1 Thursday, 31 July 2003

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Madam Registrar, good morning to you, could

6 you call the case, please?

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

8 IT-99-36-T, the Prosecutor versus Radoslav Brdjanin.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you, Madam.

10 Mr. Brdjanin, good morning to you. Can you follow the proceedings

11 in a language that you can understand?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning. I can follow in a

13 language I understand.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.

15 Appearances for the Prosecution?

16 MS. KORNER: Joanna Korner assisted by Denise Gustin case

17 manager. Good morning, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning to you and thank you.

19 Appearances for Radoslav Brdjanin?

20 MR. ACKERMAN: Good morning, Your Honours. I'm John Ackerman, I'm

21 with David Cunningham and Aleksandar Vujic and I'm about to sneeze.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Good morning to you.

23 Any preliminaries?

24 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, there are a couple of matters that I

25 want to talk with you about very briefly. The first is with regard -- we

1 need to go into private session for just a second.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's go into private session for a while.

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24 [Open session]

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman?

1 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, we were trying to work out a schedule

2 that would make it possible for to us do the things we need to do in Banja

3 Luka in preparation for the defence. And once we started putting it on

4 calendars and so forth, it became clear that we -- that it would make a

5 huge amount of sense, in fact almost necessary, that we be in Banja Luka

6 through the 8th of October, which would interfere with the scheduled

7 activities on the 3rd of October.

8 I just want to say that we are at your disposal and will

9 certainly -- at least one of us would certainly be here on that day if

10 necessary. It would involve, you know, a rather expensive round trip

11 travel from Banja Luka here and then back again; and if that's important,

12 then we'll do that. I was wondering, however, if it might make sense to

13 move that all until the 9th and do it then but whatever Your Honour

14 chooses we will of course accept. But I just wanted to point out that

15 that is kind of a problem in terms of trying to get the things done we

16 need to get done. Whatever you want to do is fine.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Korner, I don't know if you ever any

18 comments.

19 MS. KORNER: I don't particularly, save for this. We will be

20 asking for proper summaries of -- on the date that Your Honour has already

21 appointed, which I think is the end of September, for Mr. Ackerman to

22 complete.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: That's not going to change for sure.

24 MS. KORNER: No. Absolutely. I'm just hoping that Mr. Ackerman

25 and Mr. Cunningham's trip to Banja Luka doesn't mean to say that we are

1 going to be told that they don't know what witnesses they are calling at

2 the end of September nor can they tell us what these witnesses are going

3 to say. That's the only comment that I'd make if there is any plan to go

4 to Banja Luka in September.

5 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm pretty sure that we will have the summaries,

6 the identification material, with regard to about the same percentage of

7 witnesses that we will call that the Prosecution was able to provide us at

8 the beginning of their case. I think that's probably around 60 or 70 per

9 cent, and we will certainly be that far along.

10 MS. KORNER: Yes.

11 MR. ACKERMAN: No doubt we will add some witnesses as we go along,

12 just like they did but that's where we will be.

13 MS. KORNER: Yes, I don't --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Striving towards equality of arms.

15 MS. KORNER: In fact, this is the one time where it's not equality

16 of arms because the reason, as I think Your Honours and Mr. Ackerman know

17 that there were witnesses added in because witnesses suddenly, as it were,

18 came out of the wood work. Now, Mr. Ackerman has known all along what the

19 case is that he's got to meet and Mr. Brdjanin no doubt knows what

20 witnesses he wants to call. Your Honour, that's all I'm going to say at

21 the moment. I don't wants to anticipate that there is going to be a

22 problem about this.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. No, I don't think so. Let's not make a

24 causus belli out of it.

25 Mr. Ackerman, again, I find it difficult to understand how all of

1 a sudden it's only today that you realise that you need to be until the

2 8th of October in Banja Luka, when you knew all along, especially for the

3 last month and a half at least if not more that on the 3rd of October we

4 were scheduled to hand down the oral decision on the Rule 98 bis, so --

5 yes.

6 MR. ACKERMAN: I can explain that -- I can't explain it. I can

7 tell you how it happened. I'm not sure it's an explanation.

8 Mr. Cunningham and I have been talking for several days about we need to

9 sit down with a calendar and figure out our schedule between now and the

10 start of the case, and part of that has to be built around some other

11 things. We finally got around to doing that last night and that's when we

12 realised that this was a problem. So we should have done it long before

13 and it's a matter of negligence if nothing else on my part. And I admit

14 that, Your Honour. It should have been done much earlier.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm glad you admit it. However -- okay. We will

16 shift, Mr. Roberts, please you need to revise the draft scheduling order

17 that we agreed upon yesterday and move everything to the -- what's on the

18 3rd will be moved to the 9th, not, however, the deadline for the

19 submission of the lists of witnesses and all that. And 9th is now a firm

20 date. I don't want to be accused any further of almost bending backwards

21 to accommodate the Defence any further, Mr. Ackerman. So --

22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I can take it because Your Honour raised

23 yesterday - Mr. Ackerman wasn't in court - that the start date with

24 cross-examination of the two Prosecution experts remains as the 14th of

25 October?

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1 JUDGE AGIUS: I think so. I think so. And I would need to know

2 from Mr. Ackerman if he can tell us how long he expects to hold

3 Mr. Treanor and Mr. -- forgot his name now.

4 MS. KORNER: Brown.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Brown in cross.

6 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, my -- the schedule that we did last

7 night shows a -- the cross-examination of the two experts on the 14th,

8 15th, 16th and 17th and the first Defence witness on the 20th.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: So you need the full four days?

10 MS. KORNER: I think so.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, all right. Thank you. So anything further?

12 No? Let's bring the witness in. And try to finish with this witness

13 today, if possible.

14 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I've spoken to Mr. Ackerman. We think

15 it's possible. I'm not 100 per cent sure but it's possible.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: I will not stop either of you. It's definite. If

17 necessary we will continue tomorrow. But I think if we get over and done

18 with today, it's better so that we are left with whatever needs to be

19 thrashed tomorrow administratively in particular before we go into recess.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning to you, sir.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: And welcome to this Tribunal.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: If at any time you're not receiving interpretation

1 in your own language, please let me know. You are about to start giving

2 evidence in this trial against Radoslav Brdjanin, and I see that you have

3 been briefed already. You're required before you start giving evidence to

4 make a solemn declaration to the effect that you will be telling us the

5 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the course of your

6 testimony. The text you're holding in your hand, so please read it out

7 aloud and that will be your solemn undertaking with us.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

9 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10 WITNESS: MILORAD DODIK

11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Please take a chair. The procedure

13 here, sir, is quite a simple one and more or less identical to what you

14 find in domestic jurisdictions. You're going to first to be first

15 examined by the Prosecution. Ms. Korner will be directing some questions

16 to you. And she will then be followed by Mr. Ackerman, who is the

17 gentleman -- first gentleman to your left, who is the lead counsel for

18 Radoslav Brdjanin.

19 If at any time you are asked a question that you feel you should

20 be exempted from answering, either because it might expose you to some

21 criminal proceedings or denigrate you or whatever, please let me know, and

22 we will consider your objection and decide accordingly. Ms. Korner will

23 first go ahead with her questions.

24 Examined by Ms. Korner:

25 Q. Sir, good morning to you. Is your name Milorad Dodik?

1 A. Yes, my name is Milorad Dodik.

2 Q. Were you born on the 12th of March of 1959 in Laktasi?

3 A. Yes, but I was born in Banja Luka on that date, yes.

4 Q. All right. And I think you are by nationality a Serb?

5 A. Yes, a Serb.

6 Q. All right. Mr. Dodik, before I go into a little detail as to your

7 background, so it's clear, I think it's right that you have appeared at

8 this Tribunal once before, when you testified in the hearing relating to

9 the sentence of Mrs. Plavsic?

10 A. Yes. I was a witness for her defence.

11 Q. And on this occasion, you are appearing as a result of a summons

12 that was issued for you to appear in this trial. Is that right?

13 A. You mean during Mrs. Plavsic's trial?

14 Q. No, here, today.

15 A. Yes. I came in response to the summons issued to me and I

16 consider myself to be a person who is neither a witness for the Defence or

17 the Prosecution.

18 Q. All right. Can I ask you, please, a little bit about your

19 background. I think it's right that you became active in politics after

20 graduating from the school of political science in Belgrade, in about

21 1985?

22 A. Yes, precisely.

23 Q. And between 1985, up until the multi-party elections in 1990, were

24 you the president of -- described as local government, I don't know. Were

25 you the president of the assembly in the municipality of Laktasi?

1 A. I was president of the executive council, which may be considered

2 as a type of local government, yes.

3 Q. All right.

4 A. In the period from 1988 until 1990. Before that, I held important

5 positions locally in the community.

6 Q. Now, can you just tell us so the Court understands how far away is

7 Laktasi from Banja Luka?

8 A. About 15 kilometres away from the centre itself.

9 Q. And is the airport for Banja Luka actually in the municipality of

10 Laktasi?

11 A. Yes. Only a few kilometres away from the centre of Laktasi, say

12 about 4 kilometres.

13 Q. Now, in the 1990 multi-party elections, were you a member of the

14 alliance of reformist forces? It was a party formed for the whole of the

15 former Yugoslavia with its president being effectively the Prime Minister

16 of Yugoslavia, Mr. Markovic, Ante Markovic.

17 A. Yes, I was. I was a member of that party and I was a candidate on

18 the list of that party for the Banja Luka district, or rather, my name was

19 first on that list.

20 Q. And in fact, were you elected to the assembly of Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina as a member of that party?

22 A. Yes, I was. I was elected as member of parliament. The only

23 candidate for that region for that party.

24 Q. Now, can you just tell us briefly what was the political platform

25 of the alliance of reformist forces?

1 A. Yes, I can. This was a party that had as its main thrust the

2 preservation of Yugoslavia, engaging all factors in the former

3 Yugoslavia. It was a party that believed that only a peaceful solution

4 could avoid national rifts and conflicts. We all knew that they could

5 only lead to terrible destruction and loss of lives.

6 As you said, the president of that party was Mr. Ante Markovic. I

7 was a member of the republican board of that party for Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 and president of the regional board of that party for Krajina. As a

9 party, we supported the reformist course charted by the government of

10 Ante Markovic. We thought that it was necessary to find a compromise in

11 order to preserve Yugoslavia. At that time, a platform was proposed by

12 the federal government regarding the survival of Yugoslavia. That is to

13 say four or five functions were to remain common, inter alia the army,

14 foreign policy, a joint monetary policy and a few other segments.

15 However, one must bear in mind that at that time, especially before the

16 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Croatia, the party of Mr. Tudjman, the

17 HDZ, won the election. Mr. Milosevic was in power in Serbia, and when

18 national parties came to the fore, especially the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ

19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the atmosphere became such that it became obvious

20 that there would be a conflict but nobody knew what the intensity of this

21 conflict would be.

22 It should also be noted that the three parties after the elections

23 in 1990 set up a joint government in Bosnia-Herzegovina I'm talking about

24 the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ, and for a year --

25 Q. I'm going to come back to that. I just want to deal with your

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1 career and then we'll come back to the nationalist parties as a separate

2 topic.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. If we just go through your political career, thereafter, in

5 October of 1991, did you and other members of your party resign from the

6 party? That is the reformist alliance?

7 A. Yes. A number of the members of this party, together with the

8 then president, Mr. Kecmanovic, did so. We simply decided to go on

9 working as independent MPs for a simple reason. Already then -- I mean,

10 it should be noted that Mr. Ante Markovic had been dismissed at that time,

11 that the party was not functioning in the territory of the whole of

12 Yugoslavia, that in Bosnia-Herzegovina it became obvious that a number of

13 members of that party who were also MPs espoused the concept of the

14 disintegration of Yugoslavia and they supported the concept of an

15 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. I and that group of MPs disagreed with

16 that.

17 Q. Could you have a look, please, at a copy of the letter that you

18 and your fellow deputies sent, please?

19 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, this will be a new exhibit, P2456.

20 Q. It's an undated letter probably a copy, but we look at the

21 signatures, does it contain people who signed the letter, Dr. Kuzmanovic,

22 the president, Dr. Dragan Kalinic, yourself, Mr. Micic and Mr. Peric?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And --

25 A. I'm familiar with this letter. I remember this event, and I have

1 just explained the reasons why I agreed with this letter, though I didn't

2 sign it.

3 Q. All right. Then I don't think we need to take you through the

4 contents of the letter, thank you very much. Now, thereafter, as I say,

5 just to complete the -- your political career, did you continue to take

6 part in the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina even after the SDS deputies

7 left in October of 1991?

8 A. I think that it was not that the SDS left. They continued working

9 within the framework of the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina but what

10 happened in October or November was the formation of the Assembly of the

11 Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I must say that I attended that

12 meeting in Sarajevo at the time and I believed that under conditions of

13 complete national homogenisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one should

14 undertake to devise a policy for the Serbian national core which would

15 imply negotiating peaceful position and a peaceful settlement to any

16 potential conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so I attended that assembly

17 meeting of the Serbian people.

18 So it wasn't a formal abandoning of the Assembly of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It continued working until, I think, January or maybe

20 later, of 1992. Of course, many did leave the Assembly of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sometimes HDZ members walked out and then came back,

22 and the assembly looked more like a public meeting place at which members

23 of the coalition in Bosnia-Herzegovina presented their various views, all

24 designed towards complete national homogeneity of all three nations in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I must say that in those days, sometime around the

1 middle of 1991, armed conflicts had already flared up in Croatia and this

2 had a significant impact on what was happening in the assembly of Bosnia

3 and Herzegovina itself.

4 In fact, that was the event that was dominant in all discussions

5 in the assembly. On the one side were the SDA and the HDZ, which

6 supported the secession of Croatia, and on the other was the SDS that

7 wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain within Yugoslavia.

8 Q. All right. And that was what happened in the Assembly of Bosnia

9 and Herzegovina.

10 Q. All right. Can we just, as I say, very quickly try and finish off

11 your career -- I don't mean finish off your career in that sense, just

12 move through the evidence about it. Did you, in fact, attend the assembly

13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina until January of 1992?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. All right. Then in 1996, did you found your own political party?

16 A. I did.

17 Q. And can you just tell us, please, the name of your party.

18 A. The party's name was the party of Independent Social Democrats.

19 Q. And is that a party at the level of the Republika Srpska and also

20 what is now, what's called the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 A. The party has its representatives in Republika Srpska and in the

22 federation. It has elected deputies. We are now in the opposition in

23 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24 Q. And I think then there were elections held in 1997; is that right,

25 Mr. Dodik?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. When Mrs. Plavsic became the President of Republika Srpska and you

3 yourself were the Prime Minister?

4 A. No. Mrs. Plavsic at the elections of 1996, the first post-war

5 elections, became president, and in the course of 1997, in the summer, in

6 August, she disbanded the assembly and thereby enabled extraordinary

7 elections which took place, I think it was September or October 1997. And

8 at those elections, the SDS won a majority and a coalition government was

9 formed of which I became the president in Republika Srpska.

10 Q. For how long did you remain the president of the government?

11 A. From the 18th of January, 1998, until the 11th of January, 2000.

12 Q. And as you say, at present, your party is in opposition. But it

13 is is it right that very recently you've just been re-elected president of th

14 A. Yes. Maybe a month ago, just over a month ago, at a party

15 assembly meeting, I was re-elected president of the party, which is now

16 called the Association of Independent Social Democrats, because it has

17 been joined by several other parties that were in existence and were our

18 allies and now they have integrated with us to form one party.

19 Q. Now, I want to move, then, please to - as you began to tell us

20 about - the three nationalist parties as you've described them, that is

21 the SDS, the SDA, and the HDZ. Immediately after the 1990 elections, were

22 these parties cooperating together?

23 A. Yes. Even prior to the elections, there was visible cooperation,

24 that is, prior to the multi-party election, the SDA and the HDZ cooperated

25 openly. After the elections, those two parties together with the SDS

1 formed the first multi-party government in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

2 appointed their ministers in that government and they shared government at

3 the local level, that is, at the level of the municipalities of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina. While my party and some other smaller parties were then the

5 opposition and they were -- in other words, they were not in power.

6 Q. From your position as an independent or smaller party and then as

7 an independent, were you able to observe the functioning of these

8 particular parties during the period up until the conflict broke out in

9 1992 in Bosnia?

10 A. Yes. At the beginning, it looked like the bursts of democracy in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the leaders in power kept giving lip service to

12 democracy that had finally come into being. They started performing their

13 duties, as is normal in any state. And we all knew that, as well as those

14 in power, that Bosnia-Herzegovina was very fertile soil for influence

15 coming from the broader region, primarily the territory of the former

16 Yugoslavia. So that at the very beginning of the work of that government,

17 there was a lot of debate as to how it would continue to function. The

18 leaders and presidents of all the republics and then provinces in the

19 former Yugoslavia frequently changed places and discussed how things would

20 look. And they had meetings almost weekly in various places which created

21 a kind of psychosis among the people, especially in view of the fact that

22 it proved impossible for them to come to any kind of agreement.

23 The Slovenes clearly opted for separating from Yugoslavia.

24 Croatia, after the victory of the HDZ, also took a clear stand regarding

25 its wish to have an independent state, whereas beyond Milosevic's

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1 leadership insisted on the preservation of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina

2 because of its ethnic mix, the mix of three peoples, Serbs, Croats and

3 Muslims, later known as Bosniaks, normally was fertile soil for bringing

4 pressure to bear from all sides. So that it was impossible to adopt a

5 unified position as to what should be done next.

6 The representatives of the government, primarily Mr. Izetbegovic

7 who was president of the Presidency, said one thing but something quite

8 different was happening on the ground, and this could be felt with regard

9 to other leaders of national parties, that is, the SDS and the HDZ. This

10 applied to them too. And the crisis reached a climax when the parliament

11 was reviewing and taking a position on the decision of the Croatian

12 assembly in June 1991 for Croatia to separate from the former Yugoslavia.

13 On that occasion, a parliament session was held at which Mr. Izetbegovic

14 as a member of the Presidency took the floor and supported this decision

15 of the Croatian Sabor or assembly. It should be said that this was

16 supported by his party and the HDZ of Bosnia as well of course, and

17 representatives of the SDS and I personally I must say opposed such a

18 decision because we felt this only worsened the situation. And that

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina should have a position of its own on this matter rather

20 than joining either side. But it was quite clear that this was an event

21 in which the government formed after the multi-party elections definitely

22 split and went each side going its own way.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Korner, before we proceed, any time the

24 witness is going beyond what you need, you have my authority to stop him

25 and move to the next question.

1 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, thank you very much, but I just wanted

2 to let him finish.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

4 MS. KORNER: It's difficult.

5 Q. Mr. Dodik, all that I'm concerned about - I think you started to

6 tell us this already - was that the declaration of independence in Croatia

7 I think caused each of the parties to polarise. Is that a fair way of

8 putting it?

9 A. Yes. That was quite visible, as I have just described. After

10 that, it was very difficult to hold a parliament session at all.

11 Q. I want to move, please, then, to the events in the autumn of 1991.

12 But before doing that, were you aware in April of 1991 that something

13 called the Association of Bosnian Krajina Municipalities was formed?

14 A. I don't know the exact date, but I do know that such a community

15 was formed.

16 Q. All right. Can I just ask you to look, please, at a document

17 which is already an exhibit, P8. This is a decision on the municipality

18 of Laktasi joining the Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities, and it

19 was apparently held on the 11th of April, 1991. And do you identify the

20 stamp as the municipal assembly stamp from Laktasi?

21 A. Yes, yes, that is the stamp of that municipality.

22 Q. And is that also the signature of Mr. Jovic, who was the president

23 of the assembly?

24 A. To be quite frank, I don't know whether that is his signature, but

25 Mr. Jovic was the president of the assembly at the time. I'm just not

1 familiar with his signature.

2 Q. All right. Were you present when this decision was made by the

3 assembly to join this community of municipalities?

4 A. I do know that this happened but I don't remember being present.

5 Q. All right. Now, I want to come back in a moment to the purpose of

6 this organisation as you understood it, but that was April of 1991. Were

7 you aware in September of 1991 that the Autonomous Region of Krajina

8 assembly was created?

9 A. About that time, there were attempts to form such an assembly. I

10 do know -- I happened to be in Sarajevo at a parliament session and it was

11 clear that a number of delegates were absent from the Banja Luka region.

12 And we learnt that a meeting was being held in Grahovo. And I know that

13 Karadzic and the other members of the leadership were investing efforts

14 for the results of that meeting, either to be annulled or minimised,

15 because the -- it gave the impression that something bad was happening in

16 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 Q. All right. Well, let's take that in stages, if we may. First of

18 all, what did you understand was the purpose of forming this Bosnian

19 Krajina community of municipalities, which subsequently became the

20 assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina?

21 A. I have to say that I was not formally a member of that assembly.

22 I think that the decision about it, at least according to my

23 understanding, was influenced significantly by the war events in Croatia.

24 It should be noted that this area borders on Croatia and that in Croatia

25 at that time the conflict was already intensive between Croatia and the

1 local Serbs in the area. In such an atmosphere, one needed to distinguish

2 between what was happening in Banja Luka and Sarajevo. In Sarajevo this

3 conflict was not even felt, but in Banja Luka, which was very close to

4 those events, it was enveloped in an atmosphere which people felt, look in

5 Croatia, there is the problem of Serbs, and we need to organise here too.

6 And that is what could be intimated from the public reports. I really

7 can't go into the thoughts of the people who formed those bodies. I said

8 I wasn't a member. But I think that what was decisive for this was the

9 war going on in Croatia at great intensity at the time.

10 Q. That may have been the motive but what was the purpose of the

11 foundation of the -- first of all, the community of municipalities, which

12 was formed before the war in Croatia broke out?

13 A. It should be noted that even before the formation of that

14 community, there was a regional association of municipalities of Bosnian

15 Krajina. This association didn't have any prerogatives of power but it

16 was rather designed to coordinate certain activities and develop joint

17 projects so that region had been defined as such earlier on. Now, what

18 could have been the reasons for forming the community of municipalities, I

19 would say those were the coordination of activities to prevent any

20 potential escalation of the war and its spreading from the territory of

21 Croatia, and thereby to homogenise local communities so that the Serbs

22 could be assisted who were engaged in conflict in Croatia itself.

23 Q. I'm sorry, this was -- you say -- to assist the Serbs in -- who

24 were in the conflicts in Croatia itself. Was this organisation a Serbian

25 organisation?

1 A. It covered municipalities in which the Serbs constituted the

2 majority as a rule. Of course there were representatives of other

3 peoples. I don't think that the main intention was to provide any kind of

4 military assistance. I know that humanitarian aid was being organised for

5 Serbs in the area. At least to the best of my knowledge, because I said,

6 as I said, I was far from the structures of government. So the main forms

7 of assistance at the time was humanitarian.

8 Q. All right. Were you in favour of the -- your municipality,

9 Laktasi, joining this community?

10 A. As you can see from this document, the municipal assembly did take

11 a decision for the municipality to join. It should be noted that the SDS

12 was in power in that municipality, they had absolute authority. We were

13 in the Alliance of Reform Forces, the party I belonged to at the time, we

14 believed that any move in that direction would further complicate the

15 situation and our official position was that that was not necessary at

16 that point in time.

17 Q. And why did you believe that any move in that direction would

18 further complicate the situation? What did you think was going to happen

19 as a result of this community of municipalities?

20 A. In Bosnia and Herzegovina at least one needs to view things in

21 their entirety. Behind the political parties were movements designed to

22 homogenise. Within the SDA, a Patriotic League had already been formed

23 which had -- which rallied Muslims as a rule, which were preparing for an

24 armed conflict or what they described as the defence of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas on the other hand within the Serbian national

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1 body or core, so-called autonomous regions were being formed in areas

2 which were predominantly populated by Serbs. And that means Krajina,

3 Semberija, Romanija, Herzegovina.

4 Our position was that no political territorial organisations in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be formed unilaterally but that they should be

6 the result of political negotiation and agreement and that only after that

7 should Bosnia-Herzegovina be finally constituted on the basis of

8 agreement. So that we felt that any unilateral actions by various parties

9 in Bosnia-Herzegovina further complicated things and moved us away from

10 favourable results. On the other hand, the HDZ extended full support to

11 the government in Croatia.

12 Q. Yes. At the moment, sir, you may be asked questions about that

13 but I'm just interested in why you didn't think it was a good idea for the

14 Serbs to -- or Laktasi to join the community of municipalities. What did

15 you think was the problem?

16 A. I think I've already said, not just Laktasi, the formation of such

17 an entity was an act that further complicated the situation in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than contributing to a settlement. That was my

19 general position, and it didn't apply only to Laktasi municipality.

20 Q. All right. Could you look, please, then, at an interview that you

21 gave about this in April of 1991, published in Glas?

22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, again this is a new exhibit. Which will

23 become 2457.

24 Q. Do you recall giving this press conference after the Laktasi

25 municipality decided to join this community of associations?

1 A. Yes, I do remember. I remember that press conference.

2 Q. And did you give your reasons for why you did not approve of the

3 decision which had been taken?

4 A. Yes, as is stated here.

5 Q. All right. Thank you.

6 Now, can we just continue this topic, please, of regionalisation?

7 Were you present at the second session of the Assembly of the Serbian

8 People of Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Sarajevo on the 21st of November,

9 1991?

10 A. Yes, I was present. That assembly was operating but also the

11 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina was still functioning.

12 Q. All right. So were you attending both assemblies then at that

13 stage?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. All right. I want you to have for a moment the minutes of that

16 session, which is P17. Was it at this session that the results of the

17 plebiscite of the Serbian people, which had been held, was announced?

18 A. Yes, as can be seen from the agenda.

19 Q. And I want you to have a look, please, at the speech or part of

20 the speech made by Mr. Krajisnik as president of the assembly. I'm not

21 sure where you're going to find this in the B/C/S but our page 10 of the

22 English translation, where he said, "We have a duty to determine the

23 function of regions and autonomous districts with view to preserving the

24 unity of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why we should

25 not allow regions to become independent entities separate from the rest of

1 the Serbian people. It is essential that the Serbian people organise

2 themselves into one legal and state entity. One common state with all the

3 other peoples who want to build a happier future with us." And so on.

4 Did you understand that this was SDS policy that all Serbs were to

5 live in one state, before even this speech of Mr. Krajisnik?

6 A. I have to say that before that plebiscite of the Serbian people in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were plebiscites of the Muslim and/or Bosniak

8 and Croatian people several months before that and the atmosphere was

9 gaining in intensity and I knew that at the time the leadership of SDS was

10 not against Bosnia-Herzegovina but was for an agreement in which Bosnia

11 and Herzegovina would fully protect national communities, and I know that

12 the proposal was to introduce a chamber of peoples in the assembly of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that at the time, the dominant idea was that

14 everything was being done, at least that was my understanding, should

15 remain within the framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with the right

16 and possibility to protect in this case the Serbian people in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 At that very same time and even months before this and months

19 after this, there was visible homogenisation along the same principles of

20 both the Muslim and Croatian peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I can

21 confirm that I did attend this assembly and I do remember this speech by

22 Mr. Krajisnik.

23 Q. Was this speech by Mr. Krajisnik a surprise to you, in other words

24 that he was saying that the -- it was essential that the Serbian people

25 organise themselves into one legal and state entity? Or was that

1 something that you realised the SDS wanted to happen?

2 A. I must say that this did not come as much of a surprise, because

3 practically everybody spoke the same way and in the same terms. In those

4 days and months, this is absolutely the language that was being used. I

5 could hear this coming from other quarters as well. So I have to confirm

6 what I was confident of then and am today, that the leading party of the

7 Serb people, the SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina, believed in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it should be preserved and that the Serb people

9 should enjoy equal rights within Bosnia-Herzegovina and that

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain within Yugoslavia. That is how I

11 understood the policy of that party.

12 Q. All right. So you understood the words all Serbs should live in

13 one legal and state entity to mean that it should enjoy equal rights

14 within Bosnia-Herzegovina? That's what you're telling us, is it,

15 Mr. Dodik? Is that right?

16 A. Well, it can be interpreted that way.

17 Q. Is that the way you interpreted it at the time?

18 A. I can repeat what I said, but --

19 Q. I want to know whether you interpreted it in that way? It's a

20 simple yes or no, please. Otherwise you'll be here for much longer. Is

21 that the way you interpreted it?

22 A. It was not my understanding that a particular people, ethnic

23 group, could have exclusive rights in one territory but I did think that

24 collective efforts had to be made in order to seek a peaceful solution to

25 the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least that was my understanding.

1 Q. I'm sorry, I'll ask you one more time because it's not an answer

2 to my question. Did you understand Mr. Krajisnik, when he uttered those

3 words, to be saying that this was a Serb state remaining within Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina? Or did you understand it to mean that they -- the SDS were

5 looking to set up a separate state?

6 A. No. A certain collectivity within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Q. All right. I'll leave that. Now, did you also hear, and this is

8 at our page 29 of the assembly, the translation of the meeting, the

9 decision on the verification of the proclaimed Serbian autonomous regions

10 in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Where they verified the Autonomous Region of

11 Krajina, made up of municipalities that they listed there, and then the

12 other autonomous regions? Now, what did you understand was the purpose of

13 setting up Serbian autonomous regions within Bosnia and Herzegovina?

14 A. Well, I can't remember what I thought at that point in time but at

15 any rate the impression was that bearing in mind all round events and

16 developments, that this was a normal thing, at least that's the way it was

17 presented at the time, that within the territory where the Serbs were

18 majority population, some autonomous regions should be organised that

19 would have the task to coordinate activities. In the field of defence and

20 in the field of coordinating overall life in those territories.

21 Q. All right. Was this something, as you understood it from your

22 knowledge and your discussions with people at the assembly, something that

23 was part of a plan or something that was purely spontaneous?

24 A. Well, I think that first forms of such organisation were

25 spontaneous and then as you can see through this decision that was

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1 verified by the assembly, this indeed did assume an official nature and it

2 was verified in such a way, these regions were.

3 Q. All right. Now, can we move, then, please, to the SDS itself as a

4 party? Accepting that you weren't a member of the party, did you become

5 familiar with the hierarchy of the party and the people who were in

6 positions within that party?

7 A. Yes. This was generally known, who had which role within the SDS.

8 Q. All right. Now, within the party hierarchy, was the leadership --

9 Dr. Karadzic as president of the party, at the top levels of the party,

10 through its main board? Was the party controlled from the top?

11 A. Yes, absolutely. Mr. Karadzic was president of that party, which

12 had its main board.

13 Q. Now, if the main board issued instructions, were the municipal

14 boards and the regional boards obliged to carry out those instructions?

15 A. Yes. That was quite clear. This was a firmly organised political

16 party with clear-cut hierarchy and superior -- superiority.

17 Q. So if the main board issued instructions to the regional board,

18 were the regional board obliged to carry out those instructions?

19 A. Yes. I think that this happened as a rule.

20 Q. If the regional board - I'll come on to the later organisations in

21 a moment - issued instructions to the municipal boards, were those

22 instructions binding on the municipal boards?

23 A. Well, it can be put that way.

24 Q. I'm asking you -- sorry, Mr. Dodik, I'm asking you.

25 A. Yes. I think that's the way it was. The regional boards had a

1 coordinating role, and I think that policies were agreed at that level,

2 and this constituted a type of obligation and task for the lower levels in

3 the municipality.

4 Q. Now, we've spoken about the community of municipalities and then

5 the Autonomous Region of Krajina and the assembly. You were not a member

6 of that assembly, I think you've already told us. What sort of authority

7 did that regional assembly have in respect of the municipal assemblies of

8 the various municipalities that made up the autonomous region?

9 A. The assembly and the executive organ that was formed later,

10 regulated all of life, political, economic, cultural, all segments of

11 life. Decisions were passed and these decisions were observed by the

12 municipalities that were members of these regional communities. It should

13 be said that at that time it was quite obvious that there was total

14 disorganisation in terms of the functioning of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina

15 and even some decisions related to the fiscal system were passed at the

16 level of these regional communities.

17 Q. How strong was the control and discipline that was exercised by

18 the SDS over these bodies where they were the controlling party?

19 A. I think that this party was internally highly homogenised and it

20 functioned in a highly disciplined fashion.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters's note: Could the witness kindly be

22 asked to speak up.

23 MS. KORNER:

24 Q. Sir, you've been asked if you could talk a little louder. I think

25 if we can pull the microphone a little closer, perhaps.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, usher, please.

2 MS. KORNER:

3 Q. What happened to members of the SDS who didn't agree with some of

4 the decisions that were being made?

5 A. Well, I think that they were minimised then, and that they turned

6 passive.

7 Q. If someone made those -- his disagreement public by giving an

8 interview or something like that, what would happen?

9 A. It's important to refer to the exact period that is meant because

10 even days counted in this respect. In 1991, until, say, April, 1992,

11 absolutely people could express different views regarding certain matters,

12 and as you could see, different political parties had their press

13 conferences. After the conflict broke out in April in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

14 divergent views did not merit media attention. The media only espoused

15 official views. If somebody would come out with a position that was

16 different from that of the ruling SDS then very often -- very easily they

17 could be proclaimed a traitor. I'm talking about the time when the

18 conflict had already broken out, so they could either be proclaimed

19 traitors or somebody who was anational, unnational.

20 Q. All right. If we just for a moment -- and I won't ask you to look

21 at it, sir, but Mr. Krajisnik in the same assembly speech that he was

22 making, said this: "On our way --"

23 MS. KORNER: This is page 12, Your Honours, of the translation.

24 Q. "On our way to achieving the goals of the Serbian people, we

25 accept all friends, we accept everybody except traitors and opponents.

1 Traitors and outcasts are the most difficult opponents. We would like to

2 send the following message to all those who falter or are neutral, weak,

3 or misguided and who do not feel like traitors. Today you still have

4 time. Tomorrow will be too late."

5 In your view, from your knowledge, was that a sentiment that was

6 typical of the way the SDS dealt with what they considered traitors or

7 outcasts?

8 A. Krajisnik was a highly placed member of the SDS and he was

9 president of the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the

10 parliament of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His public speeches,

11 as a rule, were interpreted as the official stands of the party he

12 belonged to.

13 Q. All right. Thank you. Yes, you can take that document back. And

14 I want to move now, please, to the events in 1992. And if we could have a

15 look, please, at an article published or an interview published with

16 Krajisnik and Brdjanin at the time of the Lisbon talks. It's Exhibit

17 P117.

18 Now, this was an interview apparently with Krajisnik as president

19 of the Serbian an assembly and Brdjanin, then the vice-president of the

20 assembly of the autonomous region and if you go to the question, "Are

21 there differences between the republican and the Krajina SDS leaderships

22 relative to that agreement?" Which is on the second page of the

23 translation, and Brdjanin gave a reply in which he said: "For the people

24 of Krajina, there exists but one option. The Serbian Republic of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina should grow out of two cantons, the first comprising

1 the Krajina, Northern Bosnia, and Semberija, and the second Eastern

2 Herzegovina and so on. We stand behind the SDS and the ministerial

3 council of the Serbian assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Sarajevo cannot

4 be the centre of that republic, only Serbian Banja Luka."

5 I want to deal later with what you know about Brdjanin and the

6 other people. But at this stage, were you aware of ideas expressed by

7 Brdjanin and others that the centre of what was the proposed Serbian

8 republic should be in Banja Luka?

9 A. I don't remember this interview, because already then it was

10 difficult to obtain such newspapers that followed developments but from

11 the very outset, when this political, territorial organisation was

12 established of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a clash so

13 to speak between -- regarding the centre, where it should be. Karadzic

14 and his people thought that it should be Pale, and people from Krajina

15 thought that Banja Luka should be the centre. Banja Luka was the biggest

16 city and it had the infrastructure required for such an exercise. When I

17 became Prime Minister, I transferred the seat of government from Pale to

18 Banja Luka.

19 Q. All right. He goes on to say a little later - and it's your

20 knowledge I'm concerned about, not whether you read this article at the

21 time - that the assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina had voted,

22 all had voted against the agreement and that if the Serbian assembly of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina does not accommodate our requests by then, we shall

24 proclaim the Serbian Republic of Krajina. And then it goes on and

25 Krajisnik joins in. And again, he states that, in the next paragraph,

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1 that there are certain groups who do not belong to the SDS who are holding

2 even positions contrary to global SDS policy and the interests of the

3 Bosnian Krajina, not under control of the SDS. While their activity

4 cannot be underrated, it cannot be called traitorous.

5 At that stage, as you have told us, or there was a struggle

6 between Karadzic and the people in Krajina as to where the centre should

7 be. In the end, as we know, the centre was in Pale. If Krajisnik and

8 Brdjanin had held out for the centre to be in Banja Luka, from what you

9 know of the SDS, would they have remained in the positions that they later

10 held?

11 A. Well, I think, I assume, no, because the top leadership of SDS,

12 headed by Karadzic, was at that time the uncontested leadership.

13 Q. Now, can we then move, please?

14 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, I'm going to do, I know it's a

15 little early but I'm going to do a series of events in Banja Luka as a

16 group so it may be appropriate to take the break at this stage.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Ms. Korner, we will have a break of 25

18 minutes starting from now. Thank you.

19 --- Recess taken at 10.24 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. One moment, Ms. Korner.

22 MS. KORNER:

23 Q. Sir, I want to move, please, to the events in 1992. In 1992, were

24 you mobilised?

25 A. Yes, I was.

1 Q. You were still a deputy at the time; is that right?

2 A. Yes, I was a deputy.

3 Q. Was that unusual for someone in your position to be mobilised?

4 A. There were certain decisions that deputies have their own

5 mobilisation assignment within the parliament, so at least that was my

6 understanding. It was unusual for members of parliament to be mobilised.

7 Q. Do you know why you were mobilised?

8 A. I was a reserve officer of the former Yugoslav People's Army and

9 the local authorities consisting of representatives of the SDS in my place

10 of residence mobilised me, in my understanding, because I wasn't a member

11 of their structure, their group, their party.

12 Q. Was that something that the SDS could use as a lever? In other

13 words, that if someone didn't agree with their policies, or presented a

14 problem to them, they could be mobilised?

15 A. There was a general mobilisation by then, and people who had a

16 public role were perhaps mobilised for those reasons.

17 Q. I want to deal with what happened during the time you were

18 mobilised. Were you at Laktasi airport, as part of your tasks when

19 mobilised?

20 A. Yes. I was at the Banja Luka airport in Laktasi, yes.

21 Q. Sorry, yes, you're quite right. And into what sort of unit had

22 you been mobilised?

23 A. I was in a police unit, which had duties with respect to the

24 security of the airport.

25 Q. Do you remember, at the beginning of April of 1992, the arrival of

1 a group that went by the name of the SOS, the Serbian Defence Forces?

2 A. Yes, I do remember. They arrived at the airport and there was an

3 air corridor provided from the Banja Luka airport for the transportation

4 of men to Belgrade. They were there for one day, maybe a little longer,

5 and they took over control of that transportation.

6 Q. The people who were trying to leave, to go to Belgrade, what

7 nationality were they, in the main?

8 A. There were members of all nationalities. It should be noted that

9 there was no land connection with Belgrade or that is Serbia, or with

10 Croatia for that matter, and that the only way was to go by air. Quite a

11 number of people fearing events that they saw as being tragic used this

12 possibility to go towards Belgrade, and then from there possibly to

13 Europe. There were Serbs, Croats and Muslims, but in the main, they were

14 Muslims and Croats.

15 Q. Now, when the SOS arrived at the airport, what instructions were

16 you given as to how you should treat the SOS?

17 A. Members of the military police unit, which I was a member, were

18 withdrawn to the barracks and the actual area used for the control and

19 movement of these people while boarding planes to go to Belgrade, this

20 area was under the control of those SOS forces but this didn't last long.

21 Q. As far as you understood it, was this SOS force approved by the

22 authorities?

23 A. They arrived unannounced, at least as far as I was concerned. It

24 was a surprise for me. I do know that the airport command probably with

25 their leaders had discussions and after a couple of hours, things were

1 brought back to normal, at least that is the very next day. I hadn't had

2 any information up until then of the existence of such forces.

3 Q. No, but if a -- first of all I should ask you: Were these people

4 armed?

5 A. Yes, they were armed.

6 Q. Were they in uniform of some kind?

7 A. The men at the airport were wearing uniforms, with hats on their

8 heads.

9 Q. And do you remember what colour the hats were?

10 A. The same colour as their uniform, camouflage, military camouflage.

11 Q. All right. These men were not part of the JNA, were they? They

12 weren't regular army?

13 A. That is how I saw them, but I really don't know whether formally

14 they were or not but it was my impression that they were not.

15 Q. Were they members of the police? Military or civilian?

16 A. I can't confirm that because I really don't know, but I think, at

17 least during their stay at the airport, they appeared to be acting

18 independently.

19 Q. All right. Now, if an armed group of men arrived at the airport,

20 would you expect that you would receive orders that they were to be

21 prevented from taking over the airport?

22 A. I think that would be a normal order to expect.

23 Q. Were you ever given any such order?

24 A. No.

25 Q. I want you to look, please, at some articles or one in particular,

1 I think will be sufficient, that deals with the SOS arrival in Banja Luka.

2 That is, please, Exhibit P137. Now, I know you've had a chance to look at

3 this before. Do you know whether or not you saw it at the time?

4 A. Yes, I did.

5 Q. The demands that were being made by the SOS, in particular that

6 people should be dismissed who were not, as it was put, I think, loyal to

7 the Serbian republic and that a Crisis Staff should be set up, when you

8 heard about this, did you form any view as to whether or not these people

9 had any connection with the SDS in Banja Luka, or elsewhere?

10 A. It is rather hard for me to remember the thoughts I had at the

11 time, but in any event, it seemed to me to be something that was resolved

12 quickly, the situation caused by these forces was quickly addressed by

13 official authorities. Now, whether this was in direct agreement with the

14 SDS, I can only make assumptions about that. The situation was highly

15 fluid, volatile, already, so I can only make an assumption and say that it

16 is possible that there was some sort of coordination but I really can't

17 confirm that.

18 Q. I don't want you to make assumptions, please, sir. Let's look at

19 your own experience from when you were in government and as a member of

20 the assembly originally. If an armed group had arrived in Banja Luka and

21 demanded, first of all, that the lawful government should set up a Crisis

22 Staff, is that something in your experience that you would have agreed to

23 do?

24 A. Of course I wouldn't have been in the government at that time.

25 Again, I can only make an assumption. I think that the appearance of

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1 men under arms in any town is a traumatic event and everything depended on

2 their demands. I would consider whether I wanted to talk to them at all,

3 whether I wanted to accept it or not, but I can only say once again that I

4 do remember that those demands that same day that they were made, were in

5 a sense accepted and acknowledged by those in power at the time in the

6 municipal assembly of Banja Luka.

7 Q. I know that, sir. And that's what I'm asking you. I appreciate

8 you weren't in power at the time but I'm asking you whether, in your

9 experience, without further ado, if an armed band of men came into town

10 and made a series of demands, which affected government, would you have

11 accepted those demands should be met without any attempt to get rid of

12 this particular group?

13 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I'm going to object to that. That

14 question calls for pure speculation. Guessing, to make assumptions, and

15 everything else.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: No. Objection overruled, Mr. Ackerman. It's a very

17 relevant question.

18 Please proceed, Ms. Korner.

19 And, Witness, please answer the question. It's being put to you

20 that you are fully aware of what the political situation was then. All

21 you're being asked to consider is had you been in the place where the

22 government was at the time, or other members were in government at the

23 time, how would you have acted? It's not speculation. It's looking back.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can say the

25 following: I could have been in power then but I didn't want to be

1 because of that situation. And probably hypothetically let me say, if I

2 had been in organs of government, I certainly wouldn't have lightly

3 accepted any groups to appear outside the system of armed forces and I

4 would have taken certain steps. So it is a hypothetical question and a

5 hypothetical answer.

6 MS. KORNER:

7 Q. All right. Dealing with the hypothetical, what steps would you

8 have taken?

9 A. I would have engaged the lawful police units and prevented the

10 movement of those forces.

11 Q. Thank you. All right. Now, that was the first establishment of a

12 Crisis Staff in Banja Luka; do you agree with that? Or official

13 establishment?

14 A. The period after that was one when the Crisis Staff was formed.

15 Q. All right. Now, one of the people who was put on to this Crisis

16 Staff was a man named Nenad Stevandic. And in the article I think he is

17 quoted, yes, if we look under SOS demands accepted in the translation,

18 which is on the third page, and then go over to page 4, "the Crisis Staff

19 concluded that the Presidency of the Socialist Serbian Republic," I think

20 probably, not sure which, "should be informed of these demands by Nenad

21 Stevandic, the head of the Serbian Sokol society for the Krajina

22 district." Did you know Stevandic?

23 A. I heard of him. I didn't know him at the time. I met him later.

24 Q. All right. Do you know whether or not he had any connection with

25 this group of people calling themselves the SOS?

1 A. I can't be precise about it but I think he was within that

2 structure.

3 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me. Just a moment. Your Honour, the --

4 unless it's a bad translation, the exhibit that I'm looking at says that:

5 "the Crisis Staff concluded that the presidency of the SFRY should be

6 informed," and that's not what appears in the transcript. It's -- the

7 transcript says something like Socialist Serbian Republic and SFRY is

8 Yugoslavia the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. So I don't know

9 what the confusion is.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: The two are different definitely.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Ms. Korner.

12 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry. For a moment I hesitate because I wasn't

13 sure whether it was meant to be that or the Serbian republic, but that's

14 right. I agree with Mr. Ackerman.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So point taken, Mr. Ackerman.

16 MS. KORNER: Yeah.

17 Q. All right. Now, thank you. That's all I want to ask you about

18 the SOS. I want to move, then, please, to the 12th of May assembly. Did

19 you attend that assembly?

20 A. Yes, in Banja Luka.

21 Q. All right. Could you have, please, Exhibit P50? I want to ask

22 you a couple of questions about things that were said there. I'd like you

23 to look, please, if you can find it in the speech of Mr. Krajisnik -- I'm

24 sorry, Dr. Karadzic, it's our page 13, where he set out the six strategic

25 goals or he set out the strategic goals, which happened to be six. It's

1 at page 13 of the translation.

2 Do you remember him mentioning that these were the goals of the

3 Serbian people?

4 A. I do remember. I remember that this was discussed at the time,

5 that those aims were presented for the first time then.

6 Q. Why --

7 A. By Karadzic, I'm sorry, by Karadzic.

8 Q. All right. The first goal was: "separation from those who are

9 our enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially in this

10 century to attack us and who would continue with these practices if we

11 were to continue to stay together in the same state."

12 Listening to that, who did you understand Dr. Karadzic meant by

13 the "enemies"?

14 A. The enemy forces were already distinguishable. On the one side,

15 there were groups linked to the Serb people, and on the other side were

16 the Bosniak and Croat peoples.

17 Q. Now, I want then to move, please, to the speech that was made by

18 Dragan Kalinic if you could find that. It's at our page 22 in the

19 translation. Mr. Kalinic said in the second paragraph: "Have we chosen

20 the option of war or the option of negotiation? I say this with a reason.

21 And I must instantly add that knowing who our enemies are, how perfidious,

22 they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are physically, militarily

23 destroyed and crushed, which of course implies eliminating and liquidating

24 their key people." First of all, was that the same Mr. Kalinic who had

25 resigned with you from the Reformist Party?

1 A. Yes, it's the same man, but if I may, I would comment on the first

2 paragraph. Mr. Kalinic says that he's speaking on behalf of an

3 independent group of deputies and I deny that, because it wasn't on behalf

4 of an independent group of deputies because it hadn't been formed at the

5 time. So he may have been speaking in his own name and in the name of a

6 certain number of other people, but certainly not in my name.

7 Q. Now, that's what I was going to ask you. As you say, he said that

8 he was speaking on behalf of the independents and you were one of them.

9 Were these sentiments, Mr. Dodik, something that you had expected him to

10 say?

11 A. That point in time, I certainly didn't expect him to speak on

12 behalf of this independent group of deputies, but I must say that it was a

13 highly inspired speech, and it was quite well received by the other

14 deputies in the assembly.

15 Q. You see, he was saying that he wanted the enemies physically and

16 militarily destroyed and crushed and that of course meant eliminating and

17 liquidating their key people. Were those sentiments that you expected him

18 to express?

19 A. No. He said that, not I, and I do remember that moment. I didn't

20 expect such an approach.

21 Q. Now, we then -- I'm sorry, final question on that. What happened

22 to Mr. Kalinic politically, that is?

23 A. He shortly after that became a member of government or maybe he

24 already was a member, as Minister of Health. After the war, he became

25 president of the SDS and today he's president of parliament of Republika

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1 Srpska and president of that party.

2 Q. Now, if we then move on, please, in there to the speech made by

3 Mr. Brdjanin, and this is page 29 of our translation, if you can find it

4 in the original, Mr. Brdjanin, right at the beginning of his speech,

5 effectively says this: "I would like to say a heartfelt bravo to

6 Mr. Kalinic. In all my appearances in this joint assembly, it has never

7 crossed my mind that although he seems quiet, while I seem hawkish, his

8 opinions are the closest to mine." Can we move, please, to your knowledge

9 of Mr. Brdjanin? When did you first get to know him?

10 A. When we were elected together to the parliament of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as Members of Parliament.

12 Q. In, first of all, his public speeches, how did his views strike

13 you?

14 A. He took part in parliamentary debates often. I've already said

15 that at first there were three parties that formed the government, the

16 SDA, the SDS and the HDZ, and the MPs always spoke in defence of that

17 government. Later on, various things happened and only political issues

18 were dealt with by the assembly. A large number of people took part in

19 this, including Mr. Brdjanin.

20 Q. Yes. What were his speeches like? Were they quiet, restrained,

21 conservative? Were they extreme, noisy, aggressive? How would you

22 describe them?

23 A. Well, it depended on the atmosphere in the assembly. If the

24 assembly atmosphere was tolerant, then the speech would be quiet, and if

25 it was heated, then practically everybody, including Mr. Brdjanin,

1 introduced a certain dose of rhetoric, very pronounced rhetoric.

2 Q. Were you able to gauge from his public attitude, from what he said

3 in public, what his view of non-Serbs remaining in a Serbian state was?

4 A. Again, I have to set the exact time frame. These three

5 nationalist parties, the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ, formed joint local

6 government in Banja Luka. I know that the HDZ gave the vice-president of

7 the government in Banja Luka. So at that time, there was a dose of

8 tolerance that was portrayed to the public on the part of these

9 structures.

10 However, when the conflict broke out and when the problems became

11 obvious, then people from the SDS promoted the policy of resolving

12 problems in a way which can be seen from these documents. But I also have

13 to say that at that time, the media included the entire territory of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and when somebody spoke in Banja Luka on one day it was

15 impossible to distinguish it from what was said in Sarajevo and elsewhere,

16 because at that time all speeches were rather emotional and they were

17 aimed at mobilisation and homogenisation.

18 Q. All right. You drifted rather from the actual question I asked,

19 which was what were Mr. Brdjanin's attitudes, and let's take it in 1991,

20 first of all, to non-Serbs remaining in a Serbian state, between October

21 and December of 1991?

22 A. I cannot say with certainty, in such terms of time, but I think

23 that then there was not a policy of full intolerance yet.

24 Q. When --

25 A. In 1991, I mean.

1 Q. All right. When, in your view, did the policy of full intolerance

2 as you've described it, come into effect?

3 A. After -- I mean I've already said that June of 1991 is an

4 important point in time, when Mr. Izetbegovic spoke of the right of

5 Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia and that is when the parties that were

6 in power started diverging significantly. However, the parliament of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina actually broke up in January or perhaps in the

8 beginning of February, 1992. I think that after that, there weren't any

9 sessions of parliament any more, at least not with all the MPs present. I

10 was not present either. And after -- after the 6th of April, in essence

11 there was a state of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So due to everything that

12 was going on at the time, there was increasing national ethnic intolerance

13 coming from all quarters.

14 Q. We are dealing with Banja Luka, please. When do you say in

15 Banja Luka --

16 A. Well, it's impossible to talk about Banja Luka if you don't bear

17 in mind the overall context of events.

18 Q. Whether that in your view that's right or wrong, I am just asking

19 you about Banja Luka. When did the policy of full intolerance, as you

20 have described it, come into effect?

21 A. It reflected the overall atmosphere and I've already said, after

22 the well known decision made on the 6th of April, when certain structures

23 of the international community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

24 political representatives of an entire people did not agree to that. I

25 have to be very specific; this term, "full intolerance," is something that

1 perhaps never came to life in Banja Luka. There were certain things that

2 happened but it is a well-known fact that in Banja Luka, practically all

3 the time there were Bosniaks and Croats, a number of them, who went on

4 living there throughout. However, problems were considerably on the rise

5 after the 6th of April.

6 Q. All right. Regionalisation as a concept, we know was discussed in

7 various meetings of the assemblies up until 1992. Did you find out what

8 Mr. Brdjanin's view was in respect of regionalisation?

9 A. Well, Mr. Brdjanin was an active participant in this process, and

10 I think that later he was one of the more important people amongst the

11 leadership.

12 Q. And at what stage was that?

13 A. Well, I can't place it exactly, this particular event of

14 establishing the leadership, but from the very outset, when regional

15 organs of government were established in Krajina.

16 Q. Now, I want you to look, please, next, at a list of the regional

17 Crisis Staff in Banja Luka, which is Exhibit P168. This is the decision

18 dated the 5th of May, so a week or so before the assembly meeting,

19 appointing the -- what's described as the war staff of the autonomous

20 region with Radoslav Brdjanin as president and then vice-president

21 Lieutenant Colonel Sajic and various other people. Now, Kupresanin was a

22 mere member of the Crisis Staff, the regional Crisis Staff, but had been,

23 had he not, the president of the regional assembly? Is that right? Were

24 you aware of that?

25 A. I think so, yes.

1 Q. Now, did you know Kupresanin?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. We know from other evidence that the formation of these Crisis

4 Staffs from the assemblies should have had the president of the assembly

5 as president of the Crisis Staff. Do you know why Brdjanin became

6 president instead of Kupresanin?

7 A. I don't know.

8 Q. You knew both men. Is there anything in the character of either

9 or both men that provides, in your view, an explanation?

10 A. They were prominent people at that point in time. I really cannot

11 assess why this happened, why Mr. Brdjanin was president rather than

12 Mr. Kupresanin.

13 Q. All right. Now, you've told us that the regional assembly,

14 because of the hierarchies established within the SDS, had power over the

15 municipal assemblies. Did the regional Crisis Staff, when it was set up,

16 have the same powers as the assembly?

17 A. I think so.

18 Q. As president of the Crisis Staff, did Brdjanin have power?

19 A. I really am not aware of formal powers, but I believe that as

20 president, he had the right to run that Crisis Staff and that he

21 represented it in public.

22 Q. Was the function of the president that he, however decisions were

23 taken within the Crisis Staff, that he had to sign decisions before they

24 could be enacted? Was that an important function?

25 A. I think that the basic duty of the president is to sign the

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1 documents of the organ that he or she heads, that is to say decisions that

2 are adopted at sessions of that body.

3 Q. Now, you knew also, I think, well, perhaps, looking at the list,

4 did you know all of these people or were there any that you didn't know?

5 A. I knew a considerable majority.

6 Q. Well, if you can just tell us who you didn't know. I think you

7 told us that you met Stevandic later.

8 A. Yes. I heard about him but I didn't know him at the time. I met

9 him only after the war. At that time, I did not know of Slobodan

10 Dubocanin. I did not know Zoran Jokic, I didn't know who he was either.

11 Q. All right. I want to deal with first of all Vukic. At that

12 stage, what sort of influence did he have as far as the Banja Luka

13 authorities were concerned?

14 A. Dr. Radislav Vukic was president or a member of the municipal

15 board of the SDS in Banja Luka, I think, and therefore he had an important

16 position amongst the authorities as well, in the authorities.

17 Q. Predrag Radic, what about him?

18 A. He was president of the municipal assembly of Banja Luka, and that

19 is the strongest and most powerful municipality in that region. I think

20 that he was also a member of the SDS at the time.

21 Q. In the terms of the relationship between him and Brdjanin and

22 Vukic, Vukic as head of the regional SDS board, Brdjanin as president of

23 the regional Crisis Staff, and Predrag Radic as president of the

24 municipality of Banja Luka, how did -- how would those three interact,

25 together, as far as decision-making was concerned, if you know?

1 A. It is obvious that I was not a member of this organ, but I can

2 tell you of my impressions at the time. Mr. Brdjanin appeared in public,

3 but as far as true power of decision-making within this organ is

4 concerned, that is what other people had. That's the impression I had as

5 well as others. I think that Mr. Vukic and others had much more influence

6 over the process of decision-making. I think that Mr. Radic himself, as

7 president of the largest municipality, also had a significant role in the

8 work of that particular organ.

9 Q. All right. Brdjanin being the public face of the Crisis Staff,

10 Vukic and others having more influence in the process of decision-making,

11 why did you get that impression?

12 A. I've already said that it's an impression. That's as far as I

13 knew the situation and relationships there and that's what I inferred on

14 the basis of many conversations with people who then and later confirmed

15 such impressions. Mr. Vukic was president of the SDS and I think that he

16 had formal power and also actual power in terms of effecting decisions.

17 Q. And the reason being what, because of his position within the SDS?

18 A. I think so, yes. So as far as the authorities in Banja Luka

19 during this period, May of 1992 until around September, the

20 decision-making was that being made by the SDS? Is that what you're

21 saying?

22 A. Well, the SDS was the party in power, and at that time it

23 certainly conceived of the policy that was pursued at the time by the

24 organs that functioned as state organs.

25 Q. Now, again, from how you gained the impression, talking to people

1 and the like, why was Brdjanin the public face of this organisation, if

2 Vukic and Radic actually had more power?

3 A. Mr. Zupljanin himself with greater power too at the time. He

4 commanded the police. It seemed to me that this was some kind of a

5 coordination staff that coordinated the work of various authorities, the

6 police, the various municipal authorities, the military. I really cannot

7 confirm the reasons, I mean why Mr. Brdjanin was president of this staff.

8 Q. All right. As far as Mr. Brdjanin's speeches or public

9 utterances, whether reported on television or in the media, went, were his

10 views -- were his views, in your view, conservative views, extreme views,

11 tolerant views, what?

12 A. They were clear, concise. At that time, they were geared towards

13 concrete events and concrete things that were happening, and they did not

14 really leave any scope for further dilemmas.

15 Q. All right. I want then, please, finally, to deal with two

16 topics. The camps that were set up in various municipalities that came

17 within the autonomous region, Omarska and the like. Did you hear about

18 those camps at the time?

19 A. No.

20 Q. When was the first time that you became aware that these camps

21 existed?

22 A. I've already said that I was in a police unit at the airport in

23 Banja Luka. I cannot say which date and when, but I know that

24 Mr. Kouchner came to visit the region at the time and he was a

25 representative of the WHO or some other international organisation at the

1 time. When he came to the airport then - I was there in the same room -

2 he said that he came to see for himself whether certain talk in the

3 western media about the existence of camps was true or not. That's the

4 first time I heard of the possibility of them being in existence at all.

5 Q. Right. Did you discover the type of regime that had been

6 operating in these camps, in particular in Omarska and Keraterm?

7 A. No.

8 Q. When was the first time that you heard about what had been

9 happening in them?

10 A. After the war.

11 Q. Now, if the regional Crisis Staff, as the regional body of

12 authority, with authority over the municipal Crisis Staffs, had wanted to

13 prevent the camps being set up, could they have done so?

14 A. I cannot talk about that, because here in this Crisis Staff I

15 don't see anyone who was from Prijedor, and I don't know what the

16 relationships were like between the staff in Prijedor and this regional

17 staff.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's mention Manjaca instead of Omarska and

19 Keraterm.

20 MS. KORNER:

21 Q. Manjaca, you knew about Manjaca, did you?

22 A. Yes. This was in the media as well. I think it was treated as a

23 collection centre at the time.

24 Q. I'll ask you the question again, because if you recall, Mr. Dodik,

25 you were asked this when you were interviewed. In your view, knowing what

1 you know from your political life, of the authority of the regional Crisis

2 Staff, could they have prevented or indeed if they had wanted to, shut

3 down those camps? Did they have that authority?

4 A. Formally speaking, yes. In essence, everything was based on

5 strong local individuals, because I know in Prijedor, it was Simo Drljaca

6 who was such a strong individual. And I cannot confirm that this staff

7 could have exercised any significant influence over him.

8 Q. Which staff, the Prijedor or the regional?

9 A. The regional one, too.

10 Q. I see. So when you told us earlier that the regional Crisis Staff

11 had the authority to prevent the camps, that you now think was a mistake,

12 do you?

13 A. I don't know if that's exactly the way I had put it, but at any

14 rate I said that formally the regional organs had authority over the

15 lower-level organs. From the point of view of such an interpretation, it

16 is logical that they could have affected the decisions of the local

17 communities. But what I wish to say is the fact that in many

18 municipalities, there were strong, local persons who at given points in

19 time, and in certain activities, had full independence.

20 Q. First of all, which municipalities had strong local persons?

21 A. Prijedor did, first and foremost.

22 Q. Who in Prijedor? You've mentioned Drljaca.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Anybody else?

25 A. I think he was chief of police.

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1 Q. Did you know him?

2 A. No. I met him later, after the war. At that time, I didn't know

3 him.

4 Q. All right. And so you're basing your assessment of him as a

5 strong local personality on what?

6 A. I'm basing it on conversations with people who were familiar with

7 the situation, with whom I had contacts later.

8 Q. Then you said that these persons at given points in time and in

9 certain activities had full independence. First of all, what point in

10 time?

11 A. I meant certain activities, what was going on within local

12 clashes, in Prijedor, from what I know. I know that it was only local

13 people who were of key importance, and in other places, too. I cannot

14 give an assessment but I don't know. Perhaps there was coordination

15 between the Crisis Staffs, but I'm not aware of this coordination.

16 Perhaps this did exist.

17 Q. I'm sorry, you've described not so long ago the regional Crisis

18 Staff as a coordinating body.

19 A. Yes. And I said that there was no one from Prijedor on that

20 staff, at least I can't see anyone here.

21 Q. Well, if you look down at -- on the main staff, no, but if you

22 look down at number 16 on this item, does it say, "presidents of

23 municipalities"?

24 A. I think presidents of municipalities were included, yes.

25 Q. All right. Finally, I just want to ask you about the media

1 generally. You've touched on this subject before. Once the conflict

2 broke out in April 1992, in your view, how did the media behave? Were

3 they reporting independently or not?

4 A. That depended on which part of Bosnia-Herzegovina they were based.

5 The media sided with the local or regional authorities. And I think that

6 from then on, they became propaganda instruments of the authorities

7 everywhere, both of those in Sarajevo and in the Serbian Republic of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Already earlier on, a number of people who were not

9 suited in the view of the authorities were replaced by party men. The

10 same applied to the SDA, the HDZ and the SDS.

11 Q. All right. As far as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina was concerned, did Velibor Ostojic become the Minister of

13 information?

14 A. Yes, that's a well-known fact.

15 Q. And was control exercised over the media, and if so how?

16 A. By the Ministry of the Government. There were regular briefings,

17 and the control was up to the level of censorship so only what was suited

18 to the authorities was published. And I really do think that this applied

19 to all the sides equally.

20 Q. Yes. Thank you.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Korner. Mr. Ackerman? Mr. Ackerman

22 is going to cross-examine you, sir, now.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

24 Cross-examined by Mr. Ackerman:

25 Q. It's now good afternoon, Mr. Dodik.

1 A. Good afternoon to you, too.

2 Q. I want to ask you just some very, very brief questions, and move

3 rather rapidly because Ms. Korner covered this mostly, about your

4 political career. This alliance of reformist forces that you were

5 involved in, when that party was formed, did you play a role, any role, in

6 the formation of that party or was it a party that you just joined or how

7 did that work?

8 A. I played an important role. The party was formed at a well-known

9 rally attended by about 100.000 people on Mount Kozara at Mrakovica and it

10 was addressed by the Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, after which the

11 initiative was launched to set up the party. And I was president of the

12 regional organisation of that party from the very beginning.

13 Q. It's the case, isn't it, that part of the platform of that party

14 was the preservation of Yugoslavia?

15 A. Yes, I said that earlier on.

16 Q. Yes. When the nationalist parties started being formed in

17 anticipation of the multi-party elections, what was the first of the

18 nationalist parties?

19 A. The first to be formed was the national party of the Bosniak

20 people, the SDA. The HDZ had already been formed in Croatia before that,

21 and after the SDA, the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed, and a few

22 months prior to the elections, the SDS was formed. So it was the last in

23 the series.

24 Q. And the SDA was formed, was it not under the leadership of

25 Alija Izetbegovic?

1 A. Yes, yes. Alija Izetbegovic was the president.

2 Q. And he was a well-known person in Yugoslavia at that time, wasn't

3 he?

4 A. Increasingly well-known. Up until then he was known exclusively

5 as a member of a group that promoted the ideas of Muslim fundamentalism

6 and he was known to have spent time in prison in Foca as a result of those

7 activities, and he also wrote a book along those lines.

8 Q. And did that history of his, when he then became head of the SDA,

9 the basically Muslim nationalist party, that history of his, I take it,

10 was well known and played some role in the way other people reacted to the

11 formation of that party. Is that a fair statement?

12 A. I think you're quite right. His role was well-known, and the

13 judgements against him were public so that many people in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina were aware of his engagements, and I could agree with

15 you that this served for many as motives for their subsequent behaviour.

16 Q. So to some extent, would you say that the creation of the SDS was

17 very much a reaction to the way the SDA was created and under whose

18 leadership it was created?

19 A. That's what it looked like.

20 Q. There was concern, was there not, when the issue came about

21 regarding what was going to happen with Bosnia-Herzegovina and where it

22 would be within Yugoslavia, if within Yugoslavia at all, there was

23 concern, was there not, about the motivation of Mr. Izetbegovic in his

24 efforts to create an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25 A. Yes. Almost all politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina were

1 convinced that Izetbegovic wanted an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina

2 and that his public speeches had -- were only part of a strategy to obtain

3 that goal, even though they may have sounded as if they advocated measures

4 to preserve Yugoslavia. So the impression was of most people, including

5 myself, that Izetbegovic wanted an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the

6 same sort of shape in which it had existed up until then, of course, but

7 renouncing its socialist character.

8 Q. And a number of people also believed, based upon the prior history

9 of Mr. Izetbegovic, that his goal was to create an Islamic state in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't they?

11 A. A number of people, you're quite right.

12 Q. Tell the Chamber, and I think you probably know this quite well,

13 tell the Chamber why it was that the Serbs felt so strongly about the need

14 to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia?

15 A. Most Serbs in those days considered it to be quite normal that

16 they should be in the community of Serbia as the motherland and that the

17 form of order for Bosnia-Herzegovina should be such that it should remain

18 in a community, in an agreed community, with Serbia and the other

19 republics wishing to remain within Yugoslavia. The main thesis, the main

20 goal, was to remain in Yugoslavia.

21 Later on, if Slovenia and the other republics left, the other

22 republics that didn't want to remain in Yugoslavia, this thesis was called

23 in question. On the other hand, there was widespread conviction among the

24 Serbs that Mr. Tudjman's regime was identical to the one that existed in

25 the period from 1941 to 1945, and that for those reasons, Serbs could not

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1 feel safe in Croatia and therefore not in Krajina either. Because there

2 were certain aspirations by the Tudjman regime towards that Krajina - when

3 I say Krajina, I mean the Banja Luka Krajina - and this was later

4 confirmed by various witnesses like Mr. Ashdown, who spoke a map drawn by

5 Tudjman from which it could be seen that the Banja Luka region, according

6 to this division advocated by Tudjman, should have been annexed to

7 Croatia.

8 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, in the transcript, 54, line 22 I think

9 the witness said most Serbs in those days considered it to be quite normal

10 that they should be in a community with Serbia, not of Serbia.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Let me -- sir, let me read out to you what we have

12 in the English transcript of what you're supposed to have said. And then

13 having heard what Mr. Ackerman has just stated, tell me whether you want

14 to enter any correction. You were asked: "Tell the Chamber, and I think

15 you probably flow this quite well, tell the Chamber why, why it was that

16 the Serbs felt so strongly about the need to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina

17 within Yugoslavia?" And your answer was as follows: "Most Serbs in those

18 days considered it to be quite normal that they should be in the community

19 of Serbia as the motherland." It is being suggested that you didn't say

20 "in the community of Serbia as the motherland," but you stated in the

21 community with Serbia as the motherland. Is what is being suggested by

22 Mr. Ackerman correct? Or is what we have in the transcript, which

23 reflects correctly what you stated earlier on in your answer?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] People felt that Bosnia-Herzegovina

25 should be in a community with Serbia, and virtually 100 per cent of the

1 Serbs in Bosnia considered Serbia to be the motherland. They were never

2 in favour of abolishing Bosnia-Herzegovina or separating it. The idea was

3 to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course in a redefined form, and as

4 such, in a community with other republics wishing to remain within

5 Yugoslavia.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you. Mr. Ackerman.

7 MR. ACKERMAN:

8 Q. I want to talk to you now for a few moments about the referendum

9 on independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was a subject that began

10 being discussed in parliament as the year of 1991 was coming to an end,

11 correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. You have said, and I'm quoting, "We in the opposition considered

14 this to be a very serious matter which could provoke a major crisis and

15 even war. We felt that this issue should have been avoided." That was in

16 your testimony in Plavsic, page 471, line 20. First of all, let me ask

17 you how you believe that it could have been avoided, in your view? How

18 could the issue have been avoided, about independence, the referendum?

19 A. Let me confirm this statement as mine. I think it was clear, and

20 we realised that in the opposition, that a decision on the referendum was

21 being taken only by representatives of the Bosniak and Croatian people,

22 that representatives of the Serbian people were excluded from taking that

23 decision in the assembly, and it was quite normal that representatives of

24 the SDA and HDZ had a majority in parliament at the time so from the

25 formal standpoint, it was possible for them to take such a decision but it

1 was quite clear that the procedure of outvoting was underway, outvoting

2 everyone nation so we in the opposition felt that a solution should be

3 found through negotiation and not through outvoting.

4 I must say that I didn't take part in that referendum. I know it

5 was held in the spring of 1992. And facts show that almost as a rule, or

6 the absolute majority of the Serbs did not take part in that referendum.

7 So our opinion in the opposition at the time was that every move,

8 including this one, regarding a referendum that had unilateral political

9 meaning, should be halted until a final agreement was reached by all

10 relevant political forces so that an agreed restructuring of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina could take place. These were visible efforts by all

12 groupings on all sides to implement the policy that they were advocating

13 at the time. Izetbegovic himself, expounding on the need to do this, said

14 in parliament, I remember this sentence of his, that he was ready to

15 sacrifice peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina for an independent Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina. That was the subject of subsequent considerable political

17 debate and confrontations.

18 Q. You indicated that, "it was our opinion in the opposition, that

19 these moves should be halted until a final agreement was reached by all

20 relevant political forces so that agreed restructuring could take place,"

21 leaving out some of your words. Was that an opinion that you voiced in

22 the parliament? Was it something that you and other people were arguing

23 at the time in the parliament, let's back off, let's not go there, let's

24 see if we can come to some kind of an agreement? Were you making those

25 kinds of arguments?

1 A. Yes. A certain number of people felt that way. Later on, the

2 referendum was the cause for my leaving the party, the Alliance of

3 Reformist Forces, because representatives of that party, my former

4 colleagues, were in favour of having the referendum.

5 Q. I want to go back now to your statement in the Plavsic case again

6 and just read it again, "We in the opposition considered this to be a very

7 serious matter which could provoke a major crisis and even war." My

8 question to you now, at the time, in the parliament, did all of -- did the

9 parties in the parliament who were struggling with this issue understand

10 it in that way? That it was a serious matter which could provoke a major

11 crisis and even war?

12 A. I can't confirm that with respect to other political parties but

13 my feeling was that people were determined to carry out their plans

14 regardless of the horrors of war that this could provoke.

15 Q. Can you tell us this? And I'd ask you in trying to give us your

16 answer to this, that you not use the value of hindsight but try to think

17 of what you saw at the time and what you felt at the time, what you knew

18 at the time. What was it that the Serbs believed would happen if

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent rather than remaining in Yugoslavia?

20 A. Serbia? Or Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 Q. Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me rephrase that again just to make sure

22 we get it right. What I want you to try to tell us, if you can, trying to

23 dredge up your memory of that moment, those moments in parliament, and not

24 with the value of hindsight, what was it the Serbs believed would happen

25 if Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent rather than remaining in

1 Yugoslavia?

2 A. They had experience with respect to the decision on the referendum

3 in the assembly where they had been outvoted and they felt that this

4 system of outvoting would predominate and that decisions which would

5 affect significantly the lives of all in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be taken

6 through a coalition of two peoples against the third, and that was what

7 the people felt, what they feared, that developments would have -- lead to

8 institutions as it had up until then, in which peoples would be outvoted.

9 I know that an effort was made to set up a chamber of peoples as a second

10 chamber of the assembly but that was not accepted.

11 Q. When you talk about outvoting, you refer, of course, to the vote

12 that was taken in the parliament regarding the referendum was an outvoting

13 in that one nation was excluded --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You talk about the fear being that in the future, in an

16 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that would become the norm, and that

17 minority rights would simply not be recognised any longer. Is that what

18 you're saying?

19 A. Yes, only the Serbs were not then or now either a minority people

20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they are a constituent people. But in 1992, this

21 constituent character of theirs was not recognised through this voting in

22 parliament, and this instilled fresh fear in people.

23 Q. Now I will let you use some hindsight. Looking back from the

24 perspective you have today, do you believe that those fears that you've

25 expressed, that the Serbian people had in 1991, early 1992, were justified

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1 and realistic?

2 A. I think so, yes.

3 Q. And can you elaborate on that at all? And if you can, please do.

4 A. I can say a couple of things. First, that historical experience

5 that was dominant in the understanding of the political situation among

6 the Serbs was very strong. The experience linked to the previous war, the

7 Second World War, when Serbs in those areas suffered considerably at the

8 hands of the independent state of Croatia. The experiences from that war

9 also showed that Croats and Bosniaks, or rather Muslims in those days,

10 were even then together in military units, which had as their aim or their

11 target the Serbian people. And this fear was heightened by the lack of

12 readiness by the partners in government, as they called themselves at the

13 time, to acknowledge any demands so that the policies in Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina in those days could be described as one of stubbornness,

15 digging in of one side in relation to the other.

16 People were terrified and only the truth that the dominant party

17 in a certain people wanted to present them in, the SDA, to the Muslims,

18 the SDS to the Serbs and the HDZ to the Croats. The Serbs had the

19 greatest fear due to their experience from the Second World War, and also

20 the refusal to introduce the Chamber of Peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina in

21 those days, and to recompose Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 Q. Of course in 1991, the events you've discussed were fairly recent

23 in time and there were a number of people alive who had experienced those

24 events in the 1940s, correct?

25 A. Yes, certainly.

1 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think this would be a good time for

2 a break.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. We will have a 25-minute

4 break starting from now. Thank you.

5 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ackerman, at the end of the session, we need to

8 decide the matter that you raised in private session this morning. Please

9 do remind me in case --

10 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes. Your Honour, I have a matter that I'd like to

11 raise. It's quite brief, so I'll remind you if you'll remind me.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I'll certainly remember. Let's proceed.

13 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

14 Q. All right. Mr. Dodik, I want to ask you now when it was that you

15 first met Radoslav Brdjanin, if you can recall.

16 A. I don't remember the actual event, but I know that it was at one

17 of the first sessions of the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990,

18 immediately after the elections actually, in 1990.

19 Q. Had you heard of him before that or was that the first time that

20 you had either heard of him or met him?

21 A. Of course I heard of him. I knew that he worked in a construction

22 company in Banja Luka, but I didn't know him.

23 Q. You had a conversation with Ms. Korner on 16 June of 2003, and

24 Ms. Korner asked you then about Brdjanin, how well you knew him. And your

25 answer was: "Not very well, we were in conflict."

1 Can you tell me what you meant by your answer: "We were in

2 conflict"?

3 A. We were in different political parties. That's the conflict I

4 meant.

5 Q. You were just speaking of the fact that were you in a different

6 party from him?

7 A. Yes. And we had different political organisations and therefore

8 we had different views regarding certain matters.

9 Q. I'd like you to look again at Prosecutor's Exhibit 168, please.

10 Now, this is the document you were looking at earlier today. It's a

11 decision on the formation of the war staff of the Autonomous Region of

12 Krajina, and I have a few questions I want to ask you about that document.

13 First of all, if you look at the very first paragraph, it indicates that

14 the decision was made pursuant to Article 12 of the law on National

15 Defence. Do you see that?

16 A. Yes, I see that.

17 Q. Do you know what Article 12 of the law on National Defence is?

18 A. Don't know.

19 Q. The other thing that I'd like to bring to your attention is that

20 the war staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina is created not by the

21 assembly of ARK but by the executive council. Do you see that?

22 A. I see it. That's what it says.

23 Q. Why would something like this be done by the executive council

24 instead of by the assembly?

25 A. Perhaps circumstances led to that. I really cannot guess.

1 Q. Well, there certainly wasn't, you know, heavy fighting going on in

2 the Banja Luka municipality on the 5th of May, 1992, was there?

3 A. Yes. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. That there was not, right?

5 A. Well, there was no fighting, there were no military operations,

6 but the general atmosphere was that of a war. There was a war psychosis.

7 Q. The document seems to be signed by a person by the name of Nikola

8 Erceg. Did you know Nikola Erceg and do you know him?

9 A. Nikola Erceg was also a member of parliament, and that's how I

10 know him.

11 Q. And he was the president of the executive council of the

12 Autonomous Region of Krajina on 5 May, 1992, when he signed this decision.

13 Correct?

14 A. I know that the was president of the executive council.

15 Q. Do you know who else was on the executive council?

16 A. I don't know.

17 Q. You notice that --

18 A. I can't remember.

19 Q. Okay. You notice that Mr. Erceg appointed himself as a member of

20 the war staff. You see that? Number 4?

21 A. I see that. I see that, yes.

22 Q. And he also appointed Mr. Kupresanin the president of the assembly

23 of the Autonomous Region of Krajina?

24 A. Yes, I see that, too.

25 Q. Would I be correct in assuming that Mr. Erceg had, and his

1 executive council, had the power to create such a war staff or would that

2 be wrong? Do you know whether they had the power to actually do this or

3 not?

4 A. If I knew the essence of the law on National Defence, and Article

5 12, then perhaps I could answer the question. At that time, all the laws

6 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Yugoslavia were in force in the area. I

7 really don't know what Article 12 of this law pertains to.

8 Q. If it makes sense, if it's true, that Mr. Erceg did have the power

9 to create this war staff, doesn't it also make sense that he would have

10 the power to dissolve it?

11 A. Yes. Those who create something or establish it have such

12 authority, and powers.

13 Q. Yes. Now, Brdjanin, you've talked about this earlier today,

14 although Brdjanin appears there as president of the Crisis Staff, you've

15 told us that in your view, he was not the most powerful person on that

16 staff, that there were other people on there that were more powerful than

17 he, including Predrag Radic and Radislav Vukic. Correct?

18 A. Yes. That's the impression that we had then.

19 Q. And I think you said not only was it the impression that you had

20 then but it's the impression that you got from talking to a lot of people

21 afterwards also?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You had an interview that was tape recorded in Banja Luka on 17

24 July, 2003. Do you remember that interview?

25 A. If that was recorded, then indeed it did take place.

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1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to speak up?

2 MR. ACKERMAN:

3 Q. They want you to speak a little louder.

4 A. Yes. A few interviews with me were conducted, yes.

5 Q. In this one, you were being asked about the same issue that I'm

6 talking to you about, Brdjanin's role in the Crisis Staff. You said on

7 page 5, line 23 of the English version, "In other words, if Brdjanin

8 wanted to implement anything with the Crisis Staff, he had to ask for the

9 approval of Radic. Without that, he couldn't have done anything." Do you

10 stand by that statement today?

11 A. Well, that was my opinion. I was not present at these meetings

12 but this is an opinion that corroborates the previously mentioned

13 position, namely that Mr. Brdjanin was not the most influential member of

14 that staff and quite simply that people were there who had far greater

15 power and who were in such offices. I already mentioned the chief of

16 police, the presidents of the municipality, the president of the SDS. So

17 they had these positions, they held these offices, and they were on the

18 staff ex officio and the implementation of these decisions depended on

19 them.

20 Q. Now, just so we can save a little bit of time, when you say to us

21 that it is your impression or you have the opinion, that's based not only

22 upon your observations at the time but on your conversations with people

23 since that time, up until fairly recent times; am I correct in that? In

24 other words, you're not just guessing. This is based upon something that

25 you observed and have heard?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. On page 7 in that same interview we were just talking about, you

3 were talking about Dr. Vukic, and you were explaining how to be head of

4 the regional board of the SDS, he would have had to have had a very direct

5 link with Karadzic, and couldn't have done -- couldn't have gotten where

6 he did without the complete support and approval of Karadzic, and you

7 described him as, "He was the most important person in all of this."

8 Correct?

9 A. I think that it can be put that way, that it is correct.

10 Q. What about a person named Jovan Cizmovic? What do you know about

11 him? Anything?

12 A. I heard of him, but I know little about his activity.

13 Q. All right. I think you probably were in some assembly sessions

14 where there was a great deal of disagreement, dissension, going on between

15 Karadzic on the one hand and Brdjanin on the other, primarily over the

16 issue of where the government was going to be headquartered, in Pale or

17 Banja Luka. Do you remember some of those sessions?

18 A. I remember. I've already confirmed that, when I spoke to the

19 Prosecutor. I think that this was a continuous theme. At every session,

20 that issue was raised, within any item on the agenda.

21 Q. And as a matter of fact, that was a constant theme of

22 Mr. Brdjanin's, right up until the time that Ms. Plavsic brought the

23 government to Banja Luka [Realtime transcript read in error "mruuk"] and

24 then you followed her lead in that regard, or you made your own decision

25 in that regard, I suppose, but that was Brdjanin's contention throughout

1 that whole period, that the seat of government belonged in Banja Luka, not

2 in Pale, wasn't it?

3 A. That's right. That's right.

4 Q. Yeah. And that tension that Brdjanin was part of, was a tension

5 that stayed there right up until the time that Mrs. Plavsic actually moved

6 the government to Banja Luka, didn't it?

7 A. Yes. I've already said that this went on on a continuous basis

8 until the government moved to Banja Luka. Others advocated it too but I

9 remember that Mr. Brdjanin persisted the most.

10 Q. Let me ask you about Nenad Stevandic. Do you think he had more

11 power than Mr. Brdjanin had?

12 A. I don't know. I cannot assess that.

13 Q. Okay.

14 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, page 67, line 3, has the word "mruuk,"

15 and it should be Banja Luka.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, okay. That goes down for the record.

17 MR. ACKERMAN: I assume that was going to get fixed later.

18 Q. Were you in Banja Luka very much during 1992?

19 A. No. In 1992, I was mobilised, and I was within the police unit at

20 the airport, which was about 25 or 30 kilometres away from Banja Luka.

21 Q. So you were there most of the time?

22 A. Yes, yes, that's right.

23 Q. You were asked by Ms. Korner about the visits of various

24 internationals, heads of international groups, things like that, that came

25 to Banja Luka and came to the area, and it seemed that they never met with

1 Brdjanin but did meet with people like Radic and Kupresanin and Zupljanin

2 and Vukic, persons like that.

3 One of the things that I want to ask you about that is: Wasn't it

4 the case during this time, and when I say "this time," I'm talking about

5 late 1991, early 1992, that there were people who had titles and people

6 who had power and they weren't necessarily the same people?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I think in -- when you were talking with Ms. Korner, I have some

9 notes of that conversation, she asked you about this. Page 4 of those

10 notes. She said to you the international community often met with Radic,

11 not Brdjanin. Why? And it's recorded that you said this: "Brdjanin is

12 crazy, he took our public face. Radic conducted the policies. That is

13 why the international community went to where the power was, Radic.",

14 true?

15 MS. KORNER: Could you read the next line.

16 MR. ACKERMAN: No, you can read it if you want to. I don't want

17 to.

18 Q. Is that what you said?

19 A. A considerable part of that is correct. Mr. Brdjanin had a

20 hypothetical view. He took public responsibility for many things that

21 were happening so that's why it can all be put under quotation marks. It

22 is correct, this was a fact. However, the fact that everybody went to see

23 Radic was a result of the fact that he was president of the municipality

24 of Banja Luka.

25 Q. All right. Do you know, as you sit here today, do you know anyone

1 who, in early 1992, who was actually a subordinate of Brdjanin's, someone

2 who had to do Brdjanin's bidding, who had to follow his orders, who had no

3 choice with regard to Mr. Brdjanin but to do what he said? Do you know of

4 anybody who was in that position, that he was actually the superior of?

5 A. Directly, the way you've put it, I really cannot give a single

6 name, but it is a fact that there was this Crisis Staff and then one can

7 speak of subordination in terms of this hierarchy, and that's the way I

8 saw it.

9 Q. Well, I guess if you would sit down and draw a chart where you

10 would put the ARK Crisis Staff and then under that you'd put the

11 municipalities, then it would appear by looking at that chart that the

12 Crisis Staff had some power and authority regarding those municipalities,

13 but I think you also know and you've told us today that a lot of those

14 municipalities and particularly powerful individuals within them were

15 operating rather independently. Correct?

16 A. Well, they were autonomous. They were the strong individuals in

17 those local communities. I think that they had stronger links to the top

18 echelons of government then, Karadzic at the time, rather than with the

19 Crisis Staff and other regional organs.

20 Q. If, for instance, Brdjanin had ordered someone to do something and

21 Radic or Vukic or a gentleman named Vlado Kovacevic had said no, you don't

22 have to do that, they wouldn't have done it, would they?

23 A. I think that's right.

24 Q. On the contrary, if Brdjanin ordered somebody not to do something

25 who had been told by Radic, Vukic or Kovacevic to do something, they would

1 likely go ahead and do it. That's also true, isn't it?

2 A. Well, following that logic, possibly so.

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5 Q. When you talked with Mr. Tiger --

6 A. May I just say something? In relation to these interviews?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. This is an unauthorised statement on my part. Many things here do

9 not reflect what was said, and perhaps these are mistakes made by the

10 interpreters. And therefore, I cannot say that this is a fact, especially

11 as far as certain sections are concerned. This cannot be considered a

12 proper document because I did not authorise it and I did not sign it.

13 Q. That's absolutely fair. And I accept that. And I'll be a little

14 bit more careful in the way I ask you questions about these documents with

15 that in mind, okay? I do want to ask you about a paragraph that appears

16 in a document that is called investigators's notes. These are notes made

17 by an investigator of conversations you had with Mr. Tieger.

18 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I should add it's a number of

19 conversations. If you look at the front you'll see --

20 MR. ACKERMAN: I think I said conversations, didn't I?

21 MS. KORNER: No, you said a conversation.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: That's clear from -- these are interpreter's notes

23 actually or investigator's notes.

24 MS. KORNER: They are notes and they are not signed by him.

25 That's true.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

2 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, line 19 and 20 I said exactly that.

3 Made by an investigator of conversations you had with Mr. Tieger.

4 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead, Mr. Ackerman, because we are approaching

6 quarter to 2 very fast.

7 MR. ACKERMAN:

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14 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may I just for a moment - I'm sorry to

15 interrupt Mr. Ackerman - go into private session just to mention one

16 thing?

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's go into private session for a while. Yes,

18 Ms. Korner, we are in private session.

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20 [Open session]

21 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.

22 MR. ACKERMAN:

23 Q. Now we have just been talking about a group whose names I won't

24 mention again, sir. Would you agree with the proposition that their

25 influence on events around Banja Luka was decisive?

1 A. It was significant.

2 Q. Would you agree with the proposition that this group, or members

3 of it, attempted to gain command over the army but didn't succeed

4 completely in doing so?

5 A. Well, from the very beginning, it was quite clear that there were

6 differences between military and civilian structures and the civilian

7 authorities persistently endeavoured to impose its influence over the

8 military, and there were various stages, such as in 1993, when that

9 conflict between the military and civilian bodies escalated in particular.

10 Q. Could you describe that in a little more detail? There was a

11 conflict actually between Karadzic and the military, wasn't there?

12 A. It was a rather specific situation, and it depended on the period.

13 Even on the day we are talking about, the situation was one in April and

14 quite different already in May, as far as that is concerned. So the fact

15 that the Yugoslav People's Army still existed and there was total

16 confusion regarding civilian competence over that army, and there were

17 conflicts between the civilian authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the

18 time, and the army. Later on, when the Army of Republika Srpska was

19 formed, this problem was overcome.

20 MR. ACKERMAN: All right. I'm going to a whole new subject now

21 and I want to talk a little bit -- Ms. Korner talked to you a little bit

22 about the media and I want to ask you a question or two about that.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ackerman.

24 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, you're right, Judge.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: How much more time do you think you require?

1 MR. ACKERMAN: I think I have another 30 to 45 minutes, Your

2 Honour.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: So we better stop now with the witness and do the

4 rest of the business that remains on our table.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may make a request?

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we finish our work today.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: It's difficult and we have 45 minutes and we are

9 allotted time only until quarter to 2.00 where we have to stop because the

10 courtroom is taken over by another Trial Chamber so I'm afraid, I had

11 hoped that we would finish with you today but things don't always go the

12 way we desire. So we'll have to meet again tomorrow morning. I assume

13 that within an hour or so you will be out of this courtroom tomorrow

14 morning. I thank you, sir, for understanding and for being patient. The

15 usher will escort you.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 JUDGE AGIUS: So Mr. Ackerman, I understand you needed to raise

18 some further point before we handed down our decision. Do we stay in open

19 session?

20 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, this is a completely different issue, Your

21 Honour. We were just during one of the breaks we were talking about what

22 the status of the Talic exhibits are and we just want to make sure that

23 there is an order on the record by Your Honours that those exhibits become

24 part of the new Brdjanin indictment because many of the exhibits that came

25 in through Talic were exhibits that I would have put in had they not done

1 so.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Is there any objection on your part?

3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I raised it because it suddenly occurred

4 to me what their status was.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, you are right both of you.

6 MS. KORNER: In the sense that the trial was severed off and

7 presumably the exhibits went with that part of the trial. Your Honour, I

8 have no objection to that at all. I simply ask this: Whether we need to

9 have all of them. In other words, I know Mr. Ackerman may want to use

10 some of them but do we actually want all of them in the case. I mean,

11 it's just mounting up the exhibits, that's the only thing.

12 MR. ACKERMAN: It's probably a stack this high. There are very

13 few, there 26, I think, in total. As I recall.

14 MS. KORNER: I can't remember now.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: My suggestion let's be practical about it. Let's

16 admit them all or declare that they still form part of these proceedings,

17 for all intents and purposes, and that they should be preserved in the

18 records of these proceedings and that effectively is our decision. So

19 instructions to Registrar is to ensure that the exhibits tendered by the

20 Defence for General Talic in the early stages of this trial, until the

21 severance of the two trials, of the two accused, will be preserved in the

22 records of this trial and will form part of the evidence in this trial.

23 Let's go into private session for a while, please.

24 [Private session]

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18 [Open session]

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Tomorrow, first 45 minutes hopefully we will

20 dedicate to the conclusion of the cross-examination. I suppose there

21 would be a short re-examination.

22 MS. KORNER: A short one, Your Honour, I don't think there is a

23 great deal, but yes.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: So then with the rest of the matters that you

25 intended to deal with tomorrow, you know that roughly you have an hour

1 less than you would have had had we finished with Mr. Dodik this morning.

2 MS. KORNER: Absolutely, Your Honour. I don't think those matters

3 will take more than an hour. It's simply some of the documents we want to

4 put in need an explanation.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm just mentioning just in case you need to discuss

6 amongst yourselves to split the time or to organise the session. All

7 right. I thank you and we will all meet tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this

8 same courtroom. Thank you.

9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

10 1.48 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,

11 the 1st day of August, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.

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