1 - Prosecution Opening Statement, T. 562-3. 2 - The First Schedule refers to sniping incidents allegedly committed against civilians by forces under the command and control of the Accused. The Second Schedule lists a number of shelling incidents allegedly committed against civilian targets by forces under the command and control of the Accused, Indictment, para. 15. 3 - See Decision on Acquittal (details of that decision are mentioned in Annex B of this Judgement). 4 - See the Indictment in Annex A. General Galic is charged with four crimes against humanity (murder and inhumane acts) under Article 5 of the Statute and with three violations of the laws or customs of war (inflicting terror on civilians and attacks on civilians) under Article 3 of the Statute. 5 - Rule 98 ter (C): the judgement shall be rendered by a majority of judges. 6 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. 7 - Id., para. 70. 8 - Id., para. 89. 9 - Id., para. 91. 10 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 89; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 401; Furundzija Trial Judgement, paras 131-133. 11 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. 12 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 137; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 11 to 15. 13 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 137; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 15. 14 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 136; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 11 and 12; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 21950 (private session). 15 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 132. 16 - Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 21970. 17 - Defence Pre-Trial Brief, para. 8.11. Both parties also stipulated that “[a]ll parties to the armed conflict were required to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of war” (Schedule of Facts Stipulated to by the Parties, 26 October 2001, stipulated fact No. 23). 18 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1093. 19 - Id., para. 1096. 20 - Id., para. 971. 21 - Id., paras 971-2. 22 - Id., para. 977. 23 - Defence Closing Arguments, T. 21966-73. 24 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 127; Kupreskic Trial Judgement, para. 521. 25 - Strugar Interlocutory Appeal, para. 10; Martic Rule 61 Decision, para. 10. See also Kordic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 31. 26 - Both instruments were ratified by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRFY) on 11 June 1979. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina deposited its Declaration of Succession on 31 December 1992, declaring it became party to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols as of the date of its independence, 6 March 1992. 27 - See Article 1 of Additional Protocol I and Article 1 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 28 - Parties to an armed conflict may agree to bring into force provisions applicable to international armed conflicts. This is reflected in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 96 of Additional Protocol I. 29 - P58 (22 May Agreement), para. 2.3. The parties agreed to apply Articles 13 to 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. In addition, paragraph 2.3 of the 22 May Agreement specifically provides that: “The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. They shall not be made the object of attack”. 30 - P58 (22 May Agreement), para. 2.5. Each party also agreed to undertake “when it is informed, in particular by the ICRC, of any allegation of violations of international humanitarian law, to open an enquiry promptly and pursue it conscientiously, and to take the necessary steps to put an end to the alleged violations or prevent their recurrence and to punish those responsible in accordance with the law in force” (para. 5). 31 - Letter dated 12 June 1995, para. A (DDM/JUR 95/931 MSS/RBR). Copy available at ICTY Library. 32 - The representatives were Mr. K. Trnka, representative of the President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. D. Kalinik, representative of the President of the Serbian Democratic Party, Mr. S. Sito Coric, representative of the President of the Croatian Democratic Community. 33 - This agreement deals with matters such as the exchange and release of prisoners, measures to be taken to de-block populations or objects, identification of humanitarian corridors, and security guarantees to be afforded to the ICRC. Copy available at ICTY Library. 34 - 6 June Agreement, Section II, para. 6. Copy available at ICTY Library. 35 - Id., para. 7. 36 - Id., para. 10. 37 - The three parties to conflict were represented in London by Radovan Karadzic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party, Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mate Boban, President of the HDZ. 38 - Programme of Action on Humanitarian Issues, Article 3. Copy available at ICTY library. 39 - Agreement on the Release and Transfer of Prisoners, Preamble. Copy available at ICTY library. The October Agreement further stated that: “All prisoners not accused of, or sentenced for, grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law as defined in Art. 50 of the First, Art. 51 of the Second, Art. 130 of the Third and Art. 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as in Art. 85 of Additional Protocol I, will be unilaterally and unconditionally released.” Id., Art. 3 ( emphasis added). 40 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. 41 - See Art. 85(3) of Additional Protocol I. 42 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. 43 - Id., para. 134. 44 - Strugar Interlocutory Appeal, para. 10. 45 - See Art. 85(3) (a) of Additional Protocol I. See also ICRC Commentary, paras 1932, 1941. 46 - See the Programme of Action on Humanitarian Issues, Article 3(i); October Agreement, Article 3. 47 - See, e.g., Law of 16 June 1993 relative to the repression of serious violations of international humanitarian law, Belgium, Chapter 1§3, No.11; Swedish Penal Code, Chap. 22, §6, No. 3 and 4 (1990); Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XI, Section 160 (1978); Philippine Criminal Code, Article 334 (1964); Criminal Code of Mozambique, Article 83 (1987); Italian Criminal Military Code of War, Article 185 (1941); Spanish Penal Code, Article 611 (1) (1995); Croatian Penal Code, Article 120 (1) (1991). 48 - Original code (Službeni list SFRJ, br. 38/90) available at ICTY Library. 49 - BiH Decree-law of 11 April 1992 (Sluzbeni list RbiH, br. 2/92) available at ICTY Library. 50 - See, e.g., United States Field Manual No. 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare, para. 25 (1976); United Kingdom Manual of Military Law, chap. 4, para. 88 (1958); German Military Manual (Humanitäres Völkrerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten-Handbuch), paras 404 and 451 (1992) (English translation available at ICTY library); Canadian Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Section 4, paras 15 and 22 (1992); Dutch “Soldiers Handbook” (Handboek voor de Soldaat), VS 2-1350, Chapter VII, Art. 34 (1974); Australian Law of Armed Conflict Commander’s Guide (ADFP 37 Supplement 1), para. 1302 (1994); New Zealand Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, para. 517 (1992); Canadian Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Section 4, paras 15, 22 (1992); Soviet Minister of Defence Order No. 75 of 16 February 1990 on the Publication of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Victims of War and their Additional Protocols (1990), art. 8, para. (f). (French translation available at the ICRC’s web site: .). 51 - P5 (1988 Yugoslavia Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SRFY), para. 33. 52 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 160; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 9. The Prosecution submits that, in addition, two common elements of Article 3 of the Statute must be met, namely that: (1) there was a nexus between the attack and an armed conflict; and (2) the accused bears individual criminal responsibility for the attack under either Article 7(1) or 7(3) of the Statute. Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 9. 53 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, paras 133, 139; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 9. 54 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, paras 155-6; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 16-17. 55 - Prosecution Response to Defence Motion to Acquit, para. 9. 56 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 165. 57 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 10. 58 - Id., para. 16. 59 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 157; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 17. 60 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 21-33. 61 - Id., para. 23. 62 - Id., para. 24. 63 - Id., paras 25-29. 64 - Id., para. 22. 65 - Id., paras 669-76. 66 - Defence Motion to Acquit, paras 8(b). The Defence point to the difficulties of distinguishing between civilians and combatants in the context of urban warfare. Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 464-82, 707-10. 67 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 464-82. 68 - Id., para. 810. 69 - Id., para. 812. 70 - In its Pre-Trial Brief, the Defence asserts that civilian casualties caused during the conflict in Sarajevo were due to the failure of the ABiH to respect its obligations under Article 58 of Additional Protocol I. Defence Pre-Trial Brief, paras 8.14-8.15. In its Final Trial Brief, the Defence submits that the failure of the ABiH to remove the civilian population from the proximity of military objectives was a violation of its obligations under Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 537. 71 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 13-14, 986. 72 - Blaškic Trial Judgement, para. 180. 73 - Id., para. 180. 74 - Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 328. 75 - See Article 85(3)(a) of Additional Protocol I. 76 - In its broad sense, military necessity means “doing what is necessary to achieve a war aim”. (Dictionary of International Law of Armed Conflict, ed. ICRC, 1992). The principle of military necessity acknowledges the potential for unavoidable civilian death and injury ancillary to the conduct of legitimate military operations. However, this principle requires that destroying a particular military objective will provide some type of advantage in weakening the enemy military forces. Under no circumstance are civilians to be considered legitimate military targets. Consequently, attacking civilians or the civilian population as such cannot be justified by invoking military necessity. See also Art. 57(5) of Additional Protocol I. The following finding by the Nuremberg Tribunal in the United States v. List case provides some guidance in this respect: “Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money [...] It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.” (11 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1253-4 (1950)). 77 - It should be noted further that, in Article 51(6), Additional Protocol I explicitly prohibits “attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals”. This prohibition is based on the principle of protection of civilians. At ratification of Additional Protocol I, a number of states made statements of interpretation which appeared to keep open the possibility of reprisals, subject to certain requirements. For example, Italy’s statement of interpretation included the following: “Italy will react to serious and systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violations.” (Statements of Understanding made by Italy (27 February 1986). See also, e.g., Statement of Understanding made by the United Kingdom (28 January 1998)). The Trial Chamber will not pronounce itself on the legal consequences of these declarations. However, it notes that the language of Article 51(6) of Additional Protocol I implies that the prohibition against reprisals cannot be waived on the grounds of military necessity. 78 - The Trial Chamber notes that, already in 1868, the Preamble to the St Petersburg Declaration stated that the “technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity” and that the weakening of the military forces of the enemy should be “the only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war.” The Brussels Declaration of 1874 stated in its articles 15-18 that civilian dwellings are immune from attacks. This Declaration laid the groundwork for the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which established in its Article 25 that “the attack or bombardment, by any means whatever, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings or building, is forbidden.” In 1937, during the Spanish Civil War, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in the British House of Commons, made explicit reference to the rule forbidding attacks on the civilian population as such. In June 1938, following the German and Italian air forces operations during this conflict and similar attacks carried out by Japan in China, he stated in the House of Commons that one of the three rules or principles of international law equally applicable to air, land, or sea warfare in any armed conflict was the rule whereby “it is against international law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations.” (House of Commons Debates, Vol. 337, 21 June 1938, cols. 937-8). This same rule was later reaffirmed by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1938, which adopted a resolution on 30 September 1938 regarding both the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese-Japanese War, stating in general terms that “intentional bombing of civilian population is illegal.” The applicability of this rule in all armed conflicts was further corroborated by General Assembly Resolutions 2444 (1968) and 2675 (1970), both adopted unanimously. In its Resolution 2444, the General Assembly affirmed that “the following principles for observance by all governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts: (b) that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such”. (G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Session, Supp. No. 18 U.N. Doc A/7218(1968)). In its Resolution 2675, it stated that “the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive development of the international law or armed conflict (4) [C]ivilian populations as such should not be the object of military operations.” (G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Session, Supp. No. 28 U.N. Doc A/8028 (1970)). Evidence of the existence of opinio iuris regarding the prohibition against attacking civilians and its applicability in all armed conflicts can also be found in the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law in its Edinburgh session in 1969, entitled “The Distinction between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objectives in General and Particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction”. It noted that “[e]xisting international law prohibits all armed attacks on the civilian populations as such […].” (D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nihjoff Publisher, 1988, pp 265-6). The customary status of this prohibition is further borne out of the travaux préparatoires of the Additional Protocols. For example, the United Kingdom delegate in the Diplomatic Conference observed that paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 51 entitled “protection of the civilian population" contain "a valuable reaffirmation of existing customary rules of international law" designed to protect civilians. (See 6 Official Records, p. 164). For the Ukrainian delegate, paragraph 2 is "in line with the generally recognized rules of international law" (Ibid, p. 201). The Canadian delegate indicated that many of the provisions of Article 51 are "codification of customary international law” (Ibid, p. 179). The ICRC Commentary describes Article 51 as a “key article in the Protocol” and as an “indispensable provision”. It also points out that Article 51 was originally presented as one of the provisions to which reservations were prohibited (O.R. X, p. 251, CDDH/405/Rev.1). The idea of having a core of provisions to which no reservation would be allowed was eventually rejected, but some delegations nevertheless expressed the view that reservations to this article would be incompatible with object and purpose of the treaty. (O.R. VI, p. 167, CDDH/SR.41, paras 135-7; p. 187, Id. Annex (GDR), pp 192-3 (Mexico)). See also ICRC Commentary, para. 1930. 79 - See Article 48 of Additional Protocol I. This article enunciates the principle of distinction as a basic rule. 80 - ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Report 1996, para. 78. The International Court of Justice further asserted that “these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law”. Id., para.79. 81 - Article 51(1) of Additional Protocol I states clearly that “the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations”. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.” Among the instruments that provide rules for the protection of civilians are, inter alia, the Hague Regulations, annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. 82 - The Trial Chamber recalls that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege “does not prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from determining an issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a particular crime(,( nor does it prevent a court from relying on previous decisions which reflect an interpretation as to the meaning to be ascribed to particular ingredients of a crime.” Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 127. 83 - Art 4 of the Third Geneva Convention states, inter alia: “ A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; c) that of carrying arms openly; d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power (…). 6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” 84 - Art 43 of Additional Protocol I states: “1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.” 85 - See Article 51 (3) of Additional Protocol I. 86 - ICRC Commentary, para. 1944. 87 - Kupreskic Trial Judgement, paras 522-3. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights also provided guidance as to the scope of civilian immunity, in the Tablada case, by stating that: “(…)When civilians, such as those who attacked the Tablada base, assume the role of combatants by directly taking part in fighting, whether singly or as a member of a group, they thereby become legitimate military targets. As such, they are subject to direct individualised attack to the same extent as combatants. Thus, by virtue of their hostile acts, the Tablada attackers lost the benefits of the above mentioned precautions in attack and against the effects of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks pertaining to peaceable civilians. In contrast, these humanitarian law rules continued to apply in full force with respect to those peaceable civilians present or living in the vicinity of the La Tablada base at the time of the hostilities.” Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Report Nº 55/97, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7, p. 271, para. 178 (1997). 88 - Combatant status implies not only being considered a legitimate military objective, but also being able to kill or wound other combatants or individuals participating in hostilities, and being entitled to special treatment when hors-de-combat, i.e. when surrendered, captured or wounded (See Article 41(2) of Additional Protocol I). 89 - See Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I. 90 - See ICRC Commentary, para. 1938. The terms of this provision of Additional Protocol I reflect the language of General Assembly Resolutions 2444 (1968) and 2675 (1970). The Appeals Chamber has considered these resolutions to be declaratory of customary international law in this field. See Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 112. 91 - See Article 50(3) of Additional Protocol I. The Commentary to this paragraph notes that: “(i(n wartime condition it is inevitable that individuals belonging to the category of combatants become intermingled with the civilian population, for example, soldiers on leave visiting their families. However, provided that these are not regular units with fairly large numbers, this does not in any way change the civilian character of a population.” ICRC Commentary, para. 1922. 92 - See Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I. 93 - ICRC Commentary, para. 1920. 94 - Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I. See Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 327. 95 - Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I. 96 - Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol I. 97 - ICRC Commentary, para. 4783. 98 - Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 54; Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 415. 99 - See Article 85(3)(a) of Additional Protocol I. 100 - ICRC Commentary, para. 3474. 101 - Other Trial Chambers have found that attacks which employ certain means of combat which cannot discriminate between civilians and civilian objects and military objectives are tantamount to direct targeting of civilians. For example, the Blaskic Trial Chamber inferred from the arms used in an attack carried out against the town of Stari Vitez that the perpetrators of the attack had wanted to target Muslim civilians, since these arms were difficult to guide accurately, their trajectory was "irregular" and non-linear, thus being likely to hit non-military targets. Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 501, 512. In the Martic Rule 61 proceedings, the Trial Chamber regarded the use of an Orkan rocket with a cluster bomb warhead as evidence of the intent of the accused to deliberately attack the civilian population. The Chamber concluded that “in respect of its accuracy and striking force, the use of the Orkan rocket in this case was not designed to hit military target but to terrorise the civilians of Zagreb. These attacks are therefore contrary to the rules of customary and conventional international law”. The Trial Chamber based this finding on the fact that the rocket was inaccurate, it landed in an area with no military objectives nearby, it was used as an antipersonnel weapon launched against the city of Zagreb and the accused indicated he intended to attack the city, Martic Rule 61 Decision, paras 23-31. It is relevant to note that the International Court of Justice has stated, with regard to the obligation of States not to make civilians the object of attack, that “they must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”, ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Report 1996, para. 78. 102 - Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks and provides the first conventional definition of indiscriminate attacks. Paragraph (5) of the same provision provides examples of attacks considered to be indiscriminate. The Kupreskic Trial Chamber held, with regard to the prohibition of launching indiscriminate attacks, that “it is nevertheless beyond dispute that at a minimum, large numbers of casualties would have been interspersed among the combatants. The point which needs to be emphasised is the sacrosanct character of the duty to protect civilians […] Even if it can be proved that the Muslim population of Ahmici was not entirely civilian but comprised some armed elements, still no justification would exist for widespread and indiscriminate attacks against civilians”. Kupreskic Trial Judgement, para. 513. See also Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 509-10. 103 - As recognized by the Appeals Chamber, among the customary rules that have developed to govern both international conflicts and non-international strife is the protection of the civilian population against indiscriminate attacks. Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 127. The Trial Chamber observes that, already in 1922, the Air Warfare Rules enunciated the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, by providing that “where military objectives were situated so that they could not be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from the bombardments.” (Article 24 (3), Air Warfare Rules). These rules impose further limits to bombardments by providing in Article 24(4) that “in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardments of cities, towns and villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardments, having regard to the danger thus posed to the civilian population”. Although these rules were never adopted in legally binding form, they are considered to be an authorative interpretation of the law. (See, e.g., L. Oppenheim, International Law vol II, 7th ed, 1960). The IX Hague Convention concerning Bombing of Naval Forces in Time of War of 1907 also recognized in its Article 12 that collateral civilian casualties might result and urged that precautions be taken to avoid or minimize them. In March 1938, during the Spanish Civil War, the British Prime Minister explained the protest of his country to General Franco over the bombing of Barcelona to members of the House of Commons by stating that “The one definite rule of international law, however, is that direct and deliberate bombing of non-combatants is in all circumstances illegal, and His Majesty’s Government’s protest was based on information which led them to the conclusion that the bombardments of Barcelona, carried on apparently random and without special aim at military objectives, was in fact of this nature.”(House of Commons Debates, vol. 333, 23 March 1938, col. 1177). In June of that year, in reference to the same conflict, the Prime Minister affirmed before the House of Commons the existence of a rule or principle of international law prescribing that “reasonable care must be taken in attacking….military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian population in the neighbourhood is not bombed.” (House of Common Debates, vol. 337, 21 June 1938, cols 937-8). In 1938, the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations both condemned attacks carried out without sufficient precautions to safeguard the civilian population. The Assembly of the League of Nations expressed the concern that the civilian population be bombarded through negligence by stating, inter alia, that “any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian population in the neighbourhood are not bombed through negligence”. In this same sense, the Council of the League of Nations also adopted a resolution condemning inter alia as “contrary to the conscience of mankind and to the principles of international law air attacks by the insurgents directed “by negligence’ against civilian population.” In its already cited Resolution 2444 (1968), the UN General Assembly affirmed that among the principles applicable to all armed conflicts was that “a distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.” (G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Session, Supp. No. 18 U.N. Doc A/7218(1968)). Resolution 2675(1970) also stated that “in the conduct of military operations, every effort should be made to spare the civilian populations from the ravages of war, and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury loss or damage to the civilian populations.” (G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Session, Supp. No. 28 U.N. Doc A/8028 (1970). 104 - The principle of proportionality, inherent to both the principles of humanity and military necessity upon which the law of conduct of hostilities is based, may be inferred, inter alia, from Articles 15 and 22 of the Lieber Code and from Article 24 of the 1924 Hague Air Warfare Rules. This principle was codified in Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) of Additional Protocol I. It should be noted that these provisions do not make explicit reference to the term “proportionality” but speak of “excessive” incidental civilian losses. Article 51(5) of Additional Protocol I provides that “(a(mong others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: […] (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I states that: “(2). With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) […] (iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 105 - See Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I. The precautions required by Article 57(2)(a) must be “feasible” and, in this context, “feasible” means that which is practicable or practically possible. The French version of this paragraph reads: “faire tout ce qui est pratiquement possible[…]” (emphasis added). Italy stated in a declaration submitted upon ratification of Additional Protocol I that “feasible” must be understood to mean that which is “practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations”. (See Statements of Understanding made by Italy (27 February 1986)). Several states have submitted similar declarations pertaining to Additional Protocol I, with no objections raised by other state parties. (See Statements of Understanding of Belgium (20 May 1986), The Netherlands (26 June 1987), Spain (21 April 1989), Canada (20 November 1990), Germany (14 February 1991), Australia (21 June 1991), and Egypt (9 October 1992). In another context, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights examined a case of “armed clash” in which a woman, standing in the doorway of her home, had been killed in the course of a supposed ambush operation carried out against members of an alleged armed group. Regarding the obligation to avoid incidental civilian losses, the Commission considered that the planning and control of the operation needed to be assessed “… not only in the context of the apparent targets of an operation but, particularly where the use of force is envisaged in the vicinity of the civilian population, with regard to the avoidance of incidental loss of life and injury to others” (Ergi v. Turkey No. 23818/94, Decision on admissibility of 2 March 1995, 80 D&R 157, Commission Report of 20 May 1997). The Court explicitly noted that the responsibility of the State “may also be engaged where ?the security forcesg fail to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of security operation mounted against an opposing group with the view to avoiding, or at least, minimising incidental loss of civilian life” (Ergi v. Turkey, Judgement of 28 July 1998, para. 79). 106 - See Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I. The travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol I indicate that the expression “concrete and direct” was intended to show that the advantage must be “substantial and relatively close”, and that “advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded”. ICRC Commentary, para. 2209. The Commentary explains that “a military advantage can only consist in ground gained or in annihilating or in weakening the enemy armed forces”. ICRC Commentary, para. 2218. Australia and New Zealand stated at the time of ratification, in almost identical wording, that “the term “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’, used in Articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I, means bona fide expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution to the objective of the military attack involved”. (See Statements of Understanding made by New Zealand (8 February 1988) and Australia (21 June 1991)). 107 - See Article 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I. 108 - The ICRC Commentary acknowledges that “the disproportion between losses and damages caused and the military advantages anticipated raises a delicate problem; in some situations there will be no room for doubt, while in other situations there may be reason for hesitation. In such situations, the interests of the civilian population should prevail”. ICRC Commentary, para. 1979. 109 - The Trial Chamber notes that the rule of proportionality does not refer to the actual damage caused nor to the military advantage achieved by an attack, but instead uses the words “expected” and “anticipated”. When ratifying Additional Protocol I, Germany stated that “the decision taken by the person responsible has to be judged on the basis of all information available to him at the relevant time, and not on the basis of hindsight”. (See Statements of Understanding made by Germany (14 February 1991)). Similar declarations were also made by Switzerland (17 February 1982), Italy (27 February 1986), Belgium (20 May 1986), The Netherlands (26 June 1987), New Zealand (8 February 1988), Spain (21 April 1989), Canada (20 November 1990), and Australia (21 June 1991). No other party to Additional Protocol I has raised objections to these declarations. 110 - Military manuals provide guidance as to the practical application of this test. The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Section 5, para. 27 (1992) indicates, for example, that “consideration must be paid to the honest judgement of responsible commanders, based on the information reasonably available to them at the relevant time, taking fully into account the urgent and difficult circumstances under which such judgements are usually made” and indicates that the proportionality test must be examined on the basis of “what a reasonable person would do” in such circumstances. The Australian Defence Force, Law of Armed Conflict – Commander’s Guide (1994), at p. 9-10, and the New Zealand Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, at para. 515(4), contain a similar provision. See also, e.g., Yugoslav Regulation on the Application of international Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SRFY, para. 72 (1988). 111 - See Article 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I. 112 - See Article 58 of Additional Protocol I. 113 - The Prosecution refers to it as “the offence of terror”: see, for example, Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 25. 114 - In the Celebici case, acts of intimidation creating an “atmosphere of terror” in prison camps were punished as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (torture or inhuman treatment) and as violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions (torture or cruel treatment): Celebici Trial Judgement, paras 976, 1056, 1086-91, and 1119. In the Blaškic case “the atmosphere of terror reigning in the detention facilities” was part of the factual basis leading to the Accused in that case being convicted for the crimes of inhuman treatment (a grave breach) and cruel treatment (a violation of the laws or customs of law): Blaškic Trial Judgement, paras 695, 700, and 732-3. Blaškic’s additional conviction for “unlawful attack” on civilians was based in part upon the finding that his soldiers “terrorised the civilians by intensive shelling, murders and sheer violence” (Id., para. 630; also paras 505, 511). And in the Krstic case, General Krstic was accused of persecutions, a crime against humanity, on the basis of his alleged participation in “the terrorising of Bosnian Muslim civilians”: Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 533. The Trial Chamber found that a “terror campaign” was in existence: “Numerous witnesses gave evidence that, during Operation Krivaja 95, the VRS shelled the Srebrenica enclave intensively with the apparent intent to terrify the populace” (Id., para. 122). Moreover: “On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the arrival of Serb forces in Potocari, the Bosnian Muslim refugees taking shelter in and around the compound were subjected to a terror campaign comprised of threats, insults, looting and burning of nearby houses, beatings, rapes, and murders” (Id., para. 150). The Trial Chamber in Krstic characterized “the crimes of terror”, and the forcible transfer of the women, children, and elderly at Potocari as constituting persecution and inhumane acts (Id., para. 607; see also paras 1, 41, 44, 46, 147, 153, 292, 364, 517, 527, 537, 653, 668, 671, 677). See also Martic Rule 61 Decision, paras 23-31 (use of rocket was not designed to strike a military target but to terrorize the civilian population of Zagreb contrary to the rules of international law); and Nikolic Sentencing Judgement, para. 38. 115 - The Special Court for Sierra Leone has issued several indictments containing counts of “acts of terrorism” (“terrorizing the civilian population”) brought pursuant to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol II; see . 116 - Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 132. 117 - P58. 118 - Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 136. 119 - Id., para. 141. The Prosecution Final Trial Brief (para. 8, fn. 5) simply referred back to the submissions in the Pre-trial Brief. 120 - Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 142. These elements were repeated without change in the Prosecution Final Trial Brief (para. 8). 121 - Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 144. 122 - Id., para. 144. 123 - Id., paras 143, 148. 124 - Id., para. 149. 125 - Id., para. 150. 126 - Id., para. 25 (emphasis added). 127 - Id., paras 142-3 (emphasis added). 128 - Id., para. 145 (emphasis added). 129 - Id., para. 147. 130 - Id., 109. 131 - Response to Acquittal Motion, para. 16. 132 - As mentioned above, para. 8 of the Prosecution Final Trial Brief simply reverts to the submissions in the Pre-trial Brief. 133 - Art. 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Art. 13(2) of Additional Protocol II. 134 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, paras 8.11, 8.23, 8.24. 135 - Id., para. 8.20. 136 - Id., para. 8.20. 137 - Defence Closing Arguments, T. 21807. 138 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, paras 8.21-8.24. 139 - See Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1097-104. 140 - Id., para. 445. 141 - Id., para. 446. 142 - Id., para. 888. 143 - Id., para. 584. 144 - Defence Closing Arguments, T. 21810. 145 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 977. 146 - Id., paras 971-2. 147 - T. 21966-73. 148 - See supra, paras 23-4. 149 - It should be noted, however, that the Defence’s submissions on the constraining effect of Article 2 common (“Common Article 2”) to the Geneva Conventions on the applicability of Additional Protocol I are not accurate. While it is true that the scope of that Protocol’s application is given in Article 1 of the protocol as corresponding to the situations referred to in Common Article 2 – namely “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties”, as well as “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party” – clearly this does not have the effect of limiting the application of the Conventions and the Protocol to the cases mentioned above. Thus a unilateral declaration pursuant to Article 96 of Additional Protocol I by the representative authority of a people “fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination” may be enough to bring into force the Conventions and the Protocol, even though the authority is not a state power. More pertinently, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions enables parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force all or part of the Conventions and, by extension, all or part of Additional Protocol I supplementing the Conventions. 150 - The Majority is aware that several international instruments exist outlawing “terrorism” in various forms. The Majority necessarily limits itself to the legal regime that has been developed with reference to conventional armed conflict between States, or between governmental authorities and organized armed groups, or between such groups within a State. In other words, the Majority proceeds on the understanding that the present case will have a basis, if at all, in the legal regime of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols and not in international efforts directed against “political” varieties of terrorism. The Majority would also note that “terrorism” has never been singly defined under international law. The first international attempt at codification of “terrorism” was the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 LNOJ 23 (1938), which however did not receive sufficient ratifications and was not pursued. Since that time the international community has followed a thematic approach to the characterization of international terrorism, with subject-specific conventions such as the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 2 ILM 1042 (1963); the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105; the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 UNTS 177; the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 13 ILM 41 (1974); the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 18 ILM 1460 (1979); 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 37 ILM 249 (1998); 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 39 ILM 270 (2000); and Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (in process of negotiation), UN Doc. A/C6/53/L4, Annex I (1998). This incomplete list of relevant global instruments also does not include regional anti-terrorism agreements. Related resolutions of the UN General Assembly include the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, and the 1995 Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/50/53 (“that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them”). The prohibition of terror against the civilian population in times of war, which (as discussed below) is given expression in Geneva Convention IV and the Additional Protocols, is another example of the thematic, subject-specific, approach to “terrorism”. 151 - As will be seen, one of the Majority’s conclusions is that proof of actual infliction of terror is not a legal element of the crime under any interpretation of Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. This finding does not, of course, amount to a narrowing of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction; on the contrary, the Majority’s rejection of this supposed element proposed by the Prosecution leads to a broader definition of the offence. 152 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. 153 - Reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969). 154 - 999 UNTS 171. 155 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 408. 156 - Id., para. 413. On the principle of legality see also Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 126-7 (“the principle of nullum crimen sine lege ... does not prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from determining an issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a particular crime”); and Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 193 (“the Trial Chamber must further satisfy itself that the criminal conduct in question was sufficiently defined and was sufficiently accessible at the relevant time for it to warrant a criminal conviction and sentencing under the criminal heading chosen by the Prosecution”). 157 - See P58 (22 May Agreement), para. 2.5. 158 - Id., para. 2.3. 159 - Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 143. This was also the view of Security Council members. Speaking at a meeting of the Council on 25 May 1993, at which the Tribunal’s Statute was adopted, France’s representative commented that “the expression ‘laws or customs of war’ used in Article 3 of the Statute covers specifically, in the opinion of France, all the obligations that flow from the humanitarian law agreements in force on the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time when the offences were committed” (UN Doc. S/PV.3217, p. 11). The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom expressed the same view (Id., pp 15 and 19, respectively). 160 - See ICRC Commentary, para. 4785: “Attacks aimed at terrorizing are just one type of attack, but they are particularly reprehensible. Attempts have been made for a long time to prohibit such attacks, for they are frequent and inflict particularly cruel suffering upon the civilian population.” (Emphasis added.) While the second part of 51(2) uses the expression “acts or threats of violence”, and not “attacks”, the concept of “attack” is defined in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I as “acts of violence”. 161 - See the discussion in the preceding section on the crime of attack on civilians. See as well ICRC Commentary, para. 1923. The Trial Chamber also notes that in a 1995 decision on the applicability of Additional Protocol II to the conflict in Colombia, the Constitutional Court of Colombia accepted the customary-law status of Article 13 of the Protocol, including the prohibition against terror: Ruling No. C-225/95, excerpted in translation in M. Sassòli and A. A. Bouvier (eds.), How Does Law Protect in War? (Geneva: ICRC, 1999), p. 1366 (para. 30) (henceforth “Sassòli & Bouvier”). 162 - Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 17 vols. (Geneva: ICRC, 1974-77) (henceforth “Records”). 163 - The draft provision was then numbered 46. 164 - Records, vol. XIV, p. 36. 165 - Id., vol. XIV, pp 48-75. 166 - The original formulation of the second part was: “In particular, methods intended to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” 167 - Records, vol. XV, p. 241. 168 - Id., vol. XV, p. 274. 169 - Id., vol. XV, pp 328-31. 170 - Id., vol. VI, p. 163. 171 - Id., vol. VI, pp 161-2; see also vol. VII, p. 193. 172 - Id., vol. VI, pp 164-8, 187-8 (FRG). 173 - Id., vol. VI, p. 177. See also the comments of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Id., vol. VI, p. 201. 174 - Id., vol. VII, pp 194 and 205, respectively. 175 - Id., vol. VII, pp 191-251. 176 - By 1992, when there were around 191 countries in the world, 118 States had ratified Additional Protocol I and five had signed the treaty without ratifying it. The State of Bosnia-Herzegovina succeeded to the Protocol on 31 December 1992. This information is available at the ICRC’s web site: . 177 - Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. 178 - See Art. 85(3) of Additional Protocol I. 179 - Certain threats of violence would undoubtedly involve grave consequences. For example, a credible and well publicized threat to bombard a civilian settlement indiscriminately, or to attack with massively destructive weapons, will most probably spread extreme fear among civilians and result in other serious consequences, such as displacement of sections of the civilian population. 180 - Trial of Shigeki Motomura and 15 Others, 13 Law R. Trials War Crim. 138 (“Motomura case”). 181 - Id., pp. 138-9. 182 - Decree No. 44 (1946), in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1946. 183 - “Systematische terreur” in original, which translates as systematic terror and not terrorism. 184 - Motomura case, p. 140. 185 - Id., p. 143. 186 - Id., p. 144. 187 - Id., p. 140. 188 - On the Commission on Responsibilities, see UN War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London: HMSO, 1948), Ch. III. 189 - Cited in Id., pp. 33-4. 190 - See, Id., pp. 34-5 (reproduction of the Commission’s list of war crimes). 191 - Id., p. 51. 192 - Id., pp. 48-51 (summaries of cases heard). 193 - Reproduced in Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 312. 194 - Id., p. 390. 195 - See 5 Law R. Trials War Crim. 94-97. 196 - Armed forces manuals soon incorporated the prohibition. See, for example, United States Field Manual No. 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army), para. 272 (1956); United Kingdom Manual of Military Law, Part III: The Law of War on Land (London: The War Office, HMSO), para. 42 (1958). 197 - Criminal Code 1960 (Belgrade: Union of Jurists’ Associations, 1960), pp. 48-9, emphasis added. 198 - See Criminal Code 1964, translated by M. Damaška (Beograd: Institute of Comparative Law), Art. 125. The words “use of measures of intimidation and terror” appear instead, a difference in translation. 199 - Unattributed translation available at ICTY Library. The translation was checked against the original Code (Službeni list SFRJ, br. 44/76), also available at the ICTY Library. 200 - P5.1 (translation). Other post-1977 military manuals from around the world cite terror as an impermissible means of warfare or refer to Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. See, for example, German Military Manual (Humanitäres Völkrerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten-Handbuch), Section 451 (1992) (English translation available at ICTY library); New Zealand Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, Article 517 (1992); Soviet Minister of Defence Order No. 75 of 16 February 1990 on the Publication of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Victims of War and their Additional Protocols, Article 5, para. (o) (1990) (French translation available at the ICRC’s web site: .). 201 - P5.1, p. 6. 202 - Id., p. 11. 203 - Id., p. 14. 204 - Id., p. 18, emphasis added. 205 - Id., p. 19. 206 - Id., p. 29. 207 - Id., p. 14. 208 - Id., p. 15. 209 - Id., p. 20. 210 - The Criminal Code of 1990 was published in Službeni list SFRJ, br. 38/90 and is available at ICTY Library. 211 - P82.1 (translation). 212 - P276.1 (translation). 213 - Id., p. 3. 214 - Id., p. 7. 215 - Id., p. 7 (emphasis added). 216 - Id., p. 8. 217 - Id., p. 8. 218 - Para. 5 of the 22 May agreement, emphasis added. 219 - The 22 May Agreement did not make explicit reference to Article 85 of Additional Protocol I (“repression of breaches”), although it incorporated the grave breaches regime by committing the parties to the terms of Geneva Conventions I and II (para. 2.1 of the 22 May Agreement). Subsequent agreements among the parties to the conflict, cited in the preceding section, also indicate an intention to prosecute those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. See, e.g., Article 3(1) of the Programme for Action on Humanitarian Issues and Article 3 of the October Agreement. 220 - Prosecutor v. R. Radulovic et al., Split County Court, Republic of Croatia, Case No. K-15/95, Verdict of 26 May 1997; excerpted in translation in Sassòli & Bouvier, pp 1263-8. The events considered in this case occurred between September 1991 and January 1993. 221 - See Art. 85(3) (in part) of Additional Protocol I. See also ICRC Commentary, para. 1932 and para. 1941. 222 - As stated in an earlier , the Majority has not considered it necessary to enter into discussion of “political” terrorist violence and of attempts to regulate it through international conventions. Nevertheless, for comparative purposes, it may be of interest that the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 39 ILM 270 (2000), defines terrorism as including: “Art. 2: ... (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” 223 - This is not to say that the factual allegations in the indictment concerning actual infliction of terror do not remain relevant to the case. These will be discussed later in the Judgement. 224 - Certain States attempted to have intent substituted with actual infliction of terror: see the joint proposal by Algeria et al., Records, vol. III, p. 205, as well as the proposals by Mongolia (Id., vol. XIV, p. 53), Iraq (Id., vol. XIV, p. 54), Indonesia (Id., vol. XIV, p. 55), and USSR (Id., vol. XIV, p. 73). Other States tried for “acts capable of spreading terror” (see, e.g., Ghana et al., Id., vol. III, p. 203). All these proposals failed and the intent requirement was kept. 225 - Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, paras 25, 142-3; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 888. 226 - This is clear from the travaux préparatoires of the Diplomatic Conference. For example, Romania, Records, vol. III, pp. 200-1 (reprisals and other unlawful attacks); GDR, Id., vol. IV, p. 79 (reprisals or terror attacks); Indonesia, Id., vol. XIV, p. 55 (attack on the civilian population and the spreading of terror should be given “almost the same emphasis”); Ukrainian SSR: “Article (51( widens the scope of protection for the civilian population and individual civilians, who under no circumstances shall be the object of attack. In particular, paragraph 2 explicitly prohibits acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population; this is in line with the generally recognized rules of international law, which lay down that Parties to the conflict shall not make the civilian population an object of attack” (Id., vol. VI, p. 201). 227 - ICRC Commentary, para. 1940: “the Conference wished to indicate that the prohibition covers acts intended to spread terror”. 228 - At the Diplomatic Conference, Egypt said that the words “intended to” in the original version should be replaced by some other expression “in view of the difficulty of establishing intent” (Records, vol. XIV, pp. 56-7). France responded that “In traditional wars attacks could not fail to spread terror among the civilian population. What should be prohibited in paragraph 1 is the intention to do so” (Id., vol. XIV, p. 65). The comments by Iran should also be noted: “Although objections had been raised to the phrase ‘methods intended to spread terror’ in paragraph 1, methods of war undoubtedly did spread terror among the civilian population, and those used exclusively or mainly for that purpose should be prohibited” (Id., vol. XIV, p. 64). Reporting on its second session, Committee III stated: “The prohibition of acts or threats of violence which have the primary object of spreading terror’ is directed to intentional conduct specifically directed toward the spreading of terror and excludes terror which was not intended by a belligerent and terror that is merely an incidental effect of acts of warfare which have another primary object and are in all other respects lawful” (Id., vol. XV, p. 274, emphasis added). 229 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 249; Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 141. 230 - Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 249. 231 - Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 249 and 251. 232 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 85. 233 - Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 54; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 415. 234 - Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 416. 235 - Id., para. 416 endorsed by Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 89. 236 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 86 quoting Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 251. 237 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 86; Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 251. 238 - Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 421, endorsed by Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 91. 239 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 91. 240 - Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 56; Kunarac Trial Judgement, paras 421-426. 241 - Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 56; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 425; Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 638. 242 - Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 56; Kupreskic Trial Judgement, paras 547-549; Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 214; Jelisic Trial Judgement, para. 54. 243 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 90. 244 - Id. 245 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 38. 246 - Id., para. 38. 247 - Id., para. 38. 248 - Krnojelac Trial Judgment at para. 54. 249 - Id., para. 88. 250 - Id. 251 - Id., para. 94. 252 - Id., citing inter alia the discussion in Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 648. 253 - Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 95; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 430. 254 - Id. 255 - Id. (and discussion thereof). 256 - Id., para. 98. 257 - Id., para. 102. 258 - Id., para. 102. 259 - Id., para. 103. 260 - Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 59; Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 434; Blaskic Trial Judgment, para. 251. 261 - Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 205; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 324; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 236; Kupreskic Trial Judgement, paras 560-1; Rutaganda Trial Judgement, para. 80-1; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 589. 262 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 439. The element of inflicting “serious injury” is expressed as infliction of “grievous bodily harm or serious injury” in, e.g., Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 205; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 324 263 - Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 234; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 130; Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 206; Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 269. 264 - Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 234; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, par 130; Kayishema Trial Judgement, paras 151, 154. 265 - Kvocka Trial Judgment, para. 208; Blaškic Trial Judgment, para. 239. 266 - Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 235; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 131; Celebici Trial Judgment, para. 536; Jelisic Trial Judgment para. 57; Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 501. 267 - Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 236; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 132; Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 153. 268 - The Defence contends that cumulative charging under Counts 1 (Infliction of terror), 4 (attacks on civilians through sniping) and 7 (attacks on civilians through shelling) constitutes an error of law since, under all three Counts, the protected object is constituted by the civilian population and “illegal action against civilians can not be qualified as three different criminal offences only on the grounds of the armament from which [sic] the action is taken”, Defence Pre-Trial Brief, paras 8.18, 8.19, 8.24; Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1099, 1101, 1102, 1104. 269 - Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 400; see also Kupreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 385. 270 - Celebici Appeal Judgment, para. 412. 271 - Celebici Appeal Judgment, para. 413. 272 - Jelisic Appeals Judgment, para. 82. Article 3 of the Statute requires a close link between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict; that element is not required for crimes under Article 5. Article 5 requires proof that the act of the Accused formed part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population; that element is not required for crimes falling under Article 3 of the Statute. It follows that each crime under these Articles has a distinct material element to be proven at trial not required by the other. The test is met and it is permissible to cumulatively convict under both statutory provisions. 273 - Indictment, para. 10. 274 - Id., para. 11. 275 - Id., para. 10. 276 - Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 189, Kupreskic Trial Judgement, para. 746; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 388, Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 602. 277 - Cf. Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR. See also the Prosecution Pre-trial Brief (paras 69 et seq.) and the Defence’s submissions on Article 7 in its Pre-trial Brief (paras 6.1-6.35). 278 - Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 480. See also Blaškic Trial Judgement, para. 279; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 386 quoting the Akayesu Trial Judgement. 279 - Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 473. 280 - If the person planning a crime also commits it, he or her is only punished for the commission of the crime and not for its planning, Kordic Judgement, para. 386 (quoting the Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 278). 281 - Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 482; Blaškic Trial Judgement, para. 280; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387. 282 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 252, citing Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387. 283 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 252, citing Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387. 284 - Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 601, citing Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 483; Blaškic Trial Judgement, para. 281; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 388. 285 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, paras 250-1. 286 - Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 188. 287 - Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 162-4. 288 - Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 188. 289 - Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 337. 290 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, paras 6.3-6.4. 291 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 341, quoted in Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 238. 292 - Rule 61 Decision of 13 September 1996, Case No. IT-95-12, Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, paras 59-61; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 388; Martinovic Trial Judgement, para. 61; see also Abbaye Ardenne case (Trial of SS Brigadenfuhrer Kurt Meyer), Case n. 22, Canadian Military Court in Aurich (Germany), in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, volume IV, pp 97-112, stating that “?tghere is no evidence that anyone heard any particular words uttered by the accused which would constitute an order, but it is not essential that such evidence be adduced. The giving of the order may be proven circumstantially; that is to say, you may consider the facts you find to be proved bearing upon the question whether the alleged order was given, and if you find that the only reasonable inference is that an order […] was given by the accused at the time and place alleged, and that the [order was complied with], you may properly find the accused guilty.” Inferences of this kind were also drawn by the International Military Tribunal for the Far-East sitting at Tokyo, Japan (IMTFE); see section “Massacres were ordered” in Röling and Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgement, Amsterdam, 1977, vol. I, page 400, where massacres of prisoners of war were inferred to have occurred in various detention camps based on only one order in relation to one camp coupled with testimonies with regard to other camps 293 - See Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 384-6; Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 307. Some of these factors were cited in the UN Commission of Experts, Final Report, S/1994/627, 27 May 1994. 294 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 251, citing Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 688 and Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 327. 295 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 328. 296 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 346; Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 69; Blaškic Trial Judgement, para. 294; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 401; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 395, Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 604; Kvocka Trial Judgement para. 314. 297 - Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras 255-6. 298 - Id., paras 192, 256. 299 - Id., para. 197. 300 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 386, quoting the Commission of Experts Report, p. 17. 301 - Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 238. 302 - Id., para. 238. 303 - Id., para. 239. 304 - Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 395. 305 - Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 173; see also Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 652. 306 - The video interview is contained in a CD-rom marked with the ERN number V000-0120. 307 - In its Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution elaborated the notion of a “campaign”, to the extent of alleging that it was “covert” (para. 62), that it had an "intensity" which was “modulated” (para. 67) and was “sensitive to international pressure” (para. 68), that it featured “widespread indiscriminate shelling” (para. 163), and that it was "widespread and systematic" (para. 571). In its closing arguments, the Prosecution associated the notion of “campaign” with a “pattern of behaviour”, “resources ... marshalled to achieve a particular objective”, “degree of planning”, “allocation of assets”, and so forth (T. 21991-2). The Trial Chamber does not find any of these submissions as substantially adding essential elements to the notion of “campaign” referred to in the Indictment. 308 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, 3. 309 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 11; Acquittal Motion, para. 11. 310 - Indictment, counts 2 to 4. 311 - See for instance Scheduled Sniping Incident 15. 312 - The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, 1991) defines “to snipe” as “to shoot or fire at (men, etc.) one at a time, usually from cover and at long range.” The Collins Shorter Dictionary and Thesaurus (1995) gives this variety: “to shoot at enemy from cover.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (1996) has it as “to shoot at individuals as opportunity offers from a concealed or distant position.” 313 - Witness DP36, T. 18103. 314 - Kovac, T. 836-7. 315 - Briquemont, T. 10165-6. 316 - Hamill, T. 6060. 317 - Hamill, T. 6156. 318 - P3675, p. 8; Hamill, T. 6208-10. Milenko Indic, liaison officer of the SRK, referred to “sniping” even more broadly, indicating that all infantry weapons were referred to as snipers during the war: T. 18570. 319 - Indictment, para. 15. 320 - Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Decision [Appeals Chamber] on Application by Defence for Leave to Appeal, 30 November 2001, para. 16. 321 - Indictment, para. 4(a), see Annex A. 322 - Defence Counsel, T. 20073; see also Prosecutor, T. 20334, 20353. 323 - See, for example, Tadic Trial Judgement, paras 53-126; Kordic Trial Judgement, paras 453-466; Celebici Trial Judgement, paras 91-119; Martinovic Trial Judgement, paras 13-25. 324 - The term BiH will be used throughout the Judgement to denote, according to the context, either the federate entity before the dissolution of the SFRY or the sovereign state emerged during 1992. 325 - According to both the 1981 and the 1991 censuses, the BiH ethnic composition was approximately 44% Muslims, 31% Serbs, and 17% Croats. Guskova Report, p. 3. The demographic data on Sarajevo are in dispute among the Parties in this trial. The Defence relies on the 1981 census (Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 4-6), while the Prosecution alleges that the 1991 census is a reliable source of data. 326 - Guskova Report, p. 6; Donia Report, p.1. 327 - Donia Report, p. 1. 328 - Guskova Report, p. 8; Radinovic Report, para. 26. 329 - Radinovic, although denying that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was of international character (Radinovic Report, para. 2) stated that the war started “in the frontier areas between the former Yugoslav Republics” (Radinovic Report, para. 5). 330 - Donia Report, pp 2-3. 331 - Guskova Report, pp 10-11; Donia Report, p. 3. 332 - Donia Report, p. 3. 333 - Donia Report, p. 3, reports that voters were required to identify themselves as to their ethnicity and that the few non-Serb voters received ballots of a different colour. 334 - In Sarajevo, they headed towards the Lukavica barracks and were seen passing through the streets in Dobrinja, Hadžic,T. 12201. 335 - Guskova Report, pp. 8; 12-13; Radinovic Report, para. 70. 336 - Donia Report, pp. 4-6. 337 - See SC Resolution 721 of 27 November 1991. 338 - SC Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992, reaffirmed by S.C. Resolution 749 of 7 April 1992. 339 - Kupusovic, T. 614-6; Guskova Report, p. 13; Donia Report, p. 8; Terzic Report, p. 49, suggesting that the constitutionally mandated majority of two thirds for the vote had not been reached. 340 - Guskova Report, p. 18. 341 - Radinovic Report paras 53-54; 61-62; Karavelic, T. 11894-11904; Kupusovic, T. 644; Sabljica, T. 5310. 342 - Stipulated Facts 3, 4. 343 - Kupusovic, T. 610; Radinovic Report, para. 99. 344 - Stipulated Facts 2, 5, 6; Guskova Report, p. 40; Kupusovic, T. 610-612; Briquemont, T. 10144-5. 345 - Donia Report, p. 1; Radinovic Report, paras 78-82. With respect to the population in Sarajevo, according to the 1991 census, the population was 592,980– about 49.2% Muslims, 29.8% Serbs, 6.6% Croats, 10.7% self-described Yugoslavs, and 3.7% of other nationalities. Donia Report (Appendix B); Kupusovic, T. 610. According to the Radinovic Report (para. 83) and Smail Cekic’s estimates, the population in 1992 was about 527,000, of which 220,000-259,000 Muslims (Cekic, T. 12871-2). 346 - Donia Report, Appendix B; witness AD, T. 10651 (closed session). The Defence stresses that in at least 8 of the ten municipalities of Sarajevo, more than 50% of the land was possessed by Serbs, and claims that Bosnian Serbs were deeply rooted in the area (Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 4, 6; Radinovic Report, para. 84; Terzic Report, pp 18-21). The contribution of Serbs to Sarajevo history and culture are extensively dealt with in the Terzic Report, especially pp. 18-32. The Trial Chamber does not deem it necessary to take a position on the possible relevance of these data and on their conflicting interpretations. On Ilidza, see Radinovic Report, para. 84. 347 - Kupusovic, T. 616; Sokolar, T. 3586-8; Donia Report, p. 8; Radinovic Report, para. 111; Fact agreed in Court by the Parties, T. 15240. 348 - Guskova Report, p. 19; Radinovic Report, paras 113-114. 349 - Donia Report, p. 8; Guskova Report, p 14; Radinovic Report, para. 111; Sokolar, T. 3566; 3586; Witness AD, T. 10654-5 (closed session). 350 - Stipulated Fact 15; Sokolar, T. 3605; Guskova Report, p. 22. Shooting took place at, among other places, the Assembly of the Serbian People of BiH. Facts agreed in Court by the Parties, T. 7658-9; Sokolar, T. 3569; Kupusovic, T. 616; witness DP36, T. 18016. 351 - Donia Report, p. 9; Kupusovic, T. 616; DP36, T. 18016-18025; DP3, T. 13508. 352 - Donia Report, p. 9. 353 - Donia Report, pp 9-10. 354 - Donia Report, p. 9; Kupusovic, T. 622-623. 355 - Kupusovic, T. 635-7; 716-8. Eldar Hafizovic thought the incident had taken place on 1 May 1993, although was not sure of the date and only remembered with certainty it occurred on a holiday, T. 7757; see also fact agreed in Court by the Parties, T. 13531-5. 356 - Kupusovic, T. 636-7. A similar chronology and response of shock by Sarajevan civilians was provided by other witnesses, for instance Witness J said the war in Sarajevo first broke out on 4 April 1992 and for the first ten days or so, no one could believe it. Then there was a “feeling that something was wrong” and the shooting started. Around 2 May 1992, the war really started with shooting and shelling regularly occurring which continued up to and beyond September 1992 (T. 8043). 357 - Kupusovic, T. 643; Donia Report, p. 10; Radinovic Report, para. 14; witness DP36 confirmed that the eye-witnessed JNA withdrawal, T. 18035-18036. During the withdrawal, forces loyal to the Presidency attacked retreating columns of JNA soldiers on various occasions with the aim to seize military material; Radinovic Report, paras 27-28; 56. 358 - Donia Report, p. 11; Radinovic Report, paras 12-15; 126. 359 - Stipulated Fact 18; Radinovic Report, para. 12. 360 - UN GA Res. 46/237, 22 May 1992, UN doc. A/Res/46/237 (1992). 361 - UN SC Res. 752, 15 May 1992 and UN SC Res. 757, 30 May 1992; Guskova, T. 19427; Guskova Report, p. 19. 362 - Stipulated Fact 19; Radinovic Report, paras 14; 126. 363 - Radinovic, T. 21068; Radinovic Report, paras 92-95. 364 - TO units, the bulk of local defence strategy in SFRY times, had started splitting along ethnic lines since late 1991, Karavelic, T. 11904. 365 - Donia Report, pp. 7-8; Robert Donia, T. 7620; Witness D, T. 1890; DP9, T. 14441; Golic, T. 14847-51; 14860; Witness DP5, T. 15239-42 (stating that, in Nedarici, the TO had become a military organization in March 1992; after May 1992, BiH forces used weapons and material left behind by the JNA) and T. 15247-9 (stating that TO members were recognised retroactively as having enlisted into the military from 4 April 1992); Witness DP53, T. 16114; Dževlan, T. 3515 (affirming that the JNA evolved into the VRS); Kupusovic, T. 643. The Radinovic Report (para. 19) states that professional soldiers of the VRS originated from BiH, “while the major part of the command cadre originated from the reserve cadre contingent.” The assistance from Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the VRS and the Republika Srpska is described in the Radinovic Report, para. 49. Contacts of Bosnian Serbs with the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia as early as in Autumn 1991 are discussed by the Guskova Report, p. 16. 366 - Stipulated Fact 20. Each brigade headquarters included a staff whose structure replicated that of the Corps headquarters in order to facilitate communication. Philipps, T. 11692-3. 367 - Philipps, T. 11685. In the first phase of its existence, the SRK consisted of thirteen brigades, three independent regiments for support, and five battalions for servicing and supplies. Three brigades from the earliest composition of the 4th Corps of the JNA became part of the SRK: the 49th Motorized Brigade (reformed and renamed 1st Sarajevo Motorized Brigade); the 120th Light Infantry Brigade (renamed 2nd Sarajevo Light infantry Brigade); the 216th Mountain Brigade (renamed 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade), which was located east of Sarajevo in Pale; Radinovic Report, para. 92. The other Brigades were: the Novo Sarajevo Brigade, the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, and the Kosevo, Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, Blazuj, Hadzici, Rogatica and Trnovo Light Brigades. The regiments were grouped as: artillery, anti-tank, anti-armour. The battalions were: military police, medical battalion, engineering, transportation and logistics (Phillips, T. 11529). During the summer and autumn of 1992, the SRK composition was being finalised. Brigades were reconstituted, so that the Trnovo and Novo Sarajevo Brigades were brought under the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade; also, the Igman Brigade was formed from the Blazuj and Hadžici ones (DP18, T. 16433-16434). At the end of November 1992, the Romanija Motorized Brigade and the Rogatica Brigade were transferred to the VRS Drina Corps (Philipps, T. 11528), so that the number of SRK brigades was brought down to nine (Philipps, Chart 2). Towards the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994, the Rajlovac, the Vogosca and the Kosevo brigades were integrated into a new 3rd Sarajevo Brigade and the total number of brigades was reduced to seven (Philipps, T. 11570-1, Chart 3; Radinovic Report, para. 13 of Summary and Conclusions). An estimate of the positions of the single brigades of the SRK in the Sarajevo region is provided by the Radinovic Report, para. 129. 368 - Philipps, T. 11546; for instance, as of 11 April 1993, the 2nd Sarajevo Light infantry Brigade was composed of only 56 men (T. 11558), while the Ilidža brigade consisted of about 3,000 troops (T. 11559). 369 - A brigade generally consisted of several battalions varying in size from 56 to over 700 troops. Philipps, T. 11554. A battalion was divided into companies. Philipps, T. 11555; Witness DP4, T. 14201; Briquemont, T. 10115. A company was divided into four platoons with 24 to 32 members, Witness DP9, T. 14505-14507.. 370 - Radinovic Report, para. 106; Karavelic, T. 12005; Lazic, T. 13755-6 (Ilidza, Nedarici); Kolp, T. 8256, Kupusovic, T. 657 and Niaz, T. 9081 (with respect to Grbavica). 371 - Radinovic Report, para. 129. Radinovic stated that the description was made on the basis of the operative documents of the warring sides which were accessible to them, on the basis of secondary sources as well as on the basis of recounts of brigade commanders and other superior officers of the SRK. The information provided by Radinovic is however not properly sourced, and the Trial Chamber only refers to it as general information with no specific value in respect to the charges bright in the Indictment. Radinovic stated that until the end of 1992, the SRK positions were as follows: (1) the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade on the front from Gornji Kotorac to the left and Knjeginac to the right. The front line from Grbavica to Knjeginac was held by forces of 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, from the beginning of the war til mid 1993. (2) the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade from Knjeginac up to Pasino Brdo (front of 65 km) (3) Kosevo Light Infantry Brigade defended the part of the front from Pasino Brdo up to Hotonj (front of 9.5km). (4) Vogosca Brigade was holding the front from Hotonj up to Perivoje (front of 29 km). (5) Rajlovac Brigade was holding the front from Perivoje up to Azici (front of 12 kilometers). In the first part of 1994, these three brigades were joined into one. (6) Illida Brigade was positioned from Azici up to Plandiste (front of 18 km) and (7) 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade was also holding the part of the front from Gornij Kotorac up to Krupac, and then also on the exterior ring from Krupac up to Jagodnica (front of 14 km). Caution is further required when examining the positions above because Radinovic provided other details in para. 15 of summary and conclusions of his Report, stating that, in the second half of 1992, the SRK was in the following operative disposition : the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade on the front Trebevic-Hresa; the Kosevo Brigade from Pasino Brdo to Mrkovic, with the front facing Kosevo; the Vogosca Brigade from Radava to Dobrosevica, with Vogosca in the depth; the Ilijas Brigade along the line Visoko-Ilijas-Semizovac; the Rajlovac Brigade on the part of the front from Vrelo Bosne to Dogdol, on the most difficult position in Nedzarici, on Stup, and in part towards Igman; the Igman brigade on the line Tarcin-Pazaric towards Hadzici; the Vojkovac, i.e. the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, on the front from Kotorac to Krupac, facing Hrasnica and Butmir; the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade on the front from Lukavica to Grbacica with the positions towards Butmir, Dobrinja, Mojmilo and Hrasno; the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment in the region of Crepoljsko; the 4th Mixed Anti-Armor Artillery Regiment in Mokro on the positions in Hresa and Han Darventa. 372 - Radinovic Report, para. 131; the SRK controlled on the west and north-west of the city Vogosca, Raijlovac and Hadzici; on the south-east, Mount Trebevic, Tucker, T. 9926; Kolp, T. 8287; 9418; Sokolar, T. 3568; Kupusovic, T. 657-658; Van Lynden, T. 2103; DP36, T. 18047-8. 373 - See, inter alia, Witness AD, T. 10570 (howitzers targeted Sarajevo at least from August 1993) (closed session); Kupusovic, T. 772; Hajir, T. 1677-1681; Sabljica, T. 5314; Golic, T. 14940; The SRK shelled, inter alia, the Tito Barracks after retreating from them and leaving behind part of former JNA heavy weaponry, Van Lynden, T. 2134-7, 2211. 374 - Witness DP14, T. 15839; Witness J, T. 8043; Witness D (referring to SRK takeover of Grbavica), T. 1884-9; Van Lynden, T. 2210 (referring to ABiH takeover of Mojmilo); Hajir, T. 1677-1681; Maljanovic, T. 2977; Radinovic Report, paras 116-120. 375 - Witness W, T. 9538. 376 - Kupusovic, T. 625; Radinovic Report, para. 143; see Security Council Resolution 758 of 8 June 1992. 377 - Tucker, T. 9931. 378 - Kolp, T. 8223-7; Briquemont, T. 10040; by Resolutions 819 (16 April 1993), 824 (6 May 1993), 836 (4 June 1993) to protect areas “free from any armed attack or any other hostile act” (the so-called “safe areas” of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Tuzla and Goražde) as well as to monitor cease-fires and to use force in self-defence. 379 - Indjic testified that there were two French battalions, Indjic, T. 18576. 380 - In the time-frame relevant to the Indictment, UN missions in BiH were commanded by General Philippe Morillon (France) until 12 July 1993, by General Briquemont (Belgium) until 24 January 1994 and later by General Rose (Great Britain), Kolp, T. 8222. 381 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11581. 382 - Mole, T. 9514; Kolp, T. 8221; Moroz, T. 18116. 383 - Kolp, T. 8310; Harding, T. 4445-6. 384 - Karavelic, T. 11905. 385 - The troops were divided into thirteen or fourteen brigades, Cutler, T. 8995; Mole, T. 11080; Kolp, T. 8299; Karavelic, T. 11917; D144 (Decision on the units composing the 1st Corps signed by President Izetbegovic). In addition to brigades, special forces and an artillery unit were part of the 1st Corps, Briquemont, T. 10116. 386 - Karavelic, T. 11787; Bukva, T. 18325. The Radinovic Report (para. 133) estimates that the inner ring of Sarajevo numbered between 33,000 to 50,000 soldiers. 387 - Carswell, T. 8383; O’Keeffe, T. 9179-81. In December 1992, there were 7 or 8 LIMAs (Cutler, T. 8009-10); in June 1993, 11 LIMAs (Garmeister, T. 8976); from September 1993, 6 or 7 (Garmeister, T. 8976). PAPAs were between 3 and 6 (Cutler, T. 8899-8900; Gardmeister, T. 8970). 388 - In January-February 1994, the monitors increased due to the need to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weaponry; Niaz, T. 9067. 389 - Cutler, T. 8901; Carswell, T. 8330; 8358; Indjic, T. 18793-4. 390 - Radinovic Report, paras 105; 134. 391 - Kolp, T. 8256; Rose, T. 10187-8; 10259. 392 - Mandilovic, T. 1011-2; Radinovic Report, paras 105, 135. 393 - See Indictment, para. 4 (a). 394 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 11 ( omitted). 395 - Id., para. 13. 396 - Id., paras 837-849. 397 - See, for example, P358 (UNPROFOR report for November 1992); P618 (UN report for December 1992); D1826 (UNPROFOR weekly situation report for the period between 12 to 18 February 1993); D66 (Annex VI to 1994 UN report; P918 (UNPROFOR report of March 1993 – admitted under seal); P932 (UNPROFOR report of March 1993– admitted under seal); P3689 (UNPROFOR report of October 1992 – admitted under seal). There is no dispute either that there was intense fire from within the city into SRK-controlled territory. 398 - Hamill, T. 6059-60. 399 - Hamill, T. 6165. 400 - Thomas, T. 9255-7. 401 - Thomas, T. T.9265, 9394. Thomas added that in the specific cases that he referred to, UN representatives “knew that there were nobody else [other than civilians at theg location [of the shelling incidents.]”, Thomas, T. 9394. 402 - P1963 (UNPROFOR situation report on 13-14 December 1993– admitted under seal). See also P2578 (UNMO summary for 4 March 1994 to 29 April 1994):”05 [March] … civilian wounded vicinity Holiday Inn … 08 [March] … 1 X BiH civilian wounded by [small-arms] fire in Dobrinja area … 09 [March] … 3 X BiH civilians wounded by [small-arms] fire … 11 [March] … 1 X BiH cilvian wounded by [small-arms] fire … 13 [March] 2 X BiH civilians wounded … 16 [March] 3 X BiH civilians wounded by [small-arms] fire, Dobrinja area … 17 [March] … 3 X BiH cilivians wounded … 23 [March] 1 x BiH civilian wounded [by small-arms] fire … 15 ?Aprilg … 4 x BiH civilians wounded after [shooting] … 23[April] 1 x BiH civilian wounded [by small-arms] fire … 26 [April] … 1 x BiH civilian wounded by [small-arms] fire.” For the purpose of determining non-combatant status in P2578, “women and children were automatically considered civilians,” Thomas, T. 9474. 403 - T. 21992-3. 404 - Tucker, T. 9895-6; 9940. 405 - Henneberry, T. 8734. 406 - Mole, T. 9500-9501, 10997-99. 407 - Rose, T. 10184-6, 10210-1. 408 - Briquemont, T. 10037-9. 409 - Briquemont, T. 10103. 410 - P1928 (Letter from Rasim Delic dated 6 December 1993). 411 - Hamill, T. 6109. 412 - P2442 (Collection of UNPROFOR documents), p. 37. 413 - Ashton, T. 1204. Ashton was still present in Sarajevo in early 1994. Ashton, T. 1226-7. 414 - Ashton, T. 1227. For example, Ashton helped in January 1993 a person who had been shot at night while cutting wood somewhere along “the main boulevard way downtown [and] all the way out at to the PTT [building],” at a location where no military presence could be seen, Ashton, T. 1228-30. 415 - Hvaal, T. 2249-50. 416 - Hvaal, T. 2276. 417 - Hvaal, T. 2277. 418 - Kucanin, T. 4499. 419 - Kucanin, T. 4556. 420 - Kucanin, T. 4621-2. Witness Y, an UNPROFOR officer, confirmed that both the local authorities of Sarajevo and UNPROFOR erected barriers to protect the population of the city from shooting and shelling during the conflict,”notably along the access facing the Serb quarters, Serb neighbourhoods,” Witness Y, T. 10850-2. See also Kovac, T. 872-3. 421 - Kovac, T. 839. 422 - Kovac, T. 841-3. 423 - Mukanovic, T. 3086. 424 - Mandilovic, T.1022. 425 - Mandilovic, T.1036-8. 426 - Ashton, T.1216. 427 - Ashton, T.1390-1. Ashton took photographs of the incident in October 1992; its location is marked “P3” on map P3645 and the photograph is part of P3641, being ERN 0039 1285. 428 - Mulaomerovic, T.1632. 429 - Witness AD, T. 10741-2 (closed session); 10756 (closed session). The witness also stated that he saw “artillery fire from, almost from the cemetery itself” from his lines. Witness AD, T. 10687 (closed session). 430 - Hvaal, T. 2286, 2290. 431 - Harding, T.4324-6. He drew a line with the letter "S" on map to indicate the front line and a cross and "L" to indicate the lion Cemetery. 432 - Harding, T. 4393. The witness stated that Major Nikolai Roumiansev, a Russian officer with UNPROFOR, did not make any suggestion that there was outgoing fire from the Lion Cemetery which may have attracted incoming fire (T. 4395). However, ABiH armoured vehicles were seen from PAPA 3 near the Cemetery itself (T. 4471). 433 - [ehbajraktarevic, a funeral director, stated that they had to dig the graves at night because Sarajevo was safer in the darkness. Funeral rites were shortened to a minimum. The witness testified of the shelling of Fatima Karcic’s funeral procession around 4 pm in June 1993, which killed eight people on the spot. “A shell fell and hit a plum tree, and killed eight people on the spot. My men went to pick up the bodies.” After that, the Municipal Assembly gave orders to conduct funerals at night, [ehbajraktarevic, T.1777-8. 434 - Kupusovic, T.666. 435 - Fraser, T. 11229-30. 436 - Van Baal, T.9862-3. 437 - Kupusovic, T. 662: “people were happy when there was a thick fog in town and around it, when there was no sniping.” Thomas discussed P1927, which was a UNMO Daily SitRep of 4-5 December 1993), T. 9300-1. The document refers to reduced sniper activity as a result of poor visibility. 438 - Ashton, T. 1129. 439 - Mukanovic, T. 3086. 440 - Omerovic, T. 3848-9; Kupusovic, T. 680-1; Ekrem Pita, 3997. 441 - Taric, T. 3124-6; 442 - Ashton, T. 1414. Menzilovic, who lived on the hills in the area of Brijesko brdo, stated that civilians were targeted by SRK snipers, who “wouldn’t let us leave our houses,” Menzilovic, T. 6998. 443 - Ashton, T. 1371, referring to early winter 1993 and again towards the end of 1993. 444 - Kovac, T.848. 445 - Kovac, T.846. 446 - Kovac, T. 843; 871; see also Hafizovic, T. 7760-3 (shelling targeted Oslobodilaca Sarajevo Street where “it was well known” that humanitarian aid was distributed); Hadzic, T. 12294-5 (stating that anti-atomic shelters were used to deliver humanitarian aid). 447 - Menzilovic, T.6982. 448 - For example, Thomas discussed P2088, which was an excerpt from a UNMO Daily SitRep generated in January 1994 (T. 9309-9311, closed session). It recorded that the SRK was shelling areas that were known to be places that civilians used to seek cover from snipers. He testified that “the Bosnians would use covered routes to avoid sniper alley and artillery would be brought to bear on those covered routes, and that was an indicator that they were being specifically targeted.” He observed that this practice explained why there was a high number of casualties in relation to the low number of outgoing rounds reported. 449 - Kovac, T. 843. 450 - Prosecution’s Final Trial Brief, para. 285. 451 - Id., para. 285. 452 - Karavelic, T. 12005; Niaz, T. 9081; Lazic, T. 13755-6; Kolp, T. 8254, 8256; Kupusovic, T. 657; Hamill, T. 6174; Jusic, T.3242; Milada Halili, T. 2732; Vidovic,T. 4241; Golic, T. 14849; Radinovic, T. 20901. 453 - Hamill, T.6174; P3704 (pre-marked map of confrontation lines); DP10, T.14328; D1776 (map marked by DP10). 454 - Vidovic, T.4240-4241; Mandilovic, T.1014; Velic, T.2774; 2776-2777; P3644.DF (map marked by Fraser). 455 - Niaz, T. 9081. 456 - Kolp, T. 8243. 457 - Van Lynden, T. 2085, 2092-3. 458 - Van Lynden, T. 2216-7. 459 - Ashton, T. 1221. 460 - Hermer, T. 8439. 461 - Hermer, T. 8467. 462 - Van Lynden, T. 2117, 2119. 463 - Van Lynden, T. 2117, 2119. 464 - Van Lynden, T. 2262, 2264. 465 - Van Lynden, T. 2261 466 - Van Lynden, T. 2262. 467 - Thomas, T.9310-9311 (close session), 9322-9323. 468 - [ehbajraktarevic,T. 1776 469 - Hermer, T. 8468-9. 470 - Fraser, T. 11198. 471 - Ashton, T. 1254. 472 - Ashton, T. 1340-1341. 473 - Ashton, T. 1340. 474 - Hvaal, T. 2778-80. 475 - Hvaal, T. 2279, 2282-3. 476 - Hvaal, T. 2284-5. See P3625 (photograph taken by Hvaal of the victim outside the morgue of the Kosevo hospital). 477 - Van Lynden, T. 2120-2125; P3644.VL (map of Sarajevo marked by witness showing location of building). 478 - See P3647 (Video footage of report on the burning of the building made by Van Baal); P3467 A (transcript of video footage). 479 - Van Lynden, T. 2125-6. 480 - Van Lynden, T. 2125-6. 481 - Ashton, T. 1392. The set of photographs taken by Ashton are examples of people victims of sniping or shelling incidents from late September 1992 to the end of October 1992, T. 1403-4. See P3641 (set of photographs taken by Ashton). 482 - Ashton, T. 1246-7. 483 - Briquemont, T. 10142-3. 484 - Briquemont, T. 10169. The witness had the impression that, during his tenure, from October to December, essentially military objectives were shelled, more than civilian targets, T.10143-4. 485 - See, e.g., P816 (UNPROFOR daily sit-rep for Sector Sarajevo for 16 February 1993): “During the reporting period the level of combat activity remained at rather high level. Arty/mortar shelling and SA/HMG fire were report throughout the day in the various areas of the city. However the most shelled areas were […] Novo Sarajevo”; P752 (UNPROFOR report for the month of January 1993): “20 Jan. 93.The situation showed significant improvement over yesterday with both the PAPA and LIMA sides reporting a relatively calm day. The snipers were active along the main road within the city, Tito Barracks and the press building. The total number of impacts recorded (arty, or and MLRS) was 197”; P2002 (UNMO daily sit-rep for Sector Sarajevo for 14 December 1993) and P2007 (daily sit-rep for Sector Sarajevo for 25 December 1993) report that among the areas shelled was “the city centre as always”; P2064 (UNMO daily sit-rep for Sector Sarajevo for 4 January 1994): “General Assessment: Unstable. General military activity, in particular shelling and mortar fire have remained at a high level. […] Residential areas shelled and mortared during the past 24 hrs have been Novo Sarajevo […] Sniper activity and small arms/HMG activity high … inside the city”; P2840 (UNPROFOR daily sit-rep for 3 August 1994): “Location: Sniper Alley Area. Description: One sniper located in a Serbian building […] shot against the tramway. Three Bosnian civilians lightly wounded and driven to the hospital.” 486 - Jusic, T. 3243-6. 487 - Jusic, T. 3243-6. 488 - Jusic, T. 3242. 489 - Jusic, T. 3247-8. 490 - Jusic, T. 3249. See No. 1 on P3112 (map of area marked by witness). 491 - Jusic, T. 3250-1. 492 - Jusic, T. 3251-2. 493 - Kucanin, T. 4610, 4612; P3658 (map marked by witness). 494 - Kucanin, T. 4610, 4613, 4617, 4621. 495 - Kucanin, T. 4610. 496 - Mukanovic, T. 3106; P3235 (map pre-marked by witness indicating location of skyscrapers). 497 - Witness AJ, T. 7118-9, 7121. 498 - Witness AJ, T. 7119. 499 - See P3263 (photograph of the area). 500 - Witness AJ, T. 7123. 501 - Witness AJ, T. 7121, 7123, 7128. 502 - Witness AJ, T. 7122. She remained for 23 days in intensive care at the hospital. See P3282 (medical documentation from Sarajevo University Hospital) (under seal). 503 - Witness AJ, T. 7150. 504 - Witness AJ, T. 7144, 7150-1. 505 - Witness AJ, T. 7144. 506 - Witness AJ testified that she heard the sound of a shot from behind, slightly to the right, in the direction of Grbavica. She believed that the confrontation line was about 50 to 100 metres away from where the incident occurred, and stated that “in fact, there is only one road and the river of Miljacka between that part of the city and Grbavica ?….g They were on the other side of the river”, T. 7123-4. In that part of Grbavica, there were two yellow buildings, the shopping centre and four white skyscrapers, T. 7124. 507 - Witness AJ, T. 7124-5, 7131 (closed session). A two-storey white building is seen on a photograph shown in court blocking the view of the street from these high-rise buildings. The witness explained that the upper floor and left side of this building hadn’t been built at the time of the event. T. 7129-30 (closed session); P3263 (photographs of site of incident). She also pointed out the location of the shopping centre and a white skyscraper in Grbavica on a map shown to her in court, which was not tendered into evidence, Witness AJ, T. 7131. Although she showed some confusion when identifying both her building and the site of the event on this map, she clearly indicated the place where she was injured on a video and on a set of photographs which were shown to her in court, Witness AJ, T. 7132-8; P3280Y (video of site of incident); T. 7138-9; P3279Y (360 degree photograph of the location of incident); T. 7141-4 (closed session). 508 - Witness AJ, T. 7125. 509 - Witness AJ, T. 7125. 510 - Wintess D, T. 11893-5. 511 - Witness D, T. 1895-6. 512 - Witness D, T. 1919; P3637 (pre-marked map by Witness D). 513 - Witness D, T. 1919-20. 514 - Witness D, T. 1920. 515 - Witness D, T. 1933. 516 - Witness D, T. 1920. 517 - Id. 518 - Id. 519 - Witness D, T. 1928-9. He identified one of their weapons as an M76 using P3648 (manual of weapons). T. 1936. 520 - Witness D, T. 1934. 521 - Id. 522 - Witness D, T. 2033-4. 523 - Witness D, T. 2037-8. 524 - Witness D, T. 1912-14. 525 - Id. 526 - DP16 and DP11, soldiers in the 3rd battalion of the SRK stationed in the area of the Jewish Cemetery, said they did not receive orders to target civilians. According to DP16, they were to “respect” civilians, DP16, T. 16523; DP11, T. 15020-21. Izo Golic, an SRK soldier with the 1st Romanjia Brigade, said that the members of his unit were told in strict terms not to target anything of their own free will, and that they were not supposed to fire at civilians, to hold on and respect the Geneva Conventions, Golic, T. 14870. Witness DP10, a soldier in the 2nd Armoured Battalion stationed in the area of Grbavica, said his unit was never given orders to open fire on civilians, DP10, T. 14321 527 - Van Lynden, T. 2104, 2107-8. 528 - Van Lynden, T. 2111. 529 - Van Lynden, T. 2107-8. 530 - Van Lynden, T. 2107-8. 531 - Van Lynden, T. 2110. 532 - Van Lynden, T. 2112. 533 - Hvaal, T. 2258-61. 534 - Hvaal, T. 2262. 535 - Hvaal, T. 2264. 536 - Hvaal, T. 2262, 2265. 537 - Ashton, T. 1221. He pointed out the location of these blocks of flats on a map, Ashton, T. 1356-7; P3645 (map of Sarajevo marked by Ashton). See also T. 1574, 1578; position D7 on P3644. 538 - Ashton, T. 1221, 1367. 539 - Ashton, T. 1367. 540 - Id. 541 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 160. 542 - DP16, T. 16522-16523; D1809 (map marked by witness DP16); DP11, T. 14991, 15010-12; D1779 (map marked by witness); D1781(electronic map marked by DP11); Vorobev, T. 17382-3, 17390; D185 (map marked by witness); Golic, T. 14889. 543 - DP11, T. 14992; DP16, T. 16531. 544 - DP16, T. 16624; DP11, T. 14992; Vorobev, T.17390. 545 - DP16, T. 16522, 16549, 16634; D1810 (map marked by witness DP16); DP11, T.15010-15012; D1781 (map marked by witness). One witness referred to it as a synagogue, Vorobev, T. 17455, 17466-7. 546 - DP16, T. 16520, 16524. 547 - DP11, T. 14985. 548 - DP16, T. 16522, 16634; DP11, T. 15079, 15092-5. 549 - Golic, T. 14890. 550 - Vorobev, T. 17380, 17466. 551 - The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence does indicate that gunfire originated from the chapel, although it does not show that it was aimed at civilians. Victor Vorobev testified that, during his tenure in Sarajevo in 1994, his subordinates stationed on the SRK side of the Jewish Cemetery reported seeing armed men at the synagogue and intermittent fire opened from there (Victor Vorobev, T. 17456.) He did not indicate to which side these armed men belonged. DP16 said that fire was frequently opened by the ABiH from the chapel towards the positions of his company (DP16, T. 16522-3, 16534). 552 - Rose, T. 10208. 553 - Kucanin, T. 4608-9; P3658 (map marked by witness). 554 - Van Lynden, T. 2113. 555 - Id. 556 - Kupusovic, T. 664-5; Nakas, T. 1123; Ashton, T. 1282; Eterovic, T. 8844; P3645 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Ashton). This institution was also referred to at times as the “French” hospital, the “Army” hospital or the “Citizens’” hospital, Kupusovic, T. 664-5; Harding, T. 4346-7. 557 - Ashton, T. 1231. 558 - Id. 559 - Id. 560 - Ashton, T. 1231 and 1235-6. Later, in 1994, Ashton visited the area of Pale where the fire had come from and was shown by SRK soldiers heavy weapons which were positioned in the vicinity, Ashton, T. 1236-7. 561 - Ashton, T. 1232-3, 1243-4. 562 - Ashton, T. 1244-5. In October 1992, he photographed the extensive damage done both to the façade and rooms inside the hospital facing Grbavica, Ashton, T. 1393-4; P3641 (Selected photographs taken by Ashton). 563 - Ashton, T. 1244. He was at the hospital during another shelling incident sometime in 1993; he climbed to one of the upper floors of the main building, peered towards Grbavica with his camera lens and saw a tank firing onto the hospital. T. 1394. Ashton had on hand a camera with high-definition lens he normally used for his profession, which enabled him to see at a distance, Ashton, T. 1245. 564 - Van Lynden, T. 2140. Van Lynden also remembered going to the State hospital in May 1992 and observing that the medical facility “had been very badly shot up at that stage [of the conflict]”, Van Lynden, T. 2089-90. 565 - Ashton, T. 1266. 566 - Mandilovic, T. 1090. 567 - Mandilovic, T.1033-4 568 - Mandilovic, T. 1034. 569 - Mandilovic, T. 1034, 1036. 570 - Mandilovic, T. 1013. 571 - Mandilovic, T. 1013-4. 572 - Mandilovic, T. 1020, 1036. The entire southern wing of the hospital was not operational throughout the war. All activities had to be transferred to the northern wing. During the intensive shelling, everything had to be transferred to the lower floors. The higher floors, that is, from the 5th to the 12th floor, were not operational. When the intensity of the shelling subsided, the activities of the hospital would move again to higher floors, T. 1090-1091. 573 - Nakas, T. 1122-3. 574 - Nakas, T.1123, 1129. 575 - Nakas, T. 1126. After the first shelling of the hospital on 13 May 1992, the medical staff placed a large white flag with the Red Cross emblem in the southern section of the hospital facing Trebevic and the hill of Vrace, Nakas, T. 1123, 1182; Harding, T. 4348-50. The staff later took down this flag in September 1992 because exposure to gunfire had reduced it to tatters, Nakas, T. 1123-4. 576 - Nakas, T. 1126-7. 577 - Nakas, T. 1127. Judging by the location of the first impact, the witness concluded that the hits originated from the slope of Trebevic, which is an extension of Vrace hill, Nakas, T. 1127. He also testified that fragments from tank, artillery and mortar explosives were recovered at the hospital after shelling incidents, Nakas, T. 1190. 578 - Nakas, T.1189-90. 579 - P3661 (Battle damage assessment of State hospital dated January 1993 by Carl Harding). 580 - Id. 581 - Id. 582 - Id. 583 - The Indictment alleges that on 27 June 1993, Almasa Konjhodzic, a woman aged 56 years, was shot dead near the junction of \ure \akovica and Kranjcevica Street, presently Alipasina and Kranjcevica, while walking with her family, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 584 - Milada Halili, T. 2731, 2734; Sabri Halili, T. 2660-3. 585 - Sabri Halili, T. 2660. 586 - Milada Halili, T. 2732, 2734, 2754; Sabri Halili, T. 2661-4. 587 - Sabri Halili, T. 2665; Milada Halili, T. 2736, 2757. 588 - Sabri Halili, T. 2666, 2669-71; Milada Halili, T. 2736-7; P3262 (diagram of intersection). There was also a trailer between the containers about a metre and a half above the ground, Sabri Halili, T. 2669-70; Milada Halili, T. 2736-7. 589 - Milada Halili, T. 2736, 2758; Sabri Halili, T. 2664. 590 - Sabri Halili, T. 2664, 2671. 591 - Sabri Halili, T. 2664. 592 - Sabri Halili, T. 2664, 2671. 593 - Sabri Halili, T. 2678-9; Milada Halili, T. 2736-2738; P1340 (the death certificate of Ms. Konjhodzic). 594 - Both witnesses recalled that the victim was wearing a red dress with a black tiger print at the time of the incident. She was then 55 years old, Milada Halili, T. 2739; Sabri Halili, T. 2680. 595 - Sabri Halili, T. 2658, 2679-80, 2686, 2706; Milada Halili testified that her husband was a soldier but he didn’t have a military uniform. He was not carrying any weapons that day because he was off duty, T. 2740. She said that she worked in “the kitchens of the ABiH” during the conflict. T. 2749-50, 2764. 596 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 104-106, 113-115. 597 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 119. 598 - Milada Halili, T. 2740; Sabri Halili, T. 2680. In a statement given to the Office of the Prosecution on 11 November 1995, Milada Halili referred to the driver of the car who drove them to the hospital as a soldier, despite the fact that he did not wear any military uniform. She explained in court that she had thought so because she believed that any able bodied man was a soldier at the time, Milada Halili, T. 2760-1. 599 - Milada Halili, T. 2758 600 - Sabri Halili, T. 2685, 2694, 2702. 601 - D32 (UNPROFOR document of 28 June 1993); Sabri Halili, T. 2691. 602 - Sabri Halili believed that the bullet that struck his mother-in-law had probably ricocheted from the asphalt, then hitting Ms. Konjhodzic. Sabri Halili, T. 2716. Milada Halili believed her mother had been directly targeted and had not been hit by a bullet that ricocheted, because the intersection where her mother was shot was visible from the skyscrapers in Grbavica, Milada Halili, T. 2757. 603 - It claims that there was no visibility because the barricades had been erected in the area and that, in particular, the site of the incident was not visible from the high-rise building identified by the witnesses as the source of fire, Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 107-13. 604 - Milada Halili, T. 2757. 605 - Sabri Halili, T. 2671, 2716. He said that the bullets were probably shot from between the first and the tenth floor of this skyscraper, Sabri Halili, T. 2699-2700. 606 - Milada Halili, T. 2757; Sabri Halili, T. 2676-2677, 2683; P3260 (map of area marked by Milada Halili); P3271 (two photographs of site of incident); P3279A (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 5). 607 - Hinchliffe, T. 12969. 608 - P3271 (two photographs of site of incident); P3279A (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 5); P3280 C (video). 609 - The Indictment alleges that on 19 June 1994, Witness M, a woman aged 31 years, and her son, aged 4 years, were lightly wounded in their legs by a shot that penetrated a crowded tram in which they were travelling. The tram was travelling west Zmaja od Bosne Street towards Alipasino Polje. Mensur Jusic, a man aged 36 years, sustained a slight leg wound and Belma Sukic-Likic, a woman aged 23 years, was wounded in her left armpit in the same attack. The tram was near the Holiday Inn Hotel at the time of the incident, Schedule 1 to the Indicment. 610 - Jusic, T. 3225-6, 3301. 611 - Witness M, T. 3340-2, 3355. 612 - Jusic, T. 3237;Witness M, T. 3340, 3342. 613 - Jusic, T. 3237, 3270, 3298, 3301, 3303; D38 (map of area of incident); P3279J (set of photographs of intersection); P3112 (map marked by witness), Jusic, T. 3260-1;Witness M, T. 3343-4;Vidovic, T. 4294. The tram was in front of a church at the time of the event, Jusic T. 3270,3276; Witness M, T. 3344, P3279.I (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 24); P2696. 614 - Witness M, T. 3340, 3343-4, 3355. 615 - Witness M, T. 3342-3. 616 - Jusic, T. 3227-8, 3295. Jusic believed that a single bullet injured the child, the young woman and himself. He explained on P3110 (pre-marked diagram) the positions in the tram of those injured during the event and the place of impact on the tram, T. 3229-30; P3280 (video of location of event). 617 - Witness M, T.3347-9, 3370; Jusic, T. 3227-8, 3303-4,3325. Jusic marked on D38 (map of area) the two stops missed by the tram before it came to a halt at the Pofalici stop. He indicated that the tram driver stopped there because this stop was screened off from SRK positions in Grbavica by a school and a church, Jusic, T. 3228. 618 - Jusic, T. 3227. 619 - Witness M, T. 3341, 3352-3, 3366, 3370-2; P3106 (medical certificate from First Aid Centre); Jusic, T. 3341. 620 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 387. It claims that “?igf the shooter had such an intention, he would shoot at the window where he could, possibly, see the ones who were sitting or standing, i.e. the shooter would not target the lower part of a tram which, objectively, is hard to cause any sort of consequence, except to damage the tram just a bit”. Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 383. 621 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 386, 387, 389. 622 - Witness M, T. 3340; Jusic, T. 3223; Vigodic, T. 4242; P3656 (set of 8 photographs taken by the police). People can be seen walking around on the street at the Pofalici stop on a photograph shown in court (See P3656). 623 - Witness M, T. 3340. 624 - Witness M, T. 3341-2, 3355; Jusic, T. 3227, 3241. In a statement given to OTP in 1995, Witness M had stated that there were ABiH and UNPROFOR soliders at the Pofalici stop. During cross-examination, she testified that she did not recall the presence of any ABiH soldiers at this stop and said that, if any, there were two or three soldiers there, T. 3365-6, 3368. She said that the Pofalici stop was two stops further from where the tram was shot, T. 3370. 625 - Jusic, T. 3240. 626 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 376-77, 389. The Defence also contests the credibility of Jusic’s testimony based on the fact that witness testified that he smelled gunpowder when the bullet hit the tram, which, in the Defence’s view, was not possible in this case, Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 381-382. The Trial Chamber does not consider that this issue affects the credibility of Jusic’s testimony. 627 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 379-380, 384. The Defence argues that the evidence in the Trial Record shows that the northern and eastern side of the Jewish Cemetery, including the Chapel, were under ABiH control, while the SRK held the western and southern sides of the Cemetery, so that the warring parties were separated by the Cemetery itself, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 384. 628 - Vidovic, T. 4220-2, 4228, P2696 (Report of police investigation dated 19 June 1994). He pointed out on photographs taken during the forensic investigation the bullet impact points on the tram, T. 4222-7; P3656 (set of 8 photographs of tram). He explained that the bullet went through the wall of the tram car a metre from the ground, damaged the metal bracket of the heater which was under a seat, travelled across the aisle and hit the support of the seat that faced the rear of the tram on the opposite side, P3655, P3656; T. 4226-9, 4240. Bullet fragments were found in the tram, T. 4236. A report prepared by another officer indicates that the bullet fragmented after hitting the inner tin of the tram (P3655). 629 - Vidovic said that the tram was inspected by the police three stops further down from the location where it was hit. T. 4250-2. An official ballistic expert did not participate in the investigation, since it had been moved from the site of the incident. T. 4250-52. The usual technique to determine the source of fire based on the entry-exit point of impact was not used, T. 4301-2. 630 - Vidovic, T. 4240-1, 4250-2; see P3655 and P2696. 631 - Jusic,T. 3239-40. The witness confirmed that the tram was hit on the left-hand side in the direction it was travelling, some 10 centimetres beneath the window in the rear part of the first carriage.T. 3228, 3232, 3329. The witness marked on a map (P3112) the location of the Jewish Cemetery, T. 3261. 632 - Witness M, T. 3346, 3357-8; P3279.I (360 degree photograph). 633 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 396. 634 - Hinchliffe measured the distance from a building just north of the Jewish cemetery to the site of the incident to be 460 metres, Hinchliffe, T. 12994. Witness DP16 estimated the distance between the northern boundary of the Jewish Cemetery and the place where the incident occurred to be approximately 460 metres, T. 16623-4. 635 - Witness DP11 testified that it was not possible to see the site of the incident from SRK positions at the cemetery, because high-rise buildings blocked the view, Witness DP11, T. 15012-5. Witness DP16 said that the view towards the Marijn Dvor intersection was obstructed by the Assembly building and the cemetery wall, which was two to three metres high, Witness DP16, T. 165451-2, 16545; D1810. 636 - It argues that the evidence in the Trial Record shows that the northern and eastern side of the Jewish Cemetery, including the Chapel, were under ABiH control, while the SRK held the western and southern sides of the Cemetery, so that the warring parties were separated by the Cemetery itself, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 384. 637 - See P3279I (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 24); P3279.J (set of photographs of intersection); P2641 (photographs taken by Ashton). 638 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 364. 639 - Taric, T. 3140-1, 3147; 3195-8. 640 - Mukanovic, T. 3084, 3115. 641 - Witness J, T. 8054. 642 - DP10, T. 14318. 643 - DP10, T. 14364-5; D1767 (electronic map of sniping incident 10 marked by witness); D1766 (map of area marked by witness DP10). 644 - Witness D, T. 1896, 1932. 645 - Witness D, T. 1921-2, 1925-30, 2021-4. 646 - Witness D, T. 1927, 2028. 647 - Witness D, T. 2020. See Map 1 of Ex. 3637D (set of maps of area). 648 - Mukanovic, T. 3082-4, 3115; P3235 (map marked by Mukanovic); Taric, T. 3140-3141, 3147; Kucanin, T. 4622, 4630; P3658 (map marked by Kucanin); Witness J, T. 8054; P3234 (map marked by Witness J). 649 - Witness D, T. 1927-1928; P3251 (photograph of the area) depicts the view from trenches on Ozrenska Street. The witness’ positions were below the rubble on the photograph, T. 1927. 650 - Witness D, T. 1932. 651 - Witness D, T. 1928-9. 652 - Witness D, T. 1928-9; P3638 (manual of weapons); T.1936. 653 - Witness D, T. 1934. 654 - Witness D, T. 1928-9. 655 - Id. 656 - Witness D, T. 1929. 657 - Witness D, T. 1930. 658 - Id. 659 - Witness D, T. 1931. 660 - Id. A red circle on a photograph shown in court indicates one of these intersections. T. 1931; P3251 (photograph depicting view from Ozrenska Street). The witness said that snipers operated on both sides of the confrontation lines in the area of Ozrenska Street, T. 2042. During the time he was a member of his platoon, the confrontation line in this area remained almost unchanged, T. 2078 661 - Van Lynden, T. 2114. 662 - Id. 663 - Id. 664 - Id. 665 - Ashton, T. 1383. Ashton took photographs inside the bus when it was shot at. See P3641 (photographs taken by Ashton). 666 - Ashton, T. 1384, 1386. The witness marked direction of fire on a map (P 3645). 667 - Witness I, T. 2853. 668 - Habib Trto, T. 7098-9. 669 - Milada Halili, T. 2730. 670 - Milada Halili, T. 2730, 2749. 671 - Sabri Halili, T. 2717-8. 672 - Milada Halili, T. 2732. In October 1992, her flat burned down as result of SRK fire from that area. Milada Halili, T. 2733. 673 - The facility also operated four satellite stations in the municipalities of Vogosca, Ilidža, Novi Grad, Dobrinja and the airport of Sarajevo, Mulaomerovic, T. 1616-7, 1642-3. 674 - Mulaomerovic, T. 1625. 675 - Id. 676 - Mulaomerovic, T. 1627-9. 677 - Mulaomerovic, T. 1627. 678 - Mulaomerovic remembered various instances when the staff of the IEMS was injured by shelling or sniping. For example, he said that, on 17 September 1992, part of a shell hit a driver as he walked towards the building. He sustained a serious injury to a leg and remained invalid, T. 1624. Two days later, another staff member was rendered invalid by a hit at the entrance of the building, T. 1624. On 18 October 1992, a medical technician was wounded by shrapnel of a shell in front of the emergency medical service building, T. 1633. On 31 February 1993, a colleague was hit by a sniper in his spine. He was left completely paralyzed and died 6 months later, T. 1635. 679 - The Indictment alleges that on 3 September 1993, Nafa Taric, a woman aged 35 years, and her daughter Elma Taric, aged 8 years, were shot by a single bullet while walking together in Ivana Krndelja Street (now called Azize Sacirbegovic Street), in the centre of Sarajevo. The bullet wounded the mother in her left thigh and wounded the daughter on her right hand and in her abdomen, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 680 - Nafa Taric, T. 3127-8. Nafa Taric was wearing jeans, a denim waistcoat and white T-shirt, while Elma Taric was dressed in a red tracksuit, T. 3132-3. 681 - Nafa Taric, T. 3127. The Defence submits that the Report of the Commission of Experts, dated 3 September 1993, indicates that a “thick fog over Sarajevo quieted all shooting” (D36, Final Report of the Commission of Experts, Volume 2, Annex VI, Part I). It thus challenges the credibility of the witness’ testimony, Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 167-170. The Trial Chamber finds that this report does not exclude that there was visibility at 5pm at that location, and it therefore does not affect the credibility of this witness. 682 - She indicated on a map the route they took that day, P3105 (map of area); T. 3129-30, 3200-1. See also P3280.I (videotape), T. 3136-8; P3279.H (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 10), 3148-51. Ivana Krndelja Street is currently called Azize Sacirbegovic Street. 683 - Elma Taric was walking to the right of her mother, D35 (Statement given to OTP), p.2. 684 - Nafa Taric, T. 3131; D35 (Statement given to OTP), p. 2. See P3268 (set of photographs of site of event); T. 3139-40. 685 - Nafa Taric, T. 3131; D35 (Statement given to OTP), p.2. 686 - Nafa Taric, T. 3131-2; P3369A (discharge sheet from the State Hospital of Elma Taric and Nafa Taric); D107 (Official report of the 4th Hrasno Police Station - under seal). 687 - Nafa Taric, T. 3131; D35 (Statement given to OTP), p.2. 688 - Nafa Taric, T. 3132; D35 (Statement given to OTP). 689 - Nafa Taric, T. 3133. 690 - Id. 691 - Nafa Taric, T. 3133, 3135. 692 - The witness and her daughter remained at the State Hospital for almost two weeks, T. 3135; P3369A (discharge sheet from the State Hospital of Elma Taric and Nafa Taric). 693 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 174. The Defence alleges that it was not possible for the perpetrator to have had such a quick reaction and fire at the victims as soon as they left the protection of the containers, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 174. 694 - Nafa Taric, T. 3131. 695 - Nafa Taric, T. 3133. 696 - Nafa Taric, T. 3183. She believed the confrontation lines were about one kilometre away, T. 3165. 697 - According to the Defence, this data is also necessary to establish the direction of the projectile, the number of bullets fired, and whether the victims were injured by a bullet or parts of a bullet that ricocheted, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 171-172. Dusan Dunjic and Milan Kunjadic, the medical and ballistic forensic experts for the Defence, concluded that they were unable to determine the type of projectile or weapon responsible for the victims’ injuries, the direction of fire or whether the victims were directly targeted, because information such as the nature of the wound sustained by the victims or the position of their bodies was not available, D1921 (Report by medical forensic expert for the Defence Dusan Dunjic), pp 15-16; D1924 (Report by ballistic forensic expert for the Defence Milan Kunjadic), pp.7-8; Milan Kunjadic, T. 19341. 698 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 176-178. The Defence alleges that “from the intersection of Ozrenska and Mravska Streets, ?theg SRK positions are “falling” below the south slopes of the hill, and that from the locations where were ?theg SRK positions it is impossible to shoot in the direction of the place [of the eventg”, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 177. 699 - Witness J, T. 8057; D107 (Official report of the 4th Hrasno Police Station) (under seal). He found no bullet fragments at the scene. T. 8057. 700 - D107 (Official report of the 4th Hrasno Police Station) (under seal). Hinchliffe took a laser range finder reading of the distance from the area of Tagolavska road, where he saw trenches and which he suspects was the area of the source of fire, to the spot where the victims were wounded to be 700 metres, Hincliffe, T. 12979-81. 701 - Witness J, T. 8084. 702 - Witness J, T. 8084. 703 - Nafa Taric, T. 3195-8. 704 - Witness DP10 said that the street where the incident occurred was only partially visible from the SRK positions, since a white building obstructed the line of sight. However, later in his testimony, he admitted that a line of sight did exist, although he said that the part of the intersection that was visible was in fact sheltered by screens, Witness DP10, T. 14373, 14397, 14411-5. Witness DP16 testified that the site of the incident was not visible from SRK lines, Witness DP16, T. 16576. 705 - See photograph No. 1 of P3268 (set of photographs of site of incident); P3280I (videotape); P3279H (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 10). 706 - The Indictment alleges that on 2 November 1993, two men were wounded by a burst of gunfire while they were working clearing rubbish along Brace Ribara Street, presently Porodice Ribar Street, in the Hrasno area of Sarajevo. Ramiz Velic, aged 50 years, was wounded in his left forearm, and Milan Ristic, aged 56 years, was wounded in his right arm and both legs, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. The Prosecution led no evidence regarding the wounding of Milan Ristic, hence the Trial Chamber only considers the incident in relation to Ramiz Velic. 707 - Velic, T. 2769-70. 708 - Velic, T. 2771-2, 2776, 2780, 2782, P3280D (video of site of incident). Every day, the witness, then aged 50, would load up rubbish with his loader onto trucks, Velic, T. 2769-1. 709 - Velic, T. 2782. He said that he would work under UNPROFOR escort when there was intense gunfire or when he had to clear up rubbish in dangerous areas, Velic, T. 2770-1. 710 - Velic, T. 2782. 711 - Velic, T. 2782, 2826. 712 - Velic, T. 2772. 713 - Velic, T. 2817-9, 2834-5. The witness placed a line on P3244 (photograph of site of incident) to show where the wire crossed the street, Velic, T. 2819 714 - Velic, T. 2772-4, 2837. See P3280D (video of site of incident). 715 - Velic, T. 2774, 2807, 2837; P1806 (discharge report of the Sarajevo University Medical Centre). 716 - Velic, T. 2773-4, 2837-8. 717 - Velic, T. 2773. 718 - Velic, T. 2806; P3279DD; T. 2838. 719 - Velic, T. 2812. The discharge report from the Sarajevo University Medical Centre shows that he was admitted on 2 November 1993 “as result of fresh injuries on the left hand inflicted by a sniper bullet” and was discharged on 28 December 1993, after undergoing surgery on two occasions, P1806 (discharge report of the Sarajevo University Medical Centre). 720 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 241. 721 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 239, 242. It claims that “when visible damages from the photographs are considered, it is apparent that glasses are not damaged, which excludes the Prosecution’s claim that Ramiz Velic was deliberately targeted”, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 244. 722 - Velic, T. 2826-7. The witness testified that, as part of his work obligations during the conflict, he was assigned the task of digging trenches. Up until the date of the event, he had worked digging trenches only on three occasions, once at @uc and twice at Vogosca. He indicated, however, that he did not use his loader to dig trenches, but used only a pick and a shovel. T. 2810-11, 2820, 2829-30, 2833. He indicated that he had also been targeted on previous occasions whilst driving the loader and collecting rubbish in other areas, T. 2782. 723 - The witness indicated on a video shown in court the location where the APCs were parked, see P3280D (video of site of incident). 724 - Velic said that the gunfire had totally damaged the tyres, the front part of the loader and the reservoir, all which had to be replaced, Velic, T. 2807-8, 2813. 725 - Velic, T. 2826. 726 - Velic, T. 2812. The witness did not know of the existence of any military facility in the area, Velic, T. 2828. 727 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 242-243. 728 - Velic, T. 2773-4. The left-hand door of the cabin also faced Vrace, Velic, T. 2777. 729 - Velic, T. 2773-4. 730 - Velic, T. 2781. The witness clearly identified the location of this academy and of other SRK positions on photographs shown to him in court. See P3244, P3245, P3250 (set of photographs of site of incident), T. 2783-7, 2790; P3280D (video of site of incident), T. 2777; P3279D (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 15); T. 2780-1. P3245 (photograph) shows the MUP academy. The witness placed red marks and letter “B” on P3245 (photocopy of P3244) and also marked P3250 (telephotograph of site) to indicate location of MUP academy and SRK positions in Vrace, Velic, T. 2784-6. 731 - Hinchliffe, T. 12985-6. 732 - DP10 said it was not possible to fire from the MUP Academy to the site of the event, because the view was blocked by the walls of the Grbavica stadium and by screens put up near the location of the shooting, Witness DP10, T. 14361-2; D1768 (map marked by witness). Witness DP16 testified that there was no line of sight between the spot of the incident and SRK positions, because a pink building obstructed the view, although he did believe there was a partial line of sight from the MUP Academy, Witness DP16, T. 16579-82; P3244. He added that there was daily exchange of fire in the area, T. 16580. 733 - P3280D (video of site of incident); P3244 (photograph of site of incident). The witness testified that the trees seen in the photographs and video were not there at the time. See P3279D (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 15), T. 2781-2; P3244 (photograph of site of incident), T. 2783-4. 734 - The Indictment alleges that on 11 January 1994, Hatema Mukanovic, a woman aged 38 years, was shot dead while sitting in her apartment with her family and neighbours drinking coffee by candle-light on the first floor of Obala 27. Jula 89/I, presently Aleja Lipa 64, in the Hrasno area of Sarajevo, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 735 - Mukanovic, T. 3056-7. 736 - Mukanovic, T. 3057. 737 - Mukanovic, T. 3057. 738 - Mukanovic, T. 3057-9. The dining-room of the Mukanovic’s apartment had a hinge-type window. Looking outward from the dining-room, the left side had a glass pane, while on the right side there was only thin plastic sheeting. The cotton blinds of the window had holes caused by bullets and shrapnel, Mukanovic, T. 3059-60. 739 - Mukanovic, T. 3060, 3105. 740 - Mukanovic, T. 3061. 741 - Mukanovic, T. 3087. 742 - Mukanovic, T. 3061, 3105. 743 - Mukanovic, T. 3061. 744 - Id. 745 - Mukanovic, T. 3061, 3070. 746 - Mukanovic, T. 3063. 747 - Mukanovic, T. 3064-5, 3119-20. The witness pointed out on a video and photographs shown to him in court the entry points of the two bullets and where his wife was seated at the time of the incident, P3280 (video of location of incident), T. 3065-7. As shown on the video, the second entry point was measured to be 97 centimetres from the floor and 5.5 centimetres from the door frame, T. 3066. See P3237 (photograph 1A of dining room); P3238 (photograph 1B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3237), T. 3068-70, 3073. 748 - Mukanovic, T. 3065, 3119. 749 - Mukanovic, T. 3064, 3119-20. 750 - Mukanovic, T. 3065, 3119-20. 751 - Mukanovic, T. 3063-64. 752 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 303. Dusan Dunjic, the medical forensic expert for the Defence concluded that he was unable to determine the type of projectile responsible for the victim’s death, due to the absence of detailed information on the nature of the wound, D1921 (Report by medical forensic expert for the Defence Dusan Dunjic), pp 29-31. 753 - Mukanovic, T. 3073. 754 - P3235 (map marked by witness), T. 3083-3085; P3237 (photograph 1A); P3238 (photograph 1B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3237). The location of SRK positions is marked with the letter “F”. T. 3073. See P3239 (photograph 2A, view from dining room window); P3240 (photograph 2B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3239), P3241 (photograph 3A, telephoto of view from dining room window); P3242 (photograph 3B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3241), P3279 (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incidents 20), T. 3081-2. 755 - Mukanovic, T. 3115. 756 - Witness J, T. 8058, 8061. Witness J marked on map the building where victim lived when she was shot. T.8060. See No.4 on P3234 (map of location of incidents in Hrasno). 757 - Witness J, T. 8061. 758 - Witness J, T. 8089. Witness J marked on a map the area of the source of fire and drew a red line to indicate where the confrontation line ran, Witness J, T. 8061. See No.7 on P3234 (map of location of incidents in Hrasno). He recognised however that it was technically possible that the shots had been fired from another point on the hill, T. 8068. 759 - Hinchliffe, T. 2991. 760 - P3237 (photograph 1A); P3238 (photograph 1B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3237); P3239 (photograph 2A, view from dining room window); P3240 (photograph 2B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3239), P3241 (photograph 3A, telephoto of view from dining room window); P3242 (photograph 3B, pre-marked black-and-white photocopy of P3241); P3279 (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 20). 761 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 298-302, 306. The Defence notes that the incident occurred after dark, that only a candle was lit in the room, and that the dining-room window was covered with plastic foil. According to the Defence, under these circumstances, the victim could not have possibly been seen from SRK positions located at a distance of 800 metres, as claimed by the Prosecution, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 300. Milan Kunjadic, the ballistic forensic expert for the Defence, believed that the source of fire was Hrasno Brdo, T. 19360. He testified, however, that from the distance of the alleged source of fire, 800 metres, the perpetrator would not have been able to see the target if the window was covered. According to the witness, the evidence suggests that the two bullets had been fired simultaneously, T. 19361. Although he could not precisely indicate the type of weapon used, he believed it had most probably been an automatic rifle, T. 19365-7. He concluded that the victim could not have been the “immediate target” of the shooting “because of the fact that the window was covered by a blind and a curtain (which made visual communication impossible)”, T. 19353; See D1924 (Report by ballistic forensic expert for the Defence Milan Kunjadic), p.12. 762 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 302. 763 - Mukanovic, T. 3086-3087. The witness indicated that his apartment was located at 300 to 400 metres from Hero’s Square (Trg Heroja). He did not know whether the ABiH had its headquarters in the Loris building, on Hero’s Square, but said that maybe the first building on the front line was an ABiH headquarter, Mukanovic, T. 3103 764 - Mukanovic, T. 3086-7. 765 - Witness D, T. 1934. 766 - The Indictment alleges that on 22 July 1994 a 13 year-old boy aged, Witness AG, was shot and wounded in the abdomen while window-shopping with his mother and sister in Miljenka Cvitkovica Street, presently Ferde Hauptmana, in the Cengic Vila area of Sarajevo, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 767 - Witness AG, T. 6286; Witness AH, T. 6244-5. 768 - Witness AH, T. 6265; Witness AG, T. 6287. 769 - Witness AH, T. 6245-6, 6266; Witness AG T. 6286, 6318, 6334. 770 - Witness AG, T. 6286, 6318-9; Witness AH, T. 6245, 6268-9, 6277. 771 - Witness AG, T. 6287, 6296, 6316; Witness AH, T. T. 6245, 6247, 6254. Witness AG was wearing shorts and a short-sleeved shirt on the day of the shooting, Witness AG T. 6291; Witness AH, T. 6248. 772 - Witness AG, T. 6315-6316. Witness AG did not know if he heard the shot, but he did recall hearing the sound of glass breaking. Witness AG, T. 6287, 6316. Witness AH also only heard the sound of shattered glass and then saw that her brother was wounded. She saw the hole left by the bullet on the left-hand side of the shop window, Witness AH, T. 6245-7, 6267-74. 773 - Witness AH, T. 6270. Witness AH said that the men who had assisted them were dressed in civilian clothes, Witness AH, T. 6270. 774 - Witness AH, T. 6247, 6278-80; Witness AG, T. 6288, 6291, 6298, 6345. 775 - Witness AG, T. 6291; See P2794 (discharge report of the State Hospital). See P2792 (set of photographs taken by the police). The account of the event was confirmed in a written statement given to the police by Witness AG’s mother. See D80 (statement given by mother to Police Security Station of Novi Grad dated 1 March 1995), Witness AH, T. 6277. 776 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 437-8. According to the Defence, the fact that only two shots were fired and that no attempt was made by the perpetrator to hit other people present in the area indicates that the victim was not intentionally targeted, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 435. Dusan Dunjic, the medical forensic expert for the Defence indicated that, due to the absence of information such as a detailed description of the nature of the wound sustained by the victim and his body position at the time of the incident, it was not possible to determine the type of projectile responsible for his injury or whether he was directly targeted or hit by a bullet that ricocheted, D1921 (Report by medical forensic expert for the Defence Dusan Dunjic), pp 44-46. 777 - Witness AH, T. 6267. 778 - Witness AG, T. 6298, 6324; Witness AH T. 6248-9. Witness AG did not notice any military equipment nearby or any military vehicles parked in the parking lot in front of the shop, Witness AG, T. 6291, 6319. Witness AH testified that she did not see soldiers inside the restaurant when she went back for the bicycle, Witness AH, T. 6270. 779 - Witness AG, T. 6288. He said that, because he was in a state of shock after being wounded, he did not recall whether there was any shooting after he was injured, T. 6288. 780 - Witness AG recalled there were some 5 or 6 children playing very close to him at the time, and thought they probably ran away afterwards, Witness AG T. 6288, 6322. See also D80, Witness AH, T. 6277. 781 - The Official Note of the Centre of Security Department, drafted by Kucanin, indicated that there were 10 people inside the restaurant at the time of the shooting, but that no one there was injured, P2790 (Official Note of the Centre of Security Department dated 22 July 1994 signed by Kucanin). 782 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 433-435. It argues that the distance between the place where the victim was injured and the alleged source of fire was not been properly established (para. 433). Milan Kunjadic, the ballistic forensic expert for the Defence, concluded that, based on the information available to him, he was unable to determine the type of weapon used and the distance from which the bullet was shot, D1924 (Report by ballistic forensic expert for the Defence Milan Kunjadic), p.18. 783 - Witness AG, T. 6328; Witness AH, T. 6279. 784 - Kucanin, T. 4510, 4514-5; P2792 (set of photographs taken by the police); P2790 ( Official Note of the Centre of Security Department dated 22 July 1994 signed by Kucanin). Witness AH saw the bullet impacts in the restaurant when she later returned to pick up her brother’s bicycle, Witness AH, T. 6247-8, 6270. See P3280W (video of location of incident); P3279W (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 27); P3279WW (photographs of site marked by witness AG); P3269 (set of photographs pre-marked by witness AH). 785 - Kucanin saw bullet impacts inside the restaurant and on its window and was present when other members of the police took photographs of the crime scene and recorded the bullet trajectories. He said that the bullet that hit the restaurant left three impact points. It passed through the awning outside the restaurant and, after piercing its window, hit an inside wall and bounced back from it, falling on the floor, Kucanin, T. 4509-12, 4515-16, 4647-48, 4654-57, 4762-67; P2792 (set of photographs taken by the police); P2790 (Official Note of the Centre of Security Department dated 22 July 1994 signed by Kucanin). The witness indicated on a set of photographs shown to him in court the bullet impact points, T. 4515, 4647-8, 4654-7, 4762-67; P2792 (set of photographs taken by the police) He explained that the police had used a periscope-like device, developed by a ballistic expert, to visually connect the first two impact points and determine the source of fire, T. 4512, 4658-9. A 7.62 millimetre calibre rifle bullet was recovered from the scene, T. 4516; P2792 (set of photographs taken by the police); P2790 (Official Note of the Centre of Security Department dated 22 July 1994 signed by Kucanin). 786 - Kucanin, T. 4512-13; P2790 (Official Note of the Centre of Security Department dated 22 July 1994 signed by Kucanin). Kucanin pointed out the location of the house on a photograph shown to him in court, Kucanin, T. 4516-7. Hinchliffe did not take a laser range finder reading of the distance from the site where the victim was hit to the alleged source of fire, but, based on his observation of the ridge line, he estimated this distance to be 1200 metres, Hinchliffe, T. 12995 787 - He testified that, because the site of the shooting was at more than 1000 metres from SRK lines and due to “the configuration of the ground and the separation line in that area”, this site was not visible from SRK positions, Witness DP16, T. 16577. 788 - P2792 (set of photographs taken by the police); P3279W (360-degree photograph); P3280W (video of location of incident); P3269 (set of photographs pre-marked by witness AH). 789 - P36644.RH; D1814 (maps). 790 - P3644.RH (map). 791 - D1814 (map). 792 - Hajir, T. 1698. 793 - Witness DP6, T. 13869. 794 - Witness DP8, T. 14726. 795 - Kolp, T. 8243-4; P3644.MK (map marked by Kovac); Kovac, T. 877, 881. 796 - Kolp, T. 8243-4. 797 - Kucanin, T. 4633, P3658 (map marked by witness). Also, at the beginning of the conflict, Dobrinja had been exposed to intense shelling from Nedarici, Kovac, T. 877. 798 - Kovac, T. 874, 878. Witness DP6 (T. 13984) and DP17 (T. 16832-3) confirmed that the SRK had mortars in Nedarici; Witness DP5 stated that the SRK had a rocket launcher at the Institute for the Blind, T. 15349. 799 - \iho, T. 3936-3937. 800 - Hadzic, T. 12253. 801 - Defence witnesses submitted that the ABiH also fiercely fought in and around Nedarici. Richard Gray, UNMO in Sarajevo between April and September 1992, stated that in Nedarici the SRK was “under siege” and isolated; the confrontation line was at the student hostel and on Ante Babica Street. HVO forces in Stup shelled the buildings where he intended to place military observers and, in general, the area was all targeted by shell fire and mortar bombs from the ABiH. On 18 May 1992, a eight or nine-story building on Ante Babica was shelled by SRK forces in response to ABiH sniping (Gray, T. 19856; 19884, marking on D1845, western part of the map of Sarajevo; 19754; 19857; 19895; 19899-19902; 19906-7). According to witness DP5, a soldier in the SRK who left the area in middle 1993, attacks were typically launched by ABiH forces with multi-barrel rocket launchers, hand-held rocket launchers, mortars and mountain guns. ABiH snipers would fire from Vojnicko Polje and Alipasino Polje. DP5 also remembered that houses in Nedarici had been set on fire and that an attack had occurred involving tanks around 10 June 1992. He further stated that during the conflict three rows of barricades were erected at the intersection of Ante Babica Street and Aleja Branca Bujica (Witness DP5, T. 15250-2, 15256-9, 15271-4, 15404-8). The fact that large fighting operations took place around that date is confirmed by witness DP51, who stated that the Kosevo hospital treated a large number of wounded from Nedarici in the early morning of 7 or 8 June 1992 (Witness DP51, T. 13628). Destruction of buildings in Nedarici continued on a massive scale at least until December 1992 (Witness DP6, T. 13935). The Prosecution acknowledged that in June 1994 there were soldiers on both sides of the confrontation lines in Nedarici and that daily clashes occurred; also, ABiH troops enjoyed a good view of the other side of the confrontation line due to their position in high-rise buildings around Nedarici (T. 13898-9). 802 - Witness R, T. 8187-8. 803 - P3098 (map of the area marked by the witness); Omerovic, T. 3865, T. 3849-50. 804 - Omerovic, T. 3849-50; 3886; 3888. 805 - Omerovic, T. 3893-4. 806 - Omerovic, T.3863-4. 807 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3789-90; P3108 (map of the area); Faruk Kadric, T. 3742-3, showing the confrontation lines on D47, map of the area; however, the witness testified that he couldn’t actually see the confrontation lines. All the buildings in front of the “blind Institute and the institute for children were destroyed”, as those “below the institute for blind children, the Branka Bujica Street” (area marked on the map as Oslobodjenje-Studenski Dom, Zavod za Slijepe, Dom Penzionera). See also Kucanin, T. 4542, P3644.MK1 (map marked by witness). Faruk Kadric traced another confrontation line along Aleja Branca Bujica (now Aleja Bosne Srebrene), from Ante Babica street up the “Home for the Blind Children”, D47 (map of the area marked by witness); Faruk Kadric, T. 3742-3. Witness DP4 marked Aleja Branca Bujica as SRK territory under constant fire from the ABiH; Witness DP4, T. 14137. 808 - Witness DP4, T. 14228. 809 - Witness DP6, T. 13918; Witness DP8, T. 14729; 14742-7. 810 - Witness DP6, T. 13919; 14067-8. 811 - P2754 (UNMO report), discussed at T. 16852 (private session). 812 - P2759 (UNMO report), page 4, para. 24; Witness DP17, T. 16856-61. 813 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3782. 814 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3779-3784; 3763 (with regard to his son being shot at later that morning); Faruk Kadric, T. 3716 (with regard to a shooting incident early in the morning that day). 815 - Marko Kapetanovic, T. 5776, 5820; Ðiho, T. 3906. 816 - Ðiho, T. 3957. 817 - Omerovic, T. 3852. 818 - The Indictment alleges that on 4 October 1993, “Faruk Kadric, a boy aged 16 years, was shot and wounded in his neck while riding as a passenger in his father’s truck along Ante Babica street, in the west end of Sarajevo”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 819 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3753, 3757. 820 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3755-6. 821 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3761; P3107, drawing of the truck made by the witness, Faruk Kadric, T. 3706. 822 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3784, 3786-7. 823 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3757-8; T. 3786; D47 (map of the area marked by witness). With regard to the day of the incident, the Trial Chamber also regards as corroborating circumstance the declaration of the Sarajevo University Clinical Centre, P1781, stating that he was admitted on 4 October 1993. 824 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3793-6; P1781.1 (Sarajevo University Clinical Centre Patient History, where the ABiH 5th Motorized Brigade is cited as “insurance holder’s work organization”); Faruk Kadric, who at the beginning denied his father was a soldier (T. 3719), later conceded the issue, T. 3744. 825 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3803. 826 - Faruk Kadric, T. 3750; 3729. 827 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3760; Faruk Kadric, T. 3707. 828 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3761; Faruk Kadric, T. 3712. 829 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3763. 830 - Faruk Kadric, T. 3707, Fajko Kadric, T. 3765-66. According to the calculations of the Trial Chamber, the intersections of Ante Babica with, respectively, Aleja Bosne Srebrene and Ðure Jaksica street is closer to 200 meters. 831 - Faruk Kadric, T. 3706, 3715; Fajko Kadric, T. 3758, 3779-81; P3108 (pre-marked map); P3644.FK.1 (map marked in court); P3277 (photograph of the intersection). 832 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3759; P3107 (drawing of the truck made by Fajko Kadric). The witness showed on the drawing the “entry point” on the side of the car “which (was( about 20 or maybe 10 millimeters”; Fajko Kadric, T. 3765. He later specified that “the truck was hit on the right-hand side of the door, the frame of the door at the height of the neck” (T. 3761). 833 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3760; Faruk Kadric, T. 3707-10, 3714, P1781; P1701. 834 - Faruk Kadric, T. 3707-8; Fajko Kadric, T. 3759. 835 - Fajko Kadric testified that the Institute for the Blind was a well-known sniper’s stronghold. He notably indicated the presence of holes made in the walls, from which the SRK would shoot. According to him, those holes were visible from the position of the truck when they were shot at, Fajko Kadric, T. 3783. However, none of the witnesses was able to see where exactly the bullet came from, which is understandable in view of the circumstances. Fajko Kadric also stated that there was always a risk at this intersection and that his truck had been hit on various occasions, always on the right-hand side, Fajko Kadric, T. 3782. Faruk Kadric recounted that a woman was shot at on that same morning at that intersection, so he had been urged not to go to school, Faruk Kadric, T. 3716. Hinchliffe measured the distance from the Institute for the Blind to the location of the truck as being 440 metres, Hinchliffe, T. 12983. 836 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3760; Faruk Kadric, T. 3707. 837 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3766; Faruk Kadric, T. 3707-3708. At the dispensary, the wound was dressed; Faruk Kadric was later brought to an institution designated as KAR and then to the Sarajevo University Clinical Centre (Kosevo hospital), where he received extended medical treatment. Four or five months later, he went to the United Arab Emirates and stayed there for one and a half years to receive further treatment, Faruk Kadric, T. 3708-10. 838 - Faruk Kadric, T. 3710; P1781 (letter of discharge from hospital indicating that he was wounded on 4 October 1993 by a fragmentation bullet and that he presented metal foreign bodies in the back of the neck). 839 - P1701 (three x-rays of the neck). The contention of the Defence that the evidence does not permit to determine by what the injury was caused (Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 205) is without merit. The Defence itself later seems to admit that the “bullet came somewhere from the right side of the truck” (Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 215). A comparison of the fragments still present in Faruk Kadric’s neck with the visible C4 vertebra in the x-ray leads the Chamber to believe that the length of the larger one of these fragments is at least 2 cm, Faruk Kadric, T. 3713. 840 - Faruk Kadric, T. 3742-3. Two photographs, taken from the Institute for the Blind towards Ante Babica street, only show the presence of a small house under reconstruction, which stands in front of the Institute. At the time of the incident, this house had been destroyed and could not obstruct the view, Faruk Kadric, T. 3784. The trees appearing on another photograph, taken from Ante Babica street towards the Institute for the Blind, could not obstruct the view either, given their lower size at the time, P3277, photograph of the intersection; Fajko Kadric, T. 3836. With specific regard to visibility, both witnesses testified that the weather was “fair”, Fajko Kadric, T. 3761; Faruk Kadric, T. 3712. 841 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3777; Ðiho, T. 3916-7; Kapetanovic, T. 5791-2. The fact that the Institute could be seen from the position where Faruk was hit was stated by the father (Fajko Kadric, T. 3779-3784) and by the son (Faruk Kadric, T. 3746). 842 - Faruk Kadric indicated that a small barricade, a small container, had been placed there on that day, T. 3715. Fajko Kadric mentioned the presence of barricades which were about 2 meters high, T. 3776; see P3277, photograph of the intersection. 843 - Kunjadic, T. 19274-5, 19349, 19330. A vehicle traveling at 20-30 km/h, the speed suggested by Fajko Kadric for his truck on that occasion (T. 3761) moves at 5.5 to 8.3 meters per second. 844 - Kunjadic, T. 19349-51. 845 - Kunjadic, T. 19353. 846 - Due to these uncertainties, the Trial Chamber does not need to consider the claim by the Defence that, since the driver of the truck was an ABiH member (even if not on duty), it would be unreasonable to expect a soldier to distinguish the civilian status of a victim seated in a military objective from such a distance, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 215. However, the Defence also stated that it “completely agree(d(” with the witness Briquemont when he said that civilian vehicles become a legitimate military target when one is “sure that they are being used for military purposes,” T. 10134. In any event, the Defence essentially claims that a person who is in a truck allegedly used for army needs, as Faruk Kadric, cannot be considered a civilian, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 216. 847 - The Indictment alleges that on 13 March 1994 Ivan Franjic and Augustin Vucic “were shot and wounded while walking with a third man on Ante Babica street, in Vojnicko Polje, in the west end of Sarajevo. Ivan Franjic, aged 63 years, was wounded in his stomach, and Augustin Vucic, aged 57 years, was wounded in his kidneys and died from his injuries two and a half months later”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 848 - Kapetanovic could not remember the exact date of the incident and placed it around April 1993, Kapetanovic, T. 5765. Ðiho, at first, placed the incident in March 1994 (Ðiho, T. 3904) then in April 1994 (Ðiho, T. 3908). He was later confronted with his statement to the Sarajevo Criminal Department of 25 February 1995, in which he had indicated the date of 3 March 1994 (Ðiho, T. 3909-10; P2476). The Documentation from the University Medical Centre of Sarajevo and the letter of discharge issued to Franjic show that the victim was admitted to the hospital on 13 March 1994; P2477, discharge letter. The translation into English (P2477.1) bears the wrong date of 13 March 1993). With regard to the exact time of the incident, Kapetanovic recounted that his friends were shot around 10 am (Kapetanovic, T. 5766, 5827, 5841), while Ðiho declared that the incident occurred at about 2 or 3 pm (Ðiho, T. 3908). A report of the Fourth Police Station (Municipality of Novi Grad, Sarajevo) of 13 March 1994 indicates about 5 pm (P2476.1, English translation of the police report). 849 - Kapetanovic testified that Franjic was injured towards the middle of the stomach, above his navel. Kapetanovic, T. 5767-5768, 5782. Both witnesses indicated that his intestines were partially protruding from the open wound. Kapetanovic, T. 5768, 5837; Ðiho, T. 3908. The letter of discharge issued by the hospital to Franjic on 5 April 1994 is from the abdominal surgery clinic of the University Medical Centre of Sarajevo; the diagnosis was “gunshot wound to the abdomen caused by a sniper bullet.” P2477.1, discharge letter. The date of release has been mistranslated in the English version and should read as “5 April 1994”, instead of “5 April 1993”. 850 - Kapetanovic testified that Vucic was more seriously wounded in the kidney on the left-hand side (Kapetanovic, T. 5838; T. 5767-8, 5823). Although both witnesses declared that he subsequently died as a result of his wound (Kapetanovic, T. 5769; Dziho, T. 3921), the Defence submitted that the evidence presented is insufficient to conclude that Vucic’s death resulted from the particular injury to the kidneys. The Trial Chamber agrees that the nexus between the injury and Vucic’s death was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 851 - The Defence suggests that the three men might have been Croat members of the HVO (Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 313). The Trial Chamber does not find any element in evidence to support this allegation. 852 - Kapetanovic, T. 5769 (Franjic and himself were retired, while Vucic was about to retire), T. 5774, 5769; Ðiho, T. 3918. Franjic lived in the same apartment block as Kapetanovic, Kapetanovic, T. 5765. 853 - Kapetanovic, T. 5777, P3280.U (video of the incident scene). 854 - Kapetanovic, T. 5802-4, marking the left of the photograph in the vicinity of the intersection of the four-lane road which appears across the bottom of the photograph and a road that extends parallel to the side of the photograph, to the left of a red vehicle on the intersection, P3279Ob (photograph of the incident scene). 855 - P3202 (map marked by witness with a cross apparently where Trg Medunarodnog prijatelistva turns south towards Ante Babica street). 856 - Kapetanovic, T. 5862, marking the lower right-hand side of P3279 (photograph of the incident scene). 857 - Ðiho, a reserve policeman, and a colleague went to the neighbourhood, in the parking lot between numbers 1 and 3 of Ante Babica street after receiving a complaint that some children were tampering with a car. While they were there, they heard some shooting and, at first, believed they had been targeted, Ðiho, T. 3904-6. 858 - P3279Oa; P3115, map of the area marked by the witness; Ðiho, T. 3911-3912. Also, Ðiho, T. 3962, marking the lower right-hand side of P3279Ob, photograph of the incident scene. 859 - Ðiho, T. 3907-8. 860 - Kapetanovic, T. 5766. 861 - Kapetanovic, T. 5823. 862 - Kapetanovic, T. 5767, 5781. 863 - Kapetanovic, T. 5768. 864 - Kapetanovic, T. 5781. 865 - \iho, T. 3906. 866 - Kapetanovic, T. 5776; 5820; Ðiho, T. 3906. The evidence about the position of the victims and the type of wounds sustained does not sufficiently inform the Trial Chamber about the source of fire. 867 - Kapetanovic, T. 5781. In respect to the source of fire, the Defence alluded that the shot could have come from the Retirement Home or from the Oslobodenje building, which were 50 to 100 metres far from the Institute for the Blind (Kapetanovic, T. 5821) and were held by the ABiH, Ðiho, T. 3934-6; P3115 (map marked by witness). 868 - Ðiho, T. 3918. 869 - Kapetanovic, T. 5768. 870 - Kapetanovic, T. 5786. 871 - Ðiho, T. 3957. In particular, openings of 30 to 40 centimetres had been made for that purpose in the walls of the Institute for the Blind, as he could see for himself when he visited the building after the Dayton agreement of 1995, Ðiho, T. 3956-7; 3959. 872 - Kapetanovic, T. 5774; P3265, photograph of the area, marked by witness with regard to destruction due to shelling; in particular, the two private houses in front of the student hostel were destroyed; Ðiho testified that he could see the Institute for the Blind from the place where Frajic was shot, T. 3952. The student hostel was hollow and several large holes provided a view through it, Fajko Kadric, T. 3777; Ðiho, T. 3916-7; Kapetanovic, T. 5791-2. 873 - Ðiho, T. 3914. 874 - Kapetanovic, T. 5833. 875 - Kapetanovic, T. 5768, 5836-7. 876 - Kapetanovic, T. 5838; Ðiho, T. 3907. 877 - Kapetanovic, T. 5838; Ðiho, T. 3908. 878 - Statement presented to Kapetanovic by the Defence, T. 5843. 879 - The indictment alleges that on 13 June 1994 “Fatima Salcin, a woman aged 44 years, was shot and wounded in her right hand while walking with her father-in-law on Ive Andrica Street, in the Mojmilo area of Sarajevo”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 880 - Salcin, T. 2924-6, 2941. 881 - Salcin, T. 2925-7, 2942-3. 882 - Salcin, T. 2930. 883 - Salcin, T. 2926. 884 - Salcin, T. 2946. 885 - Salcin, T. 2943. 886 - Salcin, T. 2932. 887 - Salcin T. 2927, 2943, 2971. 888 - Salcin, T. 2927, 2971. 889 - Salcin, T. 2927, 2931, 2938. 890 - P3369 (Dobrinja General Hospital Discharge Paper), P3369.1 (translation); T. 2931-2. 891 - Maljanovic, T. 2976. 892 - Maljanovic, T. 2977, 2989, 2999, 3004. 893 - Maljanovic, T. 2987. 894 - Maljanovic, T. 2979, 3006. 895 - Maljanovic, T. 2979. 896 - Maljanovic, T. 2980. 897 - Maljanovic, T. 2980-2. 898 - Maljanovic, T. 2986. 899 - Id. 900 - Maljanovic, T. 2988. 901 - Salcin, T. 2932. 902 - Salcin, T. 2933. 903 - P3259, Salcin, T. 2935. 904 - Salcin, T. 2934, 2936-7. 905 - Maljanovic, T. 2987-8. 906 - Maljanovic, T. 2980. 907 - Maljanovic, T. 2982, 2984. 908 - P3100; T. 2984-6, 2990-2. 909 - Based on calculations using P3100 and C2. 910 - Maljanovic, T. 2980. 911 - Maljanovic, T. 3007-8. 912 - Witness DP5, T. 15238-9, 15249-50. 913 - Witness DP5, T. 15297. 914 - Witness DP5, T. 15409-11; D1785. 915 - Witness DP5, T. 15297. 916 - Witness DP5, T. 15297-8; D1785. 917 - Prosecution Closing Argument, T. 21707. 918 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 361. 919 - See P3100 and P3644.RH. 920 - Maljanovic, T. 3007-8. 921 - Maljanovic, T. 2988. 922 - The Indictment alleges that on 26 June 1994, “Sanela Muratovic, a girl aged 16 years, was shot and wounded in her right shoulder while walking with a girlfriend on Ðure Jaksica St., presently Adija Mulabegovica, in the west end of Sarajevo”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 923 - Omerovic, T. 3843-5, 3877-8. Medina Omerovic, the girlfriend walking with Sanela Muratovic at the time of the incident, is the only witness who testified about this incident. 924 - Omerovic, T. 3847. 925 - Omerovic, T. 3844. On 8 November 1995, Omerovic had however marked the place where Muratovic was wounded on the downhill portion of Lukavicka Cesta, on the southwest side of the confrontation line. Omerovic, T. 3864. The witness admitted not being very good at locating places on maps; Omerovic, T. 3866. All the other evidence produced at trial, and especially the 360 degree photograph of the area taken from the place where Muratovic was shot (P3280O), decisively point to the fact that the two girls were crossing the area between the two buildings in Ðure Jaksica street, from the building where the sister of the witness lived towards the witness’s building. A wing of the witness’s building comes forward towards the street (P3280O). Given this, the Trial Chamber deems the marks made on the map on 8 November 1995 not significant to determine the actual position of the two girls on the day of the incident. 926 - Omerovic, T. 3845-7. 927 - The trench completely crossed the road, Omerovic, T. 3851. 928 - Three of the soldiers who had warned them of sniping fire ran up to them and transported Muratovic to Dobrinja hospital, Omerovic, T. 3844, 3880-1. 929 - P3098 (map of the area marked by the witness). 930 - P3098 (map of the area), Omerovic, T. 3866-67. 931 - The Defence has relied on these witnesses to contend that no fire could come from the upper floors of the Institute for the Blind, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 396. In particular, witness DP4, a member of the SRK company stationed in Nedarici, stated that he never saw rifles with telescopic sights at that position (Witness DP4, T. 14225). Witness DP6 remarked that the SRK occupied only the first floor of the Institute for the Blind, and not the higher floors since it was dangerous to go there, Witness DP6, T. 14067-8. 932 - P2757, UNMO report, page 4, para. 24; P2754, UNMO report, discussed at T. 16852 (private session). Witness DP17, T. 16856-16858 (private session), referring to P2754, although contending that “the sniper did not exist” stated that, at the Institute for the Blind, “there were no sniper weapons, but there were weapons that could fire at a longer distance.” 933 - Fajko Kadric, T. 3782; Ðiho, T. 3957. Omerovic recounted that another sniping incident had occurred in spring 1994 on the same street, causing the death of Dejan Stefanovic, Omerovic, T. 3849. The boy had been shot on the other side of the street and closer to Aleja Branka Bujica, compared to where Muratovic was shot (P3098, map of the area marked by the witness; Omerovic, T. 3865, 3849-50). Although the witness gave contradicting evidence with respect to the possible source of fire in that instance, the Trial Chamber does not deem these contradictions as affecting her testimony with regard to the incident involving Muratovic. Omerovic explained that, during the years of war, based on what she heard, she gained a sense that sniping fire came from the Institute for the Blind and the surrounding area, Omerovic, T. 3852. 934 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 405. 935 - T. 13898-9. 936 - Omerovic, T. 3844. She later confirmed that the soldiers “told us to hurry up because a few moments before sniper fire had been opened”, Omerovic, T. 3881. 937 - The witness indicated that she had seen soldiers in her building and her sister’s apartment block earlier in 1994, but also said that she had never noticed soldiers on the street where the incident occurred. To her knowledge, the soldiers who assisted them were not quartered in that building, Omerovic, T. 3882, 3891. 938 - Hinchliffe, T. 12994. 939 - The Indictment alleges that on 17 July 1994, “Rasid Dzonko, a man aged 67 years, was shot and wounded in his back while sitting watching television in his apartment at Milanka Vitomira Street, presently Senada Mandica-Dende Street 5, in Vojnicko Polje, in the west end of Sarajevo”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 940 - Dzonko, T. 5645; 5712; P3279. 941 - Dzonko, T. 5645; 5711-2. 942 - Dzonko, T. 5646, P3279T (photograph taken from the video). 943 - Dzonko, T. 5651. 944 - Dzonko, T. 5655. 945 - Dzonko, T.5652. 946 - Id. 947 - Id. 948 - Id. 949 - Dzonko, T.5646, 5652; P3279TT; T.5653-4; P3279T (photograph of the victim seated at the spot where he wasshot). 950 - Dzonko, T. 5646-8, 5740. 951 - Dzonko, T. 5648. 952 - Dzonko, T. 5649-50. 953 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 363. 954 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para.422. 955 - Id.: the Defence claims that the victim was “injured in the evening, at 10.45 p.m., when there was no lights in the apartment, but only TV set was on, that there were curtains on the windows and the door, then it seems quite clear that the witness could not be observed at all”. 956 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 422. 957 - Dzonko, T. 5740-1, 5745, 5663. 958 - Dzonko, T.5741, 5745. 959 - Dzonko, T.5741: “it couldn’t have come from anywhere else except there ?the School of Theologyg at that height because it must have been fired from the roof because that is how it travelled. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have hit that way, reached the target that way”. 960 - Dzonko, T. 5649, 5663, P3279. 961 - Dzonko, T. 5689: the witness mentioned the existence of a “VRS” bunker located where a smaller house appears on the photograph, in front of the Faculty of Theology; see also T. 5663. 962 - P3728, P3644.RH. 963 - Dzonko, T. 5651, 5661. 964 - Dzonko, T. 5649; P3279T, photograph 35; T. 5664-5, 5658. 965 - P3279T, photograph 3A; Dzonko T. 5662-3. 966 - Dzonko, T. 5663. 967 - P3279T, photograph 3A; Dzonko T. 5662-3. 968 - Dzonko, T. 5657. 969 - Dzonko, T. 5655-7; P3279T (photograph 9A). 970 - Dzonko, T. 5657-8: residents used the entrance door only at night to fetch water and they pierced an entrance through the wall on the other side of the building. 971 - DP8, T. 14802, DP8 emphasized that the line of sight from the apartment did not correspond to the line of sight from the Faculty of Theology, T. 14799-14802. 972 - Dzonko, T. 5648. 973 - Dzonko, T. 5648-9. 974 - Dzonko, T. 5720, 5727-9. 975 - Id. 976 - Dzonko, T.5739. 977 - Dzonko, T. 5729. 978 - Written Statement of Mediha Golo (only portions read out in court of that statement were admitted into evidence); Dzonko, T. 5733-8. 979 - P1839 (UNPROFOR report – admitted under seal). P1839 did not specifically indicate whether the persons killed or injured by the shelling were civilians. 980 - P1839 (UNPROFOR report – admitted under seal). 981 - Id. 982 - Tsychenko, T. 17210. 983 - Tsychenko, T. 17256. 984 - D1823 (UNMO situation report for period of 10 January 1994 to 11 January 1994 - although it is dated 11 January 1994, D1823 mistakenly indicates at one point that it covers a period from 10 December 1994 to 11 December 1994). 985 - D1823 (UNMO situation report for period of 10 January 1994 to 11 January 1994). 986 - Id. Tsychenko recalled that an investigation was carried out after the incident but he didn’t know what conclusions had been reached, Tsychenko, T. 17285-6. 987 - D1823 (UNMO situation report for period of 10 January 1994 to 11 January 1994). 988 - Ashton, T. 1228. 989 - Ashton, T. 1229. 990 - Ashton, T. 1227. 991 - Ashton, T. 1228. Ashton did not specify where the shelling had come from. 992 - Kucanin, T. 4517, 4519 and 4539-40. P1840.1 (English translation of Sarajevo CSB report – admitted under seal). 993 - P1840.1 (English translation of Sarajevo CSB report – admitted under seal). 994 - Kucanin, T. 4521. 995 - Kucanin, T. 4521-3. 996 - Kucanin, T. 4522. 997 - Agnanovic, T. 7717. 998 - Agnanovic, T. 7727-8. 999 - Agnanovic, T. 7728. 1000 - Agnanovic, T. 7727-8. 1001 - Agnanovic, T. 7726-8. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence indicating that the nearby area of Novi Grad regularly experienced small arms and heavy weapon fire. See Mustafa Kovac, T. 874 and Fata Spahic, T. 7948. 1002 - The indictment alleges that on 22 January 1994 three mortar shells hit an area of Alipašino Polje, “the first in a park behind, and the second and third in front of residential apartment buildings at 3, Geteova Street (previously Cetinjska Street) and at 4, Bosanka Street (previously Klara Cetkin Street), where children were playing. The second and third shells killed six children under the age of 15 years and wounded one adult and four such children. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory approximately to the west,” Schedule 2 to the Indictment. 1003 - See, for example, DP17, T. 16729; and P3644.RH (map). 1004 - P3644.RH (map). 1005 - P3644.RH, D1814 (maps). 1006 - Todorovic, T. 8006-7. 1007 - Todorovic, T. 8008-9, 8020. 1008 - Todorovic, T. 8009, 8020. 1009 - Todorovic, T. 8011-12, 8026. 1010 - Kapetanovic, T. 7954. 1011 - Kapetanovic, T. 7955-7. 1012 - Kapetanovic, T. 7974-5. 1013 - Kapetanovic, T. 7956. 1014 - Kapetanovic, T. 7956-7, 7961-2, 7984. 1015 - Witness AI, T. 7665, 7669-70. 1016 - Witness AI, T. 7665, 7670, 7682, 7688. 1017 - Witness AI, T. 7665, 7670-1. 1018 - Witness AI, T. 7665, 7667. 1019 - Aganovic, T. 7717-8. 1020 - Aganovic, T. 7718-20. 1021 - Aganovic, T. 7720. 1022 - Aganovic, T. 7722. 1023 - Aganovic, T. 7722-3. 1024 - Aganovic, T. 7723-4. 1025 - Aganovic, T. 7723-4. 1026 - Witness Q, T. 7362-4. 1027 - Witness Q, T. 7365-6. 1028 - Witness Q, T. 7364, 7370, 7400-1. 1029 - Witness Q, T. 7400; P2171B (Witness Q’s report), P2171B.1 (translation of above). 1030 - Eterovic, T. 8839, 8854-5, 8857-8. 1031 - Eterovic, T. 8840; P2171C (Eterovic’s report), P2171C.1 (translation of above). 1032 - Eterovic, T. 8841, 8845-6, as well as the aforementioned exhibit. 1033 - Todorovic, T. 8030-1. 1034 - Kapetanovic, T. 7960-1. 1035 - Witness AI, T. 7668-70, 7687-8. 1036 - Witness AI, T. 7669. 1037 - Witness AI, T. 7684, 7691. 1038 - Witness AI, T. 7669, 7686-7. 1039 - Aganovic, T. 7727-8. 1040 - Aganovic, T. 7727. 1041 - Witness Q, T. 7402, 7406-7. 1042 - Witness Q, T. 7404, 7407. 1043 - Sabljica, T. 5248-9; P2171 (Sabljica’s report), P2171.1 (translation of above); see also P2171.A, P2171.A.1 (revised translation of above). 1044 - Sabljica, T. 5270-2, 5360. 1045 - Sabljica, T. 5270-1, 5363; P2171A.1. 1046 - Sabljica, T. 5270-2, 5378; P2171A.1. 1047 - Sabljica, T. 5271, 5275, 5282-4. The location of the Institute for the Blind is marked on P3727 (map). 1048 - Witness Q, T. 7403. 1049 - Witness AI, T. 7683. 1050 - Aganovic, T. 7725-6. 1051 - Aganovic, T. 7748. 1052 - Todorovic, T. 8015, 8027. 1053 - Todorovic, T. 8028-30. 1054 - Kapetanovic, T. 7958-9, 7978. He later said that the Kulin Ban’s location was 15 metres’ distance from the back exit of his building (T. 7962-3; the same figure appears in the French transcript), and later again that the distance was 100 to 150 metres (T. 7973). The Trial Chamber finds that the shorter distance, as it appears on the record, cannot be correct. All the evidence (including map exhibits) support Kapetanovic’s other claim (repeated twice) that the distance was at least 100 metres. 1055 - Kapetanovic, T. 7959, 7978. 1056 - Kapetanovic, T. 7959. 1057 - Kucanin, T. 4664. 1058 - Kucanin, T. 4663, 4665. 1059 - Kucanin, T. 4687. 1060 - Eterovic, T. 8869, 8875. Witnesses Vahid Karavelic and Milorad Bukva both confirmed that “Kulin Ban” denoted Croatian units or a Croatian brigade (T. 12023 and 18424, respectively). 1061 - Witness Q, T. 7441; D97 (letter). 1062 - Witness Q, T. 7441-2. 1063 - Witness Q, T. 7451-2. 1064 - Witness AI, T. 7682-3. 1065 - Aganovic, T. 7732; Kapetanovic, T. 7984; Todorovic, T. 8028; Hafizovic, T. 7845; Ljusa, T. 7886; Cutler, T. 9016; Thomas, T. 9377; Witness W, T. 9627; Mole, T. 11100; Fraser, T. 11211; Bergeron, T. 11294; and Van Baal, T. 11346. 1066 - Karavelic, T. 12023. 1067 - Vilicic Shelling Report, p. 41. 1068 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 656; Acquittal Motion, paras 121, 125. 1069 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 658-60; Acquittal Motion, paras 121, 125. 1070 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 659. 1071 - Acquittal Motion, para. 121. 1072 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 660-1. 1073 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 515, 527-8. 1074 - Id., paras 523-6. 1075 - Id., para. 482; more generally, on accuracy, see Id., paras 473-483. 1076 - DP17, T. 16832-3, 16890. 1077 - DP17, T. 16832. 1078 - Hadzic, T. 12254. 1079 - T. 21981. 1080 - Vilicic Shelling Report, p. 41. 1081 - Vilicic Shelling Report, p. 41. 1082 - Witness DP17 testified that the area of Nedarici not under SRK control was negligible (T. 16876). 1083 - See P3727 which indicates a range of possible firing positions bounded by dotted lines converging from the west on Alipašino Polje. 1084 - Van Lynden, T.2183-4: “Dobrinja [...] initially had a separate siege to the rest of Sarajevo. A link up was made at the end of June 1992”, when Mojmilo Hill fell to the ABiH (T. 2210). 1085 - Dzevlan, T. 3516; Karavelic, T. 11816, P3728 (electronic map marked by Vahid Karavelic); P3732 (map marked by Ismet Hadzic); DP9, T. 14459, T. 14464, T. 14496; D1770 (map marked by witness); D1771 (electronic map marked by DP9). 1086 - Hafizovic, T. 7778-80 and 7787. 1087 - Hafizovic, T. 7782-3. 1088 - Hafizovic, T. 7787. 1089 - Hafizovic, T. 7780-2. 1090 - Hadzabdic, T. 6736. 1091 - Hadzabdic, T. 6737. 1092 - Gavranovic, T. 6711. 1093 - Gavranovic, T. 6718. 1094 - Hadzic, T. 12205. 1095 - Hadzic, T. 12246. 1096 - Sokolar, T. 3622. 1097 - Refik Sokolar, a policeman in Dobrinja, indicated that a larger bridge was used by vehicles and two smaller ones utilised by pedestrians, Sokolar, T. 3622, see also P3097 (map marked by Refik Sokolar); the Orthodox Church was in an open area, Sokolar, T. 3581. Sokolar also described the bridges crossing the Dobrinja River within the ABIH-held territory in Dobrinja as follows: from east to west, “there was a large bridge on the confrontation line, and there was also where the buses turned, and then there was a bridge where there was a confrontation line where nobody moved. Then there was another bridge, and this was from the Emile Zola Street on to the square. Then number 3, there was a bridge for the traffic, the buses, when the buses could go, when it was possible. And then there was another pedestrian bridge between Dobrinja II and Dobrinja III. And then the third bridge which wasn't operational, and this was also for vehicles, this was in two directions towards Nedzarici”. See also P3728 (incidents 6&18, maps with location of the bridges), T. 3623. 1098 - Husein Grebic testified that at some 200 metres from that bridge, at the cross roads of Bulevar Branica Dobrinje and Emile Zola street, was the command post of the ABIH 3rd battalion of the 5th Brigade, Grebic, T. 7295 (marked as No. 3 on D95: map marked by Husein Grebic). 1099 - Sokolar, T. 3622, 3623. 1100 - [ahinovic, T. 3434; she added that “when snipers were silent, shelling started”, T.3436. 1101 - The pedestrian bridge linking Dobrinja II to Dobrinja III. 1102 - [ahinovic, T. 3423. 1103 - [ahinovic, T. 3427. 1104 - Zametica, T. 3480, Dzevlan, T. 3545. 1105 - Zametica, T. 3481-2; [ahinovic, T. 3415, 3426, 3440. Sahinovic explained that she would, sometimes, fetch water 3 to 6 times a day (T. 3415), while Zametica explained that her family would go every day or every other day (T. 3505). Zametica explained that there were six bridges on Dobrinja river and that the bridge concerned was the fourth bridge from the Orthodox Church (T. 3494-5). 1106 - [ahinovic, T. 3415-6. 1107 - [ahinovic, T. 3416. 1108 - Zametica, T. 3482-3. 1109 - Zametica, T. 3505. 1110 - [ahinovic, T. 3423. 1111 - [ahinovic, T. 3423; Zametica, T. 3503. 1112 - [ahinovic, T. 3435. 1113 - The Indictment alleges that on 11 July 1993, “Munira Zametica, a woman aged 48 years, was shot dead while collecting water from the Dobrinja River in area of Dobrinja II and III”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1114 - [ahinovic, T. 3416, 3418, 3436; [ahinovic first stated that the incident occurred at 2-3pm (T. 3416), then as the night was about to fall (T. 3417), then corrected herself and said again between 2 and 3 pm (T. 3418). [ahinovic testified that the time given by the Official Note which states that the incident took place in the early part of the evening is incorrect. Vahida Zametica corroborated [ahinovic to the extent that she testified that the incident occurred between 14:00 and 14:30 hours (T. 3440). Similarly, the death certificate of the victim which certifies that the death occurred at 16:00 hours on 11 July 1993 supports the witnesses’ testimony (P1382C). 1115 - Zametica, T. 3482; [ahinovic, T. 3440, 3416-7. 1116 - [ahinovic, T. 3436. 1117 - [ahinovic, T. 3422, 3419; the street going to that bridge was called Octobarske Revolucije and the witness thinks that the street is now called Dobrinjske Bolnice (T. 3427-8). 1118 - [ahinovic, 3417. 1119 - [ahinovic, T. 3417-8. 1120 - [ahinovic, T. 3418. Zametica, T. 3483-5, 3501. 1121 - Zametica, T. 3484-5. 1122 - [ahinovic, T. 3418, 3432-3, 3438, 3453; [ahinovic assumed that they were either going to, or coming back from, their guard duty; she did not know for certain because she had left the scene of the incident, was halfway when she returned and saw them there. They positioned themselves on the bridge behind sandbags and shot in the direction of the Orthodox Church to be able to pull the victim out of the water. The witness did not remember whether there was an exchange of fire between the ABIH soldiers who returned fire from the bridge and the Serb forces in the church. Usually, there was no fire from Dobrinja II in the direction of Dobrinaja IV, [ahinovic, T. 3418, 3434-38, 3452-3. 1123 - [ahinovic, T. 3418, 3453. The death certificate of the victim states that the death occurred at 16:00 hours, P1382. An official report of the incident by the public security services (the “Official Note”) confirmed the death of Munira Zametica; it assessed that “the murder took place on 11 July 1993 between 1900 and 1930 hrs.” and that the victim was shot by two rounds of fire. D42 (official report of public security station of Sarajevo), [ahinovic, T. 3439. The contradiction observed between this timing and that indicated by [ahinovic was put to the witness who testified that the time given by the “Official Note” was not correct, [ahinovic, T. 3440. 1124 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 125-7; Motion for Acquittal, para. 47. 1125 - [ahinovic, T. 3434-6, [ahinovic identified the Orthodox Church on a photograph, locating it in Dobrinja IV, [ahinovic, T. 3424, P3279, P3279K (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 6); Zametica, T. 3486, 3489; P3279.VZ (enlarged photograph taken from the site of the incident); P3279KK (enlarged photograph taken from the site of the incident). 1126 - Zametica, T. 3485-9; P3279.KK; [ahinovic testified that the bridge had sandbags along the length of the bridge on both sides up to 2 metres, but there was a "very small place that was not covered" so they had to run across … people got wounded there from the church." There were containers, but "they were not reliable because the tin was thin”. Photographs in evidence confirmed [ahinovic’s statement in that regard, P3279.KK (enlarged photograph) shows that there was a line of sight from the river bank concerned and the Orthodox Church. 1127 - Hadzic, T. 12249; Hajir, T. 1679; Thomas, T. 9322-9325; Sokolar, T. 3581; D42 (Official Note). Hinchliffe measured the distance between the bridge and the Church tower to be 1,107 meters, Hinchliffe, T. 12970. 1128 - The Defence witness DP9, a member of the SRK Ilidza brigade positioned in the Dobrinja area, acknowledged that Dobrinja IV was under SRK control (DP9, T. 14454, 14464). He claimed that the side of the Orthodox Church facing Dobrinja was heavily damaged by ABiH shelling (DP9, T. 14443, 14453) and subject to fire so that attempting to climb up this façade “would have been equal to suicide” (DP9, T. 14494-5). During cross-examination, he conceded that the tower survived the shelling intact except for its top part, which was seriously damaged (DP9, T. 14563). Photographs of the tower, covered by scaffolding, were shown to the witness, who recognised that they were taken from what was the ABiH side during the war and accurately depicted the state of the Orthodox Church during the Indictment Period, P3753 (set of photographs of the Orthodox Church’s tower), DP9, T. 14580-1. He insisted that the “church” was never used by the SRK for any military activity, DP9, T. 14464. 1129 - As mentioned above, the confrontation line at the eastern part of Dobrinja were along a street separating Dobrinja I and IV from Dobrinja II and III B and the buildings of Dobrinja IV and the Orthodox Church were placed within SRK-held territory, Dzevlan, T. 3516; Karavelic, T. 11816, P3728 (electronic map marked by Vahid Karavelic); P3732 (map marked by Ismet Hadzic); DP9, T. 14459, 14464, 14496; D1770 (map marked by witness); D1771 (electronic map marked by DP9). 1130 - There is some discrepancy as to the colour of the clothing of the victim. Vahida Zametica testified that her mother wore a brown skirt (T. 3486), while [ahinovic testified that the victim was wearing a multicoloured skirt (T. 3426). The Trial Chamber recalls that such details have a bearing if the clothing of the victim could have led the perpetrator – along with other details such as the carrying of a weapon or involvement in a military activity - to believe that the person targeted was not a civilian. 1131 - The Prosecution submits that, on 6 January 1994, “Sanija Dzevlan, a woman aged 32 years, was shot and wounded in her buttocks while riding a bicycle across a bridge in Nikolje Demonja Street, Dobrinja”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1132 - Dzevlan, T. 3515. 1133 - Dzevlan was aged 32 at the time of the incident, Dzevlan, T. 3513. 1134 - Dzevelan, T. 3517-8, 3556. 1135 - Dzevlan, T. 3517-9. She testified that she did not hear any shelling or sniping before she left her house, otherwise she would have not done so, Dzevlan, T. 3519, 3536-7, 3542. The Defence confronted her with UN documents reporting shelling activity that day in Sarajevo, D45 (UN report of the week up to 6 January 1994), D44 (UNPROFOR document about shelling activity on 6 January 1994 in Sarajevo). The witness responded that the shelling of all neighbourhoods mentioned in these documents was too distant for her to hear, Dzevlan, T. 3542. The UN document D44 reports shelling on Stup, @uc, Alipasin Most, Smilevici, Rajlovac, Lukavica, Grbavica and Vogosca. The UN document D45 reports shelling on the areas of the Jewish cemetery, Grbavica, the airport, the Holiday Inn, the Central Bank; the area near the Presidency building on 6 January 1994. 1136 - Dzevlan, T. 3518. Dzevlan testified that at the time of the incident she was the only passer-by in the area and was not carrying weapons. She added that there had been no soldiers or uniformed people or military equipment in the area, Dzevlan, T. 3518. 1137 - Dzevlan, T. 3518, 3523. 1138 - Dzevlan, T. 3519; P3280.L (the witness indicated the spot where she was shot and where the bullets came from while the video was playing, T. 3521); P3279.L (direction she was cycling to, T. 3522-3), Dzevlan testified that she did not know the name of the bridge she had crossed when she came back from the hospital in Dobrinja II. Dzevlan, T. 3535. Upon the Defence’s question that the bridge could be called the Emile Zola Bridge, she responded that “possibly it is” but emphasised that “I don’t know what the bridge is called, not even today”, Dzevlan, T. 3535. She recognised the bridge she had crossed on 6 January 1994 on photographs shown to her and on the video of the scene of the incident played in court (P3280L), P3264 (photograph where she marks with a circle part of the Church that is visible ); P3114 (map where the witness marked as circle number 1 the spot where she was shot and as circle number 2 the suspected source of fire); T. 3527-9; Sokolar marked on the map P3097 the location of the hospital, placing it at an equal distance between the pedestrian bridge connecting Dobrinja II and III and the traffic bridge also connecting Dobrinja II and III, Sokolar, T. 3583. 1139 - Dzevlan, T. 3519. 1140 - Dzevlan. T.3519. 1141 - Dzevlan. T.3520. 1142 - P3113.1 (English translation of the medical discharge form). 1143 - The Defence assumes that the bridge in which vicinity Dzevlan was shot was called the Emile Zola Bridge (Sokolar testified that it was a pedestrian bridge) and argues that the time when the sandbags were placed on it is inconsistent with the testimony of Sadija Sahinovic (Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 288). The video, the photographs and the maps of the scene of the incident lead the Trial Chamber to the conclusion that Dzevlan was not shot in the vicinity of the pedestrian bridge but in the vicinity of the bridge open to traffic, close to the hospital where she came from. The evidence further demonstrates that the pedestrian bridge under which Munira Zametica (see sniping incident 6) was shot is not the bridge close to the spot where Dzevlan was shot. From the description made by Sokolar of the bridges crossing the Dobrinja river and a close examination of P3264 (photograph of a bridge open to traffic) and P3728 (map of incidents 6 &18), it is clear that Dzevlan was shot in the vicinity of the second bridge connecting Dobrinja II (the area of the hospital) to Dobrinja III from the eastern part of the ABiH confrontation line. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the bridge in the vicinity of which Dzevlan was shot is the bridge indicated in P3728 (map of incident 6 &18) located between the Emile Zola Bridge (from the Emile Zola street and the square) and the Bridge where Munira Zametica was shot (to the street called Octobarske Revolucije at the time of the incident). 1144 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 287. 1145 - Id. The presence of an ABiH headquarters in the vicinity and the proximity to the confrontation lines could substantiate the thesis that the victim was hit by a stray bullet, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 289-90. 1146 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 288. 1147 - Id., para. 287. 1148 - Dzevlan, T. 3523; P3279.L (the witness indicated the position of her body when she was shot). She assumed that the bullet which hit her came from Dobrinja IV; she was uncertain whether the fire came from the Orthodox Church or another building in the area of Dobrinja IV. On a photograph of the area where she was shot, the witness pointed out the “church” she suspected to be the source of fire, P3114 (map where the witness marked as the circle number 1 the spot where she was shot and as the circle number 2 the suspected source of fire), T. 3528-9). 1149 - Dzevlan, T. 3527. 1150 - DP9, T. 14491, P3264. 1151 - Dzevlan, T. 3523, 3527-9. 1152 - Dzevlan’s uncertainty only concerned whether the gunfire she heard came from the Orthodox Church or from a building close to it, in Dobrinja IV, T. 3527. 1153 - The photograph P3264 evidences that there was a line of sight from the Orthodox Church or buildings of Dobrinja IV to the spot in Dobrinja III where the victim was shot, P3264 (photograph taken from the bridge and the line of sight to the Orthodox Church). Dzevlan recalled that the day after she was shot, a man was shot at same spot, in the open area at the end of the bridge, where she was shot in Dobrinja III allegedly by SRK forces; the spot was then considered dangerous, Dzevlan, T. 3529. As a result, in addition to barricades made of sandbags, which extended the full length of the bridge and then approximately one metre past either side of the bridge, barricades were installed either side of the bridge by the civilian protection shortly thereafter, Dzevlan, T. 3525, 3529; P3264 (photograph taken from the bridge). 1154 - As seen supra, the victim testified that shelling taking place in other places of the city could not be heard. 1155 - The distance was calculated on the basis of maps in evidence, in particular P3644.RH. 1156 - The Indictment alleges that on 25 May 1994, “Sehadeta Plivac, a woman aged 53 years and Hajra Hafizovic, a woman aged 62 years, were both shot and wounded in their legs while passengers in a crowded bus near the junction of Nikolje Demonje and Bulevar Avnoj, presently Nikolje Demonje and Bulevar Branioca Dobrinje, in Dobrinja”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1157 - Grabovica, T. 3645-6, 3659. 1158 - Grabovica, T. 3645. 1159 - Grabovica, T. 3648, 3662; P2637.1 (Translation of Official Note issued by the Novi Grad Public Security Station and Medical Documentation issued by the Dobrinja General Hospital). 1160 - Grabovica, T. 3648, 3684; Sokolar, T. 3578, 3662. For the precise location of the bus at the time of the incident, see P3280M (Video), Grabovica, T. 3652; Sokolar, T. 3578; P2637.1; D46 (map of the location of the incident marked by Grabovica), Grabovica, T. 3686. 1161 - Grabovica, T. 3649. 1162 - Grabovica, T. 3658. 1163 - Grabovica, T. 3649, 3654, 3655, 3675, 3683. 1164 - Grabovica, T. 3649, 3668. 1165 - Grabovica, T. 3651, 3692. 1166 - Grabovica, T. 3668. 1167 - Sokolar, T. 3575; Thomas, T. 9322. 1168 - Grabovica, T. 3649-50, 3668. 1169 - Grabovica, T. 3650, 3668. 1170 - Grabovica, T. 3668-69; P2637.1; the medical documentation of the victims tendered into evidence indicates that both victims sustained piercing bullet wounds in the legs (P2637.1: Plivac was wounded in the lower part of the right leg and Hafizovic was wounded in the lower part of both legs). 1171 - Grabovica, T. 3669. 1172 - Sokolar, T. 3576-3578, 3614, 3618; Sokolar visited the victims at the hospital (T. 3576, 3615-3619) examined the site of the incident (T. 3618) and heard the report of the local police, who had inspected and taken photographs of the damaged bus in the depot (T. 3576, 3618). In his report of the incident, Sokolar stated that the bullet had ricocheted off the right front wheel of the bus and then hit the victims and was fired from SRK “positions around the Faculty of Theology in Nedjarici” (P2637.1); Sokolar made that assessment on the basis of the location of the buildings around the area, the position of the bus, and the impact point of the bullet (T. 3617-8; P2637.1 (pp 1-2). Sokolar was shown photographs of the site of the incident and testified that the area where a small shopping centre is erected used to be a grassy area at the time of the incident (T. 3578); Grabovica, T. 3669-70. 1173 - Grabovica, T. 3645. 1174 - Grabovica, T. 3652, 3693. 1175 - Grabovica, T. 3652, 3680, 3693; Sokolar testified that the members of the local civilian police mostly wore civilian clothes, and that a very small number of them wore uniforms, Sokolar, T. 3594; Grabovica also said that they would wear just side arms, Grabovica, T. 3680. 1176 - Grabovica, T. 3692. 1177 - The Defence argues that Refik Sokolar and Ramiz Grabovica are not reliable witnesses as Sokolar prepared the official note of the incident on the basis of unfounded information, and Grabovica based his assessment of the alleged source of fire on hearsay and on the fact that there was a line of sight between the Faculty of Theology and the site of the incident, which is contested by the Defence, Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 334-9. 1178 - Vahid Karavelic, Commander of the ABiH 1st Corps, testified that the confrontation lines indicated on the map P3728 and separating Dobrinja (under ABiH control) from Nedjarici (under SRK control) were correct, P3728 [sniping incident 22g, Karavelic, T. 11852. A close examination of the map P3644RH shows that the distance between the SRK confrontation line and the site of the incident is approximately 750 metres. 1179 - Grabovica, T. 3683; Grabovica marked the location of the Faculty of Theology with number 1 on D46 (Map marked by Grabovica), Grabovica, T. 3686, 3655; P3274B (Photograph); Sokolar also marked the location with number 3 on P3097 (Map marked by Refik Sokolar), Sokolar, T. 3582. 1180 - See P3274B (Photograph); P3274C (Photograph). The markings on the photographs were made by Grabovica, T. 3655-6. 1181 - Grabovica, T. 3655-6. 1182 - Fire used to originate from there: Ismet Hadzic testified that a row of trucks filled with cement was placed practically all the way from the health centre in Dobrinja V to Mojmilo to protect Dobrinja from SRK firing positions located in Nedjarici, and in particular in the Faculty of Theology, Hadzic, T. 12220, 12249. Francis Thomas, a senior UNMO, explained that no other good firing position existed in the vicinity; the SRK was based in the Faculty of Theology, moving out of the building after firing in order to avoid retaliatory fire, Thomas, T. 9323. Thomas added that the SRK had a machine-gun located there and could eventually target anybody crossing the street in the line of sight of the Faculty of Theology for one to one-and-a-half kilometers, Thomas, T. 9323-9324. 1183 - Defence witness DP8, an SRK soldier stationed in the Faculty of Theology in Nedjarici in 1993, testified that there was no line of sight between the possible source of fire alleged by the Prosecution (and shown by two red circles in the map P3279 ?incident 22g) and the site of the incident, because there were houses blocking the view between the confrontation line and the site of the incident in relation to the circle indicating the Faculty of Theology. He added that there were buildings between 6 to 8 storeys high about halfway between the site of incident and the centermost circle. He testified that the Faculty of Theology was one of the tallest buildings in Nedjarici. DP8 noted that the distance between the Faculty of Theology and the site of the incident was more than two kilometers, Witness DP8, T. 14725, 14738-41, 14756; D1773 (Map marked by Witness DP8). DP8 also testified that the Faculty of Theology housed a medical corps and advanced mortar positions, Witness DP, T. 14720. DP7, a nurse in that medical corps, testified that the Faculty of Theology housed mortar and armoured units, DP7, T. 15130, 15217. 1184 - The Defence Witnesses DP8 and DP9, members of the SRK whose units were stationed in Nedjarici, confirmed that the area of Nedjarici was under the control of the SRK, DP8, T. 14726, 14765-6; DP9, T. 14587. 1185 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 344. 1186 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 341. 1187 - P1546 (UNPROFOR report–admitted under seal). The report did not specifically state whether the victims were civilians or soldiers. 1188 - Id. 1189 - Id. 1190 - Id. 1191 - Id. 1192 - Hafizovic, T. 7769-70. 1193 - Hafizovic, T. 7770-72. Hafizovic’s grandmother was not injured by the explosion, Hafizovic, T. 7770. 1194 - Hafizovic, T. 7772. 1195 - Hafizovic, T. 7773 and 7775. 1196 - Hafizovic, T. 7775-6. 1197 - Hafizovic, T. 7776. 1198 - Id. No one else in the apartment was wounded by the explosion, Hafizovic, T. 7817. 1199 - Hafizovic, T. 7776. Hafizovic believed that the nearest confrontation line was about 50 metres away, T. 7815. 1200 - Hafizovic, T. 7816. 1201 - Hadziabdic, T. 6738. 1202 - Witness AE, T. 6013. 1203 - Hadzic, T. 12248. 1204 - Hadzic, T. 12253. 1205 - The Indictment alleges that on 1 June 1993 two 82 mm mortar shells were fired in quick succession upon a civilian crowd of approximately 200 in Dobrinja IIIB, a residential settlement, who were watching a football game. Twelve people were killed and 101 wounded. The origin of fire was from VRS positions east-south-east of Dobrinja, Schedule 2 to the Indictment. In support of this alleged shelling incident, the Prosecution called, in particular, three victims (Ismet Fažlic, Nedim Gavranovic, Omer Hadziabdic) a representative of the UNPROFOR (John Hamill), a resident of Dobrinja and former commander of the ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade (Ismet Hadzic), a former doctor at the Dobrinja hospital (Youssef Hajir) and an expert on mortars (Richard Higgs). The Defence did not call witnesses to testify on this incident, although the incident was examined by the Defence’s expert on shelling. 1206 - It was the day of the Muslim holiday of Kurban Bajram, Ismet Fažlic, T.6600-1; Omer Hadziabdic, T.6743-44. 1207 - Fažlic, T.6600. 1208 - Fažlic, T.6600; Gavranovic, T. 6712; Hadziabdic, T. 6743. 1209 - Fažlic, T. 6602. Ismet Hadzic, commander of the ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade, advised the organisers not to hold the tournament, Fažlic, T. 6602. 1210 - Fažlic explained that the parking lot measured 80 by 100 to 112 metres and the football pitch was about 15 to 20 metres long by 40 metres wide, Fažlic, T.6602, 6009, 6632. 1211 - Fažlic, T.6602, 6626. P3678A (360 degree photo of the location of scheduled shelling incident 1) and P3281B (the video of Ismet Fažlic demarcating the area) visually show the dimensions of the corner of the parking lot where the football match was held. 1212 - Fažlic, 6602, 6637; Gavranovic, T.6727. Gavranovic testified that the football pitch could only be seen from Mojmilo hill. T.6727-6728. He believed that the crowd couldn’t be heard from the Serb part of Dobrinja. T. 6730. DP9 testified that it was impossible to see the parking lot from the SRK side, T. 14475, 14495. 1213 - Gavranovic. T. 6716, 6730; Fažlic, T.6604. 1214 - Fažlic, T. 6604. He estimated that there were around 100 children on these vehicles, T. 6604. 1215 - Fažlic, T. 6604. 1216 - Fažlic, T. 6600-01. 1217 - Fažlic, T. 6600. 1218 - Fažlic, T. 6601, 6608-09. 1219 - Fažlic, T. 6610. 1220 - Fažlic, T. 6608-9. 1221 - Fažlic, T. 6677. 1222 - Fažlic, T. 6610. 1223 - Hadziabdic, T. 6752. 1224 - Hadziabdic, T. 6747. 1225 - Gavranovic, T. 6713-4. 1226 - Gavranovic, T. 6715; P2506.B (medical report of injuries from Dobrinja hospital). 1227 - Fazlic said that the rounds were a matter of 3 to 4 seconds and 12 to 14 metres apart. T. 6610-6611. He testified that the second shell landed about 10 metres behind some of the vehicles surrounding the pitch, T.6601, 6610. Gavranovic said that the first shell landed in the centre of the pitch and the second shell fell some 5 to 10 seconds later, T. 6714. Hadziabdic testified that the second shell fell approximately 10 seconds later and a few metres away from the first, T. 6747-8. 1228 - Fažlic, T. 6610. 1229 - Hadziabdic, T. 6747-8. 1230 - Gavranovic, T. 6715; Hadziabdic, T. 6749. 1231 - Gavranovic, T. 6715; Hajir, T. 1689-91; Fažlic, T. 6612. See P3737A, B, C (the protocols of the Kosevo hospital emergency centre, surgical ward, and morgue). Dr. Gavrankapetanovic, General manager of the Kosevo hospital, validated P3737A, B, C (the emergency centre, surgical ward, and morgue), T. 12524, 12530-1, 12604. Dr. Nakas validated P.2506 (records for seven wounded from 1 June 1993), T. 1149. 1232 - Hajir, T. 1689-91, 1704. 1233 - Id. 1234 - Hajir, T. 1689-91. 1235 - Hajir, T. 1704, 1708. 1236 - See P3747 (list from Dobrinja hospital of patients admitted after being wounded on 1 June 1993). See also P3738R and 3738S (two death certificates); P.2506 (records for seven wounded from 1 June 1993); P1183 (death certificates for five of those killed). Arifagic, deputy director for administrative tasks at the Dobrinja hospital, authenticated P3747, as a result of the shelling of a match in Dobrinja as well as two other death certificates for persons killed at the football match (P3738R and 3738S), T. 12694-5. 1237 - Gavranovic, T. 6715. The witness remained at the hospital for 12 days, Gavranovic, T. 6724; P2506.B (medical report of injuries from Dobrinja hospital). 1238 - Gavranovic, T. 6724. 1239 - Hadziabdic, T. 6749-6750. 1240 - Hadziabdic, T. 6752. 1241 - Fažlic, T. 6612; P1197 (letter of discharge from Kosevo hospital dated 24 July 1993). 1242 - Fažlic, T. 6609, 6611, 6677. 1243 - Hadzic, T. 12254. 1244 - D25 (ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade command report for 1 June 1993), para. 2(f). 1245 - To support this claim, he applied a set of conditions to a theoretical model available for predicting the number of victims due to the explosion of a mortar shell, which would maximise the lethal effect of the detonation of an 82 mm mortar shell, Vilicic, T. 20223-4. See also D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report) for a detailed description of this theoretical model, pp 30-32. He concluded that the fact that the number of those allegedly killed was relatively small and that of those injured was unrealistically high can be interpreted to be either an exception to the statistics or an erroneous recording of those wounded in the event, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 30. 1246 - Hajir, T. 1689-1691; Gavranovic, T. 6724; Fažlic, T. 6609, 6611, 6677; Hadzic, T. 12254; P3747 (list from Dobrinja hospital of patients admitted after being wounded on 1 June 1993); P3737A, B, C (the protocols of the Kosevo hospital emergency centre, surgical ward, and morgue); D25 para.2 (f) (ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade command report dated 1 June 1993). 1247 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 663. 1248 - P1367 (Houdet Report- Crater analysis report of incident). Christian Bergeron testified that Houdet conducted the crater analysis a maximum of 2 days after the event took place, Bergeron, T. 11285 1249 - P1367 (Houdet Report). It is noted that D25 (ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade command report for 1 June 1993), para (f) indicated that 82mm mortar shells had been launched upon the crowd at the football match. 1250 - P1367 (Houdet Report), conclusion 3. According to the report, since no fuse furrow was produced by the shells due to the macadam surface of the pitch, the angle of descent and range could not be established. The report indicates that the measurement of the distance between the first crater and the roof of the buildings showed a minimum angle of descent of 40.5 degrees, P1367 (Houdet Report), conclusion 1. It also states that the minimum angle of descent for both 81mm and 120mm mortars is 45,71 degrees and that, at that angle, the minimum range is 1,120 metres for 81mm mortars and 1,340 metres for 120mm mortars, P1367 (Houdet Report), conclusion 2. No indication is given as to the charge that was used to fire the mortar shells. Based on this data, the report states that the shells could have only been fired from the SRK side and concludes that “at the minimum range, the mortars were 300 metres south of Lukavica Barracks”, P1367 (Houdet Report), conclusion 3. 1251 - Witness Y, T. 10865-6. 1252 - Bergeron, T. 11262-3, 11300-1. 1253 - He told the Trial Chamber that the results of the crater analysis report, which attributed this incident to the Serb side, were later made public during a press conference held in the Sector Sarajevo BH Command, Bergeron, T. 11262-3. 1254 - Hamill, T. 6114; Fažlic, T. 6620; Higgs, T. 12444. Hamill said that the fact the craters were filled does not impact in any significant degree on the accuracy the findings as to the direction of fire, T. 6116-7. Although the craters had been filled with a substance, Higgs stated that it was still possible to ascertain the approximate calibre of the weapon, to determine the approximate angle of descent and the direction from which the round came, T. 12444. 1255 - Hamill, T. 6111, 6114. He testified that the craters were either formed by an 81 or an 82 millimetre mortar or by artillery shells of a field calibre of approximately 100 and 130 millimetres or 122-millimetre Howitzer projectile, T. 6114-5, 6171-2. 1256 - Hamill, T. 6115, 6172-3. Hamill testified that the craters were either formed by an 81 or an 82 millimetre mortar or by artillery shells of a field calibre of approximately 100 and 130 millimetres or 122-millimetre Howitzer projectile, T. 6114-5, 6171-2. 1257 - Higgs, T. 12441; P3734 (Shelling report of Richard Higgs dated 12 February 2002), p.7. 1258 - Higgs, T. 12441; P3734 (Shelling report of Richard Higgs dated 12 February 2002), p.7. He noted that given the quick succession of the rounds, it is probable that the same mortar tube fired both rounds, P3734 (Shelling report of Richard Higgs dated 12 February 2002), pp 7-8. 1259 - Higgs T. 12448-12449; P3644.RH (pre-marked map of Sarajevo). 1260 - Vilicic, T. 20223; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 29. 1261 - Vilicic, T. 20226. Vilicic also disagreed with Higg’s calculations of the direction of fire. During his testimony in court, Vilicic attributed his discrepancy with Higgs regarding the direction of fire to the different maps used and explained that he based his findings on the “official map”, without explaining this point further. Vilicic, T. 20226-20227. 1262 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 29. During his cross-examination in court, Vilicic indicated that one of the authors of the report, Stamatovic, had visited the site of the event. However, the authors did not consider it necessary, for the purposes of the report, to analyse the crater impacts on the ground so many years after the event, Vilicic, T. 20321-7. 1263 - D1848 (set of photographs of site of event and crater impacts). 1264 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), pp 29-30 and 33. Photographs 1 and 2 depict the parking lot where the event took place and photographs 3 to 6 show the crater impacts on the ground. See D1848 (set of photographs of site of event and crater impacts). Photograph 6 depicts the imprints left by one of the shells and a map in the top-right corner, D1848 (ERN 0035-8540). In the bottom-left corner of this photograph, an arrow points toward the north. During his testimony in court, Vilicic explained that the usual practice is to place a map according to compass north. He said that if the map shown in the top part of photograph 6 had been placed correctly, it would be pointing towards the north. The imprints of the shell, which point in the direction of this map, would then also point in this northern direction. He placed additional markings on the photograph indicating northern direction, Vilicic, T. 20231-3. Based on the shell pattern on the ground, Vilicic concluded that the shells had been fired from ABiH-held territory in northeastern direction, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), pp 29-30. The Trial Chamber notes that no information was provided by the Defence regarding these photographs, in particular regarding the positioning of the map in photograph 6. 1265 - Fažlic testified that the confrontation line was few hundred metres away from the site of the event. He said that the separation line was 130 metres away from the site, Fažlic, T. 6602. He later indicated that it was 210-215 metres from the site, Fažlic, T. 6686. Hadziabdic said that the confrontation line was 100 to 200 metres from the parking lot, Hadziabdic, T. 6762. He added that the first line of defence was located 300 metres away in the building of Partizanska Olimpijada, the first building of the community of Dobrinja IV, T. 6762. The separation line ran along Indira Gandhi Street and Partizanska Olimpijada Street, which were parallel streets that lead towards the Dobrinja River, Fažlic, T. 6614, 6630 1266 - Higgs, T. 12460; P3644.RH (a pre-marked map of Sarajevo). See also P3727. Higgs testified that he had calculated with a ruler based on map that the confrontation line was approximately only 270 metres away from the impact site, Higgs, T. 12455-6. He later re-measured this distance in court and said that it was approximately 320 metres, Higgs, T. 12460. In his report, Higgs indicated that the confrontation lines were close together at a distance of approximately 200 metres. P3734 (Shelling Report of Richard Higgs dated 12 February 2002) p. 7. 1267 - P3644.RH (map marked by Richard Higgs); P3732 (map marked by Ismet Hadzic); D84 (map marked by Ismet Fažlic); 1268 - Higgs, T. 12469. 1269 - Higgs, T. 12467. 1270 - Vilicic, T. 20225. 1271 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 30-31; Vilicic, T. 20222. 1272 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 30; Vilicic, T. 20227. 1273 - Vilicic, T.20223-5; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 31. Vilicic indicated that, according to Table 9 of his report, the maximum firing range for the first increment charge is 485 metres, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), p. 30. 1274 - The Vilicic Shelling Report concluded that “most probably, the firing position was at the distance of 300 to 400 metres (the range of 300 metres corresponds to the drop angle (c =63(, the range of 400 has (c = 71(; damages caused to asphalt layer correspond to drop angles between these two values)” situated in north-eastern direction, either in a zone between the territory under UNPROFOR control and Sarajevo airport, or in an area further to the north under ABiH control, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), pp 29-31 and 33; Vilicic, T. 20225. 1275 - Hadziabdic, T.6738; Hadzic, T. 12248, 12253; Witness AE, T. 6013. 1276 - Gavranovic, T. 6723. 1277 - Fažlic, T.6621-3. He said that only cars were damaged as result of the shelling prior to the date of the incident. T. 6222-6223. He added that the area was shelled from the settlement of Dobrinja IV, the Serb-held part of Dobrinja, the Trapara houses and the barracks, Fažlic, T.6693. 1278 - Fažlic, T.6694. Fažlic testified that this shell was of the same calibre and had left similar marks as those that fell on the day of the incident. He believed the Serb side was informed of the tournament and that this had been a test, Fažlic, T. 6637-9. 1279 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 667; Motion to Acquit, p. 30. 1280 - Defence Motion to Acquit, p. 30. 1281 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 665. 1282 - Fažlic, T. 6644, 6646; Hadziabdic, T. 6770-1; P3732 (map of Dobrinja marked by Hadzic). 1283 - P3732 (map marked by Hadzic); D84 (map marked by Fažlic); P3097 (map marked by Refik Sokolar); Hadziabdic, T.6766. 1284 - Fažlic testified that ABiH soldiers were stationed there, Fažlic, T6644, 6655. Gavranovic believed soldiers slept in this shelter, Gavranovic, T. 6725. 1285 - Hadziabdic testified that it was possible that off-duty soldiers went there, but that it was not a military barracks, Hadziabdic, T. 6767-8. Sahabudin Ljusa said that the nuclear shelters in the Dobrinja area were not used by the army or by anyone during the war, Ljusa, T.7887. Enver Talasman, a member of the Dobrinja Civil Defence, said that the nuclear shelter in Dobrinja III served no military purpose, Taslaman, T.7221-3. Hadzic told the Trial Chamber that his brigade had no military headquarters in the nuclear shelters and no military equipment stored there. He said that members of the brigade under his command never used the nuclear shelters nor did they sleep there, although perhaps soldiers went into those shelters when off-duty. He added that the nuclear shelter in Dobrinja IIIB was used by a civilian protection organisation to store food, and that a religious facility and a youth club were located there, Hadzic, T. 12295-7. 1286 - Witness DP9 indicated on D1770 (map of the area) that these ran across Lukavica Cesta in the vicinity of the parking lot. DP9, T. 14473, 14476. He testified that “(i(n this part that Lukavicka Cesta was dug up so that it can be used as a trench, as a connecting trench for communication towards the buildings of Dobrinja going towards this side, and towards the Mojmilo hill. Just behind the road, there were these trenches, connecting trenches to which manpower and supplies came. And then there was another system of trenches which went towards this side of the water supply towards the top of Mojmilo hill where there was a passage to the Mojmilo locality and Alipasino locality. And there was another trench which runs through the fields and orchards up there”, T. 14476. 1287 - Hadzic said that these trenches were built in Dobrinja during the war to allow the citizens to move around in the area and to protect them against snipers. He testified further that his soldiers never fired from these trenches, T. 12221, 12242. Witness R testified that the first time she went to Dobrinja to barter for flour, she passed through connecting trenches. She believed these trenches had been dug for civilians and were not used by soldiers, Witness R, T. 8191-2. 1288 - D85 (order of the Command of the 5th ABiH Motorised Brigade, dated 20 March 1993 and signed by Bajro Murguz, Chief of Staff). 1289 - Fazlic testified that the ABiH had established only this one line of defence in Dobrinja, Fažlic, T.6660-1. Hadzic acknowledged that his brigade received an order from the 1st Corps Command to establish a second line of defence in Dobrinja, which was passed down by the Chief of Staff of the 5th ABiH Motorised Brigade to the units. However, the order was not carried out. Hadzic told the Trial Chamber that “by all elements, the configuration of the positions, the density of the buildings, it was impossible to carry out the establishment of this second line” in the Dobrinja area, Hadzic, T. 12219-21, 12237-8, 12241, 12287. 1290 - Hadzic, T.12254-6; D25 para 2 (f) (ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade command report dated 1 June 1993). 1291 - Hadzic, T.12254. 1292 - D25 (ABiH 5th Motorised Dobrinja Brigade command report for 1 June 1993), para. 2 (f). 1293 - Hadziabdic, T.6793; Gavranovic, T.6716, 6727. 1294 - Hadziabdic, T. 6793. 1295 - Gavranovic, T.6716, 6727. 1296 - Fažlic, T.6604. 1297 - Fažlic, T.6605. 1298 - Fažlic, T.6605. Fažlic said that the players were young men between 16-20 years old and that some may have been off-duty soldiers, T.6608. 1299 - The eye-witnesses to this incident testified that no military activity was underway in the area at the time of the event, Fažlic, T. 6600; Gavranovic, T. 6716; Habziabdic, T. 6743. Commander Hadzic confirmed that his brigade units were not active on that day. It was an exceptionally peaceful day, Hadzic, T.12254-6. 1300 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 664-665. The Defence claims that the front line was only 50 metres away from the site of the event, Defence Closing Arguments, T. 21928. 1301 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 666-667. 1302 - Id., para. 667. 1303 - Defence Motion to Acquit, p. 30. 1304 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 667. 1305 - Id. 1306 - Fažlic, T. 6602, 6637; Gavranovic, T. 6727; DP9, T. 14475. 1307 - Gavranovic, T. 6730. 1308 - The Indictment alleges that on 12 July 1993 “an 82 mm mortar shell was fired upon about 100 civilians who were waiting to access a communal water pump in the front yard of a residence at 39 Hakije Turajlica (previously Aleja Branka Bulica then Spasenije Cane Babovic) in Dobrinja, a residential settlement. Thirteen people were killed and fourteen people were wounded. The origin of fire was VRS-held territory approximately to the west-north-west”, Schedule 2 of the Indictment. 1309 - Taslaman, T. 7187, 7210-1; Zametica, T. 3481. 1310 - Grebic, T7264-5; the area of the well was a typical street location with houses on both sides and a five-meter wide traffic lane and sidewalks. Looking from the east, the southern sidewalk was bordered by a wire-net fence with gates leading to the yard with the well (see statement and report were admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis (C) on 2 August 2002, “Cavcic Report”). There was no military operation in that location that day (Hadzic, T. 12352). 1311 - Grebic, T. 7285-6. 1312 - Grebic, T. 7264-65, T. 7284. 1313 - Mehonic, T. 7339; according to the witnesses, their owners were hiding nearby in staircases, doors and sides of buildings to avoid being targeted by snipers (Mehonic, T. 7339; Taslaman, T. 7191-92); Witness AE testified that the police warned civilian that they risked their lives by going out every day (T. 6029). 1314 - Grebic, T. 7264-5, 7286. 1315 - Grebic, T. 7265. 1316 - Taslaman, T. 7186. 1317 - Mehonic, T. 7328-9. 1318 - Witness AE, T. 6014-6. 1319 - Witness AE, T. 6016. Cavcic Report states that the shell landed on a body. 1320 - Mehonic, T. 7330. 1321 - Taslaman, T. 7205. 1322 - Grebic, T. 7265. 1323 - Grebic, T. 7266. 1324 - Grebic, T. 7266. 1325 - Grebic, T. 7289. 1326 - Taslaman, T. 7195. 1327 - Mehonic, T. 7330. 1328 - Witness AE, T. 6016-7. 1329 - P3738 (list of dead people); Arifagic, T. 12683-9. 1330 - P1413 (Report of Witness AK-2); Witness AE testified that 29 people were wounded, T. 6020. 1331 - Witness AE, T. 6026-7; Taslaman also testified that since the other well was out of order, there could have been between 100-150 people waiting their turn to pump water (T. 7191). 1332 - Hamdija Cavcic’s task was to determine the trajectory, direction, type and calibre of mortar shells wrote a report on the shelling incident of 12 July 1993 in Dobrinja. In the Cavcic Report, it is stated that the mortar shell impact site was on Spasenije Cane Babovic Street, next to number 105 namely outside the iron gate of the house of Grebic’s sister, and that the shell detonated upon striking a person before landing on the ground (Cavcic Report). 1333 - Witness AK-2, an expert on ballistics and member of the UNPROFOR, prepared a report on the incident (he made that report on the basis of investigations he conducted on the day of the incident and independently of the local police) in which he established that the explosion on 12 July 1993 was caused by a Russian 82mm mortar shell fired from the direction west-west-north (T. 12764). 1334 - Witness AK-2 testified that another UNMO member of his team prepared a separate and independent analysis which was consistent with his findings (T. 12751-2). 1335 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 507. 1336 - Defence Trial Brief, para. 669; the Defence also notes the proximity of the well to the confrontation line, Defence Trial Brief, para. 668. 1337 - Cavcic observed that the pavement surface where the shell stabiliser was found showed “radially disposed mechanical damages caused by mortar shell shrapnel” allowing a determination of the direction of the fire. These traces formed “an irregular arc, direction Northwest-West” (Cavcic Report). The distance between the two farthest arc points was 2.4 meters and, according to the police, this established that the shell exploded above the surface of the ground, thus upon impact with the body of the woman standing next to the fence. The orientation of the arc led the police to the conclusion that the shell had been fired from the direction of Nedjarici (“i.e., from the west-north-west”) (Cavcic Report); In his report, Witness AK-2 stated that “the form of the spray shows the direction of 5100 mils (WWN)”. Witness AK-2 added in his report that the “vertical obstacles (houses) close to the point of impact exclude the origin of artillery shell, the flight angle being of 45 degrees”. He noted that “the shell fell on a woman and the absence of characteristic crater and furrow of the fuse does not allow to determine the flight angle of the shell” (P1413). However, he concluded that it was highly probable that it came from VRS-held territory, the corridor of Nedjarici-Ilidjza North (P1413). 1338 - During cross-examination, Vilicic admitted that the picture of a car damaged during the shelling incident and found in page 36 of Vilicic Report and on which he partly based his assessment that the direction of fire was east-southwest was inverted to reflect that the shelling came from the “north” (T. 20361-5). Vilicic stated that this inversion was not a surreptitious manipulation of the data as the negative of any picture can be printed either one way or by inverting that way by 180 degrees (T. 20364-5 and 20375-6). 1339 - Witness AK-2 stated that the direction of fire was west-west-north. That indication is equivalent to the indication “northwest-west”, T. 12764. 1340 - P3644.RH, the margin of error can be measured on the map and the Prosecution suggests that in this instance that margin is 8 degrees on each side of the unbroken red line, Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 507. 1341 - See P3644.RH, P3727 for distances. 1342 - The settlement Dobrinja “C5” was on the ABiH side of the confrontation line, bounded by the airport (under UNPROFOR control) to the south, by the neighbourhoods of Ilidza and Nedjarici (under SRK control (for example, P3644.RH, P3727, see also Sabljica, T. 5275.) to the west and north-west and by Momjilo (under ABiH control) to the north (for example, P3644.RH, P3727). The ABiH and SRK front lines extended around that settlement from the south (at about 125 metres to the well) to the south-west and to north-west (at about 250-350 metres of the well). (for example, P3644.RH, P3727). Therefore, if it is assumed, in accordance with Vilicic’s submissions, that the mortar shell’s angle of descent was very steep – approximately 80-85° (this angle is suggested in view of the city location of the impact site; the location of houses around the impact site makes it logical that the angle of descent of the mortar shell might have been very steep, close to 90 degrees) that the shell had no increment charge so that the mortar shell would have been fired from a distance of 84-150 metres away from the well (Vilicic Shelling Report, p. 36) then the mortar shell was fired from within ABiH-held territory. Vilicic further stated that the distance would have been 229-450 metres with one increment charge in the mortar shell cartridge and higher with additional increment charges (Vilicic Shelling Report, p. 36) thereby suggesting that there is no evidence that the mortar shell which landed on Dobrinja “C5” on 12 July 1993 was fired from Serb positions. 1343 - Taslaman, T. 7191-2. 1344 - Hadzic, an inhabitant of Dobrinja and commander of the ABiH Dobrinja Brigade, testified that the Dobrinja settlement was an acoustic area (T. 12254). He also testified that he could hear shells landing upon Dobrinja, generally originating from the direction of Nedjarici (T. 12253) where one could also hear the actual firing of mortar shells quite clearly (T. 12254). Hadzic further stated that mortar shells fired from the area of Nedjarici were of 82 mm and 120 mm calibre (T. 12254). Through the Defence military expert, Radovan Radovanovic, the Defence produced military documents which refer to mortar shells originating from Nedjarici fired in the direction of Dobrinja (see D254, D255). 1345 - Higgs, T. 12467-8. 1346 - Taslaman testified that he did not hear the mortar shell coming because according to him people were pumping water (T. 7195); Grebic testified that he heard “a strong detonation and explosion. That was a grenade.” [...] and that he could not hear the sound “but the explosion came from somewhere to the right” (T. 7265-6). 1347 - Witness AE testified that there were trenches some 50 metres away from the impact site and that ABiH soldiers were in them but she could not tell whether these trenches were in existence at the time of the incident (T. 6033-4). Hadzic testified that the entrance to the tunnel was situated in a house located some 30 to 50 metres away from the street where the shell landed on 12 July 1993 (T. 12259). However, Richard Higgs measured the distance between the spot of the incident and the entrance to the trench leading to the Dobrinja-Butmir tunnel to be 120 metres (T. 12472). 1348 - Hadzic further testified that the excavation of the trench commenced about ten days after the tunnel became operational, on 30 July 1993, Hadzic, T. 12374-6, T. 12362. Other witnesses confirmed that the tunnel was not operational at the time of the shelling incident, Karavelic, T. 11804, 11868 (see location of the tunnel in exhibit P3644.VK3); Grebic, T 7193, see also D244 (order from the ABiH commander Rasim Delic dated 14 July 1993 which, inter alia, advises for the implementation of security measures while ABiH soldiers are crossing the airport runway, which suggests that the tunnel is not in operation). Hadzic testified that at that time the tunnel was still being dug; therefore there was no trench yet and the area between the entrance of the tunnel and the buildings of Dobrinja was a meadow. See exhibit P3732, the entrance of the tunnel is marked by a small red circle; Hadzic, T. 12374-6; Higgs, T. 12472, the trench built later was in any case located 120 meters away from the water well hit on 12 July 1993. Hadzic was also of the opinion that the SRK forces were not aware of the exact location of the entrance of the tunnel, Hadzic, T. 12258-60. Prior to 12 July 1993 that area was shelled indiscriminately like the rest of Dobrinja (Hadzic, T. 12242-5, 12258-9): "“?e­very part of Dobrinja was exposed to severe shelling. One couldn't single out a specific area and say that it was shelled the more intensely than other parts. Thousands of shells were landing at the time. It was raining shells", Hadzic, T. 12248. Witnesses testified that there were no military objectives in the direct vicinity of the well (Witness AE, T. 6030, Grebic, T. 7276, Taslaman, T. 7212). There was a Bosnian army front line and a Serb army frontline close together, which extended from south-west to north-west of the well that was shelled on 12 July 1993 (Grebic, T. 7276). According to one witness, the closest military target to the well could have been the command of the 2nd ABiH Battalion in Dobrinja II (Hadzic, T. 12215) which was located approximately 120 metres north-east of the impact site (P3732). The closest confrontation line in the direction of fire of the mortar shell was located approximately 250 meters away from the well (Higgs, T. 12460, P3732 (map marked by Hadzic). The ABiH forces thereby occupied evacuated civilian buildings and installations around the confrontation line and had their own water pump at a house there (Taslaman, T. 7193-4). 1349 - Grebic, T. 7276-7. 1350 - Grebic, T. 7277. 1351 - The indictment alleges that on 4 February 1994 a “salvo of three 120 mm mortar shells hit civilians in the Dobrinja residential area. The first landed to the front of a block of flats at Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street hitting persons who were distributing and receiving humanitarian aid and children attending religious classes. The second and third landed among persons trading at a market in an open area to the rear of the apartment buildings at Mihajla Pupina Street and Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. Eight people, including 1 child under the age of 15 years, were killed and at least 18 people, including 2 such children, were wounded. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory, approximately to the east”, Schedule 2 of the Indictment. 1352 - Ljusa, T. 7862-3. 1353 - P3644.RH (map); T. 7828, P3232 (map), and D102 (map); Eldar Hafizovic, T. 3575, 3579-80, and P3097 (map) (Sokolar); Besic, T. 4932; Hamill, T. 6116. 1354 - Ljusa, T. 7863, 7867. 1355 - Ljusa, T. 7865. 1356 - Ljusa, T. 7865-6, 7868. 1357 - Ljusa, T. 7867-8. 1358 - Ljusa, T. 7866. 1359 - P2252, P2252.1 (translation). 1360 - Spahic, T. 7905-7. 1361 - Spahic, T. 7908-9. 1362 - Spahic, T. 7909, 7939. 1363 - Spahic, T. 7910-11, 7940. 1364 - Spahic, T. 7910, 7916. 1365 - Spahic, T. 7910, 7916. 1366 - Spahic, T. 7917. 1367 - Spahic, T. 7911. 1368 - Spahic, T. 7912-3, especially 7946. 1369 - Spahic, T. 7914-5, 7940. 1370 - Spahic, T. 7914. 1371 - Spahic, T. 7915. 1372 - Witness R, T. 8181. 1373 - Witness R, T. 8182, 8190, 8197. 1374 - Witness R, T. 8183, 8197. 1375 - Witness R, T. 8184. 1376 - Witness R, T. 8184-5, 8188. 1377 - Witness R, T. 8185, 8194-5. 1378 - P2251, P2251.1 (translation). 1379 - Hafizovic, T. 7758-9, 7849. 1380 - Hafizovic, T. 7759-60. 1381 - Hafizovic, T. 7766-7. 1382 - Hafizovic, T. 7759-60. 1383 - Hafizovic, T. 7762-3. 1384 - Hafizovic, T. 7762-4. 1385 - Hafizovic, T. 7762-3. 1386 - Hafizovic, T. 7764. 1387 - Hafizovic, T. 7764. 1388 - Hafizovic, T. 7765. 1389 - Hafizovic, T. 7765. 1390 - Hafizovic, T. 7766. 1391 - P3367. 1392 - Witness R, T. 8197. 1393 - P3232, Hafizovic, T. 7792; also D102, Hafizovic, T. 7832. 1394 - P2247B, P2247B.1 (translation); Eterovic, T. 8846-7. 1395 - Eterovic, T. 8847-9. 1396 - The list of injured includes Sabahudin Ljusa, Fata Spahic, Eldar Hafizovic, Witness R, and Refik Sokolar (on Sokolar, see below). The report mistakenly lists Sabahudin Ljusa also among those who died in hospital. Eterovic put this down to “the chaos prevailing at the time” (Eterovic, T. 8850). See also Arifagic, T. 12677-83 (concerning death certificates for five persons killed in the 4 February 1994 incident, as confirmed by witness Zineta Arifagic). 1397 - Besic, T. 4791, 4862. 1398 - P2247 (compilation of photographs with text); P2247.1 (English translation of text). 1399 - P2247 (photograph no. 1; see also no. 2); Besic, T. 4839-40. 1400 - The witness explained the general principle: “Damage is much bigger in the direction from which the projectile came. [...] When it falls at an angle, that is, its inferior part, when it falls at an angle, you have considerable damage in the asphalt or in the ground” (Besic, T. 4867-8). 1401 - P2247 (photograph no. 5; see also no. 3 and 4); Besic, T. 4847, 4849-51, 5015. On Besic’s use of fin size to determine the size of a mortar, see Besic, T. 4808, 4867. 1402 - P2247 (photographs no. 1, 9-11); Besic, T. 4839-40, 4848-9, 4936-7. 1403 - P2247 (photograph no. 11); Besic, T. 5014. 1404 - Besic, T. 4938-40. 1405 - P2247A, P2247A.1 (translation); Besic, T. 4941-2. 1406 - D62, D62.1 (translation); Besic, T. 4921, 4933. 1407 - D62, D62.1 (translation). 1408 - Besic, T. 4920. 1409 - P2247A, P2247A.1 (translation); Sabljica, T. 5157-9. 1410 - Sabljica, T. 5162-3. 1411 - Sabljica, T. 5161. 1412 - Sabljica, T. 5354. 1413 - Sabljica, T. 5355, 5357-8. 1414 - Sabljica, T. 5358. 1415 - P2247A, P2247A.1 (translation). 1416 - Spahic, T. 7924, 7936. 1417 - Spahic, T. 7926, 7949. 1418 - Spahic, T. 7937. 1419 - Spahic, T. 7925-6. 1420 - Witness R, T. 8182. 1421 - Witness R, T. 8191-2. 1422 - Hafizovic, T. 7767. 1423 - Hafizovic, T. 7767, 7822-3; D102, T. 7832. 1424 - Hafizovic, T. 7767, 7825; cf. 7812-3, 7833-5, 7839-40, 7847-8. 1425 - Hafizovic, T. 7826. 1426 - Ljusa, T. 7867. 1427 - Ljusa, T. 7885-6. 1428 - Ljusa, T. 7887-8. 1429 - Ljusa, T. 7892. 1430 - Besic, T. 4931-2. 1431 - Sokolar, T. 3561-3565, 3569-72. 1432 - Hadzic, T. 12200, 12205, 12264-5, 12352. 1433 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 532. At para. 533 the Prosecution also refers to the testimony of General Michael Rose (T. 10194-5), even though it is evident from General Rose’s brief remarks on this incident that he had no direct knowledge of it. 1434 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 535-6. 1435 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 662. 1436 - Id., para. 663. 1437 - See Vilicic Shelling Report, pp. 44-6. 1438 - P2247 (photograph no. 4). 1439 - Vilicic, T. 20508-9. 1440 - Vilicic Shelling Report, p. 46. 1441 - Sabahudin Ljusa testified: “I think that after I left hospital, I found out that lessons had been given at that time and that there were children in that flat. [...] But I think that they were on the other side, that is to say, in the other room which was facing in another direction. [...] I think that they were wounded there, too, but not very seriously wounded. These are things that I found out after I had returned from the hospital.” (T. 7870-1). See also Zdenko Eterovic’s report, P2247B.1, and his oral evidence at T. 8853 (correcting the statement in his report as to a “Muslim primary school”); the source of this information is not stated. 1442 - Vilicic Shelling Report, Table 2, p. 5. 1443 - See P3727 which indicates a range of possible firing positions bounded by dotted lines converging from the west on Alipašino Polje. 1444 - Indjic, T. 18595; 18661-2; Tucker, T. 9931; Witness W, T. 9538; Mole, T. 11040-42. 1445 - Kupusovic, T. 674; Witness W, T. 9646 (closed session). 1446 - DP35, T. 17600; Karavelic, T. 11878. The SRK also held some areas around the airport itself, such as Nedarici and the Airport Settlement, Witness DP4, T. 14147; Abdel-Razek, T. 11654-5; Carswell, T. 8359; Witness Y, T. 10872-3. 1447 - Witness Y, T. 10869-70. 1448 - Cutler, T. 8939. 1449 - Witness Y, T. 10870. In many cases, soldiers intercepted while crossing the runway and found to be armed would have their weapons confiscated by UNPROFOR, Witness W, T. 9700. 1450 - Witness Y, T. 10870; 10972. 1451 - Tucker, T. 9931; Briquemont, T. 10052-4; Thomas, T. 9308; Pashchenko, T. 17363. According to witness W, a military in charge of the forces at the airport, crossing became a major problem in November 1992, T. 9696-9700. 1452 - D1491 (Order issued by the commander of the 4th Light Artillery Regiment. Before shooting, however, the order apparently required SRK soldiers to file an oral protest to UNPROFOR about the presence of unauthorized people in the airport), Witness DP35, T. 17595-17606. The witness, relying on the assumption that no night-vision device was available to SRK troops around the airport, admitted that the order was to shoot indiscriminately at any type of detected movement. 1453 - Carswell, T. 8360. 1454 - Witness W, T. 9715. 1455 - Witness W, 9700-6. 1456 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11594-6. 1457 - Witness W, T. 9699; Witness Y, T. 10869; Abdel-Razek, T. 11596-7 (referring to the end of his period in Sarajevo). This was highlighted by many witnesses as the period with more attempts to flee Sarajevo, especially through the airport, due to the cold and the lack of food that greatly affected the morale of the civilian population in the city, Tucker, T. 9931. 1458 - UNPROFOR personnel seized the documents from the bodies and ascertained that both civilians and soldiers tried to cross the airstrip, Witness Y, T. 10870. See also Witness W, T. 9584 (closed session; tape of previous interview). The vast majority of the people trying to cross the airstrip, however, were civilians, Karavelic, T. 11877 (99% were civilians). 1459 - Briquemont, T. 10052-4; Tucker, T. 9932; Abdel-Razek, T. 11595. 1460 - Thomas, T. 9308-9, referring to P2064, UNPROFOR SitRep [situation reportg covering 4 and 5 January 1994. 1461 - Briquemont, T. 10095-7 and P2082, protest letter from Briquemont to Karadzic (regarding a shelling on 5 January 1993); Witness W, T. 9556-7 (“not much firing of Serb origin on the airport”, while more on the Bosnian areas in the vicinity of the airport); Cutler, T. 8937, 9008, stating that on one occasion in February 1993 it was concluded that rounds probably came from an ABiH mortar position. According to DP35, the tower of the airport was hit by ABiH fire from Igman, DP35, T. 17504. 1462 - DP35, T. 17606; Witness Y, T. 10872-5; Abdel-Razek, T. 11594-6; Bukva, T. 18467-73. Also, DP35, in response to a question on how the SRK would have distinguished civilians from soldiers on the runway, stated that he did not know, and that it would have been the responsibility of the local brigade commander to tell his subordinates how to make the distinction, DP35, T. 17602. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that SRK troops surrounding the airport did have at their disposal night-vision devices, Carswell, T. 8362-4. According to Tucker, too, the firing against civilians at night happened through “night-sights”, Tucker, T. 9932. No evidence was however led at trial on their number, quality and availability. 1463 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11596. See also T. 11600-1, 11644. 1464 - Witness W, T. 9594-9595. 1465 - Kundo, T. 5969. 1466 - Kovac, T. 956-57; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5938; Menzilovic, T. 7006, 7009-12, 7023; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, p. 3. 1467 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5938; Menzilovic, T. 6982, 7010. 1468 - Kovac, T. 924, 971; Hamill, T. 6182. The area of Briješko brdo was under the control of 2nd Vitez (or Viteska) Brigade of the 1st Corps of the ABiH; Kovac, T. 947. On the other side of the confrontation line, the Brijesce Company (also called the 1st Company) of the Rajlovac Brigade of the SRK was positioned around the field area; Kovac, T. 957; Sinisa Krsman, T. 19033, 19047. 1469 - Menzilovic, T. 6998, T. 7006, T. 7010-11. Ramiza Kundo stated that her house was quite badly damaged by shelling and there were shots coming through the wall at all hours; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, pp. 2-3. 1470 - Menzilovic, T. 7006. 1471 - Menzilovic, T. 6982, 6999, 7011-12, 7041. 1472 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5938-39; Menzilovic, T. 6981. 1473 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5939-40; Menzilovic, T. 6981, 6983. 1474 - Menzilovic, T. 6981, 6983-86; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, p. 2. In the neighbourhood of the witnesses, the field area was called “Polje” (field). In fact, during her testimony in court, Menzilovic used the term “Polje” instead of the field area; Menzilovic, T. 7053. 1475 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5981. 1476 - Ramiza Kundo stated that Hasiba Dudevic was hit in June 1992; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5990. 1477 - Menzilovic, T. 6986-88, 7021-24. Menzilovic also testified that Dudevic wore a skirt at the time she was wounded; Menzilovic, T. 6988. She added that she heard the shot fired from the direction of the field area at the time Dudevic was injured and that the neighbours could not take her to hospital immediately because shootings continued for a long time thereafter, although no soldiers or armed persons were in the vicinity at the time the incident; Menzilovic, T. 6986-88, 7023-24. 1478 - P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, p. 3; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5979-81, 5989-90; Menzilovic, T. 7001, 7061. Ramiza Kundo stated that Muharem Mesanovic was shot about 50 metres further down from the site where she was injured; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5979. Ramiza Kundo and Menzilovic did not remember exactly when this incident occurred; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5981, 5989-90; Menzilovic, T. 7001. Admitting that she did not remember the exact date of the incident, Ramiza Kundo stated that Mesanovic was shot before she was injured on 2 November 1993; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5981, 5989-5990. On the other hand, while stressing that she was not sure about the date of the incident, Menzilovic said that he could have been shot in 1994; Menzilovic, T. 7001. 1479 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5979-81, 5990; Menzilovic, T. 7962-63. 1480 - The Indictment alleges that on 2 November 1993, “Ramiza Kundo, a woman aged 38 years, was shot and wounded in her left leg while she was carrying buckets of water across Brijesko brdo Street, presently Bulbulistan Street, in the west end of Sarajevo,” Schedule 1 to the Indictment. Ramiza Kundo, T. 5939-40; Menzilovic, T. 6988-89; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, p. 2; D75 (Official Note issued by the Novi Grad Public Security Station). Ramiza Kundo’s house appears on both of the 360 degree photographs; P3279V (360 degree photograph); P3279X (360 degree photograph). When looking at the street in the opposite direction of the field area, her house is located on the right-hand side of the street, Menzilovic, T. 7016. Menzilovic’s house was at a distance of 20 metres from that of Ramiza Kundo, Menzilovic, T. 7056-57. The video-taped testimony of Ramiza Kundo introduced by the Prosecution indicates that the two women were going towards the well (P3280V, video-taped testimony of Ramiza Kundo). In court of the two witnesses indicated that the women where coming back from the well, Ramiza Kundo, T. 5946-50, 5973, 5978; Menzilovic, T. 7036-37; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, p. 2. Moreover, the fact that both witnesses testified about buckets full of water corroborates the finding that they were coming back from the spring to their houses, Ramiza Kundo, T. 5946; Menzilovic, T. 6991. 1481 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5940, 5942, 5973; Menzilovic, T. 6989. 1482 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5940. The Defence submits that the two witnesses were obviously biased against the SRK and therefore not reliable, Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 249, 251. Despite the fact that some statements made by the witnesses seem to imply prejudice against the SRK, the Trial Chamber observes that those statements do not refer to events critical for the Prosecution case (they relate to what happened on the front lines, remote from the direct context of the incident). 1483 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5940, 5971; Menzilovic, T. 6990-1. Hilmo Kundo, Ramiza Kundo’s husband (D76 Witness Statement of Hilmo Kundo) as well as a Police Report on the incident (D75) stated that the bullet hit the right leg but the victim denied having provided exact information on the wound. The victim was brought by the Civil Defence to Koševo hospital where she stayed for three days for treatment, Ramiza Kundo, T. 5942; P3673 (Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo), p. 2. 1484 - P3673 (Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo), p. 2. 1485 - D76 (Witness Statement of Hilmo Kundo); D75 (Official Note issued by the Novi Grad Public Security Station). 1486 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5940, 5942, 5973-4. 1487 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5974. 1488 - Menzilovic, T. 6989, referring to T. 6985, when she had stated that the “side of the field” (Polje) was the only position they could have been shot at. She repeated this statement almost verbatim in T. 7025, see also T. 7011-2. 1489 - Menzilovic, T. 6999-7000. The location of the house was marked by Menzilovic with a black circle on a photograph presented before the court; Photo 1 of P1812A (Photographs taken of the field area and the site of incidents 16 and 17); Menzilovic, T. 7000. Krsman admitted that the location of the red circle on the maps D1844, Map marked by Krsman and map 15 of P3728 (a series of 26 maps of portions of Sarajevo), marked by Karavelic (T. 11835) corresponds to the location of the black circle on Photo 1 of P1812.A marked by Menzilovic; Krsman, T. 19067, 19091-2, 19096. 1490 - Menzilovic, T. 6998. 1491 - Karavelic, T. 11835. 1492 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 261. 1493 - Id., paras 257, 263; Acquittal Motion, para. 79. 1494 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 265. 1495 - Krsman, T. 19048, 19060. The location of the depot was marked with “D” on the electronic map D1843; Krsman, T. 19048. 1496 - Krsman, T. 19060-1. 1497 - Krsman, T. 19062. Krsman testified that the SRK line was right next to the house owned by the Bo‘ic family indicated by him on the left-hand side of the photograph, Krsman, T. 19067, 19072-3. Krsman marked the location of the Bo‘ic’s house on the maps presented in court with the letter “K” (D1843, Map marked by Krsman) and a square (D1844, Map marked by Krsman ) respectively. 1498 - Krsman, T. 19062-3. 1499 - Krsman, T. 19081; D1844, Map marked by Krsman. He confirmed this statement looking at one of the photographs produced in court by the Prosecution (Photo 1 of P1812A, photographs taken of the field area and the site of incidents 16 and 17); D1843, map marked by Krsman with SRK confrontation lines. The ABiH confrontation line and the SRK confrontation line were printed with a light green line and a dark green line respectively on the maps. While indicating that the SRK line printed on D1844 was incorrect, Krsman confirmed that the location of the ABiH line printed on D1844 was correct, Krsman, T. 19057-8. 1500 - D1843 and D1844 (maps marked by Krsman); map 15 of P3728 (map of the area marked by Karavelic). 1501 - Karavelic, T. 11835; map 15 of P3728, map of the area marked by Karavelic. 1502 - P1812A (Photographs taken of the field area and the site of incidents 16 and 17); Krsman, T. 19081; D1844 (Map marked by Krsman). 1503 - Krsman, T. 19057-8, 19081; D1843 (map marked by Krsman); D1844 (map marked by Krsman); map 15 of P3728; P3644 (copy of large map of Sarajevo); Karavelic, T. 11835, marked on map 15 of P3728, map of the area; Menzilovic, T. 6982, 7010, 7024, 7057; 1504 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 258. 1505 - Krsman correctly states that the elevation near what appears to be a railway switchyard on D1844, black and white copy of part of a map of the area around the incident, is marked as an elevation of 492 metres (T.19064). The area around the red circle does not show contour lines as an indication of a different elevation; the closest of such isolines in the direction of the incident weaves around a railway, northeast of the red circle, and bears the number 500. The map marked by Krsman is – apart from the enlargement – similar to part of a black and white copy of P3644, copy of a map of Sarajevo. The Majority has carefully compared the black and white copy and the many enlarged colour sections of that map (a series of 26 maps admitted into evidence as P3728) with special regard to contour lines, the altitudes expressed in connection with such lines, as well as other elevation indicators. The Majority has further compared these maps with other maps in evidence and more specifically with contour lines and elevation features appearing on those maps (D1916, large colour map; P3724, copy of a large map of Sarajevo). The other maps support the findings of the Majority. The place where Ramiza Kundo was hit is closer on D1916 to the second contour (540 metres) uphill from the 500 metres contour line and further away from the third uphill line (560 metres). In fact, within that area, elevations 492 and 500 metres are marked, while no lower contour line (which would identify the elevation of 480 meters) appears. 1506 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 265. 1507 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5964-5. 1508 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5943; Menzilovic, T. 6990. Ramiza Kundo testified that, at the time she was wounded, she did not see anybody else in the vicinity apart from Menzilovic and that there was no fighting in the area, but only “snipers who would fire”, Ramiza Kundo, T. 5942; 5981. Menzilovic testified that there was no military position near her house during the armed conflict, Menzilovic, T. 7009. She also stated that, throughout the armed conflict, she had not seen any soldiers of the ABiH in her neighbourhood, Menzilovic, 7039. Ramiza Kundo stated that an ABiH tank was stationed next to a church about 500 metres uphill from her neighbourhood for about a week, although she was not sure whether the tank was stationed there in 1993 or 1994 and whether it ever opened fire. Ramiza Kundo, T. 5965-6. While Menzilovic testified that she never heard of the tank (Menzilovic, T. 7038) Sinisa Krsman, a company commander of the SRK in the area, also mentioned the tank, Krsman (T. 19052, 19085) who said that the tank was positioned slightly farther to the north-east of the position indicated by Ramiza Kundo, D1843 (map marked by Krsman). The Majority takes into consideration the position of the tank, but finds there is no ground to suggest that it was active at the time of the incident, nor that SRK soldiers would have any reason to target it with single shots fired from infantry weapons. 1509 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 264; Acquittal Motion, para. 79. 1510 - Ramiza Kundo, T. 5942, stating that her skirt was violet; P3673 (Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo), p. 3, where the skirt is described as red. 1511 - Menzilovic, T. 6989. 1512 - The Indictment alleges that on 13 November 1993, “Fatima Osmanovic, a woman aged 44 years, was shot and wounded in the right side of her face while she was carrying water across Brijesko brdo Street, presently Bulbulistan Street, in the west end of Sarajevo,” Schedule 1 to the Indictment. While incident 17 is presented in the Indictment as having occurred on 13 November 1993, the Prosecution states in its Final Brief that it took place “about seven days after” incident 16, which occurred on 2 November 1993; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 413. Both Ramiza Kundo and Menzilovic indeed recalled that the date of incident 17 was “7 days after” the date of incident 16 (Ramiza Kundo, T. 5981; Menzilovic, T. 6991). 1513 - Menzilovic, T. 6993. 1514 - Menzilovic, T. 6991. 1515 - Menzilovic, T. 6991, 7045, 7059; Photo 2 of P1812A (Photographs taken of the field area and the site of incidents 16 and 17). 1516 - Menzilovic, T. 7060; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, p. 3. Menzilovic marked the site of incident 16 with a circle, and also marked the site of incident 17 with a cross on Photo 2 of P1812A; Menzilovic, T. 7059. 1517 - Menzilovic, T. 7045. 1518 - Menzilovic, T. 6992. No medical document was presented by the Prosecution regarding the incident. Menzilovic and Ramiza Kundo said that the bullet was lodged in Fatima Osmanovic’s face, and that the doctors did not dare remove it after she was brought to hospital; Menzilovic, T. 6992; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5979, 5981-82. 1519 - Menzilovic, T. 6995; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5981 (only snipers fired). 1520 - Menzilovic, T. 6993. 1521 - Harding, T. 4311. 1522 - Harding, T. 4378. 1523 - P3644.CH (Map marked by Carl Harding). 1524 - Harding, T. 4378 and 4380. 1525 - Harding, T. 4378-80. 1526 - Harding, T. 4381. 1527 - P925 (UNPROFOR report – admitted under seal). 1528 - Id. The UNPROFOR report implied that the party responsible for this shelling was the SRK. 1529 - P1568 (UNPROFOR report – admitted under seal). Fragments from the 82 mm shell were recovered after the incident by an unspecified party. The report did not indicate whether the victims of the incident were civilians. 1530 - Id. 1531 - P3670 (Map marked by Witness P). 1532 - Witness P, T. 5555-6; P3670 (Map marked by Witness P). 1533 - Witness P, T. 5555-6. 1534 - Witness P, T. 5539-40 and 5553-4; P3670 (Map marked by Witness P). Witness P added, without elaborating, that both areas were under the control of the SRK. Witness P, T. 5540. 1535 - Witness DP21, T. 15459-60 and 15478-15479; D1787 (Map marked by Witness DP21). 1536 - See for example P3644.DF (Map marked by David Fraser), P3704 (Map pre-marked by Richard Mole) and D1820 (Map marked by Mykhaylo Tsynchenko). 1537 - Witness AF, T. 5482-5. Witness AF’s wife died as a result of her injuries, Witness AF, T. 5485. Witness AF’s mother-in-law was also lightly injured during the shelling incident, Witness AF, T. 5484. 1538 - Witness AF, T. 5487. 1539 - Zaimovic, T. 1842-3. 1540 - Zaimovic, T. 1846-7. 1541 - Zaimovic, T. 1843-5. Vase Miskina street lies immediately south of Maršala Tita street and west of the area known as Bascaršija. See for example P3670 (Map marked by Witness P) and P3637 (Maps marked by Witness D – admitted under seal). 1542 - Zaimovic, T. 1853-5. 1543 - Jusufovic, T. 6517-8. 1544 - Jusufovic, T. 6533. Jusufovic did not state where the shelling had come from. 1545 - The Indictment alleges that on 4 February 1994 “a salvo of three 120 mm mortar shells hit civilians in the Dobrinja residential area. The first landed to the front of a block of flats at Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street hitting persons who were distributing and receiving humanitarian aid and children attending religious classes. The second and third landed among persons trading at a market in an open area to the rear of the apartment buildings at Mihajla Pupina Street and Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. Eight people, including 1 child under the age of 15 years, were killed and at least 18 people, including 2 such children, were wounded. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory, approximately to the east”, Schedule 2 of the Indictment. 1546 - Besic, T. 4795; P2279A (Video footage of Markale market taken on 5 and 6 February 1994); Markale market occupies a surface area of 30 by 35 metres and is bordered by Marsala Tita street to the south, a supermarket to the north and a 20 metre-high building (the “December 22” building) to the north-east (P2261 (UN Report); testimony of people present on Saturday 5 February 1994 described the market as “very crowded” and “jam-packed” (P2261 (UN Report); a passer-by put the minimum number of persons present in the market at 600 or more persons, Travljanin, T. 6357; see also Niaz, T. 9091; P3663.A (Witness statement of Hamdija Cavcic dated 16 November 1995); Witness AK-1, T. 5452; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1547 - Kolp, T. 8247; Witness P, T. 5542-3; Travljanin, T. 6359; P2261 (UN Report). 1548 - Boškailo, T. 5041-2. 1549 - Boskailo, T. 5044-5; she testified that the people at the market were ordinary people who came for a walk or for shopping (T. 5053). 1550 - Boskailo, T. 5044-5, 5047-8. 1551 - Witness P, T. 5542-3; Hadzimuratovic, T. 5075-8; Travljanin, T. 6352-4, 6358-9; D81; Niaz, T. 9091-2; Witness AK-1, T. 5444, 5452-3; P3666 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Witness AK-1). 1552 - Boskailo, T. 5045-7; P2265A (Results of medical examination of Ezrema Boškailo dated 11 February 1994); Hadzimuratovic, T. 5077-9; Travljanin, T. 6355-6; Niaz, T. 9093-4; Suljic, T. 6811, 6905-6; P2365.1 (Official Report); P2262 (Photographs taken of Markale market on 5 February 1994); P2279A (Video footage of Markale market taken on 5 and 6 February 1994); P2309.1 (Report of Markale market incident by Stari Grad Public Security Station dated 6 February 1994 “Sabljica Ballistic Report”).. 1553 - Travjlanin, T. 6356; P2261 (UN Report); Hadzmuratovic, T. 5078-80; Boskailo, T. 5049-52; 1554 - P2261 (UN Report). 1555 - Hadzimuratovic, T. 5105; P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report); Gavrankapetanovic, T. 12620, 12624-7; Suljic, T. 6812-8 and 6821-2; Niaz, T. 9096-8; P2365.1 (Official Report); P2261 (UN Report); Niaz, T. 9096-7; Hamill, T. 6105; P3737A (Koševo hospital records) and see also Gavrankapetanovic, T. 12524-7) . 1556 - Suljic reported that 67 individuals had died and 142 had been injured by the explosion, P2365.1 (Official Report). The results of Suljic’s investigations formed the basis of another Criminal Report signed on 19 February 1994 by the Sarajevo police which identified the persons who had been killed or injured by the explosion and which was attached to the Official Report as an enclosure (P2366.1 (Enclosures to the Official Report); Suljic, T. 6823-6). There is a slight discrepancy between the Criminal Report dated 19 February 1994, which indicated that the explosion had injured 142 persons, and an earlier list compiled on 17 February 1994, also an enclosure to the Official Report (P2366.1), by the Sarajevo security forces on the basis of the work of Suljic, which identified 151 persons as having been injured. The list of victims in the Criminal Report dated 19 February 1994 (P2366.1) indicated a smaller number of injured persons because, in the course of its investigation, the Sarajevo security forces could not verify the identity or injuries of some individuals mentioned in the lists dated 17 February 1994 (Suljic, T. 6825). Niaz testified that at 17:15 hours on 5 February 1994, he had personally counted 61 people dead and 148 wounded by the explosion (Niaz, T. 9097-8; P2261 (UN Report); other UN representatives stated that the blast killed between 25 to 61 persons and injured anywhere from 60 to 148 others (Hamill, T. 6104; P2261 (UN Report). The UN reported that the incident had killed 66 persons and wounded 197 others based on information provided by international news agencies and the UNPROFOR, D66 (UN report of military activity in Sarajevo). Many of the victims of the blast appeared to suffer from wounds caused by shell fragments. P2261 (UN Report). Suljic testified that victims were mainly aged persons (Suljic, T. 6814; see P2366 (enclosures to the Official Report), showing a breakdown of injured persons by sex and age, almost half of the injured persons were over 55 years old) and Niaz emphasised that there was a possibility that off-duty soldiers wearing civilian clothes were present at the market since the day of the incident was a rotation day, during which soldiers came from the front-line to exchange cigarettes against food (Niaz, T. 9157). 1557 - Bukva, T. 18478. See also D138.1 (English translation of VRS letter dated 5 February 1994). 1558 - D137.1 (English translation of VRS letter to UNPROFOR dated 5 February 1994) and D138.1 (English translation of VRS letter dated 5 February 1994). 1559 - Bukva, T. 18422. 1560 - These Defence experts (Prof. Dr. Aleksandar Stamatovic,† Prof. Dr. Janko Vilicic and Dr. Miroljub Vukasinovic) reviewed, among other things, official reports and notes of the police and judicial authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, statements made by witnesses to representatives of this Tribunal, photographs and video footage of the site of the incident, and evidence introduced into the Trial Record. They also conducted an on-site visit, Vilicic, T. 20185; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). They completed their analysis in June 2002, submitted their report to the Defence in September 2002, Vilicic, T. 20185. 1561 - Suljic, T. 6811; Sabljica, T. 5122; P2365.1 (Official Report); P3663.A (Witness statement of Cavcic dated 16 November 1995). 1562 - On-the-scene investigations were carried out on 5 and 6 February 1994. Identification of persons injured or killed the day of the explosion started on 6 February 1994, contacts with the UN police were established on 7 and 8 February 1994 (victims had been admitted into the UN hospital) and interviews with victims and eye-witnesses of the incidents were carried out on 9, 10 and 11 February 1994. 1563 - Two parts of that official report - a description of the events of 5 February 1994 in Markale market and the Official Report from the Security Services Centre of Sarajevo signed by Suljic and two other criminal investigators- were tendered into evidence, P2365.1 (Official Report). The Official Report will not be considered systematically in this discussion of the incident since it repeats, without further elaboration information found in the Sabljica and Zecevic Ballistic Reports. Where appropriate, reference to this Official Report will be made. Four enclosures to that Official Report (the list of persons killed at Markale market, the list of persons injured at Markale market, a schema of the breakdown of injured persons by sex and age and the criminal report dated 19 February 1994) were also tendered into evidence, P2366 (Enclosures to the Official Report). 1564 - Sabljica, T. 5331. 1565 - P2309.A1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1566 - P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report); P2365.1 (Official Report). John Hamill, one of the technical advisers to the UNPROFOR investigation team, confirmed that the crater lay “5 [metresg from the nearest small building to the north.” P2261 (UN Report). See also D73 (Video of Markale market dated 6 February 1994) and P2279A (Video footage of Markale market taken on 5 and 6 February 1994) for the general position of the central crater in relation to the rest of Markale market. 1567 - Sabljica, T. 5127; P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1568 - P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1569 - P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1570 - Sabljica, T. 5125, 5127, 5131-6 and 5142-5; P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report); P2365.1 (Official Report); P2262 (Photographs taken of Markale market on 5 February 1994); P2279A (Video footage of Markale market taken on 5 and 6 February 1994). The experts reported that their measurement of the angle had a margin of error of plus or minus 5 degrees, P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1571 - Suljic, T. 6898; Besic, T. 4797, 4806, 4917, 4980-1; Sabljica, T. 5338; P3663.A (Witness statement of Hamdija Cavcic dated 16 November 1995). 1572 - Besic, T. 4810, 4828-30, 4911-2; P3663.A (Witness statement of Hamdija Cavcic dated 16 November 1995); P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1573 - Sabljica, T. 5146; P2309A.1 (Sabljica Ballistic Report). 1574 - Sabljica, T. 5146; P2365.1 (Official Report). 1575 - Sabljica, T. 5330-1; Zecevic, T.10319-21. From 1992 to 1993, Dr. Berko Zecevic worked in the department of research and development for the ABiH, Zecevic, T. 10312. The Trial Record does not disclose his occupation at the time of the explosion at Markale market; P3276.1.1 (English Translation of Zecevic Ballistic Report). 1576 - P2365.1 (Official Report). 1577 - P2365.1 (Official Report), on 6 February 1994, the team of experts searched for additional shell fragments, which they found in the nearby supermarket and which they gave to the explosive experts for analysis. 1578 - P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report); Sabljica, T. 5330-1. 1579 - With an accuracy of that measurement of +/- 5 degrees. 1580 - P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report), conclusions 1, 4, 5 and 6. 1581 - Zecevic, T. 10330. 1582 - P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report), p. 5. 1583 - Zecevic, T. 10331. 1584 - Zecevic, T. 10323, 10339-40; P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report), p. 5. Zecevic and his colleagues felt confident that the device which they were presented with was indeed the tail-fin originally recovered because, after “?using hisg finger to remove the surplus earth that had fallen ?inside the crater, it was possible,g without any effort or without using any kind of force, to place the ?tail-fin in.g”, Zecevic, T. 10324-5, 10345-6. 1585 - Zecevic, T. 10323, 10339-40; P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report), p. 5. Zecevic and his colleagues felt confident that the device which they were presented with was indeed the tail-fin originally recovered because, after “?using hisg finger to remove the surplus earth that had fallen ?inside the crater, it was possible,g without any effort or without using any kind of force, to place the ?tail-fin in.g”, Zecevic, T. 10324-5, 10345-6. 1586 - Zecevic, T. 10347-8. 1587 - Zecevic, T. 10301; P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report). Charges are increments of propellant that can be added to the base of the shell to give it a longer firing range, Hamill, T. 6074; Witness AD, T. 10590; Witness DP20, T. 15642; Knezevic, T. 19025-6; Gray, T. 19776. 1588 - P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report). 1589 - P3276 (BCS version of Zecevic Ballistic Report), p. ERN 02115548. 1590 - P3276.1 (Zecevic Ballistic Report). 1591 - Zecevic, T. 10296-8; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1592 - Zecevic “used equations obtained from Sukas and Walters”, T. 10306. 1593 - Zecevic, T. 10299-10300, 10306, 10353; Zecevic used formulas established by a French scientist, Saterline, T. 10306-7. 1594 - Zecevic, T. 10302. 1595 - Zecevic, T. 10299; the more charges a 120 mm mortar shell carries, the greater is its speed upon impact, Zecevic, T. 10293-4, 10300. 1596 - Zecevic, T. 10302; the initial speed for a shell with one increment charge is 140 metres per second, T. 10294. 1597 - Zecevic, T. 10294-6. 1598 - Zecevic, T. 10301 – 10302. 1599 - Zecevic, T. 10301. 1600 - At least two of them arrived at Markale market almost immediately after the explosion, Kolp, T. 8247-8; P2261 (UN Report). 1601 - The UN Frebat 4 team reached the market ten to fifteen minutes after the arrival of the local investigation team, Besic, T. 4906; Sabljica, T. 5338. This team was ordered to investigate the incident by General Soubirou, commander of United Nations forces at Sector Sarajevo, because of the large number of victims caused by the explosion, Rose, T. 10196-9; these representatives included the French army officer Jean-Louis Segade (P2261, UN Report). One of the reports written by the authorities of Sarajevo referred to a United Nations investigator named “Jean Luis SEGADI”, probably a misspelling of Jean-Louis Segade’s name as written in the UNPROFOR investigation report, P2365.1 (Official Report). 1602 - P2261 (UN Report). 1603 - P2261 (UN Report). 1604 - Suljic, T. 6897-8; P3663.A (Witness statement of Hamdija Cavcic dated 16 November 1995); P2261 (UN Report); P2365.1 (Official Report). There is some uncertainty as to which member of the United Nations investigation team actually extracted the tail-fin. A report by the authorities of Sarajevo stated that Jean-Louis Segade performed the extraction, but the UN Report annexed an interview of the same Jean-Louis Segade, in which he stated that he had merely watched as members of his team removed the tail-fin from the ground of the market. P2635.1 (Official report of Sarajevo authorities dated 17 February 1994); P2261 (UN Report). 1605 - P2261(UN Report). 1606 - Besic, T. 4917; Sabljica, T. 5338. 1607 - P2261 (UN Report), annex C and pp. 10/46, 12/46; 1 degree equals 17.78 mils. 1608 - Captain Verdy had estimated the vertical angle from the crater to the top of an adjacent building along the bearing he had calculated, P2261 (UN Report). 1609 - P2261 (UN Report). 1610 - P2261 (UN Report). The evidence in the Trial Record does not disclose the method used by Major John Russell to measure this angle of descent; Major John Russell also stated in the UN Report that there was a chisel and a red pipe wrench within one metre of the crater. 1611 - The deputy force commander of UNPROFOR in Zagreb ordered a follow-up investigation of the explosion, Hamill, T. 6077; Rose, T. 10196; Over three days, the team conducted a total of seven crater analyses at Markale market, reviewed reports produced after the explosion and interviewed UN personnel and liaison officers of the SRK and the ABiH, P2261 (UN Report). 1612 - P2261 (UN Report). 1613 - P2261 (UN Report), pp. 10/46, 16/46. In his written summary of his crater analysis, Major Sahaisar Khan did not elaborate on the manner in which he determined this angle of descent. On 12 February 1994, the same three UN representatives returned to the market and each conducted one additional crater analysis and all three measured again the direction of fire but, on this second day of their investigation, they did not attempt to measure the angle of descent of the projectile, P2261 (UN Report). In a memorandum summarising the results of his two crater analyses and annexed to the UN Report, Commandant John Hamill stated, without elaborating, that “the crater was disturbed between ?hisg first and second analyses, making the measurement impossible on the second occasion,” P2261 (UN Report). Commandant John Hamill explained that there had been “a change in [the United Nations] team leadership between the two periods, between the morning of the 11th and the morning of the 12th, and the new team leader decided that he wanted it done again so we went and did ?crater analysesg again”, P2261.1 (UN Report) and T. 6087. 1614 - Hamill, T. 6087-8; P2261 (UN Report), p. 10/46, 18/46. 1615 - P2261 (UN Report). 1616 - P2261.2 (Translation of Sergeant Dubant’s analysis of the crater at Markale market). The original version of P2261.2 was in French and was enclosed as an annex to P2261 (UN Report). 1617 - P2261 (UN Report). The imprecision in the reference to the measurement of the shorter axis of the ellipse arises from the fact that in the copy of Chief-Sergeant’s report that was included in P2261, the unit digit indicated for the measurement of this axis is illegible, P2261 (Translation of Sergeant Dubant’s analysis of the Markale market incident). See also P2261.2 (Translation of Sergeant Dubant’s analysis of the crater at Markale market). 1618 - P2261.2 (Translation of Sergeant Dubant’s analysis of the crater at Markale market). 1619 - P2261 (UN Report). The UN team interviewed victims to consider whether the number of casualties matched their findings that a 120mm shell had exploded in Markale market. 1620 - P2261 (UN Report). 1621 - P2261 (UN Report), p. 4/46. The UN team members explained that only the explosion of a mortar shell could have caused the crater found at the market. The inspection of the tail-fin recovered after the incident confirmed this finding. They also explained that they based their findings that the 120 mm mortar shell had exploded upon hitting the ground of the market on the shape of the crater left by the explosion, the type of damage sustained by stalls near the crater and the shape of scrapes left on the asphalt surface of the market, P2261 (UN Report). 1622 - P2261 (UN Report). Hamill testified that a bearing can be expressed in terms of mils instead of degrees, with one degree corresponding approximately to 17.78 mils, Hamill, T. 6088-9. A bearing of about 350 mils from the north therefore corresponds approximately to a bearing of 18 degrees from the north, Hamill, T. 6098-9. UTM stands for Universal Transverse Mercator. 1623 - Hamill, T. 6098-9. Michael Rose, the British general who commanded UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1994 to January 1995, confirmed that United Nations investigators determined that the mortar shell had been fired from a northeasternly direction, Rose, T. 10196. 1624 - P2261 (UN Report), p. 10/46. 1625 - P2261 (UN Report), p. 10/46. 1626 - P2261 (UN Report), p. 12/46. 1627 - P2261 (UN Report), p. 13/46. 1628 - P2261.1 (UN Report), p. 4/46; Hamill testified that the scope of the investigation was confined by the terms of reference that was given to the team, to the crater analysis and related technical aspects. The finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove which party fired was based on the investigations as confined by the terms of reference, Hamill, T. 6083-4 and P2261 (UN Report), p. 2/46; Rose also confirmed that the investigations in this regard did not go beyond a technical examination of the crater impact site Rose, T.10199. 1629 - The authors of the Report argue that there is no conclusive evidence that the tail-fin of a 120 mm mortar shell had indeed been recovered after the incident, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1630 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report); Vilicic, T. 20314-5 concerning video footage of this shrapnel. The Defence experts submit that in the absence of a visual inspection supplemented by a chemical and metallurgical analysis of these fragments, no conclusive determination can be made that these remnants originated from a 120 mm mortar shell. With the exception of a tail-fin, no such fragments were tendered into evidence and the authors of the Vilicic Shelling Report were not able to conduct such a detailed analysis, Acquittal Motion, para. 128; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 626-30. One of the authors of the Shelling Report, Vilicic, testified that reports that some of the victims of the explosion at the market had been injured in the lower limbs, are inconsistent with the manner in which fragments from an exploded mortar shell travel in the air, Vilicic, T. 20317-8. He suggested that such injuries to the lower limbs were characteristic of the explosion of a special type of concave shell used in the JNA rather than of a mortar shell, Vilicic, T. 20318. 1631 - Vilicic, T. 20268 and 20288-9. 1632 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report); Vilicic, T. 20560-1. 1633 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1634 - Vilicic, T. 20471; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1635 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). To achieve a depth of penetration of 250 mm in concrete terrain of this type, the required minimal speed increases to 508.7 metres per second when there is no detonation, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1636 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report), they observed that no known mortar shell can achieve such a high speed in flight and therefore concluded that the claim made in the Zecevic Ballistic Report that the tail-fin of a 120 mm mortar shell had been found embedded in the ground of Markale market at an even greater depth of 200 to 250 mm market was technically impossible. 1637 - D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1638 - Vilicic, T. 20449; D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1639 - Vilicic, T. 20466. See as suggested during the testimony of Zecevic, Zecevic, T. 10330. 1640 - The “Berezansky” formula was developed at the beginning of the 20th century and produced exact result, more favourable to the case of the Prosecution, Vilicic, T. 20215-17. Vilicic had produced calculations using this formula in order to confirm the conclusions of the Vilicic Shelling Report reached on the basis of the Sandia National Laboratories equations, Vilicic, T. 20271-2. See also C8 (Table of the speed of the tail-fin of a 120 mm mortar shell required to penetrate different materials according to the Berezansky formula) and C9 (Table of the speed of the tail-fin of a 120 mm mortar shell required to penetrate different materials according to the Berezansky formula). 1641 - Vilicic, T. 20475-6 and 20479-80. Vilicic implied during his testimony that such a mixed terrain would be harder to penetrate, requiring a higher speed of penetration than for a terrain consisting entirely of gravel stone, Vilicic, T. 20476. 1642 - Vilicic, T. 20480-1; C5 (Chart showing the increase in speed of a mortar shell when fired from a higher position than its target). 1643 - Witness AF, T. 5524, 5499-5505. 1644 - Witness AF, T. 5524, 5499-5505. 1645 - Witness AK-1, T. 5444, 5446-7 and 5450-1. 1646 - Suljic, T. 6903. 1647 - Hamill, T. 6193-4; Kovacs, T. 11482-4; P3734 (Shelling report of Richard Higgs dated 12 February 2002). 1648 - Hamill, T. 6193-4. 1649 - The Trial Chamber used in particular the maps adduced into evidence by the Defence (D1790 to D1796) to estimate the positions of the confrontation lines in the estimated direction of fire of the shell. 1650 - P3644.RH (map of Sarajevo); maps were often used and marked by witnesses and although no scale was indicated on them, by comparison of the different maps the Trial Chamber was able to deduce the scale of these maps. The Trial Chamber agrees with the defence that the map, admitted into evidence under C2, has a scale of 1:50.000. The Chamber further verified its understanding of the scale of the maps on the basis of the latitudinal scale indicated on them, where it is of common knowledge that one degree of latitude equals approximately 111 kilometres, a minute being 1/60th of one degree. 1651 - Higgs, T. 12447-8, 12460; P3727 (Maps of the five scheduled shelling incidents). Although the Trial Record is not entirely clear on this issue, it appears that Higgs positioned the ABiH front line on the map according to information provided to him by the Prosecution, Higgs, T. 12455. 1652 - P3644 RH (map of Sarajevo); P3727 (set of 5 maps); P3644MS (map of Sarajevo). 1653 - P3644VK (Karavelic’s map). 1654 - Kolp, T. 8248-8250. 1655 - Besic, T. 4925, 5033; Boskailo, T. 5044, 5059-62. 1656 - Hamill, T. 6191; 6218 1657 - For purposes of their calculations, the authors of the Shelling Report considered a distance ranging from 1,400 to 6,464 metres, which corresponds to the distance at which a 120 mm mortar shell would have had to be fired in order to land at an angle of 60 degrees on the ground of the market, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). They also assumed that the dimensions of the market were 36 by 30 metres, D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report). 1658 - Witness AD, T. 10759-60. 1659 - P2261 (UN Report), p. 43/46. 1660 - Besic, T. 4802; Travljanin, T. 6359-60. 1661 - Niaz, T. 9099-9100. 1662 - Hamill, T. 6107; P2261 (UN Report), p. 43/46, item 4. 1663 - Hamill, T. 6109; P2261 (UN Report), p. 43/46, item 4. 1664 - Hamill, T. 6109; P2261 (UN Report), p. 43/46, item 4. 1665 - See T. 21936, where the Prosecution explained that “various [law-enforcement] departments [where the shrapnels would have been kept] in Sarajevo [had] moved [since the incident at the market]. And that clearly was the reason that the Prosecution was unable to produce [the shrapnel]”. 1666 - Response to Acquittal Motion, paras 113-4; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 551. 1667 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 560. 1668 - Defence co-counsel, T. 10214. 1669 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 626-7, 647. The Defence experts raised the preliminary argument that the pictures of shrapnel allegedly recovered after the incident do not resemble the remnants from a single type of explosive device but from many - including mortar shells of different calibres and rocket projectiles. The Defence submits that in the absence of a visual inspection supplemented by a chemical and metallurgical analysis of these fragments, no conclusive determination can be made that these remnants originated from a 120 mm mortar shell. They also suggested that there was also no conclusive evidence that the tail-fin of a 120 mm mortar shell had indeed been recovered after the incident. See also Vilicic, T. 20314-5 concerning video footage of this shrapnel and D1917 (Vilicic Shelling Report): the authors of the Shelling Report submitted that with the exception of a tail-fin, no such fragments were tendered into evidence so they were not able to conduct such a detailed analysis. See also Response to Acquittal Motion, para. 115; Acquittal Motion, para. 128; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 626-30. 1670 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 618-9, 622. 1671 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 622, the Defence adds that even if the area was pre-recorded, a weapon is very sensitive to meteorological phenomenons. 1672 - Acquittal Motion, para. 128; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 622. 1673 - Id. 1674 - Acquittal Motion, para. 128; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 632. 1675 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 631-46. 1676 - Khan, 56-62 degrees, Hamill, 53-62 degrees; Zecevic Ballistic Report, 55-65 degrees; Vilicic Shelling Report, 55,6-62,5 degrees. 1677 - The Majority notes that the UN report does not include the statement of Russell (the statements of the Frebat team, Verdy, Khan, Hamill, Grande and Dubant are included) and gives no reason for that ommission. 1678 - It appears from the tables of fire attached to Vilicic Report that angles of descent are in some relation with angles of firing. In fact, decreasing the firing angle by one degree when closer to 90 degrees results in far greater distance gained than decreasing the firing angle by one degree when closer to 45 degrees. Therefore, upward changes of the firing angle in the area considered (between 50 and 65 degrees) increase the traveling distance much less than similar changes around the firing angle of 85 degrees. 1679 - If the angle of firing remains unchanged. 1680 - Table 2 in Vilicic Shelling Report. 1681 - That a higher velocity at firing results in a higher velocity at impact is not only a fact of common knowledge but also clearly illustrated in Table 2 in Vilicic Shelling Report. 1682 - The tail-fin of the mortar shell was found embedded in the ground; the UN team used a knife to remove the tail-fin from the ground. See the evidence above in relation to investigation by the UN and the local investigative team. 1683 - Vilicic testified that the altitude of the Markale market was at 600 meters. Maps in evidence that contain contour lines indicate a slightly lesser altitude. Similarly Vilicic testified that no elevation higher than 1000 meters existed in the northerly direction up to Mrkovici, which is also contradicted by the maps, indicating elevations of above 1000 metres in and around locations called Gornji Mrkovici and Donji Mrkovici. 1684 - C9 mentions “ground and stone”. 1685 - P3276.1 (Zecevic Shelling Report). 1686 - Based on comparison of the tables in Zecevic Shelling Report, p. 6 and C8, C9. 1687 - C8, C9. 1688 - Table on p. 6 of Zecevic Ballistic Report, this value is more favorable to the Defence case than the value of 219 m/sec for V° given by Vilicic. 1689 - The Majority took the most favourable figures from table 2 in Vilicic Shelling Report and C5: the loss of speed in flight was taken at minimum level, while the increase of speed caused by the difference of altitude was taken at a level, consistent with firing at an 0+3 charge, at a difference of altitude of 500 meters, both options resulting in a possibly higher speed of impact when firing at this lower charge. 1690 - The velocity at firing at a 0+2 charge is approximately 40m/sec lower compared to firing at a 0+3 charge which velocity could not generate the velocity at impact needed to explain the embedment of the tailfin in the ground. But even if fired at a 0+2 level the shell would have been fired at a distance of 2577 m, which would still be approximately at the SRK-held confrontation line. 1691 - Kupusovic, T. 664-665; Eterovic, T. 8844, 12519; Witness Y, T. 10947; Mole, T. 11109. 1692 - Witness DP51, T. 13582 (private session). 1693 - Gavrankapetanovic, T. 12517. 1694 - Golic, T. 14887; Tucker, T. 10023. The streets of Stjepana Tomica and Marcela Šnajdera bound, respectively, the western and the northern parts of the main Koševo complex of buildings, which is itself approximately 800 meters long and 100 meters wide. Witness DP1, T. 13317; Witness DP51, T. 13599-601 (private session); D1755 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Witness DP1) and D1758 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Witness DP51); Golic, T. 14887; Tarik Kupusovic testified that the hospital was “a large complex of clinics and hospitals,” Kupusovic, T. 664. 1695 - Many witnesses confirmed that either they or persons they knew were treated at the hospital during the conflict in Sarajevo. See for example Witness L, T. 2524, 2570; Jusovic, T. 4150; Boškailo, T. 5052; Witness AK-1, T. 5484; Dzonko, T. 5648; Kapetanovic, T. 5769; Pita, T. 5915; Fazlic, T. 6611-2; Gavranovic, T. 6715; Menzilovic, T. 7045; Mehonic, T. 7331; Witness AI, T. 7666; Ljusa, T. 7866-7, 7879; Kapetanovic, T. 7957; Arifagic, T. 12713; Witness DP51, T. 13627. 1696 - Zaimovic, T. 1844. She recounted that the children’s reaction to the shelling and shooting “was terrible. The children panicked, started screaming, and it was very difficult to calm them down”, Zaimovic, T. 1845. 1697 - Zaimovic, T. 1845. 1698 - Zaimovic, T. 1865. 1699 - Witness DP51, T. 13626. 1700 - Ashton, T. 1204. 1701 - Ashton, T. 1265-8. 1702 - Carswell, T. 8329. 1703 - When recalling which civilian targets were frequently shelled during his tenure, Carswell, testified that “the Kosevo hospital, to use the biggest example, was targeted (on( a regular basis”, Carswell, T. 8357. 1704 - Niaz, T. 9065. 1705 - Niaz, T. 9100-1. 1706 - Thomas, T. 9255-7. 1707 - Thomas, T. 9303, 9309 (closed session); P1963 (UNMO SitRep dated 14 December 1993). Both Francis Briquemont, a Belgian general who commanded UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 12 July 1993 to 24 January 1994, and Jacques Kolp, a Belgian officer who served as a UN liaison officer in Sarajevo from March 1993 to November 1994, remembered that shells had landed on the hospital during their tenures, Briquemont, T. 10037-10039,10086; Kolp, T. 8220-1, 8307. 1708 - See, e.g., D135 (Annex of 1994 UN Report on the situation in the former Yugoslavia); P1911 (UNMO daily SitRep for Sarajevo dated 1 December 1993); P1963 (UNMO daily SitRep dated 14 December 1993) and P2064 (UNMO daily SitRep dated 5 January 1994). 1709 - Harding, T. 4311. 1710 - Harding, T. 4337-8; P3660 (Battle damage assessment of Koševo Hospital dated January 1993 by Carl Harding). 1711 - P3660 (Battle damage assessment of Koševo Hospital dated January 1993 by Carl Harding). Harding also reviewed the damage caused to the State Hospital on the next day, Harding, T. 4338 . See P3661. 1712 - P3660 (Battle damage assessment of Koševo Hospital dated January 1993 by Carl Harding). As a result of the shelling, the whole casualty reception building was poorly heated and in certain parts, the temperature did not rise above 5°C; the building also lacked electricity and running water. 1713 - P3660 (Battle damage assessment of Koševo Hospital dated January 1993 by Carl Harding). 1714 - Harding, T. 6445. 1715 - Cutler, T. 8897-8. 1716 - Cutler, T. 8911-2. Cutler also remembered that when he arrived in Sarajevo, Mole informed him that the shelling of the Kosevo hospital and the indiscriminately shelling of the city were among the concerns of UNPROFOR, Cutler, T. 8909. The UNPROFOR also reported that between 1 and 7 of December 1993, SRK soldiers deliberately shelled Koševo hospital, P3714 (UNPROFOR military information summary dated 8 December 1993). Likewise, other UN representatives indicated that the shelling of the hospital between 13 and 14 December 1993 was carried out by “Serb forces”, P1963 (UNMO daily sit-rep dated 14 December 1993) 1717 - P745 (UNPROFOR reports dated 31 January 1993 related to the shelling of Koševo Hospital). 1718 - Id. 1719 - Cutler, T. 9006, 9049-50; P745 (UNPROFOR reports dated 31 January 1993 related to the shelling of Koševo Hospital). 1720 - Carswell, T. 8337-8. 1721 - Carswell, T. 8338-40. Izo Golic, a soldier of the SRK, testified that he did not know of any mortar or artillery crew located in the south of Sarajevo during the conflict which had either received orders to fire or had fired on Koševo hospital, Golic, T. 14919. 1722 - P3683A. In one shelling incident, however, the Trial Record suggests that the source of fire lay within the city – and not in SRK-held territory at the perimeter of Sarajevo. John Hamill, an Irish officer who joined the UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia from May 1993 to July 1994, examined in December 1993 the damage caused by a shell which had landed on the hospital, Hamill, T. 6059-60, 6184. He determined that the shell had followed an almost horizontal trajectory from the north, Hamill, T. 6184-5, 6226. From this information, he concluded that the shell had been fired from a tank, thereby exculpating SRK forces since their positions in the area did not allow for the targeting of the hospital in such a manner, Hamill, T. 6184-6185. John Hamill admitted that he had not carried out a detailed investigation of the incident, Hamill, T. 6185. Carl Harding also examined a Koševo hospital building which appeared to have been damaged by a source of fire located to the north, Harding, T. 6445. During his testimony, he rejected the suggestion that the source of fire lay within the city, Harding, T. 6445. 1723 - General Hussein Abdel-Razek, who served as Sector Commander in Sarajevo from August 1992 to February 1993, also protested to the Accused personally on repeated occasions about the shelling of the “main hospital in the city”. Abdel-Razek, T. 11591-2. Cutler told of one instance where UN personnel sent a formal letter of protest to the Accused after shells had landed on Koševo hospital on 29 and 30 January and also remembered raising the issue of the regular firing at the Kosevo hospital with SRK Chief of Staff, Colonel Marcetic, Cutler, T. 9005, 8930. Cutler did not specify when this conversation took place. Tucker testified about an incident during which shells apparently aimed at Koševo hospital had landed next to General Morillon’s headquarter, some 400 metres away from the medical facility, Tucker, T. 9897-8. He recalled that UNPROFOR had concluded that the SRK had fired the projectiles and had accordingly lodged a protest with General Mladic, Tucker, T. 9897-8. 1724 - The Prosecution admitted during trial that “[the] evidence has been consistent throughout [the trial] that shots were fired –the shots were fired from the grounds of Koševo hospital.” T. 10438. See also the Response to the Acquittal Motion, para. 37; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 613. 1725 - Tucker, T. 9895-6. During his stay, Tucker became military assistant to UNPROFOR commander General Morillon. T. 9895-6. 1726 - Tucker, T. 9898-9, 10022. 1727 - Tucker, T. 10022. 1728 - Tucker, T. 10022. 1729 - Tucker, T. 9938, 9981, 10022-3. 1730 - Tucker, T. 9938-40, 9961, 10022-3. Tucker’s testimony is confusing on this point as he later on suggested that the journalists had only witnessed the SRK return fire; based on their account, Tucker had then deduced that the ABiH had launched an initial attack from the hospital, provoking the SRK response, Tucker, T. 10022-3. 1731 - Cutler, T. 8913-5. The British officer had confronted a hospital administrator about this practice who had replied: “I am not military. There is nothing I can do about this”, Cutler, T. 8914. 1732 - Cutler, T. 8914. In relation to the mobile mortars at the hospital, Cutler stated that he did not consider such mortars to be legitimate military targets “because […] given the natural tendency of shells to be off-line in bearing and in range, there was a very high likelihood of hitting the hospital”, Cutler, T. 9006. He added that he "would consider mortars on the front line, not in civilian areas, to be legitimate targets, but not those located near a hospital", T. 9006-9007. 1733 - For example, John Hamill believed that the ABiH positioned mortars on the grounds of the Koševo hospital based on reports from other UNMOs, Hamill, T. 6108-9, 6168-9, 6207, 6229. Michael Carswell received on at least 25 occasions information that the ABiH fired mortars from the Koševo hospital grounds, Carswell, T. 8428. Although he did not specify the basis for his assertion, Jacques Kolp testified that at least “on one occasion, a mortar position fired from [Koševo] hospital on to Serb positions”, Kolp, T. 8292-4. Carl Harding saw armoured personnel carriers next to the hospital at an unspecified date, Harding, T. 6455. Adrianus Van Baal, a Dutch officer who served as Chief of staff of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from February to August 1994, received reports indicating that the ABiH had positioned a tank near Koševo hospital – though his forces were unable to spot and confiscate this vehicle, Van Baal, T. 9843-66, 11341-2. 1734 - General Morillon reportedly asked the head of the Koševo hospital why he allowed ABiH forces to fire from his facility, Tucker, T. 10023. The head of Koševo hospital denied knowing that the ABiH fired from his facility, but the UNPROFOR thought that the latter was a “radical hardliner” who would countenance such tactics, Tucker, T. 10023-4. Michael Rose remembered that UN forces warned the ABiH command “all the time” about firing from sensitive civilian buildings such as hospitals, Rose, T. 10211. Richard Mole, who served as Senior UNMO in Sarajevo from September to December 1992, had also concluded from reports that the ABiH would fire from hospital grounds so that it would draw SRK counterattacks, Mole, T. 9500-1, 11126-7, 11140. Despite this extensive circumstantial evidence regarding ABiH fire originating from the grounds of Koševo hospital, UN observers and others failed to spot a single ABiH mobile mortar during the entire conflict. Carl Harding never saw, or found traces related to, mortars firing from the vicinity of the hospital, Harding, T. 6437-8, 6454-5. He never observed, or received reports from observation posts or from other UNMOs, that the ABiH operated mortars mounted on trucks, even though UN observers specifically looked for such weapons, Harding, T. 4374, 6441, 6437. After a shelling incident had taken place at the hospital, Afzaal Niaz searched with his team the entire medical facility for military weapons or soldiers, but found none. Niaz, T. 9167. Francis Roy Thomas testified that although he suspected that the ABiH fired from the hospital, his unit was never “able to physically observe them on the [hospital] grounds”, Thomas, T. 9304. Witness Y, an officer who served with the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo during the Indictment Period, added that UN forces never formally established that the ABiH had positioned mortar units on hospital grounds, Witness Y, T. 10846-9, 10926-7. When he took over command of UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo on 12 July 1993, General Briquemont was not told about the ABiH firing from Koševo hospital by his predecessor, General Morillon; General Briquemont therefore dismissed the information circulating about such ABiH activity as “rumors” of “no importance”, Briquemont, T. 10138. Van Lynden, a Dutch journalist, testified that “Kosevo hospital is more than one building. It's a large academic hospital. I have never seen any artillery there, nor have I heard that it was being used for artillery purposes. The only thing I have heard is that the maternity hospital that belonged, that was a part of the Kosevo hospital, that became a front line position, but that's some way away from the rest of the Kosevo hospital”, Van Lynden, T. 2189. 1735 - Izo Golic, who served in an SRK mortar unit during the conflict, saw the ABiH fire from the hospital between 10 to 15 times but added that his own unit was not instructed to return fire, Golic, T. 14845, 14917-9. Witness DP11, a soldier in the 4th battalion of the SRK, also saw the ABiH fire with mortars on his unit from the hospital, Witness DP11, T. 14984, 14993. According to James Cutler, an SRK colonel named Marcetic had voiced his suspicions to UN personnel that the ABiH fired from the hospital, Cutler, T. 8905, 8915. 1736 - Karavelic, T. 11884. Whenever the UNPROFOR alerted him that ABiH mobile mortars were fired, Karavelic would immediately dispatch police forces to investigate but his men never found such mortar units, Karavelic, T. 11884, 12030. 1737 - Karavelic, T. 12030. 1738 - Tucker, T. 9962. 1739 - Tucker, T. 10025. 1740 - Mole, T. 11140; Harding, T. 4371-2. 1741 - Harding, T. 4371-3. 1742 - Harding, T. 4372. 1743 - Mole, T. 11128. 1744 - Kolp, T. 8307. 1745 - Hvaal, T. 2298. 1746 - Hvaal, T. 2296. Hvaal witnessed mortars of various sizes and 155-millimetre howitzers rounds impacting the hospital or landing in its vicinity, as well as tank rounds, Hvaal, T. 2296. On one occasion during the winter of 1993-1994, a large-calibre howitzer round hit the hospital, killing hospital staff, Hvaal, T. 2297. 1747 - Although using hospitals or medical facilities to commit military acts is not in accordance with international humanitarian law, before these installations loose the protection to which they are entitled, the attacking side should provide a prior warning to cease such use and provide reasonable time to comply therewith. If the medical facility is to be attacked, appropriate precautions should be taken to spare civilians, the hospital staff and the medical installations. 1748 - See P3660 (Battle damage assessment of Koševo hospital dated January 1993 by Carl Harding). 1749 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 256. 1750 - Id., para. 256. 1751 - Witness DP53, T. 16114-5; Nikolic, T. 15962. 1752 - Witness DP53, T. 16165, 16169, 16177-8; Nikolic, T. 15961-2 and 15981. 1753 - Witness DP53, T. 16170 and 16178; Nikolic, T. 15981. 1754 - Witness DP53, T. 16153; Nikolic, T. 15982. 1755 - Witness DP20, T. 15517. 1756 - Witness DP20, T. 15777. 1757 - Witness DP20, T. 15770-1. 1758 - Witness DP53, T. 16144; Nikolic, T. 15975. 1759 - Witness DP53, T. 16152-3; Nikolic, T. 15980 and 16005. 1760 - Witness DP53, T. 16155. 1761 - Witness DP53, T. 16124. One of the consequences of this ongoing fighting was that the trees on the ridgeline were damaged and felled as the conflict wore on, Witness DP53, T. 16194-5. 1762 - Thomas, T. 9255. 1763 - Thomas, T. 9325. 1764 - Witness E, T. 4033. 1765 - Witness E, T. 4067 and 4072-3. 1766 - Ocuz, T. 4164. 1767 - Ocuz, T. 4166 and 4188. 1768 - Jusovic, T. 4147. 1769 - Jusovic, T. 4156. Mejra Jusovic added that her son was not a combatant in the conflict, Jusovic, T. 4157. 1770 - The Inidctment alleges that Witness E, “a girl aged 9 years, was shot and wounded in her back while she was playing in the front garden of her house in the Sedrenik area of Sarajevo” on a date which was tendered confidentially into evidence and which falls within the Indictment Period, Schedule 1 to the Indictment; P3654E (Date of occurrence of scheduled sniping incident 3 as indicated by Witness E under seal). 1771 - P1025.1 (English translation of hospitalisation record of Witness E under seal); P3654 (Pseudonym sheet for Witness E under seal); Witness E, T. 4084 and 4090. 1772 - Witness E, T. 4034-5. 1773 - Witness E, T. 4036, 4053 and 4047. 1774 - Witness E, T. 4038; see also Witness E, T. 4039. 1775 - Witness E, T. 4039-40. 1776 - Id. 1777 - Witness E, T. 4040 and 4067. 1778 - P1025 (English translation of hospitalisation record of Witness E under seal). 1779 - Witness E, T. 4042 and 4047. 1780 - Witness E, T. 4068. 1781 - P3273 (Photographs of the location of the incident marked by Witness E under seal); P3279Q (360 degree photograph of location of scheduled sniping incident number 3 under seal). Neither P3273 nor P3279Q indicates whether the garden offered other lines of sight over a long distance. 1782 - Witness DP53, T. 16170 and 16178; Nikolic, T. 15981; Thomas, T. 9325; DP53, T. 16170 and 16177-8; Nikolic, T. 15961-2 and 15981; DP20, T. 15770-1; Thomas, T. 9325; Witness E, T. 4067 and 4072-3; Ocuz, T. 4166 and 4188. 1783 - Nikolic, T. 16002-3, 16049 and 16091-2; DP53, T. 16184; DP34, T. 17892; Knezevic, T. 18962-3. 1784 - Thomas, T. 9325-6; Šehbajraktarevic, T. 1792; Witness AF, T. 5485-6, 5490 and 5499; Jusovic, T. 4147-8 and Ocuz, T. 4176-7. 1785 - Hinchcliffe, T. 12959. Witness E indicated on map P3243 the approximate position of her house in relation to [picasta Stijena. Witness E, T. 4072. Although that map does not include an explicit scale, the gridding appearing thereon suggests that the distance between the house and [picasta Stijena is a little over 1 kilometre, in substantial agreement with the measurement of Jonathan Hinchliffe. Witness E herself estimated that distance to be 2-3 kilometers by road, but added that the distance as the crow flies was probably less, Witness E, T. 4094. 1786 - Witness E, T. 4069 and 4099-4100. Witness E recalled that people, including at times soldiers, would regularly pass through the yard of her house, Witness E, T. 4052. She did not rule out that a couple of soldiers might have passed through the yard earlier during the day, but she was alone in the garden at the time of the incident, Witness E, T. 4052 and 4069. 1787 - The Indictment alleges that “Mejra Jusovic, a woman aged 45 years, was shot and wounded in her left buttock while pulling a load of wood towards her home near Rasadnjak, Sedrenik area, Sarajevo” on 24 July 1993, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1788 - Jusovic, T. 4139 and 4152. P3243 (Map marked by Witness E under seal); P3644 (Map marked by Mirza Sabljica); D82 (Map marked by Mehmed Travljanin). 1789 - Jusovic, T. 4139-40. 1790 - Jusovic, T. 4139-40. 1791 - Jusovic, T. 4140. Asked whether the sun had come up by that time, she responded: “no, it was overcast”. Again, upon the question: “Do you know approximately how far the visibility was at 6.00 in the morning on the 24th of July, 1993?”, the witness said: “To tell you the truth, it was overcast. You could see – you could see that there were clouds, clouds moving, and that it was clearing up.” 1792 - Jusovic, T. 4139. 1793 - Jusovic, T. 4140. 1794 - Jusovic, T. 4141. 1795 - Jusovic, T. 4140-1. 1796 - Jusovic, T. 4141. 1797 - Jusovic, T. 4141. The Prosecution did not tender into evidence a medical certificate regarding Mejra Jusovic’s injury. 1798 - Jusovic, T. 4212; Ocuz, T. 4176, 4174-6: Nazija Ocuz also explained that since she hid with her family in her cellar during the daytime, she did not know if the immediate vicinity of her residential area was used by the military during the day. 1799 - Jusovic, T. 4138 and 4206; P3280R (Video of location of scheduled sniping incident 8). 1800 - Witness DP53, T. 16170 and 16177-8; Nikolic, T. 15961-2 and 15981; Witness DP20, T. 15770-1; Thomas, T. 9325; Witness E, T. 4067 and 4072-3; Ocuz, T. 4166 and 4188. 1801 - P3279R (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident number 8); P3280R (Video of location of scheduled sniping incident number 8). 1802 - Nikolic, T. 15999; Jonathan Hinchliffe, T. 12978. 1803 - Nikolic, T. 16002-3, 16049 and 16091-2; Witness DP53, T. 16184; Witness DP34, T. 17892; Knezevic, T. 18962-3. 1804 - Thomas, T. 9325-6; Šehbajraktarevic, T. 1792; Witness AF, T. 5485-6, 5490 and 5499; Jusovic, T. 4147-8 and Ocuz, T. 4176-7. 1805 - Mejra Jusovic recalled that the ABiH and the SRK had fought on the day of the incident and that “[sghells fell that day, and there was a lot of fire, gunfire,” though she did not specify when this military activity began or ended, Jusovic, T. 4206-7. 1806 - Witness E, T. 4035. 1807 - P3243 (Map marked by Witness E); Witness E, T. 4105-7 and 4109. 1808 - Witness E, T. 4108. 1809 - Witness E, T. 4129. 1810 - Witness E, T. 4129-30. 1811 - Witness DP53, T. 16153; Nikolic, T. 16070-2. 1812 - Jusovic, T. 4212. Mejra Jusovic did not indicate during her testimony that there was any ongoing military exchange which she could hear at the time of the incident. Another resident of Sedrenik, Nazija Ocuz, testified that from 1992 through 1994, she never saw any heavy military equipment or weapons in the area where both Mejra Jusovic and she collected firewood at night, Ocuz, T. 4174-6. 1813 - P3279R (360 degree pphotograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident number 8). 1814 - Witness AF, T. 5485-6, 5489-90 and 5499. 1815 - At the time of his death, the father of Witness AF was a pensioner and was not participating in the conflict, Witness AF, T. 5488. 1816 - Witness AF, T. 5485-6, 5490 and 5499. Witness AF was not in Sedrenik at the time when his parents were fired upon, but rushed to see them when he received news of the incident, about an hour later, Witness AF, T. 5487. 1817 - Kucanin, T. 4499. 1818 - Kucanin, T. 4601 and 4606. 1819 - Kucanin, T. 4601 and 4606. 1820 - Šehbajraktarevic, T. 1743. 1821 - Šehbajraktarevic, T. 1790. 1822 - Šehbajraktarevic, T. 1792; Šehbajraktarevic also spoke of other residents of Sedrenik, the members of a family with the surname “Parla,” who were killed on an undisclosed date during the conflict, Šehbajraktarevic, T. 1792. 1823 - Kovac, T. 839. 1824 - Kovac, T. 889. 1825 - Thomas, T. 9255. 1826 - Thomas, T. 9264. 1827 - Thomas, T. 9325. 1828 - Thomas, T. 9326. 1829 - Thomas, T. 9326. 1830 - Thomas, T. 9325. 1831 - Fraser, T. 11189. 1832 - Nikolic, T. 16002-3, 16049 and 16091-2. 1833 - Witness DP53, T. 16184. 1834 - Witness DP53, T. 16173-4; Nikolic, T. 16073-4. 1835 - Witness DP20, T. 15783-5; Witness DP20 also testified that he was forbidden to fire on civilians, Witness DP20, T. 15787. 1836 - Witness DP34, T. 17799. 1837 - D1834 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Witness DP34). Witness DP34 indicated that his brigade was positioned from Gornji Hotonj to Grdonj, D1834 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Witness DP34). 1838 - Witness DP34, T. 17892. 1839 - Knezevic, T. 18930-1. 1840 - Knezevic, T. 18962-3. 1841 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 236-241. 1842 - D1778 (Map marked by Witness DP11); D1809 (Map marked by Witness DP16); P3728 (Map related to scheduled sniping incident number 11 marked by Vahid Karavelic). 1843 - Witness DP1, T. 13252-3. 1844 - Witness DP1, T. 13342 and 13346. 1845 - Mukanovic, T. 3097. 1846 - Mukanovic, T. 3097 - 3099. 1847 - Harding, T. 4460; Witness DP11, T. 15004; Golic, T. 14868; Witness DP20, T. 15657; D1778 (Map marked by Witness DP11); P3704 (Map of Sarajevo); P3644.CH (Map of Sarajevo). 1848 - Radinovic, T. 20865. 1849 - D1925 (Radinovic Report). 1850 - D1925 (Radinovic Report). 1851 - Van Lynden, T. 2085 and 2092-3. 1852 - Van Lynden, T. 2103. 1853 - Mole, T. 9500-1. 1854 - Mole, T. 9523-4. 1855 - P3704 (Map of Sarajevo). 1856 - Karavelic, T. 11786. 1857 - P3728 (Map relating to scheduled sniping incident numbers 2 & 11 marked by Vahid Karavelic); Karavelic, T. 11813 and 11832: Karavelic was shown P3728 in relation to scheduled sniping incidents 2 and 11 in which the alleged source of fire was Baba Stijena; he moved on that map in relation to scheduled sniping incident 11 the position of the SRK frontline north, so that the source of fire lay very close to SRK-controlled territory but not when shown the same map in relation to scheduled sniping incident 2. The Majority notes that Karavelic may not have taken sufficient time to examine carefully the map in relation to scheduled sniping incident 2 when being examined, but may have taken that time when he was given a more ample opportunity to work on (a.o.) the map in relation to scheduled incident 11 during a break, aand therefore does not see meaningful contradiction in his testimony in relation to P3728. 1858 - Witness DP11, T. 14984-5. 1859 - Witness DP11, T. 15066. 1860 - Fatima Pita, T. 5879. 1861 - Harding, T. 4462; Thomas, T. 9450; Witness DP11, T. 15056, 15060 and 15064. An SRK map indicating the position of the confrontation lines around Sarajevo in 1994 places within SRK-controlled territory the part of the road to Pale located on Mount Trebevic, C2 (Map of Sarajevo) and Witness DP20, T. 15792. This part of the road was frequently attacked by the ABiH. Witness DP11, T. 15064. 1862 - Harding served as a UNMO in Sarajevo from July 1992 to January 1993. Harding, T. 4311. 1863 - Harding, T. 4459-60. Harding did not indicate when this attack took place. 1864 - Harding, T. 4460. Witness DP11 confirmed that the ABiH frequently attacked this road. Witness DP11, T. 15064. 1865 - Harding, T. 4462. 1866 - Harding, T. 4447. 1867 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3970 and 3997-3998; Fatima Pita, T. 5875. 1868 - Ekrem Pita, T. 4011; Fatima Pita, T. 5906. 1869 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3995-6. 1870 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3971. 1871 - Fatima Pita, T. 5882 and 5890. 1872 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3977 and 3995. 1873 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3995, 3977. 1874 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3977 and 3995. 1875 - The Prosecution alleges that “Anisa Pita, a girl aged 3 years, was shot and wounded in her right leg while she was taking off her shoes on the porch of her residence on Žagrici Street in the [irokaca area of Sarajevo” on 13 December 1992, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1876 - After the conflict began in 1992, husband and wife Ekrem and Fatima Pita, who lived in a house on Žagrici Street in the neighbourhood of [irokaca, stopped having access to running water. Ekrem Pita, T. 3971-2; Fatima Pita, T. 5880; P3704 (Map relating to scheduled sniping incident number 11 marked by Vahid Karavelic). 1877 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3974, 3977 and 3981. Ekrem Pita’s wife Fatima remembered slightly differently. She believed, though she was unsure, that her husband and daughter had left the house earlier, between 8 and 9:00 am. Fatima Pita, T. 5881. Husband and wife also had different recollections about fighting which might have taken place in their neighbourhood the night before 13 December 1992. Ekrem Pita remembered that night as being generally quiet. Ekrem Pita, T. 4009-10. His wife, on the other hand, believed that there had been heavy shelling in the area and that the family had taken shelter in the basement. Fatima Pita, T. 5876-7, 5882 and 5919. 1878 - Fatima Pita, T. 5889; Ekrem Pita, T. 3974 and 4010. 1879 - Fatima Pita, T. 5581; Ekrem Pita, T. 3974-6. 1880 - Fatima Pita believed that Anisa Pita had returned only ten minutes after she had left the house, Fatima Pita, T. 5881. 1881 - Fatima Pita, T. 5881-2 and 5901; Ekrem Pita, T. 3974-6. 1882 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3974 - 3976; Fatima Pita, T. 5881. 1883 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3976. 1884 - Fatima Pita, T. 5892. 1885 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3978-9. 1886 - Fatima Pita, T. 5876, 5882 and 5902. 1887 - At first, she testified that she had heard several “shots" which injured her daughter, without clarifying whether she meant that only one bullet was fired at the time of the incident. Fatima Pita, T. 5882. Later, she explained that she had “heard that [singleg shot" which injured her daughter, without clarifying whether she meant that only one bullet was fired at the time of the incident, Fatima Pita, T. 5893. After this shooting, Fatima Pita heard her daughter scream and saw her head fall on the threshold of the front door, where she lay huddled. Fatima Pita, T. 5882. At that point, Elma Smajkan was already inside the house, Fatima Pita, T. 5902. That sight caused Fatima Pita to faint several times, Fatima Pita, T. 5882-3. 1888 - Fatima Pita, T. 5900; Ekrem Pita, T. 3988 (closed session). 1889 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3976; Fatima Pita, T. 5883. Ekrem Pita estimated that approximately one hour had elapsed between the time he had left the house and the time he had returned, Ekrem Pita, T. 3979-80. 1890 - Fatima Pita, T. 5883; Ekrem Pita, T. 3976-7. 1891 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3977; Fatima Pita, T. 5883. 1892 - Fatima Pita, T. 5883-4. 1893 - Furthermore Ekrem Pita explained that a bullet recovered by his relatives after the incident and believed by them to have injured Anisa Pita was kept by his elder brother after the incident, who later misplaced it, Ekrem Pita, T. 3977 and 3980. Fatima Pita on the other hand testified that she herself had kept the bullet, but subsequently lost it, Fatima Pita, T. 5916. 1894 - Medical records documenting Anisa Pita's injury were not tendered into evidence since Fatima Pita testified that she had misplaced them, Fatima Pita, T. 5915-6. 1895 - Ekrem Pita, T. 3990-1 and 4001; Fatima Pita, T. 5879 and 5899-5900; P3280P (video of the location of scheduled incident number 2). Fatima Pita had also seen firing, mostly in the form of shelling, originating from the area of Baba Stijena at night when she left her cellar to go to the bathroom on the ground floor of her house, Fatima Pita, T. 5918 and 5925. 1896 - P3266 (photograph taken from the location of scheduled incident number 2); P3279P (360 degree photograph of location of scheduled incident number 2); P3280P (video taken from the location scheduled incident number 2). A picture taken from the entrance to the Pita’s house shows that a small tree lies in the direction of Baba Stijena, partially blocking the line of sight. P3267 (Photograph taken from entrance to the Pitas’ house). Ekrem Pita explained though that this tree was planted after the incident, Ekrem Pita, T. 3992. 1897 - P3704 (Map of Sarajevo); Van Lynden, T. 2103; D1925 (Report by Defence military expert Radovan Radinovic). 1898 - Hinchliffe, T. 12946. Ekrem Pita thought that the distance from his house to Baba Stijena was somewhere between 350 and 1,200 metres as the crow flies, but was unsure, Ekrem Pita, T. 3991 and 4003. Fatima Pita for her part estimated that distance to be between 200 and 300 metres, Fatima Pita, T. 5879. 1899 - The Pitas’ house is separated from Baba Stijena by 5 centimetres on D49 (Map marked by Ekrem Pita). Although no scale is explicitly indicated on this map, the gridding appearing thereon would suggest that a measurement of 5.5 centimetres corresponds to 1,000 metres in actual distance D49 (Map marked by Ekrem Pita). Map D49 thus appears to indicate that the actual distance between the Pitas’ house and Baba Stijena is approximately (1,000/5.5) x 5 = 909 metres, Ekrem Pita, T. 3991 and 4003. 1900 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 72. See also Acquittal Motion, para. 32. 1901 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5576. 1902 - D1778 (Map marked by Witness DP11) and P3728 (Map regarding scheduled sniping incident number 11). 1903 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5576 and 5601. 1904 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5582. 1905 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5598, 5621 and 5625. According to Nura Bajraktarevic, Fadila Peljto subsequently died from her injury, Bajraktarevic, T. 5598. Bajraktarevic also knew of another woman who had been killed by gunfire at an unspecified dated while on her way to wash clothes though, as with the incident involving Fadila Peljto, she did not witness that shooting at first-hand, Bajraktarevic, T. 5622 and 5625. 1906 - The Indictment alleges that “[acir Bosnic, a man aged 56 years, was shot dead while gathering wood across the road from the Hambina Carina Reservoir and adjacent to Zelengorska Street, presently Hambina Carina Street, at [irokaca, Skenderija” on 7 September 1993, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1907 - P3663B (Witness statement of Bajram Sopi dated 27 February 1996). 1908 - P3663B; see also Bajraktarevic, T. 5578 - 5579. 1909 - P3663B. 1910 - P3663B. 1911 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5579-80, 5611 and 5615. 1912 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5582; P3663B. Neither Nura Bajraktarevic nor Bajram Sopi described specifically the clothes worn by [acir Bosnic the day of the incident. 1913 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5591-4; P3279S (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 11). 1914 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 255; Response to Acquittal Motion, para. 72. 1915 - P3704 (Map of Sarajevo); Van Lynden, T. 2103; D1925 (Radinovic Report). 1916 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5591-2. 1917 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5595 and 5607. She further identified that area as containing "the road towards Lukavica", Bajraktarevic, T. 5608. 1918 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5591 and 5595. 1919 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5578-9 and 5606-7; P3663B (Witness statement of Bajram Sopi dated 27 February 1996). 1920 - P3279S (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 11). 1921 - Bajraktarevic only indicated that the incident had occurred during summertime, Bajraktarevic, T. 5578. 1922 - Hinchliffe measured the distance from the location of the incident to Baba Stijena to be 460 metres, Hinchliffe, T. 12982. 1923 - Bajraktarevic, T. 5582 and 5609; P3663B (Witness statement of Bajram Sopi dated 27 February 1996). 1924 - P3279S (360 degree photograph of the location of scheduled sniping incident 11). 1925 - Prosecution Trial Brief, para. 270. 1926 - Witness G, T. 2395-6. 1927 - Witness K, T. 2505. 1928 - Witness L, T. 2522, 2553. 1929 - [ahic, T. 2587-93. 1930 - The Indictment alleges that Witness G, a man aged 52 years, was shot and wounded in the back and chest while trying to tend a vegetable plot in Kobilja Glava, north of Sarajevo, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1931 - Witness G, T. 2396-7. 1932 - Witness G, T. 2397-8. 1933 - Witness G, T. 2397-8. 1934 - Witness K, T. 2489-91. 1935 - Witness K, T. 2490-1. 1936 - Witness K, T. 2491-2. 1937 - Witness K, T. 2492. 1938 - Witness K, T. 2492. 1939 - Witness K, T. 2492. 1940 - Witness K, T. 2494. 1941 - Witness G, T. 2407. 1942 - Witness G, T. 2407. 1943 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 97, 98. The Defence called Witness DP14 and its expert witness in Ballistic, Milan Kundjadic. The expert concluded that he was not in a position to determine what kind of projectile hit the victim, Kunjadic Report, p. 5. 1944 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 97. 1945 - Witness G, T. 2394-95: There was a road on top of the ridge and another one at the lower boundary of the property. 1946 - Witness K, T. 2509; the garden of the property was located approximately 400 metres south of the ABiH front line and approximately 500 metres south from the SRK front line, D1793, D153. 1947 - Witness K, T. 2509; Witness G, T. 2395-6. 1948 - Witness G, T. 2396. 1949 - Witness G, T. 2412. 1950 - Witness G, T. 2411. 1951 - Witness G, T. 2411. 1952 - Witness G, T. 2411. 1953 - Witness G, T. 2397. 1954 - P3280A, P3279A. 1955 - Witness G, T. 2411-2. The Trial Chamber understands this statement as meaning that the snipers there had a line of sight to the property of Witness G. 1956 - Witness K, T. 2492. 1957 - Witness G indicated in court that the sniping rifle bullet entered half-way down his back near the spine, and exited at the rear of his right shoulder (Witness G, T. 2399-2400, 2473). The medical certificate tendered into evidence states that Witness G had been shot in the middle of his back, in the spinal area, and that the bullet had exited from his right shoulder (Medical Discharge Summary, P1327, P1328, P1327.1, P1328.1). However, a photograph of the back of Witness G tendered into rebuttal evidence (P3808) confirmed the testimony of Witness G in relation to the point of entry and exit of the bullet. That evidence shows two scars made by bullet wounds in the spots indicated by Witness G in court. The observation of the photograph shows that one scar is located in the lower spinal area of the back of Witness G and another scar is located on the left upper side of the back of Witness G. 1958 - Witness DP14, T. 15952-3. He testified that in principle there could be a line of sight between Orahov Brijeg and the spot where Witness G was shot, but that “this would be a very difficult terrain for observation and for seeing targets”. Witness DP14, T. 15864. Witness DP14 testified that the wood and the orchard above the site of the sniping incident “would not represent an obstacle”, T. 15866. 1959 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 96, 99. 1960 - Cross-examination of Witness G, T. 2467; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 99. 1961 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 94. 1962 - The Indictment alleges that on “5 August 1993, Vildana Kapur, a woman aged 21 years, was shot and wounded in the leg while carrying water home along Stara cesta, Hotonj area”, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1963 - Sahic, T. 2588-9 1964 - Sahic, T. 2589, 2613; sometimes it was necessary to fetch water during the day (Sahic, T. 2592). 1965 - Sahic, T. 2594-5. 1966 - Sahic, T. 2594-5. 1967 - Sahic, T. 2594, 2638. 1968 - [ahic, T. 2594, 2641, 2643-4. 1969 - The canteen was below the road, therefore below the line of the shots, [ahic, T. 2647. 1970 - [ahic, T. 2594-5. 1971 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 156. 1972 - Id. 1973 - [ahic, T. 2595. 1974 - D153, D1793. 1975 - Sahic, T. 2595. 1976 - Sahic, T. 2595. 1977 - Sahic, T. 2624. 1978 - DP14, T. 15840-1. 1979 - Defence Trial Brief, para. 153. 1980 - The forest was getting more damaged with the time passing by according to DP14, T. 15864. 1981 - Witness DP14, T. 15865-6. 1982 - Sahic, T. 2613. 1983 - Sahic, T. 2613. 1984 - Sahic, T. 2647. 1985 - The Indictment alleges that Witness L, a man aged 29 years, was shot and wounded in the left upper arm while walking in Stara cesta Road, Hotonj Area, in the direction of Poljine, Schedule 1 to the Indictment. 1986 - Witness L, T. 2553. 1987 - Witness L, T. 2522, 2554. 1988 - Witness L, T. 2545. 1989 - Witness L, T. 2523, 21, 2576. 1990 - Witness L, T. 2523. 1991 - Witness L, T. 2576, 2523. 1992 - Witness L, T. 2576, 2523-4. 1993 - Witness L, T. 2524. 1994 - D31; Witness L, T. 2560-1. 1995 - D31. 1996 - Witness L, T. 2559. 1997 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 225 et seq. 1998 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 225. 1999 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 225. 2000 - Witness L, T. 2539-40. 2001 - Witness L, T. 2539. 2002 - Witness L, T. 2539. 2003 - Witness L, T. 2568. 2004 - Witness L, T. 2554. 2005 - Witness L, T. 2553, 2556-7. 2006 - Kucanin, T. 4545-6. 2007 - Kucanin, T. 4546-7. 2008 - Kucanin, T. 4554. 2009 - Kucanin, T. 4553-4. 2010 - Kucanin, T. 4547. 2011 - Kucanin, T. 4552. 2012 - D1834 (Map marked by Witness DP21). 2013 - See for example D1836 (Map marked by Witness DP34) and P3235 (Map marked by Akif Mukanovic). 2014 - Kucanin, T. 4552. 2015 - Henneberry, T. 8604. Henneberry did not specify whether civilians were injured as a result of this shelling. 2016 - Specifically, Henneberry explained that the fire would originate from territory monitored by UN observation posts LIMA 11 and LIMA 12, Henneberry, T. 8604. The UN “Lima” posts monitored SRK-controlled territory during the conflict, O’Keefe, T. 9180. 2017 - Hermer, T. 8439. 2018 - Hermer, T. 8474 – 8476. 2019 - Hermer, T. 8474 – 8475. The destroyed civilian house was located approximately 1500 metres west of the nearest confrontation line, Hermer, T. 8476. 2020 - Hermer, T. 8475. 2021 - Mole, T.9812-3. 2022 - Scheduled sniping incident 2. 2023 - Fatima Pita, T.5875; Hadzic, T. 12248. 2024 - Mandilovic, T.1094. To the same effect see Ashton, T.1226-7. 2025 - See also evidence of intense shelling in December 1993, January and early February 1994 (prior to the Markale incident), Thomas, T.9292-T.9312. 2026 - Cutler, T.8916-8. 2027 - Cutler, T.8918-9. 2028 - Witness Y stated that this was “in keeping with my prior statement, when I said that the artillery fire on Sarajevo aimed either at supporting proper military action on the front line with major destruction of buildings or at having random shelling which, in that case, would not destroy as much.” When asked whether “as to the random firing, was it minor?”, he responded: “Yes, it can't be minor if it kills people.” And he added that “If you talk about the amount of shells fired, if it is random firing, the consumption, the number of shells fired is far less than when you have concentrated fire.” (T.10941, closed session) 2029 - Tucker, T.9900. 2030 - Thomas, T. 9292-9312. 2031 - Kupusovic, T.670. 2032 - Rose, T. 10199 2033 - Thomas, T.9463. Thomas clarified that a proposed anti-sniping agreement in February was never signed. “General Rose announced in front of the media and the face of the two parties that there had been too much signing already, and that he expected at noon the next day that both sides would stop firing, and if anybody shot after that, the media there would know which side was not adhering to the cease-fire. So there was actually no physical signing, which actually created a problem for us in some ways because there was no document.” This agreement was a “missed opportunity,” because the soldiers on the ground on both sides seemed to want it to hold, but by March, the casualties resumed. The ABiH took advantage of the cease-fire to improve their positions, which the Serbs complained about. Thomas saw the ABiH trenches move forward. Both sides killed each other with sniper fire during the cease-fire, Thomas, T. 9276-7, Fraser, who arrived in April 1994, also noted an increase in sniping, Fraser, T. 1195-6. 2034 - Hvaal, T. 2275-6. 2035 - Hvaal, T. 2353-4. 2036 - Mandolovic, T.1094. To the same effect see Ashton, T.1226-7. 2037 - Zaimovic, T.1847. 2038 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 62; 580; Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 21776; 21796; 21946. 2039 - Radinovic Report, paras 217-242. 2040 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 738-46. 2041 - DP14: “I received orders from the command of the brigade that civilians are not to be targeted, that ammunition is to be spared, and that's what I forwarded and told my fighters, my soldiers. Although, because of the area where we held our positions, in this sector there were no civilians. Not at all. Q. Did you give your subordinates any assistance in order to determine whether someone they saw on the other side was to be regarded as a civilian or a combatant? A. Of course. He is not in uniform, if he doesn't have any weapons, he was considered a civilian, and if he is more than 300 metres away from the line. If he is on the first front line, then he is a soldier.” T. 15905. DP 10: The instructions of my superiors were never to open fire on civilians. [...] To my mind and to my troops, a civilian was every person without a uniform”, T. 14321. DP 9: We could open fire only at the orders of our superiors and only when our lives were threatened. Civilians never did this, they never threatened anyone”, T. 14537. DP 6: “we had strict orders not to fire at civilians, women, and children. They kept telling us over the telephone that we were not to fire on civilians, women, and children [...] Q. [...] if you saw a male of military age not wearing a uniform, you did not fire upon that person; is that correct? A. I wouldn't, because you cannot see whether a man is of military age or not, because if you see someone at a distance, you can see that it's a civilian, then naturally you don't fire at him because that is what our orders were. Q. And you accept that if there was any doubt in your mind as to whether the person you could see was military or civilian, if there was any doubt, then you should not target that person; correct? A. Yes. Yes, one was not supposed to open fire then,” T. 14072-3. 2042 - DP50: “Q. [...] what did you mean by enemy live forces? A. Any soldier who had weapons on him. Whether he had a uniform or civilian clothes because at the time, there were no uniforms, and people went to the front lines in civilian clothes. So even a civilian who had firearms on him was a soldier. [...] a soldier or a civilian who is bearing firearms, they are the targets. While a civilian who has no weapons, then that person is not a target”, T.16309-10. 2043 - See DP9, T.14537; DP10, T.14408. 2044 - Tucker, T. 9966. See also Briquemont, who was also of the view that Serb forces launched attacks in Sarajevo as a means of "putting constant pressure in order to make the Muslims sign a peace agreement". "In fact, both parties were uninterested in having a calm situation in Sarajevo,” T.10105. 2045 - Rose, T. 10221 (see also T. 10222-3). Serbs controlled 70 per cent of the territory of BH, and it was in their interests to negotiate a cease-fire and pursue a political settlement, Rose, T. 10228. 2046 - Rose, T. 10247. 2047 - Rose, T. 10265. 2048 - Mole, T. 11033. In this context, the Trial Chamber understands the use by the witness of the expression “indiscriminate fire” to mean shelling of areas where no specific military target is present. 2049 - Tucker, T. 10028, 9969. 2050 - Henneberry, T. 8555-6. 2051 - Henneberry, T. 8758-9. 2052 - Henneberry, T. 8599-8600. 2053 - Harding, T. 4394-5. 2054 - Witness Y, T. 10855 (closed session). 2055 - Witness Y, T. 10861-2 (closed session). 2056 - Kolp, T. 8243. 2057 - Hamill, T. 6224-5. His assessment was that “if the political and military authorities had wished, they could have stopped sniping,” but they did not wish so, the sniping continued and civilians kept getting targeted. 2058 - Van Baal, T. 9873-4. 2059 - Briquemont, T. 10155-6. 2060 - Briquemont, T. 10165. 2061 - Hvaal, T. 2366-8. 2062 - Van Lynden was in Sarajevo between May and August 1992, in September 1992 and from the end of October to December 1992, T. 2089-2092. 2063 - Van Lynden, T. 2135-7. 2064 - Ashton, T. 1410-1. In another portion of his testimony, Ashton stated that Major Indic from the SRK told him that “he didn’t want to destroy the city. He wanted to wear the people down until they would surrender or give up,” although cautioned that these were not the exact words used, Ashton, T. 1295. 2065 - Ashton, T. 1412. 2066 - e.g., Van Lynden: “[...] because of the terrain, because Sarajevo is an elongated city lying in a valley along the river Miljacka, and because the Bosnian Serbs held the high ground, they were in positions to literally shoot down streets within the new part of Sarajevo and within the central part of Sarajevo. And places like Marin Dvor square, much of the length of the Marshal Tito Boulevard, the main road in Sarajevo, were open to sniper fire.” T.2116-7. See also Kolp T.8255-6. 2067 - Mole said that the SRK was never considered as being poorly re-supplied. They generally seemed to have as much ammunition as they required. "We often saw the re-supply runs. They were unhindered. So there was no reason to believe that they would be short of munitions", T. 9803-5. 2068 - Kolp stated that since the city was under siege, the besieging forces were familiar with the layout of the city and they “know very well where they have to fire, when they have to fire.” There were military advantages that accrue from being familiar with the city. The VRS had an advantage based on their knowledge of the city, their training and the nature of their army. He stated that any good military person, armed with the familiarity of the target area, could use mortars with precision, T. 8254-5. With their high level of training, the VRS mortar crews could hit a target on the first shot, T. 8306. 2069 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 67. 2070 - Witness Y, T.10861. 2071 - Witness Y, T.10863. 2072 - Tucker, T.9967. 2073 - P3731 (Population Losses in the “Siege” of Sarajevo, 10 September 1992 to 10 August 1994,dated 10 May 2002). 2074 - P3731 (Tabeau Report),p. 18. 2075 - P3731, p. 10. The survey asked respondents to list, among other things, members of their household who had been killed or wounded during the conflict, to indicate any affiliation of these reported household members with the military, as well as provide the date, place, and cause of the reported injury or death (P3731, p. 11). 2076 - Id., Table 1. 2077 - Id. 2078 - Id., p. 5. 2079 - Id. 2080 - P3731. From September to December 1992, the corresponding daily average of civilians killed was 3.67, which dropped to 2.04 for 1993 before further decreasing to 0.93 to the first months of 1994, P3731, Table 5, p. 27. 2081 - The authors of the Tabeau Report attempted to determine if there was a correlation in terms of timing between the killing or wounding of soldiers and the killing and wounding of civilians, P3731 (Tabeau Report), pp 32-37. They concluded in tentative language that “civilians were becoming victims [of shooting and shelling] not necessarily when soldiers were killed or wounded. This would suggest that the losses of the population were perhaps caused by mechanisms other than those accounting for [the] killing or wounding [of] soldiers”, P3731, p. 37 (emphasis added). As the Radovanovic Report correctly argues though, such an attempt to compare the dates on which civilians were killed or injured with the dates on which soldiers were killed or injured to determine whether civilians were deliberately targeted is speculative, D1922 (Radovanovic Report), p. 19. 2082 - D1922 (Radovanovic Report), pp 3-4. 2083 - Id., p. 9. 2084 - Id. 2085 - Radovanovic, T. 21422-3. 2086 - The Defence tendered a document of information which identifies hundreds of persons who were killed or injured by shooting on the basis of reports from entities such as medical institutions or the police. See D1928 (Compilation of reports of shooting incidents). Radovanovic added that D1928 itself raised some concerns as a source of information, such as the distinction made between civilians and soldiers, Radovanovic, T. 21330. See also D1927 for another compilation of shooting incidents similar to D1928 tendered by the Defence. 2087 - A Defence witness, DP51, who was in charge of admissions at Koševo Hospital during the conflict, estimated that from May 1992 to January 1994, 3,000 to 4,000 patients were admitted at his medical facility, approximately 75% of whom were soldiers, Witness DP51, T. 16953-16954. He added that he determined that a patient was a civilian he was an old person, a child or a person not wearing a uniform, Witness DP51, T. 16954-5. Persons who had been wounded represented the largest proportion of these admissions, though such proportion could vary considerably, Witness DP51, T. 13627. Bakir Nakas, the director of the State Hospital, testified that his hospital admitted 3,698 civilians and 4,407 persons affiliated with the military from 1992 to 1995 and sample hospital records confirm that patients identified in these records as civilians were treated for injuries due to shooting and shelling during the Indictment Period, Nakas, T. 1190-1. Nakas compiled this information from reports from the emergency ward of the hospital, Nakas, T. 1190-1. A patient was indicated as affiliated with military if he or she was covered by a military insurance scheme, although this latter insurance scheme could also apply to civilian dependents of a military person and retired military personnel, Nakas, T. 1173, 1193-4; see P3573.1 (English translation of records from State hospital). Tarik Kupusovic, an elected municipal representative who became town mayor of Sarajevo in 1994, explained that municipal authorities received regular reports concerning civilian deaths during the conflict from an institute for public health in the city, newspapers, a public funeral society and associations of religious communities, Kupusovic, T. 612, 667. These reports indicated that from May 1992 to October 1995, approximately 12,000 civilians died from shooting and shelling, including 1,600 children, Kupusovic, T. 666-7. The Trial Chamber only considers the numbers given by Kupusovic as an indication that there was a large number of casualties. 2088 - Radinovic Report, para. 178. 2089 - Radinovic Report, paras 185 et seq. 2090 - Philipps, T. 11530-1. 2091 - Mole, T. 10991. 2092 - Henneberry, T. 8595. 2093 - DP17, T. 16819. 2094 - Witness Y, T. 10886. 2095 - DP34, T. 17908: during his Corps briefings, General Galic was always very calm, even when discussions arose about whether his orders had been fully complied with. 2096 - DP17, T. 16791-2; DP35, T. 17519-20, Radinovic Report, Filing Page number 8023 (Order for undisturbed passing of humanitarian aid, delivery, by General Galic, dated 15 May 1993). 2097 - Fraser, T. 11199-11200. 2098 - The relationship between the two men was one of a deciding senior commander to an obedient and disciplined subordinate (Tucker, T. 9910 – closed session). 2099 - Fraser, T. 11201; General Galic seemed to work well with his direct superior; Mladic had the authority to approve the humanitarian convoys (Indjic, T. 18542, 18654) and he relied on the Corps commander to ensure safe passage to all the convoys (Indjic, T. 18673, 18768). 2100 - Philipps, T. 11531. Philipps referred to a letter signed by Dragomar Milosevic indicating General Galic’s departure. General Galic’s chiefs of staff were Dragan Marcetic from September 1992 to June 1993 and Milosevic from June 1993 to August 1994, Philipps, T. 11531; see also T. 446-9, 453-4. 2101 - See map C2 marked by DP35 showing the Forward Command Posts. 2102 - Radinovic Report, para. 200. According to the Defence military expert Radinovic, usually, such high ranking commands are stationed within the operative depth and at a safe distance. 2103 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 94; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 18; Defence Pre-trial Brief, para. 2.20. 2104 - Prosecution pre-Trial Brief, para. 4. 2105 - Prosecution pre-Trial Brief, para. 35. 2106 - Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, para. 35.. 2107 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 86; The Prosecution seeks to establish the Accused’s guilt by reliance upon various bodies of complementary and corroborative evidence, such as General Galic’s high degree of command and control generally, and admission and threats made by him that he was indeed deliberately targeting civilians, either specifically or by indiscriminate fire, Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 85-91; Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 2. 2108 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, para. 7.14. 2109 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 95. 2110 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 24. 2111 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, para. 7.14. 2112 - Philipps, T. 11542; within the composition of the SRK entered three brigades from the earliest composition of the 4th Corps of the JNA which was located before the war in the broader region of Sarajevo : the 49th Motorized Brigade reformed and renamed into the 1st Motorized Brigade with the seat in Lukavica; the 120th Light Infantry Brigade (Zenica) renamed into the 2nd Sarajevo Light infantry Brigade and located in Vojkovici and the 216th Mountain Brigade (Han Pijesak) renamed into the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade and located to the East of Sarajevo, with the seat in Pale, Radinovic Report, para. 92. 2113 - Philipps, T. 11531; in particular, the operations and training section headed at the time of General Galic’s tenure by Colonel Cedo Sladoje was responsible for drawing up the written instructions for implementing the Corps commanders’ orders and ensuring the readiness of the troops, T. 11536 and T. 11541. 2114 - Stipulated Fact 20. 2115 - Philipps, T. 11692-3. 2116 - Philipps, T. 11546; for instance the 2nd Sarajevo light brigade was composed of 56 men as of April 11, 1993 (T, 11558), the Ilidza brigade of 3,000 troops as of April 11, 1993 (T. 11559) and the Ilijas Brigade of 4,738 troops as of February 1994 (T. 11560). 2117 - Philipps, T. 11554: their number fluctuated depending on their role and the number of casualties that they had incurred. 2118 - Philipps, T. 11555; DP4, T. 14201. 2119 - DP9, T. 14505-7. 2120 - DP4, T. 14133. 2121 - On 25 May 1993, some units of the ministry of the interior (the MUP) were temporarily attached to the 1st Romanija infantry brigades in what is to Richard Philipps’ knowledge, the only instance where troops of the MUP were attached to a structure outside of the MUP, Philipps, T. 11694. 2122 - DP18, T. 16433-4. 2123 - Philipps, T. 11528; Chart 2. 2124 - Philipps, Chart 2 (nine brigades). 2125 - According to Philipps, Chart 3. 2126 - According to Radinovic Report, para. 13 of summary and conclusions. 2127 - Philipps, Chart 3 (seven brigades); Radoslav Radinovic Report, para. 13 of summary and conclusions. 2128 - Philipps, T. 11685-6. 2129 - At the creation of the SRK; see supra para. 201. 2130 - Radinovic’s chart: the Brigades were the following: 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, Novo Sarajevo Brigade, the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, Kosevo, Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, Blazuj, Hadzici, Rogatica and Trnovo Light Brigades. There were also regiments (artillery, anti-tank and anti-armor) and independent battalions (military police, medical, engineering, transportation and communication). 2131 - Hvaal, in particular, testified in relation to the control over movement on SRK-held territory. “There was no way you could move around on Bosnian Serb [...] army-held territory [...] without an escort and without having gone through the proper procedure [...] in advance." There would be officers present during these trips, who would join him for instance in Lukavica. (Hvaal, T. 2256-8) “It’s a fairly bureaucratic approach, and it was (permission to visit) very often declined. It was very rare that you would actually get a permission to visit, on your first attempt.” (Hvaal, T. 2258). 2132 - Mole, T. 9797. 2133 - Hermer, T. 8463. 2134 - Gardemeister, T. 8955. 2135 - Bergeron, T. 11259-60: (in relation to the forces outside Sarajevo) “[t]hroughout the time I was there, it was clear that General Galic, for me, in my opinion, was in effect commander of the Romanija Corps and he was in charge of everything that was going on around Sarajevo: all the negotiations, all the discussions, any talks that we had for the programme regarding the repair of the utilities, the facilities, the supplies, the gas, the electricity, and so on.[...] The bottom line was that we were always referred to speak to General Galic. If we had talks regarding the access to humanitarian convoys, again, at the end of the line, it would always end up with in General Galic’s office. If we had any incidents to discuss, any protests, it was always to do with the office of General Galic.[...] For me it was very clear that General Galic, as the commander of the Romanija Corps, was in control of all the activities around Sarajevo”. 2136 - Van Baal formed the view that the VRS had a centralised and effective command system (T. 9862-3). He also confirmed the contents of a SitRep [situation report] generated in relation to a UNMO patrol that had gone missing on SRK-held territory, which stated: "Brigadier General Van Baal requested that all possible means be used to locate the UNMO patrol, knowing that nothing occurs in the regions under BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] control unless with HQ knowledge, as a result of excellent military discipline" (P3712; T. 9884-5 – closed session). He said that in his experience, during his period in Sarajevo, all that happened on the Bosnian Serb side was controlled from the top down (T. 11405). 2137 - Henneberry, T. 8594. 2138 - It consisted of a ground floor and a first floor, DP35, T. 17499. 2139 - Kolp, T. 8232-33: “on many occasions there were members of the paramilitary formations present there as well”. 2140 - The Bosnian Serb army had very efficient and comprehensive communications, Tucker, T. 9918-9. 2141 - DP34, T. 17900, corroborated by DP17, T. 16814-5. 2142 - DP34, T. 17901, T. 17836-7 (DP34 attended meetings once or twice a month). 2143 - DP34, T. 17901, 17836-7. 2144 - DP34, T. 17907. 2145 - DP35, T. 17575. 2146 - DP34, T. 17901; DP35, T. 17505: in General Galic’s absence or when he was in the field, the Chief of staff or the first official from among the assistants chaired the meetings. 2147 - Radinovic Report, para. 203, quoting the statements of Generals Lugonia, @arkovic and Sladoje given to the Prosecution. 2148 - Reports were prepared by the battalion commander and the assistant commander for morale, for logistics, for security (DP17, T. 16753), to gather all the events that happened throughout the day and sent to the brigade command. “Every day, at the end of the day, in the hours of the evening, following reception of reports from battalions, that is from the entire area of responsibility of the brigade in question, there would be a report compiled that would go to the Corps command. And these reports mostly contained the security situation in the brigade, the numbers, that is the strength in the brigade, activity with the brigade, enemy activity, logistics support, the morale in the brigade” (DP17, T. 16753); for instance, if something important occurred, it was described in a written report, which would be submitted through the Vogosca group, to the Koševo Brigade and then to the Corps duty operations officers at a prescribed time (DP34, T. 17910-1). 2149 - DP34, T. 17906. 2150 - DP17, T. 16814-5. 2151 - DP34, T. 17906. 2152 - DP34, T. 17906. 2153 - DP34, T. 17907-8. 2154 - Mole, T. 9809. 2155 - DP35, T. 17573. Forward command posts did not exist throughout the period. On the Nisici plateau, the forward command post was established in 1993, not before, and it was there until 1994, until sometime after General Galic left his duties, Id. 2156 - Radinovic Report, para. 204. 2157 - DP35, T. 17574. 2158 - DP17, T. 16756, 16816. 2159 - DP17, T. 16866. 2160 - DP17, T. 16817: DP17 had the opportunity to accompany the Accused personally on two occasions: once it was the south-western part, that is the part on the slope of Igman; the other occasion, it was the north-eastern side, on the line in the direction of the Dobrinja river. 2161 - DP17, T. 16818-9. 2162 - DP34, T. 17902. 2163 - DP34, T. 17902-3; the first visit was a matter of protocol to allow General Galic to introduce himself to the brigade; the second visit took place during the winter period of 1993-1994, DP34, T. 17903. The first visit lasted about one hour and the second visit lasted longer, in part because General Galic visited the forward command post in the area of Pretrzanj and viewed some of the artillery positions of the Koševo brigade located there, DP34, T. 17904. 2164 - DP34, T. 17904-5. 2165 - DP17, T. 16798; DP18, T. 16436 (he was in a unit within the Igman Brigade). 2166 - DP17, T. 16798. 2167 - Vorobev, T. 17431. 2168 - Vorobev, T. 17436: in June 1994, he met with General Galic to discuss additional equipment to be delivered to the Russian battalion, which had arrived in the Zvornik area and which needed to be transferred to Sarajevo. Once this issue was raised with General Galic, the witness did not encounter any difficulties in getting his equipment through these checkpoints to Vrace. There was another meeting on 20 February 1994 with General Galic: during that meeting held in the area of deployment of the battalion at the police school (T. 17433), Galic informed the witness in general terms about what was being done, the area of responsibility of the battalion, that they were in the area where the 1st Sarajevo Brigade was deployed, Commanded by Veljko Stojanovic (T. 17438), and that the witness should cooperate directly with him when establishing his posts (T. 17432). “At the meeting were present Soubirou, other head of UNPROFOR bat and Serb officials such as Veljko Stojanovic, commander of the 1st Sarajevo Brigade”, Vorobev, T. 17433. 2169 - Kolp, T. 8220. 2170 - Kolp, T. 8225. Indjic was the liaison officer of the VRS posted in Sarajevo; see infra, para 686 and references thereof. 2171 - Tucker testified that “?igt was very clear during the time that I was in Bosnia that the Bosnian Serb army had very efficient and comprehensive communications. Whenever General Mladic wanted to speak with someone or find out something out from someone, it always happened quickly”, Tucker, T. 9918. 2172 - Mole, T. 9798; Carswell, T. 8347. 2173 - DP34, T. 17906, 17837. 2174 - DP34, T. 17908-9. 2175 - Vorobev, T. 17432. 2176 - Witness D, T. 1909-10. 2177 - Witness D, T. 1910-12. 2178 - Witness D, T. 1912. 2179 - Witness D, T. 1919-21; Thomas came to the conclusion that snipers were controlled at the brigade or even battalion level, because “there would be instances of sniper fire which appeared to me to be done within a battalion area and had no reference to the overall Corps situation”, Thomas, T. 9486. 2180 - Witness AD, T. 10834 (closed session). 2181 - Witness AD, T. 10591-2 (closed session). 2182 - Witness AD, T. 10691-4 (closed session). 2183 - Witness AD, T. 10699-701 (closed session). 2184 - Witness AD, T. 10837 (closed session). 2185 - Witness AD, T. 10578 (closed session). 2186 - Witness AD, T. 10579-80 (closed session). 2187 - Witness AD, T. 10720-1, 10807 (closed session). 2188 - DP35, T. 17605-6. 2189 - DP35, T. 17605. 2190 - DP35, T. 17606. 2191 - See, e.g., DP10, T. 14323. 2192 - DP10, T. 14388. 2193 - DP10, T. 14388-9. 2194 - DP10, T. 14408. 2195 - Vorobev, T. 17431. 2196 - Fraser, T. 11186. 2197 - Fraser, T. 11193. 2198 - Fraser, T. 11190, 11198. 2199 - Fraser, T. 11191. 2200 - Fraser, T. 11191. 2201 - Fraser, T. 11193-7. 2202 - Vorobev, T. 17445-6. 2203 - Hermer, T. 8461. 2204 - Hermer, T. 8460-1. 2205 - Henneberry, T. 8572. 2206 - Van Baal, T. 9869: General Adrianus Van Baal, the Chief of Staff to the UNPROFOR commander in BiH from February to August 1994, testified that, although the parties often claimed that they lacked control over what was happening on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "in a great many cases, at least during (the witness's) period, it was clear that there was indeed very rigid control, and there was some influence on the ground activities, especially with respect to the use of heavy arms, and these specialized snipers with specialized weapons must have been under control in military respects". 2207 - Witness Y, T. 10861 (closed session). 2208 - Rose, T. 10185. 2209 - Rose, T. 10203. Similarly, based on the fact that after the February cease-fire agreement there were no instances of SRK artillery or mortar being launched into the city, Major Thomas concluded that the Accused had a firm grip on command and control issues; Thomas, T. 9475-6. 2210 - Van Lynden, T. 2089-92. 2211 - Van Lynden, T. 2144. 2212 - Van Lynden, T. 2146. 2213 - Witness Y, T. 10860-1 (closed session). 2214 - Witness Y, T. 10860 (closed session). 2215 - Witness Y, T. 10860-1 (closed session). 2216 - Witness Y, T. 10861 (closed session). 2217 - See, e.g., Tucker on @arcovic, Abdel-Razek on General Galic and Van Baal on Milanovic. 2218 - Van Baal, T. 9862-3. 2219 - Harding, T. 4383. 2220 - Harding, T. 4378 2221 - Harding, T. 4380; Harding drafted a report about the incident, P3659, where he stated that 5 civilians were killed or injured. 2222 - Harding, T. 4381. 2223 - Harding, T. 4381. 2224 - Harding, T. 6480. 2225 - Tucker, T. 9923-5. 2226 - Tucker, T. 9925. 2227 - This “area weapon” is inherently inaccurate when applied to a specific relatively small target, Hermer, T. 8477. 2228 - Tucker,T. 9925-6. 2229 - Tucker, T. 9926. 2230 - Harding, T. 4375. 2231 - Harding, T. 4376. 2232 - Harding, T. 4376. 2233 - Harding, T. 4378, PAPA headquarters was adjacent to the Presidency. 2234 - Cutler, T. 8919-20. 2235 - Witness Y, T. 10866-7 (closed session). 2236 - Briquemont, T. 10054-6; see also P3717 (Total Number of Wounded, state hospital Sarajevo) shows that the number of wounded is very low in March 1993 when the warring parties were in Geneva and the next low part similarly corresponds to the second conference in Geneva in September 1993. 2237 - Bergeron, T. 11251. 2238 - Bergeron, T. 11257-8. 2239 - Bergeron, T. 11258. 2240 - Hermer, T. 8478-9. 2241 - Hermer, T. 8478-9. 2242 - Hermer, T. 8480. 2243 - Hermer, T. 8478-9. 2244 - Henneberry, T. 8614-5. 2245 - Henneberry, T. 8613-4. 2246 - Henneberry, T. 8615. 2247 - Tucker, T. 9923; Ashton also observed that practice, T. 1310-1. 2248 - Mole, T. 11008-9. 2249 - Mole, as the Senior UNMO, attended the said meeting, T. 11009. 2250 - Mole, T. 11008: P3689. 2251 - Mole, T. 11009. 2252 - Mole, T. 11011-12. Tucker also gave evidence about this incident, which involved the “negotiations about the evacuation of several thousand Croats from Sarajevo to Split and several thousand Serbs to Belgrade, using buses provided by Sarajevo”. At one point, “we were told by the HQ Sector Sarajevo around 4 or 5 November 1992, that Colonel @arkovic, a Bosnian Serb Colonel, had sent a message saying that if the Serb convoy was not allowed to leave the city by 1300 hours that day, that he would shell the city.” It was his understanding “that this was a threat and the execution of the threat implied the firing of artillery shells at random into Sarajevo, in other words, at the civilian population in Sarajevo.” Tucker, T. 9907. 2253 - Mole, T. 11017-8. 2254 - Mole, T. 11018. 2255 - Mole, T. 11028-9. 2256 - Mole, T. 11031. 2257 - Tucker, T. 10028-9. 2258 - Tucker, T. 9907. 2259 - Witness Y, T. 10880 (closed session). 2260 - Witness Y, T. 10882, with reference to P932 (closed session). 2261 - Witness Y, T. 10885 (closed session). 2262 - Witness Y, T. 10975, 10986-7: ?tghere is little doubt that he feels betrayed by his superiors and others who have made this latest deal. He will abide by it but only under orders, and he does not support it. [...] General Galic was concerned that things were moving too quickly. Events in New York and Belgrade seemed to have caught him by surprise and he was having difficulties ?in comingg to terms with the prospects of a new order. [...] My impression of the meeting is that General Galic feels very much betrayed by his leadership and General Morillon. I expect that he will abide by the cease-fire initially but will use any violation as an excuse to respond with extreme violence. [...] ?The Accusedg would always have to put up with the decisions made by his superiors regarding cease-fires or just lulls or stops. Maybe he thought that his superiors should not have signed such cease-fires which were against the tactics adopted. 2263 - Witness Y, T. 10867 (closed session). 2264 - Witness Y, T. 10936 (closed session). 2265 - Cutler, T. 8918. 2266 - Cutler, T. 8918. 2267 - Cutler, T. 8918. 2268 - DP35, T. 17511. 2269 - Mole, T. 9808. 2270 - Mole, T. 11098. 2271 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, para. 7.25; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 24. 2272 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, para. 2.34, 7.26: the Defence submits that “General Galic did undertake all the necessary measures to eliminate from the zone of his responsibility, certain organized groups which were acting outside of his control, and that they were eliminated during the year 1993”. There “were some information that in some situations they [the certain groups] acted illegally, General Galic having, thus, undertaken and implemented measures to prevent such conduct”. 2273 - Indjic, T. 18593. 2274 - Indjic, T. 18593-4; see also Radinovic Report, para. 314: General Galic issued an order placing under control of military commands of all the paramilitaries or their disbanding and expulsion, in case they should resist. 2275 - Rose, T. 10208-9. 2276 - DP34, T. 17830-1. 2277 - DP34, T. 17831. 2278 - Vukovic, T. 14674-5. 2279 - Vukovic, T. 14688. 2280 - Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief, para. 107, Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 2. 2281 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, para. 7.33; Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 24. 2282 - Defence Pre-trial Brief, paras 7.18 and 7.19. 2283 - Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief, para. 108 2284 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11581 (he replaced MacKenzie as Commander of Sector Sarajevo). 2285 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11584-85. 2286 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11591-2. 2287 - Henneberry, T. 8551-9; T. 8562. 2288 - Henneberry, T. 8590; fire was indiscriminate and without apparent reasons, T. 8547. 2289 - Henneberry, T. 8599. 2290 - Bergeron, T. 11270. 2291 - Bergeron, T. 11271. 2292 - Bergeron, T.11268. 2293 - O’Keeffe, T. 9184-6. 2294 - Fraser, T.11194. 2295 - Witness W, T. 9541(closed session). 2296 - Witness W, T. 9551 (closed session). At such meetings, the witness was mostly accompanied by Serb interpreters, or possibly Croatian, because "the Lukavica headquarters did not accept Bosniak Muslim interpreters” and Witness W was not aware of any serious problem with the interpreting at any of the meetings, T. 9553-4. 2297 - Witness W, T. 9551-2 (closed session). 2298 - Witness W, T. 9554-5 (closed session). 2299 - Fraser T. 11193-4. 2300 - Fraser T. 11193-4. 2301 - Fraser, T. 11193. 2302 - Tucker, T. 10028-9. 2303 - Mole, T. 9831. 2304 - Mole, T. 10989-90. 2305 - Mole, T. 10990-91. 2306 - Carswell, T. 8344-6, 8407. 2307 - Witness Y, T. 10866 (closed session). 2308 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11596. 2309 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11600-1. 2310 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11600, 11644. 2311 - Witness W, T. 9564 (closed session). 2312 - Witness W, T. 9557 (closed session). 2313 - Witness W, T. 9566 (closed session). 2314 - Witness W, T. 9607-8 (closed session). 2315 - Carswell, T. 8345. 2316 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11587-8. 2317 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11588. 2318 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11593. 2319 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11594. 2320 - Henneberry, T. 8661, 8664. 2321 - Henneberry, T. 8590-1. 2322 - Henneberry, T. 8595-6. 2323 - Mole, T. 9834-5. 2324 - Mole, T. 9837. 2325 - Mole, T. 9836-7. 2326 - Witness W, T. 9552 (closed session). 2327 - Witness W, T. 9555 (closed session). 2328 - Fraser, T. 11193-96. 2329 - Fraser, T. 11196. 2330 - DP17, T. 16808-9. 2331 - DP35, T. 17731. 2332 - DP35, T. 17727. 2333 - DP35, T. 17731. 2334 - Witness Y, T. 10857 (closed session). 2335 - Carswell, T. 8348, 8429. 2336 - Witness Y, T. 10857 (closed session). Fraser, T. 11193-7. See P784 as an example of written protest sent to the liaison officer. 2337 - Witness Y, T. 10869 (closed session). 2338 - Kolp, T. 8224; Indjic was a coordinator and direct associate of the commander General Galic to whom he reported, T. 8224-5. 2339 - Defence Witness DP35 corroborated this statement: “They were made aware of each protest because it was their duty to report to the commander about this, to inform the commander about this, and they would follow how this protest was developing on the basis of the commander's decision and the task that he assigned. The task would be to check to see whether such an incident had occurred, the incident with regard to which a protest had been lodged”, DP35, T. 17501. 2340 - Indjic, T. 18560. 2341 - Indjic, T. 18558. 2342 - Indjic, T. 18857-58. 2343 - Indjic, T. 18677. Major Indjic also testified that verbal protests were never responded to in writing. No records were kept, and therefore no records could be transmitted to the General Staff (Indjic, T. 18678-9). 2344 - Indjic, T. 18571. 2345 - Indjic, T. 18572. 2346 - Indjic, T. 16080. 2347 - Indjic, T. 18570, 18571, 18681. 2348 - Indjic, T. 18565-6. 2349 - Indjic, T. 18634. 2350 - Indjic, T. 18721-2. 2351 - DP35, T. 17646: reports of investigations were forwarded to the main staff of the VRS and they were in any case in daily combat reports. 2352 - DP35, T. 17644, Major Indjic attended the meetings at the operations centre on a daily basis along with DP35, General Galic and other senior subordinates when protests were discussed. 2353 - Indjic, T. 18541. 2354 - DP35, T. 17501-2: They did receive protests in the command but not directly from the BH army. They were sent through the liaison officer for UNPROFOR. For each protest lodged and in which victims were mentioned, this would be checked in the field to determine whether it was possible that one of their units had opened fire. Names of the casualties were not mentioned in those protests. The witness personally participated or acted on some protests. 2355 - Indjic, T. 18687. 2356 - Indjic, T. 18565-6. 2357 - Henneberry, T. 8577-8. 2358 - Cutler, T. 8935-6. 2359 - Ashton, T. 1428. Indjic testified that he believed that Ashton was supposedly a CIA agent (T. 18772) - and the SRK never tried to forbid Ashton to travel on SRK territory (T. 18780-2) – because he had far more authority than a simple photographer, he could influence things with regard to the UNHCR activity and had open doors to the Sarajevo sector command (T. 18798). The Trial Chamber does not consider the evidence of Ashton unreliable because of his alleged membership to an intelligence organisation. 2360 - Aston, T. 1295-6. 2361 - Ashton, T. 1295. 2362 - Ashton, T. 1296. 2363 - Kolp, T. 8309 2364 - Kolp, T. 8310 2365 - Henneberry, T. 8585. 2366 - Henneberry, T. 8569-70. 2367 - Henneberry, T. 8572-3. 2368 - Hermer, T. 8456-7. 2369 - Hermer, T. 8457-8. 2370 - Hermer, T. 8457. 2371 - Hermer, T. 8460. 2372 - Indjic, T. 18568. The procedure when a request to stop fire arrived was to transmit it through the duty operations officer at the Corps command. He would call the brigade commander of the area of responsibility in question in order to check the authenticity of the protest and to see what was really going on. Mostly these were mutual combat operations. UNMOs would mediate in order to establish the time at which the firing should stop. 2373 - Ashton, T. 1313-14. 2374 - Ashton, T. 1310. An SRK gunner in Pale explained to Ashton what the job consisted of. A gunner must “set the gun at a range of .2 degrees and fire upwards once they established the first round, and then the shells would go straight up a line and then they would move the gun and fire five shots at calibrated degrees across the city. He said they would average 8 to 10 shots up and 5 across”, Ashton, T. 1311. 2375 - Cutler, T. 8930-2; Carswell, T. 8345. 2376 - General Van Baal noted that a daily SitRep [situation report] for 13 July 1994 recorded that the previous day: “the commander of the 1st Battalion of the BSA Illidza Brigade admitted the sniping by BSA from Bravo PAPA 859578 (house for the blind people). He promised that there would be no more sniping from that place”, Van Baal, T. 9880-1. 2377 - Witness W, T. 9555 (closed session). 2378 - Henneberry, T. 8574-5. 2379 - Henneberry, T. 8602. 2380 - Henneberry, T. 8600, 8602, 8604. The commanders of positions around LIMA 3, LIMA 10 and someone Henneberry believed to be a brigade commander in Vogosca were concerned but continued their operations of shelling. 2381 - DP35, T. 17502. 2382 - DP35, T. 17503. 2383 - DP36, T. 18103-9. 2384 - Prosecution’s Trial Brief, para. 99. 2385 - Mole, T. 9807-8. 2386 - Carswell, T. 8340-2. 2387 - Indjic, T. 18630. 2388 - Indjic, T. 18791. 2389 - DP34, T. 17867. 2390 - DP34, T. 17868. 2391 - See supra, para 174. 2392 - The SRK was composed of 18,000 troops while the ABiH numbered approximately twice that number of troops. 2393 - DP17, T. 16764, 16820, 16820; see also DP6, T. 14071, DP4, T. 14215-6. 2394 - Radinovic Report; see, for example, Ex. D1492.1 (Order signed by General Galic dated 15 September 1993). 2395 - DP17, T. 16865. 2396 - DP17, T. 16764, T. 16866. 2397 - DP17, T. 16828, 16830: the witness also stated that it is “entitled to repeat” standing orders to ensure compliance. 2398 - Exhibit D1492 is an order by General Galic to his troops dated 15 September 1993; one of the items of the order concerns a reminder to comply with the Geneva Conventions. 2399 - DP35, T. 17620. 2400 - DP14, T. 15905. 2401 - DP34, T. 17920. 2402 - Briquemont, T. 10057-8, Briquemont stated that “Not one single political leader, whether Serb, Croat or Muslim, ever came out against that sniper activity in public”; see also Harding, T. 4477. 2403 - DP35, T. 17647-8. 2404 - DP34, T. 17922. 2405 - Id. 2406 - Id. 2407 - DP34, T. 17923. 2408 - Id. 2409 - DP34, T. 17924, 17826. 2410 - DP10, T. 14390-1. 2411 - DP9, T. 14510. 2412 - DP9, T. 14511-2. 2413 - Id. 2414 - Gardemeister, T. 8953; the exact location was Skenderija, Gardemeister, T. 8975. 2415 - Gardemeister, T. 8953-4: he travelled to Vogosca where he met the SRK Chief of Staff (Milosevic), and Colonel Milovanovic, who was the responsible commander of two brigades in the north. He was given permission to travel, together with a liaison officer, Colonel Bartula, to the site where they thought the fire had originated. He noted there was a direct line to the French UNPROFOR camp and concluded that the fire originated from that position because (i) the calibre used was not normally used by the ABiH; (ii) the direction fitted the BSA position; and (iii) there was no record of outgoing ABiH mortar or artillery fire in UNMO logbooks at the relevant time. When he informed the Bosnian Serb Army Colonels of his conclusion, Colonel Bartula denied that the Bosnian Serb Army positions had fired the artillery shots, and said: “you can report whatever you want, but we are not to blame, it is the Bosniak side to blame.” 2416 - Gardemeister, T. 8954. 2417 - Indjic, T. 18687; T. 18565-6. 2418 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 192. 2419 - The Prosecution claims that circumstantial evidence such as admissions by senior subordinates, “and independently, in conjunction with evidence to the effect that the Accused enjoyed a disciplined chain of command and an effective chain of communication” (Prosecution’s Final Brief, para. 192) corroborate the evidence that allows the inference that the Accused was simply acting in accordance with a pre-established plan. 2420 - Donia Report, p. 11. 2421 - Donia Report, p. 13. 2422 - P3683 (minutes of meeting with presidents of municipalities in the zone of responsibility of the “division of the 1st Partizan Brigade”), p. 3. 2423 - P3683, p. 4. 2424 - Abdel-Razek, T. 11600-1, 11644. 2425 - Witness W, T. 9607-08 2426 - Carswell, T. 8345. 2427 - O’Keeffe, T. 9184-6. 2428 - Henneberry, T. 8590-1. 2429 - Mole, T. 9836-7. 2430 - Ashton, T. 1295. 2431 - Ashton, T. 1296. 2432 - Henneberry, T. 8577-8. 2433 - Henneberry, T. 8579. 2434 - Henneberry, T. 8579-80 (“orders were usually transmitted verbally”, T. 8580). 2435 - Henneberry, T. 8561. 2436 - Henneberry, T. 8557-9, T. 8572. 2437 - Henneberry, T. 8604. 2438 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 86. 2439 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 522. 2440 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 534. 2441 - See in Radinovic Report, filing page number 8023. 2442 - Fraser recalled in particular that incident when SRK snipers along the “Sniper Alley” made their position known to the French soldiers of the SFOR. 2443 - Bergeron, T. 11268. 2444 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 778-81. 2445 - “The measure of the Accused's criminality, comprises the fact of injury and death to the civilians who were the direct victims of the campaign, the mental suffering in the form of the terror occasioned to them and other civilians as a result of the campaign, and the physical impact on the ordinary lives of civilians during the indictment period as they survived under the constant threat of being shelled or sniped. Further, it is relevant to take into account the lasting effects of the campaign on the survivors”. For instance, Jusfovic said of the lasting effects of the terror: “The traumas have affected all of us, including the fire fighters. It was a traumatic experience. The first time that ten of us fire fighters went to Austria, in Split, we walked around - - and this was in 1998. We were walking along the seaside and a ship anchored, and we heard a whistle. And we all threw ourselves to the ground. People thought that we had gone mad. We thought it was a shell. So you see, the memory stuck in our minds," (T. 6541), Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 778. 2446 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 779. 2447 - Id., para. 780-1. 2448 - Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1129-1140. 2449 - Id., para. 1142; Closing argument, T. 21870. 2450 - Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1144. 2451 - Id., para. 1145. 2452 - Id., para. 1146. 2453 - Id., paras 1147-8. 2454 - Id., para. 1149. 2455 - Id., paras 1151-3. 2456 - Article 23 states, in pertinent part, that “1. The Trial Chambers shall pronounce judgements and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law”. 2457 - Article 24 states: “1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia. 2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. 3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners”. 2458 - Rule 87 (C) states “?igf the Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty on one or more of the charges contained in the indictment, it shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently, unless it decides to exercise its power to impose a single sentence reflecting the totality of the criminal conduct of the accused.” 2459 - (A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life. (B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account the factors mentioned in Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Statute, as well as such factors as: (i) any aggravating circumstances; (ii) any mitigating circumstances including substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction; (iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia; (iv) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any State on the convicted person for the same act has already been served, as referred to in Article 10, paragraph 3, of the Statute. (C) Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period, if any, during which the convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or appeal. 2460 - Aleksovski Appeals Judgment, para. 185; Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 806; Tadic Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 48. 2461 - Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 779-80; Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 704. 2462 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 701; citing the Trial Chamber in the Celebici case which stated that the gravity of the offence was “(b(y far the most important consideration, which may be regarded as the litmus test for the appropriate sentence”, Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 1225. 2463 - Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 741. 2464 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 701, citing the Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 1226, Erdemovic Appeals Sentencing Judgement, para. 15; Kambanda Sentencing Judgement, para. 42; Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 26; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 852. 2465 - Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 704. 2466 - See supra, Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 779-80; Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 704. 2467 - Plasvic Sentencing Judgment, para. 84. 2468 - Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 868. 2469 - Jelisic Trial Judgement, para. 124, Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 284. 2470 - The Trial Chamber bears in mind that “[t]he same elements should not be reviewed a first time as a constitutive element of the crime and a second time as an aggravating circumstance”, Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 707. 2471 - Vasiljevic Trial Judgement, para. 278. 2472 - Krstic Trial Judgement, paras 705 et seq; see also Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 847. 2473 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 705. 2474 - Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 763. 2475 - Tadic Appeals Sentencing Judgement, para. 21. 2476 - Article 41(1) of the Criminal Code of the SFRY (adopted on 28 September 1976, entered into force on 1 July 1977) states (in translation): "The court shall determine the sentence for the perpetrator of a given crime within the limits prescribed by the law for this crime, bearing in mind the purpose of the punishment and taking into account all the circumstances that could lead to this sentence being more or less severe, in particular: the degree of criminal responsibility, the motives of the crime, the degree of the threat or damage to protected property, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, the background of the perpetrator, his personal circumstances and behaviour after the commission of the crime as well as other circumstances which relate to the character of the perpetrator”. 2477 - See Chapter XVI of the Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia "Crimes Against Humanity and International Law”, Articles 141 and 142(1) dealt with the crimes of genocide and other war crimes committed against civilians. See also Articles 142-156 and Articles 38 "Imprisonment", 41 "Sentences", and 48 "Coincidence of several offences." Crimes against peace and international law, including the crime of genocide and war crimes against a civilian population, were punishable by a sentence of 5-15 years in prison, by the death penalty or by 20 years in prison if a prison sentence was substituted for the death penalty. 2478 - Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 849. 2479 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 700. 2480 - Fraser stated that “to get inside to a target who is surrounded by non-combatants [is] a soldier’s worst nightmare”, T. 11238. 2481 - Tucker stated that: “To put it bluntly, the more suffering the better because that played to the television cameras and would ultimately lead to the pressure that they wanted in order to achieve international intervention.” Tucker, T. 10030-1. 2482 - The Prosecution is unclear in its formulation of a sentence but uses the plural “life sentences”. The Chamber considers that the Prosecution suggests a life imprisonment sentence for each proven offence. 2483 - Review of the indictment, 24 April 1998. 2484 - The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic and Dragomir Milosevic, Order for Non-Disclosure, IT-98-29-I, 24 April 1998. 2485 - Ex parte and Confidential Order on Prosecution Motion, IT-98-29-I, 15 March 1999. 2486 - iDecision on Application to Vacate in Part an Order for Non-Disclosure, 17 March 1999. 2487 - Indictment, para. 15. 2488 - Order in Respect of Detention on Remand, IT-98-29-I, 29 December 1999. 2489 - Motion Hearings of 10 July 2000 and 27 July 2000. 2490 - Order on the Defence Motion on Provisional Release, 25 July 2000. 2491 - Ms. Pilipovic was present in court for the first time, together with Mr. Kostich, at the status conference of 27 November 2001. 2492 - Decision of the Registrar, 8 October 2001. 2493 - Motion to Suppress Insufficiency of Indictment, 7 April 2000. 2494 - Order on the Defence Motion to Suppress Insufficiency of Indictment, 11 May 2000. 2495 - Prosecutor’s Filing of Revised Schedules to the Indictment, 10 October 2001. 2496 - The Defence’s Request for Indicating that First and Second Schedule to the Indictment Dated 10th October 2001 Should be Considered as the Amended Indictment, 12 October 2001. 2497 - The trial was scheduled to begin on 3 December 2001. 2498 - Decision on the Defence Motion for Indicating that the First and Second Schedule to the Indictment Dated 10th October 2001 Should be Considered as the Amended Indictment, 19 October 2001. 2499 - Decision on Application by Defence for Leave to Appeal, IT-98-29-AR72, 30 November 2001 (“the Appeals Chamber’s Decision”), para. 14. 2500 - The Appeals Chamber’s Decision, para. 19. 2501 - Order of the Acting President Assigning a Case to a Trial Chamber and for the Conduct of Routine Matters, IT-98-29-I, 22 December 1999. 2502 - Status Conference of 11 April 2000, T. 24. 2503 - T. 18-20. 2504 - Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief Pursuant to Rule 65ter (E) (i) (Provisional), 20 February 2001. 2505 - Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief Pursuant to Rule 65ter (E) (i), 23 October 2001. 2506 - Confidential Prosecutor’s List of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 65ter, 29 October 2001. 2507 - Confidential Prosecutor’s “Motion” Corrigendum to Witness List Filed Pursuant to Rule 65ter (E)(ii)(a), 02 November 2001. 2508 - Confidential Prosecutor’s List of Exhibits Pursuant to Rule 65 ter (E)(iii), 01 November 2001. 2509 - Confidential Prosecution’s Notice of the Filing of its Revised List of Exhibits Pursuant to Rule 65 ter (E)(iii), 15 November 2001. 2510 - Scheduling Order, 5 October 2001; T. 434 to 559. 2511 - Order of the President on the Composition of a Trial Chamber for a Case, IT-98-29-PT, 23 November 2001. 2512 - Order of the President Assigning an Ad Litem Judge to a Trial, IT-98-29-T, 30 November 2001. 2513 - Schedule of Facts Stipulated by the Parties, 4 December 2001. 2514 - Decision, 16 November 2001. 2515 - Decision on Co-operation Between the Parties, 16 October 2002 (Certification of appeal denied on 13 November 2002). 2516 - Scheduling Order, 27 September 2002. 2517 - Decision on the Motion for Entry of Acquittal of the Accused Stanislav Galic, 03 October 2002. 2518 - Decision on Rebuttal Evidence, 2 April 2003. The witness testified on 24 March 2003. 2519 - Decision on Rejoinder Evidence, 2 April 2003. 2520 - Defence’s Final Trial Brief, 22 April 2003. 2521 - Confidential Prosecution’s Final Trial Brief, 23 April 2003. 2522 - Prosecution’s Final Trial Brief, 28 April 2003. 2523 - T. 21669 to 22015. 2524 - 29 October 2001, 30 October 2001, 12 November 2001, 3 December 2001, 5 December 2001, 14 January 2002, 25 January 2002, 22 March 2002, 28 March 2002, 24 April 2002, 16 May 2002, 24 May 2002, 29 May 2002, 01 July 2002, 25 July 2002, 31 July 2002. 2525 - 24 September 2002 and 21 October 2002. 2526 - Confidential Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Protective Measures, 14 March 2002; Confidential Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Protective Measures for, And Addition to the Prosecution’s Witness List, Of Witness AD, 31 May 2002 (Certification of Appeal denied on 7 June 2002); Confidential Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Protective Measures in Respect of Witnesses W and Y, 7 June 2002; Confidential Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Protective Measures in Respect of Witness X, 28 June 2002; Confidential Decision on the Defence’s Request for Protective Measures, 19 November 2002. 2527 - Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Protective Measures in Respect of United Nations Rule 70 Witnesses and Documents, 21 January 2002. 2528 - Further Submissions were filed on 12 November 2001. 2529 - Confidential Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Testimony with Protective Measures via Video-Conference Link Pursuant to Rule 71bis, 12 February 2001. 2530 - Decision on the Defence Request to Summon Witnesses, 19 March 2003. 2531 - Five orders were issued on 12 November 2002; three orders were issued on 18 November 2002. 2532 - T. 18076 (22 January 2003). 2533 - Requête de la défense en vue de la certification d’un appel contre la decision de la Chambre relativement au calendrier pour la determination de l’audition éventuelle de l’Accusé comme témoin, 24 January 2003 2534 - Confidential Decision on Certification Pursuant to Rule 73 (B) Regarding the Possible Testimony of the Accused as a Witness, 4 February 2003. 2535 - Decision on the Defence Request Based on Rule 94bis(A) of the Rules, 12 April 2002. 2536 - See the Decision Admitting Berko Zecevic as an Expert Witness, 31 May 2002 (Certification of appeal was denied on 18 June 2002); Decision Concerning the Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau and Richard Philipps, 3 July 2002 (Certification of appeal denied on 22 July 2002); Decision on the Expert Witness Statements Submitted by the Defence, 27 January 2003; Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration of the Admission of the Expert Report of Professor Radinovic, 21 February 2003. 2537 - Hinchliffe, T. 12954. 2538 - Kovacs Report. 2539 - Dr. Vilmos Kovacs testified on 9 and 10 July 2002. 2540 - Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Dr. Vilmos Kovacs’ Expert Report, 2 August 2002 (Certification of appeal denied on 2 September 2002. 2541 - Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for the Admission into Evidence of Written Statement by a Deceased Witness, and Related Report Pursuant to Rule 92bis(C), 12 April 2002. 2542 - Decision on the Prosecutor’s Second Motion for the Admission into Evidence of Written Statement by Deceased Witness Bajram [opi, Pursuant to Rule 92bis(C), 18 April 2002. 2543 - Appeals Chamber’s Decision, paras 13-19. 2544 - Prosecution’s Submissions Pursuant to Rule 92bis, following the Appeals Chamber Decision of 7 June 2002, 24 June 2002; Defence Rule 92bis Submissions, 5 July 2002; Prosecution’s Reply to Defence Rule 92bis Submissions, 12 July 2002. 2545 - Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Written Statement by a Deceased Witness, Hamdija Cavcic, and Related Report Pursuant to Rule 92 bis (C), 2 August 2002. 2546 - Détermination de la Défense en Relation à l’article 92 bis et suite à la Requête du Procureur en Date du 24 Jun [sic] 2002 (confidentielle), 3 July 2002. 2547 - On 4 July 2002. 2548 - Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Admission of Rule 92bis Statements, 26 July 2002. 2549 - Smail Cekic. 2550 - Prosecution’s Application to Have Witness Barry Hogan Added to its Witness List and His Evidence Admitted Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 4 July 2002; Prosecution’s Application to Have Admitted into Evidence the Witness Statement of Zoran Lesic, Pursuant to Rule 92bis (A), 23 July 2002. 2551 - Decision on the Prosecution’s Application to Have Witness Barry Hogan Added to Its Witness List And His Evidence Admitted Pursuant to Rule 92bis, 2 August 2002; confidential Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for the Admission of Zoran Lesic’s Statement, Pursuant to Rule 92bis (A), 2 August 2002. 2552 - Confidential, ex parte, Additional Submissions Concerning the Prosecutor’s Application for an Order to the Republika Sprska, Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Production of Documents Concerning or Related to Stanislav Galic. 2553 - Order to the Republika Sprska for the Production of Documents, 19 April 2002. 2554 - Confidential, ex Parte, Prosecution’s Request for Clarification Concerning the Recent Submission of Documents by the Authorities of the Republika Sprska, dated 25 June 2002, 01 August 2002. 2555 - Confidential, ex parte, Prosecution’s Withdrawal of Request for a Further Order by the Trial Chamber with Respect to Documents from Republika Sprska Authorities 2556 - Status conference of 11 April 2000, T. 39, confirmed at the status conference of 10 July 2000, T. 151. 2557 - T. 402. 2558 - Request of the Defence for Trial Chamber’s Order in Relation to Material Evidences, 4 March 2002. 2559 - Prosecution’s Response to the Request by the Defence for Trial Chamber’s Order in Relation to Material Evidences, Dated 5 March 2002, 11 March 2002. 2560 - Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Documents Tendered from the Bar Table by the Prosecutor, 11 September 2002; Decision on Admission of Documents Tendered During the Testimony of Radoslav Radinovic, Dusan Dunjic, Svetlana Radovanovic and on Motion Regarding Document of 14.05.1992, 11 April 2003. 2561 - Status conferences of 27 November 2000, 30 January 2001, 15 March 2001, 2 May 2001. 2562 - Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for the Trial Chamber to Travel to Sarajevo, 04 February 2003. 2563 - Decision on Memorial Amicus Curiae, 13 March 2003. 2564 - Decision on the Defence Motion for Withdrawal of Judge Orie, 3 February 2003. 2565 - Request for Certification to Appeal against Judge Liu Daqun’s Decision on the Request for the Withdrawal of Judge Alphons Orie Rendered on 3 February 2003 but Delivered on 4 February, 10 February 2003. 2566 - Decision on the Defence Request for Certification to Appeal the Presiding Judge’s Decision on Withdrawal of Judge Orie, 26 February 2003. 2567 - Decision on Appeal from Refusal of Application for Disqualification and Withdrawal of Judge, para. 8. 2568 - Decision on Appeal from Refusal of Application for Disqualification and Withdrawal of Judge, para. 9. 2569 - Decision on Galic’s Application Pursuant to Rule 15(B). 2570 - Decision on the Defence Motion to Suspend Proceedings. 2571 - Request for Certification, 3 April 2003. 2572 - Decision on the Defence Request for Certification to Appeal the Bureau’s Decision on Galic’s Application Pursuant to Rule 15(B), 10 April 2003.