1 Tuesday, 11 January 2005

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 2.24 p.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you please

6 call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This is

8 IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor against Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

10 Prosecution, appearances, please.

11 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your

12 Honours, Counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the

13 Prosecution, Stefan Waespi, Daryl Mundis, and our case manager today,

14 Ms. Janet Stewart. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 The Defence teams, appearances, please.

17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. On

18 behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina Residovic, counsel, Stephane

19 Bourgon, co-counsel, and Alex Demirdjian, legal assistant. Thank you.

20 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

21 On behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin

22 Mulalic, legal assistant.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On Tuesday, the 11th of January,

24 2005, I would like to bid welcome to everybody in the courtroom, to the

25 accused, to the Defence teams, and to the Prosecution. Today we will

1 proceed with the testimony of the witness that we heard yesterday. But

2 before that there are a few issues to deal with. First of all, I'm going

3 to ask the registrar to go into private session, please.

4 [Private session]

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7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session,

9 Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And now in open session we have

11 to discuss the issue of the three documents which seem to have been

12 forgotten yesterday when the list of documents was read out. The first

13 document is dated 12th January, 1993, which originates from the 3rd Corps,

14 and which was sent to the 17th Mountain Brigade and the 303rd Brigade.

15 The second document is dated 12 January, again sent by the 3rd Corps to

16 the 314th Motorised Brigade and the 7th Muslim Brigade -- 7th Muslim

17 Mountain Brigade, and a document dated 13th of January, 1993, which

18 originates from the 3rd Corps and which is marked by "urgent" and sent to

19 all the brigades and municipal defence staffs. We have to give

20 identification numbers to these documents.

21 Does the Prosecution have any objections to these documents being

22 admitted into evidence? Mr. Mundis, you have the floor.

23 MR. MUNDIS: No objection, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then.

25 Mr. Registrar, I'm going to give you the documents and can I

1 please have the numbers for them.

2 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Mr. President, these documents

3 will be admitted into evidence as follows: The first one, dated 12th

4 January, 1993, as the ERN is 01822083, and it will be given a number, 1982

5 and the English translation will be DH1982/E. The second document bearing

6 the date 12 January, 1993, and which does not have an ERN number but it

7 does have an internal number, 102/33119 will be admitted into evidence as

8 DH1283 and the English translation will be marked by E. And the last

9 document is 01822089. This is the ERN number and it will be admitted into

10 evidence as DH1984, and its translation will be 1984/E. And this

11 concludes the list of exhibits.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. We

13 had to deal with yet another problem. Yesterday I have already indicated

14 that we are considering whether it would be useful to have a sitting on

15 Wednesday, but finally we have decided that this sitting will be held

16 tomorrow afternoon but it will not start at quarter past 2.00 but at 3.00.

17 If this might be necessary and if we have to work longer, we will continue

18 after 7.00 to make up for the lost time. So this would be it and now we

19 would wish to see the witness being brought in into the courtroom. The

20 Prosecution has sent us the list of documents that they might be showing

21 the witness during their cross-examination.

22 [The witness entered court]

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. First of

24 all, let me check that you hear me. As I told you yesterday, today we are

25 going to continue with your testimony. Today you are going to have to

1 answer to the questions put to you by the Prosecution. After that, the

2 Defence lawyers will re-examine you, and if necessary the Judges will also

3 have questions for you.

4 I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Mundis.

5 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 WITNESS: AHMED KULENOVIC [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Mundis: [Continued]

9 Q. Good afternoon, witness. Yesterday when we adjourned for the

10 evening we were discussing the camp that you visited in early August 1993

11 with General Alagic, and I have a few questions about the persons you saw

12 and briefly met with at this camp near Mehurici. Sir, to the best of your

13 recollection, prior to that day had you ever seen any of those people that

14 you met with before at any other location?

15 A. Can you hear me? These people that I met in the camp I had never

16 seen before, either in Travnik or in any -- on any of the defence lines

17 that I had inspected.

18 Q. At any time after that day when you met these people in Mehurici,

19 did you ever see any of those foreigners or other people that you met at

20 this camp on any other occasion at any other location?

21 A. After that first meeting at the Mehurici camp, I saw these people

22 on several occasions, but I could not place them. In other words, I

23 couldn't say whether they belonged to a unit or not. I just saw them in

24 the zone of combat responsibilities, given the tasks that I received from

25 my superior, General Hadzihasanovic. At the end of the day, I didn't know

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1 where they were. I knew that they were there, but I was not concerned

2 with what they were doing and what units they were members of. In other

3 words, I did see them in the area. I didn't see them that often, maybe

4 one or two times, just passing by while I was tending to my tasks. So I

5 was in no way directly connected to them.

6 Q. Sir, if you can remember, can you tell us where it was that you

7 saw these people and what it was that you saw these people doing on this

8 occasion or occasions after the meeting in Mehurici.

9 A. I mostly saw them in Mehurici or in its vicinity. What they did,

10 I don't know. Either I was passing by or they were passing by. I did not

11 have any direct contacts with them. I didn't know what they were doing,

12 what their task was, whether they had been given any task and who from. I

13 was controlling the line that went from Mehurici towards Meokrnje and the

14 Vlasic plateau. And I was passing by and inspecting that line, I would

15 come across them.

16 Q. Now, I understand what you say, sir, when you say you didn't know

17 what they were doing or what their task was. But I guess my question is

18 more along the lines of: What did you observe them doing? Were they

19 simply standing on a street corner? Were they involved in what appeared

20 to be military training? What exactly did you see these people doing?

21 A. They would be standing in the street or they would be passing in

22 vehicles in one direction or another. If they had weapons, those would be

23 rifles and they would be on their shoulders, which means that they were

24 not ready for combat. There were individuals moving about, tending to

25 their business. They didn't do anything specific when I saw them. I

1 could not draw any conclusion as to what they were doing at that

2 particular moment. I just saw them as I was passing by.

3 Q. Sir, you said you may have seen them in vehicles. Can you tell us

4 what kind of vehicles you remember seeing these persons in.

5 A. Those were either small-terrain vehicles, either Toyota or Pajero,

6 small vehicles holding a driver, a co-driver, and two passengers in the

7 back. And there were some parts where you could load some equipment on.

8 So they were either Toyotas or Pajeros, those small, all-terrain vehicles.

9 Q. What type of clothing did you see these people wearing, these

10 foreigners?

11 A. I believe that I already said that yesterday, but let me repeat.

12 They wore camouflage uniforms, which was not complete and it did not look

13 like the uniform that the BiH army troops wore. Those were incomplete

14 camouflage uniforms, but they had shorts like trousers, they had wind

15 jackets or jackets, and underneath the jacket or top part of the uniform,

16 they wore some civilian clothes. And as I said yesterday, they also wore

17 head scarfs or bandanas around their necks and their head pieces were not

18 the types of hats that we were supposed to wear, that was part of the

19 camouflage uniform. And they did not have any insignia, either on their

20 shoulder or on the cap, while I have to tell you that we insisted in the

21 BH army that all our troops wore insignia.

22 Q. When did troops within the BH army begin wearing insignia on their

23 uniforms?

24 A. The BiH army troops start wearing insignia on their sleeves and on

25 their caps when the Territorial Defence was formed in May 1992. Then we

1 wore the insignia of the BiH TO. And the official insignia were

2 introduced at the beginning of 1993 when the regular army was established.

3 In more specific terms, in Travnik, when the brigades were established, we

4 received orders according to which we provided our troops with the

5 insignia to be worn on the arms and on the caps. So from the end of 1992

6 and especially after the beginning of 1993, all the troops bore the

7 characteristic insignia on their uniforms.

8 Q. Sir, let me ask you a couple of last questions about the meeting

9 in the vicinity of Mehurici at the beginning of August, 1993. On the

10 occasion that you met with these -- this small group of these foreign

11 fighters, these Mujahedin, did any of those individuals introduce

12 themselves to you by name, and, if so, do you remember the names of any of

13 these individuals that you met with?

14 A. No. They did not introduce to us -- introduce themselves to us by

15 names, but they greeted us with the characteristic Muslim greeting, Salam

16 Alaikam. We also shook hands, although it was not their custom to shake

17 hands. They never told us their names, no.

18 Q. At any point --

19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, line -- on page 8,

20 line 7 where it says that they wore the characteristic insignia it says

21 from the end of 1992 and especially after the beginning of 1993, all the

22 troops bore the characteristic. However, the witness said, "if we were

23 able to obtain them," and that was then followed by the characteristic

24 insignia on their uniforms. So part of the sentence that the witness

25 uttered was not translated.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One part of the answer was not

2 translated, and what the witness said has to be added to the answer.

3 You may proceed.

4 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you.

5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. MUNDIS:

7 Q. Sir, on any occasion of this meeting at the beginning of August,

8 1993, did you personally become aware of the names of any of these foreign

9 Mujahedin?

10 A. I did learn some of the names, but not through personal contact,

11 rather I learned them from what other people said because I moved about

12 among the soldiers. So I heard about a certain Musa or Vahid or something

13 like that, Wahiudin, but I don't think I met them personally or had

14 personal contact with them. However, through what people were saying on

15 the lines, I learned that there were these certain people there.

16 Q. And, sir, can you tell us what you learned about these people from

17 the soldiers on the lines. Can you recall what anyone told you about

18 Mr. Wahiudin?

19 A. I can't be very specific, but in general when I was moving among

20 the soldiers at the lines they would say that they had seen or heard that

21 Wahiudin was fighting, organising, preparing, recruiting. They didn't say

22 anything specific, he did or that specific things. But rather, it was the

23 general sort of things that were said on the lines. The soldiers

24 themselves avoided making any specific references, any direct references.

25 Q. Sir, did you know who Mr. Wahiudin was? Did there come a time

1 when you learned anything about this person?

2 A. I have to say again that I heard in general that he was in the

3 camp. I didn't know what his role or position was. I knew that he was

4 one of the commanders or leaders. He was in some sort of hierarchy within

5 that organisation, but I didn't know specifically what his position was,

6 whether he had any rank, whether he had any military training or civilian

7 education, I didn't know any of that. But I did know he was in there and

8 that he did have some sort of post or duty.

9 Q. And, sir, when you make reference to the camp or when you say "he

10 was in there," are you referring to the Mujahedin camp near Mehurici?

11 A. Yes, that's what I was referring to, if we can call that a camp.

12 I think we know what we are referring to. There was an organisation there

13 with -- encompassing everything including accommodation and hygienic

14 arrangements and so on. So it was really the place where they stayed.

15 Q. Sir, are you aware of General Alagic meeting with any of these

16 Mujahedin on any occasions after this meeting you've told us about in

17 early August 1993 near Mehurici?

18 A. I can't be specific because, let me repeat, the duties I was

19 carrying out were not strictly -- did not strictly require that I escort

20 General Alagic. The time I went with him as an operations man, he took me

21 along so that I could see what the situation was together with him. But I

22 had other tasks and duties. You have to understand that at that time we

23 had two kinds of struggle going on, one against the Chetniks and the other

24 kind of struggle which was not military, not with weapons, was concerned

25 with logistics, the rear, and organising life and work in the depth of the

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1 terrain. So I was absent from General Alagic's whereabouts very often,

2 carrying out these other tasks. So I cannot be sure whether they met

3 again or not.

4 Q. And just so we're clear, sir, other than this meeting in the

5 beginning of August 1993 near Mehurici, you personally never met with them

6 or attended a meeting with them at any other point in time or at any other

7 place?

8 A. That was the only time I had direct personal contact and some kind

9 of conversation with them. Anything else, if it took place at all, was --

10 took place within another context.

11 Q. Now, sir, you told us yesterday that these Mujahedin were never

12 under the command, your command, or under the command of any units of the

13 Bosanska Krajina Operational Group. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes. They were not under the direct command of the operative

15 group of the Bosanska Krajina.

16 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, with the assistance of the usher I

17 would ask that the witness be shown Prosecution Exhibit 615.

18 Q. Sir, I'd ask you if you've seen this document, P615, that's being

19 shown to you. Have you ever seen that document before?

20 A. I have never seen this document before, no.

21 Q. Have you had a chance to read the document?

22 A. This is the first time I've read it.

23 Q. Let me ask you then -- again with the assistance of the usher, if

24 the witness can be shown Prosecution Exhibit P673.

25 Sir, let me ask you first, have you ever seen this document

1 before?

2 A. This is a report by the commander of a subordinate unit, and I

3 think I saw this document in the course of the regular reporting. We

4 received many such reports from subordinate units describing the situation

5 for a certain period or on a certain day, covering a longer or shorter

6 period of time. So there were large numbers of such reports. It says

7 here at 2300 hours the Mujahedin and so on and so forth, I think that this

8 is an important element, there is some sort of slaughter mentioned here,

9 so I think I would remember this. I did have most of these documents

10 before me, so most probably I had this one, too, probably.

11 Q. Let me ask you, sir, from the face of the document, can you tell

12 me who this document was addressed to?

13 A. This document was sent to the operations centre of the Operative

14 Group Bosanska Krajina, to the commander personally, so that the commander

15 would be informed of the situation. It was addressed to the command of

16 which I was a part.

17 Q. And on the 19th of August, 1993, what position within the

18 Operation Group Bosanska Krajina did you hold?

19 A. Assistant commander for operative and training matters.

20 Q. Now, can you explain to us, because you've alluded to this, the

21 fact that the document makes actually two references to the Mujahedin.

22 There's the first one that you indicated, which is on page 2 of the

23 English translation, but it makes reference to 2300, events in Guca Gora.

24 And then if you look down three paragraphs after that first reference,

25 there's another reference to the Mujahedin. Do you see that second

1 reference, sir?

2 A. As far as I can see, the word "Mujahedin" is mentioned in only one

3 place on this document, this is line 7 or 8, where it says: "The

4 Mujahedins expelled three Croats from their houses in Guca Gora at 2300

5 hours, threatening them with slaughtering."

6 So this is the only place where the word "Mujahedin" is stated or

7 written down, if we're referring to the same document.

8 Q. Well, sir, let me draw your attention to the bottom of the

9 document above where there is a signature block. If you look at the far

10 right-hand margin of the document on the third line from the bottom, the

11 last word would seem to be Mujahedin. The copy is not maybe the best.

12 Can you see what that paragraph says?

13 A. "The rampage of the Mujahedins must be immediately stopped,

14 particularly of the domestic ones, since if this is not done there is a

15 threat that it might escalate and become an armed clash."

16 Yes.

17 Q. Now, sir, let me ask you this as a professionally trained and

18 career military officer: If the Mujahedin were not part of a subordinate

19 unit of the Operation Group Bosanska Krajina, why would there be these

20 types of references to the Mujahedin in an official report of a

21 subordinate unit?

22 A. On the basis of this written text, this report by the commander of

23 a subordinate unit, every soldier and everyone who was not a soldier might

24 conclude that they were not part of that unit because he never says in

25 this text in the first platoon of the 1st Company, and so on and so forth,

1 a Mujahedin unit did this or that. Rather, this can be interpreted to

2 mean that there was a unit called the Mujahedin who were doing this and

3 that in the area, and in my view he's asking for assistance from the

4 operations group to solve this. Because he says that the rampage must be

5 immediately stopped. So he's asking us for some sort of assistance to

6 resolve this situation.

7 Q. Why would that lower-level commander think that the operational

8 group commander could solve this problem if the Mujahedin were not part of

9 the operational group?

10 A. In my view, it's very simple. A unit can be or not be in an area

11 and it can be either subordinate or attached to a certain unit, or it can

12 be engaged pursuant to orders of a higher command. And they might be

13 carrying out tasks for this higher command, with the knowledge of the

14 local commander, of course. So it doesn't follow that the commander of

15 the area in which the unit is knows everything that the unit is doing. I

16 am -- I'd like to say again that they were not under the direct command of

17 the Bosanska Krajina Operations Group. I know that General Alagic used to

18 say that they should be placed under the command of the OG, that they

19 should be included in the group.

20 Q. Let me ask now, sir, with again the assistance of the usher if the

21 witness can be shown Prosecution Exhibit P665. Sir, let me ask you as a

22 starting point, have you ever seen this document, P665, prior to today?

23 A. I have never seen this document before, but when we formed this

24 joint command there were many similar documents that came to us for our

25 information. And whether I was physically present there in this joint

1 command or not, I don't know. But this is the first time that I've seen

2 this. I know that there were meetings and that I went out on the ground,

3 but I'm certain that I have never seen this document before.

4 Q. I show you this because in paragraph 3 there's reference to

5 foreigners in the area of the 306th Brigade, and I'm wondering if you have

6 any knowledge or information about the presence of foreigners in the area

7 of the 306th Brigade.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]

9 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, I

10 think the witness said right away that he never saw this document before.

11 We have had occasion to here officers of the 306th Brigade here, and from

12 what the Defence of General Hadzihasanovic has told us we can see that

13 even the commander of the 306th Brigade will testify here. Our objection

14 is that this witness cannot interpret this document.

15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I'm not asking the witness to

16 interpret the document. I'm asking the witness if he's aware of any

17 instances in which the commanders of the 306th Brigade lodged complaints

18 up the chain of command concerning the presence of foreigners in the area

19 of responsibility of the 306th Brigade.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Did you hear the question? The

21 Prosecution would like to know whether you heard from the soldiers that

22 you visited on the front lines any objections, any questioning with regard

23 to the presence of foreigners.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here we can speak of -- with

25 reference to your question, Your Honour, I know that in August of 1993 I

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1 heard a lot of complaints from the soldiers in this unit. But this was

2 three or four months after what is mentioned in this document. As I said,

3 this is the first time I've seen this document. Maybe at that point in

4 time I was not in the headquarters of the operations group, but I know

5 that there were various reports. What I can say is that whenever we had

6 contacts and conversations with members of the HVO, they always referred

7 to soldiers who were members of the BH army as Mujahedin. They called the

8 TO staff in Travnik the Mujahedin staff, even though our personnel was of

9 mixed ethnic origin. There were Croats and Serbs and there was even a Jew

10 as well as Muslims in it.

11 MR. MUNDIS:

12 Q. Let me turn for a moment, sir, to a slightly different topic. Can

13 you give us the dates or the approximate dates that you served as the

14 operations officer for the Operation Group Bosanska Krajina.

15 A. I think I partly answered your question yesterday. According to

16 the orders and the documents, this was in May. However, I was still the

17 commander of the municipal staff when I was appointed to the joint command

18 so that the time mentioned in the documents does not correspond to what I

19 was actually doing at the time, from April until the time I was appointed

20 to another duty, and that was in March 1994.

21 Q. So again, for the record, when you say "April or May," that would

22 be 1993. The period from April or May 1993 through March 1994, you were

23 the operations officer for the Operation Group Bosanska Krajina, the

24 assistant commander for operations and training, I believe?

25 A. Yes, for operations and training, yes.

1 Q. Now, sir, during the time period you were the assistant commander

2 for operations and training within the OG Bosanska Krajina, can you tell

3 us which units were part of the Operation Group Bosanska Krajina.

4 A. As far as I know, the Bosanska Krajina Operations Group was formed

5 as a temporary command in order to relieve the pressure on the

6 communications in the direct command of the 3rd Corps, although there was

7 some changes there. It was the 312th; the 306th; the 17th Krajina

8 Brigade; the 27th Motorised Brigade, which was in the process of being

9 formed; and then the 37th Mountain Brigade, after it was formed, entered

10 into this group; then 308th OG West was then moved to the Bosanska Krajina

11 OG; and the 325th Brigade in the Vitez area. Those were the brigades. I

12 don't know if I've listed them all, but I think that's it. I'm now trying

13 to remember whether I missed anything. That's it, I think.

14 Q. And, sir, can you tell us as a rough approximation of the

15 geographic area that the Operations Group Bosanska Krajina was responsible

16 for.

17 A. Bosanska Krajina was responsible for the territories of the

18 municipalities of Novi Travnik, Travnik, and Vitez, part of the territory

19 on the Vlasic plateau, whether it belonged to the Kotor Varos municipality

20 or not, I'm not sure, Travnik -- primarily Travnik, a part of the

21 territory of Novi Travnik, and a part of the territory of Vitez

22 municipality.

23 Q. Now, sir, you told -- you mentioned the 27th Motorised Brigade.

24 I'm wondering if you can recall when that brigade was formed, perhaps who

25 its first commander was, and what was the area of responsibility of that

1 brigade.

2 A. Specifically the forming of the brigade I think I said yesterday

3 took place over a relatively long period of time. In any case, the order

4 I think was in May but it was actually formed in early June. That's when

5 part of the unit was lined up and that was the 27th Brigade. The first

6 commander was -- oh, I know him. He's from Slovenia, but his name escapes

7 me now although I do know it.

8 Q. Okay. Sir, let me ask you if you can remember the area that the

9 27th Brigade was located in or was responsible for.

10 A. At the moment when it was established, the 27th Brigade was

11 established in the Travnik barracks. And when its units were established,

12 when troops were recruited, their zone or -- in other words, its

13 headquarters was in Mehurici.

14 Q. Now, let me return and ask you a few questions about your role as

15 the assistant commander for operations and training within the OG Bosanska

16 Krajina. You told us a little bit about what your main responsibilities

17 were, but would it be fair to summarise part of your responsibilities or

18 an important part of your role one being whereby you were receiving and

19 reviewing reports from subordinate units on a wide variety of issues

20 concerning operational matters?

21 A. Yes. Amongst other tasks, this was also my task. All the reports

22 that arrived from units involved in combat reached me. I would sort them

23 out, I would propose to the commander what could be done. A lot of these

24 documents, since we didn't have our communications centre at the

25 beginning, reached us through the communications centre of the 17th

1 Krajina Brigade that had a communications centre. The person who worked

2 in the centre would deliver these documents directly to General Alagic.

3 In other words, some of the documents reached me personally and some of

4 them reached the commander directly. However, since I cooperated with the

5 commander, I was well abreast of the situation at all times.

6 Q. And, sir, where was your office when you were the assistant

7 commander for operations and training within the OG Bosanska Krajina?

8 Where was your office located?

9 A. Officially I did not have an office on my own. I shared the

10 office with two or three persons. It was an office in -- attached to the

11 Travnik barracks in a separate little building.

12 Q. Let me ask you, sir, you've told us about receiving communications

13 and reports from subordinate units of the OG Bosanska Krajina. Do you

14 recall on -- ever receiving information where subordinate units lodged

15 complaints concerning Mujahedin?

16 A. There were a number of those complaints, but those were

17 communicated to the commander. There were very few written documents to

18 that effect, or at least there were very few that reached me. In any

19 case, this was more of an organisational problem that the commander of the

20 OG had to deal with in talking to his subordinate commanders. If anybody

21 asked me, it was my place to say I have that many people, that much

22 equipment which could be used. All I could do was propose to the

23 commander how these could be used. The final decision with regard to the

24 organisation of any possible actions depended on the commander himself.

25 Q. Do you recall, sir, any specific instances where the commander of

1 the OG Bosanska Krajina received complaints concern the Mujahedin? When I

2 say "complaints," I mean complaints from subordinate units of the

3 operation group. Can you recall any of the specific complaints, what

4 those complaints were about?

5 A. I was the assistant commander for operations and training;

6 however, I spent very little time with the commander. When he inspected

7 his units, he would take somebody from the other bodies that could be of

8 use to him, for example, the person who was in charge of morale and

9 security. So I can't say that I was present when anybody complained and

10 said in very concrete terms, General, we have this or that problem.

11 Q. So what you're telling us then, sir, was that you were aware that

12 there were complaints from subordinate units concerning the Mujahedin, but

13 you are not aware of the substance of those complaints?

14 A. Well, this is a play on words. I was aware of the substance;

15 however, I can't provide you with the concrete detail of when those

16 complaints were lodged. Like I said yesterday, the Mujahedin recruited

17 soldiers from the existing units and some young men were attracted by good

18 uniforms, by weapons, by food they gave to their families, and they left

19 their units. And these were the biggest objections and complaints.

20 Q. Now, sir, you told us yesterday that - and this was on page 59 of

21 the transcript yesterday - you said: "As far as I know, the Mujahedin or

22 the El Mujahed detachment were never placed under the command of the

23 Bosanska Krajina OG, at least not on the basis of the documents available,

24 nor did they ever become part of the structure of the Bosanska Krajina

25 Operation Group."

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1 Do you remember testifying about that yesterday, sir?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Were you aware of the orders from the commander of the 3rd Corps

4 concerning the resubordination of the El Mujahed detachment with respect

5 to the Operation Group Bosanska Krajina?

6 A. I'm familiar with this order; I didn't see it, however. At this

7 point I would like to provide you with some explanation as to what is the

8 meaning of subordination, resubordination, detachment, because all these

9 elements imply different elements of responsibility. If some unit is

10 resubordinated, then it has to be accounted for when it comes to food,

11 artillery support. So we had to make a difference between subordination,

12 resubordination, attachment for the completion of a task. If somebody is

13 attached for the completion of a certain task, then this unit is not part

14 of the strength because some units did join the OG but they were not on

15 the strength of the OG. If I had said this, which I did and I adhere by

16 that, they were never organisationally part of the OG. This order, I

17 can't say whether I saw it or not, but I know that the command of the 3rd

18 Corps ordered for this unit to be either resubordinated or attached to the

19 OG for the completion of a certain task, and I adhere by that. But I can

20 also state here that this doesn't mean that they were an organisational

21 part of the OG.

22 Q. Well, let me just ask, again with the assistance of the usher if

23 the witness can be shown two documents, Prosecution Exhibit 792 and

24 Prosecution Exhibit 440.

25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence has the floor.

2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to say something that

3 my learned friend is aware of. The time given to the Defence during their

4 examination-in-chief has now been overstepped by the Prosecution. We

5 would now like to know, because of the planning of our following

6 witnesses, how much longer will the Prosecution need. This will serve our

7 planning process.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber has not noticed

9 that, but I believe that this will be useful.

10 Mr. Mundis, you have taken longer than you were supposed to.

11 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, based on the calculations that we've

12 kept here, and I understand it's the official registry times that are

13 important, but by the estimates that we've kept I still have approximately

14 ten minutes before I would even hit the point of using the same amount of

15 time as my learned colleagues. At any rate, I would expect to be finished

16 within approximately ten minutes. But I -- if in fact the registry

17 informs me that I have exceeded my time, then we will adhere to that.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The registrar tells us that you

19 have another ten minutes. So the Defence has to re-calculate the time.

20 You may proceed, Mr. Mundis.

21 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Q. Witness, you've been shown two documents, Prosecution Exhibit P792

23 and Prosecution Exhibit P440. Let me ask you, sir, if you recall having

24 seen those documents prior to today.

25 A. The document dated 28 August 1993 and the number that you've

1 mentioned which I can't see, I have never seen before. This is an order

2 which was sent directly to the 306th. And even if the Bosanska Krajina OG

3 had been notified of it, I didn't see it. The order sent on the 6th of

4 September, 1993, seven or eight days later, again I see in this document

5 that it has never been acted upon, it hasn't been followed through.

6 Again, it is ordered that the independent unit, El Mujahed, should be

7 resubordinated to the Bosanska Krajina OG for combat according to the plan

8 of the BK Operations Group. I can explain that if you want. At this

9 moment this unit was not part of the structure and the organisational

10 strength of the OG. It didn't want to, it could not be resubordinated to

11 the 306th Brigade. The second order followed that and in this order it

12 says that this unit should be resubordinated to the OG. And I did see

13 this second document.

14 Q. Well, sir, again as a professionally trained and career military

15 man, what would you have to say about the fact that the commander of the

16 3rd Corps was ordering this El Mujahed unit to be resubordinated? You're

17 telling us that unit was not part of the OG Bosanska Krajina, but

18 certainly Commander Hadzihasanovic was ordering this unit to be

19 resubordinated to the OG Bosanska Krajina. Do you have any explanation or

20 can you shed any light on that based on your professional experience?

21 A. This is really very simple. The order pursuant to which this unit

22 is resubordinated to the unit that is part of the strength of the Bosanska

23 Krajina OG is a mistake because this could not be ordered. Our

24 subordinate unit could not receive direct units from our superior command,

25 and since this order was never followed through it was ordered that they

1 should be resubordinated to the Bosanska Krajina OG and that the commander

2 of the BK OG should use the unit as he saw fit. This doesn't mean that

3 they were on the strength or in the organisation of the OG. I have to say

4 that the corps commander did have the commanding right to deploy a unit

5 directly because the order given to me by telephone or in writing is the

6 same to me when it comes to subordination and hierarchy.

7 Q. But again, correct me if I'm wrong, sir, I believe yesterday,

8 again page 59, lines 6 through 8 of the transcript, you testified that the

9 El Mujahed unit or part of that unit participated with one of your

10 brigades in some combat operations, and that resulted in an unusually high

11 number of casualties.

12 Did I understand your testimony about that correctly?

13 A. I did say that, and I believe that this was in mid-September. It

14 was sometime around the 17th or the 18th of September. And the unit in

15 question is the 17th Krajina Brigade. They were not either subordinated

16 or resubordinated, they were attached to execute a task in the sector

17 belonging to the 17th Krajina Brigade. Within that sector they had their

18 own task, which they either completed or not completed maybe because of

19 their own mistake, maybe there was no coordination, or maybe there was no

20 cooperation, and that is why the 17th Krajina Brigade suffered enormous

21 loss within a very short space of time.

22 Q. And, sir, is this the only occasion that you have knowledge of or

23 recollection of in which the El Mujahed unit was attached to or operated

24 in conjunction with units of the OG Bosanska Krajina?

25 A. This is the only situation that I'm aware of, the only situation

1 where they worked together in the zone of responsibility of the Bosanska

2 Krajina OG. And this was within the combat area where the HVO fought in

3 Vitez against the BH army. At that time I was in a different part of the

4 zone of responsibility where the event that you mentioned a while ago took

5 place at that time.

6 Q. Thank you, sir.

7 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution has no further

8 questions at this time.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then. You have

10 exhausted your time, and now I'm turning to the Defence for their

11 re-examination. I am going to give you the floor after the break. We

12 have some five or six minutes before the break.

13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

14 Mr. President.

15 Re-examined by Ms. Residovic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kulenovic, I have a few questions for you.

17 Yesterday when you were answering my learned friend's questions you said

18 that the first rumours about some foreigner fighters from the Arabic

19 countries reached you sometime in the summer of 1992 when you were in the

20 Visoko theatre of war. My question to you is: At that time did you check

21 in one way or another if the rumours were true? Did you want to learn the

22 truth behind those rumours?

23 A. I said what you have just mentioned and I repeat that the first

24 rumours involving the Mujahedin reached me sometime in July or August

25 while I was staying in the Visoko front line. I didn't check that

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1 information. I didn't want to find out whether there is any truth in that

2 information. I was preoccupied with something else. We did not have the

3 army, the army had not been established. We had a group or a mass of

4 poorly armed men that had to be put in some order. This was my main

5 preoccupation.

6 Q. You have also stated that you saw some foreigners from African and

7 Asian countries in Travnik in the year 1992, and they mostly appeared as

8 humanitarian workers. You also told us that the War Presidency had

9 logistic tasks to support the army. As the commander of the Territorial

10 Defence staff, did you ever directly talk to those humanitarian workers

11 from African and Asian countries, or whether in Travnik that communication

12 was with the civilian bodies of authority.

13 A. At the initial period I never personally spoke to those

14 humanitarians because we had a gentlemen's agreement to deal with all the

15 issues with the commander of the logistic centre of the Defence staff of

16 Travnik. This is just the working term that we used. So whatever

17 problems we had, I spoke to this person that was appointed by the

18 municipality.

19 Q. This logistics centre of the municipality you've just told us that

20 it was established by the Municipal Assembly. This logistics centre, was

21 it under the authority of the civilian bodies of authority or was it

22 something else?

23 A. This logistics centre was under the authority of the civilian

24 bodies, and we had a gentlemen's agreement which bore on friendly to deal

25 with problems. In other words, I had a right and an obligation to submit

1 my list of requirements, and they would act on those requirements and

2 would deliver whatever was necessary to the military structures and the

3 civilian population.

4 Q. You also said that the first time you saw armed Mujahedin was when

5 you were with Commander Alagic and when you entered their camp or the

6 place where they stayed not far from Mehuric. Was that your first

7 encounter with persons from African and Asian nations which acted as

8 soldiers at the same time because they were armed?

9 A. This was my first direct physical contact with these people from

10 African and Asian countries who wore arms.

11 Q. The question -- the Prosecutor has just shown you a document that

12 originated from the command of the 3rd Corps, pursuant to which the El

13 Mujahed unit was subordinated to the Bosanska Krajina OG for the execution

14 of a task. You've just seen this document. And also, you have told us

15 that you know that they did participate in some combat operations in

16 mid-September, together with the 17th Krajina Brigade. Tell me please,

17 your information about the existence of this order, did it indicate to you

18 and were you aware of that time that Commander Alagic and the commander of

19 the 3rd Corps tried to place that unit under control and command and also

20 the experience of the 17th Krajina Brigade speaks to the contrary. In

21 other words, they could not be placed under any control. Would that be

22 your experience from the time that you spent in the OG?

23 MR. MUNDIS: Objection, Mr. President. That's a compound

24 question. It's a leading question.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.

1 MR. MUNDIS: It's a compound and leading question, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The question is indeed

3 complicated; it is compound. Can you please break it down into smaller

4 pieces.

5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Mr. Kulenovic, from your contacts with Commander Alagic after your

7 attempt to enter the camp, could you conclude -- did you have information

8 that there were efforts in place to place these people under control, or

9 would the opposite be true? I don't know how else to put that question.

10 A. Yes, I understand your question. A little while ago in answering

11 the Prosecutor's question I said that we tried to place these people under

12 control and insert them among our ranks. After my first meeting with them

13 at the facility that you refer to as camp, and after the end of that visit

14 and the attempt to reach some sort of agreement, General Alagic used some

15 very harsh words, I can't quote him, but he said more or less, These men

16 should either be disarmed or chased away to where they came from. This is

17 just a rough quote or a summary of General Alagic's opinion. I believe

18 that he spoke on several occasions to his superior command. He wanted

19 this unit to be, as he said, soldierised and placed under control. He

20 wanted them to be drilled and trained. In any case, an attempt was made

21 to place that unit under control and to put them in the function of the

22 armed combat under the control of the BH army.

23 Q. Mr. Kulenovic, given the experience that you have and about which

24 you spoken to this Trial Chamber, when you were attached to the OG, when

25 you were attached to the 17th Krajina Brigade, can you tell us could they

1 effectively be placed under the control of the Bosnian army despite your

2 efforts?

3 A. During this combat operation I was in a different place, on a

4 different location. However, based on all my previous knowledge and based

5 on the subsequent conversation with the participants in that action, this

6 unit was not an organic part of the 17th Brigade. They just performed

7 tasks. They were given their axis, their task, and as far as I know, as

8 far as I'm familiar with the military matters, they were never part of the

9 17th Brigade. They were never either subordinated or resubordinated.

10 They wanted to be independent, they wanted to perform their task

11 independently at all times.

12 Q. In the previous answer to my learned friend you said that you know

13 that they participated together with the 17th. But now if I understand

14 you well, you're saying -- you are talking about things in plural. What

15 can you tell me about your personal knowledge of the participation of the

16 El Mujahed unit together with another unit from the OG? In other words,

17 according to your personal knowledge in 1993, how many times the El

18 Mujahed detachment participated in combat together with some other unit of

19 the OG? Was it just that one occasion when they were attached to the 17th

20 or were there any other cases?

21 A. I know of just one specific case into which we had an insight,

22 where we could exert some sort of partial control and command; this was in

23 the second half of September when they sort of cooperated with the 17th

24 Brigade.

25 Q. You entered with Commander Alagic their camp in the vicinity of

1 Mehurici. Did you know whether there existed some other places in the

2 territory where the units of the Bosanska Krajina OG were active, where

3 there were also Mujahedin? Did you know of any other such places or was

4 this the only place that you visited and that you were aware of?

5 A. This was the only place that I was aware of that they had their

6 base and that they stayed there. If there had been any other places, I

7 was not aware of them.

8 Q. And my last question with regard to the questions put to you by my

9 learned friend is again connected with the logistical centre of the War

10 Presidency. Tell me please, who did the logistical centre provide

11 assistance to? Who did the civilian authorities provide aid to from this

12 logistical centre?

13 A. When this logistical centre, which had been established by the

14 municipality and was under their authority, under the authority of the

15 civilian authorities, most of the aid that arrived, I don't know where

16 from and how, was spent on refugees or people who had been expelled from

17 the territories that I have already mentioned. So whenever there were

18 different waves of refugees and expelled persons, several tonnes of food

19 were used for them, as well as clothes, food, blankets, and everything

20 else that was necessary for their accommodation. A lot of that aid was

21 used for the purposes of the TO staff. Once the units were formed, this

22 served to provide logistical support for these units. Also the

23 beneficiaries of that aid were other civilian structures. For example, I

24 received a tonne of washing powder and I provided the hospital with 700

25 kilos of washing powder, for which I was praised by the doctors, by the

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1 patients, because the situation in the hospital was critical at times.

2 Q. I apologise. I believe that this would be the last question.

3 However, the document that my learned friend showed you as originated from

4 the 306th Brigade in which the Mujahedins are mentioned in two places, the

5 question was put to you whether it would be normal for a unit to send a

6 report to the superior command and mention somebody who is not on its

7 strength. My question to you: As a soldier, tell me, would it be normal

8 for one unit to uniform its superior command of every fact that might have

9 any sort of influence on the morale and the combat readiness of that

10 particular unit?

11 A. I will be very direct in my answer. Not only is it normal, it is

12 an obligation of every unit. If a unit enters the location of another

13 unit, that latter unit has to inform its superior command and ask for

14 explanation as to why that happened. So not only is it normal, but it is

15 also the obligation of the unit to report on any other unit being deployed

16 in its area of responsibility asking for further explanations from its

17 superior command. As a lower-ranking commander, I don't have to know what

18 my superior commander is thinking or doing.

19 Q. Also as a professional soldier, can you tell me, would it be

20 normal or is it normal that a unit informs its superior command about

21 those who have nothing whatsoever to do with the army requesting from the

22 superior command to address the issue or forward it to a higher place that

23 can address the issue. Would it be normal or would it be an exception?

24 A. I've already said that this is not an exception, this is normal,

25 because any such thing as a direct bearing on the system of command and

1 control of the unit where this unit is deployed. So it is normal and it

2 is a must for such a unit to inform its superior command and even send it

3 its proposal for the solution to this problem.

4 Q. And my last question: Given your overall experience in the year

5 1993, would you be able to say if there was any other -- any level in the

6 BiH army would be the level that could deal with the issue of Mujahedin

7 and their presence in the area. Was that an issue that had to be resolved

8 by the army or could be resolved by the army?

9 A. I understand your question and I can only tell you one thing. To

10 the extent that I stayed in the territory covered by various units, in my

11 view this unit was never part of any of the units that we have mentioned

12 so far. And my opinion at the time was that this unit could not be

13 controlled or commanded. I can't tell you anything about our

14 higher-ranking units.

15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

16 Mr. President. I have no further questions.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to make a technical

18 break. It is 10 to 4.00. We should resume at 4.20.

19 --- Recess taken at 3.51 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 4.24 p.m.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We shall now resume. I am going

22 to give the floor to the other Defence team for their re-examination.

23 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

24 have no questions.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Judges have a few questions

1 to put to you. The Judges search for the truth and have the right to put

2 the questions to the witness arising from the questions put to the witness

3 from -- by the Prosecution and the Defence.

4 Questioned by the Court:

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a few issues to clarify

6 with you, sir. You told us that when you were educated by the JNA to

7 become a JNA officer you specialised in reconnaissance and sabotage. Is

8 that what you have told us?

9 A. Yes, that's precisely what I said.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I suppose that during your

11 activities within the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina you also worked in

12 the area of sabotage and reconnaissance. Is that correct?

13 A. I wish I could have done such work because the Army of Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina might have been more successful. However, as the army as an

15 armed force had not been formed. In view of our equipment and materiel

16 and other logistical support, it was not possible either to prepare such a

17 unit or carry out such activities.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You left the BiH army when, in

19 what year?

20 A. When I left the BH army, is that what you asked me? I didn't

21 leave the BH army; I remained within the BH army structure and my last job

22 was in the Ministry of Defence of the Federation of BH in the agency for

23 monitoring and controlling weapons. And now ...

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Your last job in the army then

25 would have to correspond to a certain rank. What was your last rank?

1 A. My last rank was that of colonel. And --

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. That's what I wanted

3 to hear from you because when you are responding to questions it seemed to

4 me that you were a high-ranking officer, and the fact that you left the

5 army as colonel confirms this. You explained to us that you carried out

6 inspection of the front lines. The Defence showed you a document showing

7 that you were a member of the joint command. Can we conclude from this

8 that in the operations group, that is the Bosanska Krajina Operations

9 Group and in your various activities, you had a certain level of

10 responsibility which was of medium importance or great importance. What

11 could you tell us about this?

12 A. First of all, I would like to explain something. There was a

13 difference that the HVO insisted upon. There was the joint command and

14 the common command. I was a member of the common command, not the joint

15 command. Joint would mean that they were one and the same; and the common

16 means that they carried out certain tasks together. When I was carrying

17 out my duties in the common command, my tasks and duties were of a medium

18 level of responsibility. Roughly speaking, I gathered and processed

19 information and I presented all this information together with my own

20 opinions and suggestions to the higher-level command. And I toured the

21 troops on the ground and I made proposals as to how certain problems

22 should be solved, having to do both with the army and with the

23 organisation of life in general.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Your reply to the

25 Judges shows that there were in fact two structures. There was a joint

1 level and a common level. So these were two structures, and you say you

2 were in the common command. When responding to the question on page 20,

3 line 20, of the record, and this was in connection with the Mujahedin, you

4 said the following, and I quote: "They carried out recruitment, or rather

5 they tried to recruit people from already existing units."

6 Do you confirm that you said this?

7 A. Yes, because indirectly they took these people away from the

8 regular units by offering them food, clothing, other equipment, because

9 they realised that as there was a general lack of resources these people

10 would go where they could have something to gain. And this affected the

11 situation in the units that these people left.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as you know, to the best

13 of your knowledge, how many men left the regular units in order to join

14 the ranks of the Mujahedin? Are you aware of any numbers? Do you know

15 approximately how many men there were?

16 A. I cannot be precise, but I can give you a rough estimate. Many

17 young men left because they received material means but they soon came

18 back because their code of behaviour, the religious life to which the

19 young men from Bosnia and Herzegovina were not used -- because they had a

20 different way of expressing their faith and they were not used to the

21 rigours of this religious life, so they came back. There was a lot of

22 movement to and fro. They would stay there briefly and then come back, so

23 I can't tell you exactly how many there were.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, so you do not have a

25 number. When you learned that a soldier had left his unit and joined the

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1 Mujahedin - and I am addressing you now as a professional soldier - did

2 the military hierarchy institute a procedure for desertion against such a

3 young man who left his unit, to the best of your knowledge? I'm putting

4 this question to you because we have seen documents of the 3rd Corps

5 saying that deserters should be prosecuted. That's why I'm putting this

6 question.

7 A. The question is clear to me and I can respond very briefly or I

8 can expand on my answer. The units did take certain measures. For the

9 most part, the commanders or assistant commanders for morale, religious

10 matters, and so on tried to talk to the parents or the close relatives of

11 the soldier to try to get him to come back. In the meantime, there would

12 have been a record made of this and certain measures taken. During my

13 testimony I have already said that the brigade police could not penetrate

14 into this camp. That has often been mentioned in order to interview a

15 soldier and carry out their job, actually. I can add that usually it was

16 the parents or the people, whether we wish to admit it or not, accepted

17 the Mujahedin unit because they were providing support and help. And the

18 parents would often say, Well, I want my son to fight for the freedom of

19 our people. It didn't matter where, with what units. So this did cause

20 certain problems.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but independently of the

22 parents did the army itself take any measures? Did it sanction desertion?

23 Because in any army in the world, deserters are punished. That's the

24 question I'm putting to you. At your level of activity did you know that

25 punishments had been meted out for soldiers who joined the Mujahedin and

1 later returned because this was not what they had expected? Were there

2 such punishments?

3 A. As far as I know, yes, there were punishments and certain measures

4 were taken to punish such actions. The documents pursuant to which this

5 was done is something I haven't seen. But I know we had a relatively

6 small number of men, relatively little equipment and weapons, and all

7 these young men who came back after certain measures, regardless of the

8 severity of these measures, because of the needs for fighters were sent

9 back to their units. For example, on the front lines I would punish any

10 kind of violations such as drunkenness and so on and so forth. The men

11 would be sent to do some necessary task. That's how these issues were

12 resolved.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My last question now in

14 connection with what you have just been telling us about. When you were

15 with General Alagic in this camp near Mehurici, you said quite

16 spontaneously that General Alagic told you that they were to be

17 soldierised, transformed into soldiers. When you went to visit them, what

18 was the aim of this visit? Was the purpose of the visit to tell them that

19 they had to be integrated into the structure of the Army of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina? Was this the main goal of your visit? Or was it simply

21 establishing contact with them? Can you tell us more about this? Can you

22 explain what the goal of the visit to these people was?

23 A. Yes, Mr. President. The simplest explanation would be to say that

24 General Alagic, and I with him as his immediate subordinate, went to the

25 camp for several reasons. The first of these were the frequent complaints

1 of lower-ranking units against the presence of these people and the

2 problems that have been mentioned and to integrate them into the

3 structure. And the second reason was, if we managed to integrate them

4 into the structure to see how they might possibly be used in combat, in

5 specific combat activities. After we completed this visit, I said I can't

6 recall the exact words, but what was said they had to be soldierised,

7 transformed into soldiers. We went to see how many of them there were, to

8 try and put them under some sort of control. Now, whether General Alagic

9 had any orders from a higher command or any other information, I don't

10 know. But in my view, that was the aim of the visit.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When you went to see them you

12 mentioned a number. You said that some were armed and others were not.

13 On the day you went to that camp, how many of them where were

14 approximately, more or less?

15 A. I think I said that yesterday that I saw four of Afro-Asian

16 origin, and three of them had weapons; these were rifles slung on their

17 backs. And I think there were seven or eight who were at some distance

18 from us. So we only had contact with those three men in that little hut

19 where we were sitting, and we tried to reach some sort of agreement with

20 them. So three inside, four armed, and seven or eight a bit further off.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you for

22 clarifying this. You said that General Alagic said: "They should be

23 disarmed or sent back to where they came from."

24 These words by General Alagic can also be seen in the documents.

25 If we had time we would show you that, but unfortunately we don't have the

1 time. Can you confirm, however, that General Alagic personally said that

2 they had to be either disarmed or sent home? Is this what you were

3 talking about?

4 A. Yes, Mr. President. I would like to clarify. General Alagic --

5 in Bosnia we only speak well of the dead, but he used some worse words,

6 words that were not as nice which I would not like to repeat now. But the

7 meaning was that they should be either disarmed or disciplined or sent

8 away. That would be the main purpose of what he said.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now I will put to you a question

10 that I usually put to every witness. For me as a Judge this question

11 always arises; I always ask myself this. Tell me, how is it possible that

12 some 20 men at the most in that camp - you say there were four of

13 Afro-Asian origin and there were eight or nine of them all together - how

14 could it happen that 10 or 20 persons can represent such a force in

15 comparison with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina about which a general

16 testifying before the Tribunal said was that there were 32.000 people

17 under the command of the 3rd Corps. So how is it possible for 20 people

18 to stand up to 35 or 32.000? Can you explain this or should we seek for

19 another explanation? The Defence put a similar question to you. In your

20 view, did the solution have to come through the army or through some other

21 institution? What can you as a soldier and high-ranking officer say in

22 reply to this question that we are all asking ourselves?

23 A. I will try, although you have put a number of specific questions

24 to me. I don't know whether there were 15 or 20 or more men; I don't

25 know. But in the period we are talking about, on the one hand we have the

1 Serb/Chetnik aggressors; on the other hand we have the HVO which at every

2 point in time was doing its best to cause a conflict and to minimise the

3 role and function of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was said to

4 be an illegal force of the force of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it should

5 be put under the control of the legitimate authorities of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina, that is the HVO. I had a meeting with General Blaskic and

7 General Kordic. When I went to see Blaskic to solve a problem, Kordic

8 wanted to throw me out, saying that I was illegal. I think I mentioned

9 that General Blaskic and I had worked together in the former JNA and he

10 had learned a lot from me, speaking conditionally, and I solved a lot of

11 things together with him. So we had the Chetniks, we had the HVO on the

12 other side, we had poverty, hunger and, speaking in military terms, there

13 were no conditions to prepare for combat activity. You say a small force.

14 Well, yes, objectively it's a minimal force. In military terms it would

15 not be taken into consideration as a force that could have a decisive

16 impact. However, in view of the situation I have just described, we had

17 to take care of every man, every man who could give us a drop of milk,

18 every person who could give us a bullet or two. I personally led soldiers

19 who I would give 15 bullets each before they were sent to carry out a

20 task, whereas normally this would be -- the kit would be 150. In other

21 words, I led people into war, sent them to their deaths, with 15 bullets

22 in their hands. We needed all sorts of things, and that's why both I and

23 General Alagic - and most probably the higher command, but I wouldn't like

24 to comment on that - tried to get these people to become soldiers and to

25 carry out the same role as the army as a whole. Because in my view, the

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1 army was very well-consolidated and ordered compared to the situation we

2 had, the materiel situation, and everything else.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So we have to draw a conclusion

4 that you did not have the military means to face a group of that force

5 because your men, your troops, were not well-equipped and you had

6 difficulties with that. Is that the gist of your answer?

7 A. This is just one part of the answers that I've provided. Yes, we

8 didn't have enough materiel means and we had to save every single bullet

9 to fight the real enemy. And this group, they could have been of some use

10 to us if we have been able to organise them and place them under control.

11 I'm speaking conditionally.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I thank you very much.

13 You have answered the Judges' questions and the two parties have

14 the right to put questions to you arising from the Judges' questions,

15 either to clarify the answers that you have provided or because they have

16 some other reason to re-examine you.

17 First I'm going to ask the Prosecution whether they have any

18 questions to put to you?

19 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The Prosecution has no

20 further questions for the witness.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 And now the Defence. Do you have any questions?

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do have a few questions.

24 The other Defence team does not have any questions, but I do.

25 Further examination by Ms. Residovic:

1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kulenovic, the Presiding Judge has asked you

2 about what you saw on that day and wanted to know the number of the

3 Mujahedin who were there on that day. Did you know at all what was the

4 number of persons who were accommodated, either in that camp or somewhere

5 else where our units were active? Did you ever know the number of these

6 men?

7 A. I understand your question, and I am going to provide you with a

8 clear answer. I never knew the exact number of these men.

9 Q. Mr. Kulenovic, were you aware of the number of the local men who

10 joined them for various reasons or those who supported them for various

11 reasons?

12 A. I don't know the exact number, how many joined them or supported

13 them. I've just told the Presiding Judge that there were men who joined

14 them and they returned to our ranks. How much and to what extent they

15 supported them, I don't know. But I only know that they went just to take

16 some provisions from them and return with those. I don't know the exact

17 number.

18 Q. The Presiding Judge asked you something that is very important and

19 that reappears in this trial, and that is the question of why an armed

20 force was not used against these people. And you have provided a partial

21 answer. My additional question to you is as follows: As a professional

22 soldier can you tell us, in order to carry out a military operation would

23 it have been necessary for you to know the number, the place, the

24 equipment, the level of education, and everything else that the people

25 that you are about to fight against have at their disposal? Would that be

1 important for you to know?

2 A. Let me answer professionally. The armies of the world use

3 different methods in order to acquire data on the enemy. One of those

4 means is to acquire intelligence during combat. We could have engaged in

5 combat in order to locate a block, to destroy or capture these people and

6 so on and so forth. However, let me say something else. There was a lot

7 of smuggling going on through the Vlasic plateau where there -- this

8 smuggling involved a lot of civilians and soldiers. The command of the OG

9 Bosanska Krajina carried out a blockade together with the military police

10 and the police forces of brigades that were on the ground and they managed

11 to break that smuggling chain. The BiH army was in a position and was

12 able to carry out such an operation, but they were wanted to know what the

13 final result would be. We didn't know the exact number or location, but

14 if we wanted -- if we had wanted to find out we could have done it

15 forcibly.

16 Q. Since you were aware of the situation and the importance of saving

17 your men and every bullet, would it have been necessary for you to make an

18 estimate as to -- if such a combat -- such a fight had taken place, would

19 that have caused a certain degree of fighting between you and the local

20 population that supported the Mujahedin? Was that one of the elements

21 that you had to take into account and assess?

22 A. Let me re-organise your question a little. You said whether this

23 was important. I would say whether this was decisive. And I would say

24 that this was this - a decisive element. If such a conflict had started,

25 then the people who supported the BiH army and provided them with

1 logistical support would have turned against the army and the BiH army

2 would have certainly enjoyed much less support if such a conflict had

3 started with the Mujahedin.

4 Q. Let me clarify what you have just said for the benefit of the

5 Judges. Is that the reason why you said that this could not be resolved

6 by the army but that it had to be resolved in some other place?

7 A. It could have been resolved physically, by military means, but for

8 the other reasons that I've just mentioned we avoided that, a physical

9 showdown. Instead of using force, we resorted to some other means. We

10 tried to involve politics in order to resolve that situation.

11 Q. In response to one of the questions put to you by the

12 Presiding Judge you told us what General Alagic's comment was after your

13 meeting in the camp. If I understood you well he said first that they had

14 to be soldierised, turned into soldiers and used as such; and the second

15 time he said they should be disarmed and chased away. Is that correct?

16 A. But there was no first and second time. There was just the first

17 part of his comment when he said that they had to be soldierised, turned

18 into soldiers, and the second part which was, or alternatively they should

19 be disarmed and chased away.

20 Q. You have testified about the attempt of turning them into soldiers

21 and using them in combat together with the 17th Brigade. Tell me, please,

22 this attempt to use them as soldiers in your view as a soldier, did it

23 prove that this was next to impossible? Let me not put words into your

24 mouth. How would you -- what would you say about that?

25 A. Yes. Men are always susceptible to influence; however, these

1 people were not susceptible to influence because they didn't want to be

2 turned into soldiers the way we, the army of BiH, wanted to have them.

3 And their use, the way they wanted to be used, in this specific case was a

4 failure when they were used together with our units that performed a

5 certain task.

6 Q. And my last question arising from the Judge's question. When you

7 were explaining why you couldn't enter a conflict with these groups, could

8 you also tell the Trial Chamber what were the basic problems and tasks

9 that the OG Bosanska Krajina faced in the summer of 1993. Was that the

10 Defence from the Chetniks, the Serbian and the Chetnik aggressors, the

11 fight with the HVO in the Lasva valley, the aim of which was to keep a

12 certain part of that area, or to contain this group of Mujahedin?

13 A. Well, you have already provided a good part of my answer in your

14 question. At the beginning of my testimony I said that at the moment the

15 defence staff of Travnik was formed, the most important thing was for us

16 to defend ourselves and to prevent the further breakthrough of the Serbian

17 and Chetnik aggressor in that. The second problem was to be as successful

18 in fighting against the HVO as much as we could. At the beginning, the

19 HVO was taught to cooperate with us in the fight for an integral Bosnia

20 and Herzegovina, and this was proven to be wrong eventually. And the

21 third problem was looking after the population and everybody else. And

22 our last -- if you want a hierarchy, the last problem would be the

23 internal fight for the organisation of certain units and placing them

24 under very stringent control. This may be just my opinion. We looked

25 after every man, after every bullet. On Vlasic plateau, one-third of our

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1 OG was there defending the plateau from the Serbian and Chetnik aggressor,

2 at least one-third if not one-half was on the lines fighting the HVO. So

3 we had one-fourth less troops who were either resting or doing other thing

4 which all this is against any military norm of using troops to perform any

5 tasks.

6 Q. Now finally my last question since you have provided a very good

7 explanation. As a soldier, you know and I know as a lay person that every

8 commander cares about the life of every soldier. Given into account all

9 of these elements and your experience when only during one hour of

10 fighting involving the Mujahedin, 12 members of a brigade were killed and

11 over a hundred were wounded, was there any commander who could afford

12 himself a luxury to start fighting a group that proved to be so dangerous

13 when it came to casualties?

14 A. You mentioned the word luxury; every commander could afford such a

15 luxury; however, the final result would be a disaster. It would be an

16 ultimate luxury to start such a fight in which so many casualties could be

17 expected. No commander wanted to do that. They didn't dare do that.

18 Q. Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The other Defence team, do you

20 have any questions?

21 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] No questions, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, your testimony is now

23 concluded by the answers that you have provided to various questions. We

24 would like to thank you for your personal contribution to the search of

25 truth. You have answered the questions put to you by both parties. I can

1 only wish you a happy journey back home to your country, and I wish you

2 the -- a good year on behalf of the Trial Chamber and a pleasant

3 retirement. I'm going to ask the usher to accompany you out of the

4 courtroom.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Same to you.

6 [The witness withdrew]

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we bring the next witness

8 into the courtroom, I believe that Mr. Registrar has some corrections to

9 make.

10 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Just

11 two corrections with regard to the documents that have been admitted into

12 evidence. In the first part of our session today, the first correction is

13 relative to the document that was admitted as a document under seal as

14 DH168; it is actually the Prosecution document which is P168. And the

15 second document is the one that was admitted under DH1983. There has been

16 an error here. The document is DH1983, and the translation is DH1983/E.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then. We are awaiting

18 the arrival of the next witness. And in the meantime account Defence tell

19 us how much time they have envisaged for the examination-in-chief of this

20 witness.

21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have envisaged

22 an hour and a half, but I'll make sure to curtail that by at least 15

23 minutes. The witness tomorrow will require less time and I believe that

24 today and tomorrow we will be able to complete the testimony of both

25 witnesses that have been envisaged for that.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber would like to thank

2 you for this information and your effort. And while we are waiting for

3 the second witness to arrive, it will take some time because the first

4 witness has to be taken out of the Tribunal and the second witness brought

5 in.

6 Mr. Mundis, you have the floor.

7 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. According to our records,

8 there were a few documents, perhaps four documents, that were new

9 documents that were shown to the last witness. I don't know if the

10 Defence is planning on tendering those into evidence or if we're going to

11 wait for a later point in time.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Maybe we could benefit

13 from this time and regulate the admission of documents into evidence.

14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have shown

15 several documents to the witness that have already been tendered through

16 General Merdan, and we only wish to tender document 0591, 1169, 0774, and

17 1501.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you wish to tender four new

19 documents into evidence, 0591, 1169, 0774, and 15050 [as interpreted].

20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] There is a mistake. The first

21 document is not 0591 but 0951.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. This has to be

23 corrected. It is 0951.

24 Mr. Mundis, do you have any objections?

25 MR. MUNDIS: We have no objections, Mr. President.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 Mr. Registrar, you have the floor. Can you give us the numbers

3 for these documents.

4 Mr. Usher, can you please go and fetch the next witness in the

5 meantime.

6 Everybody has a task here.

7 Mr. Registrar.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. The

9 four documents are as follows: DHD [as interpreted] 51 [Realtime

10 transcript read in error "59"], with the translation, DH951/E; the next

11 one, DH1169, and the English translation DH1169/E; and the next one is

12 774, and the translation 774/E; and finally the last document, the fourth

13 document, DH1501, and the English translation 1501/E.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. But I believe that

15 we have a mistake in the transcript on line 12. It says here that the

16 document is DH79 [as interpreted]. I believe that this is a mistake.

17 This should be DH951. Can you please have a look at line 12 of the

18 transcript.

19 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right, Mr. President.

20 There has been a mistake in the transcript and the document number is --

21 the documents are 951, 1169, 774, and 1501. Thank you.

22 [The witness entered court]

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, this is one fuzzy

24 one. Again I've made a mistake. It's too late now.

25 Luckily enough we've only had four documents on the agenda. I

1 apologise, we have dealt with the documents. We wanted to make use of the

2 time between the departure of the previous witness and your arrival.

3 Before I go on, I would like you to confirm that you hear and understand

4 me.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I hear you and understand you.

6 WITNESS: VEZIR JUSUFSPAHIC

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have been called as a

9 Defence witness. Before you take the solemn declaration, I would like to

10 know who you are and that's why I would kindly ask you to give me your

11 name, last name, the date of birth, the place of birth.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Vezir Jusufspahic, 23rd February,

13 1950, in Cajnice.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your current profession?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm retired.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1992 and 1993, did you have a

17 profession? If you were a member of the military, what military was that

18 and which units did you serve in?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992 I was working in the

20 municipal staff of the Territorial Defence of Zenica, and later on I

21 joined the ranks of the BH army.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the BiH army, were you a

23 member of a brigade or a command? What unit did you belong to?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was a member of the 3rd Corps.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you already testified

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1 before an international Tribunal or before a national court about the

2 things that happened in your country in the years 1992 and 1993? Or is

3 this the first time you testified about these events?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is my first time to testify.

5 I've never testified before.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you please read the solemn

7 declaration that the usher is handing out to you.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

9 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You may be

11 seated.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before I give the floor to the

14 Defence lawyers, I need to provide you with some explanation that will

15 facilitate these proceedings. First you have to answer the questions that

16 will be put to you by the Defence lawyers. You have already met with

17 them. After that stage, the Prosecution sitting on your right will also

18 be asking you questions, and their questions are called cross-examination.

19 The Prosecution will be given the same time as the Defence. If the

20 Defence is given one hour, the Prosecution will also be given one hour.

21 After that stage, the Defence teams will have the right to

22 re-examine you. After that, the three Judges sitting in front of you may

23 also have some questions for you. Most of the time when the Judges do

24 have the questions, it is to clarify things in order to find out the truth

25 or to elaborate on the issues that you have tackled during your testimony.

1 I need to inform you of two other things that are also important.

2 You have just sworn to tell the truth, which means you are not to

3 provide -- give us false testimony. This would be an infringement

4 punishable by law. And the second thing that I have to inform you about

5 is the fact that the witness has the right and the duties, the duty is to

6 answer questions, and the right of the witness is not to answer those

7 questions which might one day incriminate him. In that case, you are

8 allowed to say that you don't want to answer a question. In this

9 exceptional case, the Chamber may compel you to answer such a question,

10 but they will tell you that there will be no consequences for you. And by

11 doing that, the Chamber will award you a sort of immunity. I wanted to

12 tell you this because this is -- this constitutes the rights of the

13 accused [as interpreted] during any proceedings.

14 I would also like to tell you that we are in the so-called oral

15 proceedings. We don't have any written documents before us. We don't

16 know anything about what you are going to say in answering your questions.

17 So try and be as clear and precise as possible in your answers provided to

18 both parties, because what you are going to say will appear on the screen

19 in front of you in English. This will be the translation of your words.

20 You can always refer to the screen if you read English. If not, you have

21 to trust the interpreters who interpret either your words or the words of

22 the parties in the -- to the proceedings. If at any point in time there

23 are difficulties, you can always ask the party who has put the question to

24 you to rephrase it and the Chamber will take care that the proceedings go

25 on smoothly. The Defence counsel will have another information to give

1 you concerning interpretation.

2 I give the floor to the Defence counsel.

3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Examined by Ms. Residovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Jusufspahic.

6 A. Good afternoon.

7 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, in order to save

8 time I would kindly ask the usher to provide the Trial Chamber and our

9 learned friends in the courtroom with a set of documents that I'm going to

10 be using during the examination of this witness. This is to save us

11 interrupting the course of the examination-in-chief.

12 Q. During that time, as the Presiding Judge has already told you,

13 Mr. Jusufspahic, I have another information to give you. I would kindly

14 ask you to make a pause before giving the answer to my question; this will

15 allow the interpreters to interpret my question. This is my obligation

16 when you provide your answer. If we don't do that, the Trial Chamber and

17 our learned friends will not be able to follow what we are saying.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.

19 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. While this is being done I

20 rise only with hesitation to perhaps suggest that we, prior to the

21 commencement of the start of this witness's testimony, take a break.

22 There's a relatively important matter that I feel I might need to discuss

23 with my learned colleagues prior to their proceeding, which I think might

24 actually be beneficial to the parties.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well then.

1 If there are no objections on the part of the Defence, we are

2 going to make a break and we shall resume around 20 or 15 minutes to 6.00,

3 and we'll go until 7.00. The parties are going to discuss a certain

4 matter during the break, and we shall resume at around quarter to 6.00.

5 --- Recess taken at 5.19 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 5.46 p.m.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We shall now resume.

8 Did you sort out all the problems? No problems then. Okay.

9 Mr. Usher, can you please accompany the witness into the

10 courtroom.

11 [The witness entered court]

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have the floor.

13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, can you tell us what your education is.

15 A. I have completed the post-secondary two-year school for pedagogy.

16 Q. Before the war did you serve in the army and did you have any

17 rank?

18 A. I did my regular military service in the former JNA and I was

19 captain first class after I finished this service.

20 Q. When asked by the President, you said that in 1992 you were in the

21 municipal staff of the Zenica Territorial Defence. Can you please tell us

22 in 1992 who were the commanders of the municipal staff?

23 A. In 1992 the first commander was Jozo Jerkic. After him there was

24 Branko Boncina who, before the war, had been the commander of that staff

25 for a long time.

1 Q. What did you do in the municipal staff of Zenica? What were your

2 duties?

3 A. I was in charge of operations and training.

4 Q. In 1992, did there come a time when there were organisational

5 changes in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and did you change your

6 employment or your post?

7 A. Yes. Yes. In November, I don't remember the precise date but it

8 was in mid-November, two officers arrived from Sarajevo intending to

9 establish some sort of command. At the time, we didn't know what sort of

10 command.

11 Q. Were you involved in some way with the arrival of these two

12 officers from Sarajevo?

13 A. Yes. Mustafa Poparic and I because we were from Zenica and we

14 were familiar to a certain extent in the situation in Zenica were asked

15 whether there was a building in Zenica where a command could be housed.

16 And there were certain requirements that had to be met. We suggested

17 engineering Zeljica [phoen], that building, because it met those

18 requirements.

19 Q. And did you learn at that time who these officers were?

20 A. No. At that time I didn't know either of them. Later on I found

21 out who they were, but at that time I didn't know.

22 Q. After you assisted in the search for a facility to house the new

23 command, did you receive any orders on taking up new duties, on the

24 transfer to new duties?

25 A. Yes. I received an order that I was to go to the corps command,

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1 and that was the first time I learned that a corps command was being

2 established.

3 Q. I assume that you then learned who these officers were and what

4 their duties in the corps would be. Would you tell us that.

5 A. Yes, that's correct. These were two officers from Sarajevo, Enver

6 Hadzihasanovic and Muradif Mekic. One was the commander and the other one

7 was the chief of staff.

8 Q. And what were your duties in the command of the 3rd Corps?

9 A. The same as in the municipal staff. I was the operations organ in

10 the staff.

11 Q. In view of the fact that this was the beginning of the creation of

12 the 3rd Corps, can you tell Their Honours what were the commander's

13 priorities at the time.

14 A. In the beginning, we all had briefings together as there were not

15 many of us. And the priorities were to set up the operations centre as

16 soon as possible and to establish links or connections with the units as

17 soon as possible.

18 Q. Did the commander want to know the situation on the ground? Did

19 you have a role in presenting or indicating the situation in the area

20 where the 3rd Corps was to be?

21 A. Yes. The war was going on, and one had to tour the territory.

22 Some of the officers, together with the commander, toured the territory

23 where the corps was to be set up, and I was part of that team.

24 Q. And what was the situation you found on the territory you toured?

25 A. To put it briefly, there was chaos in every municipality, just

1 like in Zenica. There were many fragmented units, many different

2 commands, many commanders. Some units were acquiring a character of their

3 own. This was all very fragmented.

4 Q. In view of the fact that you were the operations and training

5 organ, do you know whether there was a re-organisation in the units in the

6 area?

7 A. Of course there was re-organisation in the units.

8 Q. With respect to your duties in the operations and training organ,

9 was there a requirement that an operations and training organ be

10 designated and established so that it could carry out the functions that

11 that organ had to do? What was done in this respect?

12 A. When the commander ordered that the operations centre be

13 established as soon as possible, quite truthfully I didn't really know

14 what that meant. I was a reserve officer; I was not a professional

15 officer. And I wasn't quite sure what an operations centre was, and he

16 insisted that the operations centre be established as soon as possible.

17 There were three of us operations men. Nehru Ganic was to be our chief

18 but he was late in arriving. So we started, the three of us, and we

19 didn't know anything about this. Ganic knew something more about this,

20 but we started working.

21 Q. Tell us, how did the operations and training organ function? What

22 did it do? How did it work?

23 A. As you heard a little while ago, first of all we had to establish

24 communications. No command can function if there are no communications.

25 We established communications by means of radio stations which were not

1 the kind that a corps was supposed to have. The real package

2 communications were not set up until June so that in the operations centre

3 we were handicapped by that fact. Then we didn't have the equipment we

4 needed or the other things such as maps. I remember I brought the maps

5 from the district staff, the TO staff I mean, whatever I was able to find.

6 Q. And how did you work? What were your tasks in fact?

7 A. Our first tasks were to receive reports from the units to see what

8 the situation in the units was, to assist as far as we were able in

9 carrying out their combat tasks. And the first order that was supposed to

10 unify all this was written down at that time. And this was about the use

11 of the units on the ground. We were the ones who were supposed to

12 implement all this.

13 Q. When you received the reports from the units, were there other

14 duties you had to do as the operations and training centre or organ?

15 A. Yes. Every report from the terrain that we received, we collated

16 these and we took note of what was important. Something has been switched

17 off. I apologise.

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Would you please assist the

19 witness.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I probably pushed something

21 inadvertently. It's all right now.

22 When we received the reports, we wrote up our own report to the

23 staffs of the superior command -- supreme command. We extracted

24 information we considered important. And once in 24 hours we had to send

25 a report of the command of the 3rd Corps to the superior command.

1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. You just said that the three of you in the operations organ had no

3 previous knowledge about the work of the operations and training centre.

4 What was the staffing situation in the subordinate units?

5 A. It was even worse in the subordinate units and we were able to see

6 that from these reports. They were not proper combat reports. We could

7 see how well-trained somebody was from the way they compiled a report, and

8 the reports were received were terrible.

9 Q. In the operations and training centre, were there certain office

10 hours or was the work organised differently?

11 A. We worked in shifts. There were three of us, and we changed

12 shifts every 8 or 12 hours. And the same thing happened in the

13 communications centre. We weren't there for 24 hours at a time. This was

14 in a basement. You couldn't stand it for more than ten hours at a time.

15 Q. You said that you had to send reports to the superior command,

16 that is the staff of the supreme command. Tell me, these reports, did

17 they have to be sent by certain deadlines or did this depend on your own

18 will when you were to send such reports?

19 A. There were deadlines. And these deadlines forced us to send

20 reports on time. This was usually by 2200 hours, as far as I can

21 remember. The units of course had to submit their reports earlier. Very

22 often they were late, so we had to rush when compiling our own report.

23 Q. Tell me, all the reports that arrived in the operations and

24 training centre, did they reach the corps commander?

25 A. No, they didn't reach the corps commander. We in the operations

1 organ would assess whether there was anything important. And if there

2 was, we would report to him about it. But as for the regular reports, the

3 daily reports that we compiled, we did that ourselves and sent them on.

4 Q. In view of the fact that you did not deliver all the daily reports

5 to the commander and, as you said, this was not possible, tell me who

6 signed these reports.

7 A. All the reports arriving from the subordinate units contained so

8 much information, there were so many of these reports that had me

9 submitted them all to the commander he would have been able to do nothing

10 else but read those reports. That would have been impossible. We had to

11 write a concise summary of what was in those reports, and then we would

12 sign that at first. Later on that was changed and a duty operations

13 officer was appointed and then he signed the reports.

14 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, tell me please, you said that first you

15 established a packet communication with the supreme command regardless of

16 the fact of who signed the document at first. Whose name and title were

17 at the bottom of the documents sent by the package communication?

18 A. Usually -- no not usually, always the name was Enver

19 Hadzihasanovic, and very often it said "SR," meaning he signed it in his

20 own hand.

21 Q. If the superior command or the organ to which something was send

22 by a package communication and they received the document on which the

23 name Enver Hadzihasanovic had been typed, did this mean that Enver

24 Hadzihasanovic had actually signed the document?

25 A. No, it doesn't because they would get his name but not his

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1 signature by this kind of communication. We would know who had signed it

2 but they wouldn't.

3 Q. In view of everything you have just said, in this bundle of

4 documents I have just shown you, would you please open to the second part

5 which says "Operations and Training Organ," and would you please look at

6 document P403. In response to my question you said that one of the first

7 documents was a document where certain tasks were assigned to the

8 subordinate units. Tell me, please, if you look at this document is this

9 one of the documents assigning the tasks you have just mentioned, or is

10 this document referring to something else?

11 A. This is one of the first documents issued by the corps command,

12 and it designates the zones of responsibility of the various units. It's

13 one of the first documents that the corps sent to its subordinate units.

14 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, what was the role of the operations and training

15 organ in preparing this and similar documents referring to combat

16 activities or areas of combat responsibility of certain units? Did you

17 play any role in all this?

18 A. Yes. We had to prepare all the elements the commander needed in

19 order to issue such an order. We had to collect the information about the

20 units. We even had to suggest to him how this order could be written.

21 Q. In view of this role of yours, tell me please, at any time was the

22 entire territory ever established as the zone of responsibility of the 3rd

23 Corps, or did you ever prepare a document whereby the corps took over

24 power -- took control over the entire territory?

25 A. No. I'm sure that there is no such document referring to the

1 corps, that the corps was responsible for the entire territory. But as

2 for this document here, it refers to the zones or areas of defence

3 connected to the line of defence. We didn't tell the commander that he

4 was the main man in that zone. Everything was subordinated to the line of

5 defence. So his area was designated with the two points to his left and

6 right, referring to defence.

7 Q. Tell me, at that time were civilian authorities functioning in the

8 same area as the area of defence of the 3rd Corps?

9 A. Yes. There was so-called War Presidencies, there was the Ministry

10 of the Interior, whatever they were called; the civilian police. They had

11 all the roles of government. The War Presidency took on the role of the

12 government executive or assembly or something like that.

13 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, you said you were not properly trained and the

14 organs in the subordinate units were even more poorly trained. What was

15 the policy of the command of the 3rd Corps in view of the training of you

16 and superior commands? And if you took any measures, what measures did

17 you take to improve the training?

18 A. The position of the commander was that training was a priority.

19 He repeated that from day one, from the first briefing. He told us that

20 we should work as we went, that officers should be trained in order to be

21 able to respond to tasks at hand. And we took all the possible measures

22 to train operations officers in lower-ranking units, because we saw that

23 people could not cope and that's what we did as we went along. Very often

24 we would invite some people from the lower-ranking units to the corps to

25 be trained.

1 Q. Can you please look at document number 2, the following document.

2 Mr. Jusufspahic, are you familiar with this document? Does this document

3 reflect the way people were trained in order to make up an army in the

4 given conditions?

5 A. I am very familiar with this document. The tasks that are listed

6 here are to take stock of the troops, of the weapons, this we did all the

7 time. We took stock of our units and we took measures accordingly. And

8 this is our attempt to analyse the situation in the units in order to see

9 what had to be done in order to improve things.

10 Q. You said that some of the reports were signed either by you or

11 later on by operative officer on duty. Can you please look at document

12 number 4. The date is 18 June 1993. Do you recognise this document? Do

13 you know the person who drafted it and who signed it? The document is

14 number 4.

15 A. Yes, okay. I am familiar with the document. This is a regular

16 command report to the staff of the command. This was drafted in June

17 1993, and a duty operations officer was I. Obviously I can't remember

18 every single sentence, but this is how I did it. This is my handwriting.

19 I remember that this is how our combat reports were written, and it was

20 not just I who did it.

21 Q. This document that was sent in mid-1993, does it reflect any

22 changes or improvements in the way reports were drafted with regard to

23 what you saw at the beginning?

24 A. At the beginning things were erratic. We did not know ourselves

25 how things should be done. Later on an institution [as interpreted] was

1 established and it was called a duty operations officer, and it was said

2 that every duty operations officer should sign their report. And here you

3 can see my name because I was the duty operations officer on the day. The

4 officers affiliated with the command were duty operations officers, and

5 they were the ones who signed those reports. And this is certainly an

6 improvement.

7 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, regardless of the efforts you made, did you still

8 notice that there were more or less problems in the subordinate units?

9 Could that have an influence on the establishment of the chain of command

10 on the part of the corps commander?

11 A. There were still problems, despite the training that we carried

12 out. The training did not involve everybody, so there were still problems

13 in reporting. For example, some reports did not arrive on time, or when

14 they did they described the events that took place a long time ago. And

15 then some people reported on particular fire being opened which was not

16 important for the corps. Or they would report on things that were

17 important but we had already learned about that thing through other

18 channels. It happened very often that people reported erroneously, even

19 the lines of defence they were manning. They would be off by several

20 kilometres. Things would change from one day to another, and they failed

21 to record that properly.

22 Q. When you observed those problems, did you react? Did you send any

23 notification of that to the subordinate units? I believe that we issued

24 an order or some sort of enactment in which we warned them how reports

25 should be written, because the wrong reporting could have terrible

1 consequences because we didn't know the real situation. I believe that we

2 either issued an order or we retrained some of the people.

3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Just for the record the document

4 was P160.

5 Q. And now can you look at the documents number 5 and 6. First can

6 you look at document number 5. This is P271. Tell me, are you familiar

7 with this document? Does it reflect exactly what you have just described

8 for us, namely your efforts to observe and rectify problems that you faced

9 with regard to your subordinate units?

10 A. I'm familiar with this document. I think that I might have been

11 involved in its drafting. Us operative officers had a biggest bone to

12 pick with those people who drafted bad reports, and this is a letter that

13 we sent to all the subordinate units explaining in great detail what was

14 wrong with the reports. But despite that, things did not improve that

15 much even after that.

16 Q. Can you please look at document number 6. This is P867. Can you

17 please focus on items 2 and 3. And can you tell us why was the

18 appropriate reporting important for the establishment of the normal chain

19 of command at the level of a command such as a corps command? Are you

20 familiar with this document? Do these items reflect the things that you

21 have just testified about?

22 A. This is just one in a series of documents. There were more of

23 such documents speaking about the importance of training. Other officers

24 and other organs struggle to train their subordinate troops. This is just

25 one of the documents requesting better training, which would ultimately

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1 serve the interests of the entire command.

2 Q. Can you please tell us, you have often signed those documents that

3 were addressed to the staff of this frame [as interpreted] command and the

4 commander did not see every of those reports. Who was it who decided

5 which facts would be presented to the commander among those that had

6 arrived from any of the superior -- subordinate commands?

7 A. At the beginning, it was us, those who worked in the service and

8 received those reports. That was at the beginning, the operative officers

9 did that. The commander of the organ, if he was there, or somebody else.

10 Later on it was the duty operations officer who did that. He would take a

11 report from operative groups and if he had the time to do that, he could

12 dwell upon those reports a bit longer. And sometimes he would just copy

13 the sentences that he found in the reports of the operative group.

14 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, who was it who decided what relevant facts would

15 be submitted in the reports to the supreme command staff? Which of the

16 facts from the subordinate command reports were sent to the supreme

17 command staff and who decided on that?

18 A. It was often the deputy commander or sometimes the commander

19 himself, the chief of staff, their assistants. Whatever was sent

20 regularly, it was us, duty operations officers, who did that.

21 Q. Let's move on to a different topic. You have told us that you

22 started working and learning on the job. In January, there were some

23 combat activities. Did you in the operations centre have any information

24 relative to the combat operations that took place in January? If that was

25 the case, can you please share that information with us.

1 A. In January, one of the first combat operations that the corps was

2 involved in was when we received alarming reports from the sector of Vakuf

3 and Novi Travnik about the fighting that was going on there. We received

4 such reports. We looked at the overall situation and we tried to see how

5 we could help those units there. This was our main preoccupation in the

6 month of January.

7 Q. Did there come a time in January when you started receiving

8 information from the areas that were closer to Zenica, closer than the

9 ones where the combat operations were already underway in Gornji Travnik

10 and Vakuf? Did you start receiving some information about the HVO forces

11 coming closer to an area closer to Zenica?

12 A. Yes. We received a report from the Busovaca sector, from Kacin,

13 about fighting going on there.

14 Q. How did you receive reports at that time? How did they reach you

15 in the operations centre? By what ways and by what means did you receive

16 them?

17 A. From the brigade we received reports through the regular

18 communications means which were rather poor. First we would receive

19 regular reports on the activities and movements of the HVO troops; later

20 on we received different reports from different sides. The initial

21 reports were those ones that we received from the brigade.

22 Q. To what extent did you in the operations centre pay attention to

23 these reports? Was there any link between those reports and the

24 strategically important facilities or features in that area?

25 A. As soon as we received the reports from Busovaca on the movements

1 of the troops, not from the town of Busovaca but from the sector where our

2 brigade was deployed, and as soon as there was fighting in that area, as

3 soon as there was movement of forces, we immediately started thinking

4 about a very important facility which was the Lasva junction. We tried to

5 protect that facility even when I was a member of the TO of Zenica. It

6 was a very important feature. It was the gateway to Zenica.

7 Q. Given the importance of that facility, did you in the operations

8 and training centre, which was the body that pointed to the commander what

9 the combat situation was, did you suggest to the commander or did you --

10 do you know whether the commander did anything, did he take any measures

11 in order to prevent the Lasva junction from falling into any jeopardy?

12 A. I did not write those orders, but I know that an order was issued

13 to secure all the roads in the area including the junction. The only road

14 towards the free territory went via Lasva and on, and there were orders

15 issued in order to secure those roads, to keep them passable.

16 Q. Do you know personally whether any sort of order was issued

17 ordering that units should be used in combat? Was an order issued to

18 attack villages in the vicinity of the Lasva junction?

19 A. As far as I know, such orders were not issued.

20 Q. Tell me please, Mr. Jusufspahic, did there come a time when you

21 start receiving -- when you started receiving information or reports in

22 the operations centre about combat taking place in Lasva or in Dusina?

23 A. The first reports that we received from our units in the sector of

24 Kacun and Busovaca spoke about movements. However, after that, after

25 those regular reports, so to speak - they were not regular reports, they

1 were interim reports, I suppose - we started receiving some other reports,

2 not only from the command of one brigade, all of a sudden people started

3 coming to the command with some verbal news about what was going on in the

4 area. This is not customary, but this was what was going on. One piece

5 of information followed another, and all that was rather alarming. Very

6 often this was controversial and we didn't have the real insight into the

7 situation; we didn't know what was going on.

8 Q. Did there come a time when you received information about some

9 people being killed in that area?

10 A. Yes. Let me put it this way: When the information is not timely

11 and when you hear rumours, the first thing I heard, the first thing I

12 remember is the killing of a commander. His name was Camdzic. He was my

13 neighbour and I learned he had been killed. Again, I learned that from

14 some sources that are not official, regular sources.

15 Q. As you were working as an officer in the army and there was

16 combat, was it usual for different reports to arrive in the course of

17 combat and only when the combat was over was the situation summed up, or

18 did you have to have precise information at every moment as to what was

19 going on on the ground?

20 A. We had to have precise information for our commander, however it

21 was very difficult to obtain it. We had to try and check to see what the

22 real truth was. But as I told you, a lower-level commander would arrive,

23 for example, with some news and we had to check it, we had to find ways

24 and means of learning what was going on; that's how it was.

25 Q. Tell me, in the end, at the end of a day or on the following day

1 did you deliver all the reports to the commander? Do you remember that?

2 A. I remember that in the evening we were asked to write a summary of

3 the situation and brief him. We would collect everything that we had

4 checked, and I know that we delivered all the reports we received to him.

5 Q. If you can recall the reports you received in various ways, did

6 any of the reports you received in the operations centre and passed on to

7 the commander indicate that a crime might have been committed in the area,

8 that there were grounds to suspect that?

9 A. No. These reports did not contain anything like that. We found

10 nothing that might lead us to suspect such things had happened.

11 Q. Thank you. You mentioned a short while ago that news arrived

12 about fighting in Busovaca. Tell me, do you know whether at a certain

13 point in time there were certain agreements about the conflict in Busovaca

14 and were you assigned any task in connection with these negotiations?

15 A. Yes. We learned - everybody - knew this, that an agreement had

16 been signed between the HVO and the army about a cease-fire and that a

17 commission was being established to monitor this.

18 Q. Were any meetings held in connection with this and were you

19 involved in any way with the work of this commission?

20 A. Yes, a meeting was held in Kakanj, I think in the hall of the

21 Termoelektrana company. There were representatives of the HVO. As far as

22 I recall there was Blaskic, we were there, our commander, and so was I. At

23 that meeting operative details were agreed upon concerning the

24 implementation of the cease-fire.

25 Q. Did you personally receive a task from the commander?

1 A. I had already received an order that I was to be one of the

2 members of that commission; the others were Serif Kadric and the chief of

3 the commission was Merdan, the deputy commander. At that meeting, and I

4 remember it well, the commander initiated the following, that this

5 commission that was to go out on to the ground to implement the fire was

6 to carry certain orders with them, and he asked me to write these down on

7 the spot. And I was taken aback and wondered how I was to do that. And

8 he said, Take that to the representatives of the HVO and as soon as they

9 agree to it, I'll sign it. So we drew up the order on the spot about the

10 removal of the checkpoints, the passage of convoys, the return of the

11 population to their homes, and so on and so forth.

12 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, I will ask you to look at part 3 referring to the

13 joint commission and to look at all these documents from 1 to 8 and tell

14 me whether you recognise these documents.

15 A. Let me find it, please.

16 Q. This is the third part, III, joint commissions. Would you please

17 look at the documents numbered 1 to 8. Do you recognise these documents?

18 A. Yes, I do. I drew them up.

19 Q. So I take it that these are orders initiated by

20 Commander Hadzihasanovic and later on signed by Commander Blaskic?

21 A. Yes. This is what we agreed in Kakanj, in the Termoelektrana

22 building.

23 Q. Tell me, what was the attitude of Commander Hadzihasanovic toward

24 the implementation of these orders? Was this a purely formal acceptance

25 or did he demand that this be strictly respected and complied with?

1 A. He asked that this be strictly complied with. When he initiated

2 these orders he simply decided that a stop should be put to all this.

3 Q. Would you please look at number 9, please. That's P140.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Does this document reflect in your view the attitude of Commander

6 Hadzihasanovic as to these orders were to be implemented?

7 A. Working in the commission, we were duty-bound to draw up reports

8 about what was going on and about the problems that we encountered. This

9 is a warning to all the commands of the brigades, and they were instructed

10 to make it possible for us to do whatever we had to on the ground. This

11 shows that he had decided firmly that the conflict should be ended.

12 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, what was the main task -- well, the main task is

13 stated here, but how did you actually implement it?

14 A. Well, you know, in the beginning it was very difficult, very, very

15 difficult. There was a lot of mistrust among the local commanders on the

16 ground, especially among the troops, and we spent a lot of time trying to

17 convince various people that the other side would do the same. This is

18 something they found hard to believe. So it was a very difficult job,

19 especially to start with.

20 Q. Apart from the implementation of these orders on the cease-fire,

21 did the commission deal with any other issues and who served these issues

22 on you, so to speak, if you dealt with them?

23 A. Let me explain how we worked. We worked in teams. There were

24 three representatives of the army and three representatives of the HVO in

25 these commissions. In the morning on arrival at that house, the Hotel

1 Tisa in Busovaca near the petrol pump, that's where we were, the chief of

2 the European monitors, I think it was Thorpin [phoen], he would read the

3 protest about the cease-fire. Then we would establish teams and go out on

4 the ground to calm down the situation, but that was not our only task. In

5 the commission we also received other requests from ordinary people.

6 Because when people heard that there was some sort of commission there

7 with the HVO, we started receiving requests that had nothing to do with

8 combat activities. For example, that tank that had been captured by the

9 HVO should be sent back. There were even requests from embassies,

10 individuals, humanitarian organisations, all kinds of requests.

11 Q. Do you remember any requests by embassies?

12 A. Yes. I think it was the Iranian embassy as far as I can recall.

13 There were others as well, but this one I remember because these people

14 had been taken prisoner, at least that's what it said in the protest by

15 HVO forces, and they had been brought to Kaonik prison in Busovaca. The

16 Iranian embassy asked that we should check this.

17 Q. Would you please look at the document numbered 12.

18 A. Yes. This protest.

19 Q. Yes, yes, the protest.

20 A. Yes. This is one of the documents that the commission received.

21 Q. Tell me, please, this request by the Iranian embassy or by

22 humanitarian organisations or the one that arrived through the 3rd Corps

23 and the mentioned foreigners, will you please tell us what sort of

24 foreigners were these? Who were these foreigners that they were searching

25 for?

1 A. Our information was that these were humanitarian workers who had

2 arrived with aid or with money. That was all the information we had.

3 Q. And these protests and requests, how did the representatives of

4 the HVO respond to these? Did they admit that they had arrested these

5 foreigners?

6 A. No. They would not even admit that they had captured the two

7 people who are in Kaonik. They refused to admit that these people were

8 prisoners at all. I know two European monitors went to that prison to

9 check this. They denied that this happened at all.

10 Q. While you were working in this commission did you ever hear about

11 Mujahedin or did you only discuss these persons as foreign humanitarian

12 workers, as you describe them?

13 A. They were not Mujahedin. I did not hear that expression at the

14 time. These were humanitarian workers. Some people even said, we're not

15 doing anything to get this aid to reach us, they're carrying money,

16 driving good cars, and we were not doing anything to get these people to

17 help us. That's what people said. I didn't hear the word "Mujahedin"

18 being used.

19 Q. When was the first time you personally encountered the expression

20 "Mujahedin," and what duty were you performing at the time?

21 A. The first time I came across that word, that expression, which I

22 didn't even know what it meant, was as a member of the commission in

23 Vitez, because the commission moved from Busovaca to Vitez. And that's

24 when I heard this expression.

25 Q. Can you explain to Their Honours on what occasion you heard this

1 expression and from whom.

2 A. As the commission moved from Busovaca where the situation was

3 under some sort of control to Vitez, where things were developing in a

4 different direction and that was the reason for the move, the events in

5 Ahmici took place, you know, the massacre in Ahmici. We didn't do that in

6 the commission for a time, but then the European monitors insisted and I

7 think that one of the first meetings after the work of the commission was

8 re-established, I heard this word from Nakic, the word Mujahedin. We

9 heard about an event that had happened in the village of Miletici, and

10 that morning Nakic arrived very upset. And he said, While we are sitting

11 here working, such things are happening up there. And I know they went to

12 that village at once, Miletici, and upon their return he himself said that

13 this had been done by Mujahedin who had entered the village.

14 Q. During that meeting of the commission or later on, did anyone in

15 any way connect the event in Miletici to members of the BH army or was

16 what Nakic said all that you learned about this event there?

17 A. No, at least not as far as I could tell. I was there and neither

18 the European monitors nor the HVO connected this to soldiers of the BH

19 army. They didn't tell us, These are members of your army there, then, at

20 the commission.

21 Q. Thank you. Tell me please, in connection with Ahmici, as a member

22 of the commission did you have any personal knowledge about what had

23 happened in Ahmici?

24 A. When we moved to Vitez from Busovaca, we continued our regular

25 work. I don't know how long this went on, but we went up there every day

1 on a regular basis and went home in the evening. One morning we didn't go

2 to that meeting. I saw in the corps that there was a kind of state of

3 emergency, that there was something going on, that we wouldn't be going

4 that day, and that's when I learned about the massacre in the corps. We

5 didn't go that morning. After the European monitors insisted that we

6 continue our work to prevent further escalation of the conflict, about a

7 week later, it might have been more or less, I'm not sure exactly how long

8 it was, we were very angry in the corps. We went to Vitez, and when we

9 arrived there, a team was set up to go to Ahmici and I was part of that

10 team. I think that the member of the joint commission for the HVO was a

11 man called Tomo. I don't know his last name. And there was a European

12 monitor and Bob Stewart, the commander of BritBat. We all went to the

13 village in two vehicles.

14 Q. And what did you find there, briefly?

15 A. It was terrible. It had all been burnt down; it was all gutted.

16 I know that there was a house where the basement was still smoldering. A

17 BritBat soldier found something that was small and charred. He was very

18 upset and then I realised it was the corpse of a child. He couldn't stand

19 it. He went out. And this made a deep impression on me.

20 Q. Mr. Jusufspahic, in the operations centre, what information or

21 what data did you keep on your subordinated units?

22 A. Just give me a minute, please. In the operations centre we were

23 supposed to have as many data on the subordinate units as possible, as

24 many. Whatever we could collect we had to collect, and this all served

25 for the commander's use on -- commander's decision on the use of these

1 units. And we did what we could.

2 Q. While you were in the operations centre, did you ever receive

3 operation that in our units, the units of the 3rd Corps, there are also

4 individuals who were foreigners or Mujahedin? While you were in the

5 operations centre, up until mid-August, 1993, did you ever receive such

6 information?

7 A. I'm not aware of any such information. The information that we

8 had on the troops, armament, equipment, among all this information I did

9 not come across information like this.

10 Q. Since you inspected the ground, did you ever face the presence of

11 foreigners in the area where the units of the 3rd Corps were active?

12 A. Yes. One of my roles was to inspect some of the units, and that's

13 where I encountered this problem.

14 Q. What was your task? Which units did you visit, and what did you

15 see there?

16 A. Towards the end of July or maybe mid-July, I remember that the

17 strawberries were ripe when we were inspecting the ground. My task was to

18 inspect a unit in the sector of the 312th Brigade, the so-called Karaula

19 Battalion in the area of Bijelo Bucje. We were supposed to assist the

20 commander at his own request because his battalion was on a very important

21 axis. He wanted to organise defence in a forest; the commander didn't

22 know how to do that. I went to inspect; I visited this unit. The chief

23 of artillery was with me. He stayed with the artillery unit of the 312th

24 Brigade, and I went uphill. And I worked out the problem with the

25 commander. He helped him to organise defence in the forest. I told him

1 where he should lay ambushes and where his points of defence should be.

2 He was very happy.

3 At the end of every visit, my last question is: Are there any

4 other questions? Are there any more problems or any more requests for the

5 corps command? I was already at the end of my visit, and just

6 matter-of-factly he mentioned this, but not as a problem. He just

7 mentioned a group of soldiers, some 30 of them. He said "Arabs." He said

8 he didn't know who they were or what they were.

9 Q. After that visit, did you visit any other units and did you face a

10 similar problem there?

11 A. Yes. When I returned from my visit to the 312th, I visited the

12 command of one of the units of the 306th Mountain Brigade. I spoke to the

13 chief of staff, the commander of the 1st Battalion, I believe that it was

14 the 1st Battalion, and the operations officers from the OG Bosanska

15 Krajina. I visited the area of Ljuta Greda. We paid a visit to the

16 battalion, we inspected their line of fire. We issued orders how the line

17 of defence should be amended and we returned to the battalion command.

18 And again my question was: Are there any other requests? Are there any

19 other questions? And then the commander whose name was Lubenovic, he was

20 the commander of the 1st Battalion, told us that he had a problem with his

21 fighters leaving for other units. His line of defence was very stretched

22 and he was afraid that he could not be able to organise his shifts if the

23 problem continued. He mentioned that there was some foreigners recruiting

24 his fighters for themselves. And this was again when foreigners were

25 mentioned in front of me.

1 Q. What did you do next?

2 A. The commander always told us that whenever we visited units, that

3 we should not bring him problems, that we should try and see what we could

4 do ourselves. I asked to be taken to the spot, to the place where they

5 were. I wanted to see whether there was anything I could do on the spot

6 instead of bringing problems back to my commander. When I was taken to

7 that place, there was a mosque in Mehurici and from the mosque you go

8 through a little forest; this is where I was taken and I was shown the

9 place where they were. And it is then that I saw a gate, something like a

10 gate, and a fence that had existed maybe even before. There was an armed

11 soldier standing at the gate. He was not wearing our uniform.

12 Q. Did you enter?

13 A. We tried to enter. It -- this soldier was told that an officer

14 from the corps command wanted to enter, but he would not allow us to come

15 closer. He started taking his rifle off his shoulder, and I turned around

16 with the other officers and we went back.

17 Q. I will now ask you --

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have some ten

19 more questions for the witness tomorrow. I would like to show him two

20 more documents, and I believe that my examination-in-chief will be

21 finished very quickly tomorrow.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will continue tomorrow.

23 Sir, you will have to come back tomorrow at 3.00. Please be at

24 the disposal of the Tribunal to be present here around 3.00 for the

25 beginning of tomorrow's session. As you have already been told by the

1 Defence, your testimony will be finished very quickly tomorrow. From now

2 on, you're not supposed to speak to any of the parties because you have

3 taken the solemn declaration, which means that you are no longer in the

4 position to talk to the Defence.

5 We will adjourn and we will resume tomorrow at 3.00.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of

8 January, 2005, at 3.00 p.m.

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