1 Wednesday, 19 June 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in the courtroom, in and

6 around the courtroom.

7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number

9 IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus Stanislav Galic.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11 I am informed that the Defence wanted to address the Chamber.

12 Mr. Piletta-Zanin, please proceed.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President and

14 Your Honours. Just a moment, please.

15 [Defence counsel confer]

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] First of all, Mr. President, I

17 am just being reminded, Ms. Pilipovic has asked me that if we can

18 cross-examine the witness in tandem for practical and technical reasons,

19 and I am thinking in advance for your decision.

20 Now, the reason why we wanted to address your Chamber is the

21 following: Very soon, we are to hear a witness -- excuse me. We are

22 going to hear a witness here whose name -- who is Vahid Karavelic. And in

23 relation to this witness, the Defence has just received - that is,

24 received it yesterday - received a supplementary information sheet

25 yesterday concerning this witness.

1 First of all, as far as the form is concerned, I understand that

2 the courtesy has gone right out of this courtroom, which I regret very

3 much. I believe that this document was drafted by the Prosecution, and I

4 can read some rather unpleasant things. I don't think that it is not

5 forbidden that if we are to -- if we are talking about an accused who is

6 presumed innocent, that we speak of an accused as a "Mr. Galic" or a

7 "General Galic," but just to speak of him as "Galic," Mr. President and

8 Your Honours, this rather shows a rather lack of courtesy. I think that

9 this is a question of form and I think that we should re-invent courtesy

10 here. That is --

11 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...ask you, if there

12 is something that you would not like to happen in this courtroom, until

13 now, as far as I can see, we are not informed about anything in respect

14 of the Witness Karavelic. If you could solve the matter with the

15 Prosecutor, then whatever is unpleasant will not come to the eyes or to

16 the ears of the Court. What you are doing now is to introduce something

17 which comes from the Prosecution and which is not yet known to the Court.

18 If you could prevent it from coming to the Court.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I will do my best,

20 Mr. President. Thank you. But the reason why we should intervene is the

21 following: In this supplementary information that we received yesterday,

22 we can see that there is a number of things that seem extraordinary, to

23 say the least. This is a high officer, Lieutenant General, or a General,

24 who was normally interviewed by the Prosecution a few months ago, and we

25 can see that a few days before the end of the case, this witness who is

1 certainly being worked by or supported by three parties present at the

2 interview, is saying in a very determined way like there were never any

3 mortars in Sarajevo, claiming that only some vehicles were used, saying

4 that in relation to some manufacturing plants of weapons ammunition, that

5 this is not true, and so on and so on.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, as you noticed, the Chamber just

8 conferred. We are now confronted with some arguments on a witness we

9 have not heard yet, and although I see that he is scheduled on the list,

10 I do not know whether whatever is in your papers will be his testimony in

11 this Court. The Chamber thinks that it is not proper to discuss evidence,

12 or potential evidence, which has not been presented yet and which even

13 might not be presented at all.

14 So, therefore, if you could inform us about the purpose of your

15 intervention and it could not --

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes --

17 JUDGE ORIE: -- to discuss what is in any additional written

18 statement of the potential witness. Yes.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I will, Mr. President.

20 The objective of my intervention is to say the following: There is a

21 decision which took place in January of this year in case Naletilic, Tuta,

22 IT-98-48-T, which rejected certain information that was tardily given by

23 the Prosecution. We believe that we are in a very similar situation to

24 that one, even comparable situation. And what we want to say is that

25 bearing in mind this new information, this new piece of information which

1 arrived very belatedly, and are trying to cover what the Defence has

2 managed to show so far, that is, trying to show the opposite of what the

3 Prosecution was saying. Now, if the witness is heard by your Chamber, and

4 bearing in mind the rather extraordinary evidence that he is going to give

5 after three representatives from the Prosecution interviewed him, we

6 believe that it will be the duty of your Chamber to remind him -- express

7 provisions about what will happen if he gives false testimony.

8 I believe that it is 98 or 99 -- Rule 98 or 99 which is dealing

9 with false testimony, and we will ask before this witness testifies that

10 he is very clearly informed of the consequences of what we call false

11 testimony.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin. The Chamber will

13 consider whether it is appropriate to do this prior to testimony given or

14 during testimony in Court. And at least it takes another month, as far as

15 I can see, before this witness is scheduled to testify in this Court. So

16 we have some time to consider the matter.

17 Mr. Ierace.

18 MR. IERACE: I have nothing to add, Mr. President. We are ready

19 to proceed.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You are ready to proceed.

21 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the

22 courtroom.

23 [The witness entered court]

24 WITNESS: FRANCIS BRIQUEMONT [Resumed]

25 [Witness answered through interpreter]

1 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Briquemont.

2 Perhaps it is not necessary, but I would like to draw your attention to

3 the fact that you are still bound by the solemn declaration that you gave

4 yesterday at the beginning of your testimony.

5 [In English] Mr. Ierace, please proceed.

6 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, I have a

7 number of documents to show to the witness. I wonder if that could most

8 efficiently be done by giving them to the witness sequentially and

9 individually, or perhaps in one large bundle and the witness going through

10 them.

11 JUDGE ORIE: If no confusion is created, Mr. Ierace, I leave it

12 to you.

13 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I will start off doing it one by one

14 and see how we go with time. I ask the witness be shown Prosecution

15 Exhibit 1740.

16 While that's being done, perhaps I can ask the witness a question

17 Examined by Mr. Ierace: [Continued]

18 Q. Good morning, General. Could you tell us who Viktor Andreev was?

19 A. Good morning, Mr. Ierace. Viktor Andreev was a Civil Affairs who

20 was the representative of the representative of the Secretary General of

21 the United Nations, and as soon as he arrived, he told me that he had many

22 difficulties to work in his hierarchy or chain of command, if I can call

23 it the chain of command, and that he was placing himself completely at my

24 disposal. He helped me as much as he could. He was Russian, so he could

25 speak easily or more easily than others. He was able to speak with the

1 Serbs. And I was taking into consideration all of these aspects of the

2 way my collaborators work. But certainly, he always helped me working as

3 a deputy.

4 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpreted] For the transcript, you said that

5 Mr. Andreev, that he was the representative of the representative of the

6 representative. That's just for the transcript

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps I should not

8 try to express myself this way but I was just trying to say --

9 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpreted] That is very well, but the

10 transcript says representative of the Secretary General.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, he was not the representative of

12 the Secretary General, of course.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Briquemont, you were asked who Mr. Andreev was,

14 and you answered that question and you gave quite some additional

15 information on the person. This Chamber is aware that the Prosecution is

16 under some time restraint and might be interested in specific information

17 you would not think of, and on the other hand, the Chamber might perhaps

18 already have been aware of other information you are giving. Could I ask

19 to listen carefully to the questions of the Prosecution, answer them, and

20 if there is any additional information, whether he spoke the language or

21 not, it might be that the Prosecution is highly interested to know, they

22 will ask you. But perhaps they have totally different purpose of putting

23 that question to you, for example, to know his age or to know when he

24 arrived. So would you please listen carefully to the question and then

25 answer to that specific question, and whatever other information is

1 needed, the Prosecution certainly will ask you. This is not to be

2 impolite to you, but we are under heavy time restraint and that is the

3 reason why I am asking you.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I apologise, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE ORIE: No need to excuse. But please proceed, Mr. Ierace.

6 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 Q. General, could you tell us who a gentleman by the name of De Mello

8 was?

9 A. Sergio De Mello was officially the representative of the

10 representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and he was

11 a deputy of Mr. Stoltenberg.

12 Q. Thank you for that.

13 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, at this stage, it would be appropriate

14 to go into closed session, given the nature of the document. There are

15 one or two others of the same category and I will deal with all of those

16 together. I imagine we will be in closed session for approximately 10

17 minutes.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could we then turn into closed session.

19 I see it is confirmed on my screen that we are in closed session

20 now.

21 [Closed session]

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11 [Open session]

12 JUDGE ORIE: We are now in open session.

13 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President. I ask the witness be shown

14 Exhibit P1522.

15 Q. General, in relation to this document, does it appear to be the

16 first Igman agreement which was signed on the 11th of August, 1993?

17 A. No. I think that the agreement, Mr. Ierace, is the military part

18 of the peace agreement of Mr. Stoltenberg and Lord Owen. If I see the

19 date -- if you look at the first page, it says: Designed to work out

20 arrangements for bringing about compliance," and so forth, the cessation

21 of hostilities and so on. So I believe that this was the agreement --

22 well, the military aspect of the peace agreement that Mr. Stoltenberg

23 hoped to present to the three parties.

24 Q. My apology for that. You are quite correct. If you could please

25 turn to page 7 of that document. We see the signatures of General Mladic

1 and yourself amongst others on the agreement.

2 A. Yes, indeed.

3 MR. IERACE: Might that be returned. And might the witness be

4 shown Exhibit 2082.

5 Q. Sir, is this a letter from you addressed to Dr. Karadzic dated the

6 8th of January, 1994, in which you inform him that a crater analysis of a

7 shell impact on Sarajevo airport which occurred on the 5th of January, you

8 believed to demonstrate conclusively that the source of the fire was from

9 the side occupied by the Serb military, in particular, it emanated from

10 the area of Lukavica?

11 A. Yes, that is correct. I don't have to make any comment in

12 relation to this letter.

13 Q. All right.

14 MR. IERACE: Might that be returned. Might the witness be shown

15 Exhibit P1928.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, may I just ask you, the document just

17 shown to the witness, P2082, contains two letters and annexes. Are they

18 -- do they have any relevance because you didn't ask --

19 MR. IERACE: No. And I am mindful of the time, Mr. President. I

20 think --

21 JUDGE ORIE: So this first letter, the front page --

22 MR. IERACE: I will be seeking to tender the bundle. I think that

23 those documents speak for themselves in relation to the same incident.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but then of course just to -- I mean, the second

25 page, I take it that you want to then verify that this is a letter that

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1 came from --

2 MR. IERACE: I am happy to do that, Mr. President, if you think it

3 appropriate. Might that document be returned to the witness.

4 Q. Would you please turn to the following page? And do we see a

5 letter, also addressed from you, on this occasion to President Izetbegovic

6 on the same date, complaining of attacks or the use of artillery in and

7 around the airport and a warning which you delivered to him that the

8 humanitarian airlift will be suspended unless you receive his assurances

9 that such an attack would not be repeated?

10 A. This letter is correct. My worry, Mr. Ierace, was that every

11 time a shell exploded not very far from the airport, the people from NATO

12 said that they wouldn't come again to bring humanitarian aid. So I was

13 doing my best with both sides in order to avoid all shelling in the

14 vicinity of the airport because the humanitarian aid was meant for the

15 whole city of Sarajevo, in fact, for the whole of Bosnia.

16 Q. Thank you for that.

17 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, may the witness be shown P1955.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise.

19 But if we look at these two letters, we see that they do not have an

20 annex, and now that you mention it, the entire bundle of the documents

21 that is presented by the Prosecution, there are three other documents

22 that were not officially annexed to either of the letters. So I don't

23 know what Mr. Ierace proposes to do with this bundle and these documents,

24 whether he is going to tender them or not tender them.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, to the other documents as well, and I see

1 a map where it identified that there is at least part of Sarajevo on it

2 but --

3 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, in order to save time, I don't -- I

4 won't tender this document in due course. I think the relevant parts --

5 JUDGE ORIE: The relevant parts. Okay. Then you will indicate

6 what these are.

7 Please proceed.

8 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just to correct that, what I propose

9 to do is not take those documents any further with this witness.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

11 MR. IERACE: The relevant parts or, rather, the parts upon which I

12 rely have now gone into evidence through the oral evidence.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 MR. IERACE: Thank you. Does the witness have 1955?

15 Thank you.

16 Q. General, in front of you do you have --

17 A. If you allow me, Mr. Ierace, I have before me two documents, P1928

18 and the P1955. So I have two documents before me.

19 A. Thank you. I will deal with 1928 first. Is 1928 a letter from

20 General Delic, addressed to you, complaining -- dated the 6th of December

21 1993, complaining that the city, that is the city of Sarajevo, had

22 received heavy shelling? And I refer you to the first paragraph.

23 A. Mr. Ierace, this letter is dated the 6th of December, so the day

24 that General Delic sent me this letter, his troops launched three attacks

25 in Sarajevo against held positions. I have to say that the development of

1 the head of the Muslim army was very clear in this month of December. He

2 was convinced that the Muslim forces were sufficiently well-organised

3 in order to be able to resume their offensive anywhere, either in Central

4 Bosnia or in Sarajevo. I have to say receiving this letter on the 6th of

5 December in the evening was very strange for me. In fact, General Delic

6 authorised himself to launch attacks from Sarajevo and he was asking me to

7 intervene with the Serbs in order not to respond. This was the kind

8 of letter to which I didn't really attach much importance. I saw

9 General Delic again immediately in order to discuss this problem. It has

10 to be made very clear, I believe, for the Tribunal, that in December both

11 sides were determined to continue the war because there was no peace

12 agreement.

13 Q. General, if I could perhaps clarify the interest of the Tribunal

14 to you. In terms of blame or fault - with your leave, Mr. President - the

15 primary interest is, one might say, is in whether or not there were

16 attacks either deliberately or indiscriminately on civilian targets or

17 civilian areas. In your answer, you referred to the steps taken by

18 General Delic to continue to prosecute the armed conflict.

19 But my question is directed to simply, in the first instance,

20 whether that is what General Delic said in his letter, that is, he

21 complained that the city had been exposed to heavy shelling. I think

22 your -- perhaps if you could just focus on that question and agree or

23 disagree that that is what the letter expresses.

24 A. Mr. Ierace, I am trying to answer your question as clearly as

25 possible.

1 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, would it be appropriate at this stage

2 to direct the witness to answer the question? I am very conscious of the

3 time limits that the Prosecution is working under.

4 JUDGE ORIE: The witness indicated that he was trying to answer

5 the question as clearly as possible.

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, the General was about to

7 say that he wanted to answer the question. And let us let him.

8 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...decide on the

9 suggestion of Mr. Ierace.

10 Could you please answer the question, that is, whether this letter

11 indicates that General Delic was sending you a letter in which he says

12 that Sarajevo has been exposed to heavy shelling.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is certain that the city of

14 Sarajevo on the 6th of December was shelled, but the troops, Muslim

15 troops, launched at 4, 6, and 8 in the morning, attacks from the city.

16 The Serbs responded. How do you want to avoid shelling of the city of

17 Sarajevo?

18 MR. IERACE:

19 Q. General, could I direct your attention to some specific words in

20 the letter, and again I emphasise I am simply asking at this stage whether

21 the letter states certain things. In the first paragraph, does General

22 Delic refer to "all available weapons having been used during the

23 past days," that is days plural, "including combat aircraft," and then in

24 brackets does he say: "Yesterday we talked about it." End brackets.

25 "The city of Sarajevo has been exposed to heavy shelling."

1 In other words, I am not asking you at this stage whether

2 General Delic was at fault, but simply whether they were the terms of his

3 complaint to you in this letter dated the 6th of December?

4 A. When I say in the first paragraph and when you read the words

5 "including combat aircraft," combat aircraft was never used in Bosnia

6 among the parties, at least during my period of command, by either

7 parties. So in this first paragraph, we can see that it is a paragraph

8 which is over-dramatising the situation. But I do repeat, Sarajevo was

9 shelled in a much more intense way in the month of December.

10 So this part of the letter does correspond to the reality, but

11 what General Delic doesn't say is that he himself launched the offences

12 from the city of Sarajevo against the Serbs

13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...Mr. Ierace. When

14 you read the words "where all available weapons have been used," what

15 would that refer to? I mean, in your question, it is not quite clear.

16 MR. IERACE: I agree, Mr. President. There are other cities

17 referred to as well.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Would "where" not refer to the other cities?

19 MR. IERACE: Yes. It is not clear where the combat aircraft was

20 used.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Would you then please --

22 MR. IERACE: Yes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: I think it is there, when I read it, it is: Beside

24 the offensive activities of the Serb aggressor in the area of

25 responsibility of the cities of Tuzla, Zivinice, Kalesija and Teocak,

1 where all available weapons have been used." So beside the offensives

2 there, where all weapons have been used, "The city of Sarajevo has been

3 exposed to heavy shelling." Or am I wrong in reading?

4 MR. IERACE: Not at all, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

6 MR. IERACE:

7 Q. General, in general terms, in relation to that first week in

8 December, you have told us so far that there was shelling of the city of

9 Sarajevo, that at some stage, either before, during or after that

10 shelling, there was an offensive by the government forces, and that

11 offensive was conducted with the objective of cutting the Pale road. Is

12 that the case?

13 I withdraw that.

14 Is it your evidence, as I understand it, that there was shelling

15 of the city of Sarajevo that week and at some stage there was an offensive

16 by the government military forces that week as well. Is that correct?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Now, during --

19 A. Talking about -- I am sorry, Mr. Ierace. When you are talking

20 about the government, you mean the Bosnian government of Sarajevo. Very

21 well.

22 Q. Now during that shelling of Sarajevo by the Serb military forces,

23 firstly, regardless of which part of those forces did it, were civilian

24 targets hit in the city?

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I have to intervene, but the

1 French booth is correcting itself. Thank you.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please answer the question,

3 Mr. Briquemont? It is where --

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is no doubt that during the

5 shelling the civilians were hit.

6 MR. IERACE:

7 Q. All right.

8 Now my next question is: Did it appear to you that those civilian

9 targets hit by the shelling coming from the Serb side were deliberately

10 hit?

11 A. I think that when two sides were responding, one to the actions of

12 the other, they were in fact targeting military targets. I am trying to

13 think of some areas, particularly in order to retake some areas,

14 particularly those that were dominating the city. Here I have to give you

15 an explanation which would be of a military aspect.

16 I was really struck by the age of the ammunition that was used for

17 Sarajevo. Some of the shells never exploded --

18 Q. If I can interrupt you there.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I would like the General to continue.

20 MR. IERACE: As you please, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please continue, Mr. Briquemont.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think perhaps this is a technical

23 matter. But when one fires very old ammunition, there is a lot that can

24 happen. It can misfire, it wouldn't work. So I can give you some

25 explanation that we believed at the Main Staff, we thought that 10 to 20

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1 per cent of the shells never exploded. On the other hand, when you have

2 a bad functioning of the weapons, then some of these shells wouldn't fall

3 exactly where they were meant to fall. So when we want to make a very

4 honest assessment of what happened in Sarajevo, one has to bear in mind

5 about some technical aspects. Thank you, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...Mr. Ierace?

7 Q. General, I appreciate you explaining in general terms of what

8 happened in terms of the quality of the artillery shells, but my question

9 is in relation to that week, to the civilian targets being hit, and simply

10 whether or not you had a view, you had an opinion, as to whether the

11 civilian targets had been deliberately hit? In other words, had they been

12 targeted deliberately?

13 A. I think that I already answered this question.

14 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, that completes examination-in-chief.

15 Thank you.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace.

17 Ms. Pilipovic, is it you who is going to cross-examine the

18 witness?

19 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you, Your

20 Honour, I will start examination-in-chief.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, let me remind

23 you that we had asked for authorisation to work in tandem.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do agree. As you know, that has no

25 consequences as far as the time is concerned.

1 Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.

2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. General, yesterday we started your testimony practical by you

7 looking at the Resolution of the Security Council, 836, dated 4th of

8 June, 1993. And yesterday, on page 59 of the transcript, line 69, you

9 said that as a General, you never could understand the actual resolution.

10 I am interpreting your words. Could you please confirm if this is what

11 you said?

12 A. Yes, that is correct.

13 Q. Thank you, General.

14 In the course of the examination-in-chief by my learned colleague,

15 at one point you said that you would give a better interpretation of the

16 resolution if you had a look at it, or rather if you had a copy with you.

17 A. Yes. I wanted to show -- point out the ambiguities in the

18 resolution where they spoke both of legitimate defence, but legitimate

19 defence is something we always have. But I especially wanted to point out

20 what was realistic when the Security Council said that in a light version,

21 and I think that I said to the Tribunal that as a General, "light version"

22 didn't mean anything in operation -- didn't mean anything in operational

23 terms. That I had been promised 6.000 men, that that was the only way to

24 be able to receive reinforcements and the -- in personnel, and the only

25 way to ensure the defence of the safe zones. And I can tell you that

1 Defence means very much something different for us military people as the

2 diplomats in New York.

3 I repeat that it was an extremely ambiguous resolution which was

4 very difficult for the Security Council to sign, and for the military

5 personnel that it was and for General Cot, didn't really mean anything at

6 all any more when we looked at how things were really happening on the

7 ground.

8 THE INTERPRETER: He said, "unrealistic," not "realistic."

9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, the Defence would ask you to have a look at the

11 resolution dated 4th of June 1993, Resolution 836. The Defence has copied

12 part of the resolution, page 3. I would like you -- if you can clarify

13 the items 5 and 6 of the resolution.

14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the usher, the page 3

15 of the resolution, that is the number of the exhibit of the Prosecution is

16 P3715. For practical reasons, we copied items 5 and 6.

17 Your Honour, considering that the Prosecution has made a proposal

18 that as an exhibit the P3715 would be tendered as an exhibit, we just

19 copied that page, the relevant page.

20 Q. General, you have before you page 3 of 836 Resolution. First of

21 all, I would like to ask you to read item 5 of the resolution.

22 A. Are you asking me to read out loud, is that what you are asking?

23 Q. If you find item 5 clear, then you can just interpret for us item

24 5 of the said Resolution.

25 A. If you will allow me, I would like to read it very quickly, read

1 the paragraph very quickly.

2 Q. Thank you. Thank you, General.

3 A. I have read the paragraph. These are words which from the point

4 that I was not receiving any reinforcements in military terms no longer

5 had any significance, at least when I was being asked to deter attacks

6 against the safe areas, to promote the withdrawal and so on or the

7 ceasefire monitors. For that, I would have needed thousands of additional

8 men, men I didn't have. Have I answered your question?

9 Q. Yes, General. Thank you.

10 General, could you tell us within item 5, considering that what is

11 mentioned is defence resistance to attack of protected areas, you as a

12 General and a military expert, can you clarify or at least explain what

13 is meant by the term "protected area"?

14 A. The safe areas that were determined, as I said yesterday, for five

15 cities, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica, these were the

16 areas where we were supposed to protect the population, preventing any

17 attacks on those zones or areas. I think there was two areas where we

18 succeeded in determining the exact limits of the safe areas, that is

19 Srebrenica and -- but there were even challenges about that in the south

20 of that and around Zepa.

21 When I arrived in Sarajevo, and I said that yesterday,

22 General Morillon was making an effort in order to exactly delineate on the

23 ground what the borders of the safe areas were as regards Sarajevo. It

24 was essential for us military people to determine those lines. When the

25 politicians or the diplomats had used a pencil in order to mark out the

1 thickness of what was written, the pencil already represented several

2 kilometres. And so were never able to delineate exactly on the ground

3 what the limits of the safe areas were and this caused constant and

4 eternal discussions and in fact, I would say that I interpreted somewhat

5 as the commander in chief what the limits were, and those limits in the

6 end did -- corresponded to the areas occupied by the parties, both the

7 parties, facing one another, but did not certainly correspond to any

8 limit, any border, which would allow us to carry out the mission which had

9 been given to us by the Security Council. To do so, we would have had to

10 have withdrawals or advances by one or other of the other parties.

11 JUDGE ORIE: I see you are looking --

12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] I think this is a good moment for

13 the break.

14 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until 11.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.

18 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Thank

19 you, Your Honour.

20 Q. General, before the break, we spoke about the safe areas and you

21 told us that Sarajevo, on the basis of Resolution 836, also was a safe

22 area. General, can you tell us if Sarajevo, as a city, could be

23 considered a protected safe area?

24 A. Sarajevo was the city, the safe area, which I was really -- if I

25 had to best protect it because that is where I had the most troops.

1 Asserting that it was protected with the troops that I had, I would say

2 no.

3 Q. General, when you speak of the city of Sarajevo, do you -- did you

4 understand by the term of "protected zone of Sarajevo," understand the

5 area under the control of the BiH army or also the part of the city which

6 was under the control of the Serb army?

7 A. It is clear that in my mind the safe area of Sarajevo was to be or

8 should have included the crests which overlook -- or the ridges that

9 overlook Sarajevo but I have already explained that it was never possible

10 to define exactly what the limits of the safe area, of the regular or

11 normal safe area, of Sarajevo were. And on the ground, in fact, the safe

12 area was, in fact, the one that was occupied by the Muslim -- the Bosnian

13 Muslim troops.

14 Q. General, when you came to the city of Sarajevo, were you aware

15 that the city of Sarajevo was composed of 10 municipalities?

16 A. Yes. I was familiar with the general organisation of Sarajevo,

17 but when you say "municipalities," if I could compare with that a city

18 like Paris, they were more "arrondisements" with local mayors, but I knew

19 that the city of Sarajevo was composed of a whole group of municipalities.

20 Q. When you say that you knew that the city of Sarajevo had a whole

21 series of municipalities, as far as you remember and on the basis of the

22 information you received during your stay in Sarajevo, were you aware of

23 how the city of Sarajevo was divided? To be more precise, did you know

24 which parts of the city of Sarajevo were under the control of the Serb

25 army and which parts under the control of the BH army?

1 A. Of course we had a relatively exact idea of the areas occupied

2 respectively by the Serbs, Muslims and even the Croats. Because the

3 Croats who were fighting with the Muslims and that more or less coincided

4 with the contact line or the confrontation line.

5 Q. General, you told us today that the safe area which you controlled

6 was the area under the control of the Muslim army. Can you confirm to us

7 that the Muslim soldiers used the protection of the UN to organise their

8 soldiers in those safe areas?

9 A. I think that I have already answered that question. It is clear

10 that as of October or November of 1993, and I pointed this out in reports

11 to the highest United Nations authorities, in which I told them that the

12 safe areas were becoming a trap for the UN troops because if the Muslim

13 troops took advantage of those areas in order to organise themselves and

14 to launch operations, military operations, from the safe areas, we were

15 completely out of -- we were completely skewed in respect of Security

16 Resolution 836. The documents are well-known, and I could even refer to

17 what I say in my book, where I almost completely repeated a document that

18 was sent in January to the United Nations authorities in order to point

19 out the dangers of that trap.

20 Q. General, as far as I have understood you, the Muslims abused the

21 protection of the UN in the safe areas to organise their own army and to

22 launch attacks from those safe areas. Can you explain to us what were the

23 UN and UNPROFOR motives to allow such illegal activities of the Muslim

24 army in the safe areas?

25 A. I leave you the responsibility for the word "abuse." And that is

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1 the whole problem of this Resolution 836. I never had the military assets

2 which were sufficient in order to prevent either of the parties from

3 militarily organising itself. And if I can illustrate the problem to the

4 Tribunal, I would say that my mandate, at the very best of things or the

5 very worst of things, was limited to humanitarian assistance. And

6 that by going to Mount Igman, I was already beyond the mandate that had

7 been given to me. It was never modified. And so I would say that I never

8 had the assets which would allow me to prevent either of the warring

9 parties from organising itself, from provoking things or from launching

10 military operations.

11 Q. General, are you telling us that according to you, UNPROFOR did

12 not fulfill its mandate in respect of Sarajevo as a protected area in

13 accordance with Resolution 836?

14 A. Madam, I said one day in Sarajevo during a radio broadcast that I

15 didn't even continue to read the Security Council resolutions because

16 they were of absolutely no use to me. Now, you can conclude from that

17 that the UNPROFOR troops were not in a position to carry out their

18 mission. I would simply add that in order to carry out a mission, one

19 must have the means in order to do so.

20 Q. General, thank you.

21 General, can you confirm to us that on July 12th, when you came to

22 Sarajevo in 1993, whether you were informed that operations Lukavac 93 was

23 being conducted by the Bosnian Serb army and that operation included

24 Jahorina, Treskavica, Bjelasnica, Trnovo, and started from July to August,

25 1993, and all three warring factions took part in that operation?

1 A. When I arrived on the 12th of July, I was briefed about the

2 situation. I believe that there was a war which was widespread all over

3 Bosnia, but it was in central Bosnia between the Croats and Muslims and

4 all around Sarajevo. I don't remember a specific briefing in respect of

5 the cities that you have just mentioned. All I know is that at the end of

6 July, the Serb troops launched a very significant operation in order to

7 surround Sarajevo by taking control over Mount Igman.

8 Q. General, were you informed, when coming to Sarajevo, about what

9 kind of army and what was the number of soldiers under the control of the

10 BH army in the Igman area?

11 A. Madam, I would first say that the United Nations did not allow us

12 to have an intelligence service. Of course, that was an order we did not

13 respect. We tried as much as possible to have one. When I arrived in

14 Sarajevo, General Morillon transmitted to me a description as accurately

15 as possible of what the situation was. I was -- I knew him very well. We

16 had gone to the war college together in Paris. And so he gave me as much

17 information as he had. And when we spoke about the troops fighting on the

18 ground, it was an estimate, more or less correct, because once again, in

19 order to know the number of units fighting on the ground, one has to have

20 an effective intelligence service, which is something which we of course

21 did not have in the beginning of July 1993.

22 Q. General, you are telling us that you were informed and given an

23 assessment by Mr. Morillon about the persons who took part in the

24 operations. Can you tell us whether you received information about how

25 many soldiers the 1st Corps of the BiH army had which covered a part of

1 the city of Sarajevo?

2 A. I certainly did have information at the time but rather than

3 giving an imaginary figure, I would prefer saying to you that I don't

4 remember any more exactly what that number was. I will give you an

5 explanation now which might be more complete.

6 When one speak about a battalion and armies, that means about 800

7 men. And after some time, we realise that a battalion, whether it for

8 the Serb or Croat or Muslim battalion, that represented only sometimes 150

9 men. They also spoke about army corps. But for us that meant 20.000 or

10 25.000 men. But on the ground, maybe there was 3.000 or 4.000 or 5.000.

11 I am also saying that the Muslim army was being reorganised further to

12 General Delic's orders, so I would say that specific figures are not

13 something that I have.

14 Q. General, if I tell you that the 1st Corps of the BiH army in the

15 documents that the Defence has as a UN report in Sarajevo, that there were

16 there brigades of the 1st Corps of the BiH army, that there was a special

17 -- that there were special forces and that there was also an artillery

18 unit, the number of persons ranged from 25.000 and 45.000. Did you have

19 such information and can you confirm whether such an information was

20 correct?

21 A. Yes, there were several brigades. You could also mention the

22 Croat brigade. If in the United Nations' reports they speak -- they

23 mention those numbers, well, you know, going through 20 to 25 -- figures,

24 I would say 20.000 to 45.000 don't mean very much. I don't know how now

25 these figures are particularly significant for me as a United Nations

1 chief.

2 Q. General, were you informed about the zone of responsibility of

3 the 1st Corps? I apologise, when I say, "1st Corps," I mean the 1st

4 Corps of the BiH army.

5 A. I had understood your question. But I suppose that the zone of

6 responsibility of the 1st Corps had been set by General Delic, who was not

7 really obliged to inform me of which limits he had set for his 1st Corps.

8 But I suppose that his zone of responsibility was to defend the Sarajevo

9 zone which he controlled. I don't really know what other zone of

10 responsibility he might have had.

11 Q. General, when I asked you the question about the area of

12 responsibility of the 1st Corps, I thought that you had been informed of

13 the different strategic locations who were under the control of the 1st

14 Corps of the BiH army and which affected the course of fighting which took

15 part in the part of the city of Sarajevo.

16 If I tell you that the main strategic points in the part of

17 Sarajevo which was under the control of the 1st Corps of the BH army was

18 Hum, Zuc, Kordun [phoen], Mojmilo, Golo Brdo, Prijedor [phoen] Brdo,

19 Igman, Colina Kapa, mala and big, and Dolac Brdo, would you say that this

20 information given to you by the Defence about the strategic points under

21 the control of the BH army was a correct piece of information?

22 A. Yes, absolutely. These are names that remind me of something.

23 One might even add Stup, which was south-west of Zuc. So I think that

24 what you are saying is more or less correct.

25 Q. In your view, what was the strategic and operational importance

1 of the party, of the side, that held these under its control?

2 A. I have to admit I don't really quite understand that question,

3 Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Could you rephrase it, Ms. Pilipovic, so that the

5 witness understands.

6 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

7 Q. General, we agreed that the important areas were Dolac, Preda

8 [phoen], Hum, Mojmilo, Golo Brdo, Colina Kapa and Velika Mala, were areas

9 which were under the control of the 1st Corps of the BH army. If I tell

10 you that these areas were areas from which a part of the city of -- that

11 was an area of the city very much under the control of the BH army, could

12 you tell us that an army that controls such important strategic areas is

13 -- had control of that area?

14 A. Well, I will answer from a military point of view. For me, the

15 most important part among those parts was Mount Igman because Mount Igman

16 had the most important ridges, from which one controlled or could

17 completely control the city. And I would say that for the Bosnian army,

18 that is the Muslims, the Mount Igman had an essential significance because

19 Mount Igman controlled the only road allowing the Sarajevo Muslims to have

20 contact with the outside world through the tunnel that went under the

21 airport and then the roads, or one or two roads, which crossed the wooded

22 area of Mount Igman toward Tarcin, et cetera. And that is why

23 the agreement on Mount Igman was so important for the Bosnian army, and

24 General Delic realised this very clearly.

25 Q. General, when we speak about the brigades of the 1st Corps of the

1 BiH army, can you tell us on the basis of your recollection how much were

2 you informed about the command points of the 1st Corps of the BiH army and

3 the headquarters of -- how well were you informed about the deployment of

4 the command post of that army?

5 A. I said yesterday that the only person I spoke with was General

6 Delic. In Sarajevo was the Sector Sarajevo commander who dealt with both

7 the parties, that is either the Serbs or Muslims, from the point of view

8 of the details of the headquarters. The only one of those headquarters

9 which was very important for me was the 1st Bosnian Corps headquarters,

10 which was on Mount Igman at the time that we signed the agreement.

11 The others, or the location of the other headquarters, was not so

12 important for me because headquarters in operations move around, depending

13 on the fighting. And the exact location of those headquarters did not

14 concern me very much as a commander in chief of the United Nations troops

15 in Bosnia.

16 Q. General, could you tell us, for the United Nations observers who

17 were in Sarajevo positioned on the side, on the Papa side, on the side of

18 the Bosnian Serb army, that is for the United Nations monitors who were on

19 that side, how important for the proper reporting, how important was it to

20 know the command posts, not only of the brigades but also of the

21 battalions and companies of the BH army?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter correction: Not the Bosnian Serb

23 side, but the BH side.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The most important for the United

25 Nations observers was to know the contact line between the Serbs and the

1 Muslims, and we knew -- but perhaps we should look at the Sarajevo Sector

2 maps again. We knew the United Nations units that were in Sarajevo. They

3 knew more or less what the limits between the brigades were, that is the

4 Bosnian brigades, because we had quite a few problems with the presence of

5 the Croat brigade in Sarajevo.

6 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, when you say that the observers had to know the

8 demarcation lines of the warring sides, could you tell us, according to

9 you, from a military aspect, on one side, how deep goes the brigade area?

10 A. I cannot answer that question. I don't have a map any more that I

11 can use. By memory, I could not tell you what the limits of the units

12 were in Sarajevo.

13 Q. General, in principal, could you tell us the depth of the front

14 of one brigade?

15 A. Madam, I am going to tell you what I have already said. Without a

16 situation map, I am not able to answer precisely for this Tribunal.

17 Mr. President, it goes back nine years and I cannot answer this type of

18 question.

19 JUDGE ORIE: It needs no explanation. If you don't know, just

20 tell us and -- or if you do not remember. Yes.

21 Please proceed.

22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. General, thank you.

24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. Now, General, if I tell you that in the course of the proceedings

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1 before this Chamber in this case we heard many United Nations observers

2 and we were not able to get from them data and information on the

3 positions of the brigades of the 1st Corps, of the command posts of the

4 battalions of the companies of the 1st Corps of the BH army, nor of the

5 brigades, could you confirm that their reporting, in respect of the

6 shelling that they were saying was coming from the Serb side, could not

7 be precise when we are talking about the shelling of facilities in the

8 city, of the part of the city which was under the control of the BH army?

9 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I object to that question.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

11 MR. IERACE: Yes, I object to that question, Mr. President. It is

12 a non sequitur. The question works from the premise that because, as my

13 learned colleague remembers it, UNMOs were not able to give information in

14 these court proceedings as to the positions of the brigades of the 1st

15 Corps or the command posts, then the proposition continues, the shelling

16 information which they conveyed to the Tribunal or recorded at the time

17 was imprecise. It is a question which simply doesn't make sense.

18 In any event, I challenge the presumption -- the premise, rather.

19 It is my recollection that there was evidence as to the position of the

20 command posts and some of the brigades from some of the UN witnesses.

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: I have had some difficulties, and perhaps some of

25 the other members of the Chamber as well, of the logic of your

1 introduction of the question and then the question itself, since the

2 introduction was about position and knowledge of the brigades, while the

3 question then later was about the source of fire.

4 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I will rephrase

5 my question. I will rephrase my question in a sense that I would like the

6 General to tell us if it was acceptable for the observers of the United

7 Nations, for their area of responsibility, they did not have precise data

8 on the positions of the command post and the positions of the brigades and

9 the battalions of the 1st Corps.

10 Q. Is that generally acceptable that they do not possess this kind of

11 information?

12 A. Madam, I can answer your question very clearly from a military

13 point of view. As regards the shelling of Sarajevo, it really wasn't

14 necessary to know where the chief of the unit was. The most important

15 thing for us was to know where the positions occupied by the men on the

16 contact line was. From that point, we could determine exactly whether

17 the shells fired on Sarajevo were falling on military positions, plus or

18 minus a few metres, and we want to be very clear here for the Tribunal

19 that the location of the headquarters was not at all necessary in order to

20 know exactly where the military or civilian points were.

21 The point was that there was fighting and there was firing.

22 Q. So what you are saying is that, according to you, the point was

23 that there was firing and that there was combat. Could you confirm, and

24 this is the information that the Defence has --

25 A. Madam, I do not think -- I think that --

1 Q. General, I did not finish my question. I would like you to

2 confirm the information that the Defence has is that the Muslims,

3 throughout the war that lasted three and a half years, carried out 88

4 operations; they launched operations and attacks from Sarajevo. Could you

5 confirm that this figure that the Defence has is acceptable to you, how

6 many of these operations were launched, these combats and attacks from

7 the -- by the Muslims, by the BH army?

8 A. If you allow me, Madam, first of all, I will finish my answer to

9 your question about the lines and the headquarters. I repeat that we knew

10 the contact lines and the positions of the troops. The exact delineations

11 between the units had very little importance for us. As regards the

12 fighting, and I am speaking here only about the period of my command, I

13 could tell you that every day, almost every day, there was an

14 exchange of fire on the contact line between the various parties. There

15 were contacts which take place -- I repeat this -- took place almost

16 every day. You are now mentioning the number of 88 or -- alleged

17 operations by the Muslims that were launched from the Sarajevo zone.

18 The figure which you are giving, well, I don't know whether it

19 covers the whole war, only the period of my command. This figure, for me,

20 as the commander of the United Nations troops, whether it is 88 or 40 or

21 68, it all comes down to the same thing: After a certain amount of time,

22 the Muslim troops were in the position to organise themselves and to

23 launch

24 attacks from Sarajevo, attacks about which we have already spoken a great

25 deal with Mr. Ierace.

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we would like

2 to consult.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

4 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. General, you spoke of the agreement for Mount Igman signed in

7 1993. You said that the Serbs handed over to the UN, to the UNPROFOR, a

8 part of Igman that they held and Mount Bjelasnica. Now, according to you,

9 was this an obligation of UNPROFOR for that part of Mount Igman to prevent

10 active operation by Muslim troops from the safe zone of Sarajevo, that

11 part of Mount Igman that was handed over to them by the Serbs?

12 A. I think that one cannot connect - cannot - the Mount Igman

13 operations from those from Sarajevo. The agreement on Mount Igman was

14 wished by Mr. Stoltenberg, and I repeat, it was carried out properly by

15 the two parties. General Mladic accepted it for the first time, agreed to

16 withdraw to Mount Igman, that is, to set up positions beyond the lines

17 that were set up by the United Nations, and the Muslim troops deployed

18 behind the line which had been set in the same way by the United Nations

19 staff. And I repeat, it was more difficult for them than the Serbs. It

20 was probably more difficult for them also.

21 The operation on Mount Igman had, as its essential purpose, and I

22 repeat this, to calm down the situation on the ground so that the major

23 military operations could be finished in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the

24 Stoltenberg-Owen negotiations with the different parties. In light of the

25 area of Mount Igman, I don't think that it was possible to launch

1 operations, military operations, on a large scale at the point that we

2 were on Mount Igman. Because neither party had the available infantry

3 troops in order to control such a wooded surface.

4 Q. General, if I tell you, if I put it to you that the Muslim army

5 from Mount Igman that was under the control of UNPROFOR launched offensive

6 operations in the direction of parts of Mount Igman that were under the

7 control of Republika Srpska, do you have such information that these

8 operations were carried out by the Muslim army?

9 A. I said that in the first days of executing the Mount Igman

10 agreement, General Delic had much more difficulty carrying out the orders

11 than the Serb part of General Galic. And I think that in the first days

12 of August, the Muslim troops were trying to take back control of two

13 hills, but which were lower than 500 or 600 metres, and it is true that

14 there was a constant effort on the part of the UN troops to have the

15 Muslim troops withdraw. And I would even say that there was an exchange

16 of fire between the United Nations troops and the Muslim troops. A French

17 captain was very seriously wounded at that time and that caused a very,

18 very strong reaction from General Cot to Mr. Izetbegovic. So in the

19 beginning, the Muslim troops tried to infiltrate into certain areas, to

20 take them back. But I think that, in general, the agreement was respected

21 because in 1995, that was where the rapid reaction forces under the

22 command of General Soubirou deployed.

23 Q. General, if I put it to you that in this -- General, in this

24 area, if I put it to you that UNPROFOR took control of the part of Mount

25 Igman which was under the control of the BH army, the BH army carried out

1 an attack and massacred a Serb battalion, four nurses were massacred at

2 the time. In the course of your mandate, did you receive this

3 information or any such information?

4 A. I didn't have any information. And I would tell you that I am

5 very surprised that General Mladic never spoke to me about that, if, in

6 fact, that happened. And so I said to you a little while ago, I know that

7 there were operations conducted mainly in the early August by the

8 Muslim troops, but I repeat that General Mladic never spoke to me about

9 that type of incident.

10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will now let my

11 colleague take over the cross-examination.

12 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, before that happens, I note that in

13 her last question, Ms. Pilipovic has put a proposition to the witness.

14 It would be appropriate, in my respectful submission, for her to indicate

15 the date that that event was claimed to have occurred. Thank you.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Is it of any importance after the witness said he

17 has no knowledge of it?

18 MR. IERACE: It is important in a sense that it seems to be part

19 of the Defence case, putting propositions, and given the fact that the

20 General was in his position for some six months, if she knows the date,

21 then that should be put or indicated, for the benefit of the Chamber

22 rather than the witness.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think I did say

24 during the mandate of the General when he was in Sarajevo, if he had

25 received such an information. I believe that is how I phrased my

1 question.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but do you have a date? Or, I mean, you are

3 talking about a certain incident. If it is part of the case of the

4 Defence, then it would be appropriate to put to the witness what, in the

5 view of the Defence, happened and when it happened. Let me just see.

6 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that was --

7 JUDGE ORIE: May I just say, if you said: "In the course of your

8 mandate." The transcript reads: "In the course of your mandate, did you

9 receive this information or any such information?"

10 Well, receiving the information during the mandate is not

11 necessarily the same as the incident having taken place during the

12 mandate. So if you could be more specific.

13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

14 Q. General, in the course of your mandate, were you informed of the

15 incident when a battalion was massacred, battalion of the army of

16 Republika Srpska in Mount Igman, when four nurses were massacred; or

17 perhaps you may have received this information after the end of your

18 mandate?

19 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, that does nothing to respond to the

20 issue.

21 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that it is the case of the Defence that

22 this happened during the mandate of the General?

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence has the

24 information that this took place in September, 1993.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you could put that to the witness.

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1 Are you aware of such an attack that happened --

2 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Such an incident --

3 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...such an

4 incident --

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Madam, I repeat the answer that I

6 gave a few minutes ago. I received no information from General Mladic

7 about those events.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Not from anyone else?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From no one else. If you will

10 excuse me, Mr. President.

11 JUDGE ORIE: That is a clear answer. You don't know anything

12 about it. You have no information about it.

13 So, therefore, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, please proceed.

14 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

15 Q. [Interpretation] General, good morning.

16 A. Good morning.

17 Q. Thank you for being here and thank you for the clarity of your

18 answers. I will cross-examine you in French, and I thank you in advance

19 for being very careful as to the cursor which is moving in front of your

20 eyes on the transcript, because everything we say will be interpreted in

21 both languages and we have to be very careful about this. Thank you in

22 advance.

23 General, you said on several occasions, and I am going to quote in

24 French, how can it happen that Sarajevo is not shelled. And then later on

25 you said it was impossible to avoid certain civilian areas. And then at

1 another point in time, you said that the age of the ammunition caused

2 naturally mistakes in firing. And at another time you said, that is in

3 December 1993, that the BH army was preparing its operations from the

4 civilian area.

5 Do you remember if that is what you said; yes or no?

6 A. Of course.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Therefore, and starting from these facts, when you say that it is

9 impossible to avoid the shelling of Sarajevo, you want to say at the same

10 time that the age of the ammunition was naturally causing mistakes in

11 firing; yes or no?

12 A. Yes, in some cases, yes.

13 Q. Thank you. You also want to say the smallness of the area and the

14 proximity of the combat areas and the so-called urban area would obviously

15 give cause to such kind of shelling; yes or no?

16 A. I will not answer by saying "yes or no" because I think I've got

17 to given an explanation. I think that when a contact line crosses a city

18 or in which two parties are fighting because both parties believe that

19 they can win the war, it is inevitable that if one uses mortar artillery,

20 there will be shells that fall on areas that could be called civilian

21 areas. That seems to be very clear to me.

22 Q. General, thank you for your answer.

23 Therefore, you are saying that the shelling of Sarajevo was

24 meaning -- that you gave your answer that it was unavoidable. Inasmuch as

25 what you said --

1 A. I would say that it became inevitable from the point that the

2 Bosnian troops decided to conduct military operations from safe areas.

3 Admittedly, it wasn't inevitable when the Bosnian troops were not carrying

4 out any operations in Sarajevo. But from the time - and I believe I have

5 already answered seven or eight times the same question - at the point the

6 both parties decided to wage war against each other, it became inevitable

7 that when there was an exchange of artillery fire, that there would be

8 shells falling on areas where there were civilians.

9 Q. General, thank you for your answer.

10 However, I don't think that you answered the question I am going

11 to ask you about Sarajevo. You said that the BH army was preparing their

12 military operations from some kind of rear base which was located in

13 civilian areas. Do you remember that?

14 A. From a military point of view, I don't know what you mean by "rear

15 base" in Sarajevo, when you look at the limits of the city.

16 Q. We will come to that. We will come to that, General. But let us

17 just say that was behind the lines.

18 A. Sir, you are saying something which is very obvious in terms of

19 military matters. When an attack is being prepared, of course it is being

20 prepared behind the contact line that one crosses in order to conquer a

21 territory.

22 Q. Very well, General, when you say this is evident for you, it is

23 not evident for everyone else, this obviousness to prepare an operation in

24 the background behind the lines, and that is certainly evident that

25 whatever is happening in this zone at the back, then becomes -- that area

1 then becomes a legitimate area for the firing?

2 A. We are continuing a discussion -- is this a military discussion

3 that we are continuing, Mr. President?

4 JUDGE ORIE: A question has been put to you and it seems that a

5 military aspect.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I will answer.

7 It is very technical in military terms but I am going to answer

8 as a professional. From the point when two parties have decided to wage

9 war and one party notes that an operation is being prepared, if one has

10 identified the exact spot where the preparations are taking place, from a

11 strictly military point of view, you can attack those making the

12 preparations. So it becomes a normal target. It is always that way that

13 things happen in our military instructions of Western democracies. I

14 cannot give any other answer. And I emphasise this, that when two parties

15 have decided to fight, the military objectives become normal ones for both

16 parties who are fighting.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you for your answer, General, and obviously we are not as

19 expert as you are. That is the reason we are asking these questions.

20 When two sides are waging war, are fighting, is it true that throughout

21 your stay in Sarajevo that two sides were -- considered themselves in the

22 state of war?

23 A. My answer is very clear. When I arrived in July, the Serbs were

24 shelling Sarajevo, whereas the Muslim troops were not preparing any

25 operation.

1 Q. The question was not to find out whether people were shelling each

2 other or not, but whether the two sides, General, were considering

3 themselves during the time of your stay as being in a state of armed

4 conflict or in a state of war?

5 A. Throughout the period of my command, since there was no peace

6 agreement, the three parties to the conflict considered themselves as

7 being in a state of war, one in respect of the other.

8 Q. Thank you for your answer, General.

9 Now, I would like you to answer briefly to the following

10 questions, and I am talking about a principal, these questions have --

11 cover a general aspect rather than the practical aspect in the situation

12 of Sarajevo, but a general aspect. .

13 Now, General, is it true - and if you can answer by "yes" or "no,"

14 I would be very grateful - it is true that a command post is a legitimate

15 military target?

16 A. A command post, when it is identified, is a legitimate target.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 General, is it true that a command post is a legitimate military

19 target, whether it is on the level of a brigade, the level of a battalion

20 or on the level of a company?

21 A. Whatever the command post, I have answered the question.

22 Q. Thank you. I am repeating that we are not answers -- we are not

23 experts, but your answers are extremely important to us.

24 General, the installations of communications and

25 telecommunications, the facilities of such type, were also -- can also be

1 considered as being military targets?

2 A. If they were identified as command posts, because when you say

3 communications and telecommunications that is connected to command posts,

4 I answer, yes. If they are communications facilities where civilian

5 telecommunications, I would say, no.

6 Q. General, if installations or telecommunications, civilian

7 telecommunications, are used for military purposes, do they then become

8 technically, from a military aspect, do they then become legitimate

9 military targets?

10 A. If you are sure that those facilities are being used for military

11 communications, then I would say, yes, as a professional soldier.

12 Q. Thank you for the clarity of your answer, General. I appreciate

13 that. Now, a military vehicle or military vehicles, are they legitimate

14 military targets?

15 A. Of course.

16 Q. Thank you for the obviousness of your answer.

17 Now civilian vehicles, General, that are used exclusively for

18 military purposes, do they become legitimate military targets?

19 A. I would tend to say, yes, but I would say in order to be sure that

20 they are being used for military purposes, that is not always so clear.

21 Q. I completely agree with you. But my answer was about the type of

22 the vehicle. So your answer is "yes" in relation to the vehicles, if I

23 understand correctly, General?

24 A. I answered that if one can determine that the civilian vehicles

25 are being used in military operations or being used by military people,

1 then they become a military target.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 General, were you or your services informed of the fact that - and

4 I have to tell you that we have multiple testimonies in this respect

5 - that certain vehicles which were originally of civilian character, for

6 instance, Volkswagen Golf vehicles, were used to transport mortars from

7 which then attacks were launched. Did you know about that?

8 A. I knew that all the possible and imaginable vehicles were being

9 used.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.

11 MR. IERACE: The last half dozen words of that question do not

12 reflect the evidence. "Were used to transport mortars," and then these

13 following words are the important ones: "from which then attacks were

14 launched." I also make the fundamental objection to, in this type of

15 context, my learned colleague informing the witness of what he thinks

16 other witnesses have said. It bears no relevance with this type of

17 question. More fundamentally, I am not aware of evidence, certainly from

18 multiple witnesses, that mortars were launched from Golf cars. Thank you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, could you rephrase your question

20 and perhaps --

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, again, I would

22 suggest that the French channel should be listened to. That would be a

23 lot clearer for everyone. And I think that the General understood my

24 question. It is technically not possible to fire from a Golf; that can

25 be very dangerous. Attacks were carried out with mortars.

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1 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...blame the other

2 party for not listening to the right channel. I am changing from channel

3 again and again. The question was whether you had any information about

4 civilian vehicles, Volkswagen Golfs, used to transport mortars and then

5 mortars being fired in connection with this transportation.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very specifically, I would say, no,

7 to the question. In general terms, this was one of my fears, that all

8 the vehicles, and I say all vehicles, all possible and imaginable vehicles

9 were being used by all the parties. And I would add, Mr. President,

10 because I think that is important, that United Nations vehicles were

11 car-jacked and that caused me a great deal of concern. I believe that I

12 have answered the question.

13 JUDGE ORIE: So no specific knowledge of mortars being transported

14 in civilian vehicles, at least vehicles with a civilian appearance?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you, General.

19 Did you or your intelligence services, did you know of the

20 existence of small lorries or small trucks, and we have testimony to this

21 effect, from which it was possible --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, it is of no use in this context

23 to tell the witness what the evidence was already. It may sometimes have

24 some use, but not here. So would you please refrain from that.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I apologise, Mr.

1 President. Very well.

2 Q. General, do you or your intelligence or information services, did

3 you know about lorries, small lorries from which it was possible or --

4 rather, it was possible to fire mortars that were mounted on them; they

5 became mobile mortars?

6 A. I had no information about that.

7 Q. Do you know, General -- do you know of the fact that

8 General Morillon had to protest the Presidency, that is the Presidency of

9 Sarajevo, in relation to the shots that were fired from the hospital

10 compound of the -- the compound of the Kosevo hospital?

11 A. When I took over General Morillon's command, he didn't speak to me

12 about that problem.

13 Q. Very well. But did you know about this?

14 A. I have just answered that he did not speak to me about that

15 problem. And if General Morillon did not speak to me about it, then I

16 attributed no importance to all kinds of rumours I heard coming from

17 everywhere.

18 Q. Very well, General I understand, but my question was the

19 following, if you can answer precisely. That is why I am rephrasing the

20 question. I am asking the question again. The General didn't speak to

21 you, but when you left, did you know about this?

22 A. No. I had no specific knowledge about that.

23 Q. Thank you, General.

24 Now, I would like us to go to another line of questioning, but in

25 order to respect the time, because I can see that the president is

1 looking at the clock.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, how much time

3 have we got left, please?

4 JUDGE ORIE: I think you would have another -- a bit less than an

5 hour. Approximately 50, 55 minutes.

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

7 Q. General, I would like you to answer this question: Did you know

8 whether in Sarajevo some schools were used by the army, either for

9 tactical purposes or in order to use them instead of barracks which were

10 not existent?

11 A. No.

12 Q. You say "no"?

13 A. I didn't know.

14 Q. You don't know it. Very well.

15 Colonel -- I apologise -- General, I would like us to go back to

16 another question now. You said that when some shelling took place on the

17 areas that you considered as being civilian areas, you would intervene

18 personally with the military authorities in question. Do you remember

19 that?

20 A. Yes, of course. I think I have already answered that question

21 several times.

22 Q. Very well. Thank you.

23 But you didn't answer this one: What was the effect, the result,

24 of your intervention? Was there a marked decrease in the shelling?

25 A. I have already answered that question, also. We often noted that

1 there was a drop, which I wouldn't say was lasting, but there was a drop

2 in the amount of firing after our interventions. That happened rather

3 frequently.

4 Q. Is that the rule?

5 A. Yes, it was rather the rule, until November.

6 Q. Thank you very much.

7 General, I would like us to go back to some other questions. Do

8 you know what is a C4? The C4.

9 A. No, that doesn't mean anything to me, C4.

10 Q. Now, I will surprise you, General, that is an explosive which is

11 used to blow buildings up.

12 A. I am not an explosives export.

13 Q. Neither am I, but I will not ask that question.

14 General, do you know if in Sarajevo there was considerable black

15 market specifically in relation to products that were -- or produce that

16 was imported or brought in by humanitarian aids?

17 A. Yesterday I answered a question of Mr. Ierace on that subject. I

18 was well aware that there was a black market in Sarajevo that was the

19 subject of an investigation. And I remember the visit of an Austrian

20 General, General Grandel, who came to investigate the problem of the black

21 market. He really annoyed us quite a bit -- or that "it" annoyed us.

22 Yes, it is true that there was a problem of black market in Sarajevo.

23 Q. General, is it true, was it possible to find produce that was

24 brought in by the humanitarian aid which was then being resold in certain

25 markets, for instance, in Tuzla?

1 A. I would not refer to Tuzla. I would simply say that when

2 humanitarian aid was distributed, certain inhabits of Sarajevo preferred

3 to be hungry so that they could read or smoke a cigarette, et cetera. So

4 we were very aware that humanitarian rations were sold among the

5 population, whether resold on the Tuzla market, that I don't know. But it

6 is so that we were very aware that when we gave out humanitarian

7 assistance to someone, it was assistance that he could do with what he

8 wanted.

9 Q. Thank you for that answer.

10 Now, did you know, General, whether this black market was

11 organised on another level, on a more organised criminal level?

12 A. I have no evidence, no proof about that.

13 Q. Thank you for your answer. You say you have no proof, but do you

14 at least have a feeling about this?

15 A. In a city under siege like Sarajevo, I can well imagine that some

16 people got rich on the black market, and I explained that at great

17 length in my book.

18 Q. I am going to ask you to give me the references. I will

19 certainly have a look at it. I don't know whether the Chamber will read

20 it. So could I consider your answer as being yes?

21 A. That is a completely personal opinion. It seems to me that the

22 black market was organised beyond the level of individual level of

23 inhabitants of Sarajevo.

24 Q. Thank you for your answer, General.

25 I would like to go back to the shelling. You said earlier, asked

1 by the Prosecution, that, "As a general rule, the Serbs, since we are

2 talking about the Serb army, was shelling most the military targets. They

3 were more targeting military targets than civilian targets. In fact, I

4 intervened." Do you remember that?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you, General.

7 If you confirm if this is the case, that the material

8 destruction, the most important material destruction that took place that

9 was as a result of the shelling took place in Sarajevo, occurred in

10 Sarajevo in the areas which were areas in the vicinity of the

11 confrontation lines or in the vicinity of the combat areas?

12 I am talking about Otes, for instance, or again in areas that were

13 near strategic incontestable military targets, strategic targets. I am

14 talking about near the Dobrinja market. Could you perhaps confirm this as

15 principle?

16 A. I believe that I have answered that question. I believe that I

17 said it was very difficult to answer by saying, "yes" or "no." Perhaps I

18 could add an additional comment --

19 Q. General, I have to interrupt. I don't think that this question

20 was asked. My question was the following: Is it true, yes or no, that

21 material damages in buildings and urban structures were the most

22 important in the areas, more considerable in the areas near combat areas,

23 near combat areas or near strategic targets?

24 A. I won't answer by "yes" or "no," and for the following reason:

25 During the periods of my command, perhaps I could answer "yes." But when

1 I arrived in Sarajevo, what surprised me the most was to see the amount of

2 significant destruction throughout the city.

3 Q. Very well.

4 But I was talking about the most significant damage. Can I

5 consider, General, that in relation to the phrasing of my question, the

6 most significant damage, would you agree with me then?

7 A. I don't know what you mean by, "the most significant damage."

8 When I went through Sarajevo along what was called "sniping alley," almost

9 all the buildings or civilian apartments were burned or destroyed or had

10 been shelled. That was what I noted when I arrived in Sarajevo. And I

11 repeat that throughout my stay in Sarajevo, thanks to the action that we

12 conducted, I had the impression - and this is a completely personal

13 impression but for me it is a certainty - that essentially from October to

14 December, essentially, military objectives were shelled more than civilian

15 targets.

16 Q. Thank you for the clarity of your question [sic], General.

17 General, I would like us to go on to some technical questions.

18 Did you personally know, and I know that without a map it is very

19 difficult, but did you know yourself, did you know the depth of the lines

20 of the separation in Sarajevo, demarcation lines of Sarajevo?

21 A. Like in all cities, the contact lines, I recall -- sorry, went

22 from several metres, from several dozen metres, because from that point on

23 you can't see.

24 Q. Thank you for your answer, General.

25 Now, I would like us to have a look at the question of ceasefires.

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1 We know, and you told us, that ceasefires were -- either didn't hold or

2 were never signed. Do you know if on the side of the Presidency, there

3 was in some way a political will not to accept ceasefires -- ceasefire in

4 Sarajevo, and only for political reasons. Did you know about that?

5 A. I will answer here by mentioning what I wrote in my book about

6 that. And this is the general idea that I had of the situation in

7 Sarajevo. Sarajevo could not be a calm city because for the Bosnian

8 Presidency, if nothing happened any more in Sarajevo, that would mean that

9 people would never -- would not continue to speak about

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the outside world. And for the Serbs, Sarajevo

11 could not remain calm either because Sarajevo was a way of putting

12 constant pressure in order to make the Muslims sign a peace agreement.

13 Therefore, I was well aware of that fact and, moreover, the situation

14 could not remain calm for a long time in Sarajevo because of that. In

15 fact, both parties were uninterested in having a calm situation in

16 Sarajevo.

17 Q. Thank you for your answer, General.

18 I would like, because of the rules of the cross-examination, I

19 would like to ask you to answer as briefly as possible to my questions. I

20 am going to come back to the Muslim side in the conflict. Should I

21 interpret your answer as saying that you are answering "yes" in a sense

22 that the Muslim side did not wish to have a ceasefire for political

23 reasons?

24 A. I don't agree with that proposal. Because now I am going to say

25 how I felt -- our experience of the negotiations that were going on. The

1 Muslim side always hoped that NATO would become involved in a decisive

2 way in respect of a peace agreement. This was the -- or rather one of the

3 main objects -- objectives of Izetbegovic, that is, to make NATO

4 intervene.

5 Q. General, I am going to have to interrupt you, because that was my

6 line of questioning. So I will continue in this direction so that things

7 become clearer.

8 Are you saying that the attitude of the Presidency in Sarajevo at

9 a given time, at the time that you have known during your stay, consisted

10 of -- consisted in refusing immediate peace through ceasefires or other

11 agreements, hoping to be able to obtain, in one way or another, an

12 intervention, a NATO intervention that you spoke of?

13 A. I will repeat what I think I have already said. Mr. Izetbegovic

14 accepted, or would have anticipated a peace agreement -- would have

15 accepted the Stoltenberg-Owen peace agreement so long that NATO would make

16 him absolutely sure that the peace agreement would be respected.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 General, were you informed of the fact that when some ceasefires

19 were obtained, that this was either de facto or de lege, the parties, the

20 sides in the conflict, but in fact it was the Muslim side which would then

21 provoke, through firing, through shooting, in the hope of destroying

22 the ceasefire, either legal or factual?

23 A. Sir, I would say to you that the three parties to the conflict

24 all ignored the ceasefire. I would not like to give a better role to one

25 than to another of those parties.

1 Q. Very well. But isn't it, however, true that in relation to the

2 question, in respect to the question that I asked you, General, the

3 provocations came in with this particular purpose?

4 A. I answered that the three parties, according to their own

5 interests, would --

6 Q. But you did not answer sufficiently clearly, at least for me. Is

7 it true, yes or no, General, that the Muslim side were provoking in the

8 military sense, in order to undermine the ceasefire?

9 A. It did the same thing as all the other parties.

10 Q. Very well. Thank you for your answer.

11 General, do you know or were you informed at the time of your stay

12 in Sarajevo of a situation, a rather specific situation, where the Muslim

13 side tried, and sometimes in a very dramatic way, to draw the attention on

14 itself for political purposes, for the purpose of sensitising the press

15 presenting the situation as being theirs? Did you know about that or were

16 you informed about that?

17 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, the last word of that question, I did

18 not hear. I think the transcript is catching up now. Thank you. I have

19 no further comment.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to ask you, sir, what

22 do you mean "sometimes"? Or what do you mean when you say "a dramatic

23 situation"?

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I will answer later but this is my next question but, General, can

1 you answer in principle and I will continue in more details if you want

2 A. I want to answer but once you've explained what you mean by --

3 when you say "very dramatic."

4 Q. Very well, General. What I was trying to say is that we believe

5 that, on some occasions, Muslim forces either exploited the situation of

6 human misery or in the media or were directly provoking the situations

7 causing the situation of human misery in order to draw attention on

8 themselves. The question is: Were you personally informed of this or

9 your intelligence services or other services, did they know about this?

10 A. I could answer by a sentence which is on the back of the

11 McKenzie's book, the Canadian General who was the first commander in

12 Sarajevo, and he said that "If I could convince both parties, and I say

13 both parties, that they should not fight -- should not fire on one zone

14 population in order to please CNN, that would be progress." I have no

15 proof, therefore, that one party fired on its own people in order to

16 provoke a media explosion. I would say that in Sarajevo it was very

17 tempting for the Muslims, of course, to use as much as they could all the

18 media, the international media, present in Sarajevo, in order to defend

19 their own cause.

20 They did so. And since you are the Defence counsel, I would also

21 say what I said, and I think that I said it yesterday in answer to a

22 question of Mr. Ierace, the Serb side did not realise that by shelling

23 Sarajevo the way it was doing, it was losing all its credit with the

24 international community. I believe that I can say to you that it was

25 extremely difficult for the UNPROFOR forces, commanders, to remain

1 objective and measured in the light of this extraordinary media pressure,

2 and that one can be understood in respect of the parties, that this media

3 coverage was being exploited for their own purposes.

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] General, we are being informed

5 that --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Would this be a suitable time for the break?

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Perfect.

8 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until 10 minutes to 1.00.

9 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 12.55 p.m.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Q. General, I would like us to continue along the line that we

14 followed before the break. You said, quoting a sentence on the last page

15 or on the back page of the book written by a colleague, General McKenzie.

16 Personally speaking, do you personally agree with this sentiment that was

17 expressed?

18 A. I want to answer that question. My personal impression has

19 absolutely nothing to do with what we are talking about. I am simply

20 going to speak about facts that I noted myself. If I didn't do it, I take

21 no position.

22 Q. Very well. General, I am going to come back to the black market

23 question. Is it true, and this is a fact, that the fuel which was

24 lacking, there was a shortage of fuel in Sarajevo, the actual market of

25 fuel was controlled by the BH army?

1 A. I don't know whether the fuel market was in the hands of the

2 Muslim army, but in light of the situation in Sarajevo, from a strictly

3 professional point of view, I would say that it was normal that the

4 Muslims would control the use of gasoline that was there.

5 Q. Thank you, General. I understand that you have written a book.

6 Is that true?

7 A. Of course.

8 Q. Can I assume that you were particularly well-documented as to what

9 went on in Sarajevo in order to be able to write this book. Is that

10 correct?

11 A. I base myself on all the documentation that I had, letters, and

12 so forth.

13 Q. So you made this effort, I believe, after your stay in Sarajevo?

14 A. I did it after my stay in Sarajevo and I would even say after I

15 was retired.

16 Q. Very well. General, thank you. Therefore you have a distance and

17 you were able to base yourself on the perhaps more numerous pieces of

18 information than you had at the time when -- during your stay in Sarajevo.

19 Is that correct?

20 A. No, I based myself only on what I had personally experienced in

21 Sarajevo.

22 Q. Very well. General, you were responsibility for Sarajevo in

23 Sarajevo. Is that correct?

24 A. As the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was

25 responsible for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of course including

1 Sarajevo.

2 Q. Very well. So the answer is "yes." So in this capacity, you must

3 know a large number of things. So in order to gain time, I am going to

4 now give you a list of names and I would like you to tell me, very

5 briefly, by a yes or no if you know to what this corresponds and where

6 this is.

7 I am going now: Sultan Fatih?

8 A. It doesn't say anything to me.

9 Q. Pavle Goranin?

10 A. Doesn't mean anything to me.

11 Q. Petar Dakic?

12 A. No. Could I stop for a moment here? I gave a long explanation

13 yesterday to the Tribunal that I would have discussions with

14 Mr. Izetbegovic, with General Delic. I know both of their deputies, the

15 Serb, the Croat, and I don't know all those names. I have no memory of

16 those.

17 Q. Thank you. This is not people, these are locations. Kobra?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Kulin Ban --

20 MR. IERACE: Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

22 MR. IERACE: Having said, "This is not people, these are

23 locations," the next question or name or word that my friend added was

24 Kobra. I gather that Kobra does not in fact refer to a location and

25 perhaps that illustrates to -- perhaps that illustrates the difficulty in

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1 simply running words with no description past a witness.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. On the other hand, Mr. Ierace, if we ask

3 Mr. Piletta-Zanin to tell us a lot about it, he always pronounces it very

4 quickly. So perhaps if he could pronounce it more quietly and then it is

5 a very quick way to find out whether it does ring a bell at all with the

6 witness. All explanations, to finally come to the answer that the witness

7 doesn't know anything about it, is not very efficient as well.

8 So, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, please proceed but keep in mind that at a

9 high speed mentioning 10 or 15 or 20 names, well, might cause a lot of

10 confusion and misunderstanding.

11 Please proceed.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel repeat the name.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Kobra?

16 A. It doesn't mean anything to me. And I would like to add a

17 comment --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Briquemont, the Defence counsel is trying to find

19 out whether certain names, these might be perhaps names of places or

20 institutions or whether they are familiar to you. Because if they are not

21 familiar, it might be of no use at all to ask any further questions.

22 So he goes through the list of his names. If they do not ring a bell,

23 please tell us that. Just by saying "no" would be enough. And if they do

24 ring a bell, perhaps there are some additional questions. Yes. Please.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you in advance. Thank

1 you, Mr. President.

2 Q. Sir, the question -- the answer is "no" to Kobra. Kulin Ban?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Does the factory Zrak mean anything to you?

5 A. [No audible response]

6 Q. Does Zetra mean anything to you? Zetra which is one of the

7 facilities, one of the halls, which was made for the Olympic Games. Was

8 that used as a warehouse by the BH army?

9 A. Zetra?

10 Q. Zetra.

11 A. It was occupied during my command period by a battalion of the

12 FrenchBat company. So Zetra was occupied by the UN troops during my

13 command at the time. At the end of July of 1993, we had a serious

14 incident there. And yesterday, I said that Mr. Karadzic even apologised

15 to the UN forces for that incident which had caused the loss of several UN

16 vehicles.

17 Q. Thank you, General. Does the name Kazani mean anything to you?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Thank you. General, I would now like to come back to the question

20 of snipers. You said in your earlier declaration followed by a question

21 asked by the Prosecution that the sniping activity, BH snipers was not in

22 any way less than the Serb snipers. Do you remember that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. When you say that the activity was in no way less intense, do you

25 mean quantitatively or in terms of quality?

1 A. I would answer in terms of quantity. And qualitatively, I think I

2 answered at length that question that was asked by Mr. Ierace.

3 Q. So what you saying is that there is no difference, there was no

4 difference, in terms of quality, that is the way that the snipers were

5 used on either side?

6 A. In respect of the use of snipers, I believe --

7 MR. IERACE: I object. As translated into the English language,

8 the question goes to the quality of sniping, which in my respectful

9 submission does not make sense. If my friend means by that that he is

10 enquiring as to whether snipers were used equally against military

11 personnel and civilians, then he should say so.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, "quality" could mean a lot of

13 thing.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed. But I believe

15 that the answer that the General was going to give was also very clear.

16 Perhaps he can repeat it because I think that he understood the question.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, a clear answer to an unclear

18 question is not what we are seeking. But if you -- yes, please.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am going to rephrase the

20 question.

21 Q. Was it used in the same way on both sides?

22 A. It was used for the same purposes.

23 Q. Thank you, General. General --

24 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interfere. The purposes could be

25 different purposes. If you say in the same purposes, I still do not know

1 what the purpose was. Was the purpose to shoot at military or to shoot

2 at civilians? You said it was the same on both sides. Could you explain

3 to us what the purpose was?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe very sincerely,

5 Mr. President, that the objectives were basically civilians in order to

6 put pressure on the population.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

8 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Q. General, in your capacity as a professional, could you tell us

11 what a sniper is, as far as you know, according to your experience?

12 A. A sniper is what one calls an elite firer, that is someone who

13 has -- who shoots a weapon over a great distance, and that weapon is used

14 to hit individual targets from a long distance.

15 Q. Thank you, General.

16 General, you spoke in your testimony yesterday about uncontrolled

17 elements. That was page 79, line 6. When you were speaking of

18 uncontrolled elements, General, do you also mean to say what I would tend

19 to call "quasi-snipers," that is, individuals who were not members of an

20 army but who were -- in some way were playing at judges?

21 A. I think that I answered that question yesterday. The snipers

22 were a constant and serious concern for us. I had the personal opinion

23 or, rather, impression there were armed people - allow me to say it - they

24 were playing at being snipers. It was something very difficult.

25 Q. When you say that they were people who were armed who were playing

1 as snipers, and I apologise, General, for coming back to that, but what is

2 clear to you after many months on the ground is not obviously clear for

3 Defence counsel or anyone else.

4 When you are speaking of people, people who were armed, you are

5 talking about people who were not members of an army, that is, in other

6 words, these were individuals, these were civilians then?

7 A. That is a personal impression. But I had the impression that they

8 were people who were armed, who had weapons, and who were not members of

9 any organised army. That is a personal impression, I repeat that.

10 Q. Thank you, General, for your impression. But since you were on

11 the ground and in the field, we need your impressions in order for the

12 truth to come out. You say that these people were armed. Did they have

13 access or could they also have automatic weapons? We know, for instance,

14 AK-47 or the Kalashnikov was very wide-spread in the countries of the

15 former Yugoslavia.

16 A. Yes. But Kalashnikov has nothing to do with a marksman's weapon.

17 Q. Indeed. But what you are saying is that the people who were

18 individuals also had elite weapons?

19 A. Perhaps not so sophisticated weapons as we might have in the

20 United Nations -- among the United Nations troops. But Kalashnikovs does

21 not allow precise firing beyond 150 or 200 metres.

22 Q. So, General, I conclude from your answer is that these armed

23 persons that you do not believe were part of a military structure had

24 weapons of -- high-precision weapons?

25 A. Not necessarily high-precision, but I can tell you that there are

1 weapons that make it possible to fire from 400 to 500 metres with

2 relatively great accuracy. They can be used as second-category snipers.

3 Q. General, could you please be a little bit specific on the type of

4 the weapon? Could you give us one or two examples of this type of weapon?

5 A. If I take the case that I am the best familiar with, the weapons

6 of my country, we have ordinary rifles that do fire, if used by good

7 people, up to distances of 400 to 500 metres. The Kalashnikov is an

8 automatic weapon which does not allow a very precise fire.

9 Q. General, when you -- I think we have a problem of an echo. I

10 don't know whether this is just in my headphones, but I will continue.

11 General, whether you are talking about sniping weapons --

12 JUDGE ORIE: I am keeping very strict to the time. You have eight

13 minutes left.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well.

15 Q. General, when you are speaking about weapons, marksman weapons,

16 sniper weapons, high-precision weapons, are you then speaking of the

17 automatic firing?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you. So you are talk about automatic bursts. They are not

20 linked to the sniper weapons?

21 A. Nothing to do with it.

22 Q. Very well, General. Now I would like us to have a look at some

23 other questions that are in relation to civilian areas. What do you mean

24 in general by "civilian area"?

25 A. A civilian area is a zone which people live and where there is no

1 possible military objectives.

2 Q. Thank you for your answer, General. Therefore, a residential area

3 where there would be a command post or a strategic facility that had

4 military importance, then that is no longer a civilian area. Is that

5 correct, as far as you are concerned?

6 A. If you are a speaking about one building, I would say that the

7 building, or I would say that the floor where a command post was

8 identified becomes a military objective, but certainly not the area around

9 that building. So I make a very clear distinction between a building, a

10 location, and I would even say a floor, when I think about Sarajevo,

11 that could become a military target, but certainly not the area around

12 that dwelling or that floor.

13 Q. Very well. So you rule out all mistakes of firing?

14 A. A firing error, well, I would say that is always possible. But if

15 you take a 20-floor building, you might make a mistake as to the floor,

16 but not fire at the building next door.

17 Q. Very well, General. Now, I am going to come back to one of the

18 consequences of the conventions, the convention that you know extremely

19 well. Isn't it true that when we are in such a situation, combat in an

20 urban area, there is an obligation between the warring parties to look to

21 create neutral zones on the level of civilian populations, that is, if

22 need be, to remove the populations away from the front line?

23 A. That is theory.

24 Q. Yes, General, that is theory perhaps but, please, could you answer

25 as a witness, quasi-expert witness? Could you answer my question, please,

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1 even if it is theoretical?

2 A. We didn't try to do that in Sarajevo. It was not possible.

3 Q. Now, General, my question is the following: Isn't it true that,

4 normally speaking, that the text makes this point very clear?

5 A. Well, if the text makes it clear, then I would say, yes.

6 Q. Very well, thank you. Do you know, General, if the Muslim side

7 did exactly this in Sarajevo, if they carried out this movement of their

8 own population in the areas of combat or near the areas of the separation,

9 in the areas of separation, demarcation lines?

10 A. As much as I can remember, I would say that the civilians

11 themselves did so. I don't think that the Sarajevo government took that

12 problem over but in fact -- in light of the fact that the city was very

13 small, moving the population from one point to another in the city didn't

14 mean very much.

15 Q. Here what you mean, you said earlier that it was impossible. So

16 what you are saying is that the city was far too small in order to do --

17 to carry this out?

18 A. It is not that the city was too small, but in light of the contact

19 light around the city, there was no sense in moving a significant number

20 of people from one area to another.

21 Q. For the reason that they would have been near another combat line?

22 A. I think so.

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No further questions,

24 Mr. President.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

1 Mr. Ierace.

2 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any need to re-examine the witness?

4 MR. IERACE: Just one issue.

5 Re-examined by Mr. Ierace:

6 Q. You were asked questions whether the fuel in Sarajevo was

7 controlled by the army and also whether there was a shortage of fuel in

8 Sarajevo. Were there -- what were the sources of fuel, and I mean by that

9 all of the sources of fuel, during your time in Sarajevo?

10 A. I suppose -- I say "I suppose" because I have no specific

11 information about that. I suppose that the available fuel in Sarajevo was

12 the fuel stocked in Sarajevo at the beginning of the war. But I wondered

13 also about the problem of the black market, black market in fuel, and I

14 would say then, when we would do something in Sarajevo, for instance, when

15 we tried to open some of the roads or sometimes to allow the Oslobodjenje

16 newspaper to operate, the UN troops would provide the necessary fuel.

17 Q. When you say you wondered also about the problem of the black

18 market, did you have any information as to whether any of the UN forces

19 were operating on the black market in terms of supplying fuel on the

20 black market?

21 A. I had one specific case in a UN battalion that was in Sarajevo and

22 which triggered an investigation, or I had an investigation started into

23 that, on that occasion. We had the feeling that some soldiers were

24 selling a few litres of fuel on the black market. I think that a litre of

25 fuel was selling for about 35 marks, and so there was a lot of temptation

1 sometimes for some of the soldiers who came from countries that weren't

2 very rich to do what I would say become small black marketeers without any

3 mafia organisation behind that. But it discredited the UN troops.

4 Q. How did the hotels and other commercial establishments in Sarajevo

5 obtain fuel?

6 A. Mr. Ierace, you are asking a good question there. I have no

7 specific answer to give you because I really believe that there was a

8 black market in petrol for which -- well, when there was an investigation,

9 it was independent, it was not under my control. And therefore one would

10 perhaps have to try to find the conclusions of the investigations that

11 were conducted during my command period. They must exist at the staff, of

12 the UNPROFOR staff in Zagreb.

13 Q. Now, one other issue, Mr. President. You were also asked

14 questions in cross-examination about what was described as quasi-snipers,

15 and you were asked as to whether they were part of any army. What was

16 your view, if you had one, as to whether the command of the Serb forces

17 could have stopped those individuals from sniping against civilians, if

18 they had so wished?

19 A. I am going to give you a very clear answer. If the Serb

20 authorities and the Muslim authorities - and I am first thinking about the

21 political authorities of both sides - had they wanted to impose -- put an

22 end to all of the snipers, whether quasi-snipers or others, they could

23 have. And I think that I said yesterday, when I answered one of your

24 questions, that no political official, whatever he was, ever disavowed

25 publicly the sniper activity.

1 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi has one or more questions to you.

5 JUDGE EL MAHDI: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Questioned by the Court:

7 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] I would ask for a clarification,

8 please. You said earlier, as I understood - I understood that you said -

9 that when you arrived in July, the city of Sarajevo was being shelled

10 intensely and that, in your opinion, this was not a response to a

11 provocation or even a response to preparations. Therefore, you mean that

12 the shelling -- well, how would you characterise it militarily? Could one

13 think that it was aiming at the civilians or that there were military

14 objectives which could have been the target of that shelling?

15 A. Your Honour, when I arrived in Sarajevo, that corresponded -- it

16 corresponded the most to shelling which had nothing to do with military

17 objectives. And I indicated a few minutes ago that I was surprised to see

18 the extent of the destruction in the city, throughout the city, when I

19 arrived in Sarajevo, which meant that before I arrived, the city of

20 Sarajevo had been hit everywhere or almost everywhere.

21 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I have a few questions for you as well.

23 You have told us extensively on what happened in the beginning of

24 December 1993. You have told us to be surprised to receive complaints

25 from the BiH side about shelling, since they prepared or launched an

1 attack themselves.

2 Was the type of shelling the BiH was complaining about, was that

3 shelling with a clear military purpose or was that the type of shelling

4 you just described in response to the question of Judge El Mahdi, that

5 means shelling without a clear military purpose?

6 A. Mr. President, I would say that as opposed to the beginning of

7 July, the shelling in December was shelling between two armies which were

8 trying to destroy one -- trying to destroy military targets, essentially.

9 JUDGE ORIE: That is clear to me.

10 You have told us about people playing snipers, as you expressed

11 it. Could you give us any idea of what percentage of snipers of each side

12 would be quasi-snipers of those playing snipers, and have you any

13 knowledge of snipers within the regular forces?

14 A. Mr. President, let me answer on three points. When I say that

15 they were playing at snipers or quasi-snipers, I would like to give you

16 two examples that I experienced myself. It happened that when my vehicle

17 was going along sniper alley, there was -- a metre in front or behind my

18 vehicle, there was shelling. At another time, it was more important, when

19 I arrived at the airport, there was a sniper that fired at the vehicle,

20 trying to hit the motor. So I don't think they were trying to hit someone

21 in the vehicle. I think they were very specific and clear type sniping.

22 That is what I call quasi-sniping or playing at snipers. I think that

23 terrorised the population. I was given other examples. That is the first

24 point.

25 The second point: Yesterday I said, Mr. President, that the

1 French Battalion had identified several sniper positions. I believe that

2 those positions were held by snipers under Muslim and under Serb control.

3 To say -- to tell you what the percentage of real snipers or

4 quasi-snipers was, that I cannot do.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Now I better understand that quasi-snipers of those

6 playing snipers were not necessarily outside the regular forces. It was

7 more the way they are using their weapons than their place in the military

8 structure?

9 A. I would say, Mr. President, in order to answer more clearly, that

10 among these snipers that I would characterise as military, there were also

11 those playing at snipers. Is my answer clearer now, more precise? I

12 would tell you that in the afternoon, that is when it was the most

13 difficult period because, in the afternoon, most of the people who were

14 playing at snipers already had drunk quite a bit of alcohol.

15 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] General Briquemont, that concludes

16 your testimony -- just a moment, please.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise, but you asked two

18 or three questions that gave answers, lengthy answers, by the General and

19 I think --

20 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...not new subjects

21 touched upon. I mean, the subjects have been dealt with both in

22 examination-in-chief and in cross-examination, and I think that is the

23 criteria we use. If there is a new issue touched upon by the --

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just one point.

25 General Briquemont was a lot more specific now in terms of aspects of

1 destruction in the city of Sarajevo, not just on the borders, so to speak,

2 of Sarajevo. It was on this point that we would like to ask questions.

3 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...has been dealt

4 with during the cross-examination and I think --

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well, we won't ask this

6 question.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE ORIE: If it is just one question, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, we

9 allow you to do it but -- and that is also because of the situation of

10 time at this moment.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

12 Mr. President, indeed.

13 Further cross-examination by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Now, General, you spoke of the significant

15 destruction in Sarajevo, that is in July of 1993, when you arrived. So in

16 relation to what you said, how can you rule out categorically, General,

17 the possibility that in relation to such-and-such and some other

18 destruction that you saw at the moment when the firing occurred, the shots

19 occurred, or when mobile targets were there or maybe some other legitimate

20 military targets like vehicles that were transporting troops, or troops in

21 movement? Could you rule out that they were there at the time?

22 A. When I remember everything that I saw in Sarajevo along the new

23 city or all the -- all the buildings - I have quite a number of

24 photographs at home - there were buildings of 10 to 15 storeys where

25 everything was destroyed. I can say that, as a military man, those

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1 buildings were a target of systematic firing before I arrived. Because

2 when you speak to me about mobile vehicles who might have been using

3 mortars, you know, to fire a mortar from the 7th floor of a building is

4 almost impossible. So, categorically, I would say that when we see the

5 scope of the destruction on all of the buildings where people lived, all

6 along Sniper Alley, that meant that those buildings were the systematic

7 target of firing before I came.

8 Q. General, my question was the following: You saw destruction, as

9 you said, not only in the sniper alley, which we discussed at great

10 length, but in the entire city. Could you, yes or no, rule out that at

11 the time the shooting occurred, and you did not witness it, there were no

12 mobile military targets in that location?

13 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, in my respectful submission, the

14 answer quite clearly did answer that question.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. General Briquemont, did I understand your

16 answer well that although one might not exclude for certain that the

17 damage might have been damage caused by the presence -- at the time the

18 damage was done by the presence of any military object, either mobile or

19 only temporarily located in that specific place, that the extent of the

20 damage as a whole could hardly be explained by the presence of such

21 military targets at so many places and -- is that what your answer tells

22 us?

23 A. Yes, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE ORIE: The question has been answered, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25 [Interpretation] Since there are no further questions, I hesitate

1 to say this, but that completes your testimony before this Chamber.

2 General, I thank you for having come to The Hague and for having answered

3 all the questions asked by the parties and the Chamber. And I will now

4 ask the usher to escort you outside the courtroom. Thank you very much.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 [The witness withdrew]

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

8 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, to save time, I seek only to tender

9 one document, which is P3717. There are also two matters I would seek to

10 raise at some stage in the next 10 minutes. One of those matters is a

11 response to the request that you made yesterday afternoon. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could you please guide us through

13 the limited number of documents, only one being tendered at this very

14 moment.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Prosecutor's Exhibit 3717 is a

16 graph entitled State Hospital Sarajevo.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and do we have any -- we have, I think, one

18 document but I do not -- was it just to be read? You have given us page 3

19 of a Security Council resolution but it bears no number. It is, of

20 course, a perfectly-known source of law or politics - I don't know - but

21 you do not tender that?

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, no. No.

23 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I do apologise. I do seek to tender

24 the resolution. Thank you.

25 JUDGE ORIE: You seek to tender the resolution as a whole or --

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No objection, Mr. President.

2 We believe that it is authentic.

3 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...one of the things

4 the parties could easily compromise on. Thank you.

5 So, then additionally Exhibit P3715, Security Council Resolution

6 836, is tendered by the Prosecution. And since there are no objections,

7 both the documents are admitted and are exhibits now.

8 Mr. Ierace.

9 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, in response to the inquiry that you

10 made yesterday afternoon, I do not have any objection to the Defence

11 retaining a copy of the material which was sent to them from the

12 authorities in Republika Srpska, but I would not want that to be seen in

13 any way as a precedent. But in this particular case, I have no difficulty

14 with that.

15 Secondly, during the examination-in-chief of this witness, I have

16 become concerned as to the frequency of interruptions which come about as

17 a result of complaints about the quality of translation. Those

18 interjections have come from Mr. Piletta-Zanin and one notes that the pace

19 of the interjections, the interruptions is increasing. In relation to the

20 examination-in-chief of General Briquemont, there were 12, and I have

21 counted them, 12 interruptions, because of concern by Mr. Piletta-Zanin

22 about the quality of the translation, overwhelmingly the French

23 translation. Of those 12, 5 related to the translation of the witness who

24 spoke in French into English. During the testimony -- during the

25 questioning of senior counsel for the Defence, Ms. Mara Pilipovic, there

1 were no interruptions from Mr. Piletta-Zanin expressing concerns about the

2 quality of the translation.

3 And of course, when he was asking questions, there was none. But

4 the appropriate comparison is with the questioning by Ms. Pilipovic.

5 Mr. President, apart from the loss of time, it directly impacts on

6 the flow of the witness's evidence. The interjection is usually made at

7 the end of a question asked by me, so that following the completion of the

8 interjection issue, the question then has to be re-asked, or the witness

9 reread the question.

10 Mr. President, I don't seek to delve into the issue of the

11 appropriateness of the interjections but simply to point out that that is

12 the inevitable consequences of them and they have now reached again, as

13 they did before the occasion that I rose to my feet and raise this issue

14 two weeks ago, they have now reached in frequency [Realtime transcript

15 read in error "frequently"] a point where they are significantly impacting

16 on the flow of evidence. I would be very grateful if the Trial Chamber

17 could consider some other mechanism to deal with these matters. Given

18 that, it apparently does not concern the Defence when they are asking

19 questions. Thank you.

20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will be very

21 brief. Very brief. It is not true and I believe it is libelous. I

22 intervene when Ms. Pilipovic was speaking, I was asking for rectification,

23 and you can check it in the transcript if you are careful. I did it.

24 Second thing: 89, line 2, "frequency" instead of "frequently."

25 Third thing, Mr. Ierace himself trapped himself yesterday on a point that

1 I had asked the English booth to check what they said. I did not say they

2 were mounted on a vehicle, but they were transporting a vehicle. Now, if

3 I am intervening, it is because it is necessary and I am keeping this to a

4 minimum. What I did today, Mr. President, there were certain wrong

5 meanings that were flagrant of what the witness was saying, that they were

6 saying more military shelling, rather than civilian, and the English

7 transcript was saying the contrary. Now if the Prosecution doesn't check,

8 as we are doing, the English transcript, although it is a lot easier for

9 them because there are more of them, then I will do it for them. But then

10 I should not be criticised in doing what I have to do and I am in fact

11 lifting the burden of the Prosecution for doing it and I am doing it at

12 the minimum when I have to do it and the way I have to do it. Thank you.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will not be able, I am afraid, to solve

15 this problem forever. But first of all, I would like to mention that

16 quite -- at quite a number of occasions, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, while

17 questioning the witness, was at the same time asking for correction of the

18 translation into English of his own question. So the Chamber would not

19 agree that he is just asking for corrections if the Prosecution is

20 examining the witness.

21 On the other hand, very often the correction does not immediately

22 affect the witness. If a question is put to the witness in English, and

23 when the witness speaks French, the Defence has a better reason to

24 interfere, because it might be confusing for the witness. If, on the

25 other hand, the witness is speaking the same language as the party that

1 examines the witness, any requests in respect of correcting the

2 translation could wait until after the question has been answered.

3 The Chamber feels on the one hand that it is important not to

4 disturb the flow of information given by the witness. On the other hand,

5 if a translation which needs specific attention might affect the answer of

6 the witness, then it should be done. And if, Mr. Ierace, if you tell us

7 that it is mainly done at the end of your question just before the witness

8 starts replying, then this might be caused also by the fact that the

9 translation always is a bit behind. So if there is a problem halfway

10 through your question, it might be only at the end of your question that

11 the translation gives a clue that it needs specific attention.

12 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, might I suggest another course that

13 could perhaps have become the problem and that is where the issue does not

14 affect the understanding by the witness of the question asked, that those

15 issues be dealt with at the end of the testimony of the witness. In other

16 words, we keep a record and then at least at the end of that day, we

17 reserve 5 or 10 minutes to do the transcript correction so as not to

18 impede the flow of evidence. Thank you.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, first of all, I

20 am not a judge of my own comprehension of the witness a priori or

21 a posteriori, I'm only worried about what he's hearing.

22 JUDGE ORIE: If the translation problem is just for the

23 transcript, this does not affect the answer of the witness because he not

24 even has heard the translation. Of course, with General Briquemont --

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Depends on which language. It

1 depends on the language.

2 JUDGE ORIE: We will consider the matter whether we should -- if

3 you want to make an observation as to saving all the comments as to the

4 end of the day --

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I must make a point is

6 that technically when I wanted to use as many yellow pads as possible, the

7 answer that was given to me by the court reporters was that the truth is

8 what appears on the screen, not what we would like to bring in the

9 modifications after the session is adjourned. This is what I try to do.

10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...question of Mr.

11 Ierace. Mr. Ierace's suggestion is that we do it at the end of the

12 hearing, not after the hearing has been closed. So it can be part of the

13 transcript. We stop 5 minutes early to say line so and so.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Apart from that, I do understand that there is also a

16 general procedure which allows any of the parties to submit comments on

17 the transcript within 10 days to the Registry.

18 I was not too well aware of that. But looking at the clock, we

19 have to finish for today.

20 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I see that that is also on the letter,

22 first, the draft transcript will be distributed to the parties and then it

23 continues, comments to be submitted by -- and then it gives another date.

24 We will consider the matter, keeping in mind both the aspects, good

25 translation and at the same time, an uninterrupted flow of information.

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ORIE: We will then adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, in

3 the same courtroom.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

5 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

6 the 20th day of June, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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