1 Monday, 22 October 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon.
7 I'm sorry that we were delayed a few minutes coming in; I
8 apologise for that. It is the case that Judge Thelin has been unable to
9 be here. He expects certainly to be able to sit tomorrow. So we will
10 continue sitting under the Rule.
11 Sir, if I may remind you of the affirmation which you made which
12 still applies.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Mettraux.
15 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 WITNESS: VIKTOR BEZRUCHENKO [Resumed]
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Mettraux: [Continued]
18 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Bezruchenko.
19 A. Good afternoon, sir.
20 Q. There's a few matters of clarification which I would like to start
21 with you in relation to the evidence which you gave in response to my
22 questions of last week.
23 The first issue was raised at page 5688 of the transcript. It is
24 the 19th of October of 2007 and in order to refresh your memory,
25 Mr. Bezruchenko, I will read to you the question again.
1 The question was as followings: "So if I understand your response
2 correctly, Mr. Bezruchenko, your suggestion is that yes, this doctrine,
3 military doctrine of operational control applies or can apply to a
4 civilian structure and it does apply in your view to the situation of the
5 Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia. Is that a correct
7 Do you recall my question, Mr. Bezruchenko?
8 A. Yes, I do, sir, but I would say at this point that I also describe
9 the Ministry of Interior not necessarily as a civilian structure but as a
10 law enforcement organisation adaptable to reacting to war situations.
11 Q. And in response to the question that I had put to you, and I'm
12 grateful for this specification, you had said this: "I'm specifically
13 referring to the forces or, rather, units of the special police of the
14 Ministry of Interior. I don't know to which extent they could be
15 described as civilian structure."
16 And perhaps you have clarified somewhat your answer to me of last
17 week, but I would like to clarify with you whether it is your evidence
18 that the entire Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia was at
19 the time subject to this doctrine of operational control or whether in
20 fact your evidence is that only this unit of the special police as you
21 named them of the Ministry of Interior were subject to that doctrine.
22 Could you clarify this?
23 A. Thank you, sir. As is evident from the annual report of the
24 Ministry of Interior for 2001, the Ministry of Interior personnel was not
25 only subject to the process of mobilisation but also was directly involved
1 in combat operations on the ground which resulted in casualties. This is
2 also confirmed by another document which was released by the Ministry of
3 Interior which is the one book of which I'm sure you're well aware.
4 Q. Yes, I'm grateful for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. But the question is
5 more limited, if I may, in scope. The question is, is your evidence that
6 the entire Ministry of Interior would have been subjected or would have
7 been liable to this doctrine of operational control which you've used or
8 only the special units of the police of the ministry as you had indicated
9 in your response?
10 A. As I have indicated previously, the specific doctrine of command
11 and control which was applied to the Macedonian security forces is
12 essentially based on three bedrock principles and I mentioned them during
13 my last testimony, I believe. I assume that the same principles as they
14 are reflected in the Law on Internal Affairs apply to the Ministry of
15 Interior including the concept of the operational control, of course.
16 Q. So your answer or your evidence, Mr. Bezruchenko, is that in fact
17 the entire Ministry of Interior was subject to that doctrine. Is that
19 A. Yes. This would be my view.
20 Q. And this would view, for instance, the traffic police. Is that
22 A. Yes. Why not?
23 Q. The drug police, also, for instance?
24 A. I do not know such entity as the drug police. There might be a
25 section in the Ministry of Interior which might be dealing with this
1 issue, but something which would be called exactly as drug police, I have
2 never come across it.
3 Q. Would this doctrine of operational control also apply, in your
4 view, to the criminal police?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And would this doctrine then also apply to the administrative
7 staff of the Ministry of Interior?
8 A. Yes, I would imagine so.
9 Q. Thank you. There's another matter which I would like to clarify
10 with you and it is again from your evidence of last week, Mr.
11 Bezruchenko. It's at page 6589 to 6590. And at that page I had asked you
12 whether you agreed with the proposition that to accept your conclusions,
13 again as regard operational control, the Chamber would have to accept that
14 this theory of operational control applied to Mr. Boskoski and to the
15 Ministry of Interior. And in response you had said this: "Yes, I think
16 just for the record perhaps I may say again that in the war situation
17 which was taking place in Macedonia in 2001 the concept of operational
18 control de facto applied both to both components of the Macedonian
19 security forces, these being the Ministry of Interior and the army of the
20 Republic of Macedonia."
21 And the clarification which I seek from you in relation to this
22 response, Mr. Bezruchenko, is this. Is it your evidence that this theory
23 or this doctrine of operational control does not apply to the MOI as a
24 matter of law, but, in your view, de facto. Is that your evidence?
25 A. Yes, I would say that this doctrine actually applied.
1 Q. And looking at this from the perspective of an employee of the
2 Ministry of Interior, any employee in view of your previous answer, this
3 would mean that although the employees were not regulated by law by this
4 doctrine, it is your evidence that they should have been aware or they
5 must have been aware of its relevance to their work. Is that your
7 A. Let me say this. First of all, I believe that the employees of
8 the Ministry of Interior at all times were under the requirements and
9 legislation as emanating from the Law of Internal Affairs, irrespective
10 whether it was war situation or peace situation in the country and I would
11 imagine that under the Law of Internal Affairs, it was their obligation to
12 carry out the proper instructions and orders which might, inter alia,
13 relate to operational control.
14 Q. Well, we're going to come to the provision. I think it is Article
15 6 of the Law on Internal Affair to which you have referred but simply to
16 address my question in particular.
17 It is your evidence that despite the fact that this theory or this
18 doctrine of operational control is nowhere to be found in the laws and
19 regulation that applies to the Ministry of the Interior it is your
20 evidence that an employee of the Ministry of Interior should have been
21 aware of the relevance of this doctrine to his or her work. Is that your
22 evidence, Mr. Bezruchenko?
23 A. Yes, I think so.
24 Q. And there's another, a last matter of clarification which I would
25 seek from you and it is again from page 6588. It is the transcript of
1 last Friday. You recall you had referred on a number of occasion, both
2 with Mr. Saxon and myself, I believe, to the book, The War of Macedonia.
3 Do you recall?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. And at some stage in response to one of my question you said this
6 Mr. Bezruchenko and I will read it: "The Ministry of Interior as such as
7 an institution and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Macedonia saw,
8 according to the opinion of these experts an attempt to concur with them
9 the concept of operational control in its military sense will be equally
10 applicable to the entirety of the entity which is called the security
11 forces of Macedonia, being, excuse me, sir, being made up of forces of the
12 Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Interior itself as well as the
13 army of the Republic of Macedonia."
14 The clarification which I am seeking from you, Mr. Bezruchenko,
15 and that is not a criticism. It may due to the transcript, but is the
16 suggestion that you make in this particular paragraph that the Macedonian
17 experts, as you call them, have in fact referred to this doctrine of
18 operational control and have in fact suggested that this doctrine applied
19 to the Ministry of Interior, or were you implying something different?
20 A. Well, what I'm implying is that the experts who have released this
21 book maintain the view that the security forces of Macedonia were indeed
22 made of two components, the army and the Ministry of Interior. And in
23 their entirety as a entity, they were deployed and committed for
24 operations on the ground, meaning that in such operations the principle of
25 operational control applied.
1 Q. And you would agree that this last part of what you have just said
2 is -- does not appear in the book that you have mentioned but is in fact
3 your own conclusions. Is that correct?
4 A. Well --
5 Q. In other words, there is no suggestion in the book that this
6 doctrine of operational control would have applied to the Ministry of
7 Interior. Do you agree with that?
8 A. Well, I think the experts and the authors of this book actually
9 speak of the -- what is in Macedonian and B/C/S for that matter is called
10 RiK, rukovodjenje, komandovanje, which is command and control.
11 Q. Well, we're going to come to the --
12 A. Which is --
13 Q. -- in a moment.
14 A. -- which is -- yes, yes, sir, please go ahead.
15 Q. Now, we're going to come in in the other concept, Mr. Bezruchenko,
16 in the RiK, the rukovodjenje, komandovanje, but for the time being I would
17 like to stick with the issue of operational control. Can you agree with
18 the suggestion I've put to you that in fact nowhere in the book do these
19 three Macedonian experts, as you call them, refer to the concept of
20 operational control. Do you agree with that?
21 A. Well, they're clearly speaking of the operations which means
22 they're also speaking of the operational control.
23 Q. But do you agree - and I will ask you one more time,
24 Mr. Bezruchenko - that they do not relay on this concept their book. Do
25 you agree with that?
1 A. They don't -- I think they don't mention the phrase like
2 operational control directly in the book but probably they do. I just
3 don't remember. But in whole -- this whole book is about the operations.
4 Q. And do you recall that last week we had a little linguistic
5 discussion in relation to the terms operativni and whether it was
6 "operational" or "operative" as we had put it to you. Do you recall
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. And would it be correct if I put to you that what matter more to
10 this issue is not whether the translation of that word operativni means
11 operational or operative, but more importantly perhaps what it means in
12 the original language. Would you agree with that?
13 A. Well, yes.
14 Q. And I think you will recall that in one particular article, that
15 was Article 154 of the rule of book there was a reference to something
16 called operative control of dangerous areas, which according to you,
17 should be operational control of dangerous areas. Do you recall that?
18 A. I think if I recall correctly I mentioned that operative can be
19 translated two ways in English. It can be translated as quick in terms of
20 quick in reaction and can also be operational, essentially meaning
21 practically the same thing. That is working quickly.
22 Q. And do you recall also that I had asked you whether you were aware
23 of any internal laws or regulation in which the meaning of this term would
24 be explained and you indicated that you were not aware of any such
25 document. Do you recall that?
1 A. Well, speaking of the etymology there is the origin of the word
2 operational and operacionalni, well -- and this is this something which is
3 based on my personal observations. I can simply say in military
4 terminology related to the B/C/S as well as the Macedonian language
5 operacionalni is the word which was taken probably from German or French
6 and can be traced to operational.
7 Q. But let's --
8 A. Operational is more like the original form of the word in the
9 B/C/S or in Macedonian.
10 Q. But let's stick with the term as used by the article in question
11 and also in other documents which is operativni, and let's stay with the
12 Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Bezruchenko. Do
13 you recall when I asked you whether you were aware of any particular
14 internal rules or regulation which applied at the time or would apply to
15 the Ministry of the Interior and which would explain the accurate or the
16 exact meaning of that concept and you said you didn't. Do you recall
18 A. We were discussing it in relation to the document which was
19 entitled the Book of Rules, I believe.
20 Q. That's correct. And thereafter --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please slow down and maintain
22 pause between questions and answers, please.
23 MR. METTRAUX: I apologise to the interpreters.
24 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you recall that after showing you the article
25 in question I had asked whether you were aware of any other document or
1 any other internal regulation or instructions of the Ministry of Interior
2 which would explain or, if you wish, define the meaning of the term as
3 used in this -- in the rule book. Do you recall that?
4 A. I think I said no to this question.
5 Q. That's correct, Mr. Bezruchenko. That's what you said. And
6 there's a document that I would like to show to you at this stage and this
7 would be Rule 65 ter 1D940, please.
8 It is it ERN 1D00-8156. The Macedonian version starts at
10 Mr. Bezruchenko, can you see the document on the screen in front
11 of you?
12 A. Yeah, and the title of the document is "Obligatory Instruction."
13 Q. That's correct. Can you read it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And on the right would you have the Macedonian equivalent of that
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. As you can see, this is a document which comes from the
19 secretariat of the internal affairs, it comes from the Ministry of
20 Interior of Macedonia and it is known as "Obligatory Instruction"?
21 A. Mm-hm.
22 Q. And if I could ask the registry to please turn to item 31 of that
23 document. That would be page 9 in the English which is 1D00-8164, and in
24 the Macedonian it would start at 1D00-8133, please.
25 And if I can ask the registry to please focus on the bottom of the
1 page, please. Thank you.
2 Mr. Bezruchenko, I'll ask -- I'd like to ask to you focus on item
3 31 of those instructions of the MOI which refer, as you can see the
4 subheading refers to operative control and you have the version in your --
5 or not your language, but a language which you also understand, in the
6 Macedonian on the right. And item 31 define operative control in the
7 following terms, and I will read it out to you. "Operative control is a
8 sum of operative-preventative measures that are being taken based on
9 general suspicions and with the aim to prevent criminal acts, following
10 certain persons inclined to commit acts and observation of specific
11 objects and point where criminal acts are committed," and I believe the
12 Macedonian would continue on the next page. Can you see that?
13 A. Yes, I can.
14 Q. And I'll continue to read the article to you, but at this stage
15 would you agree that this definition of what for the purpose of the MOI
16 constitute operative control does not refer to any military mission or
17 combat activities. Do you agree with that?
18 A. No, it doesn't, but I think this article speaks of an entirely
19 different thing. In the sense word "control" here means not necessarily
20 leadership and direction but rather a inspection.
21 Q. Well, that is quite correct and that was the next question. Would
22 you agree that the expression "operational control" in that context does
23 not refer to a relationship of authority or otherwise between two
24 persons? Do you agree with that?
25 A. Yes, I do. It speaks essentially about the police action, police
1 operation, not necessarily a military action but again, as I said, this is
2 a semantic matter again and this article was not even intended to speak
3 about the operational control as you understand in English. It was
4 intended to speak about the police action, police inspection.
5 Q. But do you agree that the way in which it is used by and in the
6 Ministry of Interior of Macedonia, do you go with that?
7 A. In Macedonian language, yes. Not in English.
8 Q. And do you agree as well that it doesn't refer to any sort of
9 commanding function. Do you agree with that?
10 A. Yes, I see that.
11 MR. METTRAUX: And I will ask the registry perhaps just to read
12 the end of the page. I will go on to read the article, Mr. Bezruchenko.
13 It says: "An object is a place where criminal acts are committed," and if
14 we can please turn to the next page.
15 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreters would like to kindly ask
16 the witness and the counsel to maintain pauses between questions and
18 MR. METTRAUX:
19 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, we have been asked to pause between questions and
21 A. Certainly sir.
22 Q. And the article goes on to say this: "A point is a place where
23 the perpetrators of criminal acts communicate or where benefit gain
24 through committed criminal acts is being manifested."
25 Can you see that?
1 A. Yes, I can see that, sir.
2 Q. And then if you go on to look at the next item or article in this
3 instructions, it says this: "Operative control is established for a
4 person, object or point."
5 Can you see that?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. So you agree that again this confirm what has been said before is
8 that it does not in this meaning refer in any way so any sort of
9 relationship or authority or commanding function between two people. Do
10 you agree?
11 A. Yes, it speaks essentially of police action.
12 Q. And you agree that this in fact would appear to be the meaning in
13 which the term was used in Article 154 of the rule book which we had
14 looked at together last week. Would you agree with that?
15 A. Perhaps.
16 Q. And do you recall that it referred to operative control over
17 dangerous areas. Do you recall that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. There's another finding --
20 MR. METTRAUX: The document can be removed at this stage. We may
21 come back to it.
22 Q. There's another comment or finding which you make in your report
23 which I'd like to turn your attention to, Mr. Bezruchenko. And this is to
24 be found at paragraph 371 of your report. It's page 107 and the exhibit
25 is exhibit P466, please.
1 Do you have that paragraph in front of you, Mr. Bezruchenko?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. This would be page 107, please, in the English.
4 Mr. Bezruchenko, as it appears on the screen, I will read the
5 paragraph to you to refresh your memory. It says this: "Several
6 Macedonian Ministry of Interior documents suggest that Minister of
7 Interior Boskoski exercise operational control of police forces which was
8 manifested in orders to deploy police at various crisis areas."
9 Do you recall making that --
10 A. Yes, in this paragraph, that's true.
11 Q. -- finding? And as indicated in your report in this specific
12 paragraph your finding on that point, namely that in your view,
13 Mr. Boskoski exercised what you called operational control was based on, I
14 believe, 29 different telegrams of redeployment of police forces. Is that
16 A. Yes, that's right, sir.
17 Q. And simply to save time, Mr. Bezruchenko, in order to avoid to go
18 through each of these telegrams, would you agree that in effect they are
19 very similar in nature, that they defer in terms of the number of men
20 which are being redeployed, the places where they come from and the
21 locations where they are being deployed. Would you agree with that?
22 A. They are similar.
23 Q. And do you agree that you were shown a number of these documents
24 during your examination in chief by Mr. Saxon. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And perhaps to simplify matter, I will keep to those at this stage
2 and I would like the witness, please, to be shown what is now exhibit
4 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, this is it under tab 6 of the OTP
6 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you still have the binder of the Office of the
8 A. I'm afraid not.
9 MR. METTRAUX: I'm very grateful to the registry. Thank you.
10 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, that would be tab 6 of the Prosecution binder.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And to refresh your memory a bit about this document, the question
13 that was asked by my colleague Mr. Saxon to you about this particular
14 document was this, and it is the 4th of October 2007, page 6076. And
15 Mr. Saxon asked you this: "Why more security forces were needed at
17 Do you recall that question being asked?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. And in reply you explain the following: "In June 2001 fighting was
20 going on in the area of Kumanovo. In fact the area of Kumanovo was the
21 second front which was opened by NLA sometime in May 2001. So I assume
22 this document indicate that certain reinforcements or replacement of
23 police forces in the area would be required."
24 And then you were asked again in relation to this document whether
25 in your view, this document had any relationship with the issue of
1 operational control which you had discussed earlier with Mr. Saxon, and in
2 answer you said this: "As I mentioned previously, the operational
3 controls involve matters related to organisation and deployment of the
4 forces on the ground. So this is the document which was issued as an
5 exercise of the operational powers by the Ministry of Interior," that's
6 page 6077.
7 Do you recall that, Mr. Bezruchenko?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. And do you recall that you essentially made the same assertions in
10 relation to what is under tab 7, 8 and 9 of the binder, that would be
11 exhibit P469, P470 and exhibit P471. Do you recall?
12 A. Yes, all these documents are of the same nature.
13 Q. So if we focus for a moment on this particular document,
14 Mr. Bezruchenko, exhibit P468, do you agree that this document refers
15 specifically to 50 policemen. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And will you agree that there is no evidence from this document
18 that these 50 policemen are being redeployed, that are being redeployed
19 were involved at any time in any military or police combat operation. Do
20 you agree that it would not be apparent if that were the case from this
22 A. Not necessarily, Mr. Mettraux.
23 Q. But do you agree, I hope, that the document which you have in
24 front of you, the telegram, does not order or does not assign the 50
25 policemen in question to take part in a military or police operation. Do
1 you agree with that?
2 A. It doesn't say so directly, but if you carefully analyse
3 specifically the second paragraph of this document it would suggest to you
4 that these 50 policemen were not supposed to be transferred to Kumanovo
5 for patrolling streets in the city. They were transferred there to
6 military barracks which apparently served as a assembly area or staging
7 area for operations in the field, and the second paragraph specifically
8 emphasises they should be fully equipped for these kind of operations,
9 they should be in camouflage uniforms, not in dress uniforms, as normally
10 would be the case, they would have to have terrain boots because they
11 would have to run up the mountains, which is a difficult enterprise. They
12 would have to have bullet-proof vests which means there was a fair
13 opportunity for them to come under hostile fire. They would have to have
14 helmets for the same reason. They would have to have masks, sleeping bag,
15 sleeping in the field in a tent. Personal hygiene and spare underwear for
16 a period of at least 15 days. Which means they were supposed to operate
17 in isolation from any sort of facilities in the field.
18 Q. But do you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that in fact from this document
19 at least it is not clear whether this -- any of these 50 policemen ever
20 took part in any operation. Do you agree with that?
21 A. That's right, Mr. Mettraux, it doesn't really say so directly.
22 But the whole concept of military analysis presupposes that you have to
23 put things together rather than relying on one isolated fact.
24 Q. So do you agree that here you merely assume in effect that's what
25 happened but this is not in any case evidence from this document. Do you
1 agree with that?
2 A. This is my assessment.
3 Q. But do you agree -- well, do you agree that in this particular
4 document Mr. Boskoski is not assigning these particular policemen to any
5 particular operation that you would know about. Would you agree with
7 A. If you're specifically referring to the concept of operational
8 control, again, Mr. Mettraux, this document does not necessarily have to
9 say it. It only says that they are supposed to be deployed in the area
10 where military operations were going on. What would happen next, this is
11 an entirely different matter.
12 Q. And you agree that what could happen next is just as likely or
13 just as possible as in fact those 50 policemen carried out regular police
14 duties in the area. We simply do not know from this document. Do you
15 agree with that?
16 A. Regular police duties in a war situation?
17 Q. Well, this is your conclusion, Mr. Bezruchenko. But do you agree
18 that this document could be read in such a way that the policemen that
19 were redeployed --
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux, we are a spending a great deal of
21 time. The witness has made clear that the document itself doesn't say so,
22 he has made clear that the second paragraph of the document gives a strong
23 indication. He can take it no further, surely. Why do we keep pressing?
24 MR. METTRAUX: I'm move on on this one, Your Honour.
25 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you agree that this document is sent to the
1 sector in Kocani and more specifically to the sector of finance and other
2 common matters, the sector for analytics and investigation; do you agree
3 with that?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. And that was the case with the other documents similar in kind
6 that have you discussed. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Is that also correct that in fact all of those documents are
9 telegrams to the effect that police should be replaced, I think you have
10 suggested in your answer to Mr. Saxon that they may be reinforcement but
11 do you agree as far as this document is concerned and I believe the
12 others, it refers to the replacement of forces. Do you agree with that?
13 A. Yeah. That could be a replacement of forces, yes.
14 Q. And do you agree that, Mr. Bezruchenko, the authority or the power
15 that the minister had to deploy or redeploy police forces was an authority
16 or power which you under the Law on Internal Affairs. Do you agree with
18 A. Yes. That's exactly the expression of operational concept.
19 Q. And do you agree or perhaps you can recall in particular the
20 provision. Would you agree that this is under article 56 of that law,
21 that the minister is able to deploy or redeploy forces, police forces?
22 A. Well, if I see this article, I would probably confirm this now,
23 but I don't have this document at hand at the moment.
24 Q. Perhaps I will help you here.
25 MR. METTRAUX: If the registry could bring exhibit P86.
1 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreters kindly ask again the
2 counsel and the witness to make pauses between question and answer and
3 allow interpretation to follow and finish.
4 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you.
5 And if I could ask the registry to go to Article 56 of that
6 document, that would be N000-8975 of the English. And N000-8993 of the
7 Macedonian. I would simply like to read out to you this particular
8 provision, Mr. Bezruchenko, Article 56 and it says this: "A employee can
9 be disposed in a organisational unit outside the seat of the ministry with
10 the decision on a post that suits to the employee's professional skills
11 for the following reasons." The first one is "shortage of employees with
12 appropriate professional skills and working abilities for concrete duties
13 and tasks or professional assistance in conducting the duties and tasks of
14 the regional organisational unit and more effect functioning of the
16 So simply the question, Mr. Bezruchenko, is to confirm that the
17 authority to deploy or redeploy, if you wish, employees of the Ministry of
18 Interior was provided for in this particular provision of the law. Do you
19 agree with that?
20 A. No, sir. I do not agree with your thesis for one specific reason.
21 To my mind and my reading of this article, is that it addresses
22 purely administrative matters, not operational matters. This article
23 deals with the situations which could be decided on case-by-case basis
24 dealing with the individuals but not entire group of people, 50 men strong
25 with personal arms and equipment to be deployed in a war situation.
1 Q. And is that your evidence, Mr. Bezruchenko, that this provision
2 would prevent the minister to issue such an order or to draft such a
3 telegram based on that provision for more than one individual. Is that
4 your evidence?
5 A. No. I'm not saying that. I'm only saying that this Article would
6 actually normally apply as the whole of the law to peacetime situations,
7 not wartime situations.
8 Q. And could you state, if your view is different, what provision in
9 your view allowed the minister to seek the redeployment of particular
11 A. Article 28 of the Law on Defence, which specifically says that the
12 police forces can be deployed to assist the armed forces in the country.
13 Q. Well, we're going come back to this article in the context of
14 Article 19 as well. At this stage I would like to show once again to
15 Mr. Bezruchenko what is exhibit P466. That's, again, Mr. Bezruchenko's
16 report. That is page 122, please.
17 And, Mr. Bezruchenko, I'll ask to you look in particular at
18 paragraph 440 of that document.
19 A. 440.
20 Q. That's at page 122.
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. I will read that to you for the record. It says this: "There is
23 at least a few Macedonian Ministry of Interior documents that suggest that
24 minister of the interior Boskoski personally exercised operational control
25 of the unit," and earlier in the section you were talking about the
1 special police unit/posebna, and you go on to say this: "Its control to
2 the unit was manifested in orders to deploy the unit personnel at varies
3 locations." And you say, for example, on 30 July 2001, Boskoski signed a
4 telegram ordering the deployment of 50 policemen of the special police
5 unit to Idrizevo at 7 hours on 2 August to take measures in the territory
6 of Macedonia and to replace a police force."
7 Can you see that?
8 A. Yes, I see that, sir.
9 Q. And if you look at the footnote which is attached to that
10 particular paragraph and which refers to a document, you will agree that
11 you are referring to a Rule 65 ter document 966 with a ERN N005-0796. Do
12 you agree?
13 A. Now, please, what is the ERN number again?
14 Q. It would be footnote 596 in your amended report.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Can you see that reference?
17 A. R042-4707, R042-4708, yes, I see that.
18 Q. And could the witness please be shown what is Rule 65 ter 1D941,
20 Mr. Bezruchenko, this is the -- as you will see, the document to
21 which you make a reference in your report in support of -- of your
23 And this is again you will agree a telegram from -- signed by or
24 on behalf of Mr. Boskoski on the 30th of August of -- of July, I'm sorry,
25 the 30th of July of 2001. Is that correct?
1 A. That's right sir.
2 Q. And if you look at the heading, if you wish of the document --
3 well, first let me ask you this: In your report you suggest that this
4 document is evidence of operative control of the minister over the special
5 unit or Posebna. Is that correct?
6 A. Yes that's right.
7 Q. Are you suggesting that the minister is in fact ordering these
8 Posebna persons to take security measures or are you making a different
10 A. What I'm saying here is that, A, these men belong to what is
11 abbreviated here as PEP, Posebna Edinica Policije, special police unit,
12 that these men were deployed to Sokob [phoen], which is apparently
13 training area in the area of Idrizevo and, C, I am saying that they were
14 equipped for operations in the field exactly along the line as the
15 personnel mentioned in similar orders.
16 Q. Well, the first matter which I would like you to confirm is, would
17 agree that that telegram is in fact not sent to the members of that
18 Posebna unit but rather to the sector of Veles, and again it's the sector
19 of finance and other common matters and the sector analytics and
20 investigation. Do you agree with that?
21 A. Yes, I agree with that.
22 Q. And do you agree also that at least according to that document,
23 the persons which are concerned by this particular document are not being
24 given any particular tasks or task, I should say, or mission. Do you
25 agree with that?
1 A. No, I don't agree with that.
2 Q. Well, do you agree perhaps as was the case with the previous
3 version that from that document the -- it is not clear at least from that
4 document that those individuals partook in any police or military
5 operation. Do you agree with that?
6 A. Well, it doesn't say so, that they're going take part in any
7 police operation or military operation. But one can easily assume reading
8 the paragraph 2 of this document that this was exactly the person-- I mean
9 it was exactly the reason of this operation, to send them to the ground to
10 take part in the operations.
11 Q. And again simply to clarify this, this is your conclusion but that
12 is not what the document says. Do you agree?
13 A. My conclusion, sir, is based on the fact of consistency of more
14 than 20 documents of this nature which basically describe the same thing.
15 Q. Well, perhaps I will ask you in a different way. Do you have any
16 information that any of the 50 policemen concerned by this document in
17 fact took part in a police or military operation of which you would know
19 A. Unfortunately, I don't have the names of these particular
20 individuals. Otherwise, that would be possible to establish.
21 Q. But in this particular case you have no such information. Is that
23 A. I don't know again, as I say, the names of these people.
24 Q. So the answer is no, Mr. Bezruchenko?
25 A. Well, my answer, in short, well, to be more precise is that I
1 believe that this document reflects the operational matter, deployment of
2 personnel. The reason why it is addressed to sector of finance and common
3 matters is that apparently such orders had to be accompanied through
4 appropriate measures through financial channels. That is, these men had
5 to be paid certain allowances, field allowances or combat allowances. And
6 the reason why it is addressed to sector of internal affairs, Veles, is
7 that this sector was supposed to provide a number of personnel for the
8 special unit and we know that in fact the special police unit as it is
9 commonly called as Posebna is a composite unit which was tailored on the
10 basis of need to address specific situations.
11 Q. And just to follow up on your answer, the responsibility to
12 prepare that group, if you so wish, of 50 policemen would in turn be with
13 the sector of Veles. Is that correct?
14 A. It would be logical to assume, sir.
15 Q. Staying for a moment with the special unit there is another
16 paragraph which I would like to draw your attention upon. Again, from
17 your report. And that would be paragraph 403 and this would be again
18 Exhibit 466, the report of Mr. Bezruchenko.
19 Mr. Bezruchenko, this would be at page 111 of your report.
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. And I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 403, where
22 you make a reference to a passage of Mr. Bolton's statement. Can you see
24 A. Yes, I can see that.
25 Q. And in your report you rely upon the particular statement and it
1 is the first sentence of that quote and it says this: "It is my
2 belief, "Mr. Bolton's belief, "that normal practice when employing police
3 special units in a pre-planned operation is for the plan to be developed
4 at a senior level." And he goes on to say --
5 A. Yes, I see this.
6 Q. And it goes on to say -- he goes on to say this: "Normally the
7 minister would be involved into this planning process but if it were not
8 to be due to the centralised nature of the ministry both in 2001 and at
9 the present time and due to the potential political and security
10 implication of such an operation, he would," and if we can turn to the
11 next page, "demand to be fully briefed and informed by his staff."
12 And Mr. Bolton expressed a further view that "I would find it hard
13 to conceive of a situation in which the minister during the operation of
14 the conflict in 2001 was not informed beforehand of any pre-planned
15 tactical operation by special or irregular police units."
16 Can you see that?
17 A. Yes, I can see that, sir.
18 Q. Do you recall however that in his evidence Mr. Bolton indicated
19 that at the time he had not met with Mr. Boskoski. Do you recall that?
20 A. No, I don't recall that, sir.
21 Q. Are you aware perhaps that there was evidence led in this
22 courtroom to the effect that the minister did not in fact take part in the
23 planning of operation of the special units, and I think the evidence was
24 led in particular in relation to the Tigers unit. Would you be aware of
25 that evidence?
1 A. I'm only aware of what I have written in my report, sir.
2 Q. But do you agree that with a view to amend and update your report,
3 Mr. Bezruchenko, you have made reference or references to a number of
4 passage from the transcript of this trial. Do you agree with that?
5 A. Yes, of course.
6 Q. And as part of your review to update or amend your report did you
7 become aware of the evidence of a particular witness that indicated that
8 the minister did not take part in the planning of operation of the Tigers
10 A. I was following the proceedings of the case, of course, and there
11 were numerous witnesses who were testifying on varies points related to
12 the functioning and responsibilities. Well, if the implication of the
13 question is why the selection of my materials for the report was
14 determined by this other factor, then the answer is that this is
15 essentially the concept which I was following which was formulated in my
16 mind throughout the examination of the entirety of the documents.
17 Q. But simply to clarify, Mr. Bezruchenko, simply whether or not you
18 were aware of that evidence to the effect that Mr. Boskoski in fact did
19 not take part in the planning of operations involving the Tigers unit.
20 A. If you could be more specific, please, Mr. Mettraux.
21 Q. Perhaps I will read out to you the evidence in that case. It
22 comes from the transcript of the 15th of June of 2007 and it is the
23 evidence of M-056. The page, I believe, is 2167 and the evidence or the
24 question, rather, was that: "The minister of the interior in one such
25 situation had no role in the planning or the execution of that operation.
1 Is that correct".
2 The answer is: "Yes, it is correct."
3 The question is: "Even if he would be present at the meeting that
4 the execution of that plan he would have no authority to issue any orders
5 or directions or suggestions to the army generals; is that correct?"
7 And the question simply, Mr. Bezruchenko, is whether or not you
8 were aware of that evidence.
9 A. If you could kindly remind of the name of the witness,
10 Mr. Mettraux.
11 MR. METTRAUX: Well, perhaps we should go into private session.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
13 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
22 MR. METTRAUX:
23 Q. And perhaps just to ask you the question again for the record,
24 Mr. Bezruchenko. Were you or were you not aware of this particular piece
25 of the evidence when amending and completing your report?
1 A. Yes, I was aware of this evidence, but I would find it hard to
2 believe that a person who would be on equal footing with the minister of
3 defence, having a number of police generals under him, would not be in a
4 position at least to issue recommendations to his military counterparts.
5 Q. But staying for a minute with the evidence of M-056, do I
6 understand your answer to suggest that you disregarded the evidence of
7 this person for the purpose of amending your report because you found this
8 evidence hard to believe? Is that your evidence or did I misunderstand
9 your interpretation?
10 A. It is not that I disregarded this evidence. Otherwise I did not
11 select this evidence for the sake of amending the report, because, as I
12 say, the evidence which I use in my report has to be evaluated in terms of
13 credibility and value and to my criteria which I establish for myself,
14 when writing this report, this was not the case.
15 Q. So your evidence in relation to that particular piece of the
16 evidence and more generally to the material which you say you have relied
17 upon for the purpose of amending the indictment you are saying,
18 Mr. Bezruchenko, that you exercised your own judgment as to the
19 reliability or otherwise and credibility or otherwise of the evidence
20 before relying upon in your in report. Is that your evidence?
21 A. I have been relying mainly and I specifically made a point for
22 myself to rely mainly, if not exclusively, on the documents which would
23 provide hard, strong and valuable evidence related to the actual situation
24 on the ground. Well, obviously in cases where there was no specific
25 evidence as reflected in the documents, specific to very specific points
1 in fact cannot be corroborated in other ways, I had to use some of witness
2 statements, but I believe there are very, very few.
3 Q. And when you did or felt had you to rely upon a statement, or I'm
4 sorry, upon the evidence of a witness, you, as you indicated, exercised
5 your own judgment as to what you believe to be the reliability,
6 credibility and I believe you use the word value of that evidence. Is
7 that correct?
8 A. Yes, that's right.
9 Q. Is it correct also that -- or perhaps I should ask you this. How
10 many plans of operations, police operations or military operations have
11 you seen that bear the signature of Mr. Buckovski [Realtime transcript
12 read in error "Boskoski"]?
13 A. Plans of military operations, none.
14 Q. And what about plans of police combat operations?
15 A. None.
16 Q. Is it correct that the statement - and if you don't know this,
17 Mr. Bezruchenko, simply indicate it - but are you aware of the fact that
18 the statement of Mr. Bolton on which you relied for the suggestion that
19 the witness had used the expression "operational control" had been taken
20 by your colleague Mr. Kuehnel. Are you aware of that fact?
21 A. I was not aware of this fact, but that would not be anything
23 Q. Are you aware of the fact that in his evidence Mr. Bolton was
24 asked to explain these paragraphs, these particular paragraphs of his
25 statement and in particular he was asked to explain his belief that
1 members of the MOI would sometimes defer to Mr. Boskoski for decision
2 concerning issues that involved low-level tactical policing. Do you
3 recall that part of his evidence?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. And do you recall also that he explained that this belief that he
6 had was based on two incidents: One about the moving or removing of a
7 particular police check-point, and another one about the timing of police
8 shifts. Do you recall that?
9 A. I think I do, yes.
10 Q. And do you recall also that in his evidence Mr. Bolton made it
11 clear that he never been able to verify the truth of what he had been told
12 about these two matters. Do you recall that?
13 A. I'm not sure about this particular point.
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the counsel and the
15 witness to observe a pause between questions and answers. Thank you.
16 MR. METTRAUX:
17 Q. But will you recall perhaps, Mr. Bezruchenko, that at the time
18 Mr. Bolton indicated that as regard the first incident, which would be the
19 adjustment of the police shift, he was or he said he had been told by
20 Mr. Bliznakovski and Mr. Jovanovski. Do you recall that?
21 A. I'm not sure if I recall this particular -- this particular
23 Q. But do you recall that under questions by counsel he explained
24 that the basis of his belief had never been verified or is it something
25 that lies beyond your awareness?
1 A. It would be very difficult for me to refer to a witness statement
2 and give my opinion about what was said in which I was not really
4 Q. So, Your Honour, perhaps to simplify I will simply give the
5 reference to the record of relevant part. This is the transcript of 8th
6 of June 2007. It is page 1777 to 1780.
7 But perhaps I can put that proposition to you, Mr. Bezruchenko.
8 Is it your expert evidence that the removal or the moving of a particular
9 police check-point in one location, or the changing or accommodation of
10 the timing of the police shift would be relevant illustrations of what is
11 known as the military doctrine of operative control. Is that your view
12 that such incident would be indication of what you termed "operative
13 control." Is that your evidence?
14 A. More on the tactical level, yes.
15 Q. And that would be regardless, in your view, of the reasons for the
16 particular check-points or the basis for the police shift. Is that
18 A. Well, I'm a little bit at a loss how to explain the reason of your
19 using the word "regardless." Obviously there are always reasons for
20 certain tactical steps to be taken.
21 Q. You're right about my question, Mr. Bezruchenko. Would you give
22 the same answer, namely that the placing of a check-point or the changing
23 police shift would be relevant to what you say is operative control,
24 whether the reason for the placing of such check-point or the changing of
25 the police shift would be military in kind, policing in kind, or for any
1 other particular reason such as the convenience, perhaps, of other
2 international organisation or that of the police employees, would your
3 answer be the same in all of those cases?
4 A. Well, not necessarily. I would only say that the mere presence of
5 a police check-point in the country in the crisis area during the war
6 situation would indicate to me the fact that this check-point was erected
7 in this particular location for a certain reason which was not explained
8 by anything else but a military situation. Or perhaps the consideration
9 of safety and security.
10 Q. And when you draw those conclusions about the reason of the
11 presence of a particular check-point or police forces - or I'm sorry - of
12 police shift, you are not relying upon the evidence of Mr. Bolton, or are
13 you, on that point?
14 A. Well, this is just my general comment. I can not really rely on
15 anyone's statement. As I said while in my report I used mainly documents
16 and those appropriate or those relevant paragraphs from various statements
17 that I quote in my report were quoted there for reasons which I hope I
18 stated previously.
19 Q. And is it correct that in your report, Mr. Bezruchenko, you have
20 cited no one order signed by Mr. Boskoski which related specifically to a
21 police operation. Do you agree with that?
22 A. Not necessarily. We have just discussed a number of those orders
23 which were signed by Mr. Boskoski which are directing police forces for
25 Q. And I thank you for this qualification. But setting aside the
1 orders of redeployment, do you agree that you have cited no particular
2 orders or plans signed by Mr. Boskoski which would relate to a police
3 operation in the meaning that is understood in military doctrine. Would
4 you agree with that?
5 A. I didn't see such documents.
6 Q. And would you agree that the reason perhaps why you saw no such
7 documents - and I will come back to this perhaps later today or tomorrow -
8 is that at the time the Law on Defence gave the power to order the use of
9 police forces in combat either to the president under the old law or the
10 president of the government, that would be the prime minister under the
11 new law. Do you agree with that?
12 A. The powers to use police in support of military operations were
13 mentioned in both the new law which I think was adopted sometime in early
14 June 2001 and in the previous law as well.
15 Q. And do you agree that the change that were brought from the old
16 law to the new law - and as I said I will show to you the relevant
17 provision later today - but if you can agree with this general
18 proposition, the change which was brought between the old law which placed
19 the authority to use police forces in support of military combat or
20 activities was in the hands of the president of the Republic of Macedonia,
21 whereas the new law which, as you said, was adopted, I believe, on the 1st
22 of June placed that responsibility in the hands of the president of the
23 government, which is the prime minister. Can you agree with that general
25 A. I think this general proposition is correct.
1 Q. And perhaps you've indicated also that you have indicated your
2 reason for referring to a number of witnesses with a view to update your
3 report for the purpose of these proceedings. Were you aware of the fact
4 that a number of witnesses of the Prosecution had given evidence to the
5 effect that the Ministry of Interior had in fact no operational powers of
6 responsibility as regard the activities of the police in the field? Are
7 you aware of this?
8 A. I remember some statements to this regard, yes.
9 Q. And could you indicate if and where you amended your indictment --
10 I'm sorry, your report with a view to allow for this evidence to be taken
11 into consideration?
12 A. Well, I was amending my report on the basis of new sources and
13 again these were mainly documentary evidence. These were mainly
15 Q. So can I understand your response to suggest that in fact you did
16 not refer in your report to the evidence which was led to the effect that
17 the minister had no operational role?
18 A. As I mentioned previously, throughout the process of preparation
19 of my report and selection of the sources for the report, I was guided by
20 major overriding consideration of providing the best possible sources
21 which mainly included documents trying to avoid any speculative statements
22 as much as possible.
23 Q. And so in answer to the question, and perhaps you can answer this
24 one simply, do you agree that have you not made any reference in the
25 amended version of your report to these particular statements that were
1 made by a number of Prosecution witness to the effect that the minister
2 had no operational control. Do you agree with that?
3 A. I didn't refer to these statements.
4 MR. METTRAUX: If I could ask the registry please to bring up once
5 again Mr. Bezruchenko's report.
6 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, I will ask you to look at page 111 of your
7 report, please. This is exhibit P466, I apologise. And I will draw your
8 attention in particular, Mr. Bezruchenko, to what is paragraph 401 of that
9 report. Can you locate it?
10 A. Yes, can I see it.
11 Q. And I will just read the paragraph in question for the record, the
12 statements which you make here. It says this: "A few Macedonian
13 government documents suggest that at a late stage of the conflict, the
14 government made an attempt to create a provisional joint anti-terrorist
15 unit. The decision to create this unit was apparently meant to fill the
16 drastic demand for units trained in special anti-terrorist operations.
17 The joint anti-terrorist unit was tailored from army elements and Ministry
18 of Interior special police units. Thus, on 6 August 2001, minister of
19 interior Boskoski signed an order authorising the transfer of "Tigers"
20 and "Lions" special police unit (together, the joint police unit) into the
21 newly created joint anti-terrorist unit."
22 And then you say the following: "This decision suggests that
23 minister exercised his powers to control the operations of the special
24 police units."
25 Can you see that?
1 A. Yes, I can see that.
2 Q. And simply to understand this last statement of yours properly,
3 Mr. Bezruchenko, is that your evidence again that this particular document
4 to which you refer, and that would be exhibit P275, is again evidence of
5 operational control on the part of the minister and this time in
6 particular operational control in relation to the special police units.
7 A. Can I see the document, please?
8 Q. Certainly, Mr. Bezruchenko. This would be exhibit P275.
9 MR. METTRAUX: The document, Your Honour, is referring footnote
10 560, I believe, of Mr. Bezruchenko's report.
11 Q. Do you have the document in front of you, Mr. Bezruchenko?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. So simply to understand the evidence which you are giving in
14 relation to this document, is that your evidence, Mr. Bezruchenko, that
15 this particular order as signed by Minister Boskoski would, as you say in
16 your report, demonstrate the power of the minister to control the
17 operation of the police units.
18 Is that your evidence?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So is that your evidence that the assignment or transfer or
21 appointment of individuals to a particular unit yet to be formed would in
22 itself be evidence of operational control? Is that your evidence?
23 A. In Macedonian this document is titled somewhat differently than it
24 is translated in effect. I would rather put it as the order for
25 definition of the units of the Ministry of Interior which are supposed to
1 be included into the provisional joint unit to fight against terrorism.
2 But in any case, the point about this document is that the
3 Minister of Interior makes a decision as to which units which are within
4 the Ministry of Interior and therefore under his purview are supposed to
5 be released and included into the ministry -- I mean, included into this
6 temporary unit to fight against terrorism, which is, again, an operational
7 decision. Basically the Ministry of Interior transfers the command of
8 this unit.
9 Q. So is your evidence on this point this, that the assignment or the
10 release, as you termed it, of individuals to a different body, in this
11 case, a joint unit, would itself be evidence of the minister's actual
12 control over the operations of the individuals who are being released? Is
13 that your evidence?
14 A. I'm not saying that. I'm not saying that this is a indication of
15 the operational control of individuals. I am saying that this is an
16 indication of the operational control of individuals. I am saying that
17 this is the evidence operational control to the unit, which is changing
18 hands which comes from under the Ministry of Interior into the temporary
19 joint unit for combat against terrorism.
20 Q. I'm grateful for that. Perhaps my question was not very clear.
21 But is it your evidence that the power to assign an individual to or to
22 release an individual to the different -- to a different unit would or
23 could also serve as evidence in your case of that person's power to
24 control the operations of the special unit in question? Is that your
1 A. Sorry, sir, I can't -- I don't quite understand what you exactly
3 Q. Well, perhaps the question is not very clear. But you will agree
4 that this order has to do with the assignment or the release of
5 individuals. You agree with that?
6 A. As a unit, yes.
7 Q. And do you agree that this particular document does not refer or
8 does not relate to any particular operation to which these individuals are
9 to be involved in. Do you agree with that?
10 A. Well, the transfer of authority of the unit and its release or, if
11 you wish, inclusion into another body, is in itself an operational action
12 because it implies transfer of operational control.
13 Q. So simply to be clear and I want to be very clear on this,
14 Mr. Bezruchenko, it is your view as an expert that the power or the
15 authority which the minister had in this case to reassign or to release,
16 as you said, individuals, is also evidence of his power to control the
17 particular unit in question. Is that your evidence?
18 A. That's right. At least he has been controlling this unit, well,
19 up to this point, and he probably preserved that means [indiscernible]
20 disciplinary control of this unit beyond this point.
21 Q. And you will agree in fact, Mr. Bezruchenko, that this particular
22 joint unit was never set up. Is that correct?
23 A. It is not necessarily the fact. I have seen at least several
24 documents which imply that joint anti-terrorist unit was involved in
25 operations in the area of Tetovo at a late stage of the war.
1 Q. But do you agree that when you prepared your original report at
2 the least you were informed by the minister of the Defence that this
3 particular joint unit to which this document refers was never set up. Do
4 you agree with that?
5 A. We had that document from the minister of defence which, indeed,
6 stipulated that such a unit was never established. But this was only a
7 verbal statement of him, which was not supported by any documents.
8 Now I can see a number of documents which clearly speak about the
9 existence of such unit. To which point this unit was actually functional
10 and operational on the ground is entirely different matter. But as I
11 mentioned, and I would like to put again, I saw at least some documents
12 which suggest that this unit was operational was committed into action in
13 the area of Tetovo in later stage of the conflict.
14 Q. But do you agree that when you interviewed the minister of defense
15 Mr. Boskoski as you just mentioned, he had indicated to that in fact this
16 joint unit had never been set up, and would you also agree with the
17 proposition that this particular statement of Mr. Boskoski which had been
18 entered in your original report has disappeared from the amended report?
19 Do you agree with that?
20 A. Yes, I have removed it from the amended report because I found
21 documents which actually negated this statement.
22 Q. And do you agree, if you look perhaps at the preamble of that
23 document, do you agree that this particular order signed by Mr. Boskoski
24 refers to two earlier documents or to a earlier decision, I should say,
25 one by the government and one by the president. Do you agree with that?
1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. And simply for the record, the decision of the government is
3 Exhibit 1D59 and the decision of the president is Exhibit 1D60. And my
4 attention is drawn to the transcript, paragraph 39, line 14 which referred
5 to a particular statement of Mr. Boskoski. It should be Mr. Buckovski.
6 My attention is also being drawn, Your Honour, on the time.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Is that convenient to you, Mr. Mettraux?
8 MR. METTRAUX: That would be convenient.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Well, then, we will adjourn until quarter past
11 --- Recess taken at 3.41 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.
14 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you.
15 Q. I apologise, Mr. Bezruchenko.
16 Do you recall that just before the break we were discussing the
17 order of the 6th of August concerning the joint unit. Do you recall that?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And do you recall making the suggestion that this particular order
20 of Mr. Boskoski was, in your view, indicative of what you call his
21 operational control. Do you recall that?
22 A. Yes, it was an act of transferring the operational control from --
23 of this unit to another.
24 Q. And do you recall also that this order which Mr. Boskoski was
25 issuing on the 6th of August of 2001, was in fact based and done pursuant
1 to two decisions. I think we've talked about this already. Do you
3 A. Yes, I understand this was the case.
4 Q. And those two decisions were respectively a decision of the
5 government of the 12th of June 2001 and of the president of the republic
6 of 15th of June 2001. Is that correct?
7 A. This document seems to suggest that.
8 Q. And you would agree that these two decisions which have just been
9 mentioned were binding on Mr. Boskoski. Do you agree with that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And do you agree also that according to the content of these two
12 decisions by the government and the president respectively, the only
13 matter that was left to Mr. Boskoski to decide was the composition of the
14 unit that was to be transferred to the joint unit. Do you agree with
16 A. I would be grateful to Your Honour if you could help me with
17 taking a look at these documents.
18 Q. Which one do you -- well, perhaps I should show you
19 chronologically, Mr. Bezruchenko.
20 MR. METTRAUX: If we could see the decision of first the
21 government of the Republic of Macedonia. That would be Exhibit 1D59,
23 Q. Do you recognise that document, Mr. Bezruchenko?
24 Perhaps to assist you, the actual decision is attached on the next
1 MR. METTRAUX: And if Mr. Bezruchenko may be shown the second page
2 of that document, please.
3 Q. Do you recognise this document, Mr. Bezruchenko?
4 A. I don't think I saw this document before.
5 Q. Well, perhaps briefly I'll go with you through the document in
6 question and that may or may not assist your recollection.
7 If you look at the first paragraph. It's the decision that is
8 referred to in the preamble of the decision of the 6th of August of 2001.
9 First paragraph says this: "The decision approves the formation of a
10 special purpose unit for halting and combatting terrorist actions on the
11 territory of the Republic of Macedonia."
12 Can you see that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And if you look at the second paragraph it says - it's paragraph
15 2 - "The ranks of the special purpose unit will be composed of army units
16 which will be selected by the president with a separate resolution and
17 police units which will be selected by the Ministry of the Interior with
18 the separate order."
19 Can you see that?
20 A. Mm-hm, yes.
21 Q. And perhaps before we proceed with the other document as well.
22 Can you recall or is it within your knowledge that the actual authority to
23 use and control the new foreseen special unit or joint unit was to remain
24 with the president of the republic. Do you know that?
25 A. I remember seeing some documents which suggested the president of
1 the republic was exercising control over the army and police.
2 Q. Well, specifically about this joint unit perhaps I should draw
3 your attention to paragraph 6, please, Mr. Bezruchenko. Can you see it on
4 your screen?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. It says this: "The order for the use of the special purposes unit
7 will be issued by the president on the recommendation of the coordinated
8 body for crisis management."
9 Can you see that?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. And if we can now turn to what is Exhibit 1D60, please. And
12 perhaps I should have asked you this before leading the document. Was it
13 a document that was within your knowledge, Mr. Bezruchenko, before it was
14 shown to you?
15 A. I have seen this document before.
16 Q. Thank you. And if you can now focus on the next document, which
17 is -- which appears in front of you. Do you recognise this document as
18 being the decision of the 15 of June 2001 signed by the president of the
19 republic and which is referred to in the preamble of the order of the 6th
20 of August of 2001?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR. METTRAUX: And if we could turn to the second page of that
23 document, please.
24 Q. And if you can focus your attention on point 1.2, please, which is
25 the part that is addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, specifically
1 it says this: "The formation of a special tasks unit and its
2 incorporation into the special operations detachment. The composition of
3 the session tasks unit is to be determined by the Ministry of Interior.
4 Then the formation of a police battalion in the ranks of the Ministry of
5 Interior that will be incorporated into the anti-terrorism unit, the
6 composition of the battalion is to be determined by the Ministry of the
8 Can you see that?
9 A. Yes, I can.
10 Q. And do you agree -- perhaps I will use an image that in these two
11 orders by the -- or decisions issued by the government and then by the
12 president, what is being asked of the Ministry of Interior is to choose,
13 if you wish, from a deck of card, what unit or what composition should be
14 transferred to the new joint unit. Would you agree with that?
15 A. Well, I don't know to which extent this could be an appropriate
16 comparison, but I don't really think that the Ministry of Interior had so
17 many units at its disposal as to compare them to a deck of cards.
18 Q. I suppose that depends on the game of card we are playing. But
19 would you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, in any case that what is left for the
20 minister of the interior to decide is the composition of the unit. Do you
21 agree with that?
22 A. Well, not necessarily. I think the point, the main point of this
23 document as far as the Ministry of Interior is concerned, is that this
24 police battalion, is yet to be formed. Well, reading the document, I'm
25 getting an impression that it speaks of some units, mainly military units,
1 which have already been in existence, like the first [indiscernible]
2 Brigade, for instance, and the yet-to-be-composed units of the Ministry of
3 Interior such as the police battalion in the ranks of the MVR.
4 What leads me to make this conclusion is paragraph 4 in fact, on
5 the first page of this document which clearly speaks of formation of the
6 police battalion in the ranks of the Ministry of Interior which will be
7 incorporated, will be incorporated. So the formation apparently didn't
8 even exist at the point of this document being released.
9 Q. But just discussing, Mr. Bezruchenko, the relationship between
10 this particular decision which you have in front of you together with the
11 decision of the government that I showed to you a moment ago, and on the
12 other hand, the order of the 6th of August, you will agree, I hope, that
13 the principle that a number of individuals or particular units should be
14 transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to a new joint unit had
15 already been decided by the government and the decision of the president.
16 Is that correct?
17 A. Yes. Apparently the concepts of the unit was already in place and
18 the process of establishing such a unit was initiated. However, I would
19 like to draw your attention, Mr. Mettraux, again, to the date of 6 August
20 2001, which is the date when the actual decision about the release of the
21 special police unit was signed. Apparently this is the date when this
22 unit actually entered into the composition of the unit for special
23 purposes or as a anti-terrorist unit.
24 Q. And the decision which was left to the Ministry of Interior as
25 regard the new joint unit was as the document in front of you suggests, a
1 decision as to the composition of the units or unit which should come from
2 the Ministry of the Interior into the joint unit. Do you agree with that,
3 on the basis of 1.2 of that document?
4 A. Depends on which date.
5 Q. But do you agree that the date at which the order was rendered by
6 the minister of the interior is the 6th of August of 2001. Do you agree
7 with that?
8 A. Yes, that's right.
9 Q. And do you agree that at that time the decision which the minister
10 had to take and which he took in fact in light of the two other decisions
11 which he cite was one of the units to be transferred to the joint unit.
12 Is that correct?
13 A. Yes. Which means that in fact he was exercising the operational
14 control of this unit exactly up to this point.
15 Q. And do you agree that the principle as to the transfer and I think
16 you have read it or you have said it already, had been decided by the
17 minister or the government and then by the president. Is that correct?
18 A. I would say not the principle but, rather, the executive decision
19 was already in the making.
20 Q. And as you indicated, that those decisions were binding on
21 Mr. Boskoski. Is that correct?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. There's another matter, Mr. Bezruchenko, that you discussed with
24 Mr. Saxon in connection or, rather, following the discussion of this issue
25 of operational control and I would like to turn our attention to this
1 now. And this is the issue of discipline, disciplinary issue. Do you
2 recall discussing this with Mr. Saxon?
3 A. That's right.
4 Q. And in paragraph 3337, that is at pages 118 to 120 of your report,
5 you discuss some aspects of these questions. Is that correct?
6 A. Yes, that's right, sir.
7 Q. And there's a number of general questions that I want to ask you
8 at this stage, and the first one is -- I think you have indicated it in
9 two places in your report, at paragraph 424 and 429 of the report that the
10 disciplinary powers to which you refer in your report in so far as
11 relevant to these proceedings relate to -- are called violations of labour
12 discipline. Is that correct?
13 A. That's right, sir.
14 Q. And because the issue of the structure particularly the
15 disciplinary matter of the Ministry of Interior lies beyond your
16 expertise, I will not direct our attention specifically to this but to
17 some more general statements which you've made in your evidence and I
18 would like to bring yourself back to those statements. And I will simply
19 summarize them to ensure that I have an accurate understanding of your
21 You've indicated, I believe, the page 6070, that's the 4th of
22 October of 2007, that in a military setting the organ or person competent
23 to enforce disciplinary standards would normally be the superior of the
24 commander who would the operational control. Is that an accurate summary
25 of what you said?
1 A. Not necessarily sir. Actually let me explain it again. I will
2 try to make it very brief and very clear.
3 We should not really mix up the operational control and
4 administrative control of which the discipline is a function. Operational
5 control relates to everything which is essentially war making function,
6 that is actual fighting. Administration is everything which relates --
7 which actually does not relate to fighting and which serves in support of
8 operational control and fighting. Discipline as well as other matters is
9 in fact a functional area of administration. So if we are talking about
10 the enforcing of disciplinary standards it really depends on the specific
11 situation and the specific level of command.
12 Q. And thank you for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. And --
13 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
15 MR. SAXON: Just before we go any further, I'd like to indicate
16 that at line 10 of page 47, my colleague said the following as a preamble
17 to his last question: "And because the question of the structure,
18 particularly the disciplinary matter of the Ministry of the Interior lies
19 beyond your expertise," and then he continued.
20 Just simply for the record, Your Honour, Prosecution believes this
21 is a matter for the Trial Chamber to draw a conclusion on, not my learned
23 MR. METTRAUX:
24 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, there is another comment or statement that you
25 made that I would like to bring yourself back to and this is - and again
1 correct me if the summary is inaccurate. You said that, and I quote: "In
2 a normal military structure," superiors generally have disciplinary powers
3 over subordinates, and I believe you said that the issue of discipline
4 would be addressed by someone higher up in the line of command. Is that
6 A. Well, I'm afraid this has to be qualified, sir. What exactly do
7 you know, which line of command and which level of command?
8 Q. Well, what I would wish to ascertain from you, Mr. Bezruchenko, is
9 the suggestion or the apparent suggestion that the responsibility for
10 disciplinary matters would normally or necessarily, as the case may be,
11 lie with a superior of the person who committed the violations of labour
12 discipline within his line of command or line of authority. Do you agree
13 with that?
14 A. Let me describe it in the following way.
15 Suppose I'm a commander of a unit and one of my soldiers commits a
16 crime or a breach of discipline. I have the obligation under the doctrine
17 of full command being fully responsible for everything happening in my
18 unit to take care about this event, meaning I have to make an
19 investigation if I have the appropriate powers, of course, and take the
20 appropriate measures. But depending on the situation and depending on the
21 exact disciplinary powers that a military commander has at each level of
22 the hierarchical structure, it is not necessarily the immediate superior
23 of the -- of mine who is supposed to take care of a situation if I commit
24 a crime or a breach of discipline. What I'm trying to say is that this is
25 not really a dogma. This is a doctrine which has flexible application.
1 Q. Well, I'm grateful for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. That was my next
2 question or my next proposition for you. Would you agree that the
3 responsibility or otherwise in a military outfit or a military structure
4 would depend on the particular structure of that body and I think, as
5 you've indicated, the responsibility for taking care of such matter will
6 and otherwise might depend from the military structure in question. Do
7 you agree with that?
8 A. Normally this is the case, yes. Normally.
9 Q. And you would agree also that in some military settings or that
10 you may or may know [sic] about the responsibility to inquire, investigate
11 or otherwise punish disciplinary breaches would be assigned to a specific
12 organ of the military whose responsibility is to take care of this. Do
13 you agree with that?
14 A. Yes. There are varies organs for these kind of activities in
15 various armies. In former JNA it was military faculties and military
16 costs, for instance.
17 Q. Thank you for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. And you would agree that for
18 a particular line of command or a particular chain of command within the
19 military, for that particular line of command to be responsible to take
20 disciplinary action, it would have to be established in the first place,
21 and I may state the obvious, but that a disciplinary offence has been
22 committed within that structure, within that line. Do you agree with
24 A. Not necessarily. Allegations would be sufficient.
25 Q. Well, thank you for that. And the allegation which you say would
1 be sufficient or the actual commission of a breach would have to be
2 committed by an individual to be found within that particular line or
3 chain of command. Do you agree with that?
4 A. Well, put it this way: A military commander has a responsibility
5 of his men in his command. If, say, a breach of discipline would be
6 committed by a neighbouring unit, well, he would not really have direct
7 authority over these men.
8 Q. Well, I'm grateful. You corrected or you made the answer clearer
9 than the question, which is that a particular commander would not have
10 disciplinary responsibility in relation to breaches committed by
11 individuals who are in a different line of or chain of command. Is that
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. And if --
15 JUDGE PARKER: Wouldn't that last answer, though, Mr. Bezruchenko,
16 be subject to the basis upon which a person is subjected temporarily to
17 the command of somebody? He may be fully subjected and therefore fully
18 subjected to disciplinary authority of the person.
19 THE WITNESS: That is right, sir. Well, in fact it is not an
20 unusual development, especially in a war situation, whenever a unit is
21 under a provisional command or perhaps being attached on a temporary basis
22 to another unit of which there is an established commander, this commander
23 would exercise a disciplinary powers over this unit including these men,
24 but having said that, as a rule and as a matter of fact, the
25 administrative and disciplinary authorities would be retained by the
1 commander of the unit to which these men originally belonged to.
2 What I am trying to say, this again comes back to the distinction
3 between operational and disciplinary control.
4 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry. I intervened, Mr. Mettraux, because I
5 thought the witness was saying something quite different from what I had
6 understood from his previous evidence but I see we -- I correctly
7 understood exactly what he was saying.
8 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you.
9 JUDGE PARKER: I hope it may have helped you as well.
10 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, if we transfer the evidence which you've given in
12 relation to the military structure in this case to the situation of the
13 Ministry of the Interior, you would agree, I hope, that for anyone within
14 the Ministry of Interior to have any type of disciplinary duties or
15 responsibilities, it would first have to be established that the breach of
16 labour discipline was in fact committed by a member of that ministry or
17 you said that there were allegations to that effect. Is that correct?
18 A. It probably would depend on the specific situation on the ground.
19 I don't think there is a general rule which would really govern these
20 kinds of situations. But, again, as a general rule, I would say that
21 there should be sufficient grounds to warrant an investigation or perhaps
22 at least to make a decision as to disciplinary action.
23 Q. But if you can focus, Mr. Bezruchenko, on the other part of my
24 question more specifically, do you agree if for the Ministry of Interior,
25 anyone within that ministry to have any duty or responsibility as regards
1 violations of the discipline, it would have to be established in the first
2 place that the person who committed that breach was in fact a member of
3 the ministry. In other words, the Ministry of Interior would have no
4 duty to discipline someone who was not a de jure member of the ministry.
5 Do you agree with that?
6 A. That's right, sir.
7 Q. Is that also correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that in the course of the
8 investigation of this case, you've interviewed quite a number of
10 A. I wouldn't term it this way, Mr. Mettraux. I have no authority to
11 interview anyone, but I was involved in the interviews.
12 Q. I'm grateful for the correction, Mr. Bezruchenko. But you would
13 agree also that on a number of occasion you actually put questions to
14 witnesses. Do you agree that?
15 A. Through the investigator, yes.
16 Q. Simply as a matter of clarification, Mr. Bezruchenko, is it your
17 evidence that you actually never directly addressed a question to a
18 interviewee or are you suggesting anything else?
19 A. As a matter of fact, my questions were addressed through the
20 investigator. But as we were talking, perhaps some of the questions could
21 be understood or implied to be understood by a interviewee as a direct
23 Q. And in fact you asked the question directly; it was not
24 investigator that asked them on your behalf, is that correct? On a number
25 of occasion you asked the question directly of the witness and got a
1 direct answer from the witness. Is that correct?
2 A. Yeah. I think there could be such instances, yes.
3 Q. And as part of your involvement in this matter, you also reviewed,
4 and I think it is quite clear in your evidence, a relatively large number
5 of documents pertaining to these proceedings. Do you agree with that?
6 A. Excuse me, sir, which proceedings do you mean?
7 Q. Well, in the context of the investigation of this case, both prior
8 and after the indictment of Mr. Boskoski and Mr. Tarculovski, you did
9 review a number of document, including documents that became exhibits as
10 part of your work as a military analyst. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes. In fact, this is my job description to review these
13 Q. And as part of this process of investigating the case and
14 reviewing documents and taking part in various interviews, you became
15 aware, didn't you, of some serious difficulties which the Prosecution had
16 to determine whether the people whom you thought might have committed
17 crimes in Ljuboten were in fact members of the Ministry of Interior. Is
18 that correct?
19 A. Well, sir, I would put it this way. My job was to analyse the
20 conflict and those aspects of the conflict which were essential for its
21 description. As to the actual investigation, investigation leads an
22 investigation clues and investigation tactics, it is not really my
23 business and wasn't really involved in this.
24 Q. Well, Mr. Bezruchenko, I'm putting it to you that you personally
25 became aware of serious problems which related to this very matter, namely
1 the fact that individuals who you believed might have been responsible for
2 the crimes in or around Ljuboten were in fact not members of the Ministry
3 of the Interior. Do you agree with that?
4 A. No, I do not, sir. Well, I am not aware that I was aware of any
5 serious problems and as I say, again, the investigation is something that
6 was not really my primary concern. My primary concern was doing precisely
7 what I was supposed to do. That is providing the description of the
9 Q. Well, I'm putting it to you that those concerns related in
10 particular to concerns which you expressed to colleagues that in the
11 absence of clear evidence that those who you believed to have committed
12 the crimes were members of the Ministry of Interior, you would be hard put
13 to establish a line of command between Mr. Boskoski and those person, and
14 you also expressed the view to your colleague that as a result of that,
15 you would encountered difficulties proving Mr. Boskoski's disciplinary
16 duties in relation to these people. Do you agree with that?
17 A. Well, I have been having, well, my views on certain documents, and
18 certain aspects of the description of the conflict, but that does not
19 necessarily mean that I actually expressed anything like this.
20 Q. Well, we're going to come back in a minute to this document.
21 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
23 MR. SAXON: Even assuming for the sake of argument that
24 Mr. Bezruchenko had made such expressions, is my colleague suggesting that
25 if he did make them, such a honesty evaluation of information available to
1 him would somehow affect the credibility of his evidence? Because if not,
2 I don't know what the relevance of this line of questioning is.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.
4 MR. METTRAUX: Well, I think the answer has been given by the
5 witness. He has indicated that he never made any such comment, Your
6 Honour. And the Defence will, in a moment, return to a document which in
7 fact might suggest a slightly different involvement of Mr. Bezruchenko
8 than the one claimed, and also a particular position taken about a number
9 of issue which we submit would be directly relevant to the credibility or
10 otherwise of the witness.
11 As far as the statements are concerned, Mr. Bezruchenko has
12 indicated that he did not make such statement and described his
13 involvement in matters of the description of the conflict and not in
14 investigative matters. We believe, Your Honour, that this is a proper
15 course of cross-examination, particularly in light of the Trial Chamber
16 which indicated that those matters could be pursued as a matter of weight
17 and credibility.
18 JUDGE PARKER: You say the relevance is credibility.
19 MR. METTRAUX: It is credibility, Your Honour, and also we believe
20 weight, if any, to be given to several aspects of the report of
21 Mr. Bezruchenko. We would wish, if permitted, not to indicate too much at
22 this stage in front of the witness, but we would indicate that this would
23 also, in our submission, be relevant to the weight to be given, if any, to
24 some parts, at least, of the report of the witness.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Anything further, Mr. Saxon?
1 MR. SAXON: It's difficult to see how such evidence, if it exists,
2 would be relevant to weight to be given to certain parts of
3 Mr. Bezruchenko's report because as Mr. Bezruchenko has testified, he was
4 tasked to analyse the armed conflict if it existed in Macedonia in 2001
5 and the parties to that armed conflict. He was not tasked to analyse
6 whether certain persons who may or may not have been in Ljuboten on the
7 12th of August were members of the Ministry of Interior. That certainly
8 was not part of the scope of his report.
9 JUDGE PARKER: At least on the basis of credibility, there
10 seems -- on what is presently known to be and on the assurance of Mr.
11 Mettraux, there seems to be some adequate basis for the questioning to
13 What, if anything, can be made of the outcome of that, this is
14 something which as far as the Chamber is concerned, is entirely
15 conjectural at the time. The issue may become clearer as the questioning
16 is pursued and it may be necessary for the Chamber then to intervene.
17 But, for the moment, please continue, Mr. Mettraux.
18 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to Your Honour. And my apologies,
19 Mr. Bezruchenko.
20 Q. Is it correct that when you became aware of difficulties with the
21 identification of those believed to have committed crimes in Ljuboten and
22 more specifically, the difficulties to establish that these persons were
23 in fact de jure members of the MOI, the decision was taken to pursue a
24 course of evidence whereby members of special units of the MOI were said
25 to have been present in Ljuboten. Is it something within the realm of
1 your knowledge, Mr. Bezruchenko?
2 A. Not -- no, sir.
3 Q. Is it within the realm of your knowledge that for the same reason,
4 the decision was -- or the course was pursued to suggest that the special
5 units of the Ministry of Interior all those which you said existed at the
6 time were under the direct control and command of Mr. Boskoski? Is it
7 something which is within the realm of your knowledge or ...
8 A. Let me put it this way, sir. The fact of the crimes committed in
9 Ljuboten as well as the perpetrators was not really the subject of my
10 report. Had it been, there should have been a special section which would
11 have been devoted to the crimes committed as well as the suspects.
12 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Bezruchenko, that at least until -- or perhaps
13 I should ask you this. Is this correct that until well into the year of
14 2005, that is after the indictment of Mr. Boskoski, there remained doubts
15 within your office as to whether the people who were alleged to have
16 committed the crimes or believed to have committed the crimes in -- in and
17 around Ljuboten were in fact regular police officers or irregulars. Are
18 you aware of that?
19 A. Well, no. If there were such doubts, well, at least I was not
20 aware of those and besides, as I say, even if these doubts existed, it
21 wouldn't have affected my report since the subject of crimes was not
22 within the scope of what I was describing.
23 MR. METTRAUX: Can the witness please be shown what is Rule 65 ter
25 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, what I'm about to show you is a so-called
1 investigator's notes and it's an investigator's note of Mr. Stojance
2 Bogeski, and it is dated the 26th of June of 2005. Can you see that on
3 your screen?
4 A. Yes, I can see it.
5 Q. And if I may draw your attention to the subheading which says
6 purpose of interview, can you see that?
7 A. The purpose of the interview --
8 Q. Can you see that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And if I may draw your attention to the last sentence of that
11 document -- of that paragraph, I apologise, it says this: "In addition,
12 the person could assist the ICTY in recognition of identity of the regular
13 or irregular groups of Macedonians involved in Ljuboten operation."
14 So first I should ask you whether you were aware of these
15 particular investigator's notes?
16 A. If you could probably go to the second page.
17 MR. METTRAUX: Could the registry please assist.
18 Q. The note, Mr. Bezruchenko, was taken by Mr. Lubomir Josefciak.
19 A. Yeah, I don't see the implication of your question.
20 Q. Well, do you agree that at least as late as 26th of June 2005 the
21 Office of the Prosecutor was still seeking to establish whether the
22 individuals believed to have committed crimes as part of the Ljuboten
23 information were regular or irregular groups of Macedonians. Do you agree
24 that's what the note suggestions?
25 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
2 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, the Prosecution will stipulate that well
3 into the spring of 2006 the Trial Chamber, the former Trial Chamber
4 compelled the Prosecution to identify additional members of the JCE as it
5 was described in its indictment in the Prosecution's second amended
6 indictment and its amended pre-trial brief.
7 Having said that, what then is the relevance of the fact that the
8 Prosecution was continuing its investigation to try to identify further at
9 this point in the summer of 2005, tried -- to try to identify with more
10 precision who were the individuals who were part of the Ministry of
11 Interior who were in Ljuboten village on the weekend of the 10th to the
12 12th of August? How is that relevant to the testimony of this witness?
13 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, with respect to Mr. Saxon' submission,
14 the issue here, I believe, is not one, at least not the one that was being
15 explored, of the fact that the Prosecution was continuing to seek to
16 investigate this matter which, as Mr. Saxon indicated, is completely
17 proper. The question was that of the knowledge of the particular witness
18 of that fact, which has now been explored with him and whether he was
19 aware of these particular facts, namely that the Prosecutor had or was
20 still seeking at the time to identify the particular individuals involved.
21 If Your Honour believes that the question is too remote, since the
22 witness has indicated that he hasn't participated in this particular
23 interview, although he's indicated he knew about the notes, I will ask him
24 specifically about the interviews to which he participated and which would
25 be relevant, we submit, to the matters indicated earlier.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Well, it certainly is not apparent that this
2 document will advance the matter, Mr. Mettraux. If you say there is other
3 material that comes nearer to relevance, we will look at it.
4 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Is it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, and the document may be removed at
6 this stage. Is it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that one of the interviews
7 to which you personally participated was the interview of former minister
8 of defence Mr. Vlado Buckovski. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that's right, sir.
10 Q. Is it correct also that during that particular interview
11 Mr. Buckovski told the investigator or the team of the Office of the
12 Prosecutor that the group that was in Ljuboten on the 10, 11 and 12 or
13 during that weekend, did not belong to the regular security forces. Do
14 you have a memory of Mr. Buckovski telling you this?
15 A. I don't think so.
16 Q. Well, perhaps I can assist you with --
17 MR. METTRAUX: It's Rule 65 ter 1D856, please.
18 Q. And if you can first focus on the first page of that document,
19 Mr. Bezruchenko. Can you -- it's, as you can see, the record of interview
20 of the minister of defence of Macedonia, Vlado Buckovski, and it list two
21 interviewers as being Matti Raatikainen and Viktor Bezruchenko. Can you
22 see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And that would be yourself. Is that correct?
25 A. That's right.
1 Q. And if we can please turn to the second page of that document.
2 And if I can ask to you look at paragraph 8 of that document. Is
3 that correct that Mr. Buckovski expressed the view that the group in
4 question did not belong to the regular security forces?
5 A. Yes, I can see this paragraph.
6 Q. And is that correct that the -- it can -- it can be removed at
7 this stage.
8 Is that correct that Mr. Buckovski also explained to you that the
9 matter of this group had been raised directly with the prime minister at
10 the time. Do you recall that?
11 A. Yes, I recall something like that, yeah.
12 Q. And do you recall also that on another occasion in a different
13 interview -- I should ask you that way. Is it correct that during the
14 interview of Mr. Sasa Isovski, a member of the army, he was asked about
15 whether a number of persons had been in Ljubanci and Ljuboten during the
16 particular weekend and whether they had been members of that security
17 agency. Can you recall that being asked of him?
18 A. Yes, I think so. And if I can comment at this point. I think
19 that the investigation was actually exploring all opportunities and was
20 open to all actions in a completely impartial and neutral way and
21 therefore all these scenarios of what happened in Ljuboten were being
23 Q. I'm grateful for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. Do you also recall that
24 when the matter was raised in particular with Mr. Sasko Isovski as to
25 whether he could rather any of those men present in the area at the time,
1 he explained to you that he was unable to distinguish between members of
2 the police and member of that agency, because who were in uniform. Can
3 you recall that he told you this?
4 A. I remember that actually he was asked questions as to the identity
5 of this man, perhaps, as far as I can recall, but I'm not entirely certain
6 what his answer was, and even if he had given some specific answer that
7 matter -- that the matter would not stop at this point in the process of
8 an investigation. There certainly would be other investigating matters.
9 Q. So you cannot personally recall whether - or I should ask you
10 that - where you cannot recall what answer Mr. Isovski gave you in
11 relation to this particular question. Is that correct?
12 A. No, I don't remember his specific answer.
13 Q. Is it correct that the prime minister himself, Mr. Ljubco
14 Georgievski, whom defence minister Mr. Buckovski had mentioned to you also
15 told your office when interviewed that he did not know what forces had
16 been involved in this matter. Do you recall?
17 A. I know that Mr. Georgievski, if I recall correctly, was
18 interviewed by ICTY investigators, but I'm not involved in this interview
19 and I'm not -- I cannot comment on that.
20 MR. METTRAUX: Well, can the witness please be shown Rule 65 ter
21 1D865, please.
22 Q. Can you -- do you have the statement in front of you,
23 Mr. Bezruchenko, that is the OTP statement of Ljubco Georgievski?
24 A. Sorry. Which Georgievski do you mean? You mean the prime
1 Q. That's correct, Mr. Bezruchenko.
2 A. Yes, I can see that.
3 Q. And if the registry could please turn to page 7 of that document.
4 That would be page 1D00-724, please. And I will ask the registry to focus
5 on page 46 of that document.
6 Mr. Bezruchenko, this is what then prime minister or in any case
7 the prime minister in 2001 told the Office of the Prosecutor: "Being
8 asked what kind of Macedonian forces participated in the operation in
9 Ljuboten, I say I do not know."
10 Can you see that?
11 A. Yes, can I.
12 Q. And did you have that particular statement in your possession when
13 preparing the report that you have prepared?
14 A. Yes, I had this statement.
15 Q. And were you familiar with this particular statement in the
17 A. Well, I don't think I was quoting this statement in my report,
18 no. As I mentioned previously I was trying as much as possible to avoid
19 relying on any statements.
20 Q. Will you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, and I'm talking once again about
21 the situation of the Ministry of the Interior of Macedonia in 2001, that
22 if a volunteer had engaged in the operation in Ljuboten without receiving
23 a call-up notification to be a reservist prior to those events, he or they
24 would have been there illegitimately and could only be regarded as
25 volunteers but not as de jure members of the MOI. Do you agree with that?
1 A. In order for me to answer, I actually have to know what exactly
2 the status of volunteer of Ministry of Interior is.
3 Q. Well, I will simply ask you this. In a situation where a person
4 would volunteer to take part in a particular operation or in any other
5 activities of the police, without a call-up notification to become a
6 reservist, you would agree that any involvement in this particular
7 activities would be illegitimate and that the individual in question could
8 not be regarded as a de jure member of the MOI. Do you agree with that?
9 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
11 MR. SAXON: Mr. Mettraux has simply basically repeated his last
12 question, and Mr. Bezruchenko has said you need to explain to me what the
13 status of a volunteer of the Ministry of Interior is. Why are we going
14 around in a circle again?
15 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.
16 MR. METTRAUX: Well, I'm happy to reformulate, Your Honour, to
17 expedite things if that assists.
18 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you agree that the procedure or the regular
19 procedure for calling up of police reservists would entail, according to
20 the procedure, a call-up notification. Do you agree with that?
21 A. Yes, there should be some document which would specify who is
22 supposed to report where and in which situation.
23 Q. And are you also aware of the fact there are other conditions set
24 out in the laws applicable to the Ministry of the Interior for an
25 individual to become formally or de jure a member of the police forces.
1 Are you aware of that?
2 A. If you could perhaps refresh my memory, sir, and specify what
3 specific conditions you mean.
4 Q. Well, for example, do you agree that there is a requirement of
5 training to become a de jure member of the police. Do you agree with
7 A. Well, it depends.
8 Q. Are you suggesting this is not a requirement set by the law,
9 Mr. Bezruchenko?
10 A. I think the requirements of the law are a little bit broader than
11 that. They actually stipulate specific educational parameters and
12 conditions for personnel to be engaged in the role of police.
13 Q. And one of the indications which -- or one of the -- yes,
14 indication that a particular individual and one of the conditions set by
15 the law to an individual becoming a reservists of the police would be the
16 provision of an identification card of the Ministry of Interior. Is
18 A. I remember seeing a document suggesting that reserve police
19 personnel should have identification cards.
20 Q. I'm grateful, Mr. Bezruchenko.
21 I'd now like to turn to a different document that relates to
22 information which I asked of you a moment ago.
23 MR. METTRAUX: And if I could ask the registry to please bring up
24 what is Rule 65 ter 1D724, please.
25 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you recognise this document as a summary and
1 analysis, this is title, prepared by you of the book by Mr. Ljube Boskoski
2 "My Struggle for Macedonia"?
3 A. Yes, I recognise it.
4 Q. There is a matter that I would like to clarify first with you,
5 Mr. Bezruchenko. Clearly the first page contains a mistake, I believe, as
6 to the date. It refers to the 24th of April of 2001, but then if you look
7 in the next paragraph it refers to the 2001 and 2002 and to the fact that
8 the book was published in 2004 in Skopje. And from the content of the
9 summary, I do understand the book -- or the summary, I apologise, to have
10 been done not on the 24th of April of 2001 but on the 24th of April of
11 2004. Would that be correct?
12 A. Of course, it could not really be done in one day. Yeah, it must
13 have been 2004.
14 Q. And I suppose that you recall preparing that particular summary
15 for the Office of the Prosecutor. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And you will also -- or I should put it that way, you will confirm
18 that the summary and the analysis of the book of Mr. Boskoski which is in
19 front of at this stage was prepared by you prior to the time when you
20 became an expert for the Prosecutor. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes, that's right.
22 Q. And do you recall making your particular -- or your personal, I
23 should say, assessment and evaluation of the content of the book of
24 Mr. Boskoski, the -- My Struggle for Macedonia?
25 A. I don't understand what you mean, so what do you mean personal
2 Q. Yes, there's a word missing from the transcript. I apologise,
3 Mr. Bezruchenko. Do you recall not only summarizing the book written by
4 Mr. Boskoski but also include your personal analysis of the content of
5 that book. Do you recall that?
6 A. Well, basically it is not really analysis. This is rather a
7 summary, and essentially it covered all the relevant chapters. Of course,
8 it is not really a direct translation. Therefore, this is a very
9 condensed summary of the book.
10 Q. Well, perhaps I will just first draw your attention to this
11 particular page. Do you agree that it refers to a summary and analysis,
12 do you agree with that?
13 A. Yes.
14 MR. METTRAUX: And if the registry can please turn to the next
16 Q. Do you agree that what appears on the screen here appears to be
17 your summary of the first chapter of the book. Is that correct?
18 A. Yes, that's right.
19 Q. And if one can turn to the second page of the document, please, or
20 the third page, I apologise. This would be a summary of the second, third
21 and you start with chapter 4. Is that correct?
22 A. Chapter 4 is at the bottom of the page.
23 Q. That's correct. But if one may turn now please to what is page 17
24 of the document, that would be 1D00-6427, please. And if I can ask to you
25 look at the second half of this page, Mr. Bezruchenko, do you agree that
1 there is a subsection called or entitled by you as "Analysis." Can you
2 see that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I would like to ask you to look at the particular analysis which
5 you made of the book of Mr. Boskoski. It says this: "The analysis of the
6 book suggest a number of conclusion and investigative leads."
7 Can you see that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So you would agree that this first sentence suggests that at least
10 as far as the analysis is concerned, this was more than just military
11 analysis. Do you agree?
12 A. Well, this book is irrelevant for a military analysis of the
13 conflict, and therefore, my analysis included certain matters related to
14 the conflict as -- related to the conflict as reflected in this book.
15 Q. And you would agree that what they are characterised by you to be
16 are investigative leads, is that correct, that's what you have named
17 them. Is that correct?
18 A. That's what it says.
19 Q. And if one goes to the first paragraph of that analysis, it says
20 this, that's what you wrote: "Boskoski's views were formed under the
21 strong influence of radical Macedonian disguised as patriotism. He
22 espouses strong nationalist idealogy."
23 So just stopping there for a moment, Mr. Bezruchenko, do you
24 suggest that this still falls within the realm of military analysis?
25 A. Well, the ideological aspect of the conflict was not really my
1 task, but if you take a look at the report in its entirety and especially
2 the part of it which is devoted to paramilitary groups, you will note
3 there that I also quote various sources which deal with the radical
4 Macedonian groups and their ideology.
5 Q. But you agree here, sir, that you are dealing not with the
6 ideology of the conflict -- I'm trying to find your exact term of the
7 groups -- but what you suggest the views and political views of
8 Mr. Boskoski's are. Do you agree with that.
9 A. Well, I'm not suggesting what Mr. Boskoski's views are, but I'm
10 saying that they were formed apparently under the influence of radical
11 Macedonian ideology.
12 Q. And what you say in the next sentence is, "Boskoski's
13 uncompromising support for the military option during the conflict as well
14 as his obviously confrontational nature brought him into conflict with
15 political opposition, Albanian parties, and international community."
16 I hope you can agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that this sentence and this
17 view which you express about the nature of Mr. Boskoski, as you name it,
18 falls well beyond the realm of military analysis. Do you agree with that?
19 A. My answer to your conjecture, sir, would be as follows. This book
20 is a important source for understanding the accurate facts which occurred
21 during the time of conflict in Macedonia.
22 This particular sentence which you have just quoted in relation to
23 support for military option during the conflict is certainly an important
24 point which I derived from this book.
25 Q. What about --
1 A. Therefore -- therefore, it is my position and my view that in fact
2 this book is a primary source for military analysis and as such was
3 analysed for featuring in the report.
4 Q. What about the obviously confrontational nature of Mr. Boskoski,
5 you claim he had? Did you see that that sort of analysis was relevant to
6 what had been later requested of you as an expert?
7 A. Well, this paragraph in its entirety is based on the analysis of
8 the book, particularly one of the chapters, I think, in which he describes
9 his relationship with various political parties and members of the
10 international community.
11 Q. But is that correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that in fact this particular
12 summary and analysis of Mr. Boskoski's book was prepared by you prior to
13 the time when you were asked to become the expert of the Office of the
14 Prosecutor? Is that correct?
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 Q. And if we can look to the next paragraph in that document it says
17 that "Boskoski's relationship with media and his statements suggest that
18 he was conscientiously cultivating an image of a dedicated fighter for
19 Macedonia, democratic brother Ljubo perhaps aspiring to become a national
21 Mr. Bezruchenko, do you agree that this particular statement or
22 suggestion of yours again falls far beyond the realm of military
23 expertise. Do you agree with that?
24 A. Not necessarily, sir. This statement cannot really be regarded
25 in isolation from the entire analysis of the book. It was the book which
1 was the subject of the analysis. And this analysis is based on its entire
3 MR. METTRAUX: If I can ask the registry now please to turn to the
4 next page.
5 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, I will ask to you look at paragraph 3 of that
6 document. I'll read it out to you. It says this: "Throughout the
7 Albanian/Macedonian conflict, Boskoski displayed a strong 'hands-on
8 approach' which was manifested in his activity to raise special police
9 unit, frequent visits of the front-line police units, as well as his
10 direct involvement and control of combat operations of these units."
11 Can you see that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And that's the same type of statement or findings which you later
14 made in your report as an expert. Is that correct?
15 A. Well, not necessarily. What exactly do you mean the same type?
16 Q. Well, is that correct that the suggestion that Mr. Boskoski was
17 directly involved and control of combat operation of those units, and you
18 are referring to special units, is to be found almost verbatim in your
19 later report. Is that correct?
20 A. Well, in fact their entire analysis of this book does suggest that
21 Mr. Boskoski indeed was very frequently seen with his troops on the ground
22 and was obviously giving directions regarding the operations. Well, this
23 book actually served as a basis for some of my assumptions and my analysis
24 of the entire conflict.
25 Q. And you go on to say this: "In the process, he was exposed to
1 risk to his life several times. This kind of behaviour and style of
2 leadership reflect the attitudes of a military commander who feels that he
3 alone is in charge, assumes responsibility for his actions and personally
4 leads his troops into action.
5 Again, is it correct that this view which you had expressed to
6 your colleagues at the time was again reiterated in your report where --
7 and in your evidence where you have sought to suggest that, in effect, the
8 Ministry of Interior and the minister function, in effect, like a military
9 body. Do you agree with that?
10 A. This is the analysis which is derived from this book. You can
11 just read it and see for yourself.
12 Q. And then at paragraph 4 you said this: "Boskoski's admission that
13 the operation in Ljuboten was a joint action of the Ministry of Interior
14 and Ministry of Defence provides a valuable lead for development of the
15 concept of joint criminal enterprise."
16 Mr. Bezruchenko, would you agree that this statement lies far
17 beyond the competencies and the mandate of a military analyst as you
18 described at the beginning of your evidence. Do you agree with that?
19 A. I'm not certain, sir. Well, I think as a military analyst, I was
20 supposed to provide an appropriate analysis of the conflict in Macedonia
21 as well as the developments in the village of Ljuboten as reflected in one
22 of the sections of my report.
23 As to the recommendations that I'm making at this point, these are
24 essentially my ideas, yes.
25 MR. METTRAUX: Would that be a convenient time, Your Honour?
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. We adjourn now and resume at 6.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 5.29 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.
5 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Could the registry please bring up, one again, Rule 65 ter 1D724,
7 please. And if we can turn -- go back, please go back to page 18. That
8 would be 1D00-6428. Thank you.
9 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, I'll ask to you go back to the paragraph that
10 we've left before the break. It's paragraph 4. And the next sentence
11 after the one I had already left -- read to you reads as follows: "In the
12 course of further investigation, the level of coordination between the
13 Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior has to be thoroughly
15 Can you see that?
16 A. Yes, I can.
17 Q. And you would agree that this in effect are what can be
18 characterised as investigative suggestions that you make to your
19 colleagues. Do you agree with that?
20 A. Not necessarily to my colleagues. In fact this whole document,
21 this summary, and the analysis which accompanies it, in fact was my
22 product which I was doing in the process of getting the understanding of
23 the conflict as well as various aspects of what had happened in the
24 village of Ljuboten.
25 Well, whether it was intended for my colleagues, this is an
1 entirely different matter. I think for most parts in this analysis I am
2 providing certain information as well as leads for further analysis, which
3 was entirely in my job description.
4 Q. But do you agree that this particular document was communicated or
5 transmitted to your colleagues of the Office of the Prosecution who were
6 involved in this investigation. Do you agree with that?
7 A. Yes, it was.
8 Q. And if you look at the last sentence of that paragraph you say
9 this: "During interviews of senior military and police suspects, this
10 point should be in the focus of investigative effort.
11 So again, would you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that this is not
12 military analysis but in effect an investigative suggestion that you make
13 to your colleague. Do you agree with that -- colleagues?
14 A. The mandate of the military analysts, sir, includes not
15 necessarily in describing the conflicts or concentrating exclusively on
16 military matters related to conflict situations but also analysis of the
17 suspects and senior military and political figures which might feature in
18 this or that investigation. So I don't really see any problem here.
19 Q. Do you agree that when describing your mandate as a military
20 analyst at the beginning of your evidence, you never suggested that this
21 mandate would include the investigation or otherwise of the suspects and
22 senior military and political figure which might -- figure -- I think it
23 was "figure" you used in that or that investigation. Do you recall being
24 asked to describe your duties as a military analyst?
25 A. Yes, I recall that.
1 Q. And do you recall the fact that you never mentioned that
2 particular aspect of your duties. Do you recall that?
3 A. Well, perhaps I didn't, but it does not necessarily mean that
4 investigation should not be accompanied by military analysis.
5 Q. And in fact you agree that - and we will come back to this over
6 the course of this day or tomorrow - that you took an important part in
7 the investigation of this case. Do you agree with that?
8 A. I took part investigation of this case, yes, that's right.
9 Q. And you took an important part, I'm putting it to you, in, for
10 instance, obtaining documents, requesting documents, receiving documents,
11 or taking part in interviews. Do you agree with that?
12 A. Yes, that's right.
13 Q. Well, for the time being, let's stay with the documents. We will
14 come to those issues somewhat later.
15 At paragraph 5 you made the following comment: "Boskoski admitted
16 that he was in Ljuboten in the afternoon on 12 August on specific request
17 of President Trajkovski and Prime Minister Georgievski. This admission
18 presents a new and important angle of the investigation and possibly could
19 provide exculpatory evidence."
20 So do you agree, again, Mr. Bezruchenko, that what you're doing
21 here is not military analysis. What you are doing is investigative work
22 on behalf of the Office of the Prosecution. Do you agree with that?
23 A. Again, not necessarily, sir, because first of all this document
24 was prepared before I started doing my report. And secondly, even while
25 doing my report, one of the focuses of my report was the developments in
1 the village of Ljuboten. And I don't think any responsible analyst would
2 really drop such an important document as the book of memoirs by the
3 former Minister of the Interior regarding the conflict in Macedonia.
4 Q. But just a matter of timing here, Mr. Bezruchenko, it's -- you've
5 explained or you've said on a few occasion that the reason for this was
6 that part of your report had to do with the developments in the village of
7 Ljuboten. But just to be clear on that point, in April of 2004 when you
8 prepared that particular document, you had not started preparing your
9 expert report. Is that correct?
10 A. I was working on the case in any case, yes, I was examining the
11 documents, I was studying the conflict in Macedonia, I was doing my
12 research in Internet and the other sources, so it was just a part of -- I
13 was reading books, so it is just a part of these activities.
14 Q. But just to answer my question, Mr. Bezruchenko, at the time you
15 agree that when you were doing that particular analysis of the document,
16 you were not yet writing a report, an expert report that should be used in
17 evidence in this case. Do you agree with that? And the indication that
18 you have given that these particular aspects of the case or the material
19 were relevant to the Ljuboten part of your report is simply not correct,
20 since at the time you were not in the process of preparing this report.
21 Is that correct?
22 A. I'm sorry, sir. Could you please repeat the last sentence again.
23 Q. Perhaps I'll put it that way. You have explained on a number of
24 occasion that the reason for the number of comments which you made in this
25 document which is in front of you in relation in particular to
1 Mr. Boskoski or otherwise who was in the village, was relevant to your
2 effort as an expert to uncover what was happening in the village of
3 Ljuboten. What I'm putting to you, sir, is, it simply cannot be the case
4 it's at the time you were not yet working on an expert report on behalf of
5 the Prosecution. Is that correct?
6 A. Well, sir, an expert is somebody who knows more than a ordinary
7 person about a certain specialized expertise or knowledge. My expertise
8 and knowledge is military in specific relation to the former Yugoslavia,
9 including Macedonia. I have been dealing with this issue for many, many
10 years and saying that I was not analysing what had happened in Macedonia
11 or Yugoslavia, for that matter, prior to compiling my report is simply not
13 Q. So if I understand your response to the question, is it correct
14 that in fact at the time when you were preparing that report the comments,
15 suggestions and otherwise contained in that documents were done not for
16 the purpose of preparing your report at the time, but for the use of the
17 Office of the Prosecution investigation team including yourself. Do you
18 agree with that?
19 A. First and foremost, this document was done for my own use, for my
20 own exploration of possible inroads into this matter. This is exactly
21 what I was supposed to do under the terms of my job description.
22 Q. And you agree that it also contains several suggestions to your
23 colleagues about further investigation or investigative efforts. Do you
24 agree with that?
25 A. Analysis, rather, analysis.
1 Q. Well, Mr. Bezruchenko, I'm simply quoting from paragraph 4 of your
2 own summary and analysis. It says: "In the course of further
3 investigation," and the next sentence says "investigative effort."
4 Do you agree that's what you told in your report?
5 A. Yes, this is what it says.
6 Q. And then at paragraph 5 you say the following. I will simply read
7 the previous sentence again. It says: "This admission presents a new and
8 important angle of the investigation and possibly could provide
9 exculpatory evidence. A decision should be made if the role of Prime
10 Minister Georgievski in the chain of command should be explored in the
11 course of investigation.
12 Do you recall making that comment?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. And just going back for a second to a proposition I had put to you
15 a moment ago. It was at page 54, line 23. It starts at line 23. I read
16 it out to you once again. It says this: "I'm putting it that you those
17 concerns related in particular to concerns which you expressed to
18 colleagues that in the absence of clear evidence that those you believed
19 to have committed the crimes were members of the Ministry of Interior, you
20 would be hard put to establish a line of command between Mr. Boskoski and
21 those persons and you also expressed the view to your colleagues that as a
22 result of that, you would encounter difficulties proving Mr. Boskoski's
23 disciplinary duties in relation to these people." And then I asked you,
24 "do you agree with that."
25 And your answer was this: "Well, I have been having, well, my
1 views on certain documents and certain aspects of the description of the
2 conflict, but that does not necessarily mean that I actually expressed
3 anything like this."
4 And if I can now to turn to paragraph 6, Mr. Bezruchenko, of this
5 summary and analysis of yours. You noted the following: "Boskoski also
6 admitted that he signed the order about demobilisation of reservists in
7 the area of Skopje on 29 June 2001. It has to be verified, if necessary,
8 if reserve police personnel engaged for attack on Ljuboten received
9 call-up notification and when. If they did not, police reservists engaged
10 for attack on Ljuboten were there illegitimately and could be there only
11 as volunteers."
12 Do you recall saying that, Mr. Bezruchenko?
13 A. Yes, yes, that's right.
14 Q. And then you go on to say: "They were probably hand picked by
15 Tarculovski on Boskoski's orders. This may explain why former and serving
16 individual Kometa members were engaged for attack on Ljuboten. To this
17 date, the investigation did not reveal any contractual obligations between
18 the Ministry of Interiors and Kometa. This informal relationship also
19 could have implications for later investigations made by the Ministry of
20 Interior..." and if we can turn the page "... this informal relationship
21 also could have implication for later investigations made by the Ministry
22 of Interior and disciplinary sanction which should have been applied to
24 Do you recall now making those comments, Mr. Bezruchenko?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And do you agree that again what you were expressing to your
2 colleagues were matters of investigation that had to be verified with a
3 view to build a case against Mr. Boskoski?
4 A. First and foremost, Mr. Mettraux, these were the analytical
5 analysis, the analytical matters which have been derived from this book,
6 and I think that my colleagues who are working on this case had the full
7 right to be aware of what this book was about.
8 Q. Well, let's look at my question once again, Mr. Bezruchenko.
9 Do you agree that again you were expressing to your colleagues --
10 the matters which you were expressing to your colleagues were matters of
11 investigation that had to be verified with a view to build a case against
12 Mr. Boskoski. Do you agree with that?
13 A. The investigation was going on, yes.
14 Q. And with that analysis, comments, and suggestion to your
15 colleagues, you were in fact contributing to building up a case against
16 Mr. Boskoski. Is that correct?
17 A. I don't quite understand the implication of your question
18 Mr. Mettraux. If you're implying that it is not my job to provide any
19 analysis or to an investigation team, this is simply a wrong assertion.
20 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, I'm not trying to imply this. What I'm asking
21 you is whether the nature of what you were doing, in particular in
22 relation to those comments, was to make suggestions to your colleague as
23 to how to make a case against Mr. Boskoski and matters which had to be
24 verified with a view to do so. Do you agree with that?
25 A. Well, yes.
1 Q. And you also agree that at the time, as is clear from this
2 paragraph, you were aware of at least possible or potential difficulties
3 in establishing a relationship between Mr. Boskoski on the one hand, and
4 members of this agency called Kometa. Do you agree with that?
5 A. I was aware of many other things, Mr. Mettraux, including various
6 open options and scenarios of analysis. Well, therefore, it was basically
7 my duty to read whatever documents come into my hands, including this
8 particular book, and analyse it with the view of presenting my analysis.
9 Q. But just sticking with the question for a moment. Do you agree
10 that one of the concern which you expressed to your colleague and one of
11 the matter which you suggested should be the subject of further
12 investigation was the matter as to whether a relationship could be
13 established between members of the Kometa agency and Mr. Boskoski. Do you
14 agree with that?
15 A. Well, it -- this issue, if you want to describe it this way,
16 directly relates to the developments in Ljuboten in August 2001.
17 Q. So the answer to the question would be yes. Is that correct,
18 Mr. Bezruchenko?
19 A. Since it was my task to describe the events in Ljuboten, to
20 present a summary of those events in August 2001, I was supposed to
21 explore all possible scenarios.
22 Q. But, again, Mr. Bezruchenko, you have indicated that this report
23 was prepared prior to the time when you were tasked with preparing a
24 report as an expert on behalf of the Prosecution which included a summary
25 of those events in August of 2001. Are you in fact suggesting,
1 Mr. Bezruchenko, now that you had started working on this report before
2 that time?
3 A. I'm afraid there is a contradiction, a contradiction in your
4 statement, Mr. Mettraux. Would you please read it again?
5 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, Mr. Bezruchenko, if there was a contradiction.
6 You have indicated in answer to my question that, "Since it was my
7 task to describe the events in Ljuboten to present a summary of those
8 events in August 2001, I was supposed to explore all possible scenarios."
9 Do you recall that, saying that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And this answer that you provided was in response to a query on my
12 part as to the nature of what you were doing, is that correct, at the
14 A. And my -- and also all documents which were available to me,
15 including this one.
16 Q. But you see, Mr. Bezruchenko, at the time when you were preparing
17 that document, you had not yet been tasked with the responsibility to
18 prepare an expert report. Is that correct?
19 A. That's right. But I don't see the point here.
20 Q. Well, the point and I'm putting it to you is that well before the
21 time when you were asked to become the so-called expert in this particular
22 case, you had long started investigating the responsibility, in your view,
23 of Mr. Boskoski. Do you agree with that?
24 A. Well, I don't really see any contradiction here again, because as
25 I say, I have been dealing with the issues of armed conflict in the
1 Balkans for many, many years, including this one.
2 Q. But I'm going to come back to this issue at some stage but I'm
3 going to put a proposition to you at this stage, Mr. Bezruchenko, and I
4 will come back to this tomorrow. But do you agree that the reason why
5 you were selected to be an expert by the Prosecution was not because of
6 your expertise but because of the fact that your views were known to the
7 Office of the Prosecutor and that they fit perfectly with the theory of
8 the Prosecution case. Do you agree with that?
9 A. Not necessarily.
10 Q. Well, going back to paragraph 6 of your statement or of your
11 summary and analysis, do you agree also that another one of those concerns
12 or matters which required further investigation on the part of the Office
13 of the Prosecutor had to do with the fact that in the absence of a
14 demonstration that these Kometa persons who you believed had been involved
15 in those events had in fact become members of the Ministry of Interior de
16 jure there could be serious issues pertaining to the duties or otherwise
17 of Mr. Boskoski as regard matters of discipline. Do you agree with that?
18 A. Well, not necessarily. What I am saying here is that there
19 possibly could be a link between these units and Mr. Boskoski and
20 essentially that we needed more documents to explore this link.
21 Q. And do you agree that what you are saying also is that in the
22 absence of such a link between Mr. Boskoski and these individuals, there
23 would be no disciplinary duties on the part of Mr. Boskoski in relation to
24 those persons. Do you agree with that?
25 A. Well, this is the view that should have been confirmed by legal
2 Q. And in particular, you have indicated and I will read out to you
3 again from paragraph 6, and you say this: "It has to be verified if
4 reserve police personnel engaged for attack on Ljuboten received call-up
5 notification and when. If they do not, police reservists engaged for
6 attack on Ljuboten were there illegitimately, and could be there only as
8 Do you recall saying this?
9 A. This was my analysis, yes.
10 Q. And in fact, you must be aware that your office, the Office of the
11 Prosecutor, took a number of steps to verify the matter as you had
12 suggested in your analysis. Is that correct?
13 A. I think so, yes.
14 Q. And in fact what came back from those steps and verifications
15 which were made by the Office of the Prosecutor, was exactly what you had
16 feared in your -- or the concerns that you had expressed in your summary,
17 namely that the person whom you believed might have been involved in those
18 events were not de jure member of the MOI. Is that correct?
19 A. Of this, I'm not aware.
20 MR. METTRAUX: Well, could the witness please be shown what is
21 Rule 65 ter 1D930, please.
22 Q. If you look at the first at the top of this document,
23 Mr. Bezruchenko, you will see it's a record of suspect interview conducted
24 by the Office of the Prosecutor, and the date is -- well, Mr. Raatikainen
25 was not so sure whether it was the 29th or the 30th of June of 2004.
1 Can you see that?
2 A. Yes, that's right.
3 Q. And that was only about a month after you had prepared your
4 summary. Is that correct?
5 A. Perhaps.
6 Q. And if we can turn to the next page, please.
7 And if the registry could please scroll down to the bottom of the
9 I'll ask you to look at the last question asked on that page by
10 Matti Raatikainen to Mr. --
11 MR. METTRAUX: I see Mr. Saxon on his feet, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry, Mr. Saxon, yes.
13 MR. SAXON: Very sorry to interrupt. It's just that on the first
14 page I saw a very familiar name, but this person's name has been the name
15 of a witness who's testified in this case, but it is also the same name of
16 someone else who has been mentioned in this case. And I'm just wondering
17 if you could clarify who the person --
18 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to you, Mr. Saxon, and perhaps, Your
19 Honour, we can go for a second into private session.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
21 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.
17 MR. METTRAUX: And perhaps with the assistance of the usher, the
18 second microphone of Mr. Bezruchenko is off.
19 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, if you can look at the bottom of the page,
20 please. There's a question that is being raised by Mr. Matti Raatikainen
21 with the interviewee or the witness, Mr. Jovanovski. And the question is
22 this: "So you were all volunteers?" And the witness says: "I was a
24 Can you see that?
25 A. Yes, I can.
1 Q. And if we can go to the next page, please, to the top of the page.
2 Mr. Raatikainen then asked this: "I mean, you were not called in
3 as a reservist?"
4 And the witness says: "No, no."
5 So you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that what was happening here, to
6 the extent that you can agree with that, was that in fact the
7 investigator, Mr. Raatikainen, was verifying what you had raised was a
8 concern about the status of the people who you believed might have
9 partaken in these events by verifying whether these peoples were there as
10 reservists or had been called up as such or whether as volunteers. Do you
11 agree with that?
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
13 MR. SAXON: I apologise. I'm not trying to be difficult.
14 Perhaps I was being difficult. It is simply that we haven't seen
15 a passage here in the transcript with reference to the interviewee and his
16 presence in Ljuboten, or if we have, I have completely missed it, and I
17 think that needs to be clarified.
18 JUDGE PARKER: You've lost me, Mr. Saxon.
19 MR. SAXON: Well, Mr. Raatikainen asked, "You were called up as a
20 volunteer?" "I was a volunteer called in as a reservist," but there's
21 been no connection made yet to the events in Ljuboten. That's what I'm
22 simply stating.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Oh. All right.
24 MR. SAXON: He could have been called up on another day at another
1 JUDGE PARKER: I see that. And could I just mention, Mr.
2 Mettraux, in your questioning, it is -- the way you framed your last
3 question slid across what I thought was a line of logic that shouldn't be
4 slid across. It's one thing whether a matter identified by this witness
5 was the subject of questioning or inquiry by a investigator. It's another
6 thing whether that was because it had been mentioned by this witness, and
7 I think you were --
8 MR. METTRAUX: I stand corrected, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE PARKER: -- into the cause, yes.
10 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to Your Honour.
11 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, to take it one or two steps back, is that correct
12 that at the time Mr. Zoran Jovanovski, Bucuk, was the owner of the
13 security agency known as Kometa to which you referred in your summary.
14 A. Is this a question, sir?
15 Q. Yes, please.
16 A. I don't see a question mark, so I'm just waiting for to you finish
17 the sentence.
18 Okay. I'm not sure if this was the case, but if he was subject of
19 a interview, it might have been. He could have been in the past.
20 Q. But do you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that at the time it was the
21 belief of the Office of the Prosecutor that Mr. Zoran Jovanovski, aka
22 Bucuk, was the owner of the company called Kometa. Do you agree with
24 A. I have seen documents which suggest that Kometa members could have
25 been involved in these developments and that they could not have been
1 involved. So basically I was reading these documents and I was thinking
2 about them, trying to make my analysis.
3 Q. But just coming back to the issue of Mr. Zoran Jovanovski, do you
4 agree, sir, that it is and was the position of the Office of the
5 Prosecutor that Mr. Zoran Jovanovski, Bucuk, was in July and August of
6 2001, the owner of the company known as Kometa. Do you agree with that?
7 A. I cannot tell you sir, because I simply don't know.
8 Q. We're going to move in a minute to a document which may assist
9 you. But staying with this particular document for a moment, do you agree
10 in any case Mr. Zoran Jovanovski, Bucuk, gave an indication to
11 Mr. Raatikainen that he, for one, had been in the Cair police station on
12 the 25th and 26th of July of 2001 as a volunteer. Do you agree with that?
13 A. Well, as I say, I was not really involved in this interview, and I
14 didn't really pay any specific attention or I didn't really attribute a
15 lots of significance to this specific interview.
16 Q. If you can down a little bit on this document, there's a question
17 asked by a man referred to as Gramsci where he says this: "Am I correct
18 there were volunteers who were getting weapons and they were volunteers
19 who were there to fight?"
20 And the witness says: "There were a lot of people there. I saw a
21 lot of people there, so I went there as -- as we -- and I asked them,
22 Please give me a rifle, I want to protect my family."
23 Can you see that?
24 A. Yes, I can.
25 Q. And simply for the record, Your Honour, I believe that on the
1 first page he mentions -- or on the second page he mentioned the 25th and
2 26th of July 2001 at the police station SOL, that is PSOLO, and not the
3 Cair police.
4 Well, Mr. Bezruchenko, in view of the fact that you are not very
5 familiar with this document, I will move on to another one.
6 Are you aware of the fact that the Prosecution wished to interview
7 a number of individuals as part of its investigation and that for that
8 purpose it directed a requested the government of Macedonia that list of
9 person be relieved of their duty to keep confidentiality or state
10 secrets. Are you aware of that?
11 A. Well, this is a routine matter. The investigation division
12 interviews various people, including the suspects.
13 Q. Is that correct that this particular request was made in relation
14 in particular to Mr. Zoran Jovanovski, aka Bucuk? Are you aware of that
16 A. In fact I think there are perhaps more appropriate persons to
17 answer this question, Mr. Mettraux. This question perhaps should be
18 directed to those who was really working on this matter.
19 Q. Well, at this stage I will ask you if you are aware that the
20 Office of the Prosecutor made a specific request on 14th of January of
21 2000 -- well, let me ask you the other one first.
22 Are you aware of the fact that the Office of the Prosecutor asked
23 to -- asked the Ministry of Interior through the Ministry of Foreign
24 Affairs that a number of individuals, including Mr. Zoran Jovanovski,
25 Bucuk, and a man known as Goce Rarevski who had been employed by the
1 agency, security agency, that they be relieved of their duty to keep state
2 secret or official secret. Do you recall that?
3 A. Well, of course these names are definitely familiar to me,
4 especially the one of Bucuk, but saying whether I was specifically aware
5 of all the paperwork, including that particular date, I'm not sure.
6 Q. Well, could the witness please be shown what is Rule 65 ter
7 1D933. It has a ERN 1D00-7900.
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the witness to
9 switch on the second microphone, please.
10 MR. METTRAUX: Mr. Bezruchenko, will you able to -- it's been
11 fixed already. Thank you.
12 Mr. Bezruchenko, can you see in front of you a letter from the
13 Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is dated the 23rd
14 of February of 2004. And it is directed to the office of the
15 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Skopje. Can you see
17 A. Yes, that's right.
18 Q. And if we can turn to the next page, the second page, please.
19 I apologise, if we can stay for a second on the first page first.
20 I apologise to the registry.
21 If you can look first at the first paragraph of that document,
22 Mr. Bezruchenko, it say that at a session of the government of the
23 Republic of Macedonia on the 26th of January of 2004, the government
24 reviewed a request of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
25 for interviewing individuals in the capacity of witnesses or suspect and
1 adopted a conclusion by which it guarantees that the person that will be
2 called as witnesses will not be prosecuted in the state for disclosing
3 certain type of information marked with certain level of secrecy and
4 confidentiality presented during their interviewing.
5 Can you see that?
6 A. Yes, I see it.
7 Q. And then in paragraph 2 follows another piece of information, the
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that,"Accordingly, we inform you that the
9 Ministry of Interior affairs, adopted decisions for release of the
10 obligation for keeping an official secret which they learned about during
11 carrying out or in relation to the carrying out of the work and the
12 assignments at the job position they were disposed to for person that were
13 or still are employed at the Ministry of Interior Affairs or that were or
14 still are members of the reserve police of the Ministry of Interior
16 Can you see that?
17 A. Yes, I can see that.
18 Q. And you can see there's a list of names, many of which I'm sure
19 will be familiar to you, which starts on this page. Can you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And if we can turn to the next page, please.
22 Do you agree that the lists of names continues up to number 23.
23 Is that correct?
24 A. Yes, that's right.
25 Q. And then at paragraph 23 -- at paragraph 3 it says this: "At the
1 same time, we would like to inform you that the Ministry of Interior
2 Affairs notified us that they could not prepare decisions concerning the
3 obligation for keeping official secrets for the individuals Zoran
4 Jovanovski and Goce Rarevski employed at Kometa security agency in Skopje,
5 as they are not employed at the Ministry of Interior Affairs nor have they
6 been engaged as members of the reserve police of the Ministry of Interior
8 Can you see that?
9 A. Yes, I can see that, sir.
10 Q. And at the time when you prepared for your report,
11 Mr. Bezruchenko, were you aware of this particular document and piece of
12 information which was provided to you by the Macedonian authorities?
13 A. I remember seeing this document, yes.
14 MR. METTRAUX: If the witness can now be shown what is Rule 65 ter
15 1D934, please. It is ERN 1D00-7942.
16 Before we look at the document itself, Mr. Bezruchenko, I'll ask
17 you whether you can recall that as part of the investigation conducted by
18 the Office of the Prosecutor, a request was made by your office for the
19 financial records of, among others, Mr. Johan Tarculovski and Mr. Zoran
20 Jovanovski, aka Bucuk. Can you recall that?
21 A. I remember seeing the previous document which you indicated, sir,
22 but I don't think I'm in a position to provide you any details since I was
23 not really working on this document.
24 Q. Well, if we can look at this particular document, it is a
25 so-called RFA, request for assistance from the Office of the Prosecutor.
1 It is dated the 14th of January of 2005. And if you can turn your
2 attention to paragraph 2 of the document, please.
3 Do you agree that in this particular paragraph the assistance
4 which the Prosecutor was seeking from the authorities was to obtain
5 information about I believe two accounts which belonged to
6 Mr. Tarculovski. Do you agree with that?
7 A. This is the way it seems.
8 Q. And the query was also about payments that were being made on to
9 the -- these or that account. Is that correct?
10 A. Well, again, Mr. Mettraux, I don't quite understand why you are
11 asking me this question. I was not working on this document.
12 Q. Well, if we look then at paragraph 3 of the -- of this document,
13 Mr. Bezruchenko, it reads like this: "Information regarding all payments
14 from the accounts mentioned in paragraph 1 in July and August 2001 to
15 Zoran Jovanovski, aka Bucuk, or to his company called Kometa."
16 Do you agree that at least as far as this document is concerned,
17 Mr. Bezruchenko, it was the view at the time that the company, Kometa, was
18 in fact Mr. Jovanovski's company. Do you agree that?
19 A. I wouldn't be so specific in this assertion, Mr. Mettraux. What I
20 would say that apparently the investigation was opening -- I mean was
21 exploring all possible scenarios and all possible lists. This is all what
22 I can say.
23 Q. But do you agree perhaps that at least this letter from the Office
24 of the Prosecutor refers to the Kometa as "his company;" do you agree with
1 A. Well, I would rather prefer if you probably could pose this
2 question to the author of this document.
3 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that what is being sought
4 effectively from the Macedonian authority in relation to Mr. Tarculovski
5 and Mr. Jovanovski are information pertaining to payment to their accounts
6 for the period July and August of 2001. Do you agree with that?
7 A. This what it would seem to suggest, but if I may make a point
8 again that perhaps somebody who was working on this document would be in a
9 better position to give the precise details, because I'm afraid I could
10 simply mislead you with my statements.
11 Q. Well, would you be willing to confirm on the face of this document
12 that is what the Prosecution was seeking to obtain, and I'm reading from
13 paragraph 1: "Information regarding all entries in July and August 2001 as
14 regard the bank accounts of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
15 Finance of the Federal Republic of Macedonia," and then in paragraph 2 it
16 relates to Mr. Tarculovski and in paragraph 3 to Mr. Jovanovski, Bucuk, do
17 you agree with that?
18 A. Again, Mr. Mettraux, I'm afraid I'm not in a position to comment
19 on this document since I was not really working on it.
20 Q. Well, perhaps you can assist there. Is it correct,
21 Mr. Bezruchenko, that the information that came back from this particular
22 request that was made on behalf of your office was that Mr. Tarculovski
23 had in fact received money on his account for July and August of 2001 as
24 he was entitled as a official of the Ministry of Interior, but that
25 Mr. Jovanovski, aka Bucuk, or his company had never received any salary or
1 payment during that period from the Ministry of Interior. Are you aware
2 of that piece of information?
3 A. No, I'm not.
4 Q. Could the --?
5 A. I was not exploring this issue at all.
6 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown what is Rule 65
7 ter 1D931.
8 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, the document which is about to appear, or has
9 appeared now on your screen, provides information to the Office of the
10 Prosecutor in response to the original request made by the Office of the
11 Prosecutor. This letter refers to your request Mar/T07/MAC-0088, which is
12 the document I've shown you a document ago. And if you look at the bottom
13 of the page of that document first, you can see what the Macedonian
14 authorities responded to the query made by your office in January of 2005
15 was the following. It's a letter from 7 February of 2005, and it is
16 signed by the liaison officer of the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Besim
17 Ramicevic and it is addressed to the office of the International Criminal
18 Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Skopje. And the subject is
19 submission of information and documentation pursuant to the request by the
20 Office of the Prosecutor.
21 And if you look at the bottom of that document, of that first
22 page, it says this: "The Ministry of the Interior made payments to Johan
23 Tarculovski on a salary basis for the period July-August 2001 during which
24 he was listed as employee of the Ministry of Interior."
25 Can you see that?
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. METTRAUX: And if the registry could please turn to the next
3 page. And go to the top of the document, please.
4 Q. It also says this: "The Ministry of Interior did not make any
5 payments to the Kometa personnel and property security agency and its
6 owner, Zoran Jovanovski. The Ministry of Finance informed us that they
7 have not made any payments to Tarculovski, Zoran Jovanovski, and the
8 Kometa personnel and property security agency for the period July and
9 August of 2001. During July and August 2001, the Ministry of the Interior
10 made two salary payments on Johan Tarculovski's account."
11 Can you see that?
12 A. Yes, I can.
13 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, is that correct that this information which is
14 contained in the document, perhaps not document itself but that the
15 content of that document was brought to your attention by your
16 colleagues? Is that correct?
17 A. I'm not sure, really. Well, now I have my doubts whether I have
18 seen this document, actually.
19 Q. But leaving aside the document itself for a moment,
20 Mr. Bezruchenko, do you agree that the information which you had suggested
21 in your original analysis of Mr. Boskoski's book in relation to Kometa's
22 people had in fact been verified by the Office of the Prosecutor and what
23 I'm putting to you or what I'm asking of you, rather, is whether the
24 information contained in the document as opposed to the document itself
25 was known to you.
1 A. I'm sorry, sir, I don't quite understand. Which information do
2 you mean and which document are you referring to?
3 Q. I apologise. I will clarify this, Mr. Bezruchenko.
4 Were you aware of the information provided by Mr. -- or by the
5 Macedonian authorities through Mr. Ramicevic that Mr. Zoran Jovanovski,
6 Bucuk, and the Kometa personnel had never received salaries or money from
7 the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Finance in relation to the
8 period July and August of 2001.
9 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
11 MR. SAXON: Virtually the same answer was -- the same question was
12 asked about a moment ago and the witness responded, "I'm not sure,
13 really. Well, now have I my doubts whether I have seen this document,
15 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, the question was about the content.
16 I believe what the witness said and the effort which was being made was
17 not whether -- I think Mr. Bezruchenko has indicated that he was not sure
18 whether he had seen the -- the actual document which is now in front of
19 him. What is being -- what I'm trying to ascertain from Mr. Bezruchenko
20 is whether he was aware of the information which is contained therein,
21 namely the fact that no payments had been made to Mr. Jovanovski and the
22 personnel from Kometa.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Now you have clarified that question, maybe we can
24 get an answer to that one, which isn't the one you were trying to put.
25 MR. METTRAUX: Well, I'm grateful for that.
1 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you want me to repeat the question?
2 A. Yes, please.
3 JUDGE PARKER: I think you'd better.
4 MR. METTRAUX:
5 Q. It is late in the day, Mr. Bezruchenko, so I will put the question
6 once again to you.
7 Were you aware of the information which is contained in the
8 document, namely the fact that no payment had been made to Mr. Jovanovski
9 and the personnel from Kometa by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry
10 of Finance of the Republic of Macedonia?
11 A. No, I was not.
12 Q. Is this correct -- or perhaps let me show you another document,
13 Mr. Bezruchenko. This would be exhibit P232 [Realtime transcript read in
14 error "P3232"]
15 JUDGE PARKER: It can't be what the transcript suggests exhibit
17 MR. METTRAUX: I have even managed to confuse the record
18 assistant. It would be 232, P232.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
20 MR. METTRAUX:
21 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, are you --
22 MR. METTRAUX: Perhaps it should not be broadcasted, Your Honour.
23 I'm being forewarned.
24 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, are you familiar with the particular document
25 which you have in front of you on the screen?
1 A. I'm not sure. But looks like a receipt of some sort.
2 Q. Well, if we can go perhaps to the second page of this document,
3 please. You will see on this page there is the name of a person. I'll
4 let you have a look at the name. And if we can turn to the next page,
6 Does that assist you in recognizing this particular document?
7 A. Well, I remember seeing some documents of this nature, various
8 receipts for various weapons, obviously, but this particular one, no, I
9 don't think so.
10 Q. Do you recognise perhaps this document as one of the exhibits used
11 in this trial, which is, as you mentioned, the receipts given by Witness
12 M-054. Do you recognise this?
13 A. Well, there were many documents which I have seen during the
14 varies stages of the trial. But again, I'm afraid you're asking the same
15 question for the third time, sir. I'm not sure if I have seen this one.
16 Q. Well, do you agree that this document and as you mentioned a
17 number of other similar documents were -- or known to you and reviewed by
18 you. Do you agree with this first proposal?
19 A. I -- I remember seeing some of these kind of document, yes.
20 Q. And do you agree that this particular document appears to be one
21 of those records or a receipt, as you properly called it, for the delivery
22 of facilities such as I believe in the page in front of you an AK-47 and
23 ammunition. Is that correct?
24 A. Sorry. Which facilities do you mean, sir?
25 Q. I was trying to find a proper word for -- to describe weapons,
1 AK-47 and ammunition that goes with it. Do you agree that this receipt is
2 in fact a receipt for such weapon and ammunition?
3 A. AK-47 and ammunition, sir, is certainly not a facility, if I may
4 say so. But it appears to be a receipt for weapon and ammunition, yes.
5 MR. METTRAUX: Would that be a convenient time, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE PARKER: We adjourn now and resume tomorrow at 2.15.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,
10 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 23 October 2007, at
11 2.15 p.m.