1 Tuesday, 12 February 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

7 Good morning, sir. The affirmation you made still applies.

8 Mr. Saxon.

9 WITNESS: PETRE STOJANOVSKI [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 Cross-examination by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]

12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Stojanovski.

13 A. Good morning.

14 Q. Good morning. Yesterday, we reviewed a financial award that you

15 received in June of 2001, as well as a pistol which you received in

16 October 2002. And I suggested to you that pursuant to the Law on Internal

17 Affairs, the minister has the final authority to decide on awards, and I

18 misspoke at that time. The minister's authority actually comes from the

19 collective agreement of the Ministry of Interior.

20 MR. SAXON: And if we could please show the witness what is

21 Exhibit P382, and if the witness could be given a copy of the first

22 Defence binder that Ms. Residovic used.

23 Actually, Ms. Usher, there's one more. If you show me that binder

24 again. Yes. This is the Prosecution's binder. There is -- what I'm

25 referring to is the first Defence binder. You should have number one as

1 well. It was used yesterday. It was number one.

2 If not, I can give the witness --

3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if my colleague

4 wants to use other documents, we could give our binder to the witness so

5 that the Prosecutor can use his own.

6 MR. SAXON: We'd be grateful.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

8 MR. SAXON:

9 Q. And with the usher's assistance, Mr. Stojanovski, if you turn to

10 tab 14 in that binder.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Which tab was it?

12 MR. SAXON: It was tab 14, Your Honours --

13 JUDGE PARKER: 14. Thank you.

14 MR. SAXON: -- in the first Defence binder.

15 Q. And this is -- if you see the first page, Mr. Stojanovski, you can

16 see that this is the collective agreement of the Ministry of Interior.

17 Do you see that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you turn the pages until you reach Article 85, please.

20 Do you see Article 85 now, Mr. Stojanovski?

21 MR. SAXON: One moment. I will give the witness my copy; and,

22 unfortunately, I also have -- I also have that page missing in the

23 original Macedonian version.

24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] If we could be of assistance, Your

25 Honours, I believe that the Prosecutor has this exhibit noted in a wrong

1 tab. The witness would be able to find this document, but the sequence of

2 documents is not proper, I believe. But I'm sure he would be able to find

3 this document.

4 MR. SAXON: The witness can see the Article on e-court, if we can

5 just stop focussing on the paper.

6 Q. And, Mr. Stojanovski, you'll see that Article 85 says that: "The

7 employee with special engagements and quality in execution of the work and

8 assignments, who will contribute significantly to the process of

9 realisation of the ministry's function, will be given a reward in the

10 amount of one salary."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. [No interpretation]

13 Q. I don't think the interpreters heard you. I'm sorry.

14 A. Yes, I see the Article.

15 Q. And if you look at the next paragraph in that Article, and it's on

16 the next page in the English version, the next paragraph says: "The

17 proposal in item 1 of this Article is submitted by the manager of the

18 organisational unit, and the decision for reward is brought by the

19 minister or an employee authorised by him."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So can we agree, then, that the final decision regarding who

23 receives an award from the Ministry of Interior is made either by the

24 minister or a person authorised by him?

25 A. Yes, of course. I believe we went through this yesterday.

1 Q. Well, you asked to see the particular law, and so that's why I'm

2 showing it to you now.

3 Yesterday, at the end of my questioning, I asked you whether, in

4 2001, the OVRs of the Ministry of the Interior were outside the normal

5 chain of command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and you responded:

6 "They're obligated by the Book of Rules, if this is what you have in

7 mind."

8 And I'm not sure that you actually answered my question, and so

9 let me rephrase it, hopefully more simply: Do the OVRs fall within the

10 chain of command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

11 A. The OVRs, the departments of internal affairs, are organisational

12 units within the Ministry of Interior, if we look at the ministry as a

13 whole.

14 Q. So can we take that response as a "yes"?

15 A. Yes, if you take into account the entire structure of the Ministry

16 of Interior.

17 Q. All right. And you mentioned earlier in your testimony - this was

18 in response to a question from Ms. Residovic, at page 9102 of the

19 transcript - that within SVR Skopje, 2001, there were five OVRs, and you

20 said: "Within the territory of the OVR," of a particular OVR, "only the

21 members of the OVR can carry out ministry matters."

22 Do you recall saying that?

23 A. The internal affairs matters are carried out at the territory of

24 the OVR.

25 Q. Yes. But you said last week, at page 9102, that: "Within the

1 territory of the OVR, only the members of the OVR can carry out Ministry

2 of Internal Affairs matters."

3 Is that your testimony?

4 A. That is within the division of work in the Ministry of Interior.

5 However, if we speak about the police competencies, then, in the cases

6 when the police officer is found within the territory of another OVR as

7 well, they have the right to undertake the necessary actions should he be,

8 for instance, present when an event is developing or should he need to

9 offer assistance to anyone.

10 Q. And following that logic, suppose, in 2001, for example, someone

11 with a higher level of responsibility arrived in a particular OVR, let's

12 suppose the director of the bureau for public security, and it would be

13 possible, wouldn't it, for the director of public security to address

14 affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the territory of a

15 particular OVR? Isn't it?

16 A. It is correct that the director can be present within the

17 territory of another -- of a particular OVR, but it does not change the

18 competences that they have pursuant to the organisational structure and

19 the systemization of the MOI.

20 Q. And the director of public security, for example, the director of

21 the bureau of public security, as an authorised official of the Ministry

22 of Internal Affairs, would be able to carry out his competences within the

23 territory of a particular OVR. Isn't that right?

24 A. I wouldn't fully agree with this assertion. As I stated, within

25 the Ministry of Interior, there are rule books on systemization of jobs,

1 organisational structure. The Law on Internal Affairs sets for the

2 competences, in general; however, the division or distribution of tasks is

3 regulated through the rule book on systemization.

4 Q. Well, suppose, for example, the director of public security was

5 driving through, for example, OVR Cair one day and witnessed a crime.

6 Certainly, the director of public security, as an authorised official of

7 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, could take certain responsible steps at

8 that time to try to report that crime or even resolve it. Isn't that

9 right?

10 A. As any other citizen.

11 Q. Well, as any other citizen or also as a member of the Ministry of

12 Internal Affairs, he would have a duty, wouldn't he, to take certain

13 steps?

14 A. To provide further clarification, shed light on this issue, it

15 would be good to see the Law on Internal Affairs which also covers the

16 rule book and the systemization. So any officer in the ministry, in

17 addition to the general competences they have, they also have direct tasks

18 and competences assigned.

19 MR. SAXON: Can we please show the witness what is Exhibit P86.

20 It's the Law on Internal Affairs, and it should be tab 2 in the binder

21 that the witness has in front of him.

22 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, is there anything in the Law on Internal Affairs

23 that would prevent the director of the bureau of public security from

24 carrying out his duties within the territory of an OVR?

25 A. As you said, nothing from within the remitt of his duties prevents

1 him from that, his duties.

2 Q. All right. How about the minister? How about the minister

3 himself or herself? Anything in the Law on Internal Affairs that would

4 prevent a minister from carrying out some of his duties or her duties

5 within the territory of an OVR?

6 A. There are no such provisions, so his competences can be performed,

7 regardless of where he is located at the time, as long as it's within the

8 territory of the Republic of Macedonia.

9 However, I'm not sure, but I think that one has to take into

10 consideration what are his competences and tasks within the ministry. So

11 when we're speaking about his specific competences and tasks, there are no

12 obstacles.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Can I interrupt, Mr. Saxon.

15 Why do you limit his competences to when he is within the Republic

16 of Macedonia?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. You're right. He, as

18 a minister, could carry out official trips where some cooperation

19 agreements are concluded, so he is performing his tasks then as well, if I

20 managed to clarify.

21 I was referring specifically to the Republic of Macedonia, but

22 within the competences of the minister fall also competences in the area

23 of international cooperation.

24 JUDGE PARKER: I was thinking more simply. If the minister were

25 in another country and a problem arose in his ministry, would not it be

1 possible for the minister, having been informed of the problem, to make a

2 decision and give a direction, even though he was then in another country?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're right.

4 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

5 Sorry, Mr. Saxon.

6 MR. SAXON: No. Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. I believe you've got the Law on Internal Affairs in front of you,

8 Mr. Stojanovski. Can you turn to the Macedonian version, please.

9 Have you got that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Can you take a look at Article 1, which begins: "Internal

12 affairs, in the sense of this law, are the activities which concern the

13 following," and then we see a rather long list of topics, beginning with

14 protection of life; personal safety and property of citizens; prevention

15 of criminal offences; solving criminal offences and apprehension of

16 perpetrators of criminal offences and handing them over to proper

17 authorities; protection of human and citizens' freedoms and rights as

18 guaranteed by the constitute, et cetera.

19 These are the competences of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

20 aren't they?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So, therefore, these are also the competences that would fall

23 within the remit of the minister's work. Isn't that right?

24 A. To clarify this a bit further, in every organisation, you have

25 distribution of tasks. You can't expect every officer in the organisation

1 to perform any and every task. So, although I am not a lawyer, it might

2 be advisable to have a look at Article 24 of this law.

3 I think that this Article, if we look at it together in

4 conjunction with the systemization rule book, would resolve some of those

5 aspects that we're discussing now.

6 Q. Where do you see within Article 24 a suggestion of limited

7 competences of the minister?

8 A. If I understood your previous questions well, they are based on

9 the competences, if I understood you well. The Article 24 defines which

10 are the officers who have competences, authorisations.

11 Q. Okay. But, of course, the minister is really the highest officer,

12 if you will, of the Ministry of Interior, isn't he?

13 A. Could you please repeat it? Highest ...

14 Q. Well, the person at the very top level of the Ministry of Internal

15 Affairs is the minister, isn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And if you take a look at Article 1, please, of the Law on

18 Internal Affairs, doesn't Article 1 then describe all the different areas

19 that are within the responsibility of the minister as the highest-ranking

20 official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

21 A. That is fine. However, if I succeeded in following your logic and

22 drawing a parallel, if you have a Minister of Health, does it mean that

23 the minister should perform surgeries, if, for instance, he is found at a

24 hospital?

25 Q. If have you a Minister of Health, Mr. Stojanovski, that Minister

1 of Health would have to be concerned about the quality and quantity of

2 surgeries performed in hospitals in Macedonia, wouldn't he or she?

3 A. Yes. The same logic applies to the Minister of the Interior. He

4 is has the political responsibility for the quality of performance of the

5 ministry.

6 Q. And the Minister of the Interior would give instructions, then,

7 about the performance of those competences to his staff, wouldn't he?

8 A. So it is the duty of the professional staff, services in the

9 ministry to monitor the work and to propose directions aiming towards

10 improving the quality of work; while the minister, as far as I understand

11 it, has the duty to take care of all organisational aspects, to provide

12 functioning, operation of the organisation.

13 Q. And if the minister disagrees with a proposal, are you suggesting

14 that the minister simply remains silent?

15 A. I don't believe that he would be silent. However, I believe that

16 through the independent bodies, through the bodies within the ministry, he

17 would have communication and would resolve all the issues that he believes

18 to be a problem.

19 Q. And those issues would fall within the list of affairs that are

20 listed in Article 1 of the Law on Internal Affairs, right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. All right. Mr. Stojanovski, during your direct examination, you

23 described the relationship between the work of the Ministry of Internal

24 Affairs and the work of the public prosecutor. You explained - this is

25 at page 9093 to 9094 of the transcript - you explained that if the

1 Ministry of Internal Affairs receives information that a crime might have

2 occurred, then the ministry has the duty to check out the facts and

3 provide a minimum of relevant facts and information that might corroborate

4 the suggestion that a crime occurred.

5 Do you recall that? Do you recall explaining that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And, so, it's important, then, at least when members of the

8 Ministry of Interior first receive information that a crime might have

9 occurred, that those colleagues, on their own initiative, investigate and

10 establish - or try to establish - whether or not a crime has been

11 committed. Is that right?

12 A. It is.

13 Q. Okay. If you could turn to what is the third tab in that binder

14 in front of you, Mr. Stojanovski.

15 MR. SAXON: If we can turn, please, this will be Exhibit P88, and

16 it's the Code of Criminal Procedure of Macedonia.

17 If turn to Article 140, please, which is on page 32 of the English

18 version.

19 Q. Do you have Article 140 in front of you, Mr. Stojanovski?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Article 140 provides: "The state agencies and institutions which

22 perform public authorisation are obliged to report crimes which are

23 prosecuted ex officio of which they are informed or of which they learn

24 about in a different way."

25 So this particular Article would effectively codify what we

1 discussed just a moment ago, right?

2 A. I'm not completely sure of that.

3 Q. All right.

4 MR. SAXON: Can we turn to Article 142 then.

5 Q. The first paragraph of Article 142 says that: "If there is a

6 ground for suspicion that the crime is committed which is to be prosecuted

7 ex officio, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is obliged to take over

8 necessary measures to find the criminal, for the criminal or the

9 collaborator not to hide or," I think the word should be "abscond," "for

10 traces of the crime and objects which may serve as evidence to be found

11 and obtained," et cetera.

12 Wouldn't that paragraph effectively codify what we mentioned a

13 moment ago, that if they're informed that a crime may have occurred,

14 members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on their own initiative,

15 should do some investigation and establish whether the crime actually did

16 occur?

17 A. Yes. You could understand it in that way, apart from the use of

18 the notion "investigation," because the investigation falls under the

19 competences of the investigating judge.

20 Q. All right. Well, I'll try to use another term then. Members of

21 the internal affairs are obliged to take measures to see if a crime might

22 have been committed. I won't use the word "investigation."

23 Is that fair?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And if you can turn to tab 8 in the binder in front of you,

1 Mr. Stojanovski.

2 MR. SAXON: This is Exhibit P96. It's the Book of Rules on the

3 work of the Ministry of Interior, and if you could turn to Article 103,

4 please.

5 Q. Do you have Article 103 now in front of you?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Article 103 says that: "When grounds exist for suspecting that a

8 crime which is prosecuted in the line of duty has been committed, the

9 authorised officials take the necessary measures to find the perpetrator

10 or the accomplice, discover and secure evidence of the crime, and then

11 collect evidence."

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And this would be then consistent with the Article 142 of the Code

15 of Criminal Procedure, wouldn't it?

16 A. Yes, this is so.

17 Q. And if you then take a look at Article 104 which has three

18 paragraphs, the third paragraph says: "The existence of grounds for

19 suspicion regarding a committed crime is confirmed through confirmation of

20 direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence."

21 Do you see that?

22 A. I can only quote that it's necessary to know relevant facts and

23 data on the basis of which it can -- a serious presumption can be made

24 that a criminal act was committed.

25 Q. And do you have a provision at the end of Article 104 that refers

1 to confirming grounds of suspicion via direct evidence or circumstantial

2 evidence?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So, just as an example, if an authorised official of the Ministry

5 of Internal Affairs saw a person who appeared to have been beaten, for

6 example, that authorised official should then carry out his

7 responsibilities with respect to Articles 103 and 104. Isn't that right?

8 A. What do you mean by "duty," if you could explain?

9 Q. Well, discover and secure evidence of a possible crime; find the

10 perpetrator of the crime, if possible; speak to the person who appears to

11 have been victim -- to be the victim and ask what happened to he or she.

12 That would all be within the remitt of Article 103 and Article

13 104. Isn't that right?

14 A. I don't know whether it's a matter of translation again, but I

15 understood that the authorised person encounters a person with visible

16 injuries that measures have to be taken.

17 Q. Measures have to be taken to evaluate whether that person was a

18 victim of a crime, right?

19 A. It is important to know whether the person is reporting that he or

20 she was a victim. Injuries could have incurred due to various other

21 reasons.

22 Q. Suppose the person is unconscious. Would you still have a duty,

23 under Articles 103 and 104 to try to verify what happened to that person,

24 wouldn't you?

25 A. I will respond with a concrete example.

1 In the area of Cair, an authorised person found a person of

2 Albanian ethnicity unconscious. This person was taken to hospital.

3 Q. Well, I'm sorry, you haven't answered my question. My question

4 was simple.

5 Suppose an authorised official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

6 sees a person lying on the street unconscious with signs that perhaps that

7 person had suffered a beating, bruises, cuts, et cetera.

8 Wouldn't the authorised official, under the Book of Rules on the

9 work of the Ministry of Interior, Articles 103 and 104, have a duty to

10 take measures to see whether that person was the victim of a crime?

11 A. Above all, there is the duty to secure medical assistance and then

12 to speak with that person.

13 Q. Well, suppose that person is unconscious, wouldn't the duty still

14 exist under Articles 103 and 104 of the Book of Rules and under Article

15 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. You explained that -- and these measures that the

18 authorised official of the ministry should take, at least the authorised

19 official has the responsibility to take those measures at least prior to

20 the commencement of a formal investigation by a public prosecutor or an

21 investigative judge, right?

22 A. The authorised official should do so.

23 Q. But you also explained to my learned colleague, Ms. Residovic,

24 that if the authorised officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs don't

25 find any relevant facts, then the case is archived or, as you put it, put

1 on stand-by. That's right?

2 A. Yes, if we don't find such information or data.

3 Q. And in those situations, you explained that the members of the

4 Ministry of Internal Affairs do not have the obligation to inform the

5 public prosecutor. Is that right?

6 A. If there is no report of a crime, or we have not established in

7 the course of our work facts or understanding that a crime has been

8 committed, then no.

9 Q. Okay. Can you please turn to Article 167 of the Book of Rules on

10 the work of the Ministry of Interior, please, the same document that we've

11 been looking at.

12 Do you have Article 167 in front of you, please?

13 A. Yes, I see it.

14 Q. Article 167 says: "If on the basis of the collected information

15 in other measures an actions taken for its confirmation and documentation,

16 it is asserted that grounds for suspicion that a crime exists, which is

17 prosecuted in the line of duty, the authorised official composes a

18 criminal report which is delivered to the competent" and in English it

19 says "publicity defender," that should be "public prosecutor."

20 Then it says: "It should be submitted along with the criminal

21 report, objects, sketches, photographs, supplemental reports," et cetera.

22 Do you see that, Mr. Stojanovski?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. If you take a look please then at Article 168, it says: "The

25 ministry informs the public prosecutor even when, on the basis of the

1 information collected, there is no basis for submission of a criminal

2 report."

3 Do you see that?

4 A. Yes, I see it.

5 Q. So what you told us last week, that the Ministry of Internal

6 Affairs has no obligation to report to the public prosecutor about the

7 so-called stand-by cases, was not correct, was it?

8 A. I would not say so --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- because these are different situations.

11 Q. And why is that?

12 A. Authorised officials act or undertake measures for uncovering

13 crimes but also act at the request of the public prosecutor. If, in this

14 case, authorised officials acted or checked information at the request of

15 the public prosecutor, then they're obliged to inform the public

16 prosecutor.

17 Q. Well, but suppose the authorised officials are dealing with a

18 crime ex officio, don't they still have the obligation to inform the

19 public prosecutor about their activities and the fact that there appears

20 to be no basis to suspect that a crime occurred?

21 A. No, they have no obligation.

22 Q. Where does it say that in Article 168 or within this Book of

23 Rules?

24 A. I could not tell you the exact Article, but I'm telling you on the

25 basis of practice, established practice.

1 Q. Well, you --

2 A. If we act on our own, we undertake measures on the basis of which

3 we expect to come to facts and knowledge whether a crime, an act has been

4 committed or not; and depending on the outcome, we react on the basis on

5 the outcome. If we work independently, we're not duty-bound to inform the

6 public prosecutor. If we had acted at the request of the public

7 prosecutor, then we are obliged to do so.

8 Q. Can we take a look again, please, at Article 167, Mr. Stojanovski,

9 because in the third line, it specifically refers to crimes prosecuted in

10 the line of duty; that is, crimes ex officio; I believe is the Latin term.

11 That is a situation where no request has been submitted by a public

12 prosecutor or investigative judge, at least not yet, and the Article 168

13 says that: "The public prosecutor must be informed when there is no basis

14 for submission of a criminal report."

15 So, at least as the rules are written, what you told us last week

16 was not correct, isn't that right?

17 A. Looking at the rules, such an impression could be gained, but my

18 25 years of experience tell me to maintain my position.

19 Q. Okay. Because, as you put it a moment ago, sometimes the practice

20 of members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs may differ to a degree from

21 what is written in black and white in the rules or laws. Right?

22 A. You're leading me into areas of legal regulations, and I said

23 several times that I'm not an expert in this area.

24 Q. And you're avoiding my question, Mr. Stojanovski. I'm not asking

25 you about legal regulations. I'm asking you about practice, because you

1 have, in the last couple of moments, volunteered that you, in your 25

2 years of practice, know that, in practice, certain activities might occur

3 or not in a way that is different, for example, from what is written in

4 the Book of Rules on the work of the Ministry of Interior.

5 So if you could, please answer my question: The practice of

6 members, the activities of members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

7 may differ, to a degree, from what is written in black and white in the

8 rules or in the laws. Isn't that right?

9 A. Practical work is based on the rules and instructions for work in

10 the Ministry of Interior and, above all, on the basis of the law.

11 Q. You still haven't asked my question. I'll ask it one more time.

12 Sometimes, the practice of members of the Ministry of Internal

13 Affairs may differ, to a degree, from what is written in black and white

14 in the rules or laws. Isn't that right?

15 A. I would not agree, because my interpretation is different than the

16 one which you have presented.

17 Q. And it's true, isn't it that, the laws and the rules and

18 regulations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs can't possibly address

19 every possible situation or activity that a police officer, or members of

20 the ministry, might have to address. Isn't that true?

21 A. I've not heard of the existence of ideal laws or ideal rule books.

22 Q. So we can take that response as a "yes"?

23 A. Yes. One could understand this as it is not possible to have the

24 law to foresee every -- every situation and to offer all possible

25 solutions.

1 Q. And that principle is particularly true, isn't it, in a period

2 like spring/summer of 2001, when, as you described, the security situation

3 in Macedonia was extremely complex?

4 A. As I said, the security situation was extremely complex, and I

5 also said that my colleagues carried out their legal obligations.

6 Q. And there were times, weren't there, when in order for your

7 colleagues to carry out their obligations, sometimes they had to be

8 creative or improvise and be flexible to ensure that those obligations

9 were carried out. Isn't that right?

10 A. Creativity is an important factor.

11 Q. Okay. And that concept of creativity, that's not mentioned

12 anywhere in this Book of Rules, is it?

13 A. You misinterpret me. Creativity is a quality which is required of

14 all employees regardless of where they may be employed.

15 Q. And creativity and flexibility is particularly important in crisis

16 situations, in emergency situations, isn't it?

17 A. Yes. This is important, just as it is important for a person to

18 be able to cope with stress.

19 Q. And, sometimes, when persons are under severe stress, they might

20 carry out their duties in a way that would differ from the way they would

21 act during peacetime, right?

22 A. Such situations cannot be excluded.

23 Q. I'd like to ask you to turn your mind, please, to another topic,

24 and that is the demonstrations that occurred in the city of Skopje after

25 the withdrawal of the NLA forces from the village of Aracinovo.

1 In response to some questions from my colleague, at pages 9117 of

2 the transcript, you described how, on the night of 25/26th June, 2001, you

3 were present in front of the Macedonian parliament with your co-workers

4 from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

5 You described how the demonstrators included civilians, reserve

6 police officers, active police officers, members of the army who were

7 upset about the events relate to the Aracinovo.

8 Do you recall that testimony?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you recall whether Minister Boskoski was present there?

11 A. Yes. Minister Boskoski was present, but we succeeded in

12 protecting him because part of the forces that were engaged in front of

13 the parliament had to be redirected towards the Albanian part for the

14 protection of members of Albanian ethnicity.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask the witness to repeat

16 the answer whether he said "succeeded" or "not succeeded."

17 MR. SAXON:

18 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Stojanovski. The interpreters missed a portion of

19 your last response and asked whether you could repeat your last response

20 where you mentioned that you and your colleagues succeeded, or did not

21 succeed, in protecting Minister Boskoski. That was not clear to the

22 interpreter.

23 A. We did not succeed in protecting him, nor did we succeed in

24 protecting the parliament, because, at that moment, we had to act to

25 protect the Albanian population, which we set out as a priority.

1 When we weighed the protection of the parliament and the

2 protection of the population, we decided part of the forces engaged to be

3 redirected for the protection of the Albanian population and a smaller

4 part did not -- this remaining smaller part did not succeed because they

5 were few in number to fully respond to their duties and tasks.

6 Q. And Risto Galevski, the head of the crime police, he was also

7 present that night, wasn't he?

8 A. No. Mr. Galevski was not the head of the crime police. He was

9 the head of the police unit. He was present and he held a speech, in a

10 way, to try to calm down the people who were demonstrating and he

11 succeeded in doing so.

12 Q. And thank you for correcting me. You're absolutely right. I

13 misspoke. Because at that time, it was Mr. Petrovski who was head of the

14 crime police, right?

15 A. [No interpretation]

16 Q. You need to speak into the microphone, sorry.

17 A. Yes, probably. My apology.

18 Q. You mentioned that you did not succeed in protecting Minister

19 Boskoski. What happened to Minister Boskoski that night?

20 A. The vehicles from his escort were destroyed, demolished.

21 Q. So it would be fair to say that the crowd of demonstrators that

22 night was pretty angry.

23 A. Yes. I think I explained that they were dissatisfied by what we

24 were duty-bound to do, that we facilitated members of the NLA to leave the

25 village.

1 Q. And when you explained a moment ago, you said "We decided that

2 part of the ministry forces that were present near the parliament building

3 would be re-directed for the protection of the Albanian population."

4 Who made that decision? Where did that decision come from?

5 A. As I said, I was there on-site, and Mr. Bliznakovski and I believe

6 Mr. Efremov; that is to say, SVR Skopje.

7 Q. And the police reservists who you saw in the crowd that night, can

8 you estimate approximately how many police reservists were there in the

9 crowd?

10 A. I really couldn't answer this.

11 Q. Well --

12 A. The -- the crowd amounted to some 4 to 5.000 people, and I would

13 only speculate about the number.

14 Q. All right. But you observed that a portion of that large crowd

15 was made up of police reservists?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And were these individuals wearing reserve police uniforms?

18 A. Yes. They were wearing police uniforms.

19 Q. And were some of these police reservists carrying weapons?

20 A. Yes. They were carrying weapons.

21 Q. And did some of these police reservists fire their weapons into

22 the air?

23 A. It is possible that some shots were heard.

24 Q. Help us understand, please: How did you know that these

25 individuals were police reservists?

1 A. I don't understand your question.

2 Q. It's a simply question. You said that, and you've said it twice

3 now, that part of the crowd of demonstrators that night was made up of

4 police reservists, and you said that they were wearing police reserve

5 uniforms and some of them were carrying weapons.

6 My question is: How did you know that these individuals were

7 police reservists?

8 A. We received information from the heads of the OVRs that part of

9 their reserve police officers refused to take the orders and started

10 towards the parliament building. So, on the basis of that information, we

11 surmised that those were reservists, if that is what you are thinking

12 about.

13 Q. And did it help your evaluation process the fact that these

14 individuals were wearing police reservists uniforms and carrying weapons?

15 A. We were not able to identify them. It might have been that some

16 of them were not reservists.

17 Q. But you believed that they were reservists, right?

18 A. According to the information that I received from the head of the

19 OVRs, departments for internal affairs, we believed that those were

20 reservists. However, I will repeat: We did not succeed in establishing

21 their identity. We did not manage to ask them for their IDs.

22 Q. Okay. So, just to summarize, you heard that these individuals

23 were reservists and they were dressed in the uniforms of police

24 reservists, and some of them were carrying fire-arms. So you --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- believed that they were police reservists, right?

2 A. Yes. We surmised that those were police reservists.

3 Q. And, in the summer of 2001, in a de facto sense at least, if you

4 saw persons wearing reserve police uniforms and carrying fire-arms, you

5 treated them like police reservists, right?

6 A. To be certain, you need to ask them to show you their IDs or they

7 need to show you their IDs if they are to undertake some activities.

8 Every police reservists employed or activated by the Ministry of Interior

9 needed to possess an ID, police ID. And until you established that a

10 person had such ID, you could not be sure.

11 Q. Well, then, why were you sure that these persons in the crowd on

12 the night of the 25th of June in front of the parliament building were

13 reserve police officers?

14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I stated that it was our surmise

16 that those were police reserve reservists. I did not say that I was sure

17 about that. I stated that we received information from the heads of the

18 departments for internal affairs that part of the reserve forces has left

19 the positions and started towards the parliament building.

20 Whether, in all those people in front of the parliament, the

21 entire crowd assisted of police reservists, I could not state.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] The witness, Your Honour, answered

24 precisely what my objection was directed at. He said that at some point

25 he wasn't sure whether those were, indeed, police reservists.

1 Thank you.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

3 And I delayed your objection because there was, at that point, a

4 critical question to be answered.

5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I understand fully, Your Honour.

6 Thank you.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Saxon, carry on, please.

8 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. You mentioned a moment ago that to be certain whether someone was

10 a police reservist, you would need them to show you their identification.

11 Well, isn't it true that only in midsummer of 2001 that Minister Boskoski

12 issued instructions for identification cards to be issued to reservists?

13 A. You need to know that the reserve police officers are carrying out

14 their duties only in the presence of an active police officer. That is

15 one aspect.

16 The other aspect is the one that you mentioned. It is true that,

17 at one point in time, a change was made to the rule books that regulated

18 the issuance -- or rather, established the format, the mode of issuing of

19 IDs for the reserve police officers.

20 Q. And you mentioned earlier, during that complex time in 2001, how

21 stretched the resources of the Ministry of Interior were. Are you

22 suggesting that all the members of the reserve -- of the police reserves

23 quickly received a police reserve identity card?

24 A. You're asking me about things outside of my competence. I believe

25 that my colleagues, who were working on that, had a maximum of seriousness

1 in the perform of their tasks and they performed it well. I can't

2 speculate and I wouldn't want to speculate.

3 Q. All right. You mentioned a moment ago that the reserve police

4 officers carry out their duties only in the presence of an active police

5 officer.

6 So another factor, if I can use a mathematical term in this

7 equation, of determining whether someone is or might be a reserve police

8 officer is whether they are in the company of an active member of the

9 Ministry of Interior. Would that be fair?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Can you explain why not?

12 A. Since that was the practice, that was applied autonomously or

13 independently by the heads of the departments for internal affairs.

14 Q. Well, you told us a minute ago you need to know that the reserve

15 police officers are carrying out their duties only in the presence of an

16 active police officer. That's what you told us just a minute ago.

17 So why are you now telling us that this was actually just an

18 autonomous or independent practice by the heads of the OVRs?

19 A. It is like this: In the area governing the performance of tasks

20 and working duties, whenever we had an opportunity, the active police

21 officers were carrying out their tasks supported by reserve police

22 officers.

23 So, when it was necessary to establish a patrol, then, considering

24 what we said previously that the resources were scarce, the practice was

25 that the patrol head would be an active police officer, while the

1 remaining members would be reserve police officers.

2 Q. All right.

3 A. However, however, they also have all rights and obligations, but

4 that doesn't mean that it has to be taken or considered as a guideline on

5 the basis of which we would identify someone.

6 Q. Well, all right, I think I understand your answer, but let me go

7 back, then, to my last question.

8 If you saw persons dressed in reserve police uniforms carrying

9 weapons in the company of an active police officer, that would be another

10 indication that these persons were actually reservists, right?

11 A. Yes. This would be indicated --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- although, not necessarily.

14 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, during your direct examination, you described

15 many protests in front of the assembly of Macedonia by citizens who were

16 not satisfied with the measures taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs

17 to suppress terrorists, or at least that's what I read in the transcript.

18 Do you recall that testimony?

19 A. Yes. I believe that I did say that.

20 Q. Wasn't it the army's job to fight the NLA?

21 A. We were reviewing the Law on Internal Affairs a moment ago, and

22 you read there the competences of the Ministry of Interior.

23 Q. Do we take your response as a "yes" or a "no," Mr. Stojanovski?

24 A. It was a task for both the army and the Ministry of Interior.

25 Q. And why was it necessary for the members of the Ministry of

1 Interior to get involved in fighting the NLA back in 2001?

2 A. You are taking me to a part that I'm not really competent to

3 explain or speak about. There is a so-called national plan for defence in

4 the Republic of Macedonia.

5 In the Republic of Macedonia, there is a council for national

6 security. I can't comment their work, nor their decisions.

7 Q. Well, Mr. Stojanovski, maybe if I can simplify this. Was the

8 security situation in Macedonia in 2001 so serious and so complex that the

9 men, women, and resources of both of Ministry of Defence and the Ministry

10 of Internal Affairs were required to combat the NLA? Would that be a fair

11 statement?

12 A. It would be.

13 MR. SAXON: If we can provide to the witness the second binder

14 provided by Ms. Residovic last week, and if we could show him what is tab

15 37 in that binder.

16 Your Honours, this would be Exhibit 1D126.

17 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, this is an information dated the 9th of August,

18 2001.

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And the subject is: "Individuals who violated the public law and

22 order and committed robberies on the 8th of August, 2001."

23 Do you see that?

24 Q. And in the first paragraph, it says: "Following operative

25 measures and activities by the OVR Centar, in connection with the

1 disturbances and public law and order violations, as well as damage to and

2 looting of shops and other buildings, a total of 44 individuals, 21 of

3 whom were minors, were arrested and detained in police stations, Centar

4 and Bit Pazar."

5 Are you following me?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And it says: "Interviews were conducted with the individuals, and

8 it was determined that 30 of them participated in the looting of the

9 damaged buildings. A large part of the stolen objects which were

10 discovered on the perpetrators was seized and will be returned to the

11 rightful owners."

12 Then below that, there is a list of the individuals who were

13 arrested.

14 Do you see that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You testified earlier that after these demonstrations in the

17 summer of 2001, once the situation was calm, the police would take

18 measures to find the perpetrators of crimes that were committed,

19 vandalism, looting, et cetera. Do you recall that?

20 A. After the situation calmed down?

21 Q. After these demonstrations ended or calmed down, then the police

22 would take measures to try to find the perpetrators of the crimes that

23 occurred during the demonstrations. Do you remember explaining that to

24 us?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. With respect to the individuals mentioned in this particular

2 report from the 9th of August, do you know how the police identified the

3 perpetrators who are described in this document?

4 A. By direct observation.

5 Q. Okay. So, if I understand you, that means that certain police

6 officers witnessed these particular crimes and these particular

7 individuals committing the crimes. Is that right?

8 A. Yes. Although, they found the perpetrators when leaving the crime

9 screen and carrying out the stolen property.

10 Q. Okay. And as part of their duties, then, these police officers

11 would then arrest the perpetrators of the crimes who they observed, right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you turn, please, to what is page 2 in the English version,

14 and it's the last page in the Macedonian version.

15 At the bottom of page 2 in the English version, there's a

16 paragraph beginning with the word, "furthermore," but it's on the last

17 page of your version, Mr. Stojanovski.

18 Do you see that paragraph? Do you see the word "furthermore"?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It says: "Furthermore, interviews with the individuals pointed

21 out that Aleksovski, Marjan, known as Zver, also stole from the shops,

22 together with four other individuals (Brle, Cikoi, Marjan, and Igor), and

23 that they are in possession of the items. They're being sought for arrest

24 in order to return the stolen goods."

25 Do you see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So, during the summer of 2001, another method that the Macedonian

3 police used to identify perpetrators of a crime was to speak with other

4 perpetrators, right?

5 A. Yes. Although, the notion identification might not be appropriate

6 to learn about other persons, but the identification is something

7 different.

8 Q. All right. Well, then, another method that the Macedonian police

9 used to learn about other potential perpetrators of a crime was to speak

10 with perpetrators of the crime, right?

11 A. Citizens, perpetrators, witnesses.

12 Q. Okay.

13 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I see the hour. Would this be the

14 appropriate time to take a break?

15 JUDGE PARKER: We will take the break now and resume at 11.00,

16 Mr. Saxon.

17 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

18 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

20 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, if you could turn to what is tab 39 in the binder

22 in front of you, please.

23 MR. SAXON: This is Exhibit 1D129.

24 Q. And, Mr. Stojanovski, you'll see that this is an information from

25 25 July 2001, regarding the security situation in the city of Skopje and

1 the wider region in the period from 1800 hours to 2400 hours on the 25th

2 of July, 2001.

3 Do you see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And it describes, for example, in the first paragraph: "Another

6 protest rally in front of the parliament; citizens from the Tetovo region

7 were joined by a larger group of citizens from Skopje.

8 And, then, in the second paragraph, it talks about how at around

9 2100 hours a group of around 1500 persons visibly revolted, headed toward

10 to the publishing and printing house, Nova Makedonija, and set fire to

11 several vehicles.

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And, in the next paragraph, it says that the same group headed to

15 the government of the Republic of Macedonia, the General Staff of the

16 army, as well as the embassy of the United States, and some of the

17 demonstrators threw rocks at the embassy, breaking several windows.

18 Do you see that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And, then, in the next paragraph, it talks about, during the

21 movements of this crowd of people, there were vehicles and facilities that

22 were damaged.

23 Have you been following me?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. If you could turn to tab 141 in that -- excuse me, tab 41 in that

1 binder, it is 1D127.

2 Are you able to find tab 41?

3 MR. SAXON: Perhaps the usher could assist Mr. Stojanovski; if

4 not, I can give -- oh, he's got it.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's fine.

6 MR. SAXON:

7 Q. You'll see, Mr. Stojanovski, this is another information of the

8 Ministry of Internal Affairs from the SVR Skopje, and it's dated the 9th

9 of August, 2001.

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And the subject is: "A protest of citizens in Tetovo and Skopje

13 during which several facilities were damaged in the centre of Skopje."

14 In the first paragraph, it describes how on the 8th of August,

15 2001, at about 4.00 in the afternoon, in front of the parliament, two

16 large groups of citizens arrived to express their revolt about the

17 terrorist act which happened on the road Skopje-Tetovo, and in which ten

18 soldiers lost their lives.

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And the paragraph ends, that eventually the crowd reached about

22 4.000 to 5.000 citizens.

23 Now, just to clarify, this demonstration or protest, this took

24 place after the attack on the convoy at the area known as Karpalak, is

25 that right, the attack on an army convoy?

1 A. Yes, this is correct. Yes.

2 Q. And, in the second paragraph, we see how the demonstrators placed

3 barriers in different locations. They damaged the entrance door of the

4 building of the government of the Republic of Macedonia.

5 And, in the third paragraph, they turned over waste collection

6 containers. Then it says, in the fourth paragraph: "At around 2030 hour,

7 around 20 citizens from the mass, from the crowd, knowing that several

8 wounded terrorists are being treated at the general city hospital, entered

9 the hall of the hospital wanting to reach by force the intensive care

10 unit. However, they were prevented in doing so and, therefore, they left

11 the hospital."

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And, then, in the next paragraph, it talks about that there was

15 damage to stores and other business facilities, as well as theft, and a

16 total of 46 persons were detained.

17 Have you been following me?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So, now, this particular protest took place in August, first part

20 of August. Would it be fair to say that by August of 2001, particularly

21 after the deaths of members of the Macedonian security forces, that acts

22 of violence against civilian property, and suspected terrorists even, were

23 becoming fairly predictable?

24 A. This happened in continuity. It was normal. This was nothing

25 that could not be expected. We were facing a situation like this.

1 Q. Okay. So the answer to my question, then, would be: "Yes, such

2 violent reactions by this time became predictable for the police." Right?

3 A. Yes, yes. It was the practice.

4 Q. And, so, again, by that time, by August 2001, the police would

5 want to take great care [Realtime transcript read in error "carry"], for

6 example, after incidents where members of the security forces were killed,

7 in order to try to avoid danger to civilians in such a volatile

8 environment. Would that also be true?

9 A. Yes. One could say that, in accordance with the available

10 resources we had.

11 Q. Okay.

12 MR. SAXON: And just for the record, I see on page 36 of the

13 LiveNote, line 3, I see the phrase take great "carry," that should be take

14 "care."

15 Q. Moving on to a different topic, Mr. Stojanovski.

16 During your direct examination, in response to a question from my

17 learned colleague, Ms. Residovic, at page 9106 of the transcript, you

18 said: "According to the Law on Internal Affairs, members of the Ministry

19 of Internal Affairs at the republic level have no operative functions."

20 And you said: "The same is true for the minister."

21 And you said that: "In the Law on Internal Affairs, there is no

22 mention of an obligation pertaining to operative tasks."

23 Do you remember that testimony?

24 A. Yes. The minister does not have operative functions.

25 MR. SAXON: Well, again, could we please provide to the witness

1 what would be binder number 1 provided by the Defence, and if we can turn

2 to what is tab 2. It's Exhibit P86, the Law on Internal Affairs.

3 Q. If you, Mr. Stojanovski, could please turn to the Macedonian

4 version.

5 Mr. Stojanovski, we've already earlier today we looked at

6 Article 1, which describes the competencies of the ministry.

7 Can you take a moment, please, where it says -- take a moment, if

8 you will, look through the Law on Internal Affairs and tell us where does

9 it say that the members of the Ministry of Interior at the republic level,

10 or the minister, have no operative functions. Where does it say that?

11 A. Article 1 does not establish the competencies of the minister --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- while Article 24 regulates these issues, together with the

14 systemization manual for working places at the ministry. Article 24,

15 then, which I mentioned, should be looked at together with the manual for

16 organisation and work of the ministry, and the rule book for systemization

17 of workplaces.

18 Q. Does it say anywhere in Article 24 that the minister or members of

19 the ministry at the republic level have no operative functions?

20 A. If we were to read the law in its entirety, not just Article 24,

21 we could see that it lists the competencies of the Minister of the

22 Interior.

23 Q. Okay. Can you take me to that Article in the law?

24 A. At least one.

25 Q. Okay. Which Article is that?

1 A. Let's say, for example, Article 75.

2 Q. Okay. In the English version, Article 75 says: "Within one month

3 from the time when this law has come into effect, the minister will bring

4 general acts for organisation and work and for systemization of the posts

5 in the ministry."

6 That's what Article 75 says, right?

7 A. This is one of the obligations of the minister.

8 Q. Does Article 75 tell us that the minister cannot play a role in

9 operative matters?

10 A. It does not obligate him. There is a difference, I believe.

11 Q. I'm not asking you whether the minister is obligated to do

12 something. I'm asking you whether anything in this law or in Article 75,

13 since you brought us to this Article, prohibits the minister from becoming

14 involved in operative matters.

15 A. It does not prohibit, but this would be outside his authorisations

16 and competencies.

17 Q. And how do you know that?

18 A. The law regulates the competencies of the minister --

19 Q. Can you turn back to Article --

20 A. -- because the minister cannot be considered as a police official,

21 as a police officer. I don't believe anywhere in the world you will be

22 find -- you will be able to find such a solution. This is not the case in

23 Macedonia. The minister is a political figure.

24 Q. The minister is also an authorised official, isn't he?

25 A. Of course. This is why I mentioned Article 24, which attempts to

1 regulate this matter.

2 Q. Okay. And as one of the authorised officials, perhaps I should

3 say as the highest authorised official in the ministry, the minister would

4 have a lot of areas of responsibility, wouldn't he?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And we can see those areas in Article 1, can't we?

7 A. Article 1 describes the term "internal affairs." It deals with

8 what internal affairs encompass.

9 Q. And the Minister of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Macedonia

10 is the person most responsible for the activities pertaining to internal

11 affairs described in Article 1 of this law, right?

12 A. The minister is the person that who cares that the ministry

13 operates and carries out its legal obligations.

14 Q. All right. Can you turn to Article 6 of the Law on Internal

15 Affairs.

16 The first paragraph says: "The employees of the Ministry of

17 Internal Affairs are conducting their duties and tasks in accordance with

18 the rights, obligations, and authorisations determined by the law and

19 other regulations that are brought based on the law."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And, below that, we see another paragraph: "An employee of the

23 ministry must implement orders of the minister or the person authorised by

24 him given in connection with the functions of the ministry ..."

25 Do you see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "... except when implementation of the orders present a criminal

3 offence."

4 Now, based on Article 6, for example, the minister could give

5 orders about operative matters, such as solving a case, can't he?

6 Couldn't the minister tell his subordinates, "Solve the crime,

7 find evidence, find the truth"? Couldn't the minister do that?

8 A. Again, you're putting me in a position to interpret the law.

9 Q. If I can just say, Mr. Stojanovski, I'm not putting you in a

10 position. You referred to this law during your testimony, so I'm asking

11 you about it.

12 A. Very well. I will tell you my opinion about this Article.

13 Article 2 -- paragraph 2 of this Article, which you're asking me

14 about, regulates the obligation of the employee, not of the employer.

15 Another aspect is that, according to my understanding, the

16 minister can issue a certain order, however, within the framework of the

17 competencies which he has. He cannot issue an order for a concrete case.

18 Even I, from the position which I have, cannot issue an order to

19 the unit of internal affairs how to solve a certain case.

20 Q. Well, if someone came into this courtroom, like you did, and

21 testified under oath that the minister told his subordinates, "Find the

22 truth; work as quickly as you can," you're saying that would be a lie?

23 A. I don't understand the question. What you're saying is general.

24 Q. No. I'm saying something very specific. If a person came into

25 this courtroom and said that the minister, with respect to a particular

1 case, said, "Find the truth; work as quickly as you can; gather all the

2 information," are you saying that would be a lie?

3 A. It would not be a lie. This is not interfering in the operative

4 matters of the units of internal affairs. This is requests for

5 information.

6 Q. It's not --

7 A. And this request of information, it is usually done through

8 commissions, by setting up working groups, and so forth.

9 Q. And, although, it is not "interfering," as you say, with the

10 operative units of the internal affairs, it would certainly have an impact

11 on the operative units of internal affairs, wouldn't it?

12 A. Probably, for them to do their work in the best possible way.

13 Q. Okay. If I can show you, please --

14 MR. SAXON: If we could show the witness what is tab 32. It's in

15 the first binder provided by the Defence. It might be the last document.

16 This is Exhibit 1D138. It's the last document in the first binder.

17 Q. And, Mr. Stojanovski, this is a document from the Ministry of

18 Interior, police section, dated the 23rd of November, 2001.

19 Do you see that?

20 MR. SAXON: Sorry. I think you've got -- yeah. I'm grateful to

21 the usher for her able assistance.

22 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, this document is dated the 23rd of November,

23 2001, and it's titled: "Annex to the general plan for the return of the

24 security forces to the towns and villages and the return of displaced

25 persons."

1 Do you see that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And it says that: "This annex modifies the general plan for the

4 return of the security forces to the towns and villages and the return of

5 displaced residents; it extends the lists of towns and villages mentioned

6 in part of phase three, subphase two, for the return of the security

7 forces to these places."

8 Then it lists a number of villages within the territory of SVR

9 Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, and Kumanovo.

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And you see, at the bottom, this document or this annex was

13 prepared by Risto Galevski, the head of the uniformed police; and it was

14 approved by Goran Mitevski, the director of the public security bureau; as

15 well as it was approved by then -- the then minister, Ljube Boskoski.

16 Do you see that?

17 A. Yes, I see it; although, I don't see where it says "approved."

18 Q. Well, all right. You may be correct, because you are certainly

19 reading your native language and I am not. But it is certainly signed and

20 stamped by Mr. Galevski, Mr. Mitevski, and Minister Boskoski. Is that

21 right?

22 A. Yes. It means that, in the least, that he was informed of it.

23 Q. Do you see the -- never mind.

24 This particular plan or this operation, for lack of a better word,

25 of sending the security forces back into a number of villages, this is not

1 something that is specifically discussed in the Law on Internal Affairs,

2 is it?

3 A. This is not done from this point of view which you're just

4 mentioning now. This is not established by the Law on Internal Affairs.

5 I did not work. I have not had any activities related to this matter. In

6 accordance to my understanding, this was under the auspices of the OSCE.

7 Q. Well, it is apparently also under the auspices of the Ministry of

8 Internal Affairs, right? It was their plan to send their officers back to

9 villages.

10 A. I would not agree. The plan was worked in accordance to the

11 information I had, together with the OSCE and on the basis of their

12 assessments.

13 Q. I'm just trying now to understand your response.

14 Are you saying that the operation to return the security forces,

15 Ministry of Internal Affairs forces, to villages in different parts of

16 Macedonia and the return of displaced residents was not an operation of

17 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that they were somehow removed from

18 this?

19 A. It was not an independent operation of the Ministry of Interior.

20 Q. Okay. Your point is, then, that this operation was carried out in

21 association with members of the OSCE. Would that be fair?

22 A. I don't know how accurately cooperation reflects the situation.

23 Surely, there was cooperation, but the OSCE, as an international

24 organisation, had a direct influence in determining the phases of this

25 plan.

1 Q. All right. So this was an operation of the forces of the Ministry

2 of Internal Affairs, but in which members of the OSCE also had some

3 influence. Is that a correct summary of your evidence?

4 A. A decisive influence.

5 Q. Okay. Was this operation to send the security forces back into

6 parts of Macedonia from which they had been compelled to leave earlier,

7 was that an illegal operation?

8 A. I would not say so.

9 Q. All right. And wouldn't these kinds of activities also be

10 considered as operative work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

11 A. This is not operative; this is more strategy.

12 Q. All right. Well, if you're moving large numbers of police

13 officers from one place in Macedonia to another place in Macedonia after

14 months of - to use your term - "a very complex security situation," you

15 wouldn't call that a matter of operative work or operational work; that's

16 only strategy?

17 A. I have a slightly different understanding of this. I understand

18 the deployment or moving of forces as tactics.

19 Q. Well, then, let me -- let me rephrase my question then.

20 Wouldn't these kind of activities then be considered - I'll use

21 your phrase - "tactical" work of the Ministry of Interior?

22 A. I would consider this tactical work, strategy developed together

23 with the OSCE and its implementation, through, what I said, the

24 appropriate tactics.

25 Q. And anywhere that you know in the Law on Internal Affairs that

1 authorised this particular - to use your term - "tactical" work?

2 A. No. The law does not specify neither operative work, nor tactical

3 work, nor strategy work. These are usually level -- usual levels in a

4 modern organisation.

5 Q. Okay. So, again, this would be another area of Ministry of

6 Internal Affairs practice, which isn't specifically described or defined

7 in the laws or regulations, right?

8 A. Yes. This situation was not foreseen in the law.

9 Q. And why do you suppose the minister and the director for the

10 public security bureau signed off on this plan?

11 A. Since the deployment of forces -- one reason is that the

12 deployment of forces across areas covered by many sectors for internal

13 affairs is under the competence of the bureau for public security; on the

14 other hand, the law prescribes that one of the duties of the minister is

15 the international cooperation.

16 My opinion - not necessarily the best opinion - is that one of the

17 main reasons for the sign and the stamp belongs to this framework.

18 Q. Is that your actual knowledge, Mr. Stojanovski, or is that your

19 speculation?

20 A. My opinion.

21 Q. All right. So the answer to my question was you are speculating

22 when you have just provided this information, right?

23 A. I told you, at the beginning, that I was not involved in these

24 activities. So I said, in the answer to several questions before, that I

25 was not involved. You are asking a person who was not involved to give

1 their opinion, and also you're asking me to give my opinion of acts of

2 other people.

3 Q. No, Mr. Stojanovski. My point is something very different. I'm

4 asking you why you decided to speculate about this particular question

5 when you told us earlier on that you did not want to speculate.

6 A. I'm not speculating. I told you what my opinion was, and I

7 stressed it also when answering one of the previous questions.

8 Q. Okay. Can you tell us what the basis for your opinion is?

9 A. What are you specifically asking me about?

10 Q. I'm asking you the basis of your opinion that one of the main

11 reasons why Mr. Boskoski signed and stamped this document was because of

12 the duty of international cooperation.

13 A. I do not understand you. I told you what my opinion was, and I

14 hope that this is recorded in the transcript.

15 Q. Okay. Then I'm going to move on.

16 MR. SAXON: If the witness could be provided with the second

17 binder now, and if we could turn to Exhibit 1D182. This is at tab 44 of

18 this binder.

19 Q. The document at tab 44, Mr. Stojanovski, is dated the 26th of

20 April, 2001, and it's a document from the Ministry of Interior, SVR

21 Skopje, OVR Cair.

22 Do you see that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And it's an overview of places from which Albanian terrorists may

25 surface and buildings of vital importance which could be targeted for

1 attacks in the area of OVR Cair, and I believe this was shown to you

2 during direct examination.

3 We see here, towards the back of this document, that there's a

4 list of check-points.

5 Do you see that list?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. SAXON: And if we could turn now to the next document at tab

8 45, this is Exhibit 1D183.

9 Q. This document is from the 12th of April, and apparently it's 2001

10 because April 2001 is in the title. It's from OVR Cair.

11 It says: "Additions to the plan for physical and operative

12 coverage of the inner part of the state border with SRY for the month of

13 April 2001."

14 Do you see that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And this addition to the earlier plan provides for several more

17 check-points, do you see that, as well as some patrol and surveillance?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. During your direct examination in response to question from my

20 learned colleague, you testified, at page 9145, that these amendments to

21 the plan, or additions to the plan, were probably submitted to the

22 headquarters of SVR Skopje "in view of the fact that headquarters had to

23 be informed and notified of the deployment of check-points in the area of

24 OVR Cair, so that we could provide assistance in time of need."

25 Do you recall that testimony?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So, if I understand your testimony correctly, the OVRs, within SVR

3 Skopje, had the duty to inform the SVR about this information, location of

4 check-points, so that the SVR would know where police officers were

5 deployed and how many officers were deployed. Is that a correct

6 statement?

7 A. You could consider it correct and due to two reasons; one is the

8 coordination. To perform the coordination role, we need to know where our

9 troops are deployed and how many forces are deployed at any of the

10 locations.

11 With regards to the support function, that support could have been

12 logical which would mean provision of, to say offhand, food, vehicles,

13 et cetera, and support with regards to security of the check-point itself,

14 because during that time very often or check-points were attacked by the

15 Albanian terrorists. And, in such cases, we needed to know where to send

16 support.

17 Q. Okay. In particular, with respect to that last point, where you

18 mentioned that often police check-points were attacked by the Albanian

19 terrorists, suppose the head of an OVR decided to place a police

20 check-point at a very danger location - for example, at a location that

21 would be very exposed to attacks by the Albanian terrorists, by the NLA -

22 a superior at SVR Skopje headquarters would instruct the head of the OVR

23 to move that check-point, right?

24 A. It is like this. The assessment of the security situation is the

25 competence of the unit for internal affairs. No one from the outside can

1 give -- can make better assessment of the security situation in a given

2 area than the actual unit for internal affairs.

3 So, if we are playing a word game now, or if we are making

4 conjectures, what if there is an obligation prescribed by the Law on

5 Internal Affairs which stipulates that the members of the Ministry of

6 Interior have the duty to carry out their tasks even when their lives are

7 at risk.

8 Q. That is very interesting, but you didn't answer my question.

9 A. Would you then repeat the question?

10 Q. Sure. Suppose the head of the OVR makes a decision to place a

11 police check-point at a very dangerous location, a location that would be

12 very exposed to attacks by the Albanian terrorists, the NLA - can I finish

13 my question? - wouldn't then the superior at SVR Skopje headquarters

14 instruct the head of the OVR to move the check-point to a more secure

15 location?

16 A. The question goes down, again, to the notion of who is making the

17 assessment. Who establishes that the situation is so dangerous or risky?

18 The head of the OVR. The head of the sector for internal affairs cannot

19 know that. The situation in the field, by definition, is the fact that

20 the OVR is best aware of.

21 The head of the sector - we discussed it the other day - his tasks

22 and the position in the structure. If you'd like, I can try and explain

23 again what his position is.

24 Q. No, thank you.

25 Well, the heads of the OVRs report information to the headquarters

1 of the SVRs, don't they, about what's going on in the OVR? Isn't that

2 part of their job?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And that's so, because it's important for the SVRs who are

5 responsible for the activities of the police within the territories of the

6 OVRs, it's important for them to know what is happening within the OVRs,

7 isn't it?

8 A. I will ask the interpreter to interpret the question once again.

9 Q. And that's so, because it's important for the heads of the SVRs

10 who are responsible for the activities of the police within the

11 territories of the OVRs, it's important for them to know what is happening

12 within the OVRs. Isn't that right?

13 A. The head of the SVR is responsible for the activities of the

14 police within the territory of the department for internal affairs, OVR,

15 if I understood you correctly; while we already made the clear distinction

16 who is responsible for what.

17 What is the role of the OVR, and what is the role of the SVR?

18 Q. My question was much simpler, Mr. Stojanovski. We'll start again.

19 The heads of the OVRs report information to the headquarters of

20 the SVRs, right?

21 A. Right.

22 Q. And, in fact, that's why the head of the OVR Cair sent this

23 proposal for check-points and plans and the addition up to the SVR Skopje,

24 back in April 2001, right?

25 A. No. This is not a proposal. This is just an addition to their

1 plan.

2 Q. That's not my question, Mr. Stojanovski. My question is: The

3 reason why the head of OVR Cair sent this addition to the plan, and as

4 well as the original plan, up to SVR Skopje was so that the headquarters

5 of SVR Skopje would be aware of where the check-points were being placed

6 in OVR Cair, right?

7 A. Now it is right.

8 Q. Okay. And if the head of SVR Skopje believed that the assessment

9 of the head of OVR Cair was mistaken and that the head of OVR Cair was

10 placing a check-point in an exposed, dangerous position, wouldn't the head

11 of SVR Skopje react and instruct the head of the OVR to move the

12 check-point?

13 A. When we are speaking in a "what if" fashion, I suppose that the

14 head of the SVR Skopje would propose the head of the OVR to reassess or

15 review his assessment. Now we have a second scenario.

16 If, in the sector for internal affairs, information arrives which

17 is of importance for the OVR, then the head of the sector will communicate

18 that information to the head of the OVR, so that the latter could take it

19 into account when making the security assessment for the area that is he

20 responsible for.

21 Q. So, then, it's true, isn't it, that the heads of the SVR, or the

22 members of the headquarters of the SVRs, could have some influence on the

23 location of police check-points in the OVRs? Right?

24 A. It is completely incorrect. I don't know why we can't understand

25 one another. We are communicating information. When I say "we," that

1 means SVR Skopje.

2 The head of the OVR compares the information that he has received

3 to his assessment, and he then decides on the relevance and importance of

4 the information and the impact it would have to the way in which he had

5 deployed or established check-points within his area.

6 Q. And what if the head of the OVR makes a mistake, who tells him

7 that he that he has made -- who tells the head of the OVR that he has made

8 a mistake and that he should correct his mistake, particularly in a

9 situation where the security situation is very complex?

10 A. The head of the OVR is a member of the collegium of the sector for

11 internal affairs, and now we need to go back again to the competences and

12 tasks.

13 If time shows that a mistake had been made, then measures will be

14 undertaken, depending on the nature of the mistake and depending on the

15 consequences.

16 Q. If time shows that a mistake has been made and the head of the SVR

17 sees that a mistake has been made, the head of the SVR will direct the

18 head of the OVR to correct that mistake, in times of a complex security

19 situation, right?

20 A. One scenario is to indicate the mistake; and the other is to

21 initiate a disciplinary procedure; or the third scenario is, if the

22 mistake is so huge, then a criminal report can be filed against that

23 person.

24 Q. Can I take your response, then, finally, as a "yes"?

25 A. No, you can't, because it won't be an order. He will indicate a

1 mistake was made.

2 Q. So it's your testimony, then, just so that we're clear, that in

3 times of an extremely complex security situation, such as existed in 2001,

4 and when the head of SVR Skopje learns that the head of, for example, OVR

5 Cair has made a mistake, which puts police officers in danger, it's your

6 testimony today that the head of the SVR is simply going to make a little

7 indication to the head of the OVR, that maybe he needs to re-evaluate his

8 decision?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Very well. One more thing, if we can turn and if we can stay with

11 the document at tab 45, which is the additions to the plan that was

12 created by the OVR Cair, can you turn to the first page of that document,

13 please.

14 Do you have the first page in front of you?

15 A. 1D183?

16 Q. That's it. You've got it. Okay.

17 Can you see, in the upper right-hand corner, there's a handwritten

18 note and it says: "For Deputy Pero Stojan, 15 April, 2002."

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I see it. It says: "For Deputy Pero Stojan," and I confirm

21 that it is intended for me.

22 Q. Why was this document directed to you?

23 A. Because most probably, at that moment, I was at the headquarter of

24 SVR Skopje. I was on duty.

25 Q. If Zoran Efremov, the head of SVR Skopje, had been on duty at that

1 time, would this document have been directed to Mr. Efremov?

2 A. If he been at the headquarters, then, yes.

3 Q. So, again, when Mr. Efremov was absent from work for one reason or

4 another, people turned to you to deal with particular matters of the SVR

5 Skopje, right?

6 A. At one time, I was replacing Mr. Efremov because he was absent.

7 At different times, Mr. Bliznakovski replaced Mr. Efremov. This was a

8 decision of Mr. Efremov. This is one aspect.

9 The other is the existence of the operative headquarters in

10 Skopje, headquarters charged to cover this matter. Mr. Efremov, if he had

11 been absent, the operative headquarters of SVR Skopje was operational,

12 worked.

13 Q. Okay. And just to follow up on one point. You clarified that, at

14 one time, you would replace Mr. Efremov if he was absent; but at other

15 time, Mr. Ljupco Bliznakovski would replace Mr. Efremov. Is that right?

16 A. Yes, this is so.

17 Q. And, so, at those times when Mr. Efremov was absent, the heads of

18 the OVRs would direct their matters either to you or to Mr. Ljupco

19 Bliznakovski, correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. If we can turn now another topic.

22 At page 9097 of the transcript, you told my learned colleague the

23 following, and you said that: "Solving cases, solving criminal cases,

24 without the cooperation of the injured party is nearly impossible."

25 Do you remember that testimony?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Well, what about murder cases? The victim is dead, obviously.

3 And if there's no one present at the time of the murder except for the

4 victim and the perpetrator, are you saying that all such murder cases are

5 unsolvable?

6 A. The response which I gave related to one situation and cannot be a

7 formula for all. In the case of a murder, we have available other

8 measures as well. For example, we had a scene, a crime scene. We have

9 the possibility to -- or rather, an obligation to inform the public

10 prosecutor and the investigating judge who can undertake adequate

11 activities.

12 Q. And you also have, depending on the case, you also might have

13 witnesses to the crime, right?

14 A. Of course.

15 Q. All right. Mr. Stojanovski, in the summer of 2001, did you use

16 the telephone number 70205719?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay.

19 MR. SAXON: If the witness could be provided with the Prosecutor's

20 binder of exhibits, please, and if we could show the witness what is

21 Exhibit P536, which should be at tab 40 of the Prosecutor binder.

22 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, this document contains a series of records

23 provided to the Prosecution by the government of the Republic of

24 Macedonia, allegedly reflecting the incoming telephone calls for Mr. Ljube

25 Krstevski during several days in August 2001.

1 There is actually -- there is an error I should tell you about, at

2 least in the English version. In the middle column, where it says "to

3 number," that should be the word "from." Then in the next column to the

4 right, where it says "from number," that should be the word "to," because

5 can he see that the column on the right was the telephone of -- used by

6 Mr. Ljube Krstevski, and he is the recipient of calls from a variety of

7 other telephones.

8 I'm wondering if you could please turn to I believe it's the fifth

9 item down from the top. We see a record from 10th of August, 2001 at

10 10.39 in the morning from telephone number 70205719.

11 Do you see that?

12 If you're having trouble, I can ask the usher's assistance to

13 assist.

14 I'm talking about the very first page, Mr. Stojanovski, the very

15 first.

16 MR. SAXON: If the usher could come here for a minute, I'll show,

17 for example --

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see a date.

19 MR. SAXON:

20 Q. Mr. Stojanovski, could you look at what the usher is showing you.

21 Do you see that line?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Fine.

25 Q. So that appears to indicate a telephone call from your telephone

1 to the telephone of Mr. Krstevski.

2 Do you see that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can you recall whether you spoke to Mr. Krstevski on the morning

5 of the 10th of August around that time; and if so, what you spoke about?

6 A. From what I'm able to see here, we spoke for one minute and I

7 could not say what we talked about.

8 Q. All right. If you now look towards the bottom of the page, and if

9 you count up six lines from the bottom, you'll see another record of a

10 telephone call, again from the 10th of August, 2001, at 9.32 in the

11 morning, from your telephone number to Mr. Krstevski's telephone number.

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes, in the duration of 53 seconds.

14 Q. Any idea what you might have discussed with Mr. Krstevski at that

15 time?

16 A. It is impossible for me to remember.

17 Q. All right. The 10th of August, that was a Friday, the morning of

18 the mine explosion at Ljubotenski Bacila.

19 If could you turn the page, please, Mr. Stojanovski, to the next

20 page, and if you look at the very top of the second page, you'll see that

21 there's A record there indicating, at least, that on the morning of the

22 11th of August, 2001, that would have been on Saturday morning, at 11.06

23 and 11.07, there were telephone calls from your telephone to

24 Mr. Krstevski.

25 Do you see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Any idea what you might have talked to Mr. Krstevski about on that

3 Saturday morning?

4 A. I believe it would be impossible for me to remember what I spoke

5 to him on -- at 11.06. What I spoke with him at that time, it would not

6 be possible for me to remember the content of each conversation which I

7 had listed here. And what was said at a given minute, that would not be

8 possible for me to remember.

9 Q. All right. If you --

10 A. Although, it is indisputable that I did have such contacts with

11 them.

12 Q. All right. And it also indisputable that some of those contacts

13 you initiated, you called?

14 A. It is indisputable to say that this was a two-way communication,

15 throughout the whole time, that I was at the SVR and he was at the OVR

16 Cair.

17 Q. If you look around ten lines down, there are records of a couple

18 more phone calls from your telephone to Mr. Krstevski's telephone shortly

19 after 1500 hours in the afternoon; one at 1506 and one at 1518.

20 Do you see those records there?

21 A. Yes, I see them.

22 Q. Is it possible that you telephoned Mr. Krstevski to discuss the

23 situation in OVR Cair, the security situation?

24 A. It is possible.

25 Q. Is it possible that you telephoned Mr. Krstevski to discuss with

1 him the calling up of reservists or the arming of reservists at OVR Cair?

2 A. I had not had such a conversation.

3 Q. Okay. If you look down the list five or six more lines, you'll

4 see that there's another -- there's a record of a telephone conversation

5 from Saturday evening, the 11th of August, at 2015.

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And then could you turn the page, please. The following page

9 contains records of telephone calls allegedly made on the 12th of August,

10 which would have been Sunday, to the telephone of Ljube Krstevski.

11 And if you count down about a dozen lines from the top, you see

12 that on the 12th of August there are records of two more telephones calls

13 made from your phone to Mr. Krstevski's phone on the afternoon of the

14 12th of August; one at 1506, and then the other one at 1602.

15 Do you see that?

16 A. Yes, I see it.

17 Q. Now, we know that there was a lot going on in the village of

18 Ljuboten on that day. Do you have any idea or recollection what you might

19 have called Mr. Krstevski to talk about on the afternoon of the 12th of

20 August?

21 A. Specifically, for these listed telephone conversations, I cannot

22 remember the content; but in regards to the event, we did talk about this.

23 I cannot say for certain whether this was on a cell phone or through a

24 land line. And, most probably, we talked about the situation in the OVR

25 Cair, regarding the current events at the time.

1 Q. If we move on to another topic now, please. I suppose it's a

2 related topic, the discussion of telephone conversations.

3 During direct examination, at pages 9151 to 9152 of the

4 transcript, you explained to the Chamber about a telephone call that the

5 head of OVR Cair, Mr. Krstevski, made to you on the afternoon of -- or

6 evening of 10 August 2001 seeking your advice about whether Mr. Krstevski

7 should attend a meeting with members of the army.

8 You thought that -- or you explained to Ms. Residovic that you

9 thought that Mr. Krstevski's telephone call was unusual, and you said that

10 you could not understand the point of his telephone call.

11 Do you remember that? You could not understand the point of

12 Mr. Krstevski's telephone call; do you recall that testimony?

13 A. I recall this testimony.

14 Q. And, again, on the same subject of telephone calls, at page 9158

15 of the transcript, you explained to Ms. Residovic that, well, the

16 conversation -- excuse me.

17 Ms. Residovic asked you about a telephone call allegedly made by

18 Mr. Krstevski to you, asking you to confirm an order allegedly made by

19 Goran Mitevski, the director of the public security bureau, an order to

20 Mr. Krstevski, the head of OVR Cair, to distribute weapons on Saturday,

21 the 11th of August.

22 You explained to my colleague that it's stupid to suggest that

23 after Goran Mitevski allegedly issued an order for the distribution of

24 weapons on the 11th of August, that you would be contacted or informed

25 about this matter, and that then you ordered that Mr. Mitevski's order be

1 carried out.

2 You explained that you felt that such an assertion was stupid

3 because, as you explained, since Goran Mitevski was much higher up the

4 chain of command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs than you were, there

5 would be no need for you to give your consent to "an order of a superior."

6 Do you recall that exchange with Ms. Residovic?

7 A. Yes. I remember this conversation. However, I cannot, on the

8 list which I'm shown, point the telephone conversations or to confirm that

9 the conversation was carried on or through a cell phone or a landline.

10 Q. That's fine, Mr. Stojanovski, and I'm not going to ask to you make

11 such a confirmation. I've moved on to a slightly different topic, all

12 right?

13 If we can, I want to ask you about these two telephone calls:

14 First, the call that Mr. Krstevski made to you on the 10th of August,

15 which you could not understand the point of; but whether he should attend

16 the meeting with the members of the army; and then this second phone call,

17 this idea or suggestion that there was a phone call on the following day

18 from Mr. Krstevski, allegedly asking you to confirm an order that had been

19 given by Mr. Mitevski. That's what I want to ask you about.

20 MR. SAXON: If we can show the witness, please, what is Exhibit

21 1D107, which is from the first binder of exhibits provided by the Defence

22 for this witness, at tab 4.

23 Q. And, Mr. Stojanovski, the document at tab 4, Exhibit 1D107, is the

24 Book of Rules on the Organisation and Operation of the Ministry of

25 Internal Affairs.

1 Could you turn, please, to Article 24.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Article 24 says this: "Employees are obliged to carry out their

4 working duties in conscious and timely manner pursuant to the law, other

5 regulations, working programmes, and within the frame of the given orders

6 and instructions for work."

7 Did you see that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. There's a colloquial expression in English, Mr. Stojanovski,

10 called "covering your back." I don't know how that translates in your

11 language. Have you heard of this concept?

12 A. I don't understand you.

13 Q. In English, the expression "covering your back" refers to a person

14 who wants to make sure that he or she does not get into trouble for taking

15 a particular action, or not taking a particular action.

16 So my question for you is this: For example, if an employee of

17 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, back in 2001, is not sure whether he is

18 acting or going to act within the law, pursuant to the law, the natural

19 thing to do would be to call a superior and ask for advice or direction,

20 wouldn't it?

21 A. What you said and gave as an explanation has yet another side, and

22 that is avoiding responsibility. In SVR Skopje and the managing of the

23 SVR was carried through working collegia, and minutes were prepared from

24 the meetings of these collegia. If the prosecutor -- if the investigators

25 had tried to find these minutes of the collegia held at the SVR, they

1 would have found that Mr. Efremov insisted on independence and

2 responsibility in the work. These are the two sides of this.

3 As for what you mentioned, surely, there's a situation where a

4 certain employee is not sure about the manner in which he has to carry out

5 his work. Then it is natural that he undertake steps to ensure himself,

6 to consult with someone, and to carry out his work tasks in a normal way.

7 Q. And in a lawful way, right; or to carry out his tasks pursuant to

8 the law, right?

9 A. Yes, of law, by laws, and internal acts of the Ministry of

10 Interior.

11 Q. Now, if we just focus, please, on the telephone that

12 Mr. Krstevski, the head of OVR Cair, made to you on the late afternoon or

13 evening of the 10th of August asking your advice about whether he should

14 attend a meeting with members of the army, that telephone call came less

15 than 12 hours after eight Macedonian soldiers had been killed within the

16 territory of OVR Cair, right?

17 A. Most probably.

18 Q. And you're saying that, at the time, you could not understand the

19 point of Mr. Krstevski's phone call to you, seeking your advice?

20 A. Yes, because this is an experienced employee who knows well his

21 tasks and competencies.

22 Q. And this was an "extremely complex security situation," to use

23 your words, wasn't it?

24 A. Yes, it was.

25 Q. And, probably, even the most experienced employees of the Ministry

1 of Internal Affairs, in 2001, had never confronted situations as complex

2 as they had to address that summer, right?

3 A. Probably, this is so.

4 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I see the time. Would this be a

5 convenient moment?

6 JUDGE PARKER: Very well.

7 We adjourn now. We resume tomorrow at 9.00.

8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.29 p.m.,

9 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of

10 February, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.

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