to his superiors?

1 A. I'm telling you what my opinion is about it.

2 Q. All right. So you differ with his opinion.

3 A. I mentioned a thousand men.

4 Q. Okay. Now, but we can agree that the physical terrain gave the

5 advantage to those men that were in, whatever the number may be, gave the

6 advantage to them.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. Now, I take it if it was an advantage to defend, it must

9 also have been an advantage to go out, commit crimes, provoke, and then

10 run back in under the protection of the terrain, the same terrain that

11 gave them the defensive advantage?

12 A. No, I would not confirm that conclusion.

13 Q. Okay. Then perhaps you can explain why is it that they were going

14 out repeatedly, committing crimes as late as June 26, 1995, and then

15 running back into the enclave under the protection of the UN flag when

16 this entire area was supposed to be demilitarised as of 1993, and we're

17 talking middle of 1995. What is your explanation for that?

18 A. According to me, I already gave you that explanation.

19 Q. Very well. You're not denying the fact that there was a large

20 presence, military presence, in the enclave at that time.

21 A. I told you already.

22 Q. Okay. And it's your understanding that they just had very few

23 weapons, these folks that were in there, very light?

24 A. No, I said they had arms, but no heavy arms.

25 Q. No heavy arms.

1 A. Particularly tanks and artillery.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I already told you so.

4 Q. Now, if we could go to the -- I would like to cover with you as

5 the last part of this area some conclusions that were drawn from the

6 Krstic trial. And I have copies of the paragraphs that I'm going to be

7 referring to. I have an extra copy if you need.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: There's enough for the interpreters. We have some

9 extra copies.

10 For the record, I'm referring to the Krstic judgement, and they

11 are paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.

12 Q. If you could just give it a quick look, sir, and then let us know.

13 A. I've read it.

14 Q. Okay. If we could go through it very quickly, paragraph 21, it

15 states that there were between a thousand to 2.000 soldiers from three

16 Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave. Would that be your

17 estimation?

18 A. The number, we already discussed. And the units I already

19 indicated.

20 Q. I'm talking about -- it says -- this is talking about the VRS.

21 A. The VRS with the tanks and the artillery.

22 Q. Now, it says that "Some extended supports, which you've indicated

23 earlier, that the unit of the ABiH, 28th Division, was not well organised

24 or equipped." It goes on to say: "A firm command structure and

25 communication system was lacking. The Trial Chamber, however, said that

1 it heard evidence that the 28th Division was not as weak as they had been

2 portrayed in some quarters. Certainly, the number of men in the 28th

3 Division outnumbered those in the Drina Corps, and reconnaissance and

4 sabotage activities were carried out on a regular basis against the VRS

5 forces in the area." This would seem to contradict what you indicated

6 yesterday when you described the sizes of the two armies, and in

7 particular, in your remark as you indicated "if we could call it that,"

8 that is, the --

9 A. It all depends what you call a soldier. When it's a farmer

10 carrying a weapon or someone in a nice uniform and having a good weapon,

11 that's decisive for how you count them. And I base myself on a thousand,

12 well-armed and well-addressed personnel.

13 Q. Okay. Now those --

14 A. Possibly another 3.000, if they existed, may have been of the

15 other type.

16 Q. Okay. Paragraph 22, I think we all agree it says "Both parties to

17 the conflict violated the safe area agreement." You would agree with

18 that. Right?

19 A. Yes, at least from within the enclave, there has also been a

20 problem with a possible Serbian attack. But there is no clear evidence.

21 Q. Well, it says here "both parties" meaning both the Serbian side

22 and the Muslim side. Right?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. But today, we have been primarily talking about the Muslim side,

25 you know, and their violating the agreement by maintaining a militarised

1 enclave.

2 Now, in paragraph 23, the Court apparently heard testimony from

3 General Halilovic. Have you ever heard of this individual?

4 A. I never met him. And my remembrance is not that big, but I think

5 he's one of the leaders.

6 Q. So you've heard of him?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. And he testified, and he indicated that he ordered members of ABiH

9 in Srebrenica to pull all armoured personnel and military equipment out of

10 the newly established demilitarised zone, but that he also ordered that no

11 serviceable weapons or ammunitions be handed over to UNPROFOR. So in

12 other words, if the weapon was operational, it shouldn't be turned over.

13 Right?

14 A. That's what it says.

15 Q. Okay. Well, that's what he testified to.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay. And I take it from your observations you were able to see

18 serviceable weapons by the Muslim army within the enclave?

19 A. As soon as we saw them, we were supposed to seize them. That was

20 our policy.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. So large quantities of arms of sufficient quality, I have not

23 seen, I have not witnessed.

24 Q. Okay. There was a cache, though, there was a place where they

25 were store weapons, was there not?

1 A. Yeah. On the compound of the bravo company.

2 Q. Were those nice and shiny out of the box kind of weapons, or were

3 they more antiques, not serviceable as General Halilovic seems to

4 indicate?

5 A. Partially, partially antique, and partially usable. Arms that we

6 seized also went there.

7 Q. Okay. Now, in paragraph 24, it says that "The Trial Chamber had

8 credible and largely uncontested evidence of a consistent refusal by the

9 Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to demilitarise the safe area."

10 I take it you would not disagree with that conclusion that was reached by

11 the Trial Chamber in the Krstic judgement.

12 A. Just a moment, please. I understand, yeah.

13 Q. Okay. And further into the paragraph, it describes the ways they

14 were violating the safe area. Then it goes on to say that "To the Bosnian

15 Serbs, it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica were using the

16 safe area as a convenient base from which to launch offensives against the

17 VRS, and that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it."

18 This is their conclusion.

19 A. No, it says that it was the conclusion of the Bosnian Serbs.

20 Q. Well, the Court concluded that to the Bosnian Serbs, it appeared.

21 Right? This is a finding of fact by the Trial Chamber that at least from

22 their observation it appeared to the Bosnian Serbs, it was a state of mind

23 on the Bosnian Serb side. Right? So I go back to my earlier question to

24 you --

25 A. It's their opinion.

1 Q. It's their opinion, of course. But it ties into my earlier

2 question when I pointed out the conclusion, and you indicated -- and you

3 corrected me when you indicated that the advantage was with the defenders

4 given the terrain. And then I went on to a very lengthy question

5 indicating that that advantage also applied for offensive purposes as well

6 particularly the UN was there offering safe haven and safe harbour and

7 sanctuary to Muslim fighters by using the enclave as a staging ground to

8 commit crimes outside the enclave.

9 A. That's an interpretation, as it says here, by the Bosnian Serbs.

10 Q. Okay. Very well.

11 I want to switch topics, and I want to go to the 11th of July,

12 1995. If I understand you correctly, yesterday, as well as in some of

13 your previous testimony, and I believe it might be also in your

14 statements, you've indicated that it was the Serb side, the VRS, that had

15 contacted DutchBat requesting a meeting or demanding a meeting?

16 A. Yeah, that's right.

17 Q. Now, is that your -- do you know that for a fact? Is that an

18 opinion? Is that a supposition, an assumption, a presumption? What

19 exactly is that?

20 A. It is a memory which is present very strongly in my mind.

21 Q. Okay. Well, does that mean that the memory is correct, or could

22 you be wrong? Because it might be somewhat critical as to who initiated

23 this meeting.

24 A. That meeting was requested by -- from the part of the BSA.

25 Q. BSA meaning the VRS or the Bosnian Serbs?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Okay.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: If I could have some assistance here with the

4 usher.

5 If I could interrupt for a second, I'm only going to be referring

6 to paragraph number 2. And there's another document that I'll give you.

7 It will save us some time.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Okay, I've read the document.

9 MR. KARNAVAS:

10 Q. Okay, for the record, the document -- the numbers on the document

11 are R0015489, and R0015490. This document, sir, what do you recognise it

12 to be?

13 A. This is a report drafted by Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, but I

14 have not seen this report. The contents appear familiar, however.

15 Q. Okay, now who is the letter addressed to, sir?

16 A. It says to the various officials.

17 Q. It says at the top, it says "To force commander"; right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And Lieutenant-Colonel Janvier. Is that it?

20 A. We've already discussed that he was the commander in Zagreb.

21 Q. Okay. And in paragraph number 2, Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans

22 says: "I have been ordered by HQ" that's headquarters, right, "UNPROFOR

23 Sarajevo to enter into local negotiations with BSA forces for immediate

24 cease-fire. It says see appendix. And then it says: "I had two meetings

25 with General Mladic." Now, from this document it would appear that

1 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans had a conversation apparently with

2 headquarters in Sarajevo, perhaps outside your presence, whereby he was

3 ordered to initiate contact with the VRS in order to enter into

4 negotiations. Would that be correct?

5 A. Yes, that would be a possible interpretation. Another one might

6 be that we -- that we met. And what I remember is that after the first

7 meeting, Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans requested instructions in Sarajevo

8 as to whether he would be receiving support or had to arrange matters

9 himself. But I'm more inclined to believe the latter.

10 Q. Just a couple of more matters -- couple of more pieces of evidence

11 on this, on July 18th, there was a letter sent by Mr. Akashi to

12 Justice Goldstone who at the time was the Prosecutor of the ICTY, of the

13 Tribunal here. I'm not so much interested in the letter itself, but in

14 the second page -- and this, by the way, for the record, the numbers are

15 R0050215, and it goes all the way through 218. Now, there's a -- and then

16 you will see the third page is similar to the document that I have just

17 shown you, that is the one that was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel

18 Karremans. Now, could you look at this particular document, sir, this

19 page 2 --

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Okay. And if you could look at it, take your time. And please

22 tell us what it is, first, who generated it, and then I'll proceed from

23 there.

24 A. Yes, I've read it.

25 Q. Okay. Now, if you could help us out here a little bit. It says,

1 the top part: "HQ, UNPROFOR, Sarajevo."

2 A. Mm-hmm.

3 Q. It says: "Outgoing fax." On the left side, it says: "To:

4 Sector North-East info, Company DutchBat." That would be you?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. You are on the receiving end of this document?

7 A. You get this for your information.

8 Q. Right, okay. But I guess you're the receiver of this. Can I

9 conclude that, or am I wrong?

10 A. The person supposed to take action is the Sector North-East, and

11 DutchBat is only receiving it for information purposes. That's the

12 military hierarchy.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you for clarifying that. But I guess what I'm --

14 well, let me go to the right side, then. It says: "From, headquarters,

15 UNPROFOR, acting commander" and I guess there's a correction here, must be

16 a Major-General.

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. And it appears to be Major-General Gobillard. Had you heard of

19 this individual?

20 A. Yes, but I did not meet him.

21 Q. Okay, but you heard of him?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. So he's actually sending this message, and DutchBat at least is

24 getting the information of this?

25 A. Yes. He's sent it to Tuzla, Sector North-East.

1 Q. Okay. And one -- it says in here under paragraph A, although

2 there's a handwritten 1 circled, it says: "Enter into local negotiations

3 with BSA forces for immediate cease-fire. Giving up any weapons and

4 military equipment is not authorised and is not a point of discussion."

5 Now, from that, it seems to appear that what he's suggesting is

6 that someone, DutchBat or the higher-ups in Tuzla are to enter into

7 negotiations, but DutchBat or the UN is not to give up its own weapons.

8 Is that how I am to interpret this?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In other words, they weren't suggesting for the Muslim army not to

11 give up their weapons, but for the DutchBat or the UN forces, peacekeeping

12 forces, not to give up their weapons?

13 A. These are instructions toward DutchBat. I assume they mean the

14 arms of the battalion.

15 Q. Okay. So somebody in Sarajevo, this acting commander, that's a

16 pretty high position, don't you think?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. He's below the commander, I guess the commander is not there, so

19 he's acting as the commander and he's giving the order. And he's not

20 saying, please, maybe, or think about it, this is basically an order for

21 DutchBat to enter into local negotiations with BSA forces. Right?

22 A. They are instructions to Sector North-East to interpret this, and

23 we receive it for our information. And I remember that Lieutenant-Colonel

24 Karremans telephoned Tuzla about this.

25 Q. Right.

1 A. But I don't remember the true contents from this.

2 Q. Okay. The meeting that you had with the folks -- the first

3 meeting took place about what time, sir, if you recall?

4 A. It was at any rate after this telegram was sent, or at least

5 signed. But I don't remember whether we did it before and/or afterwards.

6 I do remember a phone conversation between Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans

7 and Tuzla as to whether there were actual instructions and what he should

8 observe.

9 Q. Okay. But nonetheless, if you look at -- if you look at this

10 piece of document, it seems to at least indicate at the top corner of it

11 that it was faxed at 3.40 --

12 A. Yes, but the question is whether the fax actually arrived. There

13 were not that many that worked properly where we were, at least not in

14 time. The phone worked.

15 Q. Okay, all right. Well, somehow, when I look at this fax, it seems

16 to me that there's a meeting of the minds between Sarajevo, Tuzla, and

17 Srebrenica because when you look at the next page, which is the document

18 that I've shown you earlier, which was generated by your commander, okay,

19 he says: "I have been ordered by HQ UNPROFOR Sarajevo." And HQ UNPROFOR

20 Sarajevo are the folks that have sent this fax or called or whatever. But

21 this is a document that we received.

22 A. Mm-hmm. Could have been in the evening following the first

23 meeting.

24 Q. All right. Well, then, why don't we take a look at the video,

25 because maybe the video will help us where we can see and hear Lieutenant

1 Karremans himself. And Your Honour, I queued it up. It will take about 2

2 minutes.

3 JUDGE LIU: Well --

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Maybe 2 minutes after that, and I'll be through.

5 JUDGE LIU: Well, it's passed 7.00.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: All right, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE LIU: Can you do it tomorrow afternoon?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: I certainly can, Your Honour. And I will be

9 through with the witness tomorrow, I would say, 15 minutes.

10 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Well, I hope that, you know, after this sitting

11 you could discuss with the court deputy about the numbering of those

12 documents.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: I will, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE LIU: And before we start tomorrow afternoon, we hope we

15 could receive a list of those documents.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. We will do -- well, we

17 will do more than our best to comply with the order, although you must

18 understand I have a rowing boat versus an armada on the other side. So

19 we're rowing as hard as we can, and we're trying our best, but we will

20 endeavour to comply with the Court's wishes, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE LIU: Well, drawing up a list does not need an armada.

22 We'll resume tomorrow afternoon.

23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

24 7.02 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

25 the 10th day of July, 2003, at 2.15 p.m.