1.Initial Appearance, 27 Sep ’01, T. 2. The Trial Chamber notes that all dates referred to in this Judgement refer to the year 1993, unless otherwise stated.
2.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 106 ; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 84.
3.Vahid Kravelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 138.
4.Ex. 102, Decision of the RBiH Presidency on restructuring of the RBiH Supreme Command Headquarters, 8 June 1993. See infra Section IV.A.1(a).
5.Ex. 263, Order of the RBiH Presidency, 1 November 1993. See infra Section IV.F, para. 720. 
6.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T.  17-18; Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 01 Mar ’05, p. 4; Initial Appearance, 27 Sept ’01, T. 2; Defence Final Brief, para. 760.
7.Indictment, para. 3.
8.Indictment, para. 4.
9.In B/C/S, Istureno Komandno Mesto.
10.Indictment, para. 4.
11.Indictment, paras 5 and 6.
12.Indictment, paras 8 and 9.
13.Indictment, para. 10.
14.Indictment, para. 10.
15.Indictment, para. 21.
16.Indictment, para. 15.
17.Indictment, para. 24.
18.Indictment, para. 24.
19.Indictment, paras 27 and 29.
20.Indictment, para. 38.
21.Indictment, para. 34.
22.Rule 89(B) of the Rules. See also Guidelines on the Standards Governing the Admission of Evidence, 16 Feb ’05, with Annex (“Guidelines”).
23.This provision is in accordance with all major human rights instruments. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 14(2).
24.Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 66. The fact that the Defence has not challenged certain factual allegations contained in the Indictment does not mean that the Trial Chamber has accepted these facts to be proven. The burden of proof remains with the Prosecution for each allegation. The Trial Chamber interprets the standard “beyond reasonable doubt” to mean a high degree of probability; it does not mean certainty or proof beyond the shadow of doubt. See Criminal Evidence (4th Ed.), Richard May, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., London, 1999, pp. 64-65.
25.Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time -Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, dated 15 October 1998, filed 16 October 1998, para. 73, holding that: “[…] any doubt should be resolved in favour of the Appellant in accordance with the principle in dubio pro reo”; Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 601: “at the conclusion of the case the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to whether the offence has been proved”; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 319: “[…] the general principles of law stipulate that, in criminal matters, the version favourable to the Accused should be selected.”
26.Rule 89(F) of the Rules. See also Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 21 July 2000, para. 19.
27.Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 February 1999 (“Aleksovski Decision”), para. 14: “the statement of a person made otherwise than in the proceedings in which it is being tendered, but nevertheless being tendered in those proceedings in order to establish the truth of what that person says.”
28.Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, 5 Aug 1996, para. 16. See also Aleksovski Decision, para. 15. The Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski case clarified that: “The absence of the opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statements, and whether the hearsay is "first-hand" or more removed, are also relevant to the probative value of the evidence. The fact that the evidence is hearsay does not necessarily deprive it of probative value, but it is acknowledged that the weight or probative value to be afforded to that evidence will usually be less than that given to the testimony of a Witness who has given it under a form of oath and who has been cross-examined, although even this will depend upon the infinitely variable circumstances which surround hearsay evidence, ibid., also referred to in Guidelines, Annex, para. 7.
29.Brðanin Trial Judgement, para. 35, citing Criminal Evidence (3rd Ed.), Richard May, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., London, 1995.
30.Celibici Appeal Judgement, para. 458.
31.See Procedural History, Annex II, paras 19 and 21.
32.The Trial Chamber heard evidence indicating that witnesses had contacts before giving testimony at Trial. Nedzad Mehanovic testified that he had contacts with Erdin Arnautovic and Witness D in The Hague before and during the time he gave evidence before the Trial Chamber, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 77-93. In relation to possible similarities between parts of these three witnesses’ accounts, see also Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 65-69.
33.Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 69. See also Kupreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 31.
34.The Trial Chamber is referring in particular to Ramiz Delalic, Salko Gusic, Bakir Alispahic, Erdin Arnautovic, Nedzad Mehanovic, and Witness D.
35.Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 71; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Kupreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 33.
36.Oral Decision on Prosecution Motion on admission of statements of witnesses pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 18 March ’05, T. 79; Oral Decision on Defence Motion on admission of statements of witnesses pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 5 July ’05, T. 9-12; and Oral Decision on Defence Motion on admission of statements of witnesses pursuant to Rule 2 bis, 08 July ’05, T. 66-67; and Oral Decision on Defence Motion on admission of abridged statement of Witness pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 14 July ’05, T. 4-5; Decision on Motion for admission of written statement of deceased Witness pursuant to Rule  92 bis (C), 25 July ’05; and Decision on Further Defence Rule 92 bis Motion, 25 July ’05.
37.Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal concerning Rule  92 bis (C), 7 June ’02, fn. 34, referring to Judgements of the European Court for Human Rights.
38.Oral Decision on Motion re Agreed Facts and Motion for Withdrawal of “Motion for Judicial Notice”, 12 May ’05, T.  10-11; and Decision on Motion Concerning Further Agreed Facts, 25 July ’05.
39.Simic Trial Judgement, para. 21.
40.Guidelines, Annex, para. 4.
41.Guidelines, Annex, para. 5.
42.Ex. 315, book “Uzdol and all its victims”.
43.Kazo Zelenika, 5 Apr '05, T. 8 -11.
44.Kazo Zelenika, 5 Apr '05, T. 10.
45.Indictment, Count 1.
46.Common Article 3, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:
In case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions;
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; S…C
47.Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 89 (“Tadic Jurisdiction Decision”); re-affirmed in Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 136. The other violations of humanitarian law expressed in these decisions are: “(i) violations of the Hague law on international conflicts; (ii) infringements of provisions of the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as “grave breaches” by those Conventions; […] and (iv) violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict, considered qua treaty law, i.e. agreements which have not turned into customary international law.”
48.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, paras 67-70; Brdjanin Trial Judgement, para. 127.
49.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. See also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 66.
50.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70. The term “protracted” is significant in excluding mere cases of civil unrest or single acts of terrorism in cases of non-international conflicts, see Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 341.
51.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 137; Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras 140, 150.
52.ICRC Commentaries (GC IV ), p. 34.
53.Nicaragua v. U.S., Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 218.
54.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 149.
55.Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras 147-150 and 420, where the Appeals Chamber held that the provisions of Common Article are applicable to international and non-international conflicts alike.
56.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70 (emphasis added). See also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, paras 57, 64. In para. 64, the Appeals Chamber held that: “the Prosecutor did not have to prove that there was an armed conflict in each and every square inch of the general area. The state of armed conflict is not limited to the areas of actual military combat but exists across the entire territory under the control of the warring parties.”
57.Defence Final Brief, footnote 5, referring to the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Ministries case. The Defence further argued that the Prosecution failed to plead the existence of a sufficient nexus between the conduct of the Accused and the armed conflict and failed to plead any material fact in the Indictment relevant to establishing that nexus. The Defence submitted that it has been prejudiced by the Prosecution failure to plead its case with any precision, which has resulted an unfairness in that the Defence has had to guess the Prosecution case on that point. See Defence Final Brief, para. 6. The Trial Chamber notes in this respect the Decision on Defence Motion for Particulars, 16 December 2003.
58.See infra Section IV.D.
59.Defence Final Brief, para. 8. The Defence argues that the crimes were contrary to the implementation of the overall policy of the ABiH, namely a multi-ethnic country. The Defence further argues that the victims in Grabovica were not limited to Bosnian Croat victims, but also included Bosnian Muslim refugees and a soldier of another ABiH unit, ibid.
60.See infra Section IV.E.
61.Defence Final Brief, para. 13, referring to Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 623.
62.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence in its Final Brief argued that the required nexus should be established between the conduct of the Accused and the armed conflict. In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes that generally, in cases before the Tribunal where it has been found that the required nexus ought to be between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict, the accused was directly participating in the crimes, see, e.g., Vasiljevic Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 58; Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 65.
63.Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 57; Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70.
64.Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 58.
65.Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 58.
66.These conditions are that the treaty (i) was unquestionable binding on the parties at the time of the alleged offence; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogated from peremptory norms of international law, as are most customary rules of international humanitarian law. See Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 143. The Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez upheld the approach of the Trial Chamber in that case, that when it is found that a provision of treaty law is applicable in a case, the question whether that provision reflects customary law at the relevant time is beside the point, Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 41-46.
67.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94. See also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 66.
68.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 89; Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras133-136; Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 68.
69.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 89; Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 143; Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 68.
70.Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 612, referring to the Nicaragua case.
71.Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 129, confirmed by Celebici Appeal Judgement, para 153-174, in particular para. 167; see also Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, 2 March 1999, paras 32-33.
72.The Trial Chamber notes that the term “hostilities” is not synonymous to the term “armed conflict.” An armed conflict may continue to exist after the hostilities in an area have ceased. The state of armed conflict ends when a peace agreement has been achieved or – in case of an non-international conflict – if a peaceful settlement has been reached. See Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, para. 70: “International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of S…C armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.” See also ICRC Commentaries GC III, p. 37: “Speaking generally, it must be recognised that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities ”(emphasis omitted).
73.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 420.
74.Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 615. The Trial Chamber continued with holding that “if the answer to that question is negative, the victim will enjoy the protection of the proscriptions contained in Common Article 3.” See also Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 177, referring to the Tadic Trial Judgement.
75.Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 616. The Trial Chamber notes that ‘SactiveC participation in hostilities’ has been defined by the delegates as “acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces,” ICRC Commentary to AP I, para. 1944 and ICRC Commentary to AP II, para. 4788. See also Musema Trial Judgement, para. 279; Semanza Trial Judgement, para. 366. The Trial Chamber further takes note of the Commentaries, where it is stated that “to restrict Sthe concept of participating directly in hostilitiesC to combat and to active military operations would be too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort would be too broad”, ICRC Commentaries to Additional Protocol I, para. 1679. The quoted sentence continues: “as in modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort to some extent, albeit indirectly,” and that “SactiveC participation in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place,” ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, para. 1679.
76.See ICRC Commentaries GC III, p. 39: “The discussions at the Conference brought out clearly that it is not necessary for an armed force as a whole to have laid down its arms for its members to be entitled to protection under [Article 3]. The Convention refers to individuals and not to units of troops, and a man who has surrendered individually is entitled to the same humane treatment as he would receive if the whole army to which he belongs had capitulated. The important thing is that the man in question will be taking no further part in the fighting.”
77.Galic Trial Judgement, para. 50.
78.The Trial Chamber notes that a person may be listed as a member of an armed force, without being mobilised. Furthermore, it is possible that in a state of war, the civilian police by law become part of the armed forces.
79.The Defence submits that “the spontaneous reaction of the population and soldiers living in the area of Uzdol at the time may be said to constitute a levée en masse. As such, all members of that levée lost their status as civilians which they might otherwise have enjoyed for as long as the levée en masse operates”, Defence Final Brief, para. 47. The Trial Chamber notes that “Levée en masse” is regulated in Article 4 (A) (6) of GC III, which reads in its relevant parts:
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy. […]
inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
The Trial Chamber recalls, as stated above, that anyone, who is “taking no active part in the hostilities” is entitled to the protection under Common Article 3, and that it is the specific situation of the victim at the time of the crime, which must be taken into account in determining his or her protection under Common Article 3.
80.Kvocka Appeal Judgement, para. 261, with further references. The crimes of murder under Article 3 and of wilful killing set forth in Article 85(3) of Additional Protocol I and punishable under Article 2 of the Statute contain similar elements. The Trial Chamber therefore considers that the Commentary to Article 85(3) of Additional Protocol I is relevant. See the Appeals Chamber’s discussion in Celebici concerning cumulative convictions in relation to Articles 2 and 3, paras 414-426. With regard to the word “wilfully” in Article 85(3) of Additional Protocol I, the Commentary reads:
the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e. with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing them (‘criminal intent’ or ‘malic aforethought’ ); this encompasses the concepts of ‘wrongful intent’ or ‘recklessness’, viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences.
In this respect, the Trial Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber in the Strugar case, which found that “(i(t is now settled that the mens rea is not confined to cases where the accused has a direct intent to kill or to cause serious bodily harm, but also extends to cases where the accused has what is often referred to as an indirect intent”, Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 235.
81.The Defence raised this point in its Final Brief, para. 55, submitting that:
the perpetrators – and, in turn, Mr Halilovic – were aware of (the( civilian status (of the victims( at the time of the crime (for the perpetrators) and the time of the alleged failure (in the case of the accused) and that, (ii) with that awareness, the perpetrator killed the victim deliberately and Mr Halilovic deliberately failed to prevent/punish them.
However, the Trial Chamber notes that, by referring in this context to the Accused’s mens rea, the Defence appears to have confused the requirements of Article 7(3) and those of Article 3 of the Statute. The Trial Chamber will therefore, in this context, disregard the Defence submission in relation to the Accused’s mens rea. The Prosecution did not make any submission with regard to whether the mens rea of the direct perpetrator must also include knowledge of the status of the victim as a person taking no active part in hostilities. Rather, the Prosecution limits itself to submitting that “(m(urder under Article 3 requires proof that the victims were persons taking no active part in the hostilities”, Prosecution Final Brief, para. 20, footnote excluded.
82.See supra III.A.2.
83.In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes that the knowledge of the status of the victims is one aspect of the mens rea that needs to be proven for the conviction on any Article 3 charge based on Common Article 3.
84.See supra III.A.2.
85.Kvocka Appeal Judgement, para. 260. See also Tadic Trial Judgement, para. 240 (“Since these were not times of normalcy, it is inappropriate to apply rules of some national systems that require the production of a body as proof to death. However, there must be evidence to link injuries received to a resulting death”) and Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 326.
86.See for example Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 334, which reads:
?ags is most clearly evidenced in the case of military commanders by Article 87 of Additional Protocol I, international law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent persons under their control from committing violations of international humanitarian law, and it is ultimately this duty that provides the basis for, and defines the contours of, the imputed criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute.
87.Article 86 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, entitled “failure to act”, in paragraph 1 imposes responsibility for grave breaches which result from a “failure to act when under a duty to do so”. The Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1986) (“ICRC Commentary onto the Additional Protocols”) states with regards to Article 86 of Additional Protocol I that “responsibility for a breach consisting of a failure to act can only be established if the person failed to act when he had a duty to do so” (p. 1010, para 3537). Similarly the Trial Chamber in the Celebici case noted “criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only where there exists a legal obligation to act,” citing ILC Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, UN doc. A/51/10 (“ILC Commentary”). This basis can also be seen in the post-World War II trials, for example, the wording of Count 55 of the Indictment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“Tokyo Trial”) highlights the focus of that trial on the duty of commanders to act. It charged the accused with failure in a duty to act, stating that they “recklessly disregarded their legal duty by virtue of their offices to take adequate steps to ensure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war”, The Tokyo Judgement, The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, reprinted in: R. John Pritchard and S. Magbauna Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, New-York - London 1981, p. 48, 424, (emphasis added). In a later part of the Judgement, this charge was described as “failure to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of conventions and laws of war”, ibid. p. 49, 772.
88.This interpretation can also been inferred from the ICRC Commentary to Article 86 of Additional Protocol I, which states that “the direct link which must exist between the superior and the subordinate clearly follows from the duty to act laid down in paragraph 1.” ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1013, para. 3544 (emphasis added).
89.Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2, Sentencing Judgement, 10 Dec ’03 (“Obrenovic Sentencing Judgement”) para. 100, citing Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et. al. Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 Nov ’02 (“Hadzihasanovic Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction”), para. 66.
90.See also J-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Cambridge University Press, 2005, Vol. I, Introduction, p. XXV; and F. Kalshoven and L. Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War, ICRC, Mar ’01. pp. 53-54.
91.The ICRC Commentary to Article  87 states that “the role of commanders is decisive[…] the necessary measures for the proper application of the Conventions and the Protocol must be taken at the level of the troops, so that a fatal gap between the undertakings entered into by Parties to the conflict and the conduct of individuals is avoided. At this level everything depends on commanders, and without their conscientious supervision, general legal requirements are unlikely to be effective.” ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1018, para. 3550. See infra paras 81-88.
92.Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., Case No IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July ’03 (“ Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision”), para. 22.
93.Ibid. para. 23.
94.See, e.g., Order of Charles VII of France of 1439 which held that a captain “shall be responsible for the offence as if he had committed it himself and shall be punished in the same way as the offender would have been.” Similarly the Massachusetts Provisional Congress stated in 1775 that any commander who failed to punish his officers or soldiers would be punished “in such a manner as if he himself had committed the crimes or disorders complained of”, cited in Hendin, Stuart E., Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century – A Century of Evolution, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 10(2003):1, paras 6-8.
95.Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto, 18 October 1907. In its report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference in 1919, the International Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties recommended that a tribunal be established for the prosecution of, inter alia, all those who “ordered, or with knowledge thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to or repressing violations of the laws or customs of war”. Such a tribunal was never realised. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties - Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, Versailles, 29 March 1919, reprinted in 14 AJIL, 95 (1920), p. 121, cited in Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 335.
96.See infra paras 44-47.
97.Article 86, Failure to act:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Article 87, Duty of commanders:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.
In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes the finding of the Appeals Chamber in Hadzihasanovic that Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I are applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts, Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision, paras 29-31.
98.Regulation 10 of the Canadian Act respecting War Crimes 1946 provided (Law Reports, Vol. IV, pp. 128-129):
Where there is evidence that more than one war crime has been committed by members of a formation, unit, body, or group while under the command of a single commander, the court may receive that evidence as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of the commander for those crimes. Where there is evidence that a war crime has been committed by members of a formation, unit, body, or group and that an officer or non-commissioned officer was present at or immediately before the time when such offence was committed, the court may receive that evidence as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of such officer or non-commissioned officer, and of the commander of such commander, unit, body, or group, for that crime.
99.Article 4 of the French Ordinance of 28 August 1944 provided (Law Reports, Vol. IV, p. 87):
Where a subordinate is prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of a war crime, and his superiors cannot be indicted as being equally responsible, they shall be considered as accomplices in so far as they have tolerated the criminal acts of their subordinates.
100.Regulation 8(ii) of the British Royal Warrant of 14 June 1945 (Army Order 81/45) for military courts provided (Law Reports, Vol. I, pp. 108-109):
Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the result of concerted action upon the part of a unit or group of men, then evidence given upon any charge relating to that crime against any member of such unit or group may be received as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of each member of that unit or group for that crime. In any such case all or any members of any such unit or group may be charged and tried jointly in respect of any such war crime and no application by any of them to be tried separately shall be allowed by the Court.
101.In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1, para. 13.
102.Ibid., paras 15-16
103.Ibid., para. 37.
104.Ibid., para. 39, citing cases arising out of the Philippine Insurrection in 1900 and 1901.
105.Ibid., para. 39 (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Rutledge in his dissent stated (327 US 1, paras 43-44 ):
mass guilt we do not impute to individuals, perhaps in any case, but certainly in none where the person is not charged or shown actively to have participated in or knowingly to have failed in taking action to prevent the wrongs done by others, having both the duty and the power to do so.
106.Hostage case, p. 1256.
107.Ibid., p. 1271 (emphasis added).
108.Ibid., p. 1272.
109.The Court examined defendant Von Leeb’s responsibility for the crimes of those within his area of command in relation to, for example, crimes against prisoners of war, High Command case, pp. 558-559; illegal execution of Red Army soldiers, ibid., pp. 559-560 ; crimes against civilians, ibid., pp. 561-562. It also noted that in relation to Chiefs of Staff “in the absence of participation in criminal orders or their execution within a command, a chief of staff does not become criminally responsible for criminal acts occurring therein”, ibid., p. 530 (emphasis added ).
110.The SD was the “State Security Service of the SS” and the “SIPO” was the “State Security Police”, see High Command case. High Command case p. 702 “Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms”.
111.Ibid., p. 549.
112.Ibid. p. 543-544.
113.Toyoda case, p. 5006 (emphasis added). The Tribunal continued; “(i(n determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, charged with dereliction of his duty as a commander, consideration must be given to many factors”, ibid.
114.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1011, para. 3541.
115.Ibid., p. 1011, para.  3540.
116.Ibid., p. 1012, para.  3542.
117.Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993). UN doc. S /25704 (1993) (“Secretary General’s Report”). However, in this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber Judgement in Celebici relied upon the report of the Secretary General to find that command responsibility under Article  7(3) attaches responsibility for the crimes of subordinates. See Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 333.
118.Secretary General’s Report, p. 15
119.Final Report of the Commission of Experts, UN doc. S/1994/674 (“United Nations Commission of Experts Report”), p. 16.
120.Ibid.
121.Ibid.
122.ILC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 35.
123.Ibid., p. 37 (emphasis added).
124.Ibid., p. 36 (emphasis added). The most recent codification of the concept, in Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, provides that military commanders and superiors shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his command or control, Rome Statute of the ICC, Article  28.
125.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 331 (emphasis added). This was part of the Trial Chamber’s discussion as to whether command responsibility was part of customary international law.
126.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 333.
127.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 198.
128.Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, 25 June 1999 (“Aleksovski Trial Judgement ”), para. 67. The Trial Chamber notes that this statement was not challenged in the Appeals Judgement.
129.Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 32.
130.The Trial Chamber notes that different forms of expression than “for” the crimes of subordinates have been used, for example, the Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision, used the term “in respect of”, ibid., para. 18.
131.See, e.g., Celebici Appeal Judgement para. 195; Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 343.
132.For application of the principle of command responsibility to both international and non-international armed conflicts, see Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 31. The Appeals Chamber has held that customary international law recognises that there can be command responsibility in respect of some war crimes committed by a member of an organised military force in the course of an non-international armed conflict, ibid., para. 18.
133.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 346, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, 29 Jul ’04 (“Blaskic Appeal Judgement”), para. 484; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000 (“Aleksovski Appeal Judgement”), para. 72. See also Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, 17 Dec ’04 (“Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement”), para. 827; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 03 Mar 2000 (“Blaskic Trial Judgement”), para. 294; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic and Dragoljub Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 02 Nov ’01 (“Kovcka Trial Judgement”), para. 401.
134.Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76. See also ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, which states that “responsibility for a breach consisting of a failure to act can only be established if the person failed to act when he had a duty to do so”, p. 1010. See also the ILC Commentary, p. 36.
135.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 377. It is well established that command responsibility is applicable to both military and civilian superiors, Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras 195 -96 and 240; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76.
136.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 370.
137.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 256.
138.See Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 26 February 2001(“Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement”), paras 418-424.
139.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 69.
140.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 266.
141.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 193.
142.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 195. The Appeal Chamber in Celebici stated that a superior vested with de jure authority who does not have effective control over his or her subordinates would therefore not incur criminal responsibility pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility, whereas a de facto superior who lacks formal letters of appointment or commission but, in reality, has effective control over the perpetrators of offences would incur criminal responsibility where he failed to prevent or punish such criminal conduct, ibid., para. 197.
143.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 303 (emphasis in the original). See also High Command case, pp. 543 -544.
144.Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-22&23-/1-T, Judgement, 21  Feb ’01,(“Kunarac Trial Judgement”), para. 399. The temporary nature of a military unit is not, in itself, sufficient to exclude a relationship of subordination, ibid.
145.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, para. 3554.
146.Kunarac Trial Chamber para. 399, citing Celebici Appeal Judgement paras 197-198 and 256.
147.Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 303, referring to Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 106.
148.Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT- 01-42-T, Judgement, 31 Jan ’05, (“Strugar Trial Judgement ”), para. 363.
149.The ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, dealing with the concept of a “superior” within the meaning of Article  86 of Additional Protocol I, which provides the basis for the duty in Article 7( 3), emphasises that the term is not limited to immediate superiors. It states that (ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1013, para. 3544):
?tghis is not a purely theoretical concept covering any superior in a line of command, but we are concerned only with the superior who has a personal responsibility with regard to the perpetrator of the acts concerned because the latter, being his subordinate, is under his control. The direct link which must exist between the superior and the subordinate clearly follows from the duty to act […]. Furthermore, only that superior is normally in the position of having information enabling him to conclude in the circumstances at the time that the subordinate has committed or is going to commit a breach. However, it should not be concluded from this that this position only concerns the commander under whose direct orders the subordinate is placed […]. The concept of the superior is broader and should be seen in terms of a hierarchy encompassing the concept of control.
Further support can be found in the judgement in the case against the Japanese Admiral Soemu Toyoda tried in the aftermath of World War II. The military tribunal in that case highlighted that subordination does not have to be direct and stated that ( Toyoda case, p. 5006, emphasis added):
?ign the simplest language it may be said that this Tribunal believes the principle of command responsibility to be that, if this accused knew, or should by the exercise of ordinary diligence have learned, of the commission by his subordinates, immediate or otherwise, of the atrocities proved beyond a shadow of a doubt before this Tribunal or of the existence of a routine which would countenance such, and, by his failure to take any action to punish the perpetrators, permitted the atrocities to continue, he has failed in his performance of his duty as a commander and must be punished.
See also the following finding of the Military Tribunal in the Hostage case in relation to the defendant Dehner (Hostage case, p. 1298):
The defendant excuses his indifference to all these killings by saying that it was the responsibility of the division commanders. We agree that the divisional commanders are responsible for ordering the commission of criminal acts. But the superior commander is also responsible if he orders, permits, or acquiesces in such criminal conduct. His duty and obligation is to prevent such acts, or if they have been already executed, to take steps to prevent their recurrence.
Reference may also be made to the ILC Commentary, which uses the term “superiors ” in the plural form in order to indicate that the doctrine of command responsibility “applies not only to the immediate superior of a subordinate, but also to his other superiors in the military chain of command or the governmental hierarchy if the necessary criteria are met”, ibid., p. 37.
150.As discussed above, the indicators of effective control depend on the specific circumstances of the case. See Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 392.
151.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 239.
152.Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras 223 and 241.
153.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 386.
154. Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 386, citing United Nations Commission of Experts Report, para. 58. See also Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 427 and Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 307.
155.Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 80.
156. Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic (a.k.a. “Tuta”), Vinko Martinovic (a.k.a. “Stela”), Case No. IT-98-34-T, Trial Judgement, 31 Mar ’03 (“Naletilic Trial Judgement”), para. 73. See also Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 428.
157.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 62, citing Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 241.
158.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 232.
159.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 238.
160.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 238.
161.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 238 (emphasis added), citing ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1014, para. 3545. The factors listed in the United Nations Commission of Experts Report mentioned above have also been considered to be amongst those allowing inferences to be drawn concerning notice to the commander, although these factors are usually used to prove actual knowledge, Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para.  437. See supra para. 66.
162.Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 437.
163.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 393.
164.Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004 (“Brdjanin Trial Judgement “) para. 278, referring to Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras 223 and 241. With regard to the criminal reputation of troops, see also the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the Sabra and Shatilla Cases, which, when examining the responsibility of the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, held that his knowledge of the feelings of hatred of the particular forces involved towards the Palestinians did not justify the conclusion that the entry of those forces into the camps posed no danger (Blaskic Trial Chamber, para. 331, citing Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, February 7, 1983 (authorised translation), reproduced in 22 International Legal Materials 473-520 (1983 )). It stated that:
?tghe absence of a warning from experts cannot serve as an explanation for ignoring the danger of a massacre. The Chief of Staff should have known and foreseen – by virtue of common knowledge, as well as the special information at his disposal – that there was a possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of the Phalangists. Even if the experts did not fulfil their obligation, this does not absolve the Chief of Staff of responsibility.
The Trial Chamber also notes the recent finding of the Trial Chamber in Strugar which considered that it is not sufficient that the information known to the commander at the time of the offence would have indicated the possibility that such offences might occur, but it is required that the information indicated that such crimes would occur, Strugar Trial Judgement, paras 417-419, 420. The Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac, having examined the case-law, found that with regard to a specific offence, the information available to the superior need not contain specific details on the unlawful acts which have been or are about to be committed. It may not, however, be inferred from the case-law that, where one offence has a material element in common with another which contains an additional element not present in the first, it would suffice for the commander to have alarming information regarding the first offence in order to be held responsible for failing to prevent or punish the second. Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, 17 Sept ’03. (“Krnojelac Appeal Judgement”), para. 155. The Appeals Chamber mentioned the example of offences of cruel treatment and torture where torture subsumes the lesser offence of cruel treatment, ibid., para. 155.
165.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 226; Blaskic Appeals Judgement, para. 62.
166.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 226.
167.The Trial Chamber in Celebici held that (Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 387):
a superior is not permitted to remain wilfully blind to the acts of his subordinates. There can be no doubt that a superior who simply ignores information within his actual possession compelling the conclusion that criminal offences are being committed, or are about to be committed, by his subordinates commits a most serious dereliction of duty for which he may be held criminally responsible under the doctrine of superior responsibility.
168.Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 239.
169.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 63, citing Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A- A, Judgement, 3 July ’02, para. 34-35.
170.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 83.
171.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, paras 445-446.
172.Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 336. The Strugar Trial Chamber held that (Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 373):
?…g if a superior has knowledge or has reason to know that a crime is being or is about to be committed he has a duty to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime from happening and is not entitled to wait and punish afterwards.
173.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 395.
174.Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, 15 March 2002 (“Krnojelac Trial Judgement ”), para. 95. The Trial Chamber in Celebici stated that “lack of formal legal competence on the part of the commander will not necessarily preclude his criminal responsibility”, Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 395.
175.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 395 (footnotes omitted). See also Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 443.
176.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 72. In this respect the Celebici Trial Chamber stated that (Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 394):
It is the view of the Trial Chamber that any evaluation of the action taken by a superior to determine whether this duty has been met is so inextricably linked to the facts of each particular situation that any attempt to formulate a general standard in abstracto would not be meaningful.
177.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 72. It is a commander’s degree of effective control, his material ability, that may guide a Trial Chamber in determining whether he reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the commission of a crime or to punish the perpetrator thereof. See Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 335.
178.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 72, referring to Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 73-74; and Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 206.
179.Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 378.
180.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 398. The one authority cited by the Defence in the Celebici case was M. Cherif Bassiouni, in The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publisher, 1996, pp. 350-351, where the author suggests the existence of causation as “the essential element” in cases of command responsibility.
181.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 399.
182.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 400.
183.Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 445.
184.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 77.
185.Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 447.
186.See supra para. 39.
187.During the third session of the Committee I at the Geneva Conference, the Egyptian delegate (Mr. Abi-Saab) stated that his government always regarded “prevention as the most potent guarantee” of humanitarian law, but that repression had become necessary as a remedial action. See Official Records, Vol. IX, printed in Bern, 1978, p. 18, para. 14.
188.The Hostage case held Field Martial List had a positive obligation to maintain the protection of all persons within his territorial jurisdiction whether or not he had tactical command over all of the forces within that geographical area, ibid., p. 1230 and 1272. The subsequent High Command case found that that (ibid., p. 547):
One of the functions of an occupational commander endowed with executive power was to maintain order and protect the civilian population against illegal acts. In the absence of any official directives limiting his executive powers as to these illegal acts within his area, he had the right and duty to take action for their suppression.
Similarly, the Tokyo Judgement imposed a positive duty on those responsible for prisoners of war to ensure a system was in place to prevent their ill-treatment, ibid.,. pp. 48, 442 - 48, 444. Similarly, a United States Military Commission found that General Yamashita had failed in a duty to control the actions of his troops during the so-called “rape of Manila”; this was despite evidence that in fact he did not have de facto control of his troops and this finding was upheld on appeal to the US Supreme Court, In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1, p. 14. However, it may be argued that under the actual state of international humanitarian law the Yamashita standard would not be the appropriate standard to be followed since it appears from the circumstances of the case that he had no effective control over his troops and that he did not have knowledge of their crimes, therefore in the current state of international humanitarian law this would be considered as strict liability.
189.See Toyoda case, pp.  5005-5006, (emphasis added).
190.Additional Protocol I, Article  87, para. 2; Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 771.
191.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1023, para. 3563. The ICRC Commentary notes that this duty varies for each level of command, and by way of example, may imply that (ibid., p. 1022, paras 3560-3561):
a lieutenant must mark a protected place which he discovers in the course of his advance, a company commander must ensure that an attack is interrupted when he finds that the objective under attack is no longer a military objective, and a regimental commander must select objectives in such a way as to avoid indiscriminate attacks.
192.In examining the knowledge element of Article 86, the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols notes that on the basis of post World War II jurisprudence a superior cannot claim to be ignorant about the level of training and instruction of subordinate officers and their troops, and their character traits and that “examples would be information on lack of any instruction for the troops on the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol”, this may include a preventative duty which attaches prior to knowledge that an offence is about to be committed, p. 1014, para. 3545.
193.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1018, para. 3550.
194.Ibid., p. 1022, para.  3560.
195.Ibid., p. 1021, para.  3558 (emphasis added).
196.Ibid.
197.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 773.
198.Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 412.
199.Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 421.
200.See for example Prosecutor  v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 10 Dec 1998 (“Furundzija Trial Judgement”), para. 148 (referring to Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 7 July 1989, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A, No.161, para. 90):
States are bound to put in place all those measures that may pre-empt the perpetration of torture. As was authoritatively held by the European Court of Human Rights in Soering, international law intends to bar not only actual breaches but also potential breaches of the prohibition against torture (as well as any inhuman and degrading treatment). It follows that international rules prohibit not only torture but also (i) the failure to adopt the national measures necessary for implementing the prohibition and (ii) the maintenance in force or passage of laws which are contrary to the prohibition.
201.For example, the Trial Chamber in Strugar found that a failure on the part of the accused not to give a clarification on an order for attack was not sufficient to give rise to liability under Article 7(3), but that any such clarification would have been merely by way of wise precaution, however, it noted that “it remains relevant, however, when evaluating the events that followed, that no such precaution was taken”, Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 420.
202.Hostage case, p. 1290. The defendant Rendulic was held responsible for acts of his subordinates for reprisals against the population, in the light of, inter alia, the fact that he made no attempt to secure additional information (after receiving reports indicating that crimes have been committed). Similarly, in holding the defendant Dehner responsible, the military tribunal considered the fact that the defendant made no effort to require reports showing that hostages and reprisal prisoners were shot in accordance with international law, ibid. p. 1271. See also p. 1298.
203.Hostage case, p. 1311. With respect to the responsibility of the defendant Lanz for reprisal carried out by his subordinates the military tribunal held (ibid.):
(t(his defendant, with full knowledge of what was going on, did absolutely nothing about it. Nowhere an order appears which has for its purpose the bringing of the hostage and reprisal practice within the rules of war (…). As commander of the XXII Corps it was his duty to act and when he failed to do so and permitted these inhumane and unlawful killings to continue, he is criminally responsible.
204.The Tokyo Judgement, pp. 49,809. The Tokyo Judgement held with respect to the defendant Kimura that “(h(e took no disciplinary measures or other steps to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under his command”, ibid.
205.High Command case, p.  623. In finding the defendant Hans von Salmuth responsible, the military tribunal held inter alia that “it appears that in none of the documents or the testimony herein that the defendant in anyway protested against or criticized the action of the SD or requested their removal or punishment”, ibid. (emphasis added ). Similarly, in the Hostage case the military tribunal found the defendant Wilhelm List responsible inter alia in the light of the fact that “(n(ot once did he condemn such acts as unlawful. Not once did he call to account those responsible for these inhumane and barbarous acts”, ibid., p. 1272.
206.The Tokyo Judgement p. 49, 791. The Tokyo Judgement found that the defendant Hirota (ibid.):
was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about the same result. He was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being implemented.
207.In particular, the Tokyo Judgement found that (ibid., p. 49, 80):
The duty of an Army commander in such circumstances is not discharged by the mere issue of routine orders […]. His duty is to take such steps and issue such orders as will prevent thereafter the commission of war crimes and to satisfy himself that such orders are being carried out.
208.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1007, para. 3528 (emphasis added).
209.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols states that the “prevent or repress” element of paragraph 2 of Article  86 “deals with the central purpose of this paragraph: the superior who is responsible and who is aware of the facts must act to prevent or repress the breach”, ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1015, para. 3547 (emphasis added). Article 86 does not refer to punishment at all, this arises in Article 87. The ICRC Commentary to Article 86(2) continues “the present provision merely poses the principle of the indictment of superiors who have tolerated breaches of the law of armed conflict ”, ibid. (emphasis added).
210.Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 416.
211.The Hostage case considered that a commander had a duty both to prevent and punish the crimes of his subordinates. The Court in that case stated that: “The primary responsibility for the prevention and punishment of crime lies with the commanding general; a responsibility from which he cannot escape by denying his authority over the perpetrators.” The Hostage case, p. 1272. It is also of note that defendant List was found guilty of murder, and not of any different offence of dereliction of his duty as a commander, ibid., p. 1274. That a commander was responsible for failure to punish can also be seen in the Toyoda judgement, which explicitly recognised that superiors have “?ag duty to control his troops, to take necessary steps to prevent commission ?…g of atrocities, and to punish offenders”, ibid., pp. 5005-5006. However, as noted above, the charge in the Toyoda trial was one of dereliction of duty. The Tokyo Judgement, in convicting former Prime Minister Tojo stated that “he took no adequate steps to punish offenders and to prevent the commission of similar offences in the future”, ibid., pp. 49, 845. In convicting defendant Kimura, the Judgement stated “he took no disciplinary measures or other steps to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under his command”, ibid.,. p. 49, 809.
212.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1015, para. 3548 (emphasis added).
213.ILC Commentary, p. 37.
214.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 83.
215.Blaskic Appeal Judgement, para. 85. This conclusion is based on an analysis of some post-World War II cases, the relevant provisions of Additional Protocol I and the “Regulations concerning the Application of International Law to the Armed Forces of SFRY” (1998) referred to in the Celebici Trial Judgement. The question as to the existence of failure to punish as a separate mode of liability distinct from failure to prevent was considered by the Trial Chamber in its Decision in Blaskic. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Defence Motion to Strike Portions of the Amended Indictment Alleging “Failure to Punish” Liability, Case No. IT-95 -14-PT, 04 Apr 1997 (“Blaskic Decision”). The Trial Chamber determined that failure to punish was a distinct form of responsibility. This finding was later followed in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14 /2-PT, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction of the amended Indictment alleging “Failure to Punish” Liability, 2 Mar 1999 (“ Kordic and Cerkez Decision on failure to punish”), paras 9-16. It should be noted, however, that the Trial Chamber in Blaskic, in dismissing the argument that the words “or punish the perpetrators thereof” should be stricken from the indictment, stated that; “?…g the indictment is not restricted to a narrow charge of failing to punish. It covers rather, and essentially, the failure by the accused of preventing his subordinates from committing the alleged crimes in addition to having instigated, planned and ordered them himself”, Blaskic Decision, para. 16.
216.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1015, para. 3547.
217.Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 446.
218.See the Yamashita case, Law Reports, p. 35 (emphasis added):
where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops […].
The Tokyo Judgement found that the defendant Shigemitsu “took no adequate steps to have the matter investigated […] He should have pressed the matter, if necessary to the point of resigning, in order to quit himself of a responsibility which he suspected was not being discharged”, ibid., p. 49, 831 (emphasis added).
219.High Command case, p.  623. When assessing Hans von Salmuth’s responsibility for actions by his subordinates, the military tribunal considered the fact that the only punishment inflicted was a 20-day confinement sentence against a member of his own staff for unauthorised participation in this action, ibid. In the Hostage case, the military tribunal considered the defendant’s commitment to conduct an adequate investigation and to bring the perpetrators to justice (Hostage case, p. 1309):
(t(he investigation was made, the battle report of the commanding officer was found to be false, and the action of the regimental commander found to be in excess of existing orders. Upon the discovery of these facts the defendant Felmy recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the officer in charge in consideration of the sacrifices of the regiment in the combat area at the time. The defendant testified that he never knew what punishment, if any was assessed against this guilty officer. He seems to have had no interest in bringing the guilty officer to justice.
220.The Tokyo Judgement found defendant Tojo responsible for not taking adequate steps “to punish the offenders and to prevent the commission of similar offences in the future. […] He did not call for a report on the incident. […] He made perfunctory inquires about the march but took no action. No one was punished.” The Tokyo Judgement pp. 49, 846. See also Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 376 and jurisprudence cited therein. It is a matter of fact as to whether the efforts made by a commander to investigate crimes were sufficient to meet the standard of “necessary and reasonable measures ” within the meaning of Article 7(3). See, e.g., Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 488-495.
221.ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1023, para. 3562.
222.Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 316.
223.Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 95.
224.Celebici Trial Judgement, para. 395.
225.Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement, para. 446.
226.In B/C/S, Oruzanih Snaga Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, abbreviated as OS R BiH.
227.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 62. There is evidence that the commanders of the 10th Mountain Brigade and the Deputy Commander of the 9th Motorised Brigade were selected by the members of those units, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 19.
228.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 63.
229.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 137.
230.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  69; Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 13.
231.Ivan Brigic, Ex. 453, 14 Mar ’03, pp. 2-3, 18; Ex. 143, Decision on the organisational structure of the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 July 1993, which under III provides that “(t(he Main Staff consists of: […] three Deputy Commanders (Muslim, Serb and Croat) […]”. See also Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 1 Mar ’03, p. 3.
232.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 37.
233.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  25; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 90; Ex. 102, Decision on the restructuring of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Supreme Command Headquarters of the armed forces and the appointment of senior officers, 08 June 1993, which provides under VII that “(r(egulations pertaining to the introduction of ranks in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall start to apply. Ranks shall be introduced gradually”. See also Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb ’05, T. 44.
234.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 63, who agreed with Defence counsel’s proposition that the ABiH “was still very much a work in progress.”
235.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 65 ; Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 69-70; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 13-14.
236.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 14.
237.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 15, testifying that:
most of the former JNA officers transferred to the BH Army immediately after the war broke out or up to two months after that. And there was a lot of animosity between them and the ordinary commanders because those who were the former JNA members actually took part in attacking Sarajevo before they transferred to the BH Army. In addition to that, there was a lot of mistrust among the former JNA officers and the commanders who were ordinary people.
See also Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 17, and further regarding Ramiz Delalic’s opinions on former JNA officers, Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 34; Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 44.
238.In B/C/S, Glavni Stab Vrhovne Komande, or GSVK (see, e.g., Ex. 122, Ex. 501, Ex. 502). The GSVK was also referred to as Stab Vrhovne Komande, or SVK (see, e.g., Ex. 109, Ex. 146, Ex. 377).
239.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 52; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 4.
240.Nacelnik in B/C/S. The Trial Chamber notes that the term nacelnik was used in several ways within the ABiH and the MUP. For instance, in Ex. 388 the term is used to refer, on one occasion, to Sefer Halilovic as Chief of the Supreme Command Staff and, on another occasion, to the Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps; in Ex. 143 the term refers to the Chief of the Main Staff as well as the Heads (“Chiefs”) of the various administrations and branches of the ABiH Main Staff (see in this respect Ex. 224, Ex. 228, Ex. 229, Ex. 232, Ex. 233, Ex. 237, Ex. 283 and Ex. 213, wherein Jusuf Jasarevic, who was Chief of the Main Staff UB, is referred to as Chief/Nacelnik, and Ex. 296, which Avdulah Kajevic, who headed the Main Staff Administration for Organisation and Mobilisation, signed as Chief/Nacelnik); in Ex. 154, Ex. 230 and Ex.  234 Nermin Eminovic, who was Chief of the SVB in the 6th Corps, signed as Nacelnik ; in Ex. 492 Ramo Maslesa, who headed the Mostar CSB, signed as Chief/Nacelnik (see also Ex. 493 wherein Munir Alibabic of the Sarajevo CSB signs as Nacelnik Centra or Chief of the Centre); in the intercepted conversation in Ex. 390, Vahid Karavelic asks the question “Well, where are you chief?” which has been translated using the word nacelnik.
241.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 4, 50 and 04 Mar ’05, T. 30; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 15; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 42; Witness F, 09 Mar ’05, T. 63; Ex. 144; Ex. 488; Ex. 473; Ex. 220 ; Ex. 471; Ex. 377; Ex. 243; Ex 399; Ex. 219; Ex. 378.
242.Ex. 102. See also Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 22; Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 63-64; Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 1 Mar ’03, p. 3-4.
243.Ex. 102, p. 1.
244.Ex. 102, p. 2.
245.Ex. 102, p. 2.
246.Ex. 143. The preamble of this decision provides that it was adopted “(p(ursuant to […] the Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina […], at the proposal of the Minister of Defence and the (RBiH( Armed Forces Main Staff Commander […].”
247.Ex. 143. I, referring to the Decree Law on the revision of Amendment LXXXIII of the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, no. 9/92.
248.Ex. 143, III.1.
249.Indictment, para. 1.
250.Indictment, para. 3.
251.Indictment, para. 36.
252.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 67.
253.Defence Final Brief, para. 199.
254.See e.g., Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 64; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 58; Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T.  6; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 46; Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 67; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 55.
255.The position of chief of staff is a key post as far as planning, monitoring and control are concerned, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 34. The term ‘control’ in this respect means (Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 34):
to have constant oversight of the combat operations (in order that the staff be able( to prepare any kind of decisions, guidelines, directives, in terms of what to do at that point in time, tomorrow, in the future, how to conduct […] the combat operations. This is prepared by the staff of that command, together with the Chief of Staff, and it’s prepared for the commander of that unit or the commander of the Main Staff.
In other words, a chief of staff participates in coordination, planning and the other four parts of the control process but not in the command process unless he had been given specific authority to do so by his commander (Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 98). Thus, solely by virtue of his position a chief of staff does not have the authority to issue combat orders but can only do so if his commander authorises him (Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 33; see also Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 70-71). In situations when the commander authorises his deputy commander to command, orders by the deputy are signed zastupa komandanta which means that the deputy commander is acting on behalf of the commander (Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 2). In other words, a chief of staff was not “structurally speaking” in the line of command (Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 41). According to Dzevad Tirak, the 6th Corps Chief of Staff, it was his responsibility to know the whereabouts of 6th Corps units (Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 85). The chief of staff would have a duty or even an obligation to explain and clarify to subordinate units the meaning of orders issued by the commander to whom the chief of staff was subordinated (Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 34, testifying that “the orders […] issued […] are something that the Chief of Staff would understand the best, because it was the Chief of Staff who prepared that for the commander”; Selmo Cikotic testified that it is one of the important roles of a chief of staff to convey orders of the commander and explain them in detail to the units that will carry out the orders, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 79-80). In order to do this, the chief of staff could issue an order, an instruction or the like, as required by the circumstances (Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 35). The chief of staff would have “full command only over the staff within his headquarters” (Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 36). In terms of the internal Main Staff chain of command, the 18 July decision provides that the several Main Staff administrations were “directly” linked to the Commander of the Main Staff and “indirectly linked” to the Chief of the Main Staff (Ex. 143, III.3. The only Main Staff organs that were “directly linked” to the Chief of the Main Staff were the Office of the Chief of the Main Staff, the Command Operations Centre, the Headquarters Administration and the Combat Arms Administration). Importantly, a chief of staff could not directly punish soldiers or units for violations of military discipline or law; he could, however, suggest to the commander to take disciplinary measures (Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 71-72). On the other hand, if the chief of staff had been given the authority to command then he could take disciplinary measures (Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 72).
256.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T.  67-68, commenting on Ex. 143, III.3.
257.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 152. The JNA textbook “Command and Control” from 1983 (Ex. 142, p. 28) provides that:
The principle of single authority in command and control implies an inalienable right of a commander to command and control a subordinated command and unit in keeping with the powers deriving from the competence ascribed to a specific level of command and control. This principle ensures that in the process of command and control there is only one superior who issues commands and to whom the others report about the execution of tasks. The commander’s authority is stipulated by regulations. It is his right to make decisions, for which he is therefore solely responsible. In his work a commander relies on his aides, the staff and other command organs. The rights and obligations of these organs are stipulated by regulations, and they are responsible for their scope of work. A commander may delegate some of his duties and obligations on the chief of staff, his aides, a staff organ and subordinated commands, but he cannot delegate the responsibility for the situation in the unit and its use. The principle of single authority does not bar a commander from including a wider circle of associates into the decision-making process, or from hearing out their opinions and suggestions. In that way favourable conditions are created for a commander to reach best possible decisions, and for his associates to develop inventiveness and creativity.
Salko Gusic, the Commander of the 6th Corps, testified (Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 55-56) that:
(Command and control( consists of the inviolable right of the commander to command and control subordinated units, ensuring the appearance of only one superior in command and control who commands. It is the right of the commander to make decisions, so he alone bears the responsibility for this. The commander can transfer some of his rights and obligations to the Chief of Staff, assistants, or subordinated commanders but he cannot transfer responsibility for the state and use of units. The command relationship is established by the principle of subordination in a military organisation. A command relationship is founded on the duty, right, and responsibility of superiors to make decisions and designate tasks and the duty, right, and responsibility of subordinates to carry out these tasks.
Salko Gusic further testified that the five functions of the concept of ‘command and control’ are planning, organisation, command, coordination and control, Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 59. He also testified that ‘control’, or rukovodjenje, is more akin to direction or management than command. It means the control of personnel and certain services, for instance by giving guidelines. ‘Control’ does not imply issuing orders. ‘Command’, on the other hand, implies all five elements and means the issuing of tasks to subordinate units, Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T.  60-61.
258.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 24.
259.Referred to in the decision as “Nacelnik Glavnog Staba”.
260.Ex. 143, III.1.
261.Ex. 143, III.2.
262.In B/C/S, as Nacelnik Staba. See, e.g., Ex. 381, Ex. 138, Ex. 161 (signed both as “Nacelnik GS VK ” and Deputy Commander), Ex. 123 (signed as Ex. 161), Ex. 382, Ex. 122. In the following, when referring to exhibits, the Trial Chamber will therefore note the title in B/C/S with which Sefer Halilovic signed documents.
263.Ex. 143, III.1. According to IV.1 the administrations were: Combat Arms Administration; Intelligence Administration ; Airforce and Anti-aircraft Defence Administration; Personnel Administration; Armed Forces Organisation and Mobilisation Administration; Moral Guidance, Information, Propaganda and Religious Affairs Administration; Security Administration; Training, Education, Rules and Regulations Administration; Logistics Administration; Finance and Army Development Planning Administration; Legal Affairs Administration; and Navy Department.
264.Ex. 143, III.2.
265.Ex. 143, III.5. The B/C/S text of this provision reads (emphasis added):
Komandanti korpusa neposredno su potcinjeni komandantu Glavnog Staba, a vezu ostvaruju i sa Operativnim centrom komandovanja i nacelnikom Glavnog staba, po pitanjima koja odredi komandanta Glavnog Staba.
The English translation of this provision reads (emphasis added):
Corps commanders are directly subordinate to the Main Staff Commander. They shall liaise with the Command Operations Centre and the Chief of the Main Staff in issues determined by the Main Staff Command.
The Trial Chamber notes that there is a mistake in the B/C/S original as the word “komandanta” is grammatically incorrect. In order to mean “command”, as the English translation purports, it should have been “komanda” and in order to mean “commander ”, it should have been “komandant”. Therefore, on 28 September ’05 the Trial Chamber requested ex officio the Tribunal’s Conference and Language Services Section to revise the translation of this provision. The revised translation is Ex. 500 and the revised translation of the provision reads:
Corps commanders are directly subordinate to the Main Staff Commander. They liaise with the Command Operations Centre and the Chief of the Main Staff on issues determined by the Main Staff /?Commander/.
The Trial Chamber finds that it is more logical that the decision’s drafter intended that it read “komandant”. This interpretation is supported not only by the fact that it is more likely that a mistake is made of one letter and not of three, but also by the principle of single authority in command, which applied in the ABiH, Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 24 and 01 Mar ’05, T. 11; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 152. The Trial Chamber therefore considers that the decision in this respect was intended to provide that Corps commanders would “liaise with the Command Operations Centre and the Chief of the Main Staff on issues determined by the Main Staff Commander.”
266.Indictment, para. 38.
267.Indictment, para. 38; Prosecution Final Brief, para. 186. The Trial Chamber notes that in the its Pre-trial Brief (paras 203, 207-208), the Prosecution did not contend that the Accused had any de jure command authority of the units used during the “Neretva-93 Operation ” by virtue of being either “chief of the Supreme Command Staff” or “ABiH deputy commander”.
268.See infra Section IV. C.8-9.
269.In B/C/S, Sluzbe Vojne Bezbjednosti.
270.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 13-14.
271.In B/C/S, Uprava Bezbjednosti, see, e.g., Ex. 224.
272.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 30. Attached to the Main Staff UB was a Military Police Battalion, which was in charge of, among other things, guarding the facilities of the Main Staff, including the Vranica, Mladen Stojanovic, and Privredna Banka buildings, Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 11, 13-14.
273.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 5, testifying that he was appointed on 17 July 1993 and that his predecessor was Fikret Muslimovic (mentioned e.g. in Ex. 243).
274.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 12. See also Ex. 137, Rules for the Military Security Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, items 1, 5-7, pp. 4-5, detailing specific tasks for each of these functions.
275.Ex. 137, para. 5(b), p. 4.
276.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 34.
277.Ex. 137, items 27-44, pp. 7- 10. See infra Section IV.F.
278.Ex. 137, item 8, p. 5. See also Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 11.
279.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 24.
280.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 24.
281.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 25, testifying that the SVB organ would report to its commander.
282.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 31. See also Ivan Brigic who stated that when he became Chief of the Main Staff Administration for Moral Guidance, Information and Religious Affairs there were already rules in place concerning the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian law, Ivan Brigic, Ex. 453, 11 Jun ’05, p. 3. He also stated that his administration would issue daily reminders to the ABiH to protect civilians and religious buildings, ibid. See also Mirko Pejanovic, who stated that when Sefer Halilovic was Supreme Commander of the ABiH he always reacted in a responsible manner to incidents in which local commanders arbitrarily abused their position, and that Sefer Halilovic insisted on the accelerated establishment of the military police, the military judiciary and appropriate legislation, Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 1 Mar ’03, p. 4.
283.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 94.
284.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  23, testifying that these rules were available electronically at the ABiH units.
285.Ex. 104, Instructions published in the Official Gazette of the ABiH on 5 December 1992, p. 2; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 23.
286.Ex. 103, The Decree Relating to the Implementation of the International Laws of War Within the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The “International Laws of War” are defined as “International Conventions and Treates signed and ratified by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ”, “Customary International Law of War” and “General Principles of International Law of War”, ibid; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 22.
287.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  19.
288.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  19.
289.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  19-20.
290.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 95 and 22 Apr ’05, T. 147-149. He testified that during this time rules were also introduced on the SVB and military courts and prosecutors, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 100.
291.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  20. See also Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 39-41.
292.Enes Sakrak, 107 Feb ’05, T.  72.
293.Enes Sakrak, 107 Feb ’05, T.  82-83.
294.Ex. 143, III.1, p. 2.
295.Ex. 472, Decision on the formation of the 6th Corps of the BH Army and the zones of responsibility of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps of the BH Army, 9 June 1993; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 32. Ex. 109, Conclusions and tasks adopted at the meeting of the senior officers of the Main Staff and Corps Commanders, held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August, dated 29 Aug ’05, p. 4, shows that the establishment of a 7th Corps was being considered.
296.Ex. 408, Annexes filed to the Motion of Judicial Notice, 15 Apr ’05, p. 4.
297.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 139.
298.Ex. 237, Ex. 255, Ex. 257, Ex. 270, Ex. 380, Ex. 388, Ex. 400.
299.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 103. See also Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 27 and Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 35.
300.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 140-141.
301.These were: Breza, Centar-Sarajevo, Cajnice, Foca, Gorazde, Han Pijesak, Ilidza, Ilijas, Novi Grad Sarajevo, Novo Sarajevo, Olovo, Pale, Rogatica, Rudo, Sokolac, Stari Grad Sarajevo, Vares, Visegrad, Vogosca, and Zepa, Ex. 472, Decision on formation of the 6th Corps of the BH Army and the zones of responsibility of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps of the BH Army, 9 June 1993, p. 1.
302.Ex. 404, sketch of the command and composition of the 1st Corps by Vahid Karavelic. The other subordinate brigades were the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 82nd Mountain Brigades and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 101st and 102nd Motorised Brigades, ibid. See also Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 23-24.
303.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 23; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 77; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 150; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 13.
304.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 151.
305.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 152. Vahid Karavelic further testified that “after several talks with Ramiz Delalic, I do not remember the exact number of these conversations, he actually accepted the post of deputy commander of that brigade”. Ramiz Delalic however described his appointment in the following words (Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 13-14):
I proposed that myself. Since I didn't have a lot of military training and the brigade did number 5,000 men, I suggested (to Vahid Karavelic( that I be appointed deputy commander and (Sulejman Imsirevic( be appointed the commander […] Vahid Karavelic, (was( really […] quite happy to hear that (because( at that time all the commanders were just regular men who had no particular training for commanders of brigades who had no training in carrying out military operations. And in order to lead a brigade you needed a trained person. So the plan was to let the military personnel who used to be members of the former JNA lead the units.
306.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 154-155.
307.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T.  33.
308.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 13.
309.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 5; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 150.
310.Jusuf Jasarevic, 1 Mar ’05, T. 13; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 35.
311.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 16; Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb '05, T. 99; Witness F, 08 Mar '05, T. 25.
312.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 16.
313.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 22, who in 1993 was the Commander of the military police company of the 9th Brigade.
314.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 49.
315.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 23, Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb '05, T. 31, Witness F, 08 Mar '05, T. 25-26. Before the unit was deployed to Grabovica, the commander of this unit was Malco Rovcanin, thereafter it was a man nicknamed ‘Zuti’, Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb '05, T. 31. This company was used when there was heavy fighting or when a breakthrough was necessary, Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb '05, T. 81-82.
316.Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb '05, T. 98.
317.Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T. 5. The assault company was equipped with rocket-propelled grenades, hand-held launchers and automatic weapons, ibid.
318.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 23.
319.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 16. Ramiz Delalic commented that the depiction in Ex 402 of the area of responsibility of the brigade did not include all of the area and said that the 9th Brigade covererd 20-25% of the total frontline in Sarajevo, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 24. See also Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar '05, T. 64-65; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 150.
320.Witness F, 8 Mar '05, T. 24. See also Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar '05, T. 26.
321.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 16-17.
322.Enes Sakrak, 107 Feb '05, T.  90; Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 48. Also Ramiz Delalic, the Deputy Commander of the brigade, testified to this, stating that while the majority of the soldiers were Bosnian Muslims, there were also Bosnian Croats, Roma and Bosnian Serbs, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May 05, T. 21 and 19 May ’05, T. 26. See also Vahid Karavelic, who testified that Tomislav Juric was a Bosnian Croat, 22 Apr ’05, T. 19. However, Vahid Karavelic also testified that in the entire 1st Corps only 5-7 percent were Bosnian Serbs and 3-4 percent were Bosnian Croats, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 156.
323.Enes Sakrak, 107 Feb '05, T.  88 (testifying that “(e(verybody had respect for that unit. Its fighters were good ” and agreeing with Defence counsel’s proposition that “(i(t was in fact regarded as an elite unit”: “You can say that, yes, if - you can use that word, ‘elite’”). For the battle on Mt. Igman, see infra Section IV.B(d).
324.Witness F, 8 Mar ’05, T. 68.
325.Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 42-43; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 34; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 15; Ex. 216, Notes on meeting in the Main Staff with the source “Rotor”, 24 Sep 1993.
326.Witness F, 8 Mar ’05, T. 68; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 150.
327.Witness F, 8 Mar ’05, T. 27- 28; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 150-151.
328.Witness F, 9 Mar ’05, T. 24.
329.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 25.
330.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 52-53.
331.Jusuf Jasarevic, 1 Mar '05, T. 11. Jusuf Jasarevic, could not say if this conduct were common knowledge in Sarajevo, Jusuf Jasarevic, 1 Mar '05, T. 18-19.
332.Jusuf Jasarevic, 2 Mar ’05, T. 43.
333.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 13.
334.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  33, 77.
335.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  33-34, 37.
336.Witness E, 07 Mar '05, T. 19 -20.
337.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T.  31.
338.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 22.
339.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 12. Zlatan Okic testified that it was predominantly the 9th Brigade that was involved in criminal activities, Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 32-33. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that the witness several times confused the two brigades (e.g. 01 Apr. '05, T. 33) and therefore finds that it cannot rely on his testimony in this respect.
340.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar '05, T. 26 -27.
341.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar '05, T. 30.
342.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar '05, T. 30.
343.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar '05, T. 27. Kemo Kapur also testified that certain individuals misused their weapons and went to the market where they robbed goods. However, he also testified that he was only aware of certain individuals being involved in “petty criminal activities” and not of “murders or rapes or serious robberies”, Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 52-53.
344.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar '05, T. 20-21.
345.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 42 -43. Erdin Arnautovic heard about cases of civilians being taken involuntarily to the front line to dig trenches by units within the 1st Corps, including the 10th Brigade, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb '05, T. 78. Dzevad Tirak testified that his old geography professor, who at the time was around 60 years old, was taken to dig trenches by members of the 9th Brigade, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 26; however, Dzevad Tirak also testified that the soldiers who took his professor to dig trenches were “Caco’s men”, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 26. Considering that Tirak several times confused the two brigades and their commanders, the Trial Chamber therefore finds that it cannot rely on his testimony with regard to this incident. 
346.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 13.
347.Vahid Karavelic testified about the existence and the structure of such a system, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 6-7. Ex. 211 is an SVB report concerning the employment of 40 civilians for digging a road. Vahid Karavelic testified that as the document speaks of the registration of the civilians with the duty officer of the 9th Brigade, this probably indicates that the proper procedure was respected, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 12-13. At the time, however, Vahid Karavelic never had occasion to learn that the 9th Brigade was engaging in illegal use of civilians for trench digging, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr '05, T. 8.
348.Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, paras 16 -18, pp. 4-5. Kemo Kapur also testified that he considered the taking of civilians to dig trenches at the frontline a “petty crime”, Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 56. He testified that the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina by “crimes” implies “serious crimes, such as murders, rapes, robberies, armed robberies, and so on. I just wish to draw a distinction between those kinds of crimes and petty crimes. Petty crimes are also crimes. I'm speaking now as a lawyer. But the sanctions prescribed by the law for such crimes are smaller. If during the war an armed soldier steals a sack of potatoes from a market stall, that is not a serious crime; it's a petty crime”, Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 56.
349.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T.  34. The Trial Chamber notes that Zlatan Okic was uncertain as to which brigade took him to dig trenches (Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 35) and the Trial Chamber is therefore unable to conclude which brigade it was. Zlatan Okic described his experience digging trenches as follows: one day he was surrounded in the street in the centre of Sarajevo by five to six soldiers in uniform and that he and 10-15 other civilians were subsequently taken to dig trenches. Zlatan Okic showed the soldiers his official MUP identity card but without success. They were initially taken to a courtyard in Sarajevo where a soldier said that the soldiers could not dig trenches and that the civilians had to make their contribution to the defence of Sarajevo. Thereafter, they were transported to various locations by van escorted by a car with armed members of the brigade. While digging, Zlatan Okic heard that the Bosnian Serb soldiers were a few hundred meters above him on the hill, however there was no firing as long as he was there. He and the other people were not guarded while digging trenches, but the members of the brigade were a little downhill. The civilians were given dinner and stayed in an abandoned house near the ABiH positions. Zlatan Okic was there for 24 hours and was released the next day at noon. Upon return to Sarajevo, Zlatan Okic walked straight to the MUP and told his superiors and colleagues what had happened, Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 34-39.
350.Kemo Kapur testified that, as the Commander of the military police, he was informed that Mustafa Hota had seized a vehicle from the civilian Nedzad Burovic. He testified that he informed Ramiz Delalic, who agreed to return the vehicle on the condition that Nedzad Burovic would go to dig trenches; Nedzad Burovic actually went to dig trenches and got his vehicle back, Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 36 and Ex. 276, para. 15, p. 4.
351.Esad Cesko, Ex. 455, 29 Apr ’05, p. 1 and 28 Jun ’05, p. 1. See also Ex. 415, MUP Report on illegal activities of the Deputy Commander of the 9th Motorised Brigade, 16 October 1993, p. 3.
352.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 13-14, 26. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that the son of Avdo Smajlovic, a well-known Sarajevo musician, told him to having been taken to dig trenches by the members of the 10th Brigade, Jusuf Jasarevic, 1 Mar '05, T. 13-14.
353.Vahid Karavelic, 19 April ’05, T. 48-49.
354.Witness F, 8 Mar ’05, T. 39, 42, testifying that Rasim Delic’s son was “humiliated and abused” by the members of the 10th Brigade who took him to dig trenches. Ramiz Delalic testified that, to his knowledge, Rasim Delic’s son was not taken to dig trenches. However, he does remember that Rasim Delic’s son was “taken into custody in the 10th Mountain Brigade and beaten up there. Everybody knew about that. Nobody intervened and there were even some orders issued to the effect that this is the fate that should befall him ”, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 40. Ramiz Delalic also testified that he was present in the 10th Brigade command Rasim Delic’s son was detained and beaten, and that he later asked Musan Topalovic, who had spoken with someone, who that person was. Ramiz Delalic testified that Musan Topalovic had spoken with “the chief of the Main Staff, Sefer Halilovic”, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 40. The Trial Chamber notes that the testimony of Ramiz Delalic needs corroboration. As no corroborating evidence has been presented in this respect, the Trial Chamber does not consider that the incident, as described by Ramiz Delalic, has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
355.Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb '05, T. 80-81.
356.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 14.
357.Ex. 430, “Report on certain intelligence connected to the incidents between a number of soldiers from the 10th Mountain Brigade and members of the Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP in the Stari Grad Area”, MUP, 6 July 1993, p. 3, which mainly concerns the 10th Brigade but in this respects includes information regarding the 9th Brigade’s. Bakir Alispahic, the Minister of the Interior, testified that, this being a document of the SDB, it would have been composed on the basis of several sources, the majority of which would have been very reliable, Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 45.
358.Ex. 210, official note from the Main Staff UB, 1 July 1993, reporting that on 30 June 1993, the owner of a the restaurant “Amerikanac”, citizens from the area of Breka and Mejtas and a large group of taxi drivers were taken to dig trenches by members of the 9th Brigade.
359.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 18, 26.
360.Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, para. 21, pp. 5-6.
361.Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb '05, T. 80-81.
362.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 57 ; Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, paras 19-20, p. 5.
363.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T.  26.
364.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 36.
365.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 37.
366.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 39-40 and 19 May ’05, T. 20.
367.Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 22, testifying that “(m(any people know that (Sadika Omerbegovic( practically had a habit of ordering the military police and other organs to take certain individuals to dig trenches.”
368.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 39, testifying that “I personally was given an order by Sefer Halilovic to take (Esad Cesko( to dig trenches. He stayed there about seven days digging trenches.”
369.Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 21.
370.See supra Section II, para. 17.
371.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 20. Vahid Karavelic testified that “He (Ramiz Delalic( forced people to do various things in order to give voluntary donations to the brigade”, Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 152. As for the 10th Brigade, Vehbija Karic testified that Musan Topalovic badly beat his own uncle, Ibro Zulic, until he managed to get about 10,000 German marks from him, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 22.
372.Witness F, 8 Mar '05, T. 25.
373.Witness F, 8 Mar '05, T. 25- 26.
374.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 46. During the spring of 1993 Vahid Karavelic was requested to investigate, as corps commander (Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 16, 47-48; see also Ex.  415):
whether Ramiz Delalic and his men, during the night, in certain sections of the town, were forcing people to give a voluntary donation. This way and this concept of work […] is called racketeering. […] However, at the time, no such case could be proved.
375.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 48.
376.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 37 -38, 60.
377.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 38 -39.
378.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 39 ; Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, para. 13, p. 3.
379.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 39.
380.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T, 19-20.
381.Kemo Kapur Ex. 276, para. 15, p. 4; see also Ex. 210, p. 1, stating that on the 30 June 1993 members of the 9th Brigade, following a Ramiz Delalic’s order, brought to dig trenches the owner of the restaurant “Amerikanac” who had refused to pay “the last racket”.
382.Ex. 217, 1st Corps SVB document, 07 October 1993, p. 3.
383.In B/C/S, Stanica Javne Bezbjednosti, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 2.
384.Ex. 415, p. 1. Bakir Alispahic testified that this document has a high degree of accuracy, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 72.
385.Ex. 415, p. 3.
386.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 39 -40.
387.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 40, also testifying that those who made donations would receive receipts that they had done so.
388.Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 27-28, 32-34. Dzevad Tirak heard at the time about Ramiz Delalic’s involvement in cigarette smuggling, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 30. Also Zlatan Okic testified that the 9th and the 10th Brigades were involved in smuggling, Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 32-33. Concerning the Trebevic operation, see infra Section IV.F. 4.
389.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 12-13; see also Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, para. 14, p. 3.
390.In B/C/S, Centar Sluzbi Bezbjednosti, see Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 4; Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 44.
391.Ex. 204, 02 June 1993.
392.Ex. 429, 28 June 1993. Bakir Alispahic was familiar with the information contained in this document, Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 39.
393.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 53; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 29-30; Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 31-32, testifying that also the Delta Brigade was involved.
394.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 48-49.
395.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 31. Kemo Kapur testified that he heard that the incident was triggered by a rumour started by Mustafa Hota and Kenan Foco that the MUP was going to attack the 9th Brigade, Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 47.
396.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 48.
397.Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, para. 24, p. 6.
398.Jusuf Jasarevic 28 Feb ’05, T. 53, 64, calling the location “the operative centre of the Main Staff”; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 29, calling the location “the operations centre facility […] or the command and control centre of the Bosnia and Herzegovina army”. See also Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 46; Kemo Kapur, Ex. 276, para. 24, p. 6, stating that it was the “Supreme Command of the ABiH” that was blocked.
399.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 29 -30.
400.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 30 ; Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 39.
401.Witness F, 08 Mar '05, T. 30 ; Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 31, testifying that also the “main thoroughfares […] the operative staff of the Supreme Command (and( the army hall was blocked as well”.
402.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 31.
403.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 31.
404.Jusuf Jasarevic 28 Feb ’05, T. 64; Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 33, referring specifically to the blockade of the SJB in central Sarajevo.
405.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 31.
406.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 32-33. Ramiz Delalic testified that he and Musan Topalovic contacted Sefer Halilovic, who said that he did not know what was going on and that the arrest was ordered by Fikret Muslimovic “who Sefer Halilovic hated above all.” According to Ramiz Delalic, Sefer Halilovic also said that “it could be very likely that we would also be arrested.” In the subsequent contacts with Sefer Halilovic during this “rebellion ”, Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic “said more or less that we wanted Muslimovic's replacement […] We demanded this later. And he was replaced later”, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 49.
407.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 46 -48; Witness F, 08 Mar '05, T. 69.
408.Ex. 206, Report, 10 July 1993. Jusuf Jasarevic, who received the note, testified that he tasked an operations officer with “checking, in accordance with (the note’s( proposal, what needed to be checked and to act accordingly, to take a statement from this source of information ”; however, he did not remember what was the outcome of this, Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 65.
409.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 15, 22.
410.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 19.
411.Erdin Arnautovic, 104 Feb ’05, T. 77.
412.Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T. 53 -54.
413.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 26.
414.Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 27.
415.Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 30 -31, agreeing with Defence counsel’s propositions 1) that “some of the rumours which circulated in Sarajevo as to the reputation of the 9th Brigade were the result of jealousies or tensions between certain brigades and certain units, for instance, of the MUP” and 2) that the rumours “were in fact or in part the result of Caco and Celo having been particularly vocal and critical about some MUP units which did not take much part in the defence of the town, although they were well armed ”.
416.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 11.
417.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 29; Ex. 415, “Overview of security related information regarding illegal activities and abuse of authority of the Deputy Commander of the 9th Motorised Brigade in Sarajevo, Ramiz Delalic aka Celo, son of Jusuf and Ðuza, néé Merdovic, date of birth 15. 2.1963 in Priboj, Serbia”, dated 16 October 1993.
418.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 120.
419.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 118-119. See also Witness G, who testified that Enver Buza, the Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion, “very often complained to […] the Ministry of the Interior and said that (the police( weren't in fact fighting. He would criticise them and say they were being used away from the front lines. So he would criticise them for being in a safe area”, Witness G, 11 Apr ’05, T. 20-21.
420.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 48-49; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 20, 37; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 34; Mustafa Kadic, 09 Mar ’05, T. 93 and 10 Mar ’05, T. 20-21, testifying that some members of these units apparently considered that they could decide at times whether or not to obey orders which came from outside the brigade, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 100-101, 112-113. Vahid Karavelic also testified that all the orders issued by the 1st Corps command, which referred to the execution of combat activities, were for the most part carried out by the 9th Brigade so that “there were no real serious problems in respect of the execution of the basic tasks, the basic mission of the brigade”, Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 156-157. See also Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 158 and 19 Apr ’05, T. 2; Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 36 -37; Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 10-11, 13; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T.  157-158 and 22 Apr ’05, T. 16-17. Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, p. 20 (testifying that Musan Topalovic was “prone to wilfulness. He was undisciplined”), p. 22 (testifying that the 9th and 10th Brigades “weren’t completely integrated into a system of military subordination”), and p. 37 (testifying that while these brigades “nevertheless carried out their main task, which was to protect the defence line that they had been assigned as a responsibility […] They carried out their basic tasks with regard to defending the town”).
421.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar '05, T. 61-62. Dzevad Tirak testified that he was also rather surprised to learn that the units coming from Sarajevo were the 9th and the 10th Brigades, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 45. He also testified that, had he been in a position to choose, he would have chosen units with better reputation, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  71, 73.
422.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar '05, T. 62.
423.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar '05, T. 35.
424.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar '05, T. 36.
425.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 88-89.
426.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 11-12.
427.Mustafa Kadic, 09 Mar ’05, T. 85 and 10 Mar ’05, T. 12.
428.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 99; Mustafa Kadic, 09 Mar ’05, T. 85 and 10 Mar ’05, T. 12. In October 1993, Zakir Okovic replaced Adnan Solakovic as Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 48; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 149. The Trial Chamber notes that Namik Dzankovic testified that Adnan Solakovic’s unit was the “1st Sarajevo Battalion”, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 33.
429.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  16.
430.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 11.
431.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  19; Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr ’05, T. 148.
432.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T.  93-94.
433.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 11.
434.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 11.
435.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 32.
436.Ex. 472, Decision on the formation of the 6th Corps of the BH Army and the zones of responsibility of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps of the BH Army, 09 June 1993; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 63.
437.Ex. 472, listing Banja Luka, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanska Dubica, Bugojno, Busovaca, Celinac, Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Kakanj, Kotor Varos, Kupres, Laktasi, Mrkonjic Grad, Novi Travnik, Prnjavor, Skender Vakuf, Srbac, Sipovo, Travnik, Vitez, Zavidovici, Zenica and Zepce.
438.OG Zapad in B/C/S. OGs were temporary units within the army structure put together to coordinate and lead combat operations and to “reduce the links towards the corps commander”, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 04, 33; see also Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 89. The Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic, could propose the formation of an OG, however this had to be sanctioned by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 73; see also Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2, stating that in order to establish an OG “a specific written order is required and that order must be signed by the higest level of command and control”. In order to establish an OG, two orders would be issued, a resubordination order and an order appointing officers to the various functions in the OG command, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 53-54; see also Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2. The orders setting up OGs were normally written but could be given orally, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 95, and it was important that the orders specified who would command the OG and which units would be under the commander’s control, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 35; see, e.g., Ex. 144, Decision on the temporary organisation and formation of units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Alija Izetbegovic, dated 20 August 1992, which creates the OG South (or Jug in B/C/S) and specifies by name the commander and the other officers comprising the OG command; Ex. 193, which establishes OG Igman and 1) appoints a commander, 2) requests him to submit the names of proposed command members to the Main Staff within ten days, 3) resubordinates units to the OG from the composition of the 1st and the 6th Corps. Selmo Cikotic considered Ex. 193 an example of “an appropriate, adequate and sensible order by which to create a temporary military formation”, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 41. In the military hierarchy, OGs were on the same level as divisions, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 67, i.e. between brigades and corps, Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2. The commander of an OG would typically be a person of seniority similar to that of a brigade commander, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 33-34; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 68, and the command of an OG would include more or less the same staff functions as the command of a permanent unit such as a division, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Feb ’05, T. 67; Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2. An OG would have under its control several brigades and could cover several municipalities, Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2. An OG was disbanded by written order, Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2.
439.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 4, 33, testifying that he was the commander of OG West from March 1993 until April 1994.
440.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 4-5; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 63 and 28 Jun ’05, T. 3.
441.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 4-5.
442.Further on IKMs, see infra Section IV.C.4.
443.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 5.
444.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T.  25, 66; Ex. 472.
445.Bileca, Caplijna, Citluk, Gacko, Grude, Livno, Ljubinje, Ljubuski, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje, Posusje, Ravno, Stolac, Siroki Brijeg, Tomislav Grad and Trebinje, Ex. 472. See also Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 78.
446.Ex. 472.
447.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T.  20.
448.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  16; Ex. 102, Decision on the restructuring of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Supreme Command Headquarters of the armed forces and the appointment of senior officers, 08 June 1993.
449.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  37.
450.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  22.
451.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 56.
452.Ex. 472. The 6th Corps commander, Salko Gusic, testified that the 6th Corps’ zone of responsibility encompassed eleven municipalities and added to the above also Hrasnica, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 24.
453.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  37-38.
454.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  37-38. See also Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 60.
455.See infra Section IV. C.5.
456.Ex. 193, Order on organisational changes in the organic strength of the corps, signed by Rasim Delic, 5 July 1993.
457.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T.  25; Ex. 472. This decision provides that the new 6th Corps would cover Jablanica and that “Manoeuvre units as well as the Municipal Defence Staffs with their headquarters support units are directly subordinated to the Commands of the Corps in whose zones of responsibility they are”, meaning that the 44th Brigade in Jablanica therefore became subordinated to the 6th Corps on 9 June 1993. See also Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 38.
458.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T.  26; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 71, testifying that the 6th Corps was responsible for the Prozor Independent Battalion; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 76, testifying that the battalion submitted combat reports to the 6th Corps; Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 12-13, who also testified that the 6th Corps deputy commander Bahrudin Fazlic would frequently come and visit the Prozor Independent Battalion; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 104.
459.Ex. 193; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 25-26. The evidence is contradictory with regard to where in the ABiH hierarchy the Zulfikar Detachment belonged before the combat operations in Herzegovina in September 1993. The 6th Corps Commander, Salko Gusic, was unclear on this matter. In his statement to the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 11 March 1998, Salko Gusic stated that “(t(o tell the truth, the unit was also a part of the 6th Corps under my command” and that “(t(he unit was part of the 6th Corps, and as Commander of the 6th Corps, I was still authorised to provide logistical help to the unit. That was the 6th Corps’s permanent activity that could not have been stopped”, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 40, 42. However, in his testimony before the Tribunal, Salko Gusic said that the Zulfikar Detachment “was always tied to the Supreme Command Staff, and that was part of its title. It was called a special detachment which was within the Supreme Command Staff.” He also testified that officially, it was under the 6th Corps command, “but it was never actually under the corps command”, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 26-27. The 6th Corps Chief of Staff Dzevad Tirak testified that when the 6th Corps was established two units that were under the direct control of the ABiH Main Staff, the Zulfikar Detachment and the Black Swans, were present in the area covered by the 6th Corps” and that “(t(here was no real command. Units moved chaotically”, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 37, 39. Selmo Cikotic testified that the Zulfikar Detachment “by title and position” identified itself as being directly under the ABiH Main Staff, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 38; see also Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 19-20, testifying that “(i(n my understanding, (Zulfikar Alispago( was subordinated to the General Staff, to the commander of the General Staff”. There is however significant evidence that the Zulfikar Detachment was not directly subordinate to the Main Staff, but to Corps. The Trial Chamber notes the provision in the decision of the Main Staff Commander Rasim Delic, which established the 6th Corps (Ex. 472, dated 9 June 1993), that “Manoeuvre units […] are directly subordinated to the Commands of the Corps in whose zones of responsibility they are” (cf. Selmo Cikotic’s testimony that the Zulfikar Detachment was present in the 6th Corps area of responsibility). The Trial Chamber also notes the subsequent order on organisational changes by the Main Staff Commander Rasim Delic, dated 5 July 1993 (Ex. 193), which lists the Zulfikar Detachment as part of the 6th Corps. This order was addressed, inter alia, to the 6th Corps Commander. Thus, the evidence is clear that prior to the combat operations in Herzegovina in September 1993, the Zulfikar Detachment formed part of the 6th Corps. As for the specific situation during the combat operations in Herzegovina, see infra Section IV.C.1 and IV.C.5.
460.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 66-67.
461.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 65.
462.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 65.
463.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 63 -64.
464.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 65-66.
465.Ex. 377, order of Sefer Halilovic concerning transfer of troops, dated 11 March 1993; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  26.
466.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 22.
467.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  26; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 66. Enver Buza joined the battalion in May 1993, Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 7.
468.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 8- 9.
469.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 9; Witness H, 13 Apr ’05, T. 35; Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 42; Ex. 332, marked photograph. A “military police group” was co-located with the battalion command in Dobro Polje, Witness H, 13 Apr ’05, T. 36-37.
470.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 4.
471.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 6- 7 and 101 Apr ’05, T. 69; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 67, 69.
472.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 45.
473.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  67.
474.Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T.  43-44; Witness G, 07 Apr. ’05, T. 16-17; Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 69-70. In July 1993, during an attempt by ABiH to recapture the town of Prozor, the ABiH, including troops of the Prozor Independent Battalion, were confronted with Bosnian Muslim prisoners who were being used as human shields. Some of the prisoners were wounded but other prisoners were able to escape. Most of those who managed to escape joined the Prozor Independent Battalion, Witness G, 07 Apr. ’05, T. 15-17.
475.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 12.
476.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 8.
477.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 8.
478.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 8.
479.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 85.
480.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 34; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 75 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 09; Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05, T. 47.
481.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 94 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 9.
482.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 34.
483.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T.  64.
484.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 22.
485.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 71.
486.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 73 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 21; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 2. According to Namik Dzankovic, the Commander of the Cedo’s Wolves was called Saric, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 3, 22. Ex. 226, Report from the 6th Corps SVB to Jusuf Jasarevic, Chief of the Main Staff UB, dated 17 Sept 1993. Witness D testified that he thought that the Commander of the Cedo’s Wolves was called Sadic, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 21. See also Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 48.
487.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 22, testifying that “When we arrived there, we found Mr. Zuka and Mr. Edib Saric, who was the commander of, I think, Cedo’s Wolves”. See also Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 24, testifying that he was taken from the house of Stojan Tomic to the hydroelectric power plant in Grabovica where the base of Cedo’s Wolves was located ; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 21, testifying that “I think that Cedo's Wolves were commanded by Mr. Sadic. I believe that was his last name”.
488.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 9- 10, 39.
489.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 68.
490.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 11; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 5. Ex. 143, the 18 July decision by President Alija Izetbegovic, lists (at II.2, 3) the Minister of the Interior as a “permanent staff” of the “Supreme Command War Council for Defence”.
491.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 12.
492.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 4 -5.
493.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 4 -5. According to Bakir Alispahic, each CSB would supervise between three to eleven SJBs, Bakir Alispahic, 27 May ’05, T. 43.
494.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar '05, T. 18.
495.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 12; Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 44. See also Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 30-31.
496.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 13.
497.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 8 ; Bakir Alispahic, 27 May ’05, T. 43.
498.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 4.
499.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 5, 7; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 96.
500.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 20.
501.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 14.
502.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 14.
503.Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2. This unit arrived in Mostar in September 1993 to participate in the defence of that town, Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 2.
504.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 15. Bakir alsipahic also testified that all CSBs included similar units and that the unit was formed on 15 May 1992, Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 16.
505.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 15, also testifying that the Laste unit was initially used to protect citizens and property in Sarajevo.
506.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 16,
507.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 14. See also Witness G, who testified that “(i(t was common knowledge that the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence frequently and in other places used forces for operations”, Witness G, 11 Apr ’05, T. 19.
508.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 14.
509.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 14.
510.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 20. The order of resubordination could also be given orally, Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 38. Witness G testified that he never saw any written documentation between the Prozor Independent Battalion and the MUP permitting civilian police to be used in combat, Witness G, 11 Apr ’05, T. 19-20.
511.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 50-51, also testifying that in 1993 communications were frequently difficult and often official approval was not sought from the superior MUP authorities.
512.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 21.
513.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 20; Witness G, 11 Apr ’05, T. 19 (testifying with regard to the Prozor Independent Battalion, that (t(he use of the police or the deployment of the police was planned by our commander, Enver Buza, because he gave permission to the policemen how they were to move around, when they were to go, when they were to return, and so on”).
514.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 38.
515.The Trial Chamber will discuss the general situation of Grabovica and Uzdol in Sections IV.D and IV.E.
516.On 29 June 1993, the ABiH forces attacked the HVO northern barracks in Mostar, Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr ’05, Annex B, para. 541; On 2 July 1993, upon the request of the 4th Corps, Rasim Delic ordered the 6th Corps to launch an attack against the HVO forces along the Donja Dre‘nica village-Vrdi village -Golemci village–Planinica axis, Ex. 294, order of 2 July 1993, by Rasim Delic; On 31 July the ABiH destroyed practically all of the front lines of the HVO in the Crni Vrh area and advanced towards the Makljen pass, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 15. In late summer, the ABiH was facing a great deal of difficulty in the Fojnica area. The HVO forces were attempting to cut the only line of communication over to Zenica and the 3rd Corps, Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T. 5 - 6.
517.For information about OG West, see Section IV.A, para. 143.
518.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 26
519.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 27.
520.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 64.
521.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 12.
522.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 14. The troops included an armoured vehicle unit with 13 to 14 tanks, ibid.
523.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 14 ; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 66. Witness G stated that the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina lost control of Prozor. In light of the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber notes that in October 1992, the TO had already become the ABiH, see infra Section IV.A, para. 101.
524.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 5-6.
525.Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T.  5-6.
526.Out of 7.400 Bosnian Muslims living in the municipality in 1991, 128 Bosnian Muslims remained in the area of Prozor, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 14. During this time there was a list of 181 people who had gone missing and 968 able-bodied men were in camps, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 15.
527.Ex. 408, Agreed Facts 22 Apr '05, Annex B, para. 30.
528.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 5- 6, 39; Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T. 15-16; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 8; At least from early 1993, the HVO had control of Grabovica, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 5; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 6; see also Section IV.D.2.
529.Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex B, para. 36. The Trial Chamber notes that it has not been provided with information as to when this cease-fire agreement was signed. This evidence stems from the Trial Judgement in Naletilic. Based on the paragraph of that Judgement which is part of the Agreed Facts, the Trial Chamber notes that the cease-fire agreement must have been signed sometime between May and July 1993.
530.Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex B, para. 36.
531.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar '05, T. 14, 67; Ex. 406, report of “Zicro, Rifat and Vehbija” to the Commander of the Supreme Command Staff personally, dated 1 September 1993, detailing that seven 120 mm mortar shells hit Jablanica on 1 August, seriously wounding two persons and slightly wounding fourteen others.
532.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar '05, T. 14, 17, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 4. The road to Mostar was blocked, ibid.
533.Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex B, para. 37.
534.Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan '03, p. 2.
535.Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan '03, p. 2. According to Sulejman Budakovic, HV forces were also involved attacking the ABiH in Mostar, ibid; Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex B, para. 39. For more information about the course of conflict in Mostar, see Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex B, paras 38-51.
536.Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, p. 2.
537.Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan '03, p. 3.
538.Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan '03, p. 2-3; Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex B, para. 50; The HVO would not allow any humanitarian convoys to get through. Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 45-46.
539.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar '05, T. 15 ; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 45; Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan ’03, p. 3.
540.Sulejman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan '03, p. 3.
541.Ex. 138, order of 24 August 1993, signed by Sefer Halilovic as “Nacelnik Staba Vrhovne Komande OS R BiH”.
542.Ex. 138. Sefer Halilovic identified “the HV/Croatian Army/(Sokolovi/Falcons/-the 5th Guards Brigade Osijek, Tigrovi/Tigers/-the 1st Brigade of the Split ZNG/National Guards Corps/, Gromovi /Thunderclaps/-the Sisak Guards Brigade)”.
543.Ex. 138.
544.Ex. 138; Ex. 139, order of 26 August 1993, signed by Rasim Delic, in which Rasim Delic ordered the 6th Corps to engage in attack together with the 4th Corps forces on the HVO units on the Vrdi village-Domazet village axis. The “44th and the 45th bbrs/Mountain Brigades” were supposed to engage the HVO units in their zones of responsibility; Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T. 10. Dzevad Tirak found the order of Rasim Delic to be somewhat “unrealistic ” as the corps situation did not allow for such operations, Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T. 11. According to Sefko Hodzic, Sefer Halilovic informed Rasim Delic on 3 September 1993 about a report of the Commander of the 4th Corps Arif Pasalic warning that an HVO offensive against Mostar, specifically in the part of the hydroelectric plant, was being planned, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 56-57. The 6th Corps had been ordered to assist the 4th Corps along the Donja Dreznica village-Vrdi village -Golemic village-Planinica axis, Ex. 294, order of 2 July 1993, signed by Rasim Delic. According to Dzevad Tirak, the 6th Corps was unable to comply with this order, as the Corps was already heavily engaged in bids to secure the road between Konjic and Jablanica and to establish control over the Neretva River Valley, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 89-91.
545.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 155-156; Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex A, paras 205.
546.Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex A, paras 582, 590.
547.Ex. 408, Agreed Facts, 22 Apr '05, Annex A, paras 213, 217, 219 and 584. The VRS also targeted ambulances, ibid.
548.The attack started at Gorazde, then Trnovo, to end at Mt. Igman, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 106
549.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 61; Ex 405, transcript of Zenica Meeting, p. 3
550.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 61; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar '05, T. 66-67.
551.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar '05, T. 66-67.
552.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 84-85.
553.Ex. 193, order establishing OG Igman, signed by Rasim Delic, dated 5 July 1993, p. 2. The OG Igman was based in the zone of responsibility of the 1st Corps, ibid. Among other units, the Zulfikar Detachment was resubordinated to the OG Igman, Salko Gusic, 3 Feb '05, T. 26; Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar '05, T. 69. Other units resubordinated to the OG Igman were the Ilidza Municipal Defence Staff with subordinated units, the 4th Motorised Brigade of the 1st Corps, and the Trnovo Municipal Defence Staff with subordinated units, the “Crni Labudovi/Black Swans/Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment, the Silver Fox Independent Platoon, the Special Zulfikar Detachment for Special Purposes, VJ/Military Unit/5683, the 8th Motorised Brigade and the 81st Mountain Brigade of the 6th Corps”, see Ex. 193, p. 1; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05. T. 79-80.
554.Ex. 381, order of 30 July, issued by Sefer Halilovic as “Staba Vrhovne Komande OS R BiH”, assigning one unit of the 9th Brigade to the Zulfikar Detachment and one unit from the 101st Motorised Brigade and one of the 5th Motorised Brigade to the 1st Corps commander, Vahid Karavelic.
555.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 107
556.Ex. 400, order by Vahid Karavelic, dated 18 August 1993, p. 1; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 21. Other units sent as reinforcement were one company each of the the 2nd Viteska Brigade, the 101st, 102nd, and the 5th Motorised Brigades and the 2nd Mountain Brigade, ibid.
557.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 114-115. The Igman IKM had to coordinate and exercise control over the 4th Mechanised Brigade and other units, including the 4th Hrasnica Brigade, and the newly established 81st Bosniak Brigade consisting of two Foca Brigades which had fallen apart after the problems on Mt. Igman in July. Under the command of the Igman IKM there was also the 9th Mountain Brigade from Tarcin which came from the Sarajevo Brigade in order to hold the defence line on the wider Igman area, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 114.
558.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 84.
559.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 84.
560.Ex. 407, order by Vahid Karavelic, dated 4 September 1993. In this order, Vahid Karavelic appointed Nedzad Ajnadzic as commander and Salko Muminovic as his deputy commander.
561.Ex. 257, order for the 1st Corps commander number: 05/7-401 to the IKM on Igman and the 10th bbr Command regarding the return of units from the 10th bbr to Sarajevo; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 23-24.
562.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  12.
563.Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T.  85. According to Dzevad Tirak, the ABiH lost areas around Bjelasnica, Igman, and Treskavica, to the VRS, ibid.
564.Vahid Karavelic, 18 Apr '05, T. 158.
565.Indictment, para. 3.
566.Ex. 131, “Operation Neretva” Map in colour, see infra paras 268-273. 
567.See, e.g., Commander of the 1st Corps Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 70; Commander of the 6th Corps, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 19. Minister of the Interior Bakir Alispahic also testified that he never heard the name “Operation Neretva” during the relevant time period, Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 62. Chief of the UB of the Main Staff Jusuf Jasarevic also testified that he did not know of an operation called “Operation Neretva” or “Neretva 93” and that he never saw a document bearing this name, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 71, 73.
568.The Trial Chamber notes that there are some differences as to whether the meeting was held for one day or for two days. Bakir Alispahic testified that from his contacts with Rasim Delic he knew that the meeting went on to define everything discussed in the first day, Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 58-59. Vahid Karavelic testified that he did not think the meeting went on for a second day but cannot be entirely certain, and he left Zenica on the evening of the first day, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 105-107. Vehbija Karic stated that the meeting was “for two or three days”, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 11. See also Ex. 123, order of 2 September, sent to the 6th Corps Command, reorganising the structure of certain units, signed by Sefer Halilovic as “Nacelnik GSVK (Zamjenik Komandanta)”, which refers to the Zenica meeting of 21 August; and Ex. 405, tape and transcript of the meeting (“Transcript of the Zenica Meeting”). There is some debate as to how much of the Zenica meeting this tape shows. Vahid Karavelic testified that he thought the meeting had basically finished by the end of the tape but some extra conversation on less essential elements was continuing, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 76. Salko Gusic does not believe this tape reflects all that happened at this meeting, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 66. Mirza Glavas, the cameraman who videoed the meeting, stated that he recorded the full course of the meeting but there are fragments of the recording missing. He also stated that everything said by Sefer Halilovic during that meeting is on the recording, Mirza Glavas, Ex. 457, 21 Jan ’04, p. 2 and 07 Jun ’05, p. 1.
569.Ex. 109, Conclusions and Tasks Adopted at the meeting of Senior Officers of the Main Staff and Corps Commanders Held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August 1993, Issued by Rasim Delic, dated 29 August 1993 (“Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting”), p. 1.
570.Ex. 109, p. 1.
571.The Transcript of the Zenica meeting refers to Sefer Halilovic as “nacelnika Glavnog staba Vrhovne komande”, Ex. 405, p. 1. The Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting refer to Sefer Halilovic as “Nacelnik”, Ex. 109, p. 1.
572.Ex. 109, p. 1; Ex. 405, p. 1. See also Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 54. All Corps commanders, with the exception of the Commander of the 5th Corps, Ramiz Drekovic, were present, Ex. 405, p. 1; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 55-56; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 11-13; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 78.
573.Ex. 109, p. 1; Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 59.
574.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  63; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 108 and 22 Apr ’05, T. 78; Ex. 405 states “the objective is to come up with such solutions, to provide for further conduct of the armed combat which will allow us to continue having results,” Ex. 405, p. 1.
575.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 11 ; Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 106.
576.Arif Pasalic came with a message from his subordinate commanders that the Neretva Valley was a strategic and operative axis which could not be divided and that all the ABiH units in the Neretva Valley should be placed under one command, Ex. 405, Transcript of Zenica Meeting, p. 7. Rifat Bilajac stated that Konjic was the most important axis at that point in time, Ex. 405, Transcript of Zenica Meeting, p. 10. Bakir Alispahic stated that the ABiH was going to “fail the test” on the subject of Mostar, Jablanica and Konjic and that it would be wise to “freeze all the fronts and move the combat operations down there”, Ex. 405, Transcript of Zenica Meeting, p. 12-13.
577.Ex. 405, p. 17.
578.Ex. 405, p. 17.
579.Ex. 405, p. 20. Sefer Halilovic stated at the meeting “If the question would now be: your house is on fire, do you put out the house fire or take Vitez? I would go for Vitez first.” Vahid Karavelic testified that he vaguely remembered something about Sefer Halilovic expressing an interest in military operations in the direction of Vitez, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 58.
580.Ex. 405, p. 18.
581.Ex. 405, p. 19. The issue of discipline amongst the ABiH units was also addressed in the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting, Ex. 109, pp. 2-3.
582.See supra Section IV. A(e).
583.He also expressed his concern about units such as the 317th Brigade.
584.Ex. 405, p. 9.
585.Ex. 405, p. 9.
586.He refers to the Zulfikar Detachment, the Black Swans, the Handzar Division, the Akrepi Special Unit, Ex. 405, Transcript of Zenica Meeting, p. 9. See supra Section IV.A.
587.Ex. 405, p. 9, Salko Gusic stated “whether they would remain under the SVK command I don’t know” he further commented “I would be happy if all these units were to remain part of the 6th Corps,” ibid.
588.Ex. 405, p. 9.
589.Rifat Bilajac proposed that the Zulfikar Detachment and Silver Fox Unit expand into a Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade and become part of the 4th Corps, and the Black Swans also expand into a Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade and become part of the 6th Corps, Ex. 405, Transcript of Zenica Meeting, p. 10.
590.Ex. 405, p. 9.
591.Ex. 405, p. 21.
592.Bakir Alispahic, 27 May ’05, T. 35. Bakir Alispahic testified that his understanding was that during the meeting the framework was defined for the operation that was to follow, ibid. Mirza Glavas stated that Sefer Halilovic did not mention any operation in Herzegovina and that only Arif Pasalic and Salko Gusic spoke about the situation in Herzegovina, Mirza Glavas, Ex. 457, 21 Jan ’04, p. 1; Salko Gusic did not recall Sefer Halilovic referring to any operation related to Mostar or indeed related to Herzegovina, and that it was Arif Pasalic the Commander of the 4th Corps, who presented the situation of Mostar, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T. 65.
593.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 11, 14.
594.Bakir Alispahic 23 May '05, T. 60.
595.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 60-61 and 27 May '05, T. 36-37.
596.Mirza Glavas, 07 Jun ’05 p.  1.
597.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  56 and 04 Feb ’05, T. 64-65; see also Bakir Alispahic, 27 May '05, T. 34- 35; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 13. Vehbija Karic stated that the participants of the Zenica Meeting did not go into details, ibid.
598.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 90 -91.
599.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 62 and 27 May '05, T. 33; Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 107.
600.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May '05, T. 7.
601.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T.  40.
602.Ex. 109.
603.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T.  55. See Ex. 109 Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting; Vahid Karavelic testified that the document was consistent with what he saw and heard at Zenica, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 108.
604.Ex. 109, p. 3, para. 2.
605.Ex. 109, p. 4, para. 10.
606.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  75-76.
607.Ex. 109, p. 4, para. 9.
608.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  58, referring to Ex. 109, p. 4, para. 10.
609.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  57-58, referring to Ex. 109, p. 4, para. 10.
610.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  57, referring to Ex. 109, p. 4, para. 10.
611.Ex. 109, p. 4, para. 11. Changes were made affecting the “zones of responsibility” of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps.
612.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  78-79; D‘evad Tirak testified that he never heard about an order to draw a line of demarcation between the 4th and 6th Corps south of Grabovica, D‘evad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 82-83.
613.Ex. 134, map, dated 29 August 1993. Salko Gusic testified that the village of Grabovica was in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Corps, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 25. However, Salko Gusic’s own Chief of Staff Dzevad Tirak testified that while “formally” the village of Grabovica was in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Corps, at the relevant time in 1993 it was the 6th Corps that patrolled that terrain to prevent surprise attacks by the HVO forces because the 4th Corps did not have any units there. He testified that the 6th Corps did not however have any forces stationed in Grabovica itself, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 82-84.
614.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  80-81.
615.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  80-82.
616.Ex. 138, Order of Sefer Halilovic to 6th Corps, sent to the 4th Corps command for Information, dated 24 August 1993. This order is signed in B/C/S as “Nacelnik Staba Vrhovne Komande OS R BiH”.
617.Ex. 138. Salko Gusic testified that this order could only have been issued by Sefer Halilovic as “Chief of Staff ” if Sefer Halilovic had been authorised to do so by a separate order of Rasim Delic, Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 41.
618.Ex. 139, Order of Rasim Delic to the 6th Corps, to the Commander, personally, dated 26 August 1993, p. 1, point 1.
619.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T.  43.
620.Ex. 140, "Proposal for planning and carrying out combat operations", 29 August 1993, addressed to the 6th Corps Commander personally. The proposal was sent by Enes Zukanovic, an intelligence officer within the Intelligence section of the 6th Corps command, Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T. 48. The axes of attack covered the villages of Here, Jurici, Glibe, Blace, Scipe, Uzdol and Kranjcici. Salko Gusic testified that it was logical that the Prozor Independent Battalion was to provide defence in their area of responsibility, Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 50.
621.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 149.
622.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 62.
623.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 61-64. See for example, Ex. 147, Review of the Situation and Taking Measures to Increase Combat Readiness of the 6th Corps, order issued by Rasim Delic, dated 21 October 1993, together with Authorisation to Members of the Main Staff of the BH Armed Forces, signed by Rasim Delic. See infra para 338.
624.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 66 and 22 Apr '05, T. 72-74, 128-133.
625.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 62-63; Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 36.
626.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 64.
627.Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr '05, T. 62-63.
628.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 37.
629.In English, this order reads “I Hereby authorize” in the original B/C/S this reads “Ovlascujem”
630.The Trial Chamber notes that the order states “Rifet Bilajac”, however it can only be concluded that this is a spelling mistake and “Rifat” is meant.
631.Ex. 141, Authorisation of Commander Rasim Delic, dated 29 August 1993.
632.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T.  51.
633.Ex. 146, Order issued by the Commander of the Supreme Command Staff, Rasim Delic, establishing an Inspection Team, dated 30 August 1993, p. 1. (“30 August order”). The Trial Chamber notes that Vehbija Karic testified that “the Inspection Team went on 28 August 1993, to carry out Rasim Delic’s order”, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 92. However, considering the fact that Vehbija Karic was not sure as to exact dates of the events, the Trial Chamber relies on the date of the written order.
634.In B/C/S this line reads “ sagledavnaje b/g komandi i jedinica konkretno na terenu, i rukovodenje b/d” The Trial Chamber notes that it was provided with two different translations of the B/C/S word “rukovodjenje”, which was used in this sentence. One translation read “directing combat operations” while the later translation read “control of combat operations”. The translation of the exhibit was subsequently verified and the correct translation was admitted into evidence as Ex. 146, together with an explanation of the translation. The Trial Chamber notes that Vahid Karavelic on 21 April 2005 testified as to the meaning of the B/C/S word “rukovodjenje”, which was then interpreted as “directing.” In light of the verification of the translation, the Trial Chamber will not rely on the part of the testimony of Vahid Karavelic in which he explains the term “rukovodjenje”.
635.The Trial Chamber notes that Dzemal Najetovic stated that he never became part of the Inspection Team, Dzemal Najetovic, Ex. 459, 13 Jun ’05, p. 1. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he appointed Namik Dzankovic to the Inspection Team, because Namik Dzankovic was already in Mostar, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 58, 70; see also Ex. 213, Order issued by Jusuf Jasarevic to the Security Sector within the 4th and 6th Corps Commands, dated 30 August 1993, to locate Namik Dzankovic; Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he sent this order as he did not know the exact location of Namik Dzankovic at the time, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 58.
636.Salko Gusic testified that the preamble appears to be consistent with the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting, Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T. 83. Selmo Cikotic testified that the document is an implementation of the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting. “This order aims at removing the shortcomings that were mentioned in the conclusions of the General Staff.”, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 60; see also Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 130-131.
637.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T.  86-87.
638.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T.  52.
639.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T.  53.
640.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 72-74. Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T. 82-83 and 08 Feb '05, T. 6; Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he concluded that Sefer Halilovic was not the commander of an “operation,” because the 30 August order is “absolutely clear that it is inaugurating an inspection team”, Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 58-59.
641.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 63-64.
642.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T.  63.
643.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 62.
644.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 69 -70.
645.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  53. Salko Gusic stated that Sefer Halilovic could have issued other types of orders which would have had to be executed as the commanders could not be sure if Sefer Halilovic had in fact previously consulted with Rasim Delic. However, he stated that on the basis of the reporting mechanism any commander who received an order would report to Sefer Halilovic and Rasim Delic that such an order had been received and carried out, as regular reports were provided at the end of every day to the Supreme Command Staff, therefore, if any radical orders had been issued, the commander would have been aware of the fact. Salko Gusic further stated that Rasim Delic “ would have found out about it within one day,” ibid.
646.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T.  7-8.
647.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar '05, T. 4, 71.
648.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 8.
649.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 8.
650.Namik D‘ankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 24; see also Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 85.
651.Ex. 130, Final Report of the Inspection Team, dated 20 September 1993, p. 1.
652.Ex. 130, p. 2, The report states that “the relations of the command of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Corps toward the 6th Corps, as the youngest command are, to put it mildly, not good and not in line with the unity of our struggle,” ibid.
653.Ex. 130, p. 2.
654.Ex. 130, p. 3.
655.Ex. 130, pp. 3-4.
656.Ex. 130, pp. 4-5. The Trial Chamber notes that the report of the Inspection Team does not mention the events in Grabovica and Uzdol.
657.Indictment, paragraph 4.
658.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 177.
659.In B/C/S “forward command post ” is Istureno komandno mesto, which is abbreviated to ‘IKM’, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T. 90-91.
660.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  90-91, 96. Salko Gusic further testified that commanders in the ABiH formed IKMs in order to make it easier to command their units, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T. 99 -100; Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 48, testifying that an IKM was a location from which the commander could issue commands when he was in the field.
661.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T.  99-100, testified that when the situation on the ground required a quick reaction or decision-making it was always justified and reasonable to set up an IKM.
662.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  95-96; Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 42-43.
663.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T.  87; He further testified that “by definition, the forward command post is smaller than a command. It only contains as much personnel and equipment as is necessary to effect these functions of control and command.” Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T. 100 ; see also Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 109.
664.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 109. When forward command posts were set up the stamp used on documents would bear the number “2” Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 47.
665.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T.  92.
666.Ex. 407, Order issued by Vahid Karavelic establishing an IKM at Mt. Igman, dated 5 September 1993.
667.Ex. 135, Order issued by Sefer Halilovic signed as “Nacelnik Staba Vrhovne Komande OS RBiH” establishing an IKM at Zenica, dated 29 April 1993.
668.Ex. 130.
669.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 75 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 27; Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 7; Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 19 and Ex. 444, T. 71. Vehbija Karic testified that the Inspection Team was given two offices which the Municipal Staff had used in that building, so that they could go about their daily tasks, it was in those offices that they were in touch on a daily basis, Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 19. Dzevad Tirak testified that Bahrudin Fazlic told him that the IKM was in Jablanica, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 59-60; Ex. 433, Marked Aerial Photograph of Jablanica.
670.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 19; Namik D‘ankovic testified that he went to the IKM in Jablanica almost every day, but that the rest of the Team were very often out doing reconnaissance and planning the operations, Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar '05, T. 11, 72-73.
671.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  88; Namik D‘ankovic testified however, that there were no police or other guards taking care of the IKM, Namik D‘ankovic, 22 Mar '05, T. 42 – 43.
672.However, Salko Gusic testified that soon after its establishment the IKM began using the heading IKM, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 88; Selmo Cikotic testified that for an operation the size of “ Operation Neretva” he would expect to see an IKM with proper communication and with a unit or MP’s providing security, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 46 and 24 Feb ’05, T. 41.
673.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 7.
674.Namik D‘ankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 43. According to Namik Dzankovic, the Inspection Team referred to the conference room in the administrative buildings of the Jablanica hydroelectric plant as IKM, ibid.
675.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 115; Salko Gusic testified that he believes that an order establishing the IKM in Jablanica existed. However, he has never seen it, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  99-100.
676.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 71.
677.Ibid.
678.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  84, 87; Salko Gusic had an impression that the IKM in Jablanica looked “like quite a decent place”, because his own command was not better furnished or equipped, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 86-87.
679.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  84.
680.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 46.
681.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 52. However he testified that he was 100 kilometres away from Jablanica, which at the time was about a two-day journey, Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 53.
682.Zajko Sihirlic, Ex. 460, p.  1. Suljeman Budakovic stated that he heard Sefer Halilovic and some units from Sarajevo were in Jablanica, Suljeman Budakovic, Ex. 458, 07 Jan ’03, p. 3. However, Bakir Alispahic considered it to be “a typical forward command post”, Bakir Alispahic, 27 May ’05, T. 28.
683.Ex. 118, Order of Sefer Halilovic to the 4th Corps Commander, dated 9 September, concerning a meeting between Bakir Alispahic and Rusmir Mahmutcehajic. The Trial Chamber notes that this document does not bear the signature of Sefer Halilovic.
The Trial Chamber notes that this document does not bear the signature of Sefer Halilovic.
684.Ex. 116, Explanation of Further Work Requested from Chief of the SVK of the OS, sent by Members of the SVK, dated 5 September; Ex. 117, sent by Members of the SVK in Jablanica to Sefer Halilovic, stating “explanation required”, dated 5 September.
685.Ex. 235, Report by Namik Dzankovic to Jusuf Jasarevic, dated 29 September, concerning events in Grabovica.
686.Ex. 161, Order by Sefer Halilovic, as “Nacelnik GSVK (zamjenik komandanta) to the 1st Corps Commander, dated 2 September, concerning sending of troops to Herzegovina; Ex. 122, Order issued by Sefer Halilovic to the Commanders of the 4th, 6th Corps and the Zulfikar Unit, dated 6 September 1993, concerning resubordination of troops from Sarajevo to the Zulfikar Unit. The Trial Chamber notes that one of the addressees of this order was Sefer Halilovic ; Ex. 123, order by Sefer Halilovic, as “Nacelnik GSVK (zamjenik komandanta)”, to the 6th Corps Command, dated 2 September 1993, concerning reorganisation of Zulfikar Detachment, Handzar Division and Silver Fox unit.
687.Ex. 449, Report of Arif Pasalic to the SVK in Sarajevo and the Jablanica IKM, dated 2 September 1993, concerning the arrival of troops in the 4th Corps area of responsibility; Ex. 111, Report of Arif Pasalic to the IKM in Jablanica, dated 3 September 1993, requesting reinforcements ; Ex. 121, Order of Arif Pasalic to Zulfikar Alispago and IKM (for information) concerning Linking Up of the Forces of the 4th Corps of the ABiH establishing North -2 OG, dated 7 September 1993; Ex. 112, Report of Arif Pasalic to the Jablanica IKM concerning future combat activities, dated 7 September 1993; Ex. 113, Report of Arif Pasalic to the Jablanica IKM concerning combat activities, dated 20 September 1993; Ex. 114, Request of Arif Pasalic to the SVK IKM, for the attention of Sefer Halilovic, dated 1 October 1993; Ex. 115, Report from the Command of the 4th Corps to the SVK IKM Jablanica, (Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago personally), concerning planned combat activities, dated 5 October 1993; Ex. 129, Report of Arif Pasalic to SVK IKM Jablanica, to the attention of Sefer Halilovic concerning the situation on the Front Lines, dated 8 October 1993.
688.Ex. 120, Order concerning Organisational Changes in the Zone of Responsibility of the 1st, 4th and 6th Corps, issued by Rasim Delic to the Command of the 1st, 4th and 6th Corps, sent to IKM SVK OS (for information ), dated 1 September 1993, (“Reorganisation Order”).
689.Ex. 157, Order of Rasim Delic to SVK Jablanica (Chief of Supreme Command Staff, personally) and 6th Corps Command (Commander, personally), concerning re-examination of the decision to carry out combat activities and inquiring into the events in Grabovica, dated 12 September 1993, (“12 September Order”).
690.Ex. 290, Response of Vahid Karavelic to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command (Sefer Halilovic, personally) responding to the order of 2 September 1993 concerning sending troops from Sarajevo to Herzegovina, dated 5 September 1993. Vahid Karavelic testified that he received his documents from Jablanica and sent them to Jablanica, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 18.
691.Ex. 385, Order of Vahid Karavelic to the 2nd Independent Battalion Command (Commander, personally), concerning sending troops to Herzegovina, dated 6 September 1993.
692.Ex. 156, Operations Log book of the 6th Corps 8-13 September 1993.
693.Namik D‘ankovic testified that the soldiers called the place the forward command post. He continued that this was the practice of the army, in brigades and smaller units wherever there was a place where there were several officers either from the Brigades or General Staff that would be called the IKM of the Brigade or the IKM of the Main Staff, Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 7. See also Bakir Alispahic, who testified that he called the place a forward command post as the top military leadership was present there and they were commanding from that location, Bakir Alispahic, 27 May ’05, T. 77.
694.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar '05, T. 57-58.
695.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 57-58.
696.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar '05, T. 7. See also in this respect Bakir Alispahic, 27 May '05, T. 76-77, who testified in relation to the alleged Jablanica IKM, that:
based on what I know, and the extent of my knowledge is not tremendous, this was a place where there were only officers present and there were maps hanging and depicting the situation on the ground. I visited the premises. And based on what I saw there, I called them forward command post. Some people refer to it as simply command post.
In addition, Jusuf Jasarevic testified that (Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar '05, T. 76 ):
I was particularly confused by the fact that he (Nermin Eminovic, the 6th Corps Chief of the SVB( referred to IKM, forward command post, and he continues to use this term. I used the term sometimes too when expressing my opinion. I was prompted by his use of term.
697.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 49.
698.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  41.
699.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  44.
700.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 68, 71; The Trial Chamber notes that Nermin Erminovic also testified that he was not present in Donja Jablanica at the time and that he learned later that there had been an IKM in Donja Jablanica; see also Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 25. Ramiz Delalic testified “an IKM was located at Zuka’s base, if I’m not mistaken,” ibid. For the Trial Chamber’s findings as to the testimony of Ramiz Delalic, see supra Section II.
701.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 68.
702.The Trial Chamber notes that the base of the Zulfikar Detachment was in Donja Jablanica.
703.Ramiz Delalic,18 May ’05, T.  25.
704.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar '05, T. 4-5.
705.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 45.
706.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  92.
707.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  62.
708.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  63.
709.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T.  7; The Trial Chamber notes that reports from the Command of the 4th Corps: Ex. 114, Ex. 115, Ex. 129, all refer to SVK IKM. See also Ex. 474, Cancellation of Order, issued by Rasim Delic to the Command of the 6th Corps, dated 31 October 1993, in which Rasim Delic wrote that “the armed forces SVK IKM is not in Jablanica ”. See infra Section IV.F, paras 713-721.
710.See supra para 196.
711.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T.  76, referring to Ex. 120, Reorganisation Order.
712.Ex. 120, p. 2.
713.Ex. 120, p. 2-3.
714.Ex. 296, Opinion on Proposal by the 6th Corps, sent by the Chief of Administration for Organisation and Mobilisation, Avdulah Kajevic, to the SVK Commander, dated 15 November 1993, which states that this part of the order of 1 September was not implemented. Salko Gusic testified that the Black Swans Unit never came under the control of the 6th Corps, and the Akrepi Unit remained based in Konjic, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 77; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T. 39.
715.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar '05, T.  39; Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 40-41. See supra Section IV.A, para. 147.
716.Ex. 443, Order of Rasim Delic to the 4th Corps Command and to Sefer Halilovic concerning Order of 1 September on organisational changes, dated 5 October 1993.
717.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  81.
718.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  81.
719.Ex. 120, p. 5.
720.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  81.
721.Ex. 120, p. 3. As noted above, “items 1 and 2” of the order refer to the Sabotage-Reconnaissance Brigade, Black Swans unit (Crni Labudovi), Zulfikar Detachment, Silver Fox unit, Akrepi unit, and Muderiz unit.
722.Ex. 123, order by Sefer Halilovic, as “Nacelnik GSVK (zamjenik komandanta)”, to the 6th Corps command, dated 2 September.
723.Ex, 123, p. 1.
724.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T.  84-85.
725.Ex. 296.
726.Ex. 120, order.
727.Ex. 121, order of Arif Pasalic, 4th Corps Commander, dated 7 September 1993; see also Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 81.
728.Ex. 121, p. 2. The area of responsibility of the North-2 OG is stated as “Jablanica to the north, up to Salakovac HE/ hydro plant/ to the South, and the border with the enemy to the west and east,” ibid.
729.Ex. 121, p. 2.
730.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 159.
731.Vahid Karavelic testified that Delta Brigade did not go to Jablanica, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 120-121.
732.The Trial Chamber notes that the text reads “Colakovic’s Unit” and understands that this refers to Adnan Solakovic’s unit, the 2nd Independent Battalion.
733.Ex. 161. Vahid Karavelic testified that he understood this order to mean that he, as Commander of the 1st Corps, was in “command or control” of the troops until the time that they arrived at their destination “and reported to the Supreme Command group” After that “the chain of command […] which was established in the course of the implementation of the Neretva -93 operation, this chain had command and control over them” and that upon their return from Herzegovina they would return to the 1st Corps chain of command, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 26-27; Salko Gusic, 6th Corps commander, testified that he did not receive any order from Sefer Halilovic that he was to receive the 1st Corps units that had gone to Bradina, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 60.
734.Ex. 161, p. 2.
735.Ex. 161, point 2.
736.Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 112.
737.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 2-3. He states however, that he did not have access to the 30 August order at the time and only saw it when he came to The Hague. He stated that at that point in time he was not sure why he was supposed to send units to the Neretva Valley and that was the reason why he contacted Rasim Delic, ibid.
738.Ex. 382, Request from Sefer Halilovic to 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelic for Response concerning movement of Units of the 1st Corps, dated 2 September 1993.
739.Ex. 384, Reply from the 1st Corps Command to Sefer Halilovic and Vehbija Karic, dated 4 September 1993.
740.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 39 -40.
741.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 40.
742.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 40.
743.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 40, According to Vehbija Karic, the meeting took a long time and the participants to the meeting analysed several issues. The participants to the meeting were satisfied that they would be able to maintain the defence of Sarajevo and still have forces, the strength of one battalion from the 9th and 10th Brigades; Vahid Karavelic testified that it was logical to request the Delta Brigade and the 2nd Independent Battalion as they were reserve, mobile units of the 1st Corps and did not hold a defence line, while he believed that the choice of units of the 9th and 10th Brigades was not as logical as these units had their own areas of responsibility and were manning a defence line, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr '05, T. 112-113.
744.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  17-18; Zakir Okovic testified that Sefer Halilovic explained the significance of the “Operation” that was being carried out in Herzegovina. He said that the siege of Mostar had to be lifted, and insisted that the 2nd Independent Battalion be sent to Herzegovina, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar 05, T. 18, 19; The Trial Chamber notes that the only reference Vahid Karavelic made to any meetings is his testimony that Sefer Halilovic spoke with him by phone about taking units from the 1st Corps, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 108-109 and 22 Apr ’05, T. 86.
745.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  19-20; Ex. 385.
746.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 13.
747.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 50-51.
748.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 51.
749.Ex. 116.
750.Ex. 117.
751.Vahid Karavelic testified that he assumed that the fact this order was sent to Sefer Halilovic meant that he had not been close by when it was drafted, and therefore it was written by his assistants in accordance with Sefer Halilovic’s general guidelines and instructions. Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 6; see Ex. 122, p. 3.
752.Ex. 122.
753.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  83.
754.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 41.
755.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 41.
756.The Trial Chamber has not been furnished with the 5 September document and the evidence is inconclusive about whether or not the 6 September document referred to by Arif Pasalic is Ex. 122.
757.Ex. 112, p. 1.
758.Ex. 112, p. 1. The Trial Chamber notes that “Sjever” is the B/C/S word for North.
759.Ex. 112, p. 2.
760.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 25.
761.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 52-53, 67.
762.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 61.
763.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 61.
764.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May '05, T. 67; 27 May '05, T. 45. The unit contained about 50 police members, and was made up of two formations, when these two formations linked up they were sent to Konjic.
765.Bakir Alispahic, 27 May '05, T. 54.
766.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb '05, T.  50.
767.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  42-43; They were driven by a member of the Zulfikar Detachment, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 43-44.
768.Ex. 281, p. 2.
769.Ex. 406, Report to Main Staff of the Supreme Command, Commander personally, dated 1 September 1993. This report states in the opening paragraph that “we are expecting Sefer”.
770.Ex. 406.
771.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  44-45; see also Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T. 48.
772.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  48 and 24 Mar '05, T. 35. In September 1993, the Igman Wolves were billeted in the offices of the hydro-electric plant in Grabovica, see infra Section IV.B, para. 380.
773.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  45.
774.See supra paras 229-244.
775.Ex. 449. The Trial Chamber notes that this report was also sent to the Supreme Command Staff in Sarajevo.
776.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 48.
777.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 48.
778.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  49-50. At the time Sefko Hodzic thought that Zulfikar Alispago wanted to find accommodation for his troops. Later on, he found out that that was actually meant to be for the accommodation of the troops from Sarajevo.
779.Sefko Hodzic testified that the clothing of the people he saw in Grabovica suggested to him that they were Bosnian Croats, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 50.
780.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  49-51; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 47-48, 71-72 (testifying that as far as he knew, Diva Grabovica was not a Bosnian-Croat village. Diva Grabovica was situated about 4 kilometres to the north of Grabovica and known for its hunting lodge).
781.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  49-51. Sefko Hodzic stated that he did not share that opinion as it was difficult to get there and on the way to Diva Grabovica they had encountered some minefields on the way, ibid.
782.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  51-52 and 24 Mar '05, T. 37. On 2 or 3 September Sefko Hodzic met with Selmo Cikotic, Commander of OG West, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 36-37. Sefko Hodzic testified that in Kostajnica Sefer Halilovic spoke with some of the local population which included some elderly Bosnian Croats who had stayed in that village. Sefer Halilovic told them that the ABiH was not a revengeful army and that “no woman and no children should have to cry because of them.” Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 52-53 and 24 Mar '05, T. 38.
783.Ex. 161, see supra paras. 231-235.
784.Ex. 383, Order by Vahid Karavelic to Ramiz Delalic, dated 4 September 1993. Vahid Karavelic testified that he thinks the reason the order was addressed to the Deputy Commander and not to the Commander was that he probably had been told by the commander that Ramiz Delalic would be responsible for the implementation of that task, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T.  11.
785.Ex. 383.
786.Ex. 383. Vahid Karavelic testified that he issued similar orders to the 2nd Independent Battalion, the Delta Brigade and the 10th Brigade, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 14; However, he was not sure that the Delta Brigade was subordinated to the 1st Corps at that time, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 14.
787.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 16; Vahid Karavelic testified that the delay in departure was 24 hours, ibid.
788.Ex. 290, p. 1, paragraph 1; Ramiz Delalic testified that there was not a storm, but that they could not leave because the 1st Corps Commander and the Main Staff could not agree amongst themselves, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 55; He further testified that it was because Vahid Karavelic did not respect the order of Sefer Halilovic, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 13; He stated that the conclusion finally reached between Vahid Karavelic and Sefer Halilovic was that they would stay only 7 days in Jablanica, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 55; These troops would be subordinated to Zulfikar Alispago and the chain of command would be the “Sarajevo Unit, Senad Pecar” (who was supposed to be Unit Commander), Zulfikar Alispago and Sefer Halilovic at the top, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 56. Vahid Karavelic testified that he was hesitant to send troops given the situation in Sarajevo at the time. Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 108 -109; The 9th and 10th Brigades had their zones of responsibility and were holding the defence line in Sarajevo, and at the end of August also part of the defence line at Mt. Igman, Vahid Karavelic, 19 Apr ’05, T. 113; According to Vahid Karavelic, such a move was illogical and endangered the defence of Sarajevo. Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 158.
789.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  53.
790.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  53-54 and 24 Mar '05, T. 44-45.
791.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  54. The Trial Chamber notes that 4 September 1993 was a Saturday and that the Wednesday following was 8 September.
792.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  56. Sefko Hodzic later testified that the 45th Brigade was in Buturovic Polje, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 40.
793.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  56.
794.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  56-57.
795.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  57.
796.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  57 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 47- 48.
797.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  57.
798.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  58; Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 7.
799.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  59; In his book, Sefer Halilovic wrote that all members of the Inspection Team were present in Donja Jablanica on 4 September, together with Rasim Delic, Salko Gusic, Zulfikar Alispago and Commander of the 45th Brigade, Ex. 281, p. 3. Selmo Cikotic testified that he went to the meeting because he had been issued an order from Sefer Halilovic through the 3rd Corps command or the 317th Brigade command to attend, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 7, 52.
800.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 108, 109-110; Salko Gusic testified that Rasim Delic arrived to Herzegovina on 4 September and spent the night in Konjic, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T. 49.
801.Ex. 281, p. 2.
802.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  59.
803.Selmo Cikotic was not sure about the date. He testified that the meeting took place more than one day before the meeting in Dobro Polje on 5 September, possibly on 1 September, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 8, 54-55. Selmo Cikotic testified that Sefer Halilovic’s escort named Sele Halilovic and Sefer Halilovic’s son were in Donja Jablanica.
804.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 8, 54-55. Selmo Cikotic testified that Sefer Halilovic’s escort named Sele Halilovic and Sefer Halilovic’s son were in Donja Jablanica.
805.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 8.
806.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 8. Selmo Cikotic did not specify who told him what the goal of the combat operations was.
807.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 9. This understanding is based on the fact that Sefer Halilovic said that he would be on the ground with a team from the General Staff and that he would be taking a coordinating role, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 9, 57. Selmo Cikotic believes that this included issuing specific orders, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 9.
808.The Trial Chamber notes that Vehbija Karic mentioned a military depot in Konjic, which was named “ARK”, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 66; see also Bakir Alispahic, who refers to a military depot in Konjic named “Arka,” Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 25
809.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 10, 56.
810.Selmo Cikotic testified that Sefer Halilovic and he did not discuss specific battalions, but discussed the use of only one battalion in addition to a reserve battalion as an optional fresh force. Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 11-12. After this meeting Selmo Cikotic returned to his IKM on Planica Mountain close to Gornji Vakuf and informed the commander Enver Hadzihasanovic about the meeting, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 5, 12, 66; Selmo Cikotic testified that he sent Enver Hadzihasanovic a written report wherein he reported about his travel and the outcome of the meeting and asked approval to take part in the activities, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 52, 66.
811.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 11.
812.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  29-30; Salko Gusic testified that in the first ten days of September Rasim Delic arrived in the area and spent the night in Konjic and the next day there was a meeting in Dobro Polje, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb '05, T. 49.
813.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  29-30; Nermin Eminovic testified that he knew that Sefer Halilovic made an unannounced visit to the 6th Corps headquarters in Konjic, in late August 1993. There were several brigade commanders there: Mitko Pitkic, the Commander of the 43rd Brigade, was present, and Sefer Halilovic was “a bit rough with him”; he is not sure if Salko Gusic was there, Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 67; Nermin Eminovic does not think it was a military meeting – in the sense of being a briefing, a debriefing, issuing of tasks, Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 68.
814.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 42 -46, 65-67.
815.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 66.
816.Ex. 148, Order on Defence Stabilisation Measures, issued by Stjepan Siber “standing in for the Commander” to the 6th Corps Command, dated 4 September 1993. This order was sent at 19:52 hours.
817.Ex. 148.
818.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 41. See also Witness B, who testified that the Hand‘ar Division was present in Grabovica in September 1993, Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 51.
819.Selmo Cikotic testified that the meeting in Dobro Polje was held on 5 September 1993 and that he did not meet Sefer Halilovic again before 26 October of 1993, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 57 and 24 Feb ’05, T. 5; Sefko Hodzic also gave 5 September 1993 as a date of the meeting in Dobro Polje, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 59; Witness G testified that the meeting was held on 4, 5 or 6 September 1993. Witness G stated that Sefko Hod‘ic came to Dobro Polje with Sefer Halilovic. He also testified that Sefer Halilovic came to Dobro Polje two or three times during that period and during one of the meetings the area was shelled by the artillery, Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 19; Mehmed Behlo testified that the meeting in Dobro Polje had been held about five days before the actual combat began. He testified that Salko Gusic, Selmo Cikotic, Sefer Halilovic were there, that the meeting did not last very long and mostly logistical needs were discussed for units that were already in Dobro Polje, Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T. 72-73; Witness J testified that the meeting in Dobro Polje took place seven to eight days prior to the combat operations on 14 September 1993, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 19.
820.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 15.
821.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T.  87-88; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T. 72-73.
822.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 15-16. Selmo Cikotic was accompanied by his officers Amir Durakovic and Kenan Dautovic. Also present from the OG West were Tahir Granic, Commander of the 307th Brigade from Bugojno, and Enver Zejnilagic, commander of 317th Brigade from Gornji Vakuf, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 17; Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 19-20, 103-104 ; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 87-88 and 04 Feb '05, T. 49.
823.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 17.
824.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 17.
825.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  88.
826.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 18; He testified that the 3rd Corps command was not tasked with a role, but that he still perceived his OG to be part of the 3rd Corps, ibid.
827.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 19.
828.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 19.
829.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 57.
830.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 19 and 24 Feb '05, T. 24. He testified that the 6th Corps might have been involved in a task more to the south, but only this part of the order affected Selmo Cikotic’s tasks. He thinks that Enver Buza was given a general task for the 6th Corps by Sefer Halilovic, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 19; Salko Gusic testified that “Buza was supposed to infiltrate his forces into the town of Prozor, and they were to begin operations from the rear. He then briefed the general that he was unable to do that,” Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 88.
831.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  87; Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 19.
832.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  88-90.
833.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  90.
834.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  88; However, Selmo Cikotic testified that Enver Buza was given a task by Sefer Halilovic, which fell under the general task that was given to the 6th Corps, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 19.
835.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 57.
836.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 16.
837.Ex. 131, “Operation Neretva” map in Colour.
838.These were, starting from the north: OG West, the 317th, 45th, 44th, 47th Brigades, Zulfikar Detachment, 41st, 48th and 42nd Brigades. See Ex. 131.
839.In the original B/C/S this reads “Komandant SVK OS”
840. See supra Section IV.A.1(b). The Trial Chamber was provided with a JNA Military Manual including the JNA rules on combat documents (Ex. 106). The Trial Chamber notes that the ABiH for the most part applied the same military organisation rules as the JNA. Paragraphs 493 and 494 of the JNA Manual define maps as combat documents which purpose is to prepare and implement the commander’s decision. Paragraph 498 reads in its relevant parts:
The following information is placed on plans (maps, tables or text): the annotation “I HAVE APPROVED IT” in the upper left-hand corner, and position, rank, first name, last name and the signature of the commanding officer and the time/date (day, month, year and hour) of approval is placed below it; level of confidentiality and registry number in the upper right-hand corner; the name of the plan and its code name and the section (if needed) in the middle. A document is considered to be issued (completed) at the moment when the commanding officer has signed/approved it. […]
The Manual regulates the competence of the deputy commanders stating in paragraph 501 that the chief of staff, in his capacity as deputy commander, signs documents from the commander’s jurisdiction only if the commander is not there and if, due to the urgency of the matter, it is not possible to wait for his return. It adds that plans are signed by chiefs of organs who worked on them. As to the signature in the lower right-hand corner paragraph 508 reads:
The title, position of the commanding officer (organ) that keeps the map up to date, type of operation, time and confidentiality classification are placed in the middle of the upper margin of the operation map. […] After the completion of the task or of updating the operation map (for the task as a whole or a part thereof), the map is signed by the commanding officer who has been updating it. He marks the time when the operation map has been completed. The map is signed in the lower right- hand corner.
841.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 20, 57; However, Salko Gusic testified that he did not see this map at the meeting in Dobro Polje on 5 September, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 28.
842.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 31.
843.See supra paras 257-258.
844.Vahid Karavelic did not draw any conclusions on the basis of the map, because the map could be indicative of several possibilities, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 99-101 and 22 Apr ’05, T.  150-151; Vahid Karavelic testified that (Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 101-102 ):
the first variant or possibility is that the Chief of Staff drafted this decision, the commander approved the decision, and the Chief of Staff then was charged with personally being in charge of control and command, in terms of the execution of this particular plan of operations. Then again, there could have been a second variant. Namely, the Chief of Staff with his staff drafted this plan of operations on orders from the commander. The commander approved it, and as to the question of who will be the chief officer in command, who will be in command, which of course is not that often the case, can be the kind of question that would be dealt with subsequently, after the actual production of such a plan of operations.
845.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 22-23.
846.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ‘05, T. 23; He stated that in the JNA doctrine there were several options as to who signed such maps, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ‘05, T. 23.
847.D‘evad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T.  22. However, he also testified that the signature on the map does not automatically preclude the possibility that someone else actually ran the operation on the ground pursuant to Rasim Delic’s orders or for some other reason, D‘evad Tirak, 31 Mar '05, T. 80.
848.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ‘05, T.  21.
849.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ‘05, T.  24.
850.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ‘05, T.  24.
851.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ‘05, T.  26; Vahid Karavelic testified that (Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ‘05, T. 102):
along with a topographic map of this kind which has drawn into it the plan of operations, must necessarily be accompanied by a combat order, written, the text of the combat order, for the actual execution of the operation in question. In its full scope an operation of this kind, which is quite a complex operation, should be accompanied by a written document of at least 50 or up to 100 pages, including the orders for all the arms of service, and the combat orders for all the participants in the execution of such a plan of operations.
852.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ‘05, T.  20.
853.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ‘05, T. 21-22.
854.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ‘05, T.  56; Zakir Okovic testified that he first saw this map in The Hague, Selmo Cikotic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 55.
855.Witness G, 07 Apr ‘05, T. 101.
856.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  63. As mentioned above, Rasim Delic had insisted that Sefer Halilovic use his influence to persuade Musan Topalovic to go to Herzegovina. See supra para. 261.
857.Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T.  72-73.
858.Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T.  73-74 and 28 Jun ’05, T. 5-6.
859.Ex. 123.
860.Ex. 385. Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 12-13; The troops were to carry out combat operations with the purpose of liberating the Jablanica-Mostar communication in co-operation with the units of the 4th and 6th Corps in that area. Ex. 385, p. 1.
861.Ex. 385, p. 1.
862.Zakir Okovic testified that the troops left on the evening of 7 September, following an order of Vahid Karavelic of 7 September, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, 22-23, 49. He based this date on Ex. 270, Report of the 2nd Independent Battalion from the Field for the Period from 7 September to 20 September, sent to the 1st Corps Command, dated 25 September. The Trial Chamber recalls its earlier finding that Zakir Okovic throughout his testimony was uncertain of the exact dates and may have been mistaken on the dates. For this reason, the Trial Chamber will treat the testimony of Zakir Okovic, as regards specific dates, with caution and will rely on dates provided by him when corroborated through other evidence. Based on the overall assessment of the evidence the Trial Chamber concludes that the 2nd Independent Battalion left Sarajevo on 6 September.
863.Ex. 270; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 21-22.
864.Mustafa Kadic, 09 Mar ’05, T. 87; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 23, 49.
865.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  22, 49.
866.Ex. 270, p. 2. The Trial Chamber notes that this document refers to the arrival of the 2nd Independent Battalion on 8 September, however, in light of the other evidence presented to the Trial Chamber concerning the arrival of troops in Herzegovina, the Trial Chamber finds that the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived in the Jablanica area on 7 September.
867.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 13.
868.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  27-28. Vehbija Karic testified that at the beginning of September, the Inspection Team members in the area were reconnoitring in one of the hills to the east of the “M17” road, below Grabovica, and when returning, they went to the barracks where the Igman Wolves were from and they spoke to the former detainees there. The members of the Inspection Team did not cross the bridge over the Neretva River in order to enter Grabovica, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 54-55.
869.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  28.
870.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  63; Ramiz Delalic denied this, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May '05, T. 30-31. For Ramiz Delalic’s credibility, see supra Section II, para. 17; Ramiz Delalic testified that he didn’t have any role to play in the “Neretva Operation”, he was not supposed to accompany the troops to Herzegovina, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 62.
871.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  54.
872.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  63-64.
873.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  64; Ramiz Delalic denies that he saw Sefer Halilovic in Hrasnica. Ramiz Delalic, 19 May '05, T. 31-32.
874.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  56-57; Vehbija Karic believes that only Sefer Halilovic could have persuaded Musan Topalovic to go and carry out the task to move to Jablanica. Vehbija Karic, Ex.  444, T. 45-46; Later on Vehbija Karic found out that Sefer Halilovic had talked to Musan Topalovic in Hrasnica, and he barely managed to convince him that he should leave for Jablanica on that night. Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 45.
875.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  65.
876.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 116-117.
877.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 54, 59.
878.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 31-32, 82; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 54; T. 61; Ramiz Delalic states that Vahid Karavelic personally lined up the unit and halved it and sent them off to the Jablanica Sector. Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 54, 61.
879.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 32.
880.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 32.
881.The term “sapper” means a soldier whose responsibility is to dispose of mines, bombs etc, The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition, p. 1269.
882.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 32; Erdin Arnautovic, testified that there were no platoon leaders. Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 7; Ramiz Delalic testified that the commander was supposed to be Senad Pecar. Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 55-56; However, Vahid Karavelic, 1st Corps commander, testified that he did not appoint Senad Pecar as the commander of the three units who went to Herzegovina. Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr '05, T. 118.
883.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 33, 83.
884.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 33.
885.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 33; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 65; 19 May '05, T. 15-16; Ramiz Delalic testified that he was sent to Hrasnica to prevent the troops returning to Sarajevo, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May '05, T. 33. He stated that he saw Senad Pecar in Hrasnica but did not approach him, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May '05, T. 34.
886.On their way to Herzegovina, the soldiers from the 9th Brigade attacked police officers at a checkpoint near a place called Pazarici and mistreated three police officers, Ex. 207, report from the MUP State Security Service to the Main Staff Security Service, dated 19 September 1993. According to the document, at 04:30 hours on 8 September 1993 Ramiz Delalic and 50 men from the 9th Brigade, who were on their way to Herzegovina, attacked a police checkpoint and mistreated three police officers, one of which was brought to the barracks in Pazarici. Bakir Alispahic stated that he was familiar with the information contained in this document, Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 46 and 26 May ’05, T. 28. He stated that one policeman was gravely wounded. Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 46. He further stated that the policemen were civilian police, but noted that sometimes the checkpoints were manned by both military and civilian police, Bakir Alispahic, 26 May ’05, T. 28. See also Ex. 208, document from Jusuf Jasarevic, the Chief of UB of the Main Staff, to the 1st Corps Chief of the SVB, dated 29 September 1993, tasking the latter to collect evidence and institute criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. Ramiz Delalic testified to remember this incident, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 67. See also Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 35. Proceedings were initiated against Ramiz Delalic by the SVB, Bakir Alispahic, 26 May ’05, T. 27. Moving on from there the 9th Brigade stopped next in Jablanica, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 35.
887.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May '05, T. 66; 19 May '05, T. 36. Erdin Arnautovic stated that Ramiz Delalic was not in the truck with the rest of the soldiers, that he went as far as Konjic to purchase weapons and supplies and arrived in the evening, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 51. However, this testimony of Ramiz Delalic is conflicting with his own previous statements, see Ramiz Delalic, 19 May '05, T. 47-59; 20 May '05, T. 41.
888.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T.  41.
889.According to Vehbija Karic, Sefer Halilovic was not present when the decision was made. See also Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 6.
890.He refers to there being about “10,000 refugees” in Jablanica in September 1993, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 47.
891.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 49 -50.
892.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 50 -51and Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun '05, T. 6-7. The Trial Chamber notes that Namik D‘ankovic testified that he was not involved at all with the stationing of units in the Jablanica sector and that at the time he was in Mostar, Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 51.
893.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun '05, T. 6-7, 9, 25.
894.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 56. Vehbija Karic testified that the ABiH did not have the necessary logistics which other armies had, with proper camps and tents, and that the ABiH “never had any of this”, so that for the most part, the soldiers had to stay with the local population, wherever there was room, “along with previous coordination and contacts with the population”. He testified that for a certain amount of time, they would take soldiers in and put them up in barns, sheds, etc. because that was the only available possibility, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 49.
895.Witness B was told that some agreement as to the billeting of troops in Grabovica was reached with the local inhabitants possibly on 1 September 1993. Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 87.
896.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 51 ; Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun '05, T. 5.
897.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 13 -14, 86.
898.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 51.
899.See infra Section IV. D.3(c).
900.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun '05, T. 6, 7-8.
901.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun '05, T. 11-12.
902.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun '05, T. 10-11.
903.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 10.
904.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  70.
905.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  70.
906.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, 08 Jul '03, T. 52.
907.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 52 -53.
908.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 53.
909.Ex 110, report of Salko Gusic to VK Sarajevo, for the attention of Sefer Halilovic, dated 7 September 1993, p.  1; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 61-62. The Trial Chamber notes Vehbija Karic’s testimony in this respect, he is unclear at what time he informed Sefer Halilovic of the billeting of troops.
910.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T.  61.
911.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 39 ; Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 35, 84; Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 103; on 8 September Sefko Hodzic saw soldiers from Sarajevo passing through Donja Jablanica, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 70, 72. No military police accompanied soldiers in the trucks from Sarajevo on 7 and 8 September, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T.  67-68.
912.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 35.
913.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 84.
914.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 36.
915.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 37.
916.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 37.
917.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 32-33.
918.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 114 ; Ramiz Delalic testified that he purchased weapons while in Konjic, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 70; Vehbija Karic testified that Ramiz Delalic was buying weapons from deserters and that allegedly he was supposed to take these weapons to Sarajevo, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 114.
919.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 114.
920.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 11, 75.
921.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 11.
922.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 74.
923.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 75.
924.Namik D‘ankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 12.
925.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T.  72-73.
926.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  28-29, 59. Zakir Okovic testified that he went to the meeting because Adnan Solakovic was not yet in Grabovica, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 62.
927.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  28-29.
928.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  61.
929.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  29, 61.
930.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  29, 60.
931.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  30 and 16 Mar '05, T. 12.
932.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  30. He testified that Ex. 272, coded message from Adnan Solakovic to Vahid Karavelic, dated 11 September 1993, which states “agreement with the Chief is off” probably concerns the problem of the resubordination of the unit to the Zulfikar Detachment, and that “Chief” refers to Sefer Halilovic, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 35-36.
933.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  63; Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar '05, T. 13; Ex. 270, report from 2nd Independent Battalion to 1st Corps Command, dated 25 September 1993, p. 2; Erdin Arnautovic stated that the 2nd Independent Battalion was subordinated to the 9th Brigade, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb '05, T. 100.
934.Zakir Okovic, 16 Mar '05, T.  12.
935.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  62.
936.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  62.
937.Zakir Okovic, 16 Mar '05, T.  12.
938.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  29-30; Zakir Okovic testified that he believes either Zicro Suljevic, Vehbija Karic, or Rifat Bilajac distributed the tasks that were handed out during the meeting, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 60.
939.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  30, 59, 62-63.
940.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T.  29.
941.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T.  30.
942.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  73-74. See infra Section IV.D.2.
943.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  71.
944.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  76-77. See infra Section IV.D.9.
945.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 55.
946.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 52.
947.D‘evad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  45-46, 52.
948.D‘evad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  46.
949.D‘evad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05. T.  88.
950.D‘evad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05. T.  46. D‘evad Tirak found it illogical for Rasim Delic not to know what his “Chief of Staff” was doing, D‘evad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 59-60.
951.Ex. 270, report, 25 Sep ’93, p. 2.
952.Ibid.
953.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 65; Ned‘ad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 18.
954.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 65.
955.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 89 ; 17 Mar ’05, T. 57. Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 19 Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Namik Dzankovic was already there when he arrived, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 18 and 70.
956.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 19.
957.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 19.
958.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 20, 63-65.
959.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 22. Ramiz Delalic testified that he went to Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment on the evening of 10 September, but that neither Ahmed Salihamidzic or Namik Dzankovic or Sead Brankovic were present; and that Zulfikar Alispago was drunk, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 92-93. The Trial Chamber notes that Ramiz Delalic’s testimony is contradictory to the other reliable evidence before the Trial Chamber in this respect.
960.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 20-21, referring to Ex. 118. The Trial Chamber notes that it has been presented with evidence that Bakir Alispahic also met Sefer Halilovic in the evening of 9 September, or the morning of 10 September. See infra Section IV, para. 520.
961.Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 65.
962.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 19.
963.Ned‘ad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 19.
964.Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 65.
965.The Prozor Independent Battalion had its base in Dobro Polje.
966.Ex. 152, Order to Attack, Op.No.01/1500-27, sent from the 6th Corps (Dobro Polje), signed by a commander (name of the commander was not specified), dated 11 September 1993, concerning combat activities of the Prozor Independent Battalion, 45th and 317th Brigades; Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun ’05, T. 2-3. See also Ex. 149, Commander’s Report, signed by the Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion, Enver Buza, sent to the 6th Corps command, dated 20 September 1993, with the preamble “Pursuant to attack order operative number 01/1500-27 of 11 September 1993”.
967.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T, 46 and 47-48.
968.Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun ’05, T.  3.
969.Ex. 152, p. 1.
970.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  81.
971.Ex. 503, Order to Attack, issued by the SVK PN SO Commander, Zulfikar Alispago, dated 11 September 1993, concerning operation Defence of the People’s Rights Vrdi 93.
972.The order states that Irfan Maslesa, a.k.a. Braco, is to be commander of the first axis and that Mehmed Coric is to be commander of the second axis.
973.Ex. 503, revised translation p. 2.
974.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  79 and 81.
975.The Trial Chamber notes that this date can be incorrect. The document has the handwritten date 11 September, however it is not clear if it was actually sent on this date or sent on 10 September.
976.See infra Section IV. D, para. 423.
977.Ex 272, request, p. 1; Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 67-69; Zakir Okovic was concerned not to provoke attacks on his own soldiers, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 76. See infra Section IV.D, para. 423.
978.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 75-76.
979.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  43.
980.Ex 270, report dated 25 September 1993, p. 2; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T. 84.
981.Ex. 388, request from 1st Corps Commander to Sefer Halilovic, dated 12 September 1993, p. 1. See also Ex.  272, coded message from Adnan Solakovic to Vahid Karavelic, dated 11 September 1993. Ex. 388 is a request from Vahid Karavelic, Commander of the 1st Corps, dated 12 September 1993, addressed to Sefer Halilovic, asking him: 1. Based on collected intelligence regarding the aggressor activities in the zone of responsibility of the 1st Corps, “to respect the orders” and if possible to somehow ensure the return of parts of the 2nd Independent Battalion, the 9th and the 10th Brigades on 12/13 September; 2. If he would still need the assistance of the aforementioned units, to enable the company of the 2nd Independent Battalion to return to Sarajevo.
982.Ex. 385, order of Vahid Karavelic to the 2nd Independent Battalion Command, dated 6 September 1993, p. 1, para. 3.
983.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 106.
984.See infra para. 324. In the course of 12 September, part of the 2nd Independent Battalion went down to Arapovo hill. Ex 270, p. 3; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T. 85.
985.Ex. 157, 12 September Order.
986.Ex 157. Sefko Hodzic first testified that this occurred on 12 September, but later corrected himself stating that it was on 13 September, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 89., 24 Mar '05, T. 76.
987.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  89.
988.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  98-99, 100-101.
989.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  98-99.
990.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  105.
991.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  105-106.
992.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  105.
993.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  106 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 80; see also Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 52-53; 24 Mar '05, T. 38.
994.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T.  80.
995.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 48.
996.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T.  106, 24 Mar '05, T. 79-80.
997.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T.  2.
998.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T.  2; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 113; Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 46. Originally the main offensive was supposed to be directed along the Neretva River. Later on, the plan was changed and the main axis of attack was to be in the direction of Prozor, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 87-88.
999.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T.  2.
1000.Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 68.
1001.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T.  93-94. The front line between the ABiH and the HVO was shown by Mehmed Behlo on Ex 445, sketch drawn by Witness , Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 66-67.
1002.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T.  94.
1003.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 23, 27.
1004.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 24.
1005.Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T. 76.
1006.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T.  46.
1007.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 23. Selmo Cikotic saw documents mentioning 13 September 1993, as a date when the “operation” started but according to his recollection, the attack started in mid-September. Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 23. Selmo Cikotic testified that on this first day of combat operations they occupied Vilica Guvno. The offensive stopped there and during the next day, the units were facing HVO counter-attacks, Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 28. He further testified that the OG West troops remained engaged in combat in that area even after the whole operation finished, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 24. Mehmed Behlo testified that the 317th Brigade reinforced by the units from Sutjeska Battalion and the Neretvica Battalion attacked Crni Vrh with the aim of capturing its highest peak called Sljeme. After the initial success, the advance was stopped as the Commander of the Neretvica Battalion was killed. At the end of the second day, following the HVO counter-attack, the ABiH were forced to withdraw to their starting positions, Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T. 78-79.
1008.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 24. Selmo Cikotic sent his reports to the command post of the 317th Brigade, which is where Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac were. They were in contact with Sefer Halilovic, Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 51.
1009.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 85.
1010.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 2.
1011.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 2.
1012.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 3.
1013.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 4.
1014.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 4, 76. Witness J testified that he remembered Sefer Halilovic saying that Enver Buza would be held accountable for failing to accomplish the task, but that he would postpone dealing with that until everything was over, Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  21.
1015.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 4. In his book, Sefer Halilovic wrote that on the afternoon of 13 September he monitored combat operations in the area of Jablanica and in the evening he arrived at the command post of the 317th Brigade. In the village of Voljevac he received a report on the course of combat operations along the axis and on the course of combat operations along the axis held by OG West, Ex. 281, A Cunning Strategy ( Lukava Strategija), book by Sefer Halilovic, 1997, p. 5.
1016.Witness G, 11 Apr ’05, T.  6.
1017.Ex. 149, report, p. 2.
1018.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 101.
1019.Ibid.
1020.See infra Section IV.E.
1021.Ex. 501, combat order issued by Sefer Halilovic to the Commanders of the 45th, 317th Brigades and Prozor Independent Battalion, dated 15 September 1993, concerning combat activities in the areas of Gornji Vakuf and Prozor.
1022.Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun ’05, T. 2, referring to Ex. 152.
1023.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 9. Selmo Cikotic testified that this order is consistent with the map Ex. 131, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb ’05, T. 27. Two identical orders were issued. One was signed by Sefer Halilovic, the second was signed by Vehbija Karic for Sefer Halilovic; see Ex. 501, order by Sefer Halilovic and Ex. 502, order by Vehbija Karic, No. 21-1/15.07.1993, dated 15 September 1993.
1024.Ex 150, Order to attack, issued by Enver Zejnilagic, dated 15 September 1993, concerning combat activities of the 45th and 317th Brigades, Prozor Independent Battalion, Sutjeska Battalion and 2nd Mountain Battalion, p. 2; Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 36; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T. 80-81. Enver Zejnilagic’s order states in the preamble “on the basis of the order of the NGS/ Chief of General Staff and the Command of the Commander of the 6th Corps OP” 01/1500-27 of 11 September”, Ex. 150, p. 1. Witness J testified that he did not know who wrote this order and that he found it illogical given their defeat on Crni Vrh and after Uzdol, it was his impression that there was no activity, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 52. Dzevad Tirak testified that in September 1993 he was not aware of the “command of the commander of the 6th Corps” mentioned in the preamble of Enver Zejnilagic’s order, Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05, T. 51. He further testified, when asked whether the 317th Brigade was under the role of the 6th Corps, that “ this was one of the moments that were much debated and also one of the reasons (he( went to Visoko to speak to (Rasim( Delic”, Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05, T. 52. According to Dzevad Tirak, looking at the number 3 of the document, it appears that the 317th Brigade was within the composition of the 3rd Corps. Dzevad Tirak 31 Mar ’05, T. 52. However he also testified that, having regard to the introductory paragraph of that order, it appears that Enver Zejnilagic was acknowledging that he derived his authority to issue combat orders in part from a combat order of the 6th Corps commander, Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05, T. 52. Dzevad Tirak also stated that “it was highly unusual for a brigade commander to issue an order with two units involved that were actually not within his brigade” and that “looking at that order today, it appears another one of those orders that were issued as an alibi throughout the war”, Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05, T. 53. Selmo Cikotic testified that in principle orders issued to the 317th Brigade, which was a part of the OG West under Selmo Cikotic, would be issued through him or his command, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 27. Selmo Cikotic testified that this order is consistent with the “Operation Neretva map”, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 27, referring to Ex. 131. The 317th Brigade, which was supposed to carry out an attack on the village of Glibe axis, could not accomplish its tasks as it encountered a minefield near Glibe, Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun ’05, T. 83-84.
1025.Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T.  53.
1026.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 86.
1027.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T. 86-87.
1028.Mustafa Kadic testified that he did not remember the name of this mountain. Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 8.
1029.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 8, 28.
1030.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T. 88; Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 28.
1031.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T. 87. Zakir Okovic testified that his commander had told him that the 2nd Independent Battalion was supposed to stay in the area, but that they had done their job and should go home, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05. T. 88.
1032.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 10.
1033.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 10.
1034.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 84.
1035.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 102; Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 52.
1036.Ex 127, Order from Sefer Halilovic to Salko Gusic and Zulfikar Alispago, dated 20 September 1993.
1037.The document in B/C/S refers to “Vrdima”. This is translated in Ex. 127 as “Vrda” and in Ex. 126 as “Vrdi”. The Trial Chamber finds that the reference to “Vrda” in this document is to Vrdi.
1038.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 5.
1039.Ex. 126, Order from Salko Gusic to the Commander of the 45th Brigade, dated 20 September 1993. The original B/C/S version states “Nacelnikom SVK”, Ex. 126, p. 1.
1040.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 4.
1041.Ex. 126, para. 1.
1042.Ex 128, Report from 6th Corps Deputy Commander Bahrudin Fazlic to Sefer Halilovic, dated 20 September 1993, p. 1; Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 5-6.
1043.Ex. 113, report from Arif Pasalic to the IKM in Jablanica, dated 20 September 1993.
1044.Ex. 130, Final Report. See supra paras 206-209.
1045.Ex 160, cease-fire order, signed by the Deputy Commander Stjepan Siber (for the Commander), dated 16 September 1993, p. 1; Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05. T. 51-52.
1046.Ex 391, cease-fire order, signed by the Deputy Commander Stjepan Siber (for the Commander), dated 17 September 1993, p. 1; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 75.
1047.Ex 391, order, p. 2.
1048.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 88-89.
1049.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 52.
1050.Ex. 389, order issued by Sefer Halilovic to the 1st Corps Commander, dated 23 September 1993.
1051.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 108.
1052.Ex. 395, order by Vahid Karavelic to the Command of the 9th Brigade (for the attention of Ramiz Delalic), dated 24  September 1993.
1053.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 25.
1054.Ex. 469, Order of Rasim Delic to the 4th, 6th Corps and Sefer Halilovic, dated 29 September 1993, concerning the cessation of combat operations against HVO.
1055.Ex. 133, Order of Rasim Delic, to Sefer Halilovic, and Command of the 6th Corps (Commander personally), dated 1 October 1993. See also Ex. 132, telegram from Sefer Halilovic to Rasim Delic, the date is unclear, this was sent in response to a document dated 25 September 1993, in which Sefer Halilovic wrote:
Although, with your permission, I said to Salko Gusic, the Commander of the 6th Corps, that we would see each other in Jablanica on Saturday, he has not shown up yet or contacted me. This has become his habit. I was looking for him in the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps for four or five days and then met him by chance /?in/ the Command of the 6th Corps […] I would really like a sincere response and an order to the Commander of the 6th Corps to conduct himself in a proper military way.
1056.Ex. 133. Salko Gusic testified that this refers to defensive operations, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 57-58; According to Salko Gusic this order cannot show that this was a continuation of the “Operation Neretva 93” but can prove that “preparations were not being made to create the conditions for a continuation of combat operations”, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 59. He stated that “work was underway in planning new combat operations or even to continue combat operations as part of Neretva 93”, Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ’05, T. 60.
1057.Ex. 147, Order issued by Rasim Delic, dated 21 October 1993, together with Authorisation to Members of the Main Staff of the BH Armed Forces signed by Rasim Delic; and Report of Asim Dzambasovic to Commander Rasim Delic and Command Operations Centre, dated 31 October 1993, and Order signed by Asim Dzambasovic, dated 3 November 1993.
1058.Ex. 147, p. 1.
1059.Ex. 147, p. 2.
1060.Ex. 147, p. 3. Salko Gusic testified that he considers this order to be “usual in the case of teams”. Comparing it with the 30 August order he considered the latter as “a bit broader than what is generally understood as the powers of an inspection team”, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 12.
1061.Ex. 147, p. 4.
1062.Ex. 260, correspondence of Sefer Halilovic to the Commander of the SVK of the ABiH and Commander of the 1st Corps of the ABiH, dated 25 October 1993.
1063.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 186, (footnotes omitted).
1064.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T. 78.
1065.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 63-64.
1066.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T. 70.
1067.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 24-25.
1068.Salko Gusic, 04 Feb ‘05, T. 57. He stated (ibid.):
I'm not denying for a single moment that somebody else was perhaps commanding the operation, but I have no proof of that. I know who was the commander at the Forward Command Post. I know who directly issued tasks to the units on the ground. And whether that's someone – not someone but General Halilovic. Whether he had to consult General Delic about each one of his decisions and receive approval from him, it was not General Halilovic's duty to inform me of this nor can I claim to know about it.
1069.See supra paras 201 and 204.
1070.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 52.
1071.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 53.
1072.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 53. Salko Gusic stated that Sefer Halilovic could have issued other types of orders and that the commanders could not be sure if he had in fact previously consulted with Rasim Delic, and such an order would have to be executed. However, he stated that on the basis of the reporting mechanism any commander who received an order would report to Sefer Halilovic and Rasim Delic that such an order had been received and carried out, as regular reports were provided at the end of every day to the Supreme Command Staff, therefore, if any radical orders had been issued, the commander would have been aware of the fact. Salko Gusic further stated that Rasim Delic “ would have found out about it within one day,” ibid.
1073.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T. 7-8.
1074.The Trial Chamber notes that these were low-ranking soldiers.
1075.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 30-31.
1076.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 74, 18 Feb '05, T. 43-44.
1077.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb '05, T. 70-71.
1078.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T.  105.
1079.Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T.  21-22.
1080.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  25.
1081.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T.  45.
1082.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 4, 13; 27 May ’05, T. 28.
1083.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 5.
1084.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 5-6.
1085.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 8.
1086.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 13.
1087.Dzevad Tirak, 31 Mar ’05, T. 75.
1088.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ‘05, T. 71.
1089.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 26; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 71, testifying that the 6th Corps was responsible for the Prozor Independent Battalion; Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 75, testifying that the battalion submitted combat reports to the 6th Corps; Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 12-13, who also testified that the 6th Corps deputy commander Bahrudin Fazlic would frequently come and visit the Prozor Independent Battalion; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 104.
1090.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ‘05, T. 54; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 9 and 98; Ex. 130, Final Report.
1091.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  8. Vehbija Karic testified that it was necessary to review the strength of the unit’s logistic support, the ammunition situation, discipline, morale, the experience in combat activity, issues which influenced the combat readiness of the units, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 102.
1092.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  8.
1093.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ‘05, T. 11-12.
1094.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  9, 69-70, 75, 102.
1095.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  72.
1096.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  75.
1097.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  70.
1098.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  104.
1099.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  106.
1100.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  21-22.
1101.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 60-61.
1102.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 66.
1103.Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 66-67.
1104.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 86.
1105.Ex. 449, Ex. 111, Ex. 112, Ex. 113, Ex. 114, Ex. 115, Ex. 121, Ex. 129. See supra para. 216.
1106.See Ex. 481, combat report, request for reinforcements sent by Deputy Commander of the 4th Corps D‘emal Najetovic to the R BH OS SVK Centre for Operations Command, dated 13 September 1993.
1107.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 46.
1108.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 46.
1109.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 47.
1110.Ex. 293, separate page of Sefko Hodzic’s diary.
1111.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 43.
1112.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 27.
1113.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 27.
1114.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 102.
1115.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 103. When Sefko Hodzic eventually saw the 30 August order he also saw another order of Rasim Delic, dated 3 August, setting up an Inspection Team for Mt. Igman “to help stabilise the situation over there” of which Sefer Halilovic was also the Team Leader, and Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac were some of the members of that inspection team. Sefko Hodzic thought that Rasim Delic was basing himself on this 3 August order when he wrote the 30 August order, ibid.
1116.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 103.
1117.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 47.
1118.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar '05, T. 48.
1119.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 48.
1120.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 49.
1121.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  111.
1122.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  110.
1123.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  110.
1124.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 70.
1125.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 71-72.
1126.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 73-74.
1127.Selmo Cikotic referred to “the orders issued by the Main Staff to individual units or commands”, ibid.
1128.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 51, 52. He further stated that he did not send his reports to the IKM in Jablanica as he was not aware at the time that there was one, ibid.
1129.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 49.
1130.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 6.
1131.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 52.
1132.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 7.
1133.Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 9. This understanding is based on the fact that Sefer Halilovic said that he would be on the ground with a team from the Main Staff and that he would be taking a coordinating role, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb '05, T. 9, 57. Selmo Cikotic believes that this included issuing specific orders, Selmo Cikotic, 23 Feb 05, T. 9.
1134.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 35, 48.
1135.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb '05, T. 48, 50.
1136.See supra Section IV.C, para. 189.
1137.See supra Section IV.C, para. 189.
1138.See supra Section IV.C, para. 244.
1139.See supra Section IV.C, para. 210.
1140.See supra Section IV.C, para. 225.
1141.See supra para. 244.
1142.See supra Section IV.C, para. 221.
1143.See supra Section IV.C, para. 217.
1144.See supra Section IV.C, para. 347.
1145.Bakir Alispahic, 27 May ’05, T. 34.
1146.Ex. 132, telegram from Sefer Halilovic to Rasim Delic, the date is unclear, this was sent in response to a document dated 25 September 1993, in which Sefer Halilovic wrote:
Although, with your permission, I said to Salko Gusic, the Commander of the 6th Corps, that we would see each other in Jablanica on Saturday, he has not shown up yet or contacted me. This has become his habit. I was looking for him in the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps for four or five days and then met him by chance /?in/ the Command of the 6th Corps […] I would really like a sincere response and an order to the Commander of the 6th Corps to conduct himself in a proper military way.
See also Ex. 132 and Ex. 133, see supra Section IV.C, para. 337.
1147.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 170.
1148.See supra para. 273.
1149.See supra Section IV.A.1(b).
1150.See supra para. 247.
1151.See supra paras 231 and 252-254.
1152.See supra para 351.
1153.See supra para. 216.
1154.The full name of the village is “Gornja Grabovica”, but the parties and many witnesses referred to it as “Grabovica ”, see, e.g., Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 45. The Trial Chamber will also refer to Gornja Grabovica as Grabovica.
1155.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  45. Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 42. For a map of the area around Grabovica, see Ex. 134.
1156.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  39.
1157.On the road from Grabovica to Jablanica there are two short tunnels, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 41.
1158.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  3; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 39; Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 57-60; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 49. This road is called the M17 road.
1159.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 39.
1160.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  3; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 4.
1161.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  45.
1162.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 46.
1163.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 47. Further south on the left bank there is a small hamlet called Sjencine, Witness  B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 47.
1164.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  47-48.
1165.The Trial Chamber notes that during the testimony, some witnesses referred to a body of water called “the lake.” According to Katica Miletic, when referring to the Neretva River, people would also use the word “lake”, Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 25.
1166.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  4; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 15.
1167.Witness C testified that on a quiet day, the villagers could talk to one another from the opposite sides, Witness  C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 8-9, 47-48.
1168.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  62. The Trial Chamber notes that witnesses use the term “right bank” to indicate the west bank of the Neretva river, and the term “left bank” to indicate the east bank of the Neretva river. In this judgement, the Trial Chamber will use the terms “right bank” and “left bank”.
1169.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 44.
1170.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24, 51.
1171.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24, 51; Ex. 79, photograph of Grabovica.
1172.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 77 ; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 25.
1173.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 37; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 39.
1174.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  70; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 45; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 35. For a picture of the huts, see Ex. 271, photograph marked by Zakir Okovic, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 25-26.
1175.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  4.
1176.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  5.
1177.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  15; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 4; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 69; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 40.
1178.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  70 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 21.
1179.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  5; Witness C, 10 Feb 05, T. 5.
1180.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  5.
1181.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  5.
1182.For the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence on this alleged statement, see Section IV.D.9.(b)
1183.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  5- 6; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 15-16; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 8.
1184.Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T.  16.
1185.Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T. 16-17; Witness B, 2 Feb ’05, T. 6.
1186.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 8.
1187.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 8.
1188.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 5.
1189.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 7 -8; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 15; Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 63; Vehbija Karic testified that mostly elderly Bosnian Croat villagers lived in approximately 10 houses on the right bank, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 49.
1190.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  7-8.
1191.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  76.
1192.These soldiers were billeted in the offices of the hydroelectric power plant in Grabovica, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 75; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 23, 33, 51; Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 48; and Ahmed Salihamidzic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 96, 18 Mar ’05, T. 2.
1193.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  51; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 38-39; According to Witness C, the Igman Wolves consisted of about 30 soldiers, who stayed at the hydroelectric plant. She testified that the Handzar Division arrived in Grabovica on 5 September 1993 and that they went to the right bank, Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 9-10, 39, 41.
1194.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  9-10, 12, 39, 69-70; Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 51; Saban Neziric, 10 Mar '05, T.  42, 45; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 8-10, 45; Zakir Okovic,18 Mar '05, T. 15; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 17 Mar '05, T. 21-22 and 18 Mar ’05, T. 2, 15.
1195.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  39.
1196.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  106.
1197.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  10, 38-39; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 9. According to Witness C, there were two checkpoints in the village, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 70.
1198.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar '05, T. 42-43; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 69; Ex. 215, Report by Namik Dzankovic, dated 13 September, p. 1.
1199.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  56-57; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 39-40; Saban Neziric, 10 Mar '05, T. 42; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 53. Zulfikar Alispago also promised the villagers that he would arrange a bus so that they could go to Jablanica, but this never happened, Witness  B, 02 Feb '05, T. 56; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 40; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 40
1200.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  39; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 17.
1201.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  14-15.
1202.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  17.
1203.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  69.
1204.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  69.
1205.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  48; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 16; Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 71 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 35; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 93-94; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 39, 49; Vehbija Karic testified that there were 10,000 refugees from Prozor and other HVO-held areas in Jablanica, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 47.
1206.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  15.
1207.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  15-18; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 6-7.
1208.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  15-18; Witness B, 2 Feb ’05, T. 70; Vehbija Karic, 2 Jun ’05, T. 14-15, Ex. 444, T. 47; Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 73.
1209.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  8-9, 58; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 39; Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 48.
1210.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  15, 48; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 69.
1211.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  9, 87.
1212.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 57; Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 5-6; Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 74; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 9; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 28; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 70 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 21; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 35; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 54-55.
1213.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 45, 54-55; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 70, 17 Mar ’05, T. 21; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 57; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 28; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 40.
1214.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  51.
1215.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  48-52; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 15, 18; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 25-26; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb 05, T. 40.
1216.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  57-58; Katica Miletic, 9 Feb ’05, T. 39-40; Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 50-52; Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 71; Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 53-54. The Trial Chamber notes that Dzevad Tirak heard that there was a lot of tension between the different ethnic groups, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 41. However, the Trial Chamber finds that the other evidence presented before the Tribunal does not support that assertion.
1217.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  40.
1218.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 46; Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 39; Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 54-55.
1219.Ex. 406, report of “Zicro, Rifat and Vehbija” to the “commander of the Supreme Command Staff” personally, dated 1 September 1993.
1220.These prisons were referred to as prisons of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, Ex. 406.
1221.Ex. 406.
1222.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 22; Edin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 20-21; Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 6 -8; Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 48-49, 24 Mar ’05, T. 35; see also Ex. 406, letter to the commander of the Supreme Command Staff, dated 1 September 1993.
1223.Ex. 490, report of the Assistant Commander for Security of the 44th Brigade to the 6th Corps Command, dated 8 September 1993, in which it is reported that a group of former detainees from the Dretelj camp had arrived in Dreznica. As the Spanish Battalion of the UNPROFOR did not receive approval of the HVO to transport these refugees, the refugees stayed in Dreznica ; Ex. 99, report of Assistant Commander for Security of 44th Brigade to 6th Corps Command, dated 9 September 1993, in which it is reported that the Spanish Battalion still did not receive approval to transport the refugees and that the refugees had walked to Grabovica. They were transported from Grabovica to Jablanica by members of the 44th Brigade; see also Ex. 153, handwritten version of Ex. 99.
1224.Witness B remembered the arrival of refugees in Grabovica, in late August, but not in September, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 60. However, he also testified that he remembered a large group of refugees en route to Jablanica. Some of those refugees stopped in Grabovica, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 58; He further testified that he saw refugees entering houses on 9 September 1993, while the killings were ongoing, taking whatever they wanted, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 62; Witness C did not see any refugees from the Dretelj camp in Grabovica, but she was told of the arrival of about three or four people she knew, Witness  C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 49-50; Emin Zebic does not remember the arrival of a large group of refugees on the morning of 9 September 1993, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 26-27.
1225.See supra Section IV.C, paras 278 and 287
1226.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 10, 12; Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 104; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T.  23, 50; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 17-18. Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 9-11.
1227.See Section IV.C, paras 291, 302-303.
1228.Ex. 269, Request, dated 15 November 1993, of the Chief of Administration for Organisation and Mobilisation to the SVK Commander on 6th Corps Proposal No. 14/75-140; see also Section IV.C, para. 227
1229.The Trial Chamber notes that Namik Dzankovic testified that a few days after the killings, he saw a group of officers, including Edib Saric, who were taking part in combat operations in the area, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 33-34. Witness D was confronted with a statement he had made during “Operation Trebevic”. In that statement, he said that the Igman Wolves participated in an attack on Mt. Medved with the 9th Brigade. However, when testifying before the Tribunal, Witness D testified: “believe me this is the statement that I deny. They could have written whatever they wanted”, Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 70. Witness D testified before the Trial Chamber that the Igman Wolves were among the soldiers who were lined up when Vehbija Karic allegedly made the statement as detailed in para. graph 10 of the Indictment, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 21-27. For the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence on this alleged statement, see Section IV.D.9.(b) The Trial Chamber further heard evidence that the Igman Wolves were accommodated sometime between May 1993 (Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 38) and approximately twenty days before the events in Grabovica (Witness  C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 41) However, the Trial Chamber has not been provided with evidence as to the reasons why the Igman Wolves were sent to Grabovica or what their tasks were to be while in the area.
1230.Witness C testified that all soldiers who arrived on 7 and 8 September came during the night, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 70; Witness B saw soldiers arriving on 7 and 8 September, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 9. Witness A saw three buses arriving on 9 September, Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 74.
1231.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 12, 16, 44; Ex. 170, photograph of Grabovica; Ex. 182, photograph of Grabovica; Ex. 265, photograph of Grabovica; Ex. 266, photograph of Grabovica. The Trial Chamber notes that all these photograph depict houses situated on the right bank of Grabovica.
1232.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  13.
1233.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar '05, T. 12-13: Mustafa Kadic estimated that approximately 100 to 120 soldiers were sent to Herzegovina. Zakir Okovic estimated that less than a hundred soldiers travelled with him to Herzegovina, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 22. However, page 1 of Ex.  270, combat report of the 2nd Independent Battalion for 7 to 20 September 1993, reads that “a company of 125 soldiers was prepared for sending in the area of Herzegovina ”.
1234.Ex. 270, combat report of the 2nd Independent Battalion, p. 2; Erdin Arnautovic testified that when the 9th Brigade arrived, the 10th Brigade and Adnan Solakovic’s unit were already in the area, Erdin Arnautovic 14 Feb ’05, T. 32. Witness D testified that when the 9th Brigade arrived, the 2nd Independent Battalion, the Igman Wolves and the Handzar Division were in Grabovica, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 15. According to Mustafa Kadic, the 9th Brigade arrived a day later than the 2nd Independent Battalion, Mustafa Kadic, 9 Mar ’05, T. 88.
1235.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 51. According to Zakir Okovic, operations officer of the 2nd Independent Battalion, the battalion arrived in Grabovica in the morning of 8 September. This date is also mentioned in Ex. 270. However, the report states that a company of the battalion set of to Herzegovina, based on an order of Vahid Karavelic, the 1st Corps commander, dated 7 September 1993, Ex. 270, p. 1. The Trial Chamber has the order of Vahid Karavelic ordering the 2nd Independent Battalion to go to Herzegovina in evidence as Ex. 385. This order is dated 6 September. Ex. 270 shows that the battalion started going to Herzegovina on the same day that the order of Karavelic was issued. The Trial Chamber further notes that Zakir Okovic repeatedly testified that he was not certain about the exact dates, e.g. Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 18, 21, 40; and that Witness B and Witness C testified that the first soldiers arrived in Grabovica on 7 September at around 08:00 in the morning, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 9, 16; Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 17, 70. The Trial Chamber further notes that it heard evidence that the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived before the 9th Brigade, see supra fn 1332
1236.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24, 51. Adnan Solakovic, the Commander of the Battalion, arrived in Grabovica later on, ibid; Mustafa Kadic, 09 Mar '05, T. 91; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 60-61.
1237.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 23-24, 26, 51; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 36-38, 40; Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 14, 17.
1238.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24-26; Ex. 249, photograph of Grabovica, on which Witness E indicated with nr 4 where the command of the 2nd Independent Battalion was billeted, Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 36; see also Ex. 265, photograph of Grabovica, marked by Mustafa Kadic. Nr 2 indicates the house where the command was billeted, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 9. According to Mustafa Kadic, Adnan Solakovic, Samir Pezo, Haris Svrakic, nicknamed “Pilot” and possibly also Zakir Okovic and Jasmin Panjeta, nicknamed “Pike”, were billeted in the old railway station, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T.  15.
1239.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24, 26. Zakir Okovic marked the location of the old railway station and one of the houses in which soldiers were billeted on Ex. 271, Ex. 274 and Ex. 275, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24-26 and 16 Mar ’05, T. 4-7. According to Zakir Okovic, the third house was not visible on Ex. 271, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 26. The first house, where Mustafa Kadic and Witness E and about 30 other soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion stayed, was empty when they were billeted there, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 26; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 34; Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 3, 15. to Mustafa Kadic, the remainder of the 2nd Independent Battalion were accommodated in a second house, which was located uphill from where he was billeted, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 3, 18. He marked the house on Ex. 266, photograph of Grabovica, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Feb ’05, T. 16-18.
1240.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 25, 52.
1241.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 42; Mustafa Kadic, 9 Mar ’05, T. 91and 10 Mar ’05, T. 4, 25.
1242.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 41.
1243.As noted, Enes Sakrak was accommodated in the house of Dragica and Pero Maric and Erdin Arnautovic was accommodated in an empty house. Nedzad Mehanovic indicated on Ex. 177, photograph of Grabovica, that he and approximately 5 other soldiers stayed in the house of Andrija Dreznjak, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 45-49. Witness D indicated on Ex. 184 a total of 5 houses in which the 9th Motorised Brigade stayed, including the engineering unit, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 16-17.
1244.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 57.
1245.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T.  42-43. Enes Sakrak marked those two houses on Ex. 182, photograph of Grabovica, Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 94-95.
1246.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  61.
1247.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 43.
1248.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 36.
1249.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 43-44 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 24-25.
1250.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 45.
1251.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 45-46 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 26.
1252.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 37 and 15 Feb ’05, T. 13. According to Nedzad Mehanovic, members of Zulfikar Alispago’s unit directed the soldiers to the houses in the village, Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 104-105.
1253.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 37 and 15 Feb ’05, T. 13.
1254.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 39. According to Witness D, Erdin Arnautovic, Malco Rovcanin and Ramiz Delalic and another soldier spent one night in an abandoned house without a roof, Witness  D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 15-16, 61-62. Witness D testified that the abandoned house was the last empty house in the village and that it was dirty and had no electricity, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 62-63. Witness D marked the house with nr 1 on Ex. 184, photograph of Grabovica; Erdin Arnautovic marked the house he said he secured for himself with no. 2 on Ex. 170, photograph of Grabovica, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 46.
1255.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 76. Ramiz Delalic testified that he went to Grabovica, along with Zulfikar Alispago after he found out about the crimes, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 70-73. Ramiz Delalic testified that he was told about the crimes in the afternoon of 8 September, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 70-71. He further testified that the only information available at the time was that civilians in Grabovica had been killed in the course of the previous nighT. The Trial Chamber notes that it has been established that the killings in Grabovica did not occur before dusk on 8 September. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that Ramiz Delalic must have been mistaken about the date and in fact went to Grabovica on 9 September.
1256.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 47.
1257.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 47.
1258.Ahmed Kaliman, 22 Mar ’05, T. 101.
1259.Ahmed Kaliman, 22 Mar ’05, T. 97. Ahmed Kaliman testified that he could not clearly remember in which house he stayed, but that it was one of the houses which was marked with nr 2 or 3, or 3a on Ex. 78. Those houses are marked on the photograph as being that of Marjan Maric and Ilka Maric.
1260.Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 105 and 16 Feb ’05, T. 38, 45, Nedzad Mehanovic marked the location of the house on Ex. 177. On that photograph the house is marked as the house of Andrija Dreznjak.
1261.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  48. Vehbija Karic testified that the approximately 200-210 soldiers in Grabovica were soldiers from the 9th Brigade, half of the 10th Brigade and the 2nd Independent Battalion, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 50.
1262.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  48 and 02 Jun ’05, T. 7. Vehbija Karic stated during the deposition hearing that the troops from Sarajevo were billeted in Donja Grabovica. However, in his subsequent explanation of the location and the reasons behind the choice of location, he refers to the hydroelectric power plant in Grabovica, the fact that the Igman Wolves were billeted in Grabovica and to the prefabricated huts in which refugees had been housed. The Trial Chamber finds that Vehbija Karic can only have been referring to Grabovica, not to Donja Grabovica, which is located further south.
1263.Witness E, 07 Mar '05, T.  2; Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 94. Witness D testified that when his unit arrived in Grabovica, there were soldiers from the 2nd Independent Battalion, the Igman Wolves, the Zulfikar Detachment and the Handzar Division. He did not mention the 10th Brigade as being present in Grabovica. Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 15. Mustafa Kadic, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, testified that on the day the soldiers of the 9th Brigade arrived in Grabovica no other unit arrived there, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 20.
1264.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 9.
1265.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 79
1266.Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 90.
1267.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 82 and 22 Mar ’05, T. 90.
1268.Indictment, para. 8.
1269.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  14. According to Mustafa Kadic, there was no indication that anything bad was going to happen, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 19-20.
1270.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  17; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 17.
1271.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  17; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 17.
1272.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  51-52.
1273.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  7, 28-29; Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 25, 31. They kept the weapons and ammunition in the house, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 31.
1274.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 16-18; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 35.
1275.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 16-18.
1276.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  35.
1277.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  44.
1278.Witness B testified that soon after a group of soldiers arrived on 8 September, shooting started and did not stop for the whole day. The soldiers were entering the houses, mistreating people and stealing the livestock, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 16-18; Witness E testified that the atmosphere began to change in the afternoon, after the arrival of Ramiz Delalic’s unit. Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 2-3. However, when he heard the shooting and shouting, he thought the soldiers were just having a good time, and that it was “silly behaviour ”, Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 3, 29; see also Mustafa Kadic, 9 Mar ’05, T. 91 and 10 Mar ’05, T. 19. The Trial Chamber notes that according to Mustafa Kadic, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, the atmosphere changed after Ramiz Delalic himself had addressed the soldiers of the 9th Brigade in the morning after the brigade arrived in Grabovica, Mustafa Kadic, 09 Mar ’05, T. 92, 94 and 10 Mar ’05, T. 25. Witness C, who lived on the left bank in Grabovica, testified that when the soldiers arrived on 8 September 1993 shooting and celebrations could be heard from the right bank of the river, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 46.
1279.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 27.
1280.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 27-28.
1281.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 46.
1282.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  51-52.
1283.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  54.
1284.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16.
1285.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16.
1286.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16. For further information on Marinko Maric, see Section IV.D.7.(d)
1287.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  52-53.
1288.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 47-48.
1289.See infra Section IV.D.7.(a)
1290.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 5, 24.
1291.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 5.
1292.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 5.
1293.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 24.
1294.The Trial Chamber notes that Witness E on several occasions during his testimony was inconsistent. Witness E is the only Witness testifying as to a specific rape. As the case against the Accused does not concern any allegations of rape, the Trial Chamber will not make a finding on this particular part of the testimony of Witness E.
1295.In the evening, at around 21:00, Witness E went to pick tomatoes and peppers with another soldier of his Battalion. They were stopped by a soldier of the 9th Brigade who asked them what they were doing. Witness E noticed that inside the house next to where they were stopped there were soldiers and some distraught women. One woman, about 40 years of age, was crying, the sleeve of her sweater was torn and next to her was a soldier with his trousers down. The 9th Brigade soldier asked the two soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion to “join them.” Witness E thought that the soldier asked them to join in a rape and possible killing and refused to do so. When Witness E and the other member of the 2nd Independent Battalion left, the 9th Brigade soldier told them that they “hadn’t seen anything”, Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 3-4,4-5, 30, 43.
1296.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 83, Sefko Hodzic spoke with a member of the Igman Wolves on 11 September. That person told him that the persons committing the crimes in Grabovica also attacked four or five Bosnian Muslim women and tried to rape them; Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Zulfikar Alispago told him that a “refugee girl” had been raped, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 19. In the Official Note that Ahmed Salihamidzic compiled, he reported that he was told of the rape on 10 September of a refugee woman, Ex. 222, official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic. See also Ex. 221, Report to Jusuf Jasarevic, date illegible, pp. 2-3, in which it is stated that “a woman was raped and the rape of another woman was attempted on the left bank of the Neretva in the village where the refugees from Capljina are accommodated.”; Ex. 215, report by Namik Dzankovic, dated 13 September 1993, p. 2; Namik Dzankovic included the information that he received from the Jablanica SJB as to an alleged rape and an attempted rape in his report of 13 September. He learned that this woman would be interviewed and that a written statement would be taken, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 16-17 and Ex. 215, Report of Namik Dzankovic, dated 13 September, p. 1.
1297.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  7.
1298.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  8.
1299.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  2, 8. Sefko Hodzic testified that a member of the Igman Wolves told him that the soldiers had been under the influence of drugs and alcohol when they committed the crimes, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 83. Enes Sakrak however testified that neither he, nor Kagaric or Rajkic had taken drugs or alcohol at the time they killed the members of the Zadro family, Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 35. For a description on this crime, see Section IV.D.7.(f).
1300.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 12-13. Witness E heard screaming and shooting throughout the night as well, Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 8, 55.
1301.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  53.
1302.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 12. Witness E heard shooting and screams from the village in the night of 8 September, Witness E, 7 Mar ’05, T. 55.
1303.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  64; Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 33. Nedzad Mehanovic testified that he had gone to Jablanica with Haris Salihovic and spent the nights of 8 and 9 September at the Hotel Jablanica, Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 106-107 and 16 Feb ’05, T. 61, 93. In his statement to the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo on 12 January 1999, Nedzad Mehanovic had stated that he spent the night of 8 September as well as the following night in Grabovica, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 67. During his testimony before the Tribunal, he denied having stated this, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 67.
1304.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  19, 64. Witness D said that, after cleaning the house in which he was billeted, he went across the street. At that house, there were an elderly man, four Bosnian Muslim refugees and a few soldiers of the 9th Brigade. The group “were sitting at a table having coffee and having a laugh”. According to Witness D, the soldiers of the 9th Brigade at that house got a sheep to eat from the elderly man. After this meal Witness D returned to his house to continue cleaning, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 18.
1305.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 63. See also Section IV.C.6.(h).(ii) on this meeting in Konjic.
1306.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 66. Zakir Okovic then went to bed, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 66-67. The Trial Chamber recalls its earlier finding that Zakir Okovic throughout his testimony was uncertain of the exact dates and may have been mistaken on that issue. For this reason, the Trial Chamber will not rely on his testimony insofar as it concerns the date of the events he described without corroboration through other sources.
1307.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 43.
1308.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 43.
1309.See supra Section II, para. 17.
1310.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 15-16. Ahmed Salihamidzic was told of this later, when he interviewed the guard.
1311.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 16.
1312.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 53-54; Katica Miletic, 9 Feb ’05, T. 14. At around 09:00, one bullet passed over the house of Katica Miletic, Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 15.
1313.Enes Sakrak is not completely certain about the first name of Karagic. He stated that the name is either Sead or Sejo Karagic, Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 93. For the purposes of this judgement, the Trial Chamber will use the name Sead. The Trial Chamber notes that Enes Sakrak was speaking about one person only and that the Trial Chamber has not been furnished with evidence that another member of the 9th Brigade had an identical or similar name.
1314.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 54.
1315.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 54. According to Enes Sakrak, this is not the kind of order that Nihad Vlahovljak would have given on his own accord, Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 54 and 18 Feb 05, T. 82.
1316.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 83.
1317.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 55.
1318.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 55.
1319.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 55.
1320.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 55-56. Enes Sakrak does not know for certain that these soldiers actually took part in any killing in the village, Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 42.
1321.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 57. The Trial Chamber, based on the evidence presented, in particular Ex. 89, on which the house of the Zadro family is marked with nr. 1 and the railway station is marked with nr. 3, finds that Enes Sakrak and the two other soldiers were walking along the new railroad in Grabovica.
1322.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 58-59.
1323.See infra Section IV.D.7.(f).
1324.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 67 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 36. Enes Sakrak marked the location of the house where they saw Habib Alic on Ex. 179, photograph of Grabovica, Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T.  76.
1325.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 36.
1326.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 36.
1327.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  18, 55.
1328.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  18, 55; Ex. 215, Report by Namik Dzankovic, dated 13 September 1993, p. 2. The Trial Chamber notes that Franjo Ravlic and Edib Saric lived on the left bank of Grabovica, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 18, 55; Ex. 82, photograph of left bank in Grabovica. For a description of the circumstances of the disappearance of Franjo Ravlic and Edib Saric, see infra Section IV.D.7.(d).
1329.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  19.
1330.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  19.
1331.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  20. Witness C testified that this soldier was a member of the ‘Tigers’, Witness  C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 75.
1332.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  20. The soldier did not tell her who had given the order to kill her, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 76.
1333.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  75.
1334.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  76.
1335.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 20.
1336.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  20.
1337.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  19.
1338.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  19.
1339.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  22. Witness C said that this livestock was brought by soldiers who had arrived 20 days before, ibid.
1340.Saban Neziric did not remember the exact date, but stated that he worked with Alija Turkic the night he heard shots, Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p. 2. Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Alija Turkic worked at the power plant in Grabovica during the night of 8 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 15.
1341.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  2.
1342.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 38 and Ex. 267, p. 2.
1343.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 37-38, 47.
1344.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 38. The Trial Chamber notes that Zakir Okovic testified that he went on reconnaissance missions with Zulfikar Alispago twice during the relevant period. Both times, Zakir Okovic was collected from the old railway station in Grabovica by Zulfikar Alispago early in the morning, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 31, 40, 67-68.
1345.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 48 and Ex. 267, p. 2.
1346.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 48.
1347.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 48.
1348.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 49.
1349.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 49-50.
1350.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 38-39, 50-51.
1351.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  3.
1352.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  4.
1353.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  4.
1354.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  9, 55.
1355.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  9.
1356.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  9, 13, 51.
1357.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  10.
1358.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  10-11. Witness E marked the location of all the bodies he saw on Ex. 247, photograph of Grabovica, Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 22-23.
1359.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  10.
1360.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  10.
1361.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  11.
1362.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  11-12. See supra para. 401
1363.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  55.
1364.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  12, 56.
1365.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, pp. 3-4. The Trial Chamber notes that in light of the evidence on the location of the bodies and the evidence that on 9 September, bodies of dead villagers were removed from Grabovica, the events Ahmed Kaliman is describing in this part of his statement, must have happened on 9 September.
1366.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, p.  3. The other soldier was Suad Ceranic, ibid.
1367.Ahmed Kaliman, 22 Mar ’05, T. 102. Ahmed Kaliman marked the location of the bodies on Ex. 287, photograph of Grabovica, Ahmed Kaliman, 22 Mar ’05, T. 98-100.
1368.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 15.
1369.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 14-15.
1370.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 15.
1371.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 15.
1372.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 10, 12, 15-16; According to Katica Miletic, all soldiers in the village had a rifle over their shoulder; “they wouldn’t be a soldier without a weapon,” Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 12.
1373.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 16. Katica Miletic gave them 500 German Marks, Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 17.
1374.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 22-23.
1375.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 18, 48.
1376.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 18, 48.
1377.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 17-18, 41.
1378.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 17, 42.
1379.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 43.
1380.See infra Section IV.D.7.(h).
1381.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  70 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 87; Witness C, 10 Feb’05, T. 58.
1382.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  71; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 96; Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic on the events in Grabovica on 8, 9 and 10 September.
1383.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 97 and 18 Mar ’05, T. 3, 36.
1384.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 36. Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that when they arrived at the old railway station, they were stopped at an improvised checkpoint. He and Sead Kurt showed their identification and were allowed to continue, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 4. Namik Dzankovic also mentioned this information in his report of 13 September, saying that the units from Sarajevo had set up an improvised checkpoint at the entrance of the village, where they exercised control over people entering and leaving the village. He further mentioned that Ahmed Salihamidzic and Sead Kurt were asked to show their credentials, upon which they were allowed into Grabovica, Ex. 215, Report by Namik Dzankovic, dated 13 September, p. 1.
1385.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 9.
1386.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 5.
1387.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 7.
1388.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 7; Ex. 215, Report by Namik Dzankovic, dated 13 September, p. 1.
1389.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 7.
1390.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 7.
1391.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 10.
1392.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 10.
1393.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 9-10.
1394.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 10, 34-35; Ex. 279, photograph marked by Ahmed Salihamidzic.
1395.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 38.
1396.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 11, 35, 40.
1397.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 11.
1398.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 11. Ramiz Delalic testified that he did not see a police car in Grabovica on that day, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 74.
1399.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 11.
1400.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 11.
1401.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 73.
1402.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74; 19 May ’05, T. 77.
1403.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74; 19 May ’05, T. 77. Ramiz Delalic could not be sure of the number of bodies, because bushes obstructed his view, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 77. They did not see any other bodies while in Grabovica, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 78.
1404.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74 and 19 May ’05, T. 77.
1405.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74, 76 and 18 May ’05, T. 13.
1406.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 11.
1407.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  13
1408.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  13, 57; Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. T. 4, 24, 30. Mustafa Kadic testified that because of rising tensions, all non-Muslim soldiers were ordered to come to stay at the command of the 2nd Independent Battalion, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 24. Zakir Okovic testified that this happened some time on 10 September, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 33, 72-73. However, by that time, most of the soldiers had already moved out towards Dreznica, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 73.
1409.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 24, 29; Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 13.
1410.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  35-36, 42.
1411.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  36.
1412.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  36. The Trial Chamber notes that Namik Dzankovic wrote in his report of 29 September 1993 that Ivan and Stoja Pranjic were evacuated by members of the 2nd Independent Battalion, Ex. 235, report by Namik Dzankovic, dated 29 September, p. 1.
1413.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 71. He testified that he did not see anyone, but that this did not mean that there were no living Bosnian Croats left, ibid. Erdin Arnautovic testified that when he was in Grabovica on 11 September, there were no more villagers left in Grabovica ; “it was as if everyone had vanished”, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 67.
1414.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  21, 55; Saban Neziric, 10 Mar ’05, T. 48; see also Ex. 222, Official Note, p. 2.
1415.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  55. These two soldiers were Serb soldiers in the ABiH. Witness C did not know them personally, but knew that they were Serbs who had joined the ABiH. She saw them assisting in the evacuation of the villagers, ibid. The bedridden were carried on blankets, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 23
1416.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  23. See also Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 49 and Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 66-67.
1417.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  57-58, 73. The truck had a big cat depicted on its side, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 58.
1418.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  22.
1419.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  58.
1420.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  23, 63.
1421.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  23. The circumstances of Ilka Miletic’s death will be discussed below in Section IV.D.7(h).
1422.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  66. In his Official Note, Ahmed Salihamidzic wrote that the civilians were brought to the museum in Jablanica, see Ex. 222, Official Note, p. 2.
1423.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  66. Witness C recalled seeing Ruza Pranjic, Stojan Pranjic, Mira Pranjic and her husband, and Matija Miletic, ibid. She further testified that there were a few men in the cellars of the camp “They were treated as soldiers, but they weren’t. They were civilians”, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 65.
1424.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  66. The total amount of people in the camp eventually was about 300, which included people from other villages, who had arrived later on, ibid. Ex. 221, Report to Jusuf Jasarevic, date illegible, p. 2 states that in total 14 adult villagers and two children were evacuated and accommodated in Jablanica; see also Ex. 226, report from Nermin Eminovic, dated 17 September, reporting that 14 adult villagers and two children were evacuated and accommodated in Jablanica.
1425.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 19. Katica Miletic was unable to say if the people were soldiers of police. She testified that they “had multi-coloured clothes,” Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 47. Witness C testified that Katica Miletic had received a lift somewhere on the way to Jablanica, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 65. Ahmed Salihamidzic and Sead Kurt dropped off three people they had picked up on their way back from Grabovica. However, they dropped them off at the house of a relative of theirs in Jablanica, and not in the camp, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 41-42.
1426.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 54. He saw people around on the road towards Jablanica, but could not tell if these Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslim or former camp detainees, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 47.
1427.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 16, 77. This alleged visit to Grabovica by Sefer Halilovic and Vehbija Karic will be discussed in Section IV.D.9.(b)
1428.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 86. Nedzad Mehanovic testified that he spent the night of 8 September and the night of 9 September in Jablanica, Nedzad Mehanovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 107 and 16 Feb ’05, T. 16, 93.
1429.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 96. Upon his return on 10 September, Nedzad Mehanovic did not see any bodies in Grabovica, although he did see some blood in a puddle in the road which “you could hardly notice,” Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 17, 40.
1430.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  102-103 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 15.
1431.The Trial Chamber notes that Witness D was not certain about dates and testified that Pero Maric was killed on 9 September 1993, and that he saw the bodies on 10 September, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 28, 76, 94, 102. The evidence presented to the Trial Chamber establishes that Pero Maric was killed on 8 September, see infra Section IV.5.(a).
1432.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 30, 94-95 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 15, 38. Witness D marked the location of the bodies on Ex. 186, photograph of Grabovica, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 94-95.
1433.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  30.
1434.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  30.
1435.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  32, 95 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 16, 38. At an earlier interview, Witness D stated he only saw one body., Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 96-97 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 16-17, 33, 52.
1436.Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T.  101. Witness D testified that some of them even took pride in having seen what happened, because they themselves were looking for revenge for what had happened to their families, Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 102. Witness D further testified that two soldiers confessed to the killing of four people. One of those soldiers was Mustafa Hota, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 30.
1437.Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T.  46-47.
1438.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  30-31 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 48. Witness D’s testimony is unclear on the time of arrival of Zulfikar Alispago. Initially, he testified that Zulfikar Alispago arrived at 15:00, while later during his testimony, he testified that Zulfikar Alispago arrived at around noon, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 31 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 48.
1439.Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T.  47.
1440.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T.  38.
1441.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 70-71, 89-90.
1442.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 35, 42; Ex. 272, coded message addressed to Commander of the 1st Corps. According to Zakir Okovic, the message was sent by the afternoon of 10 September, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 39-40, 91. Before this message was sent, Zakir Okovic had learned of the killings. Upon his return to the old railway station, he found Adnan Solakovic, Samir Pezo, Musan Topalovic and some of his men at the command. On that night, Zakir Okovic was told about the killings by “some of the men who were in the house on the other side”, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 40-41. The Trial Chamber notes that Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that on 9 September, he spoke with Adnan Solakovic about the killings in Grabovica, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 5. The Trial Chamber further notes that Zakir Okovic was not certain about exact dates. The Trial Chamber further notes that on the message, the following text is handwritten “11.9.93. 1700 hours FR3878 Conveyed to “Holivud” /Hollywood/” The Trial Chamber finds that this evidence is insufficiently clear to establish a date on which the message was actually sent to Vahid Karavelic. See also Section IV.C, para. 304.
1443.Ex. 272, coded message addressed to Commander of the 1st Corps.
1444.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 36.
1445.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 36. By that time, the command had already heard about the 5 to 6 bodies being found, ibid.
1446.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 37.
1447.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 37.
1448.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 37, 77.
1449.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 69-73. Vahid Karavelic testified that he spoke with Adnan Solakovic via a Motorola, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 69-70.
1450.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 75. See Ex. 388, request from Vahid Karavelic to Sefer Halilovic, dated 12 September 1993, requesting that the troops be sent back to Sarajevo, and if not all troops could be sent back, that at least the members of the 2nd Independent Battalion be sent back to Sarajevo. Vahid Karavelic testified that he only heard about the events in Grabovica much later following the return of the units from the Neretva river valley, Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 91-92. The Trial Chamber notes that Ramiz Delalic, referring to Ex. 388, testified that on 12 September the 1st Corps commander and the Supreme Command already knew about the crimes and that the 1st Corps commander ordered that the units should return to Sarajevo in order to question the men, but that the order was not carried out, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 15-16. The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence shows that Rasim Delic was informed about the crimes on 12 September, see infra Section IV.F, para. 680. However, the Trial Chamber has not been presented with evidence which clearly establishes when Vahid Karavelic was informed about the events in Grabovica.
1451.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 91-92.
1452.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 16-17.
1453.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 16-17.
1454.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 16.
1455.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 16-17; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 56.
1456.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 17.
1457.Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 85.
1458.Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 85.
1459.Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 85.
1460.Namik Dzankovic testified that he went to Zulfikar Alispago’s flat either the night of the killings or the following night, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 22. In light of the evidence presented as to the visit of several people to the apartment of Zulfikar Alispago, the Trial chamber finds that Namik Dzankovic went there on 10 September.
1461.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 23 and 22 Mar ’05, T. 13.
1462.Ex. 222, Official note of Ahmed Salihamidzic, compiled on 11 September, p. 3. The information available to Ahmed Salihamidzic was that the members of the 9th Brigade asked Ivica for his identity papers and found out that Ivica was a Bosnian Croat. The members of the 9th Brigade then slit Ivica’s throat and threw his body into the Neretva River, ibid. See also Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ‘05, T. 16-17; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 56.
1463.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 36; Ex. 215, report by Namik Dzankovic to Jusuf Jasarevic.
1464.Ex. 215, report by Namik Dzankovic to Jusuf Jasarevic, p. 2. This report further contained the information that Namik Dzankovic had gathered in the course of his investigation into the events in Grabovica.
1465.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 33, 69, 75.
1466.Erdin Arnautovic testified that on 10 September, he and Ramiz Delalic brought two boys, who had survived the killing of the Zadro family to the base of the Zulfikar Detachment. When he returned to Grabovica, Erdin Arnautovic found that an additional checkpoint had been set up near the bridge on the road from Grabovica to Jablanica, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60, 62-63; Ramiz Delalic also testified that Zulfikar Alispago set up a checkpoint right after the killings, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 2-3; Witness  D testified that Zulfikar Alispago arrived in the afternoon of 10 September and set up a checkpoint in front of the houses, one at the entry of Grabovica and one checkpoint at the exit of Grabovica, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 31 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 48, 50. Witness D marked the location of the checkpoints on Ex. 191, photograph of Grabovica, Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 55-56. Nedzad Mehanovic did not see a checkpoint on the day after the killings, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 48. The Trial Chamber recalls that Nedzad Mehanovic returned to Grabovica in the afternoon of 10 September, after the two boys of the Zadro family had already been found.
1467.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 63; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 31 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 105. According to Witness  D, each checkpoint was manned by two of Zulfikar Alispago’s men, ibid.
1468.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 2. Ramiz Delalic testified that “immediately after the crime in Grabovica, an order was issued. Mr Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago issued the order to set up a checkpoint somewhere at the bridge, because those who managed to flee the massacre had already reached Jablanica and the information was already out about the crime.”
1469.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 64 and 15 Feb ’05, T. 70. According to Erdin Arnautovic, the purpose of the checkpoints was to close off all access to Grabovica, to prevent anyone from going in or out because some international press team protected by the UNPROFOR attempted to reach Grabovica. According to Ramiz Delalic, the reason for the checkpoint was that the villagers who had escaped had reached Jablanica and that the news had become known to the international journalists. The soldiers at the checkpoint were to prevent journalists, police and UNPROFOR from entering Grabovica, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 2, 7-8.
1470.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 64.
1471.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  31and 22 Feb ’05, T. 48.
1472.See, e.g., Witness  C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 26, 28, 35.
1473.Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 47-48. Namik Dzankovic testified that this checkpoint was located just outside Donja Jablanica.
1474.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 30-31.
1475.Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 47-48.
1476.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 33.
1477.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 67.
1478.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  14, 17. See supra para. 305.
1479.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 6.
1480.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 6.
1481.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 6.
1482.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 6-7. Mustafa Kadic marked the location of the two bodies on Ex. 265, photograph of Grabovica, Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 9-10.
1483.Mustafa Kadic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 7-8.
1484.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 16. According to Ahmed Kaliman, the soldiers were lined-up on the second day of their stay in Grabovica, ibid. According to Nedzad Mehanovic, the 9th Brigade went into battle at around 23:00 on 10 September, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 18. Erdin Arnautovic testified that the “fighting men” left Grabovica on the night of 10 September, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 66. According to Ramiz Delalic, the offensive started a few days after the events in Grabovica, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 21. Ramiz Delalic does not specify a date as to when the 9th Brigade went into battle. He further testified that the offensive lasted until the 21st or 22nd of September, upon which the troops returned to Sarajevo, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 21. According to Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Brigade, most of the troops who had been accommodated in Grabovica, left for combat in the morning of 10 September, Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 42.
1485.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 16.
1486.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 16. Erdin Arnautovic testified that he went to Grabovica on 11 September, because there were some soldiers there that might have needed logistical support, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 66.
1487.Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 17. Ahmed Kaliman thinks that the other soldiers returned from battle on the same night, ibid.
1488.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 18. The Trial Chamber notes that Nedzad Mehanovic testified that the village was called “Vrda.” However, in light of the evidence on combat operations in the area of Vrdi and the fact that the village of Vrdi is in the immediate vicinity of Grabovica (see Ex. 131, map), the Trial Chamber finds that the Witness  must have been referring to Vrdi village. Nedzad Mehanovic testified that he did not return to Grabovica, but continued to the Medved Mount, from where the soldiers returned to Sarajevo, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 19. Ahmed Kaliman testified that the soldiers of the 9th Brigade all returned together to Sarajevo. He did not testify as to whether the soldiers who had gone into battle actually returned to Grabovica, Ahmed Kaliman, 22 Mar ’05, T. 106. For the evidence as to when the troops returned to Sarajevo, see supra Section IV.C.7.
1489.Prosecution’s submission of Proofing Chart, filed confidentially on 17 June 2005, p. 32.
1490.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 236.
1491.The Trial Chamber heard the following evidence as to the murder of Cvitan Lovric and Jela Lovric. In September 1993, Cvitan and Jela Lovric lived in Copi, a village about 4 kilometres from Grabovica, Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 76; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 30-31. Witness C saw the couple about twelve days before the events in Grabovica, Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 31. Witness B last saw the couple in May 1993, Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 39, 77. Witness C was told in the camp in Jablanica that Cvitan and Jela Lovric were killed and that when soldiers left the house it was burned, Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 31. However, Witness C heard that they were killed later in 1993, possibly around 15 September 1993, Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 31, 37. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness C is unclear on the exact time of death of Cvitan and Jela Lovric. However, she is clear in her testimony that the pair was killed after the events in Grabovica on 8 and 9 September. Cvitan and Jela Lovric were not seen again, Witness  C, 10 Feb '05, T. 31; Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 77.
1492.The Trial Chamber heard the following evidence as to the alleged murders of Marko Maric and Matija Maric. Marko and Matija Maric lived in Kremenac, about one kilometre south of Grabovica, Witness  B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 45, 74. Marko Maric was an old man, in bad health. He was last seen by Witness B in July 1993. Marko Maric’s body was never found. Witness B heard rumours that the couple had been killed a month after the killings in Grabovica. The body of Matija Maric was found and was then buried in Mostar. Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 74-75.
1493.The evidence presented to the Trial Chamber as to the death of Ruza Mandic is as follows. Ruza Mandic was born in 1935, Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 1. The body of Ruza Maric taken to Split for autopsy, together with other bodies of villagers from Grabovica, Marija Definis -Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 6-7 and Ex. 167, p. 2. The body of Ruza Maric was identified by a family member, Ante Maric, who recognised the clothes and a wristwatch and some jewellery as being Ruza Maric’s belongings, Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 2. Dr. Simun Andjelinovic, a colleague of Dr. Marija Definis-Gojanovic, performed the autopsy, Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 1; Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 3. The cause of death of Ruza Maric could not be established, Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 2. According to Marija Definis-Gojanovic, it was not possible to identify a specific time of death. It could only be established that Ruza Maric had been dead for at least some months, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 20.
1494.The Trial Chamber heard the following evidence as to the alleged killing of Jozo Istuk. In 1993, Jozo Istuk lived in Ominje Dreznica, near Dreznica and south of Copi, Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 41, 76. Witness B heard that Jozo Istuk was killed in July 1993, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 76; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 37. Jozo Istuk is buried at the cemetery in Copi, Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 76.
1495.See supra Section IV.D.2-3.
1496.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  15; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 4; Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 24; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 69; Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 40; Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 41.
1497.Defence Final Brief, para.  91.
1498.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  9, 87.
1499.See supra paras 382 -383
1500.See supra paras 398 and 407.
1501.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 45.
1502.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 45; Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T. 28.
1503.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 46 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 26.
1504.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 46-47.
1505.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 46.
1506.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 47.
1507.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 47; Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T. 28.
1508.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 48 and 18 Feb '05, T. 29-30.
1509.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 47.
1510.In its Final Brief, the Defence has argued that Mustafa Hota only formally became a member of the 9th Brigade on 15 September, and therefore at the time of the killing was not yet a member of the 9th Brigade, Defence Final Brief, para. 77. However, later in its Final Brief, the Defence stated: “only four members of the 9th Brigade were identified as perpetrators : […] and Hota.” See Defence Final Brief, para. 93. The Trial Chamber notes that the Defence did not allege that Mustafa Hota in actual fact was not a member of the 9th Brigade, nor does the Trial Chamber find that the evidence could support such a finding.
1511.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb '05, T. 31-32.
1512.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 48-49.
1513.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 49, 52.
1514.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 50.
1515.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 32.
1516.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 50.
1517.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 50-51.
1518.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 52.
1519.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 52.
1520.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 52-53.
1521.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 53.
1522.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 53.
1523.Witness D testified that were sitting at a table outside the house of Pero Maric, some time between 18:00 and 19:00 Witness D testified that a group of about six to ten soldiers had been sitting at the table with Nihad Vlahovljak, a company Commander of the 9th Brigade, for about one hour before another soldier, carrying an automatic rifle, arrived. Witness  D further testified that about ten minutes after Pero Maric was killed, Witness  D returned to the house in which he was billeted, at around 19:00, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 28-29, 77, 79. The soldier entered Pero Maric’s house. According to Witness D, about twenty seconds later, Pero Maric was killed by that soldier in the corridor of the house, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 28-29, 80. Dragica Maric, who had been in a room in the house, started screaming and was killed as well, Witness  D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 29. According to Witness D, when the soldier left Pero Maric’s house, Nihad Vlahovljak asked the soldier if he was crazy and was told that he should not say anything or he would be killed too, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 29. After the soldier left, Nihad Vlahovljak went inside the house, and when he returned told the soldiers at the table that “the madman killed both the man and the woman”, Witness  D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 83.
1524.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 69-70.
1525.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 66.
1526.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 70.
1527.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 70-71 and 18 Feb '05, T. 40.
1528.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 57, 74. On 20 May 1994, the Firule hospital in Split received a number of bodies from Grabovica, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 2. Dr. Marija Definis-Gojanovic and Dr. Simun Andjelinovic performed autopsies on the bodies in order to establish the identity of the victims, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 7, 11 and Ex. 167, p. 2. It was required by law that a cause of death be noted in the autopsy report, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 11 and Ex. 167, p. 2. The bodies were in an advanced state of decomposition. It was very difficult to establish the exact time of death, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 16. The pathologist was able to determine that all bodies which were examined on 23 May 1994 could have died either on the same date or close to the same date, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 6. The Trial Chamber has been provided with 13 autopsy reports, identifying ten of the victims listed in the Indictment, Ex. 166, autopsy reports. The Trial Chamber notes that the autopsy which is described in the report numbered 240/94 was performed on 26 June 1994. Dr. Definis-Gojanovic testified that the term “violent death of unknown cause” in the autopsy report does not form the diagnosis of the cause of death. However, the term was used “because we were talking about casualties, victims of war, and it was assumed that each one of them died a violent death.” Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 21. See also Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 6, in which it is explained that the term “violent death of unknown cause” was used and assumed “based on the information received and on their victim’s status of having died in a war zone during hostilities.”
1529.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 3; Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 57, 74.
1530.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 57, 74; Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 20-21. The bodies of Pero and Dragica Maric were in an advanced state of decomposition at the time of the autopsies.
1531.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  79-80; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 31, 35; Ex. 80, photograph of Grabovica.
1532.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 69; Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T. 30.
1533.Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T.  29-30.
1534.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  35; Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 78-79. Witness B testified that they lived in Grabovica in the beginning of September 1993, Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 38. Witness C testified that they had moved to Grabovica two weeks before they were killed, Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 29.
1535.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  31; Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 79.
1536.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  79. Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 31.
1537.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  35.
1538.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  33, 35.
1539.Witness C, 10 Feb 05, T. 17.
1540.Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T.  29, 56-57. Witness A in prior statements has stated that he saw more dead people at the Brekalo house apart from Josip Brekalo. When confronted with his prior statements Witness A stated that he only testified before the Tribunal insofar as he recalls the events.
1541.Witness A, 01 Feb '05, T.  29.
1542.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  30, 35.
1543.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 69; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 30; Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 38-39, 80.
1544.The Trial Chamber notes that there are indications that the soldiers who killed the villagers of Grabovica were members of the 9th Brigade. However, the Trial Chamber finds that these indications are insufficient for a general finding that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators of all killings were members of that Brigade.
1545.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  82.
1546.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  79; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 5.
1547.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  82.
1548.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  79-80. See also Ex. 78, photograph of Grabovica.
1549.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  81.
1550.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 9. According to Ahmed Salihamidzic, Martin Maric was bedridden, ibid.
1551.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  79.
1552.See supra paras 414 and 418 
1553.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 13-14.
1554.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 13-14.
1555.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 14.
1556.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 14.
1557.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 5, 14. The Trial Chamber notes that Ahmed Salihamidzic used the name “Ruzica ” for Ruza Maric. However, as he indicated that his account concerned the daughter of Ilka Maric, the Trial Chamber finds that Ruza and Ruzica Maric are the same person.
1558.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 9.
1559.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  80.
1560.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16.
1561.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16.
1562.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16.
1563.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  14, 64.
1564.Witness C testified that Marinko Maric, “his wife, and his father and mother were killed.” The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution has not alleged that the mother of Marinko Maric was in fact killed during the events in Grabovica in September 1993.
1565.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  16-17.
1566.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 4, 5.
1567.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 6.
1568.Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic, p. 1.
1569.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 6; Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic, p. 1.
1570.Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic, p. 1.
1571.Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic, p. 1. The Trial Chamber notes that the houses of the Maric families were located in the same direction as the houses where the 9th Brigade were billeted, see Ex. 249, photograph of Grabovica, marked by a witness.
1572.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar '05, T. 10; Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic, p. 1.
1573.Ex. 247, photograph marked by Witness E; Ex. 279, photograph marked by Ahmed Salihamidzic. See para.  410
1574.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  17.
1575.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 84-86.
1576.Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 85. Dr. Marija Definis-Gojanovic stated that the daughter-in-law of Martin Maric identified the body by the nails on the left foot, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex.  167, p. 4.
1577.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 84-86.
1578.The Trial Chamber notes that there are indications that the soldiers who killed the villagers of Grabovica were members of the 9th Brigade. However, the Trial Chamber finds that these indications are insufficient for a general finding that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators of all killings were members of that Brigade.
1579.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  77, 80.
1580.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  77, 80-81.
1581.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  34.
1582.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  34.
1583.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  18, 55. See also para. 407.
1584.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  18, 55.
1585.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  34.
1586.See supra para. 418.
1587.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 39.
1588.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 14.
1589.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 38.
1590.The Trial Chamber recalls that Grabovica belongs to the Dreznica commune, Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 45; Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 42. See also supra para 373.
1591.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  78; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 34.
1592.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  80, 91-92.
1593.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  35.
1594.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 31, 44.
1595.Ex. 79, marked photograph of Grabovica.
1596.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  18-19. The soldiers arrived at around 09:00, ibid.
1597.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  18.
1598.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  19, 67.
1599.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  20.
1600.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  21.
1601.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  21.
1602.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  68.
1603.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  20-21,69, 93-94.
1604.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  22.
1605.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  22-23.
1606.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 32, 45.
1607.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 3.
1608.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 16-17 and Ex. 167, p. 3; Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 32;
1609.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 3.
1610.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 20 and Ex. 167, p. 3; Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 45.
1611.The Trial Chamber notes that there are indications that the soldiers who killed the villagers of Grabovica were members of the 9th Brigade. However, the Trial Chamber finds that these indications are insufficient for a general finding that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators of all killings were members of that Brigade.
1612.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  21; see Ex. 180, photograph, Enes Sakrak marked with number 2 the Zadro house, Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 78; see also Ex. 22 and Ex. 84, photographs of the Zadro house.
1613.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 58.
1614.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 36, 54, 57, 63; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 18.
1615.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 58-59; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 18; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 83.
1616.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  18-19.
1617.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  19.
1618.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 59.
1619.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 59.
1620.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 59.
1621.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 59.
1622.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 59-60. At the time of the killing, Mladen Zadro was dressed in civilian clothes and was not carrying a weapon, Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 64.
1623.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 60.
1624.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 60.
1625.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 61.
1626.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 61.
1627.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 61-62. Ahmed Kaliman stated that in 2000, Haris Raijkic told him that he had seen Enes Sakrak shooting a woman and her child, Ahmed Kaliman, Ex. 285, para. 18.
1628.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 62.
1629.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 63; Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 20.
1630.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  20.
1631.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  28.
1632.One of the soldiers was called “Rambo”, Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 40.
1633.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  39; see Ex. 25, photograph of the area where, according to Witness A, the two children were found, Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T. 39.
1634.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  39; Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 85.
1635.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  40.
1636.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  40.
1637.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 85; Witness A, 01 Feb’05, T. 40-41/
1638.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  41.
1639.Ex. 166, autopsy report, pp. 21, 67-69.
1640.Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 21; Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb '05, T. 15-16.
1641.Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 85. Initially it was believed that this concerned the body of Martin Maric. However, upon further inspection, the pathologist found traces of burns on the right upper arm “indicating that the arm is charred”. Based on the fact that the fabric surrounding the arm matched the fabric worn by Ivan Zadro, whose body was missing the right arm, it was concluded that this was in fact the right upper arm of Ivan Zadro.
1642.Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 68.
1643.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  48.
1644.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  36; Ex. 235, Report of ABiH Security Service, 29 September 1995, listing the inhabitants of Grabovica; Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 50.
1645.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  36, 54.
1646.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  42. Witness B noted that the situation at that moment was still calm, but tense; Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 84.
1647.Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T.  83-84.
1648.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  36.
1649.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  42; see supra fn 1527
1650.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  42; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 36; Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 3.
1651.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 20; Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 51. The pathologist found that the skull of Dragica Dreznjak was fractured. However, it was impossible to determine what caused the fracture; Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 3.
1652.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 20.
1653.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  42; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 36.
1654.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 20.
1655.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  39, 40; Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 15.
1656.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  24.
1657.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  39.
1658.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 19-20, 36.
1659.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 15.
1660.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  24, 63.
1661.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  24.
1662.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  24, 63-64.
1663.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26.
1664.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26.
1665.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26.
1666.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1667.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26. Witness C’s sister has since died, ibid.
1668.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26-27.
1669.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26.
1670.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26, 27.
1671.The Trial Chamber notes that Katica Miletic testified that she saw Ilka Miletic at around 10:00 and that she subsequently went home. Katica Miletic did not specify when the soldiers who came to her house told her to leave and when exactly she, her brother and her sister- in-law went to Jablanica, Katica Miletic, 09 Feb ’05, T. 15-16.
1672.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 17.
1673.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 17-18.
1674.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 19.
1675.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 19, 33.
1676.Katica Miletic,09 Feb '05, T. 35.
1677.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 48-49.
1678.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 37.
1679.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 36.
1680.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 19.
1681.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 35.
1682.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1683.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  22, 23.
1684.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  23.
1685.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  23.
1686.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  25, 63.
1687.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  23.
1688.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  25.
1689.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  25.
1690.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  27. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness C did not state whether or not these acquaintances were soldiers. She testified that “two guards came who had been on duty at the dam, our acquaintances from Jablanica”, ibid.
1691.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  27.
1692.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  27-28.
1693.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  28.
1694.Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T.  28. Witness C was present in Split, when the daughters identified Ivan Mandic, ibid.
1695.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  28
1696.Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb '05, T. 8.
1697.Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 88. The report states that the photographs partially correspond to the case. Marija Definis-Gojanovic testified that she cannot remember why she used the word “partially ” but thinks she probably used that word because the photographs depict more than is evident from the report, Marija Definis-Gojanovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 17.
1698.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  28
1699.Katica Miletic, 09 Feb '05, T. 26. Witness B testified that he last saw Katica Miletic at the end of August 1993 and does not know what happened to her after that date. Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T. 82.
1700.The Trial Chamber notes that there are indications that the soldiers who killed the villagers of Grabovica were members of the 9th Brigade. However, the Trial Chamber finds that these indications are insufficient for a general finding that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators of all killings were members of that Brigade.
1701.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  39; Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T. 22; Ex. 82, photograph of Grabovica. According to Witness B, Mara Mandic lived next door to Ivan Mandic. Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  39.
1702.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  22, 59.
1703.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  25. Witness C testified that she was approached by the soldier ten minutes before she left for Jablanica. She could not clearly state the time of the evacuation, saying first that the truck arrived around 17:00 (Witness C, 10 Feb 05, T. 22), while in cross-examination, she said that she may also have left for Jablanica at around 15:30, Witness C, 10 Feb ’05, T. 58.
1704.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  25, 59.
1705.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  22, 26, 59.
1706.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  60.
1707.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  60-61.
1708.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  61-62.
1709.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26. Witness C heard this from the husband of the Bosnian Muslim woman who saw allegedly that Mara Mandic was killed, ibid.
1710.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  26, 62.
1711.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  61. Dragan Zadro told Witness C that he was lying under a soldier’s car to repair it, when he overheard the comment, ibid.
1712.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  61.
1713.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  62.
1714.Witness C, 10 Feb '05, T.  62.
1715.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  75-76. The Trial Chamber notes that it has been presented with evidence that in Grabovica, there were several persons called Saric, see Ex. 82 and 83, photographs of Grabovica, which indicate the houses of the villagers named Saric.
1716.Witness B, 02 Feb '05, T.  39-40, 76.
1717.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 66, 69-70.
1718.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb '05, T. 70.
1719.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  3. For the evidence of Saban Neziric on bodies in Grabovica, see also para. 408
1720.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  4.
1721.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  4.
1722.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar '05, T.  95. For further evidence in this respect, see infra Section IV.F, para 696.
1723.Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T.  31.
1724.Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T.  31.
1725.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  82. Witness D stated that he “wasn’t collecting dead bodies. It was Zuka’s men who did that”, ibid.
1726.Witness D, 21 Feb '05, T.  31, 32, 82.
1727.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb '05, T. 40.
1728.Saban Neziric, Ex. 267, p.  3.
1729.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar '05, T. 49 and Ex. 267, p. 3.
1730.Saban Neziric, 10 Mar '05, T. 50-51 and Ex. 267, p. 3.
1731.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 42-44. Zakir Okovic testified that this meeting took place either on 11 or 12 September 1993, ibid. The Trial Chamber notes that Zakir Okovic was not certain about dates throughout his testimony and will therefore not rely on Zakir Okovic’s testimony on the date of this event.
1732.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 44.
1733.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 44.
1734.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 44.
1735.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 44.
1736.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar '05, T. 44.
1737.Zakir Okovic, 16 Mar '05, T. 9.
1738.Ex. 166, autopsy report, p. 16, where Marija Definis-Gojanovic found the remains of two individuals, amongst which there were burned bones and a burned prosthesis; p. 19, where Marija Definis -Gojanovic found the remains of two individuals, for whom the cause of death could not be established due to the burning of the bone fragments; p. 85, where Dr. Simun Andjelinovic found traces of burns on the right upper arm “indicating that the arm is charred”. It was concluded that this was in fact the right upper arm of Ivan Zadro; Marija Definis-Gojanovic, Ex. 167, p. 6.
1739.See supra para. 462.
1740.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  42.
1741.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  41-42, 61.
1742.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74-75.
1743.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 75.
1744.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  63-64; Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 70, 72.
1745.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  43; Erdin Arnautovic testified that on 9 September, at around 18:00, he was with Ramiz Delalic at the bar of Zulfikar Alispago’s base, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 50-51. He further testified that Ramiz Delalic met the two boys for the first time on the morning of 10 September, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 55-57 and 15 Feb ’05, T. 52-53.
The Trial Chamber notes that Erdin Arnautovic was confronted with statements he gave to the Cantonal Court on 3 December 1998 and to ICTY investigators on 7 October 1999 which conflict with the testimony he gave before the Tribunal. Erdin Arnautovic abided by his testimony given before the Trial Chamber, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 53-55, 58-60. Considering the inconsistencies between Erdin Arnautovic’s testimony and the evidence given by Witness A and Ramiz Delalic, and considering also the discrepancies with Erdin Arnautovic’s prior statements, the Trial Chamber does not rely on the evidence presented by Erdin Arnautovic in this regard.
1746.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  43.
1747.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  43. Ramiz Delalic corroborated Witness A’s testimony, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 81-82. However, while Witness A testified that the meeting between Ramiz Delalic and the two boys took place inside Pero Maric’s house (Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  43), Ramiz Delalic testified to have met the two boys in front of a different house - not far from Pero Maric’s house - in which soldiers of the 9th Brigade had been billeted, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 81.
1748.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 73, 74-75.
1749.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  44.
1750.Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T.  47, 63, 107-108.
1751.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 55-56, 57-58.
1752.Sefko Hodzic testified that on the evening of 10 September, he saw Ramiz Delalic arrive at Zulfikar Alispago’s base, with two boys in his car, Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 79. In light of the consistent testimony regarding what happened after the line-up, the Trial Chamber finds that the testimony of Sefko Hodzic as to the arrival of the boys at Zulfikar Alispago’s base is circumstantial evidence corroborating the evidence as to the date of the line-up.
1753.In this respect, the Trial Chamber also notes its earlier finding that the testimony of Ramiz Delalic requires corroboration by other, reliable evidence. See supra Section II, para. 17.
1754.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  44.
1755.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  44; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84.
1756.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  32 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 56-57; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84. Ramiz Delalic only inquired about the murder of the Zadro family; he did not make a general inquiry about other murders, Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 103.
1757.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84; Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 32 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 49.
1758.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84. According to Witness D only soldiers from the 9th Brigade were lined up, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 33.
1759.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 57-58, 76.
1760.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  32 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 57; Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 59-60; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84-85.
1761.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84 and 20 May ’05, T. 13; Witness D referred that of the 50-60 soldiers, only 45 were in the line-up, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 33; According to Erdin Arnautovic five or six fighters were missing, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 67. Erdin Arnautovic testified that Mustafa Hota was not there at the time, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 59.
1762.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 84; Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 67. Nedzad Mehanovic testified that his statements given on 23 March 1998 and 12 January 1999, in which he declared that he was present at the line up, are not true, and that he was not lined up but only heard about it, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 17, 94-96; Ahmed Kaliman heard about the line-up, but at the time he was not there, he was on his way towards Jablanica, Ahmed Kalilman, Ex. 285, 21 Mar ’05, par. 17.
1763.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 68-69 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 81.
1764.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 82.
1765.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 69 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 35-36, 82.
1766.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  45. Ramiz Delalic testified that he only learned that the boys had family in Jablanica after they had been brought to Zulfikar Alispago’s base and after one of them had spoken to the officers there, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 86. For the Trial Chamber evaluation of Ramiz Delalic’s credibility, See supra Section II, para. 17.
1767.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60; Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85. Witness D heard that Ramiz Delalic took the children to Jablanica, where Sefer Halilovic, Zulfikar Alispago, Vehbija Karic and the Supreme Command were, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 57.
1768.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 79 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 59. The car stopped in front of the base of the Zulfikar Detachment, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 59 -60.
1769.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 79 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 60-63; Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60.
1770.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 79 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 60, 63; Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60. Ramiz Delalic testified that he took the children with him into the base and placed them at a table in front of Zulfikar Alispago’s office, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85.
1771.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 79.
1772.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85.
1773.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60.
1774.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60.
1775.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 61.
1776.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 60, 61, 77.
1777.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 79-80 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 62-63.
1778.See supra¸ para. 492.
1779.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85.
1780.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85.
1781.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 61.
1782.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85.
1783.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 85-86 and 18 May ’05, T. 2, 3.Witness D testified that he heard at the time that there was an order to kill the boys, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 34 and 22 Feb ’05, T. 106.
1784.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 3.
1785.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 2, 5.
1786.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 86 and 18 May ’05, T. 4, 5.
1787.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 86, 18 May ’05, T. 4-6 and 20 May ’05, T. 74.
1788.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 5.
1789.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 4-6. When confronted in cross-examination, Ramiz Delalic testified to remember that Nihad Bojadzic took a statement from the Zadro boys, that he got the copy of that statement five or six years later, and that he then gave it to the investigators of the Prosecutor, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 79-80.
1790.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 80.
1791.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 80.
1792.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  45-46; Witness B, 02 Feb ’05, T. 31-32.
1793.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 23; Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 82; Ahmed Kaliman, 22 Mar ’05, T. 14.
1794.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 83-84.
1795.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 84.
1796.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 86.
1797.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 86.
1798.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  46.
1799.Witness A, 01 Feb ’05, T.  45. Namik D‘ankovic wrote in his report that “two of Mladen Zadro’s children are also alive and are now in Jablanica, Ex. 235, report sent from Jablanica by Namik D‘ankovic to Jusuf Jasarevic, dated 29 September 1993, p. 1.
1800.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  19-21, 69-70. Witness D is not completely sure of the time, it may have been at around 12:00 but it may also have been at around 15:00, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 73-74.
1801.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  19, 21, 25, 69, 71. According to Witness D, it was not exactly a line-up; the soldiers were sitting on the lawn in front of the commanders, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 70. Witness D named a number of people present at the line-up: “Sadic,” Commander of the Igman Wolves, Nihad Vlahovljak, “Klos”, “Dzigi”, “Hajre”, Nevzed Sabanovic, Sulejman Lujinovic, Erdin Arnautovic and the Commander of the Handzar Division, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T. 21, 24, 72-73, 75. The Trial Chamber notes that the Commander of the Igman Wolves was named Edib Saric, see supra Section IV. A.1(e)(vi).
1802.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  23.
1803.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  25. Witness D testified (ibid.):
he made it quite clear to all of us, the soldiers there, that he was the commander of the Operation Neretva, that this was to be a very difficult battle to lift the siege of Mostar, that it was going to last for who knows how long, and that we would not return until Mostar had been liberated at any cost, so that we were going to stay there until we basically capture Mostar.
1804.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1805.Witness D did not clarify who exactly explained the “operation” to the soldiers, Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1806.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1807.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1808.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26.
1809.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26, 27.
1810.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26, 27. The Trial Chamber notes that the Witness did not specify which kind of gesture Sefer Halilovic made.
1811.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  27.
1812.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  28.
1813.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  26-27, 70. Witness D further testified that Vehbija Karic did not have his son with him, ibid.
1814.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  27.
1815.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 5.
1816.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 8 and 17 Feb ’05, T. 2.
1817.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 9.
1818.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 12.
1819.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 9.
1820.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 13.
1821.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 13.
1822.Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 21.
1823.Nedzad Mehanovic, 17 Feb ’05, T. 22-23. Nedzad Mehanovic marked the location where the soldiers assembled on Ex. 174 and Ex. 175, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 11, 22. When confronted with a statement he gave on 23 March 1998, in which he did not mention the presence of Sefer Halilovic, indicated a different date, and gave a different version of the events that occurred immediately after the alleged Vehbija Karic’s statement, Nedzad Mehanovic testified that on that occasion he told the same story that he told the Trial Chamber. He could not explain any discrepancies, Nedzad Mehanovic, 16 Feb ’05, T. 51-53.
1824.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 39, 43. According to Erdin Arnautovic, one of the officers was nicknamed Zico and the officers belonged to the “Herzegovina unit.” He could not remember whether that unit was part of the 4th Corps or the 6th Corps, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 91. Erdin Arnautovic further stated that “Karic” was called Mehmed Karic, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 42. In light of the evidence presented in this case, the Trial Chamber finds that Erdin Arnautovic was mistaken about the first name of “Karic”, and was actually referring to Vehbija Karic.
1825.Erdin Arnautovic testified that on 8 September he told Ramiz Delalic and Malco Rovcanin, another member of the 9th Brigade about the alleged comment made by Vehbija Karic, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 53. However, during cross-examination, Erdin Arnautovic could not explain the discrepancy between his testimony before the Trial Chamber and a previous statement he had made to investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor in 1999, where he said that Vehbija Karic and the other officers arrived “the next morning ” after the soldiers were billeted”, which, in light of the evidence that the 9th Brigade arrived in Grabovica on 8 September, would place this alleged visit by the officers on 9 September, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 22-24. Erdin Arnautovic further stated that the group of officers arrived on the second day that the soldiers were in Grabovica, which, in light of the evidence that the 9th Brigade arrived in Grabovica on 8 September, would place this alleged visit of the officer on 10 September, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 88.
1826.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 41.
1827.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 71.
1828.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 89.
1829.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 71.
1830.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 43. Erdin Arnautovic marked the location where the officers stood when the soldiers gathered on Ex. 170, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 48.
1831.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 43.
1832.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 42.
1833.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 42.
1834.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 42 and 15 Feb ’05, T. 24.
1835.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 49.
1836.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 49.
1837.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 27.
1838.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 53.
1839.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 77.
1840.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 77.
1841.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 77.
1842.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 78.
1843.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 21.
1844.Ahmed Salihamidzic,18 Mar ’05, T. 22.
1845.Ex. 222, Official Note, compiled by Ahmed Salihamidzic, p. 3. According to Emin Zebic, Sead Brankovic relayed the incident at Zulfikar Alispago’s flat to him, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 77-78.
1846.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 27, 53 and 16 Mar ’05, T. 11-12.
1847.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 27-28 and 16 Mar ’05, T. 11-12.
1848.Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 59-60. The Trial Chamber notes that Zakir Okovic also testified that he was on reconnaissance missions on two days following his arrival in Grabovica, Zakir Okovic, 15 Mar ’05, T. 31, 68 and 15 Mar ’05, T. 40.
1849.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  14, 90-91. Others told Witness E that the command had gathered after the killings, Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T. 17.
1850.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 12, 16, 18.
1851.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 16-18. His friends were members of the 2nd Independent Battalion, ibid.
1852.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 18.
1853.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 16-18.
1854.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 76. See also Enes Sakrak, who testified that he did not see Sefer Halilovic visiting Grabovica at that time, Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 44, 70.
1855.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 82-83.
1856.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 83.
1857.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 5-6, 8, 23.
1858.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 9, 14.
1859.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 8.
1860.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 24. Vehbija Karic testified (ibid):
Who knows how many times over can you not believe honourable people [than] some asocial types who provided statements that I said that if there were any problems, you can kill them and throw them into the Neretva River. Two or three asocial drugged persons are believed who committed those crimes and not people who went with me, who are honourable generals.
1861.Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar '05, T. 19
1862.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 65; Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 82-83.
1863.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar '05, T. 51.
1864.For a description of Operation Trebevic, see infra Section IV.F.4.
1865.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 68.
1866.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 201.
1867.Witness D testified that the alleged statement was made on 8 September, Nedzad Mehanovic testified that the alleged statement was made on 9 September, while Erdin Arnautovic was unclear as to on which date the alleged statement was made, see supra paras 501, 503, and 505
1868.See infra paras 502, 504 and 506.
1869.Witness D testified that the officers addressed the soldiers during a line-up, while Nedzad Mehanovic testified that Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago were walking around and talking to the soldiers personally. Nedzad Mehanovic, further testified about the presence on a balcony of a Bosnian Croat civilian which was not mentioned by the other two witnesses. See supra para. 504.
1870.See supra Section II, para. 17. As for the Prosecution submission that the testimony of these three witnesses regarding Vehbija Karic’s alleged statement is substantively the same, the Trial Chamber notes that it has been provided with information which could suggest a possible contamination of the witnesses’ testimony.
1871.See supra para. 510.
1872.See supra paras 501 -502.
1873.See supra paras 503 -504.
1874.See supra paras 510-511.
1875.See supra paras 509-510.
1876.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 71 and 20 May ’05, T. 99. Ramiz Delalic testified that he was told about the crimes in the afternoon of 8 September, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 70-71. He further testified that the only information available at the time was that civilians in Grabovica had been killed in the course of the previous night. The Trial Chamber notes that it has been established that the killings in Grabovica did not occur before dusk on 8 September. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that Ramiz Delalic must have been mistaken about the date and in fact went to Grabovica on 9 September.
1877.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 71.
1878.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 71-72. Ramiz Delalic testified that “the conversation did not actually touch upon what had to be done” but “it was more about some grenades, mountain cannon and Howitzers that had to be obtained”, Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 72. Erdin Arnautovic testified that a meeting was held at Zulfikar Alispago’s base, on the morning of 9 September, where Sefer Halilovic, Zulfikar Alispago, Ramiz Delalic and others “discussed the attacks and all that”, Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 55.
1879.See specifically Section IV.D.7.(a) on the killing of Pero Maric, who was killed on 8 September.
1880.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 73. Ramiz Delalic testified that he was not sure of the time and that he could speculate about the time, putting the time that he left for Grabovica between 14 :30 and 16:00. The Trial Chamber recalls Ahmed Salihamidzic’s testimony that Ramiz Delalic passed by him and Sead Kurt in Grabovica in the afternoon of 9 September. Ahmed Salihamidzic returned to the police station shortly after Ramiz Delalic passed him and Sead Kurt. They arrived there some time between 16:00 and 16:30, being an hour to an hour and a half after they left for Grabovica, see para. 415
1881.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 72-73.
1882.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 72.
1883.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74.
1884.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 74.
1885.Ramiz Delalic, 17 May ’05, T. 75.
1886.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 76-77.
1887.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 77-78, 101.
1888.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 77 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 58.
1889.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 77 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 59.
1890.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 77.
1891.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 77, and 24 Mar ’05, T. 59.
1892.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 78 and 24 Mar ’05, T. 59. Sefko Hodzic stated that “perhaps, if I hadn’t asked him anything, he wouldn’t have said two words”, Sefko Hodzic 23 Mar ’05, T. 78.
1893.Sefko Hodzic, 23 Mar ’05, T. 78.
1894.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 101.
1895.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  80 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 45.
1896.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  80-81 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 24. Bakir Alispahic came because a few days earlier, on 6 September, he had taken the Laste unit of the MUP to Mostar to assist the Mostar CJB, ibid. Emin Zebic did not know that time that Bakir Alispahic would arrive, but it was customary that he would stop by the Jablanica SJB, as one had to pass through Jablanica to reach Sarajevo, Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 81 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 45-46.
1897.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  81.
1898.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  81, 83–84 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 46, 88.
1899.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  82, 84.
1900.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 3.
1901.Bakir Alisphahic, 24 May ’05, T. 10, 14. Bakir Alispahic referred to the hydroelectric plant of Jablanica as the location of the “IKM”, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 10.
1902.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 14.
1903.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 14.
1904.According to Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic, Sead Brankovic was a member of the Mostar CSB and placed at the Jablanica SJB in August and September 1993, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 7-8; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 40. According to Namik Dzankovic, Sead Brankovic was from the Mostar SDB, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 10.
1905.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 27; Ex. 215, report, pp. 2-3.
1906.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 28; Ex. 215, report, pp. 2-3. Namik Dzankovic also testified that in the morning of 9 September, he had gone to the hydroelectric power plant in Jablanica, where Zicro Suljevic, Rifat Bilajac and Vehbija Karic were. Namik Dzankovic asked them if they had heard about the events in Grabovica. They had not. Namik Dzankovic briefly told “the generals” what happened. Vehbija Karic said “Namik, could you please do your best and continue to collect as much information as you can. Continue to work on it”, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 28-29. See infra Section IV.F, para. 661.
1907.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  82.
1908.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  82-83, 119-120. Vehbija Karic first testified that they were informed by Namik Dzankovic on the morning of 8 September, but then, after checking his notes, stated that it was in the morning of 9 September, ibid.
1909.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  83.
1910.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 28-29.
1911.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 29.
1912.Vehbija Karic, 02 Jun ’05, T. 10.
1913.Indictment, para. 15.
1914.See supra Section II, para. 17.
1915.Ex. 222, Official Note by Ahmed Salihamidzic.
1916.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 7 and 30. A number of photographs depicting the village of Uzdol were admitted into evidence; see, e.g., Ex. 319, Ex. 320 (see Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05), T. 4; and Ex. 299 (see Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 8). The Trial Chamber notes that some witnesses referred to Uzdol as a “village”.
1917.Ex. 322, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked the hamlet of Rajici (“1”), Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 6; Ex. 340, photograph of the area of Uzdol above the school, where Witness G marked the village of Rajici, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 73.
1918.Ex. 299, photograph where Kazo Zelenika marked the school in Cer (“1”), Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 8; Ex. 340, photograph of the area of Uzdol, where Witness G marked the school building in Cer and said that an accumulation of HVO forces were in the area surrounding the school, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 72.
1919.Ex. 320, Ex. 322 and Ex. 326, photographs where Ivka Stojanovic marked the hamlet of Kriz, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 5-6 and 63; Ex. 334 and Ex. 340, photographs where Witness G marked the hamlet of Kriz, Witness G, 07 Apr 05, T. 42-43 and 73; Ex. 347, overview of Kriz, marked by Janjko Stojanovic, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 28.
1920.Ex. 337, photograph where Witness G pointed out the village of Bobari, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 59. The hamlet of Bobari is located at the very beginning of the road that leads from Here to Uzdol, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 60.
1921.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 7, 30; Ex. 323, photograph of the hamlet of Zelenike, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 10-11; Ex. 340, photograph where Witness G marked the village of Zelenike, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 73.
1922.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr '05, T. 13.
1923.Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 44.
1924.Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 67; Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 11; Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 18.
1925.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 13.
1926.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  115.
1927.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 13.
1928.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 13. See also Ex. 445: map drawn by Mehmed Behlo, where he indicated the villages of Here, Scipe and Kute, Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 66.
1929.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 3. Ex. 322, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic recognised where the ABiH front line positions were, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 6. According to Witness G, Prozor was a strategically important area for the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 54.
1930.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  43. See also, e.g., Ex. 334 and 336 and 337, photographs where Witness G marked the hamlet of Here, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 43-44 and 56.
1931.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  10-11.
1932.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  11.
1933.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  10.
1934.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  10-11.
1935.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 55. Ivka Stojanovic testified that on 3 July 1993, following the killing of a man called Drago Ratkic, “an army” arrived in Uzdol and ordered that all civilians should leave the village. In the evening of 3 July, Ivka Stojanovic left her house in Kriz and went to Rama Rumboci with her mother, Luca Zelenika, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 7-8. See also Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 7.
1936.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 55, Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 14.
1937.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 14 and 07 Jul '05, T. 87.
1938.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 59. Witness H testified that the front line was marked by military outposts and that several of the villages surrounding Uzdol were directly exposed to the front line, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 45.
1939.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 73. Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 13-14. The village of Kriz was between the front line and the battalion headquarters in Cer, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 50.
1940.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  44.
1941.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  44.
1942.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  44.
1943.See infra Section IV.E, paras 535-540.
1944.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 42; Ex. 328, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked the hill of Krstiste, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 67; Ex. 334, Ex. 336 and Ex. 339, photographs where Witness G marked the hill of Krstiste, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 43-44 and 61.
1945.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 61-62.
1946.Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 16.
1947.Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 16. The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of Ivka Stojanovic who had left at the beginning of July and had moved to Rumboci with her mother Luka Zelenika. On 12 September Ivka Stojanovic and her mother returned to their homes in Kriz and in Zelenike, respectively, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 10-11. Ivka Stojanovic’s son, Janjko Stojanovic, did not want her to stay in Kriz, because he feared that she might be attacked by Bosnian Muslim forces while he was on duty in the HVO. He had been told that there was danger of an imminent attack by the ABiH either on 12 or 13 September. He told his mother to leave but she stayed, Janjko Stojanovic 11 Apr '05, T. 87 -88 and 12 Apr '05, T. 59-60. See also Witness G, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, who testified that from what the unit could see from their position, Uzdol was half deserted, there were more soldiers around than civilians, but that they were aware of the fact that there were still some civilians left, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 50.
1948.For example, Marko Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, Marija Zelic (Marko Zelic, 12 Apr '05, T. 83) and Jadranka Zelenika (Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 22-23) were in Uzdol.
1949.Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T.  32. According to Janjko Stojanovic, as of 14 September 1993, about 15 civilians and 10 soldiers were living in the village of Kriz. Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 30 and 54.
1950.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  13-14 and 07 Jul '05, T. 81-83. Witness J explains his conclusion in the following way: the ABiH and the HVO were a single formation from the beginning of the conflict, from April until October 1992 in Prozor, and even longer in some other areas. Each one knew what the other one had; the purchase of weapons was no secret. Moreover, there was a joint action by the army and the HVO against facilities of the former JNA, where a large amount of weapons were seized and were then distributed in proportion to the number of inhabitants between the Bosnian Muslims and the “Croats”. He also added that the “Croats” had an organised service to collect funds for the purchase of weapons and all those who were working abroad were obliged to send money to that fund. The Prozor Independent Battalion knew approximately who was buying weapons, how many, who was distributing weapons, and where. They also had general information about who was in the village, where they were, and what weapons and artillery they had, and approximately how many women and children were there, ibid., T.  83-85.
1951.Witness J, 07 Jul '05, T.  81-83.
1952.During the war Kazo Zelenika was the registrar in Uzdol and in charge of maintaining records of births, marriages and deaths, Kazo Zelenika, 04 April 05, T. 6-7.
1953.Kazo Zelenika testified that his father was a hunter and that he and his father had a shotgun, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 70-71; Marko Zelic testified that there was a hunting club in Zelenike, and that his father had a hunting rifle in the house, Marko Zelic, 13 Apr '05, T. 13-14.
1954.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 43.
1955.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 58, 67 and 71. Kazo Zelenika did not know whether some civilians had hand grenades in their homes, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 93.
1956.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 57; Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 93.
1957.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 71. Ivka Stojanovic testified that on 12 September there was fighting in the area of Zelenike and that there was some random shooting in Kriz, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 12-13.
1958.Kazo Zelenika said that there were between 100 and 200 HVO soldiers, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 61. According to Janjko Stojanovic there were approximately between 80 and 100 HVO soldiers, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 80; Witness H testified that there was approximately “a battalion” of HVO soldiers in the area of Uzdol, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 45.
1959.Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T.  28; Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 60 and 70; Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 72; Witness  H, 14 Apr '05, T. 2-4. See also Ex. 320, photograph of the village of Uzdol where Ivka Stojanovic marked the school, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 4; Ex.  299, photograph where Kazo Zelenika marked the school, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 8; Ex. 340, photograph of the area of Uzdol above the school, where Witness  G marked the school and said that “an accumulation of HVO forces were in th?eg area surrounding the school building”, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 72.
1960.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 62; Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 45.
1961.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 60; Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 79-80.
1962.Witness I, 15 Apr ’05, T.  18, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 61. See also Ex. 340, photograph where Witness G marked the positions where the tank and the mortar were, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 73-74; Ex. 341, photograph where Witness G marked the artillery positions in Cer, Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 9-10.
1963.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  67.
1964.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 62. According to Kazo Zelenika, the soldiers in the school were all sleeping in their uniform, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 91. See also Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 29.
1965.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  67.
1966.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 62.
1967.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 61.
1968.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 72 and 11 Apr '05, T. 67.
1969.See, e.g., Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 44 and 05 Apr '05, T. 20- 21; Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 38; Witness I, 14 Apr '05, T. 92.
1970.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 44. According to Kazo Zelenika, women who were mobilised would work in the kitchen and they would take shifts, ibid., T. 44.
1971.Witness I, 14 Apr '05, T.  95.
1972.Witness I, 14 Apr '05, T.  95.
1973.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  14-15. Witness J, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, testified that in August and early September 1993, many of the Bosnian Muslims whom had remained in Prozor had been taken to dig trenches in the Uzdol area.
1974.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  47.
1975.See, e.g., Ex. 340 and 341, photographs where Witness G marked some of the HVO positions, including artillery positions, in Bobari, Kranjcici, Gradac, Cer, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 72-75 and 11 Apr '05, T. 8-10. See also Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 61.
1976.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr 05 T. 80-81.
1977.The hill of Borak overlooks the hamlet of Kriz, which is situated just at at the base of the hill, Ex. 326 and 328, photographs where Ivka Stojanovic marked the hill of Borak, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 63 and 67. Ex. 340, photograph where Witness G marked Borak, Witness  G, 07 Apr '05, T. 73.
1978.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 81.
1979.There was a sort of machine gun called Zbrojovka, and heavier weapons such as a mortar, which, however, was not always located there, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 82. See also Ex. 340, photograph where Witness G marked mortars on top of the hill Borak, Witness  G, 11 Apr '05, T. 10.
1980.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 85.
1981.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 40; Marko Zelic, 13 Apr '05, T. 11. This position was to the right of Borak looking towards the Bosnian Muslim positions and the nearest position to the left was Gradac with Brdo in between, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 40.
1982.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  9. See also Ex. 341, photograph where Witness G marked Kranjcici, ibid.
1983.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  9. See also Ex. 341, photograph where Witness G marked Gradac and the anti -aircraft positions, ibid.
1984.Komin is a hill above Uzdol, between Lisina and Konjsko, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 66.
1985.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 85; Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 10. See also Ex. 341, photograph where Witness G drew an arrow in the direction of the Prozor artillery, which is not visible in this photograph, ibid.
1986.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 58.
1987.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  74. See also Ex. 340, photograph where Witness G marked the village of Here, Witness G, 07 Apr 05, T. 75.
1988.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  74. See also Ex. 340, photograph where Witness G drew an arrow to the left of the school in Cer pointing to where these other artillery positions were, Witness  G, 07 Apr '05, T. 75.
1989.Among them were Janjko Stojanovic, Marko Stojanovic, Mato Stojanovic, Pero Stojanovic, Josip Stojanovic, Marinko Stojanovic, Mijo Ratkic, Kazo Ratkic, Niko Ratkic, and Drago Ratkic, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 2 and 51; Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 79, and 12 Apr '05, T. 34. Zoran Stojanovic and Ivan Stojanovic were underage and did not belong to the HVO. They were never seen with weapons in their hands, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 47.
1990.Among them were Pavo Zelic, Pavo Grubesa, Pero Kovcalija, Marinko Kovcalija, Ivo Kovcalija, Ante Zelenika, Ivan Zelenika, Mario Zelenika, Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 18-19. See also Marko Zelic, 13 Apr '05, T. 10-11, 17 and 28.
1991.Marko Zelic testified that as far as he knows “they were all in the HVO”, however he did not know of the home guard or that the older men in Zelenike were performing patrol duties in September 1993, Marko Zelic 13 Apr '05, T. 11.
1992.In the two days before the attack on 14 September 1993, Janjko Stojanovic worked his shift at Borak and spent the nights at home. On the night of 13 September, Janjko Stojanovic was at home with his mother: he slept in the room on the first floor, wearing his camouflage uniform, and with his rifle right by the bed, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T.  88 and 94. See also Ex. 349, photograph where Janjko Stojanovic marked the civilian houses and the soldiers’ houses. He also indicated where there were civilians and soldiers living in the same houses, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 31-33. In Ex. 350 (photograph) Janjko Stojanovic marked (with triangles) the houses where soldiers sometimes stayed, and more in particular: Ilja Kovcaljia, Niko Ratkic, Fabio Ratkic, Marko Stojanovic, Mijo Stojanovic. The soldiers that were in the marked houses were armed, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 50-51 and 56. Witness I marked on Ex. 371, (photograph of Zelenike) each house in which an HVO member lived in August and September 1993, as well as the houses of civilians, Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 19-21.
1993.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 63-68 and 05 Apr '05, T. 29
1994.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  14. According to Janjko Stojanovic, some of the soldiers in Uzdol had semi-automatic rifles, some had sniper rifles, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 83.
1995.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 92. Janjko Stojanovic also testified that he did not personally have any hand grenades, and that he does not think that any other soldier at his position in Borak had any either, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 83
1996.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 83. According to Janjko Stojanovic, the soldiers did not have the heavier rocket-propelled grenades.
1997.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 61.
1998.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 38; Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 91.
1999.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 56. Janjko Stojanovic never saw an order to this effect. He also stated that no one ever asked him to leave his weapon anywhere after his shift was over, and that it it was logical to bring the weapon with him home, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 56-57.
2000.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 14.
2001.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 34. Witness I, however, stated that the uniforms of the HVO soldiers and the soldiers “from the other side” were very similar, Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T.  11.
2002.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 85-86. According to Marko Zelic, there was no clear distinction between the HVO and the ABiH uniforms, Marko Zelic, 12 Apr '05, T. 87. See also Witness  I, 15 Apr '05, T. 11.
2003.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 14.
2004.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  14.
2005.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 91.
2006.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 91. Kazo Zelenika wore a uniform too, ibid.
2007.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 45-46 and 67.
2008.According to Kazo Zelenika, members of the “home guard” were people who had previously worked in Croatia or in Sarajevo, and once the war began they were out of work, and they returned home, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 46, 67.
2009.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 66; Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 24.
2010.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 45.
2011.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 46, 67.
2012.Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 24.
2013.Amongst them were Pavo Grubesa, Ivan Grubic, Rade Stojanovic, Marko Dzalta and Ivan Ratkic, Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 25-26. Ex. 372, photograph where Witness I marked the house of Ivan Ratkic, Witness I, 15 Apr '05, T. 26-27. Pavo Grubesa, Mara Grubesa’s husband, lived in Zelenike. He was a member of the “home guard” and in the morning of 14 September was at Kracko Polje, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 29.
2014.Witness I, 14 Apr '05, T.  79 and 15 Apr '05, T. 23-24. Concerning the location of Kracko Polje the Trial Chamber heard only the testimony of Kazo Zelenika, who testified that on the morning of 14 September 1993, he parked the vehicle “about two or three kilometres from Uzdol itself towards Kracko Polje, between Kolanusici and Kracko Polje”, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 13. This unit included Marko Rajic, Pavo Grubesa and Ivan Ljubic, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 46 and 05 Apr '05, T. 29. According to Kazo Zelenika there were two or three people standing guard at Kracko Polje at night. Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 69.
2015.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 45.
2016.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 31.
2017.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 46. Domin Rajic’s brother, Franjo Rajic, had a uniform and a rifle, and he was a member of the “home guard”, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 46 and 05 Apr '05, T. 29.
2018.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 46. Kazo Zelenika testified that every three or four days some of the people standing guard at Kracko Polje would come over, and Kazo Milicevic from Kranjcici, who was the man in charge, “probably” reported to Josip Prskalo, the Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the Rama Brigade, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 69.
2019.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 70.
2020.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 82.
2021.As mentioned above (see supra para. 313) Witness G testified that the area of responsibility of the Prozor Independent Battalion during the “Neretva Operation” was situated between the 45th Brigade on the left and the 317th Brigade on the right, Witness G, 07 Apr ’05, T. 94. The front line between the ABiH and the HVO was shown on Ex. 445, Mehmed Behlo, 27 Jun '05, T. 66-67.
2022.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  74-75. See also Ex. 336, photograph where Witness G drew and arrow in the direction where the Prozor Independent Battalion was. Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  44-45.
2023.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  17-18 (testifying that Dzevad Corbadzic, Aziz Bobar, Sabahudin Motika, and a man with the last name Hujdur were members of the MUP and present in Uzdol during the fighting on 14 September 1993; and testifying that “(a(ll I can say is that the army and the police took part together in this operation”), 19 (testifying that the “use of the police or the deployment of the police was planned by our commander, Enver Buza, because he gave permission to the policemen how they were to move around, when they were to go, when they were to return, and so on”), 19-20 (testifying that he never saw any written documentation that passed between the Prozor Independent Battalion and the MUP at the time permitting civilian police to be used in the action ), and 68 (testifying that he thinks that “it was considered a moral obligation on the part of policemen to take part in actions of this kind, so that as policemen there was a great pressure being exerted on them to take part, to participate”).
See also Ex. 149, Report that Enver Buza sent to the 6th Corps, dated 20 September 1993 (“Enver Buza’s Report”).
2024.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  77 (testifying that 120-130 members of the Prozor Independent Battalion participated ) and 11 Apr '05, T. 69-70. Buza’s Report provides that “?ag total of 156 soldiers ” participated in the attack directed towards the Uzdol sector, the Klupa sector and the Blace village sector, Ex. 149.
2025.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  17-18 and 68.
2026.Ex. 149, Enver Buza’s Report, which provides that among the units that participated in the attack, there were a number of platoons belonging to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th companies, the Military Police, and “part of the Prozor MUP forces”.
2027.Ex. 337, photograph where Witness G marked an arrow in the direction of Laniste, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  57. The commander of this unit was Osman Hero, who was in communication by radio with Enver Buza, Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 63-64. Witness G also added that the army had probably no more than two or three radios, which were assigned to combat group commanders. None of the normal soldiers had radios, Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 38.
2028.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  57.
2029.Ex. 339, photograph where Witness G drew a broken line along the axis his unit followed, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 61.
2030.Such as the area of Gradina and an area called Galvica, Witness G, 07 Apr 05, T. 44 and 58. See also Ex. 336, photograph where Witness G marked Gradina hill, Witness G, 07 Apr 05, T. 44.
2031.Such as those in Borak, Kranjcici, Osljani and Bobari, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 58 and 60.
2032.These other units were supposed to secure contact with the main units, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 58 and 61-62. Ex. 339, photograph where Witness G drew an arrow in the direction of the school where the other unit went when the units split up, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 61-62.
2033.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  61. Witness G was in combat from about 02:00 in the morning of 14 September until just before day break. He testified that by that time, the entire valley was on fire. At the beginning Witness G participated in a part of the attack on the left flank at a fortified position at Borak. There were no more than ten men in the combat group that Witness G was in. After that, Witness G’s group disbanded and he returned along an axis, where there was danger that the HVO forces might cut across the communication lines where the ABiH were located. However, some of the soldiers were wounded and Witness G assisted in taking care of them. Witness G only went up to Borak, Witness  G, 07 Apr '05, T. 64-65 and 11 Apr '05, T. 66. He did not enter the villages of Kriz, Rajici, Zelenike and Cer on the 14 September 1993, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 89.
2034.Witness G testified that he did not personally want to take revenge on or kill local Bosnian Croat civilians, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 78-79.
2035.Ex. 361, photograph where Witness H marked the village of Here, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 10.
2036.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  7.
2037.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  2-4 and 8.
2038.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  2-4. He was told that the tank was shelling their units daily, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 12. Ex. 363, photograph where Witness H marked the place where the tank was, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 13-15.
2039.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  2-4. Ex. 361, photograph where Witness H marked the school, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 10. Ex. 363, photograph where Witness H marked the school, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 13-15.
2040.On the way to the school, they did not go through any hamlets and villages, and did not see any soldiers or civilians,Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 11. See also Ex. 361, photograph where Witness H drew the route he took from the village to the school with a dotted line. From Here to the school it was 800 to 900 meters, ibid., T. 11-12. Apart from Witness H and his group, another 15-20 soldiers from the Prozor Independent Battalion were involved in this attack, coming from the same route as Witness H, ibid., T. 15.
2041.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  12-14 and 65-66. These reinforcements wore HVO uniforms, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 65-66. Ex. 363, photograph where Witness H marked the direction from which HVO reinforcements came, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 13-15.
2042.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  12. Witness G also heard that the tank by the school had been destroyed, Witness  G, 07 Apr '05, T. 67.
2043.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  67.
2044.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  15.
2045.According to Witness H, the attack lasted about 40-50 minutes and the shelling started after about half an hour or 45 minutes from the beginning of the attack, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 15 and 52. Witness G testified that 20 or 30 minutes after the beginning of the operation the HVO artillery began to shell, Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 65.
2046.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  48-49 and 55-56; Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 13 and 65. Witness G testified that at least some of the HVO artillery began to shoot in the direction of the Bosnian Croat hamlets of Uzdol. It appeared to Witness G that the shelling was very heavy during the time he was in the area. There was a lot of smoke in Uzdol, which was, according to Witness G, probably caused by explosions of shells combined with burning buildings, Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 12-13.
2047.Witness G is quite certain that the firing came from the HVO positions as the ABiH “did not have 2 per cent of the capacities that were used then in that area”, Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T. 10 -11 and 65. Witness H testified that the ABiH did not have a tank in the area at the time, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 55. Though several tanks were firing at the Witness H’s position, throughout the day Witness H only saw one HVO tank, the one positioned in Uzdol, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 48.
2048.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  14; Ex. 363: photograph where Witness H marked the line of retreat, Witness H, ibid. It was about 10:00 or 10:30 on the morning of 14 September when Witness  H arrived in Here. Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 56. Witness G testified that at around 12:00 there was a counter attack by the HVO and after that the ABiH forces withdrew from Uzdol and returned to Here. Witness G returned to the village of Here at about 12:00, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 64-65 and 11 Apr '05, T. 14.
2049.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  54. They were also being shot at by small arms fire, and by automatic weapons., Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 50, 54. Witness G testified that around 13:00, the HVO started shelling the village of Here, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 65 and 11 Apr '05, T. 14.
2050.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  14.
2051.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  54.
2052.Witness H was unable to leave Here for two hours after the pullout due to the heavy artillery fire, Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 56. Witness G testified that during the combat the HVO shelled the entire village and area. This lasted for almost the whole day, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 64-65 and 11 Apr '05, T. 14.
2053.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  56.
2054.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  61. Witness G testified that from what the unit could see from their position, Uzdol was half deserted, there were more soldiers around than civilians, but that they were aware of the fact that there were still some civilians left, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 50.
2055.Witness G, 11 Apr '05, T.  62.
2056.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  51, 53-54.
2057.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  66. Witness G testified that he heard that the ABiH units had inflicted significant losses on the HVO and the tank which was by the school had been destroyed and other artillery had either been destroyed or damaged, ibid., T. 66-67.
2058.Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T.  66, 68. Witness G did not go and discuss this information with Enver Buza, ibid., T. 68.
2059.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T.  57. Their bodies were left behind because of the heavy artillery fire, ibid.
2060.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  73.
2061.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  39-40. Osman Hero told Witness J that he had thrown a hand grenade into a house because they had been shooting at him from that house. Osman Hero thought there were children in that house, Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 40-41.
2062.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  41. Witness J is not sure if the person on the radio said “ten” but he did give a figure, ibid.
2063.Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T.  40.
2064.According to Nermin Eminovic this unit was “perhaps numbering the size of a platoon, or a little bit less”, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 25.
2065.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 25.
2066.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 25.
2067.Ex. 149, Enver Buza’s Report.
2068.The report refers to attack order operative number 01/1500-27 of 11 September 1993, ibid.
2069.The report further states that in another direction, two platoons were infiltrated into the Klupa sector and the Blace village sector, ibid.
2070.Those soldiers participated in the overall attack, which included the Uzdol sector, the Klupa sector and the Blace sector. In relation to the attack on the Blace sector the report indicates :
The right wing, whose task was to take control of the general Blace village sector was led by the guide from the 317th bbr of the 2nd bbt/Mountain Battalion/(Voljevac). They ran into a mine field and so one soldier and the company commander were killed and eight soldiers were wounded, some slightly and some seriously. I therefore ordered this unit to withdraw to the sector of its initial position (Predvorci village ) because I could not communicate with the right wing and I did not notice any activity of the neighbor on the right-hand side from the observation post in Here village (Glavica).
In this respect, Mehmed Behlo, Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, testified that he was not aware that on 14 September the Prozor Independent Battalion was involved in combat in Uzdol; he knew that there was fighting but he did not know exactly where. He was not in direct contact with the Prozor Independent Battalion, but he received some information from his subordinate commanders which indicated that soldiers of the Prozor Independent Battalion suffered a failure, that they had a lot of casualties, and that they had entered a mine field somewhere on the border of the area of responsibility of the two battalions. He did not have any contact with the Prozor Independent Battalion on that day, although they were on his flank, right next to him. They were reporting to their superior command. Mehmed Behlo received some information by his subordinate commanders, who were close to the area of responsibility of the Prozor Independent Battalion, and who were monitoring what was happening, Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 44-46.
2071.Ex. 149.
2072.Ex. 149, (emphasis in the original).
2073.Ex. 236, Supplement to the Report of 20 September 1993, sent by the Command of the Prozor Independent Battalion to the 6th Corps Command, Security Sector on 31 October 1993.
2074.Ex. 318, Combat report from HVO, sent by Zeljiko Siljeg to the Main Staff of the HVO on 14 September 1993. It consists of three interim reports with the situation at 07:00, at 08:00 and at 10 :00.
2075.Ex. 318, Combat report from HVO, situation at 07:00 (emphasis in the original). Janjko Stojanovic was confronted with this document and stated that he had never seen it before and he does not know who wrote it. He does not know who Commander Colonel Zeljiko Siljeg is, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 45.
2076.Ex. 318, Interim report from HVO, situation at 08:00 (emphasis in the original).
2077.Ex. 318, Combat report from HVO, situation at 10:00.
2078.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 13-14; Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 93-95.
2079.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 94-95.
2080.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 94. At the beginning there was very strong shooting from heavy weapons, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 95.
2081.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 56.
2082.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 95. The visibility was quite good. During the few minutes he was outside, Janjko Stojanovic tried to determine the direction the bullets came from, Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 96 and 12 Apr '05, T. 58-59. He did not see people with guns, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 5.
2083.Janjko Stojanovic, 11 Apr '05, T. 95.
2084.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 5.
2085.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 6.
2086.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 6-7.
2087.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 61-62. Janjko Stojanovic clarified that although he could not state with certainty that it was anti-aircraft gun, he was sure that “it was a gun. It was something stronger than an automatic weapon or a machine gun”, Janjko Stojanovic 12 Apr, '05 T. 62.
2088.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 8-9.
2089.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 7-8. See also Ex. 347, photograph of Kriz where Janjko Stojanovic marked Ivan Stojanovic’s house, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 28.
2090.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 8. See Ex. 325, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked Ivan Stojanovic’s house (“2”), Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 43-46.
2091.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 8, 62.
2092.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 11.
2093.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 11.
2094.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 11-12.
2095.Anica Stojanovic was later found shot in front of the house, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 63. See infra Section IV.E, paras 594-597.
2096.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 10. They only got two meters from the house, near a low wall, ibid.
2097.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 11. According to Ivka Stojanovic’s testimony her son told her: “Mom, go to that orchard behind that abandoned house over there. I’ll cover you and keep shooting into the air. Run and try to save your life”, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 14, 57. See also Ex. 347, photograph of Kriz where Janjko Stojanovic marked the place where he stood firing into the air when his mother ran away, Janjko Stojanovic 12 Apr '05, T. 29.
2098.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 14. See also Ex 324, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked her house (“1”), ibid., T. 27, 31. She also marked with a line the route she took once she left her house: the line goes from the house around the back of another house, into some bushes to the upper right of the photograph, ibid., T. 28, 31 ; Ex. 325, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked the place where she last saw her son Janjko Stojanovic when she fled (“3”), ibid., 43-46.
2099.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 14, 15. See also Ex. 324, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked where the man with the green uniform was (“2”) and where she was (“3”), ibid., T. 29. Ivka Stojanovic did not look at the man for very long; it was probably just a sideways glance before she turned her head and started to run away, ibid., T. 60.
2100.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 14, 15.
2101.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 14, 60. The shot was fired in the direction of Ivka Stojanovic and she fell down before the man actually fired the shot, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 19.
2102.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 19.
2103.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 19.
2104.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 19.
2105.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 20.
2106.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 20, 22.
2107.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 20. See also Ex. 324, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked the place where she fell down and where she was lying when she heard the voices making the comments (“4”), ibid., 29, 31.
2108.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 21. She only heard one male voice, but she did not recognise it as the voice of the person who had called out to her before, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T.  21-22.
2109.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 61.
2110.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 22.
2111.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 22-23.
2112.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 23. See also Ex 324, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked the spot in the bushes where she heard the soldiers singing and yelling (“5”), ibid., T. 31.
2113.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 23.
2114.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 57.
2115.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 24.
2116.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 24. As it will be seen above, Kazo Zelenika testified that when he visited Uzdol in the morning of 14 September 1993, he was followed by two cameramen who videotaped everything. See infra para. 579.
2117.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 24. See also Ex. 324, photograph where Ivka Stojanovic marked the spot in the bushes where she was when she was found, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T.  31.
2118.She saw the bodies of Anica Stojanovic, Ante Stojanovic, Kata Ratkic and Martin Ratkic, Sima, Mara, Stanko, Lucija, Mijo and Ivka Rajic, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 25. See also Ex. 312, video where Ivka Stojanovic recognised some of the above-mentioned bodies, ibid., T. 36-40.
2119.Ex. 312, video. Ivka Stojanovic was present when the video was recorded in the church which is near Rajici. They entered the church so they could film the damage inside, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 40.
2120.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 27. Ivka Stojanovic was eventually taken to Rama and Prozor, ibid., T. 27, 61.
2121.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 20-21.
2122.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 74-75.
2123.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 21,73-74.
2124.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 21.
2125.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 21.
2126.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 21.
2127.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 21-22.
2128.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 22.
2129.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 22.
2130.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 22.
2131.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 23.
2132.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 23.
2133.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 23.
2134.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 23.
2135.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 24.
2136.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 61.
2137.Janjko Stojanovic did not hear the sound of mortars being used and he does not think that a tank was used, as he would have recognised this, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 24, 46.
2138.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 43.
2139.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 24-25.
2140.Ruza Stojanovic lived in the hamlet of Kriz all her life and Cvita, Franjo and Serafina Stojanovic were her closest neighbours, Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2141.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2142.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2143.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2144.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2145.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2146.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5. On their way to the school, Ruza Stojanovic saw the body of Franjo Stojanovic, which was lying on the ground at a distance of about 5 meters from his house, ibid. See infra para. 621.
2147.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5. Ruza Stojanovic knew Jusuf Hero very well because they were neighbours and he attended the same school as her son, Pero Stojanovic, ibid.
2148.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5. The other people who were with Ruza Stojanovic and her daughters were: Cvita Stojanovic, Sofija Stojanovic, Zdenko Dalto, Brigita Dalto and Mijo Dalto. Sofija Stojanovic told Ruza Stojanovic that some ABiH soldiers took money from her, ibid. See also Ex. 236: Supplement to the Report of 20 September 1993, which reads in its relevant part: “[one ABiH] soldier hid women and children in a basement in order to protect them from the shells. This was also confirmed on Radio Rama in an interview with one of the women, except that it was added in a commentary that he had done it for money […]”.
2149.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2150.Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9, para. 1.
2151.Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9. para. 2.
2152.Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9. para. 3. He still has a piece of that grenade in his shoulder, ibid.
2153.Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9, para. 4.
2154.Milan Zelenika later learned that she was killed, Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9, para. 4.
2155.Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9, para. 4.
2156.Milan Zelenika, Ex. 466, p. 9, para. 5. He personally did not Witness any killing nor he did see any dead body in the village, but he did not go through the village when he was fleeing, ibid.
2157.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 11-12 and 05 Apr '05, T. 84-85. He went to Uzdol with Rajic and Slavko Zelenika, his driver, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 12.
2158.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 7.
2159.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 11-12.
2160.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 88. He also said, while commenting on the HVO shelling on the Uzdol hamlets, that “our men wouldn’t fire on their own people”, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T.  65.
2161.The exact time of Kazo Zelenika’s arrival in Uzdol is not consistent in his testimony; it varies between 7:00, 8:30 and 10:00, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 13 and 05 Apr '05, T. 84, 85. However, it is clear that when he arrived “?egverything was over. They were all dead”, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 84.
2162.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 85.
2163.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 74 and 05 Apr '05, T. 2, 63.
2164.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 74.
2165.Kazo Zelenika does not know who these people were, but he thinks that one of them was from Rama, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 58. See also Ex. 312, video of the bodies in Uzdol recorded on the morning of 14 September 1993.
2166.Ex. 314, picture where Kazo Zelenika marked the route he took through the different hamlets. See also Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 75-82. In relation to his testimony concerning the victims listed in the Indictment, see infra Section IV.E.4.
2167.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 58. See also Ex. 312, video of the bodies in Uzdol recorded on the morning of 14 September 1993.
2168.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 56. Three of them were crew of the tank. Pero Lucic was one member of the tank crew who was killed. Josip Maric was killed at the school building. Ilija Cvitanovic was in the school building and was killed during the fighting in Uzdol. Pero Kovcalija was at the school, and was killed on 14 September outside Ante Zelic’s house. He was wearing a uniform and he was not armed. There was a body of an ABiH soldier not far from him, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 63, 65, 67-68.
2169.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 56.
2170.See supra Section IV.E.3(a)-(d).
2171.The evidence includes testimony of members of the ABiH (see supra paras 553-563), ABiH and HVO reports ( see supra paras 564-566), as well as testimony of residents of Uzdol at that time (see supra paras 567-580).
2172.See supra para. 575, in particular Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 24-25, 43, 46. See also Kate Adie, a BBC war correspondent who visited Uzdol on 15 September 1993. She did not notice any remains of an army tank near the school, nor did she hear that there had been one there which had been destroyed the previous day. She testified that there were no major shells or mortar holes, or anything resembling any large, heavy weaponry being fired at all, nor were there any shell damage against the walls of large buildings. There was absolutely no evidence of artillery fire, there was only signs of small-arms fire. When inspecting the houses in Uzdol, she did not see any sign of shelling damage: no craters on the road, no holes in walls or in roofs. She saw two buildings with signs of fire. There was a house with some fire damage on the outside: there were the roof tiles coming off, suggesting that the interior of the house had gone up and that the roof had collapsed, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 24-25, 51-52, 76.
2173.See supra para. 578, in particular Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 11-12 and 05 Apr '05, T. 65, 88.
2174.The evidence shows that about 5-7 ABiH soldiers were killed in combat activities in Uzdol on that day, Witness  H, 14 Apr '05, T. 56-57; Ex. 236: Supplement to the Report of 20 September 1993. This report states that the number of HVO soldiers killed was “much higher” (than seven). Kazo Zelenika testified that twelve HVO soldiers were killed, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 56.
2175.See supra Section III.A.2.
2176.Indictment, para. 27.
2177.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 18, fn 20.
2178.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 18.
2179.Defence Final Brief. See also Hearing of 30 Aug '05, T. 4.
2180.The Trial Chamber heard evidence that Slavko Mendes, an HVO soldier, was captured by ABiH forces who were calling on the HVO intervention unit billeted in the school in Cer to surrender. On the circumstances of his death, the Trial Chamber refers to the evidence mentioned above in relation to the attack on the school in Cer, in particular to Ex. 236: “Supplement ” to the Report of 20 September 1993 (see para. 565). See also Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar '05, T. 68-69), and to the testimony of Witness J (see para. 560). Moreover, in response to the information included in the “Supplement” to the Report of 20 September 1993 mentioned above, Witness J specified his account regarding the killing of Slavko Mendes as follows: “[the ABiH soldiers] walked into a school and they made him walk in front so he could call on the others to surrender. Once he opened the door to the classroom in which the soldiers were billeted, they shot at him and killed him.”, Witness J, 06 Jul '05, T. 39 and 57-58. Kazo Zelenika testified that Slavko Mendes, who was stationed in front of the school in Cer, was captured by ABiH soldiers, taken to a pharmacy and there he was tied up, Kazo Zelenika saw Slavko Mendes’s body: he had been killed by a firearm, he wore a uniform, and his hands were tied behind his back by a length of wire, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 14 and 68; Ex. 301: diagram where Kazo Zelenika marked the area where he saw the body of Slavko Mendes, ibid., T. 15-17 and 26.
2181.Ex. 409, autopsy report.
2182.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 82. See also Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked the Zelic’s house, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 9.
2183.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 83.
2184.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 83.
2185.Ex. 315: book “Uzdol and all its victims”, p. 61
2186.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr ’05, T. 20-21. Marko Zelic did remember that his late brother Ivan Zelic, who was a member of the HVO, used to keep two hand grenades in the house. However, Marko Zelic only saw the hand grenades “about a month before” the killings and also testified that his brother never allowed him to come near the hand grenades, ibid., T. 12. Kazo Zelenika testified that he knows “that a hand grenade was thrown near old Ruza Zelic’s house” and that he has “no idea who threw the grenade, whether it was the soldiers or someone else”, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 93. Kazo Zelenika also testified that while he did compile text for the book “Uzdol and all its victims ” (Ex. 315), “certain changes” had been made to the text describing Ruza Zelic, including the text concerning the alleged throwing of the hand grenade, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr ’05, T. 8-9. In his words, “[s]ome of the people who processed the text changed things around. I provided the data, but then they turned things around.” He also testified that he “never got the information [about the hand grenade throwing]” and that his job was “to provide the data, when people were born, when they died, but they added things later on, so that’s why there’s actually more than I wrote ”, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr ’05, T. 9. See also ibid., T. 78-79. In relation to the weight given to Ex. 315, see supra Section II, para. 21.
2187.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 87.
2188.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 87.
2189.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 87.
2190.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 84.
2191.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 84.
2192.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 85.
2193.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 88. The road junction is depicted on Ex. 356. See also Ex. 355, photograph where Marko Zelic marked the junction, ibid., T. 85-86.
2194.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 89 and 13 Apr ’05, T. 2.
2195.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 89 and 13 Apr ’05, T. 2.
2196.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 89-90.
2197.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr ’05, T. 4.
2198.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr ’05, T. 5.
2199.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr ’05, T. 6. Ex. 357, photograph of the junction where Marko Zelic marked where the bodies were located, “M” for Marija, “S” for Stjepan, and “R” for Ruza. The arrow indicates where Marko Zelic hid during the killings, Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 89 and 13 Apr ’05, T. 6-7. Also Kazo Zelenika saw the dead bodies and described the scene as follows: “Little Stipo was only in his underpants. Ruza had put a coat of some kind on. She put quite a few clothes on, but she was barefoot. The other young girl was barefoot. They didn't have time to take any clothes”, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 25. See also Ex. 312, video where Kazo Zelenika identified Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic and Stjepan Zelic, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 50-51.
2200.Ex. 409, pp. 10-15 (Stjepan Zelic), pp. 16-20 (Ruza Zelic), pp. 109-113 (Marija Zelic). Dr. Simun Andelinovic described how the entry wounds’ characteristics differ depending on the distance. An “absolute range wound” is inflicted from 0-5 centimetres from the barrel point of the firearm. This wound will be star-shaped, i.e. irregular, and at the bottom of the wound there will be burns and gunpowder residue. This type of wound is normally bigger than its corresponding exit wound. A “relatively close wound” is inflicted at a distance of 5 centimetres and longer. How long depends on the type of firearm; it may be up to a metre. The entry wound will be circular in shape and will be surrounded by gunpowder residue. A “far range wound” is also circular, unless the bullet has turned and entered sideways, in which case the wound is oval. What is characteristic of this type of wounds is the so-called contusion ring, the diameter of which could be 1-2 millimetre. If the wound is oval then the contusion ring is more pronounced on one side of the wound than on the other, Simun Andelinovic, 12 May ’05, T. 19-20, T. 67-68.
2201.Ex. 409, p. 10 (Stjepan Zelic ), p. 16 (Ruza Zelic), p. 109 (Marija Zelic).
2202.Ex. 409, p. 11 (Stjepan Zelic was dressed in a woollen sweater and underpants) p. 17 (Ruza Zelic was dressed in a jacket, a pullover, a long-sleeved sweater, a skirt, long underpants, grey woollen socks and a rubber shoe), p. 110 (Marija Zelic was dressed in a short-sleeved T- shirt, long black trousers, a sleeveless undervest and underpants).
2203.See supra Section II, para. 21. Kazo Zelenika did not know who exactly inserted the information about the hand grenade or who edited the book, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr ’05, T. 8-12 and T. 78-79.
2204.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 12-14.
2205.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 12-14. Anica Stojanovic’s house is indicated on Ex. 303 by the number 3, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 28. Janjko Stojanovic is not aware if Anica Stojanovic had any weapons in her house, and he never saw her in the possession of any weapons, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr 05, T. 58.
2206.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 14; Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr ’05, T. 40. See also Ex. 409, p. 145 (Anica Stojanovic was dressed in a knitted sweater, long-sleeved vest, underwear, nylon stockings, white socks, rubber shoes, and gold-coloured earings).
2207.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 13.
2208.Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 12-13. Ex. 347, photograph of Kriz where Janjko Stojanovic marked the place where a soldier shot Anica Stojanovic, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 28. Ivka Stojanovic testified that as she was running away from her house, she saw the body of Anica Stojanovic lying on the ground. She later learned that Anica Stojanovic was dead, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 58, 68. Ivka Stojanovic and Janjko Stojanovic identified the body of Anica Stojanovic in the video Ex. 312, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 36, and Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr '05, T. 27, respectively.
2209.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 12-13 and 05 Apr '05, T. 86, testifying that Ivan Stojanovic was “?pgerhaps 13 or 14 years old” at the time, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 41. The Trial Chamber considers that this Ivan is the same as the “about 14-15” year-old Ivan Stojanovic that Janjko Stojanovic refers to at 12 Apr '05, T. 8, see supra para. 569. Hero Saban died later in an accident, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 12 and 05 Apr ’05, T. 86. Kazo Zelenika also identified Anica Stojanovic on the video in Ex. 312, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 51.
2210.Ex. 409, pp. 144-149.
2211.Simun Andelinovic, 13 May ’05, T. 13. See also Ex. 409, pp. 146-147.
2212.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 84 and 13 Apr ’05, T. 22-23.
2213.Marko Zelic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 84 and 13 Apr ’05, T. 22-23.
2214.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr ’05, T. 23.
2215.Marko Zelic, 13 Apr ’05, T. 23. See also Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked his and his father’s house, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 8.
2216.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 22-23.
2217.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 23-24.
2218.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 23.
2219.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 23. Ivka Stojanovic identified the bodies of Ivan, Ruza and Jadranka Zelenika in the video in Ex. 312, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 34-35.
2220.Ex. 409, p. 116, see also p. 114-118.
2221.Ex. 409, p. 115, see supra fn 2200.
2222.Ex. 409, p. 70, see also pp. 68-72.
2223.Ex. 409, p. 38. See also Simun Anðelinovic, 12 May '05, T. 29.
2224.Ex. 409, p. 38, see also pp. 36-40. Dr. Simun Anðelinovic clarified that contusions do not appear if the victim is already dead, Simun Andelinovic, 12 May '05, T. 31.
2225.Ex. 409, p. 37 (Ruza Zelenika was dressed in a short-sleeved dress, a T-shirt, and long underpants), p. 69 (Jadranka Zelenika was dressed in a tracksuit and a short-sleeved T-shirt, trousers, a vest, knickers and gold-coloured earrings), p. 115 (Ivan Zelenika was dressed in a shirt, jeans, longjohns, and socks).
2226.Witness I, 14 Apr '05, T.  79.
2227.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 20-21 and 05 Apr ’05, T. 27-28. See also Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked Mara and Pavo Grubesa’s house (nr. 7), Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 9-10.
2228.The Trial Chamber has considered the evidence by Witness I.
2229.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 21-22 and 49 (identifying Luca Zelenika on the video in Ex. 312); Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked Luka Zelenika’s house (no. 9), Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 10 (identifying Luca Zelenika on the video in Ex. 312); Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 33, (identifying Luca Zelenika on the video in Ex. 312).
2230.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 21-22 and 45 (identifying Janja Zelenika on the video in Ex. 312).
2231.Ex. 409, p. 52 (Janja Zelenika was dressed in a headscarf, a sweater, a skirt, underpants, socks, rubber shoes and slipper socks) and p. 74 (Luca Zelenika was dressed in a scarf, a hat, a jumper, a sleeveless coat, an underskirt, a dress, a pullover, socks and slipper-socks ).
2232.Ex. 409, pp. 73-77, in particular p. 75 (also describing that some wounds had contused edges, indicating that she was shot from a distance, see supra fn 2200).
2233.Ex. 409, pp. 51-56.
2234.In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes the testimony of Kate Adie, who stated that when she visited the houses in Uzdol on the day after the killings and she noted that there were no signs of looting and damage, she got the impression that there was a pattern of killing: that the soldiers went systematically from house to house, and that the victims had been sought out, looked for in their houses. There was no evidence as to the victims having died because of any military action, such as crossfire. See infra paras 647-648, in particular Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 122 and 126-127.
2235.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 22; Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked Dragica Zelenika’s house (no. 10); Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 10; Ex.  301, diagram marked by Kazo Zelenika (no. 7 indicates Dragica Zelenika’s house); Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr. ’05, T. 22. See supra para. 577.
2236.Ex. 409, p. 63 (Dragica Zelenika was dressed in a T-shirt, a suit of synthetic material and tights).
2237.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 22.
2238.Ex. 409, pp. 62-67, in particular p. 63, which describes contused edges on both entry wounds on the back.
2239.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 19-20; Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked the house of the Perkovic family (no. 6); Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 9 and 48 (identifying Kata Perkovic on the video in Ex. 312); Ex. 301, diagram marked by Kazo Zelenika (no. 4 indicates Kata Perkovic’s house), Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr. '05, T. 19.
2240.Ex. 409, p. 22 (Kata Perkovic was dressed in a dress, underwear, stockings, slipper-socks, and a vest); Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 19-20.
2241.Ex. 409, pp. 21-25.
2242.Ex. 409, p. 129, the autopsy report describes Martin Ratkic as “Elderly”. Ex. 315, the book “Uzdol and all its victims”, p. 32, provides that Martin Ratkic was born in 1925. The Trial Chamber finds no reason to doubt that this is an accurate description of Martin Ratkic’s age at the time of his death.
2243.Also Kata Ratkic is described as “Elderly” in the autopsy report (Ex. 409, p. 139). Ex. 315, the book “Uzdol and all its victims”, p. 34, provides that Kata Ratkic was born in 1928. The Trial Chamber finds no reason to doubt that this is an accurate description of Kata Ratkic’s age at the time of her death.
2244.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 32-33. The house of Martin Ratkic and Kata Ratkic is indicated by no. 4 on Ex. 303. No. 5 indicates the house of the brother, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 32. Also Ivka Stojanovic saw the bodies of Martin and Kata Ratkic, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 25. See also Ex. 373, video.
2245.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 32-33.
2246.Ex. 409, p. 130 (Martin Ratkic was dressed in a jacked, shirt, T-shirt, trousers, underpants, socks and rubber shoes), and p. 140 (Kata Ratkic was dressed in a sleeve-less coat, apron, a dress, underwear, stockings and rubber shoes).
2247.Ex. 409, pp. 129-130; Simun Andelinovic, 12 May ’05, T. 34-35.
2248.Simun Andelinovic, 12 May ’05, T. 45-49. According to the autopsy report, the right ear had been removed after Martin Ratkic died, Simun Andelinovic, 12 May ’05, T. 34, testifying that this could have been done by small animals, like rodents. It also appeared on the video in Ex. 373 (at 01.40) that the right ear was still intact when the video was taken, Simun Andelinovic, 12 May ’05, T. 32. See also generally concerning difference of wounds inflicted before and after death, Simun Andelinovic, 13 May ’05, T. 8.
2249.Ex. 409, p. 140.
2250.Ex. 409, p. 141.
2251.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 27 and 51 (identifying Anto Stojanovic on the video in Ex. 312); Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 25; see also T. 36-39 testifying regarding the video in Ex. 312; Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 20, who also identified the body of Anto Stojanovic in the video Ex. 312, Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 26. Anto Stojanovic’s house is indicated on Ex. 307 by no. 1, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 28.
2252.Ex. 409, p. 135 (Anto Stojanovic was dressed in a shirt, underpants and socks); Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 27 (also testifying that Anto Stojanovic was not wearing any shoes); Janjko Stojanovic, 12 Apr ’05, T. 20 (testifying that Anto Stojanovic was wearing socks, not shoes, and long underpants, not regular trousers).
2253.Ex. 409, p. 136.
2254.Ex. 409, p. 124, the autopsy report describes Serafina Stojanovic as “elderly person”. Ex. 315 on p. 22 (the book “Uzdol and all its victims”) provides that Serafina Stojanovic was born in 1922. The Trial Chamber finds no reason to doubt that this is an accurate description of Serafina Stojanovic’s age at the time of her death.
2255.Ruza Stojanovic, Ex. 465, p. 5.
2256.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 33-34. The house of Franjo and Serafina Stojanovic is circled on Ex. 309, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 35.
2257.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 34.
2258.Ex. 409, pp. 150-154, in particular p. 152.
2259.Ex. 409, pp. 124-128, in particular p. 126.
2260.Ex. 409, p. 125 (Serafina Stojanovic was dressed in a dress, a vest, a scarf, underpants, socks, and boots ) and p. 151 (Franjo Stojanovic was dressed in a pullover, a shirt, a T-shirt, trousers, underwear and socks).
2261.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 38 and 52 (identifying Stanko Rajic, Lucija Rajic, Sima Rajic and Mara Rajic on the video in Ex. 312). The locations of the bodies are marked on Ex. 305, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 38 and 40.
2262.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 25. Ivka Stojanovic also identified the bodies on the video in Ex. 312, Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 36-38.
2263.Ex. 409, pp. 78-84, noting on p. 80 that there were contusion rings around some of the entry wounds.
2264.Ex. 409, pp. 85-91, noting on p. 87 that there were contusion rings around some of the entry wounds.
2265.Ex. 409, pp. 57-61,
2266.Ex. 409, pp. 119-123.
2267.Ex. 409, p. 58 (Sima Rajic was dressed in a scarf, sweater, a sleeveless cape, long-sleeved T-shirt, an apron, an undershirt, longjohns, stockings and rubber shoes), p. 79 (Stanko Rajic was dressed in a jacket, a sweater, a T-shirt, two pairs of trousers, longjohns, socks and shoes), p. 86 (Lucija Rajic was dressed in a scarf, a sweater, a coat, a pullover, a vest, knickers, socks, slipper-socks and rubber shoes), p. 120 (Mara Rajic was dressed in a pullover, a long-sleeved T-shirt, a bra, a skirt, tights and slippers ).
2268.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 37; Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr '05, T. 36-37.
2269.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 49-50, recounting what Jela Dzalto’s sister had told him.
2270.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 38-39.
2271.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 49-50.
2272.Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 38. See supra paras 535-538.
2273.Ex. 315, p. 52.
2274.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 54.
2275.There were two women by the name of Ivka Rajic, one born in 1921 and married to Mijo Rajic, and one born in 1934 and married to Domin Rajic (see infra para. 634), Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 72.
2276.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 39 and 53 (identifying Mijo Rajic on the video in Ex. 312); Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 27.
2277.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 39-40 and 53 (identifying Ivka Rajic on the video in Ex. 312); Ivka Stojanovic, 06 Apr ’05, T. 27. Ivka Stojanovic also identified the bodies of Mijo Rajic and Ivka Rajic on the video in Ex. 312, 06 Apr ’05, T. 38-39.
2278.Ex. 409, p. 32 (Ivka Rajic was dressed in a scarf and a T-shirt), and p. 47 (Mijo Rajic was dressed in a sweater, a shirt, trousers, long underpants, and socks).
2279.Ex. 409,pp. 46-50, see in particular p. 48.
2280.Ex. 409, pp. 31-35. On p. 33 the autopsy report mentions that the exit wound was star-shaped, see supra fn 2200.
2281.Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked Domin Rajic’s house (no. 5); and Ex. 300, sketch of Uzdol drawn by Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 9 and 15.
2282.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 17 and 47-48 (identifying Domin Rajic, Ivka Rajic and Ivo Rajic on the video in Ex. 312; Ivo Rajic (at 17.05), who is dressed in a uniform).
2283.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 18, and 47-48 (identifying Domin Rajic and Zorka Glibo on the video in Ex. 312 ).
2284.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 17-18. Ivo appeared to have been hit over the head with something because “he had a bulge on his head”, ibid; Ex. 409, p. 99 (Domin Rajic was dressed in a sweater, a shirt, an undershirt, trousers, underpants, socks and shoes), p. 27 (Ivka Rajic (1934) was dressed in a scarf, sweaters, a T-shirt, a vest, a skirt, underwear, socks and rubber shoes), p. 93 (Zorka Glibo was dressed in a sweater, a pullover, a short-sleeved dress, a vest, underwear, socks and slipper-socks).
2285.Ex. 409, p. 100, “An external examination of the back revealed two entry wounds caused by the action of projectiles fired from a hand-held firearm”, also mentioning contused edges of the entry wounds. See also pp. 98-102.
2286.Ex. 409, pp. 26-30.
2287.Ex. 409, p. 94, “A defect was observed in the head area, on the left side of the chin […] with a contused ring […] The projectile wound was caused by the action of a projectile discharged by a firearm at long range.” See also pp. 92-97.
2288.In the B/C/S original, ”MOS ”, which means the “Muslim armed forces”, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr ’05, T. 62-63.
2289.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 18, referring to Ex. 316. The document is not signed by Josip Prskalo, but by “Commander Ante Pavlovic”. Kazo Zelenika has never seen it before, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 17-18. Kazo Zelenika testified that as far as he knows Domin Rajic was not mobilised in 1993, Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 45. The Trial Chamber has found that Josip Prskalo was the Commander of the 42nd Home Guard Battalion of the Rama Brigade, see supra para. 550.
2290.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 20-21, testifying that “(Kata Ljubic( did not have a uniform. She didn’t have a weapon. They’d bring in a tonne of flour and they would have to bake the bread, all elderly women. But Kata was there, and there were other women baking the bread too. Ivka baked bread too” (emphasis added).
2291.Ex. 299, photograph depicting the hamlets comprising Uzdol where Kazo Zelenika marked Mato and Kata Ljubic’s house (no. 8); and Ex. 300, sketch of Uzdol drawn by Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 10 and 15.
2292.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 18.
2293.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 18-19, and 48 (identifying Mato Ljubic and Kata Ljubic on the video in Ex. 312 ). See also Ex. 409, p. 42 (Kata Ljubic was dressed in a woven pullover, T-shirt, undershirt, a skirt, slipper-socks, and rubber shoes) and p. 104 (Mato Ljubic was dressed in a jacket, a sweater, a shirt, a vest, trousers, socks, and rubber shoes).
2294.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr ’05, T. 25.
2295.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr ’05, T. 18 and 05 Apr ’05, T. 25.
2296.Ex. 409, pp. 103-108, in particular p. 104-105 noting that there was gunpowder residue around the entry wound.
2297.Ex. 409, pp. 41-45, in particular p. 43.
2298.Simun Andelinovic, 12 May ’05, T. 76-77.
2299.Kazo Zelenika, 04 Apr '05, T. 44 (testifying that “I know that at the beginning of the war she made bread […] but this didn’t go on for a very long time. After a while we stopped making our own bread and we were again supplied with bread […] It could have been two or three days; it could have been as long as a month. We made bread ourselves until we got fresh supplies of bread) and 05 Apr '05, T. 20-21 (testifying that she did not have a uniform or a weapon).
2300.Ex. 315, p. 65.
2301.Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 23-24, referring to Ex. 317. The certificate provides that it has been “issued upon finding out the factual situation regarding the cause of death on the basis of the commanding officer’s original report. It will be used for gaining permanent right and cannot be used for any other purposes”, Kazo Zelenika has never seen it before, Kazo Zelenika, 05 Apr '05, T. 24.
2302.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  115 and 116-117.
2303.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  25 and 71. Kate Adie added that the school appeared to be virtually empty on the ground floor. There was no communication equipment nor uniformed members of the HVO with radios upstairs at the time because they would not wish to show anything to the British Army, Kate Adie, 18 April 05, T. 71-72.
2304.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  25. According to Kate Adie, the bloodstains looked as if someone had attempted to clean the place up, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 25. According to Witness G, the Bosnian Muslims who were in the camps in Prozor were engaged a day or two later to clean the school, Witness G, 07 Apr '05, T. 67. Kate Adie did not notice any remains of an army tank near the school, nor did she hear that there had been one there which had been destroyed the previous day, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 51-52.
2305.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  19-20.
2306.Nobody could explain to her the reason for this, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 129. Kate Adie testified that there seemed to be no substantial difference in the state of the bodies that she saw in Prozor and in Uzdol. The bodies in Prozor and in Uzdol were all wrapped in the same type of blankets. According to her, the cause and time of death appeared to be the same, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 131-132.
2307.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  20-21. Kate Adie said that despite the fact that misleading information was provided by the parties to the conflict, and despite the fact that when she went into the village she was very aware that things could have been arranged, at no point she saw any dramatic, over exaggerated “display of the bodies”. It seemed to her that the bodies were lying where they had been shot, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 128-129.
2308.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  21 and 23-24.
2309.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  24-25.
2310.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  25. Kate Adie testified that a few buildings were wrecked, they had been burnt, and there was a smouldering building. According to her, there were no major shell or mortar holes, or anything resembling any large, heavy weaponry being fired at all, nor were there any shell damages against the walls of large buildings. There was absolutely no evidence of artillery fire, there was only signs of small-arms fire, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 52.
2311.There was a house with some fire damage on the outside: there were the roof tiles coming off, suggesting that the interior of the house had gone up and that the roof had collapsed, Kate Adie, 18 April 05, T. 76.
2312.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  122 and 126-127. What she means with “systematically” is that someone must have taken the decision, individually or through an order, and a voice must have been raised saying "kill whoever you can find", ibid., T. 127.
2313.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  127.
2314.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  27.
2315.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  119.
2316.Unless, Kate Adie conceded, they knew that there had in fact been quite a few Bosnian Croat soldiers in the village who had shot at Bosnian Muslim soldiers, or who had run away, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 119-120.
2317.Ex. 373 and 374. The two videos are more or less similar, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 29-33.
2318.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  27-28.
2319.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  28.
2320.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  28.
2321.Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T.  35.
2322.Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 6.
2323.Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 6. According to Kate Adie, all warring sides had propaganda outfits. She testified that they used whatever information assisted their cause, even making information up. Often, even false or exaggerated claims about atrocities were put out over those media outlets. They were unreliable, unless one constantly monitored their information and their sources, Kate Adie, 18 Apr '05, T. 107-108.
2324.Mehmed Behlo, Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, which was operating next to the area of the Prozor Independent Battalion, testified that he learned about the killings of villagers in Uzdol several days after the operation on 14 September 1993. He said that he heard this information from his security officer, whom, in his turn, had heard it on Radio Rama. He also said that probably some soldiers had heard it on this radio station, Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun '05, T. 6-7 and 46-47. Witness H testified that he found out about the killing of Bosnian Croat civilians about a month after the operation of 14th September. He heard about it on Radio Rama. Soldiers in Uzdol said they had heard on Radio Rama that there had been an operation in the village of Uzdol and that some Croat civilians had been killed. Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 37. Witness J testified that information about civilians having been killed in Uzdol was probably broadcast on the radio. He said that the first thing he heard was on the Croatian media, which had reported that there had been over 100 civilians killed. Later on, the numbers varied, Witness J, 07 Jul '05, T. 28 and 40-41.
2325.Witness H, 14 Apr '05, T. 58.
2326.Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 7-8. Between the 16th and the 18th Sefko Hodzic learned that some civilians had been killed in Uzdol between 16 and 18 September 1993, from a cousin in Dre‘nica, who had seen it on CNN or on some other TV station. He also saw excerpts from that report on some TV station, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar '05, T. 7 and 9.
2327.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 14-15 and 20; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 50.
2328.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 16-19; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 35-36.
2329.Ex. 137, Rules for the Military Security Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo 1992 (emphasis added) The Trial Chamber also notes Article 39 of the Rules for the Military Security Service, which reads:
[t]he work and powers of the internal affairs organs as laid down by the [law on criminal procedure] relate also to the conduct of and action taken by authorised officers of the Military Security Service in pre-trial and criminal proceedings within the frame of their competence.
2330.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 14-15.
2331.Ex. 136, Compilation of Rules of Procedure in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrade 1978. (emphasis added).
2332.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 72-73 and 24 May ’05, T. 47; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 37 and 85.
2333.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 41 and 47-48; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 46; Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 44. The military police would secure the area and arrest the perpetrators, while the civilian police would assist in carrying out the on-site investigation or take witness statements, if so requested by the ABiH, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T.  45-49.
2334.Selmo Cikotic, 24 Feb ’05, T. 47.
2335.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 44; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 49-50.
2336.Ex. 107, as published in the Official Gazette of RBiH on 13 August 1992, Art. 71 of the Rules on Military Discipline, which also provides that the disciplinary investigation may last for a maximum of three days from the day it commences. Ex. 107 reads in relevant parts:
Article 2: Military discipline is the correct, complete and prompt execution of military duties in the Army, in conformity with the law, service regulations and other regulations and orders of superiors in charge.
Article 3: A serviceman who, in the line of duty or in connection with the performance of duties, breaches military discipline shall be held accountable in disciplinary proceedings for an error of discipline or a disciplinary infraction. An error of discipline constitutes a lesser breach of discipline. A disciplinary infraction constitutes a more serious breach of military discipline.
Article 5: For criminal offences or misdemeanours, servicemen shall be accountable in accordance with the regulations regulating criminal offences or the regulations regulating misdemeanours in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Article 6: The accountability of a serviceman for a criminal offence or misdemeanour does not exclude his being held accountable for the same offence as a breach of military discipline too, if, according to these Rules, such offences constitute a breach of military discipline.
Article 8: An action by a serviceman which is not in line of duty and is incompatible with the duty of serviceman shall be considered a breach of military discipline. This relates in particular to: 1) the commission of a criminal offence for base motives […] 3) a serious violation of public morals […]
Article 22: Military superiors in the Army specified under these Rules shall have the authority to establish responsibility for errors of discipline.
Article 44: Military disciplinary courts shall have the authority to try disciplinary infraction […]
Article 67: The provisions of these Rules shall be applied accordingly in a state of war, provided, that as a rule, in a state of war no measures are pronounced whose execution given the conditions and circumstances under which they are to be carried out, is inapplicable or impossible.
Article 68: Decisions on disciplinary accountability for breaches of military discipline during a state of war shall be taken as a matter of urgency.
2337.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 9-11 and 08 Feb ’05, T. 102; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 46-47 and 49. See also Ex. 107, Articles 22-24 and 35.
2338.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 10 and 19; Salko Gusic testified that the perpetrators of the crimes committed in Grabovica (Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 21-22):
would definitely not be punished under a disciplinary procedure. There has to be a criminal proceeding instigated, although there could have been a sort of a disciplinary procedure conducted at the same time for some minor breach that was related to this crime. But definitely the perpetrator of the crime should have been prosecuted, meaning that there would be investigations and prosecutions, both by the civilian MUP and by the military prosecutor’s office.
See also Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 31-32; Ex. 107, Article 6.
2339.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 39; Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 44. There were instructions issued by the Main Staff stating that each army member was duty-bound to report crimes, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 42. According to Salko Gusic, most often squad or platoon commanders would be the first to learn about crimes committed because they would be in direct contact with the soldiers, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 37.
2340.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 38 and 41-42 and 08 Feb ’05, T. 102; Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar '05, T. 54; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05 T. 35-36.
2341.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb '05, T. 102.
2342.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 95. See also Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 41.
2343.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 95. See also Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 41.
2344.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 38.
2345.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb '05, T. 40; Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 41. As a rule, the unit commander could not terminate investigations initiated by either the security organ or the military police, Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 41-42.
2346.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb '05, T. 37. The military police could start collecting evidence once they learnt that a crime was committed, but needed the approval of the military prosecutor in order to launch a “full-scale” investigation, ibid.
2347.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr '05, T. 98. As to the security organ reporting to the superior security organ, see also Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar '05, T. 37-38.
2348.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 47 and 08 Feb ’05, T. 102; Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 34-35; Ex. 137, Articles 40-41. Nermin Eminovic, Chief of the SVB of the 6th Corps, testified that in the investigation of crimes committed by members of the military he had to discuss with the military police all the information it had collected, to analyse it, and to carry out certain measures that fall under the scope of the military police work. If there was evidence that a crime had been committed, a criminal report would be sent to the military prosecutor or investigating judge. The reports against the perpetrators of crimes were signed by the unit commander, Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 63. The military prosecutor in charge of the case could request the military police and the security organs at the appropriate level to provide additional information, clarifications and case material that might be relevant for taking appropriate steps, Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 39.
2349.Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 35; Ex. 137, Articles 40-41.
2350.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 96-97. Vahid Karavelic testified that “the commander’s mission as it pertains to a given combat task or operation always comes first”, ibid.
2351.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 97. Vahid Karavelic testified that “an operation cannot be stopped simply because an individual, civilian or not, has been killed, or five individuals, or ten individuals, if we are looking at a large scale operation or mission”, ibid.
2352.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 95-97.
2353.Vahid Karavelic, 20 Apr ’05, T. 96-97.
2354.Namik Dzankovic testified that in February 1993, he became a security operative for the Main Staff, i.e. a soldier working in the field. He further testified that when he started to work at the Main Staff UB, he learned how to interview people, gather data, and make official notes from more senior colleagues. He did not receive any particular training in crime scene investigation or evidence collection, Namik Dzankovic, 21 March ’05, T. 2-3. For the task of Namik Dzankovic within the Inspection Team, see supra Section IV.C, para. 205.
2355.Namik Dzankovic testified that during the night after he returned from Grabovica with Vehbija Karic, where they visited the troops that had just arrived from Sarajevo, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 12-13. The Trial Chamber has found that this visit took place on 8 September 1993, see supra Section IV.C, para. 289.
2356.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 20.
2357.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 27.
2358.Vehbija Karic first testified that they were informed by Namik Dzankovic on the morning of 8 September, but then, after checking his notes, stated that it was in the morning of 9 September, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 82, 119-120.
2359.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 28-29. The Trial Chamber notes that Namik Dzankovic’s testimony as to when he first spoke with members of the Jablanica SJB is inconsistent with the testimony of Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic, see infra fn 2403.
2360.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 29.
2361.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  70-71. See supra Section IV.D, para. 413.
2362.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  73-74; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 2.
2363.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 4 and 31.
2364.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  74.
2365.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  74.
2366.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  90.
2367.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  73; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 31. Emin Zebic further testified that in September 1993, there was no pathological specialist in the Jablanica hospital. The nearest pathologist was in Sarajevo, but it was impossible to transport 30 bodies from Grabovica to Sarajevo; however he stated that had anyone requested it and organised it, a pathologist could have come from Sarajevo to Grabovica, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 63 and 83-84. Also Bakir Alispahic testified that for autopsies the services of the hospital centre in Sarajevo were used, because at the time neither the army nor MUP had appropriate services within their own framework, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 48.
2368.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 72-73. Bakir Alispahic testified that it was clear that members of the army had committed the crimes and that Emin Zebic had at least mentioned to him that members of the 9th Brigade having committed the crimes. The civilian police wanted a thorough investigation to be carried out to establish the identity of the perpetrators in order to facilitate the task of the military police and “other judicial system organs.” There was a concern that if the perpetrators were not identified and isolated they might commit further crimes. “In view of the situation and in view of who these people were, they represented a risk for the army”, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 35-37. Bakir Alispahic testified that he insisted that the problem be taken seriously and be resolved, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 35. He further stated that while the SDB had the authority to collect intelligence and security-related information, the SJB had no authority to investigate the events unless requested by the military to assist, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 42. However, as to the body or organ having the authority or power to investigate the murders in Grabovica, Bakir Alispahic testified that he could not be specific and that it would have been the military judicial bodies or the civilian judicial bodies that should have reacted, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 42-43.
2369.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  29.
2370.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  37 and 85.
2371.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  50.
2372.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  75.
2373.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 97. The vehicle was identified by police markings, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18  Mar ’05, T. 36.
2374.See supra Section IV.D, para 408.
2375.See supra Section IV.D, para. 411.
2376.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  77-78; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 12.
2377.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  12 and 41.
2378.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  78-79. Emin Zebic testified that he did not know with whom Safet Cibo spoke on the telephone, Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 80.
2379.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  80-81.
2380.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 3.
2381.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ‘05, T.  81 and 17 Mar ‘05, T. 46.
2382.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ‘05, T. 3-4; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 82, 84 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 47.
2383.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  84.
2384.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  85 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 83.
2385.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 10.
2386.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 14.
2387.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 15.
2388.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 15. Bakir Alispahic further testified that in the evening of 10 September, he met with Sefer Halilovic and Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Minister for Energy, in Konjic, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 20-21, referring to Ex. 118, order of Sefer Halilovic, dated 9 September 1993, addressed to the 4th Corps command, to inform Bakir Alispahic of the meeting scheduled for 10 September 1993 at 19:00 hours. At the meeting there was also an informal discussion about the events in Grabovica, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 23.
2389.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 73.
2390.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  85 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 89; Bakir Alispahic, 26 May ’05, T. 32.
2391.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 27. Namik Dzankovic testified that it was “the day after the killings, in the evening”, ibid.
2392.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 28.
2393.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 28. The Trial Chamber notes that Namik Dzankovic’s testimony as to when he first spoke with members of the Jablanica SJB is inconsistent with the testimony of Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic, see infra fn 2403.
2394.Ex. 215, Report by Namik Dzankovic to Jusuf Jasarevic, p. 3.
2395.Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 26. Emin Zebic testified that Sead Brankovic informed him that Sefer Halilovic appealed to him and Namik Dzankovic and insisted that an investigation be conducted, but that he could not remember the date, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, 78-79. Sefko Hodzic testified that when he spoke with Sefer Halilovic on 9 September and asked him whether he had heard about the killings in Grabovica, Sefer Halilovic told Sefko Hodzic that there were people around whose duty was to investigate these matters. See supra Section IV.D, para. 519.
2396.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 31.
2397.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 32.
2398.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 40. The Trial Chamber notes that according to Vehbija Karic, Sefer Halilovic was informed in detail about the events in Grabovica by Namik Dzankovic and the other members of the Inspection Team on 10 September, see supra Section IV.D, para. 522.
2399.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  49.
2400.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 12-13 and 56.
2401.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 15. Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Semsudin Halebic, a member of the 44th Brigade came to the Jablanica SJB and that the two men went to interview Alija Turkic together, ibid. See also Ex. 222, p. 2.
2402.See supra Section IV.D, para. 424.
2403.The Trial Chamber notes that according to Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic, Sead Brankovic was a member of the Mostar CSB and placed at the Jablanica SJB in August and September 1993, Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 7-8; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 40. Namik Dzankovic testified that Sead Brankovic was a member of the Mostar SDB, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 10.
2404.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  87. Emin Zebic testified that Namik Dzankovic had been introduced to Emin Zebic by Sead Brankovic as a member of the SVB, ibid.
2405.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  89 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 51.
2406.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  88-89 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 53. Namik Dzankovic testified that during the night after he returned from Grabovica, where he had visited with Vehbija Karic the units that had just arrived from Sarajevo, he heard in the hotel in Jablanica where he was staying, that civilians had been killed in Grabovica, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 12 and 20. The same night, Namik Dzankovic went together with Sead Brankovic, who was staying in the same hotel, to the Jablanica SJB in order to find out whether Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic had heard about the events in Grabovica, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 20-21. Having already heard about the crimes they discussed how to gather as much information as possible and to see what they should do. They agreed that Namik Dzankovic, Sead Brankovic and Ahmed Salihamidzic should talk to Zulfikar Alispago to see whether he could provide them with more information about the crimes, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 22. Namik Dzankovic testified that he was not sure whether they went to Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment that same night or the following nighT. Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 22. Confronted with the chronology of events as described in the official note written by Ahmed Salihamidzic (Ex. 222), Namik Dzankovic stated that after 12 years, he cannot be a 100 % certain whether a particular meeting was on 8, 9, or 10 September 1993. Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that he met Namik Dzankovic for the first time on 10 September and does not recall further meetings with him in the SJB, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 59-60.
2407.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 31.
2408.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  89 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 57. Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Namik Dzankovic was already there when he arrived at Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 18 and 70.
2409.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 18 and 70.
2410.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 19.
2411.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 19.
2412.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 20 and T. 63-65; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 24 and 22 Mar ’05, T. 9 and 12. Ramiz Delalic testified that he went to Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment on the evening of 10 September, but that Ahmed Salihamidzic, Namik Dzankovic and Sead Brankovic were not present; and that Zulfikar Alispago was drunk, Ramiz Delalic, 19 May ’05, T. 92-93. The Trial Chamber notes that Ramiz Delalic’s testimony is contradictory to the other reliable evidence before the Trial Chamber in this respect.
2413.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 22. According to Namik Dzankovic, he, Sead Brankovic and Ahmed Salihamidzic spent around an hour in Zulfikar Alispago’s apartmenT. When they left, Zulfikar Alispago and Ramiz Delalic stayed behind, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 25. However, Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Ramiz Delalic left after he had the discussion with Zulfikar Alispago about withdrawing his troops to Sarajevo, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 20.
2414.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 76. Nermin Eminovic testified that this was only preliminary information as the information was conveyed to him by an open telephone line, Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 76. The Trial Chamber also notes Ex. 153, report from the 44th Brigade, dated 9 September 1993, signed by Zajko Sihirlic, Assistant Commander for Security and Fadil Kevric, Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security, addressed to the 6th Corps SVB, providing information as to killings committed in Grabovica.
2415.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 77.
2416.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 37-38.
2417.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 27. Bakir Alispahic further testified that he told Rasim Delic that he had talked with the Minister of Energy, Rusmir Ahmutcehajic, about the events while they met in Konjic, ibid.
2418.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 27-28.
2419.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 38-39. See infra para. 680.
2420.Bakir Alispahic understood that Jusuf Jasarevic was familiar with the case, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T.  40-41.
2421.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 28.
2422.Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 10.
2423.According to Vehbija Karic, until the return of the Inspection Team to Sarajevo, and up until the investigation in the framework of the “Trebevic Operation,” towards the end of October 1993, they only knew that the perpetrators were members of the 9th and 10th Brigades, Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T. 124.
2424.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  120-121. According to Vehbija Karic, the Inspection Team did not have any authority to file criminal reports and initiate court proceedings, ibid.
2425.Vehbija Karic, Ex. 444, T.  121.
2426.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  59.
2427.Ex. 222, which consists of the official note drafted by Ahmed Salihamidzic and a report drafted by Sead Brankovic on 13 September 1993.
2428.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 13, 22-24, 51; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 86. The information contained in the report included the interviews with Ivan and Stoja Pranjic and the guard of the hydroelectric plant, Alija Turkic; as well as the informal meeting in Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment, Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 23-24; Ex. 222.
2429.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 53; Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T. 58.
2430.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  60-62.
2431.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 73-74. Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 77. Salko Gusic further testified that he did not know what Nermin Eminovic’s role was in the investigations, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 60. There was no reason for him, as the Commander of the 6th Corps, to know of the correspondence between Jusuf Jasarevic and Nermin Eminovic as that went along the security chain of command, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 57.
2432.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 73-74.
2433.Salko Gusic understood the phrase “units from Sarajevo” to refer to the which were parts from the 9th, the 10th and the Delta Brigade, Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 75. The Trial Chamber notes that the Delta Brigade did not leave Sarajevo, see supra Section IV.C, para 231.
2434.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 73-75.
2435.Salko Gusic, 07 Feb ’05, T. 22.
2436.Ex. 157. According to Salko Gusic, Rasim Delic’s order was addressed to him only because Rasim Delic received the information from Dzevad Tirak, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 78. Salko Gusic further testified that Dzevad Tirak violated procedure because Salko Gusic did not send him to provide the information to Rasim Delic nor did he give his approval, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 74-75.
2437.Ex. 157, preamble.
2438.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 46 and 51. Salko Gusic was absent at that time, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T.  51-52.
2439.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 53. The 6th Corps command asked for the withdrawal of these troops because they believed that those troops could not contribute to any offensive operations, but, knowing of their “bad reputation,” could only cause problems. The news about the crimes committed in Grabovica only reinforced Dzevad Tirak’s views in this respect, Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 66.
2440.Dzevad Tirak, 30 Mar ’05, T. 58-59 and 31 Mar ’05, T. 45.
2441.Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T.  94 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 63-64. Zajko Sihirlic, Assistant Commander for Security of the 44th Brigade, stated that he was present at the command of the 44th Brigade when a meeting was held in September 1993 with Bakir Alispahic, Senad Dzino and representatives of the authorities in Jablanica, where the crimes committed in Grabovica were discussed and Zajko Sihirlic was told that the investigation would be conducted in Sarajevo, Zajko Sihirlic, Ex. 460, p. 2.
2442.Ex. 224, order of the Main Staff UB, dated 12 September 1993, signed by Jusuf Jasarevic. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he probably had found out about the crimes in the afternoon or evening of 11 September, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 74.
2443.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 79.
2444.Ex. 119, report from the 6th Corps Military Police Battalion to the 6th Corps Security Organ.
2445.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 80-81. In the report, Nusret Sahic further stated that he was told about the “slaughtering” of 20 Bosnian Croat civilians by unknown perpetrators of the ABiH. He had attempted to go to Grabovica, but was told that it was “dangerous” to go to the crime scene and inspect what happened as the units located in that area “ kept everything under control”, Ex. 119, p. 1.
2446.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 80-81. Nermin Eminovic testified that the order from the “IKM” had to be obeyed because of the following reasons: it was an order, the units involved in the operation were not part of the 6th Corps and not under its command, and because there was nothing to be relied on officially as there was nobody Nermin Eminovic could communicate with within the Security Service, Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 81-82. According to Nermin Eminovic, “the command” could postpone some activities until later if carrying out these activities would cause greater damage, Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 83.
2447.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 42, confronted with Ex. 214.
2448.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 79.
2449.See supra Section IV.D, para. 428.
2450.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 33. When Namik Dzankovic saw Samir Pezo he asked him what exactly had happened, but Samir Pezo told him not to ask. Samir Pezo also said that he was on guard duty around the old railway station where the 2nd Independent Battalion command was billeted, because he was afraid for his soldiers who were of a different ethnicity, ibid. Then Adnan Solakovic approached them and when he heard what they were talking about, told them to stop thinking about it, and that combat operations had started, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 34. At that point, Ramiz Delalic, together with “Dzeki”, Commander of the Handzar Division and Edib Saric, Commander of the Igman Wolves, arrived in a jeep from the direction of Jablanica, ibid. He further testified that his attempt to discuss the events with Samir Pezo and Adnan Solakovic “came up against a wall”. They appeared to be unhappy and depressed about what had happened in Grabovica, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 32.
2451.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 34.
2452.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 34-35.
2453.Jusuf Jasarevic testified that Namik Dzankovic only reported to him as it concerned a possible war crime which was an intelligence-related issue and because Sefer Halilovic had ordered him to do so, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 85. He further testified that Namik Dzankovic’s proposals were unrealistic and that it was unclear to whom they were addressed, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 3, 8.
2454.Ex. 215; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 36-37. The report stated amongst other information, the following : that on 8 September, ABiH units from Sarajevo, commanded by Ramiz Delalic, came to Grabovica within the scope of a planned operation towards Mostar; that the units were “put up” on the right bank in Grabovica in houses owned by Bosnian Croats; that in the night of 8 September, rifle shots were heard in Grabovica almost all night and that in the morning of 9 September the news spread that the Bosnian Croat civilian population had been massacred by ABiH members from Sarajevo; that Edib Saric, Commander of the Igman Wolves, confirmed that several murders had been committed on the right bank in Grabovica, but that he did not know the scope of the crime nor who the perpetrators were; that the Deputy Chief of the Jablanica SJB went to the crime scene together with the Jablanica military police commander on 9 September, where two inhabitants provided the names of people who probably were killed; that the Deputy Chief of the Jablanica SJB again interviewed these inhabitants about the events on 10 September; that Zulfikar Alispago wrote a report about the events which he would forward to the Supreme Command in Sarajevo; that according to Namik Dzankovic, eleven Bosnian Croat civilians were killed and that he assumed that some of the bodies had been thrown into the reservoir of the hydro electric power plant ; and that fourteen adults and two children, all Bosnian Croats, had been evacuated from the area to Jablanica. The report further stated that the present situation in Grabovica was under control and the fact that Ramiz Delalic executed one of his soldiers had contributed to this. See also Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 21-22. The Trial Chamber notes that Namik Dzankovic testified that Zulfikar Alispago told him that he wrote a report, when they were at the apartment of Zulfikar Alispago, but that he, Namik Dzankovic was never provided with a copy of that report, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 7, 9-10.
2455.Namik Dzankovic testified that he intended to convey in that report that it was impossible at the time to carry out an on-site inspection, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 17.
2456.Namik Dzankovic further stated that he would not have been protected in Grabovica, but also if an investigation team would have gone down there, there would have been a conflict, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 18, 21. Ramiz Delalic, however, testified that no soldiers were arrested at the time even though it could have been done very easily as most of the soldiers billeted in Grabovica were not in favour of the crimes, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 9. He further stated that he was not hostile towards an investigation, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 46.
2457.Ex. 215, pp. 2-3.
2458.Ex. 215, p. 3.
2459.Both Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that Namik Dzankovic’s proposal to establish a mixed commission consisting of MUP officials and the SVB led by military investigation organs never reached the Jablanica SJB, Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 85; Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 28, referring to Ex. 215. The Trial Chamber recalls that Grabovica fell under the jurisdiction of the Mostar SJB. See supra para. 663.
2460.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 36. Namik Dzankovic testified that he had only a small amount of experience as criminal investigator and had never been involved in any major criminal investigation, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 3, 32. It was impossible for Namik Dzankovic to assemble a team of professionals and experts. Such personnel was not available in Jablanica and he did not have the authority to issue any orders to this effect, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 31.
2461.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 37.
2462.Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 32-33.
2463.Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 18.
2464.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 79; Ex. 214, communication from 6th Corps SVB, dated 14 September 1993. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he received the report on 15 September, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 75.
2465.Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he sent the request to Namik Dzankovic to find out what Namik Dzankovic could do and to receive information about what actually had happened. He sent the request via the 6th Corps, because he did not know where Namik Dzankovic was, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 50.
2466.Ex. 225, request to report, dated 15 September.
2467.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 85.
2468.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 86 and 11 Mar ’05, T. 41-43; Ex. 154, request from 6th Corps SVB, addressed to Zajko Sihirlic, Assistant Commander for Security, dated 14 September 1993. Zajko Sihirlic stated that he heard about the crimes committed in Grabovica, but that he did not participate in any investigation, Zajko Sihirlic, Ex. 460, p. 1. The Trial Chamber notes that the statement of Zajko Sihirlic is in contradiction to evidence before the Trial Chamber as to the involvement of members of the 44th Brigade in the investigation, see supra paras 663, 665 and 682; see also infra para. 696. The Trial Chamber further notes in this respect Ex. 153, report from 44th Brigade, signed by Zajko Sihirlic, and Fadil Kevric, Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security, addressed to the 6th Corps command, SVB, dated 9 September 1993, providing information as to murders committed in Grabovica and as to the Jablanica SJB and the military police visiting the site and stating that new information will be provided.
2469.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 47; Ex. 268, request for a report dated 15 September.
2470.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 37-38. Nermin Eminovic also testified that he and Namik Dzankovic did not report to one another, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 53-54
2471.Ex. 226, Report from 6th Corps SVB, addressed to Main Staff UB, Jusuf Jasarevic personally, dated 17 September 1993; Nermin Eminovic 10 Mar ’05, T. 86 referring to Ex. 226. The Trial Chamber notes that this report contains almost the same information as Namik Dzankovic’s second report (Ex. 215). Jusuf Jasarevic testified that this report was received on 20 September, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 54-55. Ex 226 included information that giving prominence to these events would result “in revolt” of the units lead by Ramiz Delalic and their return to Sarajevo.
2472.Nermin Eminovic testified that maybe some information came also from Namik Dzankovic, but he did not receive it directly as they did not report each other, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 53 -54.
2473.Nermin Eminovic, 10 Mar ’05, T. 86, 88.
2474.Ex. 228. In this request, Jusuf Jasarevic also requested information as to the killings in Uzdol, see infra para. 704.
2475.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 12.
2476.Ex. 229; Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 13-14.
2477.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 16-17.
2478.Ex. 230, in which Nermin Eminovic refers to the report of 17 September, admitted into evidence as Ex. 226.
2479.Ex. 231, Weekly Report, dated 19 September 1993, p. 3; Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 68-69. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that the statement in the report, that “cooperation with the MUP/Ministry of the Interior/ has continued and so has the exchange of information with the Intelligence Administration” was probably a general remark, which would not rule out that it also referred to the specific investigations mentioned before, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 69-70.
2480.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 79, referring to the attachment of Ex. 215.
2481.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 82.
2482.Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he did not know who was the commander of “the operation”, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 66.
2483.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 80-81. Jusuf Jasarevic referred in his testimony to the authorities present in the area: “chief of staff of the Supreme Command” Sefer Halilovic, Minister of Interior, Bakir Alispahic, the commanders of the 4th and 6th Corps and their military police battalions, the President of the Jablanica War Presidency, Safet Cibo, and the Jablanica SJB. Jusuf Jasarevic concluded that “quite powerful figures” were in the area who should have been responsible for carrying out an “inspection”, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 81-83.
2484.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 12-13.
2485.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 83-84.
2486.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 84.
2487.Nermin Eminovic testified that while the units from Sarajevo were still in Herzegovina, the 6th Corps SVB sought information about the crimes. It considered the possibility of an on-site inspection but concluded that it was impossible and dangerous to conduct it. It was not able to interview the soldiers, because they were involved in combat operations and later left the 6th Corps area of operations and returned to Sarajevo, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 60. As it concerned units which were part of the 1st Corps, the SVB of the 1st Corps should then have questioned the soldiers about the events, ibid.
2488.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 79-80, referring to Ex. 233.
2489.Ex. 233.
2490.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 39. Nermin Eminovic did not recall having received the order that he was supposed to forward to Namik Dzankovic, but stated that there is no reason why he would not have done so, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 20.
2491.Ex. 277, request by Emin Zebic to the Command of the 44th Brigade, dated 29 September; Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 95-96 and 17 Mar ’05, T. 72. Emin Zebic testified that he did not contact the IKM at Jablanica, because in contacting someone in the military structure, it is customary to contact the command of the same rank, which in this case was the 44th Brigade, Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 96.
2492.Emin Zebic, 17 Mar ’05, T.  72-73. See also Ex. 238, MUP report, signed by Jozo Jozic, addressed to the Main Staff UB, dated 2 October 1993, stating that members of the military police and the Jablanica SJB were unable to conduct an on-site investigation because there were indications that they too could be killed.
2493.Ex. 235, Report from Namik Dzankovic, sent from the Forward Command Post of the Supreme Command Staff – Jablanica to Jusuf Jasarevic, personally, dated 29 September 1993; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 38.
2494.Ex. 235. The report included the names of the Bosnian Croat civilians assumed to have been killed as well as other information he had collected in cooperation with the Jablanica SJB, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 38-39. It also stated that there were no eyewitnesses in Jablanica; that the only eyewitnesses that could be found would be members of the 2nd Independent Battalion, who probably witnessed some murders; that Samir Pezo “banned movement and participation in combat operations by any of his SBosnianC Serb and Croat soldiers for fear that they would be killed by members of Celo’s ‘Assault Detachment’’’ and that it would be impossible to obtain statements from, or identify, the perpetrators, because they had returned to Sarajevo immediately after the operation at Vrdi, Ex. 235.
2495.Ex. 235.
2496.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 39. Emin Zebic testified that the Jablanica SJB never received a request to help, Emin Zebic, 16 Mar ’05, T. 94.
2497.Ahmed Salihamidzic, 18 Mar ’05, T. 30.
2498.Namik Dzankovic testified that in a matter such as the investigation of the killings in Grabovica, he was obliged by the rules to report to Jusuf Jasarevic. He asked for assistance, and his correspondence was directly with the Main Staff UB of which he was a member, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 88. As a member of the SVB, Namik Dzankovic had a dual line of responsibility. He had to obey commands of his superior officer, in that case, Sefer Halilovic; but he had also an obligation to report up the professional line to Jusuf Jasarevic, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 24-25. Namik Dzankovic testified that all three reports that he sent to Jusuf Jasarevic were sent electronically on the “paket veza system”, and he assumed that it would take 24 hours to reach the person it was addressed to, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 38-40. The “paket veza system” is similar to the e-mail system, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 39. There was a local telephone network in Jablanica, but it was incapable of ringing Sarajevo. Motorola hand-held radios were the only means that were used in the field, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 44. According to Jusuf Jasarevic, Namik Dzankovic, as a member of the Inspection Team, did not have any authority to suggest or impose any military disciplinary measures, because he had never received an order from “the commander” in this respect, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 32.
2499.Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 2, 5. Jusuf Jasarevic stated that apparently at that time he did not see any need for Namik Dzankovic, in his function as a member of the Inspection Team, to stay there any longer. However, according to Jusuf Jasarevic, this decision was also based on some other documents; otherwise he would not have asked Namik Dzankovic to return as “he was under the jurisdiction of Mr. Sefer Halilovic”, Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 5-6.
2500.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 56.
2501.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 56.
2502.Ex. 436, transcript of intercepted conversation between Jusuf Jasarevic and Sefer Halilovic, dated 13 October.
2503.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 40.
2504.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 39.
2505.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T.  48, 50.
2506.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T.  49.
2507.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T.  49-50.
2508.Witness E, 07 Mar ’05, T.  26.
2509.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 68-69.
2510.Erdin Arnautovic, 14 Feb ’05, T. 69 and 15 Feb ’05, T. 90.
2511.Enes Sakrak, 17 Feb ’05, T. 35 and 18 Feb ’05, T. 44. For several years Enes Sakrak denied having any part in what happened in Grabovica, Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 45-46. The Trial Chamber notes that Enes Sakrak was not registered as a member of the 9th Brigade at the time of the events in Grabovica, Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb 05, T. 66-67; Ex. 181, Excerpt of list of members of 9th Brigade.
2512.Enes Sakrak, 18 Feb ’05, T. 47. Izet Mustafic testified that in 1994, when he became chief of sector for investigation and documentation of war crimes, he spoke informally with Adnan Solakovic, who was willing to tell him all he knew about the events in Grabovica. When Izet Mustafic informed his superior Jusuf Jasarevic about it, he told him not to inquire any further and forget about the crimes committed in Grabovica, Izet Mustafic, Ex. 463, p. 4.
2513.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 92-93. See supra Section IV.E, para. 651.
2514.Salko Gusic, 03 Feb ’05, T. 94.
2515.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 62. Sefko Hodzic testified that “even until the end of the war we were not sure that any crimes had been committed in Uzdol, whether it was some sort of orchestrated operation that they had put dead Bosniaks there […]”, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 7-8.
2516.Ex. 155; Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 61-62. The report stated:
according to the official operative report from the site of the battles for Uzdol village in Prozor municipality, about 60 HVO/Croatian Defence Council/ members were killed. Among the dead there were civilians who had weapons in their hands, and probably due to a shortage of soldiers, they fired on R BH Army members. All other statements and fabricated facts in the above information are not true.
2517.Ex. 159, request for information from the Supreme Command Staff, Commander’s office, signed by Deputy Commander Stjepan Siber, “standing in for the commander”. According to Salko Gusic, this document (Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 86):
does not have the form of a document issued by the deputy. It is a document having the form of a document issued by the commander. So [Stjepan Siber] was actually signing for the commander at that point. He was acting on the commander's behalf.
Salko Gusic further stated that such requests were made on several occasions, Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 83 and 86.
2518.Ex. 227; Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 59.
2519.Ex. 228. The Trial Chamber notes that Jusuf Jasarevic in that same document also requested to be provided with information as to the events in Grabovica, see supra para. 690. Nermin Eminovic testified that he probably learned about the events in Uzdol when he received Jusuf Jasarevic’s request of 18 September, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 22. Nermin Eminovic testified that he did not have access to Croatian media at the time and therefore did not become aware of reports in the Croatian media about the events happened in Uzdol, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 53.
2520.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 22-23.
2521.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 23. However, Witness J testified that based on all statements a report was compiled that was sent via packet communication to the 6th Corps around five days after the events, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 47 and 60. As clarifications were requested further reports were compiled, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 60-61.
2522.Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T.  27-28. Witness J, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, testified that already in the afternoon of 14 September, he saw Erzimana Dzogic taking statements from soldiers in her office at Dobro Polje. According to Witness J, at this stage there were no allegations as to a massacre of civilians. It was only two to three days later that there were public announcements of a massacre, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 58-59, 07 Jul ’05, T. 29. There was no information as to who specifically had been murdered, how many had been murdered, where exactly it happened, or who the perpetrators were, Witness J, 07 Jul ’05, T. 68. According to Witness J, most of the statements were taken by Mustafa Bektas, Witness J, 07 Jul ’05, T. 19-20.
2523.Witness J stated that “[i]n Sarajevo, when we spoke about the main command, the main headquarters and the security, we used theses terms to refer to the overall organization of both the civilian and military authorities”, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 38.
2524.Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T.  37-38.
2525.Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T.  36.
2526.Witness J, 07 Jul ’05, T.  27-29, 58-59, 96.
2527.Witness J, 06, Jul ’05, T.  43. See also Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 71, who testified that at that time he did not have the possibility to verify the information contained in a supplementary report, dated 20 September (Ex. 236), because he was not able to go to the hamlets within the area of Uzdol which were under HVO control.
2528.Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T.  43. According to Witness J, a request to local HVO commanders for permission to go there would probably have been denied because any type of contact between ABiH and HVO was considered dangerous, ibid.
2529.Ex. 229; Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 64. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that “the security service was asking for a report from the 6th Corps security service. We have no other way. We cannot order such a report, but we were insisting, requiring, asking to have this information sent to us”, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 64.
2530.Ex. 230. The Trial Chamber notes that Nermin Eminovic in this reply also stated that he had already sent a report as to the events in Grabovica, see supra para. 691.
2531.Ex. 230; Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 17-19. The Trial Chamber concludes from Nermin Eminovic’s testimony that “Prozor” as used in the report (Ex. 230) refers to the Prozor Independent Battalion.
2532.Ex. 231, p. 3; see supra para. 660.
2533.Ex. 149. This report stated in relevant parts that:
The armed soldiers and civilians in the surrounded villages even held armed women in front of themselves and started to put up resistance. Fire was returned. The entire Uzdol, Here, Kute and Scipe sector was under heavy artillery fire.
I could not send assistance/?to /the forward/defence /line and so I ordered the forces to withdraw. This was carried out in the regular combat formation, and seven soldiers were pulled out, some slightly and some seriously wounded. Four soldiers, who were sent to pull out a dead body of a fellow-soldiers, were killed with a PM-84 heavy machine-gun, which fired from a room in Uzdol school where communications were located.
By my estimate, about 65 Croatian soldiers and about 30 civilians, mostly armed, were liquidated during the operation. One should bear in mind that the Ustasha artillery was literally destroying the entire Uzdol sector the whole time.
Nermin Eminovic testified that he did not find the report to be a “serious” one, because somebody who writes about 30 armed civilians would need to define such a term, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 81. Witness G testified that it did not seem credible that the HVO would use their own civilians as human shields, Witness G, 11 Apr ’05, T. 68. Mehmed Behlo, Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, which did not take part in the attack on Uzdol, but was fighting at “the right wing” (see Ex. 149) on another axis, testified that he was never questioned by military police or military security about the events in Uzdol or about activities or the lack of activities of his units in Uzdol, Mehmed Behlo, 28 Jun ’05, T. 49 -50.
2534.Ex. 149.
2535.According to Sefko Hodzic, Zicro Suljevic gave an interview explaining that no crime had been occurred, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 79.
2536.Ex. 149, p. 2.
2537.Ex. 281, book published by Sefer Halilovic, “Cunning Strategy”, 1997, chapter 16, p. 5. Sefko Hodzic testified that when he arrived together with Sefer Halilovic at the base of the Prozor Independent Battalion in Dobro Polje in the early afternoon of 14 September, there was mention that members of the Prozor Independent Battalion had surprised “the Ustashas” asleep in “some school”, but “the impression was that it was a […] battle which was ok, but they had to withdraw”, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 6-7, 76.
2538.Salko Gusic, 08 Feb ’05, T. 31-32.
2539.The Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion would send its reports to the Commander of the 6th Corps, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 24-25.
2540.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 26, referring to Ex. 149. According to Nermin Eminovic the handwriting at the top left of the document is of Aziz Kadic, Nermin Eminovic’s deputy, and it is likely that his deputy explained the substance of the document to him, enabling him to write a report to Jusuf Jasarevic, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 56-57.
2541.Ex. 232.
2542.Ex. 232 (emphasis in the original ).
2543.Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 57, 70.
2544.Jusuf Jasarevic, 28 Feb ’05, T. 11. According to Jusuf Jasarevic, there were two ways in which the Main Staff UB provided information: in the form of a bulletin on a daily basis, and special information if it had some particular task, ibid. Toward the end of September, Witness J spoke with Alija Izetbegovic and his Deputy Ejup Ganic, about what happened in Uzdol. Alija Izetbegovic asked a series of questions based on which Witness J concluded that he was very familiar with details, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 38-39, 45. According to Witness J, Alija Izetbegovic made a comment to his Deputy along the lines of “see how they set it up to make it look like a crime”, Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T. 45.
2545.Witness J, 06 Jul ’05, T.  56-57 and 07 Jul ’05, T. 49-50 and 55-56.
2546.Ex. 236, Supplement to Report of 20 September 1993 (Ex. 232), dated 31 October 1993. According to Nermin Eminovic, the Supplement was received by the 6th Corps Assistant Commander for Intelligence and then sent to him. Nermin Eminovic testified that it was unusual that it was sent to him and that it probably happened because he had asked to receive as much information as possible about what happened in Uzdol. He further stated that the “Supplement” was supposed to be forwarded to Jusuf Jasarevic, but that he cannot say with certainty that it was actually sent to him. Nermin Eminovic also testified that something could have been added or corrected before the text was supposed to be forwarded, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 67-69. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he did not remember ever having seen the “Supplement”, Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 14. Jusuf Jasarevic stated that there were two indicators that he never received this document: he would always when he received a document put in his own handwriting instructions to his subordinates as to what they were supposed to do with regard to the particular document, but there are none on this document; and it did not have a stamp indicating the date of receipt which was common practice, Jusuf Jasarevic, 04 Mar ’05, T. 14-15.
2547.Ex. 236, which reads in the relevant parts:
The school is at the edge of the village so they had to pass through the entire village. Most of the /Croatian/ soldiers were in private homes, so they opened fire at our men from the houses. The fire was returned as much as was possible at that proximity. From the HVO’s neighbouring positions, it could have appeared that the village had been captured or was about to fall, which is most probably the reason why fire was opened from a tank, BOFORs/ anti-aircraft guns/, MBs/ mortars/ and VBRs/ multiple rocket launchers/. Shells were falling on the entire village, both on our and on their soldiers, setting quite a few buildings on fire. One group of our soldiers came under fire from the house of Alojzije Stojanovic or possibly that of his brother. Our men returned fire. At that moment, a tank from Osljan (a neighbouring position) opened fire and hit the house. There were probably no survivors. That is one of the examples of what was happening. The entire action lasted less than two hours, but after our men had pulled out, artillery continued to pound the village for nearly two more hours, not realising that our men were no longer there. In such a lightning action, there was no time for either looting or mutilation, as the Croatian media are trying to portray it. /? There is an /example where our soldiers hid women and children in a basement in order to protect them from the shells. This was also confirmed on Radio Rama in an interview with one of the women, except that it was added in a commentary that he had done it for money. Even the exact name of the soldier was mentioned. Seven of our soldiers were killed in action, while on their side the number was much higher, but no one knows exactly how many.
2548.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 58, 79-80. Nermin Eminovic stated that “it was impossible at the time to prove what the truth was”, Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 58.
2549.Witness J, 07 Jul ’05, T.  19.
2550.Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar ’05, T. 66-67. Namik Dzankovic testified that he was not aware of what had happened in Uzdol during the month of September, while he was in Jablanica. He only learned of it when he returned to Sarajevo. He did not receive any communications or assignments in relation to Uzdol, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 43.
2551.See supra Section IV.A, para. 136.
2552.Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 03 June ’05, p. 1. Witness F, a member of the Main Staff UB, testified that immediately after the incidents of 2-3 July 1993, the Security Service took a more offensive position towards the behaviour of the 9th and the 10th Brigades by gathering more intelligence, Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 37 and 71-72. See supra para. 700. The information gathered about the activities of the 9th and the 10th Brigades was not shared with Sefer Halilovic, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 33-34.
2553.On 10 June 1993, the State Security Service (“SDB”) proposed that surveillance measures, also referred to as operative measures be taken against Sefer Halilovic, Ex. 437, SDB proposal and decision to apply surveillance measures, dated 10 June 1993. According to the SDB, Sefer Halilovic started obstructing the decisions of the RBH Presidency, particularly the implementation of decisions and ordered measures. In the presence of several people he spoke about leading RBH military, political and state figures disdainfully and disparagingly, a fact which has been documented, with the aim of creating a sense of distrust among the general public, and in particular the distrust of army members towards the RBH OS command staff, ibid. The Trial Chamber was provided with the evidence indicating that the SVB was also engaged in secret surveillance and collection of evidence about “hostile activities of Sefer Halilovic,” as well as evidence that could be used to compromise his reputation in the public and amongst his soldiers. Izet Mustafic, stated that he was tasked with surveillance and evidence collection by Sacir Arnautovic, Chief of the SVB of the 1st Corps, Izet Mustafic, Ex. 463, p. 2; Jusuf Jasarevic testified that the information about the conduct of Sefer Halilovic was collected by the State Security Services, the 1st and the 4th Corps, Jusuf Jasarevic, 03 Mar '05, T. 81. Witness F testified that the SVB never had Sefer Halilovic under any secret surveillance, Witness F, 09 Mar '05, T. 42. Izet Mustafic was sent to Mt. Igman during the military operation there with the assignment to “completely disable Sefer Halilovic from having any actual influence on military units and their commanders.” Izet Mustafic believed that he succeeded in creating a negative image for Sefer Halilovic, Izet Mustafic, Ex. 463, p. 2.
2554.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 47-48 and 02 Mar ’05, T. 26. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that among the people present at the meeting were: Mirko Pejanovic (presiding), Alija Izetbegovic, Rasim Delic, Bakir Alispahic and Jusuf Jasarevic himself, Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 47-48.
2555.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 27; Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 03 Jun ’05, p. 1.
2556.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 49.
2557.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 49.
2558.Jusuf Jasarevic, 01 Mar ’05, T. 54.
2559.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T 38 and 49; Vahid Karavelic testified that without political support the whole operation would have failed, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 54; Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 33.
2560.The name “Operation Trebevic ” was attached to the general idea of dealing with the problems of leadership of the 9th and the 10th Brigades in late September, early October. That was when more immediate preparations began to implement that operation, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 27.
2561.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 26 and 26 May ’05, T. 14; Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 58.
2562.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 8.
2563.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 8, 27 and 37. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that the crimes committed in Grabovica also determined the form of the operation, Jusuf Jasarevic 04 Mar '05, T. 38-39. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he forwarded reports with information on these crimes to his superiors. He also stated that the 1st Corps SVB was informed about these reports and then “Operation Trebevic” was organised, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar '05, T. 4. According to Vahid Karavelic, from a military point of view there was no reason to postpone the investigation of the crimes committed in Grabovica, Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 145 and 155.
2564.Bakir Alispahic, 23 May ’05, T. 29; Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 8; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 52.
2565.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 59. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that it was very important to keep it confidential, because the enemy forces could use the carrying out of the operation as an opportunity to launch an offensive, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 11; see also Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 12.
2566.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 8- 9; Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 56 and 26 May ’05, T. 15; Witness F, 09 Mar ’05, T. 51.
2567.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 8- 9. Approximately 5000 men, including the special units of the MUP, the Military Police Battalion of the Main Staff, and units from the 1st Corps, were involved in the operation to ensure superiority in strength in relation to the estimated numbers who would decide to stand by Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 53; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 49-50.
2568.Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 61. Bakir Alispahic testified that Sefer Halilovic was asked to use his authority as it concerned Musan Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic because they held him in high esteem, but Sefer Halilovic refused, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 61.
2569.Ex. 401, decision of the President of the R BiH, Alija Izetbegovic, dated 25 October 1993.
2570.Ex. 261, order of Rasim Delic, 25 October 1993.
2571.Ex. 261, para. 5.
2572.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 11; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05.
2573.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 12; Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 60; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 88. Jusuf Jasarevic and Vahid Karavelic testified that no violence was used, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 12; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 54. Ramiz Delalic however, testified that on the morning of 26 October, troops killed and wounded several members of the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic, 20 May ’05, T. 89.
2574.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 12; Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 53-54.
2575.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 13-14. The police report stated that Musan Topalovic tried to escape. The police officers who were escorting him opened fire and at daybreak the next day he was found dead in the park, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 14. Vahid Karavelic testified that Musan Topalovic was “liquidated”, Vahid Karavelic, 21 Apr ’05, T. 58.
2576.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 12 and 15.
2577.Vahid Karavelic, 22 Apr ’05, T. 144.
2578.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 15. According to Jusuf Jasarevic, several hundred statements were take, ibid.
2579.Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T.  50-52. Jusuf Jasarevic testified that throughout the operation, the Military Prosecutor was continuously updated on the ongoing activities, Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 18.
2580.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 60. Every morning, the investigators received instructions from their superiors in the Main Staff UB as to the direction of questioning. Namik Dzankovic’s tasks were assigned to him by Vahid Bogunic, Deputy of Jusuf Jasarevic, Namik Dzankovic, 22 Mar ’05, T. 64-65.
2581.Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 60; Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 66-67; Witness F, 08 Mar ’05, T. 54.
2582.Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 75; Witness D testified that the interrogators were trying to have a case against Sefer Halilovic, Witness D, 22 Feb 05, T. 68; Sefko Hodzic testified that whatever positive he said about Sefer Halilovic during the interrogation was not written down; and that his words were turned “into something horrible” by the investigator, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 93.
2583.Namik Dzankovic testified that the soldiers were also interviewed in connection with the killings in Grabovica, but Namik Dzankovic himself was not assigned to interview any soldier who had been in there at the time of the events, Namik Dzankovic, 21 Mar ’05, T. 60. Witness D testified that during almost 5 months he spent in the prison in Sarajevo, he was interrogated about crimes in Grabovica only once, 22 Feb ’05, T. 67. Erdin Arnautovic testified that, he was asked the least number of questions regarding the events in Grabovica, Erdin Arnautovic, 15 Feb ’05, T. 75 and 89. Sefko Hodzic testified that during the 16 hours of his interrogation, the inspector did not show the least interest in finding the perpetrators of the crimes committed in Grabovica, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 99.
2584.Witness D, 21 Feb ’05, T.  92; Kemo Kapur, 16 Mar ’05, T. 51; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 92-93, 95; Ramiz Delalic, 20 May ’05, T. 30-31.
2585.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 15-16.
2586.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 86. Sefer Halilovic was questioned by Zlatan Okic, an SDB officer, and Hemzo Popovic from the SVB at the SDB offices in Sarajevo on a daily basis, Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 51, 55, 57 and 60-61; Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 17. Zlatan Okic further testified that Sefer Halilovic was questioned 10-12 hours per day, which could put him under psychological pressure, Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 76. Zlatan Okic testified at length regarding the manner in which the interview was conducted, see Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 50-86. The Trial Chamber, in its oral rulings of 30 March and 1 April 2005, did not admit into evidence two statements, given by Sefer Halilovic to the SDB on 8 and 12 November 1993, which were tendered by the Prosecution.
2587.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 16; Bakir Alispahic testified that “as far as the [MUP] was concerned [Sefer Halilovic] was not in custody. Every day, or whenever agreed, he would arrive in his own vehicle with his driver at the state security premises, where the interview was conducted”, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 65.
2588.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 64; Witness D, 22 Feb ’05, T. 69; Vehbija Karic, 10 Jul ’03, T. 122-123; Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 96, 97. Sefko Hodzic testified that while Sefer Halilovic was under house arrest, he went to visit him many times. Sefer Halilovic insisted that the reason that he was under house arrest was essentially because of his political disagreement with Alija Izetbegovic, Sefko Hodzic, 24 Mar ’05, T. 98.
2589.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 64.
2590.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 51and 60-61.
2591.Zlatan Okic, 01 Apr ’05, T. 51-52.
2592.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 17. Bakir Alispahic confirmed that Sefer Halilovic was interviewed following a request of the Military Service which was approved by Alija Izetbegovic, Bakir Alispahic, 24 May ’05, T. 63.
2593.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 17.
2594.Ex 263, order, 1 November 1993; Witness F, 09 Mar ’05, T. 63. The Trial Chamber notes that Alija Izetbegovic on 26 November 1993 stated at a meeting of the Presidency (Ex 435, transcript from the meeting of the Presidency, dated 26 November 1993, p. 24):
As regards Sefer Halilovic, for the time being he is assigned to work in the Main Staff, his actual work post is still a question being considered by some people along the lines Ministry of Defence or the Main Staff, I do not know what position he might be assigned to, however, with this we wanted to demonstrate that some major mistakes have not [sic] been established, which are the kind of mistakes that make him unsuitable to stay on as main Chief of Staff/?Chief of Main Staff/, but are not such that he should be removed from the army in a way, on the contrary, generally he is deserving and we must not be the kind of people to disregard that, he has made certain mistakes, yes, slip-ups, however, we must give him credit for his contributing to the forming of the army from the very first days, we just marked its second anniversary, so that I think that a balance has been struck between the two.
2595.Jusuf Jasarevic, 02 Mar ’05, T. 17-18.
2596.Nermin Eminovic, 11 Mar ’05, T. 72-73.
2597.Mirko Pejanovic, Ex. 456, 03 Jun ’05, p. 2. Ramiz Delalic was kept in custody about seven and a half months. He was charged of insubordination to the Commander of the 1st Corps and for not executing orders. He was sentenced to three and a half years in prison for failure to execute the order of Ismet Dahic to surrender the barracks. Later on, he was pardoned by the Presidency, Ramiz Delalic, 18 May ’05, T. 29 and 20 May ’05, T.  88 and 89; Ex. 427, Judgement of the District Military Court in Sarajevo, dated 7 July 1994, convicting Ramiz Delalic for insubordination. Izet Mustafic stated that Ramiz Delalic never stood trial for any alleged offences and was “given amnesty for his criminal activities” by the SVB because of the tasks he performed for the SVB, Izet Mustafic, Ex. 463, p. 4.
2598.See supra Section IV.B(d), in particular para. 173.
2599.Defence Final Brief, para. 7.
2600.Defence Final Brief, footnote 5. The Defence further argued that the Prosecution failed to plead the existence of a sufficient nexus between the conduct of the Accused and the armed conflict and failed to plead any material fact in the Indictment relevant to establishing that nexus. The Defence submitted that it has been prejudiced “by the Prosecution failure to plead its case with any precision, which has resulted an unfairness in that the Defence has had to guess the Prosecution case on that point.” See Defence Final Brief, para. 6. The Trial Chamber notes that this issue has been decided on in the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Defence Motion for Particulars, 16 December 2003.
2601.Defence Final Brief, para. 8. The Defence further argued that the victims in Grabovica were not limited to Bosnian Croat victims, but also included Bosnian Muslim refugees and a soldier of another ABiH unit.
2602.Defence Final Brief, para. 13, referring to Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 623.
2603.Defence Final Brief, para. 13, in which the Defence submits that the crimes did not further in anyway the military operation that was underway (in Uzdol) or about to start (in Grabovica); the perpetrators did not act in an official, military, capacity, but in purely personal capacity and for un-specified reasons; that he targets of the crimes were not people who could be associated with the military enemy; that there is a lack of a “policy, plan, or general acceptance” on the part of Bosnian authorities for the commission of war crimes by their forces; and Sefer Halilovic’s ideals of maintaining a unified and multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina all are factors demonstrating the absence of any nexus.
2604.See supra Section III.A.1, para. 29
2605.See supra Section IV.D.7.
2606.See supra Section IV.D.7.
2607.See supra Section IV.D.7.
2608.See supra Section IV.E.4.
2609.Defence Final Brief, paras 127-131.
2610.See supra Section IV.E.3, paras 582-584.
2611.In support of its contention that the autopsy report does not establish the cause of death with certainty but that the victims may have died as a result of shelling, the Defence has quoted the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Simun Andelinovic, that “when I testify at court my assertions are not 100 per cent certain. You always have to be – leave some room for circumstances in life or medicine” (12 May ’05, T. 50)”. The Trial Chamber notes that this statement was given in response to a question by the Defence whether Dr. Andelinovic could be certain that the amputation of the right ear of Martin Ratkic was carried out while he was still alive, and not to a general question whether the victims were killed by shelling. The Trial Chamber also notes that the Defence did not put any questions to Dr. Andelinovic in this respect. Moreover, the Trial Chamber finds that Dr. Andelinovic’s descriptions, on the one hand, of the characteristics of explosive wounds, such as those resulting from shrapnel (13 May ’05, T. 3), and, on the other hand, of the characteristics of gunshot wounds (12 May ’05, T. 19 -20, T. 67-68) were very clear. When kept in mind when reading the autopsy report, there is no doubt that the autopsy report only describes gunshot and cutting wounds.
2612.See supra Section IV.E.3.
2613.Ibid.
2614.Ivan Zelenika, Kata Ratkic, Mijo Rajic, Ivka Rajic (1921), Mato Ljubic and Kata Ljubic.
2615.Ivan Zelenika, Dragica Zelenika, and Domin Rajic.
2616.Ruza Zelenika and Ivka Rajic (1921).
2617.Martin Ratkic.
2618.Domin Rajic, Ivka Rajic (1934 ) and Zorka Glibo.
2619.Ruza Zelenika.
2620.Serafina Stojanovic.
2621.Franjo Stojanovic.
2622.Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Jadranka Zelenika.
2623.Indictment, para 38.
2624.Prosecution Final Brief, para. 186 (footnotes omitted).
2625.See supra Section IV.A, paras 105-111.
2626.See supra Section IV.C, para. 175.
2627.See supra para. 189.
2628.See supra para. 179.
2629.See supra para. 191.
2630.See supra para. 192.
2631.See supra para. 320.
2632.See supra para. 210.
2633.See supra para. 221.
2634.See supra para. 244.
2635.See supra para. 350.
2636.See supra Section IV.G, paras 728-729.
2637.See supra paras 231 -233.
2638.See supra paras 231 and 252-254.
2639.See supra para. 233.
2640.See supra para. 232.
2641.See supra para. 235.
2642.See supra fn 788.
2643.See supra para. 253.
2644.See supra para. 276.
2645.See supra para. 302.
2646.See supra para. 351.
2647.See supra para. 327.
2648.See supra para. 670.
2649.See supra Sections IV.E.4 and IV.G.2(b).
2650.See supra para. 348.
2651.See supra Section IV.F.3.
2652.See supra para. 366.
2653.See supra Section III.B.3.
2654.Indictment, Case No. IT-01 -48, 10 September 2001. The Indictment was originally filed on 30 July 2001, modified and supplemented by the Prosecution on 10 September 2001 and confirmed by Judge Patricia Wald on 12 September 2001. The Indictment was ordered to be kept under seal until “the arrest warrant was served on the accused or unless further ordered ”. See Order on Review of Indictment Pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute and Order for Non-Disclosure, 12 September 2001.
2655.Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 65 Ter (K) Requesting the Pre-Trial Judge to Grant Relief From Waiver and to Grant Relief Pursuant to Rule 72, 13 March 2003. The Defence argued that the amended indictment should specify in relation to each alleged murder the name, surname and father’s name of the victim, the place and date of the alleged murder, the cause of death, and the identity of the alleged perpetrator. The Defence further argued that the previous counsel for the Accused did not file any preliminary motion as he claimed to have had an agreement with the Prosecution that the indictment would be withdrawn.
2656.Decision on Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 65 Ter (K) Requesting the Pre-Trial Judge to Grant Relief From Waiver and to Grant Relief Pursuant to Rule 72, 1 April 2003. The Trial Chamber further noted that none of the previous defence counsel who represented the Accused raised the issues at hand and that change of counsel is not a reason for making the order sought.
2657.The particulars sought by the Defence fall into five categories: general context; elements of the crime charged ; alleged role and position of the Accused; alleged perpetrators; and victims. See Decision on Defence Motion for Particulars, 16 December 2003.
2658.The Defence Motion and the letter of 31 October 2003 are referred to in Decision on Defence Motion for Particulars, 16 December 2003.
2659.Decision on Defence Motion for Particulars, 16 December 2003.
2660.Motion for Certification, 23 December 2003.
2661.Decision on Motion for Certification, 28 January 2004.
2662.Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment, 29 September 2004. See also Response to Prosecution Motion to Amend the Indictment, 18 October 2004.
2663.Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment, 17 December 2004.
2664.Prosecution Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of “Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment”, 22 December 2004.
2665.Decision on Prosecution Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of “Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment”, 12 January 2005.
2666.Order of the President Assigning a Case to a Trial Chamber, 1 October 2001. Trial Chamber III was composed of: Judge Richard May presiding, Judge Patrick Robinson, Judge Mohamed Fassi Fihri. Judge Fassi Fihri was assigned as Pre-Trial Judge. Order Designating a Pre-Trial Judge, 3 October 2001. Due to the expiration of Judge Fassi Fihri’s term of office on 16 November 2001, Judge O-Gon Kwon was assigned as Pre-Trial Judge. See Order of the President on the Composition of a Trial Chamber for a Case, 6 December 2001, and Order Designating a Pre-Trial Judge, 10 December 2001. On 26 February 2004, Judge Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart replaced Judge Richard May. Order Assigning a Judge to a Case before a Trial Chamber, 26 February 2004. On 1 August 2004, Judge Iain Bonomy replaced Judge Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart. Order Assigning a Judge to a Case before a Trial Chamber, 23 July 2004.
2667.Initial Appearance, 27 September 2001.
2668.Order for Detention on Remand, 27 September 2001.
2669.Initial Appearance, 27 September 2001.
2670.Decision of the Registrar, 1 October 2001. The counsel was assigned for a period of 120 days, pending the process of verification of Sefer Halilovic’s declaration of means by the Registry.
2671.Decision of the Registrar, 12 February 2002. The Registrar assigned Dijana Kreho as a co-counsel. See Status conference, 12 April 2002, T. 19.
2672.Cancellation of Power of Attorney, 6 June 2002. Further reasons for that cancellation were submitted in the correspondence dated 11 June 2002, from the Accused and Mr. Balijagic. See also the letter from the Accused to the Registry, dated 14 June 2002, where the Accused stated that Mr. Balijagic did not represent him as much as required as he was representing at the same time a large number of clients in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The letter is referred to in Decision of the Registrar, 19 June 2002.
2673.This request is referred to in Decision of the Registrar, 19 June 2002.
2674.Decision of the Registrar, 19 June 2002. The Registrar considered that Senad Kreho held the position of Chairman of the Military Court in Sarajevo from September 1992 and September 1993 and due to this he had been involved in a case that appeared to be linked to the facts for which the Accused was charged in the indictment. The Registrar also considered that Senad Kreho was also a potential prosecution witness and that his involvement in the above-mentioned case could have been used as evidence by both the Prosecution and the Defence.
2675.This application was referred to in Decision on Sefer Halilovic’s Application to Review the Registrar’s Decision of 19 June 2002, 1 August 2002. In a letter dated 11 July 2002, the Accused argued that he wanted to have a counsel who spoke the Bosnian language. See letter from Sefer Halilovic to Richard Soyer, filed on 25 July 2002.
2676.Decision on Sefer Halilovic’s Application to Review the Registrar’s Decision of 19 June 2002, 1 August 2002, referring in particular to Art. 13 (B) of the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, adopted by the Tribunal on 28 July 1994 (“Directive”).
2677.Decision of the Registrar, 25 September 2002.
2678.Request of the Counsel of the Accused to the Registrar for Withdrawal of Counsel pursuant to Article 19 (A0 (i) of the Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel (Directive No. 1/94), 9 September 2002.
2679.Request of Withdrawal from this Case Pursuant to Article 19(A)(1) of Directive no. 1/94, 30 December 2002.
2680.This request is referred to in Decision of the Registrar, 18 February 2003. On 21 January 2003, Bakir Caglar agreed to represent the Accused for a period of 30 days in case his assignment as counsel was withdrawn by the Registrar. See Decision of the Registrar, 20 February 2003. During the Status Conference on 10 February 2003 Sefer Halilovic maintained that he would seek a change of lead counsel. See Status Conference, 10 February 2003, T. 91-92. In a letter dated 12 February 2003, and filed on 18 February 2003, the Accused asked for the appointment of Ahmet Hodzic.
2681.Decision of the Registrar, 20 February 2003.
2682.This motion is referred to in Decision on Withdrawal of the Defence Counsel Appointment, 28 July 2003.
2683.Pre-trial conference, 15 July 2003. T. 142. See also Decision on Withdrawal of the Defence Counsel Appointment, 28 July 2003.
2684.Decision of the Registrar, 10 September 2003. The decision followed a request of Ahmet Hodzic in this respect, dated 21 August 2003.
2685.Request for Withdrawal from the Case, 6 October 2003, referred to in Decision of the Deputy Registrar, 3 November 2003.
2686.Notice of Acceptance of Resignation and Withdrawal of Lead Counsel, 7 October 2003, referred to in Decision of the Deputy Registrar, 3 November 2003.
2687.Decision of the Deputy Registrar, 3 November 2003.
2688.On 22 March 2004, the Registrar refused to grant the request of the Accused on the basis that Stefan Kirsch and Guenaël Mettraux were fully capable of representing the Accused in a satisfactory manner. However, since no reconciliation was reached between Stefan Kirsch and Sefer Halilovic, on 25 March 2004, the Registrar appointed independent counsel, Karim Khan, to assist the Accused in filing an application for review of the Registry decision. In his application for review dated 23 April 2004, the Accused submitted that the Registrar’s decision to reject the withdrawal of Mr Kirsch was erroneous. On 24 May 2004, the Registry filed a response in which it presented additional arguments in support of its decision not to withdraw Mr Kirsch, including the assignment of successive lead counsel in the case. On 21 June 2004, the President quashed the decision of the Registry and directed it to reconsider the request of the Accused de novo. See Decision of the Registrar, 10 August 2004.
2689.See Decision of the Registrar, 10 August 2004.
2690.Decision of the Registrar, 10 August 2004.
2691.Request for Provisional Pre -Trial Release, 28 November 2001.
2692.Prosecution’s Response to “Request for Provisional Pre-Trial Release”, 6 December 2001. The Netherlands, as host country, did not object to the request of the Accused. See Letter from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 December 2001.
2693.Decision on Request for Pre -Trial Provisional Release, 13 December 2001.
2694.Scheduling Order, 24 January 2003,
2695.Scheduling Order, 27 June 2003.
2696.Scheduling Order, 24 January 2003, Scheduling Order, 27 June 2003.
2697.Order Regarding the Start Date of the Trial, 17 October 2003.
2698.Status conference, 15 December 2003.
2699.Order on Defence Motion for Scheduling of Date for Trial, 9 December 2004.
2700.Order on Defence Motion for Variation of Court Order, 14 January 2005.
2701.Status Conference, 8 January 2002, T. 8-9.
2702.Urgent Motion for Immediate Disclosure, 16 December 2004.
2703.Oral Ruling, Trial Hearing, 31 January 2005, T. 53.
2704.Pre-Trial Conference, 15 July 2003, T. 142.
2705.Status conference, 15 December 2003, T. 165.
2706.Defence Objection to Prosecution Continued Disclosure, 12 March 2004.
2707.Defence Objection to Prosecution Continued Disclosure, 12 March 2004.
2708.Decision on Defence Objection to Prosecution Continued Disclosure, 7 May 2004.
2709.Motion for Striking out of Paragraphs in Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, 20 January 2005. During the Pre-Trial Conference on 24 and 27 January 2005, the Defence clarified its position, by stating that the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief may indeed provide some further particulars as to the facts which are being pleaded in the Indictment, but that in the present case the Prosecution is in fact attempting to broaden its case, going “beyond the Indictment through the Pre-Trial Brief”; that the evidence which will be led by the Prosecution, might go to facts which are not properly or not sufficiently pleaded in the Indictment; and that, therefore, the aim of the Motion is to avoid the Defence facing a suggestion that it had adequate notice of those facts at the end of the Prosecution case, Pre-Trial Conference, 27 January 2005, T. 293-294.
2710.Decision on Defence Motion for Striking Out of Paragraphs in Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, 7 February 2005; see also Pre-Trial Conference, 27 January 2005, T. 294. The Trial Chamber notes that on a number of occasions during the proceedings, including in its Final Brief, the Defence raised its concerns about the change in the scope of the Prosecution case.
2711.Trial Hearing, 31 January 2005, T. 1-2; Trial Hearing, 2 June 2005, T. 72-73.
2712.Concerning the witnesses heard pursuant to Rule 89(F) of the Rules, the following procedure was adopted. The Prosecution read in court a summary of the witness statement, which was later admitted into evidence. The witness was present in court and confirmed that the statement accurately reflected what he or she had said at the time the statement was taken. The witness was available for examination on the most significant points of his or her statement, for cross-examination and questioning by the judges. The procedure pursuant to Rule 89(F) was used only in relation to evidence in written form which did not concern significant acts or conduct of the Accused, did not relate to issues pivotal to the Prosecution case, and did not concern persons or events significantly proximate to the Accused.
2713.Decision On Prosecution’s Motion For The Temporary Transfer Of Detained Witness Enes Sakrak, 10 February 2005.
2714.Trial Hearing, 2 June 2005, T. 53-54.
2715.Trial Hearing, 27 June 2005, T. 1; Trial Hearing, 14 July 2005, T. 19.
2716.Decision On Motion For Admission Of Written Statement Of Deceased Witness Pursuant To Rule 92 bis (C), 25  July 2005, filed confidentially.
2717.One of the main advantages of the use of the E-court system is that it allows simultaneous display in-court of documents in several languages, and therefore it allows the Accused and the witness, as well as the parties to view the documents in a language they understand.
2718.See also Decision on Motion for Prosecution Access to Defence Documents Used in Cross-Examination of Prosecution Witnesses, 9 May 2005, in particular paras 14-19.
2719.President’s Order Reassigning a Case to a Trial Chamber, 17 January 2005.
2720.President’s Order Assigning Judges to a Case before the Trial Chamber, 25 January 2005.
2721.Status Conference, 30 May 2005, T. 2.
2722.President’s Order Replacing a Judge in a Case before a Trial Chamber, 31 May 2005.
2723.Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Order of Non-Disclosure, 22 January 2004.
2724.Oral Ruling, Trial Hearing, 07 Mar '05, T. 101-102.
2725.Oral Ruling, Trial Hearing, 7 March 2005, T. 101.
2726.Motion for Judicial Notice, 1 March 2005.
2727.See Motion Re Agreed Facts and Motion for Withdrawal of “Motion for Judicial Notice”, 22 April 2005.
2728.Motion Re Agreed Facts and Motion for Withdrawal of “Motion for Judicial Notice”, 22 April 2005.
2729.Oral Ruling, Trial Hearing, 12 May 2005, T. 10-11.
2730.Motion Concerning Further Agreed Facts, 14 July 2005, see Annex A and B.
2731.Trial Hearing, 14 July 2005, T. 4.
2732.Decision on Motion Concerning Further Agreed Facts, 25 July 2005.
2733.Status conference, 28 April 2005, T. 26.
2734.Response to Prosecution Motion to Tender Record of Interview Obtained in Violation of Statute and Rules, 9 May 2005.
2735.Decision on Admission into Evidence of Interview of the Accused, 20 June 2005.
2736.See Motion for Certification Concerning Admission of Record of Interview of the Accused, 22 June 2005; and Decision on Motion for Certification, 30 June 2005.
2737.Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Admission of Record of Interview of the Accused from the Bar Table, 19 August 2005.
2738.Status Conference, 28 April 2005, T. 26.
2739.Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Statement of Accused, 8 July 2005.
2740.Prosecution Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of “Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Statement of Accused ”, 13 July 2005.
2741.Decision on Prosecution Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of “Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Statement of Accused”, 25 July 2005.
2742. Prosecution Motion to Call Rebuttal Evidence, 14 July 2005.
2743.Decision on Prosecution Motion to Call Rebuttal Evidence, 21 July 2005.
2744.Trial Hearing, 12 April 05, T. 61.
2745.Decision on Motion for Provisional Release, 21 April 2005.
2746.Renewed Motion for Provisional Release, 6 July 2005 (“Renewed Motion for Provisional Release”).
2747.See Annex to the Renewed Motion for Provisional Release.
2748.Prosecution’s Response to Defence Renewed Motion for Provisional Release, 15 July 2005.
2749.Decision on Renewed Motion for Provisional Release, 22 July 2005.
2750.Motion for Provisional Release, 22 August 2005. On 29 August 2005, the Defence submitted the guarantees from the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Addendum Re Motion for Provisional Release, 29 August 2005.
2751.Decision on Motion for Provisional Release, 1 September 2005. The provisional release of the Accused was granted under the same conditions as the previous decision of the Trial Chamber in that matter.
2752.Order Modifying Decision on Provisional Release, 31 October 2005.